toon's bunkers can be seen to the right.

was attached to the 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion, designated Task Force

Shepherd. It had 19 General Dynamics

LAV-25 light armored vehicles divided

into two platoons and a company headquarters element.* Each LAV-25 was

armed with an M242 Bushmaster 25mm

cannon and carried a four-man infantry

fire team. A section of seven General Dynamics LAy-AT light armored vehicles

from 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion's Headquarters Company was attached to Pollard's company. Each

LAy-AT was equipped with an Emerson

901A1 TOW 2 [Tube launched, optically

tracked, wire command link guided] antitank guided missile launcher, a thermal

imaging system, and was manned by a

crew of four. They were the company's

primary antitank asset.69

At 1200, Company D was ordered to

move to Observation Post 4 and act as a

*Standard light armored infantry company organization was three platoons and a headquarters element, but Company D had only four assigned

officers. To compensate for the lack of officers, Captain Pollard organized the company into two platoons and trained the company to operate as two

elements.

screen for the evening. Captain Pollard

conducted a reconnaissance and established his company and its attached LAyMa) Jeffery A. Powers (left), operations officer of 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion (Task Force Shepherd) and Capt Roger

L. Pollard (right), commander of Company

D, 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion

(Task Force Shepherd) examine the aftermath of the battle at Observation Post 4 on

the morning of 30 January 1991.

Photo courtesy of Col Jeffrey A. Powers

AT section northwest of Observation Post

4 at around 1500. He created his fire plan,

used a global positioning satellite device

to precisely note his unit's location, and

met with Lieutenant Ross. The liaison

with Lieutenant Ross would prove to be

incomplete, as Captain Pollard did not

know that 2d Platoon had its own vehicles. This oversight would lead to misunderstandings during the engagement.7°

The first serious ground combat in the

Battle of al-Khaf5i occurred at Observation Post 4. The 6th Armored Brigade of

the 3d Armored Division was assigned to

strike through the gap in the berm, drawing attention away from the movement of

the 5th Mechanized Division to the east.

As General Salah Aboud later recalled:

"The 6th Armored Brigade was ordered to

move forward from the heights above the

al-Zabr [Observation Post 4] and they

crossed the line at the eight o'dock at

night. And at nine o'clock and thirty minutes they encountered enemy resistance

at al-Zabr, in Saudi Arabia."7'

The Battle of al-Khaf)i 15

Photo courtesy of MGySgt Gregory L. Gillispie

Ma) Keith R. Kelly, Executive Officer, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, and SSgt Gregory L. Gillispie, Platoon Sergeant, 2d Platoon, CompanyA, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, pose at the southern end of their position on the berm at Observation Post 4. One of the pla-
At 2000, Lieutenant Ross heard the

clank of treads, then observed Iraqi armored vehicles advancing through his

night-vision device; it was a sizeable force.

He attempted to contact his outlying

teams as well as Company D and the reconnaissance battalion headquarters by

radio but got no response. Since contact

earlier was no problem, there was a strong

presumption that the reconnaissance platoon's radios were being jammed. Using

runners, Lieutenant Ross alerted his platoon and continued trying to get through

and inform higher headquarters and

Company D of the oncoming Iraqi

force.72 Finally, at 2030, he made radio

contact and informed Company D that a

large mass of Iraqi vehicles, tanks, and armored personnel carriers, were advancing on Observation Post 4. Captain

Pollard informed Task Force Shepherd

and prepared his company to face the

threat.73

At the observation post, there appeared to be some confusion within Ross'

platoon. Rather than simply retreating to

the U-shaped berm as planned, one of the

teams opened fire on the oncoming Iraqi

armor with machine guns and antitank

weapons. At the ranges involved, there

was very little chance that the Marines

would do any damage to an Iraqi vehicles

Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom, 199!, Modified by W Stephen Hill

with their light antitank weapons. However, the fire startled the oncoming Iraqis,

who slowed or stopped as they heard the

"ping" of machine gun fire on their tank

hulls. In response to the reconnaissance

platoon's fire, the Iraqis began to fire back.

Their fire was random and inaccurate, but

the volume was impressive. At the same

time, Iraqi communications jamming appeared to have stopped and Lieutenant

Ross was able to re-establish radio contact

with all three of his teams. He promptly

ordered everyone to fall back to the Ushaped berm as previously arranged.74

To cover the reconnaissance platoon's

withdrawal, Captain Pollard led his 2d

16 The Battle of al-Khafji
Platoon's light armored vehicles forward,

along with half of the LAV-ATs. The plan

was for 2d Platoon to advance in line to

aid the reconnaissance platoon, while the

LAV-ATs conducted a "bounding overwatch." The LAy-AT had to stop when

they fired. In order to provide cover for

the advancing LAV-ATs and LAV-25s,

half of the LAV-ATs would stop, ready to

fire, while the others advanced a short

way. The second group would then stop

and cover the first group as they advanced, and so on. During the advance,

after receiving permission, one of the

LAV-ATs fired its antitank missile on

what it believed to be an Iraqi tank. Instead, the missile hit "Green Two:' one of

its fellows, a few hundred yards to its

front.75

The missile penetrated the rear hatch

of the armored vehicle and detonated the

16 missiles stored in the rear compartment, completely destroying it in a huge

fireball and killing its crew.76 "It came

through the bottom, right, troop hatch on

this one," Lieutenant David Kendall of

Company D later said. It "hit all the other

missiles, I guess, and it was all a spontaneous detonation. There were no secondary explosions. Nothing. This whole

thing just went up."77

There was confusion at this point, with

some Company D Marines believing the

vehicle had been destroyed by Iraqi tank

fire and others not certain the vehicle had

actually been destroyed. The explosion

obliterated it so completely that there was

not enough wreckage left to register on

night vision devices. The crew did not respond to radio calls, but it was common

for a radio to cease working. The fate of

the LAy-AT would not be confirmed

until the next morning.78

Captain Pollard and his 2d Platoon

continued forward, leaving the LAV-ATs

behind. He was finally informed that

Ross' platoon had sufficient vehicles to

withdraw. Pollard's platoon halted and

began firing on the Iraqi vehicles with

their 25mm guns. The reconnaissance

platoon had observed the incident and

Photo courtesy of LtCol Charles H. Cureton

During the fight at Observation Post 4, LAy-AT "Green Two" was struck in the rear by an antitank missile fired by one of its fellows,

causing the armored vehicle's magazine of 16 missiles to detonate with catastrophic results. Four Marines were lost with the vehicle:

Cpl Ismael Cotto, PFC Scott A. Schroeder, LCpl David T Snyder, and LCpl Daniel B. Walker.

Two LAV-AT5 from 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion drive across the Saudi desert. The LAy-AT provided the heavy fire power of

the battalion with its antitank missiles.

History Division Photo

The Battle of al-Khafji 17
Lieutenant Ross was convinced that

Company D would soon fire on his troops

by mistake as well. He ordered the platoon to mount its vehicles and withdraw

from the battlefield.

After Ross' platoon had completed its

withdrawal, Company D's 1st Platoon

shifted south of the 2nd Platoon in order

to support 2d Platoon's fire against the

Iraqi forces advancing on the now-abandoned observation post. Pollard's company then backed away from the border

but continued to engage the Iraqi armor

with missile and 25mm cannon fire. Although the fire had little hope of damaging the Iraqi vehicles at the ranges involved, it served to disorient the Iraqi

tanks, which stopped and buttoned up as

the rounds ricocheted off their armor.

The fire was also useful for marking Iraqi

vehicles for incoming aircraft. The company's executive officer, First Lieutenant

Scott P. Williams, and Corporal Russell T.

Zawalick, acted as forward air controllers

for a series of air strikes against the Iraqi

forces, using this method of marking the

enemy.79

The battle at the observation post was

now under control as Coalition air support arrived in large numbers. "At that

point, everything was going pretty welL"

Lieutenant Kendall later noted, "We

started getting the air in. It was hitting

the tanks down there, and we were just

marking for the air by firing our main

guns at the tanks and they were following

the tracer rounds to them and hitting

them with the air'8° Hearing reports of

some Iraqi tanks attempting to cross the

berm further south, Captain Pollard

withdrew the company approximately

5,000 meters from the observation post.

A section of Air Force A-b Thunderbolts then arrived over the battlefield.

Corporal Zawalick was controlling air

support with live ammunition for the first

time, but under Lieutenant Williams'

guidance, he directed the incoming aircraft to their targets. But the A-lOs were

finding it difficult to identify the Iraqis.

After two failed attempts, a Thunderbolt

dropped a flare, which landed next to

"Red Two:' one of the company's LAy25s. Corporal Zawalick informed the A10 the flare had marked a friendly

position, and directed him toward the

enemy from the flare. Meanwhile, a rifleman jumped from "Red Two" to bury the

flare, but as he did so the A-b fired an

AGM 65 Maverick air-to-ground missile

which struck the LAV-25, destroying it

and killing all of the crew that remained

inside save the driver, who was ejected

from the vehicle.8' The investigation con18 The Battle of al-Khaf3i

DVIC DF-ST-92-07825

An Air Force A-i OA Thunderbolt patrols over the desert during the Gulf War. The aircraft carried AGM 65 Maverick air-to-ground

missiles and was one of the primary providers of close air support during the Battle of al-Khafji.

An American flagflies from the burnt hulk of "Red Two," which was destroyed by a malfunctioning air-to-surface antitank missile during the fight at Observation Post 4. Seven

Marines were lost with the vehicle: LCp1 Frank C. Allen, Cpl Stephen E. Bentzlin, LCpl

Thomas A. Jenkins, LCp1 Michael E. Linderman, Jr., LCp1 James H. Lumpkins, Sgt Garett

A. Mongrella, and LCp1 Dion I. Stephenson.

Photo courtesy of Sgt Mark S. McDonnell
Map by W. Stephen Hill

ducted by I Marine Expeditionary Force

after the battle determined that the most

likely cause of the incident was a malfunction by the Maverick missile.82

Again there was confusion as Pollard

tried to determine if "Red Two" had been

destroyed by friendly or enemy fire.

"That's the first time, the first time I got

scared:' he later remembered. "I didn't

know what had happened. I didn't know

where the bad guys were."83 There was

some worry that the Iraqis had penetrated

the berm and succeeded in out-flanking

the company. As a result, Pollard reorganized the company into a screen line

and pulled it back slowly.84

"The Marines, of that company, as the

whole battalion, were calm:' said the

commander of Task Force Shepherd,

Lieutenant Colonel Clifford 0. Myers III.

"All of my conversations with Captain

Pollard... were extremely calm and in

total control. Even after the Maverick hit

Despite the calm demeanor that Lieutenant Colonel Myers observed, Pollard's

company had lost one vehicle to fire from

its own air support and another was missing. With massive amounts of air support

moving to the border, and other companies ready and able to move into contact,

Lieutenant Colonel Myers ordered Company D to withdraw to the west and link

up with Task Force Shepherd's Company

A, commanded by Captain Michael A.

Shupp. Company D accomplished the

maneuver shortly after midnight on the

30th. The remaining six LAV-ATs were

transferred to Company A, and Company

D was reorganized and resupplied behind

Shupp's company, which moved forward

to screen Observation Post 486

The Iraqi perspective on the battle's

outcome at the observation post differed

considerably from the American view.

"Now this small [enemy] force consisted

of armored vehicles equipped with a large

number of the antitank weapons and the

brigade informed us they had destroyed

a number of tanks, stopping the brigade

convoy:' General Salah Aboud remembered. "So, I ordered those fighting the

enemy, to stop the enemy forces and let

the brigade pass this resistance to the east,

and to move towards the brigade target

without stopping. [The] 6th Armored

Brigade moved deep into Saudi Arabia

and the small resisting force was rolled

over and the brigade caused a large

amount of damage:' 87 There is no evidence that the flanking movement General Salah described penetrated more

than a few hundred meters into Saudi

Arabia, and the 3d Armored Division's

commander did not mention it. "Although, our troops continued by moving

towards the targets, we faced a very

strong ground resistance at al-Zabr supported by the Air Force and helicopters

from the enemy:' As Brigadier General

Hussan Zedin reported: "At 8 o 'clock on

29 January, we executed our duty and we

stayed in the area until the forces of Mohammad Al Qasim completed their duty

and mission to occupy al-Khai."88 *

Whether or not it had entered into

Saudi Arabia, the 6th Armored Brigade

had accomplished its primary mission.

*

"Mohammad Al Qasim" was the honorific name

for the 5th Mechanized Division.

The Battle of al-Khafji 19
"All the airplanes of the enemy were over

the brigade convoy and attacking the

area," as General Salah explained. "The

brigade had succeeded in capturing completely the attention of the enemy. And

the enemy didn't observe any movement

of our troops to occupy al-Khafji so at

midnight, I instructed the 3d Armored

Division to order the 6th Armored

Brigade to go back towards Al Wahfra

and their original positions:'89

Supported by air, the Marines of a light

armored vehicle company and a reconnaissance platoon had stopped the attack

of an Iraqi armored brigade in its tracks.

The two units suffered 11 casualties, none

of which was from enemy fire. The

Marines at Observation Post 4 had not

experienced combat before the attack on

29 January.

While the fight at Observation Post 4

was taking place, a brigade of the 5th

Mechanized Division attempted to cross

into Saudi Arabia through the berm near

Observation Post 1, then screened by

Company A, 2d Light Armored Infantry

Battalion, commanded by Captain Dennis M. Greene. At 2115, it observed "60-

100 BMPs [armored personnel carriers]. . . moving south with arty."* The company called in air, reporting that AV-8s

and A- lOs engaged the Iraqi forces.9° The

company then observed a 29-vehicle column of Iraqi armor arriving at the berm.

At 2320, Corporal Edmund W. Willis III

knocked out one of the Iraqi T-62 tanks

with an antitank missile.9'

Greene's company continued to act as

forward air controllers for strikes on the

Iraqi forces moving across the berm

throughout the evening. It received a significant amount of air power: five A-6s,

two F-16s, two A-lOs, and eight AV-8s,

and reported 11 destroyed vehicles. Corporal Willis fired another missile at 0157,

hitting the same T-62 as the Iraqis attempted to move it to the rear.92 At

around the same time, the Iraqis halted

their attack and retreated back into

Kuwait.93

Further north, Company C, 1st Light

Armored Infantry Battalion established a

screen between Observation Post 6 and

Observation Post 5. Commanded by

Captain Thomas R. Protzeller, it had a

section of LAV-ATs attached, similar to

Pollard's company at Observation Post 4.

But unlike Company D, it had a section

of General Dynamics LAV-Ms (a light armored vehicle variant armed with an

M252 81mm mortar) attached. Originally, Protzeller's company screen line

centered on Observation Post 5, but early

on the evening of 29 January, the company had fired its mortars at suspected

Iraqi forward observers. As a result,

Major Jeffrey A. Powers, Task Force Shepherd's operations officer, ordered the

company to withdraw from the berm in

order to forestall any retaliatory Iraqi artillery fire.94

Protzeller's company observed the

* Most sources confuse Observation Post 1 and Observation Post 2, but according to both the 2d Light

Armored Infantry Battalion's command chronology,

and the 1st ANGLICO's after action report, Observation Post 1 was in 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion's area of operations and Observation Post 2

was in the Joint Forces Command-East area of operations. Most likely, this confusion resulted from

the use of two conflicting methods of numbering

the border observation posts. Originally, U.S. Army

Special Forces teams numbered the observation

posts as they occupied them, in chronological sequence rather than geographic sequence. The

Marines later attempted to regularize the observation post designations, but the new system did not

stick and only served to confuse the issue.

20 The Battle of al-Khafji

Photo courtesy of MGySgt Gregory L. Gillispie

The remains of two of the 6th Armored Brigade's T-62 tanks, destroyed on the night of

29 January 1991, lie abandoned on the sand in front of Observation Post 4. The Iraqis

suffered severe materiel and equipment losses during the four-day Battle of al-Khafji.

A Marine LAy-AT is positioned behind the sand berm that separated Saudi Arabia from

Kuwait. Built to control the wanderings of nomadic Bedouin tribesmen, the berm offered a convenient demarcation of the border between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Observation Post 5 can be seen in the background.

Photo courtesy of Cpl Kenneth J. Lieuwen
fighting taking place to the south around

Observation Post 4, but did not take part

in the fight until around 2230 when it was

ordered to occupy Observation Post 5 as

a blocking force. Shortly thereafter, the

company was informed that approximately 70 enemy vehicles were moving

toward Observation Post 6, and it was ordered to block that position. Traveling

along the berm, Protzeller's company advanced north cautiously; each platoon

took turns covering the other. As it advanced the company fired antitank missiles at a group of Iraqi vehicles it spotted

on the Saudi side of the berm. Once the

company reached Observation Post 6,

around 0100, it settled in and called

airstrikes on the Iraqi infantry, who had

occupied the post and on their vehicles

that had retreated back to the Kuwaiti side

of the berm. In the morning, many of the

demoralized Iraqi soldiers surrendered

with little fuss, others having apparently

withdrawn.95

The 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion's fight at Observation Post 1, and

Company C, 1st Light Armored Infantry

Battalion's fight at Observation Post 6

both ended early on the morning on 30

January, but the enemy made one last

gasp at Observation Post 4 just after the

sun rose at 0720. There Task Force Shepherd's Company A, under Captain Shupp,

called in airstrikes from Air Force A-lOs

and Marine Corps FIA-18s. The air attack smashed this final Iraqi advance at

the outpost. 96

At dawn, Company A established a

screen on the berm while Company D recovered its dead and secured Iraqi prisoners. The morning light revealed fully

the destruction caused in the previous

evenings fight. Pollard's company and its

attached LAy-AT section had lost 11

Marines and two vehicles in the five hour

battle at Observation Post 4, but destroyed approximately 22 Iraqi tanks and

armored personnel carriers and killed

scores of Iraqi soldiers. When the recovery effort was complete, Company A

withdrew and Company D reestablished

its position at Observation Post 4, which

it was to hold for another 10 days.97

At Observation Post 2, Captain David

W Landersman and his air-naval gunfire

team heard a large number of vehicle

noises approaching their position. Keenly

aware of the fight at Observation Post 4 to

their west, they requested air support but

abandoned the outpost before the air support could be diverted from the fight at

the western observation post.98 Meanwhile, Iraqi artillery began firing on Captain Kleinsmith and his team at

Observation Post 7, as well as south along

the coast road. The two teams reported

that the artillery fire was a combination of

illumination and high explosive rounds.99

As Captain Kleinsmith's team was

being shelled by the Iraqis, a mechanized

Iraqi force attacked Observation Post 8

and Lieutenant Lang's team with "intense

direct machine gun, recoilless rifle, and

tank main gun fire."°° Three different

groups were stationed at Observation

Post 8: Lang's fire control team team; a

U.S. Navy SEAL detachment; and a team

from 3d Force Reconnaissance Company.

"After numerous illumination rounds,

pop-up flares, and mortar rounds Fire

Control Team 9 [FCT], south of OP-8,

was overrun by APCs [armored personThe Battle of al-Khaf3i 21

Photo courtesy of Cpl Kenneth J. Lieuwen

Iraqi prisoners of war huddle near afire to keep warm, while Marines of Task Force Shepherd examine the prisoner's weapons, an AK74, RPK-74, two pistols, and two grenades. Although some prisoners were captured by Marine and Saudi forces during the Battle of

al-Khafji, they did not surrender in the vast numbers taken during the later advance into Kuwait.
nel carriers] with the SEALs from OP-8

retreating just in front of the enemy

APCs' °' Despite the heavy fire, all three

teams managed to evade the Iraqi assault

and fell back without suffering casualties.

The SEAL and reconnaissance teams

pulled back to al-Mishab, and Lieutenant

Lang's team joined 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group at

the desalination plant. 102

Three Saudi battalions had formed a

screen along the Kuwaiti border in Joint

Forces Command-East's area of operations. Their orders, according to General

Khaled, were clear: "to observe the movement of Iraqi troops and report the approach of hostile columns. They were not

to engage the enemy or risk being taken

prisoner. I did not want to give Saddam a

propaganda victory. If the Iraqis crossed

the border, they were to rejoin our main

force further south"°3

The 5th Mechanized Battalion of the

2d Saudi Arabian National Guard

Brigade, commanded by Lieutenant

Colonel Naif, had responsibility for the

coast road and the surrounding area. The

road itself was not covered; the vehicle assigned to it was repositioned closer to the

rest of the unit, and the battalion was not

in communication with the various

American forces stationed in al-KhafJi

and the border observation posts. As the

battalion advanced down the coast road,

it came under enemy artillery fire, and

pulled back before the Iraqi advance

without offering any resistance. Two battalions from the 8th and 10th Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigades, screening

further inland, executed similar movements.'04 Unopposed by ground forces,

the Iraqi 15th Mechanized Brigade drove

south into al-Khafi, although it was

struck by an Air Force Lockheed AC-130

Spectre gunship and Marine AH-1W

Super Cobras.'°5

"As the APCs overran the forward position tank main gun and mortar rounds

began impacting in the area of the desalinization plant that SALT 5 [Supporting Arms Liaison Team 5] and SRIG

[Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group] forward occupied," Captain James R. Braden of 1st ANGLICO

explained. "SRIG [Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group] forward ordered all teams in the city to pull

out and head for the 'safehouse' in alKhafji. A hasty meeting was held just

south of the desalinization plant between

FCT 9 [Fire Control Team 9] and SALT 5

Supporting Arms Liaison Team 5] to

conduct a head count and confirm the

rendezvous at the safehouse in the southern part of the city of Khai."°6

Lieutenant Colonel Barry's group and

Lieutenant Lang's team withdrew from

the desalination plant to the southern

outskirts of al-Khafji and established an

observation post in a water tower, but the

advancing 15th Mechanized Brigade

forced the units to withdraw again.

Barry's group headed south to al-Mishab,

while Lieutenant Lang's team rejoined

other 1st ANGLICO teams with the

Qatari brigade.'07

Stationed on the east side of al-Khafji,

near the beach, was a unit of Saudi

Marines. Designed to emulate U.S.

Marines, this newly formed Saudi force

lacked equipment and their American

Marine advisors who had not yet joined

them. As Captain Molofsky later explained, they were "camped out—basically functioning at very low ebb"°8Joint

Forces Command-East ordered the unit

to withdraw just after midnight to alMishab and they took no further part in

the battle.'°9

At this point in the battle, some bitterness arose on the part of the Saudis concerning the amount of air support being

allocated to Joint Forces Command-East

forces. In the face of the Iraqi advance,

Major General Sultan "repeatedly called

on the U.S. Marine Corps for air strikes

to stop them." As General Khaled later recounted: "He was in close touch with the

Marines because they shared a sector.

They had trained together and an American liaison officer was attached to his

headquarters. But in spite of his pleas, no

air strikes had taken place. Coalition aircraft had not moved."0 The resentment

can be attributed in part to poor communications. Shortly after midnight, Major

General Sultan had called for airstrikes

against the 15th Mechanized Brigade as it

During exercises prior to the beginning of the war, Marines rush to load antitank missiles onto an AH-1 W Cobra of HMLA 369. The

Cobras provided extensive close air support during the Battle of al-Khafji, both at the observation post battles and in the town proper.

History Division Photo

22 The Battle of al-Khafji