UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

REGINALD WALKER, 

 Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 4:15-11789 

v. Honorable Linda V. Parker 

 

WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S 

OFFICE, ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR 

NANCY WESTVELD, JUDGE KYM L. 

WORTHY, ATTORNEY WILLIAM 

WINTERS III, DETROIT POLICE 

DEPARTMENT, OFFICER RAPHAEL 

CLEMENTS, OFFICER DANIEL VICKERS, 

ANTHONY LYONS, OFFICER STANLEY KROPIK 

 Defendants, 

 / 

OPINION AND ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT 

 On May 18, 2015, Plaintiff Reginald Walker (“Plaintiff”) filed a pro se civil 

rights complaint against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is 

incarcerated at the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility in Muskegon Heights, 

Michigan. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s 

Complaint must be summarily dismissed. The Court also concludes that an appeal 

from this decision cannot be taken in good faith. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint

On April 11, 2000, City of Detroit police officers arrested Plaintiff in 

connection with a murder investigation. Plaintiff claims that the officers who are 

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named as Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him 

without a warrant at the home of Barbara Jones, where he was staying as an 

overnight guest. Plaintiff was charged with the murder of Larry John Troup. 

On March 1, 2001, Plaintiff was convicted of first-degree murder and 

felony-firearm following a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Wayne County, 

Michigan. Defendant Kym L. Worthy was the judge who presided over Plaintiff’s 

trial. Plaintiff claims that Wayne County prosecutors, including Defendant 

Assistant Prosecutor Nancy Westveld, presented perjured testimony at the 

preliminary examination to obtain a bind over and later at trial to obtain Plaintiff’s 

conviction. Plaintiff further claims that the prosecutors suppressed exculpatory 

evidence. Plaintiff asserts that his attorney, Defendant William L. Winters, III, 

was ineffective for failing to present an insanity defense. 

 Plaintiff’s conviction was affirmed by the state appellate courts. See People 

v. Walker, No. 249406, 2005 WL 657727 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2005), appeal 

denied, 703 N.W.2d 815 (2005). He sought federal habeas relief, which was 

denied by the district court. See Walker v. McQuiggin, No. 06-15686, 2010 WL 

200813 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 14, 2010). However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 

reversed the district court and granted the writ of habeas corpus, finding that trial 

counsel had been ineffective for failing to investigate and present an insanity 

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defense. Walker v. Hoffner, 534 F. App’x. 406, 407 (6th Cir. 2013); cert. denied, 

134 S. Ct. 1025 (2014). 

 In lieu of opting for a retrial, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of 

second-degree murder and felony-firearm. Plaintiff was sentenced to terms of 

imprisonment of fifteen to thirty years on the murder conviction and two years on 

the felony-firearm conviction.1

Standard of Review 

In this action, Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed without 

prepayment of the filing fee under 28 § U.S.C. 1915(a). (ECF No. 6.) Pursuant to 

§ 1915, the Court is required to dismiss any action brought by a plaintiff 

proceeding in forma pauperis if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a 

defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Moreover, the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act requires the Court to initially screen any complaint filed by 

a prisoner regardless of any filing fee paid, and to sua sponte dismiss any 

complaint the Court determines is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 

 

1

The Court obtained some of this information from the Michigan Department of 

Corrections’ Offender Tracking Information System (OTIS), of which the Court is 

permitted to take judicial notice. See Ward v. Wolfenbarger, 323 F. Supp. 2d 818, 

821, n.3 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 

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upon which relief can be granted, or that seeks monetary relief against a defendant 

who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

 The Court must read a pro se complaint liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 

U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are 

clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 

(1992). All complaints, however, must plead facts sufficient to show that a legal 

wrong has been committed from which the plaintiff may be granted relief. See 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint need not contain “detailed factual 

allegations,” however, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide grounds entitling him to 

relief “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). 

Analysis 

Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to dismissal under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A 

for several reasons. 

 First, the Eleventh Amendment bars civil rights actions against a state and its 

agencies and departments unless the state waived its immunity and consented to 

suit, or Congress has abrogated that immunity. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State 

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). The State of Michigan has not consented to be 

sued for civil rights actions in federal court, see Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 

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877 (6th Cir. 1986), nor did Congress abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity 

when it enacted § 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979). The 

Michigan Supreme Court and its lower courts operate as arms of the state, and thus 

enjoy the same sovereign immunity as the State of Michigan. See Pucci v. 

Nineteenth Dist. Ct., 628 F.3d 752, 762-64 (6th Cir. 2010). Eleventh Amendment 

immunity likewise applies to state employees sued in their official capacities. See 

Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F. 3d 282, 289 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Cady v. Arenac Co., 

574 F. 3d 334, 344 (6th Cir. 2009)). 

 Next, absolute judicial immunity and § 1983 shield Defendant Worthy from 

Plaintiff’s claims. The United States Supreme Court has held that judges are 

absolutely immune from damages suits arising from “acts committed within their 

judicial jurisdiction.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). This is 

because the principle of independent judicial decision-making “is so important to 

our system of jurisprudence that judicial immunity even extends to allegations of 

judicial acts done incorrectly, maliciously or corruptly.” King v. Caruso, 542 F. 

Supp. 2d 703, 728 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 

356 (1978)). Judges are “absolutely immune from liability for [their] judicial acts 

even if [their] exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave 

procedural errors.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978). There are only 

two instances where judicial immunity will not apply: (1) the judge acts in a non4:15-cv-11789-LVP-PTM Doc # 7 Filed 07/15/15 Pg 5 of 13 Pg ID 190
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judicial capacity; or (2) the judge acts in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. 

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). A judge acts in the complete absence 

of all jurisdiction only if a matter was clearly outside the court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction. King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir. 1985). This immunity 

extends to state and federal judges alike and it applies to actions alleging a 

violation of the United States Constitution. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 334 

(1983). 

The 1996 amendments to § 1983 also extended absolute immunity for state 

judges to requests for injunctive or equitable relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“in any 

action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such 

officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory 

decree was violated or declaratory relief is unavailable”); see also Coleman v. 

Governor of Michigan, 413 F. App’x 866, 873 (6th Cir. 2011). 

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Worthy relate only to her actions 

presiding over Plaintiff’s criminal trial. Neither of the exceptions to judicial 

immunity applies in this case. Accordingly, judicial immunity bars Plaintiff’s 

action against Defendant Worthy. 

 Further, “[a]bsolute prosecutorial immunity, like absolute judicial immunity, 

is a common law principle that shields a prosecutor from § 1983 liability.” Cooper 

v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 946 (6th Cir. 2000). A prosecutor has absolute immunity 

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for all acts “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” 

such as “initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v. 

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). The Sixth Circuit has explained: 

Those acts that occur in the course of the prosecutor’s role as an 

advocate for the state, e.g., acts taken to prepare for the initiation of 

judicial proceedings or to prepare for trial, are protected by absolute 

immunity. By contrast, a prosecutor who performs the investigative 

functions normally performed by a detective or police officer such as 

searching for the clues and corroboration that might give him probable 

cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested is entitled only at most 

to qualified immunity. 

Cooper, 203 F.3d at 947 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As with 

judicial immunity, the motives of the prosecutor are irrelevant for purposes of 

immunity. Eldridge v. Gibson, 332 F.3d 1019, 1021 (6th Cir. 2003). Indeed, 

absolute prosecutorial immunity is not overcome by a showing that the prosecutor 

acted wrongfully or maliciously. Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F. 2d 1135, 1138 (6th 

Cir. 1989). 

 The Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office and Assistant Prosecutor Nancy 

Westveld therefore are absolutely immune from liability for their actions in 

prosecuting Plaintiff. This is so regardless of the fact that the Sixth Circuit 

subsequently set aside Plaintiff’s first-degree murder conviction. See, e.g. Ziegler 

v. Michigan, 59 F. App’x. 622, 623-624 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the 

prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity on the prisoner’s § 1983 civil rights 

claims even though the prisoner’s conviction was later reversed on the ground that 

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the trial court judge had not adequately discussed the ramifications of selfrepresentation with prisoner). 

 Next, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant William L. Winters, his court 

appointed attorney in the criminal case, must be dismissed because it fails to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A viable § 1983 

claim requires proof of “(1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution 

or laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting under color of state law.” 

Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). “It is well-settled that a lawyer representing a 

client is not a state actor ‘under color of law’ within the meaning of § 1983.” 

Dallas v. Holmes, 137 F. App’x 746, 752 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Polk Cnty. v. 

Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 & n.7 (1998); Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 289 (6th 

Cir. 1998)). “[E]ven though the defective performance of defense counsel may 

cause the trial process to deprive an accused person of his liberty in an 

unconstitutional manner, the lawyer who may be responsible for the 

unconstitutional state action does not himself act under color of state law within 

the meaning of § 1983.” Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 329, n.6 (1983) (internal 

citations omitted); see also Floyd v. Cnty. of Kent, 454 F. App’x. 493, 497 (6th Cir. 

2012) (holding that a public defender could not be liable in § 1983 suit for 

ineffective assistance of counsel brought by his former client, as he did not act 

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under color of state law when performing traditional functions as counsel for the 

accused). Plaintiff’s Complaint therefore must be dismissed against Defendant 

Winters. 

 Finally, Plaintiff’s Complaint against the Detroit Police Department and the 

individual officers based on his alleged illegal arrest is subject to dismissal because 

he fails to allege that he suffered any injury as a result of his arrest other than the 

fact the he subsequently was convicted. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 

(1994), the Supreme Court articulated that civil actions “are not appropriate 

vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Id. at 

485. The Court therefore held that a claim for damages, which if decided in the 

plaintiff’s favor “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or 

sentence,” is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487. The Court recognized, 

however, that “the district court must consider whether a [civil] judgment in favor 

of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction . . . [and if 

it would not], the action should be allowed to proceed in the absence of some other 

bar to the suit.” Id. 

Not every civil judgment will imply the invalidity of the underlying criminal 

conviction because “doctrines like independent source and inevitable discovery, 

and especially harmless error” allow a court to recognize a constitutional violation 

while upholding the conviction itself as constitutional. Id. at 487 n. 7 (citations 

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omitted). The Sixth Circuit has held that a plaintiff’s § 1983 claim based on the 

defendants’ alleged warrantless entry into his home “would not ‘imply the 

invalidity of his conviction or sentence.’ ” Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 

676, 684 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). This was because the 

plaintiff’s conviction in that case could not be disturbed whether he was legally or 

illegally seized. Id. 

To state a viable § 1983 claim based on an alleged unlawful arrest, however, 

the plaintiff must show that his seizure was illegal and, if it was, that he suffered a 

compensable injury. Id. (citing Braxton v. Scott, 905 F. Supp. 455, 458 (N.D. Ohio 

1995) (quoting Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 1999)) 

(“Fourth amendment claims under § 1983 may be brought without setting aside the 

conviction only if success would not undermine the conviction and if the plaintiff 

alleges a compensable injury other than the conviction.”). As the Supreme Court 

noted in Heck: 

[A] suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search 

may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was 

introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff’s 

still-outstanding conviction. Because of doctrines like independent 

source and inevitable discovery, and especially harmless error, such a 

§ 1983 action, even if successful, would not necessarily imply that the 

plaintiff’s conviction was unlawful. In order to recover compensatory 

damages, however, the § 1983 plaintiff must prove not only that the 

search was unlawful, but that it caused him actual, compensable 

injury, which . . . does not encompass the “injury” of being convicted 

and imprisoned (until his conviction has been overturned). 

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512 U.S. at 487 n.7 (internal citations omitted). 

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the defendant officers entered Barbara 

Jones’ home, without a warrant, in order to arrest him. He has not alleged any 

facts indicating that such conduct caused him “actual compensable injury” other 

than the injury of being convicted and imprisoned on the criminal charges on 

which he was arrested. As such, his claim against the officers and police 

department is barred by Heck. This is so even though Plaintiff’s original firstdegree murder conviction was vacated, as his subsequent guilty plea to the lesser 

offense of second-degree murder established that there was probable cause for his 

arrest. See, e.g. Barnes v. Wright, 449 F. 3d 709, 716-17 (6th Cir. 2006). 

 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Complaint is further subject to dismissal to 

the extent he is seeking to have his criminal conviction for second-degree murder 

vacated or set aside. Where a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration 

of his physical imprisonment and the relief that he seeks is a determination that he 

is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his 

sole federal remedy is a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 

411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). A plaintiff cannot seek injunctive relief relating to his 

criminal conviction in a § 1983 action. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 

(2004). Instead, “§ 1983 must yield to the more specific federal habeas statute, 

with its attendant procedural and exhaustion requirements, where an inmate seeks 

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injunctive relief challenging the fact of his conviction or the duration of his 

sentence.” Id. 

 Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff is asking this Court to reverse his current 

criminal conviction, his Complaint would stand in habeas corpus and the current 

defendants would not be the proper respondent. See Urrutia v. Harrisburg Cnty. 

Police Dep’t, 91 F. 3d 451, 462 (3rd Cir. 1996) (citing Rule 2(a), Rules Governing 

§ 2254 Cases). The only proper respondent in a habeas case is the habeas 

petitioner’s custodian, which in the case of an incarcerated habeas petitioner would 

be the warden of the facility where the petitioner is incarcerated. See Edwards 

Johns, 450 F. Supp. 2d 755, 757 (E.D. Mich. 2006); See also Rule 2(a), 28 foll. 

U.S.C. § 2254. 

 Finally, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking to be released from custody and his 

action should have been filed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus rather than a 

civil rights suit under § 1983, the Court may not convert the matter to a petition for 

a writ of habeas corpus. Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1999). 

Instead, the matter should be dismissed, leaving it to the prisoner to decide whether 

to refile it as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id.

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Conclusion

 For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted and several defendants named in Plaintiff’s 

Complaint are immune from suit. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A. The Court also 

concludes that an appeal from this order cannot be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). 

 s/ Linda V. Parker 

 LINDA V. PARKER 

 U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: July 15, 2015 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of 

record and/or pro se parties on this date, July 15, 2015, by electronic and/or U.S. 

First Class mail. 

 s/ Richard Loury 

 Case Manager 

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