Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) Operations 

CPT Andrew Cairns/CPT Jacob Dellinger 

Support for reconnaissance operations is the inherent responsibility of the combat trains 

command post (CTCP). The CTCP is charged with maintaining the momentum of the operation 

through supporting the maneuver plan. The squadron’s success is contingent on a CTCPs ability 

to resource and maintain the squadron’s three reconnaissance troops through a task organization 

inclusive of logistical, administrative, and maintenance functions. 

The squadron’s ability to conduct sustained reconnaissance and security operations was heavily 

reliant on the ability for the tactical logistics execution to adequately support the maneuver plan. 

During 5th Squadron 4th Cavalry’s most recent 

rotational experience at the National Training 

Center (NTC), it experienced widespread success 

through the implementation of a sound 

reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan 

supported by a thorough sustainment plan. The 

link between the execution of the sustainment by 

the forward support company (FSC) and the 

maneuver troops was the CTCP led by the 

headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT) 

commander with support from the squadron’s 

logistics and personnel officers. This article will 

provide a way to approach the preparation of a CTCP to include training, manning and equipping 

to enable the squadron to have depth in mission command, maximize the logistical common 

operating picture and sustain operations. 

The most critical aspect of the preparation of the CTCP was the identification of the routine 

operations required to successfully employ the CTCP and execute sustainment operations. The 

squadron was offered a fantastic opportunity to identify the routine with a training density 

occurring in the summer of 2014. Prior to 5-4 CAV’s deployment to NTC 15-06, the squadron 

deployed to Fort McCoy, WI in support of the Exportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC) 

rotation. The mission allowed the squadron to train all aspects of the armored reconnaissance 

fight, to include implementing the CTCP in support of the unit’s sustainment operations. During 

this exercise, the CTCP included the squadron S-1 and S-4 sections, the HHT headquarters 

section, and elements of the FSC maintenance platoon. The CTCP was controlled by the HHT 

commander in conjunction with the S-1 and S-4. The following is the task organization of the 

combat trains: 

 Figure 1-2, Task Organization of the Combat Trains 

Figure 1-1, Elements of HHT completing 

break down of CTCP at Fort McCoy, WI

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To ensure that the combat trains would be capable of supporting the squadron, intensive 

rehearsal of the battle drills was conducted and that became the main focus of the troop. The 

longest and most complex drill that required multiple rehearsals was displacement of the CTCP. 

This drill consisted of tearing down the Standardized Integrated Command Post System (SICPS) 

and preparing the command track (M1068) for movement while simultaneously maintaining 

communication with squadron HQs and receiving reports from the troops. The most important 

lesson from conducting multiple iterations was that tear down and set up of the OE-254 antenna 

significantly slowed down movement. Without losing capability, the CTCP modified its 

communication design to where the Quick Erect Antenna Mast System (QEAMS) was used for 

the brigade administrative/logistics (A/L) net since this frequency needed to reach the furthest 

(was not used at XCTC) and a COM201 was emplaced on top of the M1068 for talking to the 

forward troops. Other key battle drills rehearsed included battle tracking, owning the fight when 

the command post (CP) met its displacement criteria, and receiving and transmitting combat 

reports via frequency modulation (FM) and Joint Capabilities Release (JCR). 

The preparation of the CTCP continued when the squadron redeployed to Fort Riley. The CTCP 

was able to maintain tempo in its development through the execution of several validation 

exercises leading up to the NTC rotation. The squadron utilized home station training 

opportunities at both the unit level and installation schools to enhance the capability of the 

CTCP. Entering into this training density, there was a clear focus on digital reporting which 

helped shape the training regimen. The focus would later pay significant dividends during the 

training rotation due to the depth of knowledge amongst the Troopers in both the CP and the 

CTCP. The NTC offered the squadron an opportunity to put stress on systems, validate training 

focuses, and prepare for future operations. 

A pivotal component of the CTCP was the ability to receive, process and act on information 

which was reported by the troops. The emphasis on digital systems and long range 

communications prior to the deployment enabled the CTCP to be successful. 

During the execution of operations, the squadron would leverage the JCR system, specifically, 

the chat feature, to assist in the execution of logistics synchronization (LOGSYNC) meetings 

with the troops during operations. The JCR log provides a window for an open dialogue over 

JCR or a chat room to aid in reporting and cut down on flash, immediate, priority, routine (FIPR) 

backlog; preventing reports from being lost. Rapid and accurate reporting endured during the 

mission as a result of employment of this system. Additionally, the S1 section would focus 

heavily on the employment of “open office” within JCR to provide the troops a standardized and 

accurate reporting tool for statuses (STATs) throughout operations. This technique would pay 

dividends during sustained operations over stretched lines of communications. Furthermore, the 

S1 was able to use the Microsoft Excel and Word features on JCR log for reporting of personnel 

statuses (PERSTATs) and tracking of casualties and equipment. The troop 1SGs reported their 

daily losses from the previous day’s battle period to maximize situational awareness for the 

squadron headquarters and would allow for more responsive soldier regeneration. The chat room 

created shared understanding for all troops during critical battle rhythm events. JCR quickly 

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became the primary means of communication due to the distances troops were located from the 

CTCP and CP throughout the operation. 

In terms of providing depth of mission command nodes for the squadron, the CTCP stood 

prepared to assume control of the fight throughout the battle. This was completed largely in part 

due to adhering to doctrine and understanding of communication platforms. The combat trains 

attempted to replicate all the systems, digital and analog, to provide the squadron with an 

alternate and sometimes a tertiary command post. 

The CTCP was able to do this by maintaining 

doctrinal distance to the CP of 1-4 kilometers 

(KM) to ensure that it was not removed from the 

fight. Due to the squadron’s integration of high 

frequency (HF) radios and JCR, it was able to 

maintain communication via multiple platforms 

during operations stretched over 30KM. 

The squadron’s depth in communication platforms and thorough primary, alternate, contingency, 

emergency (PACE) plan made it so that the distance maintained between the CTCP and CP was 

not a major factor for mission command purpose, but it did allow for a mutually supportive 

relationship between the two nodes. The distance of the CTCP in relation to the CP became 

increasingly important as vehicles at the CP experienced mechanical problems as well as 

improper forecasting for fuel where the distance allowed for rapid response to the CP from the 

CTCP. 

Since the CTCP included the unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) during the rotation, it 

was difficult to displace and the command team had to tie into the micro-terrain to ensure 

survivability during the mission. The lack of ideal terrain to house an element ranging from 20-

30 vehicles made finding suitable positions within doctrinal distance difficult and proved to be a 

daunting challenge throughout the rotation. 

While it was a challenge to conduct reconnaissance 

(RECON) ahead of displacement and secure the 

CTCP, it was not impossible. Since all 

elements of the CTCP were aware of delineated 

responsibilities, the command team was able to 

focus on security and reconnaissance for the 

CTCP during operations. However, 

there were instances when prudent risk was 

taken and security was reduced (based on 

intelligence) to allow for the headquarters 

elements to conduct movement preparations. Much of the focus for the troop commander was on 

conducting both map/mounted reconnaissance ahead of displacement. This meant that the 

command team, which accounted for 50% of the organic combat power, were away from the 

Figure 1-4, M88 Conducting recovery 

operations during NTC rotation 15-06

Figure 1-3, Doctrinal Distance between 

CTCP and SQDN Command Post

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CTCP during reconnaissance. During the initial phases of the operation, the site location 

RECONs for the CTCP were not conducted effectively and lacked key personnel to ensure 

feasibility of a location. Therefore, it became a tactic, technique, and procedure (TTP) for site 

location RECONs to include the commander, squadron maintenance sergeant or squadron 

maintenance technician, squadron medical officer and an element from the S-1 section. The need 

to balance security and mission accomplishment, specifically maintenance was delicate as the 

CTCP had to be positioned on terrain suitable to employ the Forward Repair System (FRS) and 

the boom on M88 for vehicle maintenance. Many times the location of the CTCP was not ideal 

in terms of defense, but prudent risk was assumed to ensure that doctrinal distance was 

maintained and that maintenance could be conducted. 

Additionally, protecting the trains was a continually evolving problem as the troop 1SG had the 

responsibility to tie in all disabled vehicles awaiting parts into the security plan. The crews of 

those vehicles were also integrated into the security plan not only from their mounted platforms, 

but also to conduct disruption patrols and set observation points to detect any threats. Prior to 

the deployment to the NTC, the squadron integrated vehicle crews from the forward support 

company into Table (TBL) VI gunnery to provide qualified crews. Having additional combat 

power assisted in the security of the CTCP. 

A planning oversight and poor forecasting by the troop commander for Class IV materials 

contributed to reduced security at the CTCP. The Class IV package which was fielded to the 

CTCP was not sufficient, and the commander and 1SG had to conduct engagement area 

development with a less than ideal amount of concertina wire and sand bags. Once the task 

organization with inclusion of the UMCP was finalized, a standard Class IV package needed to 

be identified prior to line of departure (LD) and use of these materials tied into the rehearsals 

conducted. Failure to do so put the security of the command node in jeopardy. However, the 

command team followed standard engagement area (EA) development procedure by “red 

teaming” their position through rehearsals and reconnaissance from likely enemy avenues of 

approach. Doing so, enabled the most efficient use of a reduced supply for turning and fixing 

obstacles. 

Furthermore, displacement inside of the CTCP was a challenge due to the terrain and the robust 

size of the element. Thus, there were many times when vehicles were too close together and 

were at risk to catastrophic damage and degradation of capability in the event of indirect fire 

(IDF). 

The security of the CTCP waned as vehicles came and went through the UMCP. At one point 

the combat power was reduced to only three combat platforms. This proved to be problematic 

when vehicles were pulled to support casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) from the main aid station 

(MAS) as security had to be reduced to ensure Soldiers did not die of wounds, thus, degrading 

combat effectiveness of the line troops. Therefore, the command team assumed risk during the 

execution of CASEVAC operations at the CTCP. 

With respect to the chemical threat, the CTCP employed radiac sets and M8 paper to detect 

possible chemical attacks. The CTCP was successful at preparing for attacks across all of the 

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forms of contact and it spent much of the rotation avoiding becoming a soft target. Emblematic 

of this was the fact that only one successful IDF attack occurred throughout the 16 day rotation. 

Overall, security at the CTCP proved to be the most daunting task and one which required more 

deliberate planning and resourcing during both the train up and the rehearsal phase. 

A critical lesson learned during the rotation at the NTC was to task organize for mission early in 

the training cycle. During the reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) 

week, a lot of time and energy was spent integrating the different elements which would serve in 

the CTCP, many of which were not organic to HHT. The problems were not insurmountable, but 

the cohesion and fluidity of operations would have been enhanced if during the train up for NTC,

the CTCP had conducted operations as it had at NTC. Additionally, depth of knowledge in 

critical equipment would have assisted the CTCP [i.e. only one operator for the Combat-ServiceSupport Automated Information Systems Interface (CAISI) and only two personnel proficient on 

HF radios. Both pieces of equipment were available at home station and not given enough of a 

focus prior to the rotation. 

This article has provided a way to approach the preparation of a CTCP for the decisive action 

training environment in the areas of training, manning and equipping to enable the squadron to 

have depth in mission command, maximize the logistical common operating picture and sustain 

operations. Key lessons identified include task organize for your mission early, train multiple 

personnel on low density equipment for redundancy, conduct homestation training on assuming 

control of the fight from the main CP, and finally, plan and rehearse security of the CTCP using 

all available assets. These techniques and lessons are applicable to all maneuver formations 

(Armored, Infantry, and Stryker BCTs) that utilize CTCPs. 

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