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i 

57–399 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–59] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

HEARING HELD 

MAY 14, 2009 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

JON WASON, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, May 14, 2009, Fiscal Year 2010 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request from the Department of the Army ................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, May 14, 2009 .......................................................................................... 33 

THURSDAY, MAY 14, 2009 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT— 

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Casey, Gen. George W., Jr., USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ............................... 7 

Geren, Hon. Pete, Secretary of the Army .............................................................. 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Geren, Hon. Pete, joint with Gen. George W. Casey, Jr. .............................. 40 

Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. 37 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Boren .......................................................................................................... 80 

Ms. Giffords ....................................................................................................... 78 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 75 

Mr. Loebsack ..................................................................................................... 77 

Mr. Nye ............................................................................................................. 80 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 76 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, May 14, 2009. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:34 p.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the 

committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good afternoon. The House Armed Services Committee meets now to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2010 

Army budget request. Our witnesses today, the Honorable Pete 

Geren, Secretary of the Army, and a former Member over here; and 

General George Casey, Chief of Staff of the United States Army. 

And we welcome you and thank you for coming to our hearing. 

Afghanistan and Iraq have driven big changes for the Army. New 

doctrine manuals on counterinsurgency, stability operations, and 

security forces assistance have all been issued in the past few 

years, and they all point to the increasing emphasis on balancing 

the effort of the Army between traditional and conventional war 

and stability operations and irregular warfare. And this, too, may 

drive force structure changes as the Army looks to build the Advise 

and Assist Brigades that the President mentioned as part of changing our mission in Iraq. 

What these will look like, whether we institutionalize these brigades, and if and how they will be used in the future are all significant questions. 

Budgets, as we often say, are the actual demonstration of our 

strategy in the way ahead. I think the Army budget that has been 

submitted certainly points to big changes. The cancellation of the 

Future Combat Systems (FCS) vehicle, the decision to build only 45 

instead of 48 Active Duty combat brigades, and the hand-off of the 

Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) program to the Air Force are just a few 

of the very significant changes in our budget. I am sure our committee will have many, many questions about these program 

changes. 

At the same time we ask about the future, we shouldn’t lose 

sight of the present in doing so. Army readiness levels are still unacceptably low. I hope we will hear today about how we will fix 

that readiness problem, particularly since the budget appears to 

flat-line operations and maintenance (O&M) funding. 
2 

Army recruitment and retention, on the other hand, seem to 

have recovered significantly from the levels of a few years ago, although it remains to be seen what happens when the economy begins to recover. In the past we moved too aggressively to cut funding for recruitment and retention, and I hope that we will hear 

more about this today. 

Back home this budget appears to continue the commitment to 

take care of our troops and their families by funding a 2.9 percent 

pay raise and increasing funding to care for the wounded and the 

injured. Best of all, this budget moves these funds to the base 

budget, institutionalizing them for the future. 

Family support programs, such as child care and spousal support, also fare well. I have long said that our people and their families are our first priority. I am glad that this budget appears to 

adopt that point of view. 

In short, the budget signals many changes for the future. Some, 

like the continuing commitment to our personnel, are welcome. 

Other decisions, however, will no doubt generate many questions. 

Decisions made today will develop the Army of the future and 

should not be entered into lightly. We have heard the general talk 

about this at length. We need to understand the future environment that is envisioned and the way these programs will address 

them. I hope our witnesses here today will help us. 

I now turn to my friend, the Ranking Member, the gentleman 

from New York, John McHugh. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM NEW YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to see you 

again, Mr. Chairman. We have all spent a lot—— 

The CHAIRMAN. It has been a while since we have seen each 

other. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Yeah. A little time together in the last 36 hours 

or so. I was quipping earlier, about this time, I want to know if I 

need a shave, I look at Ike Skelton’s face. 

But we are honored, of course, to have our distinguished panelists, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, and we have had on the plus side 

some opportunity to say thank you to some remarkable leaders. 

And today this afternoon’s panel is certainly no exception. General 

Casey and Secretary Geren have been incredible leaders in an 

Army whose success story has been, first of all, a tribute to that 

leadership, but second of all, a real testament to the men and 

women who wear the uniform of the United States Army. And it 

is remarkable. In the midst of a war in two very different theaters, 

the Army has completely transformed its structure of the forces, 

adapted to the enemy and environment, and moved ahead with its 

modernization. And those are hard things to do under the best of 

circumstances, and obviously, these have not been the best. They 

have been very challenging circumstances. 

And gentlemen, thank you, and please convey all of our deepest 

appreciation to those brave men and women who wear the Army 
3 

uniform for all that they have done and continue to do in remarkable ways each and every day. 

Two years ago, gentlemen, both of you testified before this committee regarding the Army’s strategic initiatives. You, I felt, made 

it very clear that the Army was out of balance. It was not a secret, 

not a surprise. You made it clear as well that as you continued to 

shepherd our way through those challenges, that it would probably 

take three to four years to reacquire that balance, and in the process having the Army seek to achieve four objectives: sustain, prepare, reset, and transform. 

And the question, as the Chairman, I think, rightly outlined is 

does this budget request fail or succeed in the many choices that 

it had to make to support those efforts? And just let me pick off 

a few areas that I think we need to explore and obtain your opinions on. 

The fiscal year 2010 Army top-line request is advertised as being 

rather significant, 2.1 percent increase over 2009. But that could 

be somewhat misleading, that when you add together the funding 

that was received in the past through supplementals, and the dropoff as we migrate those supplementals into the base, it looks more 

like the fiscal year 2010 Army budget will be funded at something 

around $4 billion less than fiscal year 2009. 

Secondly, those costs associated with end-strength, increases, 

and reset, which are so important, our men and women in uniform, 

the heart and soul, our efforts to grow this force that many on this 

committee, in fact the vast majority on this committee, have 

worked hard to achieve, has been funded through supplemental appropriations, approximately $20 billion a year. 

I support doing away with the supplementals. I think the President and Secretary Gates have taken an important step forward. 

But as, again, we consider that migration into the base, the Army’s 

budget and supplemental, now called the OCO, the Overseas Contingency Operation Account, doesn’t appear to have increased accordingly. In fact, the fiscal year 2010 OCO funds reset at $11 billion. We have more forces going to Afghanistan, more equipment 

returning from Iraq, and that reset reduced by several billions of 

dollars. 

In that same vein, procurement accounts for the Army, not including JIEDDO, or the Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 

Defeat Organization, in the past were funded at some $61 billion 

in 2008, $37 billion in 2009, yet the request for fiscal year 2010 totals about $30 billion. 

I remember very clearly, Mr. Chairman, and you may recall as 

well, that then-Chief of Staff General Schoomaker coming to this 

very room and telling us the Army entered the post-9/11 world with 

a $56 billion procurement shortfall. He called it holes in the ark. 

And the question, therefore, is pretty simple: Does this budget signal the start of yet another procurement holiday, or does it represent an equitable balance of hard choices? 

Just a couple of other areas of concern. The research and development (R&D) accounts were funded at $12 billion in 2008 and 

2009, yet the 2010 request has been decreased to $10 billion. And 

while the President and the Secretary of Defense have said they 

support the Army’s plan to grow the force, something I credit the 
4 

President with, is putting into one of his highlights of his proposal 

a 2.1 percent increase when adjusted for inflation, causes me some 

concern that the Army might have to pay for much of this increase 

out of hide. 

And lastly, before the QDR, the Quadrennial Defense Review, 

has really even begun, a decision has been made, as the Chairman 

referenced, to cut projected Army force structure by three brigade 

combat teams (BCTs). Was this is a cut, again, as a matter of hard 

choices, on balance, or was it what I fear—I will rephrase, I hope— 

it is not, and that is a lack of commitment to growing the force? 

And, Chief, you and I talked about this, and I think it is important 

for you to have your views placed on the record. I think they are 

enlightening. 

So, in conclusion, gentlemen, we look forward to your comments. 

All of us stand together as one team. That is the pride of our Nation’s military forces, and it is also, frankly, the pride of this committee that we work in ways that, for all the differences we might 

bring to the table, we understand our unified commitment has to 

be to those men and women in uniform that serve us so bravely. 

So again, gentlemen, thank you for all you do. And with that, Mr. 

Chairman, I will yield back the balance of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

During our hearing yesterday with the Secretary and Admiral 

Mullen, as well as this morning when we had the Navy and Marine 

Corps here, we were interrupted by votes on the floor, and I anticipate that might happen again. So we ask you to bear with us. We 

shall return and continue our hearing. 

Mr. Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PETE GEREN, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY 

Secretary GEREN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman and Congressman 

McHugh. It is truly an honor for General Casey and me to appear 

before you and discuss our United States Army, an Army that has 

been built on a partnership between this great institution and the 

soldiers of our Army, a partnership that goes back to the First Continental Congress and continues to this day. 

We provided the committee a full posture statement. I ask that 

that be introduced into the record. 

The Army family suffered a horrible tragedy in Baghdad, Monday, two days ago, and I know all of our prayers and condolences 

go out to the loved ones of those who lost their lives in that incident. Sergeant John Russell has been charged under the Uniform 

Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) with five counts of murder. I 

know many of you have questions concerning that tragic incident. 

However, because of the role of service secretaries in the military 

criminal justice system and concerns about command influence, we 

won’t be able to discuss that in this hearing today. I just wanted 

to address that at the outset. 

Mr. Chairman, the President’s budget for 2010 is before the Congress, and it recommends $142 billion for our Army. The Army 

budget is mostly about people and the operations and maintenance 

(O&M) to support our people. Our personnel and O&M accounts 

make up a full two-thirds of our budget, reflecting General Abram’s 

axiom that people are not in the Army, people are the Army. Our 
5 

Army, soldiers, families, and civilians are stretched by this long 

war, but our Army remains the best-led, best-trained, bestequipped force we have ever put in the field, and this committee’s 

ongoing support has much to do with that, and we thank you for 

that. 

Mr. Chairman, the noncommissioned officer is the backbone of 

this great Army, and we have designated 2009 as the Year of the 

Noncommissioned Officer (NCO). At the front of every Army mission, here or overseas, you will find a noncommissioned officer. 

This year we give our noncommissioned officers special recognition 

and commit to enhancing their professional development to be able 

to meet the demands that we place on them. 

I would like to recognize former noncommissioned officers who 

serve on your committee: Congressman Coffman, Congressman 

Conaway, Congressman Marshall, and Congressman Reyes. 

This year we are honoring all noncommissioned officers, past and 

present, and next week we are going to honor all former NCOs who 

are Members of Congress with a parade on Fort Myers Whipple 

Field on May 19, and we hope all Members can join us to recognize 

these great soldiers who now are serving our country as Members 

of the United States Congress. 

Currently we have over 710,000 soldiers on Active Duty, with 

243,000 deployed in 80 countries around the world. Additionally, 

we have over a quarter of a million Army civilians providing support. Our National Guard and Reserves continue to shoulder a 

heavy burden for our Nation. Since 9/11 we have activated over 

400,000 guardsmen and reservists in support of Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and we 

are all thankful that our Reserve component carries such a heavy 

load in responding to domestic emergencies. 

We truly are one Army. Our National Guard and Reserves are 

transitioning from a strategic reserve to an operational force, and 

I would like to discuss some of the progress we have made. In 

2001, we spent about $1 billion on National Guard equipment. This 

year we are spending $4 billion, and we have for the last couple 

of years. The 2010 budget calls for $4 billion. As a result, we anticipate that the last Huey helicopter, the venerable workhorse dating 

from the Vietnam era, will leave Guard service by the end of this 

year. At that time the Guard will have 40 brand new light utility 

helicopters and nearly 800 new Black Hawks, with more on the 

way. Additionally, over 8,000 new trucks have been provided to the 

Guard and the famous Deuce and a Half soon will go the same way 

as the Huey. 

This 2009 hurricane season is the first since 2004 in which the 

Guard is not going to have to borrow equipment from the Active 

or the Reserve components to meet their planning needs for the 

hurricane season. 

And we have also made good progress in implementing the recommendations to the Commission on National Guard and Reserves 

with 14 of the 19 Army-led implementation plans completed. 

Mr. Chairman, as you well know, soldiers are our most valuable 

asset. The strength of our soldiers depends on the strength of Army 

families, and the support of those families is a top priority in this 

budget. From fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2009, with your sup-
6 

port we have more than doubled funding for Army family programs. In this fiscal year 2010 budget, it includes $1.7 billion in 

the base budget for family programs. 

We have made many changes in how we support families. We 

have provided full-time personnel to family readiness groups to 

provide support to our volunteer spouses who carry such a heavy 

load in this time of multiple deployments. We are providing expanded child care for families of deployed soldiers, including 16 

hours per child per month of free child care for every deployed soldier’s child. 

The budget maintains Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (SRM) and continues to push ahead with Residential Communities Initiative (RCI), a program that you championed. They are 

at a level that will ensure that we provide our soldiers and families 

with the quality of life they deserve. The budget continues improvement in the care of support for wounded, ill and injured soldiers, 

and we have initiated programs to better diagnose and treat the invisible wounds of war, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and 

traumatic brain injury, and with congressional leadership we are 

investing unprecedented amounts in brain injury research. 

The fiscal year 2010 budget also will let us work towards a seamless transition from the Department of Defense to the Veterans Affairs for those wounded or injured soldiers who return to private 

life. After seven-plus years of war with an All-Volunteer Force, we 

are in uncharted waters, and our soldiers and families are carrying 

a heavy burden for our Nation. 

We are working to reverse the tragic rise in soldier suicides. It 

is a top priority throughout our Army, and our Vice Chief of Staff 

of the Army General Corelli is leading that effort. We partnered 

with the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) on a 5-year, 

$50 million study to incorporate their world-renowned expertise in 

mental health research into the Army’s suicide prevention efforts. 

We are educating all soldiers in new and innovative ways of suicide 

risk identification and reduction. Every NCO now knows how to 

recognize the symptoms of a heat stroke and knows what to do 

about it. Our goal is for every soldier in the Army to be able to 

identify the symptoms of a potential suicide and know what to do 

about it. 

We have also launched new initiatives to attack the problem of 

sexual assault and harassment, and as we work to prevent sexual 

harassment and sexual assault, we are also working to become the 

Nation’s best in the investigation and prosecution of sexual assault. 

We have used the highly qualified expert authority that you gave 

us a couple of years ago to hire national experts to work with our 

investigators and our prosecutors. We want to be the Nation’s 

model for the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of sexual 

assault. 

To meet the mental health care needs of a growing force, the 

U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) has increased their mental health providers by about 40 percent, and we have more than 

200 behavioral health care providers deployed to theater. But even 

with these increases, we do not have all the mental health support 

that we need, and we will continue to work with this committee to 

address that issue. Whether the problem is PTSD, suicidal idea-
7 

tion, the trauma of sexual assault, or dealing with any mental or 

emotional health issue, we are working hard to remove the stigma 

that stops some soldiers from seeking help for their mental health 

needs. 

We are improving how we do business, instituting major reforms 

in our contract acquisition processes, while continuing to provide 

the equipment our soldiers need to the more than 250,000 soldiers 

scattered around the world. We thank you for last year you authorized five new general officers for our Contracting Command. That 

is going to make great strides for us in building the bench that was 

depleted over the last 15 years. And we are adding nearly 700 military and over 1,000 civilians for our contracting workforce. 

Being a good steward is more than just taking care of our money. 

Our goal is to lead the Department and the entire Federal Government in protecting the environment. Our Army’s Energy Security 

Strategy reduces energy consumption and carbon dioxide emission 

by using innovative technologies. At Fort Carson we built a twomegawatt solar project. We have solar projects at 20 other locations, and currently we produce nearly 19,000 megawatts of nonfossil-fuel energy on our installations around the country. We are 

planning for a 500-megawatt solar farm at Fort Irwin, bigger than 

any solar project in America today. At Fort Myer you can see some 

of the 4,000 electric cars we are in the process of acquiring. Those 

4,000 cars will cut fuel consumption by 11.5 million gallons and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by over 100,000 tons per year, and 

we are investing over 54 billion in green building. 

I am pleased to report that we are on track to finish Defense 

Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) by 2011. 

Mr. Chairman, in summary, we are a busy, stretched, and 

stressed Army, with soldiers, civilians, and Army families doing the 

extraordinary as the ordinary every single day. Our Nation’s finest 

young men and women are ready to respond to whatever our national leaders demand around the world and here at home. In 

2008, nearly 300,000 men and women enlisted or reenlisted in our 

Army, joined our Army or reenlisted in an Army at war. They are 

volunteer soldiers with volunteer families. They are proud of what 

they do, and we are proud of who they are. 

For the past 71⁄2 years, I have watched soldiers go off to war, and 

I have watched their families stand with them, and watched our 

Congress stand alongside of them every step of the way. Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, thank you for your support 

of our soldiers and their families and for the resources and support 

you provide us every year. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Geren and General 

Casey can be found in the Appendix on page 40.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Now for the uniformed leader of our Army, General Casey. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, CHIEF OF 

STAFF, U.S. ARMY 

General CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I start, 

though, I would like to pick up on the Secretary’s theme about the 

Year of the Noncommissioned Officer. And I would like to present 
8 

to you some great noncommissioned officers and the spouse of a 

fallen noncommissioned officer. 

First I would like to introduce Sergeant Joel Dulashanti. He is 

a sniper from the 82nd Airborne Division from Cincinnati, Ohio. He 

was wounded in Afghanistan, fairly severely, has lost his right leg. 

And he is the holder of a Purple Heart and an Army Commendation Medal with V for valor. He is here recovering and expects to 

be back in a couple of months to his unit. 

Second, Staff Sergeant Brian Tidwell. Sergeant Tidwell has two 

tours in Iraq, both with Stryker units, and he, like the other three 

NCOs you will meet now, are all helping us in our program executive office for soldiers. They are giving us direct combat experience 

into preparing equipment for our soldiers. 

Master Sergeant Jonathan Holmes. One tour in Iraq. He is an 

Air Defense Artillery noncommissioned officer, and, again, he is 

helping us there develop systems for our soldiers. 

And Master Sergeant Marc Griffith, six tours in Iraq and Afghanistan with the Rangers and with the Strykers, and great experience being applied to our soldiers. Thank you. 

And I have got one more person I would like to introduce, and 

that is Dana Lamberson. And Dana is the spouse of Sergeant First 

Class Rand Lamberson, whose bracelet I wear, who was killed a little over three years ago in Ramadi, Iraq. And she sits on our panel, 

my panel, to help us better understand the needs of surviving 

spouses, and she has made great contributions. 

So, Dana, thank you very much for coming. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you for bringing these great 

Americans with you, and the very best to you. And thank you for 

your service and your sacrifice. 

General. 

General CASEY. Thank you, Chairman and members of the committee. I would like to give you just an update of where we are and 

where we have progressed over the last year here. You will recall, 

and Congressman McHugh mentioned this in his opening statement, that last year I came before you and said that the Army was 

out of balance, that we were so weighed down by our current demands that we couldn’t do the things we know we need to do to 

sustain this All-Volunteer Force for the long haul and to prepare 

to do other things. I can tell you we have made progress to put ourselves back in balance, but we are not, by any stretch of the imagination, out of the woods yet. 

I also told you that we had a plan in place, centered on four imperatives to achieve balance by 2011: That we had to sustain our 

soldiers and families; that we had to continue to prepare soldiers 

for success in the current conflict; that we had to reset them effectively to go back; and that we had to continue to transform for an 

uncertain future. 

I would like to give you just a progress report on our six major 

objectives to get ourselves back in balance. Our first objective was 

to complete the growth that was directed by the last Administration in February of 2007. I can report to you that, as of this month, 

all components, Active, Guard, and Reserve, have met the directed 

end-strength targets that were originally not going to be achieved 

until 2012. Now, we still have some work to do to put those people 
9 

into units, match them with equipment, and train them, but that 

is very good news for us and a very positive step forward. 

Why is it a positive step? First, it allows us to begin coming off 

of stop-loss this year. And several months ago Secretary Gates announced that our Army Reserve will begin deploying units without 

stop-loss in August, our Guard in September, and the Active Force 

in January. This is something that we have been working toward 

as we modulize the Army and put it on a rotational cycle. And 

we—because it is finishing our growth, we are in a position to put 

ourselves in a place to deploy without stop-loss by 2011 as we had 

planned. 

The second reason it is important that we finish our growth is 

that it is one of the elements of increasing the time soldiers spend 

at home. And I have come to realize after two years in this job that 

the most important thing we can do to get back in balance is to 

increase the time that our soldiers spend at home, and completing 

the growth helps us do that. 

Dwell time, or the time spent at home, is important for several 

reasons: One, because it gives our soldiers time to recover from repeated combat tours. And 12 months is not enough, and we have 

to continue to expand that. 

Second, it gives them a more stable preparation time for their 

next mission. If you are only home for 12 months, you are going 

back out to the field shortly after you get back, and that is not good 

enough. 

And then lastly, it gives our soldiers time to do other things, to 

prepare for different kinds of missions besides Iraq and Afghanistan. And I will tell you that in 2007, based on what I thought the 

force structure would be over the next four years, I thought we 

wouldn’t get quite to one year out, two years back, right away. If 

we execute the President’s Iraq drawdown plan, and I have no reason to doubt that we will, we will actually do better and actually 

get to a one-to-two or even better ratio. We have to do that. It is 

very important to the long-term health of the force that we meet 

that goal in 2011. 

The third element of balance is to continue our move away from 

Cold War formations to formations that are far more relevant in 

the 21st century. In 2004, we began what we said was the modular 

conversion of our Army. We are 85 percent done, and that is 85 

percent of the way through converting all 300 brigades of the Army 

to modular designs that are far more relevant today. 

The other element of this is we are about two-thirds of our way 

through rebalancing the force, moving soldiers out of the skills that 

we needed for the Cold War into skills we need today. Some examples. Since 2004 we have actually stood down 200 tank companies, 

artillery batteries, and air defense batteries, and we have stood up 

a corresponding number of military police units, engineer units, 

Special Forces companies and civil affairs companies, those skills 

that you hear that we need all the time. That is a big step for us. 

Together, this represents the largest organizational transformation 

of the Army since World War II, and we have done it while we are 

deploying 150,000 soldiers over and back to Iraq and Afghanistan 

every year. 
10 

Fourth, we are moving to put the whole Army on a rotational 

cycle much like the Navy and Marine Corps have been on for many 

years. And we believe that is important because we need to be able 

to sustain the flow of trained and ready forces to combatant commanders, and we need to do it in a manner that provides our soldiers and families a predictable deployment tempo, and so we are 

moving out on our way to do that. 

Fifth, as Secretary Geren mentioned, we are halfway through our 

rebasing effort, and the combination of BRAC, global reposturing, 

building facilities for our units that we are growing is resulting in 

new basing arrangements for 380,000 soldiers, civilians, and families across the Army. And we are about halfway through that, and 

we will finish by 2011. One of the great benefits of this is the improvement in the quality of facilities for our soldiers and families. 

And sixth, and our final objective here, Mr. Chairman, is to increase our strategic flexibility. And the longer our soldiers spend 

at home, the more time they have time to prepare for other things. 

And what I have told them is that if you are home for 18 months 

or less, stay focused on your regular warfare mission. If you are 

home for 18 months or more, start to rekindle some of the skills 

that have atrophied while you have been in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

And so as we build time at home, we will also build resiliency to 

do other things. 

So that is where we are. We have made good progress, but we 

are not out of the woods yet, and the next 12 to 18 months, I think, 

will be the most difficult time. And the reason for that is we will 

actually increase in the number of forces we have deployed slightly 

before the drawdown begins, but when we get through the next 12 

to 18 months, we will be in a much better position. 

Now, if I could briefly just make a few comments about how the 

budget helps us get ourselves back in balance and sustain, prepare, 

reset, and transform. First of all, sustaining our soldiers and families, number one priority. And the budget contains housing, barracks, child care centers, youth care centers, warrior transition 

units, and operational facilities, all critical to improving the quality 

of life of our soldiers. We have put more than $1.7 billion in the 

budget for soldiers and families. That is about double where we 

were two years ago, and we are absolutely committed to delivering 

on our Soldier Family Action Plan. 

I will tell you, Mr. Chairman, I have just been—over the last 

seven weeks visited five of our stateside installations here and 

been to Djibouti and Afghanistan. And it continues to be clear to 

me that our families are indeed the most stretched part of the 

force, and that is why we are paying such close attention to their 

support. 

On the prepare side, Mr. Chairman, probably the most significant thing that has happened over the last year is the infusion of 

about 10,000 mine resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs) 

into the theater. And I talk to soldiers in Afghanistan, and sometime they gripe a little bit about being hard to drive off the road. 

But anybody that has been in an MRAP and had an IED blow up 

underneath them and lived is a convert, and so they are already 

making a great difference. 
11 

Reset, number three. There is $11 billion in this budget to reset 

the force, and that is absolutely critical to our ability to keep preparing soldiers properly to go back. 

Lastly, on transform, we are in an era of what I call persistent 

conflict, and I believe that we need land forces that can do four 

things in this era. One is we have to prevail in a protracted global 

counterinsurgency campaign. Two, we have to be able to engage to 

help others build capacity to deny their countries to terrorists. 

Three, we have to provide support to civil authorities at home and 

abroad. And fourth, we have to deter and defeat hybrid threats and 

hostile state actors, and we are building an Army to do just that. 

It is an Army with a versatile mix of tailorable organizations organized on a rotational cycle so that we can provide a sustained flow 

of trained and ready forces to combatant commanders and hedge 

against uncertainties, and then we can do this at a tempo that our 

soldiers and families can sustain. 

I will close, Mr. Chairman, by talking about one more noncommissioned officer, and that is Staff Sergeant Christopher Waiters, and he received the Distinguished Service Cross, our Nation’s 

second highest award, for valor in April for actions in Baghdad in 

April 2007. Sergeant Waiters was in a Stryker following a Bradley 

Fighting Vehicle on a patrol. The Bradley hit an improvised explosive device, blew up, burst into flames. He realized soldiers in there 

were trapped and couldn’t get out. He left his Stryker, fought his 

way over 100 yards to the burning Bradley, dragged two soldiers 

out back to his Stryker, treated them and realized there was still 

another soldier inside. He went back across the open area, back 

into the vehicle as the ammunition was exploding, realized the soldier inside was dead, went back to his Stryker, got a body bag, 

went back and recovered the soldier, never leaving a fallen comrade. 

So our noncommissioned officers are the glue that is holding this 

force together at a very important time. 

So, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Casey and Secretary 

Geren can be found in the Appendix on page 40.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you for your excellent statement. 

General, Bill Caldwell was kind enough to give me briefings on 

the two new manuals regarding the wide scope of potential warfare. You and I have discussed that before. And I question, and I 

ask you to explain to our committee how you can train soldiers to 

do the entire spectrum of warfare on the one hand, conventional, 

such as we have had in Korea or elsewhere, or during the Second 

World War and most places, and on the other hand, insurgency or 

terrorism type of warfare on the other hand. I think we would be— 

we would appreciate your explaining. 

General CASEY. Thank you very much. And as you suggest, this 

is not an easy question, and it is one that we have been wrestling 

with, frankly, for the last two years as we adopted a doctrine of 

full-spectrum operations. 

As we have thought about this, frankly, I was originally in a position where I was thinking conventional war or irregular war, two 

different things, and the more we thought about this, that is less 
12 

and less useful. What we are really talking about is war in the 21st 

century. And as we view the character of conflict in the 21st century, we believe that our doctrine of full-spectrum operations where 

we say Army formations will simultaneously apply offense, defense, 

and stability operations to seize and retain the initiatives and 

achieve decisive results, we believe that that is a very relevant 

operational concept not only to fight the wars that we will be fighting, but also to use as a vehicle to train our units and to develop 

our leaders. 

It is not an attempt to train everyone to be good at everything 

all the time, as you suggest. That is impossible. And, for example, 

on leader development, what we say is, I don’t want someone who 

is good at everything; I want someone who is very good at their 

core competency, and that is broad enough and educated enough to 

deal with a wide range of challenges that may be presented to 

them. 

And as we look to develop our leaders, we are looking to add 

what we are calling broadening windows onto their officer development time lines, probably late captain and late major. And we put 

a range of activities in those windows that they could choose from. 

And so we want broad leaders as well as tactically competent leaders. 

So when we publish a new doctrine, as we did in February of 

2008, we fully expect that it will take us several years to ingrain 

that doctrine in the force. And one of the greatest challenges that 

we have is exactly the question that you ask. But we have given 

it a lot of thought, and we will continue to evolve in our ability to 

do that. But it is—we believe it is the right doctrine, and we believe it is doable. 

The CHAIRMAN. I have a question that has bothered me for quite 

some time as to whether our war colleges are producing first-class 

strategic thinkers and, in addition on that, identifying them, putting them in the right positions and keeping them. I had an interesting discussion with General Peter Pace not long before he retired, and I asked him, how many graduates—and I used the National War College—how many graduates of the National War College could sit down and have a good discussion with the late 

George C. Marshall? He said three or four. That is not bad. That 

is good if you are producing that. 

Everybody that goes to the National War College, and I am sure 

that is true with your war college as well, understands strategy. 

They know it when they see it. They know it is good or not. But 

those that can actually lead the charge in the thinking is going to 

be a limited number. How do you identify them? How do you put 

them in the right position? And how do you keep them, General? 

General CASEY. Mr. Chairman, that is another great question. It 

is something that, as the Director of Strategy and Policy on the 

Joint Staff several years ago, I came face to face with. And I am 

inclined to agree with your assessment that we, as a country, have 

not done a good job of identifying, training, and capturing not only 

good strategic thinkers, but strategic thinkers who can apply the 

art of strategy to the complex strategic and operational problems 

that we are dealing with today like Iraq and Afghanistan. 
13 

We have a course out at Leavenworth called the School of Advanced Military Studies. The focus of that course in the past has 

been largely at the operational level of war. We have augmented 

that course recently to include a block on strategy. And the thought 

was to try to identify at the major rank officers who may have the 

capabilities as they go on to become the strategic thinkers and the 

strategists that you are talking about. It is going to take us several 

years, I think, for that program to mature, but it is a step in the 

right direction. And I very much agree with your assessment here 

that we have more to do here. 

The CHAIRMAN. You have to have it at the right place. And I 

have seen instances where, the different services, that that person 

has been overlooked and not used to their potential. 

Mr. McHugh. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, gentlemen, welcome. 

Chief, when you made your opening comments, you observed that 

the $11 billion provided in this budget for reset is critical. I think 

we can all agree with that. It is absolutely essential. But going 

back to my opening statement, as I noted, we traditionally in those 

accounts in supplementals had about $20 billion on end strength 

and reset. And the OCO account, now the Overseas Contingency 

Operation account, which is the budget line for these activities in 

the base budget, is for this document about $11 billion. At least on 

its face that seems to be quite a change. Why is that not cause for 

concern? 

General CASEY. I think the larger part of the change, Congressman, is because we are resetting less units than we were before. 

Now, as we get—we just got the details of the drawdown plan from 

General Odierno Monday. And so our staffs now are starting to 

work that, and we may have to come back at a later time as we 

look at the timing and the scope of equipment coming out of Iraq 

and ask for some additional funds. But the money in the budget 

for right now allows us to reset the units that will be coming out 

of Iraq and Afghanistan during the period covered by the budget. 

Mr. MCHUGH. So, based on conditions then, you feel currently 

the $11 billion is an adequate figure, even at a $9 billion level less, 

but you reserve the prerogative, if you will, of reevaluating that 

and trying to plus that account up at some future point. 

General CASEY. I do. Once again, once we get an idea of the 

scope. I mean, there is a lot of stuff that is going to come out of 

Iraq when we start moving that out, but I don’t have a good 

enough feel for it to put a number on it. 

I must say the other big change in the OCO budget was some 

new rules about procurement and about buying material that 

wasn’t directly related to the war effort. And we had used that in 

the past, and so that is another reason why the number went 

down. But, again, $11 billion gives me the money that I need to 

reset the units coming out of Afghanistan during this period. 

Mr. MCHUGH. On that point, those excluded items, I mean, they 

still require monies. Where do we get that from? 

General CASEY. Well, I mean, over the long haul, Congressman, 

we are going to have to make judgments about, well, we are going 
14 

to fix the things that are coming out, but we have to make— 

prioritize decisions about where we can invest all of our money. 

Mr. MCHUGH. I wish you didn’t have to make those choices, but 

I understand how those kind of things play out in the real world. 

Similarly, on procurement, I mentioned General Schoomaker’s 

comments about a post-9/11 environment, and the figure he quoted 

was $56 billion procurement shortfall. And the recent history of 

those accounts has been, as I mentioned in 2008, $61 billion; in 

2009, $37 (billion); yet in 2010, it is $30 billion. A lot of us were 

here, through what seemed to be a pretty good idea at the time, 

because of the so-called peace dividend, to go on what we now call 

the procurement holiday. And, of course, those brave folks who sit 

behind you had to struggle with those judgments that we were all 

a part of. How does this trend line, particularly the procurement 

account in 2010 and $30 billion, assure us that doesn’t represent 

the start of another procurement holiday? 

General CASEY. It certainly is too early to tell. And I don’t feel 

that it is. We have benefited substantially from a plus-up in our 

investment accounts over the last several years, and that has substantially helped us fill some of those holes. We haven’t filled all 

of them, but we have filled more than I would have thought possible, and that is a very good thing. 

We, I think, owe this committee and our Department of Defense 

an affordable modernization strategy that allows us to build a force 

that continues to be capable into the future, and an investment 

strategy is a big part of that. And we are actively doing that now, 

and we will sharpen it over the next year. 

Mr. MCHUGH. I take it that, based on your last few comments, 

that if I were to ask you to provide a figure, as General 

Schoomaker said, how much are those unfilled holes going to cost, 

do you have a ballpark figure, or are you still on the calculation 

tables for that? 

General CASEY. I have periodically gone back and said, okay, 

show me what we received, and help me fill the holes, and I don’t 

have that today. I can get that for you though. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. MCHUGH. I would appreciate that. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Mr. Chairman, I recognize that we have got some 

votes coming up. I obviously have other questions, but we have 

other valuable Members here who want to ask, so I will yield back 

at this time. 

Mr. ORTIZ. [Presiding.] Thank you, first of all, for your service, 

and good to see both of you. 

I had the honor and privilege of serving with my good friend Pete 

Geren when he was a Member of the congressional Texas delegation. And thank you both for your service and your dedication and 

keeping our country strong and free, and I hope we can keep it like 

this. 

But one of the things that I am concerned with—and I know that 

we are about to increase our presence in Afghanistan, and, of 

course, we will have soldiers in Iraq— is the medical services that 

the soldiers get. I just read an article the last four or five days 

about the impact on the health services. And that story came about 
15 

because it talked about the contractors who are there. I think we 

have 3-, 400,000 contractors, and they are utilizing the health facilities that are there for our soldiers, and the impact that is having. And not only that, the article mentioned that the contractors 

are not paying their bill. 

Now, we have our soldiers there, and this is one of the things 

that may be for another hearing. We are going to find out how the 

contractors get this contract and whether they are supposed to hire 

doctors and nurses to treat their workers. 

Will this increase of the 17,000 to 20,000 soldiers also put a huge 

load on your back when they have to treat both our soldiers and 

the contractors? 

Secretary GEREN. Your question of whether the contractors are 

supposed to reimburse for their medical care, and they are, and we 

are working through that issue. And whether it is food services or 

medical services, they are supposed to reimburse. And we are—as 

we ramp up in Afghanistan, we are ramping up the medical services. 

One of the issues that we spent a great deal of time on over the 

last four months is working on the medical evacuation (Medevac) 

that will be available for the soldiers in Afghanistan. The terrain 

and the altitudes pose some special challenges there that we don’t 

have as much of in Iraq. But this build-up, the medical plan to support the build-up, is well developed, and we are resourcing it. We 

are moving more helicopters into Afghanistan to be able to enhance 

the Medevac services, and we fully expect that we will have medical care there that will meet the needs of the soldiers not only for 

physical issues, but mental health as well. 

And one of the areas that we have emphasized a great deal over 

the last couple of years is moving mental health care forward to 

the soldiers, both having the mental health care at the division 

level, at the brigade level, in the combat support hospitals. And we 

even have mobile teams that will go out and provide mental health 

care. If there is an IED explosion in some area, the mental health 

professionals go to that site and start working with those soldiers 

immediately. We have learned a lot about what this environment 

requires in terms of medical care, and I feel good about the plan 

that we have for the Afghanistan build-up. 

General CASEY. I have nothing to add to that. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Okay. One of the things that I have asked before this 

came about has been training. Are we providing better psychological training for our troops before they are deployed, and even 

while they are there? This has been a great concern to me and 

members of my Readiness Subcommittee. Are we doing better as 

far as providing this type of training for them? 

Secretary GEREN. We are. And the Chief and I, I think, both 

would like to speak to that issue on many different levels. And we 

are also continuing to look for ways to improve the training, the 

resiliency training, different ways to judge the mental health preparedness for a soldier. And we look at all these different factors 

as far as how they are handling the stress of deployments. 

But we have some very specific training. We have training, a 

chain teach program for post-traumatic stress for our soldiers. Literally every soldier in the Army, we are attempting to give them 
16 

a modular training on post-traumatic stress disorder, how to spot 

it in themselves, and what to do about it. Same with suicide prevention. And we have got a program under way right now, we are 

in the middle of a chain teach program to literally teach every single soldier in the Army about how to identify in himself and his 

buddies the possibility of a suicidal thoughts, ideation, and what to 

do about it. General Casey has been working on a project having 

to do with developing the total soldier fitness and resiliency, a program we are going to emphasize over the course of this summer. 

And I would like—the Chief might speak about that resiliency 

training and the program that General Cornum has developed. 

General CASEY. If I could, as we look at the challenges, the mental health challenges that we are facing, you know, that is one of 

the things that worries me most, when people ask me what keeps 

me up at night. Last year we had 13,000 new cases of post-traumatic stress identified in the Army. That is about double what it 

was two years before. Now, that is a high number, but the good 

news is more and more people are feeling comfortable enough to 

come forward to get the treatment, which is the important thing. 

But I was worried that we were being too reactive, that we were 

getting there after the fact. And so we, over the last year, have 

been building what we call a comprehensive soldier fitness program, and the intent of this program is to raise mental fitness to 

the level that we give to physical fitness. And the idea is to build 

resiliency in all soldiers so that we can enhance their performance. 

And a lot of people think that everyone that goes to combat gets 

post-traumatic stress, and that is just not true. Everyone that goes 

to combat gets stressed, no doubt about it, but the vast majority 

have growth experiences because they are challenged by something 

that is very, very difficult, and they succeed. 

And so the idea is to give resilience skills to more and more of 

the force so that more and more people have growth experience and 

are able to expand and enhance their performance. And so I would 

expect in July we will start with this program. It will include master resilience trainers, just like we have master fitness trainers. 

And our first class of noncommissioned officers is scheduled to go 

to the University of Pennsylvania next week to begin training. We 

will ultimately build our own school. There will be a self-diagnostic 

test that soldiers will take, and they will be given personal feedback on where they stand on a range of things, and then they can 

connect through the computer to modules that will give them selfhelp means to help them out. And then there will be standard modules to be given before, during and after deployment and in every 

one of our developmental schools for our officers, noncommissioned 

officers. But I believe this is a proactive way to get at this and help 

us build resilience. 

Secretary GEREN. Just something real quickly, though. I don’t 

want it to sound as if we think we have solved the problem. The 

stress of combat, the stress of multiple deployments takes a heavy 

toll on soldiers, takes a heavy toll on families, and we have this 

partnership with the National Institute of Mental Health, a fiveyear program. We recognize that there is knowledge, experience, 

and expertise outside of the Army that we could take advantage of, 
17 

and that is one of the initiatives that we feel will bear fruit for us 

going forward. 

So we are working very hard in this area. High priority for everybody in the Army. But I don’t want it to sound as if we think 

we have got all the answers, because we don’t. We are learning. We 

are in uncharted waters. We have never been at seven-plus years 

of war with an All-Volunteer Force. We have never had soldiers do 

this kind of deployments over and over and over. So we are living 

and learning, but I can assure you it is a priority for everybody in 

our Army, and we are working, both inside the Army and outside 

the Army, to do the best we can in this area. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, gentlemen for your service. 

I am going to ask two brief sets of questions. The first relates 

to body armor. As you know, our military people frequently are in 

a quandary. They know they need the protection from the body 

armor, but it is so heavy and cumbersome that it restricts mobility, 

and so they decide for some missions that the increased mobility 

is more important than the protection. 

I wonder if we have had an aggressive enough program to reduce 

the weight of body armor. For instance, for MRAPs and for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) we have set up task 

forces to look intensively and broadly at what might be done to advance some technology in those areas. I don’t—I am not sure that 

the extent of the Army’s R&D efforts to reduce the weight of body 

armor is large enough. And I wonder, are there any plans to include a program element in the base budget for lightening of body 

armor and equipment since it is so important to lighten those two? 

Mr. BARTLETT. The second set of questions deals with the joint 

cargo aircraft (JCA). As you know, this was originally an Army vision. The Air Force was a very reluctant partner to this. Some 

might say that they were dragged kicking and screaming into this 

relationship. 

The Army originally said that they needed 78 of these. In the 

last couple of weeks, we have had witnesses from both the Army 

and from the Guard that testified that there was no study that indicated that we needed less than 78 of these. And, by the way, that 

78 did not include the aircraft that the Air Force might need. That 

was to be factored in later. 

Now, we understand that the total number is going to be 38, that 

the program has moved totally over to the Air Force, and I am kind 

of mystified by that and wonder if you can comment on it. 

General, you are quoted this week as telling reporters that you 

are comfortable with the transfer of this program to the Air Force 

because they told you they were going to support you down to the 

last tactical mile. Yet, for several years, the Army has steadfastly 

defended a program requirement to support tactical delivery supplies and the Guard’s homeland defense missions. 

Now, if you are convinced that the Air Force is going to meet 

your needs—and I don’t see how they can with 38 planes when the 

Army thought and we had testimony in the last couple of weeks 
18 

that the 78 was still the need—how are we going the support the 

needs of the Guard back home here? 

You also were quoted as saying that we might need more than 

38. I agree we need more than 38 planes, and the question is, how 

are you going to get those and where was the money coming from? 

Secretary GEREN. I will take your body armor question. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I would rather have you report on the body armor 

thing, a written response, and if time remains both certainly, but 

how about first the JCA aircraft and then the armor? 

Secretary GEREN. Certainly. 

General CASEY. To me, I think there are two issues here for me. 

First of all is who should have the muscle—and, Congressman, my 

core competency in the United States Army is not flying cargo aircraft. We can do it. We do it. But, as I looked at this, I need the 

service. We need to be able to resupply our forward brigades in 

places that can’t be accessed by a C–130. And so I have talked to 

the last two Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force and said, look, I need 

the capability here. If you all can provide that to me, then I am 

comfortable with you taking this program over. Norty Schwartz 

agreed to that. 

Now, we are still working out exactly how that transfer will take 

place and have the requirement to get back to the Department at 

the end of this month to say how we are going to do that. And the 

issues you raised with the Guard, whether it is in the Army Guard 

or the Air Guard, we have got to work through those modalities. 

Mr. BARTLETT. You don’t believe that the Air Force can get twice 

the effectiveness out of these aircraft so if the Army needed 38, the 

Air Force—only needed 78, the Air Force only needs 38 to meet 

your needs? 

General CASEY. That is the second element. The second element 

is the number of aircraft, and we put a requirement on the table 

for 78 aircraft, I believe it was. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Seventy-eight. 

General CASEY. Okay, 78 aircraft, and I believe that requirement 

is still valid. 

Now, what General Schwartz wants to do to merge those aircraft 

in with this C–130 fleet and whether he ultimately needs the full 

number to support us in the way that we need to be supported, I 

think that remains to be seen and discussed. 

Mr. BARTLETT. General, I have here a little diagram from a report done by the Institute of Defense Analyses (IDA). I think in our 

2008 defense bill we asked for that. They had on the abscissa the 

cost and on the ordinate they had the effectiveness. Obviously, if 

you put a little four quadrants there you would like to be in the 

upper left quadrant where it costs less and is more effective. The 

only plane they had in the left quadrant out of the C–5, the C–17, 

and the C–130 was the JCA. 

General CASEY. I am happy for that, and it has been a while 

since I have dealt with ordinances and abscissas. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The thing that was the most effective, we are 

going to buy less than half of what we need. I am having troubling 

understanding that. 

General CASEY. I understand. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Taylor. 
19 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Secretary Geren, 

General Casey, thank you very much for your service to our country. 

For those of you who have not been around here as long as I 

have, I want to tell you, Secretary Geren, you would have been sitting right here, and that he left Congress about 15 years ago so he 

could spend more time with his family, only to come back and 

spend even more time working, serving our Nation as the Secretary 

of the Army. And so I very much appreciate your service to our Nation. I very much on behalf of every family of the troops appreciate 

the great job you did in turning things around at Walter Reed. 

And, General Casey, thank you for your service. Thank you for 

what you said about the MRAPs. I am in violent agreement with 

you. I think we are saving kids’ lives every day with them. 

And towards that end, you know, for years I have been hearing 

the Army tell me that they train as they fight and they fight as 

they train. We still have a significant shortfall of MRAPs at the 

training installations. I very much appreciate General Chiarelli on 

a very frequent basis letting me know that he is increasing the 

number, and I appreciate the updates. I still don’t think it is 

enough. I don’t think that we honestly say we are training as we 

fight with the few that we have. 

I appreciate that you are going in the right direction. I want to 

encourage you to get some more for your training installations as 

we now have the industrial capacity. 

And I am going to yield my remaining time to a member of the 

Ranger Hall of Fame, Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, let me just start by saying that a lot of people make reference to, you know, advocacy for the MRAP in various 

quarters, but if my history is correct, if my recollection is correct, 

here in the Armed Services Committee the advocate, the major advocate was Mr. Taylor, and he deserves an awful lot of thanks from 

an awful lot of people. We would not be where we are where the 

MRAP is concerned without Mr. Taylor pushing the hell out of it. 

General Casey, you and I have already talked a little bit about 

JCA. I will just second what my good friend has just said on that 

subject, and I just hope we continue to think about this thing and 

that the Institute for Defense Analyses’ study, done at our request, 

under your supervision, is taken into account as we move forward 

thinking about mix where error is concerned and that we not have, 

sir, a repeat of the sort of back and forth that we experienced 

where the Caribou was concerned in the Vietnam era, and I just 

encourage you to sort of look at that history. 

Pete, you have been a great Secretary. You have been so responsive, and you care so much about our troops. 

I mentioned to you Fort Stewart and the reliance that Fort Stewart and the local community has already incurred with regard—in 

anticipation of another BCT, and I told you that I was going to get 

to you a figure of the reliance that this community has—well, the 

costs that the community has incurred. And the figure that I 

have—and I can’t give you the piece of paper at this point because 

I want to vet it a little bit more, but it is $441 million in public 

and private dollars put into getting ready for this BCT. 
20 

It seems to me for a community that has been that great, for a 

fort that has been that great over many, many years in support of 

the military, we have got to figure something out here so that, you 

know, so they don’t get harmed to that extent in the course of rethinking how we are going to do our BCTs. Some compensation 

needs to occur or we just need to rethink this idea or we need to 

station some folks there so that that reliance just doesn’t go to 

waste. 

Secretary GEREN. On that point—and thank you for getting me 

that number—Fort Stewart community, we have embraced Fort 

Stewart as long as there has been an installation there. The Army 

encouraged the community to step out, to build the schools, build 

the roads, build the housing; and as we have seen with the other 

two communities that are impacted by the decision, we have seen 

folks really step up and make the investments to accommodate 

these soldiers. Those are factors we have got to take into consideration as we move forward. We will continue to go to communities 

and ask them to do things for soldiers and communities need to be 

able to—it is a two-way street. 

Mr. MARSHALL. It is a partnership. 

Secretary GEREN. It certainly is a partnership, and I appreciate 

the opportunity we have had to discuss it. And it certainly is a factor that, as we move forward and work through this very recent decision that has been made, we have got take that into consideration. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, I appreciate that response. 

In this partnership, it is clear it is a two-way street, as you say; 

and we have some obligations, frankly, to those communities that 

have relied extensively on our promise and our request that they 

do so. 

Thank you both for your service and the service of those that you 

lead. 

The CHAIRMAN. [Presiding.] We will try to get one more member’s questioning in before we break for the vote. As I understand 

it, we have three votes, but they will be the last of the day, and 

we hope that our members will return. 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your service. 

I remember, Secretary Geren, it was 2002 I was at the basic 

school at Quantico, and we did our 20-mile hump that we had to 

do. We started at about one in the morning because it was summer, and we wanted to get it done while it was cool out. And Secretary Geren and my father, the former chairman of the Armed 

Services Committee here, walked with us for three miles. By then, 

it was like 1:30 in the morning, and they left because they said 

that they had to catch a flight, and the traffic was really bad. So 

they were able to get out of the other 17 miles. But great to see 

you here. 

I have got a question. It is kind of a touchy one because there 

is no right answer to it, I don’t think. 

First, General Casey, have you signed off on any Medal of Honor 

citations since, let’s say, 2001? 

General CASEY. I have. I am trying to—I know I signed off—— 
21 

Mr. HUNTER. Let me rephrase, for living recipients. 

General CASEY. For living recipients, no. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. 

General CASEY. I don’t believe I have, no. 

Mr. HUNTER. What I don’t understand is either our soldiers and 

marines and sailors—and this goes for every service—but we are 

either not as brave as we used to be, there is no more acts of courage and valor, which I don’t think is true because I have compared 

side by side citations from World War II, Korea, Vietnam, to the 

citations we have now for lesser awards, or the criteria for the 

Medal of Honor has changed to you have to die. 

And that story that you told me about the soldier running back 

and forth, you compare that to a Korean War, probably Medal of 

Honor winner, who knows. But there has not been a living recipient that earned a Medal of Honor since Vietnam. The last person 

to receive it earned it in like 1971. 

So the question is why? Are we not as brave? Are we not as courageous? Are there no more acts of valor? Have the criteria 

changed? Or is it no longer that battlefield commander making the 

recommendation to get that Medal of Honor approved? Is it brass, 

which I think—not necessarily brass but possibly civilians in the 

DOD that are shooting this thing down at higher levels than even 

those people sitting here today in this room? 

General CASEY. I can tell you I can come up at this from two perspectives. One is my time in Iraq, and the other is my time here 

as chief seeing these awards come across my desk. 

The criteria hasn’t changed. It has been the criteria—you know, 

the criteria for the award has been in our regulations and policies 

for years and hasn’t changed. And I have seen neither in Iraq nor 

here any effort by anyone to consciously downgrade and downplay 

the valor of our soldiers when it comes to awards. 

What I can tell you is what I have seen is every organization has 

a process where they bring these awards before a board of officers 

and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and they review them and 

discuss them to see if they meet the criteria. And I can tell you I 

have seen some hugely heroic acts and read about some hugely heroic acts, and in my own mind they haven’t risen to the level of 

Medal of Honor. 

And sometimes, as you suggest, the line between a Distinguished 

Service Cross and a Medal of Honor is quite thin, but I can tell you 

there is absolutely no effort to try to press down the criteria for 

Medals of Honor. 

Mr. HUNTER. So the answer really is that there has not been an 

act of valor that you have seen in the Army that warrants the 

Medal of Honor in the last eight years of combat? 

General CASEY. For a living person. 

Mr. HUNTER. Correct. 

General CASEY. A living person. I think I would go back to your 

opening comment. There is no right answer to this question. 

Mr. HUNTER. Well, the right answer is that the criteria has probably changed a little bit, meaning you have to be dead. That is 

what I would say. 

General CASEY. I don’t think that is the case. I have never heard 

that stated. I have never heard that stated. 
22 

Mr. HUNTER. There have been Medal of Honor recommendations 

that have gone all the way up the chain and have been stopped 

back here in D.C. When everybody on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan concurs, the people that actually saw the combat concur, 

that that is a Medal of Honor awardee and that the soldier, sailor, 

marine, or airman should get the Medal of Honor. So it is not just 

the Army. It is every service. Because not a single one from any 

service has been given out since the war started. 

I would just ask you to think on it. We are trying to track down 

where the Medals of Honor are being hijacked at. Because they are 

being stopped, in my opinion. But thank you. If you have anything 

else you would like to say—— 

General CASEY. I think I am sitting here reflecting as you are 

talking about awards that have come across my desk in the last 

two years where the recommendation to downgrade has been made 

here in Washington. And maybe one or two—most of the ones I see 

that are downgraded are downgraded out of theater. But let me get 

back to you because I would like to find out the answer to that myself. 

Mr. HUNTER. Let me, if I may, Mr. Chairman, are there any 

being processed right now? 

General CASEY. There may be. There may be. There may not. I 

will check that as well. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, General. Thank you, Secretary. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. We have three votes. We 

shall return. I urge our members to come back to continue. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General, Secretary, 

we certainly welcome y’all being here today and all the special 

guests you have with you. Thank you so much. 

I claim Fort Bragg in my part of North Carolina. We come right 

to the Fort with our district, but I claim Fort Bragg. 

One thing I want to just mention to you today—and I am going 

to do this very quickly, and I am going to be following up on this— 

I told Chairman Skelton about earlier today. Some people came to 

my office yesterday—and part of the Army has incorporated this 

idea already. It is a box that can hold blood at the proper temperature for 72 hours without refrigeration, between 2 degrees and 8 

degrees centigrade. It allows blood to be taken to the combat area 

where we could potentially keep people from bleeding out. Instead 

of having to carry the wounded soldiers back to where the blood 

would be, we can carry the blood to the soldiers. 

I don’t know if y’all are aware of this or not. It was just brought 

to my attention. I am going to be following up with this, but it is 

something that could save lives that we are excited to be pursuing 

it. 

Secretary GEREN. I am not familiar with it, but I would certainly 

like to learn more about it. 

Mr. KISSELL. We will follow up, and it is just an exciting development. 

The question I have is, the Wounded Warrior Program is such 

a delicate balance between having individuals who are at the same 
23 

time soldiers but also patients. And I spent time at Fort Bragg 

talking with the people, talking with the patients. I know the intent is wonderful, but sometimes we have these patient soldiers fall 

between the cracks. I am just wondering what y’all’s thoughts are 

on the Wounded Warrior Program, maybe what—the weaknesses 

you see, the strengths and maybe how we can improve it as we go 

forward. 

Secretary GEREN. I think we both can speak to that. 

I was recently at Bragg and met with the Warrior Transition 

Unit soldiers. As you know, we started that approach to meeting 

the needs of soldiers in outpatient care just about two years ago, 

and we have come a long way in developing a system that is responsive to the needs of the soldiers. It is a great step forward as 

far as meeting the needs of the soldiers, letting them focus on healing. 

We hope—and our goal is to work with them and give them an 

opportunity to return to service in the military. For those that 

choose to go on to private life, our goal also is to help them make 

that transition successfully, work with the Department of Veterans 

Affairs (VA), help them develop the skills that they would need to 

be successful on the outside. 

We have had some situations—in fact, we had one at Fort Bragg 

that I have spent a quite a bit of time working with Medical Command and with the head of the Warrior Transition Unit. It is a 

delicate balance. You have got soldiers that have—the cadre there 

are, most cases, they are soldiers that come from—who have served 

in combat. They are great leaders, and we are selective on who we 

pick to be in that cadre. They get special pay to be in that cadre. 

But it is a new skill for them, to lead—to be a noncommissioned 

officer and lead these soldiers who are patients and they are also 

soldiers and striking that right balance to help that soldier heal 

and progress as a soldier. It is a balancing act. 

I think, though, it has been a very good approach. By and large, 

it has worked very well. We have had a very high percentage of 

soldiers who have returned to active duty or returned to the Guard 

or Reserve, but I go around and I know General Casey does and 

other members of our leadership. We meet with these warriors in 

transition. We ask all the cadre to leave. We ask all the leadership 

to leave. We want to hear from them without anybody present 

what can we do to make this better. I always tell them you have 

got two jobs: one is to heal; the other is to help us make the Warrior Transition Unit approach a success because it is still a work 

in progress. And the input that we have gotten from these soldiers 

has helped us continue to tweak it and make it better. 

But, by and large, it has been a great success. My hat is off to 

General Schoomaker and now General Cheek, before him General 

Tucker. They have done a great job with building it, but we continue to work to make it work better for the soldiers. But I appreciate your interest in that issue. 

General CASEY. If I can just add—you asked for things to make 

it better. We are still not where we need to be on the medical evaluation board process and the bureaucracy of the process. We have 

got more work to do there, automating it, streamlining it, but that 

is the area where we need to focus some attention. 
24 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, sir. 

Secretary GEREN. Very briefly on that point, Dr. Gates and General Shinseki are working—they have a partnership at that level 

across the whole Department of Defense, working with the Department of Veterans Affairs, and their commitment is to make that 

process better. We in the Army are working it, but it is something 

that personally Dr. Gates and General Shinseki are working. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Geren, a Colorado-specific question. I just wonder if 

you could talk about for a minute whether or not there is a valid 

requirement to expand the Pin ̃ on Canyon maneuver site in southeastern Colorado. 

Secretary GEREN. Congressman, thank you for your support of 

that initiative. 

Expanding the Pin ̃ on Canyon training range is a priority for us. 

We have—there is some debate over what the exact right number 

of acres is that we need to meet our goals. But we want to—we 

cherish the relationship we have had with the State of Colorado. 

We want to be a good neighbor. Colorado has certainly been good 

neighbors to us. Fort Carson is such an important part of our military, and we have talked to soldiers who serve at Fort Carson. 

They appreciate very much how their neighbors in Colorado 

Springs and in Colorado embrace them. 

As you and I have talked, I think we got off on the wrong foot 

in some regards in the effort to expand Pin ̃ on Canyon. Our goal is 

to accomplish the expansion, but we want to do it in a way that 

accommodates the legitimate needs of the neighbors up there. We 

want to be a good neighbor. We know that their goal is to be a good 

neighbor as well. 

So we would like to continue to work with you and other State 

leaders in figuring out a way where we can accomplish what we 

need and the landowners in that area can get their needs met as 

well. As you know, we have taken eminent domain off the table. 

We are not going to force this. We want to work in a cooperative 

way to get this done. We are hopeful that, with that approach, that 

over the coming months—or it might take years—we will be able 

to put it together. 

Thank you for your leadership on it. I appreciate your help. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Secretary Geren, how would you respond to critics 

who claim that the Army has not yet adequately justified its need 

to expand the Pin ̃ on Canyon maneuver site? 

Secretary GEREN. Well, the original expansion was over 400,000 

acres. We have reduced our goals for that, and there is still some 

debate over exactly what the right size is. But you look at the 

training requirements we have today and the space we need in 

order to achieve a realistic representation of what a brigade combat 

team would experience in combat today, we do need to grow it. 

I think most people would say the 400,000 acres that were originally proposed, not needed. We have looked at numbers considerably less than that. But we need to expand it, and it is the accessibility of it, the proximity of it to Fort Carson that saves us a con-
25 

siderable amount of money so we don’t have to send those brigades 

a long way off to get that type of training. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you. 

Secretary Geren, I think that there have been expressed some 

concerns by the local citizens in southeastern Colorado that if the 

Army gets the authority to expand the Pin ̃ on Canyon maneuver 

site, as to whether or not the Army will live up to their commitment in terms of jobs in those local communities. I wonder if you 

could respond to that. 

Secretary GEREN. Well, our installation command, as well as the 

civilian leadership, has been working with the local communities; 

and Trinidad, I believe, is one of the communities that had some 

concerns about that. And, again, our goal is to make it work for the 

whole community, make it work for the region, and want to continue to work with those communities so that the economic benefits 

of that expansion would benefit the region. So we want to listen. 

We want to figure out how to make it work. 

And I know that we have looked at some military construction 

in certain areas and, also, there are—some of the contractor and 

the support workforce that would be coming into the region and 

working with the communities to determine how we best site that 

so that it does provide the economic benefit to the area. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Secretary Geren, quick question. Last question. 

Are you committed not to go forward with the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) until these issues have been worked out with 

the local community? What is your position on the Environmental 

Impact Statement? 

Secretary GEREN. Well, I need to get back with you on that. We 

have limitations that were put upon us by the Congress as far as 

what kind of funds we could spend as we research this undertaking, and I would have to get back with you on whether or not— 

what the impact is on the EIS. I don’t know the answer to that. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Secretary Geren. Thank you. 

Secretary GEREN. We are going to work with the Congress, and 

the Congress has put some restrictions on it, and I assure you we 

are going to live up to those restrictions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Massa. 

Mr. MASSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, General, thank you very much for being here. 

Later in the day, I had the pleasure of just canceling a flight to 

be able to sit and have a conversation, and I appreciate your patience. 

I, also, as a veteran myself, honor your service and recognize all 

that you and your team do for our troops every day in the field. 

That having been said, I would like to register a very significant 

concern that I have been in conversations with leadership of the 

United States Army now for some 120 days. 

As I look at the future of communications in the United States 

Army, a field of endeavor not entirely unknown based on my own 

personal professional past, I am exceptionally concerned about the 

more than $700 million that is about to be spent on a single-channel, frequency-hopping Very High Frequency (VHF) radio, when al-
26 

ternate technologies that are far more compatible with the future 

needs of the force are extant in the commercial world. I speak 

today of Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System 

(SINCGARS) radios. 

Satisfying an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) and a 

requirement that is more than 25 years old is not what I consider 

to be forward thinking. I am certainly not advocating on behalf of 

a single company, corporation, producer or manufacturer but, rather, on the reality that in the last 25 years we have seen tremendous increases in mobile telecommunications and radio technologies. And from my own personal experience in the field, if you 

have the opportunity to offer a platoon leader, a sergeant, a squad 

leader, a handheld radio that has a single VHF channel operation 

capability, or one at the same time with a flick of a switch that 

gives you VHF, Ultra High Frequency (UHF), satellite, satellite 

data capability for the same cost, I have yet to meet a soldier in 

uniform that does not take the more capable radio. So I register today officially exceptional concern about some $700 

million that is about to be spent on a radio that is both fundamentally incompatible with your number one acquisition priority, which 

is the future combat system, and the needs in the field. I don’t 

know how else to place my words on the table for the official 

record. 

I have had conversation after conversation after conversation 

with general officers, but, more importantly, the same conversations with individuals fresh home from Iraq who are the end users 

of these communication devices who, without my prompting, concur 

with the fact that we are about to waste one heck of a lot of money; 

and in a budgetary environment where literally we are counting by 

billions, which is something I don’t quite understand, I think we 

are about to make a horrific mistake. 

And, Mr. Secretary, I speak to your announcement that this contract award is about to be made. I worked very hard in a supplemental to have funds reprogrammed to higher priorities, but I don’t 

have the capability to change this $700 plus million dollars that 

you are about to spend other than to, with the utmost of respect 

and professionalism, ask you and your team to reconsider. 

Your comments, sir. 

Secretary GEREN. Well, thank you for raising that issue. But, as 

you know, we are—we do have a competition out to complete the 

buy—— 

Mr. MASSA. Sir, if I could just—and I am sorry to do this, because I know it sounds disrespectful. 

The Army is competing a single channel VHF radio. That is not 

competition. It just doesn’t work that way, sir. And I am sorry to 

be contrary. I am not trying to be confrontational, but the statement that the Army is competing is just not accurate. 

Secretary GEREN. We have a competition that is in the final 

stages to complete the buy of the SINCGARS radio, 56,000—the 

last 56,000 of the buy. We are making tremendous investments in 

the next-generation radio. This will complete our buy that has been 

going on for years, and it is the last step of the process, and we 

will be announcing sometime fairly soon the outcome of that decision. 
27 

Mr. MASSA. Mr. Secretary, I am sorry, for the record. I absolutely 

disagree with you. 

Secretary GEREN. I respect that. 

Mr. MASSA. And the facts do not bear out that statement. I am 

sorry. We are competing a single-channel SINCGARS radio that 

does not match up with the needs of the force. And this is not my 

opinion. This is the opinion of warriors and combatants who have 

returned with this story to me, not anecdotally but in overwhelming preponderance of evidence. It is evidence of an acquisition process that is so unable to react to the requirements on the 

field that we are buying 53,000 radios—— 

Secretary GEREN. Fifty-six. 

Mr. MASSA. I am sorry, 56,000 radios. Thank you for making my 

point for me. And every general officer with whom I have had this 

conversation, every single soldier with whom I have had this conversation, when given the opportunity for to buy better technology 

for the same price would rather do that. It is an example of an acquisition process that has gone awry, and I can’t agree with you, 

but thank you for stating your position. 

Secretary GEREN. I appreciate your observations. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Mike Rogers, please. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

I want to thank both of you for being here and for your service. 

It is very much appreciated by the whole country. 

I want to talk to you about the budget request on the Stryker. 

As you know, we have—I keep hearing calls for additional variants 

on the Stryker, and I hear that the Army wants to keep production 

warm in anticipation of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). 

And given the significant investments we have made in the 

Stryker, you know, 260 of these Strykers in the supplemental and 

$390 million for enhancements and modifications, what do you see 

the Stryker of the future? Where is it going? 

Either one of you or both of you can take that. 

Secretary GEREN. We are looking at the future force mix, examining what it is going to look like in the years ahead, and it is possible at the end of this process that the decision will be made that 

some of the heavy brigades could become Stryker brigades. The 

Stryker brigades have served to great effect in the current conflict. 

It has been an extraordinarily successful program, and we are 

working within the Army and working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), with the QDR, and I think that at the end 

of this process it is—the issue of the future of the Stryker could 

end up being in a different place than it is today. It is hard to say 

where it will come out, but I think it is quite likely that we will 

see an expanded role for the Stryker in the future. That is looking 

at a crystal ball. 

Chief, you want to add some to that? 

General CASEY. I mentioned in my opening statement about the 

need to have a versatile mix of tailorable organizations organized 

on a rotational cycle. Because, as we look to the future, one thing 

we know is we never get it quite right. So we want to have available with every rotational cycle a mix of capabilities, Strykers, 

heavies, lights, and probably some lights, infantry units on MRAPs, 

and things like that. That is the type of thinking we are doing as 
28 

part of this QDR to build the versatile mix of forces that we need 

for the 21st century. And I agree with the Secretary that it is likely 

or possible that the Strykers could have an increased role in that. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. 

The Secretary made some reference to future combat systems. 

Obviously, y’all have made—there have been proposed some significant cuts in these combat systems. My concern is or the thing I 

would like you to respond to is if we continue to pursue these cuts, 

is there a chance it is going to make us much more reliant on our 

current legacy fleet, things like the M113, which we heretofore 

have been phasing out? 

General CASEY. Thank you. The only element of the future combat systems program that has been canceled is the manned ground 

vehicle, and I include the non-line-of-sight cannon as part of that. 

As we went through the deliberations here, first of all, the Secretary of Defense is very comfortable with the things we call the 

spinouts, that is the network and everything else. And that is going 

forward. It is not only going forward. It is going forward to all of 

the brigades, not just some of them. 

When it came to the manned ground vehicle, I was not able to 

convince the Secretary of Defense that we had incorporated enough 

of the lessons learned from the current operations we were in into 

that manned ground vehicle. And so what he asked us to do was 

stop, take out a clean sheet of paper, incorporate the lessons that 

we have learned, use the technology that we have developed in the 

future combat systems. Because we know where vehicle technology 

is, because that program has helped us get there, and put it together and come back with a new ground combat vehicle that will 

be full spectrum. It wouldn’t necessarily be optimized for major 

combat operations like the tanks and the Bradley but would maybe 

be able to do that. 

So that is what we are doing, and we expect to come back and 

have a new concept design after Labor Day. And then we will bring 

that forward, and we want to work very closely with Congress as 

we are working with the Department to get a program that is supported. But we need a fighting vehicle, and this ground combat vehicle will be a fighting vehicle. 

And we have also put on a time horizon of five to seven years, 

which tells us we need to use the technology that is available today 

to go forward; and I think that will help us. That will actually deliver that ground combat vehicle around the same time that we 

would have had it at our future combat systems program. So we 

are treating this as an—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. Thank you both for your service. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, General, thank you for being here. 

And, Mr. Secretary, congratulations on your success and service. 

You prove there can be life after Congress. 

And, General, I found out from a mutual friend of ours, Mike 

Flack, who is the director of the Columbia Metropolitan Airport, 

that the three of us were cadets, Army Reserve Officers’ Training 

Corps (ROTC) cadets, at Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, 

Annville, Pennsylvania, during the summer of 1968. 
29 

So Mike and I are very impressed and appreciative of your success; and I am grateful to be here and, in particular, because my 

dad served with the Flying Tigers, Army Air Corps. I am a son of 

a veteran. I served 31 years in the Guard and Reserve myself, but 

I am particularly grateful. I have four sons serving in the military; 

and three them, of course, have chosen to serve in the Army National Guard. One of our sons served field artillery in Iraq. Another 

has served signal in Egypt. The fourth guy just joined the National 

Guard, but he is Army ROTC. So I am very, very much appreciative of your promoting national defense but providing opportunity for young people to serve our country. 

And, Secretary Geren, I am very grateful to be on the Military 

Personnel Subcommittee with Chairwoman Susan Davis. We have 

been reviewing problems in the past couple of years in regard to 

suicide, sexual assaults, criminal behavior, drugs. Has this Army’s 

waiver policy contributed to this problem, and is the quality of recruits what it should be? 

Secretary GEREN. Let me first say that only 3 out of 10 young 

people today meet the requirements to join the United States 

Army, meet the academic, meet the moral and the physical requirements to be a soldier today, top 30 percent of our kids. 

The other screen that tells you a whole lot about the young men 

and women who join the Army is they are joining the Army in the 

middle of a war. So we are getting outstanding young men and 

women in the Army. 

As far as the issues you have raised, we have examined very 

closely the performance of the soldiers that have come in under the 

waiver process, and I would say none of the issues that you raise 

have we found any connection between waivers and those issues. 

In fact, we just recently finished a look to look at soldiers who 

came in under waivers and suicide rates, and the suicide rate 

among the soldiers who came in under waivers was lower than it 

was for those that didn’t. 

You mentioned sexual assault. If you are a registered sexual offender, you don’t get in the United States Army, period. We have 

found no connection between the number of waivers and the instance of sexual assault. 

We watch these issues very closely. We have learned with our recent study of waivers that there are a couple of categories that 

have not performed as we would like them to. 

We have been giving drug and alcohol waivers. Those are people 

who test positive for drug and alcohol. We have been working with 

them, in some cases going through this 10-step process and giving 

them a waiver, providing them an opportunity to join the Army. 

We have found through this recent review that we have done that 

the recidivism rate for those soldiers is higher than the other soldiers who came in through other processes. So we have recently 

closed that category. You are no longer eligible if you test positive 

for drug or alcohol. You are no longer able to get into the Army. 

So our recruiting process has been a living and learning. As we 

work with the waiver process, we will open up and try some areas. 

If we learn that there are problems associated with it, we shut that 

down. But, by and large, the young men and women who joined the 

Army over the last eight years, those who have come in under 
30 

waivers have performed with great distinction, in many cases, 

achieved valor awards at a higher rate than those who came in the 

other category. 

It is a very labor-intensive process to come in under a waiver. It 

is, as I mentioned a 10-step process for every one of those. It is 

really hand-picking. But as we learn about some of those categories’ performance, if there are problems, we are shaping the 

waiver process to work them out of the system. 

Mr. WILSON. Also, in our subcommittee we have been following 

this situation of sexual assaults and response. You had announced 

in January specific positions to be added. What is the status on 

adding positions to address this situation? 

Secretary GEREN. If you look at the way the private sector handles sexual assault investigation and prosecution, it has become a 

very specialized area, with specialized investigators, specialized 

prosecutors. We are recreating that in the Army, and we are using 

the highly qualified expert authority that y’all gave us a couple of 

years ago to go out and the get the very best people in the outside 

world in investigation and in prosecution and building within the 

Army what we believe will be one of the best teams in that area 

in the country. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. We are nearing the end, and I couldn’t let you 

leave without, General, talking about the joint cargo aircraft. How 

would you like to tell us about the decisions and what went into 

them regarding the joint cargo aircraft? 

General CASEY. Sure, chairman, I would be happy to. 

We have been working on this program for a while. When I got 

there, I reviewed the program, and it is something that we need. 

We need to be able to supply our units in forward bases out of airstrips that can accommodate a C–130, and we are doing that now 

in places in Iraq and Afghanistan with the Sherpa. 

But as I thought my way through that, and I look at the range 

of things that the Army is doing these days, as I said earlier, you 

know, flying cargo aircraft isn’t my core competency. It is Air 

Force’s core competency. And I thought that if I could get the Air 

Force to take over the planes and give me the service, that would 

be the best of all worlds. 

So I worked it with General Moseley. We weren’t able to bring 

it to conclusion. And then I worked it again with General 

Schwartz, and we had a broad conceptual agreement. We still have 

to work out the details of how we will do this, and we have until 

the end of May to come back and tell the Department. 

So it is one of those things that I felt was an Air Force mission. 

As long as I got the service, they are the experts, and so I felt comfortable giving that to them. 

The CHAIRMAN. How about the Army National Guard, joint cargo 

aircraft units? 

General CASEY. That is part of the details that has to be worked 

out. You know, initially in my thinking, I expected that would stay 

in the Guard. It might be the Air Guard, and we might work something creative where our Army pilots shift over to the Air Guard 

for a time until they retire. 
31 

The CHAIRMAN. Would you have to change an entire unit to the 

Air Force Guard? 

General CASEY. That is one of the things—we have asked General Craig McKinley, Director of the Guard, to work through that 

and help us do that with the Army Guard and the Air Guard. 

The CHAIRMAN. When will you have a final decision on that? 

General CASEY. We owe a report by the end of May back to the 

Department on the implementation. I don’t know that we will have 

the whole memorandum of understanding, you know, to do all this 

by then, but we will have a preliminary report by the end of the 

month. 

The CHAIRMAN. Will that include the Army National Guard 

units, your requirement at the end of May? 

General CASEY. I don’t know that we will have complete resolution on that by the end of May, but the Guard will be very much 

included in the discussions. They are very much included. 

The CHAIRMAN. If you transfer Army National Guard cargo aircraft units to the Air Force National Guard, wouldn’t there be a 

problem in retaining rank and longevity, et cetera, for your—say, 

the sergeants and the corporals and the captains? 

General CASEY. Chairman, I don’t know. As I said, we have to 

work through the modalities of all that. I said that was a possibility. I wouldn’t want anyone to leave here thinking that that is 

what we have decided to do. That is one of the options. 

The CHAIRMAN. If you did that, you would have to guarantee that 

persons who have been in the Army National Guard for years and 

years will not be penalized should he wear a different color of uniform doing the same mission. 

General CASEY. Absolutely. Anything we do will take into consideration the people aspects of this. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. 

John McHugh. 

Mr. MCHUGH. None, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, thank you so much for being with us. 

Appreciate your testimony, and we are very grateful for the hard 

work that you do for our soldiers. 

[Whereupon, at 4:58 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MAY 14, 2009 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MAY 14, 2009 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MAY 14, 2009 

(75) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. When the original decision was made to grow the Army to 48 

BCTs, the Vice Chief of the Army, Gen Dick Cody, briefed that the stationing decision for the additional 65,000 active duty forces was built on the analysis and studies of all 304 Army posts, camps, and installations. Key considerations in the decision included maximizing support for the growth while balancing future growth potential, power projection, training capacity in maneuver training areas and ranges, 

and quality of life. Given that the end strength is not changing, what analysis has 

been done that supports the decision to stop BCT growth at 45 versus 48 BCTs? 

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) completed a manpower analyses which resulted in the SECDEF’s decision to 

halt the growth of Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) at 45 versus 48, while 

maintaining the planned increase in Active Component end strength at 547,400. 

This decision was to ensure the Army has better-manned units ready to deploy, and 

help put an end to the routine use of Stop Loss. Although the Grow the Army Plan 

and associated stationing actions remain on track, eight years of sustained combat 

operations have increased non-deployable rates in our units. This requires the Army 

to overfill deploying units in order to deploy at a minimum of 90% fill. The additional Soldiers needed to overfill these units reduced available strength for resetting 

units and the rest of the Army, which impacted the overall readiness of the force. 

By not building the last three BCTs, ∼10,300 Soldiers which would have been used 

to build the last three BCTs, are now available for the Army to continue to ensure 

deploying units are appropriately manned, while eventually eliminating stop loss. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Since the Army goal appears to be focused on ‘‘better-manned’’ 

units ready to deploy, will Fort Carson see the expected 4,800 Soldier increase in 

FY11 previously released by the Army? 

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The planned FY11 activation of the 5th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division at Fort Carson was cancelled following the Secretary of 

the Army’s announcement on June 2, 2009, to halt the Army’s plan to grow three 

additional brigade combat teams. This reduced Fort Carson’s planned growth in 

FY11 by 3,452 Soldiers, and Fort Carson’s projected FY11 Soldier population is expected to be 25,101. Using the 2003 Fort Carson population of 15,119 as a baseline 

for comparison, this demonstrates an increase in Soldier population of 9,982 at Fort 

Carson by FY11. Installation populations will continue to fluctuate based on operational needs and force structure decisions. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Can you provide further documentation and analysis showing the 

need for additional acreage for training purposes at the Pin ̃ on Canyon Maneuver 

Site? 

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The current Army position is that there will 

be no further action on Pin ̃ on Canyon Maneuver Site (PMCS) expansion until land 

owners, willing to sell or lease their land, officially approach the Army. The Army 

has provided many written reports, analyses, responses to queries, information papers, and briefings to Congress regarding the training needs at the Pin ̃ on Canyon 

Maneuver Site. There are no further documents defining requirements for land at 

Pin ̃ on Canyon Maneuver Site. A partial list of PMCS related documents is provided 

below. 

Army Reports and Studies and Responses Pertaining to Land Acquisition at 

PCMS: 

1. FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 2831 (a) Report on 

Pin ̃ on Canyon Maneuver Site, 18 Jul 08, 

2. FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 2829 (a) Report on Utilization and Potential Expansion of Army Operational Ranges, 25 Jul 08, 

3. FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 2827 (a) Report on 

Pin ̃ on Canyon Maneuver Site, 30 Nov 06, 

4. FY 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 2827 (c) Report on Potential Expansion of Army Operational Ranges, 1 Feb 07, 

5. Pin ̃ on Canyon Maneuver Site Land Use Requirements Study (LURS), 17 Mar 

05, 
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6. Pin ̃ on Canyon Maneuver Site Analysis of Alternatives Study (AAS), 18 Mar 

05, 

7. Pin ̃ on Canyon Maneuver Site, CO Army Major Land Acquisition Proposal 

(AMLAP), 18 Jul 06, 

8. Fort Carson and Pin ̃ on Canyon Maneuver Site Community Research, Jul 08, 

9. Information Paper on the Use of Other Federal Lands for Training at PCMS, 

provided to Rep. Salazar staff, 1 Apr 09, 

10. Insert for the Record (Page 68, Line 1505), HASC–Readiness hearing, 24 Feb 

2009, 

11. Response to Rep. Rob Bishop (R–UT) question regarding other Army land in 

Utah, 

12. Range and Training Land Strategy, 11 Feb 04 (redacted version provided to 

GAO in Nov 08). 

Mr. LAMBORN. As you know, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated 

that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process ‘‘may address many 

questions.’’ The report went on to state ‘‘nothing in our recommendation prevents 

the Army from using the NEPA process to provide...the information to Congress in 

a timely manner.’’ Do you agree with the GAO? Do you believe that the best way 

for the Army to provide the remaining answers to Congress on PCMS is to complete 

an EIS on PCMS expansion? 

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. Completion of an EIS, as part of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, would potentially provide beneficial insights. However, the current Army position is that there will be no further 

action on PCMS expansion until land owners, willing to sell or lease their land, approach the Army. If those conditions were met, and a decision made to pursue expansion at PCMS, the Army would complete the appropriate NEPA actions. 

Mr. LAMBORN. The Army told Congress in its July 2008 report that if an agreement were forged to expand PCMS, the Army would invest over $140M in new 

range facilities to take advantage of the increase training capability. These facilities 

would employ over 100 people. Can the Army reassure the local citizens of Southeast Colorado that if the Army gets the authority to expand PCMS that you will 

live up to the commitment to create these jobs and make these investments? One 

of the key concerns for opponents is the perception that the Army failed to live up 

to past promises regarding Army investments in the local community surrounding 

the original creation of PCMS. 

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The current Army position is that there will 

be no further action on Pin ̃ on Canyon Maneuver Site expansion until land owners, 

willing to sell or lease their land, officially approach the Army. As such, there are 

no plans to invest in $140M in range facilities nor will there be any need to create 

additional jobs. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WITTMAN. The Army’s vehicle modernization plan for the previous six years 

has focused on the fielding of the FCS family of vehicles. The cornerstone of that 

plan was the introduction of the Manned Ground Vehicles (MGVs) that provide significantly increased capabilities in lethality, survivability, situational awareness, reliability, maintainability and reduced life cycle costs compared to the combat vehicles in the current forces today. We understand that FCS vehicle designs have 

evolved to incorporate many of the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan and 

the MGVs provide survivability protection equal to or better than current force vehicles. Further, the MGVs and all other FCS system components have successfully 

completed a major design review. Given only $100M has been allocated for these 

MGVs in FY10, how will the Army take advantage of the technologies and capabilities developed under the FCS program in a new combat vehicle development program while maintaining the momentum and schedule associated with the FCS program? 

Secretary GEREN. The Army intends to take advantage of the technologies and capabilities developed under Future Combat Systems (FCS) by making relevant hardware, software, and design work available to potential bidders for the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV). Additionally, the Army anticipates that the demonstrated technologies developed under the FCS program will be captured in the new GCV requirements. The relevance of this hardware, software, and design work will be determined by the requirements update as directed by FCS Brigade Combat Team 

(BCT) Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM), dated 23 June 2009. 

In accordance with direction given in the FCS (BCT) ADM issued by the Defense 

Acquisition Executive, the MGV portions of the FCS program has been terminated 
77 

or put on a stop work order. These actions and the reassessment of GCV requirements have fundamentally changed the schedule from that of the original FCS program. 

Mr. WITTMAN. After billions of dollars have been invested in FCS MGVs over the 

past six years, please explain to this committee why the Army cannot leverage this 

investment, adapt the MGV design to any updated threat requirements, and field 

these vehicles in the 2015 timeframe as was originally intended? 

Secretary GEREN. The FCS MGV designs were adjusted to meet updated threat 

requirements, most recently in 2007, and again at the end of 2008. Increasing the 

survivability significantly from the MGV Preliminary Design Review design point to 

meet the updated threat requirements will require significant redesign of the MGV 

common chassis, which will delay the MGV fielding timeline. 

Mr. WITTMAN. The FCS MGVs were specifically designed for commonality and increased reliability to reduce the operational cost associated with the current force 

vehicles they are replacing. To date the program is meeting all development goals 

and milestones. Can the Army afford the increased operational costs of keeping the 

existing current force vehicles around longer due to the production delays associated 

with MGVs? 

Secretary GEREN. As a result of the generous support from Congress for our Soldiers, the Army has made significant progress over the last several years modernizing and resetting our Combat Vehicles. Therefore we do not foresee a significant 

increase in operational costs over the near term as a result of keeping the existing 

current force vehicles longer due to the termination of the FCS program. We believe 

several years of reset and modernization, readiness profiles, and the overall health 

of the fleets in question mitigate the risk of significant Operations and Sustainment 

increases in the short term. For example, the M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley 

Fighting Vehicles fleets have been undergoing recapitalization efforts since 2001. 

Recapitalization, coupled with Reset, has resulted in a majority of the M1 Abrams 

tank and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles being reset or recapitalized since March 

2004. This has resulted in an overall extension to the Abrams and Bradley fleet life 

and mitigates the potential growth in Operations and Sustainment costs. As a result, the average operational readiness rate for these fleets has been above 90 percent since 2008. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK 

Mr. LOEBSACK. I am glad to see funding included in the budget request for the 

Iowa Army Ammunition Plant. The Iowa Ammunition Plant plays a critical role in 

our national defense, and modernizing the facility is essential to assuring that the 

men and women who work there do so in a safe and productive environment. 

I am also very glad to see that the three Iowa National Guard BRAC sites in my 

District (in Cedar Rapids, Muscatine, and Middletown) that have been awaiting 

funding for several years have been included in the budget request for FY 2010. 

These are critical facilities for the Iowa Guard and their modernization will be essential to readiness and recruiting efforts. 

You state in your joint testimony that in 2008, the Army initiated a six month 

pilot reset program and that you are applying the lessons learned from this program 

to accomplish reset objectives at home stations. You also state that it is your goal 

to complete the transformation of the Reserve Components to an operational force 

by changing the way you train, equip, resource, and mobilize Reserve Component 

units by 2012. 

Can you elaborate on these efforts and specifically address how the Army is assuring that the Reserve Components have the equipment they need to train for, and 

respond to, the full spectrum of their mission, including homeland defense and 

emergency response? 

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The Army’s equipping goal is to ensure that 

Soldiers of both Active and Reserve Components always have the equipment they 

need to execute their assigned mission as they progress through the cyclic readiness 

model. That is equipping balance. Balancing growing requirements and fiscal constraints across all areas within a cyclical readiness model to provide trained and 

ready units to Combatant Commanders is critical. 

Since we began to develop modular formations and implement Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), we have developed a strategy to meet the variable equipping 

needs of a force being managed under cyclic readiness. The Army’s strategy is to 

Equip to Mission: As units move through the ARFORGEN cycle, their missions 

change, as do their equipment requirements. We manage equipment to ensure units 

have the right types and amounts at the right times. 
78 

The Army Equipping Strategy clearly articulates the equipping goals for all units, 

regardless of component, for each phase of the ARFORGEN and acknowledges the 

Army National Guard (ARNG) requirement for Critical Dual Use (CDU) equipment. 

ARFORGEN ensures Reserve Components have the equipment they need to train 

for and respond to the full spectrum of combat missions. The CDU equipment is not 

ARFORGEN-dependent and consists of a list of equipment required to support 10 

essential capabilities in support of homeland security and homeland defense. The 

goal is for each unit, in each state, to have on hand this list of equipment and in 

quantities indicated on its Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE). 

Additional equipment not listed on the MTOE is also included. The list of equipment 

was developed in close coordination with the states and lessons learned from responses to natural disasters such as hurricane relief. Equipping the ARNG with sufficient CDU equipment ensures they have the equipment they need to support 

homeland security missions and emergency response. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Can you discuss how shifting the Joint Cargo Aircraft solely to the 

Air Force will affect the National Guard’s intra-theater airlift capability and domestic response? 

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. In and of itself, shifting the JCA solely to 

the Air Force will not affect the National Guard’s intra-theater airlift capability. 

The Air Force’s stated plan is to field all 38 JCAs in the Air National Guard so JCA 

will remain a National Guard asset. Current procedures allow State Adjutants General to request the assistance of airlift assets from both the Army National Guard 

and the Air National Guard. The stationing plan for the Air National Guard JCAs, 

which will potentially affect response time, will be shaped during final stationing 

decisions. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Do you believe that the Army National Guard end strength goal 

of 358,200 will allow for proper dwell time, full training, increased readiness levels, 

and the end of cross leveling while also reducing the stress on the force? 

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The Army National Guard (ARNG) end 

strength of 358,200 does not alleviate the stress on the force, eliminate cross leveling, or increase readiness. Inside the 358,200 end strength are: Soldiers who have 

not completed their initial entry training, Warriors in Transition, and personnel 

who are non-deployable due to medical issues. This causes un-readiness in ARNG 

units forcing commanders to cross-level ∼30%-35% of the unit personnel prior to deployment. The elimination of Stop Loss authority further challenges deploying units 

to mitigate cross leveling. 

The Army recognizes the ARNG concerns and the Total Army Analysis (TAA) 

major objective is to create a Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) 

account. However, to increase unit readiness and reduce the need to cross level fully 

trained Soldiers into the deployment cycle earlier than projected, the ARNG also 

proposes growing its end strength to create a TTHS account of similar size and 

scope as the Active Component (AC). The AC places ∼13% of its assigned strength 

in a TTHS account which is not associated with force structure. 

If approved, the ARNG will be able to stabilize deploying units earlier in the deployment cycle, increase the dwell Army goal of 1:4 and make future deployments 

more predictable for the Citizen-Soldiers who are answering the nation’s call, reducing the stress in the force. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS 

Ms. GIFFORDS. The cancellation of the Mid Range Munition program appears to 

be premature. It is likely that TRADOC’s future recommendation on a new Mounted 

Combat System will require a stand-off, Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) capability 

that MRM currently provides. It is also a logical assumption that the current force 

could benefit from such a capability. Is there a JROC-approved requirement for a 

BLOS capability for the MCS? Is there Capabilities Decision Document (CDD) currently being staffed that requires BLOS and enhanced lethality in the Abrams? If 

both requirements remain valid, how does the Army intend to satisfy these BLOS 

requirements without MRM? 

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The JROC-approved Future Combat Systems (FCS) Operational Requirements Document includes a requirement for a 

BLOS capability for the MCS. Additionally, the JROC approved the MRM CDD. The 

Abrams CDD also includes a BLOS requirement to enhance both lethality and force 

protection due to greater stand-off against Anti-Tank Guided Munitions threats. The 

Army is re-evaluating its Brigade Combat Team modernization strategy to include 

vehicles as well as enabling munitions. 
79 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Is the Army predicating the MRM termination based on an assumption that alternative precision indirect fire solutions are available to satisfy a 

BLOS capability requirement? Can you assure the Committee that the Army is not 

intending to fill this requirement only with precision indirect fires? Can you comment further on how the CONOPS associated with an MRM-type weapon differs 

from an indirect fire support mission? 

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The Army is terminating MRM because 

funding for its development and acquisition strategy is tied to the termination of 

Future Combat Systems (FCS). However, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

(JROC)-approved MRM Capabilities Development Document requires MRM be compatible with both FCS and Abrams. The Army is re-evaluating its Brigade Combat 

Team (BCT) modernization strategy to include vehicles as well as enabling munitions. The concept of operations for MRM type weapons is dependent on BCT 

enablers and on overall BCT modernization. 

MRM is a precision munition fired from a 120mm tank main gun using direct 

shooter-to-sensor linkage to provide Beyond Line of Sight capability. This characteristic is what makes MRM a direct fire capability instead of indirect fire. Additional information about MRM: (1) With shooter-to-sensor linkage, MRM is a traditional direct fire system that can engage targets ‘‘over the hill’’ or into the next terrain compartment; (2) Because MRM is not guided with a global positioning system 

(GPS) it can engage moving targets such as vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) or mortars mounted in pick-up trucks as well as heavy armor; (3) 

MRM is an extension of the direct fire capability of the tank main gun as opposed 

to indirect fire which transits the battle space. MRM is fired in a company size area 

of operation; (4) MRM does not have the latency of indirect fire because it is fired 

from a high density platform in the formation. It requires less time to travel because tanks are generally in the vicinity of the action. For example a battery will 

fire targets sequentially while a company of Abrams could fire multiple targets simultaneously; (5) MRM cannot be fired using an extreme high angle like indirect 

fire systems. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Given the success of the Abrams tank in Iraq in both conventional 

and irregular warfare and testing that indicates that MRM would also be effective 

against armor, bunkers, structures, troops and thin skinned vehicles, isn’t it prudent to maintain funding for the MRM program? Would the MRM program help the 

Army maintain a capabilities balance within modernization for full spectrum operations? 

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. We continue to assess the lethality requirements of our ground combat formations carefully to ensure these formations are 

equipped properly for Irregular/Hybrid Warfare combat operations while also ensuring our Army maintains a campaign and expeditionary quality force with full spectrum capabilities. While we recognize the tremendous capability Beyond Line of 

Sight (BLOS) munitions like Mid-Range Munition (MRM) can potentially provide 

our Soldiers and formations, we are in the process of refining our Brigade Combat 

Team (BCT) modernization strategy and force structure plans to ensure our Army 

is equipped properly for the wide range of warfighting capabilities required for these 

types of operations and missions. Additionally, the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will further illuminate Army warfighting requirements and the associated modernization requirements. Whatever approach we take regarding BLOS munitions, it will be integrated with and supporting of our BCT modernization strategy 

and force structure plan, as well as meeting QDR-directed capabilities. In doing so, 

we will ensure our Soldiers and formations continue to have lethality overmatch 

during this ongoing period of persistent conflict. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Did the Army evaluate the possibility of sustaining the MRM program at a minimum rate through FY10 in the likely event that any new ground 

vehicle would also have the requirement for BLOS capability? 

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. No. With the termination of Future Combat 

Systems Manned Ground Vehicles, there is no current, validated requirement for 

MRM in FY10. Should a future Ground Combat Vehicle requirement include a 

BLOS capability, all options would be evaluated to meet that need. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. What is the minimum budget required to sustain the MRM program through FY10? 

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. Since the FCS Manned Ground Vehicle program was terminated and the funding eliminated, there is no justification for sustaining MRM in FY10. Accordingly, no budget projections have been prepared for 

the program. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Has the Army evaluated the termination costs associated with the 

proposed cancellation of the Mid Range Munition program in the FY10 request? 
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What would those costs be and do they exceed the costs associated with maintaining 

a minimum rate of production through FY10? 

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. All termination costs will be borne from current FY09 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation funds. Termination cost is 

estimated to be about $1.4 million. There is no cost of maintaining a minimum rate 

of production since MRM would have still been in Engineering and Manufacturing 

Development in FY10. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. What would be the restart costs associated with MRM if the program were to be reconstituted in FY11? 

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The cost to reconstitute and restart MRM 

beginning in FY11 would be about $75 million more over the previous Engineering 

and Manufacturing Development total program cost. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. If MRM were cancelled this year and the requirement revalidated 

under a new ground system program, would the Army also be required to pay the 

costs of recompeting this capability, adding to the overall cost? 

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. Yes. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Would a decision to defer termination of MRM until the MGV program is realigned be less costly than termination in FY10? 

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The Army made the decision to terminate 

MRM in July 2009 and there are no program funds in FY10. The MRM program 

will terminate within its remaining FY09 program funding. However, it is expected 

that the cost for restarting and completing the MRM program would increase. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. NYE 

Mr. NYE. I would like to commend the Army for its hard work and initiative developing the Third Generation Extended Cold Weather Clothing System (GEN III 

ECWCS). I strongly believe the system fills an essential role in ensuring the safety 

and health of our soldiers while bolstering mission readiness and combat capability. 

I understand GEN III ECWCS has proven to be a combat advantage for our troops. 

Compared to the previous clothing system, GEN III reduces the weight borne by the 

soldier by 7 lbs and reduces bulk volume by 33%. However, I remain concerned 

about the Army’s present and future plans to fully field and fund the GEN III 

ECWCS System. 

What is the Army’s requirement for GEN III ECWCS and how does the Army 

plan to fund the deployment of GEN III in future years in the absence of supplemental funds? 

Secretary GEREN and General CASEY. The Army requirement to provide its Soldiers effective protection from the environment without hindering their performance 

is documented in our Core Soldier System Capability Production Document (CPD). 

The Third Generation Extended Cold Weather Clothing System (GEN III ECWCS) 

supports this requirement as a product improvement over previously fielded Soldier 

items. At this time, one set of GEN III ECWCS is fielded per deploying Soldier as 

part of our Rapid Fielding Initiative. The Army’s future requirement for GEN III 

ECWCS is currently being staffed as part of an update to the Core Soldier System 

CPD, and will likely be one set per Soldier. 

Current GEN III ECWCS fielding is supported primarily with supplemental funding; however, there is limited sustainment funding for select layers as part of Army 

Clothing Bag and Central Issue Facility support. For future years the Army Staff 

is in the process of developing fielding and sustainment processes that will be integrated into the Equipping and Sustainment Program Objective Memorandum requests for Fiscal Years 2012 and beyond. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BOREN 

Mr. BOREN. Please describe the Operational Needs Statement (ONS) and the tactical situation in Afghanistan that necessitates a precision mortar solution? 

Secretary GEREN. The requirement for precision capability within a 120mm mortar system answers a capability gap for highly accurate precision fire when other 

means of precision fire are not readily available. Other platforms with precision capability include M109 and M777 Howitzers with Excalibur, Multiple-Launch Rocket 

Systems (MLRS) with Guided-MLRS, in addition to Army and Air Force aviation assets. Precision guided munitions will provide an organic capability to all units assigned with 120mm Mortars. More extensive fielding of this capability provides for 

greater precision area coverage within the Theater of Operations. The smaller warhead and corresponding blast radius of a 120mm precision round gives the 

Warfighter more targeting flexibility through the advantage of less potential collat-
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eral damage. Additionally, the 120mm Mortar’s relatively small size to other platforms enables greater battlefield mobility. 

Mr. BOREN. I am concerned to learn that the APMI schedule has slipped several 

weeks. Is urgency the priority in fielding this capability and if so, when does the 

Army intend to deliver the first production round to Soldiers in Afghanistan? 

Secretary GEREN. The Accelerated Precision Mortar Initiative (APMI) demonstration, completed during the April-May 2009 timeframe at Yuma Proving Grounds, 

was delayed by two weeks. However, this delay did not in turn delay the projected 

fielding of initial APMI rounds to OEF. The objective of the APMI fielding schedule 

remains to deliver the first APMI rounds to our Soldiers in Afghanistan within 11 

months of receipt of funding from the Army’s Fiscal Year 2009 (FY09) Omnibus reprogramming request. The Army is evaluating alternative resourcing solutions to 

ensure we meet the Warfighter’s urgent operational need for to APMI as quickly as 

possible within receipt of Omnibus funds. 

Mr. BOREN. How does the Army intend to fund this initiative? 

Secretary GEREN. The Army requested FY09 funding as part of the Omnibus Reprogramming. Additional requirements for RDTE and Procurement funds in FY10 

will require reprogramming actions. Funding requirements for FY11 and beyond 

will be addressed in annual budget requests. 

Mr. BOREN. Please describe for the record the performance associated with the 

APMI demonstrations now underway at Yuma. Please include a description of each 

test shot, to include range, temperature conditioning, elevation change and whether 

meteorological data was utilized in computing a fire solution. Include threshold and 

objective requirements for the munition and indicate whether the performance of 

each test shot satisfied these requirements. 

Secretary GEREN. The Army completed the APMI demonstrations in May 2009. 

Three of the four competing contractors had designs mature enough to proceed into 

the next phase. Since the Army has not selected the final design, the test results 

from the APMI demonstration are considered competition sensitive and cannot be 

publically released at this time. The threshold accuracy is 10 meters Circular Error 

Probable (CEP); objective accuracy is five meters CEP. CEP is a statistical distribution where 50 percent of the rounds land within the radius of a circle and 50 percent 

outside. 

Mr. BOREN. The APMI acquisition strategy proposes a three-month Phase I technology demonstration contract between two contractors following completion of the 

Yuma testing in May. Typically, tech demos are at least one year efforts that allow 

contractors to significantly refine and rework designs, addressing issues raised during the initial test phase. In this case, it appears that the truncated Phase I tech 

demo will allow very little opportunity to modify the design, consuming dollars and 

time that could be used to more rapidly field rounds to theater. In the event a technically superior round is demonstrated in May, will the Army forgo Phase I and proceed directly to Phase II to accelerate availability of this needed munition? 

Secretary GEREN. The Army has established an aggressive program schedule in 

order to respond to the approved Operational Needs Statement (ONS) as rapidly as 

possible. Based on the results of the May 2009 demonstration, the Army intends, 

subject to availability of funding, to award three follow-on contracts for Phase I. The 

short timeframe for Phase I is possible based on the maturity of the demonstrated 

designs coming out of the demonstration. The down-select decision to go from Phase 

I to a single design in Phase II & production will be based on an established set 

of criteria that includes the key program elements of technical, cost, and schedule 

to deliver sufficient quantity to meet the ONS requirement. 

Mr. BOREN. Background: Excalibur is a GPS-guided 155mm artillery round and 

can be fired from the M109A6 Paladin and the M777 Lightweight Howitzer as well 

as from the Non-Line of Sight Cannon. The first increment of Excalibur, XM982 

1A1, was fielded to Iraq in May 2007 in response to an Urgent Needs Statement 

for precision cannon munitions in Iraq. The Objective accuracy requirement for Excalibur 1A1 is 10 meters Circular Error Probable and performance in the field has 

far exceeded this requirement. Procurement of the second increment of Excalibur, 

1A2, will begin in FY09 and a competition is underway for the third increment, intended to offer objective accuracy of 6 meters CEP with a lower unit cost. 

Does the Army intend to review Excalibur compatibility and support for meeting 

the existing objective range requirements of the NLOS–Cannon as part of the 

TRADOC FCS realignment? 

Secretary GEREN. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command is currently reviewing capability gaps of the current force to guide development of requirements 

for a future Ground Combat Vehicle as part of FCS realignment. The Excalibur Ib 

Operational Requirements Document objective range requirement is 40km and the 

review indicates the objective range requirement remains valid. 
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The Army intends to remain committed to our requirement for the full compatibility of Excalibur as a key enabler (as outlined in our requirements documents) 

for the M777 Lightweight Howitzer, M109A6 Paladin, Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) Howitzer and any future indirect fire cannon. 

Mr. BOREN. As the Army moves increasingly to precision fire solutions, are the 

logistics and support function savings being weighted in evaluating unit costs? The 

requirement for certain Excalibur missions calls for defeating a target with two 

rounds; unguided artillery would traditionally require some 150 rounds to achieve 

the same effect, with likely significant collateral damage. Aside from the direct reduction in the number of rounds fired, fewer artillery tubes may be required for the 

same effects, fewer trucks may be required to move pallets of ammo, and fewer gallons of fuel are consumed. How is the Army accounting for the internal savings associated with precision fires? 

Secretary GEREN. Costs are considered when the Army evaluates all of the potential solutions available to meet our validated requirements, including changes in 

doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and material solutions. If the Army determines that a material solution is required to meet the requirement, complete 

lifecycle costs estimates are prepared and reviewed at each milestone decision review. These lifecycle estimates include costs associated with the logistics and support functions required to support that material solution. In that regard, logistics 

and support costs are considered and weighed in the evaluation of unit costs. 

Mr. BOREN. A recent open letter from former artillery commanders bemoaned a 

lack of training and the atrophying of experience in artillery units. Are tactics, 

training and procedures being updated to address the new flexibility that precision 

fires offer? Are Excalibur rounds being used regularly at the National Training Center as part of unit workups prior to deployment? 

Secretary GEREN. Yes, tactics, techniques, and procedures are continually updated 

to address the unique capabilities that precision guided munitions offer at both the 

Fires Center of Excellence and tactical field artillery units. Precision guided munitions mission considerations and target effects have been integrated in all relevant 

courses to date. 

Excalibur munitions are used or replicated routinely at the Maneuver Combat 

Training Centers (MCTCs) to prepare units and Soldiers for deployment. Incorporating live fire of Excalibur at the MCTCs enables both the gunnery team and 

maneuver commander to execute precision munitions mission and see the effects on 

the ground. 

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