1 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, 

 v. 

CHRISTOPHER BLACKWELL, 

Defendant. 

4:15-CR-20152-TGB-MJH 

HON. TERRENCE G. BERG 

ORDER DENYING MOTION 

TO VACATE SENTENCE 

(ECF NO. 241) 

Petitioner Christopher Blackwell pleaded guilty to aiding and 

abetting tampering with a witness by physical force. Though Blackwell 

later sought to withdraw his plea, the Court denied his request, and that 

decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 

Circuit. Petitioner Blackwell now moves to vacate, correct, or modify his 

sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Blackwell claims that the government 

committed prosecutorial misconduct by allegedly withholding certain 

evidence until Blackwell had pleaded guilty. Blackwell also argues that 

his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate 

various witness statements or demand the evidence that the government 

had allegedly withheld. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

The following facts are drawn from Blackwell’s plea agreement. See

Blackwell Plea Agreement, ECF No. 169. In 2013, a grand jury indicted 

Juawone Jones, Frank Hogg, and Jaquavious Towns for conspiracy to 

distribute cocaine base.1 While he was detained in July, 2014, Hogg called 

Christopher Blackwell, the petitioner in this case. Hogg told Blackwell 

that he believed Jones, who had been released on bond, was cooperating 

with the government. ECF No. 169, PageID.759-60. 

Four days later, Blackwell’s co-defendant Lezlye Taylor met with 

Jones and drove around the city of Flint. Id. at PageID.760. While they 

drove, Taylor communicated her and Jones’s location to Blackwell and 

Blackwell ultimately “arranged for [Jones] to be shot to prevent his 

testimony” in the underlying case before Judge Parker. Id. 

Defendant Blackwell signed a plea agreement on August 31 2016. 

Id. at PageID.766. The Court accepted the agreement on December 21, 

2016. A month later, Blackwell moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that 

he had not wanted to sign the plea agreement, but had felt coerced to do 

so by his lawyer and by the Court. See Motion to Withdraw Plea, ECF 

No. 185. The Court denied that motion. Transcript, ECF No. 196, 

PageID.1069. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial. See Order of the 

1 That case, United States v. Hogg, et al., No. 13-20809-LVP, remains 

before the Hon. Linda V. Parker. 

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Sixth Circuit, ECF No. 218. Blackwell now moves to vacate his sentence 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A prisoner serving a sentence imposed by a federal court may 

challenge that sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 “upon the ground that 

[it] was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such 

sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized 

by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” § 2255(a). As relief, 

the prisoner may move the court which imposed the sentence to correct, 

vacate, or set it aside. The law is clear that “§ 2255 claims that do not 

assert a constitutional or jurisdictional error are generally cognizable 

only if they involve[] a fundamental defect which inherently results in a 

complete miscarriage of justice.” Snider v. United States, 908 F.3d 183, 

189 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 

(1974) (internal quotations omitted)). This standard is met only in 

exceptional circumstances; not every alleged error of law can be raised on 

a § 2255 motion. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); Davis, 

417 U.S. at 346. 

III. DISCUSSION 

Petitioner raises two arguments: (1) that the government 

committed prosecutorial misconduct by withholding certain evidence 

until after Blackwell pleaded guilty; and (2) that Petitioner’s lawyer 

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rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to provide him with 

certain evidence and failing to investigate several witness statements. 

Mot. for Relief, ECF No. 241, PageID.1678-79. 

A. The government did not withhold evidence 

Blackwell claims that the government withheld certain witness 

testimony until after he pleaded guilty. ECF No. 241, PageID.1677. He 

requests an evidentiary hearing to determine when the evidence was 

provided to the defense. 

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires the 

government to disclose to a criminal defendant exculpatory evidence 

material to guilt or punishment in the government’s possession. Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). There are three essential elements of a 

Brady violation: “[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, 

either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that 

evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or 

inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 

U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). “[F]avorable evidence is material, and 

constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, if 

there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to 

the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Kyles 

v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995) (citation and internal marks 

omitted). 

Blackwell’s Brady claim is not supported because the evidence he 

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says he did not receive was in fact provided to his lawyer. As the 

government points out, evidence in this case was subject to a stipulated 

protective order. See Stip. Protective Order, ECF No. 133. Under the 

terms of that order, the identities, statements, and prior testimony of 

certain witnesses was to be disclosed to the defendants’ attorneys only. 

Id. at PageID.525. Defense counsels were prohibited from disclosing that 

information to their clients “[u]ntil one week prior to trial,” and were 

prohibited from attempting to “contact or interview witnesses identified 

by information obtained pursuant to [the] order until two weeks prior to 

trial.” Id. at PageID.526. 

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically contemplate 

protective orders. See Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 16(d)(1) (explaining that “at any 

time the court may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or 

inspection, or grant other appropriate relief”). Given the charges against 

Blackwell—arranging to shoot a person believed to be cooperating with 

the government in another case—a protective order delaying disclosure 

of information about possible cooperating witnesses was entirely 

reasonable. The Sixth Circuit has squarely held that no Brady violation 

arises and no new trial is justified when evidence is provided to a 

defendant’s lawyer but, because of a protective order, the defendant is 

not permitted to see it until a certain stage of the case. See United States 

v. Simels, 636 F. App’x 13, 15-16 (2d Cir. 2015). 

Accordingly, Blackwell’s first claim of error is insufficient to show 

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that he was deprived of his constitutional right to due process. 

B. Blackwell’s lawyer did not render ineffective assistance 

Blackwell’s second claim is that he was deprived of his right to 

counsel because his attorney rendered ineffective assistance in two ways: 

by failing to timely deliver discovery and failing to investigate the case. 

Mot., ECF No. 241, PageID.1678. 

Claims of ineffective assistance are governed by the two-prong test 

set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). A petitioner 

must show (1) that their attorney’s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness, and (2) prejudice: that there is a “reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. 

Blackwell charges that his attorney failed to deliver discovery 

material until after Blackwell pleaded guilty. While Blackwell does not 

specifically identify what discovery his lawyer purportedly withheld, it 

appears Blackwell is referring to the same witness statements discussed 

throughout his motion. See ECF No. 241, PageID.1679 (“Counsel failed 

to investigate the discovery, nor did he even give it (discovery) to the 

movant until after the movant had pled guilty. Had counsel investigated 

the evidence, he would have easily found that the witnesses testimony 

and statements did not ‘match up.’”). 

 For the same reasons discussed above, no error justifying relief 

under § 2255 arises when a lawyer complies with a court’s order evidence 

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not to share evidence with the defendant until a certain stage in the case. 

Blackwell’s other argument is that his lawyer rendered ineffective 

assistance by failing to investigate certain witness statements. Blackwell 

points to several inconsistencies that he believes additional investigation 

would have found. See ECF No. 241, PageID.1679-81, 1683-84. Blackwell 

argues that, had counsel discovered this evidence, Blackwell would not 

have pleaded guilty, but would have proceeded to trial. Id. He further 

argues that, with this evidence in hand, no reasonable jury could have 

convicted him. Id. at PageID.1682. 

At the outset, this argument is not persuasive, because there is no 

basis supporting Blackwell’s contention that his lawyer did not review 

the evidence and discover the very inconsistencies Blackwell complains 

were overlooked. Blackwell does not consider the real possibility that his 

attorney was well aware of the inconsistencies, but made a strategic 

decision that they would make no difference at trial. This is particularly 

true in light of the statement in the government’s response that 

Blackwell had admitted his own involvement in arranging the shooting, 

but lied about being at the scene, and that his inculpatory statement 

would have been offered against him at trial. See Gov’t. Resp., ECF No. 

248, PageID.1710-11. Consequently, it is more plausible that Blackwell’s 

counsel did review the material, but nevertheless concluded that 

Blackwell’s proceeding to trial would have been too risky in light of the 

evidence against him. 

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Moreover, as discussed below, the kinds of inconsistencies 

Blackwell identifies are relatively minor. Even if Blackwell’s counsel did 

not review the material and failed to discover the evidence to which 

Blackwell alludes, such a failure would not be ineffective assistance of 

counsel unless Blackwell can show prejudice. When a criminal case is 

resolved by guilty plea, as this one was, the prejudice inquiry “will depend 

on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to 

change his recommendation as to the plea.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 

59 (1985). That assessment, in turn, will depend “in large part on a 

prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome 

of a trial.” Id. 

Blackwell contends that two witnesses testified inconsistently with 

prior statements and points to other purported inconsistencies in the 

investigatory notes. But most of these are so minor that they barely rise 

to the level of effective impeachment material, let alone evidence that 

“likely” would have changed the outcome of a trial. 

For example, Blackwell says that Jones testified that the shooter 

called him a “snitch” and a “snake” before opening fire. But Jones had 

apparently previously told FBI agents that the shooter had instead 

shouted “snitch” and a racial epithet. ECF No. 241, PageID.1680. 

Elsewhere, Blackwell complains that two pages of a single report bore 

two conflicting dates, and of other minor inconsistencies between witness 

statements. The most significant of these is that Jones initially told police 

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shortly after the shooting that he did not know who had shot him, but 

later identified the shooter as Blackwell. This inconsistent statement 

could have used to impeach Jones and undermine his credibility if he 

testified. 

But Blackwell pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting witness 

tampering by use of physical force. See ECF No. 169, PageID.759 

(pleading guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(a)(2)(A) and 18 U.S.C. 

2). And he admitted to arranging the shooting. The government did not 

have to prove that Blackwell was or was not the shooter. So it is highly 

questionable whether Jones’s purportedly inconsistent statement about 

the shooter’s identity would have changed counsel’s recommendation 

about whether to plead guilty. 

Ultimately, the inconsistencies in the witness testimony must be 

weighed against the evidence against Blackwell that would have been 

presented at trial. Blackwell has not raised more than “speculative 

assertions” that, with this minimally exculpatory evidence in hand, his 

lawyer’s recommendation as to the plea would have been different. 

Bowen v. Foltz, 763 F.2d 191, 194 (6th Cir. 1985). Even if Blackwell’s 

lawyer did not review the purportedly missing evidence, Blackwell 

suffered no prejudice—the other evidence against him was 

overwhelming, 

Most critically, as mentioned, Blackwell confessed to arranging the 

shooting in a proffer session. See FBI 302 Report, ECF No. 183-6, 

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PageID.903-05. Blackwell’s admission would have presented a virtually 

insurmountable obstacle at trial. See, e.g., Leonard v. Warden, Ohio State 

Penitentiary, 846 F.3d 832, 848-49 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[a]ny minor 

inconsistencies [Defendant] now points out ... could not possibly have 

changed the impact of [his] confession ...”). At trial, Blackwell’s counsel 

would have had to convince the jury that Blackwell had lied to 

investigators when he admitted his own involvement. 

And although Blackwell both denied being present for the shooting 

itself and claimed the shooting was motivated purely by personal animus 

and not because Blackwell believed Jones was a cooperating witness, 

substantial evidence would have undermined Blackwell’s position at 

trial. That evidence included jail call records showing that Blackwell had 

spoken to Hogg, a defendant in the underlying case, shortly before the 

shooting. See Hogg Jail Calls, ECF No. 183-2, PageID.898. Records show 

that Blackwell promised Hogg that he would “holler at [Jones] for [him],” 

assuring Hogg that he wouldn’t have to “worry about” Jones anymore. Id.

Jones was shot just days later. Also available were phone records 

showing multiple calls between Blackwell and the other co-conspirators 

the night of the shooting. Blackwell Phone Records, ECF No. 183-7. 

Moreover, multiple witnesses identified Blackwell as present at the scene 

of the shooting. And, finally, Blackwell admitted to a jailhouse informant 

that he had participated in the shooting. Informant Statements, ECF 

Nos. 183-8; 183-9. 

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All of this is more than enough to overcome the marginally 

exculpatory nature of the inconsistent witness statements Blackwell 

complains were not disclosed to him. Blackwell has not shown that the 

purportedly missing evidence would have had a substantial likelihood of 

altering his attorney’s recommendation whether to accept or reject a plea 

agreement when considering along with all the inculpatory evidence that 

would have been presented at a trial. 

Finally, Blackwell appears to argue that his plea was not knowingly 

and intelligently entered. He says that, because his lawyer rendered 

ineffective assistance, he did not have full knowledge of the evidence 

against him. See ECF No. 241, PageID.1684. 

When a habeas petitioner claims that their guilty plea was 

motivated by the erroneous advice of counsel, the question is whether 

counsel’s advice was “within the range of competence demanded of 

attorneys in criminal cases.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 

(1970). Thus, the same Strickland test is used to analyze ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims in the plea context. Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. And 

for reasons discussed above, Blackwell’s attorney did not render 

ineffective assistance. 

In any event, this Court previously rejected Blackwell’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea after receiving briefing and hearing argument 

in open court. See Transcript, ECF No. 196, PageID.1069. As the Court 

explained, Blackwell’s plea was a “fair and thorough guilty plea in which 

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[Blackwell] was under oath” and gave answers that satisfied the Court 

that Blackwell’s plea was voluntary. Id. at PageID.1068-69. When 

Blackwell expressed concerns, the Court took a recess and allowed 

Blackwell to consult with his family and his attorney. Id. And ultimately, 

“[i]t was Mr. Blackwell who asked to enter a guilty plea” after that recess. 

Id. at PageID.1069. And when Blackwell appealed the Court’s decision, 

the Sixth Circuit determined that Blackwell had waived his right to 

appeal in his plea agreement, and that the plea agreement was 

knowingly and voluntarily entered. See ECF No. 218, PageID.1470-71. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the above-stated reasons, Petitioner Christopher Blackwell’s 

motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 must be DENIED. Blackwell’s 

request for the appointment of counsel (ECF Nos. 223, 242) will also be 

DENIED AS MOOT. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 31, 2023 s/Terrence G. Berg 

TERRENCE G. BERG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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