.

NEWS FROM THE 

FRONT 

 October 2017

LTG Michael X. Garrett

Commander, USARCENT

Distribution Statement A: Public release. This product contains unclassified/unrestricted information 

releasable to the public.
ii

United States Army Central White Paper

The “By, With, and Through” Approach: 

An Army Service Component Command Perspective

From Egypt to Pakistan, and from Kazakhstan to Yemen, the US Central 

Command’s area of responsibility is, by most estimates, just as strategically 

important as it is volatile. All of this instability combines to make our 

partnership and cooperation with regional militaries all the more critical.

Lieutenant General Michael X. Garrett, Commander, United States Army Central

Remarks at the Task Force Spartan Transition of Authority (29th Infantry Division to 35th InfantryDivision)

July 13, 2017

United States Army Central

7 September 2017
Table of Contents

Foreword ii

Introduction 1

Background 4

By, With, and Through Effect on Warfighting Functions 6

Recommended Application to DOTMLPF-P 11

Political and Strategic Implications 13

Conclusion 14

References 15

Appendix 1: CENTCOM “By, With, and Through” Terminology 16

Appendix 2: Doctrinal Lineage of the Terms: “By, With, and Through” 17
ii

Foreword

This white paper provides US Army Central’s perspective on the contemporary operating 

environment as the Theater Army for the US Central Command Area of Responsibility. It also 

constitutes a request of the Army to analyze the By, With, and Through (BWT) operational 

framework for the purpose of informing future force generation, training, and mission command 

for Army forces.

While current doctrine does not provide a settled definition for the BWT method of conducting 

operations, USARCENT describes the By, With, and Through operational approach as 

conducting military campaigns primarily by employing partner maneuver forces with the support 

of US enabling forces through a coordinated legal and diplomatic framework.

Effectively executing BWT requires several changes in policy and in mindset. The definition of 

the term partner must be carefully and continuously refined. Strategy may differ when US 

forces are not the only means and partners see the ends differently. Operational art is affected 

when partners have the initiative and dictate the tempo. Methods of tactical execution must 

remain flexible as junior leaders blend tactics, techniques, and procedures with those of partner 

forces. We discuss the risk to mission and risk to force at the operational level of war and ways 

we have mitigated that risk in execution.

This paper will highlight the impact of unsettled definitions on the Theater Army’s support to the 

Joint Force Commander in the BWT prosecution of Operation Inherent Resolve. It is written

from the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) perspective rather than that of the 

Coalition Joint Task Force (CJTF). While USARCENT is not suggesting that we stop fighting 

By, With, and Through our partners, we suggest that this operational approach needs more 

analysis in order to be employed optimally. In fact, a deeper understanding of the implications of

By, With and Through will very likely inform the future training and preparation for the US Army’s 

Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB). 

This paper is complementary of ongoing initiatives throughout the US Central Command 

(CENTCOM) area of responsibility such as the Mosul Studies Group in Iraq and Expeditionary 

Advisor Packages in Afghanistan. 

Finally, I would like to thank all involved for their hard work in developing this White Paper in the 

interest of the future force.

Michael X. Garrett

Lieutenant General, United States Army

Commander, US Army Central
1

INTRODUCTION

United States Army Central (USARCENT), the Theater Army for the Central Region, provides 

comprehensive support to multiple efforts through an operational approach that United States 

Central Command (CENTCOM) describes as fighting By, With and Through operational 

partners. This approach poses a unique set of circumstances that require greater 

understanding to overcome inherent challenges and to fully realize associated opportunities. 

The terminology can be found in CENTCOM messaging, written orders, and engagements with 

key leaders. This BWT operational approach shapes the security environment in countries or 

regions where a large US presence may be unwelcome, impractical, or merely a supporting 

effort to other instruments of US policy. However, doctrine does not fully define this concept, 

and it is not yet known how this operational approach will affect the readiness and tactical 

employment of US Army forces. 

USARCENT seeks to illustrate the unique characteristics of the BWT way of war from the

perspective of a Theater Army responsible both for supporting the fight and, in some cases, 

contributing forces directly to combat operations. Because the intent of this paper is to 

engender discussion across Department of Defense (DoD) and contribute to the development of 

the future force, USARCENT welcomes dissent and constructive dialogue.

While CENTCOM uses the term BWT in mission statements for current operations the concept 

is doctrinally undefined. For the purpose of this paper, USARCENT describes the By, With, and 

Through operational approach as conducting military campaigns primarily by employing partner 

maneuver forces with the support of US enabling forces through a coordinated legal and 

diplomatic framework. Adherence to this approach finds US forces task organized and 

deployed in small, non-doctrinal packages1 across Joint Operations Areas (JOA) to austere 

locations among non-organic formations, often without habitual and doctrinal sources of 

support. In some cases, this dispersion exceeds the Theater Army’s capacity to provide mission 

command, protection, and some categories of sustainment such as medical, maintenance, 

distribution, and risk to force sustainment. 

Challenges inherent in the BWT method of war confronted USARCENT from the time it 

established the initial Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Headquarters for Operation Inherent 

Resolve (OIR) in 2014. The same challenges persist to the present time while USARCENT

serves as the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) for CENTCOM in addition 

to being the Theater Army and Army Service Component Command. In each of those roles, 

and at various times, USARCENT adapted its organizational architecture to successfully 

accomplish all missions assigned by the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC). 

Frequently, these solutions call for the use of capabilities and resources originally allocated for 

other missions to include deterring malign influence and hostile aggression throughout the 

region. USARCENT is greatly enabled in its efforts to provide this support by leveraging the 

proximity of the friendly nation of Kuwait and the relationships developed there during more than 

twenty years of continuous presence and engagement.

 

1 Non-Doctrinal Employment describes the employment of units in packages that are different 

from and/or with mission command relationships that are unintended by approved force design.
2

The notable success of the 1st Theater Sustainment Command (1TSC) and Task Force (TF) 

Spartan (divisional mission command node for Operation Spartan Shield [OSS]) in their 

respective roles as provider of theater logistical support and mission command of an armored 

brigade combat team and field artillery, air defense artillery, combat aviation, and engineer 

brigades is due in large part to their spirit of adaptability. In an allusion to the diplomatic skills 

required to overcome obstacles such as the obscure customs regimes of partners sharing a 

common border, Brigadier General Robert D. Harter, Commander of the 316th Expeditionary 

Sustainment Command, noted that “BWT is inherently working through sovereign nations to get 

approval to help them. This can be very frustrating.” (BG Harter Interview 19Jul17) 

Executing within the BWT operational approach not only poses challenges, but opportunities as 

well. BWT’s defining characteristic may be the limitation placed on the direct employment of US 

combat arms Soldiers. Currently, infantry remains the decisive arm for coalition forces fighting in 

Iraq and Syria, but not for supporting US forces. Combined Joint Task Force – Operation 

Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) is not employing US maneuver units as trained and organized,

and, by design, this often limits conventional US troops’ exposure to direct ground combat. In 

practice, the BWT approach requires the Theater Army to enable both US Special Operations 

Forces (SOF) and coalition partners, as well as US conventional forces employed in an advisory 

role that is more commonly associated only with SOF. 

The national or non-state partner is readily providing soldiers to perform infantry and even armor 

roles in close combat operations. This reliance on host nation maneuver forces changes the 

calculation of risk to US forces. As Colonel Pat Work, Commander of 2nd Brigade, 82nd 

Airborne Division, noted in his interview with the Center for Army Lessons Learned, "They [Iraqi 

Security Forces] assume 99.9% of the physical risk every day." Lieutenant General Steve 

Townsend, Commanding General CJTF-OIR, cited a specific instance of this behavior with a 

vignette about Iraqi infantry following closely behind bulldozers during intense combat 

operations in Mosul (Lt. Gen. Townsend, CENTCOM Commander’s Conference, July 23, 3107). 

While decreasing the risk of US casualties, the willingness on the part of partner nations to incur 

loss may also lend increased legitimacy to their efforts. As partners invest in their own security 

and demonstrate commitment to their nation, it counters the perception of US forces as an 

occupier with only self-interest at stake.

Multiple capabilities of the US military complement the needs of our warfighting partners. US

infantry and armor Soldiers find themselves in the role of primary trainer to counterpart

indigenous forces. The partners also rely on a large volume of US precision fires to enable their 

maneuver on the battlefield. They lack non-human sources of intelligence (GEOINT, MASINT, 

and SIGINT). They do not possess sophisticated equipment such as vehicles that enable 

protected mobility or precision weapons that mitigate collateral damage. Their logistical 

capabilities are insufficient to sustain or extend operational reach. Their technology is not 

sufficiently advanced to provide an edge in the action/counter-action cycle of weapons 

development and force escalation. Partners hunger for the morale boost and confidence that 

US support brings. In his exit interview, MG Martin, Commanding General of 1st Infantry 

Division, noted that “What we had to do is assure them that we would always be there.” (MG 

Martin Interview, 12Jul17) 

USARCENT anticipates that the US civilian leadership will continue to demand that military 

operations be executed BWT. This preference for BWT operations is due in part to the 

empirical effectiveness of letting those with the greatest stake in the outcome shoulder the 
3

greatest burden of risk. Survival is clearly a powerful motivating force. It is also true that local 

forces are more culturally attuned to the nuances of dealing with local populations. Perhaps 

most importantly, BWT supports the US national preference for minimizing casualties in the 

absence of an existential threat. As a result, the challenges of BWT execution will continue to 

confront operational and tactical commanders. Commanders must, therefore, adapt their 

methods to achieve mission success.

The examples provided throughout this paper represent the experiences of USARCENT as the 

Theater Army supporting Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) and Operation Inherent Resolve 

(OIR). While some lessons may be unique to the operational environment in the Central Region, 

most actions taken in support of OIR and OFS can surely provide a model for similar future 

conflicts and inform related initiatives such as the Multi-Domain Battle concept. The reliance on

partner nation ground maneuver and the relative absence of similar US forces from the 

battlefield bears further analysis to determine impacts to present day force generation and 

future force readiness. While USARCENT acknowledges that the US Army must plan and be 

prepared for near-peer conventional war, the unpredictable nature of future wars dictates that 

the Army must also account for the tactical and operational implications of BWT warfighting.
4

BACKGROUND

In 2017, as the US enters its sixteenth consecutive year of conflict in the Middle East, the goal 

of building partner capacity for the effective implementation of a BWT operational approach 

continues to be a work in progress. USARCENT, as the CENTCOM Theater Army, remains 

front and center in the fight, straddling the line between the complexity of informing strategy and 

the complication of designing feasible operations. Although the BWT approach to fighting is 

neither without precedent in military history or an altogether new development in CENTCOM

operations, its current formulation to minimize US forces and casualties bears new analysis.

The term itself, “By, With and Through”, or “BWT”, originated decades ago as a component 

within the definition of Unconventional Warfare (UW).2 The 2003 edition of Joint Publication 3-

05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (December 2003), defined UW as "a broad spectrum 

of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted 

through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, 

supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes but is not limited 

to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities and unconventional assisted 

recovery."

Picture: British BG Brock and Tecumseh 1812

From its inception in describing SOF activities in low intensity conflict, BWT has evolved over 

the years to describe conventional activities in multi-domain battle. In years past, BWT could be 

viewed as an operational approach in an economy of force environment. Today’s fight against 

ISIS is hardly an economy of force mission from the standpoint of whole-of-coalition operations. 

Presently, BWT describes how the US applies the warfighting functions, minus US maneuver, in 

its fight alongside major partners willing to commit thousands of troops to decisive action. The

lack of common understanding results in challenges at the tactical and operational levels while 

also having implications for the strategic level of warfare.

A comparison with OIF I (2003) draws a stark contrast to the BWT approach. That campaign 

was a conventional fight employing combined US arms to defeat a mostly conventional enemy

force. However, following the initial, successful invasion, the need to place coalition partners at 

 

2 See Appendix: Doctrinal Lineage of the terms “By, With, and Through”

“Fighting BWT is as old as our 

country’s history, even 

though the name is new. In 

the American Revolution,

Brits [British Military] used 

Torie colonists and Native 

Americans. [And during the]

Indian Wars we used tribes 

against each other.”

- LTG Michael X. Garrett
5

the forefront of operations emerged. While this practice led to an anecdotal understanding of 

BWT, the present resource-constrained environment demonstrates the need for a thorough 

DOTMLPF analysis in order to anticipate the demands and the efficiencies of the approach.

The 2017 CENTCOM Posture Statement reads: “The Counter-ISIS (C-ISIS) Campaign has 

entered its third year and we are on track with the military plan to defeat the terrorist 

organization in Iraq and Syria. Our “by, with, and through” approach and operational level 

simultaneity strategy are working, and our partner forces continue to build momentum across 

the battlespace as we pressure the enemy on multiple fronts and across all domains.”

(Statement of General Joseph L. Votel on the Posture of U.S. Central Command March 9, 2017)

USARCENT’s support to the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) would benefit greatly 

from an analysis by the institutional arm of the US Army on the deeper implications of this 

approach.

BWT EFFECT ON WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS

The Army forces assigned to the CENTCOM AOR are one tenth of the number assigned to the 

Pacific Command (PACOM) AOR and one fourth the number in the European Command 

(EUCOM) AOR. All forces other than those assigned are present in response to need-based 

requests for forces (HQDA Globally Engaged Army chart, August 2017). In the course of 

meeting the GCC’s need for Army forces, the Theater Army is the first echelon to review a

request for additional capabilities. Often, the process of force generation leads to a denial of 

additional capability from outside the theater and a directive to employ capabilities already 

present for other purposes. This alternative sourcing process is documented in the form of a 

Theater Coordinated Assistance (TCA) request from the warfighting headquarters to the GCC. 

Absent an explicit policy decision which underwrites the drawing down of capabilities allocated 

to respond to other, more existential threats, it is then left to the service component to ensure 

the GCC understands the associated risk to the ability to respond to other contingencies. 

USARCENT supports two named operations in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR),

Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) and Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR). It exercises force 

protection responsibilities for the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) treaty organization 

in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, home to a very active branch of the Islamic State. It directly 

executes tasks associated with the deterrence and theater security requirements of Operation 

Spartan Shield (OSS) in the fifteen nations where US troops are not engaged in active combat. 

At the operational level, there is only one source from which to draw forces should the 

Department of the Army choose not to resource new deployments. As a result, the ASCC must 

carefully articulate the risk to executing its OSS mission in its support to either OIR or OFS.

Mission Command: From the Theater Army perspective, the lack of a full complement of 

division-level enablers in the OIR CJOA results in operations that are unable to be fully 

synchronized with associated support requirements. Outside the CJOA, Task Force Spartan

(TF Spartan), a mobilized Army National Guard (ARNG) division headquarters, supports both 

OSS, OIR, and OFS with deliberate planning and detailed risk mitigation practices. The high 

number and wide variety of dynamic and un-programmed missions conducted by its arrayed 

forces continues to have impacts on manning, equipping, maintaining, and employing the force 

in support of both operations. 
6

Major General Blake Ortner, TF Spartan Commander from December 2016 to July 2017, said in 

his exit interview that TF Spartan “had elements that were tasked for the Advise and Assist 

missions, but they were tasked across huge geographic areas. So, what that often meant is that 

you have the battalion commander that’s running the TAC up in Mosul, you’ve got his XO down 

here in Kuwait managing the rest of the forces, the staff is split between the locations ... So, 

what you have is each location ending up with a reduced force, reduced staff planning and 

things like that. So, that could constrain the mission command capability a little bit.” (MG Ortner 

07Jul17)

MG Ortner also noted an adjustment in command relationship that supported mission 

accomplishment: “Some of the command and support relationships were working against OIR 

and us. So, in working with OIR and ARCENT, we adjust some to improve combat operations.” 

(MG Ortner, 07Jul17) As an example, he referenced CENTCOM’s adjustment to authorities 

which permitted the repositioning of HIMARS to respond more flexibly to the fluid tactical 

situation on the ground in Iraq.

MG Ortner summarized the risks to the OSS mission of deterring malign influence and hostile 

aggression across the Middle East when he stated, “Leaders at all levels are being asked to 

step outside of their normal responsibilities and lead and mitigate risk beyond what they were 

trained to do. They are also being asked to employ their equipment and forces outside of what 

would be normal (Mission Essential Task List [METL] or Army Universal Task List [AUTL]) 

mission requirements. In practice, not all of these efforts or employments are success stories,

but the challenges, and resultant solution sets, are in line with what was derived in the Army 

Operating Concept (AOC) – guiding future force development through identification of first order 

capabilities that the Army must possess to accomplish missions in support of policy goals and 

objectives.” (MG Ortner 07Jul17)

Examples of non-doctrinal employments incurring increased risk include: 

 Attack Weapons Teams (AWT) (2x AH-64s) are executing geographically dispersed 

operations and with a command and support relationship separate from its company

headquarters. The Combat Aviation Brigade operates with limited maintenance and

refueling in an undefined logistics supply situation. TF Spartan depends on USAF to 

execute operational movement in the absence of organic US Army transportation 

capabilities.

 TF Spartan HIMARS ISO OIR are deployed in 2x launcher teams called Light HIMARS 

Packages. Technically, the HIMARS units are designed to fight in 4 launcher platoons 

where each platoon includes a required Fire Direction Center. In the smaller 

configuration, Sergeants are independently executing mission command of Fire 

Direction Centers. While they have been generally successful, the situation calls for 

anticipatory training of NCOs who may find themselves in this role.

 The 420th Engineer Brigade forms cross-functional teams and detachments below the 

level presumed in doctrinal task organization. These small teams are “commanded” by 

Staff Sergeants who are controlled by SOF elements with loose command and control 

relationships, and faced with making tactical and operational level decisions in the 

execution of their mission.

In an opposing view, COL Pat Work, an on-the-ground Advise and Assist (A&A) brigade 

commander, noted, "There is no loss of chain of command because our TTP is not recorded in 
7

doctrine. Perhaps this mission profile epitomizes Mission Command." Work also said that 

"Bandwidth might be the most important class of supply to A&A. Power generation may be 

number two." (COL Work, Jul17)

Movement and Maneuver. US Army forces are conducting movement in Iraq and Syria, but not 

maneuver, because the current form of BWT calls for the reliance on a partner’s maneuver force 

in the battlefield geometry. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, defines maneuver as,

“Employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to 

achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy.” (JP 3-0, 17Jan17, p. xiv) Although not 

used for direct ground combat, there remains a requirement for US infantry in other traditional 

roles. In CJTF-OIR small advisor teams often have a full platoon of infantry for force protection. 

Intelligence. The US military has the most capable intelligence architecture in the world and 

focuses a variety of intelligence assets in the fight against ISIS. However, the absence of prior

intelligence sharing agreements among partners can hinder the sharing of technologicallyderived information from US sources. For the counter-ISIS fight, this challenge was somewhat 

overcome by the development of a tailored Middle East Security Forces (MESF) caveat.

Inversely, US forces are unable to use HUMINT generated by partner nations to fill gaps in their 

situational understanding. US Forces must determine a means to achieve efficiency in the 

development of a common operating picture and situational awareness in coordination with 

partner forces having different technology, language, and culture.

Fires. The current BWT fight relies on precision fires, and the US military delivers fires more 

accurately now than at any time US history. BWT, in effect, trades the effects of Precision 

Guided Munitions (PGMs) for the lethality and fire discipline of US troops on the ground. US 

combined arms doctrine calls for unified fire and maneuver to mass effects, seize and maintain 

the initiative, and cause multiple dilemmas for the enemy (ADP 3-0 Unified Land Operations, pg.

1). Iraqi Army and Syrian Defense Forces instead depend heavily on fires to disperse or attrit 

enemy forces prior to the seizure of terrain through maneuver. This Iraqi and Syrian practice of 

employing fires to achieve the effect of eliminating enemy resistance without complementary 

maneuver required fire missions in such number as to increase the risk of error or collateral 

damage. 

Because US policy is averse to incurring casualties to either US forces or noncombatants, the 

employment of relatively scarce precision munitions is preferred, which greatly increases their 

rate of expenditure. Some observers may conclude that the high demand for indirect fires on 

behalf of less capable partner maneuver forces has little applicability to a more conventional 

conflict. However, it seems likely that a US commander would show the same reluctance to 

commit infantry into an urban fight if precision fires were available and unconstrained.

Additionally, fires employed in the course of BWT operations are typically dynamic rather than 

deliberate, making predictability of usage rates and resupply forecasting slightly more complex. 

MG Martin in his exit interview said "Of the 16,500 so strikes we did over the course of the year I 

bet 90% or more were dynamic because it was the nature of the fight. Deliberate targeting in 

this environment for CJFLCC does not work.” (MG Martin, 12Jul17)

Sustainment. 

BWT is at least as logistically intensive for U.S./Coalition forces as traditional operations, 

especially when supplying munitions in support of indirect fires. As a result of the increased 
8

expenditure of precision munitions, the allocated storage and distribution capabilities are hardpressed to provide sufficient stocks to the point of use, and the industrial base is severely taxed 

to meet manufacturing demand. BG Harter refers to this unexpectedly high expenditure of 

artillery munitions with his observation, “BWT is more logistically intense than if our forces were 

doing this ourselves. Particularly intensive in the use of precision fires.” He also noted that “The 

Iraqis understand maneuver, but sustainment in their formation is not there yet.” (Harter, 

19Jul17)

MG Paul Hurley, Commanding General, 1st Theater Support Command from June 2015 to June 

2017 wrote, “Waging war against [ISIS] with a limited U.S. military presence requires nondoctrinal logistics solutions to support coalition, U.S., and host nation forces. ... Without the 

authorities, access, and logistics structures of the past, the 1st TSC’s challenge is two-fold: 

providing operational and tactical logistics to U.S. forces while simultaneously providing material 

and supply support to the Iraqi forces.” (Army Sustainment, Nov-Dec 2016, pages 39-40.)

Indications are that BWT inhibits the development of US partners’ tactical and operational 

sustainment beyond that which is necessary to conduct the close fight. It may be the case that 

so long as the US is willing to establish, and pay for, the establishment and upkeep of lines of 

communication for major operations, partners will continue to rely on that support. MG Hurley 

noted, “Coalition partners in the region rely too heavily on U.S. logistics expertise and 

equipment to achieve operational capability.” (Army Sustainment, Nov-Dec 2-16, page 40.)

USARCENT provides medical and maintenance support to partners and the Joint Force through 

tailored, non-doctrinal packages. The decentralized employment of small elements (HIMARs 

sections, AWTs, Sentinel Radar systems, sustainment packages), and constraints on the 

number of Soldiers deployed, stretches the ability of the maintenance and supply systems to 

uphold the readiness of critical systems supporting the CJOA. Maintenance support relies 

heavily on civilian field service representatives (FSRs) who in turn depend on military-provided 

transportation and security to move to remote and austere locations around the battlefield. The 

concept of traditional unit basic loads (UBLs) for supplies and spares is not employed, and 

formations rely on a just-in-time (JIT) concept of support.

In order to match the partners’ operational tempo and extend operational reach, BWT requires 

basing from multiple contingency operating locations. While this places advisors and support 

with partner forces where they are most critically needed, the requirement to provide logistics at 

each of those locations requires sustainment packages (forward logistics element [FLE]) in 

ever-smaller numbers with less robust capabilities. The sustainment architecture on which 

coalition and partnered forces rely is continually modified to provide the maximum possible 

support to a rapidly changing CJOA within the constraints of US policy and the political 

sensitivities of coalition partners.

Bureaucratic customs processes associated with conducting operations in sovereign nations 

also challenge the distribution and transportation networks within the CJOA. For example, the 

need to use commercial line-haul carriers over inadequate road networks, as well as limited 

airfield capability and an insufficient number of movement control units lessens the 

effectiveness of the current CJOA distribution network. Maintaining effective control and 

accountability over the distribution of weapons and equipment in a semi-permissive environment 

also continues to be a significant logistical challenge.
9

Others have noted that the lack of available force structure constrains operational flexibility. MG

Martin gave an example of the request for an advisor team, “You also have to understand that 

the tail that is supporting that advisory team, has to be accounted for. So, when you say advisor 

team, you’re looking at an infantry platoon plus a couple of staff officers, let’s say that’s forty 

people. However, there’s an additional five or ten people we have to add to the BSB [Brigade 

Support Battalion] or whoever. When we throw some extra advisors, now we have to ask for a 

route clearance package, because now, more advisors, more networks for them to move to and 

from the roads, now we’ve got more roads to clear." Because these forces are not readily 

available, planners must forecast and request the capabilities far in advance or the tempo of 

operations must slow to await their arrival.

Operational headquarters must budget for forces to support base operating support (BOS) 

requirements, and this mission has further taxed the limited logistics forces available to provide 

BWT support in the CJOA. MG Hurley wrote that “US logisticians are meeting this non-doctrinal 

workload using a manning-restricted sustainment footprint that is arguably inadequate for the 

task.” (Army Sustainment, Nov-Dec 2-16, page 40.) 1st TSC and USARCENT always 

accomplished the mission, but DOTLMPF improvements can reduce risk and improve 

efficiency.

Protection. BWT mitigates the risk to infantry and armor Soldiers who historically have the 

highest incidence of casualties, but it increases the risk to other forces distributed across the 

battlefield that are dependent, in some cases, on local forces for their force protection. 

MG Martin stated “To achieve that access and to build that relationship you must have people 

forward that are not commuting to work, but they are living there with them and with that it works 

very well. But there are risks associated with that.” He continued, “This environment forces 

commanders to spend a lot of time assessing risk because it is not something that you look at 

episodically or periodically. It’s a thing you must continually assess over time.”

In referring to another dimension of Soldier risk, COL Work noted in his exit interview that 

"Protecting ourselves and our partners is a top priority. Risks include illness and injury. ... I

spend much of my time evaluating and mitigating risk with our TF A&A Cdrs. ... Consider the 

roles of Chaplains and Behavioral Health specialists as well. Distributed forces, potential 

limitations to ground mobility, and the human dimension of our Soldiers in a hazardous 

environment creates risk if there is not added preventative and reactive capacity." 

While BWT seeks to increase the likelihood of accomplishing political objectives and to 

decrease the risk to US forces in the close fight, it increases the risk to strategic and tactical 

mission accomplishment. The tactical mission is placed at risk in relying on the decision-making 

processes and priorities of partners, while risk to the overarching strategic mission is increased 

when objective end states and those of chosen partners diverge.

Finally, USARCENT executes BWT operations at an increased risk to its steady-state

requirement: deterring malign influence and hostile aggression while setting conditions for 

transition to combat and shaping the environment to mitigate threat. Of course, the elimination 

of all risk is an unachievable, and probably an undesirable, objective. As an Army War College 

professor noted, “In war, risk is a zero-sum game where combatants have to make trade-offs 

between risk to themselves, the mission, and noncombatants. Eliminating the risk to 

noncombatants places this risk squarely on combatants and the mission. If combatants also 
10

refuse or are not able to accept sufficient risk, then it all falls on the mission, which is often itself 

sacrificed (as a result).” (Pfaff, 16Feb17)

RECOMMENDED APPLICATION TO DOTMLPF-P

Doctrine: The Army should establish a doctrinal definition of BWT and a framework for BWT 

operations, similar to the Multi-Domain Battle construct. The outcomes of this effort would 

better enable planning and resourcing the BWT fight, and it would provide warfighting 

headquarters, force providers, and other key stakeholders a common frame of reference for 

discussing the requirements and objectives for BWT operations. The effort could create doctrine 

for adapting employment of smaller formations with enablers through leveraging the Mosul 

Study Group and embedded analysts from the Center for Army Lessons Learned.

Organization: Develop the Security Force Assistance echelons to execute BWT at all levels in 

the competition period of conflict, including high intensity ground combat. The Army should 

design scalable formations to execute BWT operations at multiple echelons able to incorporate 

subject matter expertise able to advise multiple warfighting functions. 

Training: Incorporate the lessons learned described in this paper during units’ pre-deployment 

rotations to training centers. Training to succeed in contemporary combat operations means that 

units are trained to effectively execute BWT. BWT requires living with partner forces versus 

"commuting.” Training should replicate the current battlefield conditions, including the dispersal 

of constrained resources and the presence of reduced or indigenous force protection.

Materiel: At the operational and tactical level, BWT calls for additional analysis of the types and 

quantities of equipment the US provides to partners and whether planning assumptions for 

expenditures remain valid. The Army should study the implications of providing BWT partners 

with technologically advanced equipment and how to best assist with maintenance of that

equipment. At the strategic level, BWT should drive analysis on which partners the US chooses 

to equip. The Joint Force needs to plan for the possibility that a portion of that equipment may 

fall into the hands of our enemies. Commanders must inventory the skills required of 

sustainment personnel at all echelons level to execute the appropriate distribution of materiel.

BWT requires development of sustainment operations for US and partner forces that are subject 

to US partners’ momentum and initiative. Current sustainment models require reframing.

Leadership and Education: US Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) should continue to 

train small-unit leaders for the independent actions that this method of warfighting requires. 

Training must incorporate an understanding of the cultural characteristics of coalition partners.

Personnel: A consequence of the relative success in conducting BWT operations is that leaders 

today see it as more acceptable from a domestic political perspective than placing large 

numbers of boots on the ground. As a result, requests for forces (RFF) are often deployed at 

less than MTOE capacity and capability, with less than full complement of staff, fewer personnel 

than required, and without the necessary array of skills. USARCENT has found that fighting 

BWT is as hard as fighting conventional battles and needs complete organizations for 

supporting functions. Fewer boots on the ground may equate to more resource intensive 

operations due to reliance on partner maneuver forces.
11

Facilities: USARCENT’s support to OIR may be an anomaly in the overall BWT method of war. 

Success is heavily reliant on the access, basing, and overflight from nearby stable and reliable 

partners (particularly the nodes in Kuwait). In the future, success in BWT should not be 

dependent on facilities in the theater and near the fight.

 

Policy: US policy makers should be informed about the 

impact of sustained BWT operations on the future 

ability of US forces to execute operations at the higher 

end of the warfare spectrum. 

POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS

In addition to the implications of fighting By, With and Through for warfighting functions and 

DOTMLPF, there appear to be implications for national policy and strategy as well. For 

example, the reduced presence of US combat troops may blur red lines for opposing forces, 

increasing the opportunity for miscalculation. While these and other matters may be beyond the 

scope and breadth of this document, USARCENT seeks to highlight a few issues for further 

consideration by the appropriate organizations.

Prosecuting wars through a BWT approach requires a national political commitment that is 

different, and may have a lower threshold, than a personnel-intensive, casualty-inducing 

campaign. What does this mean for the ability of the GCC to obtain the policy and resource 

support necessary to sustain and succeed in extended operations?

What considerations must be made when the narrow interests that form the basis for a BWT 

relationship begin to diverge? What binds the partners together until the primary goal is 

accomplished? What other agencies of government or international organizations are 

necessary to outline areas of agreement and to define the mechanisms and boundaries of 

cooperation?

Is the US government or military liable for war crimes committed by partners through whom we 

are prosecuting the conflict? What is the US responsibility to influence partners and prevent 

From the Theater Army perspective, 

can we succeed BWT [by-withthrough] without access to a large, 

permissive ISB [intermediate staging 

base]? And, are we prepared to 

provide BOS-I [base operations 

support integration], including Force 

Protection, to multiple small FOBs 

and COPs?

- LTG Garrett’s comments at AUSA 

2017 Warriors Corner 

Presentation 
12

their violation of the laws of war? Would a proven violation, or even an allegation of illegal 

conduct, affect US commitment at the expense of accomplishing national objectives?

Fighting BWT requires the massive transferal of US military equipment to partners who may 

have other uses for that equipment, or their ability to maintain possession may be minimal. In 

what ways should the US tailor or condition lethal-aid assistance in order to minimize future 

threats, or do short-term benefits outweigh long-term risks?

These and other questions have no easy answer. Even so, their consideration by senior 

headquarters and policy planners now may greatly ease the task of commanders in the future. 

Those commanders are charged with designing operations and developing relationships with 

partners that bear the best possible chance meeting strategic objectives and accomplishing 

desired national end states. A road map to effective and acceptable coalition architecture for 

the execution of BWT operations would be helpful to planners and commanders alike. 

CONCLUSION

In the execution of current operations, US Army Forces in the CENTCOM AOR are often not 

operating as designed, formed, and trained. In response, force providers should consider the 

characteristics of BWT when building and deploying organizations. For instance, it is worth 

considering whether SFABs ought to have tiered capabilities in order to serve most effectively 

as maneuver elements for the Theater Army’s execution of BWT operations. The adaptation of 

US Army forces to the BWT paradigm will have a direct impact on the execution of missions by 

other components in the CENTCOM AOR.

US Army pre-deployment training does not account for the manner in which some units and 

personnel are employed in the CENTCOM AOR. BWT often results in units and personnel 

conducting operations as interchangeable parts without organic enablers. Units are deployed, 

tasks and purposes evolve, and TTP remain in theater. There is as of yet little formal

knowledge transfer of BWT back to the generating force.

Fewer boots on the ground does not necessarily equate to less resource intensive operations. 

In fact, quite the opposite is often true. The military organizations of US partners are often less 

sophisticated, making support for their operations even more complex. The fact that the BWT

approach is dependent on vulnerable US-affiliated groups provides enemies with opportunities 

to indirectly affect the US mission. US forces reliant on local actors lose control over certain 

elements of operational art: operational reach, tempo, and risk. US Army forces cede initiative to 

either an imperfect partner or an enemy motivated by an existential threat.

In conclusion, it is apparent that the continued employment of US Army forces in a “By, With,

and Through” operational approach demands further study by the institutional Army. If our 

forces are to be successful in this new operational approach, it is essential to reach a common 

definition of the concept and to prepare leaders and formations for its intelligent execution.
13

REFERENCES

1. Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, with change 1, July 

12, 2017

2. Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, December, 2003

3. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, January 17, 2017, pg xiv

4. Field Manual 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, with change 1, June 21, 2013

5. Field Manual 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, with change 1 June 2, 2014

6. Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, Headquarters, US Army (August 2017) Bugle Call, 

Globally Engaged Army 

7. Harter, BG Robert D., Deputy commanding general of the 1st Sustainment Command 

(Theater) / commanding general of the 316th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary) (July 19, 

2017) Phone interview with COL Jason Awadi and Mr. Bryan Hilferty 

8. Hurley, MG Paul C. Jr., BG Susan Henderson, and COL Sean J. Cannon, “Considerations 

for Supporting a Train, Advise, and Assist Environment in Iraq.” (Nov-Dec 2016), Army 

Sustainment, p39-40

9. Martin, MG Joseph M., Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division (July 12, 2017) 

Interview with CALL LNO COL Jason Awadi

10. Ortner MG Blake C., Commanding General, 29th Infantry Division and Task Force Spartan, 

(July 7, 2017) End of Tour Interview with COL Jason Awadi

11. Pfaff, Dr. C. Anthony, “Fighting Irregular Wars Well” Available at: 

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/02/16/fighting_irregular_wars_well_110819.html 

(Accessed June 30, 2014)

12. Townsend, Lt. Gen. Stephen J., Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force –

Operation Inherent Resolve, U.S. Central Command; the Commanding General of XVIII 

Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg, North Carolina (July 23, 2017) Remarks at the CENTCOM 

Commander’s Conference, Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar

13. Votel, GEN Joseph L., Commanding General U.S. Central Command, (March 9, 2017) 

Statement of on the Posture of U.S. Central Command, pg 13

14. Work, COL J. Patrick, Commander 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division 

(Jul17) Interview with COL Jason Awadi
14

Appendix: Doctrinal Lineage of the terms “By, With, and Through”

The current DOD definition of UW alludes to present day understanding of BWT. It states, 

“Unconventional warfare — Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency 

to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or 

with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. (JP 3-05, 16 July 2014).”

Army Field Manual 3-22 Army Support to Security Cooperation, Jan 2013, uses the term BWT 

in several places including:

 Paragraph 1-2. Although the Department of State (DoS) leads and provides oversight for 

security cooperation efforts through its bureaus, offices, and overseas missions, security 

cooperation activities are conducted and coordinated throughout the geographic 

combatant command area of responsibility (AOR) by, with, or through the theater army 

to—(1) Build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests. (2) 

Develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational 

operations. (3) Provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host 

nation. (FM 3-22, January 2013)

Notice the focus of this paragraph is the DOD effort to further DoS missions. In addition, the 

ASCC is the BWT agent, not the actor.

 Paragraph 1-38. The three ways addressed above help shape the security environment 

by enabling partners to develop the capability to provide for internal and external 

defense, export security capacity-building regionally or globally as appropriate, and 

expand access in countries or regions by, with, or through those partners where U.S. 

presence may be unwelcome or impractical. (FM 3-22, January 2013)

Notice the focus of this paragraph is aligned, most closely, with present day understanding.

 Paragraph 3-71. ARSOF support operational preparation of the environment through a 

wide range of activities that directly support unified land operations. ARSOF assess and 

shape operational environments by, with, or through host nations, regional partners, 

and indigenous populations in a culturally attuned manner that is both immediate and 

enduring. Coordination and integration between conventional forces and ARSOF support 

theater objectives and unified action to prevent and deter conflict or prevail in war. (FM 

3-22, January 2013)

Notice this paragraph reinforces the importance of SOF in BWT.

 6-38. (Chapter 6 Considerations for Working Effectively With Foreign Security Forces.) 

All planned operations must be conducted by, with, or through the FSF and defense 

establishment. The measure of an effective advisory effort is the amount of personal 

responsibility the FSF take for their own operations. Civilians must see that their FSF 

can provide for their internal security and external defense while promoting the 

legitimacy of the host-nation government and its capacity to build trust and confidence. 

Advisors maintain a subtle and ongoing influence, their presence being as constant and 

unobtrusive as a shadow. (FM 3-22, January 2013)

Notice this paragraph links the advisory effort to BWT.
15

FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, 13 May 2014, demonstrates the evolution 

of the term BWT and application to the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan. Paragraph 10-25 states, 

“Identify, separate, isolate, influence, and reintegrate is a method that combines several 

activities that affect relevant population groups. This can be done in both high threat situations 

and situations where the insurgency is at its infancy and combat is less intense. This method 

works by, with, and through the host nation; however, it may have some elements which 

Soldiers and Marines are directly interacting with a local population. (FM 3-24, May 2014).”

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 25 March 2013, states, 

“The nature of the challenges to the US and its interests demand that the Armed Forces operate 

as a closely integrated joint team with interagency and multinational partners across the range 

of military operations. Using a whole-of-government approach is essential to advancing our 

interests to strengthen security relationships and capacity by, with, and through military forces 

of partner nations, US and foreign government agencies, state and local government agencies, 

and intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations.” (Preface, pg. i.)