Report to the Special Oversight Panel

on Morale, Welfare, and Recreation,

Committee on Armed Services, House

of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

April 2001 DEFENSE

INFRASTRUCTURE

Commissary

Reorganization Should

Produce Savings but

Opportunities May

Exist for More

GAO-01-473
Page 1 GAO-01-473 Defense Infrastructure

April 26, 2001

The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett

Chairman

The Honorable Robert A. Underwood

Ranking Minority Member

Special Oversight Panel on Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

In July 2000, the Defense Commissary Agency proposed changes to its

regional management structure that it expects will generate savings,

improve efficiencies, and provide more effective management of

commissary operations. The plan calls for eliminating the two area offices

within the Eastern Region and consolidating most of the Eastern Region’s

operations at the region’s headquarters at Virginia Beach, Virginia. The

plan also called for transferring the management of 25 of the Eastern

Region’s commissaries to the Agency’s Midwest Region, which is

headquartered in San Antonio, Texas. However, with the issuance of a

revised plan in February 2001, this portion of the proposal was deferred,

pending further study.

In response to a request from the former Chairman and former Ranking

Minority Member, we reviewed the organizational and financial

effectiveness of the Defense Commissary Agency’s proposed restructuring

actions. Specifically, we determined whether (1) the estimates of costs and

savings from the planned consolidation of the Eastern Region’s operations

reflect all potential costs and savings and (2) the consolidation is the best

way to achieve regional efficiencies. We are also including some

perspective on the issue of regional span of control in providing oversight

to commissaries located within a region. The Agency intends to examine

this issue in a follow-on study of the current reorganization plan.

Although the Defense Commissary Agency’s proposed restructuring

actions should generate annual savings after initial expenses are recouped,

the Agency did not include all potential costs and savings in the estimates

we reviewed in the July 2000 plan. In calculating the estimates associated

with that proposal, Agency officials included only those expected costs

and savings associated with personnel-related actions, such as personnel

separation costs. While personnel-related actions are the primary cost and

savings elements in the reorganization, the Agency did not include other

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548

Results in Brief
Page 2 GAO-01-473 Defense Infrastructure

potential costs and savings such as operational costs. After we discussed

this issue with Agency officials, they revised their cost and savings

estimates. But the estimates are not yet fully refined and could still

change, pending the plan’s final approval. As of February 2001, the

Agency’s estimated one-time costs were about $1.5 million, with annual

net savings of about $3.8 million thereafter.

Whether the proposed consolidation of the Eastern Region’s operations at

Virginia Beach is the best way to achieve efficiencies is unclear. Unlike

previous reorganization efforts, the Defense Commissary Agency’s current

effort did not compare the financial and operational implications of

alternative approaches to improving its regional operations. Although the

Agency’s views were mixed on whether the planned consolidation in the

Eastern Region is the best approach to achieving efficiencies, most of the

Agency’s officials we spoke with agreed that eliminating the two Eastern

regional area offices would most likely improve operations. While the

proposed consolidation should produce efficiencies, it may cause some

temporary loss of operational expertise because of the loss of some

personnel in the closing area offices. At the time of our review, the Agency

was developing plans to transition to the consolidated organization, but

those plans will not be finalized until after the reorganization proposal is

approved.

While the Agency’s July 2000 plan included shifting management

responsibility for 25 commissaries from the Eastern Region to the Midwest

Region, the Agency did not have documented analysis supporting the basis

for this proposal. After we expressed concern about this issue, the Agency

withdrew this concept and intends to perform further study to determine

the optimum number of stores to be managed within each region. To

provide some perspective on the issue, we sought views from within the

Agency and the commercial sector regarding regional span of control for

effective and efficient oversight operations. In general, we found no

conclusive information on what constitutes a reasonable span of control

for a region in oversight operations. Agency officials had mixed views on

the number of stores that a region could reasonably manage. An Agencydirected study of seven commercial-sector firms in 1994 also showed

mixed results, as these firms had varying regional spans of control over

their retail stores. Our discussions with three commercial-sector retail

firms produced similar results. While this issue may be difficult for the

Agency to resolve, the commercial firms we contacted expressed a

willingness to assist the Agency in achieving efficiencies in its regional

structure.
Page 3 GAO-01-473 Defense Infrastructure

We are making several recommendations to the Under Secretary of

Defense (Personnel and Readiness) to help ensure that changes made in

the organization and management of the Defense Commissary Agency are

in the best long-term interest of the commissary system. The Department

of Defense provided written comments on a draft of this report and agreed

with our findings and recommendations.

The Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA), headquartered at Fort Lee,

Virginia, is the Department of Defense’s designated agency for managing

commissaries on a worldwide basis. As of September 30, 2000, the Agency

had 290 stores and over 19,000 employees under its purview and had

annual sales in fiscal year 2000 of about $5 billion. In providing services

for its military customers, DeCA strives to provide the lowest cost

possible, charging patrons only for the wholesale cost of goods plus a 5-

percent surcharge. The annual cost of operating the Agency’s

infrastructure was about $1 billion in fiscal year 2000, which was funded

primarily through direct appropriations from the Congress.

To perform its mission, DeCA, in addition to its headquarters and field

operating activities, operates four regional offices that oversee

management of its commissaries. (See table 1.) Commissaries are, for the

most part, geographically dispersed throughout the world, and are located

in 45 states and many foreign countries. To assist regional management in

overseeing store operations, the regions employ zone managers, whose

role is to work with store managers to resolve problems and keep

operations running smoothly. Zone managers typically oversee from 7 to

10 stores, depending on, among other things, the geographical dispersion

of the stores within the region.

Background
Page 4 GAO-01-473 Defense Infrastructure

Table 1: Defense Commissary Agency’s Regional Offices (Fiscal Year 2000)

Dollars in billions

Region Number of storesaSales volume

Authorized

personnelb

Eastern 106 $2.3 179

Midwest 34 0.8 73

Western/Pacific (Far East) 86 1.5 153

European 64 0.4 132

Total 290 $5.0 537

a

As of February 2001, the number of stores decreased to 287; an additional six closures and one new

store are expected by October 2001.

b

Includes regional headquarters and area office personnel only.

Source: Defense Commissary Agency.

As part of a larger effort to reduce costs and improve operations on an

Agency-wide basis, DeCA prepared a plan to reorganize its regional

management structure. In July 2000, the Agency submitted its plan for

approval to the Commissary Operating Board, which is comprised of

representatives from each of the military services. The Board, which has

day-to-day operational oversight responsibilities for DeCA, reports to the

Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), who exercises

overall supervision of DeCA. After we expressed concerns about the July

2000 plan, DeCA redrafted its proposal and in February 2001 sent the

revised plan to the Commissary Operating Board for its approval. While

the initial plan affected both the Eastern and Midwest regions, the revised

plan affects only the Eastern Region and does not affect store-level

operations. The key component of the initial plan is unchanged in the

revised plan. It involves the closure of the two area offices within the

Eastern Region—the Northern Area Office at Fort Meade, Maryland, and

the Southern Area Office at Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery,

Alabama—and the relocation of most operational functions to the existing

Eastern Region headquarters in Virginia Beach. Through consolidation and

a succeeding regional headquarters reorganization, DeCA expects to

reduce the number of Eastern Region personnel authorizations from 179

to 122—a reduction of 57 spaces.

The July 2000 plan also called for transferring the management of 25 stores

located in the Eastern Region to the Midwest Region. Had this transfer

been retained in the revised plan, the number of stores in the Eastern

Region would have been reduced to 81, while the number of stores in the

Midwest Region would have increased to 59. However, the revised plan

defers this aspect of the reorganization for further study.
Page 5 GAO-01-473 Defense Infrastructure

DeCA’s initial estimates of costs and savings from its planned

reorganization did not include all the potential costs and savings

associated with the reorganization. That plan focused on personnel-related

actions affecting costs and savings and excluded, for example, other

potential operational costs, such as increased facility leasing expenses or

savings resulting from implementing the plan. While personnel-related

actions are most likely the largest determinant of costs and savings, the

total estimated costs and savings were not identified. On the basis of our

discussions with DeCA officials and a limited analysis of the revised plan,

DeCA has made an effort to more precisely identify one-time costs and

subsequent annual savings resulting from the reorganization. While the

estimates are not fully refined, the annual savings resulting from personnel

reductions in the reorganization should still be significant, once the

implementation costs are offset.

In contrast with the initial July 2000 plan that had estimated one-time costs

of about $1.2 million and annual savings of about $4.6 million, the revised

reorganization plan contains estimates of one-time costs of about $1.5

million and annual savings of about $3.8 million. With the revised plan, the

payback period for recouping the one-time costs is estimated at about 5

months. As identified previously in the July 2000 plan, personnel-related

costs, which include separation costs and permanent change-of-station

costs for those who relocate from the closing offices to Virginia Beach,

constitute a large portion—nearly 50 percent—of the expected one-time

costs presented in the February 2001 plan. Likewise, the elimination of

personnel spaces by consolidating operations at Virginia Beach is the

primary component in the revised plan’s estimate of annual savings.

However, in revising the July 2000 plan, DeCA officials included some

expected operational costs, such as the costs for relocating equipment and

increased facility leasing costs at Virginia Beach, that have had the effect

of providing greater precision to the cost estimates.

Although the revised February 2001 plan includes more complete

estimates, these estimates should still be viewed as a rough approximation

of the actual figures for the following reasons:

• Personnel-related cost estimates are based on historical averages of the

percentages of DeCA personnel who have either voluntarily separated or

relocated. The actual numbers will be unknown until these personnel

actions occur as the plan is implemented.

• DeCA may be optimistic in assuming that it will not incur any involuntary

personnel separation costs because it believes that everyone who desires

Reorganization Plan’s

Estimates Do Not

Include All Potential

Costs and Savings
Page 6 GAO-01-473 Defense Infrastructure

employment will retain a job, whether within DeCA or another

government agency.

• Some changes in operational costs, such as business travel costs, are not

included in the analysis. While the consolidated operation may result in

increased travel costs to oversee store operations, DeCA officials told us

that any potential increase would not materially affect the expected

annual savings.

• A portion of the expected annual savings is predicated on a reduction of 35

additional positions in the Eastern Region Office after the consolidation.

At the time of our review, that figure had not been finalized. Furthermore,

the standard compensation factor used in calculating the reductions is

most likely too high because these reductions are expected to include

more lower-salaried employees. To the extent that these 35 positions are

not reduced as planned, the expected annual savings could be overstated,

perhaps by as much as $280,000.

In developing its regional reorganization plans, DeCA management

officials did not consider alternative structural approaches to achieve

operational efficiencies and generate savings. However, on the basis of our

discussions with various DeCA officials and a review of prior

reorganization documentation, a number of alternatives could have been

explored. Without a critical analysis of the merits of potential alternative

approaches, the approach that would provide the most efficient operation

is unclear. Nonetheless, the proposed approach appears to offer an

opportunity to improve operational efficiency and save money.

While DeCA’s proposed plan affects only the Eastern Region, several

alternative approaches could have been considered. Some officials, for

example, believed that consolidating the three continental U.S. (CONUS)

regions into two—the Eastern and Western/Pacific regions—and retaining

a European Region would be preferable to the existing plan. In this case,

the Midwest Region would be eliminated, and the management of its 34

stores would be divided among the remaining two CONUS regions. While

those supporting this action believed that eliminating a regional

headquarters could reduce overhead costs, the resulting expected savings

would have to be weighed against the increased oversight workload of the

assuming regions and their ability to maintain quality service to their

customers. When asked whether this was a viable option, the DeCA

Director told us that the Agency was not prepared to undertake such a

move, especially at the same time that it was initiating agency-wide unit

cost reduction initiatives and instilling a business-like culture in its

operations.

Proposed

Reorganization May

Not Be the Best Way

to Achieve

Efficiencies, but It

Should Improve

Operations
Page 7 GAO-01-473 Defense Infrastructure

Among the other alternatives that could have merit were varying

configurations of the three CONUS regions. One such option suggested by

some officials was retaining the Western/Pacific Region and creating

Northern and Southern regions with headquarters at Fort Meade and

Maxwell Air Force Base, respectively. In this scenario, the Midwest Region

would be eliminated and the management of its stores would be divided

between the Northern and Southern regions, which would also manage the

existing Eastern Region’s stores. Furthermore, the existing Eastern Region

headquarters at Virginia Beach would be eliminated. While this alternative

would tend to preserve operational expertise at the existing Fort Meade

and Maxwell locations, it would also mean increasing their staffs to

assume functions now performed at Virginia Beach. In any case, whether

this or other alternatives would provide a more efficient operation than

that in the proposed plan is subject to question, pending a detailed

examination of the costs and benefits of each approach.

Whether or not other alternatives would be more beneficial to the Agency

would require in-depth analysis by DeCA. Regardless, the proposed plan, if

properly implemented, should improve regional operations and create

efficiencies. A comparative DeCA analysis of the Eastern and

Western/Pacific regions shows that the Eastern Region currently has more

staff to accomplish a mission and scope of work similar to that of the

Western/Pacific Region. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the

Western/Pacific Region, despite having fewer personnel, performed at a

comparable level, as measured by customer satisfaction and Inspector

General inspection results, to that of the Eastern Region. Most of the

perceived overstaffing in the Eastern Region—about 22 positions—was

attributable to duplicative management and administrative positions

across the region’s three offices, while the Western Region had

consolidated operations. Furthermore, our discussions with the Eastern

Region’s former Director indicated that efficiencies were lost because of

(1) poor communications between the region’s headquarters and its area

offices and (2) overlapping roles and responsibilities between the region’s

headquarters and the area offices. Most DeCA officials we spoke to agreed

that the Eastern Region’s existing organizational structure, which includes

a headquarters and two area offices, was an anomaly in DeCA’s

organization and was not conducive to smooth operations and maximum

efficiency.

While promoting improved efficiency, the reorganization plan, if

implemented without proper planning to mitigate the potential loss of

operational expertise from departing personnel in the closing offices,

could have a detrimental effect on operational efficiency and customer
Page 8 GAO-01-473 Defense Infrastructure

service. Under the Eastern Region’s existing organization, much of the

operational responsibility for the day-to-day oversight of the stores within

the region rests with the two area offices that are to close under the

reorganization. For example, personnel within these offices visit stores

and assist store managers with contractor performance and operational

issues on a regular basis, thereby helping them to provide quality customer

service. Over time, many of these personnel have formed beneficial

relationships with the store managers and employees. With the transfer of

these responsibilities to the regional headquarters, it is important that this

assistance continue in a quality manner in order to minimize the potential

for degraded customer service. At the time of our review, the Agency was

developing plans to transition to the consolidated organization, but those

plans will not be finalized until after the reorganization proposal is

approved.

We found no conclusive information to suggest what a reasonable span of

control is for DeCA’s regions in performing oversight of commissaries

within the regions’ boundaries. As previously noted, DeCA had no

documented analysis to support shifting the management of stores

between regions, and the Agency subsequently deferred this issue for

further study. From our limited evaluation of this issue, we found that

views within DeCA on adequate span of control were mixed and that

subjectivity and managerial style played important roles in the

determination of DeCA’s views. A prior DeCA-contracted study of

commercial-sector retail firms’ spans of control was inconclusive as well.

Furthermore, our recent discussions with three commercial retail firms

produced similar inconclusive results. The firms did express an overall

willingness, however, in assisting DeCA in its efforts to reduce costs and

promote efficiencies within its organizational structure.

Span of control is an important concept in determining the optimum

number of stores for a regional organization to manage most efficiently

and cost-effectively. While having a large number of stores within a region

may save money by proportionally reducing overhead expenses, it may

result in degraded operations and customer service if the oversight

responsibility is too demanding. On the other hand, a region with a smaller

number of stores may provide greater oversight and better service at the

expense of proportionally greater overhead costs. The difficulty is in

determining what is a reasonable number of stores to manage, balancing

costs with quality of service to the customer.

DeCA officials we spoke to had different views on how many

commissaries a region could reasonably manage, given their oversight

Observations on

Regional Span of

Control Issues
Page 9 GAO-01-473 Defense Infrastructure

responsibilities. In general, our discussions showed that, in many ways,

determining a reasonable span of control is a subjective judgment that

depends on such issues as managerial philosophy, style, and preference.

Many Eastern Region officials believed, for example, that they have

managed and could continue to manage their existing 106 stores without a

problem. The Eastern Region’s former Director, however, expressed

concerns that his span of control was too large to reasonably manage. The

Midwest Director and several of his staff generally favored a smaller

number of stores per region, stating that providing continued quality

customer service and routinely visiting geographically dispersed stores

necessitated a smaller span of control. In this regard, the Midwest Director

questioned whether a larger number, such as 106 stores in the Eastern

Region, was manageable without suffering degradations in operations and

service.

Commercial-sector retail firms’ practices and views on the appropriate

span of control for overseeing their store operations also appear to vary. A

1994 DeCA-sponsored study of seven commercial-sector firms by the

HayGroup (private organizational consultants) was inconclusive in

specifying a common or uniform number of stores that were managed

within a firm’s regions. Our recent discussion with three major

commercial food retailers also showed different views on span of control

and the number of stores they managed within each of their regions.

• One firm we visited operated about 180 stores in five contiguous states. A

management official from the firm told us that, although two divisions (or

“regions” in DeCA terminology) manage about 90 stores each, three

divisions with about 50 stores each would be more reasonable but

probably more costly. He further told us that having over 100 stores in a

geographically dispersed region like DeCA’s Eastern Region would

probably be too much to properly manage.

• A second firm we visited operated 578 stores in 22 states. A management

official from this firm believed that about 50 stores per region was a

reasonable structure. In this particular case, the firm builds its structure

around distribution centers and locates stores within 250 miles of a center.

• Finally, the third firm we visited was a much larger organization with over

2,300 stores in 31 states. According to management officials from that firm,

their regions operate from 88 to 450 stores and their span of control in

managing these stores was generally not a problem. While the stores in

this firm were more geographically concentrated than DeCA’s stores, these

officials believed that having 100 stores in a DeCA region was probably

manageable, given the strong use of its zone managers within a region.
Page 10 GAO-01-473 Defense Infrastructure

While the results of our review of span of control issues were generally

inconclusive, it should be recognized that comparisons of business

practices between the commercial sector and DeCA are inherently difficult

because of different circumstances surrounding their respective

operations. DeCA believes that no comparable retail enterprises in either

the government or the private sector exist. Agency officials told us that,

whereas DeCA’s organization spans the world and its stores are generally

widely dispersed, most commercial firms have a greater concentration of

stores within a given area. Our limited contact with the commercial sector

supports this assertion. Furthermore, DeCA officials told us that many

commercial firms own and operate their own distribution centers within

their regions, while DeCA operates through direct deliveries from vendors

and does not have distribution centers within its CONUS regions. These

and other differences have an impact on span of control within a region’s

operations.

Although the operations of the commercial sector and DeCA may not be

directly comparable, this does not imply that the Agency cannot take

advantage of commercial sector best practices that would be applicable to

organizing and managing its regional operations. In this regard, the firms

we contacted generally expressed a willingness to assist DeCA in reducing

costs and promoting organizational efficiency—business goals that are

common to both the commercial sector and DeCA. A corporate official

from one firm we contacted suggested that grocery executives could

discuss their experiences in increasing efficiency with DeCA management.

Another firm’s official believed that since DeCA is seeking to move to a

more cost-conscious environment, the Agency could probably benefit by

reaching out to the commercial food sector.

While the Defense Commissary Agency has not fully refined its cost and

savings estimates, it appears that, by eliminating the Eastern Region’s area

offices and consolidating those regional operations at its Virginia Beach

location, the Agency will produce savings and improve operations.

However, with the implementation of the plan comes a loss of operational

expertise in the closing offices that could potentially disrupt operations

and customer service. Whether the Agency’s proposed regional

reorganization is the best approach for achieving efficiencies is unclear

because the Agency did not assess alternative structural approaches to

improving regional operations and creating efficiencies. The plan is limited

because it considers only the Eastern Region and not the totality of the

regional structure, which is to be considered in the Agency’s follow-on

study of the current reorganization plan.

Conclusions
Page 11 GAO-01-473 Defense Infrastructure

While the closure of the area offices is likely to improve efficiency, the

planned study to determine the optimum number of stores for the

Agency’s regions provides an additional opportunity for achieving

additional streamlining and improved regional operations and efficiencies.

In this regard, experience from commercial-sector retailers may provide

useful insights into determining how to shape the Agency’s future regional

structure.

If the proposed reorganization plan is approved for implementation, we

recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and

Readiness), in consultation with the Chairman, Commissary Operating

Board, require that the Director, Defense Commissary Agency, include

steps in the Agency’s transition plans to minimize the potential disruption

of regional operations caused by the loss of operational expertise from its

closing offices.

As part of the Agency’s upcoming study of what is the optimum number of

stores in each of its regions, we recommend that the Under Secretary of

Defense (Personnel and Readiness), in consultation with the Chairman,

Commissary Operating Board, require that the Director, Defense

Commissary Agency,

• solicit commercial food retail firms’ views on structuring regional

operations for improved operations and efficiency and

• assess whether other restructuring alternatives, such as the consolidation

of the three continental U.S. regions to two regions—an Eastern and

Western/Pacific Region—would generate additional savings without

sacrificing quality service to its customers.

In its written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of

Defense agreed with our findings and recommendations. The

Department’s comments are presented in their entirety in the appendix. It

also provided technical clarifications, and where appropriate, we

incorporated them in the report.

To determine whether the estimates of costs and savings from the planned

consolidation of the Eastern Region’s operations reflect all potential costs

and savings, we analyzed the estimates as presented in DeCA’s July 2000

proposal, along with the underlying assumptions and supporting detail. On

a more limited basis, we also analyzed, but did not verify, the reliability of

the revised estimates in DeCA’s February 2001 proposal. We also

discussed with DeCA officials their methodology for arriving at the

estimates to ensure that the logic was sound.

Recommendations for

Executive Action

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

Scope and

Methodology
Page 12 GAO-01-473 Defense Infrastructure

To determine whether the proposed consolidation was the best way to

achieve efficiencies, we examined planning documentation and

interviewed key officials across the Agency. In reviewing the plan’s

documentation, we sought out alternatives that may have been considered

in developing the proposal but found none. We subsequently interviewed

various officials for potential alternatives, but made no attempt to

independently perform comparative analyses of those that were identified.

In interviewing officials, we learned of prior organizational studies and

reviewed available documentation. We also sought views on the proposed

approach from officials within the DeCA headquarters as well as those

most directly affected by the reorganization. The latter include officials in

the Eastern Region Office, Virginia Beach, Virginia; Northern Area Office,

Fort Meade, Maryland; Southern Area Office, Maxwell Air Force Base,

Montgomery, Alabama; and Midwest Region Office, San Antonio, Texas.

We also contacted several former DeCA officials for their views on the

reorganization plan and a historical perspective leading up to the

formulation of the plan.

Because DeCA is now studying regional span of control, an issue in the

Agency’s July 2000 proposal, we sought to obtain both the Agency and

commercial sector’s views on what constitutes a reasonable span of

control for a region to have in managing stores within its boundaries. In

this regard, we interviewed various DeCA officials, including recent

former DeCA managers, regarding span of control issues. We also

reviewed a previous study of commercial-sector retail management

practices conducted by the HayGroup, which was contracted by DeCA to

study reorganization alternatives in 1994. We also interviewed

management officials from three grocers that were in the top 25

nationwide in annual sales during 2000 to gain a sense of their

organizational structure and span of control in managing their stores. To

the extent possible, we compared the commercial data with that of DeCA’s

to ascertain whether any commercial best practices regarding span of

control would be applicable to DeCA’s store management. While we

collected data for comparative purposes, we could not generalize to all

retail operations because of our limited sample.

We conducted our review from July 2000 through March 2001 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld,

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Charles L. Cragin, Acting Under

Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness); Lieutenant General

Michael E. Zettler, Chairman, Commissary Operating Board; Major General
Page 13 GAO-01-473 Defense Infrastructure

Robert J. Courter, Jr., Director, Defense Commissary Agency; the

Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Director, Office of Management and

Budget; and other interested parties. We will make copies available to

others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report were William

Crocker, James Reifsnyder, David Combs, and Arnett Sanders.

Barry W. Holman

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix: Comments From the Department of

Defense

Page 14 GAO-01-473 Defense Infrastructure

Appendix: Comments From the Department

of Defense
Appendix: Comments From the Department of

Defense

Page 15 GAO-01-473 Defense Infrastructure
Appendix: Comments From the Department of

Defense

Page 16 GAO-01-473 Defense Infrastructure (709535)
17

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