STRATEGIC PLANS, JOINT DOCTRINE

AND ANTIPODEAN INSIGHTS

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

and

Thomas-Durell Young

October 20, 1995
sincere gratitude to the following individuals for their

insightful and helpful comments made on earlier drafts of

this essay: Dr. William T. Johnsen; COL D.J. Murray, CSC; Dr.

Douglas Johnson; Professor Mike Morin; and COL Phil Mock,

USA, (Ret). Special thanks are accorded to the Directing

Staff of the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre who

graciously hosted a visit by T. Young, which was sponsored by

the Australian Defence Studies Centre of the Australian

Defence Force Academy, Canberra.

*******

The views expressed in this essay are those of the

authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or

position of the Department of the Army, the Department of

Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is approved for

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and

should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies

Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

17013-5050. Comments also may be conveyed directly to the

authors by calling commercial (717) 245-4058/3010 or DSN 242-

4058/3010,or via Internet at lovelacd@carlisle-emh2.army.mil.

ii
This is the second in an analytical series on joint

issues. It follows the authors’ U.S. Department of Defense

Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus, in which they

articulated the need for more formal joint strategic plans.

This essay examines the effect such plans would have on joint

doctrine development and illustrates the potential benefits

evident in Australian defense planning.

Doctrine and planning share an iterative development

process. The common view is that doctrine persists over a

broader time frame than planning and that the latter draws on

the former for context, syntax, even format. In truth the

very process of planning shapes new ways of military action.

As the environment for that action changes, planners address

new challenges, and create the demand for better methods of

organizing, employing and supporting forces. Evolutionary,

occasionally revolutionary, doctrinal changes result.

The authors of this monograph explore the relationship

between strategic planning and doctrine at the joint level.

They enter the current debate over the scope and authority of

joint doctrine from a joint strategic planning perspective.

In their view, joint doctrine must have roots, and those

roots have to be planted firmly in the strategic concepts and

plans developed to carry out the National Military Strategy.

Without the fertile groundwork of strategic plans, the body

of joint doctrine will struggle for viability.

The Strategic Studies Institute offers this analysis

with the aim of stimulating further dialogue about our system

of developing joint doctrine and joint strategic plans.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies

Institute

iii
The relationship of strategic planning for the U.S.

armed forces to the development and implementation of joint

doctrine is opaque, but important. Strategic plans, by

translating the National Military Strategy into strategic

concepts, could guide the development and implementation of

joint doctrine. This essay identifies the many improvements

that would accrue to the joint doctrine development process,

as well as to the implementation of joint doctrine, if the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to develop

strategic plans, as defined herein. Strategic concepts,

derived from strategic plans, would provide a basis for the

development of joint doctrine, thus ensuring joint doctrine

is more responsive to the National Military Strategy (NMS).

These strategic concepts, in contrast to those broad concepts

found in the NMS and other strategic planning documents,

would be specific and focused. The linkage of strategic

planning and joint doctrine development is not without

precedence: the Australian defense planning system has

evolved in recent years with the objective, inter alia, of

producing a useful body of joint doctrine. The Australian

Defence Force has been using a planning process by which

strategic direction is converted into Strategic Concepts,

which form the basis for Australian joint doctrine.

KEY FINDINGS

• Strategic plans should be developed that further

define the National Military Strategy and provide supporting

strategic concepts. These concepts could provide the basis

for the development of joint doctrine.

• The practice of Lead Agent in the development of joint

doctrine should be modified and the Joint Warfighting Center

should be given responsibility and authority for managing the

development of joint doctrine.

iv
• The development of strategic plans can improve

adherence to, and implementation of, joint doctrine.

v
Introduction.

Over the past decade, "jointness" has become a paean in

the quest to improve the effectiveness of the U.S. armed

forces, and justifiably so. Recent military operations have

demonstrated a high correlation between joint operations and

success on the battlefield. Consequently, the trend toward

increased "jointness" is not likely to abate. The

congressional perception of the importance of joint

operations by the U.S. armed forces was underscored by the

passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense

Reorganization Act ("Goldwater-Nichols Act"), the most

significant reorganization and redistribution of authority

and responsibilities within the Department of Defense since

1958.1 In an effort to assure more effective joint

operations, Congress increased the powers of the combatant

Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), made the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) the principal military advisor to the

National Command Authorities (NCA), and assigned the CJCS

specific responsibilities in the areas of strategic planning,

joint training and joint doctrine. Additionally, the Joint

Chiefs of Staff lost their baronial influence and the Joint

Staff was reoriented to serve the CJCS, vice the corporate

Joint Chiefs of Staff.2

This does not suggest that this seminal legislation has

overcome all the institutional impediments to raising,

training and employing joint forces. Problems remain; one of

which is the focus of this essay. Difficulties in the

development and implementation of sound joint doctrine have

been caused, in large measure, by the systemic gap in the

existing strategic planning process. The absence of a direct

link between the strategic direction of the U.S. armed forces

and the operational planning for their employment has

hindered the development of coherent and integrated joint

doctrine. Also, this situation

1
strategic planning for the U.S. armed forces that would

connect the National Military Strategy (NMS)3 to key joint

planning documents. Filling this strategic planning void

would enhance the development and implementation of sound and

comprehensive joint doctrine. In short, there is a need for a

coherent, traceable, and accountable connection between the

NMS and the body of joint doctrine developed to support it.

Specifically and proximately, there are no nationallevel strategic concepts set forth in strategic plans to

guide the development and implementation of joint doctrine.4

Consequently, the current body of joint doctrine can, at

best, be only loosely connected to the NMS. The development

of strategic plans would permit strategic guidance, as first

expressed in the form of the National Security Strategy

(NSS)5 and then by the NMS, to be better conveyed to the

service chiefs and the CINCs.

As strategic guidance and direction work their way

through the system, they are further refined and defined.

This elucidating process should provide specific guidance for

the development of a body of more useful and accepted joint

doctrine to guide the conduct of operations for U.S. forces,

as well as to rationalize the required types, number, and

balance of service forces. A process that integrates

strategic planning with joint doctrine development would

better actualize the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

And, in this era of penury, such reforms would assist the NCA

in validating to the Congress that a more effective and

efficient national defense capability is being pursued.

While this essay may seem fairly critical of joint

doctrine, the process by which it is developed, and the

effectiveness of its implementation; one must recognize that

the U.S. armed forces have made great progress in developing

and promulgating joint doctrine since passage of the

Goldwater-Nichols Act. As demonstrated during operations

Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the availability and

application of joint doctrine have significantly improved the

warfighting

2
which it is developed, and how more complete implementation

can be encouraged. Both can be accomplished by more directly

linking joint doctrine to the NMS.

The Chairman is aware of two significant problems

regarding joint doctrine. First, he is uncomfortable with the

level of understanding of joint doctrine within the U.S.

armed forces. Recent initiatives, such as the creation of the

Joint Warfighting Center and its charge to broaden service

understanding of joint doctrine, manifest his concern.6

Second, he has inferred that the services may not feel

obligated to adhere to joint doctrine. This has resulted in

his recent direction to the Joint Staff to change the

qualifier that appears in all joint doctrine publications

from, "This publication is authoritative but not

directive..." to "The guidance in this publication is

authoritative; as such, commanders will apply this doctrine .

. . except when exceptional circumstances dictate

otherwise."7 However, what may be the most important step

toward improving the development and implementation of joint

doctrine has yet to be taken.

In order to address the problem of the need to improve

joint doctrine by better linking it to the NMS, this essay

will frame the argument in the following manner. First, a

brief overview of the value of joint doctrine, the Chairman’s

responsibilities, and joint doctrine’s general utility will

be presented. Second, imperfections in the existing joint

doctrine development process will be addressed. Third, the

current process by which the Chairman translates strategic

direction into strategic and operation plans will be examined

to show how it could be improved to enhance joint doctrine

development and encourage adherence. Fourth, the Australian

defense planning process will be presented as an illustrative

example of an effective strategic planning process, which

facilitates the development and implementation of joint

doctrine. Fifth, an assessment of U.S. joint doctrine

development and implementation will be provided. Finally,

proposals will be presented for reforms aimed at improving

the relationship

3
Joint Doctrine: Overview.

Its Value. Over the past several years, the Chairman has

formalized the joint doctrine development process in Joint

Publication 1-018 and has promulgated a substantial amount of

joint doctrine.9 More is yet to come. Viewed within the

construct that strategy should address "ends, ways and

means,"10 joint doctrine is as important to successful

military operations as the NMS is to achieving national

military objectives. In short, it is the role of joint

doctrine to link what must be accomplished to the tools

available or required. Thus, joint doctrine should derive

from, inter alia, the NMS and therefore help implement it.11

Similar to how the NMS rationalizes defense resources

with national military objectives at the strategic level,

joint doctrine guides the employment of joint forces and

facilitates the use of operational capability to achieve

strategic and operational end states. In fact, theater

operation plans should be developed to conform to established

joint doctrine.12 It also assists strategic leaders in

determining the types and amount of various military

capabilities combatant commanders require, as well as

ensuring the effective and efficient application of military

capability to accomplish specific objectives.13

While the value of joint doctrine in improving joint

warfighting capability is widely accepted, it also has

collateral value. Effective joint doctrine informs senior

civilian leadership and governmental agencies as to how they

may expect the U.S. armed forces to be employed, and thus

illuminates force strengths and limitations. It can also

serve a similar purpose for alliance and potential coalition

governments and armed forces, particularly apropos

establishing a U.S. national position for the development of

multinational doctrine.14

The Role of the Chairman. The Goldwater-Nichols Act (now

codified in Title 10 of the United States Code [10 USC]),

established a statutory basis for the development of joint

doctrine and assigned the responsibility to the Chairman.15

4
development is unwarranted. It is obviously needed. However,

it is clear that Congress recognized the primacy of joint

doctrine.

In a broad sense, the Chairman is also responsible for

the development of joint training and military education

policies for the services.16 This authority allows the

Chairman to influence the nature of joint training in

documents such as the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). It

also provides him with opportunities to prescribe how joint

training will be evaluated and to influence joint exercises

by designating special areas of interest.17 Within the

military education arena, the Chairman can influence the

nature and amount of joint education that takes place at

service schools.18 Thus, the Chairman’s joint training and

military education responsibilities provide additional venues

for advancing the implementation of joint doctrine.

Pervasiveness of Joint Doctrine. The utility of joint

doctrine extends beyond the employment of joint forces. It

affects virtually all of the Chairman’s strategic planning

activities. Specifically, by combining the responsibilities

given the Chairman in sections 153 and 163 of 10 USC, one

finds he is responsible for soliciting the requirements of

the combatant commanders; evaluating, integrating, and

establishing priorities; and advising the Secretary of

Defense of their requirements, individually and collectively.

Additionally, he is to advise the Secretary of Defense on the

extent to which service program recommendations and budget

proposals conform to the priorities established in strategic

plans and for the combatant commanders. This advice may

include alternative program recommendations that differ from

those submitted by the services.19

In integrating and establishing priorities for the

requirements of combatant commanders and in assessing service

programs, the Chairman logically must consider existing and

emerging joint doctrine. Therefore, if elements of service

programs do not comport with existing or emerging joint

doctrine, the Chairman, as principal military advisor to the

5
The Chairman’s triennial report containing recommended

changes in the assignment of roles and functions to the

services is also influenced by joint doctrine.20 On the

surface this may seem debatable; however, closer examination

reveals its validity. A case in point is the proposal by the

former Chief of Staff of the Air Force that the battlefield

be partitioned and that each section be assigned the

responsibility of a service or functional component command.

His intent was to assign responsibility for the rear and

close "battles" principally to the Army, with the "high" and

deep "battles" primarily the responsibility of the Air Force.

This proposal, which was inconsistent with joint doctrine,

would have called for the transfer of responsibility for

close air support to the Army and the responsibility for deep

interdiction (currently shared by all services) to become

primarily the responsibility of the Air Force, and to a

lesser extent, the Navy. Therefore, the Army would be

expected to give up its high and deep battle systems, as well

as the funding that acquires and maintains them.21 Given the

negative response this proposal received from the "joint

community," one may reasonably conclude that any serviceinitiated changes in roles and functions that do not comport

with existing or emerging joint doctrine would not be

favorably considered.

Joint doctrine is also crucial for effective joint

training and education. It provides the doctrinal principles

that orient and focus such training. For example, the UJTL is

guided by joint doctrine. Armed with it, joint force

commanders perform focused mission analysis and develop Joint

Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETL).22 They can then plan

their training programs to meet the requirements of their

JMETLs. During the execution of joint training, commanders

are able to rely on joint doctrine to frame the broad

training tasks and to suggest measures of training

effectiveness. The result, obviously, is improvement in joint

warfighting capability.

If joint doctrine is patently important and valuable to

the national defense, then what can be done to enhance its

development and improve its implementation? To answer this

6
by the services in developing joint doctrine. The unique

doctrinal orientation which each service brings to the joint

doctrine development process provides for valuable, healthy

interaction. However, service uniqueness also creates

challenges within the process.

Joint Doctrine: Process Imperfections.

Overview. Otto von Bismarck stated: "Laws are like

sausages. It is better not to see them being made."23

Bismarck’s analogy seems applicable to the process by which

joint doctrine is developed. Joint doctrine is not devised in

a manner that necessarily encourages observance, nor does it

meet all the expectations and requirements of the services

and combatant commands. No less an authority than the current

CJCS has stated that joint doctrine ". . . is not well

vetted, [not] well understood. It is certainly not

disseminated out there, and is almost never used by anyone .

. . ." Once these problems are solved, he said "We can go on

to the next step and ensure our joint training and joint

exercises [are] in consonance with it."24 Elaborating further

on the problem, the Chairman said "I have gone to more joint

exercises and walked away [more] embarrassed from them than

anything else."25

At present, the development of U.S. joint doctrine is a

process based upon consensus. Thus, many joint publications

reflect the lowest common denominators upon which the

services do not disagree.26 This often results in imprecise,

confusing, or contradictory doctrinal concepts. Consequently,

internal inconsistencies within the current body of joint

doctrine are not uncommon.27 The key factors contributing to

inconsistency in joint doctrine are the differing views of

doctrine held by the respective services and the

compartmented manner in which it is developed. And,

interestingly, an effective vehicle for cross-checking the

consistency of various doctrinal publications has yet to be

implemented. In a twist of Bismarck’s admonition, those who

dislike the current doctrinal sausage will

7
Doctrine: The Services’ Views. In an historical sense,

the services have not shared similar views as to what

"doctrine" means, let alone what purpose it should serve. The

Miriam-Webster Dictionary defines doctrine as: "something

that is taught, held, put forth as true, and supported by a

teacher, a school, or a sect; a principle or position or the

body of principles in any branch of knowledge." The

Department of Defense’s Dictionary of Military and Associated

Terms (which applies to all of the Department of Defense)

defines doctrine as: "[f]undamental principles by which the

military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in

support of national objectives. It is authoritative but

requires judgement in application."28 These definitions

notwithstanding, to under- stand the current working

definitions of military doctrine, one must examine the

varying service perspectives.

Within the Army, doctrine is seen as essential. It is

accepted as the basis of the organization as well as the

engine of change. It is pervasive, encompassing the Army’s

ethos, professional qualities, esprit de corps, legal basis,

readiness, operations, principles of war and operations other

than war.29 While the Army agrees with the definition of

doctrine in the Department of Defense dictionary, it seems to

interpret the use of "judgement in application" more

liberally than the current Chairman.30 Army doctrine preceded

joint doctrine and the Army’s wide experience in the

development and use of doctrine has enabled it to be a prime

contributor to the ever-growing body of joint doctrine. This

has caused one or more of the other services to feel that the

Army exerts inordinate influence within the joint doctrine

development process.31 Given the maturity of the U.S. Army’s

Training and Doctrine Command and the relative inexperience

of the doctrine centers of the other services, this is

somewhat understandable.

The Navy, notwithstanding its more recent statements to

the contrary, has only begun to formalize and

institutionalize its own doctrine.32 The limited emphasis the

Navy has historically placed on doctrine can be, at least

partially, attributed to its culture, particularly its focus

on technology and

8
Naval Doctrine Publication 1, lays the foundation for a

robust body of doctrine that, nevertheless, has yet to be

written, vetted, accepted, and validated. This new

publication defines doctrine as being ". . . conceptual—a

shared way of thinking that is not directive."33 The Navy

currently believes that doctrine should form a bridge between

the NMS and the tactics, techniques, and procedures employed

by the service.34 The Navy’s acknowledgement of the

importance of doctrine notwithstanding, the time required to

develop institutional devotion to doctrine and the

intellectually vigorous processes necessary for its

development will likely extend the growth of a Navy doctrinebased culture well into the future.

The U.S. Air Force defines its doctrine in the

introduction of Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace

Doctrine of the United States Air Force. It states,

Aerospace doctrine is, simply defined, what we hold

true [emphasis added] about aerospace power and the

best way to do the job in the Air Force....doctrine is

a guide for the exercise of professional judgement

rather than a set of rules to be followed blindly. . .

. Doctrine should be alive—growing, evolving, and

maturing. New experiences, reinterpretations of former

experiences, advances in technology, changes in

threats, and cultural changes can all require

alterations to parts of our doctrine even as other

parts remain constant. If we allow our thinking about

aerospace power to stagnate, our doctrine can become

dogma.

It appears that the Air Force considers doctrine

development and revision to be a more living and fluid

process. Its view of doctrine can also be explained in terms

of service culture. It results from a predominant focus on

technologically advanced systems, and seeks to improve their

effectiveness through improved human contributions. As a

result, the Air Force believes that one of the defining

characteristics of a war is the weaponry employed. The

service’s lexicon includes system-oriented terminology like

"sortie generation," "weaponeering," and "target servicing."

The Air Force’s focus on systems and its desire to adopt the

newest technology

9
The U.S. Marine Corps considers doctrine to be a

philosophy of warfighting. Its higher level doctrine does not

contain specific techniques and procedures for the conduct of

war. Rather, it provides broad guidance in the form of

concepts and values. Indeed, a review of FMFM 1, Warfighting,

reveals that Marine Corps doctrine sets forth a particular

way of thinking about war and a way of fighting, a philosophy

of leading Marines in combat, a mandate for professionalism

and a common language.36 In short, it appears that the Marine

Corps views its doctrine as a codification of its essence,

its raison d’être, rather than a body of knowledge to be

consulted in the preparation for, and conduct of, war.

Given this general discussion of service’s views of

doctrine, it is clear that significant differences exist. It

should be noted that service doctrines are developed to meet

the unique needs of individual services. The challenge for

joint doctrine, on the other hand, is to transcend individual

service doctrines, and provide an overarching approach to

warfare that effectively integrates each service’s

contributions. Whereas the development of service doctrines

can be accomplished via a bottom-up approach, the development

of effective joint doctrine can only be achieved in a topdown manner. A bottom-up approach to the development of joint

doctrine can result in nothing more than an imperfect

synthesis of the disparate doctrinal bents of the services. A

top-down approach, on the other hand, would set forth

requisite unifying concepts at the outset. Moreover, joint

doctrine is key to the flow of strategic direction that

begins with the NSS, runs through the NMS and strategic plans

that contain strategic concepts, and ultimately results in

the planning and conduct of operations that support national

strategy. Joint doctrine, therefore, should translate

strategic concepts into authoritative guidance to the

services and the CINCs for the conduct of military

operations.

Joint Doctrine: Role of the Services. The current

process of developing joint doctrine is limited in its

ability to overcome the differing views of doctrine held by

the services. Once the Joint Staff’s Director for Operational

Plans and Interoperability

10
development effort. The Lead Agent, a service in most

instances, writes or directs the writing of the drafts of the

new publication37 and is, therefore, able to inject its

doctrinal view of the subject area during the early stages of

development. The result is that draft joint doctrine may

emphasize, early on, what the Lead Agent considers to be its

service’s unique contributions to the doctrinal issue under

consideration. While these parochial views may or may not

survive the iterative coordination process unaltered, they

establish adversarial relationships among the services. And,

the reluctance to raise contentious issues for the Chairman’s

adjudication may result in doctrine that is not only watered

down but also retains a certain amount of bias toward the

Lead Agent’s service.

The development of joint doctrine can be contentious

from the perspective of the services for a different reason.

Disagreement exists among the services concerning the actual

role to be played by joint doctrine. The U.S. Air Force, for

instance, completely agrees with the proviso in Joint

Publication 1-01 that states, "Joint Doctrine will be written

to reflect extant capabilities."38 Thus, from a U.S. Air

Force perspective, doctrine development should follow force

capability development. That is, technological advances will

dictate new or revised doctrine. The Army, alternatively,

believes that doctrinal concepts should be more than that and

should act as the engine of change, heavily influencing

decisions concerning future systems and capabilities.39 To

the extent that there is not a common view of the purpose and

utility of joint doctrine and that its development process

permits the infusion of service parochialism, the

effectiveness of the process is constrained.

Joint Doctrine: Unappetizing Sausages. Criticism of the

efficacy of the current joint doctrine development process

coupled with the varying views of the purposes and uses of

doctrine held by the Chairman and the services tend to cause

the latter to not feel bound by joint doctrine, even though

it was crafted via a consensus-building process. Furthermore,

the

11
prohibited from exercising any executive authority (i.e,

shades of a Generalstab).40

Yet, the inability to assure uniform application of

joint doctrine can have significant negative ramifications. A

tragic example is the April 14, 1994 downing of two Army

Black Hawk helicopters in Iraq by two Air Force F-15 fighter

aircraft, killing all 26 people aboard the helicopters.

Recognizing that correct application of joint doctrine may

have prevented this tragedy, the Chairman directed "immediate

and serious attention" to applicable joint doctrine.41

Continued improvement of joint doctrine is required if

the U.S. armed forces are to benefit from it as envisaged by

the framers of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Joint doctrine

development and implementation problems can be related to

incomplete strategic planning. Therefore, it is not

surprising that these two problems share a common solution.

Incomplete Strategic Planning.

In theory and practice, joint doctrine should facilitate

the implementation of the NMS. In Joint Pub 1, the Chairman

observes that "[t]hough neither policy nor strategy, joint

doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how best to

employ the national military power to achieve strategic

ends."42 In other words, it should help relate the "ways" to

the "means" and "ends." From a purely military perspective,

national strategic ends are attained through the

accomplishment of military strategic and operational

objectives. A key feature of joint doctrine is that it should

facilitate the translation of national and theater level

strategies into operationally useful methods.

While it is apparent that the NMS, in its current form,

is of little operational use until it is refracted through

the prism of a national military strategic plan, it also

seems logical that joint doctrine should be developed to

accommodate specific strategic concepts presented in such a

strategic plan. The raison d’être of the NMS is to translate

into military terms the

12
relations document. It communicates the Chairman’s views on

the relevancy of military power, as opposed to delving into

the specifics of a strategy designed to achieve specific

objectives.

A review of Section 153, 10 USC provides some

illuminating information regarding the formulation of

strategic direction and national military strategy and the

development of strategic and contingency plans. This section

describes a hierarchy for strategy development and

promulgation. The first subparagraph charges the Chairman

with the responsibility for assisting the President and the

Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction

of the armed forces.43 This is, in essence, the purpose of

the NMS. Although the NMS in its current form is general in

nature, it does provide in broad terms the Chairman’s advice

to the NCA regarding the best use of the military element of

power in pursuit of broad national security objectives. The

NMS serves another key purpose; it provides general guidance

to the services, CINCs and defense agencies as to the role

U.S. armed forces will play in achieving national security

objectives.

However, the NMS does not provide adequate guidance for

the development of specific objectives, let alone the methods

for attaining them. By its very nature, broad in scope and

general in content, it is open to diverse interpretation.44

Consequently, by itself, it is insufficient to guide

effectively the development of, inter alia, joint doctrine.

Returning to 10 USC, the second subparagraph of Section 153

requires the Chairman to "[prepare] strategic plans,

including plans which conform to resource levels projected by

the Secretary of Defense to be available for the period of

time for which the plans are to be effective."45 These

strategic plans should conform to the NMS and carry strategic

direction to a level of increased specificity.

A review of the third subparagraph of Section 153

reveals that the Chairman is required to "[provide] for the

preparation and review of contingency plans which conform to

the policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of

Defense."46

13
strategic direction and the JSCP is an effective tool to

cause the CINCs to prepare contingency plans, neither fully

attends to the Chairman’s responsibility to prepare strategic

plans.47 One consequence of this planning lacuna is its

negative effect on the development and implementation of

joint doctrine.

Strategic plans should enumerate specific strategic

objectives, identify constraints to include fiscal

constraints, offer strategy for securing objectives, and

should be key in determining force capability requirements.48

They are envisaged to be comprehensive plans, based on a

global perspective, that contain strategic priorities and

strategies for attaining them.49 These plans should set forth

specific strategic concepts distilled from the broad general

concepts presented in the NMS. These strategic concepts

should help guide the development of joint doctrine.

Therefore, the concepts must be specific if the derivative

doctrine is to be useful in achieving the objectives outlined

in the NSS and NMS.

An example helps illustrate this point. A strategic

concept of the current NMS is overseas presence.50 Along with

power projection, this concept facilitates the three

components of the strategy: peacetime engagement, deterrence

and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning our

Nation’s wars.51 One notes immediately that the NMS provides

general definitions of overseas presence and peacetime

engagement. It also describes them in terms of where forces

are currently located and why they are there. For peacetime

engagement, the strategy describes the different forms it may

take and why it is important. The strategy is educational in

that it informs the reader of the broad concepts and

components of the NMS and why they are important. But there

is nothing in the NMS that tells us how we should apply

overseas presence to achieve the right type and amount of

peacetime engagement, in the right places around the globe,

to optimize the promotion of U.S. interests, given military

capability (resource) limitations, for the period of time

under consideration. However, these factors, and others, must

be addressed if joint doctrine can be

14
Therefore, the value of strategic plans to the

development of joint doctrine would be considerable. Not only

would they provide the specific strategic concepts upon which

joint doctrine should be based; more importantly, they would

outline the contextual framework within which it would be

developed. Additionally, strategic plans would provide a

unifying mechanism for the services, CINCs, and defense

agencies. This would:

• legitimize the preeminence of joint doctrine over

individual service doctrines;

• result in better rationalized service doctrines;

• produce a more coherent body of joint doctrine; and,

• increase service predilection to implement joint

doctrine.

In summary, neither the NMS nor the JSCP meets the

requirements of strategic plans. The development of strategic

plans, inter alia, would allow the services to arrive at a

more common understanding of the NMS and a more unified

commitment to a body of joint doctrine that would better

support the NMS. Additionally, the applicability and

implementation of joint doctrine at the theater level would

be enhanced since contingency plans and joint doctrine would

be consistent with an overarching strategic plan. In short,

the direction provided by these documents would introduce a

new rigor into strategic and operations planning, joint

doctrine development and implementation, joint exercises, and

joint operations. Interestingly, such a system already

exists, in large part, in Australia.

Lessons from the Antipodes.

Developments over the past 25 years in the Australian

Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Force (ADF)

provide many useful lessons on threat-benign, as well as topdown, defense planning. Beginning in the early 1970s,

15
This section will not dwell at length on the Australian

defense planning system, as this subject has already been

documented and analyzed elsewhere.52 What will be presented

is a précis of Australia’s defense planning methodology and

how strategic guidance is conveyed through the planning

system for execution and for the development of joint

doctrine, which from all accounts is actively used.53

Defense planning in Australia begins with the

government’s current defense white paper,54 a document that

provides policy and strategy much in the same way that the

NSS and NMS do in the U.S. system. Strategic guidance for the

ADF is further refined by strategic planning documents.55

Second, a net assessment of the military capabilities of

other regional states is derived, without consideration given

to their intent to employ their capabilities against

Australia. Third, "credible contingencies" are developed

which provide a baseline of regional military capabilities,

against which the Department of Defence conducts capabilities

planning. Fourth, projected financial guidance is provided to

enable force development planners to produce force structure

priorities.

The above planning system is somewhat unique in that it

is not threat-based. Prescient for the purposes of this

essay, is that Australian strategic guidance is employed to

develop "Strategic Concepts."56 These important principles

outline the missions that the ADF is likely to be required to

perform. These are national level strategic concepts and are

not comparable to regional strategic concepts developed by

U.S. combatant commanders, nor can they be equated to more

specific concepts found in U.S. joint doctrine.

Australian Strategic Concepts provide a very useful

foundation for the development of the ADF’s joint doctrine.

They consist of specified task parameters (e.g., rates of

effort, location, and duration), and judgements of task

priorities (where possible). Strategic Concepts have become

the prime influence in the Australian force development

process in recent years. In fact, it is extremely difficult

for a service to propose

16
between Strategic Concepts and joint doctrine.

Joint doctrine is viewed by the ADF as essential in

ensuring that the ADF is capable of performing the missions

described by Strategic Concepts. The ADF Warfare Centre,

established in 1990, is chartered to develop and teach joint

doctrine, manage the ADF exercise analyses plan and maintain

an analytical data base for post-exercise analyses.58 The

Centre concerns itself with developing and validating joint

doctrine at the operational level of warfare.59 Generally,

the Centre does not participate in the development of

tactical level doctrine. This is left to the individual

services, but it must be developed in accordance with joint

doctrine.

Joint doctrine has come to play an important role in the

activities of the ADF in recent years for a variety of

important reasons. First, as a result of a series of command

reorganizations,60 the ADF, perforce, has had to become more

proficient in joint operations. Consequently, ADF exercises

are now always joint. Joint doctrine, such as Australian

Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 1 "Doctrine," has become

umbrella guidance for the three services, to which their

service doctrines must conform.61 The services have come to

accept joint doctrine as a very useful means to achieve the

often illusive goal of "jointness." Second, and perhaps more

important, a key objective of joint doctrine is to help

translate Strategic Concepts into operational directives. In

this respect, joint doctrine flows from and supports the

specific concepts. Thus, ADF joint doctrine provides the

methods by which the services can support Australian national

strategy.62 Although the services previously found it

difficult individually to demonstrate that they were capable

of executing Strategic Concepts, joint doctrine now provides

important and necessary integrating and rationalizing

guidance.63 Third, by providing guidance requisite to

achieving Strategic Concepts, ADF joint doctrine assists the

ADF’s three environmental and one geographic commanders. It

helps them to assess and demonstrate their commands’

preparedness to accomplish missions as stipulated in the

17
ADF joint doctrinal development accomplishes these

ambitious objectives in the following manner. First, joint

teams of field grade officers with recent operational

experience draft doctrine at the ADF Warfare Centre. Within

this process, it is a truism that for joint doctrine to be

valid, it must address Strategic Concepts. Once completed and

vetted by Centre staff, joint doctrine is reviewed for

approval by an organization called the Joint Operations

Doctrine Group. This group is comprised of representatives

from the three services, the joint commands, Headquarters

ADF, and other interested parties. Draft doctrine is

subsequently staffed through the service staffs. Agreement on

publication is reached through consensus. The watering down

effect that consensus-building produces during the

development of U.S. joint doctrine is largely mitigated

during the development of ADF joint doctrine, because its

focus on Strategic Concepts is assured during the early

stages of development and maintained throughout the

coordination phase.

Joint doctrine is evaluated and validated through the

ADF Warfare Centre’s regular observation of joint and

combined exercises to ensure that joint doctrine is both

relevant and workable. The Assistant Chief of Defence Force

(operations) sponsors these visits, thereby ensuring

Headquarters ADF’s involvement in the review process.

Observed doctrinal inadequacies could result in a review of

existing doctrine. In this manner, the ADF endeavors to

ensure that doctrine remains relevant and useful to operators

in the field. Knowledge of joint doctrine is disseminated in

large part through a large number of courses conducted

annually by the ADF Warfare Centre; training of ADF personnel

is one of its key functions.65

Assessment.

This analysis does not advocate that the Australian

defense planning system and the ADF’s joint doctrine models

be

18
between Australian strategic planning and joint doctrine

offer insights into improving U.S. joint doctrine development

and encouraging its implementation. The Australian system

demonstrates that it is possible to have a strategic planning

system and joint doctrine development process that integrate

to provide a coherent logic-flow from national security

policy, to strategic guidance, to strategic planning, and to

joint doctrine development and implementation.

Applying the pertinent features of the Australian

systems to the U.S. strategic planning and joint doctrine

processes suggests the Joint Staff should develop strategic

plans to provide a more coherent linkage between the NMS and

the operation planning of the CINCs. Analogous to the manner

in which theater operation plans develop and elaborate on the

strategic concepts found in CINCs’ theater strategies,

national level strategic plans would present the specific

concepts that would not only unify the planning efforts of

the various CINCs, but would elaborate on, and add meaning

to, the broader concepts presented in the NMS.66 Furthermore,

the unifying effect of strategic plans would provide an

overarching framework that would promote a common

understanding within DoD of the broad and general concepts

set forth in the NMS. Strategic plans would also provide

authoritative and specific guidance for use in developing

agreed upon, rationalized, and practicable joint doctrine.

The responsiveness of joint doctrine to the NMS could be

enhanced and it would be less influenced by parochialism of

the Lead Agent. This would be accomplished by ensuring that

early drafts of joint doctrine are consistent with strategic

plans. The U.S. Joint Warfighting Center should be assigned

that responsibility.

Additionally, if in the course of doctrine development

services are unable to reach agreement on certain doctrinal

issues, the Joint Warfighting Center, on behalf of the

Chairman, could base its arbitration of the dispute on the

strategic concepts contained in the strategic plans. While

perhaps not perfect, the adoption of these methodologies

19
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Conclusion.

This essay has argued that improvements in U.S. joint

doctrine development and implementation are required and can

be accomplished, in part, through improvement in strategic

planning. This can also result in a more coherent translation

of the broad concepts of the NMS for the combatant commands

and services, leading to improved operation planning.

Certainly, the changes outlined above and recommended below,

although controversial, have sufficient merit to warrant

further examination. A strategic planning system that makes

the U.S. armed forces more responsive to the NMS could have

significant systemic implications. By making joint doctrine

more responsive to the NMS and requiring service doctrine to

conform to it, service and joint training and exercises would

be better focused and harmonized. Ultimately, the CINCs would

be provided forces better prepared to accomplish their

assigned missions.

This essay, however, does not imply that the Chairman

has been unaware of the need to improve joint doctrine

development and implementation. For example, the key

initiative started by General Colin Powell and consummated by

General John Shalikashvili, the combination of the Joint

Doctrine Center with the Joint Warfare Center to form the

aforementioned Joint Warfighting Center, created an

organization that will, inter alia, take a more active role

in the development of joint doctrine. This reform should

reduce problems inherent in the current joint doctrine

development process. Capitalizing on its potential, the new

center has the potential to ensure that publications are

truly joint in their early stages of development. This could

be accomplished in at least two ways. One alternative would

be for the Joint Warfighting Center to organize and manage

inter-service joint doctrine development teams, thus

obviating the need for Lead Agents. A more preferable

alternative might include retention of the

20
development process. Either alternative would enable the

Joint Warfighting Center to form early consensus on joint

doctrine issues and ensure that doctrine is void of any bias

toward a particular service from the beginning.67

Another major initiative taken by the Chairman is the

more effectual dissemination of joint doctrine throughout the

U.S. armed forces. Concerned that forces provided by the

services do not apply joint doctrine because of a general

lack of familiarity and understanding, the Chairman has

directed the review and revision, if necessary, of all

existing joint doctrine publications. Moreover, by using a

multi-media approach, the Joint Staff hopes to make the

doctrine more accessible, readable, and understandable.68

These examples evince the Chairman’s desire to effect

reforms to improve joint doctrine development and

implementation. However, a promising reform yet to be

implemented is the development of strategic plans and

ensuring that they guide the development of joint doctrine.

In an era of strategic ambiguity and defense penury, the need

for U.S. forces to be as effectively and efficiently

responsive to the NMS as possible has never been greater.

Recommendations.

• Strategic plans, as envisaged by the Goldwater-Nichols

Act, should be developed to add definition and utility

to the NMS and provide the specific strategic concepts

upon which joint doctrine should be based.

• The service doctrine centers and the newly created

Joint Warfighting Center should move toward closer

coordination and greater integration.

• The concept of Lead Agency should be modified to

ensure that the Joint Warfighting Center assumes a

21
• The Chairman should clarify and emphasize his policy

that joint doctrine is authoritative.

• The Chairman should implement a process that ensures

that service doctrine conforms to, and is consistent

with, joint doctrine.

• The Australian Defence Forces’ joint doctrine

development methodology should be studied for possible

applications within the U.S. armed forces joint doctrine

development process.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Defense

Organization and the Need for Change, Staff Report, 99th Congress,

1st Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing office, 1985,

p. 1; and, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Goldwater-Nichols

Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Report 99-824, 99th

Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

office, 1986, p. 3.

2. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed

Services, Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces, 103rd Congress,

1st Session, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, April

1993, Section 155.

3. U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff,

National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Strategy

of Flexible and Selective Engagement, Washington, DC, February 1995,

pp. 1-20.

4. The strategic concepts envisaged here differ from the broad

concepts found in the National Security Strategy, National Military

Strategy and other national strategic planning documents. These

strategic concepts would be sufficiently specific and focused to help

form the basis for developing new, and reviewing existing, joint

doctrine. Many factors, including historical writings, legislation,

operational experience, and technological developments, combined with

strategic planning, form a multidimensional basis for the

establishment of joint doctrine. This essay focuses on the strategic

planning dimension.

5. The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement

and Enlargement, Washington, DC, February 1995, pp. 1-33.

22
7. On behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of the Staff,

the Director of the Joint Staff issued on July 28, 1994 a memorandum

(MCM-90-94) to all Service Chiefs and Unified Combatant Commandersin-Chief regarding joint doctrine. In this memorandum the Chairman

directed that the doctrinal concept found in the preface of all joint

publications be changed.

8. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-01: Joint Publication System,

Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Development Program, Washington, DC, July 30, 1992, pp. I-1 thru III-15.

9. See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1: Joint Warfare of the US Armed

Forces, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January

1995.

10. Arthur F. Lykke, "Toward an Understanding of Military

Strategy," in Military Strategy: Theory and Application, ed. by

Arthur F. Lykke, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, May 1,

1986, p. 3.

11. Joint Pub 1: Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, p. I-3;

U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Washington, DC,

p. vi; and, U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Washington,

DC, February 1, 1995, p. I-1.

12. See, U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, User’s Guide for JOPES (Joint Operation Planning and

Execution System), Washington, DC, May 1, 1995, p. 9.

13. We acknowledge the proviso in Joint Pub 1-01 (p. I-2) that

"Joint doctrine will be written to reflect extant capabilities."

However, we consider it to be superficial with respect to the proper

relationship between joint doctrine and force capability development.

Obviously, the Department of Defense would not develop military

capabilities and then try to ascertain how best to use them.

Alternatively, the joint doctrine development process should consider

potential force capability development options. To say that joint

doctrine must be written to reflect extant capabilities ignores the

dynamic and reciprocating relationship between joint doctrine and

force capability development.

14. Joint Pub 1-01, pp. I-1 thru I-2.

15. Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces, section

153 (a) (5).

23
management of joint training. See U.S. Government Accounting Office,

Military Capabilities: Stronger Joint Staff Needed to Enhance Joint

Military Training, Report NSIAD-95-109, Washington, DC, July 6, 1995.

18. U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Military Education Policy Document, CM-1618-93, Washington,

DC, March 23, 1993, Chapter 3 and Appendix A.

19. Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces, sections

153(a)(4) and 163 (b)(2).

20. U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed

Forces of the United States, CM-1584-93, Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, February 10, 1993, pp. II-18/19; III15/16; and, III-37.

21. Bradley Graham, "Air Force Chief on Attack: McPeak Boldly

Criticizes other Services’ Roles and Plans," Washington Post, October

24, 1994, p. 1; and GEN Merrill McPeak, USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S.

Air Force, briefing given before the Roles and Mission Commission,

Washington, DC, September 14, 1994.

22. U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Universal Joint Task List, CJCSM 3500.04, Version 2.1,

Washington, DC, May 15, 1995.

23. Lewis D. Eigen and Jonathan P. Siegel, Macmillan Dictionary

of Political Quotations, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company,

1993, p. 325.

24. John Boatman, "The Jane’s Interview," Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 10, 1994, p. 32.

25. Idem, "Spreading the Word," Jane’s Defense Weekly, December

10, 1994, p. 19.

26. The use of the double-negative here is intentional. Service

concurrence on a piece of joint doctrine may mean agreement but more

often than not merely means the service does not strongly disagree

with it.

27. Michael J. Morin, Professor of Doctrine at the U.S. Army War

College, has conducted a comprehensive review of current joint

doctrine. He discovered a considerable number of areas of substantial

internal inconsistency and numerous others of lesser significance.

The Joint Staff

24
28. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02: Department of Defense

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office, March 23, 1994, p. 120.

29. U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 100-1:

The Army, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1994,

"Foreword."

30. On behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of the Staff,

the Director of the Joint Staff issued on July 28, 1994 a memorandum

to all Service Chiefs and Unified Combatant Commanders-in-Chief

regarding joint doctrine. In this memorandum the Chairman directed

that the applicability paragraph found in the preface of all joint

publications be changed to read: "The guidance in this publication is

authoritative; as such, commanders will apply this doctrine (JTTP)

except when exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise." In a

September 15, 1994 memorandum the Commander of the U.S. Army Training

and Doctrine Command wrote that the Chairman’s ". . . views are

consistent with the Army view that doctrine is authoritative, but

requires judgement in application." While the Commander of TRADOC

acknowledged doctrine to be authoritative, he appeared to endorse the

exercise of "judgement and application" for situations with less than

"exceptional circumstances."

31. In a February 8, 1995 memorandum to the Commission on Roles

and Missions of the Armed Forces, Air Force Major General Link

expressed the Air Force’s concern that "Current Joint doctrine is

largely dominated by outmoded perspectives which handcuff airpower to

the constrained mission of land component commanders." Additionally,

an analysis of Appendix H of Joint Pub 1-01 reveals that the Army has

been designated Lead Agent significantly more often than the Air

Force and almost twice as often as the Navy and Marine Corps

combined.

32. James J. Tritten and Gary W. Anderson, "Lessons from the

History of Naval Doctrine Development," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol.

78, No. 10, October 1994, pp. 50-52. In response to criticism that

the Navy’s use of doctrine has been spotty at best, the recently

created Naval Doctrine Command held forth a number of historical

documents as containing past or current doctrine. This was not very

convincing proof of past emphasis on formal doctrine.

33. U.S. Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval

operations, Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare, Washington,

DC, March 28, 1994.

25
36. U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting, Fleet Marine Force Manual 1,

March 6, 1989, pp. 43-44.

37. Joint Pub 1-01, pp. II-2 thru II-3.

38. Ibid, p. I-2.

39. U.S. Department of the Army, Army Focus 93, Washington, DC:

U.S. Army Publication and Printing Command, September 1993, pp. 29-

30.

40. Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces, section 155 (e).

41. In a July 28, 1994 memorandum (CM-378-94) to all the Service

Chiefs and Combatant Commanders-in-Chief, the CJCS, in response to

the accidental downing of the U.S. Army helicopters, directed their

"immediate and serious attention" to specific elements of joint

doctrine: Command and Control for Joint Air Operations and JTTP for

Close Air Support.

42. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, p. I-3.

43. Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces, section

153(a)(1).

44. U.S., National Military Strategy, passim; and, see our

essay, U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing

Nexus, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September

1, 1995, passim.

45. Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces, section

153(a)(2).

46. Ibid., section 153(a)(3).

47. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Instructional Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, MCM-126-92,

Washington, DC, August 25, 1992. A review of the Instructional JSCP

shows that it provides a précis of the NMS, general planning guidance

to the CINCs and the services, assigns specific, regionally focused,

planning tasks to the CINCs, and lists and apportions forces for

planning. Of particular note is what the JSCP does not provide. It

does not assign missions, nor does it provide national level

integration of the planning efforts of the various CINCs. Therefore,

it cannot be considered a strategic plan within the context of 10

USC, section 153.

48. U.S. Congress, Defense Organization and the Need for Change,

pp. 493-500. See, as well, U.S. Department of Defense Strategic

Planning.

26
51. Although a similar argument could be made for the other two

components, for brevity we will analyze peacetime engagement only. Of

the two concepts, overseas presence is more applicable to peacetime

engagement, so we will use it for our illustrative analysis.

52. See Paul Dibb, The Conceptual Basis of Australia’s Defence

Planning and Force Structure Development, Canberra Papers on Strategy

and Defence No. 88, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,

Australian National University, 1992; and, Thomas-Durell Young,

Threat-Ambiguous Defense Planning: The Australian Experience, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 10,

1993.

53. Interviews with numerous ADF operational commanders in

Canberra, ACT, Holsworthy, NSW, Sydney, NSW, and Newcastle, NSW,

December 1994.

54. Australia, Department of Defence, Defending Australia:

Defence White Paper 1994, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing

Service, 1994.

55. For example, Australia, Department of Defence, Strategic

Review December 1993, Canberra, Defence Central, 1993.

56. These are essentially listed in ibid., Annex, pp. 61-67.

57. Discussion with Australian defense officials, Russell

Offices, Canberra, ACT, December 1994.

58. The Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre was created on

July 1, 1990 through an amalgamation of the Australian Joint Warfare

Establishment and the Australian Joint Maritime Warfare Centre.

Personal correspondence from Colonel D. J. Murray, Australian Defence

Force Warfare Centre, April 25, 1995.

59. There is, in actuality, very little in the published

literature on the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre. One of the

few essays which provide general information and the historical

development of joint warfighting doctrine in Australia is, Al Clancy,

"Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre, Maritime Patrol Aviation:

The Voice of VP International, Volume 2, No. 4, March 1993, pp. 18-

21.

60. See, Report on the Implementation of the Structural Review

of Higher ADF Staff Arrangements, Canberra, Directorate of

Departmental Publications Division, Management Improvement and

Manpower Policy Division, May 1, 1990.

27
63. ADFP 1, "Doctrine," Chapter 2, "Functions and Roles of the

ADF."

64. Briefings, Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre, RAAF

Base Williamtown, NSW, December 1994.

65. Briefing Charts, "Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre,"

May 1994; and, personal correspondence from Colonel D. J. Murray,

Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre, November 2, 1994.

66. U.S. Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Volume I,

Planning Policies and Procedures, Joint Pub 5-03.1, Washington, DC,

August 4, 1993, III-1/III-12. Our use of the term "operation plan"

conforms to the JOPES discussion of operation planning contained in

this Joint Pub. We recognize that deliberate operation plans may be

further developed into theater campaign plans.

67. John Boatmen, p. 19.

68. Ibid.

28
*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Authors

DDouglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Thomas-Durell Young

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries

Mrs. Shirley E. Martin

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

Mrs. Kay L. Williams

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler