J-S23016-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.C., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.C., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 16 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered November 25, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Domestic Relations 

at No(s): CP-51-DP-0002599-2015

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.T.C., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.C., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 17 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 25, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Domestic Relations 

at No(s): CP-51-AP-0001070-2016

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McCAFFERY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED JUNE 03, 2020

At Docket 17 EDA 2020, M.C. (Mother) appeals from the decree entered 

in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, granting the petition of the 

Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) to terminate involuntarily 

Mother’s parental rights to her minor son, J.T.C., (Child), pursuant to Section 
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2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act.1 At Docket 16 EDA 

2020, Mother also appeals from the order changing Child’s permanent 

placement goals to adoption pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351.2 

After review, we affirm.

Child was born in November 2014 to Mother and an unknown father

(Father). DHS became involved with the family shortly after Child’s birth, 

after receiving a general protective services (GPS) report that Child tested 

positive for opiates and methadone at birth, and Mother tested positive for 

opiates, methadone, and cocaine. N.T., 11/25/19, at 7. Stephanie Hawkins, 

Community Umbrella Agency (CUA) case supervisor, testified at the 

termination hearing that CUA assisted in implementing in-home services for 

Mother to address her substance abuse and mental health issues. Id. at 7-8. 

Mother completed an intake at Parkside rehabilitation facility, at which time 

she reported a 21 year-long history of cocaine abuse and a 15 to 18 year-long 

history of opiate abuse. Id. at 13. Mother also reported using 7 to 15 bags 

of heroin daily. Id.

____________________________________________

1 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938. By separate decree the same day, the trial court 

also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Child’s unknown father. 

Trial Ct. Op., 2/4/20, at 1 n.1.

2 This Court sua sponte consolidated these two appeals. Furthermore, we note 

that although the captions identify the Child as J.C. and J.T.C., we clarify both 

matters concern the same child.
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As safety concerns continued, on September 22, 2015, DHS filed a 

dependency petition. N.T. at 8. On October 5, 2015, following a hearing, the 

court adjudicated Child dependent, but allowed Child to remain in Mother’s

physical custody. See Order of Adjudication & Disposition, 10/5/15, at 1. 

Mother was ordered to participate in an assessment and/or evaluation, drug 

testing, and dual diagnosis at the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU). Id. at 2. 

Single case plan (SCP) objectives for Mother included: attending supervised 

visitation with Child at CUA; obtaining appropriate housing; attending dual 

diagnosis treatment; providing verification of employment and housing; 

engaging in Intellectual Disability (IDS) services; and attending parenting 

classes. N.T. at 5-9. Referrals were made to appropriate services, including 

to IDS, CEU, Behavioral Health Services (BHS), and housing. Id. at 5-9, 16.

Ms. Hawkins requested that Mother sign releases so that her mental health 

treatment could be monitored, due to Mother’s past diagnoses of bipolar 

disorder, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and borderline 

personality disorder. Id. at 10.

On October 6, 2015, DHS obtained an order of protective custody (OPC) 

for Child (who was then approximately 11 months old) due to Mother’s failure 

to comply with the safety plan and due to drug and alcohol issues. See Order 

for Protective Custody, 10/6/15, at 1. The following day, the court held a 

shelter care hearing, at which time Child was placed in foster care. See

Shelter Care Order, 10/7/15, at 1. Mother was granted supervised visitation 
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with Child. Id. On October 27, 2015, DHS sought a finding of aggravated 

circumstances against Mother, after her parental rights to her three older 

children were involuntarily terminated.3 See DHS’ Mot. for Agg. 

Circumstances, 10/27/15, at 1-2. On October 29th, DHS filed an amended 

dependency petition as to Child. See DHS’ Pet. for Adjudication of 

Dependency, 10/29/15, at 1-9.

Permanency review hearings were held in January, April, and July, 

2016.4 In January 2016, Mother was again referred to CEU for drug testing 

and dual diagnosis assessment. See Permanency Review Order, 1/4/16, at 

1-2. At that time, Child’s permanency goal was “return to guardian,” and 

Mother was granted weekly supervised visitation with the requirement that 

she confirm visits 24 hours in advance. Id. In April 2016, a concurrent 

permanency goal of adoption was identified for Child, who was residing in a 

pre-adoptive foster home. See Permanency Review Order, 4/25/16, at 1; see 

also N.T. at 19.

On November 8, 2016, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate the 

parental rights of Father and Mother pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), 

____________________________________________

3 The certified record is not clear as to whether the court made a finding of 

aggravated circumstances as to Mother. Nevertheless, this record omission 

does not affect our determination.

4 The trial court did not make findings regarding Mother’s progress towards 

reunification or compliance with her objectives in these orders.
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(5), (8), and (b). On November 9th, DHS filed a petition seeking to change 

Child’s permanency goal to adoption.5

The case was continued a number of times throughout 2017, as either 

attorneys or Mother were unavailable. See, e.g., Status Review Order, 

1/5/17; Status Review Order, 8/21/17. On January 11, 2018, the court held 

a permanency review hearing, but did not make additional findings as to 

Mother’s progress or compliance. On September 11, 2018, the court held a 

permanency review hearing and granted Mother supervised visitation at DHS 

“once she avails herself.” See Permanency Review Order, 9/11/18, at 1. 

Mother was transient and did not have a visit with Child from 2015 until June 

2018, when she attended three out of ten scheduled visits. Id. Mother had 

an open bench warrant, was residing in Virginia with her father, and was only 

sometimes in Philadelphia. Id.

The matter was continued throughout 2018. On January 28, 2019, at 

the status review hearing, the court ordered Mother to present for drug 

testing. The matter was then continued until June 27, 2019, when the court 

held a permanency review hearing. Mother’s visitation remained supervised, 

and she was again ordered to attend a drug screen.

On November 25, 2019, the court conducted a hearing on the goal 

change petition and the petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental 

____________________________________________

5 Amended goal change petitions were filed on November 21 and December 

12, 2016. 
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rights. We note that at this time, Child was approximately five years old. At 

the hearing, DHS presented the testimony of CUA case supervisor Hawkins, 

and CUA visitation coach Frankie Ocasio. Child was represented by his 

attorney, Nghi Duong Vo.6 Mother, represented by counsel, testified on her 

own behalf.

Ms. Hawkins testified that Mother did not complete her objectives. For 

instance, Ms. Hawkins explained, when asked about her employment, Mother 

provided documentation on October 16, 2019. N.T. at 14-15. However, Ms. 

Hawkins had concerns the documentation was falsified because “[i]t was typed 

in all caps[ and] had no signature[ a]nd there were misspelled letters.” Id. 

Ms. Hawkins stated:

So I contacted the director of the agency, Metusso (sp) Piazza 

(sp). And he stated that the letter was falsified because he said 

all documentation goes through him . . . I did provide him with 

my updated contact information, but I think he missed a letter off 

of my email address, which happens with Turning Points. And he 

said — my understanding is the email bounced back, but that 

[Mother] did provide verification later that day dated the same 

day I spoke to him, October 16, 2019 verifying that she was 

employed at that time.

Id. Mother provided two pay stubs, but Ms. Hawkins stated her

“understanding [was] that [Mother was] not employed.” Id. at 15-16.

Ms. Hawkins further testified Mother’s mental health remained a serious 

concern. N.T. at 10. Ms. Hawkins could not verify that Mother’s mental health 

____________________________________________

6 At the termination hearing, Attorney Vo indicated he could not convey Child’s 

preferences because Child was non-verbal. N.T. at 46. Attorney Vo has not 

filed an appellate brief on Child’s behalf.
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was stable, and, accordingly, it would be unsafe for Child to have any 

unsupervised contact with Mother. Id. at 10-11. Ten days prior to the 

hearing, Ms. Hawkins requested Mother to sign Community Behavioral Health 

(CBH) releases to verify her treatment, but Mother refused. Id. at 10-11.

Ms. Hawkins testified she could not verify whether Mother completed 

drug and alcohol treatment due to, again, Mother’s refusal to sign releases. 

N.T. at 11. Ms. Hawkins noted that at the previous permanency hearing in 

June 2019, Mother admitted she had used drugs recently and had relapsed on 

heroin and cocaine use multiple times over the last few years. Id. at 12. Ms. 

Hawkins reiterated Mother’s decades-long struggle with opiate and cocaine 

addiction which, in combination with Mother’s recent relapses, were safety 

concerns for CUA. Id. On cross-examination, the following exchange 

occurred:

[Mother’s counsel:] So, you’re not aware that Mother successfully 

completed her intensive outpatient program at [Skills and 

Opportunities for Achievement and Responsibility (SOAR)]?

MS. HAWKINS: No, I’m not[,] because I specifically asked her to 

sign releases. She stated no. Prior to walking in this hearing, I 

specifically asked her, “Was there any documentation you’d like 

to provide to me so I can present what you’re doing at this 

hearing?” She refused. Her father did suggest that she give me 

the information, but she refused.

Id. at 25.

Ms. Hawkins testified Mother’s visitation was nonexistent or sporadic 

through the history of the case. N.T. at 17-19. Mother did not visit Child at 

all from October 2015, when he was taken into DHS’ care, until July 11, 2018. 
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Id. Mother came to a visit on July 18, 2018, but appeared to be high. Id. 

Mother was late to an August 1, 2018 visit, and the visit then lasted only 15

minutes. Id. Mother did not visit with Child again until July 3, 2019. Id. 

Child did not appear to suffer any harm from not visiting with Mother for 

almost three years. Id. at 18. Ms. Hawkins described Mother and Child’s 

contacts during visits:

I was present at the visit on 11/15/19. I mean, the visits seem 

to go fine. But what I get from the visits is that [Child] doesn’t 

view her as his mother. I don’t think that he personally even 

knows that that’s his biological mother. It seems to me that he 

views [her] as someone that he plays with once a week.

Id. at 24-25. Child did not call Mother “Mother.” Id. at 25.

CUA caseworkers had difficulty maintaining regular contact with Mother 

throughout the case. N.T. at 23. A prior caseworker made repeated attempts 

at home visits at an address Mother provided, and stated that the few times 

she was able to enter the residence, it did not appear to be lived in. Id. 

Mother refused to provide CUA caseworkers with her location, which made it 

difficult to provide outreach for issues such as medical appointments for Child. 

Id. at 24. Mother did provide a working phone number, but “she respond[ed] 

when she want[ed] to.” Id. at 24.

Ms. Hawkins further testified to the following concerning Child’s current 

placement. Child is in a pre-adoptive foster home, where he has lived for the 

last four years with his foster parents and their 16-year-old biological son. 

N.T. at 19-20. Child has a primary parent-child bond with his foster parents. 

Id. at 20. Child is considered to have special needs, as he has been diagnosed 
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with autism and is mostly non-verbal. Id. at 19-20. Foster parents are 

meeting Child’s “significant” autism-related, medical, and developmental 

needs, and have been for the last four years. Id. at 20-21. Mother has not 

been involved with meeting Child’s autism-related needs. Id. Anyone 

parenting Child on a full-time basis would need to be capable of managing 

Child’s behaviors, which can be challenging in an unsupervised setting. Id.

at 21. Ms. Hawkins believed that Child would not suffer irreparable harm if 

Mother’s parental rights were terminated, but would suffer irreparable harm if 

he were removed from his foster home. Id. at 22.

Frankie Ocasio, CUA visitation coach, testified he has been involved with 

the family since in-home services were implemented five years prior to the 

termination hearing. N.T. at 26. Mr. Ocasio supervised recent visits, and 

noted Child did not have any emotional issues separating from Mother at the 

end of the visit. Id. at 27. When asked to describe Child’s interaction with 

his foster parents, Mr. Ocasio stated, “[W]hen the foster parents say . . . ‘We 

love you,’ in Spanish, he will say it back to them as well. Wave to them 

goodbye. Hug and kiss. And the same . . . returning as well.” Id. Mr. Ocasio 

observed that Child has a primary parent-child bond with his foster parents. 

Id. 

With regard to Mother’s visitation with Child, Mr. Ocasio observed 

numerous issues, the most glaring of which was lack of Mother’s supervision. 

N.T. at 28. Specifically, during one visit, Child almost put his head into the 

toilet. Id. During another visit, Child grabbed things out of Mother’s purse 
J-S23016-20

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when she was not looking. Id. Mother did not appear to understand it was 

necessary to constantly “keep up” with Child and maintain eye contact. Id. 

Mr. Ocasio had safety concerns for any unsupervised visitation with Child. Id.

at 28-29. Mr. Ocasio also stated, “Foster parents also shared with me, [Child 

is] a runner. [So if Mother does not] hold onto him, very, you know, wellgripped[,] he may run off and into the streets.” Id. at 29. Mr. Ocasio 

discussed Child’s need for increased supervision with Mother, who was 

receptive to the recommendations. Id. at 31. However, Mother needed to be 

reminded every visit. Id. For example, Mr. Ocasio described Mother’s eye 

contact with Child:

[S]he’ll turn away. Then he’ll do something. I remind her, Hey, 

listen, this is what’s going on. You need to pay attention to him. 

And she’ll turn around quickly and redirect him. But, then, yet, 

again, she’ll lose her focus again. And I have to remind her again.

Id. at 32 (quotation marks omitted). Mr. Ocasio testified he did not believe 

any irreparable harm would come to Child if Mother’s rights were terminated, 

and believed it was in Child’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be 

terminated and Child’s permanency goal changed to adoption. Id. at 29, 32.

Mother testified on her own behalf, and stated that, for the last six 

months, she had been living in Philadelphia in a recovery house. N.T. at 34. 

Mother claimed she was sober, was currently in drug and alcohol treatment, 

and had completed five or six months of intensive outpatient treatment. Id. 

Mother stated she was drug tested at the recovery house every other week, 

and drug tested at a clinic every other week. Id. at 35.
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Mother stated she was drug tested once on June 27, 2019, after the 

permanency review hearing, at the request of CUA. N.T. at 35. When asked 

if she had tested positive, Mother first claimed she did not receive the result, 

and then that she had been drug tested three times that day. Id. at 36. The 

court, however, took judicial notice that Mother tested positive for opiates and 

cocaine on that day. Id. When asked if she had recently relapsed, Mother 

denied having done so, and stated that the last time she had relapsed was 

“the last court hearing[, June 27, 2019].” Id. at 37.

Mother claimed she had signed all requested releases, “except for CBH 

because I didn’t see the reason of signing my whole medical history when 

every other — every other thing they wanted me to sign I had already signed.” 

N.T. at 34-35. When asked when she last visited with Child, Mother stated,

I missed my last visit because I was in the hospital Monday and 

Tuesday with facial cellulitis. And I’ve been really sick and on bed 

rest. And just when I was starting to get better, I just had lost 

track of time and — and days, and totally forgot to call and confirm 

. . . So it would have been the week prior.

Id. at 38. When asked why her parental rights should not be terminated, 

Mother stated that when Child was born she had been “forced to get back on 

methadone when [she] was clean.” Id. at 40. Mother claimed that Child calls 

her “Mom” at visits. Id. at 41.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court involuntarily terminated 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), 

and (b), and changed Child’s permanency goal to adoption. See Permanency 
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Review Order, 11/25/19, at 1; N.T. at 46-48. On December 22, 2019, Mother 

filed timely, counseled notices of appeal and statements of errors complained 

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error, when it 

involuntarily terminated [M]other’s parental rights where such 

determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence 

under the [A]doption [A]ct, 23 Pa.[C.S.] § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) 

and (8)[?]

2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated [M]other’s parental rights without giving 

primary consideration to the effect that the termination would 

have on the developmental, physical and emotional needs of 

[Child] as required by the [A]doption [A]ct, 23 Pa.[C.S.] § 

2511(b)[?]

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting a goal 

change to adoption, where the goal change from reunification to 

adoption was not supported by clear and convincing evidence[?]

Mother’s Brief at 8.7

We first note the relevant standard of review:

____________________________________________

7 Mother’s statement of questions — as well as her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement — raise a fourth issue:

Whether the trial court erred because the evidence was 

overwhelming and undisputed that [M]other demonstrated a 

genuine interest and sincere, persistent, and unrelenting effort to 

maintain a parent-child relationship with her child[?]

See Mother’s Brief at 8. However, Mother does not present any argument 

regarding this issue. Accordingly, we do not consider it. See In re W.H., 25 

A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011) (failure to provide discussion of claim 

with citation to relevant authority results in waiver of claim).
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The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1215 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations 

omitted). The decision to admit or exclude evidence is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court. In re A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d 1157, 1166–67 (Pa. 

2018).

This Court has explained:

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act . . . which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies 

the statutory grounds for termination delineated in 

Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the 

parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her 

parental rights does the court engage in the second part 

of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under 

the standard of best interests of the child. One major 

aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the 

nature and status of the emotional bond between parent 

and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the 

child of permanently severing any such bond.
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Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1215 (citation omitted). We have defined 

clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, weighty and 

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re C.S., 761 A.2d 

1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (citation omitted). In order to affirm 

a termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to 

any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). Adoption 

of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1215.

In her first issue, Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating her parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), 

and (8). We focus on her claims relating to Subsection 2511(a)(2). Mother 

avers she has worked to meet her objectives to the best of her ability. 

Mother’s Brief at 17. Mother contends she attended a parenting class, had 

been sober “for a period of time” and was residing in a recovery house. Id. 

Mother also contends her father was ready and willing to testify regarding her 

sobriety, but was not permitted to do so. Id. No relief is due.

Subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b) provide:

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 
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conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the 

basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent . . . .

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.[ ] § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements 

must be met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes 

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

"The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To 

the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as 

incapacity to perform parental duties."

Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1216 (citation omitted). Parents are 

required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of 

full parental duties. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010).

In finding grounds for the termination of Mother’s parental rights, the 

trial court observed:

Applying . . . the elements set forth under [Section] 

2511(a)(2) to the instant case, it is clear that DHS met their 

burden of demonstrating that termination was proper. The 

evidence established that “incapacity” and “refusal” under 
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[Section] 2511(a)(2) existed given that Mother failed to 

demonstrate a concrete desire or ability to remedy the problems 

that led to the Child’s placement. Mother failed to cooperate with 

the services provided by CUA, including housing, drug and alcohol 

treatment and mental health treatment. Notably, Mother failed to 

sign releases to allow CUA to monitor her mental health and 

substance abuse treatment, which were the issues identified as 

causing Child to be adjudicated in 2015. Moreover, the evidence 

established that “neglect” existed given that Mother had not 

participated in the Child’s medical treatment in four years, despite 

his significant special needs. This Court found that Mother’s 

failure to fully comply with her objectives throughout the life of 

this case has left the Child without essential parental care, and 

the cause of such neglect, refusal and continued incapacity will 

not be remedied by Mother. Based on the foregoing, this Court 

found that competent evidence existed to justify the termination 

of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

Trial Ct. Op. at 9-10 (citations to record omitted).

Our review of the record supports the trial court’s finding of grounds for 

termination under Section 2511(a)(2). We emphasize the trial court’s finding 

that Mother had not complied with her objectives, and specifically that Mother 

refused to sign releases for her medical history and drug treatment. Even on 

the day of the termination hearing, Ms. Hawkins asked Mother to provide any 

documentation or releases regarding her treatment so it could be presented,

and Mother refused. N.T. at 25. Similarly, although Mother claimed to be 

sober and residing in a halfway house, she admitted she relapsed at the time 

of the prior permanency hearing, which was approximately five months

earlier. Id. at 37. 

Furthermore, Mother’s visitation with Child was sporadic. Mother did 

not visit Child from October 2015, when he was taken into DHS’ care, through 

July 2018. N.T. at 17-19. In July 2018, Mother attended two visits, but 
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appeared to be under the influence at one visit. Id. In August 2018, Mother 

attended a single visit, but was so late the visit only lasted fifteen minutes. 

Id. Mother did not visit again for almost a year, in July 2019. Id. When 

asked about her visits, Mother gave equivocating explanations that she was 

“really sick” and “just when I was starting to get better, I just had lost track 

of time and — and days, and totally forgot to call and confirm.” Id. at 38.

Finally, the testimony showed that Mother was incapable of properly 

supervising Child. Mr. Ocasio testified he repeatedly advised Mother of Child’s 

need for increased and careful supervision. N.T. at 31-32. However, Mother 

needed to be repeatedly reminded to maintain eye contact with Child in order 

to redirect his behaviors. Id. at 28-29. 

With respect to Mother’s claim her father should have been allowed to 

testify about her sobriety,8 we reiterate that the admission of evidence is 

within sound discretion of the trial court. See In re A.J.R.-H., 188 A.3d at 

1166–67. The trial court observed:

[T]he testimony was she relapsed less than six months ago. The 

evidence is that in . . . late June of this year, she tested positive 

for both cocaine and opiates.

The testimony is that up until July of this year, she hadn’t visited 

for a year. And that was not — after having not visited for three 

years. How could his opinion on her drug usage help this [c]ourt?

N.T. at 44. We discern no error in this conclusion. 

____________________________________________

8 Mother does not develop her argument beyond the bald assertion that her 

father should have been allowed to testify.
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We agree with the trial court that DHS established: Mother exhibited 

“repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;” that caused 

Child “to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for [her] is physical or mental well-being;” and Mother cannot or will not 

remedy the “causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal.” See 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2); In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1215. We thus 

do not disturb the trial court’s ruling under Section 2511(a)(2). We need not 

address any other subsections of Section 2511(a). See id.

In her second issue, Mother argues the trial court erred in finding 

grounds for termination under Subsection 2511(b). She alleges DHS failed to 

prove that family ties did not exist between her and Child. Mother’s Brief at 

21. Mother contends the court erred in terminating her parental rights 

“without providing [her] the opportunity to bind [sic] with her child, given her 

newfound sobriety.” Id. Mother also avers the court erred in failing to fully 

consider Child’s needs and welfare, because she was attempting to bond with 

Child, who called her “mom” during visits where they played together. Id. at 

22. We disagree.

Our Supreme Court has stated:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have 

been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love, 

comfort, security, and stability.” [T]he determination of the 

child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional 

bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” 
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should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently 

severing the parental bond. . . .

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted). “[T]he court 

must take into account whether a bond exists between child and parent, and 

whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). The court 

is not required to hear expert testimony, and social workers and caseworkers 

may offer evaluations. Id. “[W]here there is no evidence of any bond 

between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.” 

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

“While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.”

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have with 

the foster parent . . . .

Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219 (citations omitted).

With respect to Section 2511(b), the trial court 

determined that the Child would not suffer irreparable harm if 

Mother’s parental rights were terminated. There was compelling 

testimony offered at the [termination] hearing that the Child does 

not have a primary parent-child bond with Mother. Ms. Hawkins 

testified that she is unaware if Child knows that Mother is his 

biological mother. Mother failed to offer any evidence establishing 

the existence of a parent-child bond. The testimony of both Ms. 

Hawkins and Mr. Ocasio demonstrated that the Child’s primary 

bond is with his foster parent[s]. Furthermore, this [c]ourt found 

Mother’s infrequent visits with the Child insufficient to foster a 
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meaningful and healthy parental connection. Notably, Mother 

failed to visit with Child from the time of his adjudication in 

October 2015 until July 2018, and then from August 2018 until 

July 2019. This Court believes that we are nowhere closer to 

reunification now than we were when this case first came in . . . 

October 2015.

Additionally, in determining that termination would best serve 

the needs and welfare of the Child, this Court considered that 

Mother has not been able to meet the Child’s emotional, physical, 

and developmental needs, or provide the Child with a healthy, safe 

environment for four years prior to the [termination] hearing. In 

fact, Mother had never been to a medical appointment for Child 

despite his significant special needs. More importantly, there are 

significant safety concerns regarding Mother’s ability to provide a 

safe environment for Child because of unwillingness to cooperate 

with CUA regarding her substance abuse and mental health 

treatment. . . .

Trial Ct. Op. at 13 (citations to record omitted and paragraph break added).

Upon review, we again discern no abuse of discretion. We emphasize

that, although Mother testified that Child called her “mom” during visits, Ms. 

Hawkins testified Child does not call Mother “mom,” and the trial court did not 

find Mother credible. The trial court found Mother was not able to properly 

supervise Child during visitations, and has attended only a few visits with Child 

in nearly five years. Further, Mother’s own testimony did not mention any 

bond with Child, or even her own feelings of love and affection for Child. 

Accordingly, it is reasonable to infer that no parental bond exists. In re 

K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763. Child has been in foster care for nearly five years, 

has seen Mother but a handful of times, during which Mother had to be 

redirected to supervise Child; Child deserves the love, permanency, and 

stability that his foster parents provide him. See Adoption of C.D.R., 111 
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A.3d at 1219. Thus, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Child’s 

developmental, physical and emotional needs favor termination of Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.

In her final issue, Mother argues that the court erred in changing Child’s 

permanency goal to adoption.

9

 She asserts the court failed to consider the 

factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351 and did not consider that Mother was 

capable of caring for Child. Mother’s Brief at 23. Mother argues that, following 

the June 2019 hearing, she became and remained sober, completed a 

rehabilitation program, and was residing in a sober living facility. Id. She 

contends that the court abused its discretion in terminating her “burgeoning 

bond” with Child. Id. We disagree.

We review a juvenile court’s permanency determination for an abuse of 

discretion. Interest of A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2011).

Pursuant to [42 Pa.C.S.] § 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, when 

considering a petition for a goal change for a dependent child, the 

juvenile court is to consider, inter alia: (1) the continuing 

necessity for and appropriateness of the placement; (2) the extent 

of compliance with the family service plan; (3) the extent of 

progress made towards alleviating the circumstances which 

necessitated the original placement; (4) the appropriateness and 

feasibility of the current placement goal for the children; (5) a 

likely date by which the goal for the child might be achieved; (6) 

the child’s safety; and (7) whether the child has been in placement 

for at least fifteen of the last twenty-two months. The best 

interests of the child, and not the interests of the parent, must 

guide the trial court. As this Court has held, “a child’s life simply 

cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon 

the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.”

____________________________________________

9 The trial court did not address the goal change in its opinion.
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Id. at 1088-89 (citations omitted).

Additionally, Section 6351(f.1) requires the trial court to make a 

determination regarding the child’s placement goal:

(f.1) Additional determination.—Based upon the 

determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant 

evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall determine one 

of the following:

* * *

(2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption, and 

the county agency will file for termination of parental rights 

in cases where return to the child’s parent, guardian or 

custodian is not best suited to the safety, protection and 

physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f.1)(2).

In the instant case, we incorporate our above reasoning for affirming

the termination of Mother’s parental rights, and conclude the trial court did 

not abuse is discretion in changing Child’s goal to adoption. Mother did not 

complete or provide documentation of the completion of any of her goals, and,

indeed, refused to sign releases, even on the day of the termination/goal 

change hearing. N.T. at 11-25. From the time the goal change petitions were 

filed until the termination hearing, Mother had not obtained stable housing or 

undergone mental health treatment, had recently relapsed on heroin and 

cocaine use, and had provided falsified proof of employment. Id. at 10-25. 

Mother was still inconsistent in attending visits and incapable of properly 

supervising Child, and had not engaged in his medical treatment in any way. 
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Id. at 17-32. Thus, the record supports the trial court’s findings. See

Interest of A.B., 19 A.3d at 1088.

While Mother testified that since July 2019 she had made progress 

towards alleviating the circumstances leading to Child’s placement — namely, 

achieving sobriety — such progress came only after five years in which Child 

was denied permanency. See N.T. at 19-20, 34-35. Mother’s assertion she 

attempted to forge a bond with Child is not supported by the record; Mother 

missed visitations, once appeared for visitation under the influence, came to 

a visit late, and could not properly supervise Child at the few visitations she 

attended. Id. at 17-25, 28-32. Child viewed Mother as someone he played 

with rather than a parent, and, instead, he has a parental bond with foster 

parents. Id. at 20, 24-25. The trial court did not err in finding it was in Child’s 

best interests to be adopted by his foster parents, who were appropriately 

caring for his emotional, physical, medical and developmental needs, and had 

been doing so for five years. The court also did not err in changing Child’s 

permanency goal from reunification to adoption.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court appropriately 

terminated Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b)

and changed Child’s permanency goal to adoption.

Goal-change order at 16 EDA 2020 affirmed. Termination decree at 17

EDA 2020 affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/3/2020