United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Secretary of Defense

January 1998 AIR FORCE

AIRCRAFT

Reorganizing Mobility

Aircraft Units Could

Reduce Costs

GAO/NSIAD-98-55

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-276447 

January 21, 1998

The Honorable William Cohen

The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Over the past few years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been

interested in modernizing its forces with new weapons and equipment. For

a variety of reasons, these efforts have been stymied, and funds that DOD

expected to have available to modernize the force have been needed

instead for current operational activities. Therefore, you have expressed

an interest in reducing operating costs.

We have been assessing various Air Force activities to determine the

feasibility of reducing operating costs. A few years ago, we evaluated

whether the Air Force could operate its fighter forces more

cost-effectively. In May 1996, we reported that the Air Force’s fighter force

was not organized economically and recommended that the Air Force

develop an implementation plan for operating its fighter force in larger,

more cost-effective squadrons.1 DOD concurred with that recommendation.

For this follow-on effort, we assessed the cost-effectiveness of organizing

the Air Force’s airlift and refueling force into fewer, larger-sized squadrons

and wings. In making this assessment, we (1) evaluated the effect that

reorganization may have on mission accomplishment, (2) determined

whether costs could be reduced through redistributing aircraft among

fewer wings, and (3) developed five possible options for redistributing

C-130 and KC-135 aircraft among fewer wings at lower operating costs.

This report focuses on the reserve component2

 combat C-130 and KC-135

aircraft.

Background The C-130 and KC-135 aircraft are important parts of DOD’s air mobility

force. The C-130’s primary role is to provide airlift for theater cargo and

personnel. The KC-135 aircraft is the Air Force’s core refueler. The

majority of these aircraft are in the reserve component, as shown in 

table 1.

1

Air Force Aircraft: Consolidating Fighter Squadrons Could Reduce Costs (GAO/NSIAD-96-82, 

May 6, 1996).

2

In this report, the term reserve component refers to the Air Force Reserve (Reserve) and the Air

National Guard (Guard) collectively.

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Table 1: C-130 and KC-135 Force

Structure

Type of aircraft

Number of

aircraft

Number of

locations

Percent of

Air Force

aircraft

C-130

Active Air Force 148 7 33

Air National Guard 196 23 44

Air Force Reserve 104 10 23

Total 448 40 100

KC-135

Active Air Force 204 7 43

Air National Guard 204 19 43

Air Force Reserve 64 6 14

Total 472 32 100

Source: Air Force, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard data.

Reserve component C-130 flying squadrons generally have 8 aircraft, and

KC-135 squadrons generally have 10. Active force C-130 squadrons

typically have 14 aircraft, while active KC-135 squadrons have 12. A

reserve component wing comprises flying squadrons and other nonflying

squadrons. Generally, reserve component wings have one flying squadron,

unlike active wings, which generally have two to three flying squadrons.

Some of the nonflying squadrons, such as maintenance, military police,

and logistics squadrons, are directly related to the flying squadron, while

others, such as medical, civil engineering, and communications squadrons,

are not directly related.

Reserve component C-130 and KC-135 aircraft are dispersed throughout

the continental United States and Hawaii and Alaska. There are 22 states

whose National Guard wings have C-130 aircraft, and 19 states whose

National Guard wings have KC-135 aircraft. Seven states have both. There

are nine states that have Air Force Reserve wings with C-130 aircraft and

five states that have Air Force Reserve wings with KC-135 aircraft. Seven

of the Guard wings with KC-135 aircraft are located on military bases and

12 are located with civilian airports. All six Reserve wings with KC-135

aircraft are located on military bases. Most Guard wings with C-130

aircraft, 20 of 23, are located with civilian airports. Half of the 10 Reserve

wings with C-130 aircraft are located on military bases, and the other half

are with civilian airports. Several locations maintain both Guard and

Reserve wings.

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Though reserve component members are sometimes thought of as

weekend warriors, about one quarter to one third of wing personnel are

full-time military or civilian employees. These personnel are concentrated

in areas such as maintenance, logistics, and security squadrons and the

wing staff. The balance of wing personnel are part-time military personnel

and are likely to have full-time employment in addition to their military

responsibilities.

Results in Brief The Air Force could reduce costs and meet peacetime and wartime

commitments if it reorganized its C-130 and KC-135 aircraft into

larger-sized squadrons and wings at fewer locations. These savings would

primarily result from fewer people being needed to operate these aircraft.

For the reorganization options we developed, up to $209 million dollars

could be saved annually.

Creating larger-sized squadrons and wings would still allow the Air Force

to accomplish its peacetime and wartime missions with the existing

number of aircraft. In peacetime deployments, reserve component C-130

and KC-135 personnel do not participate as part of entire squadrons or

wings but rather as individual volunteers. Thus, creating larger-sized

squadrons and wings should not compromise these missions. For wartime

deployments, requirements for C-130 and KC-135 aircraft are typically

stated by the number of aircraft rather than by squadrons or wings.

Moreover, war plans where existing flying squadrons are assigned can be

changed to accommodate larger-sized squadrons. Finally, specific reserve

component wings are not usually assigned in existing war plans; thus, the

impact of reducing them would be minimal.

Redistributing the reserve component’s C-130 and KC-135 existing aircraft

into fewer, larger-sized squadrons and wings would reduce operating

costs. For example, redistributing 16 C-130 aircraft from two 8-aircraft

wings to one 16-aircraft wing would save about $11 million annually,

primarily from personnel savings.

We developed five options to illustrate the kind of savings that can be

achieved by creating larger-sized squadrons. These savings range from

about $51 million to $209 million annually. We found that sufficient

personnel could be recruited and most locations’ facilities could be

inexpensively expanded to accommodate the unit sizes in our options.

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Missions Can Be

Fulfilled With

Larger-Sized Reserve

Component Units

Larger-sized reserve component units would still be able to perform

peacetime missions. When reserve component C-130 and KC-135 units

have participated in peacetime deployments in Bosnia, Saudi Arabia, and

Panama they have done so on a rotational basis. However, unlike the

active Air Force, Reserve and Guard rotations are not assigned completely

to a single flying squadron or wing, which makes the squadron size less

important. In a typical reserve component rotation, while one wing is

designated to lead the mission, it depends on many other wings to provide

aircraft and personnel. For example, the reserve component was assigned

to support operations in Saudi Arabia for a 3-month period. Personnel and

aircraft from 19 Guard wings were typically rotated for 15 to 30 days to

staff a flying squadron of 8 aircraft. A similar practice was used in Bosnia

and Panama. Rotations are done in this manner because participation by

reserve component members without a presidential call-up is voluntary.

To obtain the complement of personnel needed, individual volunteers

from many units are necessary. Thus, the number or size of units is not as

important as the number of people that volunteer. Unit officials from

several wings cited advantages in increasing the number of aircraft in a

flying squadron. These included increased training opportunities and

improved scheduling flexibility.

Creating fewer larger-sized flying squadrons should have little impact on

wartime missions as well. Wartime requirements for C-130 and KC-135

aircraft are not typically defined by the number of squadrons or wings but

by the number of aircraft. For example, the July 1996 Joint Chief of Staff’s

Intratheater Lift Analysis expresses C-130 requirements in terms of

aircraft, not wings or squadrons. The recent C-130 Airlift Master Stationing

Plan also expresses requirements in terms of the number of C-130 aircraft.

Moreover, the study also states that the current C-130 inventory exceeds

requirements, which we believe further lessens the impact of eliminating

squadrons.3

The manner in which the Air Force plans to use reserve component units

in wartime also minimizes the impact of reducing the number of flying

squadrons. According to planning officials from the Air Combat Command

and the Air Mobility Command, because active Air Force units are

available immediately, they are typically tasked as lead units to provide the

command and control in theater for wartime deployments. Reserve

component flying squadrons generally follow active Air Force units and

3

This report was submitted to congressional defense committees in 1997. The Air Force planned to

reduce the number of C-130 aircraft in its active and reserve component inventories to reflect

requirements. However, the Conference Report on the 1998 Department of Defense Appropriations Act

recommended that reserve component squadrons remain at current levels.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
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are placed under their command structure. These officials stated that

planners partly assign existing reserve component flying squadrons in war

plans by matching the capacity at likely deployment locations with the

squadrons available in the reserve component inventory. They said that as

long as the total number of aircraft available to perform missions

remained the same, they could change assignments based on larger-sized

squadrons. Further, an Air Force official stated that while the Air Force

prefers to assign aircraft by squadrons for planning purposes, flying

squadrons’ aircraft can be split, provided a command structure is in place.

Unit officials stated that during Operation Desert Shield, reserve

component aircraft and personnel were used in this manner. Moreover, in

current deployment plans we viewed, one KC-135 flying squadron was split

between two locations.

Although squadrons are assigned to wings in peacetime, war plans

described to us did not call for these wings to deploy or operate together.

For example, civil engineer, medical, and security police squadrons may

operate separately from the flying squadron. Wing officials stated that the

Air Force has moved away from activating entire reserve component units;

instead, war-fighting commanders choose packages of equipment and

personnel that will meet their requirements for the mission at hand. At

several wings we visited, officials stated that they had not deployed as a

wing and were unaware of any plan to deploy as a wing. Further, many

wing staff, including the wing commander, are not tasked in war plans and

do not have a specific supporting mission.

Reorganizing C-130

and KC-135 Squadrons

at Fewer Locations

Could Reduce Costs

Redistributing the reserve’s component C-130 and KC-135 existing aircraft

into fewer, larger squadrons and wings would reduce operating costs. For

example, redistributing 16 C-130 aircraft from two 8-aircraft wings to one

16-aircraft wing would save about $11 million dollars annually, primarily

from personnel savings.4

 This reorganization could eliminate about 

155 full-time positions and 245 part-time positions. The decrease in

full-time positions is especially significant, since the savings associated

with these positions represents about $8 million, or 75 percent, of the total

savings. Fewer people would be needed in areas such as wing

headquarters, logistics, operations, and support group staffs as well as

maintenance, support, and military police squadrons. Appendix II

describes the organization of a typical wing and how redistributing aircraft

would affect the wing.

4

Savings were calculated using the Air Force’s Systemic Approach to Better Long-Range Estimating

(SABLE) model. For a more complete description of SABLE, see appendix III.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
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In many cases eliminating the aircraft from a wing could also generate

savings additional to operating savings. For example, civil engineering and

medical squadrons, which help to support the wing and base in peacetime,

are not directly related to the aircraft. If the wing is inactivated, these

units’ worldwide requirements would have to be reexamined to determine

whether they were still needed in the force structure. When the Reserve

inactivated a C-130 wing in 1997, all eight of the nonflying squadrons not

directly related to the aircraft were eliminated from the force structure,

which involved about 140 full-time and about 625 part-time drill positions.

Using average Air Force Reserve full- and part-time pay rates, these

eliminations represent about $12 million in annual salaries.

Options for

Reorganizing Aircraft

and Achieving Savings

We developed five options for redistributing the existing reserve

component C-130 and KC-135 aircraft into larger-sized squadrons that

show a gradual increase in savings in operating costs—from $51 million to

$209 million annually.5

 Our options are not the only ones possible, but they

do illustrate the significance of the savings that can be achieved through a

redistribution of the aircraft. The options base like model aircraft together

and involve the same number of aircraft as are now planned for the

reserve component. In developing our options, we considered the two

factors that reserve component officials cited as most important to

successful reorganization: adequate recruiting potential and facility

capacity.

We also evaluated how three other issues could affect our options:

one-time costs of redistributing the aircraft, the significance of the

geographical location of the aircraft, and the effect that eliminating

squadrons would have on states’ abilities to respond to domestic crises.

Options Redistributed

Aircraft From Existing

Squadrons to Create Larger

Squadrons

We developed five options that redistributed aircraft from existing C-130

and KC-135 flying squadrons to other squadrons. The first option required

the least reorganizing, increasing the number of squadrons with fewer than

10 aircraft to that level. This reorganization would be achieved by

redistributing aircraft from three C-130 squadrons and one KC-135

squadron to other squadrons. Our fifth option increased the squadron size

to 16 aircraft for the C-130 and 12 for the KC-135 by redistributing aircraft

from 13 C-130 squadrons and 5 KC-135 squadrons to other squadrons. A

detailed discussion of each option is in appendix I.

5

To the extent that options are selected that would cause civilian personnel reductions that exceed the

thresholds established in 10 U.S.C. 2687, the Secretary would have to follow the procedures provided

for in that section.

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Populations Surrounding

Gaining Bases Could

Support Increased

Recruitment

Our analysis of data provided by Guard and Reserve recruiting officials

demonstrates that a sufficient number of personnel could likely be

recruited to meet increased requirements of larger squadrons in most

locations. Air Reserve headquarters recruiters estimated that they could

recruit enough personnel to support 16 C-130 aircraft at 8 of their current

10 locations. Guard headquarters recruiters estimated it could recruit an

adequate number of personnel to support 16 aircraft at 9 of 23 C-130

locations. For KC-135 aircraft locations, Air Reserve officials estimated it

could recruit enough personnel to support a 12-aircraft squadron at five of

its six locations, with two locations capable of adding an entire 10-aircraft

squadron. Guard recruiting estimates for the KC-135 indicate that

12-aircraft squadrons could be supported at 15 of 19 locations.

Headquarters officials stated that for some options that double the sizes of

existing flying squadrons, additional recruiters would be required for at

least 6 years at affected locations.

Reserve component officials at units we visited were more optimistic

about their ability to recruit additional personnel than were headquarters

officials. The four C-130 wings we visited estimated that they could add

four additional aircraft with little or no problem. While headquarters

recruiters estimated adding four C-130 aircraft at some locations could

take several years to fully staff, unit officials estimated that recruiting

additional personnel for the same number of aircraft would usually take

no longer than 18 to 24 months. Recruiters also indicated that recruiting

additional personnel for more than four aircraft at a given location would

be more challenging but possible, if additional experienced recruiters

were added to the wing receiving the aircraft and if spaces were available

at schools to train new recruits.

According to reserve component recruiters, the outlook for recruiting

could improve if full- and part-time personnel moved with the aircraft. In

the recent move of four C-130 aircraft from Chicago, Illinois, to

Milwaukee, Wisconsin, about 200 part-time personnel relocated to

Milwaukee. Reserve component officials believe it is probable that many

personnel from wings clustered closely would move with the aircraft if the

aircraft were moved to a nearby location.

The outlook for recruiting could improve further if personnel from the

C-141 fleet, which is being phased out of the inventory, could be used to

support C-130 and KC-135 aircraft. The reserve component provides

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
B-276447 

personnel to support most of the C-141 fleet of about 160 aircraft.6 Only

about three-quarters of the C-141 aircraft will be replaced with C-17

aircraft. Some current Reserve units are not scheduled to become C-17 or

any other Reserve units. Thus, this trained pool of personnel could be

available for C-130 or KC-135 aircraft. Reserve officials have been actively

seeking a role for these personnel.

Facilities Have Sufficient

Capacity to Expand With

Little Investment

Our analysis of facility data provided by reserve component civil

engineering officials shows that many bases could absorb additional

aircraft at little or no cost. According to these officials, 38 locations could

increase the number of assigned aircraft with no military construction

costs.7

 In other cases, ramp and hangar space would need to be increased

slightly. Also, some locations may require increased administrative and

supply space. Only in very few instances would locations require

completely new facilities, such as additional hangars. All of the National

Guard KC-135 wings could expand to at least 12 aircraft (3 already have

more than 12 aircraft) with one-time construction costs of no more than

$6 million. For most Guard C-130 wings, the military construction costs

would be no more than a $1 million for increasing from 8 to 12 aircraft.

Also, 17 of 23 locations could accommodate 16 aircraft at a cost ranging

from $1 million to about $10 million.

Expansion is possible at only three of six Air Force Reserve wings where

KC-135 aircraft are located. The Reserve estimates it could add up to 10

additional aircraft at two of the three locations at a one-time cost of

$1 million per squadron. The Reserve has two locations with 16 C-130

aircraft. With an investment of $1.5 million to $5.5 million per location, the

Reserve could accommodate 16 aircraft at five of its other eight C-130

locations.

Geographic Location of

C-130 and KC-135 Aircraft

a Consideration

Before developing our options, we considered whether any mission

requirements would preclude C-130 and KC-135 aircraft moving from their

current locations. We were told that only four had unique missions. Other

than those locations, Guard and Reserve officials stated that airlift and

refueling missions could be accomplished from a number of locations as

long as some general geographical requirements were met. For instance,

6

Only 56 C-141 aircraft are owned by the reserve component. The Air Force Reserve provides crews

and maintenance personnel for approximately 100 additional C-141 aircraft owned by the active force.

7

For most of these locations, funds would be needed for real property maintenance to existing

facilities. For the majority of those locations needing this maintenance, the costs would be $75,000 or

less.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
B-276447 

tankers meet their customers off the east and west coasts in a high

concentration of areas to facilitate the movement of aircraft over the

Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Thus, some refueling aircraft should be

located in proximity to these areas. These officials also believe that it is

important to maintain reserve component KC-135 aircraft in the northeast

because active duty KC-135 aircraft are no longer based in this region.

Some officials told us that KC-135 and C-130 aircraft should be based close

to the units they train with, whether with other aircraft units—as in the

case of KC-135 aircraft—or Army units for the C-130 aircraft.

Long-Term Savings Would

Exceed One-Time Costs of

Consolidations

Although we could not determine one-time costs of consolidating C-130

and KC-135 aircraft in larger squadrons, we do not believe these costs to

be significant relative to expected savings. Our options would result in

some initial costs for such things as training for additional people hired at

a location gaining aircraft and for transferring some personnel from one

location to another. In some cases, personnel could be eligible for

severance pay if their position was eliminated. Reserve component

officials could not provide estimates of these costs, which would vary

depending on how many trained personnel might relocate with the aircraft

and how much of the relocation expenses the Air Force would pay.

Because we did not identify specific bases in our options, it is difficult to

determine these costs. However, during the 1995 base realignment and

closure process, initial implementation costs to move C-130 aircraft from

three locations were estimated to be offset in 1 year for two of the three

locations and 3 years for the third. According to reserve component

officials, these implementation costs could be minimized in several ways,

for example, by moving aircraft to nearby bases and allowing recruiters

sufficient time to phase in additional personnel.

Eliminating Wings in Some

States Should Not Prevent

Emergency Assistance

National Guard units are unique in that they are under state control when

not federalized. These assets are available to governors during

emergencies and disasters. For this reason, inactivating Guard units has

historically caused concern. However, not all states have C-130 or KC-135

aircraft in their Guard units. In 16 states, no Guard units are equipped with

C-130 or KC-135 aircraft. We recognize that some of our options would

likely eliminate National Guard wings in some states, but these states

could still receive assistance during disasters and emergencies.8

 States can

receive assistance from other states’ National Guard units in several ways,

8

With the approval of a state governor, National Guard units located entirely within one state may

make certain organizational changes.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
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for example, through state compacts, federal laws, DOD regulations, and

informal agreements.

Compacts, which are agreements between states to support one another in

times of need, are one way that assistance can be provided. One of the

most inclusive compacts is the Emergency Management Assistance

Compact, which was originally sponsored and established by the Southern

Governors’ Association in 1992. Under this compact, member states agree

to provide for mutual assistance in managing any declared emergency or

disaster as well as mutual cooperation in exercises and training. Through

this compact, members agree on issues such as terms of liability,

compensation, and reimbursement when emergency assistance is provided

to member states. The compact was endorsed by the National Governors’

Association and other regional and national organizations, and any state

can now become a member. Currently, 20 states have joined the compact.

While a National Guard official stated that no C-130 or KC-135 aircraft

have yet been used under this compact, other assets such as helicopters

have been shared. For example, Virginia, Florida, and Kentucky have

provided helicopters to other states.

States can also receive assistance during a natural disaster or emergency

through the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance

Act, which authorizes the Federal Emergency Management Agency to

assign missions to any federal agency if the President declares a federal

emergency or disaster. Under the act, the agency can provide federal

assets, including National Guard and active duty personnel and equipment,

to states that are experiencing the emergency or disaster. For example,

C-130 aircraft from a National Guard unit in Maryland assisted Florida,

which has no C-130 aircraft in its National Guard, in its efforts to reduce

the effects of Hurricane Andrew.

Another way states can receive assistance is under a recently implemented

Defense Department directive referred to as “innovative readiness

training.” Under this directive, Defense assets can be used to assist states

and communities if the assistance provides a training opportunity related

to units’ wartime missions. In this case, the Guard can authorize units to

participate even if a federal disaster is not declared. For example, we were

told by Guard officials that Guard units from outside Iowa received

training in water purification during floods in Iowa.

Beyond these provisions, National Guard officials stated that assistance

can be coordinated through the National Guard Bureau, even without an

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
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agreement among the states. To reduce response time, Guard officials

sometimes develop preliminary plans for providing assistance when a

major disaster is pending. For example, before Hurricane Iniki struck

Hawaii, California National Guard, National Guard Bureau, and Hawaii

National Guard officials coordinated relief efforts to allow California

Guard units’ C-130 aircraft to be prepared to provide assistance there, even

though no formal agreement existed between the two states.

Recommendation The reserve components’ C-130 and KC-135 aircraft can be redistributed

into larger-sized squadrons and still accomplish their peacetime and

wartime missions. Such a reorganization would result in significant

savings that could be used to partially fund the modernization of the

Defense Department’s force. Therefore, we recommend that you direct the

Secretary of the Air Force to develop a plan to organize the C-130 and

KC-135 aircraft in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve into larger

wings at fewer locations and seek congressional support for the plan.

As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires you to submit a written statement on

actions taken on this recommendation to the Senate Committee on

Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government Reform

and Oversight not later than 60 days after the date of the report and to the

Senate and House Committees on Appropriations with the agency’s first

request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the

report.

Agency Comments DOD generally concurred with our findings but non-concurred with our

recommendation. The Department agrees that reorganizing aircraft at

fewer locations could reduce costs while still allowing the Air Force to

meet its commitments but it pointed out that other factors must also be

weighed in any reorganization plan.

DOD disagreed that it should develop a specific plan to consolidate at this

time. The Department observed that some options could involve base

closures and/or realignment of military installations and the Department

intends to seek legislative authority to close and realign installations in

conjunction with its fiscal year 1999 budget. DOD believes that it would be

premature to develop a plan until Congress acts on the Department’s

proposal.

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We recognize that many factors are involved in reorganizing aircraft

locations and we assume that the Air Force would take these factors into

account in developing a reorganization plan. We also recognize that some

options could have base closure and realignment implications, and that

DOD’s authority in this area is subject to the requirements of 10 U.S.C. 2687.

However, the range of options available to the Secretary is broad, and

many options would entail reductions that would not be subject to these

requirements. Because DOD agrees that there are cost reductions

associated with reorganizing C-130 and KC-135 aircraft into larger-sized

squadrons and wings, we believe that the Air Force should not delay in

developing a reorganization plan and seek congressional support for that

plan.

A detailed explanation of our scope and methodology appears in appendix

III, and DOD’s comments are reproduced in appendix IV.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of the Air Force and

interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available

to others upon request.

Please contact me at 512-3504 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix V.

Sincerely yours,

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Options for

Reorganizing Reserve

Component C-130 and

KC-135 Aircraft

16

C-130 Options 17

KC-135 Options 21

Appendix II 

Consolidation of

Aircraft Could Result

in Reduction in

Personnel Positions

26

Wing Headquarters 27

Operations Group 28

Logistics Group 28

Support Group 28

Medical Group 29

Appendix III 

Objective, Scope, and

Methodology

30

Estimating Cost Implications 30

Developing Options 31

Appendix IV 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

33

Appendix V 

Major Contributors to

This Report

34

Tables Table 1: C-130 and KC-135 Force Structure 2

Table I.1: Total Annual Savings From Reorganization of C-130 and

KC-135 Squadrons

16

Table I.2: Comparison of Air Force’s Planned C-130 Basing With

Our Five Options

20

Table I.3: Comparison of Air Force’s Planned KC-135 Basing With

Our Five Options

24

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Contents

Table II.1: Comparison of Squadron Staffing for an 8- and

12-Aircraft Unit

29

Figure Figure II.1: Typical Reserve Component Wing Organization 27

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

SABLE Systematic Approach to Better Long-Range Estimating

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix I 

Options for Reorganizing Reserve

Component C-130 and KC-135 Aircraft

We developed five options for organizing reserve component C-130 and

KC-135 aircraft more cost-effectively into fewer, larger-sized squadrons. In

developing these options, we incrementally increased the number of

aircraft per squadron for each succeeding option with 16 aircraft as the

limit for C-130 squadrons and 12 aircraft as the limit for KC-135 squadrons.

For each option we developed, we assessed whether (1) the Guard and

Reserve could recruit sufficient personnel to support additional aircraft

and (2) sufficient existing locations had facilities that could be expanded

to accommodate additional aircraft. We also varied the mix of Guard and

Reserve aircraft slightly and limited consideration of units outside the

continental United States in some options because these issues have been

identified as sensitive.

We based our recruiting assessments on data provided by Guard and

Reserve officials. They rated their likely ability to increase personnel at all

existing C-130 and KC-135 locations as (1) fully able to meet additional

personnel requirements, (2) could meet personnel requirements with some

difficulties, and (3) unlikely to meet additional requirements. We based

our facility expansion assessments on civil engineering estimates provided

by Guard and Reserve officials. We rated locations as low cost if

expansion could be accommodated for $3 million or less, medium cost if

expansion could be accommodated for $3 million to $10 million, high cost

if expansion could be accommodated for over $10 million.

To calculate savings, we determined the total operating costs for

larger-sized units in our options and compared them to the baseline costs

for the smaller-sized units. We did not determine option-specific one-time

implementation costs for military construction or other costs. Our options

show possible annual savings from $51 million to $209 million, as shown in

table I.1.

Table I.1: Total Annual Savings From

Reorganization of C-130 and KC-135

Squadrons Annual recurring savings

Dollars in millions

Option C-130 KC-135 Total

One $35 $16 $51

Two $66 $32 $98

Three $110 $66 $176

Four $130 $77 $207

Five $130 $79 $209

Source: Developed by GAO using Guard and Reserve data.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix I 

Options for Reorganizing Reserve

Component C-130 and KC-135 Aircraft

C-130 Options In our five options, we eliminated from 3 to 13 C-130 flying squadrons from

the reserve components’ current number of 34 squadrons. We did not

reduce the number of C-130 aircraft already in the reserve component

inventory.

Option one increased almost half of the flying squadrons with less than 10

aircraft to that level. Aircraft located outside the continental United States

were not considered in the analysis for this option. There were sufficient

locations with the capability to recruit personnel to fully meet personnel

requirements in most cases and to expand facilities at low cost. Six

aircraft shifted from the Guard to the Reserve. Three squadrons were

eliminated, and a net of 12 squadrons would increase in size. This option

would save about $35 million annually.

Option two increased some squadrons with less than 12 aircraft to that

level. There were sufficient locations with capabilities to recruit personnel

to fully meet personnel requirements in most cases and to expand facilities

at low cost. Four aircraft moved to the Guard from the Reserve, 

6 squadrons were eliminated, and a net of 12 squadrons would increase in

size. This alternative would save about $66 million annually.

Option three increased many squadrons with less than 14 aircraft to that

level. Most locations would be able to recruit personnel to fully meet

personnel requirements, but recruiting would be challenging at some

locations. Most facility needs could be met at low cost, but a few locations

could expand only at medium cost. Eight aircraft moved from the Guard to

the Reserve, 10 squadrons were eliminated, and a net of 14 squadrons

would increase in size. This option would save about $110 million

annually.

Option four increased some of the squadrons to a maximum of 16 aircraft.

Recruiting would be challenging at more locations than in option three,

but most facility needs could be met at low cost, with some locations able

to expand at medium cost. Two aircraft moved from the Guard to the

Reserve, 12 squadrons were eliminated, and a net of 15 squadrons would

increase in size. This option would save slightly more than $130 million

annually.

Option five maximized the number of flying squadrons with 16 aircraft.

The recruiting and facility situations were about the same as in option

four, with some recruiting challenges and facility expansion possible at

medium cost in some areas. Eight aircraft moved from the Guard to the

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix I 

Options for Reorganizing Reserve

Component C-130 and KC-135 Aircraft

Reserve, 13 squadrons were eliminated, and a net of 14 squadrons would

increase in size. This option saved about the same amount as option four,

$130 million annually.

Table I.2 shows the Air Force’s current basing plan for its squadrons of

C-130 aircraft and the reorganization of the aircraft in our five options.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix I 

Options for Reorganizing Reserve

Component C-130 and KC-135 Aircraft

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix I 

Options for Reorganizing Reserve

Component C-130 and KC-135 Aircraft

Table I.2: Comparison of Air Force’s Planned C-130 Basing With Our Five Options

Current basing

One Two

Squadron size Squadrons Aircraft Squadrons Aircraft

Change in

squadrons Squadrons Aircraft

Change in

squadrons

Guard

4 2 8 2 8 0 1 4 –1

8 16 128 4 32 –12 4 32 –12

10 0 0 9 90 9 2 20 2

12 5 60 5 60 0 12 144 7

14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Subtotal 23 196 20 190 –3 19 200 –4

Reserve

8 8 64 5 40 –3 3 24 –5

10 0 0 3 30 3 0 0 0

12 2 24 2 24 0 5 60 3

14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

16 1 16 1 16 0 1 16 0

Subtotal 11 104 11 110 0 9 100 –2

Total 34 300 31 300 –3 28 300 –6

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix I 

Options for Reorganizing Reserve

Component C-130 and KC-135 Aircraft

Three Four Five

Option

Squadrons Aircraft

Change in

squadrons Squadrons Aircraft

Change in

squadrons Squadrons Aircraft

Change in

squadrons

0 0 –2 0 0 –2 0 0 –2

2 16 –14 1 8 –15 1 8 –15

1 10 1 0 0 0 1 10 1

3 36 –2 2 24 –3 5 60 0

9 126 9 7 98 7 1 14 1

0 0 0 4 64 4 6 96 6

15 188 –8 14 194 –9 14 188 –9

2 16 –6 2 16 –6 0 0 –8

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

2 24 0 1 12 –1 0 0 –2

4 56 4 1 14 1 0 0 0

1 16 0 4 64 3 7 112 6

9 112 –2 8 106 –3 7 112 –4

24 300 –10 22 300 –12 21 300 –13

Source: Developed by GAO using Guard and Reserve data.

KC-135 Options In our five options, we eliminated from 1 to 5 KC-135 flying squadrons

from the reserve components’ current number of 29 squadrons but did not

reduce the number of KC-135 aircraft already in the reserve components’

inventories. We did not reduce the number of aircraft from the four

locations that the Air National Guard considered mission unique in any of

our options.

For option one, we increased most squadrons with less than 10 aircraft to

that level. There were sufficient locations with adequate capabilities to

recruit personnel to fully meet requirements with one exception, where

recruiting would be challenging. Facilities could be expanded at low cost

at every location. One squadron was eliminated, and a net of seven

squadrons would increase in size. This option would save about

$16 million annually.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix I 

Options for Reorganizing Reserve

Component C-130 and KC-135 Aircraft

Option two increased all squadrons but one to a minimum of 10 aircraft.

There were sufficient locations with adequate capabilities to recruit

personnel to fully meet requirements with one exception, where recruiting

would be challenging. Facilities could be expanded at low cost at every

location. Four aircraft were shifted from the Guard to the Reserve, two

squadrons were eliminated, and a net of 10 squadrons would increase in

size. This option would save about $32 million annually.

Option three increased most squadrons to 11 aircraft. For a few locations,

recruitment would be challenging, but for all others there was adequate

capability to recruit personnel to fully meet requirements. Facilities could

be expanded at low cost at all but two locations, where expansion was

possible at medium cost at one and at high cost at the other. Six aircraft

were shifted from the Guard to the Reserve, 4 squadrons were eliminated,

and a net of 20 squadrons would increase in size. This option would save

about $66 million annually.

Option four increased many squadrons to 12 aircraft. There was adequate

capability to recruit personnel to fully meet requirements at most

locations, and facilities could be expanded at low cost. Five squadrons

were eliminated, and a net of 16 squadrons would increase in size. This

option would save about $77 million annually.

Option five maximized the number of squadrons with 12 aircraft and

minimized the number of locations. Most locations were capable of fully

meeting personnel requirements, with recruiting more challenging, but

possible, at several locations. Most locations could expand facilities at low

cost, with expansion at one location possible at medium cost and at

another location at high cost. Ten aircraft were shifted from the Guard to

the Reserve, 5 squadrons were eliminated, and a net of 16 squadrons

would increase in size. This option would save about $79 million annually.

Table I.3 shows the Air Force’s current basing plan for its squadrons of

KC-135 aircraft and the reorganization of the aircraft in our five options.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix I 

Options for Reorganizing Reserve

Component C-130 and KC-135 Aircraft

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix I 

Options for Reorganizing Reserve

Component C-130 and KC-135 Aircraft

Table I.3: Comparison of Air Force’s Planned KC-135 Basing With Our Five Options

Current basing

One Two

Squadron size Squadrons Aircraft Squadrons Aircraft

Change in

squadrons Squadrons Aircraft

Change in

squadrons

Guard

8 5 40 3 24 –2 0 0 –5

9 6 54 0 0 –6 0 0 –6

10 11 110 18 180 7 20 200 9

11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Subtotal 22 204 21 204 –1 20 200 –2

Reserve

6 1 6 1 6 0 0 0 –1

8 1 8 1 8 0 1 8 0

10 5 50 5 50 0 6 60 1

11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Subtotal 7 64 7 64 0 7 68 0

Total 29 268 28 268 –1 27 268 –2

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix I 

Options for Reorganizing Reserve

Component C-130 and KC-135 Aircraft

Three Four Five

Option

Squadrons Aircraft

Change in

squadrons Squadrons Aircraft

Change in

squadrons Squadrons Aircraft

Change in

squadrons

0 0 –5 0 0 –5 2 16 –3

0 0 –6 0 0 –6 0 0 –6

0 0 –11 5 50 –6 1 10 –10

18 198 18 2 22 2 0 0 0

0 0 0 11 132 11 14 168 14

18 198 –4 18 204 –4 17 194 –5

0 0 –1 0 0 –1 0 0 –1

1 8 0 1 8 0 0 0 –1

4 40 –1 2 20 –3 5 50 0

2 22 2 0 0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 3 36 3 2 24 2

7 70 0 6 64 –1 7 74 0

25 268 –4 24 268 –5 24 268 –5

Source: Developed by GAO using Guard and Reserve data.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix II 

Consolidation of Aircraft Could Result in

Reduction in Personnel Positions

Organizing existing C-130 and KC-135 aircraft into fewer wings could

result in significant savings due to reductions in personnel positions.

These reductions would primarily be in squadrons directly related to each

aircraft, since much of the overhead at locations losing aircraft would no

longer be needed; the Air Force would have to determine the disposition

of squadrons not directly related to the flying squadrons. Also, squadrons

with duplicative functions could be eliminated. According to data provided

by Guard and Reserve program officials, only small increases in positions

would be necessary at existing locations receiving additional aircraft.

Figure II.1 shows the major elements of a typical wing structure.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix II 

Consolidation of Aircraft Could Result in

Reduction in Personnel Positions

Figure II.1: Typical Reserve

Component Wing Organization

Wing 

staff

Operations 

 group

Operations

 (flying) 

 squadron

Operations

 support

 flight

Logistics 

 group

 Aircraft

generation

 squadron

Maintenance

 squadron

Logistics

squadron

Logistics

 support

squadron

Medical

 group

 Medical

operations

 squadron

Support 

 group

 Mission

 support

squadron

Security 

 police

squadron

Communications

 flight

 Civil

engineer

squadron

Services

 flight

Note: Shaded organizations are typically directly related to aircraft and personnel savings in

these areas make up the cost savings in this report.

Source: Developed by GAO using Guard and Reserve data.

The following sections describe each main organization typically in a wing

and the effect that consolidation is likely to have on its personnel

requirements. Actual locations may have additional squadrons in the wing

that are not directly related to the aircraft.

Wing Headquarters The wing headquarters includes the wing commander and staff that

develop operational plans; evaluate exercises; and provide financial, legal,

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix II 

Consolidation of Aircraft Could Result in

Reduction in Personnel Positions

safety, public affairs, historical, and other services. If a wing loses its only

flying squadron, the wing headquarters would likely be eliminated. The

wing headquarter’s staff would not need to increase if the squadrons’

aircraft increase from 8 to 12. The number of full-time staff would increase

slightly.

Operations Group The operations group comprises a commander and a small staff that

supervise the flying squadron and the operations support flight. The flying

squadron is staffed with pilots and a crew that operate the aircraft and are

in a fixed ratio to the number of aircraft. The operations support flight

provides intelligence, scheduling, combat tactics, training, air crew life

support, airfield and air traffic operations, and weather support to the

flying squadron. If a wing loses its flying squadron, the operations group

would be eliminated. As shown in table II.1, the wing that receives a

50-percent increase in aircraft would need to increase its flying squadron

personnel by 42 percent. Full-time staff would increase about the same

percentage. The other squadrons would increase minimally.

Logistics Group The logistics group commander and staff oversee the aircraft generation

squadron, maintenance squadron, logistics squadron, and the logistics

support squadron. The aircraft generation squadron handles flight line

maintenance and related tasks, and the maintenance squadron handles

more substantial repairs. The logistics squadron manages transportation

vehicles and other base-owned equipment. The logistics support squadron

manages engines and training. All of these squadrons are directly related

to the performance of the aircraft. If a wing loses it flying squadron, the

logistics group would be eliminated. The wing that receives a 50-percent

increase in aircraft, from 8 to 12, would have to increase its aircraft

generation squadron and maintenance squadron personnel by about

25 percent. Full-time staff would increase by a slightly greater percentage.

Other organizations would be affected only slightly.

Support Group The support group includes the mission support squadron and the security

police squadron, which are directly related to the aircraft, and elements

that provide base and other support services, such as the communications

flight, civil engineer, and services flight squadrons. If a wing loses its flying

squadron, the support group would be eliminated. The mission support

squadron and security police at the receiving wing would not increase if

the number of aircraft increased from 8 to 12. The civil engineering

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix II 

Consolidation of Aircraft Could Result in

Reduction in Personnel Positions

squadron and the communication and services flights are not directly tied

to the aircraft, and their disposition would have to be determined by the

Air Force.

Medical Group The medical squadron provides family practice, inpatient, and medical

nursing and emergency room, mental health, pharmaceutical, and dental

services. In the reserve component, one squadron may be the only

organization in the group. This squadron is not directly related to the

aircraft and would be unaffected at a receiving unit if additional aircraft

were assigned. The disposition of the medical squadron losing aircraft

would have to be determined by the Air Force.

Table II.1 shows the impact of adding four additional aircraft to an

eight-aircraft reserve component C-130 wing.

Table II.1: Comparison of Squadron Staffing for an 8- and 12-Aircraft Unit

Military personnel

Personnel

increase

(percent) Full-time personnel

Personnel

increase

(percent)

Wing organization 8 aircraft 12 aircraft 50 8 aircraft 12 aircraft 50

Wing headquarters staff 56 56 0 20 21 5

Operations group staff 6 6 0 1 1 0

Operations squadron 95 135 42 19 28 47

Operations support squadron 20 21 5 7 8 14

Operations subtotal 121 162 34 27 37 37

Logistics group staff 10 11 10 6 7 17

Logistics support flight 13 13 0 9 9 0

Logistics squadron 112 112 0 41 44 7

Aircraft generation squadron 63 79 25 29 36 24

Maintenance squadron 138 175 27 52 71 37

Logistics subtotal 336 390 16 137 167 22

Support group staff 5 5 0 2 2 0

Mission support flight 26 26 0 12 13 8

Security police squadron 58 58 0 12 12 0

Support subtotal 89 89 0 26 27 4

Wing total 602 697 16 210 252 20

Source: Developed by GAO using Guard and Reserve data.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix III 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

We assessed whether the Air Force’s reserve component combat C-130

and KC-135 aircraft could feasibly be reorganized into fewer, larger-sized

squadrons and wings. In making this assessment, we (1) determined the

effect of a reorganization of the C-130 and KC-135 aircraft on mission

accomplishment, (2) determined whether costs could be reduced through

a restructuring of the aircraft squadrons, and (3) developed five possible

options for increasing the number of aircraft in C-130 and KC-135

squadrons and analyzed their effect on operations and costs. We focused

on combat-coded reserve component C-135 and C-130 aircraft. We did not

include locations that had only special-mission versions of these aircraft,

especially the C-130.

To determine the effect of a reorganization of C-130 and KC-135 aircraft on

mission accomplishment, we interviewed officials and obtained data from

the Headquarters, Air National Guard, and the Office of the Air Force

Reserve, in Washington, D.C.; the Air National Guard Readiness Center at

Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland; and the Air Force Reserve Command,

Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, in the following functional areas:

recruiting, civil engineering, manpower, financial management, planning

and programming, and training. We discussed legal provisions that would

affect the relocation of existing reserve component flying squadrons with

the Air National Guard General Counsel staff and Air Force Reserve

planning staff.

We also interviewed wing and squadron officials at the 135th Airlift

Squadron at Martin State Airport, Maryland; the 133rd and 934th Airlift

Wings at Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport, Minnesota; the 302nd

Airlift Wing, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado; and the 163rd Air

Refueling and 452nd Mobility Wings, March Air Force Reserve Base,

California, to discuss the same functional areas listed above. These flying

squadrons represent a cross section of reserve component basing

arrangements. We examined a variety of Air Force and reserve component

regulations, including those regarding facility requirements and staffing

procedures. We interviewed officials at the Air Mobility Command, Scott

Air Force Base, Illinois, and the Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force

Base, Virginia, to understand how reserve component assets would fit into

the gaining command’s war plans and to obtain their perspectives on the

effect of consolidations.

Estimating Cost

Implications

To determine whether costs could be reduced through a restructuring of

the aircraft squadrons, we developed staffing estimates from data provided

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix III 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

by reserve component officials that develop personnel requirements. In

developing our estimates, we interviewed staffing and budget officials at

the services’ headquarters, readiness centers, and the squadrons we

visited. We also obtained wing staffing and budget reports for all

squadrons and analyzed specific squadron staffing authorization

documents for 12 squadrons of various sizes. At the squadrons we visited,

we reviewed and discussed the number of assigned personnel and the

squadron’s budgets and discussed their estimates of the personnel

increases and facility additions that might be needed to accommodate

additional aircraft. Since over 70 percent of the operating costs and almost

all of the estimated savings are associated with military and civilian

personnel, we primarily analyzed the reasonableness of the services’

personnel and salary planning factors. We found their estimates to be

reasonable. We provided these staffing estimates to Air Force officials to

use in its SABLE model.1

 Our savings estimates include only the savings

from reduced operating costs that are directly related to each aircraft and

do not include any military construction, base closure, and other fixed or

indirect costs and savings that may be associated with transferring aircraft

from one location to another.

Developing Options To determine the feasibility of increasing the number of aircraft in C-130

and KC-135 squadrons at various locations, we examined the reserve

component’s submissions on capacity to the 1995 Base Realignment and

Closure Commission. The reserve component’s headquarters civil

engineering branches provided more current estimates of the estimated

capacity of each squadron and the cost to increase the capacity. During

visits to C-130 and KC-135 wings, we obtained civil engineering estimates

on each location’s ability to expand, the facilities needed, and the

accompanying cost to ensure that data provided from headquarters was

reliable.

To determine the reserve component’s capability to recruit additional

personnel needed to organize wings with additional aircraft, we obtained

assessments from the Air National Guard’s and the Air Force Reserve’s

headquarters recruitment staff. These personnel provided estimates for

each location’s ability to support additional personnel for incremental

1

The Air Force’s Systematic Approach to Better Long Range Estimating (SABLE) automated model

uses various cost and planning factors to estimate the peacetime operating and support costs of flying

units. Operating costs include cost elements in the operation and maintenance, military personnel, and

other procurement appropriations. Within these appropriations, the major cost categories directly

related to each aircraft include military and civilian pay, aviation fuel, depot maintenance, and depot

level repairables. These costs are estimated for each type and model of aircraft within each reserve

component. This model is not considered budget quality.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix III 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

aircraft increases. We also factored in personnel readiness standards used

by the Department of Defense. A more complete discussion of the

methodology used in developing options is included in appendix I.

For the four C-130 and two KC-135 squadrons we visited, we used the

squadron’s recruiting potential according to headquarter’s estimates and

assessed its consistency with the local recruiting office’s estimate of its

ability to recruit an adequate number of people for an increase in aircraft

at its location.

To estimate one-time costs for facility improvements, we obtained cost

estimates from the reserve component’s civil engineering headquarters for

each location. We checked these estimates against those made by local

civil engineering personnel at the squadrons we visited. To estimate

relocation and separation expenses, we examined 1995 base closure

estimates on permanent change of station and separation costs for

civilians and military personnel. We also interviewed reserve component

training personnel to gain an understanding of the expected changes in

training demand due to consolidation.

We conducted our review from July 1996 to September 1997 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix IV 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
Appendix V 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Fred Dziadek, Assistant Director

Rodell Anderson, Evaluator-in-Charge

Anthony DeFrank, Senior Evaluator

Norfolk Field Office Dan Omahen, Senior Evaluator

Mary Jo LaCasse, Evaluator

(701089) Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-98-55 Air Force Aircraft
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