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Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

News from the Front

185th Theater Aviation Brigade (TAB)

Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX): 

Leveraging All Assets to Benefit Training

Major Edward O. Ziembinski

CALL LNO to ARCENT

November 2015
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Introduction

The full spectrum of Army Aviation operations is always evolving. Part of this evolution is the 

need for Army Aviation to operate over large bodies of open water in the littoral areas. The 

Army has experience in over the water operations in both the ARMY Pacific and ARMY Central 

areas of operations. In the Army Central (ARCENT) Area of Operations, Army aircraft operate off 

the coastline of Kuwait. 

Background

The 185th Theater Aviation Brigade (TAB) is currently deployed to Camp BUEHRING, Kuwait in 

support of Operation SPARTAN SHIELD. Of specific concern to the 185th TAB are the subjects of 

Personnel Recovery (PR) and PR in a maritime environment. Though the 185th TAB has 

conducted numerous land PR exercises in the past, and trains their aircrews extensively for 

ditching into a body of water, the brigade had not previously conducted a PR exercise in an 

open-water environment.

Given the operational environment (OE) of the 185th TAB, they saw a need to develop and 

refine the techniques for PR in a maritime scenario. The TAB needed a means to practice these 

techniques as they developed them. They also needed an opportunity to learn and train on the 

survival equipment used in open water survival.

The HARD-7(S) life raft is Theater Provided Equipment (TPE), and was provided to the 185th TAB 

upon arrival in theater. Though provided the HARD-7(S) life raft equipment, the 185th TAB did 

not receive any manuals, checklists, training aids, training videos, SOPs, or AARs in reference to 

the HARD-7(S), and no one in the 185th TAB had any experience deploying the HARD-7(S) life 

raft.

These two factor were the catalyst for the 185th TAB in developing a phased Search and Rescue 

Exercise (SAREX) to train their aircrews for PR operations over water. The TAB had available the 

US Army Vessel (USAV) Corinth. The USAV Corinth had supported several training exercises for 

other U.S. forces in the past, most notably with SEAL Team 10 in early 2015. The USAV Corinth, 

like all other U.S. Army vessels, relies primarily on manuals and doctrine from the U.S. Navy, 

Coast Guard, and Codes of Federal Regulation (CFRs) to perform operations at sea. 

Phase I: Academic Training

 

The first phase of 185th TAB’s SAREX involved identifying problems associated with fielding the 

HARD-7(S) life raft and conducting academic training in a controlled environment. 

The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) pioneered designed the concept for 

the HARD-7. The HARD-7S is a unique life raft system, designed to give total protection while in 
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the water. Inside the kit, there is a raft and an overwater survival kit. The raft was designed to 

be used on a MH-60 Blackhawk and MH-47 Chinook. And the HARD-7S is applicable to fixedwing applications as well. 

The HARD-7S canister features a unique clamshell opening. The hard shell case separates into 

two sides. One-half of the box stores the raft, and the other half of the box contains the 

survival kit. The functional areas of the survival kit include signaling, food, water, and first aid.

 

PHASE I: Academic training in an indoor, controlled environment

 Survival kit contents of the HARD-7(S)

 

Phase II: Pool training / Develop TTP

The second phase of 185th TAB’s SAREX involved training in a pool, to replicate a water 

environment while still maintaining controlled conditions, and developing tactics, techniques, 
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and procedures (TTPs) for the use of the HARD-7(S) life raft. The 185th TAB reuses the HARD7(S) life rafts repeatedly for training. The 185th TAB has several “training” HARD-7(S) life rafts, 

which have been deployed and are now used as training aids, which can be inflated and 

deflated as needed for training. The reason why the brigade reuses the life rafts is because it 

costs $10,000 dollars every time a HARD-7(S) life raft is deployed from its original protective 

casing.

Aircrews were trained on the deployment and use of the HARD-7(S) life raft. There are many 

aspects to the HARD-7(S) life raft and aircrews must be familiar with them all. For example, the 

life raft has a large, metal CO2 canister on the port side of the raft. This canister can be a 

danger to aircrews, especially if the raft inflates upside down and the aircrew is forced to flip 

the raft. Being aware of the location of the canister will help to prevent accidental head 

injuries.

Another portion of the Phase II training covered alternate / emergency inflation methods for 

the life raft. In the event the center beam does not inflate, the downed personnel locate the 

center-beam fill valve and pump, which is tethered to the inside of the raft, and use the pump 

to inflate the center structure unit of the raft. 

Upon pulling the deployment handle, if the raft fails to inflate properly or fully inflate, locate 

the fill pump attached to the inside of the raft. Locate the side fill nozzles and rotate one turn. 

To prevent damage to the fill nozzle, do not exceed one turn or use excessive force when 

attaching the pump. Attach the pump and manually inflate while keeping the pump out of the 

water. Be sure to close the valves after inflating each section. 

The final portion of Phase II academic training 

involved repair damages to the HARD-7(S) life 

raft. In the event that the aircrew locates any 

leaks and/or holes, the aircrew will locate and 

identify the repair kit, which is located in the 

survival kit and packaged in a silver foil 

container. The aircrew will follow the written 

instructions on the repair kit in order to fill the 

hole.

Training to inflate the HARD-7(S) life raft by hand
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Phase III: Deploying Raft from Aircraft 

Currently, there is no Technical Manual (TM), Field Manual (FM), etc. depicting how to deploy a 

raft from a U.S. Army helicopter. For this reason, the 185th TAB conducted the multi-phase 

SAREX. Additionally, the 185th TAB leveraged subject matter expertise from the U.S. Navy, Joint 

Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC), and other organizations to develop training products for U.S. 

Army Aviators regarding the deployment of the HARD-7(S) life raft. 

In a real-world incident, a helicopter crew will not employ their own HARD-7(S) life raft. When 

a helicopter conducts a forced landing into the water, the pilot will auto-rotate and will pull 

power right before touching down onto the surface of the water. The aircrew will open all the 

doors and prior to entering the water the pilot in command will say, “Everyone stay in the 

aircraft until the aircraft starts to roll.” U.S. Army helicopters, like virtually every helicopter, are 

top-heavy. Once the aircraft has rolled over upside-down in the water, then the crew will 

attempt to exit the aircraft. It is much safer staying inside that aircraft through the rollover. 

Attempting to exit immediately will likely result in the aircrew being hit by a rotor or debris. For 

these reasons, it is extremely unlikely that an aircrew will be able to deploy their own HARD7(S) life raft. Therefore, the HARD-7(S) life raft is best employed through buddy-aid. The 

wingman of the downed aircraft deploys its HARD-7(S) life raft for the downed aircrew.

PHASE III: Deploy the HARD-7(S) from a UH-60 Blackhawk in a real-world environment
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Winds and current should be considered before deploying the raft from the aircraft. The rotor 

wash will affect the raft’s location to the downed aircrew. It is recommended that the raft be 

deployed from the aircraft at a 10 foot, 10 knot hover or a 15 foot, stationary hover. 

Prior to deploying the raft, it is recommended that personnel in the water tether themselves to 

one another to maintain positive control. 

“Downed” aircrew, tethered together, swim towards the HARD-7(S) life raft case

Once the raft is in the water and “downed” aircrew approach the raft, they must orient the raft 

case wheel-side down to ensure the raft opens right-side up. Personnel in the water then 

locate the static line and attached it to an air crewman’s survival vest to avoid loss of the raft. 

The aircrew grasps the deployment handle and firmly pulls to activate the CO2 canister. The 

aircrew must maintain their grasp on the deployment handle to ensure positive control of the 

raft. The raft should deploy upright with the survival kit and case still attached for retrieval. 

The downed personnel should then begin boarding the raft. 

Once all have boarded, the aircrew retrieves the survival kit that is attached to the raft by 

lanyard, conducts an inventory, and separates appropriately as needed. Finally, the aircrew 

retrieves and stows all available dunnage.
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Phase IV: Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX) with U.S. forces Only (Joint)

On 27 October 2015, the 185th TAB, supported by the United States USAV Corinth, conducted a 

Joint SAREX in the North Arabian Gulf (NAG). 

Purpose – Conduct PR training in an open-water environment, and to conduct PR training using 

the HARD-7(S) life raft with survival kit.

Key Tasks –

1) Movement to NAG training area

2) Launch “downed” aircrew in HARD-7(S) life raft

3) “Downed” aircrew successfully transmits distress call

4) USAV Corinth remains on-station (simulating wingman UH-60)

5) “Downed” aircrew recovered by PR assets

6) Movement back to Kuwait Naval Base (KNB)

End-state – “Downed” aircrew recovered safely and expeditiously, and all personnel & vessels 

returned to KNB.

 

SAREX Execution (US Only)

The USAV Corinth departed KNB at 0600 on the morning of 27 October 2015. The USAV Corinth

steamed 35 Nautical Miles (NM) into the Northern Arabian Gulf (NAG) to reach the exercise 

area.

At 0950 the exercise radio call was made for the downed aircraft, and at 1000 the “downed” 

aircrew was launched into the water in their HARD-7(S) life raft. The “downed” aircrew carried 

Man Overboard Identification (MOBI) system transmitters, Combat Survivor Evader Locator 

(CSEL) radios, and VHF radios. As part of the exercise, there was no pre-planned resource to be 

employed by NAVCENT/JPRC.

Once the “downed” flight crew had signaled for help, the USAV Corinth remained on station to 

maintain contact with the crew and to prevent any civilian maritime traffic from interfering 

with the exercise. It took approximately 45 minutes from the time that the “downed” aircrew

sent their signal to the JPRC before the dispatch message was sent to a U.S. Coast Guard vessel. 

Of note, the responses times included in this narrative are only applicable to this specific 

training exercise. PR recovery times vary greatly and are the result of a myriad of factors 
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including weather, location, assets available, etc. The recovery times from this exercise should 

not be used for planning purposes.

 USAV Corinth moving away from the life raft USCGC Wrangell (WPB-1332) locates “downed” aircrew

The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter (USCGC) Wrangell (WPB-1332) arrived at approximately 1125 local. 

The USCGC Wrangell is an Island-class Patrol Boat. The USCGC Wrangell attempted to establish 

communication with the “downed” aircrew, but was unable. The assumption is that the USCGC 

Wrangell did not know what frequency the “downed” aircrew was transmitting on (the 

aircrew’s transmissions were heard aboard the USAV Corinth), and the “downed” aircrew did 

not have a maritime survival craft transceiver. If the “downed” aircrew had a maritime survival 

craft transceiver, they would have had assured communications with the USCGC Wrangell

because all maritime vessels are required to monitor channel 16. Additionally, a maritime 

survival craft transceiver would have allowed the “downed” aircrew to communicate with the 

numerous civilian vessels in the area, if the need had arisen. The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter, after 

radio communications failed, decided to establish face-to-face communications and launched 

its cutter small boat at approximately 1145 local to retrieve the aircrew. 
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 Rescue boat from the USCGC Wrangell (WPB-1332) Recovering the “downed” aircrew from the HARD-7(S)

In all, it took approximately 1hr and 25 minutes from the time the initial “emergency” signal 

was sent until the personnel recovery assets arrived on scene. Once the “downed” aircrew was 

recovered, the USAV Corinth retrieved the HARD-7(S) life raft and returned to KNB. After 

arrival, CW5 Dukes returned to the USAV Corinth from the USCGC Wrangell to conduct AARs 

with the members of the 185th TAB and the crew of the USAV Corinth.

Phase V: Bilateral SAREX (U.S. Army & Kuwait)

On 4 November 2015, the 185th TAB, supported by the USAV Corinth, conducted a Bilateral 

SAREX in the NAG with the Air Forces of Kuwait. 

Purpose – Conduct a bilateral PR training exercise in an open-water environment, conduct PR 

training using the HARD-7(S) life raft with survival kit, and conduct multinational 

interoperability PR training.

Key Tasks –

1) Movement to NAG training area

2) Launch “downed” aircrew in HARD-7(S) life raft

3) “Downed” aircrew successfully transmits distress call

4) USAV Corinth remains on-station (simulating wingman UH-60)

5) “Downed” aircrew located by Kuwaiti Air assets

6) Kuwaiti Air assets direct the USAV Corinth to the “downed” aircrew

7) “Downed” aircrew recovered by USAV Corinth

8) Movement back to KNB
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End-state – “Downed” aircrew recovered safely and expeditiously, and all personnel, aircraft, & 

vessels returned to KNB.

Concept of the SAREX (US & Kuwait)

The concept of the operation for the 4 November 2015 SAREX relied on swift communication 

between the JPRC and the Kuwait Area Operations Center (AOC). The plan was for the 

“downed” aircrew to transmit an “emergency” signal to the JPRC. Next, the JPRC would call by 

telephone to the Kuwait AOC. The name of the Kuwait AOC is Mulhalub Control. From 

Mulhalub Control, the message would be relayed to the Kuwaiti Joint Operations Center (JOC).

The Kuwait JOC would approve the message and then transmit it back to the Kuwait AOC. Next, 

the Kuwait AOC would send the message to base operations. Following receipt of the message, 

base operations would transmit the message to the Kuwaiti 32nd Squadron to be executed.

Once the aircraft from the 32nd Squadron arrives on the scene, the Kuwaiti pilot would talk 

directly to the Kuwait AOC, i.e. Mulhalub control. Mulhalub control would then call by 

telephone back to the JPRC. Finally, the JPRC would then call back to NAVCENT or ARCENT,

depending on the recovery vessel that they are going to use, for communications with the final 

recovery vehicle. In summary, a “downed” aircrew calls for assistance, the Kuwaiti Air Forces 

locate the “downed” aircrew, and JPRC dispatches the recovery asset.

On 3 November 2015, the day prior to the exercise, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA) issued a Space Weather Event Message:

“Space Weather Message Code: WARK06

Serial Number: 307

Issue Time: 2015 Nov 03 0811 UTC

WARNING: Geomagnetic K-Index of 6 expected

Valid From: 2015 Nov 03 0815 UTC

Valid To: 2015 Nov 03 1700 UTC

Warning Condition: Onset

NOAA Scale: G2 – Moderate”

NOAA issued an extension to the warning later that same day:

“Space Weather Message Code: WARK06

Serial Number: 308

Issue Time: 2015 Nov 03 1657 UTC

EXTENDED WARNING: Geomagnetic K-Index of 6 expected

Extension to Serial Number: 307
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Valid From: 2015 Nov 03 0815 UTC

Now Valid Until: 2015 Nov 03 2100 UTC

Warning Condition: Persistence"

These messages from NOAA would have a significant impact as the exercise proceeded.

The USAV Corinth departed KNB at 0700 on the morning of 4 November 2015. The USAV 

Corinth steamed 20 NM into the NAG to reach the exercise area. One of the “downed” aircrew 

experienced difficulties obtaining and retaining a signal lock on his GPS.

Prior to launching, the “downed” aircrew executed the exercise “emergency” call over their 

CSEL radio at approximately 1000. The aircrew never received a response over their CSEL radio, 

but did receive confirmation of message receipt at JPRC through VHF radio communication 

from the USAV Corinth’s bridge at approximately 1020.

The “downed” aircrew launched in their HARD-7(S) life raft at approximately 1025. The 

“downed” aircrew carried MOBI system transmitters, CSEL radios, and VHF radios. Once the 

“downed” flight crew had signaled for help and launched in their HARD-7(S) life raft, the USAV 

Corinth remained on station to maintain contact with the crew and to prevent any civilian 

maritime traffic from interfering with the exercise. As part of the exercise, the pre-planned PR 

resource to be employed was Kuwait rotary-wing aircraft.

The Kuwaiti rotary-wing aircraft arrived on location at approximately 1115, communicated the 

“downed” aircrew’s location to the USAV Corinth, and the USAV Corinth recovered the 

“downed” aircrew at approximately 1135. The “downed” aircrew never did receive a response 

from JPRC over the CSEL radio, but maintained communications with the USAV Corinth

throughout the exercise over VHF radio.

In all, it took approximately 1hr and 15 minutes from the time the initial “emergency” signal 

was transmitted until the personnel recovery assets arrived on scene. Once the USAV Corinth

recovered the “downed” flight crew, the USAV Corinth and all personnel returned to KNB.

Joint and Bilateral SAREX Concept

Based upon the success of the 185th TAB’s SAREX, the brigade decided to execute an additional

SAREX before redeploying. The SAREX sequel would combined elements of the previous

exercises to execute a joint & bilateral SAREX. The 185th TAB’s replacement, the 40th Combat 

Aviation Brigade (CAB), would also attend the exercise to gain familiarity with the 185th TAB’s

operating procedures and lessons learned.

The U.S. Army Vessel (USAV) MG Charles P. Ross (LSV-5) is a General Frank S. Besson-class 
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Logistics Support Vessels (LSV), which is designed for amphibious operations and the global 

movement of cargo. The Besson-class LSVs are the largest powered watercraft in the United

States Army. The USAV MG Charles P. Gross is capable of transporting roll-on/roll-off cargo, as

well as load-on/load-off cargo to established harbors or beachheads.

Joint/Bilateral SAREX

On 7 December 20155, the 185th TAB, supported by the USAV MG Charles P Gross, a Besson

class Logistics Support Vessels (LSV) designed for amphibious operations, conducted a Joint and 

Bilateral SAREX in the NAG with the U.S. Air Force and the Navy of Kuwait (KNF).

Purpose – Conduct a Joint & Bilateral personnel recovery (PR) training exercise in an open-water

environment, conduct PR training using the HARD-7(S) life raft with survival kit, ensure that

communication and coordination architecture between Kuwait and the U.S. is functional IOT

facilitate the recovery of survivors inside or outside of Kuwaiti territorial waters, and exercise

phase one reintegration facility at Camp ARIFJAN

Key Tasks –

1. Movement to NAG training area onboard the USAV MG Charles P. Gross

2. Launch “downed” aircrew in HARD-7(S) life raft

3. “Downed” aircrew successfully transmits distress call

4. USAV MG Charles P. Gross remains on-station (as a safety vessel)

5. “Downed” aircrew located by Kuwaiti Air assets

6. Kuwaiti Air assets direct Kuwait Naval vessel to the “downed” aircrew

7. “Downed” aircrew recovered by Kuwait Naval vessel

8. Movement back to Kuwait Naval Base (KNB)

9. “Downed” aircrew are transported to Camp ARIFJAN for reintegration

10. ENDEX

End-state – “Downed” aircrew recovered safely and expeditiously, and all personnel, air craft, & 

vessels returned to KNB.

As part of the joint aspect of the SAREX, the USNAVCENT liaison officer (LNO) to the Combined

Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF- OIR) participated. The U.S. Navy has been

focusing on conducting more exercises with the U.S. Army, and participating in more operations

within the CJTF-OIR Area of Operations (AO). The U.S. Navy is also dedicated to the process of

improving PR, and understanding the process of conducting PR with Kuwaiti forces is integral to 

the U.S. Navy’s PR cell at USNAVCENT.
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Supporting the SAREX was an U.S. Air Force SSG SERE specialist from JPRC, attached to

USARCENT to aid with their PRCC (Personnel Recovery Coordination Center). T he purpose of 

his attendance was to provide supplementary training for the 185th TAB and the 40th CAB. 

The SSG SERE specialist provides briefings and training on spectrum of captivity, conduct after 

capture, escapes training, and theater briefs on Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, etc. for all high-risk

personnel. He provided his subject matter expertise, to further prepare the Army aviators for

PR operations within the CJTF-OIR AOR.

As the exercise was conducted in Kuwaiti territorial waters, Kuwait has the first right of refusal,

under international law. If the SAREX had been a real world incident, the Kuwaiti forces are in

charge of rescue within their country, and coalition forces must rely on them as the host nation.

For this reason, along with many other, the building of relationships between Kuwaiti and U.S.

forces is paramount for successful PR operations.

The concept of the operation for the 7 December 2015 SAREX relied on swift communication 

between the JPRC, the Kuwait Area Operations Center (AOC), the Kuwait Joint Operations Center 

(JOC), and the Kuwait Naval Forces (KNF). The plan was for the “downed” aircrew to transmit an 

“emergency” signal to the JPRC. Next, the JPRC would call by telephone to the Kuwait AOC, also 

known as Mohallab control. From Mohallab control, the message would be relayed to the 

Kuwaiti JOC. The Kuwait JOC would approve the message and then transmit it to the Kuwait 

AOC and the KNF. Once approval was received from the Kuwait JOC, Mohallab control would 

notify the JPRC that the Kuwait military was launching recovery asset.

Next, the Kuwait AOC would 

transmit a launch order to base 

operations. Following receipt of 

the message, base operations 

would transmit the message to 

the Kuwaiti 32nd Squadron to 

be executed. Simultaneously, 

the KNF would transmit a 

launch order to the flotilla. 

Following receipt of the 

message, the flotilla would 

transmit the message to the 

Kuwait Navy SAR vessel to be

executed.
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The Kuwait AOC wound send its SAR aircraft to locate the “downed” aircrew and provide

command and control until the SAR vessel dispatched by KNF arrived on at the incident

location. Once the aircraft from the 32nd Squadron arrives on the scene, the Kuwaiti pilot

would talk directly to Mulhalub control. Mulhalub control would then call by telephone back to

the JPRC to provide updates to U.S. forces. Once the KNF vessel arrived on-station, the Kuwait

SAR aircraft would direct the KNF vessel directly to the “downed” aircrew. The KNF vessel

would recover the “downed” aircrew, and both the SAR aircraft and vessel would return to KNB,

where the “downed” aircrew would be transferred for transportation to the phase one

reintegration facility at Camp ARIFJAN. In summary, a “downed” aircrew calls for assistance,

JPRC contacts the Kuwait AOC, the Kuwait Air Force locate the “downed” aircrew, and the

Kuwait Navy recovers the “downed” aircrew.

SAREX EXECUTION

The USAV MG Charles P. Gross departed KNB at 0800 on the morning of 7 December 2015.

The USAV MG Charles P. Gross steamed 20 NM into the NAG to reach the exercise area. The

“downed” aircrew carried MOBI system transmitters, CSEL radios, and VHF radios. Prior to 

launching, the “downed” aircrew executed the exercise “emergency” call over their CSEL radio

and activated their Shout/Nano at approximately 1000. The aircrew received a response from

JPRC over their CSEL radio at approximately 1002. Once the “downed” flight crew had signaled

for help and launched in their HARD-7(S) life raft, the USAV MG Charles P. Gross remained on 

station to maintain contact with the crew and to prevent any civilian maritime traffic from 

interfering with the exercise.

The “downed” aircrew launched in their HARD-7S life raft at approximately 1005. The JPRC

contacted the Kuwait AOC at approximately 1020. At approximately 1040, Army personnel onboard the USAV MG Charles P. Gross, were notified by the JPRC that coordination/clearance

issues with the Kuwait AOC had halted the exercise and updates would be issued as they

occurred. At this point in the operation, the Kuwait JOC should have been granting launch

authority to the Kuwait AOC, who then should have issued launch authority to Base Operations,

who then should have called the 32nd squadron to launch the aircraft.

At approximately 1230, the coordination/clearance issues had been resolved and the Kuwait

AOC relayed the “downed” aircrew’s location to Base Operations for launch release. At

approximately 1300, the Kuwait Air Force’s 32

nd Squadron launched a Super Puma aircraft to

conduct search and rescue operations. The 32nd Squadron aircraft arrived on station at

approximately 1325. At approximately 1335, with the status of the KNF vessel unknown and

the sea conditions worsening and with concern toward the “downed aircrew’s” exposure to the 

elements, the decision was made to have the USAV MG Charles P. Gross recover the “downed”
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aircrew thus ending the SAREX.

As the survivors in the raft were being recovered by the USAV Gross, they radioed the Kuwaiti

Air Force helicopter that the rescue was complete enabling the aircraft to depart the exercise 

area. Once the Gross recovered the “downed” flight crew, the vessel and all personnel

returned to KNB.

At approximately 1340, the KNF Mk5 boat SAR vessel arrived on station. In all, it took

approximately 3hr and 40 minutes from the time the initial “emergency” signal was transmitted 

until the personnel recovery assets arrived on scene.

Observations

Overall, the SAREX was successful as the Kuwait Air Force aircraft did locate the “downed”

aircrew, and the Kuwait Naval vessel arrived at the “downed” aircrew’s exact location to

recover them. Unfortunately, the encumbered communications architecture prevented the KNF

vessel from conducting the physical recovery of the “downed” aircrew. The most obvious area

for improvement is the communications architecture between Kuwaiti forces and U.S. forces.

Additionally, the bilateral communications architecture requires refinement and repeated

application through search and rescue exercises.

At the commencement of the SAREX, everything worked as designed. The activation of the PR

architecture and communications between the “downed” aircrew and the JPRC went well.

However, the SAREX became mired when the Kuwait AOC was notified that the exercise had

commenced. The authorization order had not been received by the AOC, which delayed the

launch of Kuwait recovery assets for two hours. Miscommunication at the Kuwait AOC

prevented the immediate launch of KAF and KNF forces, though authorization had already been

granted. Nevertheless, once the order was received, the KAF Super Puma aircraft and KNF Mk5 

vessel recovery assets departed immediately and did arrive on station within the planned 

response time.

Additionally, communication did not occur between the KAF aircraft and the Kuwait AOC.

Communication did not occur between the KAF aircraft and the KNF vessel. Communication

between the KNF vessel and the “downed” aircrew did not occur. Finally, the exercise of the

phase one reintegration facility at Camp ARIFJAN did not occur.

Observations and Lessons Learned (US & Kuwait SAREX)

1) U.S. Army Vessels Are A Valuable Training Resource: The number one lesson 

learned from the 185th TAB’s SAREX is the value of utilizing U.S. Army Vessels for 
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personnel recovery exercises in a maritime environment. The USAV Corinth is an 

organic Army asset, and by leveraging this available asset, the 185th TAB was capable 

of conducting a significant amount of maritime PR training. Utilizing Army vessels 

for maritime training also has the benefit of flexibility. There can be considerable 

difficulties when an Army unit attempts to conduct training with other services. Like 

the Army, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard have specific doctrine and regulations 

the must be adhered to when conducting training. The bureaucratic differences

between the services can extend the planning process and inhibit training. This 

problem does not exist when utilizing U.S. Army vessels.

2) U.S. Army Vessels Are A Valuable Personnel Recovery Resource: U.S. Army vessels 

are a valuable resource for conducting PR. The JPRC should incorporate U.S. Army 

vessels into their list of available PR resources. Though U.S. Army vessels are not 

specifically equipped to conduct PR, they are numerous and can be employed in a 

“first-responder” role (if in the vicinity). Determining the location of personnel on 

the open ocean is very difficult and getting “eyes-on” personnel in a life raft quickly 

is vital to successful PR.

3) Personnel Recovery Course: The personnel recovery course is an invaluable training 

opportunity for all Army personnel involved in recovery operations. Personnel 

recovery officers, planners, U.S. Army vessel commanders, etc. would benefit from 

attending this course.

4) U.S. Helicopters Not Equipped For Independent Maritime PR: U.S. Army helicopters 

are not equipped to conduct independent personnel recovery in a maritime 

environment. U.S. Army helicopters do not have the training, do not have the 

necessary equipment, do not have rescue swimmers, do not have the enablers, etc. 

However, this merely reinforces further, why U.S. Army aviators must understand 

the entire personnel recovery organization and roles in maritime environments, and 

understand how U.S. Army aircraft can correctly aid in personnel recovery 

operations.

5) Survival Craft Transceiver: A survival craft transceiver should be added to the 

survival kit in the HARD-7(S). A survival craft transceiver operates on channels 16 

(Maritime emergency) and 6 only, and it has an extended battery life to ensure 

communications for extended periods of time. As CSEL radios are designed for land 

operations, and maritime frequencies are not standard to the radio, the inclusion of 

the survival craft transceiver inside the HARD-7(S) survival kit facilitates an excellent 

back-up communications platform. It also allows for bridge-to-bridge 
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communications with civilian vessels if needed, since all maritime traffic are required 

to monitor channel 16 by international maritime law. 

6) Space Weather: The 185th TAB did not check the space weather forecast prior to the 

exercise. The space weather event (solar flare) of 3 November 2015 significantly 

degraded the UHF SATCOM environment, which included GPS and the 185th TAB’s 

planned UHF SATCOM communication frequencies for the exercise. The identified 

best practice for the future is for the 185th TAB to contact the USARCENT Space 

Support Element (SSE) prior to operations and exercises in order to obtain the next 

24-48 space forecast. In the event there is space weather that will affect certain 

SATCOM communications frequencies during an exercise, the 185th TAB can easily 

utilize other communications assets and frequency bandwidths that are not 

impacted by scintillation (solar flares). Army units at all levels have SSEs available to 

support them at division level and higher. Additionally, Army planners can sign up 

for space weather alert emails from NOAA.

7) Test Communications: There is a CPN phone line between the Kuwait AOC and the 

JPRC. This phone line should be tested at least monthly.

8) Foster Relationships: The personal relationship between members of the 185th TAB 

and the Kuwaiti forces made the SAREX a success.

9) HARD-7(S) Raft Drop Location: The identified best practice of deploying the HARD7(S) raft to the downed aircrew from the wingman’s aircraft at a 10 foot, 10 knot 

hover or a 15 foot, stationary hover, is vital to crew survival. The downed aircrew 

will be tired and stressed from evacuating their aircraft as it sank. Additionally, the 

downed aircrew may have injuries and may be fighting heavy ocean currents. The 

HARD-7(S) raft must be deployed as close as possible to the downed crew to 

minimize the likelihood of the raft case floating away from the downed aircrew.

10) Sun Protection: The HARD-7(S) life raft is emergency equipment and as such does 

not feature a canopy to provide protection from the sun. Downed aircrews could 

potentially spend several hours in the HARD-7(S) life raft before PR assets locate 

them. Sunscreen should be included in the HARD-7(S) survival kit to minimize the 

risk of sunburns.

Observations and Best Practices (Joint/Bilateral SAREX)

1) Bilateral Preparations: The Kuwait AOC, the Kuwait JOC, and the Kuwait Navy
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need to be included in the pre-mission planning for personnel recovery

exercises.

2) Communications: Every organization has its own command and control structure,

and every organization communicates according to its own set standards.

Communication across multiple branches of service (joint) and with multinational

partners is exceedingly difficult, and the solution does not lie in aspirations for a

single standard for communications. Within the U.S., the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) has developed the Incident Command System (ICS) to

aid with communications issues such as were encountered during the

Joint/Bilateral SAREX. The ICS focuses on simplicity of communication in

emergency situations. Besides refining and rehearsing for the next SAREX, the

lessons of the ICS may also be applied to assist in multinational interoperability.

3) Exercise Approval Letter: Approval for a bilateral SAREX is exceedingly complex,

relies on diplomatic channels, and takes a long period of time for approval. The 185th

TAB had short notice the last SAREX and the Joint/Bilateral SAREX; approximately 33

days. The 185th TAB submitted the approval letter a week after the previous SAREX,

which was as quickly as the brigade could get it formulated, signed by the brigade

commander, translated into Arabic, submitted to ARCENT, ARCENT could submit it to

the U.S. embassy, the embassy could put it on their letterhead, translate it, send it 

over to the Kuwait AOC, for it to go to the Kuwait JOC.

4) Exercise of the Phase One Reintegration Facility: USARCENT has a phase one

reintegration the necessary approval channels facility at Camp ARIFJAN, but it

has not been involved an exercise recently.

5) Personnel Recovery Officers: Personnel Recovery Officers (PRO) are invaluable in

coordinating PR assets. Additionally, it is the responsibility of the unit PROs to

learn and know all about the PR assets within their unit’s AO. The JPRC does not

know all of the specifics for PR at a specific base or facility. The JPRC coordinates

across the entire COCOM. The individual unit PROs must become subject

matter experts for all PR resources that their respective unit may employ.

6) Reciprocal Support Relationships: The 185th TAB has developed reciprocal support

relationships with Kuwaiti forces, as well as with the Harbor Master and the U.S.

Army vessels at:

• Kuwait Naval Base, and with staff at USAFCENT, USARCENT, and

USNAVCENT.
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• Without doubt, this level of complex PR exercise never would have

occurred without the relationships that the 185th TAB fostered and

cultivated.

The way forward

During the AAR following the exercise, all participants agreed that in the future both the KAOC 

and the KJOC need to be included in the pre-mission planning briefings for personnel recovery 

exercises. The KNF flotilla and the KAF 32nd & 62nd Squadrons are extremely capable and

proficient assets, as are the 185th TAB and the USAV MG Charles P. Gross. The major issue

lies in the communication architecture at the major command level.

Summary

Overall, the SAREX was an excellent exercise for all units involved. The 185th TAB developed 

training and TTPs for the HARD-7(S) life raft, conducted joint PR training, and multinational PR 

training.

Overall, the 185th TAB’s SAREX Sequel was an excellent training exercise for both the Kuwaiti 

Forces and the U.S. Forces. The 185th TAB further developed their PR procedures, as well as 

successfully integrating an additional level of complexity to the SAREX exercise. The bilateral

exercises between the Kuwaiti and U.S. forces are vital to ensuring the successful recovery of

Kuwaiti or U.S. forces in a real world incident. The 185th TAB has made major

accomplishments in building the relationships with their Kuwaiti brothers, and the 40th CAB

will undoubtedly build upon this.