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Chief of Staff

Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW

Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army

1300306

U.S. Army Engineer School

(573) 563-8080/DSN 676-8080

COMMANDANT

BG Peter A. (Duke) DeLuca

563-6192

<peter.a.deluca.mil@mail.mil>

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

COL Barry K. Williams 

563-6192

<barry.k.williams8.mil@mail.mil>

DEPUTY COMMANDANT

Mr. James R. Rowan

563-8080

<james.r.rowan4.civ@mail.mil>

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR

CSM Terrence W. Murphy

563-8060

<terrence.w.murphy2.mil@mail.mil>

REGIMENTAL CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER

CW5 Scott R. Owens

563-4088

<scott.r.owens.mil@mail.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–USAR

COL Adam S. Roth 

563-8045

<adam.s.roth2.mil@mail.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–ARNG

LTC Rodney M. Graham 

563-8046

<rodney.m.graham.mil@mail.mil>

CHIEF OF STAFF

LTC Philip M. Secrist III

563-7116

<philip.m.secrist.mil@mail.mil>

COMMANDER, 1ST ENGINEER BRIGADE

COL Daniel S. Larsen

596-0224, DSN 581-0224

<daniel.s.larsen.mil@mail.mil>

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT

LTC Paul Huszar

563-4093

<paul.huszar.mil@mail.mil>

DIRECTOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION

Mr. Robert F. Danner

563-2845

<robert.f.danner.civ@mail.mil>

COUNTER EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS CENTER

LTC Chris Barron 

563-8142

<christopher.j.barron3.mil@mail.mil>

HUMANITARIAN DEMINING TRAINING CENTER

Mr. Jonathan D. Green

563-6199

<jonathan.d.green.civ@mail.mil>

ENGINEER DOCTRINE, MSCoE CDID, CODDD

LTC Sinlan Morrow

563-2717

<sinlan.r.morrow.mil@mail.mil>

MANEUVER SUPPORT ORGANIZATION

Mr. Don Wenzel

563-7264

<donald.l.wenzel.civ@mail.mil>

MANEUVER SUPPORT MATERIEL

LTC Chris A. Parks

563-5055

<chris.a.parks2.mil@mail.mil>
E R

DEPARTMENTS

02 Clear the Way

By Brigadier General 

Peter A. (Duke) DeLuca

04 Lead the Way

By Command Sergeant Major

Terrence W. Murphy

05 Show the Way

By Chief Warrant Officer Five

Scott R. Owens

18 Dedication

26 Book Review: “The Damned 

Engineers”

Reviewed by Captain Wesley J.

Hunnell

36 Engineer Doctrine Update

45 Engineer Writer’s Guide

MANAGING EDITOR

Diane E. Eidson

EDITOR

Rick Brunk

GRAPHIC DESIGNER

Jennifer Morgan

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT

Phyllis E. Grayson

COMMANDANT

Brigadier General Peter A. (Duke) DeLuca

FEATURES

07 Initial-Entry Capability for the Engineer Regiment in Support of the 

Army of 2020

By Colonel Adam S. Roth

12 Things I Learned From Superstorm Sandy

By Lieutenant Colonel Chris Becking

15 19th Engineer Battalion Responds to Superstorm Sandy

By Captain Joel W. Prusi

19 Engineers Support U.S. Border Patrol

 By Captain Sean T. Sullivan

22 Firefighters in the Ranks

 By First Lieutenant Alex H. Carlier

28 Operation Mountain Blade

 By Staff Sergeant Derek M. Smith

32 How to Succeed at the Sapper Leader Course

By Captain John R. Chambers, Master Sergeant Jerimiah E. Gan, 

Sergeant First Class Matthew F. Simon, Sergeant First Class Matthew B.

Zwolinski, and Sergeant Jeremy W. Rohrer

38 Base Closure and Transition in Kandahar Province

 By Captain Noah Cordova

40 When Combat Advising Equals Company Command

By Captain Colby K. Krug

43 Countermobility: Geographic Engineering?

By Captain Nicholas J. Cosmas

46 132d Engineer Company “River Rats” Bridge and Fight in 

Afghanistan

By First Lieutenant Jose D. Torres

48 Using the Project Management Body of Knowledge to Enhance the 

Operations Process

By Captain Kyle P. Moore

52 Trojan Horse Integrated Training Strategy

By Major Louis L. Birdwell III, Captain Adam R. Martin, and Captain

David M. Picard

55 When the Target They Choose Is You—What Every Army Engineer 

Should Know About Protecting Personnel and Securing Property

By Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence M. Smith

58 Developing a Trained and Ready Security Force Assistance Advisor

Team

By Lieutenant Colonel Jared L. Ware

Volume 43 PB 5-13-1 Headquarters, Department of the Army January–April 2013

NGINEE

U.S. ARMY

ENGINEER SCHOOL

The Professional Bulletin of Army Engineers

January–April 2013 Engineer 1

Front cover: Engineers tie a time fuse 

to a detonating-cord firing system during explosives training. Photo by SGT 

Michael J. MacLeod

Inside back cover: Photo by Mike Curtis

Back cover: U.S. Army photos
2 Engineer January–April 2013

 

Clear the Way

Brigadier General Peter A. (Duke) DeLuca

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School

“You cannot be disciplined in great 

things and undisciplined in small things. 

Brave undisciplined men have no chance 

against the discipline and valor of other 

men.” 

—George S. Patton1

This edition of Engineer comes at 

a time when the Army and the 

Nation are entering a period of 

federal budget uncertainty and what 

is likely to be a prolonged era of diminished resources to accomplish Army 

missions. This environment will put a 

premium on our ability to analyze tasks 

and meet readiness needs (not wants) in 

the most disciplined way and to use available resources—

people, time, equipment, money, and virtual and real training space—in the most disciplined way. We must achieve 

maximum impact with our troops, time, and resources by 

simultaneously training multiechelon skills, using missionfocused training, and casting away nice-to-have actions and 

entertaining diversions. Administrative discipline and fiscal discipline are not new to the Army, nor do they prevent 

readiness. In fact, they enable it—see the quote above.

The near future promises to be tumultuous as various 

political actions and forces buffet Army resources, but this 

will not affect the Nation’s expectations of us. You will have 

to navigate this environment, preparing your organizations 

and formations to be the best and highest-performing possible, whether you are a Soldier, NCO, officer, or civilian. 

Most important will be to avoid panic and knee-jerk reactions to the wide variety of worst-case scenarios that will 

be discussed, some of which may happen, but others may 

not. Cool heads and passionate hearts focused on what is 

important are required now. The most important thing will 

be to use rigorous, disciplined analysis to overcome the few 

significant challenges that matter. Do not respond to the 

tumult with poorly thought-out, counterproductive actions. 

At the heart of government and Army institutional dysfunctions lies the poorly thought-out, undisciplined desire 

to centralize resources and decisionmaking authority in the 

face of perceived crisis, be it budget or otherwise. We cannot allow ourselves and our Army to be driven down that 

path. The Army in the field has become the most agile and 

adaptable military force in the history of warfare, and it 

achieved this by decentralizing authority and decisionmaking in combat in almost every aspect of leadership and 

management. In contrast, the institutional Army and Department of Defense 

continue to perform expensively and sclerotically because of overcentralization of 

almost every aspect of their leadership 

and management. Approximately 100 

general officers lead the Army in the 

field, while about 200 general officers and 

450 Senior Executive Service officials 

(civilian equivalents to general officers) 

lead the institutional Army. Clearly, 

authorities and resource management are 

fragmented, yet much more tightly controlled at flag rank in the Army institution. This has not enhanced performance, 

but diminished it—expensively. These 

are hardworking, dedicated public servants, but we have 

trapped them in an overly centralized set of processes that 

cannot hope to deal with the complexity and diversity of 

the Army.

The centralization of decisionmaking authority, time 

and money management, and other resources is always justified incorrectly in the name of efficiency and sometimes 

also in the name of quality. But centralization is always

the enemy of efficiency and quality for some very simple 

and obvious reasons:

■ Centralizing authority and decisionmaking creates

principal-agent problems. The principal has a mission

and needs resources to achieve it. The agent is put in

place to say, “I will manage your resources for you in

the name of efficiency and quality.” This sounds plausible until you realize that the principal and the agent

from the very beginning have divergent goals, risk preferences, and situation understanding. 

■ The best understanding of an organization’s needs and

challenges is known at the lowest organizational level.

The local nature of training, leader development, readiness, and information is obvious and not overcome

through periodic and less detailed Army standard reporting systems. Moving information up the chain of command or chain of management control to a central 

decisionmaker leads to the inevitable reduction of the 

accuracy and quantity of information available to make a

decision, even in the digital age. With less information—including less accurate information—what are the

chances for the best, most nuanced decision? Zero. Poorer

decisions result, and that is not the only flaw.
January–April 2013 Engineer 3

■ Centralizing the awareness and information needed to

get a decision from higher up takes time, even in the

digital age. The higher that decisionmaking is centralized, the greater the number of situations and requests

coming in to the central authority, resulting in a huge

lack of responsiveness to urgent needs. We have all lived

out this scenario many times. 

■ Centralizing decisionmaking and resource management

removes or degrades technical depth and competency

across the force. Without authority, one has to kick all

decisions upstairs and need never work through the 

painful process of remedying conflicting priorities and

allocating shortfalls. So, less and less of the force

becomes practiced at these core leadership and managerial tasks. Why would we voluntarily choose to degrade

the skills and competency of the force?

■ And last, centralizing decisionmaking and resource

authorities distributes inefficiency differently in the 

force and increases it at the lowest level, which is the

business end of our profession. One of the best examples is the Army installation, the “power projection platform” where units train and then deploy to fight. The

Army installation is like the aircraft carrier for our

field Army forces. But on the aircraft carrier, there are

two bosses. The ship boss is the captain, who guides the

employment of the carrier and its supporting ships to

preserve their capability to execute missions. The air

boss, the officer in charge of the air group, has missions 

to strike, protect, or reconnoiter and influences the

placement of the ship to perform those tasks. Do I

need to point out that both bosses live on the carrier? On

an Army installation, we have an aircraft carrier with 

one chain of centralized command for the garrison (U.S.

Army Installation Management Command), one command to provide logistics services (U.S. Army Materiel Command), two commands for the mission command

of forces (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

and U.S. Army Forces Command), and one command to

provide communications and network services (U.S.

Army Network Enterprise Technology Command).

Do I need to point out that none of these centralized 

chains of command are located on the installation? It is 

like an aircraft carrier with the engine room under one 

off-ship chain of command, the deck crew under another 

off-ship chain of command, the air group under two different off-ship chains of command, and the security and air 

defense group under another off-ship chain of command. 

Can you imagine how this might work on an aircraft carrier? Yet, that is our system on Army installations. The 

result appears efficient at the top Army “enterprise level,” 

but has distributed huge inefficiencies at the senior mission command and installation level. It is like a model 

United Nations on an Army installation, with gigantic chunks of leader time consumed in coordinating the 

most basic forms of support for our missions to train and 

deploy to combat. Readers can no doubt contribute many 

anecdotes and stories illustrating these problems of overcentralization. But these problems are not systematically 

measured by the Army.

The uncoordinated nature of operating this way will 

become more pronounced as each of these commands undergoes budget revisions in the near future. This will have sudden and chaotic effects, at least during this fiscal year. You 

will have to overcome these gaps and lack of linkages at 

the local level with disciplined effort and analysis. Do not 

abandon hope; apply your iron will to train and your creativity and agility to achieve your mission in any environment, using the same iron will, creativity, and agility demonstrated by the field Army in combat for the last 12 years. 

And on this note, I close with another quote from George

S. Patton:

“Battle is an orgy of disorder. The sudden change from 

accustomed order to utter disorder, to chaos, but emphasizes the folly of schooling to precision and obedience where 

only fierceness and habituated disorder are useful.”2

Endnotes:

1

General George S. Patton, Jr., 17 May 1945, Address 

to officers and men of the 2d Armored Division, The Patton 

Papers, II, 1974.

2

General George S. Patton, Jr., 27 October 1927, Lecture 

“Why Men Fight,” The Patton Papers, I, 1972.
4 Engineer January–April 2013

Lead the Way

Command Sergeant Major Terrence W. Murphy

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

the credentialing pilot program that the 

Engineer School is conducting. The program will assist in the credentialing of 

commissioned officers, warrant officers, 

and enlisted Soldiers. This will take the 

enlisted population to a place where we 

have never been. It will assist the Regiment by bringing it a credentialed skill 

set and will assist individuals once they 

begin their transition from the military. 

We also want to increase the professional literary skills of our enlisted 

population through collegiate styles of 

researching and writing. The exposure of 

our enlisted leaders to this type of education through the Noncommissioned Officer Education System and other means 

will bring the Army more diverse leaders who can read, 

comprehend, write, research, and transform their thoughts 

in a literate, understandable fashion. Better-prepared, 

-educated, and -credentialed NCOs will provide betterprepared leaders for their unit missions and staff functions. The training provided and the methods used will 

also provide the Regiment with young leaders who are able 

to write for professional publications, share their knowledge, and help document the history of this great Regiment. Units will benefit when these leaders prepare and 

produce their annual unit histories.

This will be my last article as your regimental command sergeant major, since I have been selected to serve 

as the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence command 

sergeant major. I will soon transition to that new role.

I want to thank everyone in the Regiment for their support 

and confidence in me during my tenure in this position. It 

has been an honor and a privilege to serve. Just more than 

29 years ago, I became a member of the Regiment; and I 

do not regret a single day of my service. I am absolutely 

awestruck with the things that the Regiment has accomplished thus far and where it will go in the future. Thank 

you all for what you do every day and for what you will do in 

the future. 

Essayons!

I

have been the command sergeant 

major of the U.S. Army Engineer 

School and the Engineer Regiment 

for 20 months. For me, every day of that 

time in this position has been absolutely 

fantastic and rewarding. I had a few goals 

when I was selected for this position and 

would like to update you on them.

My first goal was to revive communication throughout the Regiment, pushing information out to ensure that our 

senior enlisted Soldiers—Regular Army 

and Reserve Component—are informed. 

It is great that sergeants major from the 

Regular Army, the Army National Guard, 

and the U.S. Army Reserve and students 

of the U.S. Army Sergeant Major Academy are sharing ideas, information, and ways to make our 

Regiment better. I believe that the information flow will 

fuel and increase communication up, down, and side to side: 

and it is something that will strengthen our Regiment. I 

believe that this goal was achieved, and I appreciate the support from the sergeants major in the Regiment. Increasing 

the educational opportunities was also a goal associated with 

improving the communication throughout the Regiment. 

The second goal was to get command sergeants major 

into the Engineer Precommand Course. Initially, only 

commanders came to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, for 

the course; and I could not understand why command sergeants major did not also attend. The purpose of the course 

is to inform incoming commanders about what the Regiment is doing, from the viewpoint of the Engineer School 

and throughout the Army as a whole. Why would the command sergeants major not need to get that same information? Their attendance will increase the teamwork of the 

command team and the knowledge of the commander and 

the command sergeant major. 

The third goal concerns the enlisted population in the 

Regiment, who need to “up” their game personally and 

professionally where education is concerned. We must find 

a way to improve the level of credentials for enlisted Soldiers. Recently, implementation guidance was signed for 

“Better-prepared, -educated, and -credentialed 

NCOs will provide better-prepared leaders for their 

unit missions and staff functions.”
January–April 2013 Engineer 5

Chief Warrant Officer Five Scott R. Owens

Regimental Chief Warrant Officer 

Show the Way 

Brigadier General Peter A. “Duke” 

DeLuca, U.S. Army Engineer 

School commandant, describes 

the Engineer Regiment as the Army’s 

“Swiss Army knife.” That’s an apt analogy; the Engineer Regiment brings a lot 

of capability to the Army’s tool chest. 

Over the past decade, this Swiss Army 

knife has served extremely well, proudly 

reflecting the heritage of those who 

served before us and, in many cases, 

being used for missions for which it was 

never designed. Now the Engineer Regiment is taking a look at that tool, performing preventive maintenance checks 

and services on it, recalibrating it, and 

retooling it to meet the requirements for 

the Army of 2020 and beyond. In addition to the Engineer 

Regiment’s overhaul, the Army is making some changes 

as well. Many of these changes impact the whole Army, 

while others are focused specifically on warrant officers. In 

this Show the Way article, I’ll provide a brief overview of 

some of the key changes affecting engineer warrant officers 

today and in the years to come. 

The first changes are those to the promotion system. 

Over the past two promotion board cycles, there have been 

sudden and unexpected changes, including the following:

■ Board dates have shifted from January to the original

time frame of April/May.

■ Zones of consideration have shrunk from 1 year to

approximately 8 or 9 months.

■ Some warrant officers, for the first time in several

years, have not been selected for chief warrant officer

three and chief warrant officer four on their first look. 

The Army drawdown is the primary factor driving 

these changes. In the early 2000s, the Army had a serious shortage of chief warrant officers three and chief 

warrant officers four, so it made adjustments to address 

the problem. Pay compression in all warrant officer pay 

grades was a major contributor to the Army’s inability 

to retain senior-grade warrant officers who were past 

20 years of service, so the Army implemented targeted pay 

raises for warrant officers. In 2006, the Army accelerated 

promotions to chief warrant officer three from 5 years to 

3 years and to chief warrant officer four 

from 5 years to 4 years. That same year, 

all chief warrant officers two who would 

have been below the zone for promotion were moved into the primary zone, 

resulting in a large influx of chief warrant officer three promotions. 

Those changes went a long way 

toward fixing the problem, but they 

also caused a bubble in the senior-grade 

warrant officer populations. Now, the 

Army is downsizing, but wants to do it 

in a way that retains the best warrant 

officers and protects them from undeserved and unnecessary cuts. This is 

the reason that the zones have changed. 

By shrinking the zones, the Army can 

flatten the large bubble of senior-grade warrant officers 

and shift some of them into other year groups. Also, by 

gradually returning to a longer time between promotions, 

the buildup to chief warrant officer three and chief warrant officer four will slow down. This will allow warrant 

officers to serve longer, gain greater experience, and reach 

their full potential. 

Finally, while promotions are becoming more competitive, there are a few things to keep in mind that will 

make warrant officers more competitive. Because the 

Engineer Regiment has a small warrant officer population compared to other branches, the Army isn’t holding its military occupational specialties (MOSs) to a cap 

according to grade. Therefore, qualified engineers in the 

grade of chief warrant officer three may be promoted 

even if the Engineer Regiment has a full authorization 

of chief warrant officers four. Warrant officers will be 

promoted based on how their records stack up against 

warrant officers in other branches. Engineer warrant 

officers who do their jobs well, continue to develop themselves, perform as team players, remain visible, stay 

engaged, and support their commanders will be competitive. They should also remember to update their officer 

record briefs and keep their Department of the Army 

photographs current.

Other changes that affect warrant officers are the 

impending modifications to the officer evaluation report 

and the professional military education (PME) system.
The new evaluation report divides officers into the following categories: 

■ Company grade. Second lieutenant to captain and

warrant officer one to chief warrant officer two.

■ Field grade. Major to lieutenant colonel and chief 

warrant officer three to chief warrant officer five.

■ Strategic leader. Colonel to brigadier general.

Among other changes to the officer evaluation report, 

raters will have a managed rating profile just as senior raters do today.

The PME system is also undergoing significant changes. 

Now, the system is not linked to promotion because the 

Army realized that the pace of operations has not allowed 

many warrant officers to attend PME classes. Therefore, 

it unlinked the PME system from promotion so that those 

warrant officers were not at a disadvantage. However, 

now the Army is conducting studies to determine if PME 

should again be linked to promotions. If PME does become 

linked to promotions, it will be phased in gradually by 

grade, probably starting with the requirement that chief 

warrant officers four graduate from the Warrant Officer 

Senior Staff Course before being promoted. No decisions 

have been made yet, but my advice to all warrant officers—

especially those who are behind in more than one PME 

course—is to attend PME as soon as possible.

In another major change, soon there will no longer be 

separate construction engineering technician courses (MOS 

120A) for the Regular Army and Reserve Components. 

They all will receive the same training in an integrated 

class, starting with the Warrant Officer Basic Course in fiscal year 2014. The geospatial engineering technician (MOS 

125D) warrant officer courses have always been integrated. 

Other changes are being explored by the ongoing Warrant 

Officer Continuum of Learning Study and will be outlined 

in a final report later this year.

Force structure changes will continue to affect the 

warrant officer population, and overall authorizations 

will fluctuate as units stand up or inactivate. There are 

several initiatives that impact the 120A and 125D warrant 

officer MOSs. The brigade engineer battalion will include 

a warrant officer with MOS 120A. This is not a growth, but 

a reallocation of the 120A warrant officer already within 

the brigade. This initiative will place that warrant officer 

in a key position to apply skills as the technical expert and 

advisor for construction engineering. The Army is also conducting an experiment to place an operational energy team, 

including a warrant officer with MOS 120A, within the 

brigade combat team. If the team gets approved, the 120A 

in the brigade engineer battalion will fill that role as an 

additional duty or the Army will have to denote a bill payer 

if an additional warrant officer with MOS 120A is added. 

Also in the works for geospatial engineers is a force design 

update that will result in adding 125D warrant officers

as follows:

■ One chief warrant officer two to each engineer brigade.

■ One chief warrant officer three and one chief warrant 

officer four to the U.S. Army Special Operations

Command.

■ One chief warrant officer three and one chief warrant 

officer five to the Army Geospatial Intelligence Battalion. 

These changes can be unnerving because of the uncertainty they bring, but they are part of the normal Army 

life cycle. After every major conflict, the Army returns to 

the basics, incorporates lessons learned from recent and 

distant conflicts, and retools itself to meet future requirements. The Engineer Regiment is doing the same. Engineer warrant officers are a small, yet vital, component of 

the Engineer Regiment’s role as the Army’s Swiss Army 

knife. Stay sharp, perform preventive maintenance checks 

and services, and continue to be the professionals that you 

have proven yourselves to be. I am proud to serve with 

you and to be your representative at the Engineer School

and Regiment.

Essayons et Faissons!

6 Engineer January–April 2013
January–April 2013 Engineer 7

The Army of 2020 (A2020) will be an expeditionary 

Army with perhaps only 1 percent of its forces stationed outside the continental United States. The 

tenets of A2020 (to include AirSea battle, sea basing, antiaccess, and area denial) are parts of what will become the 

new “normal” for the Engineer Regiment. While the A2020 

will be required to perform offense, defense, stability, and 

defense support of civil authorities operations, it can perform none of these functions if conditions are not set for the 

initial entry (IE) of forces. 

These are challenges that have not been encountered 

by U.S. forces from an infrastructure perspective since the 

establishment of the Cam Ranh Air Base during the Vietnam War and from the area denial perspective since the 

landings at Normandy Beach during World War II. The 

engineers serve as the Army’s “Swiss Army knife” and must 

be able to perform a multitude of missions ranging from 

infrastructure to area denial and the entire range of engineer operations. The purpose of this article is to broadly 

frame the problems that engineers will face in setting conditions for A2020 success, to show the hard work being 

performed at the U.S. Army Engineer School and Regiment 

to solve these problems, and to solicit assistance from the 

Regiment in shaping those solutions.

Initial Entry

The IE of forces must be seen in varying contexts. The 

IE of forces that support a contemplated area of operations may be in a land-based or littoral area. Each 

has vastly different circumstances for the engineer problem 

set. Another variable is the type of mission that will be performed, leading to one of the following three scenarios:

■ A Phase 1, 2, or 3 fight, possibly facing aggressive antiaccess and area denial measures that might include

deliberate defense in depth and complex layers of improvised explosive devices.

■ A deployment to the scene of a humanitarian episode

such as a genocide. The deployment may not include 

active-defense measures, but infrastructure at such sites

may be less than optimal to support insertions by air

or sea.

By Colonel Adam S. Roth
8 Engineer January–April 2013

■ A deployment that supports homeland-based defense 

support of civil authorities or humanitarian assistance/

disaster relief such as the Haiti earthquake recovery in

2010, where forces encountered heavily damaged airport 

and seaport facilities.

In these scenarios, engineers will set the conditions for 

the joint force commander to meet these challenges. The 

variables of time, infrastructure, and enemy situation figure into the calculus of how to seize a lodgment, expand it, 

and set conditions for follow-on forces and the generation of 

combat power. The brigade engineer battalion (BEB) serves 

as the mobility/countermobility/survivability solution at the 

point of need for the brigade combat team commander in 

those initial stages. They are part of the tooth in the toothto-tail ratio; but in setting the theater, engineers at echelons 

above brigade (EAB) also help generate the tail needed to 

develop and sustain combat power. In the IE challenge, it is 

imperative to realize that the engineers serve as both tooth 

and tail.

Knowledge of the Theater

Only about 5 percent of the earth’s surface is digitally 

mapped. Any IE capability must include adequate 

geospatial capability at the planning headquarters, 

with sufficient data for the identification of land masses or 

sea areas and a situational understanding of enemy behavior there. This is a critical geographic intelligence function 

that may develop for years after IE.

Conditions for IE capability must also be set through a 

cultural understanding, ranging from the individual level, 

to the indigenous tribe/group/leader level, to the diplomatic/

political level. The engineer participating in humanitarian construction as part of an overarching theater security 

cooperation plan may also be years ahead in setting conditions for eventual IE operations. Those humanitarian projects that remain may partially set infrastructural conditions for later IE operations, ranging from simple structures 

and well drilling to the dredging of ports. This is the act of 

“setting the theater” and must be ongoing and continuous, 

planned, and routinely resourced.

Operational energy will also set conditions for the 

employment of any force to assure IE operations. As technologies develop that decrease the need for fossil fuels, their 

successful employment will be critical. If the logistical footprint can be decreased appreciably, it will make more lift 

available for IE and create leaner supply lines for the duration of operations.

The last portion of situational understanding of a particular area is engineer interoperability with special operations forces that may have been in the theater long before 

declared hostilities. Engineers must anticipate the needs of 

those forces by establishing habitual relationships through 

training and try to establish dedicated engineer assets to 

support their operations (possibly in the form of an engineer 

special operations force support squadron).

Modes of Entry

The five modes of entry into a theater of operations are 

as follows: 

■ From space. The use of directed-energy weapons can 

provide an entry of effects into a theater of operations. 

The more realistic space effect is the use of communication and surveillance satellites that support numerous 

mission command and geospatial platforms. Space superiority remains a priority in IE.

Future deployments 

may present challenges to engineers, 

such as this salvage 

and repair operation 

in the main seaport in 

Port-au-Prince, Haiti. 
January–April 2013 Engineer 9

■ From cyberspace. This was used successfully during the

2008 Russian incursion into Georgia to project effects 

into a theater of war. The engineer role in setting conditions for these effects could include providing facilities

and “clean power” in the operational area.

■ From land. The use of Kuwait as an intermediate staging base was a luxury that the United States enjoyed during Operation Iraqi Freedom. This may not be the case in

the future.

■ From the sea. Engineers have not been fully challenged

in this realm since the landings at Inchon during the

Korean War or Da Nang during the Vietnam War. The

most recent example of Army port establishment in a 

denied area was in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, and

the denial was not by an enemy force but by forces of 

nature. Key IE capabilities will be required to set the

theater, and they will be a joint responsibility among 

many branches. Key IE engineer requirements in support 

of seaborne operations may include the following:


 Diver support for port reconnaissance, hydrological

survey, minor pier repair and construction, demolition (to include the destruction of sea- and shore-based 

mines), and salvage operations.


 Engineer amphibious operations to augment divers.


 Engineer support to the joint logistics over-the-shore 

(JLOTS) process. These requirements continue to

evolve, and there are engineer forces embedded with

certain transportation units tasked with the JLOTS

mission. The implied tasks of this mission include the 

construction of marshaling yards that can be 

used by material-handling equipment for downloaded shipments, basic combat roads and trails to 

support the onward movement of forces, and the 

development of protective systems to support those 

operations and the mission command that controls

them. 


 Pier and causeway construction and reconstruction in

conjunction with transportation and U.S. Navy units.


 Area clearance of specified areas, as in Bosnia and

Afghanistan operations.


 Route clearance within the area of operations.


 Power generation to support the JLOTS and critical 

mission command systems.


 Support to the interface of the offshore petroleum discharge and inland petroleum distribution systems and

the provision of sea-based petroleum, oil, and lubricants to support follow-on operations, to include the 

construction of fuel bag farms and trailer transfer 

points.


 Fire protection support to fixed- and rotary-wing 

aviation.

Engineers assist seaborne entry into the theater of operations.

“As technologies develop that decrease the need for fossil 

fuels, their successful employment will be critical.”
10 Engineer January–April 2013


 Contract capability, ranging from acquiring construction materials to providing services germane to an 

austere theater.


 Environmental support planning that generates baseline surveys before, or concurrent with, area 

occupation.


 Construction of ammunition holding areas.


 Construction of Level 3 medical facilities.

■ From the air. Although it is the quickest way into a 

theater, it is also limited by space available on U.S. Air 

Force aircraft. The mission of airfield seizure remains an

enduring requirement. The role of the engineer is of

particular importance as IE operations commence. Once

airborne or airmobile forces reach the ground and dominate any opposing force, the work of the engineer begins

in earnest. The IE capability in connection with the Air

Force must include the ability to—


 Conduct rapid runway repair and improve existing

runways (including the need for quick compaction

capability, the construction or clearance of areas with

diminished foreign-object damage hazards, or the use

of AM-2 matting or other technical alternatives to

expand the maximum-on-ground rating).


 Work with Air Force engineers to establish functionality such as lighting, instrumentation, standoff, control towers, and navigational aids.


 Establish fire protection for flight line operations.


 Establish fueling and rearming points for rotary- and 

fixed-wing aircraft and off-loading ground vehicles.


 Conduct facility repair and construction to support

air terminal operations (to include force protection for 

passengers in marshaling areas) and construct holding areas for material.


 Increase fuel storage in the lodgment.


 Assist the arrival and departure airfield control group

with engineer material-handling equipment.

After reception, staging, onward movement, and integration, the force performing a mission will be supported by 

engineers. The brigade combat team, with its organic BEB, 

will be tasked with the following requirements:

■ Establishment of tactical assembly areas and associated 

force protection measures.

■ Construction of combat roads and trails.

■ Route clearance and offensive breaching.

■ Lethal countermobility.

■ Gap crossing.

■ Construction of survivability positions.

■ Construction of basic sanitary facilities.

■ Establishment of force protection for mission command

and air defense nodes.

■ Construction of holding areas for enemy prisoners of war.

■ Construction of temporary shelters for displaced 

civilians.

■ Establishment of patrol bases.

There will also be a multitude of missions to be performed 

by EAB engineers (directly assigned to BEB formations or 

under EAB engineer mission command), to include the critical mission of geospatial intelligence throughout the operation, maturation of the theater, and eventual phase changes 

that may lead to different objectives, such as contractor 

transition, improved quality of life, and the eventual building of partner capacity. 

Engineer School and Regiment

Accomplishments

The EAB redesign has been the centerpiece of efforts 

to support IE. The BEB is at the point of need in brigade combat team formations and will be ready to 

accept EAB engineer capability based on the future mission. 

The EAB redesign community of practice will continue to 

contribute to the force design update process. Thus far, force 

design updates for the engineer construction company and 

A2020 engineers will be called on to perform a multitude of 

missions such as conducting rapid runway repair.
January–April 2013 Engineer 11

the geospatial planning cell are moving forward. Both of 

these capabilities, as delineated in this article, are critical 

condition setters for IE. In the coming year, the engineer 

combat company, the EAB battalion headquarters, and the 

theater engineer command will be reviewed and modified 

to support IE and engineer operations across all phases of

an operation.

The Engineer School and the Maneuver Support Center 

of Excellence continue to participate in Army lessons learned 

and infantry warfighter forums, where IE is a regular topic. 

The Engineer School and Regiment are helping craft IE doctrine, to include supporting the movement-and-maneuver 

concept at the U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence 

and the joint concept for entry operations of the joint staff 

(in connection with the Army Capabilities Integration Center, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command).

The Engineer School, in connection with the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers (USACE), held a secure video teleconference in September 2012 that hosted numerous Army 

service component commands and brigades and the three 

components of the Engineer Regiment. The topics of discussion were IE concepts, the level of training and readiness to 

perform IE operations, the needs of the Army service component commands in support of their geographical combatant commanders, and ways that the Engineer Regiment can 

help meet their IE challenges. The Engineer School forged 

a strategic relationship with the U.S. Army Transportation 

School and attended JLOTS events at Fort Story, Virginia, 

and Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, last year. JLOTS is an 

Army mission for the joint force, and we continue to identify 

gaps in doctrine and planning and to develop solutions to 

meet the most intractable IE challenges along the doctrine, 

organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 

personnel, and facilities spectrum.

The Engineer School commandant and key staff attended 

the Joint Operational Access Exercise at Fort Polk, Louisiana, in October 2012. Key lessons from that exercise directly 

affect modifications of the EAB force structure that will support light and heavy airfield repair packages and the training that is required to sustain them.

The Solution and You

None of this planning can be accomplished in a vacuum. The connectivity within the Engineer Regiment will inform these processes. For engineers 

from the Regular Army, Army National Guard, U.S. Army 

Reserve, and USACE who can influence and provide a voice, 

the following steps are suggested:

■ Continue to participate in the EAB redesign community

of practice. Those who have not already joined are asked

to contact the author at <adam.s.roth2.mil@mail.mil> to

be included.

■ The Engineer School commandant seeks a joint engineer

exercise that will test IE concepts in supporting the

maneuver force. This could be part of an existing 

exercise or a stand-alone exercise. The USACE joint 

rapid airfield construction (now engineer rapid airfield

construction), which was last fully tested at Exercise

Talisman Saber in Australia in 2007, was also a staple

of these types of exercise for many years. If there is a

desire in the field to participate in reinvigorate, or

sponsor such an exercise, please contact the author to

share your thoughts.

■ Many of the junior leaders who developed the tactics, 

techniques, and procedures of IE during the late 1990s 

are now senior leaders in the Engineer Regiment. Have 

those tactics, techniques, and procedures been codified 

into institutional documents? Are there gaps in training 

that the Engineer School and Regiment can help fill? Are 

there products and smart cards that can assist Sappers 

at the hammerhead? Are there thoughts about developing 

gunnery tables or drill manuals that focus on the engineer IE tasks required to get troops on the ground, on

the basics of soil mechanics to achieve proper compaction 

at an austere forward landing site, or on standardizing 

airfield repair packages? Engineer leaders are encouraged to contact the author as the Regiment works to 

answer these questions.

Conclusion

This article delineates what must be done, but does 

not determine who will do it. What capabilities will 

the Regular Army require of the Reserve Component? Which service will be responsible for performing what 

functions? Will the reduction in naval mobile construction 

battalion capability create new mission sets for the other 

services? Will the need for simultaneous action in A2020 

for multiple landing sites exceed the capabilities of the U.S. 

Marine Corps air-ground task force? Will the other Services 

have to augment the Marines in the function that has been 

their sole domain since the end of World War II? Lastly, will 

the Engineer Regiment have the depth of skills required to 

relearn tasks that have long been neglected and will there 

be resourcing available to make this a reality? 

As always, the author welcomes vociferous debate. 

Colonel Roth serves as the deputy assistant commandant—

U.S. Army Reserve at the U.S. Army Engineer School. Before 

graduating from the U.S. Army War College, he served as the 

commander of the 844th Engineer Battalion and deployed to 

Iraq as part of Task Force Sky. He served in numerous staff 

assignments, including executive officer of the 458th Engineer Battalion and has commanded a combat heavy engineer company. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command 

and General Staff College and holds a master’s degree in 

mechanical engineering from Boston University. 
January–April 2013

On 29 October 2012, after causing many deaths and 

creating much destruction on its move northward 

during the preceding 7 days, Superstorm Sandy came 

ashore in New Jersey. Sandy caused levels of destruction 

not seen in recent memory and was eventually categorized 

as the largest Atlantic storm (based on storm diameter) in 

U.S. history. As the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) 

district responsible for the majority of the New Jersey 

coast, the Philadelphia District responded to all requests by

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to 

provide emergency public works and engineering support throughout 

New Jersey. 

During the month after Sandy arrived, this mission provided several experiences that had been foreign to me, but 

taught a number of lessons worth sharing with the Engineer 

Regiment. 

An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.1

We have often heard this familiar quotation of Ben Franklin, but many of us only remember it after a problem arises. 

Because we were able to anticipate Superstorm Sandy’s 

arrival, the Philadelphia District had 

approximately a week to prepare for 

the storm. We took the usual steps 

of ensuring that standing operating procedures, phone rosters, and 

personal data were up to date. 

However, we also increased the 

staffing of the emergency operations center (EOC) and moved to 

full 24-hour operations before 

the storm. Given the high 

potential for Sandy to come 

directly toward the Philadelphia area, we ensured that 

all EOC personnel moved to 

within walking distance of 

the EOC before the storm 

arrived. We also contacted 

key local leaders and the 

EOCs of other agencies 

to ensure that we had a 

common understanding 

of roles, synchronized 

plans, and redundant 

communications. While 

preparations are never 

By Lieutenant Colonel Chris Becking

Devastation from the hurricane is shown on this 

boardwalk at Atlantic City, New Jersey.

12 Engineer

New Jersey.
January–April 2013 Engineer 13

complete and there is rarely advance notice of an emergency, 

we greatly benefited from this “ounce of prevention.” 

USACE needs its military leaders. People not familiar 

with USACE often ask if there are any civilians in the organization, not realizing that only about 600 of the approximately 37,000 personnel in USACE are Soldiers. While many 

USACE civilians say that USACE and the Philadelphia 

District are “really run by civilians,” events at the Hoboken 

Ferry Terminal in Hoboken, New Jersey, after Superstorm 

Sandy demonstrated why USACE remains a military organization with military leaders at various levels. The Hoboken Terminal, an intermodal transportation hub that supports tens of thousands of people commuting daily into New 

York City from New Jersey, experienced severe flooding and 

a resulting power outage due to the storm. Political leaders identified the restoration of service at the terminal as 

critical to returning normalcy to the New York City metropolitan area. Many agencies, civilian and military, were 

busily working to restore services. However, each agency 

focused on its own task without regard to the larger picture. By applying leadership—asking questions, identifying 

constraints and their corresponding exception authorities, 

and coordinating operations across multiple agencies—two 

USACE Soldiers without detailed technical knowledge of the 

inner workings of a ferry terminal ensured that the terminal 

moved toward full operations before the upcoming Monday 

morning commute. Over the following 2 weeks, I saw numerous, similar examples where USACE Soldiers applied Army 

leadership to solve problems and complete the mission. 

Every engineer officer should have an assignment 

in USACE. The 554th Engineer Battalion graciously

provided six officers, only one of whom had any previous 

USACE experience, to support the Philadelphia District 

with the response to Superstorm Sandy. These officers 

served admirably, helping lead the Philadelphia District 

EOC, coordinating an immense emergency power operation 

at the Lakehurst (New Jersey) incident support base, and 

assisting the restoration of the Hoboken Terminal. While 

their service is another example of the need for military 

leaders in USACE, their experience was also hugely valuable to their professional development and was personally 

rewarding. Their experience highlights a worthy goal for our 

Engineer Regiment—all engineer officers should have experience in USACE during their careers. 

USACE civilians are technical experts who can 

apply their knowledge and skills to many problems. 

FEMA assigned many tasks to the Philadelphia District 

that were outside our normal expertise. In each instance, 

USACE personnel applied their experience and skills to 

achieve success. In one example, FEMA tasked the district 

to remove 200 million gallons of water from the Passaic Valley Sewerage Commission wastewater facility in Newark, 

New Jersey, the largest facility of its type in the eastern 

United States. Philadelphia District civilians volunteered to 

supervise this massive pumping operation and did so with 

distinction. They coordinated the efforts of the USACE contractors and the commission pumping operations to remove 

the water ahead of schedule. However, the mission soon 

evolved. The USACE volunteers found themselves advising 

on the rehabilitation of other parts of the facility. While not 

within their field of expertise, they applied their existing 

skills and knowledge to assist with sedimentation ponds, 

sludge tanks, and centrifuges. Their efforts allowed the 

This Ocean City guard rail was taken down by Superstorm Sandy.
14 Engineer January–April 2013

commission to return to 

full primary treatment only days after 

the storm and partial secondary treatment in weeks instead 

of months. Their example was typical of USACE employees during Superstorm Sandy response; they applied their 

expertise to solve problems outside their normal duties. 

The Nation expects USACE to be able to do just 

about anything. A corollary to the above lesson is that 

there is no limit to what the Nation might ask USACE to do. 

Even compared to the typical range of normal USACE missions, Superstorm Sandy presented a much broader array 

of tasks than the Philadelphia District ever envisioned. In 

the span of 72 hours, New Jersey Governor Christopher 

James “Chris” Christie asked if the district could pull a 

roller coaster out of the ocean, FEMA tasked it to supervise dive operations at the bottom of a tank of human waste, 

and the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection inquired about recovery of a house floating in the 

Intracoastal Waterway. While these were unusual requests, 

they were not uncommon during the immediate response to 

Superstorm Sandy and will probably be representative of 

tasks assigned to USACE in the future. 

USACE handles emergencies like a team sport. During the first week alone, I received at least six telephone 

calls from other district commanders offering assistance. I 

came to appreciate this honest and open offer of support; 

I made many late-night calls to request favors, get advice, 

and address problems. I cannot imagine a similar situation among peer commanders in other parts of the Army. 

This teamwork was fantastic, but it was not unique to this 

one storm. USACE approaches all situations with the same 

ethic of cooperation and collective success. 

Contracts can be written and implemented quickly. 

Despite common misperceptions of an overly bureaucratic 

and burdensome process, the Philadelphia District executed several acquisitions very quickly. On 

one occasion, FEMA tasked the 

district to repair a breach of the 

barrier island at Mantoloking, 

New Jersey. After the storm created a new ocean inlet through 

the middle of the Mantoloking 

community, the Philadelphia 

District identified the best engineering solution, found a suitable local business to perform 

the repairs, signed a contract, 

and watched the contractor begin 

work within 48 hours of the formal tasking from FEMA. 

Other acquisition actions occurred even faster. 

Negotiation with elected officials is the same in any 

language. Many engineer officers have honed their engagement skills through years of meeting with government officials or tribal leaders throughout Central and Southwest 

Asia, but might feel daunted by the thought of meeting with 

an elected official in the United States. In my experience, 

the engagement skills I used with Afghan warlords worked 

extremely well in meeting with U.S. congressmen or state 

governors. The meeting preparation and the skills used during the meeting are very similar—engineer leaders should 

just use different jokes and not exchange kisses at the end. 

We have not yet seen the final chapters on Superstorm 

Sandy. Even now, the Nation is debating the level and scope 

of recovery to invest after this tremendous storm. Regardless of how this debate concludes, USACE will be a key partner for recovery and reconstruction. While the above lessons 

were particular to my experience during the immediate 

response to Superstorm Sandy, they will bear consideration 

for the future recovery and reconstruction. 

Endnote:

1

U.S. History.orgTM, <http://www.ushistory.org/franklin/

quotable/singlehtml.htm>, accessed on 31 January 2013.

Lieutenant Colonel Becking is the commander of USACE, 

Philadelphia District. He is a graduate of the Engineer Officer Basic Course, the Infantry Captains Career Course, the 

Combined Arms and Services Staff School, and the U.S. 

Army Command and General Staff College. He holds a bachelor’s degree in mechanical engineering from the University 

of Michigan, holds a master’s degree in mechanical engineering from Auburn University, and is a registered professional 

engineer in the Commonwealth of Virginia.

A residential house floats in the 

Intracoastal Waterway.
I

n June 2012, the 19th Engineer Battalion, Fort Knox, 

Kentucky, received an order 

to support the 20th Engineer 

Brigade severe weather response 

force mission in the U.S. Northern Command area of operations 

from July to November 2012. 

With the unit focused on supporting the Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Response Force (DCRF) and Command and Control Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

Response Element (C2CRE) missions, plus planning for a deployment to the U.S. Central Command area of operations, the 19th 

Engineers faced the challenge 

of balancing multiple mission 

requirements. Although this did 

not present issues that could not 

be overcome, it did result in some 

challenging moments. 

On 29 October 2012, the battalion received an order 

placing it on alert to deploy within 24 hours to Joint Base 

McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, and prepare to 

provide disaster relief support in the aftermath of Superstorm Sandy. The engineers prepared to deploy over the next 

96 hours, working with Fort Knox installation support agencies while awaiting the execution order from U.S. Forces 

Command. During this process, a number of gaps in deployment preparations were revealed. One issue was cycling 

multiple units through the Soldier readiness processing 

center. The 15th Engineer Company had been the only 19th 

Engineer Battalion unit sourced against the DCRF mission 

for the previous 12 months, and the assumption was that it 

would be the first unit used in civil support missions. Therefore, the battalion had only focused on conducting Soldier 

readiness processing for the 15th Engineer Company every 

90 days. With the assistance of the Fort Knox agencies, the 

battalion was able to complete these requirements quickly. 

Also, the battalion was directed to not bring heavy engineer 

equipment, which eventually hindered access clearance 

operations.

The 19th Engineer Battalion received a verbal order 

to deploy on 1 November, which was followed by a written 

order the following day. This final order did not include the 

By Captain Joel W. Prusi

Photo by Mary Markos, USACE, St. Louis District

An Air Force member of JFT Pump helps clear water from 

Breezy Point, New York.

Photo by Mary Markos, USACE, St. Louis District

Members of JTF Pump removed an average of 750,000 to 1 million gallons of water 

per day in the week following Superstorm Sandy.

January–April 2013 Engineer 15
16 Engineer January–April 2013

15th Engineer Company, but did direct the 76th Engineer 

Company to deploy. An advance party of seven Soldiers, 

including the battalion commander, deployed from Fort 

Knox on an aircraft provided by the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers (USACE), North Atlantic District. The party 

met with leaders from Joint Task Force (JTF) Sandy and 

USACE, conducted reconnaissance in New York City, and 

established life support for follow-on forces.

The main body deployed on 3 November. Convoy commanders carried maps that noted the locations of maintenance support activities and fuel stations along the route. 

Overnight stopping points were selected along the route, 

with the understanding that convoy commanders would 

make the final decisions about where to stop, based on the 

state of their convoy. The convoys traveled for 2 days to 

reach Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst and faced few 

maintenance issues along the way.

By the time the convoys arrived at Joint Base McGuireDix-Lakehurst, the advance party had coordinated with 

installation agencies to set up joint reception, staging, 

onward movement, and integration in-processing. 

Elements of Headquarters, Headquarters Company, 

and the Forward Support Company then traveled to 

Fort Hamilton, New York, to link up with the battalion commander, set up the joint tactical operations 

center, and establish mission command.

The mission command relationship for this operation was unique. JTF Sandy was a dual-status 

command, led by the commander of the 53d Troop 

Command, New York Army National Guard. JTF 

Pump, led by the 19th Engineer Battalion commander, served as a subordinate element of more 

than 600 Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen.

In addition to the elements from the 19th Engineer 

Battalion, units included the following:

■ 86th Engineer Dive Team, U.S. Army.

■ 401st, 410th, and 431st Quartermaster Teams,

U.S. Army Reserve.

■ 11th, 28th, 366th, and 633d Civil Engineer

Squadrons, U.S. Air Force.

■ 823d RED HORSE1 Squadron, U.S. Air Force.

■ Joint Communication Support Element, U.S. Air

Force.

■ Mobile Dive and Salvage Unit 2, U.S. Navy.

■ Naval Marine Construction Battalion 5, U.S.

Navy.

■ 8th Engineer Support Battalion, U.S. Marine

Corps.

Mission command issues presented the most immediate difficulty on arrival at JTF Sandy. The 

number of organizations and the speed at which 

they arrived conspired to create an environment 

without clear lines of authority. This was apparent with civilian and military organizations. Many organizations, at all 

levels, called the JTF Pump operations center directly to

request reports, rather than using appropriate chains of

command to gather information. Tactical missions were

received from the USACE, North Atlantic District, even

though JTF Pump was never officially task-organized under

its control. Another mission command issue was the creation and enforcement of consistent reporting requirements

with subordinate units from different Service cultures. This 

made tracking operations during the first days challenging.

JTF Pump also confronted the challenges of legal restrictions on the use of military personnel for recovery work. 

They were not permitted to conduct debris clearance operations or assist citizens inside their homes unless the work 

was tied to an official mission requirement with the presence of civil authorities. JTF Pump leaders had to inform 

communities of these constraints so that there was a shared 

understanding of what tasks Service members could and 

could not perform. 

The storm’s tidal surge devastated Breezy Point.
caption

January–April 2013 Engineer 17

Pumping operations were conducted throughout 

three of the five boroughs of New York City and in 

communities on Long Island, New York, and in New 

Jersey. Many of the dewatered buildings belonged 

to the New York City Housing Authority, including Redfern Housing Complex in Far Rockaway and 

Red Hook housing projects in Queens. JTF Pump 

discovered that more control was needed on some of 

these tasks, since engineers frequently received only 

general descriptions of the buildings to be dewatered 

and sometimes ended up dewatering the same buildings multiple times due to reflooding.

Mobile Dive and Salvage Unit 2 conducted operations in the basement of One World Trade Center 

(commonly known as Freedom Tower), removing 

more than 770,000 gallons of water and enabling 

contractors to restart work. The 86th Engineer Dive 

Team helped the New York City Fire Department 

and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 

conduct dewatering operations in the Port Authority 

Trans-Hudson station and tunnel in Jersey City. The 

team also conducted pier inspections and repair with 

Mobile Dive and Salvage Unit 2 at the U.S. Coast 

Guard, Battery Park Pier C facility in New York. 

The wastewater treatment plant for Long Beach, 

New York, suffered a failure of its main intake 

pumps. Crews of Air Force civil engineers rotated 

through the plant, conducting 24-hour operations 

to pump 3,100,000 gallons of water and prevent 

flooding.

The largest continuous project for the Soldiers,

Marines Sailors, and Airmen, of JTF Pump was the operation at Breezy Point in Queens, New York. This peninsular community had been flooded by the tidal surge of 

Superstorm Sandy. Fires had broken out in the aftermath 

and destroyed more than 90 homes. As operations in other 

areas wound down, this project became the focus for task 

force efforts. The project required extensive 

access clearance operations to open narrow 

walkways throughout 

the community. Individual pumping sites 

were small and were far 

from drainage locations. 

This required frequent 

pump moves and the 

elaborate chaining of 

hoses to remove standing 

water from public areas. 

Access clearance operations were slowed noticeably by the earlier order 

JTF Pump personnel helped speed access to communities damaged by the storm.

The 76th Engineer Company convoy gathers 

in front of the Brooklyn 

Public Library.

Photo by Mary Markos, USACE, St. Louis District
18 Engineer January–April 2013

Dedication

The following members of the Engineer Regiment have been lost in overseas contingency operations since the last 

issue of Engineer. We dedicate this issue to them.

Staff Sergeant Rayvon Battle, Jr. 38th Engineer Company, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington 

 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team

Sergeant Brett E. Gornewicz 444th Engineer Company, 479th Engineer Battalion Oswego, New York

Specialist Ryan P. Jayne 444th Engineer Company, 479th Engineer Battalion Oswego, New York 

Sergeant First Class Darren M. Linde 818th Engineer Company, 164th Engineer Battalion Williston, North Dakota

Specialist Tyler J. Orgaard 818th Engineer Company, 164th Engineer Battalion Williston, North Dakota

Private First Class Markie T. Sims 38th Engineer Company, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington

4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team

Staff Sergeant Dain T. Venne 444th Engineer Company, 479th Engineer Battalion Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington

 

to leave heavy engineer equipment back at Fort Knox. The 

Army 76th Engineer Company and Marine 8th Engineer 

Support Battalion persevered in conducting the operations in conjunction with the New York City Department of 

Sanitation, moving debris from access ways to parking lots 

where Department of Sanitation loaders and trucks could 

transport it to landfills. More than 1,000 tons of material 

were moved in this fashion. The terrain presented unique 

opportunities for the Marine and Navy components of 

JTF Pump, which conducted 2 days of amphibious landings on the beaches at Breezy Point to move their personnel and equipment into position. They removed more than 

8,000,000 gallons of water during 9 days of operations in 

this area.

After 15 November, there were no further requirements 

for pumping missions. Units began retrograde operations 

back to their home stations. The 19th Engineer Battalion traveled back to Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst 

to regroup and prepare for the long convoy back to Fort 

Knox, returning safely on 19 November. The military 

personnel of JTF Pump acquitted themselves well. More 

than 13,200,000 gallons of water and 1,300 tons of debris 

were removed from public areas in New York and New Jersey. Military forces expended 10,500 man-hours in successful joint operations to support the citizens of the Nation in 

their hour of need.

Endnote:

1

Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair 

Squadron Engineer.

Captain Prusi is the assistant training officer for the 19th 

Engineer Battalion. He holds a bachelor’s degree in civil 

engineering from Michigan Technological University and a 

master’s degree in civil engineering from Missouri University 

of Science and Technology in Rolla. He is a graduate of Army 

Officer Candidate School, the Engineer Officer Basic Course, 

and the Engineer Captains Career Course.
January–April 2013 19 Engineer

From 4 May to 28 June 2011, the 2d Platoon of the 15th

Engineer Company (Horizontal) completed a 1.5-mile 

section of road west of Nogales, Arizona, as part of 

efforts by Joint Task Force–North (JTF-N) to enhance border 

security. JTF-N is a federal interagency program that coordinates efforts between agencies such as the Department 

of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense. The 

U.S. Border Patrol is part of the U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection, which falls under the Department of Homeland 

Security. The Department of Defense supplies military units 

for nonpolicing ventures in support of the Border Patrol. 

This article focuses on the interactions that the platoon had 

with various civilian and military personnel and how they 

contributed to the stress and relief of the 2-month mission. 

The platoon arrived after three previous rotations had 

cut the rough length of the road, added two large culverts, 

emplaced riprap along the sides of the road and in spillways, and constructed a low-water crossing. In 2 months, 

the platoon would have to complete a large task list, which 

included emplacing another culvert, completing a long 

stretch of cut-and-fill operations, emplacing more riprap, 

finishing a cattle guard, and laying an experimental road 

surface known as soil-cement. The latter had never been 

used to surface a road, and the subject matter experts had 

little idea how to lay the material so that it would hold up to 

wear and tear. These tasks had to be accomplished in a short 

time while maintaining safety and remaining environmentally conscious.

By Captain Sean T. Sullivan
20 Engineer January–April 2013

The proposed work schedule called for 

six 10-hour days, with the seventh day 

reserved for “reset.” Temperatures were 

in the 90s, and the 10-hour limit to the 

workday was meant to prevent fatigue, 

which could lead to reduced productivity 

and increased safety risk. Since the location was on the border, danger from drug 

traffickers at night was also an issue. 

The 10-hour workday would keep the 

platoon on the site during safer daylight 

hours. Morale was a concern because of 

the work schedule, but the seventh day of 

rest would give Soldiers a chance to enjoy 

Army morale, welfare, and recreation 

trips in the surrounding area. From the 

beginning, this plan was questioned by 

one of the JTF-N mission planners. The 

platoon Soldiers were called on to work 10 

days straight to get ahead on the project. 

A compromise reduced the planned reset 

day from a full workday to a half day, and the platoon managed to stay on schedule for the remainder of the project 

with little overtime. It is important to realize that increasing hours may not always increase productivity, but rather 

lower morale and increase fatigue. 

Farthest east on the road was the culvert, which became 

the main effort of 3d Squad. The culvert served as good 

training since the Soldiers had to dig the trench, compact 

the bottom, lay the large concrete pipe, compact the fill, 

and emplace riprap at the entry and exit sides to encourage 

water to flow into the culvert so that it would not undermine their work. Keeping the pipe straight was the hardest 

part of laying the culvert. The squad removed and reset the 

pipe once because it bowed slightly, which would have hindered the free flow of water. Early on, the platoon reviewed 

the plans and saw that the culvert would divert water more 

than 90° from the original direction of travel. The Soldiers 

voiced objections to a representative of the engineer firm in 

charge of the project. However, the firm decided to stick with 

its plan and the platoon complied, adding a spillway in the 

direction of original travel so that excess water would flow 

smoothly away from the culvert rather than collect and possibly damage the roadway. 

West of the culvert, 1st Squad was responsible for bringing a 300-meter stretch of road up to grade. The Border 

Patrol specifies that traffic be able to travel at 25 miles per 

hour, which required the squad to 

cut and fill. The process proceeded 

slowly, but successfully, maintaining a high degree of compaction 

along most of its length. A 50-meter 

stretch of road lost its compaction 

due to water leaching from higher 

up the road, so the squad had to 

work overtime to bring it back

to standard. 

Once the road itself was at 

grade, well-placed drainage features to prevent erosion had to be 

finished. Arizona’s monsoon rains 

in the summer and fall can be 

severe enough to create flash floods. 

Drainage features included crowning the road on straightaways. As 

the road came out of a curve and 

continued downhill, the water 

A load of soil-cement is ready to be spread along the road.

Engineers lay ArmorFlex® at the 

low-water crossing.
January–April 2013 Engineer 21

would sheet down the road itself. To 

catch the water before it could gain 

speed and damage the road, a broadbased dip caught and drained it off 

the side. Ditches on one or both sides 

ran along most of the road. They 

required riprap to prevent erosion 

from compromising the roadway. 

Border Patrol agents had reported 

problems with suspects throwing 

rocks at them from the ditches and 

requested that the platoon seal the 

riprap together with concrete slurry. 

A team of Soldiers from the 76th 

Engineer Company (Vertical) and the

538th Engineer Detachment (Concrete) completed that task. 

They also worked on a cattle guard 

on the canyon floor, which had been 

partially completed by Marines in 

the preceding rotation. The Marines 

had poured a concrete, low-water crossing on the east side of 

the cattle guard, but none on the west side. The large trucks 

needed to pour soil-cement on the west end of the road could 

only gain access to it by way of the low-water crossing. However, placing concrete on the unfinished west side would 

take too long to cure and there was no alternate access. 

Instead, the mission planner provided ArmorFlex concrete 

blocks that can be set on the ground to protect it from erosion. ArmorFlex proved to be a valuable asset; it would 

hold up to heavy traffic, and the platoon was able to lay the 

sections within a day.

Soldiers from 2d Squad laid the experimental soil-cement 

along the entire length of road. This mix of aggregate and 

a small amount of cement had previously been used only to 

enhance fill strength. Finding the correct moisture content 

for the mix was critical. The first batch was too moist and 

came out as a sludge that was nearly impossible to work 

with. A second load with too much water created so much 

suction that the material would not pour from the dump 

truck, nearly setting up in the bed of the truck. Even after 

finding the correct moisture content, the batch plant had 

recurring mechanical breakdowns that delayed surfacing for 

4 weeks. When the plant finally began functioning properly, 

the Soldiers developed a rhythm that allowed them to lay 

out the lanes quickly and meet the project deadline.

In 2 months, the platoon—with augmentation from the 

76th Engineer Company (Vertical) and 538th Engineer 

Detachment (Concrete)—completed a road that was vital to 

the mission of protecting the Nation’s borders. Though the 

road itself was only a small portion of the ongoing effort, it 

served as a great training tool for the platoon. The Soldiers 

who signed up to be engineers did so in part to exercise engineering skill. Border defense projects are a great opportunity for engineer units in the United States to exercise their 

technical skills while gaining knowledge and understanding 

for future operations here or abroad. 

Captain Sullivan is the unit movement and safety officer 

for the 19th Engineer Battalion, Fort Knox, Kentucky. He 

holds a bachelor’s degree in history from the University of 

California, Davis, and completed the Engineer Basic Officer 

Leader Course at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Soldiers pour concrete, using the cattle guard to prop the form.

Soldiers prepare to seal a section of culvert.
22 Engineer January–April 2013

The Army firefighting military occupational specialty 

(MOS) 12M is organized into very small, specialized, 

and effective teams that are fragmented across the 

Engineer Regiment and the Army. As a result, this has created organizational and operational challenges to the various firefighter mission sets. Also, the current firefighting 

force structure has created ample operational leadership 

experience at the junior noncommissioned officer (NCO) 

level, but very little for senior NCOs. Recent experience 

as the commander of the 95th Engineer Detachment, the 

only active duty firefighting headquarters detachment in 

the Army, offers insights on understanding the force and 

improving its operational capabilities.

Army Firefighters

Army firefighters transferred from the U.S. Army 

Quartermaster Corps to the ranks of the Engineer 

.Regiment on 4 December 1941, just 3 days before 

the attack on Pearl Harbor. Firefighters possess unique skill 

sets and equipment that allow them to breach obstacles and 

manipulate the tactical terrain. Their mission is to provide 

fire prevention and protection, aircraft crash rescue, natural 

wildfire response, and hazmat response within a theater of 

operations. Also, firefighter detachments are authorized the 

equipment to accomplish this mission.

There are currently 242 active duty firefighters; most of 

the Army firefighting force is in the Reserve Components. 

Army firefighters attend advanced individual training at 

Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas. There, they train in a 

joint environment alongside Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, 

and Coast Guard firefighters. They obtain nationally recognized certifications and MOS-specific certifications for the 

following:

■ Firefighter I and II.

■ Hazmat awareness and operations.

■ Airport firefighter.

By First Lieutenant Alex H. Carlier
January–April 2013 Engineer 23

The Louis F. Garland Department of Defense Fire 

Academy at Goodfellow Air Force Base also teaches 16 

advanced fire courses that are internationally accredited by 

the International Fire Service Accreditation Congress. Most 

certifications are permanent and follow a Soldier who leaves 

the Army and serves in a civilian capacity.

Firefighters can be assigned to three different types of 

operational units—

■ A firefighting headquarters, which is authorized

3 personnel.

■ Ten firefighting detachments (also called a firefighting 

team or fire truck), which are each authorized

7 personnel.

■ Nine firefighting detachments, which are each authorized 7 personnel, within a modular ordnance company.

If firefighters are assigned to a modular ordnance company, they may serve under leaders who are not engineers. 

Because of the unique structure and lack of upward mobility, many of these contain more firefighters than authorized. 

Often, these additional personnel are attached to a company 

level headquarters section to perform non-MOS-related 

tasks. Although this can be beneficial to Soldiers in terms 

of staff experience, it does come with risks, particularly in 

developing individual firefighting task proficiency and maintaining perishable skills. If Army firefighters are assigned 

to nonstandard positions, it is recommended that they work 

into a local firefighting unit training program to maintain 

MOS proficiency.

In garrison, firefighters can work for the local installation 

fire department or department of emergency services (DES) 

to maintain their skills. Unit leaders should meet with the 

DES fire chief to establish a training program. This relationship between the unit commander and the installation 

fire chief is vital to obtaining a vibrant training program. 

Typically, a memorandum of agreement between the unit 

and DES is required to establish the policy, procedures, and 

sharing of resources. Additionally, the senior NCO in the 

unit should be the conduit for training and resources and for 

communication with the DES. This provides the NCO with a 

more senior role in implementing the training program and 

builds upon leadership and management skills.

Training

I

ndividual tasks. Like any Soldier, Army firefighters 

require MOS-specific training and firefighting equipment maintenance. Table 25-5, Army Regulation (AR) 

420-1, Army Facilities Management,

1

 shows which certifications are required for each duty position. Note that to 

be a licensed operator of a tactical firefighting truck and 

heavy expanded mobility tactical truck-based water tender, 

a Soldier must have the proper International Fire Service 

Accreditation Congress-approved certifications and must 

have completed driver training with a master driver who 

is licensed on the fire apparatus. Also note that according 

to Department of Defense Instruction 6055.06, DOD Fire 

and Emergency Services Program2 (which guides firefighting 

doctrine for all military Services), Soldier firefighters must 

possess certifications for their rank and duty position within 

2 years or face MOS reclassification. Each firefighter skill 

level corresponds with an annual refresher training requirement. The frequency for each firefighting task can be found 

in Table 25-6, AR 420-1. 

Collective Tasks. Sergeants and staff sergeants in 

MOS 12M do not often conduct their skill level tasks when 

A heavy expanded mobility tactical truck-based water tender undergoes a test at Pope Field, North 

Carolina.
24 Engineer January–April 2013

supporting a local installation because these positions 

are generally held by Department of Defense civilian firefighters. The best way to validate equipment and firefighting 

task competency is to conduct collective training. The use 

of training areas for these events can be coordinated with 

the assistant chief of training in the installation fire department. It is important for detachments to take advantage 

of every opportunity to conduct collective training. A best 

practice would be to conduct one event per quarter. Some 

examples include, but are not limited to—

■ Structural burn.

■ Airport firefighting burn.

■ Vehicle extrication.

■ Confined-space training.

■ Rescue operations. 

The Combined Arms Training Strategy task template 

for firefighting teams and headquarters is available on 

the Army Training Network at <https://atn.army.mil/dsp

_CATSviewer01.aspx>.3

Balancing firefighting operations with Army training is a 

manageable leadership challenge if there is a plan in place 

and it is agreed to in a memorandum of agreement between 

the unit and the installation fire department. Experience 

shows that it is best to establish a standard training calendar which also fits into the installation fire department 

operational schedule. A best practice is to allow Soldiers to 

cease installation fire department duties for 2 weeks every 

quarter to conduct individual warrior tasks, leader development training, and collective MOS training.

Maintenance

The bottom line is that tactical firefighting equipment is unique to the Army. A common after action review comment from firefighting detachments following deployment is that there were not enough personnel 

trained to maintain the water pumps on the fire apparatus. 

Unfortunately, there is no longer a military course to train 

firefighters in water pump maintenance (a task that was a 

requirement during Hurricane Sandy recovery). However, it 

is possible to send them to a manufacturer training course. 

It is also recommended that mechanics from forward support companies who support firefighters be trained on

fire apparatus. 

Uniform

Army firefighters are authorized to wear a modified 

Army combat uniform while performing official 

.duties. A distinctive unit fire department identification badge is authorized for wear; it is centered on the 

left pocket of the uniform. Firefighters may also be identified with items such as a brassard on the left sleeve and 

a black cap with the words “Fire Department” embroidered in the center. Army firefighters are under the tactical control of their station captain (a Department of 

Defense civilian) while on duty in the fire station, and 

the modified uniform serves the purpose of keeping 

them distinguishable from other Soldiers on the installation. Army firefighters should wear flame-retardant 

clothing while on duty, including a flame-retardant 

Army combat uniform and a modified physical fitness 

uniform (specific design according to local policy). The 

clothing must contain a majority of natural fibers to 

meet National Fire Protection Agency standards.

Areas of Emphasis

Manning. Transfer more positions from 

the force generation pool into the operational U.S. Army Forces Command pool. 

There are 19 sergeant first class positions in MOS 

12M, yet only one of them is in a U.S. Army Forces 

Command unit. Since the MOS has few senior 

NCO leaders, the Engineer Regiment must understand the role of firefighters in an effort to improve 

their leadership opportunities and operational 

expertise. An Army firefighter demonstrates wear of turn-out gear.
January–April 2013 Engineer 25

Missions. Review joint 

operations plans, and determine where 12M Soldiers 

can be employed to support 

wartime, contingency, and 

disaster relief operations. 

Currently, the headquarters 

is working with the National 

Interagency Fire Center to 

determine where Army firefighters can support future 

wildfire operations as 

part of the U.S. Northern 

Command plan.

Meal Plan. Authorize 

basic allowance for subsistence to all firefighters. 

Army firefighters typically 

work a 24-hour-on/24-

hour-off schedule. Every 

firefighter is assigned 

a “Kelly Day,” which 

is a day off that gives 

each firefighter a 2-day 

“weekend” periodically.

Given the usual DES 

obligation to work 

24-hour shifts, which 

prevents Soldiers from using a dining facility, all 

firefighters on a team should be authorized basic allowance 

for subsistence. 

Medical. Ensure that firefighters with duty-limiting 

medical profiles get beneficial training and experience with 

the installation fire department. For example, Army firefighters on profile can conduct visual inspections of facilities 

and buildings for the installation fire prevention office.

Conclusion

The Army firefighting capability is at a crossroads 

of operational capability and leadership expertise. 

The future is likely to feature civilian contract firefighters instead of uniformed Soldiers in deployed environments. Without innovative ideas and a renewed emphasis 

on firefighter operations, deployable readiness will decrease 

along with a lack of training opportunities. Moreover, it 

will become increasingly difficult to retain quality personnel as other opportunities present themselves. It is time to 

aggressively integrate firefighters into military and agency 

operational plans to provide contingency mission sets such 

as chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 

explosives response. It is also time to review the Army firefighter stationing plan to find more effective ways to maintain mission command of the force. A more centralized 

force would improve overall training and readiness, reduce 

infrastructure costs associated with training, and develop a 

more robust deployable firefighting capability. For example,

if an installation with a 

firefighting headquarters gained three 

7-person detachments, it could serve as a joint, deployable 

hazmat technician team and maintain contingency search 

and rescue capabilities for a global response force mission. 

By developing better ways to train and employ the Army’s 

firefighters, a more robust and effective force will be available to meet future challenges.

Endnotes:

1

Army Regulation 420-1, Army Facilities Management, 

12 February 2008.

2

Department of Defense Instruction 6055.06, DoD Fire 

and Emergency Services Program, 21 December 2006.

3

Army Training Network, <https://atn.army.mil/dsp

_CATSviewer01.aspx>, accessed on 14 January 2013.

First Lieutenant Carlier is the officer in charge of the 

intelligence support team for the 618th Engineer Support 

Company (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He previously served as a platoon leader for the 100th Engineer 

Company (Topographic) and as commander of the 95th 

Engineer Detachment (Firefighting). He holds a bachelor’s 

degree in construction systems management from The Ohio 

State University.

Firefighters battle a blaze in this historical photo from the Philippines.
26 Engineer January–April 2013

The Damned Engineers (Studies in Military Engineering, Number 1), by Janice Holt Giles, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, 2d Edition (1987), ASIN B000N8US56, $49.95 

(Paperback)

The Damned Engineers is a narrative account of the 291st 

Engineer Combat Battalion actions during the Battle of the 

Bulge. Histories of this pivotal engagement in December 

1944 frequently focus on the stubborn defense of Bastogne, 

Belgium. However, as the author points out, other no less 

heroic stands were made on the northern shoulder of the 

Bulge. Mrs. Giles gives a dramatic account based on extensive firsthand sources and interviews. It not only retells 

what the 291st accomplished, but also describes who these 

men were and what motivated them. The author thoroughly 

explores the perspective of Waffen–SS Lieutenant Colonel Jochen Peiper in his rapid advance. To this she adds a 

detailed description of the slaughter of American prisoners committed by Peiper’s soldiers and the direct impact it 

had on the 291st. The 291st Engineer Combat Battalion so 

frustrated the German commander during his offensive that 

supposedly he swore in frustration, “The damned engineers! 

The damned engineers!”

On 16 December 1944, the Germans launched a desperate offensive through the Ardennes Forest in Belgium that 

caught the Allies by surprise. The offensive drove a wedge 

almost 70 miles deep into the Allied lines before the advance 

was halted. Peiper, commanding the German unit Kampfgruppe Peiper, led the attack on the northern shoulder of 

the wedge. This area saw some of the most aggressive German attacks, spearheaded by the Waffen–SS. During 17–18 

December, the engineers of the 291st found themselves facing this overwhelming armored force. The desperate nature 

of the campaign can be seen in German atrocities committed 

along the way, most infamously a massacre where nearly 

100 American prisoners of war were killed near the town of 

Malmedy. While initially shocked by the scale of the offensive, the Allies poured reinforcements into the battered front 

to stem the advance. During those critical days, the 291st 

stopped the German advance along the northern shoulder.

At the outbreak of the battle, the three line companies 

of the 291st Engineer Combat Battalion operated sawmills 

to prepare for the harsh winter and maintained roadways 

across an area several miles wide behind the front line. The 

rapid advance of Peiper’s unit of 5,800 men and 100 tanks 

forced the 291st to set up hasty defenses along the entirety 

of Peiper’s route. The 291st commander, Lieutenant Colonel 

David E. Pergrin, recently promoted and in his late twenties, organized the defense of the key town of Malmedy 

with a single engineer company until reinforcements could 

arrive. Similarly, the other two companies worked independently to slow the German advance westward. More often, 

they fought as squads or platoons. The engineers manned 

Late in 2012, Brigadier General Peter A. (Duke) Deluca, commandant of the U.S. Army Engineer School, approved his 

“Engineer Commandant’s Reading List” as a program to promote professional development. The list includes a variety of 

books on history, politics, and culture that are appropriate for Soldiers and civilians in the Engineer Regiment. This book 

review section will be a feature in each issue of Engineer. Authors will summarize the content of the books on the reading 

list, and they will point out the key lessons to be learned from those books. Readers who wish to read a book and submit a 

review should contact Dr. David J. Ulbrich, Engineer School command historian, at <david.j.ulbrich.civ@mail.mil>. The list 

is located at <http://www.wood.army.mil/usaes/library/documents/ENGR_CMDT_READING_LIST_2012.pdf>.
January–April 2013 Engineer 27

roadblocks, laid mines and abatis, demolished critical 

bridges, and fought as infantry when needed. In the end, 

they were able to help slow the advance enough that the 

Germans could never achieve the decisive breakthrough 

they sought.

One of the more memorable moments of the book occurs 

when an engineer detail of about a dozen men from A Company worked to wire and guard the Habiemont Bridge 

directly in the path of the German advance. The author 

gives exceptional detail by recalling the assigned tasks of 

the Soldiers, from which man was positioned as security to 

who was wiring the bridge and with what charges. Within 

2 hours, with night fast approaching, triggerman Corporal Fred Chappin and Lieutenant Alvin Edelstein spotted 

the advancing German Tiger II tanks through the trees. 

Unfortunately, the Americans were simultaneously seen by 

the approaching armor. Corporal Chappin worked quickly 

to blow the bridge and escape, but not before a machine 

gun bullet cut his cartridge belt as he maneuvered back to

the detail. 

Peiper’s tanks did not get any farther, but the American 

defense of the bridge site by this detail didn’t end there. In 

order to protect the site, Lieutenant Edelstein sent Soldiers 

armed with daisy-chained mines to cover secondary roads 

in the area. In an act of individual courage, Private Johnny 

Rondenell waited until an approaching German reconnaissance patrol was nearly on top of him before he sprinted 

across the road directly in front of the patrol, dragging a 

string of mines behind him. He destroyed the first vehicle 

and, thereby, disrupted the patrol. Similar accounts and 

actions fill the pages of the book as Mrs. Giles seamlessly 

pieces together individual stories to provide a continuous 

and gripping narrative of the battle.

In order to write this effective narrative, the author relies 

heavily on the personal accounts and correspondence of 

members of the 291st. She was the widow of Sergeant Henry 

Giles, who served in the battalion, and she ably drew on the 

memories of her husband and his fellow servicemen for the 

details that fill the book. In her comments at the end, Mrs. 

Giles makes an effort to note where she could not corroborate some of the personal accounts. In such cases, she relies 

on a single source for portions of the narrative. Her list of 

personal references within the battalion is impressive, and 

she made an effort to confirm these accounts with outside 

sources. These include official correspondence, after action 

reports, and unit histories as well as German accounts taken 

after the war. There are no endnotes and only a few footnotes in the book for readers who want to research further. 

Giles also draws on other books to fill in the gaps as the 

battle unfolds, most notably citing John S.D. Eisenhower’s 

The Bitter Woods1 numerous times.

Through the author’s narrative style, the reader leaves 

with a greater appreciation of the efforts exerted by the 

291st to accomplish its missions effectively. The Battle of 

the Bulge is often synonymous with endurance under harsh 

conditions, but that is only a piece of the 291st experience. 

The unit conducted an impressive defense through the initiative it gave to small-unit leaders. In the immediate disruption of communications by the German offensive at the 

outset, the disparate companies, platoons, and squads acted 

independently without formal orders. The small-unit leader 

flexibility to make quick decisions derived from the culture 

in place among the 291st Soldiers and their understanding 

of the commander’s intent. The engineers proved their versatility through the numerous tasks they performed. During 

the course of the campaign, they abandoned their general 

engineering work of road repair and sawmill operations to 

conduct extensive countermobility operations. This rapid 

change of mission included demolishing bridges, laying 

minefields and abatis, and emplacing roadblocks and other 

obstacles. During the entire campaign, the 291st Engineers 

also performed numerous mobility tasks, to include building 

Bailey bridges, timber trestle bridges, and the first and longest float bridge across the Rhine near Remagen. To display 

this expertise across such a wide array of engineering tasks 

and to accomplish these tasks effectively was a tribute to 

their training and discipline. 

Lieutenant Colonel Pergrin held the unit to high standards; and the battalion leaders possessed an unstated tactical proficiency and mental agility that should be developed 

in all leaders, regardless of rank. While far from perfect, the 

291st leaders made few, if any, major mistakes conducting 

their defense. The reader will gain a clear appreciation for 

the overall competence of the unit leadership. The Damned 

Engineers is an outstanding lesson in the mental toughness 

and physical stamina that engineer units should bring to a 

fight. It will be an easy read for any engineer leader who is 

seeking perspectives on conventional warfare to provide better training or who is simply furthering his or her personal 

development.

Endnote:

1

Eisenhower, John S.D., The Bitter Woods: The Battle of 

the Bulge, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1969.

Reviewed by Captain Wesley J. Hunnell. Captain Hunnell 

is a student in the cooperative degree program sponsored by 

Missouri University of Science and Technology, Rolla, Missouri; and the 554th Engineer Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Texas A & M, 

College Station, Texas; and a master’s degree in military history from Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont.
28 Engineer January–April 2013

The Salang Pass is more than a roadway in Afghanistan; it is an economic and cultural symbol to Afghans. The battered roadway through Parwan 

Province is the primary route between northern and southern Afghanistan, crossing the treacherous Hindu Kush 

mountain range. It is the only pass in the area to remain 

in use the entire year. Nearly all commerce for the capital 

city of Kabul and all other cities in the east, such as Bagram 

and Jalalabad, travels this route. An estimated 5,000 vehicles travel daily through the winding mountain pass.

With little maintenance since it first opened in 1964, the 

Salang Tunnel has slowly slipped into a rutted path of decay. 

The continuous risk of closure threatened the economic and 

social lifeline to southern Afghanistan. After decades of conflict and neglect, Afghan and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leaders concluded that something had to 

be done. The International Security Assistance Force committed to assist Afghanistan with repairs before winter. The 

engineers of the 411th Engineer Brigade, Joint Task Force 

(JTF) Empire, were tasked with the mission; and Operation 

Mountain Blade (OMB) was born.

The Road Oft Traveled

The Salang Tunnel reduces travel time between northern and southern Afghanistan from 72 hours to10 hours and cuts approximately 300 kilometers from 

the trip. The tunnel is 2.6 kilometers long at an altitude of 

approximately 3,400 meters above sea level, making it one 

of the highest road tunnels in the world.

The Soviet Union and Afghanistan developed the Salang 

Road jointly, starting in 1955. Later it was a crucial military 

link through the country during the Soviet-Afghan war. The 

natural dangers inherent in the pass, such as avalanches 

and extreme weather, have been compounded over the years 

by military actions and accidents. A tunnel fire in 1982 

killed more than 170 Soviets and Afghans. Due to combat 

between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban throughout 

1997 and 1998, the ventilation system and entrances to the 

tunnel were destroyed, resulting in the closure of the tunnel to all but foot traffic. It was not reopened until January 

2002, after a joint effort by Afghanistan, Russia, the United 

States, and other countries cleared the pass of mines and 

debris. The tunnel may become pitch black inside, and the 

air can become filled with deadly carbon monoxide. While 

there are other routes through the Hindu Kush, the tunnel 

is the quickest, most efficient road and deemed safest from 

insurgent attacks.

“The Salang Tunnel is a strategic piece of key terrain,” 

explained the JTF Empire chief of operations and Afghan 

National Army development officer. “It’s the focal point of 

the northern distribution network. It’s of substantial interest to [NATO and Afghan forces].”

Traveling through the darkened length of the tunnel, 

travelers could see runoff water from the mountain seeping 

through holes in the 50-year-old walls. Pavement was worn 

into a bumpy, rutted path of mud in many parts. Depending on traffic volume, cars and trucks squeeze through, often 

with only inches to spare between a vehicle and the walls.

By Staff Sergeant Derek M. Smith
January–April 2013 Engineer 29

The Long Climb

The latest operation was initiated to enable the 

Afghan Ministry of Public Works (MoPW) to conduct emergency repairs of Highway One through the 

Salang Pass by providing equipment, materials, and technical advice. JTF Empire had a specific task—to assist in the 

repair of 400 meters of road inside each end of the tunnel and 

200 meters outside each end of the tunnel for a total of 

1,200 meters. The repairs were to be conducted as soon as 

possible to finish before the winter snows arrived. The purpose of the operation was to improve the road surface, which 

was in a serious state of disrepair. There were massive ruts 

and potholes running through the inside 

of the tunnel as a result of poor drainage. 

The road had been repaired over the years 

by placing concrete or overlaying it with 

asphalt in different spots. One of the biggest 

challenges of the operation was getting down 

to a solid base on which to rebuild the road.

OMB is phase one of a $20 million, twophase project to complete emergency repairs 

of the tunnel. Phase one was allocated $2 million, while phase two entails enduring repair 

of the road surface throughout the Salang 

Tunnel. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE) has contracted with a civilian firm 

for phase two, which is to begin in the spring. 

Movement to the site for phase one began in 

August, and construction started on schedule on 1 September. The 605th Engineer 

Detachment Construction Management 

Team took the lead on the operation, which 

included elements of the 7th Engineer Battalion (Task Force Red Devils); the 1st Battalion, 142d Infantry Regiment (Task Force 

Hydra), assuming the security role; and 

the 10th Sustainment Brigade (Task Force 

Muleskinner) supplying logistical support. 

The operation was a collaboration between 

JTF Empire and Afghan engineers, with 

the U.S. Army providing equipment operators and horizontal engineers to train MPoW 

personnel to maintain the road. The Americans purchased gravel and heavy equipment, 

which were turned over to the Afghans. 

Initial key leader engagements established guidelines on cooperation and equipment availability. In addition to the typical 

language barrier and the limited number of 

linguists, issues such as pay, liability, and 

equipment also hampered progress. Once 

OMB began, it became obvious that more 

construction assets would be needed. The 

Army purchased 17 pieces of construction 

equipment for use during the project and 

to enable the MoPW to maintain the road 

through the winter. The construction effort was hard on 

the equipment. The removal of multiple layers of potholed 

asphalt inside the tunnel resulted in worn and damaged 

equipment every day.

In such a remote location, communications became more 

critical than usual. The JTF Empire communications chief 

worked with a staff of two, then remained on-site for the 

duration of the project to maintain the systems. Initially, 

communications were limited to radio and a satellite-based 

messaging system. A satellite data communications system 

providing secure and nonsecure data services, telephone 

capability, and secure video teleconference capability was 

A Soldier stands watch outside a patrol base by the Salang Tunnel during 

Operation Mountain Blade.
30 Engineer January–April 2013

added later. The system provided updates on project status, 

security-related information for force protection, and even 

morale and welfare support by helping Soldiers stay in touch 

with their families.

The Plunge Into Darkness

Due to the large volume of traffic though the pass, all 

construction was performed at night. Even with artificial light, visibility is limited 

during night time operations, increasing risks and decreasing worker 

ability to maintain safety standards. 

The task force experienced minor 

vehicle accidents with the construction 

equipment, even with ground guides in 

use. No guardrails are present on the 

treacherous mountain pass, elevating the risk of a vehicle plunging over

the edge.

Construction equipment was the 

most difficult obstacle that the task 

force had to overcome. Military and 

purchased equipment became nonmission-capable every night, presenting constant maintenance problems. 

Other issues included blown transmissions and alternators, dead batteries, failed fuel pumps, thrown tracks, 

broken windshields, broken cutting 

blades on graders, flat tires, civilian vehicle accidents, and 

severed fiber-optic cables. By working nonstop, OMB Soldiers kept the project from falling behind schedule.

Earlier repairs had used local materials extracted from the 

surrounding mountains, mostly dirt and rocks that weren’t 

suitable for a high-traffic road. JTF Empire arranged for the 

delivery of high-quality aggregate to establish an adequate 

subgrade and a maintainable road surface. More than 800 

JTF Empire Soldiers 

observe the area outside 

the north entrance to the 

Salang Tunnel.

Vehicles pass within inches of each other in the Salang Tunnel.
January–April 2013 Engineer 31

truckloads of base course 

and road surface aggregate, totaling 15,000 

cubic meters, were delivered. Some was used for 

immediate repairs before 

winter, while the remainder was stockpiled for 

use in phase two. Unusable road surface was 

removed from the work 

areas, averaging 10–20 

inches in depth. An 

aggregate road surface 

was then laid down. An 

asphalt transition ramp 

was constructed to merge 

the concrete road surface 

with the existing road 

surface of the tunnel, 

and severe potholes were 

repaired with asphalt. 

The engineers worked 

throughout the night in and around the tunnel, pausing regularly to allow through traffic. A continual stream 

of authorized traffic (such as emergency vehicles, wedding 

and funeral processions, government officials, and vehicles 

supporting other construction efforts) had to use the tunnel. Unauthorized vehicles also plagued construction efforts, 

since no strict limits had been established by the ministry 

traffic control personnel and vehicles could not be allowed to 

accumulate at the construction sites. Traffic and darkness 

were not the only adversaries to the engineers. The elements 

and environment exacted their toll on the Soldiers as well. 

The elevation resulted in many cases of altitude sickness 

and exposure. 

The Top of the World

Soldiers of Task Force Red Devils established a temporary patrol base on the north side of the tunnel. Using existing buildings on-site, the Soldiers provided a 

suitable area for mission command, equipment staging, and 

billeting. Initially, the staging and living site was austere, 

but within 2 weeks, engineers established latrine, shower, 

and laundry facilities, and water and trash contracts. The 

MoPW assisted with facilities for barracks, maintenance, 

supply storage, and vehicle staging. 

A route clearance patrol established initial security until 

Task Force Hydra assumed the project security mission. 

Task Force Muleskinner maintained supplies for the operation, conducting convoy and airdrop operations to the site. 

The remote location made routine ground supply difficult, 

so the majority of resupply was conducted with directional 

parachute drops.

Two snowstorms in September and nighttime temperatures below freezing didn’t cool Soldier spirits. Continual 

contact with local nationals and a sense of accomplishment 

kept morale high. Thanks to the MoPW, Soldiers had access 

to freshly baked bread and, occasionally, freshly cooked 

rice, beans, or lamb. Soldiers consumed the local food as a 

welcome supplement to the meals, ready-to-eat supplied by

the military.

Light at the End of the Tunnel

OMB completed and exceeded the original mission 

scope by repairing more than 500 meters of road 

inside each end of the tunnel 400 meters approaching each end of the tunnel, and 300 meters of additional 

repairs farther down the route. The entire project totaled 

more than 2,200 meters of road repair and was completed 26 

days ahead of schedule.

A site survey a month after completion confirmed that 

the project met its intended goal. The road surface was 

wearing exceptionally well, enabling safer traffic and setting conditions for the start of phase two of the USACE contract. USACE can do very minor maintenance on the base 

established by OMB to start putting down asphalt. OMB 

was successful at providing MoPW with the equipment and 

materials to continue necessary road maintenance through 

the winter months and beyond. It also trained Afghan equipment operators and increased their knowledge of best practices for repairing and maintaining a critical link in the 

Afghanistan road network.

Staff Sergeant Smith serves as the public affairs officer 

for JTF Empire. He has served in the U.S. Army Reserves for 

more than 16 years as a photojournalist, broadcast journalist, and public affairs noncommissioned officer.

Most road repair was performed at night because of heavy, daytime traffic.
32 Engineer January–April 2013

The Sapper Leader Course at Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri, is an intense, 28-day course that teaches 

engineer leaders (in grades specialist through sergeant first class and second lieutenant through captain) 

advanced skills in mobility, countermobility, and survivability. The course is divided into two phases: general subjects 

and patrolling. In the general subjects phase, students learn 

technical skills in—

■ Field craft.

■ Air operations.

■ Waterborne operations.

■ Mountaineering.

■ Demolitions. 

During the patrolling phase, students integrate these 

technical skills in a tactical environment while using smallunit tactics and battle drills to evaluate leadership abilities.

Starting in fiscal year 2013, Sapper Leader Course 

graduates were awarded the S-4 additional skill identifier. 

In fiscal year 2014, the S-4 identifier will be coded into engineer organizations throughout the U.S. Army. Given the 

current number of graduates in the field and the current 

course throughput, it will take a substantial time to fill the 

shortages. Engineer Regiment leaders should know what 

the course entails and how to choose the right Soldiers to 

attend and succeed.

The primary graduation discriminator at the course is 

physical fitness. In fiscal year 2012, 51 percent of attendees graduated from the course. Students who scored higher 

than 275 on the Army physical fitness test (37 percent of 

students) had a 62 percent graduation rate, while those 

who scored below 230 (9 percent of students) had only a 

31 percent graduation rate. The best way to set up Soldiers 

for success is to ensure that they are physically fit and properly trained before attending. Too often, a student’s training 

for the course consists of tying knots, brushing up on demolitions calculations, and conducting a sporadic physical training regimen. This is inadequate. 

By Captain John R. Chambers, Master Sergeant Jerimiah E. Gan, Sergeant First Class Matthew F. Simon, 

Sergeant First Class Matthew B. Zwolinski, and Sergeant Jeremy W. Rohrer
January–April 2013 Engineer 33

Within the course, the biggest hurdle for students is leading a successful patrol. Therefore, students must get out 

into the woods and practice small-unit leadership and battle 

drills before attendance. This can be accomplished during 

sergeants time training or company field training exercises 

or by setting up a Sapper train-up platoon with 

other prospective students within a unit. 

General Subjects

During the first phase of the course,

Soldiers spend 14 days balancing its

grueling physical demands with an academic load that throws a tremendous amount of 

information at them in a very short period. For a 

Soldier to succeed, the unit must be willing to provide at least 30 days of preparation for the physical, academic, and technical aspects of the course. 

Without quality preparation, students frequently 

become overwhelmed and struggle with the 

amount of information they are expected to learn. 

Due to the intense and fast-paced schedule, 

Soldiers are required to complete strenuous, 

daily training events with limited time for rest 

and recovery. The Soldier’s preparatory training 

should be consistently demanding, with minimal 

time for recovery between physical exertion and 

academic study. The physical training should consist of cardiovascular endurance events, 12-mile 

road marches with at least 40-pound burdens, and 

circuit training. This will allow leaders to accurately assess the Soldier’s physical and mental 

abilities. Intense physical training coupled with 

extensive classroom study that 

involves demonstrations, practical exercises, and examinations 

will create a challenging environment in which the Soldier 

must grasp information and 

perform. To succeed academically at the course, the Soldier 

needs proficiency in demolition 

calculations, mountaineering 

knots and anchor points, air 

operations, and basic medical 

techniques. A Soldier also needs 

a strong background in teambuilding and interpersonal 

skills. Soldiers with opportunities to gain knowledge and experience from additional schools 

(such as airborne, air assault, 

rappel master, mountain warfare, Ranger, urban mobility 

breacher, explosive ordnance 

clearance, or pathfinder) will 

have a solid foundation for

success.

To set up students for success, their leaders must give 

them the opportunity to prepare for the challenges they 

will face. The selection process must be strict and demanding, with a keen eye for sharp character traits, strong 

personal skills, and overall quality leadership potential. 

A “casualty” is transported down a 100-foot cliff face.

A Sapper student performs an equipment rappel down a 40-foot tower.

U.S. Army photo

Photo by Melissa Buckley
34 Engineer January–April 2013

Without these elements, Soldiers will have difficulty

succeeding in the general subjects phase and at the Sapper

Leader Course overall.

Patrolling

The Sapper Leader Course is one of the 

most demanding leadership schools that 

the Army offers. In the patrolling phase, 

students are expected to lead combat patrols by 

using engineer-specific skills and basic infantry tactics in a simulated combat environment 

where stress is induced by instructors who are 

well versed at pushing Soldiers to the edge of 

their comfort zones—and then a little farther. 

As if that weren’t enough, students lead patrols 

that are composed of peers (and often, superiors) and are expected to motivate the patrol to 

accomplish any mission, regardless of their collective abilities.

To succeed in patrolling, an understanding of the definition and principles of leadership is essential. Having an understanding of 

basic patrolling techniques before attending the 

course will help, but it is even more important 

that students be ready to lead. Many students 

come to the course for the wrong reasons, such 

as: My first sergeant made me; I want to wear a tab; 

It looked cool on TV. These are the wrong reasons. 

Potential Sappers need to arrive ready to prove that 

they are leaders. During train-up, a focus on improving existing leadership skills and self-confidence will 

add to the potential for success. Soldiers who are not 

confident or lack a command presence at their home 

station won’t fare well in the course. Students must 

be aggressive in their decisionmaking and be able to 

take initiative regardless of duty position.

Next, students need to arrive at the Sapper Leader 

Course with one focus: successful completion of the 

course. During the month leading up to their report 

date, students must ensure that their affairs are in 

order so that they can focus on success. The worst 

possible scenario is to work hard and complete 2 or 

3 weeks of the course and then have to return home 

for a foreseeable event. Preparation includes putting 

their bills on autopay and ensuring that appropriate family members have a power of attorney. Cell 

phones are not allowed at the course, and students 

will only be allowed to contact family members and 

their units in emergencies. 

Finally, motivation is often the most important 

factor that determines success in the course. Motivation is generated through a confidence in the 

knowledge of required skills, the ability to complete 

required physical events, and other internal factors. 

Students must know Skill Level 1 required tasks and 

doctrine-based tactics and techniques and be physically fit and ready for any challenge. With all of this in hand, 

students will be successful. 

Sapper students clear a trench system during their final mission.

Sapper students conduct a road-cratering mission.

U.S. Army photo

U.S. Army photo
January–April 2013 Engineer 35

To assess these qualities, 

leaders must put together a 

training program that gives 

potential students the opportunity to practice small-unit tactics 

and battle drills. It may be difficult to plan and coordinate this 

training at the company or platoon level if only one or two Soldiers from the unit are preparing 

for the course. Therefore, units 

must think outside the box and 

consider sending potential Sappers to a pre-Ranger course or 

coordinating with other units in 

their battalion, brigade, or division to create a Sapper train-up 

platoon that will take Soldiers 

into the woods to practice patrolling skills. The patrolling phase 

is 50 percent of the course, and 

neglecting this aspect in a training plan puts Soldiers at a 

huge disadvantage when they arrive at the course.

Medical

The Sapper Leader Course lasts a demanding 28 days, 

and students who take it lightly might either fail to 

meet their full potential or get dropped as a result 

of injury. The most common afflictions are musculoskeletal 

injuries involving the knees, ankles, or back. These injuries 

can result from bad luck, but more often occur due to overuse by an unprepared student. The best way to avoid these 

injuries is by pursuing a rigorous training regimen before 

attending the course. This will give a student the best chance 

of success with the physical aspects of the course and will 

serve as a preventive measure against avoidable musculoskeletal injuries. Of the 69 percent of students who scored 

below 230 on the Army physical fitness test and failed to 

graduate in fiscal year 2012, 35 percent were medical drops. 

Conversely, of the 38 percent of students who scored over 

275 on the test and failed to graduate, only 5 percent were 

medical drops. 

Students should focus mainly on short runs of 3 to 

5 miles or road marches of 6 to 12 miles. Runs should 

be conducted at a pace of 8 minutes per mile; rucksack 

marches should be conducted at a pace of 15 minutes per 

mile over rolling terrain. These events should be done 

5 days per week to prepare students for the constant beating that these types of events inflict. Often, students 

neglect this kind of train-up in order to avoid “over training.” While this is a possibility, students who listen to their 

body during training will have nothing to worry about. It’s 

better to go a little too far in training than not nearly far 

enough. 

In addition to running and rucksack marching, students should perform a muscular strength and conditioning program of Olympic lifts and fitness circuits involving 

push-ups, pull-ups, and abdominal exercises. This will build 

strength, muscle mass, and muscular endurance that will 

be keys to peak performance and health during training at 

the Sapper Leader Course. A few items that students should 

bring are sunscreen, petroleum jelly to prevent chafing, lip 

balm, foot powder, bandages, gauze, self-adhesive wrap, 

medical tape, and antibiotic ointment. These items will allow 

students to prevent and treat many small medical problems 

that are common inconveniences during the course. 

Conclusion

The Sapper Leader Course is the Engineer Regiment’s premier course to train small-unit, combat engineer leaders on the tactics, techniques, and 

procedures required to successfully support the maneuver 

commander. As such, unit leaders should do their part to 

select the right personnel to attend and should ensure that 

these Soldiers get an adequate train-up. This will ensure 

that the Soldiers have the best chance for success when 

they arrive for the course. 

Captain Chambers is the officer in charge of the Sapper 

Leader Course Detachment. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and holds a master’s degree from Missouri

University of Science and Technology in Rolla. 

Master Sergeant Gan is the senior noncommissioned officer at the Sapper Leader Course Detachment. 

Sergeant First Class Simon is the Sapper Leader Course 

patrolling committee chief. 

Sergeant First Class Zwolinski is the Sapper Leader 

Course general subjects committee chief. 

Sergeant Rohrer is a medic at the Sapper Leader Course. 

He is currently studying journalism at the University of 

Missouri–Columbia.

Sappers detonate a water impulse charge.

Photo by Melissa Buckley
36 Engineer January–April 2013

Publication 

Number

Title Date Description

(and Current Status)

ATP 3-34.22 Feb 09

FM 3-34 Aug 11

ATP 3-37.34 

(FM 5-103)

Survivability Operations Jun 85 This will be a full revision of FM 5-103, Survivability.

Status: To be published 3d quarter, FY 14.

Publication Revisions

Combat Engineering

ATP 3-34.20

(FM 3-34.210)

Explosive Hazard 

Operations

Mar 07 This will be a multi-Service, full revision of Field Manual (FM) 3-34.210, 

Explosive Hazards Operations.

Status: To be published 3d quarter, FY 13.

Engineer Operations—

Brigade Combat Team and 

Below

Engineer Operations 

This revision is pending Headquarters, Department of the Army, approval of 

the brigade engineer battalion.

Status: To be published 1st quarter, FY 14.

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence 

Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate

Concepts, Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division

Engineer ngineer Doctrine octrine Update pdate

ATP 3-34.23

(ATTP 3-34.23)

Engineer Operations—

Echelons Above Brigade 

Combat Team

Jul 10 This manual will undergo review and update as required.

Status: To be published 1st quarter, FY 14.

ATP 3-90.61 Brigade Special Troops 

Battalion

Dec 06 This manual will undergo review and update as required.

Status: To be published 3d quarter, FY 14. (FM 3-90.61)

This manual contains the “box top” as our doctrinal framework; integrates 

the three engineer disciplines of combat, general, and geospatial 

engineering; and introduces the four lines of engineer support for decisive 

actions.

Status: Final approved draft due 3d quarter, fiscal year (FY) 2013.

ATP 3-90.4

(ATTP 3-90.4)

Combined Arms Mobility

Operations

Aug 11 Status: Anticipate a change document to convert the manual from Army 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 3-90.4 to Army Techniques 

Publication (ATP) 3-90.4 1st quarter, FY 14.

ATP 3-90.8

(FM 3-90)

(FM 5-102)

(FM 90-7)

Combined Arms 

Countermobility

Operations

Jul 01

Mar 85

Sep 94

This will be a full revision that includes the consolidation of FM 3-90, 

Tactics; FM 5-102, Countermobility; and FM 90-7, Combined Arms 

Obstacle Integration. This will be a multi-Service manual that discusses 

countermobility and combined arms obstacle integration and their 

relationship to the combined arms defense and warfighting functions with 

regard to wide area security.

Status: To be published 4th quarter, FY 14.

ATP 3-90.37

(FM 3-90.119)

Combined Arms 

Improvised Explosive 

Device Defeat Operations

Sep 07 This will be a multi-Service, full revision of FM 3-90.119, Combined Arms 

Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations.

Status: To be published 2d quarter, FY 14.
January–April 2013 Engineer 37

Publication 

Number

Title Date Description

(and Current Status)

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence 

Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate

Concepts, Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division

Engineer ngineer Doctrine octrine Update

General Engineering

ATP 3-34.40

(FM 3-34.400)

General Engineering Dec 08 This manual will undergo review and update as required.

Status: To be published 4th quarter, FY 13.

ATP 3-37.10 Base Camps New

Notes: 

1. Current engineer publications can be downloaded from the Army Publishing Directorate Web site at <http://www.apd.army.mil>. The 

manuals discussed in this article are currently under development and/or recently published. Drafts may be obtained during the staffing 

process by contacting the Engineer Doctrine Branch at commercial (573) 563-0003, DSN 676-0003, or <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx

.cdidcodddengdoc@mail.mil>. The development status of these manuals was current as of 1 March 2013.

2. Items in parentheses are publication numbers of current publications, which will be superseded by the new number at the top of the 

entry. Multiple numbers in parentheses indicate consolidation into one manual.

ATP 3-34.81

(FM 3-34.170)

Engineer Reconnaissance Mar 08 This manual will undergo review and update as required.

Status: To be published 2d quarter, FY 14.

Geospatial Engineering

ATP 3-34.80

(FM 3-34.230)

Geospatial Engineering Mar 08 This manual will undergo review and update as required.

Status: To be published 2d quarter, FY 14.

This will be a multi-Service manual. It will be targeted for all branches (not 

a manual solely for the use of engineers). It is a compilation of TTP found in 

doctrine, lessons learned, and reference material that provides an integrated, 

systematic approach to base camps.

Status: To be published 1st quarter, FY 13.

This manual will undergo review and update as required.

Status: To be published 3d quarter, FY 13.

ATP 3-34.5

(FM 3-100.4)

Environmental 

Considerations

Feb 10

ATP 3-34.45

(FM 3-34.480)

Power Generation/

Distribution

Apr 07 This manual will undergo review; renaming from FM 3-34.480, Engineer Prime 

Power Operations; and update as required. 

Status: To be published 3d quarter, FY 14.

Currently, 28 of 30 Army doctrine publications/Army doctrine reference publications have been published. Every Army professional should have a basic knowledge of our fundamental principles since they rarely change quickly. They can be downloaded 

from the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) Web site at <http://www.apd.army.mil>.
38 Engineer January–April 2013

As the troop surge in Afghanistan ended in September 2012 and the number of International Security .Assistance Force personnel was reduced in Regional 

Command–South, commanders in Kandahar Province were 

faced with an unsustainable amount of tactical infrastructure. The numerous company- and platoon-size bases that 

had been critical to the surge became a hindrance that tied 

forces to base security and limited the number of troops 

available to patrol. As the 2d Stryker Brigade Combat 

Team, 2d Infantry Division, addressed this challenge, it 

became clear that engineers would play a large role in the 

brigade mission. The 562d Engineer Company was tasked to 

reinforce the brigade base closure efforts and was assigned 

to lead the two largest base closure missions.

The 562d was initially assigned to close Forward Operating Base Dashtu, a battalion-size base in the Arghandab 

River Valley. After successfully closing that base, the 

company was assigned 

to transition Forward 

Operating Base Sarkari 

Karez (formerly Forward 

Operating Base Ramrod) 

to the Afghan Ministry 

of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock. Both 

bases required significant horizontal and vertical construction efforts, 

in addition to major logistical efforts and heavy 

security requirements. 

Over the course of the 

projects, the 562d Engineer Company knocked 

down 6,000 meters of 

walls; demolished 12 

buildings; transferred

49 buildings; remediated

all environmental issues; 

and shipped 621 containers, 2,930 concrete barriers, and 

more than 1,600 truckloads of U.S. government property.

The key to the company’s success on those projects was 

the implementation of effective project management practices. The global standard practices of the Project Management Institute provided a tested and effective framework 

to the operations. Working within the standardized project 

management process groups taught lessons in the following areas:

Initiating. In the initiating process group, it is critical 

to fully understand the project. Leaders should know the 

mission objectives and constraints before setting foot on 

the base and should have knowledge of the project stakeholders. The project manager must then conduct a detailed 

leader reconnaissance of the base as early as possible. The 

initiating process group will feed the planning processes, 

By Captain Noah Cordova

Engineers bury a structure.
January–April 2013 Engineer 39

and the leader should have the 

following takeaways from the

reconnaissance:

■ Maps.

■ Current contracts.

■ Work in progress.

■ Tenant units with exit

timelines.

■ Security requirements.

■ Available enablers.

■ Project timeline.

Planning. During initial 

planning after the leader reconnaissance, units should assess 

the base sewage, water, electricity, and trash requirements to 

determine the baseline life support systems. Food, fuel, communications, and materials-handling equipment must also be 

deliberately managed as the base closure progresses. Due 

to the rapid changes that can occur during base closure or 

transition, these services must be compared to the current 

population over time. Closing a dining facility provided by 

the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program while a base still 

supports a population of 1,000 personnel will be a significant emotional event if there are only three cooks on hand. 

Basic services typically don’t get much attention—until they

don’t work.

The development of a detailed scope of work that is easy 

to share and understand is also critical to the planning process. A best practice from the 562d Engineer Company closure experience was to produce a scope of work that was 

visually laid out in a map format, with each major task 

identified on the map and marked with a standardized 

label. A standardized base document could then be sent to 

all stakeholders, clearly explaining a complex plan to people 

who had never visited the site. A 50-page statement of work 

in document form may work well for contracting, but not 

when explaining the location of water wells to the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers.

Executing. The executing process taught that maximizing the output of project enablers required a full understanding of what they can do and how they can work together. 

A movement control team can order a limited amount of 

trucks, but a mobile redistribution team can reduce transportation requirements by destroying nonrecoverable items 

on-site. A horizontal construction platoon can demolish 

foamed structures and stockpile rubble for shipment to a 

hazmat collection point, but an environmental remediation 

control team can advise them on the safe, on-site disposal of 

the materials. By combining the efforts of different enablers, 

units can reduce the resources required and maximize the 

outputs for the base closure project. 

During execution, it is also important to predict and 

manage potential changes. Over the course of a months-long 

project that relies on acceptance by multiple agencies of the 

Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, significant changes can be expected. To minimize the impact of the 

changes, units must identify tasks that are common to all 

possible courses of action. Those tasks can be executed while 

the overall scope of work goes back to the drawing board 

for changes.

Monitoring and Controlling. Monitoring and controlling processes continue throughout the project. A well 

thought-out system in this process group will identify issues 

early and then help identify solutions. A huge takeaway 

from these projects was the importance of reporting through 

the owner of the operational environment in a way that 

clearly showed the progress of the project. Because the 562d 

reported issues through the daily commander’s update brief, 

the task force commander had up-to-date information on the 

project and frequently provided additional assets to support 

the project.

Closing. In the closing process group, units must compile 

lessons learned and develop recommended improvements to 

the process. By sharing the lessons learned with the brigade 

and division engineer leaders, systems improve and each 

closure becomes easier than the one before. 

Captain Cordova is the commander of the 562d Engineer 

Company, currently deployed to support Operation Enduring 

Freedom. He is a graduate of the Engineer Captains Career 

Course. He holds a bachelor’s degree in management information systems from the Florida Institute of Technology and 

a master’s degree in geological engineering from Missouri 

University of Science and Technology at Rolla.

A movement control team loads containers on Afghan trucks.
40 Engineer January–April 2013

The last thing an officer 

expects after attending the 

Engineer Captains Career 

Course is to take command of a company and then immediately deploy 

its most experienced and talented 

leaders to Afghanistan as advisors. 

Even more unexpected is to leave 

the company behind to lead a 12-

person team to advise an Afghan 

kandak, or battalion-size element. 

My unit, the 2d Brigade Combat 

Team (BCT), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Task Force 

Strike, was one of the first BCTs to 

be assigned this mission set. 

The Train-Up

At first, the mission was disheartening to a company.commander just 3 months

into that assignment. The new

mission would remove and deploy 

all company noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who served as platoon sergeants and above, which would have a negative 

impact on the behavior of the lower-enlisted Soldiers. 

However, an intense training cycle for the new advisor 

team (later called a security force assistance advisor team

[SFAAT]) began. It consisted of 2 months of predeployment 

training that included— 

■ Weapons familiarization and qualification.

■ Casualty care.

■ Close-quarters marksmanship.

■ Call for fire through the use of close combat air support.

■ A comprehensive situational training exercise. 

The list does not include the 120 hours of classroom training conducted on topics ranging from insider threat to the 

operation of Harris radio systems. When the train-up was 

complete, the advisors headed for the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The company provided 

most of one team and augmented other teams with engineer 

subject matter experts.

During the bus ride from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 

team members read through the list of required reading 

to prepare for training at Tigerland, the advisor academy 

conducted by the 162d Infantry Brigade at Fort Polk. The 

academy consisted of language and cultural training, simulated key leader engagements with retired Afghan National 

Army (ANA) members, and the role of SFAATs on the battlefield. The team learned that “security force assistance is the 

unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host 

nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate 

authority.”1 U.S. advisors should use a mutually developed bond of trust to provide their ANA counterparts with 

expert opinions, advice, and counsel. They deploy to serve as 

observers/controllers for the ANA. 

As the 12-person team headed to “the box” for its rotation, 

members did not know what to expect or how they would 

be tactically employed. The team advised approximately 

By Captain Colby K. Krug

When Combat Advising 

Equals Company Command

Afghan sappers tie a shaped charge into a ring main.

W
January–April 2013 Engineer 41

eight “ANA soldiers” and 

four “ANA staff officers,” 

who were in fact all young 

U.S. Soldiers. The team 

members taught a few 

classes to their ANA counterparts and were also used 

as a commando strike force 

during raids. Since the job 

of the team in Afghanistan 

would be more like observers/controllers, the training might have been better 

if it had concentrated more 

on those skills. A successful 

team requires 12 extroverts 

who can speak clearly, foster relationships, buy into 

the mission, and tactically 

protect the group by offering 

360° security. 

By the end of the rotation, some personnel changes had 

to be made to meet those requirements.

The Deployment

The 12-person element took the name Team Beast and 

was told by the division commander that it was being 

sent to help shift security duties in Afghanistan to 

the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The key tasks 

laid out were simple: 

■ Provide full-time, focused attention to ANA counterparts.

■ Develop genuine relationships with them.

■ Create a plan that applied Afghan solutions, ensuring

that the way forward was “Afghan sustainable.”

■ Understand ANA systems; and advise ANA personnel

to use their outside entities such as the Operations

Coordination Center–Provincial, the Afghan Uniformed

Police, the Afghan Border Police, and the Afghan Local 

Police.

■ Integrate coalition enablers to prevent catastrophic

failure.

The Relationship

Trust is the key to any good relationship; but unfortunately, trust cannot be built overnight. From the start, team members got to know their ANA counterparts as people, gave them honest and direct answers, 

and gained their trust and loyalty on the battlefield through 

partnered operations. The relationship did not start easily. 

Initially, the team was only asked to help provide bottled 

water, air conditioners, and generator parts. However, the 

team stuck to its guns and remembered why it was deployed 

to Afghanistan. Team Beast was there to advise, assist, and 

train the Afghan kandak; to increase its operational effectiveness; and to help it enable its brigade. 

It only took a few rounds of drinking tea and breaking 

bread with their counterparts before Team Beast Soldiers 

were standing in front of the kandak formation and being 

introduced to the Afghan soldiers. The advisors at the company level made terrific headway in planning missions, conducting maintenance, coaching various types of training, 

encouraging religious and education classes, and sharing 

risk on missions with their counterparts. The U.S. Soldiers 

saw the Afghan command climate and attitude toward them 

change before their eyes. 

Initial Basic Approach

Team Beast used the warfighting functions to help the 

kandak leaders and staff solve their own problems, 

especially in the mission command, enabler, and 

sustainment lines of effort. The team started with a personnel asset inventory and created a book with a photograph 

of every ANA soldier in the unit. Next, the team helped 

the kandak staff establish a basic battle rhythm. The company advisors kicked the effort into high gear by developing 

“train the trainer” programs. The idea was that the advisors should build up the Afghan NCO corps, thus empowering the backbone of the ANA formations. The next step 

was to get the companies to conduct an inventory without 

U.S. Soldiers counting the equipment. The advisors focused 

on the importance of a sense of responsibility at every level 

throughout the chain of command. Soon, the idea caught on 

and pride became an important factor on future missions. 

Advice for Future Advisors

As in any deployment, future advisors will find some 

things that work and others that don’t. Along the 

.mission command line of effort, Team Beast found 

that its kandak was doing an effective job of providing its 

brigade with engineers (survivability, countermobility, 

and mobility support), fire support, and reconnaissance 

Donkeys resupply an observation post in Kunar Province.
42 Engineer January–April 2013

capability. Lessons from Team Beast’s deployment yield the 

following advice to SFAAT advisors:

■ Find parallels to U.S. Army methods, and try to model

the Afghan units on those parallels. Understand that

there will be cultural differences, accept “sustainable,”

and move on. 

■ Understand the ANSF. Realize that Afghan soldiers, 

police, and border patrol personnel are born warriors.

They can move up mountains like billy goats, and they

have an innate talent for employing infantry tactics, since

they were born in a war-torn country. They do not need to

be taught these skills.

■ Develop the NCO backbone of the ANA. Advisors at the

kandak level should advocate literacy training and skills

such as map reading for the NCOs. These classes should

then be taught to the soldiers by their high-speed NCOs,

just as in the U.S. Army.

■ Remember that people, not paperwork, are most important. U.S. advisors cannot solve ANA logistical

problems with supply request forms. It requires human

interaction with the ANSF to get ANA requisitions

sourced. The advisor’s job is to take the ANA soldiers

to the point of distribution and show them how important

it is to make contact and know who to call to get what

is needed.

■ Put soldiers first. At the end of the day, the job is all

about leaders taking care of soldiers. Advisors must make 

it a priority to work with the ANSF to provide decent 

facilities, working equipment, and a worthwhile mission

for the ANA soldiers. Advisors always have the same 

questions: Why can the ANSF not run their own bases?

Why is there such a high desertion rate? Why are there 

insider attacks? These questions are simple to answer:

efforts have been so focused “outside the wire” that it has 

not been a priority to show lower levels what is needed to 

run a facility. 

Conclusion

The Nation’s leadership got advising 

and assisting right in the Afghanistan transition. In this case, an 

SFAAT came from a unit with an established 

chain of command, creating the environment needed to make teams take ownership 

for the results of their counterparts. It also 

provided an effective observer/controller net 

where raters, senior raters, and reviewers 

know their subordinates and can apply necessary amounts of pressure to get results. The 

SFAAT model also created a unity of effort 

that is critical to the mission set when there 

are many hands in the pot. Leaders who are 

offered the opportunity to lead such a critical team at such a critical juncture in the 

Nation’s history should embrace the opportunity from the beginning.

Endnote:

1

Field Manual 3.07.1, Security Force Assistance, 1 May 2009.

Captain Krug is the commander of A Company, 2d Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 

2d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne 

Division (Air Assault). He is a graduate of the 

Ranger School, the Airborne School, the Air 

Assault School, the Sapper Leader Course, 

and the Engineer Captains Career Course. 

He holds a bachelor’s degree in accounting from St. Bonaventure University and 

a master’s degree in engineering management from Missouri University of Science 

and Technology. Team Beast Soldiers replace a tower on the corner of their combat outpost with help from ANA engineers.
January–April 2013 Engineer 43

Historically, the primary role of the combat engineer has been twofold: to enhance the mobility of friendly forces and to impede the enemy’s ability 

to maneuver on the battlefield. Whereas there have been 

numerous developments in the realm of U.S. Army assured 

mobility operations, the countermobility engineer function 

has become increasingly difficult in the common operating 

environment (COE). While it is still true that countermobility operations use or enhance the effects of natural and 

man-made obstacles to deny the enemy freedom of movement and maneuver, today’s Sapper must be prepared to 

adjust the countermobility paradigm. This article aims to 

serve as an addendum to Colonel Robert F. Kirby’s 1990 

Engineer bulletin article, “Why Study Military Geography?” 

which recommended that “Engineer terrain expertise . . . 

evolve to military geography expertise in order to execute 

our geographically diverse engineering missions.”1 Although 

this advice was prescient when it was published more than

20 years ago in Engineer, the constraints of the modern battlefield make it even more imperative that we embrace it today.

Since at least the 13th century A.D., when Chinese 

military engineers under the Song Dynasty first developed 

crude explosive mines activated by trip wire, armies have 

employed land mines in nearly every military engagement 

across the globe.2 The modern use of land mines began in 

earnest during World War I and has been the cornerstone 

of engineer countermobility doctrine ever since. In the most 

recent conflicts of the 21st century, nonstate actors have also 

demonstrated the combat utility of mines and their brethren, the improvised explosive device. The cost of land mines 

is low in relation to their effectiveness. At first glance, land 

mines are the “perfect soldiers,” as Khmer Rouge general 

and dictator Pol Pot purportedly said. They never sleep or 

eat and are always ready, capable, and lethal.3

But because the land mine is indiscriminate, the United 

States and countries across the globe have become more

sensitive to their human cost over the last 30 years. Long 

after armed conflicts end, unexploded land mines continue 

to claim the lives of school children, livestock, and other 

innocents. Recognizing the malign effects of land mines 

on civilians and friendly forces, 160 states have signed the 

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their 

Destruction.4 Even the United States and other nonsignatories to the treaty have refined their design and implementation of mines to limit their use in warfare.5

 In ceding the 

most effective countermobility asset to our adversaries, we 

have fundamentally degraded this component of combat 

power and lost an essential combat multiplier.

Because U.S. forces are no longer authorized to employ 

persistent land mines, nonpersistent scatterable mines are 

the only deployable land mine systems currently in the U.S. 

inventory. The following systems comprise the family of 

scatterable mines:

■ Modular-pack mine system.

■ Area-denial artillery munitions.

■ Remote antiarmor mines.

■ Volcano multiple-delivery mine system.

■ Gator air-dropped mine system.

Each of these systems can be effective in achieving the 

intended obstacle effects of a maneuver commander, but it 

appears that doctrine has not kept pace with the COE. In 

implementing the family of scatterable mines, the primary 

responsibility for the deployment of land mines has shifted 

away from the engineer and toward a combined arms team 

that includes field artillery, combat aviation, and the U.S. 

Air Force. The engineers may still maintain responsibility 

for countermobility, but their ability to deploy land mines, 

hitherto the weapon of choice, is constrained by the internal priorities of Service branches that lack a doctrinal 

foundation in the tenets of countermobility. Army Doctrine 

By Captain Nicholas Cosmas
44 Engineer January–April 2013

Publication 3-09, Fires,

6

 fails to mention land mines; while 

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-09, Fires,

7

 fails to 

list the employment of scatterable mines as a role, core competency, or critical capability of the field artillery. The aviation communities of the Army and Air Force demonstrate 

a similar lack of focus on the deployment of land mines in 

support of countermobility operations, yet it remains a nostrum among doctrine writers that mine warfare is countermobility. While land mines have certainly played a

significant role in countermobility in the past, the future

will necessarily be far more nuanced. Field Manual

90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration, offers a mere 

seven pages of information on the use of obstacles other than 

land mines, while devoting far more copy to covering land 

mine warfare in exhaustive detail.8 Even new drafts of Army 

and U.S. Marine Corps doctrine fail to account for the challenges that the COE presents to the traditional view of countermobility given the inherent limitations of mine warfare. 

Today’s battlefield presents many challenges to countermobility operations. U.S. and international law restrict the 

use of land mines, while budget and logistical constraints at 

all levels limit the availability of nonpersistent scatterable 

mines and networked munitions. Meanwhile, uniformed and 

irregular enemies seek to conduct operations in heavily populated and urban terrain in order to limit U.S. advantages. 

As the Engineer Regiment continues to revise countermobility and combined arms integration doctrine, commanders and their staffs must realize the potential negative impacts that obstacles can have on noncombatants, 

the environment, and the ability to conduct stability operations. They should employ obstacles judiciously to create the 

desired effects without excessive collateral damage. 

Though the limitations of land mines in the COE are 

real, current doctrine seems almost wholly focused on promoting mine warfare to the detriment of all other military obstacle efforts. Road cratering, rubbling, and preconstructed obstacles get short shrift, while mine warfare 

remains the centerpiece of Army countermobility doctrine. 

It is up to the commander on the ground to understand the 

reinforcing effects of the abatis, wire obstacle, dam breach, 

or road crater without the benefit of an updated engineer 

framework. The guidelines are scant for using these methods to reinforce natural and man-made cultural obstacles. 

Instead, current doctrine still advocates the use of selfdeactivating and self-destructing land mines. It is clear that 

the Engineer Regiment must actively seek to develop a new 

countermobility paradigm that aligns with the souring 

public sentiment toward land mines and the inherent design 

flaws of land mines that render them ineffective in many 

military mission sets today. The basis for this new doctrine 

ought to rest within a geographical framework. As Colonel Kirby implored, “the study of military geography must 

become as much a part of our professional development as 

tactical support, engineering design, and project management.”9

 Whereas Field Manual 90-7 supposes that “the technology used to create obstacles may continue to become more 

complex,” terrain is still one of the most significant assets 

that commanders have at their disposal.10 Terrain evaluation is and should be the first step in the development of a 

countermobility plan. Even more so than in the past, commanders today must take full advantage of existing natural 

and cultural obstacles and the restrictive nature of battlefield terrain in an increasingly urbanized world. In doing so, 

commanders can reduce demand for the limited quantities 

of scatterable mines and networked munitions in the Army 

inventory and accomplish missions without tarnishing the 

U.S. image abroad. 

The conditions in the COE call for a countermobility 

framework that emphasizes the ability to accurately predict when and where enemy attacks will occur by conducting more thorough analyses of the human and physical terrain. Like the engineer of bygone eras, today’s Sapper must 

possess a deep understanding of slope, soil composition 

and trafficability, religious beliefs, weather, climate, cultural artifacts, and social mores among other dimensions so 

that commanders can be more precise in how and where to 

employ their diminished countermobility capabilities. Just 

as we expect the engineer to accurately establish a drainage 

plan for a forward operating base, it is imperative that the 

engineer understand that a religious group may regard a 

certain mountain as sacred before beginning construction or 

destruction in that spot. As Colonel Kirby wrote, “mere data 

of physical geography (position, topography, resources, population, and climate) have no intrinsic political or military 

significance. Such data acquire military geographic or political significance only when they are related to some frame of 

assumption as to what is to be attempted by whom, when, 

where, and in conjunction with what adversaries, allies, and 

neutrals.” To be of use to the maneuver commander, these 

raw data “must be communicated in a timely manner and 

in a form which supports the decision.”11 The benefit of the 

geographical perspective to the commander is that it serves 

to synthesize relevant spatial markers and inform the 

decisionmaking process. A geographical perspective

“The conditions in the COE call for a countermobility framework that emphasizes the ability to accurately predict when 

and where enemy attacks will occur by conducting more 

thorough analyses of the human and physical terrain.”
January–April 2013 Engineer 45

improves the way that engineers conduct countermobility 

and will improve assured mobility and refocus threat reduction efforts. 

In the past, mine warfare nearly usurped the full power 

of countermobility as a way to attack the enemy’s ability to 

execute its plan. However, the sun has set on the era of land 

mines. War in the era of persistent conflict will increasingly 

be waged before a public that tolerates precious little collateral damage to civilian populations and infrastructure. 

Unfortunately for military planners and strategists who 

would prefer to continue using land mines as they always 

have, in the court of public opinion, the use of land mines 

is tantamount to targeting civilians. In such an environment, commanders need Sappers who can think about the 

full capabilities of the Engineer Regiment to counter the 

mobility of rivals. We must restore the premium once placed 

on geographical competence, and engineer doctrine and programs of instruction should reflect this.

Endnotes:

1Robert F. Kirby, “Why Study Military Geography?” 

Engineer, October 1990, Volume 20, No. 3.

2

Joseph Needham, Tsien Tsuen-hsuin, Wang Ling, and 

Lu Gwei-Djen, Science and Civilisation in China, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993.

3

Stuart Hughes, “Cambodia’s Landmine Victims,” BBC 

News, 11 November 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world

/asia-pacific/3259891.stm>, accessed on 30 November 

2012. 

4International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Treaty 

Basics,” <http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Treaty/MBT

/Treaty-Basics>, accessed on 2 December 2012. 

5

Presidential Decision Directive 48 (PDD-48), “AntiPersonnel Landmines (APL),” 26 June 1996.

6

Army Doctrine Publication 3-09, Fires, 31 August 2012. 

7

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-09, Fires,

31 August 2012.

8

Field Manual 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration, 29 September 1994.

9

Kirby, 2012.

10Field Manual 90.7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration, 29 September 1994.

11Kirby, 2012.

Captain Cosmas is the commander of B Company, 

31st Engineer Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He is 

a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and holds a master’s degree in engineering management from Missouri University of Science and Technology in Rolla. 

’

Engineer is a professional-development bulletin designed to provide a forum for exchanging information and ideas within the Army 

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Articles should be concise, straightforward, and in the active voice. 

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Engineer is published three times a year: April (article deadline 

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The Engineer Writer’ s guide
46 Engineer January–April 2013

During spring 2012, the 132d Engineer Company 

(Multirole Bridge), California Army National 

Guard, arrived at Camp Leatherneck, Helmand 

Province, Afghanistan. The highly 

trained engineer unit from northern California immediately took up 

its duties of providing personnel and 

equipment to transport, assemble, disassemble, retrieve, inspect, and maintain all standard U.S. Army and North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization bridge 

systems in the Afghanistan Combined 

Joint Operations Area. The primary 

panel bridging systems used throughout Afghanistan by International Security Assistance Forces cater to a wide 

variety of military and civilian vehicles, including those with low ground 

clearance. The steel structures assembled from prefabricated sections give 

coalition forces and Afghan civilians 

greater freedom of movement throughout Afghanistan’s challenging terrain. 

Other bridging systems maintained, constructed, and inspected 

by the 132d Engineers include the improved ribbon, dry 

support, and rapidly emplaced military bridges, as well as 

civilian bridges. Toward the end of April, engineers from the 

By First Lieutenant Jose D. Torres

132d Engineer Company “River Rats”

Bridge and Fight in Afghanistan

Soldiers from 1st Platoon repair a bridge on Highway One.
January–April 2013 Engineer 47

2d Platoon were assigned to man 

the improved ribbon bridge already 

in place across the Helmand River. 

This type of bridge is the premier 

wet-gap crossing option for distances exceeding the limit of other 

tactical bridges. The bridge allows 

coalition forces to cross the river 

even during flood seasons. During 

the rest of the year, vehicles can 

ford the stream.

The 132d “River Rats” have conducted emergency and deliberate 

bridging operations with different 

bridging systems in every Afghan 

regional command. In addition, the 

132d is occasionally tasked with 

nonbridging missions, such as security for gravel deliveries in western 

Kandahar Province. During that 

mission, the gravel security team 

supported Regional Command–

South units with the safe and 

successful delivery of 12,360 tons of 

gravel for road construction.

The year 2012 was a busy year 

for the entire company, especially for the Soldiers of 1st Platoon. Soon after arrival, they conducted seven bridge repairs 

along the Highway One “Ring Road” from Herat in Regional 

Command–West to Paktia Province in Regional Command–

East. A short time later, the Soldiers emplaced their first 

10-bay Acrow modular bridge in southern Afghanistan. 

With little break in the action, they went on to emplace 9- 

and 8-bay Acrow bridges and a pair of 5-bay Mabey bridges. 

They also removed a 10-bay Acrow bridge, a 15-bay Mabey 

bridge, and two rapidly emplaced bridges and repaired six 

nonstandard bridges along Highway One. In total, the 1st 

Platoon engineers repaired or replaced more than 30 bridges 

in less than 180 days.

The Soldiers of the 2d Platoon were no less challenged. 

They emplaced two rapidly emplaced bridges and a 6-bay 

Mabey bridge. Other bridging operations included the 

removal of a 5-bay, medium-girder bridge and the repair of 

20 line-of-communication bridges along Highway One. The 

Soldiers of the 2d Platoon have repaired or emplaced more 

than 30 bridges since their arrival in the Afghanistan theater of operations.

The unsung heroes in the Support Platoon also maintained a high operational tempo by providing solid preventive maintenance checks and services for mission-critical 

bridging equipment and tactical vehicles. From start to 

finish, the Support Platoon consistently maintained the 

company equipment readiness rate at 98 percent or higher. 

This was no small achievement, considering that the platoon performed maintenance on more than 900 pieces of 

serviceable equipment, two and a half times the normal 

multirole bridge company complement. The Support Platoon 

also provided jobsite security personnel and heavy equipment operators for more than 50 bridge repairs, removals, 

and emplacements. This allowed the company bridge crewmen to do what they do best—build bridges—while the 

Support Platoon conducted heavy-lift crane operations and 

secured bridge sites during bridge-building missions. 

Two Support Platoon members had the privilege of partnering with the Afghan National Army, providing training in 

the maintenance and operation of heavy equipment, including the hydraulic excavator, bucket loader, D7 bulldozer, 

grader, backhoe loader, dump truck, and 30-ton crane. Support Platoon trainers worked at many forward operating 

bases, instructing members of the Afghan National Army on 

tasks such as clearing and grubbing, road grading, cutting 

and filling, and quarry and haul operations. Over 6 months, 

five classes of specialized Afghan National Army equipment 

operators graduated.

The Afghanistan wet season and subsequent spring runoff will increase the water volume at numerous wet-gap 

bridge sites and erode embankments at others. Whatever 

the conditions or mission requirements, the 132d Engineer 

Company River Rats will be up to the “bridge and fight” 

challenge.

First Lieutenant Torres is the executive officer of the 132d 

Engineer Company (Multirole Bridge). He holds a bachelor’s 

degree in civil engineering from the University of the Pacific 

and is a registered engineer in training. He is a graduate of 

the Engineer Basic Officer Leader Course.

Soldiers from the 132d Engineer Company emplace a 5-bay Mabey bridge.
48 Engineer January–April 2013

Field Manual (FM) 1-02, Operational Terms and 

Graphics,1 defines a military operation as “A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military 

mission,” and the operations process as the “activities performed during operations: plan, prepare, and execute with 

continuous assessment.” Contrast these definitions with the 

Project Management Institute® definition of a project as “a 

temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique product, 

service, or result,” and project management as the “application of knowledge, skills, tools, and techniques to project 

activities to meet the project requirements.” A commander 

or staff officer may be led to believe that the operations process and project management are two separate approaches 

to the same idea. This belief, however, could limit their planning capabilities.

This article will argue that these are not two separate 

takes on the same idea, but rather that project management 

is a broad approach while the operations process is a specific 

set of techniques and procedures developed by the military 

that fits within the Project Management Body of Knowledge®

(PMBOK).2 Since project management is a broader look, it 

can be used by planners to enhance analysis and planning. 

When viewed this way, it is easy to see the value and utility 

of studying and employing project management at the unit 

level. This study can be accomplished through an officer or 

noncommissioned officer professional development program.

Project management is often part of the required curriculum at many civilian undergraduate and graduate institutions. It is most common in engineering and business administration programs. As a result, many commissioned officers 

are already familiar with the principles of project management and can serve as subject matter experts for unit level 

training. Commissioned, warrant, and noncommissioned 

officers serving in command and staff roles who are not formally trained will greatly benefit from such training.

The value of using project management to enhance the 

operations process is most obvious in planning stability 

operations, support operations, and operations that are 

not unique to the military, such as formal balls, community outreach programs, or Family Readiness Group activities. The primary planning mechanism in the operations 

process—the military decisionmaking process (MDMP)—is 

primarily designed for, and is most effective in, planning 

offensive and defensive operations, though it is applicable 

to all military operations. There are specific aspects of 

PMBOK that enhance the MDMP, some of which are highlighted below.

Similarities

Despite some significant vocabulary differences, 

studying the PMBOK at a unit level will be a familiar process to most planners. The PMBOK and 

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, Unified Land 

Operations3 break down each process into phases. Army 

Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0 divides the operations 

process into the following four phases, or mission command 

activities:

■ Plan.

■ Prepare.

■ Execute.

■ Assess. 

The PMBOK breaks down project management into the 

following five phases, or process groups:

■ Initiating.

■ Planning.

■ Executing.

■ Monitoring and controlling.

■ Closing. 

By Captain Kyle P. Moore
January–April 2013 Engineer 49

In both breakdowns, phases overlap in time. In addition, 

both processes explain the phases as cyclical during the life 

of a project or military operation. Figure 1 outlines where 

most of the tasks of each process overlap.

Project management and the MDMP use a series of 

inputs, tools (or processes), and outputs to maximize efficiency. Many of the inputs, tools, and outputs are similar in 

nature. For this reason, Soldiers familiar with MDMP will 

grasp the concepts in the PMBOK very quickly. See Figure 2

for an example.

Differences

Project management is divided into 42 processes. They 

are organized into the five process groups named 

above, but are further organized into nine knowledge areas. Many of the knowledge areas, such as project 

human resource management and project risk management, describe existing command and staff functions. Some 

of the project management processes are not addressed in 

the operations process, but are addressed in other Army 

doctrine. The project management process of “perform 

quality assurance,” for example, is addressed at length in 

Army Regulation 750-1, Army Materiel Maintenance Policy.

4

An organization studying the PMBOK adds the most 

value by concentrating on the project management processes that are not a particular focus of the operations process, MDMP, or other Army doctrine. While many talented 

commanders and staffs will include the concepts of the 

PMBOK without formal training, the deliberate approach in 

the PMBOK will improve the efficiency and completeness of 

the unit planning efforts.

Of the 42 project management processes, the following 

will have the most impact when used in conjunction with 

existing Army doctrine and will be discussed in greater 

detail: 

■ Identify stakeholders.

■ Manage stakeholder expectations.

■ Estimate costs.

■ Determine budget.

■ Perform quantitative risk analysis.

Identify stakeholders. A stakeholder is defined as 

a “person or organization that is actively involved in the 

project, or whose interests may be positively or negatively affected by execution or completion of the project. 

Figure 1

Figure 2
50 Engineer January–April 2013

A stakeholder may also exert influence over the project . . .”5

Typical stakeholder identification in a military operation is 

accomplished by a METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain and 

weather, troops and support available, time available, and 

civil considerations) analysis. The most difficult stakeholders to identify are often part of the civil considerations. Army 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 5-0.1, Commander and 

Staff Officer Guide, states that “The [assistant chief of staff, 

civil affairs operations] ([civil affairs operations officer]) 

ensures each war-gamed [course of action] effectively integrates civil considerations (the “C” of METT-TC) The civil 

affairs operations officer considers not only tactical issues 

but also sustainment issues.” This officer assesses how operations affect civilians and estimates the requirements for 

essential stability tasks commanders might have to undertake based on the ability of the unified action. Host nation 

support and care of dislocated civilians are of particular concern. The civil affairs operations officer’s analysis considers 

how operations affect public order and safety, the potential 

for disaster relief requirements, noncombatant evacuation 

operations, emergency services, and the protection of culturally significant sites.”6

The challenge for many battalions is that there is not a 

civil affairs operations officer assigned or attached to the 

unit. These duties then fall to other staff members who are 

not trained in civil affairs. Practice in stakeholder identification can bridge the knowledge gap between the formal training that a Soldier with a civil affairs military occupational 

specialty receives and any other Soldier. 

Stakeholder analysis also makes a significant impact 

in operations that are not unique to the military. Knowing 

the demographics of family readiness group members will 

help leaders plan events that are fun and age-appropriate 

for most of the group. Bringing a caterer into the planning 

process for a formal ball at the right time can mean the difference between a good event and a great event. Stakeholder 

analysis is the means to this end.

Manage stakeholder expectations. This is defined 

as “the process of communicating and working with stakeholders to meet their needs and addressing issues as they 

occur.”7 An output of the “identify stakeholders” process 

above is also a key input for this process. The stakeholder 

management strategy “defines an approach to increase the 

support and minimize the negative impact of stakeholders 

throughout the entire project life cycle.”8 The stakeholder 

management strategy is a list of stakeholders, their views 

of the project or military operation, the expectations of the 

planners, the impact of the stakeholder, and a strategy 

of how to gain support or reduce obstacles. See Figure 3 

for a sample stakeholder analysis matrix for a battalion 

formal ball.

Managing expectations for all moderate- and high-impact 

stakeholders can mean the difference between mission success and mission failure. Consider the impact that local 

elected officials and nongovernmental organizations had on 

the operations of the numerous Army National Guard units 

activated in the wake of Superstorm Sandy. A local official 

may expect more out of a unit than that unit can provide. 

Figure 3

Legend:

DTMS - Digital Training Management System

FRG - family readiness group

G-3 - operations and training officer

OIC - officer in charge

RSVP - reply
January–April 2013 Engineer 51

If that expectation is not communicated and mitigated, the 

Army National Guard could lose credibility despite a heroic 

performance. A commander or staff may also be able to 

convince stakeholders to allocate resources to the military 

operation, increasing the capabilities of the unit.

Estimate costs. The operational budget for a battalion 

is often directed from a higher headquarters. As a result, 

cost estimating at the battalion level is often a top-down 

approach. The benefit of using the PMBOK methods of estimating costs comes mainly from the tools and techniques. 

One such tool is bottom-up estimating. This method estimates the cost of each component of work within the project 

and then summarizes the costs to higher levels. This technique is particularly useful if fund-raising is needed to meet 

the financial requirements of an operation. Estimating the 

cost can lead to setting accurate and realistic fund-raising 

goals.

Determine budget. Estimating the costs leads directly 

to determining the budget. How much can we spend on hamburgers for the battalion organization day celebration? What 

should the ticket price be for the formal ball? Do we need to 

submit an unfunded request, or are there sufficient funds 

in the operation budget to support the operation? The tools 

and techniques in this project management process can help 

commanders and staffs answer these questions.

Perform quantitative risk analysis. FM 5-19, 

Composite Risk Management, is primarily concerned with a 

process that the PMBOK defines as qualitative risk management. FM 5-19 defines composite risk management (CRM) 

as “the Army’s primary decisionmaking process for identifying hazards and controlling risks across the full spectrum of 

Army missions, functions, operations, and activities. CRM is 

a decisionmaking process used to mitigate risks associated 

with all hazards that have the potential to injure or kill personnel, damage or destroy equipment, or otherwise impact 

mission effectiveness.”9

CRM is primarily concerned with personnel and equipment and does not explicitly associate financial cost with 

residual risk. Quantitative risk analysis, on the other hand, 

“is the process of numerically analyzing the effect of identified risks on overall project objectives.”10 In real terms, 

commanders and staffs can assess the budgetary impacts of 

residual risks identified during CRM. It puts real numbers 

to questions such as what can be done if the caterer gets a 

down payment but the ball is cancelled, or if extra food must 

be purchased when more people than expected show up to 

the family readiness group picnic. Quantitative risk analysis 

can significantly improve the contingency planning of a unit 

and may enable the commander to make better-informed 

decisions.

Training Conducted With the PMBOK

Among the most common tools and techniques used in 

the 42 processes of project management are organi-

.zational process assets. They are defined as “any 

or all process-related assets . . . that are or can be used to 

influence the project’s success. These process assets include 

formal and informal plans, policies, procedures, and guidelines.”11 When conducting training using the PMBOK, 

the operations process, including the MDMP, should be 

viewed as an organizational process asset. Army Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures 5-0.1 states that MDMP, for 

example, “helps leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound 

judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to understand 

situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach 

decisions.”12 This description nests perfectly with the definition of an organizational process asset.

Project management and the operations process should 

not be viewed as opposing ideas. Rather, proficiency in one 

should lead to proficiency in the other. The desired end state 

of training and planning with the PMBOK is to improve the 

unit planning efforts and overall effectiveness in military 

operations. Encouraging professional development using the 

PMBOK will enhance the planning capabilities of any unit 

and should be strongly considered by commanders and staff 

for use as a training tool.

Endnotes:

1

FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, 21 September 

2004.

2

A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge 

(PMBOK Guide), Fourth Edition, Project Management 

Institute, 2008, p. 442.

3

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, Unified Land 

Operations, 16 May 2012.

4

Army Regulation 750-1, Army Materiel Maintenance 

Policy, 20 September 2007.

5

A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge 

(PMBOK Guide) 2008.

6

Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 5-0.1, 

Commander and Staff Officer Guide, 14 September 2011.

7

A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge

(PMBOK Guide) 2008.

8

Ibid, p. 251.

9

FM 5-19, Composite Risk Management, 21 August 2006.

10A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge 

(PMBOK Guide) 2008.

11Ibid, p. 439.

12Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 5-0.1, 2011.

Captain Moore is the senior instructor at the Oklahoma 

Army National Guard Officer Candidate School and holds 

the Project Management Professional credential. He was 

commissioned in 2006 as an engineer officer and was a 

Distinguished Military Graduate of the Reserve Officer 

Training Corps at Marquette University, Milwaukee, 

Wisconsin.
52 Engineer January–April 2013

The 8th Engineer “Trojan Horse” Battalion, 36th Engineer Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas, began training for its return to combat operations shortly after redeploying from Afghanistan in December 2011. The battalion 

training plan was designed for the mission command of a 

multifunctional engineer task force operating in Regional 

Command–East. To prepare for the deployment, training 

focused on the prevalent lethal threats in Regional Command–East, the most common being command wire, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and direct-fire engagements. 

To train for this operational environment most effectively, 

the train-up integrated engineer-specific tasks with mounted 

and dismounted live-fire 

events to create highly 

skilled route clearance 

patrols. We developed 

the Trojan Horse Integrated Training Strategy (THITS) to combine 

the engineer qualification tables (EQTs) with 

mounted, unstabilized 

gunnery tables to achieve 

this result. 

The goal of this fourphase strategy was to 

train elements of six 

companies on three different deployment and 

Army force generation 

timelines to a common 

benchmark. The training foundation for THITS 

rests on standards in

By Major Louis L. Birdwell III, Captain Adam R. Martin, and Captain David M. Picard

Soldiers prepare a Talon®

robot to place a charge 

on an IED during a live 

blow-in-place event.
January–April 2013 Engineer 53

current engineer and gunnery

squad qualification tables. The 

amalgamation of the two tabled 

training strategies was nested 

with the 36th Engineer Brigade 

and Fort Hood counter-IED 

gated training strategy. 

There were multiple benefits 

to using doctrinal models as 

bases for the training construct. 

Using the heavy brigade combat team unstabilized gunnery 

model, the training methodology 

could be expressed in common 

maneuver language, thus nesting with the III Corps gunnery 

support plan. This secured highdemand training resources, 

such as dedicated ranges and 

land, that otherwise would have 

been scattered across the entire 

training area. The construct 

also helped to clearly outline training expectations for each 

company, by phase, through annual and quarterly training 

guidance. The ability to communicate these expectations 

on a quarterly basis to subordinate units on different Army 

force generation cycles helped manage a complex training 

calendar. 

To implement the phased training, one company was 

assigned to support the overhead—cadre, lane support, 

ammunition, range coordination and administration—

associated with running the training. This freed the training unit to focus on executing that task. As companies 

leapfrogged through the training, those that were already 

familiar with the construct could be cycled in, reducing the 

number of rehearsals and in-progress reviews needed to 

educate and synchronize the rest of the formation. 

A battalion master gunner was essential to implement, 

organize, and execute the blend of EQTs and gunnery. After a 

quick survey of the ranks, a Bradley-qualified master gunner 

was identified and reassigned to the operations and training section. The tremendous amount of knowledge that this 

leader brought to the fight enabled the battalion to seamlessly plan and execute EQT tasks in concert with gunnery. 

The companies began the process with individual training. During phase 1 of THITS, the unit trained individual 

Soldiers and crewmen on the initial EQTs and gunnery 

tables at the company level before starting the remaining 

tables, which were incorporated into squad and platoon 

level field exercises. The individual tables were completed at 

crew-served weapons ranges and in classrooms, using inert 

and live demolitions, premarksmanship instruction, and 

individual and crew-served, live-fire weapons qualification. 

Phase 2 of THITS focused on the squad/crew level, where 

the next EQTs and gunnery tables were completed. These 

tables were conducted through a combination of route 

clearance-focused missions on demolition ranges, training 

areas, and multiuse ranges. Squad EQT tasks were a combination of mounted and dismounted operations, including—

■ React-to-contact.

■ React-to-IED.

■ IED blow-in-place. 

Gunnery crews (consisting of a driver, gunner, and tank 

commander) trained and qualified as teams. Crews went 

through lanes consisting of dry, blank, and live engagements, culminating in crew qualification. In the culminating 

event of phase 2, squads conducted a dismounted live-fire 

event with a live, blow-in-place event. This event placed a 

squad on the ground to conduct dismounted clearance and 

small-arms, live-fire engagements; exercise mounted to dismounted communication and synchronization; and conduct 

a blow-in-place with the Talon robot, which validated the 

previous training. Phase 2 forced the crews to communicate 

and work together for the gunner to quickly and effectively 

engage targets and coordinate with the dismounted clearance element.

As part of crew certification, the battalion also incorporated mine-clearing line charge training, including inert 

shots at Fort Hood and live shots at the National Training 

Center at Fort Irwin, California. It was imperative that 

young Soldiers and leaders train on this invaluable piece 

of equipment because of the complex obstacle belts present 

during route clearance operations in Regional Command–

East. Once crews completed the inert shot, they incorporated mine-clearing line charges into their formations 

during phase 3 of THITS. 

In phase 3, the focus shifted to the section/platoon level, 

where the EQT and gunnery tables were completed in 

route clearance missions with sections of two gun trucks 

A Soldier engages targets during a gunnery table.
54 Engineer January–April 2013

and then platoons of four gun trucks. Sections and platoons 

went through the same training progression as the squads 

and crews, using dry, blank, and live ammunition lanes. 

The platoon portion of the EQT training used a complete 

route clearance patrol consisting of four gun trucks; two 

Husky vehicle-mounted mine detectors, one Buffalo mineprotected clearance vehicle, and recovery assets. Facing scenarios that included IED finds, IED strikes, and small-arms 

fire, platoons had to use enablers, such as handheld detection 

systems, robots, and aerial support. These enablers added a 

sense of realism to the training that forced leaders to exercise mission command over multiple elements in an intensely 

realistic environment. Phase 3 culminated with platoon route 

clearance that included mounted and dismounted, live-fire 

engagements and a live, blow-in-place event. 

To inject the proper training stimuli, the Fort Hood 

Counter IED Integration Cell was drawn into lane planning 

and execution. These subject matter experts provided handson training for tactical site exploitation, tactical questioning, 

and cultural awareness. They also provided state-of-the-art 

training aides that replicated IEDs, giving a level of realism 

that otherwise would not have been possible. 

In Phase 4 of THITS, the companies started the culminating training event at the National Training Center or 

the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana. 

Here the lessons learned from earlier squad and platoon 

level training events were applied to company level missions 

where the company headquarters has tactical authority over 

multiple moving pieces. The company leaders were validated 

at this time, just as squad leaders and platoon sergeants/

platoon leaders had been during earlier training. After completing this training, units revisited the Virtual Clearance 

Trainer Suite to hone and sustain route clearance skills and 

implement the lessons learned from combat training center 

rotations. The units also used the Warrior Skills Trainer to 

go through virtual gunnery tables, which allow continuous 

training while working around time constraints in the final 

weeks leading up to a deployment.

THITS proved to be a highly effective training construct that seamlessly integrated the engineer qualification 

table and the mounted, unstabilized gunnery table. THITS 

enabled the 8th Engineer Battalion to successfully prepare 

six companies, operating on three Army force generation 

cycles, for deployment to Regional Command–East. The 

training construct also achieved the goal of producing Soldiers and leaders who are confident in their ability to be 

lethal while employing mounted and dismounted weapon 

systems, to conduct mounted and dismounted route clearance, and to simultaneously apply both of these skill sets. 

Finally, THITS has also provided the added benefit of training a new generation of engineer leaders in tabled training, ensuring that they are proficient with standards-based 

training and fluent in the doctrinal language and terminology of maneuver qualification tables. 

Major Birdwell is the operations officer for the 8th Engineer Battalion, 36th Engineer Brigade, Fort Hood. He 

holds a bachelor’s degree in geology from California State 

University–Fresno and a master’s degree in engineering 

management from Missouri University of Science and Technology at Rolla. 

Captain Martin is the assistant operations officer for the 

8th Engineer Battalion. He holds a bachelor’s degree in civil 

engineering from Clarkson University in New York. 

Captain Picard served as the training officer for the 

8th Engineer Battalion when this article was written. He 

holds a bachelor’s degree in engineering management from 

the U.S. Military Academy. He is currently attending the 

Engineer Captains Career Course at Fort Leonard Wood, 

Missouri.

A BuffaloTM interrogates a suspected IED.
January–April 2013 Engineer 55

Our Threat: Fighting Terrorism and Crime

The summer heat was still trapped in the muggy 

night air when an explosion cracked the stillness 

outside the local police station in Baksan, Russia. 

It was approximately 0200 on 21 July 2010. No one was 

hurt in the blast, but authorities called in patrol officers to 

assist with the investigation and 

secure the crime scene. With 

the local police distracted, members of the radical Islamic group 

Baksan Jamaat executed the second phase of their plan on the 

other side of town. They fatally 

shot two guards and wounded 

three others as they stormed 

the hydroelectric plant and dam 

facilities. Once inside, they 

rounded up two employees and 

tortured them to gain access to 

the plant’s main turbine hall. 

With less than 25 pounds of 

TNT, they destroyed two generators worth $49 million, disabled the plant, and ignited a 

major fire that took more than 

3 hours to extinguish.

The Baksan attack echoed a

similar incident in 2006, when

terrorists belonging to the Earth Liberation Front unsuccessfully conspired to attack the Nimbus Dam near Folsom, California, with explosives. Ecoterrorists target dams 

because they are large projects that symbolize man’s arrogance and greed by dramatically altering “nature’s course” 

to fulfill his selfish needs. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

By Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence M. Smith

Baksan hydroelectric plant after terrorist attack 
56 Engineer January–April 2013

(USACE) has more than 500 dams. About 80 of them house 

more than $20 billion worth of hydropower assets. The 

USACE employees who operate these dams face a persistent threat from ecoterrorism. In the tumultuous era ushered in by 11 September 2001, every USACE employee faces 

a heightened threat from political zealots and religious 

extremists—increasingly homegrown—who would relish 

the chance to grab provocative headlines with a successful 

attack against members of a U.S. Army organization. Ideologically motivated threats will be a danger for the foreseeable future. On top of them, USACE also faces the constant 

threat of crime and vandalism. In 2010, USACE had 1,167 

construction projects, all of them potential targets for theft 

and vandalism. USACE also manages 422 federal lake and 

river project sites across 43 states, making it the largest 

water-based outdoor recreation provider in the Nation. 

These sites offer an array of potential targets for criminals 

and vandals and have historically been chosen by mentally 

troubled people as ideal settings for harming themselves 

or others.

Prediction: Discovering Terrorist Attacks 

in Time to Prevent Them

The USACE assistant chief of staff intelligence (G-2) 

section is the first line of defense against terrorism. 

Operating within secured confines on the third floor

of the Government Accountability Office building in Washington, D.C., USACE G-2 personnel provide credible, relevant, 

responsive intelligence products and mission area predictive analysis to Soldiers, civilians, and partners throughout 

the full spectrum of USACE missions. A combined team of 

Department of the Army civilians, contractors, and Reservists budget, manage, supervise, and evaluate all intelligence 

and intelligence-related security activities within USACE. 

The G-2 focuses on providing 

worldwide situational awareness (from an engineer’s perspective), deciphering relevant terrorism trends, and 

discovering specific threats to 

USACE personnel and property in time to issue warnings.

Gleaning intelligence from 

open and classified sources, 

USACE G-2 analysts create intelligence products and 

briefings for USACE leaders 

and personnel by collaborating with other fusion intelligence cells from combatant 

commands; the Department 

of Homeland Security; and 

national intelligence agencies such as the Defense 

Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the 

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Increasingly, G-2 analysts collaborate with their colleagues in other intelligence 

organizations via subject-specific “communities of interest,” such as the Homeland Security Information Network; the Central Intelligence Agency Analyst Space; and 

Intellipedia, a veritable Wikipedia® for intelligence which 

is sourced and refined by analysts from across the intelligence community. 

Significant intelligence is often synthesized from a series 

of apparently unconnected, unusual incidents. One observation may be the missing piece in a puzzle that only the 

USACE G-2 intelligence analysts are researching. The section receives and analyzes suspicious activity reports submitted by USACE personnel throughout the world. But if 

nothing gets submitted, nothing gets detected. That’s why it 

is important for USACE personnel to maintain high levels 

of vigilance and awareness and submit reports when something seems potentially suspicious.

“The best intelligence fusion system in the world isn’t 

worth a dime without high-quality inputs from the folks 

in the field. Having USACE employees tip us off to what 

they see out there is a critical step toward ultimately getting warnings disseminated in enough time to prevent an 

attack,” explained a USACE G-2 spokesman.

Most USACE personnel are considered the consumers of intelligence. But they also play a part in intelligence 

production. On one hand, they have a duty to routinely 

“pull in” products that increase their broader situational 

awareness. On the other hand, they have a responsibility

to “push out” pertinent data about their localities and 

experiences to intelligence analysts for evaluation and

synthesis.

Nimbus Dam on the American River in California
January–April 2013 Engineer 57

Protection: Engineering the 

USACE Fight Against Crime

The USACE G-2 focuses primarily 

on terrorism threats. This effort 

is complemented by the USACE 

Contingency Operations–Protection 

Division (CECO-P), which focuses primarily on criminal threats to USACE 

property and personnel. Each year, 

millions of dollars in property is damaged or lost due to vandalism, larceny, 

arson, and misuse. CECO-P collaborates with base provost marshals, local 

law enforcement agencies, the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, and the Army 

Criminal Investigation Command to 

reduce USACE exposure to crime and 

solve the crimes they couldn’t prevent. 

Three times a year, instructors from 

CECO-P join forces with their colleagues 

in USACE G-2 to provide comprehensive intelligence and security training to newly appointed 

USACE park rangers from across the country. They meet 

for a week at the USACE Learning Center in Huntsville, 

Alabama. During their January training session, USACE 

CECO-P and G-2 instructors also provide advanced training 

to park rangers who have recently been promoted to supervisory positions. 

The CECO-P is responsible for monitoring USACE anticrime and antiterrorism protective measures. Securing 

USACE operations begins with a robust awareness program 

including posters; electronic billboard messages; e-mail 

reminders; criminal alert notices; physical security inspections; and nuclear, biological, and chemical defense plans 

and training programs. 

Awareness: The Critical First Link

USACE needs the help of employees. Those who see 

something should say something. Too often, people 

assume that someone else has reported an incident and no one ends up reporting anything. The USACE 

also needs to enlist the general public’s help, especially the 

people who visit USACE projects and recreational facilities. 

Anyone who witnesses suspicious or criminal activity should 

call a local military police desk. All they need is the phone 

number.

Educating employees and the general public on their 

role in security is the genesis of the Department of Defense 

iWatch program. Championing the slogan, “iWatch, iReport, 

I Keep Us Safe,” the program is a nationwide version of the 

neighborhood watch that is designed to encourage community members to identify and report suspicious behavior. 

Army iWatch sends posters and materials to USACE district commands to enhance their security awareness. The 

program also places ads in newspapers and on community message boards, billboards, local television, and the 

Internet. An offshoot of Army iWatch is the USACE Corps 

Watch Program, which targets community members and 

USACE employees. It is designed to heighten public awareness of the impact of crime at dams, lakes, navigational 

locks, recreational areas, and other USACE facilities.

And Corps Watch pays reward money. USACE has congressional authority to offer cash rewards up to $1,000 for 

information leading to the arrest and prosecution of individuals who cause damage to USACE property. Individuals who witness a crime or suspect that a crime has been

committed against USACE property are encouraged to call

the Corps Watch Program hotline toll-free at (866) 413-7970

(available 24 hours a day) to report information about theft, 

vandalism, or any other threats or suspicious activity against 

USACE property. Callers can remain anonymous. 

Vigilance: Ensuring the Price of Freedom

Force protection largely depends on the personal 

involvement of everyone. The early recognition and 

reporting of potential terrorist and criminal activity is the first line of defense against those who intend to 

harm us or our resources. People should stay alert as they 

go about their daily business and become familiar with 

the normal routines of their neighborhoods, communities, 

and workplaces. Understanding these routines will help 

them spot anything out of place. And if you see something, 

say something.

Lieutenant Colonel Smith is assigned to Headquarters, 

USACE, as a U.S. Army Reserve intelligence analyst, and 

is currently deployed to U.S. Forces Korea to help develop 

its theater infrastructure master plan. He holds a bachelor’s 

degree from Cornell University and a master’s degree in public management from the University of Maryland School of 

Public Policy.

Suspicious Behaviors
58 Engineer January–April 2013

The purpose of this article is to provide a framework 

to develop a trained and ready security force assistance advisor team (SFAAT) based on recent operational and training initiatives conducted by the SFAATs 

from the 30th Engineer Battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In early 2012, the battalion was tasked by XVIII Airborne Corps to develop an SFAAT to deploy to support operations in Afghanistan. Since that request, the battalion has 

trained and deployed one SFAAT, activated and deployed a 

second SFAAT, and conducted two mission readiness exercises at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at 

Fort Polk, Louisiana. The battalion also provided a robust 

observer controller/trainer team to the National Training 

Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, for an infantry 

brigade combat team (BCT) security force assistance brigade rotation augmented with a construction effects engineer battalion. From an engineer battalion perspective, it 

is imperative to understand the roles and missions of any 

SFAAT since that capability is the linkage between a BCT 

and its Afghan military counterparts. Moreover, the engineering mission sets will be easier to achieve with Afghan 

partners if the SFAAT is trained, integrated, and able to 

operate at a high degree of competence. 

The SFAAT individual selection process, the individual 

training program, and a team level mission readiness exercise provide a strong foundation to certify and employ the 

team. The success of any SFAAT is due, in large part, to 

the emphasis placed on SFAAT operations by its higher 

headquarters. The effectiveness of an SFAAT in-theater is 

a direct function of the quality of the individuals selected, 

their training certification, and their employment as a distinct and integrated team. Since most SFAAT descriptions 

include “advise, coach, and mentor,” it is necessary to select 

members who are confident and comfortable conducting 

those tasks at the individual and collective levels. 

Leader Skills

I

n Small Wars Journal, Morgan Smiley advises that 

augmenting these teams with field grade officers as the 

lead advisors creates cohesive teams with the rank and 

experience necessary to deal with Afghan leaders and mitigates a clumsy manning process by creating a force structure primarily focused on advising and enabling the Afghan 

National Security Forces (ANSF).2 Our unit selected strong 

field grade officers to lead the teams and chose experienced 

noncommissioned officers for the SFAAT. To increase the 

credibility of the SFAAT with its in-theater counterparts, 

advisors developed proficiency in basic combat skills, to 

include warrior and survival skills. Since these skills are 

critical due to the isolated and independent nature of the 

mission, advisors were expected to refresh them during predeployment training.3

 Once baseline proficiency is gained 

in these skills, it is imperative to test the SFAAT during a 

mission readiness exercise to validate individuals skill sets, 

collective training tasks, and team dynamics in a realistic 

operational environment. 

SFAATs from the United States and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations have identical minimum 

training requirements. This is directed by the commander 

“The military advisory mission has become a key component of U.S. military operations—for the Army 

in particular—and we need to be good at it.”

—Colonel Marc D. Axelberg1 

By Lieutenant Colonel Jared L.Ware
January–April 2013 Engineer 59

of the International Security Assistance Force and is further 

outlined in memorandums by U.S. Central Command and 

Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum.4 The U.S. Army, 

U.S. Marines, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries conduct SFAAT certification in three phases. Although 

the type and magnitude of training for each phase may differ 

slightly, there is commonality in the training topics. These 

include individual and collective combat skills training, 

advisor training, and a mission readiness exercise for final 

certification. 

A certifying mission readiness exercise is vital to validate the strength, skill, and credibility of the team before 

it deploys. In his article discussing mentoring ANSF units, 

Canadian Lieutenant Colonel (now Brigadier General) W.D. 

Eyre said that “mentoring efforts and advice will fall on deaf 

ears unless the Afghan National Army (ANA) see the source 

as being credible.”5 After serving as the senior engineer 

observer controller/trainer at the NTC during a security force 

assistance brigade rotation, the importance of SFAAT credibility became more evident. This rotation for 2d Brigade, 

10th Mountain Division, included two National Guard brigades that were reorganized into 64 SFAATs. The training 

format at the NTC followed a pattern similar to that conducted at JRTC. Current training regimens, particularly 

those at the training centers, rely heavily on situational 

training exercises to examine a potential advisor’s response 

in a particularly complex environment. This is important to 

training advisors because situational training exercises are 

valuable in assessing responses from individuals in new and 

difficult situations, particularly in the context of another culture.6

 Having personnel to evaluate each SFAAT and having 

scenarios with realistic role players provides the optimal 

environment for determining the strengths and shortfalls of 

any team undergoing the training. 

Given the SFAAT training framework with a JRTC 

rotation, it is reasonable to expect that the training principles would provide any team with the baseline capabilities to operate effectively in-theater. Given this framework, 

the initial XVIII Corps SFAAT from the battalion qualified 

as the best of 25 teams during that rotation. However, to 

achieve full mission success, an SFAAT must complete all 

individual training certifications and complete a credible, 

unbiased mission readiness exercise to fully prepare for the 

complexities and challenges of operations in-theater. Even 

with a solid training and certification program, areas for 

improvement will still exist, particularly for an SFAAT once 

it arrives in-theater and begins its mission for its higher 

headquarters and with its ANSF partners. One former advisor said that “in order to support their prescribed roles, 

planners must take careful design in the organization and 

resourcing of military advisors either employed as a unit 

or as individuals.”7 The topic areas listed are mainly based 

on feedback about the initial SFAAT employment once intheater. Although the observations are limited in scope, 

the same trends were common in discussions with previous 

SFAAT advisors, the SFAAT in-theater, and with observer 

controllers/trainers during the NTC rotation. 

Mission

I

n-theater, key leaders at the brigade level tend to lack 

a sophisticated understanding of the SFAAT mission 

and role. This leads to the inability to correctly use the 

SFAAT’s full capabilities. This resulted in team members 

being assigned to perform traditional staff functions instead 

of their individual SFAAT role. For example, one member 

of the SFAAT was assigned to the brigade engineer cell and 

another was assigned to the governance stability transition 

team. This broke the SFAAT integrity model, degraded its 

overall effectiveness, and impeded its ability to establish a 

high level of rapport with ANSF counterparts. During the 

NTC rotation, BCT leaders without requisite individual 

training were reassigned to fill SFAAT positions. This created confusion about what role they would assume within 

the SFAAT, since they were not fully trained on the required 

tasks. 

Metrics

Reporting credible counterinsurgency metrics 

requires proper SFAAT-led and -reviewed assessments. Credible metrics cannot be properly evaluated at the brigade level without a credentialed SFAAT in 

place. In certain instances, the in-theater brigade reported 

higher levels of ANSF preparedness than that evaluated by 

the SFAAT. For example, ANA companies had leaders who 

were not capable of performing basic military decisionmaking process tasks or troop leading procedures. However, it 

was reported that these units were prepared for unilateral 

missions based solely on individual task assessments instead 

of collective-level assessments as defined by metrics evaluated by the SFAAT. The SFAAT must immediately establish 

its credibility with its higher headquarters and their ANA 

counterpart. During the recent NTC rotation, I viewed a 

combat outpost defense in which the SFAAT and their “ANA 

counterparts” (played by Fort Irwin Soldiers) had not even 

met before the defensive operations, thus skewing any credible counterinsurgency assessment of subsequent operations. 

This led to various interpretations of the overall readiness of 

the ANA unit, reduced the initial credibility of the SFAAT, 

and led to a “metrics mismatch” between the SFAAT and its 

higher headquarters. 

Sustainment

The SFAAT lacks the baseline logistical support package required to properly deploy and sustain itself until employment in-theater. The SFAAT depends 

entirely on its higher headquarters and outside resources for 

sustainment activities. Without a well-established command 

and support relationship, the team cannot function outside 

its assigned operational role. The team requires communications, logistics, and force protection support; and the BCT 

commander must rely on the advisors to provide the inputs 

required to coordinate joint patrols and the daily actions of 

the advised force.8 In one example from Afghanistan, the 

SFAAT received four vehicles from its higher headquarters 
60 Engineer January–April 2013

upon arrival and linkup, three of which were non-missioncapable. The SFAAT does not have organic maintenance 

support and lacks a funding source to purchase vehicle parts 

or contracted services. A major issue at NTC was the availability, fielding, and logistical support of force tracking and 

communications equipment for SFAAT teams. Given the 

sustainment challenges to support multiple SFAATs, any 

BCT deploying to support a security force assistance brigade mission should strongly consider not reorganizing its 

organic brigade support battalion into SFAATs; the brigade 

support battalion is vitally important to the overall sustainment of all SFAATs from the BCT. The advanced logistical 

support provided by the brigade support battalion is the key 

to sustaining the SFAATs within the brigade. 

Recommendations

Conduct a mission readiness exercise. Ensure 

that every person on the SFAAT completes required 

theater training requirements and that the team 

conducts a credible mission readiness exercise, preferably 

as an established team. The JRTC Advisor Academy provides premier training that consists of language and cultural training, key leader engagements with retired Afghan 

soldiers, and lessons on the advisor role in a deployed theater according to Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance.

9

 One SFAAT leader, in a previous rotation, remarked 

that his team learned “. . . security force assistance is the 

unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host 

nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate 

authority.” 

Build and sustain team integrity. This allows personnel on the team to know that their teammates are prepared 

and ready to assume their roles. It also allows members to 

learn each other’s strengths and areas that require additional focus before linking up with ANSF counterparts. It is 

important to build team integrity during any training rotation, but it is equally important to sustain it into the deployment. Valuable lessons, which will eventually prove successful in-theater, are gained in the overall training framework. 

Establish peer-to-peer advisory relationships. All 

SFAATs should be able to properly advise their ANA/ANSF 

counterparts at the command and staff levels and ensure 

that the process occurs parallelly, vertically, and horizontally. This includes sourcing SFAAT positions with personnel of the proper rank and experience level and engaging 

and advising counterparts at all levels. Personnel selected 

for advisory duties must be adept at the tasks and functions that they will teach to others and must possess the 

proper attributes to be effective advisors. Furthermore, it 

is important to provide advisor-specific training to SFAAT 

members before having them mentor ANA forces.10 With a 

proper SFAAT structure in place, coupled with trained and 

vetted personnel, a more effective, accurate, and credible 

assessment of established counterinsurgency metrics can be 

attained, which reduces ambiguity for any ANSF readiness 

assessments. 

Deploy cohort SFAATs that are organic or assigned 

to a brigade before deployment. This would provide the 

teams with an established command and support relationship and a dedicated brigade level staff to address any 

requirements. Moreover, it would address any mission and 

sustainment gaps, as the brigade would have a dedicated 

SFAAT mission and the resources required to meet mission 

success. Additionally, allow the SFAAT team leaders time 

to influence professional development training at training 

centers; develop tactics, techniques, and procedures; and 

prepare standing operating procedures.11

It would be presumptuous to imply that the recommended 

solutions will address all SFAAT development and training 

issues. However, the recommendations can be applied to 

any future SFAATs and their specific training requirements 

with reasonable validity. By properly applying the training 

framework and principles, it can be reasonably expected 

that any SFAAT would have the baseline knowledge and 

skills to perform its mission.

Endnotes:

1

Mark Axelberg, “Enhancing Security Force Assistance: 

Advisor Selection, Training, and Employment,” U.S. Army 

War College strategy research project, 22 March 2011, p. 27.

2

Morgan Smiley, “Combat Advisor Unit for Afghanistan 

Transition,” Small Wars Journal, 15 December 2011.

3

Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, 1 May 

2009, p. 7-4.

4

Headquarters, International Security Force Joint Command, SFAAT predeployment training survey, October 

2012.

5

W.D. Eyre, “14 Tenets for Mentoring the Afghan 

National Army,” The Bulletin, Volume 14, Number 1, March 

2008, pp. 1-9. 

6

Brennan Cook, “Improving Security Force Assistance 

Capability in the Army’s Advise and Assist Brigade,” School 

of Advanced Military Studies, 10 May 2010. 

7

Joshua J. Potter, “American Advisors: Security Force 

Assistance Model in the Long War,” Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2011.

8

Axelberg, 2011, p. 23.

9

Field Manual 3.07.1, Security Force Assistance, 1 May 

2009.

10Sean R. Pirone, “Security Force Assistance, Strategic, Advisory, and Partner Nation Considerations,” thesis, 

Naval Post Graduate School, December 2010, p. 47. 

11Headquarters, International Security Force Joint Command SFAAT, predeployment training survey, October 

2012.

Lieutenant Colonel Ware is the commander of the 30th 

Engineer Battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

PIN: 103077