GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Ranking Minority Member, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives

October 1999 DOD PERSONNEL

Inadequate Personnel 

Security Investigations 

Pose National Security 

Risks

GAO/NSIAD-00-12

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Recent Broad-Based Studies of the Personnel 

Security Investigation Process 38

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 42

Appendix III: Defense Security Service Resources and 

Workload 46

Appendix IV: Deficient Investigations in Our Sample 48

Appendix V: Investigators’ Recall of Recent Training Received 

on Federal Investigative Standards 49

Appendix VI: Comments From the Department of Defense 53

Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 62

Tables Table 1: Comparison of DSS Investigations Sent for Adjudication

Before and After CCMS Implementation 29

Table 2: Status of Joint Security Commission Recommendations 39

Table 3: Status of Joint Security Commission II Recommendations 40

Table 4: Status of Secrecy Commission Recommendations 41

Table 5: Number of DSS Investigations Sent to Four DOD

Adjudication Facilities and Sampled by GAO 42

Table 6: Precision Rates for Investigations Sampled at Four DOD 

Adjudication Facilities 43

Table 7: Personnel Security Investigation Budget 46

Table 8: Personnel Security Investigation Staff 46

Table 9: Personnel Security Investigation Workload 47

Table 10: Number of Deficient DSS Investigations at Four DOD 

Adjudication Facilities 48

Table 11: Investigators’ Responses to Survey Questions on Recent

Training Received on Federal Standards 49
Contents

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Figures Figure 1: Personnel Security Investigation and Adjudication

Process 8

Figure 2: Percent of Personnel Security Investigations With

Deficiencies 13

Figure 3: Percent of Deficient Investigations in Nine Required

Investigative Areas 14

Figure 4: Calendar Days Needed to Complete Investigations 17

Figure 5: Percent of Investigators Without Recent Training on

Investigative Requirements 26

Figure 6: Investigators Views on Workload 28

Abbreviations

CCMS Case Control Management System

DOD Department of Defense

DSS Defense Security Service

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act

NSA National Security Agency

OCB Operations Center Baltimore
Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-283901 Letr

October 27, 1999

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Skelton:

The federal government uses personnel security investigations to 

determine whether an individual should be granted access to classified 

information. Because these investigations are a critical first step in 

safeguarding national security information, the federal government has 

established standards to ensure that various aspects of an individual’s 

background are consistently investigated and considered when a federal 

agency decides if a clearance should be granted. Although such 

investigations do not guarantee that individuals will not later engage in 

espionage activities, they remain a critical step in identifying those who can 

be trusted to access and safeguard classified information.1

 The Department 

of Defense’s (DOD) Defense Security Service, with oversight by the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and 

Intelligence), conducts the investigations for DOD and forwards the results 

to one of eight DOD adjudication facilities, which decide whether to grant 

or deny the clearance. These decisions are referred to as adjudications.

At the end of fiscal year 1998, about 2.4 million DOD active duty military, 

civilian, and contractor employees held personnel security clearances: 

96,000 employees held confidential clearances, 1.8 million held secret 

clearances, and 524,000 held top secret clearances. From 1982 through 

September 1999, 80 federal employee and contractor personnel, 68 of 

whom were employed by DOD, were convicted of committing espionage 

against the United States. These individuals had undergone personnel 

security investigations and held security clearances; 19 held clearances 

that allowed access to top secret information. Top secret, secret, and 

1

Personnel security investigations are the cornerstone of, but only a part of, DOD’s 

personnel security program to prevent and detect espionage. Other mechanisms include 

employee education and counseling programs, continuing evaluations of employee 

workplace behavior, and counterintelligence operations.
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confidential clearances require reinvestigations every 5, 10, and 15 years, 

respectively.

In view of the importance of these investigations to national security, you 

asked us to review DOD’s personnel security investigative functions. 

Specifically, we assessed (1) the completeness and timeliness of DOD 

personnel security investigations; (2) what factors, if any, might be 

hindering the completeness and timeliness of the investigations; and 

(3) what actions DOD has taken to address any program weaknesses. As 

you requested, we are also providing information on recent broad-based 

studies that examined federal personnel security investigations and the 

status of actions taken on these studies’ recommendations to improve the 

process. This information is presented in appendix I.

To address these objectives, we reviewed the extent to which a sample of 

530 randomly selected personnel security investigations conducted by the 

Defense Security Service included the information required by the federal 

standards. These investigations included 226 (43 percent) investigations 

conducted for the purposes of determining whether to grant or deny an 

initial top secret clearance and 304 (57 percent) reinvestigations conducted 

to determine whether to continue or revoke a top secret clearance already 

held. We randomly selected the investigations from four of the eight DOD 

adjudication facilities: the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, and the National 

Security Agency. Our findings can only be generalized to the investigations 

done during the January and February 1999 period at the four adjudication 

facilities. However, these facilities accounted for 73 percent of the 

investigative work done by the Defense Security Service in fiscal year 1998; 

therefore, these findings suggest systemic program weaknesses. In 

addition, we surveyed all Defense Security Service investigators and case 

analysts about their workload, training, the manner in which they conduct 

investigations, and the adequacy of the investigative policy guidance they 

received. A detailed discussion of the scope and methodology for 

conducting our work is presented in appendix II.

Results in Brief DOD personnel security investigations are incomplete and not conducted 

in a timely manner. As a result, they pose a risk to national security by 

making DOD vulnerable to espionage. In the 530 cases we reviewed, DOD 

granted clearances notwithstanding that

• 92 percent of the 530 investigations were deficient in that they did not 

contain the information in at least 1 of the 9 investigative areas required 
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by the federal standards for granting clearances, which include 

confirming the subject’s residency, birth and citizenship, and 

employment records; checking records for prior criminal history, 

divorces, and financial problems; and interviewing character references;

• 77 percent of the investigations were deficient in meeting federal 

standards in two or more areas; and

• 16 percent of the investigations identified issues that the Defense 

Security Service did not pursue pertaining to individuals’ prior criminal 

history, alcohol and drug use, financial difficulties, and other problems 

that could be cause to deny a security clearance.

Defense Security Service clearance investigations are also not timely. Half 

of the 530 investigations we reviewed took 204 or more days to complete 

even though DOD components and contractors requesting the 

investigations want them completed in 90 days. Less than 1 percent of the 

530 investigations met this 90-day time frame. This lack of timeliness 

causes defense contractors to incur costs because their personnel cannot 

begin work on DOD contracts without a security clearance. Also, about 

600,000 individuals holding clearances are overdue for reinvestigations. 

Delays in initiating reinvestigations create risks because DOD may be 

unaware of changes in employees’ personal circumstances or behaviors 

that make them a greater security risk.

Completeness and timeliness problems in DOD’s personnel security 

program have resulted largely from a series of Defense Security Service 

management actions that weakened quality assurance and led to delays in 

processing cases. Specifically, the Defense Security Service 

• adopted relaxed investigative policy guidance causing confusion about 

investigative requirements and raising concerns about the sufficiency of 

information available for clearance decisions and the impact on 

uniformity in all personnel security investigations;

• eliminated quality control mechanisms such as quality assurance and 

supervisory review of completed investigations;

• ineffectively managed implementation of a new automated investigative 

case processing system that caused delays in processing cases; and

• did not adequately train its staff on the new federal investigative 

standards, causing much confusion among Defense Security Service 

staff about conducting investigations in compliance with the federal 

standards.
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These problems arose and persisted, in part, because the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and 

Intelligence) did not provide proper oversight of the program.

DOD is taking steps to address these problems; however, it will take a 

significant amount of time and money to identify and implement all of the 

actions and additional steps needed. DOD recently appointed a new acting 

Defense Security Service Director who has (1) negotiated with the Office of 

Personnel Management and private contractors to assist in eliminating the 

large backlog of clearance reinvestigations; (2) directed a review of all 

investigative policies; (3) begun reinstating quality control mechanisms, 

such as quality assurance reviews, and established a new training 

organization; and (4) appointed a team to assess automation problems. 

DOD has not developed a strategic plan for the program that includes 

measurable program goals and performance measures. Such a plan is 

needed to institute sound management practices and to assess progress in 

overcoming identified problems. DOD has recognized the need for a 

strategic plan for the personnel security investigation program, but the plan 

is only in the early stages of development. Moreover, despite the serious 

and widespread nature of the completeness and timeliness problems 

affecting the personnel security investigation program, DOD has not 

planned to report these problems as material weaknesses under the 

Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982.2

 This act mandates that 

federal agencies conduct ongoing evaluations of their internal control 

systems to protect federal programs against fraud, waste, abuse, and 

mismanagement. Reporting the Defense Security Service’s material 

weaknesses under the act would focus needed attention on a formal 

corrective action plan with specific milestones and actions to address their 

underlying causes.

This report makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to 

improve oversight and identify the personnel security program as 

containing material internal control weaknesses in DOD’s next report to 

the President and the Congress in accordance with the Federal Managers’ 

Financial Integrity Act. We are also recommending that the Secretary 

require that the Defense Security Service Director develop a strategic plan 

and performance measures to improve the quality of the investigative work 

and correct other identified weaknesses.

2

See 31 U.S.C. 3512.
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Background Espionage against the United States is any overt, covert, or clandestine 

activity designed to obtain information relating to national defense with the 

intent to injure the United States or to provide an advantage to a foreign 

nation. Acts of espionage have had serious consequences for the United 

States: intelligence personnel have been killed, critical information has 

been compromised, and U.S. military forces have been put at risk. Although 

the number of acts of espionage appears small in comparison to the 

number of security clearances in effect, according to DOD 

counterintelligence officials, hundreds of other potential instances have 

been detected but have not resulted in convictions because (1) individuals 

defected or committed suicide or (2) the cases were settled in other ways.

To commit espionage, a person must have access to national security 

information, contacts with foreign personnel seeking it, and a willingness 

to compromise the information. The primary motive for the 80 individuals 

convicted of espionage was greed—the chance for financial gain—but 

ideology was often another important factor. These two issues are among 

the areas that are to be addressed in personnel security investigations and 

considered in decisions to grant clearances.

Personnel Security 

Investigations in DOD

The personnel security investigation is a critical step toward ensuring that 

individuals can be trusted to protect classified information. In granting a 

security clearance, DOD determines that the person’s loyalty to the United 

States, character, trustworthiness, honesty, reliability, discretion, and 

judgment are such that the person can be expected to comply with 

government policy and procedures for safeguarding classified information.

The process of obtaining a security clearance, as shown in figure 1, begins 

with a request from a military commander, contractor, or other DOD 

official for a security clearance for an individual because of the sensitive 

nature of his or her duties. The individual then completes a security 

questionnaire that asks for the personal details needed to conduct the 

investigation, which is forwarded to the Defense Security Service’s (DSS) 

Operations Center Baltimore, in Linthicum, Maryland. The Center’s case 

analysts review clearance requests to ensure that all necessary forms are 

complete, develop a scope for the investigation, and assign the required 

work to the 12 DSS field-operating locations throughout the United States. 

An investigation may be sent to one or more operating locations depending 

on where the individual seeking the clearance (referred to as the subject) 

has lived, worked, or attended school. Once received in the field, an 
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investigation is assigned to an investigator who seeks information in that 

geographic location about the subject’s loyalty, character, reliability, 

trustworthiness, honesty, and financial responsibility. The investigation 

must be expanded to clarify and resolve any information that raises 

questions about the subject’s suitability to hold a position of trust. As 

investigative elements are completed, the field sends reports to the DSS 

Operations Center, where case analysts determine if all investigative 

criteria have been met and all issues relevant for a clearance decision have 

been resolved. The case analysts also request information from other 

federal agencies, such as the Office of Personnel Management, Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service. DSS sends the completed 

investigation to the appropriate adjudication facility, which decides 

whether to grant or deny a clearance. Every 5 to 15 years, personnel are 

supposed to undergo a reinvestigation, depending on the type of clearance.

Figure 1: Personnel Security Investigation and Adjudication Process

Source: Defense Security Service.

DSS Resources and 

Workload

Over the past 7 years, financial and personnel resources at DSS and 

investigative workloads have fluctuated, but have declined overall. In fiscal 

year 1998, DSS had a budget of $190 million and spent approximately

75 percent of its budget on personnel security investigations. The agency 

had approximately 2,500 employees, half of whom worked on personnel 

security investigations. The remainder of DSS’s budget and staff are used 

for DSS’s industrial security program and other areas related to its 

responsibilities, such as administrative support. DSS received about 

126,000 investigation requests and completed 142,000 investigations in 
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fiscal year 1998, some of which were submitted in prior years. These 

workload figures do not include about 600,000 reinvestigations for 

confidential, secret, and top secret clearances that are overdue but have 

not been submitted for reinvestigation. On average, a top secret 

investigation or reinvestigation costs about $1,600 to $2,600. DSS’s budget, 

staffing, and investigative workload for fiscal years 1991 through 1998 is 

presented in appendix III.

Federal Standards for 

Personnel Security 

Investigations and 

Adjudication

In 1994, the President established the Security Policy Board as a new 

interagency body to develop directives for U.S. security policies, 

procedures, and practices; in addition, the National Security Act was 

amended to require the President to establish uniform executive branch 

procedures to govern access to classified information.3

 In August 1995, 

under Executive Order 12968, the President directed the Board to develop 

a common set of investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines for 

determining eligibility for access to classified information. In March 1997, 

the President approved federal standards developed by the Board. These 

standards apply to all U.S. civilian and military personnel, consultants, 

contractors, and other individuals who require access to classified 

information. The objectives of the standards are to (1) investigate and 

assess various aspects of an individual’s trustworthiness and reliability, 

taking into account both positive and negative issues (a practice known as 

the whole person concept), and (2) standardize federal processes to 

achieve reciprocity and avoid unnecessary and costly reinvestigations 

when an individual switches agencies.

3

The Board, created by Presidential Decision Directive 29, consists of senior representatives 

from the following 10 federal agencies, departments, and other organizations: the Central 

Intelligence Agency; the National Security Council; the Office of Management and Budget; 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Energy, Justice, and State; 

and a non-defense agency rotated on an annual basis (now served by the Department of 

Transportation). 
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The purpose of initial investigations for top secret clearances is to provide 

information in the following nine areas:4

• corroboration of subject’s proof of date and place of birth; verification 

of citizenship for foreign-born subjects and their foreign-born 

immediate family members;

• corroboration of education;

• verification of employment for the past 7 years (including all prior 

federal and military service and type of discharge) and interviews with 

supervisors and co-workers;

• interviews with character references with social knowledge of the 

subject and any former spouse divorced within the last 10 years;

• interviews with neighbors to confirm all residences for last 3 years;

• a national agency check for the subject and spouse or cohabitant 

(searches of investigative files and other records held by federal 

agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central 

Intelligence Agency);

• a financial review, including a credit bureau check;

• a local agency check of criminal history records and other public 

records to verify any civil or criminal court actions involving the subject; 

and

• a personal interview of the subject.

The standards call for investigations to be expanded to resolve issues that 

arise, such as potential criminal history, alcohol or drug usage, and 

financial matters, including unexplained affluence or a history of not 

meeting financial obligations.

The standards for reinvestigations are essentially the same as those for 

initial investigations, with two exceptions. Reinvestigations do not require 

corroboration of proof of birth and citizenship for subjects and their family 

members or the subjects’ education. According to officials of the Security 

Policy Board and in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), the basis for not 

requiring this information in reinvestigations is that it is to be obtained in 

the initial investigation. However, the officials stated that if there were 

significant changes since the last investigation, such as a new spouse or 

4

Secret and confidential clearances require proof of the subject’s date and place of birth, 

national and local agency checks, and a financial review.
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claim of significant education attained, such as a college degree, 

reinvestigations are to include this information.

In deciding if a clearance should be granted or denied, the federal 

adjudicative guidelines require adjudication facility staffs, using the results 

of the investigation, to base their decision on the following factors:

• allegiance to the United States;

• foreign influence;

• sexual behavior;

• personal conduct;

• financial considerations;

• alcohol consumption;

• drug involvement;

• emotional, mental, and personality disorders;

• criminal conduct;

• security violations; 

• outside activities; and

• misuse of information technology systems.

Investigations Have 

Been Incomplete and 

Untimely

The DOD personnel security investigation program has resulted in 

investigations that 

• did not obtain the information required by the federal standards, such as 

residency, corroboration of birth or citizenship for foreign-born subjects 

or their immediate family members, verification of employment, 

interviews of character references, and local records checks for any 

prior criminal history, divorces, or financial problems;

• did not address issues that the investigations revealed could disqualify 

individuals from holding security clearances, such as prior criminal 

history, financial problems, and alcohol and drug use; and

• were not completed in a timely manner to meet the needs of DOD 

components and contractors.

These weaknesses pose risks to national security in that individuals have 

been granted access to classified information without undergoing a 

personnel security investigation that complies fully with federal standards. 

In addition, the delays in completing the investigations have hindered some 

contractors’ ability to meet their cost and performance schedules on DOD 

contracts, according to contractor officials. Further, the large number of 

overdue reinvestigations has allowed hundreds of thousands of individuals 
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to continue to access classified information without having a current 

reinvestigation as required. In 1999, the Joint Security Commission II 

reported that delaying reinvestigations poses risks to national security 

because the longer individuals hold clearances, the more likely they are to 

be working with more critical information and systems.5

 Also, the longer a 

reinvestigation is delayed, the greater the risk that changes in an 

individual’s behavior will go undetected.

DSS Investigations Have 

Been Incomplete

In our review of 530 randomly sampled top secret security clearance 

investigations and reinvestigations completed by DSS in January and 

February 1999 for the 4 DOD adjudication facilities that received most of 

DSS’s investigations, we found that 92 percent (489) did not fully meet 

federal investigative standards because they were incomplete. The 

incompleteness rates for each adjudication facility were 95 percent for the 

Air Force facility, 94 percent for the National Security Agency facility,

91 percent for the Navy facility, and 88 percent for the Army facility. (These 

rates are projectable to the respective populations with a precision rate of 

± 3 to 5 percentage points. See app. II, table 6). Overall,

• 92 percent of all 530 investigations90 percent of the 226 initial 

investigations and 94 percent of the 304 reinvestigationswere 

deficient; that is, they did not contain the information in at least 1 of the 

9 investigative areas provided in the federal standards for granting 

clearances;

• 77 percent of the investigations were deficient in meeting the federal 

standards in two or more areas; and 

• initial investigations had an average of 3.1 investigative deficiencies per 

investigation and reinvestigations averaged 2.7 deficiencies.

Figure 2 shows the percent of deficiencies among all four DOD 

adjudication facilities included in our sample. Appendix IV includes more 

information regarding these deficiencies.

5

The Joint Security Commission was convened twice to review U.S. security policies and 

procedures. It issued reports on its work in 1994 and 1999. See appendix I for more detailed 

information on the Joint Security Commission’s work. 
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Figure 2: Percent of Personnel Security Investigations with Deficiencies

Note: An investigation could be deficient in up to nine areas. In our review, the maximum number of 

deficiencies was eight.

Source: GAO sample of 530 DSS investigations.

As shown in figure 3, we found problems primarily in six of nine areas 

required to be investigated for a security clearance by the federal 

standards.6

 Frequently, DSS did not obtain one or more of the following 

types of information: confirmation of residency; corroboration of birth or 

citizenship for a foreign-born subject, spouse, or family member; 

verification of employment; interviews of character references; check of 

6

For our analysis, we grouped interviews with former spouses with other character 

references.

0

20

40

60

80

100

3+ deficiencies

2 deficiencies

1 deficiencies

0 deficiencies

Air Force Army Navy National

Security

Agency

Percent of deficient investigations

62 53 56

43

20

21

35

15

14 16

12

9 6

17

16

5
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local agency records for any criminal history, divorce, or financial 

problems; and corroboration of education. DSS frequently met the 

requirement to conduct national agency checks, and almost always 

conducted financial checks. Both checks are done in an automated manner. 

In addition, DSS almost always conducted subject interviews.

Figure 3: Percent of Deficient Investigations in Nine Required Investigative Areas

Source: GAO sample of 530 DSS investigations.

DSS also did not pursue issues needed for making clearance decisions that 

arose in 84 of the 530 investigations (16 percent) that we reviewed.7

 These 

issues included prior criminal history, failure of a prior polygraph 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60 Percent of deficient investigations

Residency Birth and

citizenship

Employment Reference Local records

check

Education National

agency check

Finances Subject

interview

54

51

47

36

30

23

10

1 1

7

Because the basic investigative work was incomplete in a high percentage of the cases we 

reviewed, we were unable to determine the extent to which other issues may have existed 

but were not identified.
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examination, potential foreign allegiance, serious sexual issues, alcohol 

and drug use, and financial problems, including large outstanding debts and 

bankruptcy. Officials at DSS, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), and the 

DOD adjudication facilities said that issues such as these should be 

pursued. Derogatory information on these issues could potentially 

disqualify an individual from being granted a clearance. Further, since 

financial gain has been the major reason individuals committed espionage, 

the failure to resolve issues pertaining to large outstanding debts and 

bankruptcy is of particular concern. The following are examples of the 

types of issues we found that DSS investigators did not pursue.

• In an initial investigation for an individual involved in special 

operations, DSS did not address allegations by character references that 

the subject, a former police officer, had assaulted an inmate or had an 

affair that produced a child. In addition, DSS did not contact creditors 

owed nearly $1,000 in past due accounts with an additional $2,800 that 

had been charged off.

• In an initial investigation for an individual assigned to a communications 

unit, the subject’s credit report listed a bankruptcy. The investigative file 

did not show that DSS questioned the subject about the matter or made 

any further attempt to address it.

• In a reinvestigation for an electronics technician, DSS did not verify the 

subject’s claim of foreign military service and citizenship. In addition, 

DSS did not resolve whether the subject might have been involved in 

shooting another individual.

• In a reinvestigation for a systems engineer, the subject stated that he had 

failed a polygraph test regarding loyalty to the United States. He claimed 

he was loyal, but he could not explain the test results. DSS did not 

perform an additional polygraph or provide documentation on the failed 

test.

• In a reinvestigation for an individual in a joint service office, the 

subject’s credit report showed $10,000 past due on a mortgage and 

indicated that the lender had begun foreclosure proceedings. The 

subject denied knowledge of the matter and DSS did not contact the 

lender.

DSS Investigations Have 

Not Been Timely

DSS investigations have not been timely in two respects. First, once 

requests for investigations are received and logged in as open cases, DSS 

has not completed them in the time that its customers, such as the military 

services and industrial contractors, need them to be completed. According 
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to DSS customers and the Joint Security Commission, when investigations 

take longer than 90 days (1) the military services are unable to assign 

servicemembers to jobs that require clearances and (2) defense contractors 

incur financial costs because their personnel cannot begin work on DOD 

contracts. Second, periodic reinvestigations are overdue because they have 

not been initiated within the periods established by federal standards. In 

1994 and 1999, the Joint Security Commission reported that delaying 

reinvestigations poses risks to national security because the longer 

individuals hold clearances, the more likely they are to be working with 

more critical information and systems.

DSS investigation time has not 

met customers’ needs

The federal standards do not contain any specified time requirements for 

agencies to complete their investigative work. However, DSS’s customers 

(the military services, DOD civilian agencies, and industrial contractors) 

and adjudication officials stated that they need DSS to complete its 

investigations within 90 days. The Office of Personnel Management, which 

conducts personnel security investigations for employees of non-DOD 

federal agencies, uses a standard of completing its work in 35, 75, or a 

maximum of 120 days, depending on the price the customer is willing to 

pay for the service.8

From our review of 530 investigations, we found that the median time for 

DSS to complete investigative work was 204 days—more than twice as long 

as what its customers want.9

 Figure 4 shows that DSS completed 4 

investigations, less than 1 percent, in less than 90 days; 11 percent (57 

investigations) took more than 1 year.

8

OPM charges from $1,600 to about $3,000 for top secret investigations and reinvestigations.

9

The median is the point at which 50 percent of the investigations took longer than 204 days 

and 50 percent took less than 204 days.
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Figure 4: Calendar Days Needed to Complete Investigations

Source: GAO sample of 530 DSS investigations.

Adjudication facility officials said that because of the amount of time it has 

taken to receive DSS investigative reports, they have been reluctant to 

return incomplete investigations to DSS because of further delays. When 

they have returned investigations to DSS for additional work, it has not 

been unusual to wait an additional 6 months for DSS to complete the work. 

Adjudication officials said that they frequently made decisions to grant or 

deny clearances based on incomplete investigations because it would 

simply take too long to have DSS obtain the missing information. They 

considered this a judicious weighing of the risks entailed.

In 1994, the Joint Security Commission reported that the costs to DOD 

directly attributable to delays in obtaining security clearances was as high 

as several billion dollars in fiscal year 1994 for workers who were unable to 

perform their jobs while awaiting a clearance.10 In February 1999, 

representatives of several contractors wrote a letter to the DSS Director 

complaining about the time taken to clear personnel scheduled to work on 

45

40

35

25

20

15

10

5

0

Percentage of days

0-90 91-180 181-270 271-365 > 365

Days to complete

4

209

161

99

57
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defense contracts and pointing out that the delays were threatening to 

affect some facilities’ ability to effectively perform on contracts and meet 

cost schedules. They noted that 64 percent (1,426) of the 2,236 

investigations they had requested were pending for more than 90 days, with 

76 investigations pending since 1997.

Periodic reinvestigations are 

overdue

The federal standards require a periodic reinvestigation of individuals 

granted access to classified information. Clearances are outdated if a 

reinvestigation has not been initiated in the past 5 years for top secret 

clearances, 10 years for secret clearances, and 15 years for confidential 

clearances. Historically, DOD has had a large backlog of overdue 

reinvestigations. In fiscal year 1986, DOD had a backlog of 300,000 overdue 

reinvestigations.11 According to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in June 

1999, about 600,000 DOD clearances were based on outdated 

investigations. However, DOD is not certain of the total number of overdue 

reinvestigations, and was analyzing the backlog at the time that we 

completed our work.

According to the 1999 report by the Joint Security Commission II, as many 

as 700,000 reinvestigations are overdue and the backlog was continuing to 

grow.12 The Commission recommended that DOD should (1) begin to fully 

enforce the standards for reinvestigations and (2) screen all individuals 

whose reinvestigations are overdue to identify those whose positions and 

access suggest the highest risk, and provide resources to complete those 

reinvestigations promptly. At the time we completed our work in 

September 1999, DOD was determining its response to this 

recommendation.

10In its 1994 report, the Joint Security Commission noted that DSS customers wanted 

clearance investigations completed within 90 days. At the time, it took DSS an average of 

149 days to complete investigations. The Commission used an average cost of $250 per day 

beyond the 90-day standard for each DOD employee who was unable to perform their duties 

while awaiting a security clearance.

11National Security: DOD Clearance Reductions and Related Issues (GAO/NSIAD-87-170BR, 

Sept. 18, 1987).

12A Report by the Joint Security Commission II, August 24, 1999.
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Management Actions 

and Inadequate 

Oversight Have 

Weakened 

Investigations

The lack of completeness and timeliness in the DSS personnel security 

investigation program can be traced, in part, to several management 

actions by DSS and inadequate oversight by the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and 

Intelligence). Management actions that affected investigative completeness 

have included DSS (1) causing confusion and raising concerns by adopting 

relaxed investigative policy guidance that gives investigators greater 

discretion in doing their work, (2) eliminating important investigative 

quality control mechanisms, and (3) inadequately training its investigative 

staff and case analysts. Many of these actions were adopted from 1996 to 

1998, under a policy of reinventing business practices. DSS based its 

mandate for these changes on (1) the National Performance Review, which 

called for improving government at less cost; (2) the 1994 report of the 

Joint Security Commission, which called for defining the security needed in 

terms of an affordable price; and (3) DOD’s 1997 Quadrennial Defense 

Review, which called for DSS to streamline the security investigative 

process and charge its customers for investigations. Additionally, 

inadequate planning by DSS management for a new automation initiative 

has caused further delays in the timely completion of investigations.

DSS Relaxed Its 

Investigative Guidance 

The incomplete DSS personnel security investigations stemmed, in part, 

from the organization’s reinvention effort to streamline investigative 

requirements. DSS relaxed its prior investigative policy guidance, thereby 

allowing investigators greater discretionbut also causing much 

confusionregarding the work needed to complete investigations. In two 

instances, DSS’s relaxed guidance was inconsistent with federal standards. 

In adopting the relaxed guidance, DSS also ignored the concerns of DOD 

officials and the Security Policy Board about the adverse effects of the 

policy changes on the completeness of investigative work. The officials 

were concerned that these changes would result in the adjudicators not 

having sufficient information to make informed clearance decisions. The 

Security Policy Board was also concerned that DSS’s policy changes would 

hinder efforts to achieve reciprocity of clearances between DOD and other 

federal agencies.

DSS investigative policies give 

greater discretion to 

investigators 

In June 1996, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence) formally announced that DOD would 

adopt the new federal investigative standards as of July 1, 1996, while they 

were being reviewed by the National Security Council. In implementing the 

new standards, however, DSS began to relax its prior investigative 
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requirements. Between August 1996 and February 1999, DSS issued 31 

policy letters directly related to the manner in which investigations were to 

be conducted. Several letters announced policy changes that gave 

investigators greater discretion in how they would meet the standards or 

pursue issues that might be of significance in deciding to grant clearances. 

This greater discretion is illustrated below: 

• In August 1996, DSS eliminated its requirement to contact creditors 

about debts not listed on credit reports but revealed by the subject; and 

in November 1996, DSS eliminated its practice of routinely contacting 

creditors to verify the status of disputed accounts, instead relying on the 

subject’s documentation. 

• In October 1996, DSS eliminated its requirement to confirm allegations 

of adultery and stated that the subject should be questioned “briefly” 

about the matter. 

• In October 1996, DSS issued policy guidance that allowed investigators 

“broad leeway” in deciding whether to obtain character references from 

the subject’s neighborhood. In May 1997, DSS issued additional policy 

guidance that allowed investigators broad leeway in determining how 

the subject’s residence will be confirmed. 

• In October 1996, DSS encouraged discretion in pursuing alcohol-related 

issues, stating that “only a minimal number of specific leads to resolve” 

alcohol-related issues are required and “cases will no longer be routinely 

expanded as issues based solely on one alcohol-related incident within 

the last three years.”

• In December 1996, DSS eliminated its previous requirement for its 

investigators to verify federal employment using personnel records if 

there was no issue to resolve. 

• In November 1998, DSS adopted a policy providing that the time period 

to be covered in a reinvestigation is to be the period since the last 

investigation or the most recent 5-year period, whichever is shorter. DSS 

currently has about 600,000 reinvestigations that are overdue, in that it 

has been more than 5 years since the last investigation. Thus, DSS policy 

allows for gaps in developing information that could be relevant in 

making a clearance decision.

DSS’s policies were also inconsistent with federal investigative standards in 

two areasthe requirement to conduct local agency checks and to verify 

public records.

• Federal standards require local agency checks of criminal history 

records for the last 10 years for all locations where a subject has lived, 
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been employed, and/or attended school for 6 months or more. However, 

it has been DSS policy not to conduct these checks if the local 

jurisdiction charges a fee for this service, an exception not provided for 

in the federal standards. 

• With regard to public records, the federal standards require verification 

of divorces, bankruptcies, and other court actions, whether civil or 

criminal, involving the subject. For civil actions, DSS policy requires 

that records of divorce be routinely reviewed. In cases of bankruptcy, 

DSS policy requires review only if the bankruptcy occurred within the 

last 2 years. For all other civil actions, DSS policy requires review only if 

it appears likely that suitability issues are involved. The federal 

standards, however, do not provide for exceptions based on date of the 

event, “suitability issues,” or any other reason.

These policy changes have confused many investigators about what 

investigative work is to be done. In responding to our surveys, 59 percent 

(625) of the 1,061 investigator respondents and 90 percent (79) of the 88 

case analyst respondents said that DSS policy guidance has resulted in 

confusing investigative requirements, while only 23 percent (239) of the 

investigators and 3 percent (3) of the case analysts said that it has clarified 

requirements. When we completed our work in September 1999, these 

policies were still in effect but being reviewed by the acting DSS Director.

DOD officials and the Security 

Policy Board raised concerns 

about DSS’s revised policies

In our review of DSS policies, we discussed the DSS revised investigative 

policy guidance and the DSS process for adopting policy changes with 

officials in the DOD Office of the General Counsel assigned to DSS, the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence), the eight adjudication facilities, and 

the Security Policy Board. These officials expressed two overall concerns 

about the impact of DSS’s policy changes: (1) the DSS investigations have 

increasingly provided less complete information for use by adjudicators in 

determining whether to grant clearances and (2) the revised policies 

undercut the Security Policy Board’s efforts to achieve uniformity among 

federal agencies conducting personnel security investigations. These 

officials stated that, for the most part, the DSS Deputy Director for Policy 

presented the policy changes to them after decisions had been made rather 

than consulting with them in advance. The officials also said that DSS had 

adopted certain policies that were not consistent with their expectations 

about how federal agencies would meet the federal standards.

Adjudication facility officials described frequent shortfalls in many of the 

investigative areas covered by the federal standards, such as failures to 
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corroborate citizenship of a foreign-born subject, spouse, or family 

member; verify employment; or conduct local agency checks for prior 

criminal histories. Adjudication officials also stated that DSS often failed to 

pursue issues, such as unexplained affluence. Furthermore, the officials 

from the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals, which serves as the 

appeal board for DOD and industry personnel whose clearances have been 

denied or revoked, said that the investigative information provided by DSS 

was frequently insufficient to make an informed determination about a 

denial or revocation of a clearance being appealed.

In addition, in their policymaking actions, DSS officials have ignored the 

explicit concerns of the Security Policy Board regarding the goal of 

achieving investigative uniformity. The following examples illustrate this 

problem:

• In October 1996, DSS’s Deputy Director for Investigations briefed the 

Board’s Personnel Security Committee on DSS reinvention efforts and 

its proposal to eliminate neighborhood checks. The Committee 

disagreed with this change and noted that DOD was a full partner in the 

cooperative effort to develop new, standard investigative and 

adjudicative policy and that unilateral action by DSS would undermine 

the process. The Committee also said that a failure by DSS to meet the 

federal standards would constitute a serious deterioration in the quality 

of its investigations and would unacceptably increase risk. In 

correspondence dated October 28, 1996, the Board notified all Security 

Policy Forum members and others, including the Deputy Secretary of 

Defense and the DSS Director, of its concerns about DSS initiatives that 

it believed would run counter to the investigative standards, focusing 

especially on the adverse effect on reciprocity when agreed upon 

standards are ignored. It reiterated that Presidential Decision Directive 

29 established the Security Policy Board structure as the vehicle for 

“vetting and proposing security policies” and advised DSS to bring any 

proposed changes to the standards to the Board. DSS, however, 

continued to revise and implement relaxed investigative policies after 

the Board’s instruction.

• In March 1998 correspondence to the Security Policy Board’s Staff 

Director, the Chairman of the Board’s Personnel Security Committee 

expressed concerns about DSS’s intent to unilaterally initiate changes to 

investigative policies. The Chairman believed DSS’s changes constituted 

a departure from federal standards. The Chairman noted that, in January 

1997, the Personnel Security Committee advised that the Board’s 

Personnel Security Research Subcommittee (comprised of 
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representatives from DSS, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other 

agencies) was the appropriate organization to coordinate and vet 

research initiatives to change national standards. Moreover, the 

Committee emphasized that all personnel security investigative 

standards should continue to be assessed and refined under the 

cognizance of the Security Policy Forum. In April 1998, the Board’s Staff 

Director notified all Personnel Security Committee members and DOD 

about these concerns and advised that any research initiatives regarding 

the standards should be vetted through the Board’s processes.

In February 1999, when we brought these concerns to the attention of DSS 

officials, the Deputy Director for Policy acknowledged that DSS’s proposed 

policy changes were not sufficiently coordinated with key officials, 

including the DOD General Counsel, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), the 

adjudication facilities, and the Security Policy Board. In July 1999, the 

acting DSS Director stated that he would review DSS policies and 

procedures to ensure that they are consistent with the federal standards. 

The Director also plans to improve the liaison with the Board, including 

meeting monthly to discuss investigative standards.

Important Quality Control 

Mechanisms Have Been 

Eliminated

The elimination of important quality control mechanisms has also 

compromised the quality of DSS investigations. In the absence of such 

mechanisms, DSS investigations have been sent for adjudication with 

virtually no review to determine if they are complete and meet federal 

investigative standards. DSS had two major quality control procedures to 

review investigative work until 1996, when both were eliminated as a part 

of reinvention efforts. First, field supervisors routinely reviewed completed 

investigations before forwarding them to the DSS Operations Center. 

Second, the quality assurance branch, composed of seven investigators, 

conducted weekly reviews of a sample of completed investigations. The 

quality assurance branch also published a quarterly newsletter on common 

investigative problems. By eliminating both the quality assurance branch 

and supervisory reviews, the 112 case analysts in the DSS Operations 

Center became the only quality control mechanism, responsible for 

reviewing about 150,000 investigations per year. The analysts that we spoke 

with stated they have been so consumed with processing investigations 

that they have spent little time reviewing the quality of investigative work.

Before 1996, DSS used two other programs to ensure quality. It sent letters 

to a sample of individuals interviewed by DSS investigators to determine if 
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the investigators were respectful and courteous, and it periodically had 

supervisors accompany their subordinates to become familiar with how the 

work was being done. These programs allowed DSS to determine that 

investigators were actually and properly conducting their work. Both 

programs were eliminated in 1996 under reinvention efforts at DSS.

DSS Staff Training Has Been 

Inadequate

Investigative quality has also been diminished by a lack of training on the 

federal standards for the investigative and case analyst staffs. During the 

past 3 years, DSS provided almost no formal training, especially on the 

standards, and DOD dismantled the major training infrastructure that 

provided the training. Consequently, the investigative and case analyst 

staffs may not be fully aware of what the federal standards require.

DSS acknowledged that it has conducted little training for its staff on the 

new federal investigative standards. Our analysis of DSS training data for 

fiscal year 1998 showed that DSS conducted 31 training courses attended 

by 2,468 DSS personnel. Only five of these courses covered personnel 

security topics; 414 staff attended these courses. The remaining 26 courses 

covered industrial security topics, classification procedures, technical 

computer training, adjudication, information security, and other topics. 

DSS officials stated that since few investigators have been hired in recent 

years due to a hiring freeze, DSS did not believe that training covering the 

new federal standards was necessary. In June 1999, the acting DSS Director 

stated that no formal training for case analysts has been conducted since 

1991. Thus, the analysts may not be fully aware of what the federal 

standards require as they review investigations forwarded from DSS’s field 

locations.

Cutbacks in the DSS training infrastructure have contributed to a lack of 

training. In 1997, DOD eliminated the main investigator training 

organization at DSS, the DOD Security Institute in Richmond, Virginia. 

Besides training DSS staff on investigative and other security procedures, 

the Institute trained other federal agency and contractor personnel on 

security procedures. In November 1997, the functions of the DOD Security 

Institute were integrated into DSS, along with the DOD Personnel Security 

Research Center and the DOD Polygraph Institute. The Security Institute’s 

functions were transferred to the DSS Office of Mission and Training in 

Baltimore, Maryland. One year after the transfer, DSS studied its 

investigative training program and found major deficiencies. DSS 

concluded, among other things, that (1) the infrastructure was not in place 

for quality training, (2) many training courses were obsolete, (3) no means 
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existed to evaluate staff training needs, (4) training had not met the 

customers’ needs, (5) refresher training and continuing education were 

lacking, and (6) a new curriculum was not developed because of a lack of 

resident expertise. Based on the study, DSS established a training task 

force to oversee the training office. In May 1999, DSS hired a training 

director, and in July 1999, the acting DSS Director established a new DSS 

training organizational entity, the Defense Security Service Academy.

The respondents to our investigator survey provided information on their 

training, which we defined to include both staff meetings covering 

investigative standards and formal classroom training. Many of the 1,009 

investigators who answered the questions on training in our survey said 

that they were not trained or could not recall receiving any training on 

many of the federal standards since 1996.13 Figure 5 shows the areas where 

investigators most frequently cited a lack of training in their responses to 

our survey. A complete analysis of the investigators’ training responses is 

presented in appendix V.

13The Security Policy Board approved the new investigative standards in March 1996. In 

June 1996, DOD decided to implement the new standards while the National Security 

Council considered them for approval. The President approved the standards in March 1997.
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Figure 5: Percent of Investigators Without Recent Training on Investigative Requirements

Note: We did not include information on national agency checks because investigators do not perform 

this function.

Source: GAO survey of 1,009 DSS investigators who provided information on their training.

Transition to Automated 

Case Management Has Led 

to Case Processing Delays

DSS did not properly plan for the implementation of its new case 

management automation initiative, referred to as the Case Control 

Management System (CCMS). As a result, DSS has not been able to process 

its investigations, and the volume of investigations sent to DSS field agents 

for investigative work and to the adjudication facilities for clearance 

decisions has decreased. This has caused further delays in the processing 

of investigations.

The CCMS was supposed to expedite case processing by linking all relevant 

information critical to an investigation through a series of subsystems. 

These subsystems include 

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Military records

check

Family legal 

status

Employment

Subjects' 

citizenship

Subjects' birth

Subjects' past

education

Verify divorces

Subjects' recent

education

Local records

checks

Verify civil and 

criminal acts

Check 

unemployment

Interview divorced

spouses

Verify employment

over 6 months

Percentage of investigators

81

73 71

65

62 62

59

49 48 46 45 45 43
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• the Electronic Personnel Security Questionnaire, which collects 

electronically the personnel security data to initiate and conduct an 

investigation;

• the Field Information Management System, which generates field 

investigative reports that are then fed into the system; 

• the Files Automation Scanning System, which converts paper personnel 

security questionnaires and attachments into electronic form for storage 

and retrieval;

• the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index, which integrates the 

system’s applications with the central index of all DOD personnel 

security investigations and clearances; and

• the Industrial Security System, which is a separate application that 

shares information in the corporate database.

DSS officials acknowledged that CCMS (for which DOD has spent about 

$100 million) has not operated as intended, is not year 2000 compliant,14

and may cost about an additional $100 million to stabilize. DOD officials 

confirmed that DSS did not complete the system acquisition planning steps 

required by DOD Directive 5000.1 or adequately test the system before 

implementation.15 In addition, when the system was implemented, DSS 

eliminated its existing capability before ensuring that the new system 

would operate as intended and ensure it could retrieve previously 

developed information. Further, even after this system achieves a stable 

operational status, DOD may have to replace it in order to meet user 

requirements. DSS officials estimated that they should know in 6 months to 

1 year what alternatives are available and the approximate cost to complete 

this automation effort.

DSS has experienced significant system start-up problems with CCMS. For 

example, CCMS has been unable to accept data from the electronic 

personnel security questionnaire needed to open investigations and cannot 

produce investigative reports. Instead of expediting the transmission of 

requests for investigations and reports to and from DSS field offices, 

14The year 2000 problem results from the inability of a computer system at the year 2000 to 

interpret the century correctly from a recorded or calculated date having only two digits to 

indicate the year. As a result, the computer system could malfunction or produce incorrect 

information. To be year 2000 compliant, a computer system must be tested, verified, and 

validated to function or produce correct information when the year 2000 is encountered 

during its processing of automated data.

15DOD Directive 5000.1, titled Defense Acquisition, contains policies and principles for all 

DOD acquisition programs.
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system problems have caused serious delays in information processing and 

resulted in a dramatic drop in the number of case openings and field 

investigations.

Our survey of DSS investigators reflected this drop in the number of 

investigations being undertaken in DSS’s field offices. We asked the 

investigators about their workload before and after CCMS implementation. 

As shown in figure 6, 58 percent stated that they had too much investigative 

work before the new system was implemented; 23 percent said they had 

too little work; and 9 percent said their workload was appropriate. Since 

the new automation system was implemented the situation has reversed:

60 percent of investigators stated that they have had too little work, only

25 percent said that they have had too much work, and 9 percent said that 

their workload has been appropriate.

Figure 6: Investigators Views on Workload

Source: GAO survey of 1,061 DSS investigators.

Our analysis of the volume of completed investigations sent for clearance 

decisions to the four DOD adjudication facilities included in our review 

corroborates the investigators’ views about the substantial decrease in 

workload since the new case management system was implemented. For 

example, in fiscal year 1998, the Air Force adjudication facility received, on 

average, more than 2,200 completed investigations per month from DSS. 

From October 1998 through June 1999, it received about 900 completed 

Before CCMS With CCMS

9%

10%

58%

23%

Appropriate

workload

No response

60% 25% Too much work

9%

6%

Too little work

Appropriate

workload

No response

Too little work

Too much work
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investigations per month. Table 1 shows the volume of investigative 

receipts for four of the eight adjudication facilities before and after CCMS 

implementation. Adjudication facility officials stated that the delays in 

receiving completed investigations prevent DOD from assigning individuals 

to high-priority units that require a security clearance for their personnel.

Table 1: Comparison of DSS Investigations Sent for Adjudication Before and After CCMS Implementation

Source: GAO analysis of data from Air Force, Army, Navy, and National Security Agency adjudication 

facilities.

DSS officials stated that, for the most part, DSS has not been able to use 

CCMS to process investigations as intended. As a temporary solution to the 

start-up problems, DSS has recruited investigators, reserve military 

personnel, and Office of Personnel Management employees to open and 

scope investigations manually, and it has attempted to make emergency 

repairs to the system. The acting DSS Director has placed a high priority on 

correcting the problems with CCMS. He has established a project office to 

provide a short-term capability that will allow DSS to process 

investigations, and he is working on long-term alternatives for a permanent 

solution. The acting Director expects to study the long-term options in 

2000.

Inadequate Oversight of 

DSS Has Allowed Quality 

Problems to Persist and 

Increased the Number of 

Overdue Reinvestigations

DSS has operated for at least 4 years with little or no oversight from the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence), which is responsible for assessing the 

completeness of DSS investigative work. Officials in the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary stated that there had been little oversight of the 

management of DSS, including monitoring the investigative work and 

whether DSS was properly planning its automation efforts. Sound 

management practices call for such oversight. The officials stated that once 

Adjudication 

facility

Average monthly receipts

(Oct. 1997 − Sept. 1998)

Average monthly receipts

(Oct. 1998 − June 1999) Difference Percent change

Air Force 2,238 901 -1,337 -60

Army 2,044 1,292 -752 -37

Navy 1,920 947 -973 -51

NSA 448 149 -299 -67
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DSS became a reinvention laboratory, it was allowed to operate, for the 

most part, at its own discretion.

Inadequate oversight has also resulted in a large backlog of overdue 

reinvestigations. In June 1999, the Senior Civilian Official in the Office of 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, 

and Intelligence) attributed the backlog to (1) DOD’s need to implement the 

federal standards that lowered the interval for secret clearances from 15 to 

10 years and set a new 15-year requirement for confidential clearances and 

(2) the restrictions his office imposed from fiscal year 1996 to the present 

on the number of reinvestigations that DOD components could request.16

DOD implemented these restrictions in an effort to reduce the time for 

completing investigations received by DSS. However, the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary did not monitor the effect that these restrictions had on 

the number of overdue reinvestigations until the situation became critical.

In 1995, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence) directed DOD components to cease 

submitting reinvestigation requests that were due to DSS because, if such 

action was not taken, the average investigation completion time would 

exceed 278 days. Instead, the Defense Manpower Data Center would 

identify individuals for reinvestigation based on (1) the length of time since 

the last investigation and (2) potentially disqualifying issues raised in the 

last investigation.17 In June 1996, the Assistant Secretary revised the policy 

to allow DOD components to submit up to 40,000 secret and 42,000 top 

secret reinvestigation requests per year—commonly referred to as a quota. 

While these restrictions may have helped to reduce the time to complete 

DSS investigations, from 278 days to 204 days, the policy has contributed to 

a backlog of 600,000 overdue reinvestigations.

16From February 1998 until October 1999, a senior civilian official headed the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence).

17The Defense Manpower Data Center, established in 1974, collects and maintains an archive 

of automated manpower, personnel, training, and financial databases for DOD. One of its 

databases (the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index) maintains data on active duty 

personnel, reservists, and DOD civilians and contractors who have been involved in a 

security clearance investigation or adjudication.
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DSS Has Acted to 

Improve Investigations 

but Lacks Corrective 

Action and Strategic 

Plans

In recognition of the problems confronting DSS, DOD recently appointed 

an acting DSS Director who has been developing a series of corrective 

actions for the problems we identified. Despite the serious and widespread 

nature of the completeness, timeliness, and other problems affecting the 

personnel security investigation program, DOD has not planned to report 

these problems under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act. 

Further, DOD has not yet developed a strategic plan for the program that 

includes measurable program goals and performance measures as required 

under the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993.18

New Acting DSS Director 

Taking Steps to Improve 

Investigative Quality and 

Timeliness, but Formal 

Corrective Plan Is Needed

DOD has begun to address several DSS management weaknesses that have 

affected the quality of personnel security investigations. In June 1999, the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense appointed a new acting DSS Director charged 

with improving the overall management of the organization. In June 1999, 

we briefed the acting Director on the preliminary results of our work. The 

Director stated that DSS would address the large backlog of clearance 

reinvestigations, the case management automation problems, any lack of 

consistency between DSS policy and investigations and the federal 

standards, and the lack of training and quality control mechanisms. In July 

and August 1999, the Director began to take a series of actions, including 

the following:

• Working with the Defense Management Data Center, DSS will define the 

extent of the reinvestigation backlog to assist other DOD components in 

prioritizing those individuals in the most critical positions to support 

DOD missions. After preliminary discussions with the Office of 

Personnel Management and private contractors, DSS plans to seek their 

assistance to eliminate the backlog of overdue reinvestigations.

• The Director has initiated a review of all investigative policy guidance 

and procedures to ensure that DSS complies with federal standards. 

DSS subsequently plans to issue a new investigative manual.

• The Director stated that he is re-instituting a uniform quality assurance 

function in DSS and has tasked the DSS Inspector General to 

periodically review the quality of investigative work.

• The Director has created a Defense Security Service Academy that will 

be responsible for training all DSS staff on the federal standards and 

implementing the recommendations from the 1998 DSS training report.

18See 5 U.S.C. 306 and 31 U.S.C. 1115.
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• DSS, with the assistance of the U.S. Air Force, established a program 

office to lead the effort to stabilize the current automation system. As of 

August 1999, DSS officials could not estimate the level of effort or funds 

needed to resolve the automation problem. Preliminary estimates 

ranged from $100 million to over $300 million in additional funding 

requirements. DSS officials acknowledge it would be another 6 months 

to 1 year before alternatives could be identified and a course of action is 

planned.

While the acting DSS Director is taking positive steps to improve the 

personnel security investigation program, at the time we completed our 

fieldwork in September 1999, DOD had not planned to report the identified 

control weaknesses in this program as material weaknesses under the 

Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act. Under the act, agency managers 

are publicly accountable for correcting deficiencies; the head of each 

agency reports annually to the President and the Congress on material 

internal control weaknesses and on formal plans for correcting them.19

According to officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), the weaknesses 

are due, for the most part, to the discretion given to DSS over its 

management, which resulted in the issuance of relaxed investigative policy 

guidance, elimination of quality control mechanisms, and inadequate 

investigative work. The serious and widespread nature of the problems and 

the weaknesses in DSS’s internal control systems for the personnel security 

investigation program would typically warrant reporting under the Federal 

Managers’ Financial Integrity Act.

DSS Improvements Have 

Not Been Guided by a 

Strategic Plan or Methods to 

Measure Performance

Under GPRA, federal agencies are required to set strategic goals, measure 

performance, and report on the degree to which goals were met. GPRA 

incorporates performance measurement as one of its most important 

features. Executive branch agencies are generally required to develop 

annual performance plans that use performance measurement to reinforce 

the connection between strategic goals and the day-to-day activities of their 

managers and staff. The annual performance plans are to include 

performance goals for an agency’s program activities as listed in the 

budget, a summary of the necessary resources to conduct these activities, 

the performance indicators that will be used to measure performance, and 

a discussion of how the performance information will be verified.

19See 31 U.S.C. 3512 (d)(2).
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DOD does not have a strategic plan for DSS’s personnel security 

investigation program that includes goals and performance measures. The 

acting DSS Director has recognized the need for such plans, and DSS is in 

the early stages of developing them. In addition, DSS currently lacks 

adequate methods to measure the quality of its investigative work. DSS has 

used two primary measurement methods: (1) a customer assessment team 

that met periodically with adjudicators and requesters of investigations to 

determine their satisfaction with DSS investigative work and (2) the 

number of completed investigations returned by the adjudication facilities 

for re-work. Based on these measures, DSS determined that its customer 

assessments “have not raised any systemic issues” and that the 

adjudication facilities have returned only a small number of investigations 

(1 percent) for re-work due to incomplete investigations. Based on these 

results, former DSS officials stated that they believed DSS customers were 

satisfied with its work.

Contrary to this DSS view, officials in all eight adjudication facilities told us 

that they had complained about the quality and timeliness of the 

investigative work on numerous occasions. As discussed earlier, DSS’s 

reliance on the number of cases returned for re-work is not a valid 

indicator of the quality of its investigative work because the adjudication 

facility staffs only return a small number of incomplete investigations 

because they said that it takes too long for DSS to complete the work and 

return the cases. Without independent performance measures, DSS cannot 

be sure it has accurate data on work quality. In addition, although DSS has 

established time goals for completing its investigations, it has not met its 

customers’ needs to have investigations completed within 90 days. In fiscal 

year 2000, DSS goals are to complete (1) 75 percent of top secret initial 

investigations for military and civilian personnel within 120 days and

90 percent within 220 days and (2) 50 percent of top secret periodic 

reinvestigations within 180 days and 90 percent within 300 days. However, 

DSS has not conducted any workload analysis to determine the caseload 

that its investigators and case analysts can carry and produce timely, highquality work. Without such information, it is difficult to determine what 

level of staff is necessary.

Conclusions DOD investigations have not fully complied with federal personnel security 

investigative standards, creating risks to national security by granting 

security clearances based on incomplete investigations. Although there is 

no guarantee that individuals fully investigated will not engage in espionage 

activities, these investigations are a critical first step in ensuring that those 
B-283901

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granted access to classified information can be trusted to safeguard it. At 

this time, DOD cannot make such assurances. Problems at the Defense 

Security Service, combined with the lack of adequate oversight by the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and 

Intelligence), have allowed the weaknesses in the Defense Security 

Service’s personnel security investigations program to persist and go 

unreported.

The Defense Security Service has implemented investigative policies that 

relaxed its prior requirements and gave its investigators greater discretion 

in doing their work. As a result, nearly 60 percent of the Defense Security 

Service investigators and 90 percent of the case analysts reported being 

confused about the investigative work required, and according to the 

Security Policy Board, DOD has hindered efforts to achieve uniformity 

among federal agencies in conducting clearance investigations. More 

importantly, the completeness of Defense Security Service investigations 

has been significantly compromised. DOD has stated that many of the 

changes in the management of personnel security investigations were 

undertaken as efforts to reinvent the Defense Security Service using better 

business practices; however, Defense Security Service actions have not 

achieved this result. Rather, the reinvention efforts have eroded the 

completeness and timeliness of clearance investigations. As a result, 

hundreds of thousands of individuals can access classified information 

without assurances of their trustworthiness and reliability because their 

investigations may be incomplete and the reinvestigations for many are 

overdue. Moreover, the reduced volume of investigations processed by the 

Defense Security Service since October 1998 has hindered contractors’ 

efforts to meet cost and performance schedules. Finally, the Defense 

Security Service has not planned to report this program as containing 

material internal control weaknesses, in accordance with the Federal 

Managers’ Financial Integrity Act.

There are no quick and easy solutions to the problems in the Defense 

Security Service’s personnel security investigations program. It may take 

several years before DOD can fully implement the needed corrective policy 

and infrastructure changes, and the cost of the corrective actions may be 

substantial. The actions that the acting Defense Security Service Director 

has taken are steps in the right direction, but few definitive plans for 

improvements have been developed and many planned actions have not yet 

been implemented. The Defense Security Service does not yet have a 

strategic plan that establishes program goals and measures to assess its 

performance against the goals. In addition, the plans for separate 
B-283901

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

activities—such as revising investigative policy guidance, re-instituting 

quality control mechanisms, and providing an infrastructure for training—

have not yet been brought together into an overall corrective action plan. 

Additionally, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, 

Control, Communications, and Intelligence) has not developed specific 

plans for improving its oversight of Defense Security Service activities.

Recommendations Because of the significant weaknesses in the DOD personnel security 

investigation program and the program’s importance to national security, 

we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) to

• report the personnel security investigation program as a material 

weakness under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act to ensure 

that the needed oversight is provided and that actions are taken to 

correct the systemic problems in the Defense Security Service 

personnel security investigation program;

• improve its oversight of the Defense Security Service personnel security 

investigation program, including approving a Defense Security Service 

strategic plan; and

• identify and prioritize overdue reinvestigations, in coordination with 

other DOD components, and fund and implement initiatives to conduct 

these reinvestigations in a timely manner.

In addition, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense instruct the 

Defense Security Service Director, with oversight by the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and 

Intelligence), to

• develop a corrective action plan as required under the Federal 

Managers’ Financial Integrity Act that incorporates corrective actions 

and milestones for addressing material weaknesses in the Defense 

Security Service personnel security investigative program and 

performance measures for monitoring the progress of corrective 

actions;

• establish a strategic plan that includes agency goals, performance 

measures, and procedures for tracking progress in meeting goals in 

accordance with sound management practices and the Government 

Performance and Results Act;

• conduct analyses needed to (1) determine an appropriate workload that 

investigators and case analysts can manage while meeting federal 
B-283901

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

standards and (2) develop an overall strategy and resource plan to 

improve the quality and timeliness of investigations and reduce the 

number of overdue reinvestigations;

• review and clarify all investigative policy guidance to ensure that 

investigations comply with federal standards;

• establish a process for identifying and forwarding to the Security Policy 

Board suggested changes to policy guidance concerning the 

implementation of the federal standards and other investigative policy 

issues;

• establish formal quality control mechanisms to ensure that Defense 

Security Service or contracted investigators perform high-quality 

investigations, including periodic reviews of samples of completed 

investigations and feedback on problems to senior managers, 

investigators, and trainers;

• establish a training infrastructure for basic and continuing investigator 

and case analyst training that includes formal feedback mechanisms to 

assess training needs and measure effectiveness, and as a high priority, 

provide training on complying with federal investigative standards for 

investigators and case analysts; and

• take steps to correct the case management automation problems to gain 

short-term capability and develop long-term, cost-effective automation 

alternatives.

Further, we recommend that the Secretary direct all DOD adjudication 

facility officials to (1) grant clearances only when all essential investigative 

work has been done and (2) regularly communicate with the Defense 

Security Service about continuing investigative weaknesses and needed 

corrective actions.

Agency Comments In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed that the 

deficiencies cited in the report represent a potential risk to the DOD 

personnel security program and the protection of classified information. 

DOD concurred with all our recommendations to improve its personnel 

security investigation program. DOD also stated that it plans to 

aggressively monitor and report on progress to remedy the problems we 

disclosed and to fully implement all recommendations, including 

complying with the reporting requirement under the Federal Managers’ 

Financial Integrity Act. DOD further described many actions already 

planned or under way to implement each recommendation. When fully 

implemented, these actions should correct the significant weaknesses we 

found in our review.
B-283901

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

DOD’s comments are presented in their entirety in appendix VI. DOD also 

provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 

15 days after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the 

Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Arthur L. 

Money, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence); the Honorable Louis Caldera, 

Secretary of the Army; the Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the 

Navy; the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Secretary of the Air Force; 

Lieutenant General Michael V. Hayden, Director, National Security Agency; 

and Lieutenant General (retired) Charles J. Cunningham, Jr., Acting 

Director, Defense Security Service. We are also sending copies to the 

Honorable Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security 

Affairs, and General (retired) Larry Welch, Chairman, and Mr. Dan 

Jacobson, Executive Director, Security Policy Board; and other interested 

parties.

If you have any questions about this report, please call the contacts listed in 

appendix VII.

Sincerely yours,

Carol R. Schuster

Associate Director, National Security

 Preparedness Issues
Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Appendix I

Recent Broad-Based Studies of the Personnel Apendxies

Security Investigation Process ApendxiI

Since 1974, 21 studies have assessed various aspects of the personnel 

security investigation process. The Department of Defense (DOD) 

Inspector General, GAO, special commissions, and other groups conducted 

these studies. Most recently, the Joint Security Commission and the 

Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy conducted 

three broad-based studies of the policies and procedures used for security 

investigations. This appendix describes the 33 recommendations made by 

these broad-based studies to improve personnel security investigations. 

The Security Policy Board is responsible for evaluating the 

recommendations and is tracking the status of their implementation. As of 

August 1999, 19 recommendations had been implemented, 2 had been 

rejected, and 12 were still under consideration.

Redefining Security: A 

Report by the Joint Security 

Commission, 1994

In May 1993, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central 

Intelligence established the Joint Security Commission to review security 

policies and procedures. It reviewed security procedures in DOD and the 

intelligence community and obtained advice from policymakers at all 

levels, including the Congress, military and industrial leaders, and public 

interest groups.

The Joint Security Commission’s 1994 report covered a wide variety of 

topics relating to security, including personnel security, classifying 

documents, threat assessments, physical security, and protecting 

technology and information systems. However, the Commission devoted 

most of its report to the personnel security investigation and adjudication 

processes. The Commission found the security clearance process 

needlessly complex, fragmented, and costly. It noted that (1) security 

clearances were sought for personnel who did not need them, (2) too many 

forms were required, (3) automation and information sharing were 

insufficient among federal agencies, and (4) investigations and 

adjudication were practiced differently across agencies. It made 23 

recommendations related to the personnel security investigation and 

adjudication processes. At the time we completed our work in August 1999, 

17 recommendations had been implemented, 5 were in process, and 1 had 

been rejected. Table 2 lists the recommendations and their status.
Appendix I

Recent Broad-Based Studies of the Personnel 

Security Investigation Process

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Table 2: Status of Joint Security Commission Recommendations

Source: GAO analysis of Redefining Security: A Report by the Joint Security Commission, Joint 

Security Commission, February 28, 1994.

A Report by the Joint 

Security Commission II, 

1999

On August 24, 1999, the Joint Security Commission issued its second report 

on the security systems of the United States. The Deputy Secretary of 

Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence reconvened the 

Commission to (1) assess the progress toward meeting the goals 

recommended in the Commission’s 1994 report and (2) examine emerging 

security issues that may require increased emphasis due to electronic data 

systems, networks, and communications systems due to the increasingly 

global nature of businesses and technologies. With regard to personnel 

Recommendation Status

Request clearances only for personnel requiring access to classified information Implemented

Standardize personnel security questionnaire Implemented

Establish investigative standards for secret clearances Implemented

Establish reinvestigative standards for secret clearances Implemented

Establish investigative standards for top secret clearances Implemented

Establish reinvestigative standards for top secret clearances Implemented

Grant interim clearances based on favorable review of security questionnaire Implemented

Adopt common adjudicative criteria Implemented

Do not re-adjudicate individuals with existing clearances Implemented

Limit the authority of program managers when making access determinations Implemented

Do not use trial-type procedures for clearance appeals by DOD civilian employees Implemented

Inform employees facing loss of clearances of right to counsel Implemented

Make available documents pertaining to loss of security clearances for review by employees Implemented

Give DOD civilian employees the right to personally appeal clearance revocations or denials to adjudication 

facility

Implemented

Give DOD civilian employees the right to appeal any adverse clearance decision to an appeal board Implemented

Give DOD military personnel facing clearance denials same rights as civilian employees Implemented

Appoint an executive agent for security training Implemented

Institute fee-for-service mechanisms to fund security requests In process

Increase investment in automation In process

Begin process improvement programs in all investigative and adjudicative agencies In process

Develop standard measurable objectives for investigations, adjudications, and appeals In process

Merge all DOD adjudicative entities In process

Establish a joint investigative service Rejected
Appendix I

Recent Broad-Based Studies of the Personnel 

Security Investigation Process

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

security investigations, the Joint Security Commission noted some 

progress toward achieving reciprocity as individuals move from one 

agency’s security purview to another due to the adoption of the uniform 

investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines. However, it recognized 

that there were important issues regarding the appropriateness of some of 

the standards that needed to be resolved, such as neighborhood checks and 

financial data reporting, and recommended that a research effort should be 

conducted to determine the efficacy and effectiveness of personnel 

security policies. The Commission made six recommendations related to 

personnel security investigation and adjudication processes. Since they 

were very recent, all six recommendations were in process. Table 3 lists the 

recommendations and their status.

Table 3: Status of Joint Security Commission II Recommendations

Source: GAO analysis of A Report by the Joint Security Commission II, Joint Security Commission, 

August 24, 1999.

Secrecy: Report of the 

Commission on Protecting 

and Reducing Government 

Secrecy, 1997

Title IX of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal years 1994 and 

1995 (Pub. L. 103-236, Apr. 30, 1994) created the Commission on Protecting 

and Reducing Government Secrecy. The Congress sought to (1) make 

comprehensive proposals to reduce the volume of classified information, 

(2) strengthen the protection of legitimately classified information, and

(3) improve existing personnel security procedures. This Commission was 

the first authorized by statute to examine these matters in over 40 years.

The Commission noted that the personnel security system was established 

after World War II as a means of supporting the classification system and 

Recommendation Status

The Security Policy Board should fund research on the efficacy and effectiveness of personnel security policies In process

DOD should begin to fully enforce the reinvestigative standards and within 90 days should screen all individuals 

overdue for reinvestigation and promptly complete reinvestigations for those whose positions and access suggest 

the highest risk

In process

DOD and the Central Intelligence Agency should limit interim clearances to 180 days In process

Efforts to create, coordinate, and implement security training for government and industry should continue In process

The Security Policy Board should charter a coordinated, government-wide security awareness program within 

2 years

In process

Funding should be created to initiate security training, awareness, and research projects by designated federal 

departments and agencies 

In process
Appendix I

Recent Broad-Based Studies of the Personnel 

Security Investigation Process

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

implementing programs to investigate the loyalty of federal employees. It 

found that a variety of directives and regulations had been issued to meet 

these objectives, resulting in a buildup of rules and other inefficiencies. It 

noted that although Executive Order 12968 provided for common 

investigative and adjudicative standards to improve clearance reciprocity, 

strengthen appeal procedures, and other things, it did not supersede prior 

directives. In effect, the Commission said that the new order simply added 

another regulatory layer to prior directives and regulations regarding the 

personnel security system.

The Commission concluded that the solutions to these problems called for 

a fundamental reevaluation of the personnel security system. It made four 

recommendations to improve the process. Two recommendations were 

implemented, one was in process, and one was rejected. Table 4 lists the 

recommendations and their status.

Table 4: Status of Secrecy Commission Recommendations

Source: GAO analysis of Secrecy: Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government 

Secrecy, March 3, 1997.

Recommendation Status

Make clearances reciprocal from one agency to another Implemented

Establish guiding principles for an effective personnel security system Implemented

Achieve a greater balance between initial clearances and continuing employee evaluations In process

Eliminate neighborhood and educational interviews Rejected
Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Appendix II

Scope and Methodology ApendxiI

This review focused on DOD policies and procedures for conducting 

personnel security investigations to determine individuals’ eligibility to 

access classified information. To determine whether DOD complied with 

federal investigative standards, we reviewed 530 cases that the Defense 

Security Service (DSS) sent to four adjudication facilities in January and 

February 1999 for individuals seeking a top secret clearance. We selected 

this period because DSS stated that it had instituted some special reviews 

of investigations in fiscal year 1998 to improve the investigations and that 

these changes should have been fully implemented by January 1999.1

 We 

selected separate random samples for the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, 

and the National Security Agency adjudication facilities. In fiscal year 1998, 

these adjudication facilities accounted for 73 percent of the investigative 

work done by DSS. Table 5 shows the number of investigations completed 

by DSS in January and February 1999 for each of the four DOD adjudication 

facilities and the number we reviewed.

Table 5: Number of DSS Investigations Sent to Four DOD Adjudication Facilities and 

Sampled by GAO 

Note: All investigations were received by the adjudication facilities in January and February 1999.

Source: GAO compilation of DSS completed investigations in January and February 1999 for four DOD 

adjudication facilities. 

The sampling strategy was designed to yield a precision of ±7 percentage 

points, under the assumption that we would find that 50 percent of the 

investigations were done in accordance with federal standards and

1

DSS officials stated that DSS began a series of multiple reviews of investigations it had 

completed for the Army based on complaints DSS received from the Army about the 

completeness of the cases. DSS officials further stated that cases found to be incomplete 

were not to be sent forward to the Army’s adjudication facility until all required investigative 

work was done.

DOD adjudication 

facility

Investigations sent to

facility

Investigations sampled by

GAO

Air Force 895 175

Army 429 146

Navy 190 105

National Security Agency 184 104

Total 1,698 530
Appendix II

Scope and Methodology

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

50 percent did not comply with the standards. Since the percentage of 

noncompliant investigations was much greater than 50 percent, our 

precision increased. Table 6 shows the precision for the investigation 

deficiency rate for each of the sample DOD adjudication facilities.

Table 6: Precision Rates for Investigations Sampled at Four DOD Adjudication Facilities

Source: GAO sample of 530 DSS investigations. 

To review the completeness of investigations, we developed a data 

collection instrument that incorporated the federal investigative standards 

approved by the President in March 1997. Officials in the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and 

Intelligence) and the Army’s adjudication facility reviewed the instrument, 

and we pretested it using Army investigations. To ensure the accuracy of 

our work, two of our staff reviewed each sampled investigation, and we 

returned a random subsample of deficient investigations to the Air Force, 

the Army, the Navy, and the National Security Agency adjudication facilities 

for their review.

To determine the factors that might be hindering the investigative process, 

we reviewed DSS (1) investigative policies and procedures,

(2) mechanisms to ensure the quality of investigative work, (3) methods to 

train investigative staff, and (4) automation initiatives. We reviewed DSS 

investigative policy guidance and DSS’s process for implementing policy 

changes, including coordination with other organizations, such as the DOD 

General Counsel and the Security Policy Board. To assess quality control 

procedures, we reviewed what mechanisms had been established to ensure 

the completeness of the investigative work. To assess the adequacy of 

investigative training, we determined the number of training courses 

offered to investigative staff and the number of staff attending in fiscal

Investigations with at least one deficiency Investigations with two or more deficiencies

DOD adjudication facility Number Percent Precision Number Percent Precision

Air Force 166 95 ±3 % 138 79 ±6 %

Army 129 88 ±5 % 107 73 ±6 %

Navy 96 91 ±4 % 81 77 ±6 %

National Security Agency 98 94 ±3 % 81 78 ±6 %

Total 489 407
Appendix II

Scope and Methodology

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

year 1998. We supplemented this work with surveys mailed to all 1,174 DSS 

investigators and 112 DSS case analysts. Ninety percent (1,061) of the 

investigators and 79 percent (88) of the case analysts responded. The 

questionnaires asked respondents’ views on (1) manageability of 

investigative workload, (2) adequacy of training, (3) clarity of investigative 

policy guidance, (4) manner of conducting investigations, and

(5) frequency that investigations were returned for additional work.

We also reviewed DOD’s oversight of DSS and DOD’s assessment of the 

internal controls in the personnel security investigation program. Further, 

we reviewed this program in relation to the Federal Managers’ Financial 

Integrity Act of 1982, which mandates that federal agencies conduct 

ongoing evaluations of their internal control systems to protect federal 

programs against fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.2

 That act 

further requires that the heads of federal agencies report annually to the 

President and the Congress on the condition of these systems and on 

actions to correct the weaknesses identified.

We identified the actions DOD was taking to improve investigative work, 

but we were unable to assess their effectiveness because they had not been 

sufficiently developed or implemented at the time we completed our work 

in September 1999. We also determined the number of federal employees 

(including DOD military, civilian, and contractor personnel) convicted of 

espionage from 1982 through September 1999 and reviewed studies of the 

personnel security investigation process and determined the status of 

recommendations for improvement.

We performed our work at the following DOD and other organizations:

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence), Washington, D.C.;

• Headquarters, DSS, Alexandria, Virginia;

• Gulf Coast Operating Location, DSS, Smyrna, Georgia;

• Security Policy Board, Arlington, Virginia;

• Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility, Fort Meade, 

Maryland;

• Air Force Headquarters 497th Intelligence Group, Bolling Air Force 

Base, Washington, D.C.;

2

See 31 U.S.C. 3512.
Appendix II

Scope and Methodology

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

• Department of the Navy Central Adjudication Facility, Washington, D.C.; 

and

• National Security Agency Central Adjudication Facility, Linthicum, 

Maryland.

We also discussed the personnel security investigation program, 

automation, and other issues with officials of the following adjudication 

facilities: the Defense Intelligence Agency, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense 

Office of Hearings and Appeals, and Washington Headquarters Service. In 

July 1999, we held a meeting with representatives from the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and 

Intelligence), DSS, and all eight adjudication facilities to obtain their views 

on the personnel security investigation program and any actions needed to 

improve it.

We conducted our review from October 1998 to September 1999 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Appendix III

Defense Security Service Resources and 

Workload ApendxiI

This appendix describes the Defense Security Service’s resources and 

workload for fiscal years 1991 through 1998 and the percent of changes 

during that period. Table 7 presents information on the personnel security 

budget. 

Table 7: Personnel Security Investigation Budget 

Source: Defense Security Service and GAO analysis of DSS data.

Table 8 describes the number of investigative staff assigned as personnel 

security investigators, the number assigned to other DSS functions, and the 

total number of DSS staff.

Table 8: Personnel Security Investigation Staff

Source: Defense Security Service and GAO analysis of DSS data.

Fiscal year 1998 dollars in millions

Fiscal Year

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

Investigative budget $176 $169 $184 $167 $164 $165 $146 $142

Change from FY1991 -4% +5% -5% -7% -6% -17% -19%

Other budget 53 65 51 62 59 55 56 48

Change from FY1991 +23% -4% +17% +11% +4% +6% -9%

Total DSS budget $229 $234 $235 $229 $223 $220 $202 $190

Change from FY1991 +2% +3% 0% -3% -4% -12% -17%

Fiscal Year

Staff 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

Investigators 1,652 1,562 1,432 1,324 1,230 1,120 1,165 1,251

Change from FY1991 -5% -13% -20% -26% -32% -29% -24%

Other staff 2,334 2,198 2,219 1,956 1,887 1,739 1,450 1,260

Change from FY1991 -6% -5% -16% -19% -25% -38% -46%

Total DSS staff 3,986 3,760 3,651 3,280 3,117 2,859 2,615 2,511

Change from FY1991 -6% -8% -18% -22% -28% -34% -37%
Appendix III

Defense Security Service Resources and 

Workload

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Table 9 describes the personnel security workload, including the number of 

investigations opened, the number opened per investigator, the number of 

investigations closed, and the number closed per investigator.

Table 9: Personnel Security Investigation Workload

Source: Defense Security Service and GAO analysis of DSS data.

Investigations in thousands

Fiscal Year

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

Investigations opened 227 271 214 208 212 126 190 126

Change from FY1991 +19% -6% -8% -7% -44% -16% -44%

Investigations opened per investigator 137 173 149 157 172 113 163 101

Change from FY1991 +27% +9% +15% +26% -18% +19% -26%

Investigations closed 232 264 217 206 204 158 172 142

Change from FY1991 +14% -6% -11% -12% -32% -26% -39%

Investigations closed per investigator 140 169 152 156 166 141 148 114

Change from FY1991 +21% +8% +11% +18% +1% +5% -19%
Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Appendix IV

Deficient Investigations in Our Sample ApendxiIV

This appendix describes the number of deficiencies we found in our review 

of 530 DSS investigations completed in January and February 1999. A 

deficiency is an instance where an investigation was incomplete in that it 

did not contain all the information required by federal investigative 

standards. The numbers of deficiencies are presented for (1) each of the 

four DOD adjudication facilities in our sample and for the total 530 

investigations and (2) initial investigations and reinvestigations. Table 10 

describes the number of deficient DSS investigations at four facilities.

Table 10: Number of Deficient DSS Investigations at Four DOD Adjudication Facilities

Source: GAO review of 530 DSS investigations.

No deficiency

One

deficiency

Two

deficiencies

Three or more

deficiencies

Total

investigations

Air Force

Initial investigations 1 10 8 53 72

Reinvestigations 8 18 21 56 103

Army

Initial investigations 13 12 12 37 74

Reinvestigations 4 10 18 40 72

Navy

Initial investigations 5 7 11 37 60

Reinvestigations 4 8 11 22 45

National Security Agency

Initial investigations 3 7 6 4 20

Reinvestigations 3 10 30 41 84

All four adjudication facilities

Initial investigations 22 36 37 131 226

Reinvestigations 19 46 80 159 304

Totals 41 82 117 290 530
Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Appendix V

Investigators’ Recall of Recent Training 

Received on Federal Investigative Standards ApendxiV

This appendix describes the results of the investigators’ responses about 

their training experiences on the federal investigative standards during the 

last 3 years. In our survey, we broadly defined training to include any 

courses, agent continuing education seminars, and office-held meetings 

that discussed personnel security investigation topics related to the federal 

standards. Table 11 presents the number and percent of responses 

indicating that “nothe topic had not been covered in training,” “yes—it 

had been covered,” or “could not recall.” The responses are presented for 

three groups whose sizes varied according to the number of people who 

answered each question. The groups are all investigators (996-1,009 

respondents), investigators with at least 4 years experience (921-934 

respondents), and investigators with 3 or less year’s experience (75-76 

respondents).1

 Because not all investigators answered every question, 

totals for each topic vary slightly.

Table 11: Investigators’ Responses to Survey Questions on Recent Training Received on Federal Standards

1

We separated the years of DSS investigative experience at 4 or more because DSS had a 

hiring freeze for investigators in effect from 1989 until late 1996.

All investigators

Investigators with 4 or 

more years DSS 

experience

Investigators with 3 

or less years DSS 

experience

Topic related to federal standards Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent

Corroborate subject’s birth

No 512 51.0 496 53.4 16 21.1

Yes 379 37.7 320 34.5 59 77.6

Do no recall 113 11.3 112 12.1 1 1.3

Corroborate subject’s citizenship

No 533 53.2 514 55.5 19 25.0

Yes 350 34.9 298 32.2 52 68.4

Do not recall 119 11.9 114 12.3 5 6.6

Check family’s legal status if foreign born

No 566 56.5 542 58.6 24 31.6

Yes 274 27.4 232 25.1 42 55.3

Do not recall 161 16.1 151 16.3 10 13.2

Continued
Appendix V

Investigators’ Recall of Recent Training 

Received on Federal Investigative Standards

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Corroborate education more than 3 years ago

No 465 46.6 446 48.3 19 25.3

Yes 377 37.8 332 36.0 45 60.6

Do not recall 156 15.6 145 15.7 11 14.7

Verify education within last 3 years

No 399 39.9 388 41.9 11 14.7

Yes 510 50.9 448 48.4 62 82.7

Do not recall 92 9.2 90 9.7 2 2.7

Verify all residences for last 3 years

No 316 31.5 310 33.5 6 7.9

Yes 623 62.2 555 59.9 68 89.5

Do not recall 63 6.3 61 6.6 2 2.6

Verify last 7 years of employment

No 338 33.7 332 35.8 6 7.9

Yes 598 59.6 528 57.0 70 92.1

Do not recall 67 6.7 67 7.2 0 0

Verify each employment more than 6 months

No 351 35.1 345 37.3 6 7.9

Yes 573 57.3 503 54.4 70 92.1

Do not recall 76 7.6 76 8.2 0 0

Interview each employment more than 6 months

No 348 34.7 343 37.0 5 6.6

Yes 579 57.8 509 55.0 70 92.1

Do not recall 75 7.5 74 8.0 1 1.3

Corroborate any unemployment of more than 60 days

No 360 35.9 353 38.0 7 9.2

Yes 556 55.4 487 52.5 69 90.8

Do not recall 88 8.8 88 8.5 0 0

Verify federal/military employment and discharge

No 497 49.6 474 51.2 23 30.3

Yes 296 29.5 259 28.0 37 48.7

Do not recall 209 20.9 193 20.8 16 21.1

All investigators

Investigators with 4 or 

more years DSS 

experience

Investigators with 3 

or less years DSS 

experience

Topic related to federal standards Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent

Continued from Previous Page
Appendix V

Investigators’ Recall of Recent Training 

Received on Federal Investigative Standards

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Corroborate military service records

No 598 59.8 565 61.1 33 43.4

Yes 189 18.9 160 17.3 29 38.2

Do not recall 213 21.3 199 21.5 14 18.4

Interview subject

No 215 21.5 211 22.8 4 5.3

Yes 736 73.5 663 71.7 72 94.7

Do not recall 51 5.1 51 5.5 0 0

Interview four character references

No 286 28.5 280 30.2 6 7.9

Yes 648 64.6 582 62.8 66 86.8

Do not recall 69 6.9 65 7.0 4 5.3

Interview all former spouses

No 341 33.9 328 35.3 13 17.1

Yes 557 55.4 496 53.4 61 80.3

Do not recall 107 10.6 105 11.3 2 2.6

Conduct state and local government records’ checks

No 382 38.3 367 39.8 15 20.0

Yes 524 52.5 465 50.4 59 78.7

Do not recall 92 9.2 91 9.9 1 1.3

Conduct financial checks and resolve credit issues

No 37 3.7 31 3.3 6 8.0

Yes 949 94.1 881 94.3 68 90.7

Do not recall 23 2.3 22 2.4 1 1.3

Verify bankruptcy

No 156 15.5 151 16.2 5 6.7

Yes 799 79.5 731 78.6 68 90.7

Do not recall 50 5.0 48 5.2 2 2.7

Verify divorces

No 426 42.7 410 44.4 16 21.3

Yes 413 41.4 363 39.3 50 66.7

Do not recall 159 15.9 150 16.3 9 12.0

All investigators

Investigators with 4 or 

more years DSS 

experience

Investigators with 3 

or less years DSS 

experience

Topic related to federal standards Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent

Continued from Previous Page
Appendix V

Investigators’ Recall of Recent Training 

Received on Federal Investigative Standards

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Verify civil/criminal actions with court records

No 342 34.3 333 36.2 9 12.0

Yes 537 53.9 476 51.7 61 81.3

Do not recall 117 11.7 112 12.2 5 6.7

All investigators

Investigators with 4 or 

more years DSS 

experience

Investigators with 3 

or less years DSS 

experience

Topic related to federal standards Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent

Continued from Previous Page
Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiVI
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Now on p. 35.

Now on p. 35.

Now on p. 35.
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Now on p. 35.

Now on p. 35.
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 56 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Now on pp. 35-36.
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 57 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Now on p. 36.
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Now on p. 36.

Now on p. 36.
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Now on p. 36.
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Now on p. 36.
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Now on p. 36.
Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-00-12 DOD Personnel

Appendix VII

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiVI

GAO Contacts Norman J. Rabkin (202) 512-5140

Carol R. Schuster (202) 512-5140

Christine A. Fossett (202) 512-2956

Acknowledgments In addition to those named above, Mark E. Gebicke, Rodney E. Ragan, 

Frank Bowen, Jay S. Willer, Carole F. Coffey, Jack E. Edwards, Thomas W. 

Gosling, Ernie E. Jackson, Michael R. Kellermann, Stanley J. Kostyla, Tracy 

A. McCaffery, Joseph T. McDermott, Holly R. Plank, Madelon B. Savaides, 

Robert L. Williams, Jr., Susan K. Woodward, and William E. Woodward 

made key contributions to this report.

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