IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS

NO. CR-2011-196 ALBERT RODRIGUEZ MEDELLIN, Petitioner

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Respondent

ON PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW OF THE FOLLOWI NG:

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 13 THDISTRICT NO. 03-13-00158-CR ON DIRECT APPEAL FROM COMAL COUNTY, TEXAS TRIAL COURT CASE NO. CR2011-196 Honorable Carl E. Stewart, Chief Judge Presiding

Larry Warner, Counsel for Petitioner Alberto Rodriguez Medellin 3109 Banyan Circle Harlingen, Texas 78550 Phone: (956) 230-0361 Facsimile: 1-866-408-1968 office@larrywarner.com Texas Bar#20871500;USDC,SDTX 1230; Board Certified, Criminal Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization(1983) Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States (1984)

Page 1 of 20Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P.68.4,Appellant provides the following i dentity of parties

and counsel: Identity of parties and counsel Alberto Rodriguez Medellin, Appellant FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS at trial and on appeal and o n petition for discretionary review: Ms. Jennifer C. Smith *** and ***
Ms. Laura B. Bates COMAL COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 150 North Seguin, Suite 307 New Braunfels, Texas 78130 (830) 221-1300 FOR THE DEFENDANT ALBERT RODRIGUEZ MEDELLIN at tria l: Thomas P. 'Tom' Clark ATTORNEY AT LAW 800 West San Antonio Street, Suite B New Braunfels, Texas 78130 (830) 624-0804 FOR THE DEFENDANT ALBERT RODRIGUEZ MEDELLIN On Appe al and on petition for discretionary review: Larry Warner, Counsel for Petitioner Alberto Rodriguez Medellin 3109 Banyan Circle Harlingen,Tx 78550 Phone: (956) 230-0361 Facsimile: 1-866-408-1968 office@larrywarner.com Texas Bar#20871500;USDC,SDTX 1230; Board Certified, Criminal Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization(1983) Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States (1984)

Page 2 of 20Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P.68.4(a), Petitioner provide s this Table of Contents with

reference to the pages of the Petition, indicating the subject of each ground or question presented for review. TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Index of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Statement re oral argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6 Statement of the case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7 Statement of procedural history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8 Grounds for Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-9 1. The Court of Appeals has decided an important qu estion of state or federal law in a way that conflicts with the applicable dec isions of the Court of Criminal Appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States. The question is: Does the Trial Court abuse its dis cretion in denying a change of venue when the evidence is otherwise in equipoise b ut the District Attorney herself announces publicly pretrial her personal opinion th at the defendant is guilty? Does the district attorney’s publicized opinion fulfill the prejudice requirement of TEX.CODE CRIM.P.art.31.02(a)? The decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is Ransonnette v. State ,522S.W.2d509(Tex.Crim.App.1975) Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-12 Prayer for Relief......................... 16

Page 3 of 20Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P.68.4(b), Petitioner provide s an Index of Authorities,

arranged alphabetically and indicating the pages of the petition where the authorities are cited.

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CASES: PAGES Ransonnette v. State ,522S.W.2d509(Tex.Crim.App.1975) McCutcheon v. State, 363 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Crim.App. 1962)

Refusal of defendant's motion for change of venue o n ground that publicity given by radio, television and newspapers of district attorney's announcement that defendant was one of 12 persons h e most wanted to convict and send to penitentiary deprived defendant of fair and impartial trial was not error in absence of showing that any prejudice found its way into jury box. Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P. 68.4©, Petitioner include s a short statement of why oral argument would be helpful.
Statement re Oral Argument Oral argument would be helpful to the decisional pr ocess. The Court and Counsel could discuss the correct standard of revie w of the decision to deny a motion for change of venue. Most recently, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated :

“Indeed, even extensive knowledge of the case or de fendant in
Page 4 of 20the community as a result of pretrial publicity is not sufficient if there is not also some showing of prejudicial or inflammatory coverage.8" Gonzalez v. State ,222 S.W.3d446,449hn2(Tex.Crim.App.2007) regresar Earlier, the Court of Criminal Appeals had set a mo re exacting standard:
“Refusal of defendant's motion for change of venue on ground that publicity given by radio, television and news papers of district attorney's announcement that defendant wa s one of 12 persons he most wanted to convict and send to peni tentiary deprived defendant of fair and impartial trial was not error in absence of showing that any prejudice found its way into jury box. McCutcheon v. State, 363 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Crim.App. 1962).
The Court and Counsel could discuss whether the Cou rt of Appeals correctly interpreted the standard set out by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Ransonnette v. State ,522S.W.2d509(Tex.Crim.App.1975) The Court of Appea ls did not review the prejudice from the publication of the District Atto rney’s opinion that the defendant was guilty. Considering evolving standards of due process and due course, as well as promulgation of higher standards of conduct and mor e precise rules of professional conduct, the Court of Criminal Appeals and Counsel could discuss whether it is time to revisit a half-century old opinion on the subjec t of the prosecutor’s public expression of opinion on the defendant’s guilt. See : McCutcheon v. State, 363 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Crim.App. 1962)

Page 5 of 20Refusal of defendant's motion for change of venue o n ground that publicity given by radio, television and newsp apers of district attorney's announcement that defendant was one of 12 persons he most wanted to convict and send to penitentiary deprived defendant of fair and impartial trial was not error in absence of showing that any prejudice found its way into jury box. McCutcheon v. State, 363 S.W.2d 457 (Tex.Crim.App. 1962) Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P.68.4(d), Petitioner provide s a statement of the case, noting briefly the nature of the case, and reservin g the details of the case for statement with the pertinent grounds or questions. Statement of the case The nature of the case was a prosecution of Petitio ner for murder. Petitioner pleaded not guilty and tried guilt/innoc ence to a jury. The jury found him guilty of murder. The jury recommended and the judge imposed a senten ce of life imprisonment. Petitioner timely filed a Notice of Appeal to the C ourt of Appeals for the Third District of Texas. The Supreme Court of Texas trans ferred the matter to the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas. A Panel of the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed. Petitioner sought and obtained an extension and the n timely filed Motions for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc. The Court of Appea ls overruled both Motions on

Page 6 of 20May 14, 2015. (Before Petitioner filed timely motio ns for rehearing and rehearing en

banc, Petitioner sought from the Court of and obtai ned from the Court of Criminal Appeals a thirty-day extension to file this Petitio n until June 3, 2015.) Petitioner timely presents this Petition for Discre tionary Review. Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P.68.4(e), Petitioner provide s a Statement of Procedural History.

Statement of the Procedural History of the Case The court of appeals is the Court of Appeals for th e Thirteenth District of Texas. (The matter was appealed to the Court of Appeals fo r the Third District of Texas. The Supreme Court of Texas transferred the matter to th e Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas.) Re: TEX.R.APP.P.10.5(b)(3)(B), the date of Court o f Appeals’ judgment is April 2,
2015. Re: TEX.R.APP.P.10.5(b)(3)© the case number in the Court of Appeals is “NUMBER 13–13–00190–CR”. Re: TEX.R.APP.P.10.5(b)(3) (D), the date every moti on for rehearing or en banc reconsideration was filed: On May 1, 2015, Petitioner filed a Motion for Exte nsion of Time to file the Motion for Rehearing and to file the Motion for Reh earing En Banc. Those Motions

Page 7 of 20for Rehearing were due on May 4, 2015. Petitioner asked till June 3, 2015 to file

those Motions for Rehearing. An extension was granted until June 3, 2015. The Court of Appeals overruled both motions on May 14, 2015. However, on May 4, 2 015, Petitioner filed both Motions for Rehearing and Motion for Rehearing En B anc. The 30 thday after May 14, 2015 is Saturday, June 13, 2015. So, the Petition for Discretionary Review is due on Monday, June 15, 2015. This Petition is filed by sending it electronically to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals to the following address: Clerk, Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas, 5th Floor, Hidalgo County Administration Building, 100 East Cano Stree t, Edinburg, Texas. Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P.68.4(f), Petitioner states briefly, without argument, the questions presented for review, expressed in the te rms and circumstances of the case, but without unnecessary detail. GROUNDS FOR REVIEW Grounds for Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. The Court of Appeals has decided an important qu estion of state or federal law in a way that conflicts with the applicable dec isions of the Court of Criminal Appeals or the Supreme Court of the United States.

Page 8 of 20The question is: Does the Trial Court abuse its dis cretion in denying a change

of venue when the evidence is otherwise in equipois e but the District Attorney herself announces publicly pretrial her personal opinion th at the defendant is guilty. The decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals is Ransonnette v. State ,522S.W.2d509(Tex.Crim.App.1975) The Court of Appeals did not apply the standard correctly because it did not consider the extreme prejudice of the district atto rney’s having publicly expressed to the small-town newspaper her personal opinion that the defendant was guilty. The District Attorney charged Petitioner with causing h is wife’s death and then told the media, “he caused her death”. Pursuant to TEX.R.APP.P.68.4(g), Petitioner provide s a direct and concise argument, with supporting authorities, amplifying the reasons for granting review. ARGUMENT The question is: Does the Trial Court abuse its dis cretion in denying a change of venue when the evidence is otherwise in equipois e but the District Attorney herself announces publicly pretrial her personal opinion th at the defendant is guilty. The decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals are Ransonnette v. State ,522S.W.2d509(Tex.Crim.App.1975) In Ransonnette the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the trial court did not abu se its discretion in denying a change

Page 9 of 20of venue when the trial court was presented with anevenly divided choice of

witnesses and evidence regarding whether the defend ant could receive a fair trial. The Court of Appeals treated the record as if it we re like the record in
Ransonnette ...evenly divided. But the record was not evenly di vided. The record showed that the District Attorney herself expressed to the one newspaper in this county of five-thousand subscribers her personal op inion that Petitioner was guilty. Here the prosecutor expressed her personal opinion to the media that the defendant was guilty. “Jennifer Smith, stated that: We don't know the fi nal 6 mechanism of death, but I want it to be clear th at she died as 7 a result of Albert Medellin.” (RR 2 40) Another decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals i s Williams v. State ,170 S.W.2d 482(Tex.Crim.App.1943). “The venue of this c ase should have been changed.” Williams v. State ,170 S.W.2d 482(Tex.Crim.App.1943) The question is important to the jurisprudence of the state because the District Attorney is prohibited from expressing such opinion

.

“(b) A lawyer ordinarily will violate paragraph (a) , and the likelihood of a violation increases if the adjudication is ongoing or imminent, by making an extrajudicial state ment of the type referred to in that paragraph when the statement refers to:***(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant

Page 10 of 20or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that co uld result in incarceration;” Tx Disc.R.Prof.Conduct§3.07 The analysis of the Court of Appeals in relying on Gonzalez, Montanez, De Blanc, and Salazar is flawed precisely because none of those cases inv olved a public and publicized opinion by the very District Attorne y who was to prosecute the defendant that he was guilty.
In Gonzalez , “local newscasts aired the surveillance tape depi cting the murder o f th e co n v en ien ce sto re clerk .” Go nza lez v . Sta te ,2 2 2 S.W.3d446,447(Tex.Crim.App.2007) There is nothing i n Gonzalez from which the public might conclude that the person who was to pr osecute the case might have or did have important evidence about the case supporting h er/his opinion that the defendant was guilty. The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Gonzalez was misplaced.
In Salazar , “The trial court admitted several newspaper stories and transcripts of television news coverage concerning appe llant's case and the similar cases underway at the time.” Salazar v. State ,38SW3d141,150hn13(Tex.Crim.App.2001) Nor was there anything in Salazar about the distric t attorney saying in the media that the defendant was guilty. In Medellin the district attorney told the newspaper that Medellin caused the death of Medellin’s wife, exactly what Medellin was charged with.
Page 11 of 20Montanez deals with presumed findings of fact. It was a matter involving a

motion to suppress. Montanez v. State ,195 S.W.3d101,106hn4(Tex.Crim.App.2006) Montanez does not treat venue.
In DeBlanc , the appellant’s own evidence on publicity was weak and conflicting and the state put on twenty-five witnes ses who said the murder defendant c o u l d g e t a f a i r t r i a l i n L i b e r t y C o u n t y . DeBla nc v . State ,799SW2d701,704hn2(Tex.Crim.App.1990)

Nor was there anything in DeBlanc about the district attorney saying in the media that the defendant was guilty. In Medellin the district attorney told the newspaper that Medellin caused the death of his wif e, exactly what he was charged with. McCutcheon distinguished This is not an appeal and Petitioner is not trying to treat this process as if it were one seeking a writ of error. The Court of Appeals s imply did not apply the standard correctly because it did not examine the prejudice adequately. Ryser, infra, relies on Mendez , another half-century old decision adopted before the 1965 Code of Criminal Procedure, before present rules of professional conduct were in effect, and before American Bar Ass ociation Standards for a Fair Trial and a Free Press were published.

Page 12 of 20In Mendez: “District Attorney Briscoe ‘has been reported by Te levision and Radio news reporters and by all of the three Ho uston newspapers both by story and photographs that Guadalupe Morales Mendez was a person charged with an offense in Harris County and was one of twelve he most wanted to convict andmost wanted to see in the penitentiary..........’” Mendez v. State ,362SW2d841,842hn2(Tex.Crim.App.1962) The Court of Criminal Appeals did not reach the venue matter in Mendez because trial counsel had not reserved an exception , another ancient practice no longer used. Mendez v. State ,362SW2d841,843hn3(Tex.Crim.App.1962)

The Court of Appeals did not consider the “nature of the publicity”. Gonzalez at 451hn7 The Court of Criminal Appeals set out the test for whether pretrial publicity was prejudicial: “In examining whether the pretrial publicity is pre judicial and inflammatory, a trial court may take three matters into consideration: 1) the nature of the publicity, 2) any evide nce presented at a change of venue hearing, and 3) testimony receive d from venire members at voir dire.17" Gonzalez at 451hn7 The Court of Appeals did not consider the "nature o f the publicity", namely that the District Attorney told the small-town's only ne wspaper that the defendant caused his wife's death, that he was guilty.
In Gonzalez the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that it had onl y reversed for

Page 13 of 20the trial court's failure to grant a change of ven ue onetime, in Jack Ruby's case,

Rubenstein v. State, 407 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Crim. App . 1966)
In Gonzalez , the Criminal Appeals said that showing a video of the crime was "not sufficient to place beyond the zone of reasonable disagreement the trial court's decision to deny appellant's motion." Gonzalez at 451 hn8 In Medellin, the Court of Criminal Appeals s hould clarify the standard in the light of Rubenstein ; it should hold that the District Attorney's pu blicizing of her opinion that Petitioner "caused the death of his w ife" after the very same District Attorney had c hargedthat Petitioner "caused the death of [his wife]" was indeed sufficient to place beyond the zone of reasonable d isagreement the trial court's decision to deny appellant's motion." Other jurisdictions' treatment of prosecutor's pret rial statements re defendant’s guilt. The Court of Criminal Appeals may consider the opinions of other jurisdictions . “ Numerous decis ions of other appellate courts, including Texas courts of appeals and courts of oth er jurisdictions, are in accord with our holdings ...." Lawrence v. State ,240 S.W.3d 912,917 hn12 fn24(2007) Those opinions about the prosecutor's pretrial stat ements about the defendant's guilt are gathered at "Pretrial Publici ty in Criminal Case as Ground for Change of Venue" 33 A.L.R.3d 17.

Page 14 of 20"Prosecuting attorneynewspaper under control of § 27[a] participation in release of publicity §§ 20, 27[a], 32[a], 40, 46 television appearances by § 32[a]"
When the judge said in a letter that defense counsel knew the def endant was guilty in a murder case, the judge was disqualified . His letter was publicized in the small-town newspaper. Even though there was a new j udge, the trial was deemed unfair because of the comment by a trial official o n the defendant’s guilt. People v. McKay ,236 P2d145(Cal.1951) Where the newspaper coverage went beyond objective dissemination of information by reporting of extrajudicial statement s by prosecutors, the trial judge abused his discretion in denying a change of venue and the Supreme Court of Montana granted a peremptory writ. State ex rel. Coburn v Bennett ,655 P2d 502(Mont.1982) It was reversible error to refuse change of venue f or defendant accused of trafficking in heroin where prosecutor, at press conference imm ediately after defendant's arrest, stated that defendant was guilty. State v Wilson (W Va) 202 SE2d 828 (W. Va.)

“In this press conference which was reported by new spapers, radio and television in and around Monongalia County, the prosecutor made several extra-judicial assertions. He strongly indicated that this defendant, among others, was g uilty.

” State v Wilson , 202 SE2d 828 (W. Va.1973) The Court in Wilson found prosecutorial misconduct and cumulative error and ordered a new trial.

Page 15 of 20The Court of Appeals in Medellin misconstrued the s tandard of review on denial

of a motion for change of venue. The Court of Crimi nal Appeals should grant this petition for discretionary review, allow full brief ing, and order a new trial. The Court of Appeals in Medellin misapplied the tes t for prejudice in discounting the fact that there was only one newspa per in the county. In Coburn , there was only one newspaper in the county. The “ Independent Record, the only daily newspaper in Lewis and ClarkCounty.” The population of Lewis and Clark Co. In 1982 was about 52,000. (Goog le, “population Lewis and Clark County, accessed 06/11/15). Comal County had abou t 100,000 at the time of trial (Google, “population Lewis and Clark County, access ed 06/11/15). In Coburn , the prosecutors intimated their opinion of the strength of their evidence: ““County Attorney Charles Graveley was shaking his head in wonder. “ ‘When you read her statement,’ he said of Thursday's 11-year-old rape victim, ‘you'd think she was 28 or 29, and well-edu cated at that. “ ‘It's the best statement from a rape victim I hav e seen in five years,’ he said. “Assistant County Attorney Steve Garrison had anoth er way of putting it this morning. “ ‘He picked the wrong little girl,’ he said. ‘She' s the kind that when you say, “describe the vehicle,” she just does it.’” Coburn at 503 [internal quotations unchanged,lw] The County Attorney also said: “Graveley said it wa s his opinion that $100,000 bail to keep Coburn in jail to protect the community was legally proper.” Coburn at 504 “ ‘Once he's found insane, he virtually has a licen se to commit another crime and another crime and not go to prison,’ Grav eley said.” Coburn at 504

Page 16 of 20The prosecutor in Coburn plainly told the only news paper in the county that he

thought the defendant was guilty. “County Attorney Graveley was campaigning for reele ction during the pendency of the Coburn case. The Independent Record ran a “Candidates Say”“ ‘The bail in serious crimes must be set suffi ciently high to insure that the defendant is not going to commit any more crimes against our citizens while awaiting trial on the former charge.’ ” (Emph asis supplied.)” [Court supplied emphasis,lw] The Court condemned the prosecutor’s statements in Coburn: “County Attorney Graveley's campaign statement that bail should insure that “the defendant is not going to commit any more crimes” shows a total disregard for the fundamental constitutional protection embraced by the concept of presumed inno cence, and under the circumstances implies that relator is guilty.” Coburn at 507hn5 Although not in the record, in deciding whether to grant this petition for discretionary review, the Court of Criminal Appeals may note that the prosecutor in Medellin was running for election after Medellin wa s arrested in 2010. She was sworn in January of 2011. Medellin was indicted in April of 2011. In Medellin, the District Attorney’s comments were even more explicit than those in Coburn. The District Attorney charged thatMedellin caused the death of his wife and then told the county newspaper that “he caused the death of his wife”. The Court of Appeals misapplied the standard when it di scounted the District Attorney’s comment. In applying the standard, the Court of Appeals did not consider the effect of there being one newspaper in the County. The eviden ce showed that Comal had 100,000 people and that 5,000 subscribed to the new spaper, the only newspaper. The Court of Appeals should have considered the pre judicial effect of publishing the prosecutor’s opinion that the Petitioner “cause d his wife’s death”.

Page 17 of 20“While the exact figures of the number of people wh o saw the telecast

were in doubt, the court stated that there could be no doubt that it was a very large number and that the potential for inf luence on possible talesmen was significant, and that the effect of th e telecast could only be prejudicial.” People v Martin (1963) 19 App Div 2d 804, 243 NYS2d 343 The Court of Appeals misapplied the standard by tre ating Harris County and Comal County as if they were the same for purposes of publicity. The population of the county matters when consideri ng prejudice and change of

venue. The Court of Appeals relied onRyser v. State ,453 SW3d 17,37(Tex.App.–Houston[1st Dist]2014,pet.ref’d) Ryser dealt with a news conference involving the mayor, a state representative, and the district attorney. The opinion in Ryser does not cite any statement or opinion from the dis trict attorney. The Court of Appeals considered the size (population) o f Harris County in deciding that prejudice was not proven. The Court of Appeals in Ryser also noted that there was a video of the crime. Ryser v. State ,453 SW3d 17,37(Tex.App.–Houston[1st Dist]2014,pet. ref’d) The Thirteenth Court of Appeals’ reliance on Ryser was misplaced. Harris has almost thirty-six times more population that Comal. Harris has “population, 2014 estimate 4,441,370". http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48/48201.ht ml a c c e s s e d M a y 2 5 , 2 0 1 5 ) C o m a l h a s “ p o p u l a t i o n , 2 0 1 4 estimate123,694".(http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/ states/48/48091.html accessed May 25, 2015) The Court of Criminal Appeals will please take judi cial notice of those statistices from the United States Census Bureau. TEX.R.EVID.20 1(d) The case against Medellin was circumstantial; there was no statement from the defendant and there were no eyewitnesses.

Page 18 of 20CONCLUSION

The Court of Criminal Appeals should grant this petition and allow full briefing.

In the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas No. CR-2011-196 On Petition for Discretionary Review of the followi ng:

CAUSE NO 03-13-00158-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIRTEENTH JUDICI AL DISTRICT

ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ MEDELLIN, PETITIONER

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS ON APPEAL FROM COMAL COUNTY, TX
TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. CR2011-196

* * * * * * * * * * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE * * * * * * * * * * I mailed on a copy of the PDR Addressed to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas to: , State Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 12405, Austin, TX 78711 Hon. Jennifer Tharp, District Attorney, 150 N. Segu in Ave., Suite 307, New Braunfels, TX 78130 Hon. Laura Burton Bates, Assistant Criminal Distric t Attorney, 150 N. Seguin Ave., Suite 307, New Braunfels, TX 78130

I mailed the copies on June 12, 2015.

Page 19 of 20Respectfully submitted June 12, 2015 By:/S/ LARRY WARNER Larry Warner, Counsel for Petitioner Alberto Rodriguez Medellin 3109 Banyan Circle Harlingen, Texas 78550 Phone: (956) 230-0361 Fax: 1-866-408-1968 email: office@larrywarner.com Texas Bar#20871500;USDC,SDTX 1230; Board Certified, Criminal Law, Texas Board of Legal Specialization(1983) Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States (1984)

Page 20 of 20Envelope Details

https://reviewer.efiletexas.gov/EnvelopeDetails.aspx?envelopeguid=c82223d7-4f61-4250-af88-0ad27ebbc87d [6/12/2015 5:07:45 PM] Print this page 

## Envelope 5663500

Case Information Location Court Of Criminal Appeals Date Filed 06/12/2015 04:11:55 PM Case Number Case Description Assigned to Judge Attorney LARRY WARNER Firm Name LAW OFFICE OF LARRY WARNER Filed By LARRY WARNER Filer Type Not Applicable Fees Convenience Fee $0.00 Total Court Case Fees $0.00 Total Court Filing Fees $0.00 Total Court Service Fees $0.00 Total Filing & Service Fees $0.00 Total Service Tax Fees $0.00 Total Provider Service Fees $0.00 Total Provider Tax Fees $0.00 Grand Total $0.00 Payment Account Name TX REG OPERATING Transaction Amount $0.00 Transaction Response Transaction ID 9294092 Order # 005663500-0 Petition for Discretionary Review Filing Type EFile Filing Code Petition for Discretionary Review Filing Description Medellin PRD Reference Number Alberto Rodriguez Medellin Comments Status Rejected Fees Court Fee $0.00 Service Fee $0.00 Rejection Information Rejection Reason Time Rejection Comment

06/12/2015 The petition for discretionary review does not contain a certification of compliance with T.R.A.P. 9.4(i)(3). The petition for discretionary review does not contain theEnvelope Details

https://reviewer.efiletexas.gov/EnvelopeDetails.aspx?envelopeguid=c82223d7-4f61-4250-af88-0ad27ebbc87d [6/12/2015 5:07:45 PM] Other 05:05:38 PM identity of Judge, Parties and Counsel in compliance with [Rule 68.4(a)]; the identity of the trial court judge is missing. The petition for discretionary review does not contain a copy of the court of appeals opinion. [Rule 68.4(j)] Your petition remains due June 3, 2015. Documents Lead Document PDR 061215.pdf [Original]