PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

No. 23-2189

________________

ALISON GEORGE,

Appellant

v.

RUSHMORE SERVICE CENTER, LLC; 

MILES K. BEACOM; DALE DOBBERPUHL; 

THOMAS D. SANFORD; JOHN DOES 1 to 10

________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 2-18-cv-13698)

District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini

________________

Argued on May 2, 2024

Before: KRAUSE, CHUNG, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 13, 2024)
2

Yongmoon Kim

Philip D. Stern [ARGUED]

Kim Law Firm

411 Hackensack Avenue

Suite 701

Hackensack, NJ 07601

Counsel for Appellant

Daniel McKenna [ARGUED]

Ballard Spahr

1735 Market Street

51st Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19103

William P. Reiley

Ballard Spahr

700 E Gate Drive

Suite 330

Mount Laurel, NJ 08054

Counsel for Appellees

________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

________________

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

For almost six years now, Appellant Alison George has 

been seeking to represent a class and obtain damages from 
3

Rushmore Service Center, LLC,1 based on a letter naming the 

collection arm of George’s credit card company, rather than the 

credit card company itself, as the “current/original creditor.” 

App. 36 (capitalization altered). As alleged in the operative 

complaint, that phrasing violated the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act (FDCPA) by failing to identify “the creditor to 

whom the debt [was] owed” and providing “false, deceptive, 

or misleading” information. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692g(a)(2). 

And as alleged by way of injury, these violations would have 

left “the least sophisticated consumer” confused about “to 

whom the alleged debt [was] owed and if it [was] legitimate.” 

App. 28. After the District Court granted Rushmore’s motion

to stay proceedings and compel individual arbitration, George 

lost before the arbitrator, who ruled in Rushmore’s favor, and

before the District Judge, who declined to vacate the arbitration 

award. On appeal, George challenges the merits of those 

rulings.

As it turns out, however, the main question on appeal is

not related to the merits. Instead, it is whether these many 

years of litigation have been much ado about nothing. For 

while George’s suit was proceeding, we issued two opinions—

Kelly v. RealPage Inc., 47 F.4th 202 (3d Cir. 2022), and

Huber v. Simon’s Agency, Inc., 84 F.4th 132 (3d Cir. 2023)2—

calling into question whether confusion alone is sufficient to 

allege a concrete injury in this context. Because we conclude

1 Where relevant, we use “Rushmore” to refer to both 

Rushmore and the Rushmore officers named in the amended 

complaint.

2 Both Kelly and Huber have “full retroactive effect in all cases 

still open on direct review.” Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Tax’n, 509 

U.S. 86, 97 (1993).
4

that George lacked standing from the very outset, we must

vacate the District Court’s orders and remand with instructions 

to dismiss George’s case. But as it may be that the arbitration 

award “can be enforced in a jurisdictionally correct 

proceeding,” Brown v. Francis, 75 F.3d 860, 868 (3d Cir. 

1996), we will decline to vacate the award itself at this 

juncture.

I. Background

A. The Rushmore Letter

In 2013, Alison George opened a credit card account 

with First Premier Bank. Under that account’s contract, which 

became binding on George shortly after her enrollment, 

George agreed to resolve all account-related claims via 

individual arbitration. The arbitration provision covered 

George, First Premier, First Premier’s “employees, parents, 

subsidiaries, affiliates, beneficiaries, agents and assigns,” and 

the “employees, parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, beneficiaries, 

agents and assigns” of those entities. App. 109.

A few months after First Premier issued George’s credit 

card, George defaulted on her account by failing to make the 

minimum required payment. This failure to pay triggered First 

Premier’s collection apparatus, run through servicing entity 

Premier Bankcard, LLC. Notably, Premier Bankcard does not 

perform all of its own collection work. Instead, it outsources 

some of that work to corporations like Rushmore. A 2011 

contract between Premier Bankcard and Rushmore, for 

example, obligated Rushmore to “undertake the collection of 

such . . . [First Premier] accounts as [Premier Bankcard chose] 
5

to place with [Rushmore] for the purpose of collection.”3 Id.

at 79.

In the 2011 contract, Rushmore agreed to contact its 

First Premier accounts “through collection letters as well as 

consistent direct telephone contact to maximize recovery.” Id. 

Consistent with this commitment, and with Premier 

Bankcard’s apparent assignment of George’s account to 

Rushmore, Rushmore sent George a collection letter in April 

2018. That letter, which was Rushmore’s first communication 

to George, contained the following header: “Current/Original 

Creditor: PREMIER Bankcard, LLC.” Id. at 36.

B. The Instant Suit

In the amended complaint, the operative complaint in 

this case,4 George alleged that Rushmore’s April 2018 letter

was (1) “confusing as to whether” Premier Bankcard was the 

current or original creditor, and (2) misleading in any event,

because First Premier, not Premier Bankcard, was “the current 

creditor to whom the debt [was] owed” and the “original 

creditor” of the account. Id. at 28. On that basis, George 

3

In exchange, Rushmore would receive a commission based 

on the amount collected.

4 Around the same time George received her letter, another 

First Premier customer, Josephine Tailor, received a similar 

letter from Rushmore. Tailor filed a class-action complaint 

against Rushmore in the District of New Jersey in September 

2018, and the amended complaint (filed two months later) 

added George as a plaintiff. The District Court dismissed 

Tailor’s claims with prejudice when she passed away in August 

2019, leaving George as the only putative class representative.
6

claimed—on behalf of herself and a putative class of those who 

received similar letters—that the letter violated the FDCPA. 

Specifically, George claimed that the letter failed to identify 

“the name of the creditor to whom the debt [was] owed” as 

required by law, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2); that it constituted a 

“false, deceptive, or misleading representation . . . in 

connection with the collection of [a] debt,” id. § 1692e; and 

that it used “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or 

attempt to collect [a] debt,” id. § 1692f.

As to George’s individual injury, however, the 

complaint was oddly silent. It alleged that George “received 

and reviewed the [April 2018] letter,” App. 28, but it did not 

allege any consequences for George as a result of that receipt 

and review. And even as the complaint alleged that the letter 

was “confusing” and would “leave the least sophisticated 

consumer in doubt about to whom the alleged debt is owed and 

if it is legitimate,” id., it omitted any allegation that George 

herself was confused.

In May 2020, after limited discovery regarding 

arbitrability, the District Court granted Rushmore’s motion to 

compel arbitration and stay proceedings under sections 3 and 4 

of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4.5 

Rejecting George’s arguments to the contrary, the Court held 

that (1) Rushmore could enforce the arbitration provision 

because it was Premier Bankcard’s agent, Premier Bankcard 

5 At that point, the Supreme Court had not yet issued its 

seminal decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 

2190 (2021). Neither party challenged standing before the 

District Court, and the District Court declined to consider it sua 

sponte.
7

being a First Premier affiliate, and (2) the arbitration provision 

covered George’s FDCPA claims, which “unquestionably” 

related to her credit card account. George v. Rushmore Serv. 

Ctr., LLC, No. 18-cv-13698, 2020 WL 2319293, at *2–3 

(D.N.J. May 11, 2020). The Court therefore ordered George 

to “submit her claim[s] to [individual] arbitration or notify the 

Court of her intention not to do so” within 60 days. App. 3.

C. Arbitration Proceedings

Rather than notifying the Court of her intent not to 

arbitrate, George filed an arbitration demand against Rushmore 

with the American Arbitration Association (AAA).6 The 

parties engaged in “extensive discovery,” Answering Br. 8, and 

in June 2022, the arbitrator rejected George’s attempt to 

relitigate arbitrability and ordered a hearing to resolve the 

FDCPA claims on the merits.7 At that hearing, which took 

place in October 2022, the arbitrator “heard testimony from 

three witnesses, received twenty-two exhibits, and heard oral 

argument” on contested legal issues over the course of five 

hours. Id. at 9. The parties later filed post-hearing 

submissions.

6 George initially filed a timely arbitration demand with JAMS, 

but she refiled with the AAA after Rushmore objected. After 

a dismissal without prejudice (followed by refiling) and a stay, 

arbitration proceedings began in earnest in January 2022.

7 The arbitrator, in effect, denied summary judgment, finding 

genuine issues of material fact as to whether Premier Bankcard 

was also a creditor and whether “the formatting of 

original/current creditor was misleading.” App. 102.
8

The arbitrator issued his “final and binding” decision in 

November 2022. App. 112. In that decision, which awarded 

George $0, the arbitrator found that Rushmore was not liable 

for two reasons. First, by George’s own admission, she never 

read the April 2018 letter: She stated during the hearing that 

“she did not read the Rushmore [letter] and, in fact, was 

essentially not reading debt collection letters generally, but 

rather passing them on to her attorney.” Id. at 106. Even if the 

letter was misleading, the arbitrator reasoned, George herself 

“could not have actually been misled.” Id. (emphasis omitted). 

Second, the letter itself was not misleading: Because Premier 

Bankcard serviced George’s account and “received and was 

entitled to part of the funds from payments made by [George] 

on [that] account,” it was at least a current creditor, and could 

therefore be listed as a “current/original, meaning current or 

original,” creditor. Id. at 107. On the whole, the arbitrator 

concluded, George did not meet her “affirmative burden of 

proof to show . . . violations of the FDCPA.” Id. at 106.

D. The Motion to Vacate

George returned to the District Court shortly after the 

arbitrator issued his decision, asking the Court to vacate the 

arbitration award pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 10. In her motion to 

vacate, George challenged arbitrability for a third time, arguing 

that Rushmore was not a Premier Bankcard agent and therefore 

could not enforce the arbitration provision. She also argued 

that the arbitrator “failed to consider the relevant evidence,” 

“manifestly disregard[ed] the controlling law,” and, based on 

these factors, “exhibited evident bias” toward Rushmore. 

Suppl. App. 127.
9

The District Court once again disagreed. In its opinion 

and order of May 2023, the Court (1) declined to reconsider its 

prior arbitrability ruling, and (2) found that the arbitrator 

“properly considered the evidence before him” and properly 

applied the law. George v. Rushmore Serv. Ctr., LLC, No. 18-

cv-13698, 2023 WL 3735977, at *2–3 (D.N.J. May 30, 2023). 

The Court accordingly denied George’s motion to vacate.8 Id. 

at *4.

George timely appealed both the May 2020 order 

compelling arbitration and the May 2023 order declining to 

vacate the arbitration award.

II. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction

The District Court had putative jurisdiction under 15 

U.S.C. § 1692k(d) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 

jurisdiction to review final orders under, among other statutes,

28 U.S.C. § 1291. But in this case we must assure ourselves of

both finality and George’s Article III standing, as the two are 

intertwined. See Hartig Drug Co. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 836 

F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2016). Assuming the District Court’s 

orders are final, we cannot avoid the question of standing as 

we did in O’Hanlon v. Uber Technologies, Inc., an 

interlocutory appeal. See 990 F.3d 757, 762–66, 766 n.4 (3d 

Cir. 2021).

8 Although both TransUnion and Kelly had been decided by

this point, the District Court again did not consider standing 

sua sponte.
10

We conclude that the May 2023 order declining to 

vacate the arbitration award is final for two reasons. First, the 

May 2023 order did exactly what is required for finality under 

§ 1291: It “terminate[d] the litigation between the parties on 

the merits” and left nothing to do but “enforce by execution 

what has been determined.” Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller, 

Inc., 454 F.3d 163, 168 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks 

omitted). Although it is true that the District Court neither 

confirmed the arbitration award nor entered judgment for 

Rushmore before terminating the case, an order can be final 

under § 1291 when it leaves nothing “for the district court to 

do but . . . confirm the arbitration award and enter judgment.” 

Alpine Glass, Inc. v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 643 F.3d 659, 663–

64 (8th Cir. 2011). That is the situation here.9

Second, even if the order declining to vacate were not 

final under § 1291, it would be final and appealable under 9 

U.S.C. § 16(a)(3). That section allows for the appeal of a “final 

decision respecting . . . arbitration,” and an order declining to 

vacate an arbitration award is one such “final decision.” 

Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 584 

F.3d 513, 521 (3d Cir. 2009); accord, e.g., Selden v. Airbnb, 

Inc., 4 F.4th 148, 155 (D.C. Cir. 2021); United States v. Park 

Place Assocs., Ltd., 563 F.3d 907, 919–20 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Even though § 16 does not contain an explicit grant of appellate 

jurisdiction, we have treated it as a jurisdiction-conferring 

9 To the extent Rushmore’s ability to file a motion to confirm 

affected finality, it no longer does. Such a motion must be 

made “within one year after the award is made,” and more than 

a year has passed since the arbitration award became final. 9 

U.S.C. § 9; see Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer E., Inc., 124 

F.3d 551, 557 (3d Cir. 1997).
11

provision in the past. See, e.g., Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC, 369 

F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2004). This makes sense as a practical 

matter: Because many appealable orders listed in § 16(a)(1) are 

not covered by 28 U.S.C. § 1292, a contrary determination 

would render the language that an appeal “may be taken from” 

such orders without effect. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a).

The order declining to vacate the arbitration award is 

thus final, and the order compelling arbitration is final because

“it [has] merged with [that] final order.” Sapp v. Indus. Action 

Servs., LLC, 75 F.4th 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2023); see R & C 

Oilfield Servs. LLC v. Am. Wind Transp. Grp. LLC, 45 F.4th 

655, 659 (3d Cir. 2022).

Having ascertained that the relevant orders are final and 

appealable, we must next consider Article III standing, which 

“is essential to federal subject matter jurisdiction.” Hartig 

Drug, 836 F.3d at 269. We turn to that question now, 

recognizing the “familiar” principle that we “always [have] 

jurisdiction to determine [our] own jurisdiction.” United

States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002).

B. Standing

Both George and Rushmore assert that George has, and 

had, standing. That does not, however, end the inquiry: 

Standing is a “threshold jurisdictional requirement,” and we 

have a “bedrock obligation to examine both [our] own subject 

matter jurisdiction” and that of the District Court. Pub. Int. 

Rsch. Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 

111, 117 (3d Cir. 1997). Our independent review reveals that, 

based on the amended complaint, George lacks standing under 

Article III and lacked standing below.
12

1. Applicable Law

In order to show standing, a plaintiff bears the burden 

of establishing three distinct elements:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in 

fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest 

which is (a) concrete and particularized; and

(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal 

connection between the injury and the conduct 

complained of—the injury has to be fairly 

traceable to the challenged action of the 

defendant, and not the result of the independent 

action of some third party not before the court. 

Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely 

speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a 

favorable decision.

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)

(cleaned up). The first element is most relevant here, and three 

cases—TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021), 

Kelly, 47 F.4th 202, and Huber, 84 F.4th 132—bear heavily on 

our analysis. So we briefly recap those cases.

In TransUnion, the Supreme Court clarified that the 

“[c]entral” question when assessing concreteness is “whether 

the asserted harm has a close relationship to a harm 

traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in 

American courts—such as physical harm, monetary harm, or 

various intangible harms including . . . reputational harm.” 141 

S. Ct. at 2200 (quotation marks omitted). Based on this 
13

principle, the Supreme Court concluded that plaintiffs whose 

misleading credit reports “were disseminated to third-party 

businesses . . . suffered a concrete harm” qualifying as an injury 

in fact; these plaintiffs, the Court reasoned, had been subjected 

to “reputational harm associated with the [traditional] tort of 

defamation.” See id. at 2208–09. Plaintiffs whose credit 

reports contained misleading information but were not 

disseminated, on the other hand, suffered no concrete harm and 

lacked standing to sue under the Fair Credit Reporting Act 

(FCRA). See id. at 2209–13.

In Kelly, we examined TransUnion in the context of 

“informational injury,” the injury that occurs when “a

plaintiff . . . fail[s] to receive information to which she is 

legally entitled.” 47 F.4th at 211 (cleaned up). We first noted 

that informational injury can be “sufficiently concrete to confer 

standing,” and that TransUnion did not disturb that basic 

premise. See id. at 211–13, 212 n.8. We then, in light of 

TransUnion, articulated what is required for informational 

injury: A plaintiff must show “(1) the omission of information 

to which [she] claim[s] entitlement, (2) adverse effects that 

flow from the omission, and (3) [a] nexus to the concrete 

interest Congress intended to protect” by requiring disclosure 

of the information. Id. at 214 (quotation marks omitted). We 

ultimately found informational injury because (1) the 

defendant did not disclose required source information, (2) as 

a result, both plaintiffs were denied apartments for which they 

applied, one plaintiff needlessly wasted his time and suffered 

confusion and distress, and one plaintiff could only secure 

public housing, and (3) the failure to disclose frustrated 

Congress’s goal, under FCRA, of “empowering consumers to 

correct inaccurate information in their credit files.” Id. at 214–

15 (cleaned up).
14

In Huber, another case arising under the FDCPA, we 

distinguished Kelly and clarified that the informational-injury 

doctrine does not “extend . . . to the failure to disclose clearly 

and effectively.” 84 F.4th at 146 (emphasis omitted). Because 

the plaintiff in Huber alleged an “unclear disclosure[]” rather 

than a “failure to disclose,” we held that she did not suffer an 

informational injury and could not claim standing on that 

ground. Id. at 145–46. Nonetheless, we concluded that Huber 

had Article III standing “under traditional standing principles” 

because she suffered two financial consequences from the 

unclear disclosure: “one in consulting with her financial 

advisor . . . at her own additional cost, and the other in her 

failure to pay down her debts or otherwise take appropriate 

action beyond that consultation.” Id. at 149 (quotation marks 

omitted). These “detrimental consequences,” we wrote, were 

“sufficiently similar to the kind of harm protected by the tort 

of fraudulent misrepresentation”—the most “apt analogue” to 

Huber’s FDCPA claim—“to establish . . . standing.” Id. at 

148–49.

As relevant here, Huber highlighted the importance of 

financial or other detrimental consequences to establishing 

traditional standing under the FDCPA. “[T]he harm 

traditionally recognized as providing a basis for fraudulent 

misrepresentation,” we wrote, “is not the mere receipt of a 

misleading statement, or even confusion, without any further 

consequence.” Id. at 148 (cleaned up). Instead, a claimant in 

Huber’s shoes “must identify . . . a consequential action or 

inaction following receipt of a misleading or deceptive 

collection letter” to demonstrate injury in fact. Id. at 149 

(quotation marks omitted). “[C]onfusion alone” isinsufficient. 

Id. at 141.
15

2. George’s Standing

With those precepts in mind, we turn to George’s case.

10

Her amended complaint asserts two different theories of harm: 

one, that George did not receive information to which she was 

legally entitled, and two, that the April 2018 letter was “false, 

deceptive, and misleading” in violation of the FDCPA. App. 

28. Although the first sounds in informational injury and the 

second in traditional injury, George has not established 

standing under either theory.

a. Informational Injury

As noted, a plaintiff asserting informational injury must 

show “(1) the omission of information to which [she] claim[s] 

entitlement, (2) adverse effects that flow from the omission, 

and (3) [a] nexus to the concrete interest Congress intended to 

protect” by requiring disclosure of the information. Kelly, 47 

F.4th at 214 (quotation marks omitted). George has alleged 

10 We take this opportunity to correct an apparent 

misapprehension. In its briefing, Rushmore suggests George’s 

admission during arbitration—that she never read the April 

2018 letter—might somehow operate to retroactively deprive 

her of standing. Not so. We look to the amended complaint to 

assess standing at the outset, and for purposes of our analysis 

we accept as true the allegation that George “received and 

reviewed the . . . letter.” App. 28; see, e.g., N. Jersey Brain & 

Spine Ctr. v. Aetna, Inc., 801 F.3d 369, 371 (3d Cir. 2015). 

Because we hold that George lacks (and lacked) standing based 

solely on the amended complaint, we need not determine 

whether and how her later admission affects the standing 

inquiry.
16

enough to get past prong one: Read fairly, her complaint 

indicates that Premier Bankcard was not, as required by 15 

U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2), “the creditor to whom the debt [was] 

owed.”11 But her standing argument falters at prong two.

That is because the amended complaint does not allege 

specific adverse effects flowing from the omission; instead, it 

simply states that the April 2018 letter would have left “the 

least sophisticated consumer in doubt about to whom the 

alleged debt [was] owed and if it [was] legitimate.” App. 28. 

Nothing in the complaint indicates that George could not pay 

her debt as a result of the letter, that the omission caused 

downstream financial consequences, or that George suffered 

distress.12 Cf. Kelly, 47 F.4th at 214 (listing adverse effects). 

And even if confusion alone were sufficiently adverse to 

demonstrate informational injury, but see Huber, 84 F.4th at 

148–49, the complaint does not even allege George herself was 

confused. George’s first theory of harm thus fails under our 

test in Kelly, and George has not shown an informational injury 

sufficient to confer Article III standing.

11 We now know that Premier Bankcard was likely entitled to 

a share of George’s debt, making it a creditor for FDCPA 

purposes. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). But we again accept as 

true, for purposes of our analysis, the allegation that Premier 

Bankcard was neither a current nor an original creditor.

12 True, George alleges that her First Premier account was past 

due and in default. But we cannot infer adverse effects from 

that allegation alone—doing so would vitiate the second prong 

of Kelly, since nearly every FDCPA claim involves an indefault or past-due account. For the same reason, the filing of 

this lawsuit cannot constitute an adverse effect.
17

b. Traditional Injury

George’s second theory of harm fares no better. Under 

the “more traditional path prescribed by the Supreme Court in 

TransUnion,” we must ask whether the injury alleged “has a 

close relationship to a harm traditionally recognized as 

providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.” Huber, 84 

F.4th at 146 (quotation marks omitted). As we clarified in 

Huber, a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e is analogous to the tort 

of fraudulent misrepresentation,13 and “the harm traditionally 

recognized as providing a basis for [a] fraudulent 

misrepresentation [suit] . . . is not the mere receipt of a 

misleading statement, or even confusion, without any further 

consequence.” Id. at 148 (cleaned up). Yet “the mere receipt 

of a misleading statement” is all George has alleged: The 

amended complaint does not indicate George suffered 

confusion, let alone any sort of “cognizable harm . . . flow[ing] 

from that confusion.” Id. at 148–49. Accordingly, George has 

not shown an injury in fact under Huber and TransUnion, and 

she lacks Article III standing under the “more traditional” 

approach in those cases. Id. at 146.

George attempts to evade this holding in Huber by 

arguing that “unreasonable debt collection,” not fraudulent 

misrepresentation, is the most appropriate tort analogue for 

FDCPA claims. Opening Br. 4. Because unreasonable debt 

collection is an intentional tort that “gives rise to nominal and 

punitive damages without the need to allege any tangible harm 

13 George also alleges “unfair or unconscionable” practices in 

violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, but that claim is entirely 

dependent on her § 1692e claim and rests on the same theory 

of harm.
18

or actual damages,” George says, the “harm traditionally 

recognized as providing a basis for [an unreasonable-debtcollection] lawsuit in American courts” is essentially the fact 

of the occurrence. Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted); TransUnion, 

141 S. Ct. at 2200. Thus, in George’s view, the injury she has 

alleged—receipt of a misleading letter—is sufficiently 

concrete to constitute injury in fact.

Even assuming, arguendo, that unreasonable debt 

collection is an “apt analogue” for a violation of § 1692e, 

George’s argument lacks merit.14 Huber, 84 F.4th at 148. As 

far as we can tell, the freestanding tort of unreasonable debt 

collection first appeared in the 1950s and is recognized only in 

one jurisdiction—Texas. Boe W. Martin, A Creditor’s 

Liability for Unreasonable Collection Efforts: The Evolution 

of a Tort in Texas, 9 S. Tex. L.J. 127, 130–32 (1966); see also, 

e.g., Church v. Collection Bureau of Hudson Valley, Inc.,

No. 20-cv-03172, 2023 WL 8185669, at *7–8 (D.N.J. Nov. 27, 

2023). We cannot say, based on this fact, that the harm 

associated with unreasonable debt collection was 

“traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in 

American courts.”15 TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2200 (emphasis 

14 The law firm representing George has repeatedly tried to 

argue traditional standing based on the tort of unreasonable 

debt collection, and courts have repeatedly rejected those 

efforts. See, e.g., Chang v. Frontline Asset Strategies, LLC, 

No. 18-cv-02388, 2024 WL 1209184, at *3–5 (D.N.J. Mar. 21, 

2024); Church v. Collection Bureau of Hudson Valley, Inc., 

No. 20-cv-03172, 2023 WL 8185669, at *4–15 (D.N.J.

Nov. 27, 2023). We do the same here.

15 The sources cited by George are not to the contrary. George 

states that “there are many reported decisions from the 
19

added). And in any event, one element of the tort seems to be 

that “the unreasonable collection efforts were a proximate 

cause of physical illness and mental and emotional pain.” See 

Church, 2023 WL 8185669, at *5 (cleaned up) (citing Texas 

cases). The harm associated with unreasonable debt collection 

would thus be “physical illness and mental and emotional 

pain,” id. (quotation marks omitted), not just the receipt of a 

misleading letter. George has not come close to alleging that 

harm.

* * *

In sum, because George’s amended complaint alleges 

neither an informational injury nor a traditional one, George 

lacks standing before us and lacked standing before the District 

Court. See Lutter v. JNESO, 86 F.4th 111, 124 (3d Cir. 2023) 

(“[T]he general rule is that a plaintiff in federal court must have 

Article III standing on the date the lawsuit was commenced.”). 

We proceed to consider how this lack of standing affects the 

District Court’s orders compelling arbitration and denying 

vacatur.

nineteenth and twentieth centuries” classifying unreasonable 

debt collection as a separate tort. Opening Br. 4. But the article 

she cites in support of that proposition discusses intentional 

infliction of emotional distress as related to debt collection, not 

unreasonable debt collection itself. See Calvert Magruder, 

Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 

Harv. L. Rev. 1033, 1063–64 (1936). The same is true of the 

Restatement illustrations George flags. See Restatement 

(Second) of Torts § 46 illus. 7–8 (Am. L. Inst. 1965).
20

C. The District Court’s Orders

The FAA is “something of an anomaly in the field of 

federal-court jurisdiction,” in that it “bestow[s] no federal 

jurisdiction but rather require[s] an independent jurisdictional 

basis.” Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 

581–82 (2008) (quotation marks omitted). For a federal court 

to have jurisdiction over a motion to compel arbitration, it must 

be that the “entire . . . controversy between the parties . . . could 

be litigated in federal court” without the arbitration agreement. 

Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 66 (2009) (quotation 

marks omitted); see 9 U.S.C. § 4. We must, in other words, 

“look through” a motion to compel and find a jurisdictional 

basis for the underlying suit. Vaden, 556 U.S. at 66. And a 

motion to vacate must identify a “grant of jurisdiction, apart 

from [the FAA] itself, conferring access” to a federal forum; 

there is no look-through approach for such a motion. 

Badgerow v. Walters, 142 S. Ct. 1310, 1315–18 (2022) 

(quotation marks omitted); see 9 U.S.C. § 10.16

Here, because George lacked standing at the outset of 

her suit, the District Court could not properly exercise 

jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) or 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

See Hartig Drug, 836 F.3d at 269. And because the District 

Court could not properly exercise jurisdiction under either 

statute, it lacked jurisdiction over the “controversy between the 

16 Of course, if a district court has an independent jurisdictional 

basis, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1331, to hear a suit, that court’s 

jurisdiction “continues over” both a motion to compel and a 

subsequent motion to vacate. See, e.g., Kinsella v. Baker 

Hughes Oilfield Operations, LLC, 66 F.4th 1099, 1103 (7th 

Cir. 2023).
21

parties” and the motion to compel.17 See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 

66 (quotation marks omitted). Similarly, because (1) the 

District Court lacked jurisdiction over the suit, and

(2) George’s motion to vacate identifies no “grant of 

jurisdiction” beyond the FAA, the District Court had no 

jurisdiction to consider that motion.18 Badgerow, 142 S. Ct. at 

1316.

A lack of jurisdiction “voids any decree entered in a 

federal court,” and the District Court’s orders granting 

Rushmore’s motion to compel and denying George’s motion 

to vacate are void.19 Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & 

17 In a recent case similar to the one before us, the Fifth Circuit 

wrote that “any of the reasons . . . a federal court may lack 

subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying dispute—e.g., 

ripeness—would similarly prevent a district court from having 

jurisdiction to compel arbitration” under Vaden. Lower Colo. 

River Auth. v. Papalote Creek II, L.L.C., 858 F.3d 916, 923 

(5th Cir. 2017); see id. at 926–27. We agree, and we recognize 

Article III standing as one of those reasons.

18 The motion references the FDCPA, § 1692e, and the “least 

sophisticated debtor” standard. See Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 

464 F.3d 450, 453–54 (3d Cir. 2006). But these references 

cannot constitute an “independent jurisdictional basis” for a 

motion to vacate. Badgerow, 142 S. Ct. at 1316. To hold 

otherwise—to allow federal jurisdiction over a motion to 

vacate whenever the underlying dispute involves federal 

claims—would be to embrace the exact look-through approach 

Badgerow rejected. See id. at 1317–18.

19 We asked the parties to address whether the orders might be 

erroneous, rather than void, under the logic of Marshall v. 

Board of Education, 575 F.2d 417 (3d Cir. 1978). In Marshall, 
22

Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir. 1987); see also, e.g.,

Lower Colo. River Auth. v. Papalote Creek II, L.L.C., 858 F.3d 

916, 926–27 (5th Cir. 2017). We will accordingly vacate those 

orders.

D. The Arbitration Award

There is one loose end to tie up before concluding, and 

that is the arbitration award. What becomes, or should become, 

of an arbitration award stemming from a void order like the one 

we held that “a judgment is not void” under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) “simply because it is erroneous, or is 

based upon precedent which is later deemed incorrect or 

unconstitutional.” Id. at 422. “A court has the power to 

determine its own jurisdiction,” we wrote, and “[i]n the interest 

of finality . . . an error in that determination will not render the 

judgment void” absent a “clear usurpation of power.” Id. at 

422 n.19 (quotation marks omitted).

It is tempting to analogize to Rule 60(b)(4) in this case. The 

arbitration award resembles a final judgment, and the high 

standard for setting aside a final judgment is similar to the high 

standard for setting aside an arbitration award. See App. 112 

(noting that the arbitrator’s decision “will be final and binding” 

on the parties); compare Marshall, 575 F.2d at 422 & n.19, 

with Whitehead v. Pullman Grp., LLC, 811 F.3d 116, 119–21 

(3d Cir. 2016). But Marshall, by its terms, applies only to

collateral challenges, and the opinion clarifies that erroneous 

jurisdictional determinations can still be held void on direct 

review. 575 F.2d at 422–23, 422 n.19. Marshall is therefore 

distinguishable, and we decline to extend its logic to this direct 

appeal.
23

at issue here? George suggests that, because the order 

compelling arbitration is void, we must also vacate the 

arbitration award. Rushmore, meanwhile, would have us 

invoke various equitable doctrines to preserve the award for 

future enforcement. It suggests, for example, that “George is 

estopped from . . . arguing that the arbitration award against 

her is a nullity” because, as between the District Court’s two 

options, she elected to initiate arbitration proceedings. 

Rushmore First Suppl. Br. 5. It also suggests that Caterpillar 

Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61 (1996), requires enforcement of the 

award, and that the arbitrator “was legally empowered to enter 

the arbitration award . . . regardless of George’s Article III 

standing,” Rushmore First Suppl. Br. 5.

Having considered the parties’ positions, we decline to 

endorse either. George lacks standing on appeal, and “when 

[jurisdiction] ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the 

court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” 

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) 

(quotation marks omitted). In addition, we note that section 10 

of the FAA lists the “exclusive grounds” for vacating an 

arbitration award, and “where the award stemmed from a void 

order” is not plainly listed in that section. Mattel, 552 U.S. at 

584; see 9 U.S.C. § 10.

We therefore do not reach the question of whether the 

arbitration award remains valid and enforceable (under the 

AAA rules, because George assented to the arbitrator’s 

jurisdiction, or otherwise) or whether it should be vacated in a 

“jurisdictionally correct proceeding.” Brown, 75 F.3d at 868. 

The answer to that question lies with a court of competent 

jurisdiction—presumably a New Jersey state court or an AAA 

tribunal.
24

To close, we offer a few words on the equities in this 

case. We recognize that our holding may ultimately clear the 

way for a redo of George’s lawsuit—a frustrating result for 

Rushmore given that “the parties have already fully [litigated 

and] arbitrated the underlying dispute once.” Papalote Creek, 

858 F.3d at 927. And we recognize this result may be 

particularly frustrating given its origin in cases decided after 

the motion to compel. See supra notes 5, 8. But that is the 

importance of Article III standing, and “we cannot evade the 

fact that the district court lacked jurisdiction when it compelled 

arbitration” and ruled on George’s motion to vacate.20 

Papalote Creek, 858 F.3d at 927.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 

Court’s orders and remand with instructions to dismiss this 

case for lack of standing.21

20 We do not foreclose the possibility that, in a case where

gamesmanship is apparent—a case, perhaps, where a plaintiff 

deliberately submits an on-the-fence complaint and later 

argues she lacks standing in order to void an arbitration 

order—equitable considerations could compel a different 

result. Here, however, both parties assert that George has 

standing, and we do not doubt the parties have operated in good 

faith.

21 While in some circumstances we might remand with 

instructions to grant leave to amend, here we find amendment 

would be futile given George’s testimony that she never read 

the April 2018 letter. See Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, 

Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 292 (3d Cir. 1988).