NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 20a0406n.06 No. 19

- 6330 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

– Appellee,

v. JONATHAN SHELTON , Defendant

– Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
OPINION

B EFORE : MOORE, CLAY , and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. On April 23, 2017, convicted felon Jonathan Shelton attended a Memphis

- area gun show with his mother and a few friends. While there, Shelton caused a disturbanc e and was ejected from the premises

. Detective Jarrett Parks, who was assigned to work the event, then saw Shelton hand some cash to his mother , a nd, later, get into a car with her, as she was carrying a newly purchased firearm. Notably, too, to Detective Parks ’ s eye, the car’s windows seemed darker than Tennessee law permitted

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55

- 9

- 107(a)(1) (prohibiting Tennessee drivers from operating “any motor vehicle in which any window

. . . [h] as a visible light transmittance of less than thirty

- five percent (35%) ”). Detective Parks relayed this information to a colleague, Detective Mario Tate , who promptly located the vehicl e on a nearby highway. And Detective Tate, who had over ten years’ worth of experience enforcing window

- tint violations, concurred in Detective Parks’ s assessment : the car’s windows appeared illegally tinted

. R.126 (Suppression Hr’ g Tr.) (Page ID #465).No. 19

- 6330 , United States v. Jonathan Shelton

2

So Detective Tate pulled the vehicle over, performed a roadside “field comparison test with a digital tin t m e ter,” and, sure enough, discovered that the driver’s

- side window had a visible light transmittance of only 21%, significantly below the legal limit. Id

. Worse yet, while performing the field comparison test, Detective Tate spotted “a weapon in the back floorboard and

. . . noticed the smell of marijuana, ” which provided him probable cause to search the vehicle further

. Id . at Page ID #466. And, unfortunately for Shelton , t hat search revealed more guns , and drugs, too

. R.154 (P SR ¶ 4 ) (Page ID #550)

. Arrest and federal prosecution (for being a felon

- in

- possession

- of

- a - firearm) followed. In response, Shelton moved to suppress the firearms found in the vehicle , arguing that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment because “ [n] o reasonable person” could have believed that the car’s windows were illegally tinted. R.98 (Mot. to Suppress) (Page ID #394). 1 But after holding a hearing, at which both Detective Parks and Detective Tate testified as to the events set forth above (without any cross - examination or contrary presentation from Shelton’s counsel), the magistrate judge denied Shelton’s motion , finding both officers credibl e . United States v. Shelton , No

. 18

- cr - 20056, 2019 WL 3417369, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 1, 2019) . The district c ourt followed suit. United States v. Shelton , No. 2: 18

- cr - 20056, 2019 WL 2563821 (W.D. Tenn. June 21, 2019). Shelton then ple aded guilty, received a 100

- month prison sentence , and filed this appeal, raising, again, just the window

- tint issue. The Suprem e Court has held that when a police officer has “probable cause” to believe that

a driver has violated traffic law , the officer may stop the driver without running afoul of the Fourth

1 Shelton did not challenge any other aspect of Detective Tate’s search.No. 19

- 6330 , United States v. Jonathan Shelton

3

Amendment ; this is true even if the officer is actually motived by some other purpose , such as investigating a n unrelated crime

. Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 81 0 , 812 (1996). And i n the context of “ongoing” traffic violation s

— like a blocked license plate or, more relevantly, an overly tinted window

— we have held , and the parties agree, 2 that the less demanding “reasonable suspicion” standard applies. United States v. Simpson , 520 F.3d 531, 541 (6th Cir. 2008). In turn, then, we have held that an officer reasonably suspects a window

- tint violation i f the officer is “familiar[]” with their state’s tint law and “estimate[s] that [a] vehicle [is] tinted substantially darker than ” that law permits. United States v. Shank , 543 F.3d 309, 313 (6th Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of motion to suppress) ; see also United States v. Terrell , 483 F. App’x 161, 164

– 65 (6th Cir. 2012) (same)

. Shank decides this case. Detective Tate testified , credibly, in the magistrate judge’s view, that he ha s a decade’s worth of experience enforcing Tennessee ’s window

- tint law , and that, based on that experience, he believed the car Shelton was riding in had windows tinted substantially below Tennessee standards

. And, if that weren’t enough, the positive field test and Detective Parks’ s testimony confirm ed the reasonableness of Detective Tate’s suspicion

. Shelton ’s only argument on appeal

— t hat the government needed to supplement this showing with yet more evidence, like photographs of the car’s exterior

— is unavailing. Not only does this point fail to come to grips wit h Shank , wh ich specifically held that the kind of testimony Detective Tate offered here suffice s for reasonable

- suspicion purposes, but also Shelton offers no

2 For this reason, to the extent confusion remains on the subject , see, e.g. , United States v. Taylor , 471 F. App’x 499, 510

– 11 (6th Cir. 2012), we need not consider it here. S ee Heien v. North Carolina , 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014) (applying reasonable

- suspicion standard in Fourth Amendment traffic stop case because “ [a] ll parties agree[d]” on the issue).No. 19

- 6330 , United States v. Jonathan Shelton

4

reason to think that photographs of the car’s exterior would have disprove d what the officers’ eyes, and the objective tint meter, plainly observed : that the car’s windows were illegally tinted. Consequently, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Shelton’s motion to suppress

.