J-A15043-17

2017 PA Super 302

FLORENCE A. GOOD, INDIVIDUALLY 

AND AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF 

BARRY D. GOOD, DECEASED,

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

:

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

FRANKIE & EDDIE'S HANOVER INN, LLP :

:

RCA INSURANCE GROUP ON BEHALF :

OF STATE NATIONAL INSURANCE :

COMPANY : No. 2006 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order entered November 15, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County,

Civil Division, No(s): 13-15184

BEFORE: MOULTON, SOLANO and MUSMANNO, JJ.

OPINION BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 21, 2017

Florence A. Good (“Good”), individually and as executrix of the Estate 

of Barry D. Good, deceased (“the Estate”), appeals from the Order denying 

Good’s Motion for Summary Judgment in a declaratory judgment action 

against Frankie & Eddie’s Hanover Inn, LLP (“Hanover Inn”), and RCA 

Insurance Group (“RCA”), on behalf of State National Insurance Company,
J-A15043-17

- 2 -

and denying as moot RCA’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.1 We 

affirm.

On April 4, 2012, at approximately 10:56 p.m., Barry D. Good (“the 

Deceased”) was fatally injured when a Ford F250, driven by Francis Lynch 

(“Lynch”), collided with the Deceased’s Kawasaki Vulcan Motorcycle. At the 

time of the accident, Lynch was driving under the influence of alcohol, which 

had been served to him at Hanover Inn.2

On the date of the accident, Hanover Inn was covered by a commercial 

insurance policy (“the Policy”) issued by RCA. The Policy includes a Liquor 

Liability Coverage Form,3 which provides for liquor liability coverage with an 

 

1

“[A]n order denying summary judgment is ordinarily a non-appealable 

interlocutory order.” McDonald v. Whitewater Challengers, Inc., 116 

A.3d 99, 104 (Pa. Super. 2015). However, an order in a declaratory 

judgment action that either affirmatively or negatively declares rights, 

status, and other legal relations is a final order. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7532; 

see also Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) (providing that “[a] final order is “any order 

that disposes of all claims and of all parties[.]”); Nat’l Cas. Co. v. Kinney, 

90 A.3d 747, 754 (Pa. Super. 2014). Here, in its Order denying summary 

judgment, the trial court effectively resolved all of the claims presented in 

the declaratory judgment action. Therefore, the Order is final and 

appealable. See Kinney, 90 A.3d at 755 (concluding that trial court, by 

denying motion for summary judgment in declaratory judgment action, 

effectively resolved all issues, and therefore, the order was immediately 

appealable).

2 Good filed a wrongful death and survival action against Lynch and Hanover 

Inn.

3 The Liquor Liability Coverage Form appears to be a standard insurance 

policy form provided by Insurance Services Office, Inc. (“ISO”). 
J-A15043-17

- 3 -

“Aggregate Limit,” as well as an “Each Common Cause Limit.”4 The 

Declarations page of the Policy specifies that the liquor liability coverage 

limit for “Each Occurrence” is $500,000, and the “Aggregate” limit is 

$1,000,000.

During the pendency of the wrongful death and survival action, a 

dispute arose regarding the applicable amount of coverage under the Policy. 

The parties entered into a settlement agreement for the underlying action, 

whereby RCA agreed to pay the undisputed amount of $500,000 on behalf of 

Hanover Inn. The parties also agreed that a court of competent jurisdiction 

would resolve the dispute pertaining to the remaining $500,000. An

 

4 The relevant portion of the Policy’s Liquor Liability Coverage Form provides 

as follows:

Section III – Limits of Insurance

1. The Limits of Insurance shown in the Declarations and the 

rules below fix the most we will pay regardless of the number of:

a. Insureds; 

b. Claims made or “suits” brought; or

c. Persons or organizations making claims or bringing “suits.”

2. The Aggregate Limit is the most we will pay for all “injury” as 

the result of the selling, serving or furnishing of alcoholic 

beverages.

3. Subject to the Aggregate Limit, the Each Common Cause Limit 

is the most we will pay for all “injury” sustained by one or more 

persons or organizations as the result of the selling, serving 

or furnishing of any alcoholic beverage to any one person.

Liquor Liability Coverage Form at 3 (emphasis added).
J-A15043-17

- 4 -

additional $15,000 was paid by Safe Auto Insurance Company, on behalf of

Lynch, for bodily injury.

On June 17, 2013, Good filed a Complaint, seeking relief in the nature 

of a declaratory judgment that the applicable liability limit is the $1,000,000 

“Aggregate Limit,” resulting in an additional payment of $500,000. 

On July 23, 2013, RCA filed an Answer and Counterclaim for 

Declaratory Relief, asserting that the applicable liability limit is the $500,000 

“Each Occurrence Limit.”

Good filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on August 22, 2016, 

alleging that there were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute. RCA 

filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on September 19, 2016, 

asserting that the Policy unambiguously provides for a lower “Each Common 

Cause Limit,” and a higher “Aggregate Limit.” By Order dated November 15, 

2016,5the trial court denied Good’s Motion for Summary Judgment, denied 

as moot RCA’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and determined that 

the lower “Each Occurrence/Each Common Cause Limit” is applicable, rather

than the higher “Aggregate Limit.”

Good filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) Concise Statement of errors complained of on appeal.

On appeal, Good raises the following issues for our review:

A. Whether the trial court erred in determining that the liquor 

liability coverage available to [Good] is in the amount of 

 

5 The Order was docketed on November 21, 2016.
J-A15043-17

- 5 -

$500,000 [,] where the [L]iquor [L]iability [C]overage [F]orm 

does not contain the term “occurrence[,]” and where[,] as 

delineated in the [L]iquor [L]iability [C]overage [F]orm[,] 

$1,000,000[] in liquor liability coverage was available to [Good,] 

given the clear and unambiguous language contained in the 

[L]iquor [L]iability [C]overage [F]orm[?]

B. In the alternative, whether the trial court erred in determining 

the term “occurrence” was unambiguous in the absence of a 

definition for that term in the [P]olicy[?]

C. Also, in the alternative, whether the trial court erred in 

applying the “[E]ach [O]ccurrence” limit as the “[E]ach 

[C]ommon [C]ause [L]imit” where those terms are not 

interchangeable within the insurance industry[?]

Brief for Appellant at 5.

Our standard of review in evaluating a trial court’s grant or denial of 

summary judgment is well-settled:

We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of 

material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only 

where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is 

clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 

of law will summary judgment be entered. Our scope of review 

of a trial court’s order granting or denying summary judgment is 

plenary, and our standard of review is clear: the trial court’s 

order will be reversed only where it is established that the court 

committed an error of law or abused its discretion.

Hall v. CNX Gas Co., LLC, 137 A.3d 597, 601 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation 

omitted).

We will address Good’s claims together. In her first claim, Good 

asserts that the trial court erred in determining that liquor liability coverage 

was available in the amount of $500,000, rather than $1,000,000. Brief for 

Appellant at 13. Good claims that the language of the Policy, read in its 
J-A15043-17

- 6 -

entirety, provides liquor liability coverage in the amount of $1,000,000. Id.

at 15-16. Good points out that the Policy provides for payment of the 

“Aggregate Limit,” unless the “Each Common Cause Limit” applies, but 

argues that there is no definition of the “Each Common Cause Limit” in the 

Declarations page of the Policy. Id. at 17. Good asserts that the language 

of the Policy is unambiguous, and therefore, the trial court was only 

permitted to look at the terms of the Policy itself. Id. at 20. Good also 

contends that the trial court’s determination that the parties intended for 

there to be two separate and distinct limits of liquor liability coverage was 

mere speculation. Id. at 21.

In her second claim, Good argues, in the alternative, that the trial 

court erred in determining that the term “occurrence” is unambiguous, 

absent a definition in the Policy. Id. at 22. Good avers that the ambiguity 

should be interpreted in favor of the insured, resulting in an available 

$500,000 for each “category” of damage (i.e., wrongful death action and 

survival action). Id. 

In her third claim, Good contends that the trial court erred in applying 

the “Each Occurrence” limit as the “Each Common Cause” limit, because 

those terms are not interchangeable within the insurance industry. Id. at 

23. Good cites to the report of Craig F. Stanovich, wherein Stanovich 

provided the following opinions: 1) it is not insurance industry custom to use 

the phrases “Each Occurrence” and “Each Common Cause” interchangeably 
J-A15043-17

- 7 -

in general liability insurance policies; 2) the definition of “occurrence” applies 

only to the Commercial General Liability Coverage Form and cannot be 

incorporated into and used with the Liquor Liability Coverage Form; and 3) 

the Policy’s Declarations page is not an ISO form, and therefore is not 

applicable to the Liquor Liability Coverage Form. Id. at 24-27.

The interpretation of an insurance contract is a matter of 

law and is generally performed by a court. The goal of insurance 

contract interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the parties as 

manifested by the language of the written instrument. When 

analyzing an insurance policy, a court must construe words of 

common usage in their natural, plain, and ordinary sense. If the 

language of the insurance contract is clear and unambiguous, a 

court is required to give effect to that language. A court must 

not distort the meaning of the language or resort to a strained 

contrivance in order to find an ambiguity.

D’Adamo v. Erie Ins. Exch., 4 A.3d 1090, 1096 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted); see also 

Mitsock v. Erie Ins. Exch., 909 A.2d 828, 831 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating 

that “courts should try to read policy provisions to avoid ambiguities, if 

possible....” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). However, “where a 

provision of a policy is ambiguous, the policy provision is to be construed in 

favor of the insured and against the insurer, the drafter of the agreement.” 

Windows v. Erie Ins. Exch., 161 A.3d 953, 957 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(citation, quotation marks and brackets omitted). Additionally, “[w]hen an 

ambiguity in contractual language exists, parol evidence is admissible to 

explain or clarify or resolve the ambiguity, irrespective of whether the 

ambiguity is patent, created by the language of the instrument, or latent, 
J-A15043-17

- 8 -

created by extrinsic or collateral circumstances.” Id. (citation and quotation 

marks omitted).

Here, the trial court considered Good’s claim, and determined that the 

applicable coverage limit was the $500,000 “Each Occurrence/Each Common 

Cause Limit,” rather than the $1,000,000 “Aggregate Limit,” stating the 

following:

[The trial court] has examined the insurance policy in light 

of the above [contract interpretation] standards and the mutual 

intent of the parties to contract for insurance. It is clear ... [that] 

the intentions of the parties are clear and unambiguous. The 

facts of this case make clear that a quote was obtained from 

RCA for a policy of insurance that included liquor liability 

coverage with two separate and distinct liquor liability limits. 

Those limits being $500,000 per occurrence and $1,000,000 

aggregate. ... It is abundantly clear that at all times the parties 

intended for there to be two separate and distinct limits of liquor 

liability, an occurrence limit of $500,000 and an aggregate limit 

of $1,000,000. There is no way that [the trial court] can 

construe the facts to believe that the parties had only intended a 

policy of liquor liability that contained only a single $1,000,000 

limit. 

....

[The trial court] has found the contract language to be 

unambiguous. The [L]iquor [L]iability [C]overage [F]orm clearly 

states that there are two limits of liquor liability coverage. The 

[“Aggregate Limit”] is clearly $1,000,000. The lower limit, 

although referenced as “[E]ach [O]ccurrence” in the [P]olicy, is 

not reasonably susceptible of a different construction or capable 

of being understood in more than one sense to mean anything 

other than the “[E]ach [C]ommon [C]ause [L]imit[”] set out in 

the [L]iquor [L]iability [Coverage F]orm. To hold otherwise 

would defeat the clear and unambiguous intentions of the parties 

to contract for two separate and distinct limits for liquor liability. 

When viewed in the light of the intent of the parties and the 

reasonable expectations of the insureds, it is clear that [Good’s] 
J-A15043-17

- 9 -

interpretation of the [P]olicy would lead to a result not 

contemplated by the parties.

[RCA] contends, and [the trial court] agrees[,] that the 

fact that the [D]eclaration[s] page of the [P]olicy does not 

contain an express “[E]ach [C]ommon [C]ause [L]imit[”] does 

not mean that it should be converted into something that it is 

not—a policy with [neither an] “Each Occurrence [Limit,]” nor an 

“[E]ach [C]ommon [C]ause [L]imit[”] for liquor liability 

coverage. It is clear that RCA contemplates two separate limits. 

The [D]eclaration[s] page includes two separate limits, one for 

“[E]ach [O]ccurrence” and one for “[A]ggregate.” The only 

reasonable conclusion, consistent with the intention of the 

parties and the reasonable expectations of the insureds, is to 

apply the “[E]ach [O]ccurrence [L]imit[”] as the “[E]ach 

[C]ommon [C]ause [L]imit[”]. This is the only possible 

interpretation that provides for two[] separate and distinct 

limits, one higher and one lower[,] that is required by the 

language of the [L]iquor [L]iability [C]overage [F]orm.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/25/17, at 6, 7-8. Upon review, we conclude that the 

trial court’s interpretation is sound and free of legal error, and we affirm on 

this basis as to Good’s claims. See id.6 Accordingly, the trial court properly 

denied Good’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/21/2017

 

6 We additionally observe that the trial court’s interpretation is consistent 

with the definition of the “Each Common Cause Limit” set forth in the Liquor 

Liability Coverage Form. See Liquor Liability Coverage Form at 3.
J-A15043-17

- 10 -