This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-0457

In re the Marriage of:

Jacob Anthony Pulsifer, petitioner,

Respondent,

vs.

Julie Ann Pulsifer,

Appellant. 

Filed December 28, 2015

Affirmed

Klaphake, Judge*

Kandiyohi County District Court

File No. 34-FA-13-254

Theresa J. Patock, Jones & Patock, P.A., Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)

Jon C. Saunders, Sarah L. Klaassen, Griffin R. Leitch, Casey J. Swansson, Anderson 

Larson Saunders & Klaassen, P.L.L.P., Willmar, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and 

Klaphake, Judge. 

 * Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10. 
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

KLAPHAKE, Judge

On appeal from the dissolution of her marriage, appellant challenges the district 

court’s conclusions that (1) annual gifts she received from her mother constituted marital 

property, (2) income should be imputed to her for the purposes of child support based on 

her voluntary unemployment, and (3) it was not in the best interests of the parties’ children 

to award her additional parenting time. We affirm.

D E C I S I O N

I. Annual Gifts

Appellant Julie Iverson-Pulsifer argues on appeal that gifts totaling $27,000 that she 

received from her mother, Carol Iverson, in 2012 and 2013 were nonmarital property.

“Whether property is marital or nonmarital is a question of law, but a reviewing court must 

defer to the [district] court’s underlying findings of fact.” Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797, 

800 (Minn. 1997); see also Baker v. Baker, 753 N.W.2d 644, 649 (Minn. 2008) 

(“[Appellate courts] independently review the issue of whether property is marital or 

nonmarital, giving deference to the district court’s findings of fact.”). Appellate courts 

may find the district court’s decision to be clearly erroneous if they “are left with the 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, . . . notwithstanding the 

existence of evidence to support such findings.” Olsen, 562 N.W.2d at 800 (quotation 

omitted). 

Marital property includes property acquired by either spouse “at any time during the 

existence of the marriage relation between them.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b (2014). 
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“All property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage . . . is presumed to be 

marital property regardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in a form 

of co-ownership . . . .” Id. To rebut the presumption that property is marital, “a party must 

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is nonmarital.” Olsen, 

562 N.W.2d at 800. Nonmarital property includes “property real or personal, acquired by 

either spouse before, during, or after the existence of their marriage, which . . . is acquired 

as a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance made by a third party to one but not to the other 

spouse.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3b. “For nonmarital property to maintain its 

nonmarital status, it must either be kept separate from marital property or, if commingled 

with marital property, be readily traceable.” Olsen, 562 N.W.2d at 800. “Whether a 

nonmarital interest has been traced is . . . a question of fact.” Kerr v. Kerr, 770 N.W.2d 

567, 571 (Minn. App. 2009). 

Appellant argues that the district court clearly erred by concluding that the annual 

gifts from Ms. Iverson were marital property. “The most important factor in determining 

whether a gift is marital or nonmarital is the donor’s intent.” Olsen, 562 N.W.2d at 800. 

The donor’s intent is a question of fact and “is demonstrated by the surrounding 

circumstances.” Id.

The district court found that the annual gifts from Ms. Iverson were intended to 

“avoid tax liability, but at the same time to assist the family unit as a whole.” This finding 

is supported by evidence in the record. When asked whether it had been her understanding 

that the amounts she gave to her children each year were the maximum allowable, Ms. 

Iverson testified, “[i]t was, that’s what they told me.” In addition, Ms. Iverson testified 
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that her children’s spouses “knew that [she] was putting [the checks] in their name[s]

because [she] could only give so much to [each] child. This was a way of getting double 

the amount to [her] child[ren] through their spouse[s] and [the spouses] understood that.” 

While Ms. Iverson testified that she “didn’t specify” how the parties should spend the 

money and that she “would never dictate how [the parties] should spend their money,” she 

also testified that, when she gave the gifts, she was “hoping [the parties would] pay down 

their mortgage.” Moreover, respondent Jacob Pulsifer testified that 

each year [Ms. Iverson] gave the maximum or close to the 

maximum so we didn’t have to pay taxes on it. . . . [Ms. 

Iverson] wanted to see her kids’ families enjoy the inheritance 

so . . . she was giving the inheritance now versus after she 

passed so [certain receipts are for] gift checks to us. 

Based on this testimony, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that the gifts 

“were not meant as non-marital gifts to each [party] individually” and that “[the gifts] were 

meant to avoid tax liability, but at the same time to assist the family unit as a whole.” Thus, 

we affirm the district court’s conclusion that the gifts were marital property. 

II. Imputed Income

Appellant next argues that the district court clearly erred by imputing income to her 

for purposes of child support after finding that she was voluntarily unemployed. “Whether 

a parent is voluntarily unemployed is a finding of fact, which [appellate courts] review for 

clear error.” Welsh v. Welsh, 775 N.W.2d 364, 370 (Minn. App. 2009) (citing Putz v. Putz, 

645 N.W.2d 343, 352 (Minn. 2002) (concluding that magistrate abused his discretion by 

making the clearly erroneous finding that the father was not voluntarily unemployed)). “A 

finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm 
5

conviction that a mistake has been made.” Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 

(Minn. App. 2000) (quotations omitted). “[A]ppellate courts defer to [district] court 

credibility determinations.” Id.; see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (providing that “due regard 

shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses”); 

Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (“Deference must be given to the 

opportunity of the trial court to assess the credibility of the witnesses.”).

To determine a parent’s basic child-support obligation, the district court must 

determine the gross income of each parent. Minn. Stat. § 518A.34(b) (2014). A parent’s 

gross income includes his or her potential income. Minn. Stat. § 518A.29(a) (2014). Child 

support must be based on a determination of potential income “[i]f a parent is voluntarily 

unemployed, underemployed, or employed on a less than full-time basis.” Minn. Stat. 

§ 518A.32, subd. 1 (2014). For this determination, “it is rebuttably presumed that a parent 

can be gainfully employed on a full-time basis.” Id. A parent can rebut this presumption 

by showing that “the unemployment, underemployment, or employment on a less than fulltime basis is because a parent is physically or mentally incapacitated.” Id., subd. 3 (2014). 

Accordingly, it was appellant’s burden to rebut the presumption that she could be employed 

on a full-time basis by showing that her unemployment was due to her mental 

incapacitation. See id.

Appellant argues that her claim that she was unable to work due to mental 

incapacitation was supported by her testimony concerning her disability, as well as the case 

notes and letter from her doctor, who recommended appellant be placed on leave from her 

employment. Appellant argues that the district court erred in rejecting the doctor’s case 
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notes and letter because respondent did not object to the introduction of that evidence; the 

doctor’s recommendations were based on his training and experience and not solely 

appellant’s statements to him concerning her symptoms; and the court placed an improper 

burden on appellant to demonstrate the existence of her mental incapacity as it is “common 

knowledge” that, due to the “inherent character of mental illness, . . . medical practitioners 

rely extensively on the input of patients as to their symptoms.”

The district court considered appellant’s evidence and “d[id] not believe that 

[appellant’s] claim that she is unable to work [wa]s credible.” The court noted appellant’s

“statements, voice inflection, . . . body language and . . . positions” and concluded that “she 

wishes to hurt [respondent] in any way she can.” In addition, the court indicated that 

appellant did not claim that she was disabled until the trial, “leaving [respondent] with no 

opportunity to request independent verification.” The district court also considered 

appellant’s testimony regarding her disability and did not find it to be credible because her 

testimony was “extremely vague and often conclusory.” The district court indicated that 

“[o]ne of the few things that [appellant] stated clearly was that her mental illness was 

caused by stress related to the divorce. She presented no evidence or clear testimony to 

show that she would be unable to return to work a short time after the conclusion of this 

matter.” 

Additionally, the only medical evidence appellant submitted to the court was the 

case notes and letter completed by her doctor for the purposes of appellant’s request for 

leave of employment. The court discredited these reports because they were “based solely 

on what [appellant] told [the physicians she chose and paid].” The court was not persuaded 
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that appellant was unable to work due to any mental incapacity because it was “provided 

only [appellant’s] testimony, without any verification through testing or independent 

examination.” 

Appellant argues that the district court erred in discrediting the doctor’s reports 

because “[the doctor]’s medical notes reveal that his medical opinions were not solely

based upon [appellant’s] statements, but were also based upon [his] interpretation of 

[appellant’s] statements in light of [his] training and experience.” In support of this 

argument, appellant relies on this court’s decision in Ingram v. Syverson, 674 N.W.2d 233 

(Minn. App. 2004), review denied (Minn. Apr. 20, 2004). In Ingram, the district court 

granted summary judgment on a personal-injury claim on the basis that the plaintiff’s 

expert medical testimony lacked adequate factual foundation. 674 N.W.2d at 235. The 

plaintiff’s doctor admitted on cross examination that he was unable to causally connect the 

plaintiff’s injuries to the accident solely from his own findings and examination, but rather 

had relied on the plaintiff’s statements that her pain resulted from the accident. Id. This 

court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment because the doctor’s 

testimony “derives not only from statements made by his patient, but also from his 

education, training, and experience as a practitioner,” and therefore the doctor could “form 

an opinion as to the legitimacy of [the plaintiff’s] statements about her pain, and could 

rationally relate her symptoms to the accident.” Id. at 236-37. 

There is a significant difference between this case and Ingram. While the plaintiff 

in Ingram offered the doctor’s testimony as to her injuries, appellant here did not offer any 

medical testimony at trial. As respondent notes, appellant relied solely on the doctor’s 
8

reports, which were completed for the purpose of obtaining leave from her employment. 

Respondent had no opportunity to cross-examine appellant’s doctor or therapist, and the 

district court had no opportunity to assess the credibility of the doctor or therapist.

The district court here concluded: “In view of the totality of the circumstances of 

this case, and after being able to see and hear the parties and the witnesses, the Court has 

determined that [appellant] is, and has been, capable of working at her job.” Given the 

deference due the district court’s credibility determinations and appellant’s failure to 

submit sufficient evidence to satisfy her burden of showing that she was mentally 

incapacitated and therefore not voluntarily unemployed, the district court did not clearly 

err in finding that appellant is voluntarily unemployed. Thus, we affirm the district court’s 

order imputing income to appellant for the purposes of child support.

III. Additional Parenting Time

Lastly, appellant argues that the district court erred in denying her request for 

additional parenting time with the parties’ children because the court failed to make 

particularized findings of fact in regard to the children’s best interests. “Appellate courts 

recognize that a district court has broad discretion to decide parenting-time questions and 

will not reverse a parenting-time decision unless the district court abused its discretion by 

misapplying the law or by relying on findings of fact that are not supported by the record.” 

Suleski v. Rupe, 855 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Minn. App. 2014) (citations omitted). “On appeal, 

findings of fact are accepted unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. (citing Minn. R. Civ. 

P. 52.01; Griffin v. Van Griffin, 267 N.W.2d 733, 735 (Minn. 1978)). 
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Under Minnesota law, 

The [district] court may allow additional parenting time to a 

parent to provide child care while the other parent is working 

if this arrangement is reasonable and in the best interests of the 

child, as defined in section 518.17, subdivision 1. In addition, 

the court shall consider:

(1) the ability of the parents to cooperate;

(2) methods for resolving disputes regarding the care of 

the child, and the parents’ willingness to use those methods; 

and

(3) whether domestic abuse . . . has occurred between 

the parties.

Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 8 (2014). Thus, when considering a request for additional 

parenting time for child care under section 518.175, subdivision 8, the district court must 

evaluate the best-interests factors set forth in section 518.17, subdivision 1 (2014).1 The 

district court’s findings here reflect its consideration of both the best-interests factors under 

Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1, and the additional factors under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 

8.

 1 The best-interests factors were amended in 2015. See 2015 Minn. Laws ch. 30, art. 1, 

§ 3, at 271-73. We apply the pre-amendment best-interests factors because the legislature 

demonstrated its intent to change the best-interests factors by completely replacing the 

factors in the amendment and because the legislature did not provide that the amendment 

applies retroactively. See Minn. Stat. § 645.21 (2014) (“No law shall be construed to be 

retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature.”); see also Braylock 

v. Jesson, 819 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Minn. 2012) (“When the Legislature merely clarifies 

preexisting law, the amended statute applies to all future or pending litigation. If, on the 

other hand, the amendment changes preexisting law, the amendment is not retroactive 

unless the Legislature states otherwise.” (citations omitted)). 
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The district court relied on the custody evaluator’s report, which contains a detailed 

analysis of the best-interests factors under section 518.17, subdivision 1. The court found 

that “there appears to be an open and loving relationship between both parents and their 

children.” This finding reflects “the intimacy of the relationship between each parent and 

the child[ren],” see Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(4), as well as “the capacity and 

disposition of the parties to give the child[ren] love, affection, and guidance,” see id. subd. 

1(a)(10).

The court also found, however, that “[t]he parties have an extremely contentious 

relationship” and that “at this time, the ability of the [parties] to cooperate is tenuous at 

best.” The court found that “[e]ach parenting exchange is difficult for the parties and the 

children,” that “[appellant] appears to be unable to refrain from disparaging [respondent] 

in the presence of the children,” that “[w]hen [the parties] communicate with one another 

directly, the conversation often becomes argumentative,” and that “[appellant] in particular 

appears to be unable to resist the urge to lash out.” In addition, the court found that 

“[appellant’s] motive in this matter is further clarified by her statement that she ‘didn’t 

bring two kids into the world to have them only 50% of the time.’” These findings are 

supported by respondent’s testimony, the custody evaluator’s testimony and report, and 

appellant’s email to respondent stating that “[e]ven while trying to ‘fake’ being a dad it’s 

still obvious that you never put those kids first.” These findings reflect the inability of the 

parties to cooperate, see Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 8(1), as well as “the disposition of 

each parent to encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact by the other parent 

with the child[ren],” see Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(13). 
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The district court concluded that, “[t]aking into account the best interests of the 

children, including a need to lessen their exposure to conflict between the parties, . . . at 

the present time it is not in [the children’s] best interests for [appellant] to provide daycare 

services while [respondent] is working.” The district court made appropriate findings on 

the best-interest factors that are supported by the record. We therefore conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s request for additional 

parenting time under Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 8.

Affirmed.