DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

AVATAR PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellant,

v.

CECILIA CASTILLO and JORGE GUILLEN,

Appellees.

No. 4D18-3154

[April 22, 2020]

Appeal and cross-appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth 

Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Lisa S. Small, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

2017CA003554XXXXMB AH.

Carol M. Rooney of Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP, Tampa, for 

appellant.

John H. Pelzer of Greenspoon Marder LLP, Fort Lauderdale, and 

Warren Diener and Jesse R. Feldman of The Diener Firm, P.A., Plantation, 

for appellees.

GERBER, J.

The primary issue arising in this appeal is whether the insureds’ policy 

requires them to produce for examinations under oath (EUOs) the 

handyman and water restoration employees who performed the home 

repairs for which the insureds are seeking coverage under the policy. The 

circuit court concluded the policy did not require the insureds to produce 

the handyman or water restoration employees for EUOs because those 

persons were not the insureds’ “agents” or “representatives” as those terms 

are used in the policy. We agree with the circuit court’s conclusion. Thus,

we affirm on that issue. On the other issues raised in the appeal and 

cross-appeal, we affirm without further discussion.

Procedural History

A pipe leak caused water damage to the insureds’ home. The insureds

hired a handyman to repair the pipe, and a water restoration company to 
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dry out their home. The insureds submitted a sworn proof of loss with the 

repair invoices to the insurer, and requested coverage for the claim.

The insurer requested the insureds to produce themselves, the 

handyman, and the water restoration company’s employees for EUOs 

pursuant to the policy, which provides, in pertinent part:

2. Your Duties After Loss. In case of a loss to covered 

property, you must see that all of the following are done:

. . . 

i. In the County where the “residence premises” is located 

you, your agents, your representatives, including any 

public adjuster engaged on your behalf, and any and all 

“insureds” must submit to [EUOs] and sign same when 

requested by us.

(emphasis added).

After the parties’ attorneys exchanged correspondence regarding 

whether the policy required the insureds to produce the handyman and 

water restoration employees for EUOs, the insureds filed a petition for 

declaratory relief. The insureds argued the policy did not require them to 

produce the handyman or the water restoration employees for EUOs

because those persons were not their “agents” or “representatives” as those 

terms were used in the policy. The insureds later filed a motion for final

declaratory judgment to that effect.

The insurer then filed its own motion for final declaratory judgment. 

The insurer argued the policy required the insureds to produce their 

“agents” and “representatives,” which included the handyman and the 

water restoration employees.

The circuit court held a hearing on the motions. The circuit court 

understood the facts to be undisputed, thus allowing it to decide the 

motions as a matter of law. The circuit court issued a final judgment

concluding:

6. The [insurance] policy only requires the [insureds] and 

their “agents and representatives or public adjuster” to submit 

to [EUOs]. The policy does not define the terms “agent” or 

“representative.” Nevertheless, just because an insurance 

policy does not define a term does not make the insurance 
3

policy ambiguous. Cheetham v. S. Oak Ins. Co., 114 So. 3d 

257, 263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (holding that the mere failure to 

provide a definition for a term within an insurance policy does 

not render the term ambiguous).

7. Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “agent” as “[o]ne who 

is authorized to act for or in place of another; a 

representative.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 

According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the terms “agent” and 

“representative” have the same meaning.

8. Individuals retained by the [homeowner] to furnish 

estimates of the damage (such as a general contractor or 

handyman), or a company retained by the policyholder to 

mitigate damages (such as a water mitigation company), do 

not fit within the definition of [the insureds’] agent, 

representative, or public adjuster. If the [insurer] wanted to 

require the [insureds] to produce such individuals or “all other 

[persons whom the insureds] would rely upon to support their 

claim” it would have been “a simple matter” to include such a 

requirement in the policy. See Nawaz v. Universal Property & 

Cas. Ins. Co., 91 So. 3d 187, 189 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (“[I]n 

the present case, it would have been a ‘simple matter’ for [the 

insurance company] to have written a restriction into the 

policy limiting those who could be present for the [EUO].”).

The insurer’s appeal followed. The insurer argues the policy required 

the insureds to produce the handyman and the water restoration 

employees as their “agents” and “representatives” for EUOs. The insureds 

respond the policy did not require them to produce the handyman or the 

water restoration employees for EUOs because those persons were not 

their “agents” or “representatives” as those terms were used in the policy.

Our Review

As the appeal depends upon our interpretation of the policy, our review 

is de novo. See Altman Contractors, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Ins. 

Co., 232 So. 3d 273, 276 (Fla. 2017) (“Insurance policy interpretation . . . 

is a question of law, subject to de novo review.”) (citation, brackets, and 

internal quotation marks omitted).

Our supreme court recently summarized the law regarding insurance 

policy interpretation:
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Where the language in an insurance contract is plain and 

unambiguous, a court must interpret the policy in accordance 

with the plain meaning so as to give effect to the policy as 

written. . . .

When interpreting insurance contracts, we may consult 

references commonly relied upon to supply the accepted 

meanings of words. Moreover, when analyzing an insurance 

contract, it is necessary to examine the contract in its context 

and as a whole, and to avoid simply concentrating on certain 

limited provisions to the exclusion of the totality of others. 

This Court has consistently held that in construing insurance 

policies, courts should read each policy as a whole, 

endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and 

operative effect.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Orthopedic Specialists, 212 So. 3d 973, 975-76 (Fla. 

2017) (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

The policy does not define “agents” or “representatives.” Therefore, “we 

may consult references commonly relied upon to supply the accepted 

meanings of words.” Id. at 976. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “agent” as 

“Someone who is authorized to act for or in place of another; a 

representative,” Agent, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), and defines 

“representative” as “Someone who stands for or acts on behalf of another.” 

Representative, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

Applying those definitions to the undisputed facts here, the insureds’ 

handyman and the water restoration employees were not their “agents” or 

“representatives” under the policy. Nothing in the record indicates the 

handyman or the water restoration employees were “authorized to act for 

or in place of” the insureds, or “[stood] for or act[ed] on behalf of” the 

insureds. Instead, the record indicates the handyman and the water 

restoration employees simply performed repairs to the insureds’ home. 

Thus, the policy did not require the insureds to produce the handyman or 

the water restoration employees for EUOs.

Our decision in Nawaz v. Universal Property Casualty Insurance Co., 91 

So. 3d 187 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), is instructive. In Nawaz, the insurer 

scheduled the insured for an EUO. Id. at 188. The policy required the 

insured to “[s]ubmit to examination under oath, while not in the presence 

of any other ‘insured,’ and sign the same. . . .” Id. (emphasis added). The 

policy defined “insured” as “you and residents of your household who are

. . . [y]our relatives; or . . . [o]ther persons under the age of 21 and in the 
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care of any person named above.” Id. However, the insured appeared at 

the EUO with his public adjuster. Id. The insurer requested the public 

adjuster to leave the room before the EUO occurred. Id. The insured

refused to instruct the public adjuster to leave the EUO, so the insurer

suspended the EUO. Id. As a result, the insurer filed a complaint for 

declaratory relief, claiming the insured violated the policy by bringing the 

public adjuster to the EUO. Id. The insured filed a counterclaim for 

declaratory relief arguing no violation occurred. Id.

After the circuit court ruled in the insurer’s favor, we reversed, 

reasoning:

We find that the plain language of the contract would allow 

[the insurer] to exclude only another insured from the [EUO]. 

. . . Clearly the public adjuster does not fit into the plain 

language of the definition of “insured.”

Further, to the extent that the policy is considered 

uncertain, we are compelled to construe the interpretation

against the insurer. [The insurer], as the drafter of the 

contract, could have easily included language that would have 

excluded the public adjuster from the [EUO]. Instead, the 

policy delineated only the “insured” as being excluded from 

the [EUO].

Id. at 188-89 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).

Similarly here, the handyman and the water restoration employees 

were not the insureds’ “agents” or “representatives” under the dictionary 

definitions of those terms. Further, to the extent the policy here is 

considered uncertain, we are compelled to construe the interpretation 

against the insurer. Cf. Wash. Nat’l Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman, 117 So. 3d 

943, 949-50 (Fla. 2013) (“[W]here the provisions of an insurance policy are 

at issue, any ambiguity which remains after reading each policy as a whole 

and endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and operative 

effect must be liberally construed in favor of [the insured] and strictly 

against the insurer.”). The insurer, as the policy’s drafter, easily could 

have added language including “any persons who inspected or repaired 

the covered property.” For us to do so now would re-write the policy.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude the circuit court correctly held the 

policy does not require the insureds to produce the handyman and the 

water restoration employees for EUOs. Thus, we affirm on that issue. On 
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the other issues raised in the appeal and cross-appeal, we affirm without 

further discussion.

Affirmed.

MAY and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.