SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2623- 21
DONALD TROUT , deceased, Petitioner-Appellant,

v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Respondent-Respondent.

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Submitted January 29, 2024

– Decided February 6, 2024 Before Judges Mawla and Vinci. On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Public Employees' Retirement System, Department of Treasury, PERS No. xx3761. Alterman & Associates, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Stuart J. Alterman, on the brief). Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Jeffrey David Padgett, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 2623

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PER CURIAM Appellant Donald Trout appeals from a March 17, 20 22 final agency decision by the Board of Trustees (Board), Public E mployee's Retirement System (PERS) denying his widow's request for accid ental death benefits. We affirm

. Trout was employed by the Middlesex County Hazardo us Materials Unit

as a Hazmat Tech I when he passed away on August 27, 2021. That day, h e was responding to an emergency call and while gathering his equipment at his work vehicle, he suffered a cardiac arrest and passed away. Trout's death cert ificate listed the cause of death as "sudden cardiac death ventricular fibrillation arrest." Trout's widow filed for accidental death benefits a nd the Board denied the request on December 10, 2021. The Board noted the Division of Pensi on s and Benefits requested Trout's medical records and the Division's Medical Review Board (MRB) reviewed the records and found Trout ha d "a history of prior cardiac surgery and treatment for hypertension and hyperlipidemia." Although Trout's heart attack occurred on the job, "the MRB [did] not see a particular incident that caused this event." The Board conclu ded the plain language of N.J.S.A. 43:15A-49(a)(1) and "binding case law" req uired it to deny the application.3 A- 2623

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Appellant challenged the Board's decision and requ ested a hearing before an administrative law judge. However, the Board de nied the hearing request because there was "no genuine issue of material fac t in dispute." The Board then issued its March 17, 2022 written decision, re counting the underlying incident and the reasons it previously denied accid ental disability benefits. The Board explained N.J.S.A. 43:15A-49(a) requires that "the death of a member in active service [be] . . . a result of: ( 1) an accident met in the actual performance of duty at some definite time and place . . . ." It found Trout did not die of an accident, but "[r]ather . . . had a l ong history of pre-existing conditions[,] which ultimately resulted in his deat h." The Board cited Russo v. Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund , 62 N.J. 142 (1973). It noted although the pension fund in Russo was different than PERS, it "employ[ed] identical language to that of N.J.S.A. 43:15A-49." Russo was a custodian who died of a heart attack while performin g his job duties. Id. at 144. The Board noted the Supreme Court denied the reques t for accidental death benefits because Russo's heart attack was not the r esult of an accident. Ibid. The Board also cited Richardson v. Police & Firema n's Retirement System , which denied accidental death benefits to a police officer who suffered a heart attack while chasing a suspect. 192 N.J. 1 89, 214 (2007). There, the4 A- 2623

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Court held the death was not the result of an accid ent because "the work effort, alone or in combination with pre-existing disease, was the cause of the injury." Id. at 213. Based on these cases, the Board concluded Trout's death was not the result of an accident. It further noted it considered app ellant's "personal statements , written submission[,] and all documentation in the record. " However, because the matter did "not entail any disputed questions of fact" the Board could decide the matter without an administrative hearing. On appeal, appellant reasserts the arguments previ ously made to the Board. Appellant argues Trout qualified for accidental d eath benefits because a heart attack is "undesigned and unexpected" and the refore qualifies as an accident. Further, the Board could not decide whet her Trout's death was due to a pre-existing condition without a hearing. The Bo ard's refusal to permit a hearing was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because it should have allowed appellant to submit expert testimony regard ing Trout's cause of death. Our review of an administrative agency's final dec ision is limited. In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482 (2007). We afford "a 'strong presumption of reasonableness' to an administrative agency's exerc ise of its statutorily delegated responsibilities." Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014) (quoting City of5 A- 2623

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Newark v. Nat. Res. Council, Dep't of Env't Prot., 82 N.J. 530, 539 (1980)). Absent arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious actio n, or a lack of support in the record, the agency's final decision will be sustain ed. In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007). We are not bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute, or its determination of a strictly legal issue. Allstars Auto Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm 'n , 234 N.J. 150, 158 (2018). A lthough pension statutes are "remedial in character" and "should be liberally co nstrued and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited there by," Geller v. Dep't of Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597-98 (1969) , "eligibility is not to be liberally permitted," Smith v. State, Dep' t of Treasury, 390 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. Div. 2007). Pursuant to these principles, we affirm for the re asons expressed in the Board's decision because it is supported by suffici ent credible evidence on the record as a whole. R. 2:11 -3(e)(1)(D). We add the following comments. Russo defined what an accident is for purposes of q ualifying for accidental death benefits. The Court stated:

In ordinary parlance, an accident may be found eith er in an unintended external event or in an unanticipa ted consequence of an intended external event if that consequence is extraordinary or unusual in common6 A- 2623

- 21 experience. Injury by ordinary work effort or strain to a diseased heart, although unexpected by the indivi dual afflicted, is not an extraordinary or unusual consequence in common experience. We are satisfied that disability or death in such circumstances is not accidental within the meaning of a pension statute when all that appears is that the employee was doing his usual work in the usual way. [62 N.J. at 154.] The substantial, credible evidence in the record r eveals Trout's heart attack was suffered by "ordinary work effort or str ain" to his heart, not " an unintended external event or in an unanticipated co nsequence of an intended external event . . . extraordinary or unusual in co mmon experience." Ibid. For these reasons, the Board was not required to hold a hearing and properly applied
N.J.S.A. 43:15A -49(a)(1) when it denied accidental death benefits. Affirmed.