IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

STATE OF DELAWARE, )

)

)

v. ) ID No. 1212005871A

)

JOEQWELL S. COVERDALE, )

)

 Defendant. )

Submitted: July 31, 2014

Decided: August 11, 2014

 Corrected: August 13, 2014*1

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE

This 11th day of August, 2014, upon consideration of the Defendant’s 

Motion for Sentence Reduction and the record in this matter, it appears to 

the Court that:

(1) On February 14, 2014, following a jury trial, Joeqwell S. 

Coverdale was convicted of three counts of first degree robbery, one count 

of second degree robbery, second degree conspiracy and four counts of 

 

* This corrected order is issued to clarify the bases for the Court’s finding of the 

inapplicability of 79 DEL. LAWS c. 297 (2014) to Coverdale’s sentence, and to address 

typographical errors in paragraph 6 of the original order. See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 36 (The 

Court may correct its clerical errors at any time). 
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possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (“PFDCF”).2 On 

June 13, 2014, Coverdale was sentenced to serve: (1) ten years at Level V, 

suspended after three years for lesser levels of supervision for one robbery 

first degree charge, and three years at Level V for each of the other two 

robbery first degree charges; (2) three years at Level V for each of the four

PFDCF counts; (3) five years at Level V, suspended immediately for 

robbery second degree; and (4) two years at Level V, suspended 

immediately for conspiracy second degree. Coverdale’s 21-year term of 

unsuspended imprisonment is comprised wholly of minimum terms of 

incarceration that must be imposed and cannot be suspended.

3

 

(2) Coverdale filed a direct appeal from his convictions and 

sentence, which is now pending.

4

 

 2 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 832 (2012) (robbery in the first degree); id. at § 831 

(robbery in the second degree); id. at 512 (conspiracy in the second degree); id. at § 

1447A (PFDCF).

3

 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 832(b)(1) (2012) (“Notwithstanding any provisions of 

this section or Code to the contrary, any person convicted of robbery in the first degree 

shall receive a minimum sentence of . . . [t]hree years at Level V . . .”); id. at 

§§ 1447A(b) & (d) (“A person convicted [of PFDCF] shall receive a minimum sentence 

of 3 years at Level V . . . [and a]ny sentence imposed for a violation of this section shall 

not be subject to suspension . . .”). See State v. Lennon, 2003 WL 1342983, at *1 (Del. 

Mar. 11, 2003) (court must impose the statutory minimum for robbery first degree). 

 

4 See Not. of Appeal, Joeqwell S. Coverdale v. State of Delaware, No. 377, 2014 

(Del. filed July 14, 2014).
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(3) Coverdale then filed the present motion under Superior Court 

Criminal Rule 35(b) requesting reduction of his Level V term.5

 Coverdale 

appears to seek application of recently amended provisions of 11 Del. C. 

§ 3901,

6 suggesting they may be applied under Rule 35(b) to reduce his 

overall term of incarceration by running certain of his sentences 

concurrently.7

 He asks also that the Court defer ruling on his motion until 

after disposition of his direct appeal.8

 

(4) The Court may consider such a motion “without presentation, 

hearing or argument.”9

 And while the Court may defer decision of this 

motion during the pendency of Coverdale’s appeal, the Court may also 

decide the motion now.10 The Court will decide this motion on the papers 

filed.

 5 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b) (providing that, under certain conditions, the Court may 

reduce a sentence of imprisonment on an inmate’s motion).

6 See 79 DEL. LAWS c. 297 (2014) (effective July 9, 2014; amends 11 Del. C. 

§ 3901(d) to grant a sentencing judge discretion to impose either concurrent or 

consecutive sentences for certain crimes).

7 Def. Rule 35(b) Mot. at 1-2.

8 Id. at 2.

9 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b).

10 Id. 
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(5) The intent of Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(b) has 

historically been to provide a reasonable period for the Court to consider 

alteration of its sentencing judgments.11 Where a motion for reduction of 

sentence is filed within 90 days of sentencing, the Court has broad 

discretion to decide if it should alter its judgment. The reason for such a 

rule is to give a sentencing judge a second chance to consider whether the 

initial sentence is appropriate.12 But, while the Court has wide discretion to 

reduce a sentence upon a timely Rule 35 application, the Court has no 

authority to reduce or suspend the mandatory portion of any substantive

statutory minimum sentence.13 

(6) The Court was constrained to impose at least a 3-year 

mandatory prison term for each first degree robbery charge14 and at least a

 11 Johnson v. State, 234 A.2d 447, 448 (Del. 1967) (per curiam).

12 See United States v. Ellenbogan, 390 F.2d 537, 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1968) 

(explaining time limitation and purpose of then-extant sentence reduction provision of 

Federal Criminal Rule 35, the federal analogue to current Superior Court Criminal Rule 

35(b)); see also United States v. Maynard, 485 F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1973) (Rule 35 

allows sentencing court “to decide if, on further reflection, the original sentence now 

seems unduly harsh” . . . such request “is essentially a ‘plea for leniency.’”) (citations 

omitted).

13 State v. Sturgis, 947 A.2d 1087, 1092 (Del. 2008) (“Superior Court Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 35(b) provides no authority for a reduction or suspension of the 

mandatory portion of a substantive statutory minimum sentence.”) (emphasis in original).

14 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 832(b) (2012). See State v. Lennon, 2003 WL 

1342983, at *1 (Del. March 11, 2003) (court must impose minimum for robbery first 

degree; at the time of Lennon’s plea that was 2 years).
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3-year mandatory prison term for each PFDCF charge.15 At Coverdale’s 

sentencing, the Court was statutorily prohibited from ordering any of those 

prison terms to run concurrently.

16 And, though Coverdale might argue 

otherwise, the new provisions of § 3901(d) – enacted some 18 months after 

his crimes and about a month after his sentencing – have no retroactive 

effect.17 But even if they did, under now-amended § 3901(d), the Court still 

has no authority to impose concurrent sentencing for certain serious crimes. 

Those crimes include robbery first degree and PFDCF.18

(7) In turn, the Court must deny Coverdale’s motion to reduce his 

sentence. 

 

15 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1447A(b) (2012).

16 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3901(d) (2012) (“No sentence of confinement of any 

criminal defendant . . . shall be made to run concurrently with any other sentence of 

confinement imposed on such criminal defendant.”). 

17 State v. Jennings, Del. Super., ID Nos. 1203003795 & 1304023113, Vaughn, P.J. 

(Aug. 11, 2014) (rejecting the argument that recently amended § 3901(d) provisions that 

might allow concurrent sentencing for some crimes could be applied retroactively); State 

v. Ismaaeel, 840 A.2d 644, 654 (Del. Super. Ct. 2004), aff’d, 2004 WL 1587040 (Del. 

July 25, 2004) (sentencing scheme in effect when defendant’s drug offenses were 

committed applied because the subsequent statutory amendments applied prospectively 

only); State v. Nixon, 46 A.2d 874, 875 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1946) (“Retrospective operation 

is not favored by the Courts, and a law will not be construed as retroactive unless the Act 

clearly, by express language or necessary implication, indicates that the legislature 

intended a retroactive application.”) (citations omitted). 

18 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3901(d) (Supp. 2014) (“. . . no sentence of confinement 

. . . shall be made to run concurrently with any other sentence of confinement imposed 

. . . for any conviction of . . . Robbery in the first degree [or] . . . Possession of a firearm 

during the commission of a felony . . . .”). 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Joeqwell S. 

Coverdale’s motion for reduction of sentence is DENIED. 

/s/ Paul R. Wallace

Paul R. Wallace, Judge

Original to Prothonotary

cc: Caterina Gatto, Deputy Attorney General

John S. Malik, Esquire

 Mr. Joeqwell S. Coverdale, pro se

 Investigative Services Office