Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Lopez, 2019 IL App (3d) 170798

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

JAMIE L. LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-17-0798

Filed January 4, 2019

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island County, No. 94-CF-782; 

the Hon. Richard A. Zimmer, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Jeffrey J. Neppl and Theresa L. Sosalla, of Neppl & Zhang Law Firm 

LLC, of Rock Island, for appellant.

John L. McGehee, State’s Attorney, of Rock Island (Patrick Delfino, 

David J. Robinson, and Gary F. Gnidovec, of State’s Attorneys 

Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Holdridge and Wright concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant, Jamie L. Lopez, appeals the third-stage denial of his successive 

postconviction petition, arguing that the court erred in denying his postconviction petition 

where the sentencing court failed to consider defendant’s youth when determining his 

sentence. We affirm. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 In 1995, defendant was convicted of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 

1994)) and aggravated battery (id. § 12-4(b)(1)). The evidence at trial established that Chad 

Van Klavern and Craig Jordan were attacked with a club. Our brief review of the facts is 

based on our order in People v. Lopez, No. 3-95-0421 (1996) (unpublished order under 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). Van Klavern died due to multiple craniocerebral injuries; a 

police officer testified that he was able to observe Van Klavern’s brain through a golf ball 

sized hole in his skull. Jordan survived but suffered a head wound requiring 11 staples. The 

Moline Police Department questioned Augustin Torres about the incident based on an 

anonymous tip. During questioning, Torres implicated himself, defendant, and Anthony 

Olvera. The police conducted an investigation and recovered the club and clothing allegedly 

worn by defendant during the attack. The blood on the clothing matched Van Klavern’s 

blood. Olvera and Torres testified that it was defendant’s idea to attack Van Klavern and 

Jordan. Torres testified that defendant alone attacked Van Klavern with the club. Defendant 

told them to deny that he was with them at the time of the incident if they were questioned by 

police. 

¶ 4 A sentencing hearing was held on May 9, 1995. In mitigation, a pastor testified that 

defendant did some volunteer work. As a result, the pastor developed a positive opinion of 

defendant. Defendant’s mother testified that she and defendant’s father got divorced and 

remarried twice, which had a negative impact on defendant. She stated that defendant’s sister 

was diagnosed with “manic depressive illness” and defendant was worried and concerned 

about her. Defendant’s father testified that he had a good relationship with defendant, 

revolving particularly around baseball. He said defendant had a strong faith. 

¶ 5 The presentence investigation report (PSI) established that defendant was 16 years old at 

the time of the PSI. He completed the tenth grade but dropped out “because there were too 

many kids that he was afraid to be around.” He had earned three credits of the 21.5 required 

for graduation, had a grade point average of 0.167, and was ranked 567 out of 576. 

According to the school, defendant was dropped from school due to lack of attendance. 

¶ 6 Defendant told the police that he was not with Torres and Olvera on the day of the 

incident but that the two of them “had been pressuring him to become involved in activities 

that he did not wish to become involved in.” Defendant also said that the blood found on his 

clothing could have come from a fight he had earlier, since he got into a lot of fights. He 

further stated that he had loaned clothes to Torres and Olvera in the past. Defendant’s prior 

juvenile record included disturbing the peace, two separate retail thefts, and a curfew 

violation. Defendant reported that he had good relationships with his parents but that his 

relationship with his mother changed when he became a teenager “and began being dragged 

down by his peers.” Defendant’s parents reported that two of his sisters were diagnosed as 

manic depressive. Defendant reported that he did not belong to a gang but was “involved 
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with” Gangster Disciples, Vice Lords, and the Bishops. Defendant first drank alcohol at age 

14 and last drank in September 1994. He said drinking caused problems with his girlfriend, 

friends, and at home. Defendant reported that he started smoking marijuana at age 15. 

¶ 7 The PSI further included information regarding defendant’s time at the Mary Davis 

Detention Home. At first, defendant had a number of “lock up offenses” because he had a 

difficult time adjusting. However, it was reported that he had improved. A counselor reported 

that the home had a grading process based on room neatness, behavior, peer interaction, and 

authority problems. Defendant had been receiving C’s and D’s. He then improved and started 

earning B’s and then A’s. Defendant started volunteering for chore assignments and was a 

good worker, showed good sportsmanship, and wrote and performed a positive rap for teens 

in a talent show. Defendant stopped retaliating when taunted by racial slurs. The PSI further 

included multiple victim impact letters from friends and family of Van Klavern. 

¶ 8 Defendant made a brief statement in allocution in which he stated that he was sad about 

the tragedy and sorry for the families of the victims and his own family. The State asked the 

court to sentence defendant to between 45 and 55 years, which was less than the maximum, 

based on defendant’s potential for rehabilitation. 

¶ 9 The court stated that it had considered the PSI and the evidence presented. The court then 

stated: 

“But factors in aggravation and mitigation—the first, the defendant’s criminal 

conduct neither caused nor threatened serious physical harm to another, and second, 

the defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause or threaten 

serious physical harm to another. I cannot consider them in lieu of the fact it’s an 

element of the offense in this case, when death is an element of the offense and 

serious bodily harm, Court cannot consider that at sentencing, a sentence is not 

aggravated or mitigated in this case. 

 Number three, the defendant acted under a strong provocation. From what 

evidence Court has heard throughout this entire trial, the facts, even at Torres’ trial, 

it’s clear this was an unprovoked assault by two young teenagers out beyond hours 

that they should be out on the street, up in Chicago, travelling around unsupervised, 

they should not be travelling in Chicago, should be home, but in any event on the 

night in question when this—the night this murder occurred, an aggravated assault 

occurred, these defendants acted under no provocation. In fact, the statement of 

[defendant] himself as he told one of his friends the day afterwards when he is getting 

rid of the club, the lower portion of the club, he said they beat up two guys, jumped 

two guys because they had nothing else to do. Nothing else to do—so on the night in 

question—Court finds absolutely no provocation, no taunting by Van Klavern, no 

taunting by Jordan, they were simply walking home. 

There were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant’s 

criminal conduct though failing to establish a defense. I don’t find any in this case.

The defendant’s criminal conduct was induced or facilitated by someone other 

than the defendant. Yes and no. I think it’s clear if you listen to the testimony of 

Olvera and Torres, corroborated by friends of the defendant he was prime mover in 

this case to go outside and assault the two boys. Now that doesn’t excuse Torres. He 

knew exactly what he was doing. He got out of that car with the defendant, they took 

parts of that club, crawled by a cement wall waiting to assault two young men in the 
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street. I think it’s clear he and Torres were two planners of the fight and prime mover 

was [defendant]. 

 Defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his criminal conduct 

for the damage or injury that he sustained. Inapplicable in this case. No monetary 

damage shown here, no monetary damage that would apply. 

 The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a 

law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present 

crime. No great criminal record. I want to note [he] had drug problems, very serious 

in the [PSI], his mother was attempting to get him help for, had a fighting problem, 

but his real record was couple thefts as you point out. I am not basing—if anything is 

probably mitigating to the defendant. 

The defendant’s criminal conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to 

recur. Court cannot come to that conclusion, [defendant], you have tried to alibi for 

yourself from day one when the evidence is overwhelming against you. You never 

thought your friends would turn on you but they did, they helped convict you in this 

case, the people you ran with, not the people the victim ran with, day after the crime 

depositing of evidence, lower half of the club with blood on it. It’s clear the day after, 

after the day of the crime, you are taking people to the crime scene, almost in a 

bragging way this is where we jumped two people, had a fight, pointed it out to your 

friends, had this alibi in Court, you weren’t there, all the way—

 The imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to his 

dependents. No evidence of that—he has no dependents at this point. 

 The imprisonment of the defendant would endanger his or her medical condition. 

No evidence of this and not mentally retarded as defined in the Code, I don’t find 

factors in mitigation there. 

 Factors in aggravation, actually the flip side. I think when you turn to this, 

sentence necessary to deter others from committing the same crime. 

Court is considering [defendant’s] rehabilitation potential which you, you are a 

young man, you have committed a horrible crime. The Court must balance this, all 

parties argue before the Court, what is the appropriate sentence, the Court finds 

clearly you have a rehabilitation potential, it appears to me you improved your life in 

terms of academics. It appears you have had some athletic talent. On the other hand 

Court must consider this crime, what you have done, the degree of participation, you 

were the prime mover, and a degree of participation between you and Torres, you 

were on the crime scene beating not only Van Klavern but Jordan, testimony clearly 

supported that, as [the State] pointed out, the only reason this assault stopped is 

because those neighbors came out, you were there beating, flailing away, the match 

up of the blood on the lower half of the club, on the coat that you were wearing, 

clearly presents an implication that corroborates the testimony of Torres and Olvera 

and Craig Jordan, that you were clearly assaulting Van Klavern much more than 

Torres, that doesn’t excuse anything, however. I do note difference in 

participation—the fatal assault of Van Klavern—there’s also testimony you were 

beating on Jordan. He says two people assaulted him at one point—it appears from 

the testimony—his testimony somewhat self-serving—it’s clear he was assaulting 

Jordan at the time although he did go over, assault with the upper portion of the club, 
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also on Van Klavern, this case is about protection of people walking the streets, and 

people should be free to walk the street whether it be at night, daytime, they shouldn’t

have to worry about assault from young teenagers; young teenagers ought not to be 

contemplating with nothing else to do to decide we are going to assault two people on 

the street in Rock Island County or any County in the State of Illinois. You are 

dangerous to the public even though you have rehabilitation potential. You are still 

very dangerous, [defendant]. I don’t think you to this day realize what you have done 

in this case. But Courts have a duty to protect the citizens and Courts have a duty to 

punish severely defendants who without provocation assault people on the street, 

irrespective of their age.”

The court sentenced defendant to 50 years’ imprisonment on the murder conviction to run 

concurrent with a sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment on the aggravated battery conviction. 

We affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Lopez, No. 3-95-0421. 

¶ 10 In 1997, defendant filed a petition for postconviction relief, presenting various ineffective 

assistance of counsel arguments. The circuit court denied the petition after an evidentiary 

hearing. This court affirmed the denial on appeal. People v. Lopez, No. 3-98-0395 (1999) 

(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). 

¶ 11 In 2000, defendant filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, 

stating that his initial petition was deficient and alleging unreasonableness of postconviction 

counsel. The circuit court denied the motion, and this court allowed counsel’s motion to 

withdraw and affirmed the denial of the motion pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 

551 (1987). People v. Lopez, No. 3-02-0298 (2004) (unpublished order under Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 23). 

¶ 12 In 2015, defendant filed a second motion to file a successive postconviction petition, 

which is the subject of the instant appeal. In his motion, defendant alleged that the sentencing 

court failed to take sufficient consideration of his youth under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 

460 (2012). The circuit court denied the motion, stating that defendant failed to aver facts 

that would change the verdict or offer new evidence. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider 

and for leave to file an amended postconviction petition, both of which were granted. 

¶ 13 On April 25, 2017, a third-stage evidentiary hearing was held on the amended petition. 

Dr. Antoinette Kavanaugh testified as a defense expert that she was a forensic clinical 

psychologist. She had worked with the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 

Prevention developing a curriculum to be used in juvenile courts and detention centers. She 

had recently published an article entitled, “Prospects for Developing Expert Evidence in 

Juvenile Montgomery Resentencing Cases,” which discussed “how psychologists can help, 

can present information to the Court that’s individualized and addresses the Miller factors 

instead of what we can and can’t do.” She stated that she had testified in court “[h]undreds of 

times.” She reviewed the transcript from defendant’s sentencing hearing and the PSI. She 

discussed how juvenile brains operate differently than adult brains. Because of their brains, 

juveniles act impulsively, are easily influenced by their peers, have trouble planning ahead, 

are not as good at gauging risk, seek sensation, and are less able to delay gratification. After 

reading the sentencing transcripts, Kavanaugh made some observations, stating: 

“So one is the idea that sentence he was given that he, the judge, said in the 

sentencing hearing transcript, sentence that he was imposing a sentence necessary to 

deter others from committing the same crime. 
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 Empirically, we have a strong body of research to show that a strict sentence does 

not deter other adolescents from committing the same act, so—so that’s wrong from a 

psychological perspective. 

And he also said I don’t think you, to this day, realize what you have done in this 

case. 

I think from a developmental perspective it’s not unusual for an adolescent not to 

appreciate the gravity of their act at the time and until they have matured, so that, I 

don’t think, reflects some of the things that the courts have said to be considered in 

sentencing. 

I don’t—this is a typo because there should be a quote there, but courts have a 

duty to protect the citizens and courts have a duty to punish severely the defendant, 

who, without provocation, assault people on the streets, irrespective of their age and 

the idea certainly from Miller and Montgomery is that age and the features of, that a 

characteristic of that age, in fact, should be something that’s considered.”

Kavanaugh stated that the PSI noted that defendant’s relationship with his parents changed 

when he became a teenager, he began drinking at 14 years of age, and began using cannabis 

at 15 years of age. Kavanaugh stated: 

“It’s my clinical opinion that there’s nothing in the transcript of the sentencing 

hearing that clarifies how the judge considered these things despite the fact that they 

are in the PSI, which was known at the time or the clinical or how the adolescent 

brain is structured and functions different than an adult brain. I saw nothing in there 

in the record that noted that.”

¶ 14 Ultimately, the court denied defendant’s amended postconviction petition, finding that 

the Miller factors did not apply to defendant’s sentence as the sentence did not amount to a 

de facto life sentence or an actual life sentence where he was sentenced to 50 years’ 

imprisonment, with day-for-day credit, and would thus be released when he was 

approximately 41 years old. The court further found that the sentencing court “did look at 

[defendant’s] youthful status, [it] looked at all the factors, and exercised discretion within the 

sentencing range.”

¶ 15 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied. In doing so, the court stated: 

“I think the Court made the appropriate ruling when it denied the petition.

 I do want to comment on one thing. The defense did argue regarding [the 

sentencing court’s] comment, and specifically that comment in paragraph 6 of the 

supplemental brief filed by the defense. The record of [defendant’s] sentencing 

hearing, including the PSI reports reviewed by the Court, do contain information 

applicable to the Miller factors. [Defendant’s] case is distinguished from Holman in 

at least one significant fact. The Court stated specifically that it was sentencing 

[defendant] to 50 years irrespective of his age. And I don’t read that part of the 

transcript as saying what the defense argue it says. 

[The sentencing court] was giving [its] ruling, and [it] says: [‘]You are dangerous 

to the public. Even though you have rehabilitation potential, you are still very 

dangerous, [defendant]. I don’t think you to this day realize what you have done in 

this case.[’]
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 And then the applicable language, which defense is citing: [‘]But courts have a 

duty to protect citizens and the courts have a duty to punish severely defendants who 

without provocation assault people on the street irrespective of their age.[’]

I don’t read that as saying [the sentencing court] is sentencing [defendant] 

irrespective of his age. I read that as a general statement, a general principle of law or 

concept that [the sentencing court] has that courts have a duty to punish defendants 

severely who without provocation assault people on the street, and that that duty is 

present regardless of their age. 

And I think when you read [the sentencing court’s] comments in their entirety 

and, in fact, as stated in the brief, the record of [defendant’s] sentencing hearing, 

including the PSI reports reviewed by the court do contain information applicable to 

Miller factors.”

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 17 On appeal, defendant argues that the court erred in denying defendant’s postconviction 

petition because the sentencing court, when sentencing defendant to 50 years’ imprisonment, 

did not consider defendant’s “youth and its attendant circumstances.” Upon review, we find 

that defendant’s sentence is not a de facto life sentence and does not fall within the category 

of cases considered by Miller and its progeny. Moreover, even if defendant’s sentence was a 

de facto life sentence, the circuit court adequately considered defendant’s youth and its 

attendant circumstances. 

¶ 18 “The Post-Conviction Hearing Act offers a procedural device through which a criminal 

defendant may assert that ‘in the proceedings which resulted in his or her conviction there 

was a substantial denial of his or her rights under the Constitution of the United States or of 

the State of Illinois or both.’ ” People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 25 (quoting 725 ILCS 

5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2010)). Here, defendant argued that his sentence of 50 years’ 

imprisonment was unconstitutional under the eighth amendment. 

¶ 19 “The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the special characteristics 

of juvenile offenders.” People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶ 52. 

“When the offender is a juvenile and the offense is serious, there is a genuine risk of 

disproportionate punishment. In Roper [v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 511 (2005)], Graham 

[v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)], and Miller, the United States Supreme Court 

addressed that risk and unmistakably instructed that youth matters in sentencing. 

Roper held that the eighth amendment prohibited capital sentences for juveniles who 

commit murder. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79. Graham held that the eighth amendment 

prohibited mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses. 

Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. And Miller held that the eighth amendment prohibited 

mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit murder. Miller, 567 U.S. at 489, 

132 S. Ct. at 2475.” Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 33. 

Subsequently, our supreme court has held that Miller and its progeny stand for the 

proposition that “[l]ife sentences, whether mandatory or discretionary, for juvenile 

defendants are disproportionate and violate the eighth amendment, unless the trial court 

considers youth and its attendant characteristics.” Id. ¶ 40. De facto life sentences also fall 

into this category, as 
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“[a] mandatory term-of-years sentence that cannot be served in one lifetime has 

the same practical effect on a juvenile defendant’s life as would an actual mandatory 

sentence of life without parole—in either situation, the juvenile will die in prison. 

Miller makes clear that a juvenile may not be sentenced to a mandatory, unsurvivable 

prison term without first considering in mitigation his youth, immaturity, and 

potential for rehabilitation.” People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9. 

In sum, if sentencing a juvenile defendant to life imprisonment or an unsurvivable prison 

term, it must first consider defendant’s youth and attendant circumstances. Thus, in analyzing 

a juvenile defendant’s sentence under the Miller cases, we first determine whether 

defendant’s sentence amounted to life imprisonment or a de facto life sentence. If so, then we 

determine whether the court considered defendant’s youth and its attendant circumstances.

¶ 20 Here, defendant was sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment, with day-for-day sentencing 

credit. According to the Illinois Department of Corrections inmate database, which we take 

judicial notice of (People v. Smith, 2014 IL App (4th) 121118, ¶ 34), defendant is scheduled 

to be paroled on May 15, 2019, when he is almost 41 years old. Defendant’s sentence does 

not amount to a de facto life sentence and does not fall into the category of cases considered 

by Miller and its progeny. Defendant’s sentence is similar to a myriad of cases in which the 

court held that the sentence imposed did not amount to a de facto life sentence. See, e.g., 

People v. Rodriguez, 2018 IL App (1st) 141379-B, ¶ 73 (50-year sentence, allowing release 

at age 65); Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451, ¶¶ 65-67 (52-year sentence, allowing release 

at age 60); People v. Pearson, 2018 IL App (1st) 142819, ¶ 49 (50-year sentence, allowing 

release at age 55); People v. Evans, 2017 IL App (1st) 143562, ¶ 14 (90-year sentences, with 

day-for-day credit, allowing release at age 62). In fact, when released on parole defendant 

will be significantly younger than many similarly situated defendants. 

¶ 21 In coming to this conclusion, we reject defendant’s request to extend the Miller line of 

cases to every case in which juvenile defendants are convicted of “Adult Crimes.” As stated 

above (supra ¶ 19), Miller and its progeny apply to some sort of life sentence for juveniles, 

whether mandatory, discretionary, or de facto, not to all juveniles convicted as an adult. 

¶ 22 Significantly, even if the sentence here was a de facto life sentence, the record is clear 

that the court considered defendant’s youth and circumstances when sentencing defendant. 

Under Miller and subsequent case law, a defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment or 

a de facto life sentence but only after the court has considered “the defendant’s youth and its 

attendant characteristics.” Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46. Such characteristics include, but 

are not limited to: 

“(1) the juvenile defendant’s chronological age at the time of the offense and any 

evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and 

consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant’s family and home environment; (3) the 

juvenile defendant’s degree of participation in the homicide and any evidence of 

familial or peer pressures that may have affected him; (4) the juvenile defendant’s 

incompetence, including his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors and 

his incapacity to assist his own attorneys; and (5) the juvenile defendant’s prospects 

for rehabilitation.” Id.

“The inquiry into whether a sentencing court complied with Miller is backwards-looking.” 

Rodriguez, 2018 IL App (1st) 141379-B, ¶ 76. 
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“[T]he only evidence that matters is evidence of the defendant’s youth and its 

attendant characteristics at the time of sentencing. *** A court revisiting a 

discretionary sentence of life without parole must look at the cold record to determine 

if the trial court considered such evidence at the defendant’s original sentencing 

hearing.” Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 47. 

¶ 23 Here, the sentencing court stated that it had considered the PSI, the evidence presented by 

the parties, and the evidence from trial. The PSI stated that defendant was 16 years old, and 

the court noted more than once that defendant was young. Defendant’s parents both testified 

at the sentencing hearing about defendant’s home life, and ample information regarding it 

was included in the PSI. “Where relevant mitigating evidence is before the court, it is 

presumed that the court considered it absent some indication in the record to the contrary 

other than the sentence itself.” People v. Dominguez, 255 Ill. App. 3d 995, 1004 (1994). The 

PSI included information about defendant’s drug and alcohol use. In the PSI, defendant 

stated that Torres and Olvera “had been pressuring him to become involved in activities that 

he did not wish to become involved in.” The court noted that defendant was the “prime 

mover” behind the incident, but noted the peer involvement. The PSI showed that defendant 

had only completed tenth grade and had a low grade point average, but there was no evidence 

presented that defendant was incompetent or could not communicate with police officers or 

prosecutors. Further, the court specifically noted that defendant had rehabilitative potential 

and the PSI showed his marked improvement while at the Mary Davis Detention Home. 

Therefore, the court adequately considered the Miller factors. 

¶ 24 In coming to this conclusion, we note that defendant says, “the court specifically stated 

that it was sentencing [defendant] to 50 years ‘irrespective of [his] age.’ ” He then provides 

five definitions of the word “irrespective” and argues that such statement means that the 

court did not consider defendant’s age. At the motion to reconsider the denial of the 

postconviction petition, the circuit court responded to the same argument, stating: 

“[The sentencing court said, ‘]But courts have a duty to protect citizens and the courts 

have a duty to punish severely defendants who without provocation assault people on 

the street irrespective of their age.[’]

I don’t read that as saying [the sentencing court] is sentencing [defendant] 

irrespective of his age. I read that as a general statement, a general principle of law or 

concept that [the sentencing court] has that courts have a duty to punish defendants 

severely who without provocation assault people on the street, and that that duty is 

present regardless of their age.”

We agree with the circuit court’s assessment.

¶ 25 We further reject defendant’s statement that “Dr. Kavanaugh’s learned conclusion that 

the transcript of the sentencing hearing failed to support a finding that the sentencing judge 

thoughtfully considered and applied the ‘transient characteristics of youth’ must be given 

great weight in evaluating whether [defendant’s] sentence is in compliance with our 

constitution.” Kavanaugh specifically stated:

“It’s my clinical opinion that there’s nothing in the transcript of the sentencing 

hearing that clarifies how the judge considered these things despite the fact that they 

are in the PSI, which was known at the time or the clinical or how the adolescent 

brain is structured and functions different than an adult brain. I saw nothing in there 

in the record that noted that.”
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First, as stated above, when mitigating evidence is presented, it is presumed that the court 

considered it, unless there is some indication to the contrary. Supra ¶ 23 (citing Dominguez, 

255 Ill. App. 3d at 1004). Here, there was no indication to the contrary. There is no 

requirement that the court explicitly state on the record everything it considered when 

sentencing the defendant or the weight it gave. People v. Burgess, 2015 IL App (1st) 130657, 

¶ 227. Second, Kavanaugh’s clinical opinion has no bearing on our legal review of the facts 

of defendant’s sentencing hearing. Kavanaugh did not interview defendant when he was 16 

years old and did not have any opinion on defendant’s specific mental development and 

characteristics at that time. 

¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 27 The judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is affirmed. 

¶ 28 Affirmed.