BORDER SECURITY

State Could Enhance 

Visa Fraud Prevention 

by Strategically Using 

Resources and 

Training

Report to Congressional Requesters

September 2012

GAO-12-888

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-888, a report to 

congressional requesters

September 2012

BORDER SECURITY

State Could Enhance Visa Fraud Prevention by 

Strategically Using Resources and Training

Why GAO Did This Study

Foreign nationals may apply for entry 

into the United States under dozens of 

different visa categories, depending on 

circumstances. State’s Bureaus of 

Consular Affairs and Diplomatic 

Security share responsibility for the 

prevention of visa fraud, which is a 

serious problem that threatens the 

integrity of the process. Some 

applicants commit fraud to obtain travel 

documents through illegal means, such 

as using counterfeit identity documents 

or making false claims to an 

adjudicating officer. Visa fraud may 

facilitate illegal activities in the United 

States, including crimes of violence, 

human trafficking, and terrorism. This 

report examines (1) countries and visa 

categories that are subject to the most 

fraud; (2) State's use of technologies 

and resources to combat fraud; and (3) 

training requirements of State officials 

responsible for fraud prevention. GAO 

examined State's reports and data on 

fraud trends and statistics, examined 

resources and technologies to counter 

fraud, and observed visa operations 

and fraud prevention efforts overseas 

and domestically.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that State (1) 

formulate a policy to systematically 

utilize anti-fraud resources available at 

KCC, based on post workload and 

fraud trends, as determined by the 

Department and (2) establish 

requirements for FPM training in 

advanced anti-fraud technologies, 

taking advantage of distance learning 

technologies, and establishing 

methods to track the extent to which 

requirements are met. State concurred 

with these recommendations.

What GAO Found

Certain countries and visa categories are subject to higher levels of fraud. In fiscal 

year 2010, almost 60 percent of confirmed fraud cases (9,200 out of 16,000) involved 

applicants from Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, India, and Mexico. Department of 

State (State) officials told GAO that fraud most commonly involves applicants for 

temporary visits to the United States who submit false documentation to overcome 

the presumption that they intend to illegally immigrate. Fraud is also perpetrated for 

immigrant visas and nonimmigrant visa categories such as temporary worker visas 

and student visas. In response to State efforts to combat visa fraud, unscrupulous 

visa applicants adapt their strategies, and as a result, fraud trends evolve over time.

State has a variety of technological tools and resources to assist consular officers in 

combating fraud, but does not have a policy for their systematic use. For example, 

State recently implemented fraud prevention technologies such as a fraud case 

management system that establishes connections among multiple visa applications, 

calling attention to potentially fraudulent activity. Overseas posts have Fraud 

Prevention Units that consist of a Fraud Prevention Manager (FPM) and locally 

employed staff who analyze individual fraud cases. In 2011, the ratio of Fraud 

Prevention Unit staff to fraud cases varied widely across overseas posts, causing 

disproportionate workloads. The Kentucky Consular Center (KCC) is a domestic 

resource available to posts that verifies information on certain visa applications. 

However, KCC services are only provided on an ad-hoc basis, and State does not 

have a policy for posts to systematically utilize its resources. For example, an FPM 

at a high fraud post told GAO that the post would like to utilize KCC anti-fraud 

services for screening certain visa categories, but did not know how to request KCC 

assistance. 

Although State offers anti-fraud training courses at the Foreign Service Institute and 

online, it does not require FPMs to take them and does not track FPMs’ enrollment. 

Consular officers receive limited fraud training as part of the initial consular course, 

and FPMs are not required to take advanced fraud training in new technologies. In 

addition, GAO found that 81 percent of FPM positions were filled by entry-level 

officers and 84 percent of FPM positions were designated as either part-time or 

rotational. Between October 2009 and July 2012, entry-level officers made up about 

21 percent of the total students who registered for a course on detecting fraudulent 

documents, and State could not guarantee that FPMs were among them. Four out of 

the five FPMs with whom GAO spoke had not been trained in State's new fraud case 

management system.

Visa Applicants at a High Fraud Post Wait for Interviews with Consular Officials

View GAO-12-888. For more information, 

contact Michael Courts at (202) 512-8980 or 

courtsm@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

Letter 1 

Background 3

Certain Countries and Visa Categories Experience High Levels of 

Fraud, but Trends Evolve over Time 14

State Has a Variety of Tools and Resources to Combat Fraud, but 

Does Not Have a Policy for Systematically Utilizing Domestic 

Anti-Fraud Resources 21

Although State Offers a Variety of Anti-Fraud Training Courses, 

Fraud Prevention Managers Are Not Required to Take Them 29

Conclusion 32

Recommendations 33

Agency Comments 33

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 35

Appendix II U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Classes of Admission 38

Appendix III Case Studies 41

Appendix IV Comments from the U.S. Department of State 43

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 46

Tables

Table 1: Percentage of Tourist Visas Refused in Brazil, China, India, 

and Mexico, Fiscal Years 2006 to 2011 11

Table 2: Type and Number of Staff Assigned to Fraud Prevention 

Units and Ratio of Staff to Suspected Fraud Cases, Fiscal 

Year 2011 27

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

Figures

Figure 1: Nonimmigrant and Immigrant Visas Issued Worldwide, 

Fiscal Years 1992 to 2011 9

Figure 2: Standard Nonimmigrant Visa Adjudication Process at a 

U.S. Embassy or Consulate 12

Figure 3: Top 10 Countries for Referrals to Fraud Prevention Units, 

Fiscal Year 2010 16

Abbreviations

ARSO-I Assistant Regional Security Officer - Investigator

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security

ECAS Enterprise Case Assessment Service 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement

KCC Kentucky Consular Center

LES Locally Employed Staff

MATRIX Match Analytics and Trusted Real-time Identity X- 

 Ref (or cross-reference)

MLB Major League Baseball

RSO Regional Security Officer

State U.S. Department of State

SWT Summer Work Travel 

USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

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Page 1 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

September 10, 2012

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

Chairman

The Honorable Susan M. Collins

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Department of State’s (State) visa issuance process is the first line of 

defense against fraudulent or unlawful entry into the United States. State 

issues visas for both temporary visitors (referred to as nonimmigrant 

visas) and those seeking to enter the United States as permanent 

immigrants (referred to as immigrant visas). There are dozens of visa 

categories for entry, such as tourist visas, student visas, and temporary 

worker visas (see app. II for a list of all temporary visitor visa categories).

State seeks to identify and prevent attempts by applicants to obtain travel 

documents through unauthorized means, such as knowingly altering or 

using counterfeit identity documents or intentionally making false claims 

or statements. Some applicants use fraudulently obtained visas to 

facilitate illegal activities in the United States, including crimes of violence, 

narcotics, human trafficking, and terrorism.

In 2005, we reported that State and other agencies had taken many steps 

to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool since the 

September 11, 2001 attacks. For example, State increased hiring of 

consular officers, revamped consular training with a focus on 

counterterrorism, and increased resources to combat visa fraud.1 In 2007, 

we reported that the security of visas had been enhanced but more 

needed to be done to prevent their fraudulent use.2

 

1

GAO, Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from Improvements in 

Staffing and Information Sharing, 

That same year, we 

GAO-05-859 (Washington, D.C.: Sept.13, 2005).

2

GAO, Border Security: Security of New Passports and Visas Enhanced, but More Needs 

to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent Use, GAO-07-1006 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 

2007). 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

reported that the Diversity Visa Program is particularly vulnerable to 

manipulation from an unscrupulous visa industry in some countries.3

This report examines (1) countries and visa categories subject to the 

most visa fraud; (2) State’s technologies and resources to combat fraud; 

and (3) training requirements of State officials responsible for fraud 

prevention.

To determine the countries and visa categories subject to the most visa 

fraud, we analyzed State Fraud Digest reports from 1996 through 2012, 

reviewed fraud summaries for posts with high rates of fraud, reviewed 

compilations of Diplomatic Security Monthly Status reports, analyzed data 

on the number of visa applications referred to Fraud Prevention Units, 

and interviewed State officials at headquarters and abroad to discuss 

fraud trends. To assess State’s use of technologies and resources to 

combat fraud, we met with State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs Office of 

Consular Systems and Technology to review State’s major data systems 

as well as the latest technological tools available to consular officers and 

Fraud Prevention Managers, and we visited the Kentucky Consular 

Center (KCC) to observe prescreening and anti-fraud activities. To 

understand the training required of State officials responsible for 

combating fraud, we gathered information about the training requirements 

of Fraud Prevention Managers and staff working in Fraud Prevention 

Units. We also analyzed data on the experience level of Fraud Prevention 

Managers at all 222 visa-issuing posts. Lastly, we conducted interviews 

with consular officials and Diplomatic Security Special Agents working in 

five overseas posts on issues related to visa fraud prevention.

We conducted our work from August 2011 through September 2012, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

 

3

GAO, Border Security: Fraud Risks Complicate State’s Ability to Manage Diversity Visa 

Program, GAO-07-1174 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2007). The program provides up to 

55,000 immigrant visas each fiscal year to aliens from countries with low rates of 

immigration to the United States. Diversity visas provide an immigration opportunity to 

individuals from such countries.
 

Page 3 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

conclusions based on our audit objectives. (see appendix I for more 

information about our scope and methodology).

The mission of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs (Consular Affairs) is to 

protect the lives and interests of U.S. citizens overseas and to strengthen 

U.S. border security through the vigilant adjudication of U.S. passports 

and visas. Consular officers abroad have sole legal authority to adjudicate 

visa applications, and they receive overseas and domestic support to help 

identify visa fraud. Consular officers at overseas posts issue 

nonimmigrant visas to temporary visitors and immigrant visas to people 

who intend to immigrate to the United States.4 The adjudication 

processes for both nonimmigrant and immigrant visa applications contain 

steps to check for fraud.

Consular Affairs has more than 11,000 officers, local staff, and 

contractors working in over 300 locations around the world, including 

domestic visa centers and passport facilities. Within each consular 

section at overseas posts, consular officers adjudicate visa applications, 

serving as fraud detection officers on the first line of defense for border 

security. Consular officers are charged with facilitating legitimate travel 

while preventing ineligible aliens, including potential terrorists, from 

gaining admission to the United States. To help detect and prevent fraud, 

consular officers work with members of a Fraud Prevention Unit located in 

the consular section. In large posts, the Fraud Prevention Unit may be led 

by a Fraud Prevention Manager, and may be augmented at certain highfraud posts by a Diplomatic Security Assistant Regional Security Officer 

Investigator.5

 

4

The issuance of all visas is governed by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 as 

amended by subsequent immigration legislation. 

In smaller posts, the Fraud Prevention Manager may be a 

consular officer who has other responsibilities depending on the workload 

volume and prevalence of fraud at the post. Consular officers may also 

coordinate with a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Visa Security 

Officer and an external anti-fraud working group.

5

See appendix III for specific case studies of the Fraud Prevention Unit and the Assistant 

Regional Security Officer Investigator. 

Background 

Consular Officers Rely on 

Overseas Support to 

Identify Fraud
 

Page 4 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

• Fraud Prevention Manager. Under the Bureau of Consular Affairs, 

fraud prevention efforts at the 222 visa-issuing posts are led by a 

Fraud Prevention Manager—a Foreign Service Officer assigned by 

consular management to investigate fraud cases, conduct fraud 

training, and provide information on fraud trends to the entire consular 

section. As of April 30, 2012, 81 percent of all visa issuing posts (180 

of 222) had Fraud Prevention Manager positions filled by an entrylevel officer or an officer of unspecified grade, and 84 percent of visa 

issuing posts (186 of 222) had Fraud Prevention Manager positions 

designated as part- time or rotational.6 As of April 30, 2012, 36 posts 

had full-time mid-level Fraud Prevention Managers serving for 2 

years. An additional 40 posts had full-time entry-level Fraud 

Prevention Managers serving for 2 years in positions originally 

designated for mid-level officers. Officers assigned to part-time Fraud 

Prevention Manager positions have other consular-related duties in 

addition to preventing fraud. An officer filling the position on a 

rotational basis serves as the Fraud Prevention Manager for a 

designated period of time, typically 6 months, before moving on to 

other duties. State officials told us that the reason most Fraud 

Prevention Manager positions are part-time or rotational is in order to 

provide consular managers more flexibility in how they use consular 

staff, and also to provide officers with more opportunities to work on 

different activities.

• Fraud Prevention Unit. At 94 percent of visa-issuing posts (208 of 

222), Fraud Prevention Managers have locally employed staff to 

assist them in fraud investigations, forming a Fraud Prevention Unit.7

 

6

For more information on State staffing, see GAO, Department of State: Foreign Service 

Midlevel Staffing Gaps Persist Despite Significant Increases in Hiring,

Out of the 3,700 locally employed staff working at consular posts, 417 

are assigned to Fraud Prevention Units. These staff generally have 

special expertise in host country culture and language, as well as a 

network of local contacts to help develop leads on possible fraud. The 

Fraud Prevention Unit collects and verifies data for use in identifying 

fraud trends, analyzes individual fraud cases, and drafts and 

disseminates fraud reports. Tools utilized in individual fraud 

investigations vary from post to post, but may include physical 

GAO-12-721

(Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2012). 

7

Not all consular posts have a dedicated Fraud Prevention Unit. Some posts are very 

small and provide limited consular services (such as only American Citizen Services, and 

no visa services). 
 

Page 5 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

document examination, visa record searches, facial-recognition 

review, phone calls to verify data, Internet searches, and site visits. 

Once all of the data have been collected, verified, and assessed, the 

Fraud Prevention Manager reviews the results and provides a final 

fraud finding to consular officers, who use the information to make a

determination on whether to issue a visa to the applicant. If the Fraud 

Prevention Manager determines that the visa fraud may involve 

criminal activity, the case may be referred to Diplomatic Security 

agents at post for further investigation.

• Assistant Regional Security Officer Investigator. Under the Bureau of 

Diplomatic Security, 84 Assistant Regional Security Officer 

Investigators (ARSO-I) are assigned to 75 high-fraud posts to protect 

the integrity of the visa system and disrupt criminal networks and

terrorist mobility.8 ARSO-Is are Diplomatic Security Special Agents 

who specialize in criminal investigations of visa fraud.9 Diplomatic 

Security recommends that ARSO-Is spend 80 percent of their time 

working on visa fraud, and 20 percent of their time supporting other 

Diplomatic Security responsibilities, such as providing security to highlevel visitors at post. ARSO-Is often work with local law enforcement 

and judicial officials to arrest and prosecute violators of local laws 

related to visa fraud, such as the fraudulent production of local 

identification documents used in applications for visas. Some 

investigations are connected to large-scale alien smuggling or human 

trafficking cases.

• DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Visa 

Security Program. ICE deploys Visa Security Officers to assist the 

consular section at designated high-risk posts by providing advice and 

training to consular officers regarding specific security threats, 

reviewing visa applications, and conducting investigations with 

 

8

By the summer of 2013, Diplomatic Security plans to have 105 ARSO-Is working in 93 

posts in 63 countries, according to Diplomatic Security officials. 

9

Diplomatic Security assigns ARSO-Is based on a number of factors including the number 

of visas adjudicated and visa refusal rates. At posts without an ARSO-I, the Diplomatic 

Security Regional Security Officer is responsible for criminal investigations of visa fraud.

However, Regional Security Officers have numerous responsibilities, such as physical 

security of the compound, and according to State officials are not able to dedicate a large 

portion of their time to investigating visa fraud.
 

Page 6 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

respect to consular matters under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of 

Homeland Security.10

• External Anti-Fraud Working Group. At some posts, members of the 

Fraud Prevention Unit may coordinate with officials from other 

countries’ embassies and consulates to share fraud trends in an antifraud working group.

Domestically, both State and DHS play a role in fraud prevention and 

detection. While the Secretary of State has the lead role with respect to 

foreign policy-related visa issues, DHS is responsible for reviewing 

implementation of the policy and providing additional direction.

• State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs Visa Office has direct responsibility 

for visa policy and oversight for the operations of KCC and the 

National Visa Center in New Hampshire.11 These two centers 

prescreen visa applications for fraud and provide other support for 

visa adjudication worldwide.

• State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs Office of Fraud Prevention 

Programs advises posts on visa and passport fraud questions, 

develops training material to manage fraud prevention programs, 

produces publications on fraud issues and trends, and coordinates 

with other U.S. agencies involved in preventing visa fraud.

• State’s Diplomatic Security Office of Overseas Criminal Investigations 

Branch provides managerial oversight, guidance, and support to 

ARSO-Is at overseas posts.

• Diplomatic Security domestic field offices support overseas 

investigations by investigating visa fraud that is connected to criminal 

networks within the United States.

 

10For more information on the Visa Security Program, see GAO, Border Security: DHS’s 

Visa Security Program Needs to Improve Performance Evaluation and Better Address 

Visa Risk Worldwide, GAO-11-315 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2011). 

11KCC is a centralized nonimmigrant and diversity visa processing facility. The National 

Visa Center is a centralized immigrant visa processing facility. 

Consular Officers Also 

Rely on Domestic Fraud 

Prevention Efforts
 

Page 7 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

• DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), Fraud 

Detection National Security Directorate is responsible for detecting, 

pursuing, and deterring immigration benefit fraud, and identifying 

persons seeking benefits who pose a threat to national security and 

public safety. In addition, Fraud Detection National Security 

Directorate staff conduct site visits and administrative inquiries within 

the United States on persons or entities suspected of immigration 

fraud and follow up with ICE investigators, law enforcement, and 

intelligence agencies on potential national security risks identified 

during background checks on immigration benefit applications.

• DHS’s ICE Document and Benefit Fraud Task Forces work with 

federal, state, and local partners to detect, deter, investigate, and 

present instances of benefit fraud for criminal prosecution.

• DHS’s Customs and Border Protection agents serve as the last line of 

defense in protecting American borders. Customs and Border 

Protection agents verify that visitors have proper travel documents 

and valid visas, and have the discretion to not admit travelers with 

valid visas into the United States if the agent suspects the traveler 

intends to violate the terms of his or her visa.
 

Page 8 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the number of visas issued 

initially declined, but has generally increased steadily since 2003, and 

State anticipates demand for visas to continue to rise. As seen in figure 1, 

in 2001, the United States issued almost 8 million nonimmigrant and 

immigrant visas, based on data from the Consular Consolidated 

Database.12 From 2001 to 2003, visa issuances declined by 34 percent. 

However, since then, the number of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas 

issued has generally trended upward. In 2011, consular officers issued 

more than 7.5 million nonimmigrant visas, up 54 percent from 2003 

levels. Approximately 75 percent of the 7.5 million nonimmigrant visas 

issued in 2011 were processed for temporary visits to the United States 

for business or personal reasons, such as tourism.13

 

12The Consular Consolidated Database contains passport, nonimmigrant visa, and 

immigrant visa application information that has been collected since 1999. 

More than half (52 

percent) of the visas for temporary visits were issued to visitors from 

Brazil, China, India, and Mexico. According to the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Visa Services, State continues to see increases in visa 

demand for individuals residing in some of the world’s fastest-growing 

economies.

13These data include border crossing cards issued to Mexican nationals. 

Issuance of Visas Has 

Generally Increased since 

2003
 

Page 9 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

Figure 1: Nonimmigrant and Immigrant Visas Issued Worldwide, Fiscal Years 1992 

to 2011

While visa issuances have generally increased since 2003, visa refusals 

have fluctuated since 2006. In fiscal year 2011, more than 2.1 million 

nonimmigrant visa applicants worldwide were denied visas for entry into 
 

Page 10 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

the United States.14 As seen in table 1, adjusted refusal rates for tourist 

visas in Brazil, China, India, and Mexico fluctuated between fiscal years 

2006 and 2011.15 While refusals of visitors from Brazil, China, and Mexico 

have generally decreased in the last 6 years, refusals of visitors from 

India have increased. Visas may be refused for a number of reasons 

other than a suspicion of fraud, such as insufficient documentation or 

suspected immigration intent.16 When a consular officer suspects that the 

applicant’s travel or financial documents are counterfeit, the consular 

officer may deny the applicant’s request for a visa or may refer the case 

to the Fraud Prevention Unit for an additional fraud assessment.17

 

14Approximately 775,000 of the 2.1 million refusals were waived or overcome in fiscal year 

2011. The Immigration and Nationality Act contains provisions that may allow a visa 

applicant who was denied a visa for a particular ineligibility to apply for a waiver of that 

ineligibility. DHS adjudicates all waivers of immigrant and nonimmigrant visa ineligibility. 

Waivers are discretionary, meaning that there are no guarantees that DHS will approve a 

waiver. If the waiver is approved, the applicant can be issued a visa. For nonimmigrant 

visa waivers, the consular officer must first choose to recommend to DHS that the 

applicant be considered for a waiver. 

15Visa applicants who are deemed ineligible and refused nonimmigrant visas may apply, 

and State may choose to overcome the initial refusal or the applicant may apply for a 

waiver. The information in table 1 depicts adjusted refusal rates based on both overcomes 

and waivers. 

16Under section 214(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,[8 U.S.C. 1184(b)], an 

applicant for a nonimmigrant visa is generally presumed to be an intending immigrant until 

the applicant can demonstrate to the satisfaction of an interviewing consular officer that 

they are entitled to the type of visa for which they are applying and that they will depart the 

United States at the end of their authorized temporary stay.

17An applicant who, by fraud or willful misrepresentation of a material fact, attempts to 

obtain a visa or admission into the United States is inadmissible under section 

212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
 

Page 11 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

Table 1: Percentage of Tourist Visas Refused in Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, 

Fiscal Years 2006 to 2011

Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Brazil 13 10 6 7 5 4 

China 25 21 18 16 13 12

India 20 22 25 29 27 30

Mexico 31 33 a 11 a 11 a 11 a 13

Source: GAO analysis of State data in the Consular Consolidated Database.

a

Does not include border crossing card applications.

The U.S. travel and tourism industry benefits from foreign visitors, and the 

U.S. government is working to accommodate an increase in demand for 

tourist travel. For example, State reported in 2010 that international 

tourists contributed $134 billion to the U.S. economy and supported over 

1.1 million jobs. The Administration has encouraged State to increase 

visa processing capacity and reduce wait times for receiving a visa. In 

January 2012, President Obama issued an Executive Order requesting 

that the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, in consultation with 

the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 

Counterterrorism and the Director of the Office of Management and 

Budget, develop an implementation plan to (1) increase nonimmigrant 

visa processing capacity in China and Brazil by 40 percent over the 

coming year and (2) ensure that 80 percent of nonimmigrant visa 

applicants are interviewed within 3 weeks of receipt of visa applications.

Almost all nonimmigrant visa applicants submit an online visa application 

called the DS-160 through State’s web-based portal called the Consular 

Electronic Application Center, and then schedule a visa interview at a 

local U.S. embassy or consulate. Consular officers interview visa 

applicants, review the application and supporting documents, such as 

birth certificates, and make an initial decision to issue or deny the visa 

application. A consular officer may temporarily deny the visa in order to 

scrutinize the application for suspected fraud or to process it further 

administratively (see fig. 2).

Nonimmigrant and 

Immigrant Visa 

Adjudication Processes 

Include Fraud Checks

Nonimmigrant Visa 

Adjudication Process 
 

Page 12 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

Figure 2: Standard Nonimmigrant Visa Adjudication Process at a U.S. Embassy or Consulate

a

Prior to this step, some nonimmigrant visas require petitioners to file a petition on behalf of the 

applicant with USCIS. USCIS is responsible for approving or denying the petition, notifying the 

petitioner, and sending the approved petition to KCC, where a file is created in the Petition 

Information Management System.

b

KCC also prescreens work visas submitted to 24 high-fraud, high-volume posts based on information 

provided in the USCIS petition. Relevant information is entered into the comments on the DS-160 for 

consular officers to review at the time of the interview.
 

Page 13 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

Obtaining an immigrant visa is one part of a four part process for aliens 

outside of the United States to become a permanent resident of the 

United States. First, an eligible U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, 

called a petitioner, must file a petition (a paper form) with USCIS on 

behalf of the alien applying for lawful permanent resident status, who is 

called the beneficiary. Generally, the petitioner can be either a relative18

or employer, although there are visa categories in which the applicant can 

self petition, such as the diversity visa.19 USCIS has the sole authority to 

approve or deny the petition. Second, once a petition is approved and a 

visa number is available in the appropriate category, the beneficiary 

prepares for a visa interview by gathering required documentation and 

undergoing a medical exam. Third, the beneficiary, now called the 

applicant, submits an online visa application, either the DS-260 or the DS230, along with evidence supporting the applicant’s eligibility, such as a 

birth certificate or diploma.20

 

18For U.S. citizens petitioning for a family member, immediate relatives include spouses, 

parents of citizens ages 21 and older, and citizens’ unmarried children under age 21. 

There is no limit on the number of immediate relatives of U.S. citizens that can seek lawful 

permanent residency. U.S. citizens may also petition for adult children and for siblings; 

and there are numerical limits on these categories. For lawful permanent residents 

petioning for a family member, the family member must be a spouse, a child or an 

unmarried adult son or daughter; and there are numerical limits. 

All aliens outside the United States apply for 

an immigrant visa at the U.S. consulate in their current country of 

residence. As in the nonimmigrant visa process, the alien schedules a 

visa interview, submits fingerprints, and pays a visa application 

processing fee. During the interview, a consular officer reviews submitted 

documentation as well as biometric and other security and fraud checks, 

determines if the alien is subject to any ineligibilities, and confirms that 

the applicant has the required legal relationship with the petitioner. The 

consular officer then either approves or denies the visa application. If the 

visa application is approved, a visa is printed and placed in the applicant’s 

passport. Fourth, the applicant travels to the United States with his or her 

immigrant visa and packet of supporting documentation. Upon admission 

19Permanent residency based on employment may be provided to aliens such as (1) 

professionals with advanced degrees, (2) persons with exceptional ability, (3) skilled or 

professional workers, (4) special immigrants, and (5) immigrant investors. Immigration law 

limits the annual number of employer-sponsored immigrants.

20The DS-260 is an online immigrant visa form that is replacing the DS-230, a paper form. 

State is in the process of rolling out the DS-260 around the world, according to State 

officials. 

Immigrant Visa Adjudication 

Process 
 

Page 14 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

by a Customs and Border Patrol officer at the port of entry, the alien 

becomes a lawful permanent resident.

Certain countries, such as Brazil, China, the Dominican Republic, India, 

and Mexico, had high numbers of suspected fraud cases in fiscal year 

2010, and certain visa categories, such as work visas, student visas, and 

diversity visas, had high levels of fraud. Visa fraud has become more 

sophisticated over time with increased globalization, advanced 

technology, and ease of travel.

State requires Fraud Prevention Managers to classify fraud levels at each 

post. Fraud Prevention Managers are required to submit a fraud 

assessment twice a year as part of the post’s bi-annual fraud summary.

Fraud assessments rank a post’s fraud conditions as high, medium, or 

low, based on the ratio of visa applications referred to the Fraud 

Prevention Unit out of the total number of visa applications. The fraud 

assessment also includes the prevalence of corruption in the local 

environment, including the reliability of country documents and 

cooperation with local law enforcement. Additionally, ARSO-Is provide 

input into fraud assessments regarding the nature of criminal activity 

involving visas. According to State, a country with high numbers of 

suspected fraud cases may not necessarily be designated as a high-fraud 

country if its proportion of suspected fraud to visa applications is low.

Recently, State has taken steps to improve its ability to compare fraud 

levels across posts. In the past, according to State officials, self-reported 

fraud levels had not been used to assess posts’ fraud conditions relative 

to other posts because posts had different methods for referring cases to 

Fraud Prevention Units.21

 

21In June 2005, State’s Office of Fraud Prevention Programs developed a one-time fraud 

ranking of posts that included weighted criteria based on demographics, immigrant and 

nonimmigrant visa refusal rates, DHS statistics on adjustments of status by country, posts’ 

own assessments of fraud, and a country corruption index. This one-time ranking was 

primarily used to assist in deliberations on ARSO-I placement.

Referrals to Fraud Prevention Units are 

considered an accurate portrayal of the volume of fraud cases handled at 

individual posts because Fraud Prevention Managers must make a fraud 

Certain Countries and 

Visa Categories 

Experience High 

Levels of Fraud, but 

Trends Evolve over 

Time

Although Fraud Conditions 

Are Post-Specific, Certain 

Countries Have High 

Numbers of Suspected 

Fraud Cases
 

Page 15 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

assessment for all cases that are referred. In July 2012, State distributed 

new guidance that clarifies when consular officers should refer visa 

applications to Fraud Prevention Units. For example, new guidance 

instructs consular officers to refer applications to Fraud Prevention Units 

whenever the unit is expected to expend resources to verify some aspect 

of an applicant’s case or when consular officers cannot perform a needed 

task, such as verifying the employment of an applicant.

The volume of visas processed and the number of fraudulent applications 

vary from country to country. In general, fraudulent activity is found in a 

very small percentage of overall visas granted. Based on State’s 

Consular Consolidated Database, 6.9 million nonimmigrant and immigrant 

visas were issued worldwide in 2010. That same year, approximately 

74,000 visa applications were referred to Fraud Prevention Units for 

additional scrutiny. Of these, about 16,000, or 22 percent, were confirmed 

as fraudulent in fiscal year 2010.22 Some countries may experience high 

visa demand but low numbers of suspected fraud cases, while other 

countries may experience high visa demand and high numbers of 

suspected fraud cases. For example, in 2010, consular officers 

throughout Brazil issued approximately 556,000 visas and referred about 

3,000 visa applications to their Fraud Prevention Units, of which 750 (or 

24 percent of visa applications suspected of fraud) were confirmed as 

fraudulent. Meanwhile, consular officers throughout India issued about 

528,000 visas in 2010, referred about 5,200 visa applications to their 

Fraud Prevention Units, and confirmed about 2,600 (or 50 percent of visa 

applications suspected of fraud) as fraudulent. See figure 3 for the top 10 

posts for referrals to Fraud Prevention Units among total nonimmigrant 

and immigrant visa applications in 2010. Almost 60 percent of confirmed 

fraud cases (9,200 out of 16,000) were referred to Fraud Prevention Units 

in Brazil, China, Dominican Republic, India, and Mexico in fiscal year 

2010.23

 

22State’s suspected and confirmed fraud case data for fiscal year 2011 were divided into 

two data systems, and some cases may have been double-counted. We determined that 

State’s data for fiscal year 2010 were more reliable for our purposes. 

23These countries have many fraud cases because they process a high volume of visas. 
 

Page 16 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

Figure 3: Top 10 Countries for Referrals to Fraud Prevention Units, Fiscal Year 2010

State’s Office of Fraud Prevention Programs reports that a majority of 

visa fraud involves nonimmigrant visa applicants who submit false 

documents or make false statements to obtain a tourist or business visitor 

visa. According to State officials, some visitor visa applicants provide

fraudulent statements or documents, such as a false bank statement, to 

demonstrate strong ties with their home country and therefore overcome 

the presumption that they intend to use their temporary visitor visa to 

illegally immigrate to the United States. Denied visitor visa applications 

are not usually referred to the Fraud Prevention Unit unless the officer 

suspects the case could be linked to organized crime.

Other kinds of fraud can be found in temporary worker visas, student 

visas, exchange visitor visas, immigrant visas, and diversity visas.

• Temporary Worker Visas: While State officials said that most work 

visas facilitate legitimate travel, fraud has been found among 

Visa Fraud Concentrated 

in Nonimmigrant Visa 

Applications 
 

Page 17 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

petitioners and applicants for both skilled worker and temporary 

agricultural worker visas.24 Some petitioners in the United States 

create phony companies and petition for workers to join them in the 

United States, usually with the applicants’ knowledge and participation 

in the fraudulent activity, according to State officials. Other examples 

of fraud include cases in which educational degrees were found to be 

fraudulent, signatures were forged on supporting documents, and 

workers performed duties or received payments significantly different 

from those described in the applications. A recent DHS study reported 

that 21 percent of skilled worker petitions they examined involved 

fraud or technical violations.25 In 2005, DHS began collecting an 

additional $500 fee on certain work visas to be used for fraud 

prevention and detection purposes.26

• Student Visas: Foreign students interested in studying in the United 

States must first be admitted to a school or university before applying 

for a visa at a U.S. embassy or consulate overseas.27

 

24The most common of these types of visas are H and L visas. H visas are for temporary 

workers and L visas are for intracompany transfers. In 2011, 56 percent of all skilled 

worker visas (H-1B) were issued to citizens of India and 94 percent of all temporary 

agricultural visas (H-2A) were issued to citizens of Mexico. For more information, see 

The process for 

Visa Program: Reforms Are Needed to Minimize the Risks and Costs of 

Current Program, GAO-11-26 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2011). 

25As a result of the findings of this study and others, USCIS launched an Administrative 

Site Visit and Verification Program (ASVVP) —an ongoing program to visit work sites of 

companies hiring skilled workers and considered to be at a higher risk for abusing the 

program, according to officials. All H1-B ASVVP cases are randomly selected. During 

fiscal year 2010, USCIS conducted 14,433 skilled worker visa site inspections, which 

resulted in 948 adverse actions, such as the revocation or denial of benefits, or the referral 

of a case for criminal investigation. 

26H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447, Div. J, Title IV, Section 426, 118 

Stat. 3357. In addition, legislation established an additional fee of $2,000 for petitions filed 

through September 30, 2015, for petitioners with 50 or more employees in the United 

States and more than 50 percent of those U.S. employees on H-1B or L visas. Pub. L. No. 

111-230, § 402(b), 123 Stat. 2485, 2487, as amended by Publ. L. No 111-347, § 302, Jan. 

2, 2011, 124 Stat. 3667.

27Students are granted F and M visas. F visas are for study at academic institutions and M 

visas are for study at vocational or nonacademic institutions. According to State’s 

regulations, a student visa applicant must meet the following requirements to qualify: (1) 

acceptance at an approved school; (2) possession of sufficient funds; (3) sufficient

knowledge of the English language to undertake the chosen course of study or training 

(unless coming to participate exclusively in an English language training program); and (4) 

present intent to leave the United States at conclusion of studies. See 22 C.F.R. § 

41.61(b)(1) and 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F) and § 1101(a)(15)(M).
 

Page 18 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

determining who will be issued or refused a visa contains several 

steps, including documentation reviews, in-person interviews, 

collection of applicants’ fingerprints, and cross-references against 

multiple databases of information.28 In 2011, State issued over 

486,000 student visas, of which 71 percent were issued to students 

from Asia. According to the Fraud Prevention Coordinator for India, 

fraud among student visa applications is common throughout India.

For example, some exam centers that offer the Test of English as a 

Foreign Language (TOEFL) are suspected of being complacent when 

students cheat on the exam in order to achieve high scores. If a 

student applicant cannot answer a consular officer’s questions in 

English, yet received 105 out of 120 on their TOEFL score, fraud may 

be present, according to a consular officer in New Delhi.

• Exchange Visitor Visas: Summer Work and Travel (SWT) visas are a 

subset of the Exchange Visitor Program, and are susceptible to 

fraud.29 The Exchange Visitor Program fosters global understanding 

through educational and cultural exchanges. All exchange visitors are 

expected to return to their home country upon completion of their 

program in order to share their experiences. In 2011, 35 percent 

(108,717) of the total exchange visitors (306,429) were granted entry 

into the United States for the purpose of “Summer Work and Travel.” 

According to State officials, many SWT visa applicants misrepresent 

their status as students or their intentions for using the SWT visa.

Additionally, many U.S. sponsors falsely represent their businesses 

and how they intend to employ SWT applicants. U.S. sponsors have 

been found to exploit SWT visa holders for financial gain. On May 10, 

2012, State’s Bureau of Education and Cultural Exchange issued 

rules that are expected to protect the health, safety, and welfare of 

SWT program participants. The rules provide a cap on the number of 

annual SWT program participants that may be granted visas.30

 

28For more information, see GAO, Student and Exchange Visitor Program, DHS Needs to 

Assess Risks and Strengthen Oversight Functions, GAO-12-572 (Washington, D.C.: June 

18, 2012). 

29Exchange visitors are granted J visas. J visas do not involve petitioners, and are 

therefore not screened in the same manner as petition-based applications, according to 

State officials. 

30See 77 Fed. Reg. 27593 to be codified at 22 C.F.R. PART 62. 
 

Page 19 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

• Immigrant Visas: In 2010, State issued 482,052 immigrant visas. That 

same year, 21,013 immigrant visa applications were referred to Fraud 

Prevention Units and 4,984 (or about 24 percent) were confirmed as 

fraudulent. Immigrant visa fraud can take many forms. At several 

posts we visited, State officials said a common problem involved 

applicants who pay American citizens to marry them or who falsely 

represent their intentions to citizens and deceive them into marriage in 

order to obtain lawful permanent residence in the United States. In a 

typical immigrant visa fraud case, an individual divorces his or her 

spouse in a foreign country, marries an American citizen, and, after 

living in the United States for a certain period of time, obtains U.S. 

citizenship or legal permanent resident status, divorces the U.S. 

spouse, and remarries the original spouse so that they can reunite in 

the United States.

• Diversity Visas: The Diversity Visa Program was established through 

the Immigration Act of 1990 and provides up to 55,000 immigrant 

visas annually to aliens from countries with low rates of immigration to 

the United States.31 Aliens register for the diversity visa lottery for free 

online and applicants are randomly selected for interviews through a 

lottery process. Upon being selected, a winner must apply for a visa, 

be interviewed, and be found eligible for the diversity visa. All 

countries are eligible for the Diversity Visa Program except those from 

which more than 50,000 immigrants have come to the United States 

over the preceding 5 years. In 2011, approximately 16.5 million 

people applied for the program and about 107,000 (7 percent) were 

selected for further processing. Of those selected, 75,000 were 

interviewed at posts for a diversity visa, and approximately 50,000 

received visas. Because the program does not require a U.S.-based 

petitioner, it is particularly susceptible to fraud. Diversity visa fraud is 

rampant in parts of South Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe, and is 

particularly acute in areas where few individuals have independent 

access to the Internet.32

 

31Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 131, 104 Stat. 4978, 4997-99 (1990) 

(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (c). 

A typical scenario includes visa facilitators, 

travel agents, or Internet café operators who help would-be applicants 

submit an entry for a fee. Many of these facilitators withhold the 

confirmation information that the entrant must use to retrieve his or 

32In fiscal year 2011, between 5,000 and 6,000 individuals were registered for diversity

visas from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Ukraine. 
 

Page 20 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

her selection status. To access the lottery notification, the facilitators 

may require winning applicants to either pay an additional exorbitant 

fee or agree to enter into a marriage with another of the facilitator’s 

paying clients solely for the purpose of extending immigration 

benefits.

Visa fraud has evolved and become more sophisticated over time due to 

unscrupulous visa applicants who adapt to State’s efforts to combat fraud, 

increased globalization, advanced technology, and ease of travel. Fraud 

schemes are no longer centralized in individual countries. Criminal fraud 

rings, human smuggling networks, and trafficking rings work across 

multiple countries to circumvent State’s visa process. For example, in 

2009, a typical route for traffickers from India who sought religious asylum 

in the United States originated in New Delhi and transited through 

Moscow, Dubai, Sao Paulo, and Mexico before reaching Texas, 

according to the Assistant Regional Security Officer Investigator in New 

Delhi. In addition, new technologies have helped individuals and 

organizations adapt to State’s visa security features and develop 

increasingly sophisticated fraud schemes. For example, high-quality 

micro-printing and new assembly methods have allowed imposters to 

duplicate State’s visa security threads and serial numbers. With global 

access to the Internet, fraud scams used in one country or continent have 

quickly made their way to others, and therefore high-fraud countries and 

posts have shifted from year to year. For example, only 4 countries were 

among the top 10 countries for visa fraud in both 2005 and 2010: the 

Dominican Republic, Ghana, Jamaica, and Peru.33

 

33The other six countries among State’s 2005 Fraud Ranking included: Bangladesh, El 

Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nigeria, and the Philippines. 

Fraud Risks Evolve Over 

Time
 

Page 21 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

Consular officers rely on State’s advanced information technology, fraud 

reports, and domestic and overseas fraud prevention resources to 

improve their ability to detect and deter fraud. However, State does not 

have a policy to systematically utilize its domestic anti-fraud resources to 

offset fraud workload overseas.

The Consular Affairs Office of Consular Systems and Technology has 

deployed several new tools to counter fraud in the visa process, including 

the following:

• Online Nonimmigrant Visa Application Form, DS-160: In the spring of 

2010, State implemented the DS-160 online nonimmigrant visa 

application system, which requires applicants to submit all information 

electronically. With the collection of electronic information prior to the 

scheduled visa interview, State is able to research and analyze 

applicants’ data for indicators of fraud prior to an interview with a 

consular officer. Overseas, State encourages Fraud Prevention Units 

to conduct pre-screening checks of applicants’ visa history to identify 

aliases or discrepancies between current and previous applications.

• Enterprise Case Assessment Service (eCAS): In April 2011, State 

released eCAS, the first centralized system for Fraud Prevention Units 

to track and manage their nonimmigrant and immigrant visa fraud 

cases. eCAS is based in the Consular Consolidated Database, and 

Fraud Prevention Units use it to create, develop, and resolve fraud 

assessments. Previously, fraud cases were either designated as 

“fraud confirmed” or “fraud not confirmed.” With eCAS, fraud cases 

are now designated as “fraud confirmed,” “no fraud,” or “inconclusive,” 

which allows Fraud Prevention units more flexibility to designate that 

some cases have a suspicion of fraud but not enough evidence to 

confirm fraud. In the first 5 months of the system’s use, May 2011 

through September 2011, 188 posts worldwide used eCAS to process 

over 43,000 fraud cases. According to State, in 2012 State released 

an eCAS module domestically that can also be used to process 

passport fraud cases, and State plans to extend this module overseas 

in 2013.

State Has a Variety of 

Tools and Resources 

to Combat Fraud, but 

Does Not Have a 

Policy for 

Systematically 

Utilizing Domestic 

Anti-Fraud Resources

State Has Implemented 

New Technological Tools 

Intended to Enhance Its 

Visa Fraud Prevention 

Efforts 
 

Page 22 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

• MATRIX: In 2011, State released a new fraud prevention tool known 

as MATRIX that is accessible to Fraud Prevention Units and 

Diplomatic Security agents through State’s Consular Consolidated 

Database.34 MATRIX is a search tool that makes associations 

between information on a visa application and other records and data 

sources. MATRIX links information in the Consular Consolidated 

Database to other State records, USCIS records, and INTERPOL 

data.35 Fraud Prevention Managers and ARSO-Is can use MATRIX to 

link information contained on previous visa applications and to reveal 

similarities across multiple applications as an indicator of fraud. For 

example, according to Consular Affairs officials, MATRIX found that 

one applicant’s contact phone number in the United States matched 

the phone numbers used by 17 other applicants, a possible indication 

of fraud.

• Diversity Visa Entry Status Check: In 2010, State began an online 

verification system called the Entry Status Check that allowed all 

entrants of the 2010 Diversity Visa Program to electronically, 

individually, and privately check the status of their online submissions 

through a State website. This system eliminated the need for direct 

mailing of Diversity Visa correspondence and enhanced State’s ability 

to combat fraud. Prior to the electronic system, notification letters 

were physically mailed to the address listed on the application. 

Unscrupulous visa agents listed their own addresses so that the 

notification letters were delivered to them instead of the people 

selected in the lottery. The agent could demand thousands of dollars 

from an applicant in exchange for the letter.

• Consular Consolidated Database Search Rules to Identify Fraud 

Indicators: State is currently developing a new anti-fraud tool that will 

automatically search visa applications for fraud indicators and alert 

consular officials when fraud indicators are found. For example, State 

may find higher rates of fraud among visa applicants who rely on 

services provided by a particular local visa company. Consular 

 

34MATRIX stands for Match Analytics and Trusted Real-Time Identity X-Ref (or crossreference).

35The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) is the world’s largest 

international police organization that helps police understand criminal trends, analyze 

information, conduct operations and, ultimately, arrest as many criminals as possible, 

according to INTERPOL’s website.
 

Page 23 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

officials in that country can request that State flag future visa 

applications listing that visa company’s name.

State shares information between consular posts and headquarters 

regarding the latest fraud trends through reporting mechanisms such as 

validation studies, semi-annual fraud summaries, fraud digests, fraud 

notices, or reporting cables, Diplomatic Security monthly status reports, 

and Diplomatic Security program reviews.

• Validation Studies: State considers validation studies to be one of the 

best fraud-prevention tools available to consular officers. Posts 

conduct validation studies on visas that have been issued to 

determine the extent to which the visas have been misused, and 

posts send summaries of fraud risks to headquarters twice a year.

Posts are required to conduct at least two validation studies per year, 

one on a visa category of the post’s choosing and one on visa 

referrals.36 Generally, consular officers select a sample of visa 

issuances and determine how many of the visa recipients departed 

the United States within the terms of their visas, how many remained 

in the United States longer than their visas allowed, and how many 

never traveled to the United States.37 Validation studies help measure 

the accuracy of adjudication decisions, and allow Consular Affairs 

officials to share emerging fraud trends across posts.

• Semi-Annual Fraud Summaries: State guidance calls for validation 

studies to be incorporated into posts’ Semi-Annual Fraud 

Summaries—reports submitted twice annually that provide input for 

improvements in fraud prevention guidance, training, and resources. 

State guidance notes that the summaries should discuss current 

country conditions that may contribute to fraud risks, such as the 

presence of organized crime networks. According to the guidance, the 

summaries should discuss fraud trends for nonimmigrant visas, 

immigrant visas, diversity visas, passports, and coordination with 

 

36Visa referrals occur when State officials refer their professional contacts for expedited 

visa appointments, reducing their wait time for scheduling an interview with a consular 

officer. 

37Since 2008, State has been given access to DHS’s Arrival and Departure Information 

System (ADIS) to generate a sample of issued visas to conduct a validation study. In 

2011, ADIS results were linked to each visa application so that consular officers could 

view applicants’ prior travel history. 

State Compiles Various 

Internal Reports to Share 

Information about Fraud 

Trends and Available 

Resources
 

Page 24 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

Diplomatic Security personnel, among other topics. These studies 

should discuss new information that may be used to establish new 

fraud indicators.

• Fraud Digests: Since September 1996, State has published a monthly 

newsletter called the Fraud Digest that profiles worldwide fraud 

trends, fraud prevention techniques, and advances in areas such as 

fraud prevention technology and immigration document design. The 

digests are accessible on the web and are shared government-wide 

with approximately 3,600 subscribers, as of April 2012. The main 

audience for the digest is domestic and overseas consular personnel 

and Diplomatic Security agents.

• Reporting Cables: State headquarters gathers and analyzes 

information from posts, and distributes guidance to posts through 

monthly reporting cables in order to update consular officers on 

evolving fraud trends.

• Diplomatic Security Monthly Status Reports: According to Diplomatic 

Security officials, ARSO-Is worldwide submit monthly status reports 

that delineate the number of hours spent on criminal investigations 

and training of foreign personnel. The status report also describes 

progress on the post’s visa cases, including preliminary queries for 

information and arrests. The information supplements data entered 

into the Diplomatic Security primary case management system known 

as the Investigative Management System, according to Diplomatic 

Security officials.

• Diplomatic Security Program Reviews: Diplomatic Security officials 

told us that Diplomatic Security program reviews are internal reports 

that highlight best practices at posts and make recommendations for 

improvements. To complete the program reviews, officials from 

Diplomatic Security’s Office of Criminal Investigations told us that they 

spend 2 days at each post answering standardized questions about 

training, pending cases, arrests, budget, and information systems, 

among other topics. Diplomatic Security aims to visit all posts with an 

ARSO-I presence once every 2 years, according to Diplomatic 

Security officials.
 

Page 25 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

KCC, located in Williamsburg, Kentucky, has become an important antifraud resource for State. State opened KCC in October 2000, to process 

worldwide diversity visa applications and reduce the workload on 

adjudicating officers at overseas posts. According to KCC officials, the 

number of local employees at KCC has increased from 40 to 273, 

including 54 staff working within a Fraud Prevention Unit.38

State describes KCC as an incubator for new consular projects, and KCC 

is in the process of expanding anti-fraud services to posts overseas, 

according to KCC officials. Currently, KCC provides prescreening 

services for selected posts overseas. Any post may request KCC 

assistance in conducting research and analysis on visa applications, 

either on an ad-hoc basis for individual cases, or on a pilot basis for 

larger-scale projects. For example, since over 50 percent of all skilled 

worker (H-1B) and intracompany transfers (L) visas are processed in 

India, KCC initiated a process to verify all petitioner information contained 

on these types of visa applications from posts in India, according to State 

officials. Globally, KCC screened 81,862 H-1B and L-1 applications for 

fraud in calendar year 2011. In addition to H and L visas, KCC conducts 

prescreening on several other visa classifications that are susceptible to 

fraud. According to State officials, KCC screeners and fraud analysts 

conduct basic checks, such as verifying the legal name of the business as 

well as more complex research including data mining, evaluation of the 

petitioning organization’s business viability, and phone calls to petitioning 

employers. Additionally, KCC fraud analysts may also refer the case to 

onsite Fraud Detection and National Security officers to request a visit to 

the proposed employment site. If derogatory information, such as a 

In August 

2001, KCC began a pilot project to screen all nonimmigrant visa 

applications with facial recognition software. According to KCC officials, 

after the September 11, 2001 attack, State was required to store visa 

applications for 7 years. As a result, KCC officials began scanning old 

visa applications and uploading all biographic information and evidence of 

visa ineligibilities. All visa applicants’ biographic information, including 

both fingerprints and digitized photographs, is checked through State’s 

Consular Lookout and Support System database and facial recognition 

software.

 

38In addition to the contractors, State employs two Foreign Service Officers, two Civil 

Service employees, one Diplomatic Security Special Agent, and five assistants. DHS 

employs one Fraud Detection National Security Directorate staff member, according to 

KCC officials. 

State Has Expanded AntiFraud Activities 

Conducted by KCC
 

Page 26 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

revocation of a prior petition, exists on a petitioning company, screeners 

enter all comments into the applicant’s online DS-160 form, for access by 

the consular officer, who makes the ultimate decision to issue or deny the 

visa.

In fiscal year 2012, State intends to prescreen 15 percent of all worldwide 

nonimmigrant and immigrant visa applications prior to the visa interview, 

increasing to 50 percent by fiscal year 2013. To prescreen visa 

applications, KCC reviews and processes all sets of documents and data 

received from petitioners and beneficiaries. KCC employees conduct 

research on visa applicants and petitioners, and provide this information 

to consular officers overseas so that they have access to the information 

prior to interviewing a visa applicant in person.39 For example, we 

observed a KCC analyst conducting research on a summer work and 

travel visa application that listed the sponsor business as a restaurant.

However, the KCC analyst determined that the physical address listed on 

the visa application was an adult entertainment venue, a business 

prohibited by the program. The KCC analyst notified the interviewing post 

of this finding so that the adjudicating officer would have knowledge of it 

before the interview. KCC now prescreens the vast majority of certain 

visa categories that have been associated with high rates of fraud, such 

as summer work and travel visas. From March 2011 to April 2012, KCC 

analysts researched over 9,000 companies participating in the Summer 

Work and Travel Program and found that 13 percent of them had fraud 

indicators. For example, some companies did not exist, the company’s 

phone number was invalid, or the company reported that it never 

expected a summer work and travel participant.

Anti-fraud staffing levels in Fraud Prevention Units vary widely across 

overseas posts, causing disproportionate workloads. State assigns 

personnel to Fraud Prevention Units based on input from post 

management and consular affairs management at headquarters.

Personnel from State’s Office of Fraud Prevention Programs said 

resource decisions for Fraud Prevention Units are driven by visa workload 

 

39KCC employees do not make decisions on whether or not to issue a visa. 

Overseas Anti-Fraud 

Staffing Levels and 

Workload Vary by Post
 

Page 27 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

and other factors at posts, not by the number of fraud cases.40

The posts with the highest numbers of suspected fraud cases in 2011 

were not assigned a number of Fraud Prevention Unit staff proportionate 

to the number of fraud cases, as seen in table 2. For example, one entry 

level officer and one mid-level officer in Santo Domingo, who were 

assigned to Fraud Prevention Manager positions, joined five locally 

employed staff in the Embassy’s Fraud Prevention Unit to combat the 

entire country’s visa fraud. With approximately 7,879 cases suspected of 

fraud in 2011, each member of Santo Domingo’s Fraud Prevention Unit 

investigated an average of 1,126 cases and each member of 

Guangzhou’s Fraud Prevention Unit investigated an average of 239 

cases that year.

Although 

statistics on the number of fraud cases confirmed, unconfirmed, or 

inconclusive are used by posts to direct anti-fraud strategies, Consular 

Affairs does not use these statistics to determine the appropriate 

distribution of personnel to Fraud Prevention Units.

Table 2: Type and Number of Staff Assigned to Fraud Prevention Units and Ratio of Staff to Suspected Fraud Cases, Fiscal 

Year 2011

Posts with highest 

numbers of suspected 

fraud cases in 2011 

Level and

number of Fraud

Prevention Managers

Number of 

locally 

employed staff 

Total Fraud 

Prevention 

Unit staff

Number of 

suspected

fraud cases a b

Ratio of Fraud 

Prevention Unit 

staff to cases

Santo Domingo, the 

Dominican Republic 

1 mid-level officer, 

1 entry-level officer

5 7 7879 1:1126

Kyiv, Ukraine 1 mid-level officer 7 8 7675 1:959

Ciudad Juarez, Mexico 1 mid-level officer, 

1 part-time or rotational 

officer

11 13 3620 1:278

Shanghai, China 1 mid-level officer, 

2 entry-level officers

5 8 3068 1:384

Beijing, China 1 mid-level officer, 

2 part-time or rotational 

officers

3 6 3047 1:508

 

40The consular component of State’s Overseas Staffing Model uses consular workload 

and environmental factors to assist in the allocation of staffing resources. Workload 

factors include the number of immigrant, nonimmigrant, and diversity visa cases 

processed annually, and environmental factors include fraud and the number of thirdcountry national applications processed, among other criteria.
 

Page 28 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

Posts with highest 

numbers of suspected 

fraud cases in 2011 

Level and

number of Fraud

Prevention Managers

Number of 

locally 

employed staff 

Total Fraud 

Prevention 

Unit staff

Number of 

suspected

fraud cases a b

Ratio of Fraud 

Prevention Unit 

staff to cases

Guangzhou, China 1 mid-level officer, 

2 entry-level officers

7 10 2386 1:239

Shenyang, China 1 mid-level officer, 

1 part-time officer

5 7 2350 1:336

Bogota, Colombia 1 mid-level officer, 

2 entry-level officers

4 7 2293 1:328

Accra, Ghana 1 mid-level officer 3 4 1726 1:432

New Delhi, India 1 mid-level officer, 

1 entry-level officer

6 8 1640 1:205

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

a

Staffing data was gathered as of April 30, 2012.

b

The suspected number of fraud cases is based on data from eCAS for the period of May 1, 2001 

through September 30, 2011, as well as data from State’s previous fraud tracking system for the 

period of October 1, 2010 through April 30, 2011.

According to State officials, while State plans to expand the use of KCC 

anti-fraud resources, there is no systematic process for overseas posts to 

formally request KCC prescreening assistance. State’s Program 

Evaluation Policy notes that program evaluation is essential for planning 

decisions, and evaluation findings should be integrated into program 

strategies and policies. However, State officials told us that anti-fraud pilot 

programs conducted at KCC are not formally evaluated and there is no 

established policy for posts to access domestic anti-fraud resources.41

Rather, KCC provides anti-fraud assistance to overseas posts on an adhoc basis based on informal communication.42

According to KCC’s Director, most posts have not requested KCC’s 

assistance because they are not familiar with all of the anti-fraud services 

that KCC can provide or how to request services. For example, a Fraud 

Prevention Manager in a high-fraud post that we visited told us that the 

post would like additional KCC prescreening of certain visa categories, 

but was unaware of how to request KCC assistance. Multiple State 

 

41Although State provided us with the parameters of five KCC pilots, it was unable to 

provide the results of each pilot.

42When a post requests additional KCC assistance, KCC officials must consult with the 

Visa Office, in coordination with the Office of Fraud Prevention Programs, before initiating 

the service. 

State Does Not Have a 

Policy for Utilizing 

Domestic Anti-Fraud 

Resources to Offset Posts’ 

Fraud Workload
 

Page 29 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

officials told us that most KCC prescreening initiatives have been due to 

institutional knowledge at the management level in the field. For example, 

all India-specific services provided by KCC were a direct result of a 

Consular Manager in India who was aware of the prescreening services 

KCC could provide.

According to the KCC Director, there are clear benefits to utilizing KCC 

for fraud investigations. KCC staff are fully vetted U.S. citizens with secret 

clearances and access to all restricted databases used in visa 

adjudications. In addition, both Diplomatic Security and the U.S. 

Citizenship and Immigration Service are represented at KCC, and are 

available to assist in fraud investigations. The majority of KCC staff are 

provided through a contractor, and the contract provides for the ability to 

adjust to changes in demand for services. 

Although State offers anti-fraud courses in a classroom setting and 

online, State does not require Fraud Prevention Managers to take them.

In addition, State does not track Fraud Prevention Manager enrollment in 

anti-fraud courses, and therefore State does not know whether the large 

number of entry-level officers filling fraud prevention manager positions 

have taken the anti-fraud courses.

The Foreign Service Institute has expanded the number of courses it 

offers Foreign Service Officers in fraud prevention and detection, covering 

topics such as advanced name checking, analytic interviewing, and 

emotional content analysis.43

• Basic Consular Course (PC530): Commonly known as ConGen, 

PC530 is a 6-week course that all Foreign Service officers are 

required to take prior to their first consular tour. PC530 is also 

The institute’s anti-fraud training courses 

include the following:

 

43The George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center’s Foreign Service 

Institute is the federal government’s primary training institution for officers and support 

personnel of the U.S. foreign affairs community.

Although State Offers 

a Variety of AntiFraud Training 

Courses, Fraud 

Prevention Managers 

Are Not Required to 

Take Them

State Offers a Variety of 

Anti-Fraud Training 

Courses 
 

Page 30 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

required for any officer heading to a consular tour who has neither 

done consular work nor taken ConGen in the preceding 5 years. The 

course contains a module covering security, accountability, fraud, and 

ethics, which includes training in detecting and preventing fraud.

• Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers (PC541): This course is 

designed for Fraud Prevention Managers who are currently serving in 

the field, emphasizing anti-fraud and counterterrorism tools for 

consular officers.44

State also offers consular officers distance learning or online courses in 

detecting and preventing fraud. These courses are either prescheduled 

live courses, prerecorded or accessible 24 hours a day, or offered ondemand. Online consular training in fraud includes the following:

• Detecting Imposters (PC128): This course teaches students 

procedures for identifying imposters either at the interview window or 

in photographs.

• Detecting Fraudulent Documents (PC544): This course teaches 

consular officers how to determine whether a document has been 

altered or is counterfeit.

• New Consular Technologies (eCAS and MATRIX): This course trains 

consular officers in how to use eCAS and MATRIX to combat visa 

fraud.

State officials from the Office of Consular Systems and Technology said 

that its training programs are updated as soon as new features are rolled 

out, and the training typically focuses on new technology features.

Consular officers are provided with manuals that explain the new software 

tools about a month in advance and can attend live and prerecorded 

training courses. While some consular courses can take about 2 hours, 

training in MATRIX is a prerecorded session that takes approximately 30 

minutes. Although training on new technological tools is available and 

encouraged by State, a survey of Fraud Prevention Managers revealed 

 

44The Foreign Service Institute also offers PC542, a fraud prevention course for locally 

employed staff. 
 

Page 31 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

that respondents’ lack of knowledge of some key anti-fraud tools 

indicated that updates were not uniformly reaching officers.45

While State encourages Fraud Prevention Managers to take updated 

fraud prevention training, the training is not required. Entry-level officers 

are required to complete 6 weeks of basic consular training prior to their 

arrival at post but are not required to take other advanced anti-fraud 

courses offered at the Foreign Service Institute or online, such as eCAS 

or MATRIX. For example, four of the five Fraud Prevention Managers we 

met with had not been trained in MATRIX. Advanced fraud training 

courses are targeted to mid-level officers, but the majority of Fraud 

Prevention Manager positions (180 of 222) were filled by an entry-level 

officer or an officer of unspecified grade. In 2011, a little more than half of 

the students enrolled in PC541 were entry-level officers, and State could 

not determine whether Fraud Prevention Managers were among them.

Additionally, between October 2009 and July 2012, entry-level officers 

made up approximately 22 percent (489 of 2,252) of the total number of 

students who registered for Detecting Imposters (PC128) and 21 percent 

(486 of 2,246) of the total number of students who registered for 

Detecting Fraudulent Documents (PC544). Without advanced fraud 

training courses, Fraud Prevention Managers may not know about the 

roles and responsibilities of KCC, or how to use the Consular Lookout 

and Support System name-check database and biometric systems. For 

example, two of the five Fraud Prevention Managers with whom we met 

were unfamiliar with the anti-fraud services available at KCC. According 

to the Office of Fraud Prevention Program’s country desk officers, the 

level of anti-fraud training offered to Foreign Service Officers largely 

depends on the officer’s experience level, years in the Foreign Service, 

and available time. Desk officers offer a 1-hour briefing of country-specific 

fraud issues and resources to all Foreign Service Officers prior to their 

deployment, but not all of the officers take advantage of the briefing, 

according to officials from the Office of Fraud Prevention Programs.

In addition, a significant period of time may pass between an entry-level 

officer’s completion of the basic consular course and the time when he or 

she assumes the role of Fraud Prevention Manager. Entry-level officers 

 

45State’s survey reached 158 of the 222 visa-issuing consular posts. We determined the 

results to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

State Does Not Require 

Fraud Prevention 

Managers to Take AntiFraud Courses
 

Page 32 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

are required to take only limited fraud prevention training that does not 

include new anti-fraud technologies. For example, officers may not arrive 

at a post until they complete required language training, which can take 6 

months to a year. Additionally, entry-level officers who are not on the 

consular affairs career track may serve a rotation in a different specialty 

area before serving a rotation in consular affairs. Finally, many entry-level 

officers are not assigned to the Fraud Prevention Manager position until 

after they arrive at post.

While State offers these anti-fraud training courses, both in Washington 

D.C., and online, it does not track whether Fraud Prevention Managers 

are taking them. In 2012, four of the five Fraud Prevention Managers with 

whom we met had not been formally trained in MATRIX.46 Since its 

rollout, State has not tracked the number of Fraud Prevention Managers 

that have been trained in eCAS and MATRIX. In addition, State was 

unable to differentiate enrollment data by position and therefore could not 

confirm that Fraud Prevention Managers had enrolled in any fraud 

prevention course.

State’s fraud prevention efforts protect the integrity of the visa process 

and help prevent people from exploiting the visa process to commit 

crimes or threaten the security of the United States. Fraud trends evolve 

over time as criminal networks and unscrupulous visa applicants seek to 

circumvent State’s visa application process. Meanwhile, the number of 

visas issued has risen steadily since 2003 and consular officers face 

increased pressure to expedite visa processing. The evolving nature of 

fraud and increases in the volume of visas adjudicated require State to 

continuously update its anti-fraud efforts. In recent years, State has taken 

steps to enhance the tools and services available to combat visa fraud, 

including the deployment of new anti-fraud technologies and resources 

improving State’s ability to prescreen applications for indicators of fraud 

and to readily access information from prior visa applications. However, 

these technologies and resources are only useful if consular officers know 

that they exist and know how to use them. Currently, the majority of Fraud 

Prevention Manager positions are filled by entry-level officers, who are 

 

46The lack of training is a trend that has continued since at least 2005, when we reported 

that 10 of the 25 consular managers with whom we met said that their Fraud Prevention 

Managers had not yet received training specific to their fraud prevention duties.

State Does Not Track 

Enrollment of Fraud 

Prevention Managers in 

Anti-Fraud Courses

Conclusion 
 

Page 33 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

not the targeted audience for advanced anti-fraud training, and State 

does not require them to be trained in all anti-fraud technologies. As a 

result, Fraud Prevention Managers may not be fully equipped to detect 

and combat fraud. Furthermore, posts increasingly rely on KCC to 

prescreen certain visa applications for fraud, and State intends to 

prescreen 50 percent of all visa applications worldwide prior to consular 

interviews. However, State does not have a policy that specifies how to 

systematically utilize the center’s resources, based on post workload and 

fraud trends. Therefore, State cannot be assured that a valuable tool to 

combat fraud is being strategically utilized. Absent effective support and 

training, Fraud Prevention Units may make uninformed decisions, thus 

enabling ineligible aliens, including potential terrorists, to gain admission 

to the United States.

To further improve the visa fraud prevention process, we recommend that 

the Secretary of State take the following two actions:

(1) Formulate a policy to systematically utilize anti-fraud resources 

available at the Kentucky Consular Center, based on post workload and 

fraud trends, as determined by the department; and

(2) Establish standardized training requirements for Fraud Prevention 

Managers, to include training in advanced anti-fraud technologies, taking 

advantage of distance learning technologies, and establishing methods to 

track the extent to which requirements are met.

We provided a draft of our report to State and DHS. State and DHS 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

State also provided written comments, which are reproduced in 

appendix IV. State concurred with our recommendations.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 14 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested 

members of Congress and the Secretaries of Homeland Security and 

State, as well as other interested members of Congress. In addition, the 

report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Recommendations 

Agency Comments 
 

Page 34 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-8980 or CourtsM@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this

report are listed in appendix V.

Michael J. Courts,

Acting Director, International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 35 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

This report examines (1) countries and visa categories subject to the 

most visa fraud; (2) technologies and resources to combat fraud; and (3) 

training requirements of State officials responsible for fraud prevention.

This report focuses on visa fraud, and not passport fraud.1

To determine the countries and visa categories subject to the most visa 

fraud, and the evolution of fraud over time, we reviewed nonimmigrant 

and immigrant visa issuance data from the Consular Consolidated 

Database from 1992 to 2011. While we did not analyze State data on the 

number of visa applications during this time period, we reviewed visa 

refusal percentages by country. We did not review the reliability of these 

data because they were for background purposes only. We also reviewed 

State Fraud Digest reports from September 1996 through May 2012, 

semi-annual fraud summaries for some of the posts with the highest 

numbers of suspected fraud cases, and Diplomatic Security Monthly 

Status reports from fiscal year 2011. We also analyzed fiscal year 2010 

and 2011 data on the number of visa applications referred to Fraud 

Prevention Units. We found 2010 data more reliable because State 

transitioned to a new fraud management system in the middle of fiscal 

year 2011, and formal guidance on how and when to refer cases to Fraud 

Prevention Units was not released until July 2012. We compared the 

2005 Country Fraud Ranking of Posts to fiscal year 2010 data on the 

countries with the highest numbers of suspected fraud cases. We found 

these data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of indicating the 

countries that reported the highest volumes of reported fraud cases and 

made the most referrals. However, we found that these data may not 

accurately reflect the relative levels of actual fraud in each country due to 

possible differences in reporting by posts. We used fiscal year 2010 data 

for our analysis because State introduced a new data system in 2011, 

and we noted some potential problems with the 2011 data that arose due 

to the transition. State officials in the Office of Fraud Prevention Programs 

provided qualitative information on the types of visa categories that are 

subject to fraud. Lastly, we interviewed State officials at headquarters and 

abroad to discuss recent fraud trends.

 

1

In March 2009, a GAO investigation exposed major vulnerabilities in State’s passport 

issuance process, demonstrating that terrorists or criminals could steal an American 

citizen’s identity, use basic counterfeiting skills to create fraudulent documentation for that 

identity, and obtain a genuine U.S. passport. GAO, Department of State: Undercover 

Tests Reveal Significant Vulnerabilities in State’s Passport Issuance Process, 

GAO-09-447 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2009). 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 36 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

To assess State’s use of technologies and resources to combat fraud, we 

met with State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs Office of Consular Systems 

and Technology to review State’s major data systems as well as the latest 

technological tools available to consular officers and Fraud Prevention 

Managers. Specifically, we received demonstrations on State’s newly 

deployed Enterprise Case Assessment Service (eCAS) used for tracking 

fraud cases, and MATRIX, a search tool used in fraud prevention. We 

visited the Kentucky Consular Center, an anti-fraud resource available to 

posts, and observed its activities. We interviewed State officials at posts 

regarding their usage of these tools and resources. To determine the 

reliability of data captured by eCAS on the number of cases referred to 

Fraud Prevention Units and the number of confirmed cases, we met with 

consular officers and Fraud Prevention Managers in five posts to 

determine how information was entered into eCAS. We determined that 

the eCAS system was widely used across posts and was sufficiently 

reliable to determine the general volume of fraud referrals.

To understand the training required of State officials responsible for 

combating fraud, we gathered information about training requirements 

and course enrollment from the Foreign Service Institute’s Student 

Training Management System. We interviewed Foreign Service Institute 

personnel regarding controls, strengths and limitations of the course 

enrollment data and determined it was sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes. We also analyzed data on the number of direct hire and local 

staff working in all 222 visa-issuing consular posts as of December 2011 

and reviewed data gathered by State liaisons from the Consular Workload 

Statistics System on the number and grade of officers assigned to Fraud 

Prevention Units at consular posts as of April 2012. We obtained staffing 

data from State’s GEMS database. We tested the data on direct hires and 

local staff working at visa-issuing posts for completeness, confirmed the 

general accuracy of the data with select overseas posts, and interviewed 

knowledgeable officials from the Office of Resource Management and 

Organizational Analysis concerning the reliability of the data. We 

assessed data on the number and grade of officers assigned to Fraud 

Prevention Units for reliability, and interviewed Consular Affairs officials 

regarding how the data was collected and entered into the database, the 

controls and reviews of the data collection, and the major strengths and 

limitations of the data. We found the data to be sufficiently reliable for our 

purposes. Lastly, we conducted interviews with visa chiefs, Fraud 

Prevention Managers, and DS Assistant Regional Security Officers 

working in five overseas posts on issues related to consular staffing and 

resources, among other topics.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

We visited U.S. consular posts in five countries—Brazil, the Dominican 

Republic, India, Jordan, and Ukraine. During these visits, we observed 

visa operations and interviewed consular staff and embassy management 

about visa adjudication policies, procedures, and resources. In addition, 

we spoke with officials from other U.S. agencies that assist consular 

officers in the visa adjudication process. We chose Brazil, the Dominican 

Republic, India, and Ukraine because each of the fraud prevention teams 

in these countries investigated 500 or more fraud cases in fiscal year 

2010. We chose Jordan because of the nature of the fraud cases 

investigated in that country, which included security concerns.

We conducted our work from August 2011 through September 2012, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Classes 

of Admission

Page 38 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

Foreign nationals seeking to enter the United States temporarily may 

apply for entry under the following visa classes of admission:

Visa Class Description 

Transit aliens 

C-1 Aliens in continuous and immediate transit through the United States 

C-2 Aliens in transit to the United Nations Headquarters District 

C-3 Foreign government officials, attendants, servants, and personal 

employees, and spouses and children in transit 

Temporary visitors for business 

B-1 Temporary visitors for business 

GB Visa Waiver Program—temporary visitors for business to Guam 

WB Visa Waiver Program—temporary visitors for business 

Temporary visitors for pleasure 

B-2 Temporary visitors for pleasure 

GT Visa Waiver Program—temporary visitors for pleasure to Guam 

WT Visa Waiver Program—temporary visitors for pleasure 

Temporary workers and trainees 

H-1B Temporary workers with “specialty occupation” 

H-1B1 Chile and Singapore Free Trade Agreement Aliens 

H-1C Nurses under the Nursing Relief for Disadvantaged Areas Act of 1999 

H-2A Seasonal agricultural workers 

H-2B Seasonal nonagricultural workers 

H-3 Trainees 

H-4 Spouses and children of H-1, H-2, or H-3 visa holders 

O-1 Temporary workers with extraordinary ability or achievement in the 

sciences, arts, education, business, athletics, TV or film. 

O-2 Temporary workers with essential skills accompanying and assisting O1 visa holders 

O-3 Spouses and children of O-1 and O-2 visa holders 

P-1 Temporary workers—internationally recognized athletes or entertainers 

for a specific competition or performance

P-2 Temporary workers—artists or entertainers under reciprocal exchange 

programs with a similar organization of a foreign state 

P-3 Temporary workers—artists or entertainers under culturally unique 

programs 

P-4 Spouses and children of P-1, P-2, or P-3 visa holders 

Q-1 Temporary workers in international cultural exchange programs 

R-1 Temporary workers in religious occupations 

Appendix II: U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Classes 

of Admission
Appendix II: U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Classes 

of Admission

Page 39 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

Visa Class Description 

R-2 Spouses and children of R-1 visa holders 

TN North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) professional workers 

TD Spouses and children of TN visa holders 

Treaty traders and investors 

E-1 Treaty traders and spouses and children 

E-2 Treaty investors and spouses and children 

E-3 Australian Free Trade Agreement principals and spouses and children 

Intracompany transferees 

L-1 Intracompany transferees 

L-2 Spouses and children of L-1 visa holders 

Representatives of foreign information media 

I-1 Representatives of foreign information media and spouses and children 

Students 

F-1 Students—academic institutions 

F-2 Spouses and children of F-1 visa holders 

F-3 Canadian or Mexican national commuter students—academic 

institutions 

M-1 Students—vocational/nonacademic institutions 

M-2 Spouses and children of M-1 visa holders 

M-3 Canadian or Mexican national commuter students—

vocational/nonacademic institutions 

Exchange visitors 

J-1 Exchange visitors 

J-2 Spouses and children of J-1 visa holders 

Other categories 

A-1 Ambassadors, public ministers, career diplomatic or consular officers, 

and spouses and children 

A-2 Other foreign government officials or employees and spouses and 

children 

A-3 Attendants, servants, or personal employees of A-1 and A-2 visa 

holders and spouses and children 

BE Bering Strait Agreement aliens

FSM Federated States of Micronesia nationals 

G-1 Principal resident representatives of recognized foreign member 

governments to international organizations, staff, and spouses and 

children 

G-2 Temporary representatives of recognized foreign member governments 

to international organizations and spouses and children 

G-3 Representatives of unrecognized or nonmember foreign governments 

to international organizations and spouses and children 
Appendix II: U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Classes 

of Admission

Page 40 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

Visa Class Description 

G-4 Officers or employees of unrecognized international organizations and 

spouses and children 

G-5 Attendants, servants, or personal employees of G-1, G-2, G-3, or G-4 

visa holders and spouses and children 

K-1 Alien fiancés(ees) of U.S. citizens 

K-2 Children of K-1 visa holders 

K-3 Alien spouses of U.S. citizens 

K-4 Children of K-3 visa holders 

MIS Republic of the Marshall Islands nationals 

N-1 to N-7 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aliens, spouses, and 

children 

N-8 Parents of international organization special immigrants 

N-9 Children of N-8 visa holders or international organization special 

immigrants 

PAL Republic of Palau nationals 

Q-2 Irish Peace Process Cultural and Training Program aliens 

Q-3 Spouses and children of Q-2 visa holders 

T-1 to T-5 Victims of a severe form of trafficking and spouses, children, parents, 

and siblings 

U-1 to U-4 Aliens suffering physical or mental abuse as victims of criminal activity 

and spouses, children, and parents 

V-1 to V-3 Spouses and children of a lawful permanent resident who has been 

waiting 3 years or more for immigrant visas and dependents 

Source:State. 
Appendix III: Case Studies

Page 41 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

The following five case studies provide examples of the types of activities 

carried out by Fraud Prevention Units and Assistant Regional Security 

Officer Investigators (ARSO-Is) overseas.

In Ukraine, we observed consular officers adjudicating visas for the 

Summer Work and Travel program. A consular officer suspected an 

applicant’s student identification was fraudulent, and he told the applicant 

to wait while he asked the Fraud Prevention Unit for assistance. The 

senior Locally Employed Staff (LES) person inspected the student ID and 

said it was most likely a fake. The consular officer asked the LES to assist 

in questioning the applicant. The LES reviewed the applicant’s school 

transcripts that were submitted with the visa application, and asked the 

applicant to provide the name of the school’s chancellor. The applicant 

could not provide the name. The Fraud Prevention Unit called the school 

to attempt to verify whether the applicant was currently enrolled, but the 

school would not verify the applicant’s status. The Fraud Prevention Unit 

told the consular officer that they believed the applicant was committing 

fraud on her application, and the consular officer denied the visa.

U.S. Major League Baseball (MLB) teams award large signing bonuses to 

younger prospective players in the Dominican Republic, creating a 

significant economic incentive to make prospective players seem 

younger. As a result, MLB prospects often falsify their ages and 

sometimes their identities on visa applications to make them appear 

younger than they truly are. To date, ARSO-I Santo Domingo has 

facilitated the arrests of two MLB Dominican talent scouts, an MLB 

Investigator, and an MLB pitcher, among others, for participating in 

identity fraud. The pitcher, a Dominican citizen, assumed the identity of a 

younger person and obtained a contract to play professional baseball as 

a pitcher in the United States in 1999. The pitcher has since illegally 

obtained at least 10 nonimmigrant visas in his assumed identity. ARSO-I 

Santo Domingo confirmed the pitcher’s true identity and coordinated with 

the Dominican prosecutors’ office to obtain a Dominican arrest warrant. 

The pitcher later returned to the Dominican Republic and obtained travel 

documents and a new nonimmigrant visa petition from the MLB in his true 

identity, and applied for a nonimmigrant visa. The interviewing consular 

officer found the pitcher ineligible for the nonimmigrant visa due to identity 

fraud, and the ARSOI-I Santo Domingo subsequently facilitated his arrest 

Appendix III: Case Studies

Fraud Prevention Unit 

Case Study

ARSO-I Case Studies

U.S. Embassy Santo Domingo, 

the Dominican Republic
Appendix III: Case Studies

Page 42 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

by the Dominican National Police, based on his outstanding Dominican 

arrest warrant.

In December 2010, Sao Paulo Civil Police arrested a Brazilian who 

presented false documents in support of his U.S. visa application. This 

was the ninth arrest of applicants whom had named the same individual 

known to be a smuggler and fraudulent document vender on their visa 

application. Further investigation identified approximately 70 persons who 

had used false documents provided by the document vendor since 2009. 

ARSO-I Sao Paulo received information that the document vendor and 

his accomplices were also producing false documents in support of 

Canadian visa applications, and Italian and Brazilian passports. In March 

2011, the Brazilian Federal Police, the State of Santa Catarina Civil 

Police, and the State of Santa Catarina Prosecutor’s office arrested the 

document vendor and three of his accomplices.

Immigrations Customs Enforcement (ICE) contacted the Deputy Assistant 

Regional Officer Investigator in New Delhi after receiving information that 

a private translator was extorting money from U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services (USCIS) refugee/asylum applicants. The translator 

had access to protected information from USCIS files. ICE spoke with an 

informant who was being threatened by the translator to pay significant 

sums or have her application denied. Preliminary investigations 

determined that the translator would “cold-call” asylum applicants. ARSOI New Delhi and ICE interviewed the translator, three USCIS local 

employees, and three local guards. The translator denied obtaining 

personal identifiable information from embassy staff. As a result of this 

investigation, the translator was arrested upon departure of the Embassy, 

one local guard was terminated for accepting money from the translator, 

and one USCIS LES employee was put on administrative leave for 

divulging personally identifiable information.

Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) Attaché contacted ARSO-I Kyiv 

for assistance with an individual present in Kyiv with an active INTERPOL 

Red Warrant for human trafficking. The fugitive was wanted in the 

Eastern District of Michigan for forced labor, money laundering, 

immigration and visa fraud, and witness tampering. ARSO-I Kyiv 

coordinated assistance with the Ministry of Internal Affairs Organized 

Crime Department. The Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs Organized 

Crime Department agents arrested the fugitive at his residence for 

immigration overstay charges. ARSO-I Kyiv and ICE Attaché Frankfurt 

escorted the fugitive from Kyiv to New York, where the fugitive was 

arrested by ICE agents.

U.S. Consulate Sao Paulo, 

Brazil

U.S. Embassy New Delhi, India

U.S. Embassy Kyiv, Ukraine
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of State

Page 43 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of State 
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of State

Page 44 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. 

Department of State

Page 45 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 46 GAO-12-888 Visa Fraud Prevention

Michael J. Courts, (202) 512-8980 or CourtsM@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, Anthony Moran (Assistant 

Director), Jon Fremont, Julia Ann Roberts, Katie Bernet, Karen Deans, 

Martin De Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Mary Moutsos, Mark Speight, and Maria 

Stattel made key contributions to this report. Others providing technical 

assistance include Claude Adrien and Emily Biskup.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(320858)
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