United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-3864

 

Christina Peeper, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United

States

* District Court for the

Callaway County Ambulance District, * Western a District of

Missouri.

political subdivision of the State of *

Missouri, *

*

 Appellee. *

 

Submitted: May 21, 1997

 Filed: August 19, 1997

 

Before MURPHY, HEANEY, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.

 

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

Appellant, Christina Peeper, sought injunctive relief

from a resolution of a county ambulance district board

of directors limiting her participation as a member of

that board because of her marriage to an employee of the

ambulance district. The district court denied Peeper’s

motion, holding that the resolution was narrowly drawn to

meet significant state interests. We reverse.
2
3

I.

In April 1996, Peeper became a member of the

Callaway County Ambulance District Board of Directors

(“Board”) after winning an election for the seat

representing her subdistrict. Peeper’s husband had

worked as an emergency medical technician and supervisor

for the Callaway County Ambulance District (“District”)

for two years at the time of Peeper’s election to the

Board. The District is a corporate body and political

subdivision of the State of Missouri governed by the sixmember Board. At the time of Peeper’s election, the

District and its employees were engaged in discussions

over three major issues affecting their employment

relationship: threatened litigation regarding overtime

wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act; organization of

the employees of the District for purposes of collective

bargaining; and the schedule and hours worked by District

employees.

Peeper attended her first meeting as a member of the

Board on April 23, 1996. After conducting its routine

business and election of officers, the Board adopted,

over Peeper’s objection, a resolution limiting Peeper’s

participation as a member of the Board. On May 28, 1996,

the Board passed an amended resolution with the same

goal. The resolution provided: 

[I]n order to comply with applicable law and

effectively prevent Christin[a] Peeper from

using confidential information concerning the

District for financial gain, . . . the

undersigned board members desire and do hereby

allow Christin[a] Peeper to participate in any
4

District matter except she may not participate

in discussions involving, or vote upon, any of

the following:

A. Legal actions, causes of action or

litigation between the District and its

employees and any confidential or privileged

communication between the District or its

representatives and its attorneys or legal work

product;
5

B. Hiring, firing, disciplining or

promoting of particular employees by the

District when personal information about the

employee, including information relating to the

performance or merit of individual employees, is

discussed or recorded;

C. Testing and examination materials,

before the test or examination is given or, if

it is to be given again, before so given again;

D. Preparation, including any discussions

or work product, on behalf of the District or

its representatives for negotiations with

employee groups;

E. Individually identifiable personnel

records, performance ratings or records

pertaining to employees or applicants for

employment, including information relating to

medical, psychiatric, psychological, or

alcoholism or drug dependency diagnosis or

treatment; and,

F. Any other matter implicating the

conflict-of-interest concerns of Chapter 105

RSMo which the board may, by majority vote,

decide to prevent Christin[a] Peeper from

hearing, participating in, or voting upon.

. . . [I]n order effort [sic] to comply with

applicable law and effectively prevent

Christin[a] Peeper from acting in matters that

would result in a specific monetary benefit to

her or her spouse, that Christin[a] Peeper is

directed to recuse herself and if she does not

recuse herself she is prohibited from hearing,

participating in, or voting upon the following:

A. Budgetary items involving the

compensation, benefits, and pensions paid to

employees;

B. The hiring, promotion, discipline,

compensation, benefits, and pensions of

employees of the District; and

C. Any other matter implicating the

conflict-of-interest concerns of Chapter 105
6

RSMo which the board may, by majority vote,

decide to prevent Christin[a] Peeper from

hearing, participating in, or voting upon.

(Jt. App. at 62-64). The Missouri conflict-of-interest

law, to which the resolution refers provides, in part,

that:

No elected or appointed official or employee

. . . of any political subdivision [of the

state] shall:

. . . .
 Confidential information is defined as “all information . . . which is of such a nature 1

that it is not, at that time, a matter of public record or public knowledge.” Mo. Rev.

Stat. § 105.450(5) (1997).

 The Missouri conflict-of-interest law imposes criminal sanctions on any person who 2

violate its strictures. The first knowing violation of the conflict-of-interest law

constitutes a class B misdemeanor under Missouri law. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 105.478(1)

(1997). A party committing a second offense under the law is guilty of a class D

felony. Id. § 105.478(2).

7

(2) Use confidential information obtained in

1

the course of or by reason of . . . [her]

official capacity in any manner with intent to

result in financial gain for [her]self [or her]

spouse . . . ;

(3) Disclose confidential information

obtained in the course of or by reason of [her]

. . . official capacity in any manner with

intent to result in financial gain for [her]self

or any other person;

(4) Favorably act on any matter that is so

specifically designed so as to provide a special

monetary benefit to such official or [her]

spouse . . . . In all such matters such

officials must recuse themselves from acting . .

. .

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 105.454 (1997) (footnote added). Board

members expressed concern about their own potential

criminal liability in the event Peeper misused

2

information she received as a member of the Board.

Peeper protested the May resolution and filed a claim

in federal court seeking injunctive relief based on her

claim that the resolutions violated her rights under the

First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution and under the free speech clause of the

Missouri Constitution. The district court denied
8

Peeper’s request for relief. The court held that the May

resolution is “content-neutral,” narrowly tailored to

meet the significant government interests of preventing

the appearance of government corruption and promoting the

effective functioning of the District, and leaves open

alternative channels of communication for Peeper. Id. at

6. The court further held that the May resolution

conforms to the provisions of the Missouri conflict-
9

of-interest law, specifically citing section 105.476

which provides, in part, that “nothing in [s]ections

105.450 to 105.498 shall prohibit any political

subdivision from establishing additional or more

stringent requirements than those specified in [s]ections

105.450 to 105.498.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 105.476 (1997).

The restrictions in the May resolution place limitations

on Peeper that are not rationally related to the goals of

Missouri conflict-of-interest law and that impinge on

Peeper’s First Amendment associational rights and her

Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. Therefore,

we reverse. 

II.

We review the district court’s conclusions of law de

novo. United States v. Kistner, 68 F.3d 218, 220-21 (8th

Cir. 1995). Our first task is to determine whether the

challenged resolution deserves scrutiny that goes beyond

that traditionally required for restrictions placed on

candidates or officeholders. See Clements v. Fashing,

457 U.S. 957, 963 (1981). Where a regulation implicates

a fundamental right, such as the First Amendment’s free

speech guarantee, we review the regulation under

heightened scrutiny. Id. If no fundamental right is

implicated, traditional equal protection principles

apply. Id. Traditional equal protection principles

dictate that state-imposed burdens that affect some

citizens differently than others offend equal protection

under the Fourteenth Amendment only if such a burden is

“wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the [s]tate’s

[constitutional] objectives.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366

U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
 Strict scrutiny under the First Amendment dictates that a state may not restrict

3

speech on a content basis unless it can show the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve

a compelling state interest. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,

518 U.S. ___, ___ (1996).

10

The district court examined the May resolution under

the First Amendment strict scrutiny standard. We

3

disagree that strict scrutiny applies to the limitations

at issue. 
11

An individual’s right to be a candidate for public office

under the First and Fourteenth Amendments is nearly

identical to one’s right to hold that office. Because of

the analogous rights involved, we employ the same

constitutional test for restrictions on an officeholder

as we do for restrictions on candidacy. In reviewing

candidacy restrictions, the existence of barriers to a

candidate’s access to the ballot “does not of itself

compel close scrutiny.” Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134,

143 (1972). The Supreme Court has upheld restrictions on

candidacy that are unrelated to First Amendment values

and that “protect the integrity and reliability of the

electoral process itself.” See Anderson v. Celebrezze,

460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983) (citing Clements, 457 U.S.

at 973 (upholding state provision prohibiting an

incumbent Justice of the Peace from seeking election to

the state legislature)). To determine whether to uphold

restrictions on candidacy, we first “consider the

character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the

rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments”

caused by the challenged restriction. Anderson, 460 U.S.

at 789. Following that evaluation, we must:

identify and evaluate the precise interests put

forward by the [s]tate as justifications for the

burden imposed by the rule. In passing

judgment, the Court must not only determine the

legitimacy and the strength of each of those

interests; it also must consider the extent to

which those interests make it necessary to

burden the plaintiff’s rights. 

Id. 
12

Following this process, we initially consider the

injury caused by restrictions on the officeholder. As

is the case with restrictions on candidacy, restrictions

on an elected official’s ability to perform her duties

implicate the interests of two distinct parties: the

individual’s First Amendment associational rights and

Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights; and the

voters’ rights to be meaningfully 
 Limitations on an elected official’s participation in the proceedings of a public body 4

such as the District also conceivably affect the official’s First Amendment free speech

rights, which would require us to apply strict scrutiny as Peeper suggests. Here,

however, the May resolution only limits Peeper’s participation as a member of the

Board and does not limit her ability to vote for Board members, to speak before the

Board during public comment periods, or to otherwise express her opinions about the

District’s operation as any other citizen may under the First Amendment’s free speech

guarantee. 

 Candidacy restrictions affect the voters’ First Amendment right to be represented 5

by reducing the pool of candidates, although voters have the opportunity to recruit other

candidates to represent their viewpoints. See Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1126

(2d Cir. 1978) (requirements for candidacy are not unconstitutional unless they deny

a cognizable group of citizens the right to meaningful representation through other

candidates). Limitations on an officeholder, by contrast, provide voters no opportunity

to be heard through an alternative representative. If the restrictions prevent the

officeholder from meaningfully representing the voters who elected the official, such

restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny. See Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143. Because

Peeper does not raise the issue of the voters’ rights, and because we hold the May

resolution unconstitutional under the rational-basis test, we need not determine whether

13

represented by their elected officials. Cf. Bullock, 405

U.S. at 143 (1972) (“[T]he rights of voters and the

rights of candidates do not always lend themselves to

neat separation” when considering the effect of

limitations on candidacy). Restrictions on a public

official’s participation necessarily affect that

individual’s First Amendment associational rights and

Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. Legitimate

4

state interests may warrant restrictions that are de

minimis limitations of the official’s participation. See

Clements, 457 U.S. at 972-73. Restrictions on an

officeholder after election also infringe upon voters’

rights to be represented even more severely than when a

state similarly restricts candidacy.5
strict scrutiny applies.

14

Although the district court upheld the May resolution

applying the more rigid strict-scrutiny standard, we hold

the resolution unconstitutional under rational-basis 
 Board members also expressed an interest in avoiding their own criminal liability 6

for violations of the Missouri conflict-of-interest law that Peeper might commit. Yet,

the statute requires a person to “knowingly” violate the conflict-of-interest law before

that person is subject to criminal liability. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 105.478(1). The mere

presence of Peeper in discussions that are not specific to her husband cannot constitute

knowledge of, much less the “aiding or abetting”of a violation of the statute on the part

of other Board members. 

15

review. The resolution’s provisions injure Peeper’s

First Amendment associational rights and her Fourteenth

Amendment equal protection rights. The resolution

creates a standard specific to Peeper that treats her

differently than other Board members, strongly

implicating her Fourteenth Amendment equal protection

rights. The restrictions also restrain Peeper’s

interaction with other Board members, implicating her

First Amendment associational rights.

Having determined that the resolution injures

Peeper’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, we

evaluate the state’s purported interests and whether the

restrictions rationally serve those interests. The

Board’s stated interests are threefold: to prevent the

misappropriation of information for personal gain; to

prevent the appearance of impropriety; and to promote the

free flow of ideas among members of the Board. Each of 6

these interests, if served, can at a minimum constitute

a reasonable state interest. See, e.g., FEC v. National

Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500

(1985) (government’s interest in avoiding corruption is

compelling); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976)

(prevention of the appearance of corruption is a concern

almost equal to the prevention of actual corruption);

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 270 (1964)
16

(uninhibited, wide-open debate should be a “profound

national commitment” and a “fundamental principle of the

American government”). In this case, however, the

portions of the resolution that restrict Peeper from

participating in or even hearing discussions not directly

related to her husband do not rationally relate to those

interests.
17

The May resolution limits Peeper in a wide range of

matters, most of which do not involve the concerns

expressed by the Board or addressed by the conflict-ofinterest law. For instance, the May resolution prevents

Peeper from participating in discussions of or voting on

“[l]egal actions, causes of action or litigation between

the District and its employees” without a requirement

that the topic be related to Peeper’s husband’s

employment. Likewise, the resolution prevents Peeper

from participating in discussions of hiring or firing

employees or addressing testing and examination materials

without regard to whether Peeper’s husband is associated

with the matters. The resolution goes well beyond the

Missouri conflict-of-interest law’s general prohibition

of the misuse of confidential information for financial

gain and recusal requirement for measures “designed . .

. to provide a special monetary benefit” to the official

or her spouse. 

The Board’s concern about keeping its discussions

free-flowing, particularly during the Board’s closed

sessions, is based on its belief that Peeper’s presence

would chill discussions between other Board members.

This chilling, the Board contends, stems from the other

Board members’ opinion that if Peeper is present she

might pass on confidential information to her husband who

would, in turn, pass it on to his co-workers. It is

incongruous, however, for a state to allow the election

of people with such relationships to public office and

then consider them less-trustworthy stewards of

confidential information merely because of these

relationships. The Missouri conflict-of-interest law

prohibits any public official from misusing confidential

information or acting for self-benefit, and those with
18

spouses employed by the public bodies they serve perhaps

face greater temptations to run afoul of that

prohibition. One does not, however, face any additional

temptation where the matters are unrelated to the

official’s spouse. Yet the May resolution prohibits

Peeper from participating in any matter dealing with any

employee’s records, any testing material, or the hiring

or firing of any employee. The Board’s interest in

preventing corruption or at least the appearance of

corruption is not served by the vast portions of the May

resolution that go beyond matters that could not lead or

appear to lead to corrupt behavior by Peeper. 
19

As such, those portions of the May resolution are not

rationally related to the state interests cited by the

Board.

Because provisions of the May resolution infringe

upon Peeper’s constitutional rights under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments without being rationally related to

a legitimate state interest, the May resolution cannot

stand as written. 

III.

We reverse the decision of the district court. In

light of our holding that the May resolution cannot stand

as written, no injunctive relief is necessary.

A true copy.

Attest.

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.