GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman of the 

Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on 

Appropriations, House of 

Representatives

November 1999 DEFENSE 

COMPUTERS

U.S. Transportation 

Command’s 

Management of Y2K 

Operational Testing

GAO/AIMD-00-21

Page 1 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL 14

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 58

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements 59

Tables Table 1: Highlights of Key DOD-Recommended Year 2000

Testing Processes 7

Table 2: Summary of TRANSCOM Satisfaction of JCS Evaluation

Criteria on Deployment Evaluation 8

Abbreviations

AMC Air Mobility Command

CINC Commanders-in-Chief

DOD Department of Defense

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

MSC Military Sealift Command

MTMC Military Traffic Management Command

MTW major theater war

OPEVAL operational evaluation

TRANSCOM U.S. Transportation Command

Y2K Year 2000
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Page 3 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Accounting and Information

Management Division

B-282545 Leter

November 15, 1999

The Honorable Jerry Lewis

Chairman

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Complete and thorough Year 2000 (Y2K) end-to-end testing is essential to 

provide reasonable assurance that new or modified systems used to 

collectively support a core business function or mission operation will not 

jeopardize an organization’s ability to deliver products and services as a 

result of the Y2K computing problem. This is especially true for the 

Department of Defense (DOD) because it relies on a complex and broad 

array of interconnected computer systems—including weapons, command 

and control, satellite, inventory management, transportation management, 

health, financial, personnel and payment systems—to carry out its military 

operations and supporting business functions.

At your request, we are reviewing DOD’s management of its various Year 

2000-related end-to-end testing activities. As part of our efforts, we 

assessed the U.S. Transportation Command’s (TRANSCOM) management 

of its end-to-end test of its ability to plan and execute joint major theater 

war (MTW) deployment operations, and determined what the results of this 

test show with respect to operational risks and readiness. 1

 We briefed 

TRANSCOM officials on our findings on August 24, 1999, and made 

recommendations to correct the management weaknesses that we found. 

TRANSCOM took immediate action to address our recommendations, and 

on September 14, 1999, we briefed your office on our findings and 

TRANSCOM’s actions. The purpose of this letter is to summarize our 

briefing to your office. The briefing slides that we presented to your office 

are in appendix I, and the objectives, scope, and methodology of our review 

are detailed in appendix II. TRANSCOM provided oral comments on our 

briefing slides at the August 24, 1999, briefing, and we have incorporated 

1

DOD refers to its combatant commands’ end-to-end tests as operational evaluations 

(OPEVAL).
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them as appropriate. We performed our audit work from March through 

September 1999 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards.

Results in Brief Year 2000 end-to-end testing is an essential component of an effective Year 

2000 testing program since Y2K-related problems can affect so many of the 

systems owned and operated by an entity as well as systems belonging to 

business partners and infrastructure providers. Moreover, to be effective, 

end-to-end testing should be approached in a structured and disciplined 

fashion. Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) guidance to its combatant 

commands on managing Year 2000 operational evaluations,2

 (the term JCS 

uses to refer to Year 2000 end-to-end testing) and our Year 2000 test 

guidance3

 define a number of key management controls to employ when 

planning, executing, analyzing, and reporting on these tests and 

evaluations.

We found that TRANSCOM’s deployment operational evaluation satisfied 

most of the key processes that JCS’ guidance specifies. For example, 

TRANSCOM established a Y2K task force to guide the evaluation effort, 

which included surface and airlift experts, test and evaluation experts from 

the Joint Interoperability Test Center and the Defense Office of Test and 

Evaluation, component command and service representatives, and a public 

affairs representative. Further, TRANSCOM performed a rehearsal before 

conducting the test to ensure that all critical systems and interfaces were 

operating correctly and that all staff knew their roles and responsibilities.

However, TRANSCOM had not satisfied key steps that are pivotal to

(1) fully disclosing and appropriately addressing risks associated with 

limitations in the defined scope of the operational evaluation and

(2) accurately reporting on mission readiness and impacts. The result was 

that the Year 2000 readiness of critical tasks associated with conducting a 

MTW deployment—namely the use of commercial carriers and port 

operations to deploy goods and people—was not known with sufficient 

certainty to support TRANSCOM’s May 1999 reported position that it can 

2

Joint Staff Year 2000 Operational Evaluation Guide, Version 3.0, April 1, 1999.

3

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: A Testing Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.21, issued as an exposure 

draft in June 1998; issued in final in November 1998).
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conduct a MTW deployment in a Year 2000 environment with no material 

impact on operations.

TRANSCOM has since either implemented or initiated appropriate actions 

to address our recommendations for correcting these weaknesses. For 

example, it amended its final reports on the evaluation to disclose the 

scope limitations. It is also working with its component commands to 

identify their major commercial carrier business partners, to assess their 

readiness and risks, and to develop risk mitigation strategies. Because 

TRANSCOM has initiated these and other actions, we are not making 

further recommendations at this time.

Background As the single manager of Defense transportation, TRANSCOM’s mission is 

to coordinate the use of air, sea, and land transportation to deploy and 

sustain U.S. forces. To perform this mission, TRANSCOM relies on a wide 

array of information technology systems, including command and control 

systems, physical and human asset visibility and tracking systems, 

transportation feasibility and port analysis tools, and intelligence systems. 

TRANSCOM also depends heavily on partnerships with commercial 

transportation service providers such as Civil Reserve Air Fleet carriers, 

the commercial maritime industry, and railroad and trucking carriers. In 

total, these partners provide about 85 percent of Defense’s transportation 

needs. 

In August 1998, the Secretary of Defense directed the Commanders-inChief (CINC) to require its combatant commands, including TRANSCOM, 

to plan, execute, analyze, and report on a series of simulated Year 2000 

operational evaluations. The evaluations, which were to assess whether 

DOD can continue to perform critical military operations in a Year 2000 

environment, are one of three DOD end-to-end testing efforts.4

The purpose of end-to-end testing is to verify that a defined set of 

interrelated systems, which collectively support an organizational core 

business area or function, interoperate as intended in an operational 

4

In addition to conducting operational evaluations, the military services are conducting 

system integration testing and the functional business areas, such as personnel and health 

affairs, are conducting functional end-to-end tests. Each of these end-to-end testing 

activities is discussed in detail in Defense Computers: Management Controls Are Critical to 

Effective Year 2000 Testing (GAO/AIMD-99-172, June 30, 1999).
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environment (either actual or simulated). These interrelated systems 

include not only those owned and managed by an organization, but also the 

external systems with which they interface or that otherwise support the 

business area or function. The CINC core business areas or functions are 

referred to as “thin lines.”

The boundaries for end-to-end tests can vary depending on a given business 

function’s system dependencies and criticality to the organizational 

mission. Therefore, in managing end-to-end test activities, it is important to 

analyze the interrelationships among core business functions and their 

supporting systems and the mission impact and risk of date-induced system 

failures and to use these analyses to define test boundaries. It is also 

important to work early and continually with functional partners to ensure 

that related end-to-end test activities are effectively coordinated and 

integrated. Table 1 highlights key processes recommended by JCS’ Year 

2000 operational evaluation guidance, which is consistent with our Year 

2000 test guide.
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Table 1: Highlights of Key DOD-Recommended Year 2000 Testing Processes

TRANSCOM has already carried out two operational evaluations—the first, 

conducted in April 1999, assessed its ability to manage a MTW deployment 

operation and the second, conducted in May and June 1999, assessed its 

ability to manage a MTW sustainment operation.5 A third evaluation, which 

will retest the same 23 systems included in the May and June sustainment 

Planning • Specify test assumptions and limitations

• Establish a Year 2000 Task Force

• Identify critical missions/tasks/systems

• Verify that systems essential to the mission are Year 2000 compliant

• Develop an operational evaluation plan to guide event planning and 

execution

• Identify and schedule support from other commands, DOD components, 

etc.

• Determine relevant and necessary resources (e.g., funding, personnel, 

equipment)

• Ensure that approved Year 2000 contingency plans are prepared

• Develop risk management plan

• Identify simulation needs and establish supporting testing environment

• Develop data collection and analysis plan or approaches

Execution • Conduct operational evaluation rehearsal

• Follow configuration management policy

• Perform baseline test for operational evaluation

• Execute required Year 2000 date rollover tests

• Collect and archive all Year 2000-relevant data and ensure that systems 

are reset to current day operations

Analysis • Categorize, document, and report failures

• Determine mission impact of Year 2000 failures

• Ensure that exit criteria are met

Reporting • Prepare Year 2000 reports describing mission impact and readiness

• Provide reports to Joint Staff within required time frames

5

Deployment refers to all activities associated with systematically transporting personnel, 

material, and other elements from a home station or origin through destination. 

Sustainment refers to all activities associated with maintaining or supporting the deployed 

personnel, material, and other elements.
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evaluation, is planned for October 1999. In addition to these events, 

TRANSCOM has taken part in other DOD Year 2000 exercises.

TRANSCOM 

Implemented Many 

Important Management 

Processes on Its 

Deployment 

Operational Evaluation

As noted in table 2, we found that TRANSCOM had satisfied the majority of 

the management process controls (17 of 21) specified in JCS’ operational 

evaluation guidance. 

Table 2: Summary of TRANSCOM Satisfaction of JCS Evaluation Criteria on 

Deployment Evaluation

Consistent with JCS guidance governing operational evaluation planning, 

TRANSCOM established a Year 2000 task force, which included surface and 

airlift experts, test and evaluation experts, system analysts, component and 

service representatives, and a public affairs representative. It identified 15 

critical tasks needed to carry out a MTW deployment mission and identified 

a total of 23 “thin line” systems that support its capability to manage the 

deployment mission. TRANSCOM also verified that the 23 systems were 

certified as Year 2000 compliant. Further, TRANSCOM developed a test 

plan that documented participant roles and responsibilities, critical 

missions and tasks, test cases, and reporting requirements.

TRANSCOM also took effective steps in executing and reporting its 

evaluation. For instance, before executing the operational evaluation, 

TRANSCOM performed a rehearsal to ensure that all critical systems and 

interfaces were operating correctly and that all staff knew their roles and 

responsibilities. Before resetting systems to present day operational 

conditions, TRANSCOM officials determined that the defined “thin line” 

was completely exercised, all items in the master scenario events list were 

performed, and that all data needed to make an assessment of the 

command’s ability to perform its deployment mission were collected and 

Phases

Number of primary

evaluation criteria

Number of primary

criteria satisfied

Planning 11 9

Execution 5 5

Analysis 3 2

Reporting 2 1

Total 21 17
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archived. Also, TRANSCOM ensured that required reports were submitted 

on time and that they addressed specified reporting requirements.

TRANSCOM Did Not 

Satisfy Some Key Steps 

Related to Testing 

Limitations and 

Deviations

While TRANSCOM followed most JCS-specified criteria needed to 

effectively manage its evaluation, it did not adequately satisfy certain 

planning, analysis, and reporting criteria associated with the evaluation’s 

scope. Specifically, when planning the evaluation, TRANSCOM concluded 

that it was not feasible or affordable to actively engage commercial 

transportation providers and ports in its evaluation. As a result, 

TRANSCOM decided to rely on its commercial partners to ensure the 

readiness of their respective transportation systems, and thus to assume 

these partners’ ability to perform their military deployment and 

sustainment support roles and responsibilities. Further, while TRANSCOM 

officials stated that they communicated this assumption orally to JCS, 

TRANSCOM’s operational evaluation plan did not specify this scope 

limitation nor did it address the exclusion of these partners as a risk that 

could adversely affect its ability to draw conclusions about TRANSCOM’s 

mission readiness. Moreover, TRANSCOM did not verify the validity of this 

assumption through any assessment of its key business partners’ readiness, 

and in fact did not consider information available at the time of the 

operational evaluation that raised concerns about the Year 2000 readiness 

of the nation’s transportation sector. Despite this scope limitation, 

TRANSCOM reported to JCS that critical deployment tasks could be 

performed during calendar and leap year date rollovers with no significant 

impact on its mission readiness.

As stressed in our briefing to TRANSCOM officials, Defense transportation 

services for deployment and sustainment are provided primarily by the 

commercial transportation sector. For example, Civil Reserve Air Fleet 

carriers account for 90 percent of long-range passenger capability and

40 percent of long-range cargo capability. The commercial maritime 

industry provides nearly all wartime sustainment capability. In addition, 

commercial rail and truck carriers provide virtually all continental U.S. 

surface transportation capability. TRANSCOM also depends on commercial 

systems that support and maintain air and water port operations to fulfill 

its deployment and sustainment missions. Therefore, without knowing 

commercial carrier and port Year 2000 readiness, TRANSCOM’s conclusion 

that all its critical missions and tasks could continue to be performed into 

the Year 2000 without material disruption was not justified. Also, without 

disclosing the scope limitation and related risks, TRANSCOM did not 

provide DOD leadership with complete and reliable information upon 
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which to assess DOD’s institutional Year 2000 readiness to execute military 

operations.

To address these concerns, we recommended in our August 24, 1999, 

briefing that TRANSCOM amend its final reports to JCS to disclose the 

scope limitations and related risks. We also recommended that 

TRANSCOM assess and selectively verify the readiness of transportation 

systems belonging to its commercial partners.

TRANSCOM Is 

Addressing Our 

Recommendations

TRANSCOM agreed with our recommendations and is responding to them. 

First, TRANSCOM amended its final reports to JCS to disclose the scope 

limitations of its operational evaluation and to qualify its previous 

conclusion about Year 2000 readiness. In brief, the amended report states 

that TRANSCOM’s ability to perform its full deployment and sustainment 

missions requires a yet-to-be confirmed assumption that the commercial 

transportation industry can perform its part of the missions. 

Second, to assess commercial carrier readiness, TRANSCOM has been 

seeking confirmation letters from commercial carriers whose systems 

exchange data with TRANSCOM’s Global Transportation Network. The 

Global Transportation Network is a system that provides in-transit visibility 

of transportation assets, passengers, and cargo. As of August 24, 1999, 

TRANSCOM had received confirmations on Y2K readiness from 20 of 27 of 

the network’s data exchange partners.

Third, TRANSCOM has been working with other federal agencies, such as 

the Department of Transportation, to assess transportation sector 

readiness by reviewing industry assessments and Internet web sites. It also 

plans to verify the reported readiness of selected transportation partners. 
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Fourth, TRANSCOM is working with its component commands (i.e., Air 

Mobility Command, Military Traffic Management Command, and Military 

Sealift Command)6

 to identify their major commercial carrier business 

partners, identify these partners’ Year 2000 readiness and associated risks, 

and develop risk mitigation strategies. The first of these status reports was 

due September 15, and showed that significant progress had been made by 

TRANSCOM in determining the Year 2000 readiness of its domestic 

commercial transportation partners. For example, TRANSCOM determined 

that 89 percent of its Civil Reserve Air Fleet carriers, all major rail carriers, 

and 196 of 199 trucking carriers have reported that they are Year 2000 

compliant. In addition, most North American ports have compliance 

programs in place and all military active and ready reserve fleet ships are 

certified Year 2000 compliant. However, TRANSCOM is still in the process 

of determining the Year 2000 readiness of international ports, airfields, and 

other international commercial carriers that are key to accomplishing its 

deployment and sustainment missions.

Conclusions By acting swiftly to address our recommendations made during the

August 24, 1999, briefing, TRANSCOM is increasing the effectiveness and 

value of its operational evaluation and is mitigating the risks associated 

with being able to operate effectively in the year 2000. Further, it has 

ensured that DOD managers have complete and reliable information to use 

in making informed military decisions. As a result, they have largely 

satisfied the intent of those recommendations, and we are not making any 

further recommendations at this time.

We are sending copies of this report to Representative John P. Murtha, 

Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Defense, House 

Appropriations Committee; Senator John Warner, Chairman, and Senator 

Carl Levin, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Armed 

Services; Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman, and Senator Daniel Inouye, 

6

TRANSCOM consists of three military service-level component commands, including the 

Army Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), the Air Force Air Mobility Command 

(AMC), and the Navy Military Sealift Command (MSC). MTMC manages both land (truck 

and rail) transportation and water port operations. AMC provides strategic airlift and aerial 

refueling services, performs aeromedical evacuation, and operates special assignment 

aircraft (such as Air Force One). MSC employs a combination of government-owned and 

commercial ships to carry out sea transportation operations and also manages 

prepositioned ships.
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Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Defense, Senate Committee 

on Appropriations; Representative Floyd Spence, Chairman, and Ike 

Skelton, Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Armed Services.

We are also sending copies to the Honorable John Koskinen, Chair of the 

President’s Year 2000 Conversion Council; the Honorable William Cohen, 

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable John Hamre, Deputy Secretary of 

Defense; General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 

Arthur Money, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, 

Communications, and Intelligence; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, 

Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to 

others upon request.

Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-6240. I can also be reached by e-mail at 

brockj.aimd@gao.gov. Other points of contact and key contributors to this 

report are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Jack L. Brock, Jr.

Director, Governmentwide and Defense

 Information Systems
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Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL ApendxIi

1

Results of GAO Review of

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

House Appropriations Committee

September 14, 1999
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 15 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

2

Introduction

• In August 1998, the Secretary of Defense directed the

Commanders-in-Chief (CINC), who are responsible for Defense’s

unified combatant commands, to plan, execute, and report on a

series of simulated Year 2000 operational evaluations (Y2K

OPEVALs).

• The CINC Y2K OPEVALs are one of three Defense Y2K end-toend test and evaluation efforts. GAO’s Y2K test guide advocates

end-to-end testing, which is testing performed to verify that a

defined set of interrelated systems (i.e., systems that collectively

support an organizational core business function or operation)

interoperate as intended in a Y2K environment.

• The CINC core business functions/operations are referred to as

“thin lines.”
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 16 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

3

Objectives

• At the request of the Chairman, House Appropriations Committee,

Defense Subcommittee, GAO is reviewing selected OPEVALs to

determine

(1) if the OPEVAL was planned, executed, and documented in

accordance with DOD guidelines and

(2) what the OPEVAL results indicated concerning readiness and risks.

• OPEVALs GAO reviewed included those conducted by

TRANSCOM and SPACECOM and were selected in collaboration

with the Defense Inspector General (IG) to ensure

– appropriate coverage of all CINC OPEVALs and

– no duplication of effort.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

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4

Scope and Methodology

• This briefing addresses the TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K - Part A

(major theater war (MTW) deployment) OPEVAL. To satisfy

objective (1), we

– reviewed the OPEVAL plan, testing documents/records, and test

results/reports,

– interviewed TRANSCOM officials responsible for Y2K OPEVAL planning,

execution, and reporting tasks,

– observed the century date rollover test for the MTW deployment execution

function, and

– compared TRANSCOM’s planning, execution, analysis, and reporting

actions against Defense OPEVAL guidance.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

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5

Scope and Methodology

• To satisfy objective (2), we

– reviewed TRANSCOM’s OPEVAL results, 7- and 30-day reports, and system

problem tracking reports and

– interviewed TRANSCOM officials and analysts responsible for developing

OPEVAL assessment methodologies, interpreting evaluation metrics, and

ensuring that evaluation exit criteria were met.

• On August 24, 1999 we briefed TRANSCOM leadership on the results

of our review and made recommendations to address our findings.

TRANSCOM immediately acted on these recommendations. These

actions are described where appropriate in this briefing.

• We performed our work from March through September 1999 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

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6

Background

• To assist the CINCs in planning, documenting, executing,

analyzing, and reporting OPEVALs, the Joint Staff issued OPEVAL

guidance. The guidance is divided into phases:

– identification and planning

– execution

– analysis

– reporting

• The OPEVAL guidance is consistent with GAO’s end-to-end testing

guidance and DOD’s Y2K management plan.

DOD OPEVAL Overview
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 20 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

7

Background

• As the single manager of Defense transportation, TRANSCOM

coordinates the use of air, sea, and land transportation to deploy and

sustain U.S. forces.

• To fulfill its deployment and sustainment missions, TRANSCOM

depends on and partners with commercial transportation service

providers. These partners provide about 85% of Defense’s

transportation needs. For example,

– Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) carriers account for 90% of long-range

passenger capability and 40% of long-range cargo capability.

– the commercial maritime industry provides nearly all wartime sustainment

capability, and

– commercial rail and truck carriers provide virtually all continental U.S. surface

transportation capability.

TRANSCOM and Its OPEVAL Events’ Status
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

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8

Background

• TRANSCOM also depends on commercial systems that support

and maintain air and water port operations to fulfill its deployment

and sustainment missions.

• TRANSCOM identified an OPEVAL “thin line” within its deployment

mission and an OPEVAL “thin line” within its sustainment mission.

The deployment “thin line” consists of 15 critical tasks and 23

systems that map to those tasks. The sustainment “thin line”

consists of 7 critical tasks and 23 systems.

• The following table describes the status of TRANSCOM’s OPEVAL

events.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

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9

Background

Evaluation/Readiness

Assessment Events

“Thin Line” Schedule Results

OPEVAL Part A MTW deployment

management

April 5-30, 1999 1 softc failure and 5 hardd failures;

no contingency plans invoked.

OPEVAL Part B MTW sustainment

management

May 24-June 4, 1999 1 hard failure; contingency plan

invoked.

OPEVAL Part C MTW sustainment

management retest

October 12-27, 1999

CCAa MTW deployment

management

May 3-7, 1999 Global Transportation Network

(GTN)e

 contingency plan

evaluated.

JMRRb Dual MTW deployment

and sustainment

August 1999 Classified assessment on Y2K

readiness of international ports and

airfields. a

The Chairman’s Contingency Assessment (CCA) was designed to evaluate the ability of TRANSCOM to perform the MTW deployment mission in an

environment degraded by Y2K failures. b

Joint Monthly Readiness Reviews (JMRR) focus on describing readiness deficiencies and corrective actions and are used by Defense to identify

opportunities to improve warfighting effectiveness. c

A soft failure is a Y2K-related failure that is not immediately discernable. The effect may be cumulative and require several hours, days, or longer to

manifest itself. d

A hard failure is a Y2K-related failure that results in an obvious adverse impact to the system. For example, the system shuts down, erroneous data is

displayed, or unexpected actions occur. e

GTN is an integrated database containing all the data necessary to track the location of deploying units’ personnel and equipment, patients, sustainment

cargo, and other vital resources as they move between theaters.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

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10

Background

• Turbo Y2K - Part A evaluated TRANSCOM’s ability to manage a joint

MTW deployment operation.

• Turbo Y2K - Part A OPEVAL examined one “thin line”--deployment

management--and the capability of the system’s “thin line” to operate

correctly at Y2K.

• Turbo Y2K - Part A was conducted in collaboration with other DOD

organizations, including Central Command (CENTCOM), the military

services, and Defense agencies. It was intended to emulate a realworld MTW deployment operation.

Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

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11

Background

• Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL assessed century rollover and leap year

critical dates.

• Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL was conducted during April 5-30, 1999.

– Rehearsal: March 29 - April 2, 1999.

– Baseline: April 5-9, 1999.

– Calendar year rollover: April 19-23, 1999.

– Leap year rollover: April 26-30, 1999.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

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12

Background

Turbo Y2K-Part A critical tasks “Thin Line” systems

1. Determine transportation and support availability GCCS/JOPES/GDSS/ADANS

CMARPS/ACFP

2. Coordinate and match transportation resources and requirements GCCS/JOPES/JFAST/ADANS

3. Provide for enroute support and clearances No “thin line” systems used

4. Integrate deployment systems GTN/GCCS/JOPES/CMOS/DAAS

TCACCIS/GDSS/ADANS/RCAPS

CAPSII/C2IPS/Broker/CAMS-G081/IBS

WPS/GOPAX/IC3/CFM/AMS

5. Provide forces and mobility assets C2IPS/GDSS/Broker/CAMS-G081

IC3/AMS/WPS/CFM

6. Provide terminal operations at ports of embarkation CAPSII/RCAPS/GDSS/WPS/AMS

GCCS/JOPES

7. Move forces and sustainment from origin to port of debarkation GCCS/JOPES/GDSS/ADANS/ACFP

C2IPS/GTN/TMDS/IBS/IC3/CFM

GOPAX/AMS/TCACCIS

8. Coordinate global strategic refueling CMARPS/ADANS/GDSS/C2IPS/GTN

9. Provide global patient movement aeromedical evacuation No “thin line” systems used

10. Produce strategic and theater strategic intelligence and prepare intelligence

 products

IDHS

11. Disseminate and integrate theater strategic intelligence IDHS

12. Manage national military C4 systems worldwide for communicating strategic

decisions and information

No “thin line” systems used

13. Provide strategic direction to forces worldwide GDSS/C2IPS

14. Expand transportation support system GDSS/ADANS/IC3/JFAST

15. Determine and validate forces and cargo to be deployed or redeployed GCCS/JOPES
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

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13

Results of GAO Review
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 27 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

14

Planning

Defense Test Criteria Result

Specify and validate test assumptions Partially satisfied

Establish a Y2K task force and assign responsibilities Satisfied

Identify critical missions/tasks/systems Satisfied

Verify systems essential to mission are Y2K compliant/certified Satisfied

Develop OPEVAL plan to guide event planning and execution Satisfied

Identify and schedule CINC/Allied/Component/Agency support Satisfied

Determine relevant and necessary resources (e.g., funding,

personnel, equipment),

Satisfied

Ensure approved Y2K contingency plans are prepared Satisfied

Develop risk management plan Partially satisfied

Identify simulation needs and establish supporting environment Satisfied

Develop data collection and analysis plan or approaches Satisfied
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 28 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

15

Findings: Planning

Criteria: In planning for OPEVAL, CINCs are to define and validate

assumptions concerning the readiness of systems and the ability to

evaluate systems in light of real-world limitations.

Finding 1: To prevent potential corruption of live data during Turbo Y2K

Part A OPEVAL, TRANSCOM decided to simulate the operational “thin

line” systems environment.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 29 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

16

Findings: Planning

Finding 2: TRANSCOM determined that it would not be affordable or feasible

to include commercial transportation partners in its OPEVAL. Instead,

TRANSCOM decided to (1) limit the scope to its deployment management

capability, (2) rely on other Defense components to verify the Y2K readiness

of Defense transportation assets, and (3) assume the readiness of its

commercial partners’ assets (carriers and port operations). However, this

assumption was not based on assessment and verification of the partners’

readiness and was not stated in the OPEVAL plan. According to

TRANSCOM officials, this assumption and the limitations it imposed on the

scope of the OPEVAL was shared orally with the Joint Staff.

Finding 3: In response to our findings and recommendations, TRANSCOM

amended its 30-day reports to Joint Staff to disclose OPEVAL scope

limitations, and it strengthened its efforts to verify its assumption about the

readiness of commercial partners’ assets.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 30 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

17

Findings: Planning

Criteria: A CINC Y2K Task Force composed of various

knowledgeable Y2K, test, and systems experts should be formed to

establish the base for all Y2K planning, coordination, execution, and

reporting.

Finding: TRANSCOM established a Y2K Task Force based on the

defined scope of OPEVAL and it defined roles and responsibilities

for each member. Members of the task force included Y2K subject

matter experts, surface and airlift experts, test and evaluation

experts from the Joint Interoperability Test Center (JITC) and the

Defense Office of Test and Evaluation, system analysts, component

command and service representatives, and a public affairs

representative.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 31 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

18

Finding: Planning

Criteria: CINCs need to analyze critical missions to determine the

most critical missions and identify the critical tasks supporting each

critical mission. In addition, the minimum number of integrated

automated information platforms/systems required to perform each

critical task must be identified (the “thin line”).

Finding: Consistent with its defined scope of the OPEVAL,

TRANSCOM identified 15 critical tasks that it needed to carry out its

management of a MTW deployment mission. In addition,

TRANSCOM identified a total of 23 “thin-line” systems that support

its capability to manage the deployment mission.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 32 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

19

Finding: Planning

Criteria: Ensure that mission-critical “thin line” systems are

certified Y2K compliant.

Finding: Consistent with the defined scope of the OPEVAL,

TRANSCOM verified that all 23 mission-critical “thin line”

systems were certified Y2K compliant.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 33 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

20

Finding: Planning

Criteria: The Y2K task force should document how the Y2K

OPEVAL will be conducted, how data will be gathered and

analyzed, and what information the reports will contain.

Finding: TRANSCOM developed the Turbo Y2K Exercise

Directive and Test Plan to

– ensure that mechanisms for evaluating critical dates and contingency

plans for mission-critical systems are executed,

– document participant roles and responsibilities,

– link critical missions, critical tasks, architectures, test cases, and data

elements, and

– establish Y2K OPEVAL reporting requirements.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 34 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

21

Findings: Planning

Criteria: When preparing for a Y2K OPEVAL, determine the

extent of participation of other CINCs, allies, components, and

agencies and coordinate their participation in the event.

Finding 1: TRANSCOM identified, coordinated, and scheduled

OPEVAL with CENTCOM, the transportation component

commands, Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Information

Systems Agency, Air Force, Army, and JITC to support the

OPEVAL.

Finding 2: TRANSCOM did not provide for participation in the

OPEVAL of commercial transportation service providers or the

commercial systems supporting air and water port operations

because neither was part of the defined OPEVAL “thin line.”
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 35 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

22

Finding: Planning

Criteria: The necessary resources (funding, personnel, training,

equipment, time frames, and external organization support)

should be identified and included in the plan.

Finding: TRANSCOM identified and planned for the necessary

resources. For example, it estimated a $10.4 million funding

requirement and earmarked the funds. In addition,

TRANSCOM coordinated the evaluation scenario and scripts

with all OPEVAL participants, acquired the systems hardware

and software to simulate a real-world MTW deployment

operation, and scheduled the appropriate staff to support Turbo

Y2K-Part A OPEVAL.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 36 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

23

Findings: Planning

Criteria: To ensure that the defined Y2K OPEVAL exercise

objectives are met, it is essential to have contingency plans in

place prior to executing OPEVAL.

Finding 1: TRANSCOM ensured that approved contingency

plans for all specified mission-critical “thin line” systems had

been prepared prior to the start of OPEVAL.

Finding 2: During Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL, TRANSCOM

invoked an approved contingency plan as a work-around for the

medical evacuation function. TRANSCOM officials recognized

that the medical evacuation systems were not Y2K compliant

and planned to use a contingency plan to address this

deficiency.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 37 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

24

Findings: Planning

Criteria: CINC-unique risk management plans should be developed to

identify and mitigate system-related risks before they adversely affect

mission execution.

Finding 1: TRANSCOM developed a risk management plan that

identified risks and defined mitigation steps. For example, the plan

provided for determining the Y2K compliance of “thin line” systems

before conducting the OPEVAL and limiting OPEVAL to Y2K

compliant systems or systems with clearly delineated contingency

plans.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 38 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

25

Findings: Planning

Finding 2: While the plan did not identify the exclusion of

commercial carriers and ports from OPEVAL as a risk,

TRANSCOM did initiate risk reduction steps by specifying that

confirmation letters should be sent to vendors whose systems

interface with TRANSCOM’s GTN to confirm the Y2K

compliance of these interfacing systems. However,

confirmation letters alone do not provide sufficient verification of

key business partners’ readiness. Moreover, limiting the

confirmation to systems that interface with GTN excludes the

providers’ critical systems that actually transport goods and

people, as well as the systems used to maintain these systems.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 39 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

26

Findings: Planning

Finding 3: TRANSCOM reports that it recently expanded its

efforts to address the risk of excluding commercial carriers and

ports from OPEVAL. According to TRANSCOM, it is working

jointly with other federal agencies (e.g., Department of

Transportation) to determine the Y2K readiness of the civilian

transportation sector (air, sea, rail, and trucking) and plans to

develop risk mitigation strategies to address any Y2K

weaknesses in the sector. Further, TRANSCOM continues to

seek confirmation letter responses from GTN data exchange

partners (20 out of 27 received as of August 24, 1999), and, for

selected key commercial carrier partners, TRANSCOM plans to

verify readiness.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 40 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

27

Finding: Planning

Criteria: CINCs should (1) determine if simulations or manual

data input will be needed during the execution of the OPEVAL,

and, if needed, (2) ensure that an environment that can support

the simulation is planned for and acquired.

Finding: TRANSCOM officials identified the need for

simulations and manual data input and ensured that data

injection methodologies were included in the OPEVAL master

scenario events list (MSEL) and followed. For example, during

the evaluation of TRANSCOM’s ability to schedule air refueling

flights, TRANSCOM manually input data on fighter drag

requirements received from the Air Combat Command.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 41 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

28

Finding: Planning

Criteria: A plan should be prepared to help coordinate and

synchronize all OPEVAL data collection and assessment

activities.

Finding: Consistent with the specified scope of the OPEVAL,

TRANSCOM developed a data collection and analysis plan that

included, for example, (1) specific actions that should be

accomplished by OPEVAL participants prior to the start of and at

the completion of each OPEVAL, (2) ground rules for collecting

and documenting mission-critical system outputs, and (3)

direction on reviewing the critical tasks executed during

OPEVAL and determining the performance of the mission-critical

“thin line” systems.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 42 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

29

Execution

Defense test criteria Result

Conduct OPEVAL rehearsal Satisfied

Follow configuration management policy Satisfied

Perform baseline test for OPEVAL Satisfied

Execute required Y2K date rollover tests Satisfied

Collect and archive all Y2K-relevant data and ensure that

systems are reset to current day operations

Satisfied
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 43 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

30

Findings: Execution

Criteria: Prior to executing the Y2K OPEVAL, a rehearsal should be

conducted to ensure that all critical systems and interfaces identified

in the system architecture are operating correctly and that OPEVAL

staff know their roles and responsibilities.

Finding 1: TRANSCOM performed a rehearsal of the defined

OPEVAL from March 29 - April 2, 1999. During the rehearsal, (1) the

test readiness criteria were satisfied, (2) the data collection and

analysis methodology was verified, (3) the final baseline system

configuration was confirmed and documented, and (4) OPEVAL staff

practiced their roles and responsibilities.

Finding 2: A key staff member who participated in the Turbo Y2KPart A OPEVAL rehearsal did not participate in the actual execution

of critical date rollovers, which caused a schedule delay.

TRANSCOM officials were able to identify and correct the problem

with no significant impact on OPEVAL events.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 44 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

31

Finding: Execution

Criteria: The systems configuration established for baseline testing

should not be changed unless authorized by the Y2K test director.

Finding: During our observation of Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL, we

verified that changes made to the systems configuration were

authorized by the Y2K test director. We also confirmed that the

approved changes were made, tested, and documented in

accordance with configuration management policy.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 45 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

32

Finding: Execution

Criteria: A baseline Y2K test should be executed to establish

expected results data that will be compared to output data

captured during the Y2K date rollover tests to help establish

whether or not a failure is Y2K-related.

Finding: TRANSCOM conducted a baseline Y2K test. During

this test (1) all critical tasks were performed, (2) data were

collected as outlined in the data collection and analysis plan, and

(3) automated logging systems were operationally verified.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 46 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

33

Finding: Execution

Criteria: The defined mission-critical “thin line” system

configuration should be executed using normal operating

procedures and a seamless continuity of operations during

critical Y2K date rollovers should be observed.

Finding: According to TRANSCOM’s OPEVAL reports, all 23

mission-critical “thin line” systems that TRANSCOM defined for

this OPEVAL were executed under normal operating conditions

during OPEVAL with no significant interruptions during critical

Y2K date rollovers.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 47 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

34

Finding: Execution

Criteria: Ensure that all data needed to conduct the evaluation

for the Y2K case have been captured prior to resetting the

system to current day operations requirements.

Finding: Prior to resetting the systems to present day operational

conditions, TRANSCOM officials determined that (1) the “thinline” was completely exercised, (2) all items in the master

scenario events list were performed, and (3) all data needed to

make an assessment of TRANSCOM’s ability to perform its

MTW deployment mission were collected and archived.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 48 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

35

Analysis

Defense test criteria Result

Categorize, document, and report failures Satisfied

Determine mission impact of Y2K failures Satisfied

Ensure Y2K OPEVAL exit criteria are met Partially satisfied
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 49 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

36

Finding: Analysis

Criteria: All failures are to be identified and properly categorized

as either “hard” or “soft” failures and should be documented and

reported in accordance with the data collection and analysis

plan.

Finding: TRANSCOM identified six Y2K failures during OPEVAL

and categorized one as a soft failure and five as hard failures.

All failures were documented in accordance with DOD Y2K

requirements and reported to the Joint Staff Y2K office.

Examples of the failures include the incorrect display of the year

2000 as 100 and an incorrect time stamp date after the century

date rollover.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 50 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

37

Finding: Analysis

Criteria: Determine the impact of a system failure on the

accomplishment of a critical mission.

Finding: TRANSCOM determined that all six Y2K failures had no

impact on its ability to perform the deployment management

mission.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 51 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

38

Findings: Analysis

Criteria: JCS defined nine exit criteria that OPEVAL results should be

measured against to ensure that critical tasks and missions can be

performed in a Y2K environment.

Finding 1: TRANSCOM measured its OPEVAL performance against

the nine Joint Staff exit criteria and concluded in its May 1999 report

that all nine were satisfied and that critical tasks and missions can be

performed across the calendar and leap year dates with no significant

impact on its deployment mission.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 52 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

39

Findings: Analysis

Finding 2: During our August 24, 1999, briefing, we told TRANSCOM

that this conclusion reaches beyond, and is not justified by, the defined

scope of OPEVAL because (1) TRANSCOM’s ability to perform the

deployment mission depends extensively on commercial partners’ Y2K

readiness and (2) OPEVAL did not address, and TRANSCOM did not

otherwise know, whether its commercial partners’ systems could

satisfy the critical tasks involving them. Thus, we recommended that

TRANSCOM amend its OPEVAL reports to qualify its conclusion and

that it take steps, in collaboration with other federal agencies, to

ascertain the Y2K readiness of its critical commercial partners. 
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 53 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

40

Findings: Analysis

Finding 3: In response, TRANSCOM amended its OPEVAL Part A and

B 30-day reports to disclose that the scope of the OPEVALs was

limited to its ability to perform critical command, control, and

synchronization tasks in support of MTW operations in a Y2K

environment. The amended reports explicitly state that TRANSCOM’s

ability to perform its full deployment and sustainment missions requires

a yet-to-be confirmed assumption that the commercial transportation

sector can perform its part of the missions. Also, as described earlier,

TRANSCOM reports that it reemphasized and expanded its efforts to

determine the Y2K readiness of the commercial transportation sector in

general and selected key carriers in particular.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 54 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

41

Reporting

Defense test criteria Result

Prepare Y2K reports describing mission impact and readiness Partially satisfied

Provide reports to Joint Staff J7 within required time frames Satisfied
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 55 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

42

Findings: Reporting

Criteria: CINCs are to prepare Y2K reports describing mission impact and

readiness.

Finding 1: TRANSCOM provided its May 1999 Y2K reports to Joint Staff,

which concluded that all critical tasks supporting MTW unit deployment can

be performed with no significant impact on readiness caused by potential

Y2K failures.

Finding 2: The May 1999 OPEVAL reports did not describe the mission

impact of not evaluating or otherwise knowing the Y2K readiness of the

commercial transportation providers and port operations. However,

TRANSCOM has since amended its OPEVAL Part A and B 30-day reports,

as we recommended, to disclose that its missions would be adversely

affected if the commercial transportation sector was unable to perform its

very important role in TRANSCOM’s deployment and sustainment missions.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 56 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

43

Finding: Reporting

Criteria: A preliminary report is required within 7 calendar days

after the completion of OPEVAL and a final report is required

within 30 calendar days. Both reports are to be provided to Joint

Staff.

Finding: TRANSCOM completed both reports within the required

time frames and provided them to Joint Staff.
Appendix I

Briefing on Results of GAO Review of 

TRANSCOM Turbo Y2K-Part A OPEVAL

Page 57 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

44

Conclusions

• TRANSCOM satisfied many of the Defense OPEVAL requirements for its

defined “thin line.”

• However, key steps that are pivotal to (1) fully disclosing and appropriately

addressing any risks associated with limitations in the defined scope of

OPEVAL and (2) accurately reporting on mission readiness and impacts,

were not fully satisfied. The result is that the Y2K readiness of critical tasks

associated with conducting a MTW deployment--namely the use of

commercial carriers and port operations to deploy goods and people--were

not known with sufficient surety to support TRANSCOM’s May 1999

reported position that it can conduct a MTW deployment in a Y2K

environment with no material impact on operations.

• TRANSCOM has since either implemented or initiated appropriate actions

to address our recommendations to correct these OPEVAL limitations. As a

result, we are not making any further recommendations at this time.
Page 58 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

Appendix II

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ApendxIi

At the request of the Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, House 

Committee on Appropriations, we selected the TRANSCOM Turbo Y2KPart A OPEVAL for review to determine (1) whether the OPEVAL was 

planned, executed, and documented in accordance with DOD and GAO 

Year 2000 testing guidelines and (2) what the OPEVAL results indicated 

concerning readiness and risks. This OPEVAL was selected in collaboration 

with the DOD Inspector General to ensure appropriate coverage of all 

CINC OPEVALs and no duplication of effort.

To meet our first objective, we reviewed TRANSCOM’s OPEVAL plan, 

testing documentation and records, and test results and associated reports. 

We also interviewed TRANSCOM officials responsible for Y2K OPEVAL 

planning, execution, and reporting tasks. Further, we observed the century 

date rollover test for the MTW deployment execution function and 

compared TRANSCOM’s OPEVAL planning, execution, analysis, and 

reporting actions against JCS OPEVAL guidance and our Y2K testing guide.

To meet our second objective, we reviewed TRANSCOM’s OPEVAL results, 

including its 7- and 30-day reports and system problem tracking reports. We 

also interviewed TRANSCOM officials and analysts responsible for 

developing OPEVAL assessment methodologies, interpreting evaluation 

metrics, and ensuring that evaluation exit criteria were met.

We requested and received comments on a draft of our briefing, which was 

delivered on August 24, 1999. We incorporated those comments where 

appropriate. We performed our audit work from March through September 

1999 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards.
Page 59 GAO/AIMD-00-21 TRANSCOM Y2K Operational Testing

Appendix III

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements ApendxIi

GAO Contact Randolph C. Hite, (202) 512-6240

Acknowledgements In addition to those named above, Ronald B. Bageant, Cristina T. Chaplain, 

Richard B. Hung, Denice M. Millett, and Karen S. Sifford made key 

contributions to this report.

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