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NEWS FROM THE FRONT

Oct 2019

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

How the Kosovo Security Force Built a Successful 

Lessons Learned Program

Oct 2019

Mark E. Schiller

Military Analyst

Center for Army Lessons Learned

LTC Bekim Zejnullahu 

Chief of Doctrine

Kosovo Security Force
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News from the Front:

How the Kosovo Security Force Built a Successful Lessons Learned Program

Oct, 2019

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How the Kosovo Security Force Built a Successful Lessons Learned Program

Introduction

Today, the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) has an exemplary lessons learned 

program that continuously contributes to improving its training and operational 

performance. The KSF’s successful lessons learned program did not happen overnight, 

but developed over a period of almost 5 years with continual senior leadership support, 

outside assistance from the United States Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned 

(CALL), and its own internal, progressive improvements to its program. The following 

tells the story of how the KSF established and sustained its lessons learned program. 

The KSF’s experience in instituting its lessons learned program can serve as a model 

for other armies or land forces to emulate. 

KSF Leadership 

The KSF leadership is the driving force behind the KSF’s successful lessons 

learned program. In 2012, the KSF Commander issued a command directive to create 

and formalize a lessons learned program within the KSF. The command directive 

provided guidance to KSF commanders at all levels regarding the establishment and 

organization of a KSF lessons learned program, and most importantly, set the tone and 

emphasis for the establishment of a lessons learned culture within the KSF. The 

directive told KSF commanders at all echelons that a lessons learned system offers 

them and their units “the possibility to learn from their and others’ success and 

mistakes” and when effective, “encourages positive activity and prevents recurrence of 

errors.” 
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Shortly following the issuance of the Command Directive, the KSF Training and 

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published the KSF Lessons Learned Standard 

Operating Procedure (SOP) aimed at describing in detail the organization, functions, 

and responsibilities for the KSF lessons learned program. The SOP describes the KSF 

lessons learned process as a four-step process leading to lessons learned 

implementation and issue resolution. The four-step process, “collecting observations, 

analysis, approval/action, and validation and implementation” is depicted below (see 

Figure 1). A key event in the process is the activation of a Lessons Learned Working 

Group (LLWG) whose role is to conduct analysis of observations to determine KSF best 

practices and issues using the capability factors of doctrine, organization, training, 

materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, policy and interoperability 

(DOTMLPF-PI). "Interoperability" is from the NATO DOTMLPF-I capability factors. 

Figure 1. KSF Lessons Learned Resolution Process
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KSF and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) 

The KSF’s desire to improve its lessons learned program began in September 

2014 when the KSF Commander requested a team from CALL to provide the KSF 

Lessons Learned Program with advice and assistance in order to further improve its 

capabilities. The KSF Commander specifically sought CALL’s assistance to improve 

the KSF’s lessons learned process so it could effectively take the next step to identify 

and resolve KSF DOTMLPF-PI issues. The KSF’s lessons learned process was 

functioning to collect observations and lessons; however, conducting the analysis to 

facilitate DOTMLPF-PI effected change still presented a challenge for its lesson learned 

process. 

Working with the KSF TRADOC through the US Embassy’s Office of Defense 

Cooperation (ODC), CALL and KSF TRADOC jointly developed a path of lessons 

learned cooperation. This path consisted of three phases over a 2-year period, to help 

the KSF in enhancing the effectiveness of its lessons learned program aimed primarily 

at identifying and closing KSF DOTMLPF-PI capability gaps, per the KSF Commander’s 

guidance. The KSF TRADOC leadership and CALL agreed to leverage the existing KSF 

lessons learned process, shown in Figure 1, as it was in place and functioning, to 

elevate it to the next level to identify and solve KSF DOTMLPF-PI issues. 

KSF’s and CALL’s Three Phases of Lessons Learned Cooperation

The three phases unfolded on an annual basis from October 2014 through 

November 2016. The first phase, conducted in October 2014 entitled “Lessons Learned 

Academics,” was a seminar facilitated by two CALL analysts with participating KSF 

leaders and lessons learned personnel. The next two phases, considered the most 
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important, were lessons learned practicums occurring during the 2015 Eagle IV and 

2016 Eagle V exercises where KSF lessons learned personnel, assisted by CALL 

analysts, in a field exercise environment applied the collection and analysis phases of 

lessons learned and entitled as a practicums. The three phases are depicted below 

followed by a discussion of each phase (see Figure 2). 

Figure 2. KSF and CALL Lessons Learned Improvement Program

Phase 1: Lessons Learned Academics 

Phase 1, Lessons Learned Academics, was a 3-day seminar, facilitated by two 

CALL analysts, tailored to the existing KSF lessons learned program. The Academics 

were designed to demonstrate to KSF lessons learned personnel how the lessons 

learned process, through the collection and analysis of observations, can effectively 

identify DOTMLPF- PI best practices and issues to drive positive performance change 

within the KSF (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Lessons Learned Academics

Day 1: The seminar’s first day began with a CALL overview brief aimed at 

showing seminar students the mission, organization, and processes of an established 

and functioning lessons learned program and how it drives positive change within the 

US Army. A key point of the presentation was that CALL's lessons learned program is a 

formal, Army-sanctioned program governed by an Army Regulation (AR 11-33), “The 

Army Lessons Learned Program,” serving the purpose of integrating and implementing 

lessons and best practices within Army doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 

leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF–P). This key point 

served as a transition to the second presentation that highlighted why lessons learned is 

an important function within an Army. CALL analysts provided KSF participants several 

historical and contemporary examples from recent conflicts of how lessons identified by 

CALL enhanced the operational performance of Army units and most importantly, saved 

lives. The third presentation reinforced lessons learned terminology by reviewing the 

basic lessons learned terms of reference and their respective definitions such as 

observe, collect, analyze, issue resolution, and disseminate. CALL analysts discussed 

the DOTMLPF-PI framework and warfighting functions and how these both play an 

important role in categorizing observations for DOTMLPF-PI analysis to identify best 
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practices and issues. Day 1 concluded with a discussion of the NATO Lessons Learned 

Program and how it contrasts with that of CALL's. The main difference between the two 

is that NATO's process is passive in nature where CALL's is active. CALL actively 

collects observations by deploying collection teams to exercises and actual operations. 

CALL also has Military Analysts, known as Military Analysts Forward (MAF), in each of 

the Army Service Component Commands (ASCC) who actively collect observations. 

Day 2: Day 2 was highlighted by CALL analysts facilitating discussions pertaining 

to After Action Reviews (AAR), collection planning and execution, and analysis. A 

critical part of the AAR discussion was explaining why AARs are conducted and the 

contribution AARs make towards promoting a sharing knowledge sharing culture and 

learning in a non-retribution environment within an Army organization. Also emphasized 

is why AARs are an excellent source of observations, especially when conducted 

immediately after a training event or an actual operation. Observations from AARs serve 

as baseline from which analysts can conduct DOTMLPF-PI analysis to identify best 

practices and issues in an Army organization. Finally, CALL analysts discussed the

difference between both formal and informal AARs, when they are used, and the 

preparation involved to productively execute them. 

Collection planning was the next topic discussed and students were introduced to 

the two types of collection used by observers, direct and indirect, and how they are both 

used to collect information through active and passive means. A key part of the 

collection planning discussion focused on the observer whose role is to engage with a 

unit during training or operations in order to collect observations. Experienced analysts 

must train observers beforehand on collection techniques, especially writing a proper
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observation that effectively captures it in an issue, discussion, and recommendation 

format. CALL analysts also discussed the steps involved in forming and training a 

collection team of observers and how to develop an observer collection plan for a 

training exercise or an actual operation. 

CALL analysts' final discussion focused on analysis of collected observations. 

CALL analysts discussed qualitative and quantitative techniques, showing how an 

observation can be categorized under one or more warfighting functions and how 

DOTMLPF-PI elements apply to the observation that is further used to determine unit 

DOTMLPF-PI trends and gaps. CALL analysts then showed students examples of CALL 

collection reports, known as Initial Impression Reports that were the output of a CALL 

organized collection detailing key observations and their associated DOTMLPF-PI 

recommendations. 

Day 3: CALL analysts highlighted the Lessons Learned Issue Resolution process 

emphasizing it as the most important function for driving positive change in an Army. 

Senior leaders should have a practical means of resolving and implementing lessons 

learned to improve an Army organization’s DOTMLPF-PI performance. CALL analysts 

introduced students to CALL's DOTMLPF-PI issue resolution process to show how 

leadership, institutions, and issue stakeholders come together to methodically solve 

issues affecting the Army. Analysts showed examples of how the US Army's issue 

resolution process, facilitated by CALL, functioned to effectively resolve several 

challenging Army issues.

For the final discussion of the day, CALL analysts discussed the important role of 

archiving and disseminating of lessons learned information. Over time, a lessons 
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learned organization continually collects and archives into its database a wealth of 

lessons learned information to include AARs, Initial Impression Reports, and many other 

documents associated with lessons learned. The archived information is valuable to 

analysts for research, analysis, and answering requests for information that originate 

from around the Army. Analysts discussed various methods and models for archiving 

and disseminating lessons learned information that includes the use of databases, 

lessons learned networks, publications, seminars, social media, and professional 

military education. 

Phases 2 and 3: Eagle Exercises 4 and 5

The KSF annually conducts a major field exercise, entitled Eagle Exercise #, to 

train its land forces on potential missions such as a natural disaster and refugee control, 

as was the case respectively with 2015’s Eagle Exercise 4 and 2016’s Eagle Exercise

5. The Eagle exercises provide the KSF an opportunity to both plan and execute a 

major training exercise. During the planning phase, the KSF employs the military 

decision making process (MDMP) from brigade through battalion level and troop leading 

procedures (TLP) at company level and below. During the exercise’s execution phase, a 

Master Scenario Events List (MSEL) drives incidents/situations on the ground designed 

to achieve exercise training objectives. The KSF forms and employs observer-controller 

(OC) teams to collect on both phases giving KSF leaders and units feedback on KSF 

unit capabilities across all of its warfighting functions from a DOTMLPF-PI perspective 

in a field operating environment. 

Eagle Exercise 4: Collection Practicum 
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The KSF TRADOC Lessons Learned Team, assisted by two CALL analysts, 

planned and executed the collection practicum during the 2015 KSF Eagle 4 Exercise. 

The objective of the collection practicum was to develop an observation collection plan 

and execute it during Eagle 4. The Eagle 4 Exercise was a 2-week disaster relief 

exercise driven by a fictitious earthquake scenario. During the exercise’s first week,

KSF brigades and battalions conducted MDMP planning followed by a second week of 

disaster relief execution in a field environment. 

The US Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO) 

advisory team assisted the KSF in establishing and training an OC team to collect 

observations from both the MDMP and field phases of the exercise. The KSF OC Team 

focused its collection on the warfighting functions of mission command, movement and 

maneuver, and sustainment, providing KSF leadership DOTMLPF-PI feedback on the 

performance of its units during the exercise.

KSF TRADOC fielded a lessons learned team to work jointly with the KSF OC 

Team to collect observations using a pre-planned collection plan. The KSF Lessons 

Learned Team consisted of a team chief and nine KSF officers. Two CALL analysts 

worked closely with the lessons learned team prior to the exercise, assisting team 

members in developing a collection plan that collected observations organized by 

warfighting functions and designed to collect on KSF DOTMPLF-PI related issues and 

Master Scenario Events List (MSEL) driven exercise events.

Key inputs that went into building the Eagle 4 Exercise collection plan were 

previous Eagle Exercise AARs, Exercise Director’s Training Objectives, KSF Land 

Force Commander’s Exercise Guidance and the United States Army Universal Task List 
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(AUTL). The AUTL served as an excellent reference for the KSF Lessons Learned 

Team by providing it a comprehensive listing of universal Army tasks and missions 

performed by tactical units in a civil disaster operation during both planning and 

execution. The tasks formed the basis of the collection plan's questions. 

Prior to the start of the exercise, the KSF lessons learned team provided the OC 

team its exercise collection plan. The collection plan's inputs helped focus the OC 

team’s collection efforts on DOTMLPF-PI areas of interest. During the entire exercise, 

the KSF lessons learned and OC teams collaborated closely, holding daily meetings, to 

ensure they stayed synchronized with each other’s exercise collection activities and 

objectives.

At the exercise’s conclusion, the OC team had collected numerous observations 

from AARs it facilitated during both the MDMP and execution phases of the Eagle 4 

Exercise. The OC team subsequently passed its observations to the KSF lessons 

learned team so it could begin its DOTMLPF-PI analysis process. The collection 

practicum’s objectives, as stated previously, were completely achieved by both the KSF 

lessons learned and OC teams. Meeting these objectives was a major accomplishment 

for the KSF Lessons Learned Team because it demonstrated to them that collection, 

when done correctly, provides the needed observations for DOTMLPF-PI analysis. 

Eagle Exercise 5: Analysis Practicum

As originally planned in 2014 between CALL and KSF TRADOC, Exercise Eagle 

5 would serve as the event in which the KSF Lessons Learned Team, assisted by 

CALL, would focus on the analysis phase of the lessons learned process. 
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The Eagle 5 exercise focused on a refugee control crisis scenario designed to 

train the KSF in refugee-related situations. Similar to Eagle 4, it was conducted in two 

phases: MDMP planning and execution. MSEL injected events during the execution 

phase occurred primarily on Kosovo’s borders, presenting the KSF leadership and units 

with some unique and real-world refugee control challenges. Distances alone taxed the 

KSF warfighting functions, especially mission command, movement and maneuver, and 

sustainment to resolve the various refugee-related problem sets presented over a 4-day 

period. Some of the refugee events injected during exercise execution were refugee 

control at border crossings, refugees illegally crossing borders, refugee rioting in 

refugee camps, refugee safety and welfare, and criminal groups involved in refugee and 

weapons trafficking (see Figure 4). The red stars on the map at Figure 5 represent the 

locations where refugee-injected events occurred. Kosovo’s civil organizations played

Figure 4. Kosovo Map and Exercise Refugee Events (Stars)

a major role in the exercise, giving the KSF the opportunity to work jointly with its civil 

partners. The OCs and lessons learned personnel were present at each of these 

exercise driven events, collecting observations for post exercise analysis. 
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The KSF resourced its own OC team, employing 35 subject matter experts 

(SMEs) from within the KSF, much like it did for Eagle 4. OC coverage was 

comprehensive from brigade to company level. The OC team’s primary tasks were to 

collect observations and facilitate AARs from brigade through company level during the 

planning and execution phases of the Eagle 5 exercise. The lessons learned team, 

composed of nine members, developed a collection plan using essentially the same 

inputs as it did for Eagle 4. However, Eagle 5’s collection plan was much more focused 

on DOTMLPF-PI issues that were identified and carried over from Eagle 4.

Analysis Practicum: Lessons Learned Work Group (LLWG)

Approximately two weeks after Eagle 5’s conclusion, at the direction of the KSF 

Land Force Commander and Deputy Commander, the Land Forces Command formed a 

LLWG. The LLWG was led by the KSF TRADOC’s Chief of Doctrine and participants in 

the working group were KSF lessons learned and doctrine personnel, KSF warfighting 

function SMEs, the Eagle 5 OC Team Chief to include members of his team, and two 

CALL analysts (see Figure 5). The work group’s primary goal, after four days of analysis 

and deliberation, was to generate a DOTMLPF-PI report for the KSF Commander and 

KSF Land Force Commander identifying the DOTMLPF-PI issues, with supporting 

observations, for resolution within the KSF. 
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Figure 5. Lessons Learned Working Group 

A key component of the report, exhibited in the report's executive summary, was 

a list of the key DOTMLPF-PI issues (see Figure 6). Upon KSF leadership approval of 

the key issues list, it would task a responsible organization within the KSF to develop an 

action plan aimed at resolving each issue. 

Figure 6. Key DOTMLPF-PI Issues

The LLWG analyzed over 200 collected observations from the OCs and brigade, 

battalion, and company written AARs. The format used for each collected observation 
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was issue, discussion, and recommendation. The LLWG analyzed each observation 

determining first whether it was still valid, and if it was, further categorizing it under one 

of the KSF warfighting functions. The analysis work group then determined what 

DOTMLPF-PI criteria were applicable to each observation. 

The LLWG then prioritized the observations into two lists. The first list of 

observations, considered the most important, were DOTMLPF-PI key issues applicable 

across the entire KSF requiring the attention of senior leaders and an action plan for 

resolution. These issues were presented in the report on the DOTMLPF-PI key issues 

list depicted above and included in the final report's executive summary. The second list 

were DOTMLPF-PI issues that could be resolved at lower echelons, mainly at the 

brigade and battalion level. 

The KSF TRADOC Commander and KSF Chief of Doctrine subsequently briefed 

and received concurrence from the KSF Commander and KSF Land Force Commander 

on the findings within the DOTMLPF-PI report, particularly the key issues facing the 

KSF. The KSF is now in the process of developing action plans to resolve the identified 

DOTMLPF-PI issues. 

Conclusion 

Instrumental in the success of the KSF Lessons Learned Program was the senior 

leader emphasis and the patient efforts leaders made over time to both sustain and 

improve the program. CALL played an advisory/assistance role, but it was the continual 

support of KSF senior leadership that really made a positive, effective difference in the 

KSF Lessons Learned Program. Additionally, the collection and analysis practicums, 

conducted respectively during Eagle 4 and Eagle 5 exercises, proved invaluable in that 
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the KSF truly gained an appreciation for how a fully functioning lessons learned process 

can identify and resolve DOTMLPF-PI issues to improve its operational and training 

performance. 
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