alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-51598

James McArdle; Chung McArdle

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

State Farm Lloyds

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

1:06-CV-303

Before JONES, Chief Judge, GARWOOD, and JOLLY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The judgment is affirmed. There was no duty to defend. See Wessinger v.

Fire Ins. Exchange, 949 S.W.2d 834, 841 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997; no writ).

Under these circumstances, there being no duty to defend, there was no duty to

indemnify. See American States Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 133 F.3d 363, 368 (5th Cir.

1998).

AFFIRMED.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 4, 2008

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
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# District: 8
Federal Reserve Bank of: St. Louis

## Filings received during the week ending June 5, 2010

|Filer | Filing Type | Filing Proposal | End of Comment Period
|----- | ----------- | --------------- | ---------------------
|NONE 

## Availability of CRA Public Evaluations

|Institution / Location            | RSSDID | Exam Date  | CRAPublic Date | CRARating | Exam Method
|--------------------------------- | ------ | ---------- | -------------- | --------- | -----------
|CITIZENS BK, BATESVILLE, ARKANSAS | 856748 | 02/22/2010 | 05/21/2010     | S         | Int Sm Bank

## CRA Examinations scheduled for     Quarter of

|Institution | Location
|----------- | --------
|NONE       

* Subject to the provisions of the Community Reinvestment Act

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#### § 68.27 Definitions for purposes of this subpart.

*Certificate of Documentation* means form CG-1270.

*Citizen* means a citizen as described in part 67 of this chapter.

*Exclusive Economic Zone* or *EEZ* means the exclusive economic zone established by Presidential Proclamation Numbered 5030, dated March 10, 1983, including the ocean waters of the areas referred to as “eastern special areas” in Article 3(1) of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary, signed June 1, 1990.

*Not-for-profit oil spill response cooperative* means a corporation, partnership, association, trust, joint venture, or other entity established under the laws of the United States, or of a State, with a not-for-profit status and for the limited purposes of training for, carrying out, and supporting oil spill cleanup operations or related research activities.

[CGD 90-055, 57 FR 7642, Mar. 3, 1992. Redesignated by USCG-2005-20258, 71 FR 61418, Oct. 18, 2006]
#### In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Jeffrey Runyan

Case No. 98-2541

Dated: December 2, 1998

ORDER

Pursuant to Rule II, Section 5(E)(1) of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Judiciary of Ohio and Section 2701.11 of the Ohio Revised Code,- effective December 2,1998, the Supreme Court appoints the following judges to serve on the five-judge commission to consider the report of the hearing panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline in *In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Jeffrey Runyan,*Case No. 98-2541:

Judge William G. Lauber Lima Municipal Court (Third District)

Judge John P. Bessey Franklin County Court of Common Pleas (Tenth District)

Judge Margaret K. Weaver Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas (Sixth District)

Judge Judith A. Nicely Summit County Court of Common Pleas (Ninth District)

Judge Melissa Byers-Emmerling East Liverpool Municipal Court (Seventh District)

Pursuant to Gov.Jud.R. Ill, Section 2(B)(1), the Supreme Court designates Judge Lauber as chairman of the Commission.

Pursuant to R.C. 2701.11, Richard A. Dove, Associate Director of the Supreme Court of Ohio, for the purpose of this proceeding, is designated as Administrative Director to serve as Secretary to the Commission, with authority to sign entries and orders on behalf of and at the direction of the Commission or its chairman.

All pleadings and doeum'ents in this matter shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. The original and seven copies of all documents shall be filed. Service on the Commission shall be made by serving the Secretary. The Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio shall apply to all proceedings before the Commission, except as otherwise ordered by the Court.

THOMAS J. MOYER Chief Justice
#### § 502.401 Policy.

It is the policy of the Federal Maritime Commission to use alternative means of dispute resolution to the fullest extent compatible with the law and the agency's mission and resources. The Commission will consider using ADR in all areas including workplace issues, formal and informal adjudication, issuance of regulations, enforcement and compliance, issuing and revoking licenses and permits, contract award and administration, litigation brought by or against the Commission, and other interactions with the public and the regulated community. The Commission will provide learning and development opportunities for its employees to develop their ability to use conflict resolution skills, instill knowledge of the theory and practice of ADR, and to facilitate appropriate use of ADR. To this end, all parties to matters under this part are required to consider use of a wide range of alternative means to resolve disputes at an early stage. Parties are encouraged to pursue use of alternative means through the Commission's Office of Consumer Affairs and Dispute Resolution Services in lieu of or prior to initiating a Commission proceeding. All employees and persons who interact with the Commission are encouraged to identify opportunities for collaborative, consensual approaches to dispute resolution or rulemaking.

[66 FR 43513, Aug. 20, 2001, as amended at 70 FR 7669, Feb. 15, 2005; 70 FR 44867, Aug. 4, 2005]
NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 23-2020

___________

IN RE: ATIF B. MALIK,

Petitioner

____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the

United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(Related to D.C. Civil Action No. 3-22-cv-00059)

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.

July 11, 2023

Before: KRAUSE, PORTER, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed July 17, 2023)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

Atif Malik petitions for a writ of mandamus. For the reasons that follow, we will 

deny the petition.

In April 2022, Malik, a federal prisoner, filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241 challenging the Bureau of Prison’s (BOP) calculation of his earned time credits. 

On June 8, 2023, Malik filed this mandamus petition requesting that we order the District 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Court to order the BOP to “take action on the issuance of the remaining portion of 

Malik’s earned time credits petition.” Pet. at 6.

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. Malik must show that he lacks adequate 

alternative means to obtain the relief he seeks, and he carries the burden of showing that 

his right to relief is clear and undisputable. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of 

Ia., 490 U.S. 296, 309 (1989). A petition for a writ of mandamus is not a substitute for an 

appeal. See In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 212 (3d Cir. 2006).

After Malik filed this petition, the District Court dismissed Malik’s § 2241 petition 

as moot, noting that the BOP had calculated his earned time credit. Thus, to the extent 

that Malik asked us to direct the District Court to rule on his petition, we can no longer 

grant the requested relief. See generally Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 

690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996) (“If developments occur during the course of adjudication that 

. . . prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be 

dismissed as moot.”). To the extent that Malik requests that we order the District Court 

to order the BOP to give him additional earned time credit, he is not entitled to such relief 

via mandamus as he has the alternate remedy of appealing the District Court’s dismissal 

of his § 2241 petition.

For the above reasons, we will deny the mandamus petition.1

1 Malik improperly titles his mandamus petition as being filed pursuant to the Crime 

Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3). Subsection (d)(3) requires that we decide 

mandamus petitions filed under § 3771 within 72 hours and throughout Malik’s petition, 

he stresses that it is “time sensitive.” However, besides citing to the Crime Victim’s 

Rights’ Act in the title, he does not attempt to argue that he is a crime victim or that his 

petition in any way falls within § 3771.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

EBONY HENDRIX, et al., 

 Plaintiffs, Case No. 15-cv-12364 

v Honorable Thomas L. Ludington 

CALVIN AKIN, et al., 

 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________________/ 

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 

In accordance with the order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss, 

 It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that count one of Plaintiff’s complaint is 

DISMISSED with prejudice. 

It is further ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the remainder of Plaintiff’s complaint is 

DISMISSED without prejudice. 

s/Thomas L. Ludington 

 THOMAS L. LUDINGTON 

 United States District Judge 

Dated: November 20, 2015 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served 

upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first 

class U.S. mail on November 20, 2015. 

 s/Michael A. Sian 

 MICHAEL A. SIAN, Case Manager 

1:15-cv-12364-TLL-PTM Doc # 35 Filed 11/20/15 Pg 1 of 1 Pg ID 456
98-1994.

#### State ex rel. Ferguson v. Rogers.

In Mandamus. On motion to dismiss. Motion to dismiss sustained. Cause dismissed.

Moyer, C.J., Douglas,’ Resnick, F.E. Sweeney Pfeifer, Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., concur.
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# District: 6
Federal Reserve Bank of: Atlanta

## Filings received during the week ending June 5, 2010

|Filer                        | Filing Type | Filing Proposal                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      | End of Comment Period                          
|---------------------------- | ----------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | -----------------------------------------------
|FIRST COLUMBIA BANCORP, INC. | CIC         | After-the-fact change in control notice filed by Stafford Lester Scaff, Jr., and Anne Csercsics Scaff, both of Lake City, Florida, to retain 19.94 percent of the outstanding shares of First Columbia Bancorp, Inc. (Bancorp), and its subsidiary, Columbia Bank (Bank), both of Lake City, Florida; and to acquire up to 42 percent of the outstanding shares of Bancorp and Bank. | Newspaper:06/03/2010Federal Register:06/11/2010
|Newspaper:                   | 06/03/2010 
|Federal Register:            | 06/11/2010 

## Availability of CRA Public Evaluations

|Institution / Location | RSSDID | Exam Date | CRAPublic Date | CRARating | Exam Method
|---------------------- | ------ | --------- | -------------- | --------- | -----------
|NONE                  

## CRA Examinations scheduled for     Quarter of

|Institution | Location
|----------- | --------
|NONE       

* Subject to the provisions of the Community Reinvestment Act

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# District: 1
Federal Reserve Bank of: Boston

## Filings received during the week ending November 10, 2007

|Filer | Filing Type | Filing Proposal | End of Comment Period
|----- | ----------- | --------------- | ---------------------
|NONE 

## Availability of CRA Public Evaluations

|Institution / Location | RSSDID | Exam Date | CRAPublic Date | CRARating | Exam Method
|---------------------- | ------ | --------- | -------------- | --------- | -----------
|NONE                  

## CRA Examinations scheduled for     Quarter of

|Institution | Location
|----------- | --------
|NONE       

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UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 04-1671

JOHN L. BOYLE, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant, versus HARFORD COUNTY; HOWARD WALTER; RICHARD AIELLO; COLBURN DORSEY; ELWOOD DEHAVEN; GARY SOHL; JOSEPH P. MEADOWS, Defendants - Appellees, and STATE OF MARYLAND, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, Chief District Judge. (CA-01-3200-BEL) Submitted: January 12, 2005 Decided: January 25, 2005 Before WILLIAMS, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Howard J. Needle, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Cynthia G. Peltzman, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, Robert S. McCord,- 2 - County Attorney, Philip S. Roberts, Deborah S. Duvall, Senior Assistant County Attorneys, Bel Air, Maryland, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).PER CURIAM: John L. Boyle, Jr. appeals the district court’s order summarily dismissing his claims for religious discrimination and retaliation for whistle blowing, based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000); the First Amendment; and the Public Policy of the State of Maryland; and dismissing the remaining state law claims without prejudice. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the order on the reasoning of the district court. See Boyle v. Harford County , No. CA-01-3200-BEL (D. Md. Apr. 1, 2004). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
**Exhibit 10.3**

 

**INTERLINK ELECTRONICS, INC.**

**NON-STATUTORY STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT**

**1996 STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN**

 

This NON-STATUTORY STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT is made between INTERLINKELECTRONICS, INC., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), and                      (the “Optionee”), pursuant to theCompany’s 1996 Stock Incentive Plan, as amended (the “Plan”). The Company and the Optionee agree as follows: 

 

1. Option Grant: The Company hereby grants to the Optionee on the terms and conditions of this Agreement the right and the option (the“Option”) to purchase all or any of                     (            ) of the Company’s Common Stock (the “Grant Shares”) at a purchase price of$             per share. The terms and conditions applicable to grants of options of the Company’s Common Stock, as set forth in the Plan, are incorporated into and made part ofthis Agreement. The Option will not be treated as an Incentive Stock Option as defined in Section 422 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and is therefore a Non-Statutory Stock Option. 

 

2. Time of Exercise of Option: The grant date of this Option is                    ,              (the “Grant Date”). Subject tothe terms and conditions set forth herein and until the Option expires or is terminated as provided in the Plan, this Option may be exercised from time to time to purchase the Grant Shares as follows: 

 

The Option shall become exercisable for 1/3rd of the GrantShares at the end of each one-year period, so that the Option will be fully exercisable on the third anniversary of the Grant Date. 

 

3. Expiration: The Option shall continue in effect until the earlier of the date ten years after the Grant Date, or the date thirty days after theOptionee’s service with the Company terminates (other than by reason of death or disability), unless earlier terminated as provided in the Plan.
# C_2011130EN.01002002.xml

| 30.4.2011 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 130/20 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.4.2011

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 130/20

---

Action brought on 7 March 2011 — Ezzedine v Council

(Case T-131/11)

2011/C 130/39

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Ibrahim Ezzedine (Treichville, Côte d’Ivoire) (represented by: G. Collard, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare that, concerning the applicant, Mr Ibrahim EZZEDINE, Council Decision 2011/71/CFSP of 31 January 2011, published on 2 February 2011 in the Official Journal of the European Union, is not justified in fact, |
| --- | --- |

—

declare that, concerning the applicant, Mr Ibrahim EZZEDINE, Council Decision 2011/71/CFSP of 31 January 2011, published on 2 February 2011 in the Official Journal of the European Union, is not justified in fact,

| — | consequently,






  — | annul Council Decision 2011/71/CFSP of 31 January 2011; |
| --- | --- | --- |

—

consequently,

—

annul Council Decision 2011/71/CFSP of 31 January 2011;

| — | alternatively, order that the name of Mr Ibrahim EZZEDINE be removed from the list annexed to that decision. |
| --- | --- |

—

alternatively, order that the name of Mr Ibrahim EZZEDINE be removed from the list annexed to that decision.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant puts forward two pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law alleging a breach of the obligation to state reasons, in so far as the grounds for including the applicant on the list of persons and entities to which the restrictive measures apply are stereotyped without any specific factual element making it possible to assess the relevance of that inclusion being mentioned. |
| --- | --- |

1.

First plea in law alleging a breach of the obligation to state reasons, in so far as the grounds for including the applicant on the list of persons and entities to which the restrictive measures apply are stereotyped without any specific factual element making it possible to assess the relevance of that inclusion being mentioned.

| 2. | Second plea in law alleging a manifest error of assessment, in so far as the applicant is accused of helping to fund the illegitimate administration of L. Gbagbo, whereas the applicant is only carrying out the activity of a private businessman and is therefore simply helping to fund the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire and not a specific regime by the payment of taxes and levies. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Second plea in law alleging a manifest error of assessment, in so far as the applicant is accused of helping to fund the illegitimate administration of L. Gbagbo, whereas the applicant is only carrying out the activity of a private businessman and is therefore simply helping to fund the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire and not a specific regime by the payment of taxes and levies.

---
#### § 1155.13 Board determination with respect to a Governor's petition.

The Board shall accept the Governor's complete petition on a finding that the facility qualified as a solid waste rail transfer facility, as defined in 49 U.S.C. 10908(e)(1)(H) and 49 CFR 1155.2, on October 16, 2008. If the Board finds that the facility currently does not qualify for or require a land-use-exemption permit, any future use of the facility as a solid waste rail transfer facility would require an application for a land-use-exemption permit as a proposed facility and/or the proper state permits. In a decision granting the Governor's petition, the Board shall require that the rail carrier that owns or operates the facility, or the operator of the facility, file a land-use-exemption-permit application within 120 days of the service date of the decision.
#### § 535.101 Authority.

The rules in this part are issued pursuant to the authority of section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 553), sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, and 19 of the Shipping Act of 1984 (“the Act”) (46 U.S.C. 305, 40101-40104, 40301-40307, 40501-40503, 40901-40904, 41101-41109, 41301-41302, and 41305-41307), and the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-258, 112 Stat. 1902.

[69 FR 64414, Nov. 4, 2004, as amended at 74 FR 50727, Oct. 1, 2009]
#### § 404.109 Ratemaking step 9: Calculate revised base rates.

The Director calculates revised base rates for each area by dividing the initial base rate (from Step 7) by the average weighting factor (from Step 8) to produce a revised base rate for each area.

[USCG-2016-0268, 82 FR 41496, Aug. 31, 2017]