[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10931

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

GARNELL DEWITT QUARTERMAN, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cr-00064-WTM-CLR-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10931

Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Garnell Dewitt Quarterman appeals his 235-month sentence 

following his conviction for one count of conspiracy to interfere 

with commerce by robbery. On appeal, Quarterman argues that 

his sentence is unreasonable because it is disparate in comparison 

to his co-defendant’s sentence and because it is at the high end of 

the guideline range. After thorough review, we affirm.

I.

We review the sentence a district court imposes for “reasonableness,” which “merely asks whether the trial court abused its 

discretion.” United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 

2008) (quotations omitted). That said, we only review for plain error a sentencing challenge raised for the first time on appeal. 

United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005). 

To establish plain error, the defendant must show (1) an error, (2) 

that is plain, and (3) that affected his substantial rights. United 

States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007). If the defendant satisfies these conditions, we may exercise our discretion 

to recognize the error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. 

To preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant “must raise an 

objection that is sufficient to apprise the trial court and the opposing party of the particular grounds upon which appellate relief will 

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22-10931 Opinion of the Court 3

later be sought.” United States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003, 1011 (11th 

Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). A defendant preserves the issue of 

the substantive reasonableness of his sentence for review by advocating for a less severe sentence. Holguin-Hernandez v. United 

States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766–67 (2020).

In reviewing sentences for reasonableness, we perform two 

steps. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190. First, we “‘ensure that the district 

court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to 

calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating 

the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing 

to adequately explain the chosen sentence -- including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.’” Id. (quoting 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).1 The district court is 

not required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered 

each of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors if the record reflects the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. 

1 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense 

and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for 

the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for the 

sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to protect the 

public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational 

training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing 

Guidelines range; (8) the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the 

need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

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Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 609 (11th Cir. 2020). So, an acknowledgment by the district court that it considered the § 3553(a) 

factors is sufficient. Turner, 474 F.3d at 1281. Further, a failure to 

discuss mitigating evidence does not indicate that the court “erroneously ‘ignored’ or failed to consider this evidence.” United States 

v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007). “[T]he adequacy of 

a district court’s findings and sentence explanation is a classic procedural issue, not a substantive one.” United States v. Irey, 612 

F.3d 1160, 1194 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

If we conclude that the district court did not procedurally 

err, we consider the “substantive reasonableness of the sentence 

imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard,” based on the “totality of the circumstances.” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190 (quotations 

omitted). A court may abuse its discretion if it (1) fails to consider 

relevant factors that are due significant weight, (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor significant weight, or (3) commits a clear 

error of judgment by balancing a proper factor unreasonably. Irey, 

612 F.3d at 1189. Also, a court’s unjustified reliance on any one § 

3553(a) factor may be a symptom of an unreasonable sentence. 

United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006).

We have “underscored” that we must give “due deference” 

to the district court to consider and weigh the proper sentencing 

factors. United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir. 

2018) (quotations omitted). The district court does not have to 

give all the factors equal weight and is given discretion to attach 

great weight to one factor over another. United States v. 

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Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). Sentencing 

courts are also afforded “broad leeway in deciding how much 

weight to give to prior crimes the defendant has committed.” 

United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355–56 (11th Cir. 2022). 

We will vacate a sentence only if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear 

error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a 

sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (quotations 

omitted). We will not substitute our own judgment for that of the 

sentencing court and will sometimes affirm the district court even 

if we would have done something differently because the question 

is whether the district court’s decision was “in the ballpark of permissible outcomes.” Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355 (quotations omitted). 

A claim of unwarranted sentencing disparities requires that 

the defendant be similarly situated to the defendants to whom he 

compares himself. United States v. Duperval, 777 F.3d 1324, 1338 

(11th Cir. 2015). District courts should not draw comparisons to 

cases involving defendants who were convicted of less serious offenses, pleaded guilty, or who lacked extensive criminal histories. 

United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1118 (11th Cir. 2011). In 

other words, a well-founded claim of unwarranted disparity between sentences “assumes that apples are being compared to apples.” United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 

2009) (quotations omitted).

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We do not apply a presumption of reasonableness to sentences within the guideline range, but we ordinarily expect these 

sentences to be reasonable. United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633, 

656 (11th Cir. 2014). The party challenging the sentence bears the 

burden of establishing that it is unreasonable based on the record 

and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 

1378 (11th Cir. 2010). 

Here, Quarterman has not shown that his sentence is either 

procedurally or substantively unreasonable. As the record reveals,

Quarterman and his codefendant, Malik Stephens, were charged 

with several counts arising out of the robberies of businesses near 

Savannah, Georgia. In the initial indictment, both were charged 

with one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); Stephens was charged in three additional counts; and Quarterman was charged in thirteen additional 

counts. After Stephens pleaded guilty to the initial indictment, 

Quarterman was charged in a superseding indictment with twentysix counts, including conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); four counts of attempted Hobbs 

Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); twelve counts of 

possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); eight counts of Hobbs Act robbery, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); and one count of possession of a 

firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

Quarterman later agreed to plead guilty to the conspiracy 

count of the superseding indictment in exchange for the dismissal 

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of the other counts, pursuant to a written agreement. After hearing arguments in mitigation from Quarterman and his mother, the 

district court said that it had considered the testimony, the parties’ 

arguments and the § 3553(a) factors, and emphasized “the egregious conduct involved in the instant offense with the commission 

of 12 armed robberies [, the victims’ testimony about how the robberies have affected them, as well as] the defendant’s repeated violent criminal history, the criminal history here in this area and also 

in Maryland.” It then sentenced Quarterman to 235 months’ imprisonment, at the high end of the guideline range.

To the extent that Quarterman now raises a procedural reasonableness challenge to the explanation of the sentence, he failed 

to raise any issue like this before the district court, despite being

given the opportunity to do so. Thus, we review his procedural 

reasonableness challenge for plain error, and can find no error, 

much less plain error. As we’ve said, the court was not required to 

discuss each subpart of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in explaining his sentence. Kulhman, 711 F.3d at 1326. Further, the record -- including 

the undisputed portions of his PSI -- reflects that his history and 

characteristics, and his actions during the course of the offense conduct, supported the district court’s decision, as we’ll discuss.

As for Quarterman’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his 235-month sentence, it was not a result of an unwarranted sentencing disparity. This kind of claim “assumes that apples are being compared to apples,” but the record shows that the 

codefendants here played significantly different roles in the offense 

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conduct. While Stephens was charged with four counts in the initial indictment, Quarterman was charged in a superseding indictment with twenty-six counts. Moreover, Stephens pleaded guilty 

to the initial indictment, rather than the superseding indictment. 

Ultimately, Stephens’s guideline range was 120 to 150 months imprisonment, while Quarterman’s was 188 to 235 months imprisonment, even though Stephens had a higher criminal history score 

than Quarterman. On this record, there was no error in treating 

Stephens and Quarterman differently for sentencing purposes.

Duperval, 777 F.3d at 1338.

Nor are we persuaded by Quarterman’s argument that the 

235-month sentence was otherwise substantively unreasonable. In 

sentencing Quarterman at the high end of the guideline range, the 

district court emphasized his “egregious” conduct and “repeatedly 

violent criminal history.” The court was permitted to attach 

weight to these considerations, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) -- even great 

weight, Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355 -- and we will not second guess this 

weight if the sentence is reasonable under the circumstances. Id. 

Further, Quarterman has not shown that the district court failed to 

consider any relevant factors, to give weight to any “improper or 

irrelevant factor,” or to make any “clear error of judgment” in considering the relevant factors. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. Accordingly, 

Quarterman has not shown the district court’s within-guideline 

sentence was outside “the ballpark of permissible outcomes,” Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355, and we affirm. 

AFFIRMED.

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