Office for Victims of Crime

Advocating for the Fair 

 Treatment of Crime Victims

Office for Victims of Crime

Advocating for the Fair 

 Treatment of Crime Victims

Responding 

Terrorism Victi

Responding 

Terrorism Victi

Oklahoma City and B

Oklahoma City and B
Preparation of this document was funded by the Office for Victims of

Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The document is based on interviews with those tasked with assisting the victims

of the Oklahoma City bombing in the investigative and prosecutorial

phases of the criminal justice system. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this document are those of

the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the

U.S. Department of Justice.

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

810 Seventh Street NW.

Washington, DC 20531

Janet Reno

Attorney General

Daniel Marcus

Acting Associate Attorney General

Mary Lou Leary

Acting Assistant Attorney General

Kathryn M. Turman

Director, Office for Victims of Crime

Office of Justice Programs

World Wide Web Home Page

www.ojp.usdoj.gov

Office for Victims of Crime 

World Wide Web Home Page

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc

For grant and funding information contact

U.S. Department of Justice Response Center

1–800–421–6770

OVC Resource Center

1–800–627–6872

OVC Resource Center Home Page

www.ncjrs.org

The Office for Victims of Crime is a component of the Office of Justice Programs,

which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics,

the National Institute of Justice, and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention.

NCJ 183949
Responding 

Terrorism Victi

Oklahoma City and Be

U.S. Department of Justice • Office of Justice Programs • Office for Victims of Crime

Oc

N
About the Cover

The missing presence of the 168 killed in the Alfred P. Murrah Building bombing is marked by 168 chairs in a me

morial park where the building once stood. Although the chairs are similar in overall appearance, each was indivi

ally handcrafted so no two chairs are exactly alike, and each is etched with the name of a victim who was killed.

Some chairs are small, representing the children who died. The seat backs were cast from molten bronze and sit on

bases made of glass. The glass bases house lighting mechanisms so that the chairs glow at night.

Photo courtesy of the Oklahoma City National Memorial Foundation.
iii

the borders of this country.

The 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City literally brought home

the impact of terrorism for Americans. Individuals and agencies responded in extraordinary ways in the

aftermath of the bombing and throughout the criminal trials. No model was in place, however, to guide

them in how to respond to and what to expect from victims of terrorism. Their response has since set a

standard for others to follow in responding to victims of future terrorist events including the bombing

of the military barracks at Khobar Towers in 1996 and the bombings of two United States embassies in

Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. In addition, the preparations for the Oklahoma City bombing trial phase

helped to anticipate the complex issues that developed with the 1999 trial preparations for the two

Libyan suspects in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. The Office for Victims of Crime (OVC)

has marshaled resources and creatively used new technologies to ensure that families of the 270 victims

have information and assistance throughout the trial process.

The potential numbers of victims and the consequences of terrorist events present significant challenges and require an extraordinary response from public safety and law enforcement agencies.

Experience has taught us that the physical, emotional, and psychological impact on victims and communities persists long after the immediate crisis has been handled. Preparing for acts of mass violence

has become an important priority for federal, state, and local officials, and ongoing efforts to develop

comprehensive response plans among agencies are occurring at all levels of government. The needs of

victims and their families, beginning with the immediate crisis and continuing through the criminal

justice process and beyond, must be incorporated into the planning process.

Each act of terrorism presents unique challenges that are specific to the victims, the event itself, and

the progress of the criminal investigation and prosecution. Providing services to the victims of each terrorism event teaches additional and important lessons for responding to future events and expands our

base of knowledge for serving victims more effectively. Responding to Terrorism Victims: Oklahoma City

and Beyond attempts to summarize those lessons and to recommend plans for responding to the needs of

terrorism victims. This report focuses primarily on how criminal justice agencies and victim assistance

professionals can assist victims of terrorism and on how the roles and responsibilities of these agencies

and individuals fit into the overall response to victims.

A number of individuals involved in the provision of services to the Oklahoma City bombing victims

contributed their insights and experiences to this report in addition to OVC staff, who have been directly involved in working with victims of other acts of terrorism. Underlying their insights and efforts

have been the voices of the surviving victims and families of the victims of Oklahoma City, Khobar

Towers, the embassy bombings, and Pan Am Flight 103. These victims have honored us by sharing

their experiences of coping with the aftermath of the crimes that devastated their lives. In turn, we can

honor them by ensuring that our communities are adequately prepared to respond effectively to terrorism

victims in the future.

Kathryn M. Turman

Director
v

terrorist events. The Office for Victims of Crime is deeply grateful to them for sharing their experiences

through countless hours of interviews for the development of this report. We take this opportunity to

honor them for their remarkable service to the victims of the Oklahoma City bombing and to recognize

the impact their efforts will have on the response to victims in the future.

Gwen Allen

Executive Director, Project Heartland

K. Lynn Anderson

Assistant United States Attorney, U.S.

Attorney’s Office for the Western District

of Oklahoma

Suzanne Breedlove

Director, Victim Services, Oklahoma District

Attorneys Council

Mary Anne Castellano

Victim-Witness Coordinator, U.S. Attorney’s

Office for the District of Colorado

Robin Finegan

Director, Colorado Oklahoma Resource Council

Krista R. Flannigan

Director, Colorado Oklahoma Resource Council

Joan Gay

Victim-Witness Assistance Unit, U.S. Attorney’s

Office for the District of Kansas

Candace Grosz

Former Planning/Grants Specialist, Office for

Victims Programs, Colorado Department of

Public Safety

James M. Horn

Director, Forensic Behavioral Science

Consulting/Training

Jeannette King

Administrator, Critical Incident Workshop

Group, Inc.

Dahlia Lehman

Victim-Witness Assistance Supervisory

Coordinator, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the

Western District of Oklahoma

Diane Leonard

Former Administrator, Critical Incident

Workshop Group, Inc.

Carol Morris

Victim-Witness Coordinator, U.S. Attorney’s

Office for the Southern District of Indiana

Jim Norman

Psychologist, Project Heartland

Col. Jack Poe

Chief of Chaplains, Oklahoma City Police

Department

Patrick Ryan

Former United States Attorney, U.S.

Attorney’s Office for the Western District 

of Oklahoma

Steve Siegel

Director of Program Development, Denver

Victim Assistance and Law Enforcement Board

Mary Jo Speaker

Victim-Witness Coordinator, U.S. Attorney’s

Office for the Eastern District of Oklahoma

Gayla Stewart

Victim-Witness Coordinator, U.S. Attorney’s

Office for the Northern District of Oklahoma

Linda Wagner

Psychologist, Project Heartland

Several individuals were instrumental in the development of this report. Janet Dinsmore, writer and editor, conducted the interviews and organized the story of the Oklahoma City victim response. Her efforts

were supported and guided by OVC Deputy Director Carolyn Hightower and OVC Program Manager

Laura Federline, who was responsible for overseeing OVC funding to the various agencies providing

services to the bombing victims.
vii

II. The Immediate Crisis Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

The Initial Incident Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Victim Support Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Compassion Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Resource Coordination Committee (Unmet Needs Committee) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Crisis Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Death Notification and Recovery of Remains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Donations of Services and Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

III. Postcrisis Victim Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Ongoing Victim Needs and Vicarious Victimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Employee Assistance Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Project Heartland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Streamlining Procedures To File for Claim Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

U.S. Attorney’s Office Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Identification and Notification of Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Victim-Witness Assistance Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Attorney Liaison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

IV. The Criminal Pretrial and Trial Phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Challenges to Victims’ Rights and Services as a Result of Change of Venue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Travel Assistance to Denver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Denver-Based Support Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Victims’ Rights and Services During the Trials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

Closed-Circuit Television Broadcasts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

Explanation of Trial Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

The Victim-Witness Center, Denver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Mental Health Support and the Safe Havens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

V. Long-term Victim Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Ongoing Mental Health Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Assistance to First Responders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

Restitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

Postconviction Notification of Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

VI. Legal Issues Pertaining to Victims of Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Funding Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Victims’ Rights During the Criminal Justice Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Privacy Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
viii

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Bibliography/References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Interviewees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Additional Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i x

devastating incident of domestic terrorism in our

Nation’s history. The shock of this terrorist act

was magnified by its location—the very center

of our country. “This is the place, after all,

where terrorists don’t venture. The Heartland.

Wednesday [April 19] changed everything” (The

Daily Oklahoman, April 20, 1995). The effect of

the bombing was far reaching—extending well

beyond the borders of Oklahoma. It created mass 

casualties and injuries, affecting not only the immediate victims, survivors, and the Oklahoma

City community but also the entire Nation. 

In recent years, the Federal Government has been

called upon to play a larger role in mitigating and

responding to all types of human-caused violent

events and disasters. The federal responsibility

ranges from immediate disaster relief to long-term

assistance that helps communities to recover from

the event. Moreover, because terrorist acts are

federal crimes, investigated and prosecuted by federal law enforcement officials, federal criminal

justice agencies have statutory responsibilities related to victims’ rights and services in connection

with terrorism criminal cases. This range of responsibilities raises the issue of the Federal

Government’s preparedness to respond to acts

of terrorism and the resulting emotional and psychological impacts. Lessons learned from the

Oklahoma City bombing response provide a foundation for recommendations to improve planning

for services to victims of terrorism in the future,

keeping in mind that planning must be flexible to

meet the unique circumstances involved in each

incident. For example, the demands to provide

services to victims overseas or to victims who are

not from the location of the criminal event pose

different challenges from those raised by the

Oklahoma City bombing. Analysis of the

with responsibilities in those situations:

1. The immediate crisis must be handled.

2. Postcrisis victim needs must be met.

3. Victims’ rights and services must be provided

during any criminal justice process.

4. Long-term victim needs must be recognized

and provided for as they emerge over time.

This report identifies the special measures needed

to protect the rights and meet the needs of victims of a large-scale terrorist attack involving

mass casualties. In particular, it demonstrates efforts required to ensure an effective response to

victims’ rights and their short- and long-term

emotional and psychological needs as an integral

part of a comprehensive response to terrorism

cases involving mass casualties. This report does

not attempt to portray a complete picture of

everything that was done for the victims, and the

recommendations are not intended to present a

comprehensive plan for addressing the needs of

victims. It is a place to begin, based upon the experiences of OVC in working with victims and

providing resources for assistance.

The primary sources for the information and recommendations presented in this report are interviews and meetings with victims and staff of the

following organizations that were supported by

grants from the Office for Victims of Crime

(OVC) Emergency Reserve Fund:

✦ United States Attorney’s Office for the Western

District of Oklahoma: The Federal Government office responsible for prosecuting the

case and ensuring the provision of victims’
Government, state legislators, and city and cou

ty administrators. The report should also prove

valuable to prosecutors, law enforcement official

victim advocates, mental health providers, and a

others involved in victim-witness assistance effo

Its attention to the importance of preplanning

and coordination among responding agencies h

implications for any agency committed to servi

the needs of crime victims.

The report begins with background information

addressing the victims’ needs that emerged dur

the immediate crisis of the Oklahoma City bom

ing, the postcrisis victim needs after the immed

ate crisis was dealt with, victims’ needs during t

criminal justice process, and the long-term vict

needs that developed over time. These sections

are followed by a discussion of the laws that require victims’ rights and services to be a part of

any crisis response plan. The final sections iden

fy the lessons learned as a result of the Oklahom

City bombing and the other terrorism events

that followed it and present policy recommen

tions that promote future preparedness. All of

these criminal events have raised the followin

questions: 

✦ What are the needs of the victims, the fir

responders, and others who come into con

tact with the victims and/or the first responders (e.g., prosecutors, mental health

professionals, and family members of the

first responders)?

✦ What are the legal requirements for respo

ing to victims of terrorism?

✦ What are the chief obstacles to meeting v

tims’ needs (e.g., privacy issues versus the

x

✦ Project Heartland, Oklahoma City: An organization established by the Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and Substance

Abuse Services to coordinate and deliver

mental health services for bombing victims.

✦ Colorado Oklahoma Resource Council, Denver:

A broad-based public-private coalition that

coordinated services for victims throughout

the trials in Denver.

✦ Critical Incident Workshop Group, Inc.,

Oklahoma: An organization created to provide therapeutic debriefing sessions for families of deceased bombing victims, survivors,

and rescue-and-recovery workers.

✦ Oklahoma State Crime Victim Compensation

Program: A state agency that provided financial assistance with funding support from

OVC to crime victims for crime-related expenses such as funeral costs, medical and

mental health expenses, and lost wages.

Policy recommendations from the above

groups, in some cases, were broadened to

“Crime is a shattering experience. . . . It can destroy a

person’s sense of safety and security. Of paramount importance to crime victims and witnesses is their treatment by criminal justice personnel, who should care

about their suffering, enforce their rights and protections, offer support to help them heal, and hold the

criminal accountable for the harm caused.”

—Attorney General Janet Reno
x i
1

T

toll in human life and property damage and

changed the community’s and the Nation’s

general sense of safety and security. The blast

killed 167 men, women, and children and injured

853 others (Oklahoma Department of Mental

Health and Substance Abuse Services, May 31,

1998). A volunteer nurse became the 168th fatality when falling debris struck her as she responded

to the emergency. The explosion rocked downtown Oklahoma City, reduced the north face of

the Murrah Building to rubble, and dealt extensive damage to each of the nine floors as they collapsed into the center, pancaking one on top of

the other. When the dust cleared, one-third of

the building lay in ruins. The force of the blast

damaged 324 surrounding buildings, overturned

automobiles, touched off car fires, and blew out

windows and doors in a 50-block area. News reports indicated the explosion was felt 55 miles

from the site and registered 6.0 on the Richter

scale.

Nineteen children, many in a second floor daycare center, died in the Murrah Building’s collapse. Thirty children were orphaned. A total of

219 children lost a parent. More than 400 individuals were left homeless in the area. Seven

thousand people lost their workplace and some

16,000 people were downtown at the time of the

explosion (Oklahoma Department of Mental

Health and Substance Abuse Services, May 31,

1998). It is estimated 360,000 Oklahomans knew

someone personally who worked in the Murrah

Building (Oklahoma Department of Mental 

The bombing in Oklahoma City was an attac

cent children and defenseless citizens. It was a

cowardice, and it was evil.”

—Presiden

Health and Substance Abuse Services, May 31,

1998). To compound the devastation the bombing

had on the primary victims, unimaginable psychological and emotional impacts from the 16-day

rescue-and-recovery effort took its toll on secondary victims including law enforcement and fire 

department personnel and Urban Search and

Rescue (US&R) team members.

At the time the bomb was detonated, numerous

federal agencies had offices in the Murrah Building:

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF);

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); Army

and Marine recruiting offices; Department of

Veterans Affairs; General Accounting Office;

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services;

U.S. Department of Defense; U.S. Customs

Service; U.S. Department of Agriculture; U.S.

Department of Transportation; and General

Services Administration. The Federal Employees

Credit Union and “America’s Kids” Child Care

Development Center were also housed in the

building. When the catastrophe occurred, about

600 federal and contract workers and about

250 visitors were in the building (Oklahoma

Department of Civil Emergency Management,

1996).
3

The Initial Incident Response

Within minutes of the blast, a massive

search-and-rescue effort commenced that

included fire, emergency, medical, and law

enforcement personnel, as well as a large number

of citizens. Citizens and emergency personnel

joined together and entered the bombed structure,

forming human chains to locate and remove

trapped survivors and victims. In fact, throughout

this rescue effort, the large outpouring of citizens

and agency volunteers astonished veteran rescue

workers.

The strong State and Federal Government presence in Oklahoma City helped the response-andrescue effort. For example, immediately following

A Summary of Victims Needs During the Immediate

Crisis

The immediate response to the bombing encompassed the search-and-recovery effort

that lasted through May 4 and centered upon

the need for information about the identity 

and status of victims and emergency support.

The following victims’ needs quickly became

evident:

✧ A crisis response plan for identifying and

assisting victims of criminal incidents causing mass casualties that is linked to an

overall system for responding to acts of

terrorism.

✧ A mechanism for providing information

to families about their loved ones and to

provide comfort and protection from the

media.

✧ A system for gathering pertinent information from families necessary to facilitate

the identification of remains, for relaying

information about the remains of a loved

one, and for providing counseling services

during the process of recovering and identifying remains.

✧ A system of death notification that ensures that victims receive information

about their loved ones before the media

broadcast this information and that takes

into consideration the wishes of the family

and the safety and care of family members

once they receive notification.

✧ Mental health care service providers with

experience and training in working with

victims, their families, and others impacted

by mass-casualty crimes.

✧ Awareness of financial, technical assistance, and training resources for meeting

the needs of terrorism victims.

✧ A system for providing for first responders’ physical and emotional needs,

including regular communication with 

family members.
4

tives from the state departments of public safety,

human services, military, health, and education.

Soon joining these agencies were the National

Weather Service, the Civil Air Patrol, and the

American Red Cross (ARC). 

Within an hour and a half of the bombing,

President Clinton announced the signing of

Emergency Declaration FEMA–3113–EM–OK

under title V provisions of the Robert T. Stafford

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act

[PL 93–288]. This signing and declaration of

emergency gave the Federal Government primary

responsibility to respond to the disaster and authorized full reimbursement for all eligible response

missions performed by state and local government. 

President Clinton’s declaration that Oklahoma

City was a federal disaster area automatically triggered ARC to act as the lead agency in providing

food, shelter, first aid, relief supplies, and welfare

information. Approximately 665 rescue team

members were sent immediately by the Federal

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to

Oklahoma City.

The swift response in Oklahoma City of public

and private agencies at all levels of government

demonstrated how critical it is for those agencies

to work collaboratively in responding to the crisis

created by a mass-casualty incident. This type of

planning and coordination is just as critical to

identifying and meeting the needs of victims. 

Victim Support Services

The needs of victims and family members immediately following the bombing were

acute and urgent. Some of the support

Examiner and the Oklahoma Funeral Directors

Association, provided approximately 20 funera

directors to greet families and gather predeath

and antemortem information (American Psych

logical Association, July 1997). By the next day

April 20, the American Red Cross was operatin

the Center serving victims and families. The

Center also was supported by the hundreds of lo

clergy, police and military chaplains, and ment

health professionals from across the Nation. Oth

agencies sharing support responsibilities for the

Center included the county sheriff’s office, the

Oklahoma National Guard, the Salvation Arm

Tinker Air Force Base, and the U.S. Departme

of Veterans Affairs. The Center was located in 

First Christian Church in downtown Oklahoma

City because of its proximity to the bombing si

the size and floor plan of the building, and adequate parking for about 1,200 vehicles.1

Immediately, the Compassion Center put polic

in placeto limit media intrusion upon those wh

wanted privacy, while allowing access to the su

vivors and family members who wanted to spea

with the press. Mental health care and ARC 

public affairs specialists briefed individuals befo

interviews, escorted them to interviews, and de

briefed them afterward to reduce the possibility

of retraumatization.

The Center was a place to exchange informatio

First, the families themselves provided detailed 

formation, photographs, and medical/dental

records to identify loved ones who were still m

ing. Second, as a humanitarian effort, the Cent

provided information about emergency services

mental health counseling, security, and comfor

for victims and surviving family members. The

Office of the Chief Medical Examiner and a liai
y p 

needs stemming from the bombing. This group

continues to meet 5 years later to review requests

from victims, survivors, family members, and disaster workers and allocates a decreasing supply 

of funds.

From its beginning, the Committee focused on

filling service gaps—many services concerned financial and leave benefits and the many needs

created by the bombing that insurance did not

cover including shattered windshields, car repairs,

babysitter costs for children whose center was destroyed, and eyeglasses. In response to a flood

of inquiries about access to benefits and legal 

entitlements, the Attorney Liaison from the

U.S. Attorney’s Office worked closely with the

Committee and numerous victims throughout the

first year to find attorneys who could provide pro

bono legal counseling and troubleshoot benefit

problems with agency bureaucracies.

Crisis Intervention

Federal authorities immediately recognized the

bombing’s traumatic impact on surviving victims,

family members, rescue workers, allied professionals, and the community-at-large. By the end of

the first day, April 19, 1995, OVC placed a ninemember crisis intervention team on the ground

in Oklahoma to work with both the victims and

the people responding to the disaster. The team,

composed of professionals from across the country,

met with victims and trained law enforcement

officials, emergency services personnel, clergy,

medical professionals, and school officials.2 Other

Federal and State agencies sent personnel to provide assistance. 

5

and rescue workers seeking news, information,

and solace. Daily, some 400 mental health professionals participated in support, death notification,

and staffing mental health services at the Center

(Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency

Management, 1996). Within 48 hours, a need for

a child mental health specialist on the death notification teams was recognized. Following the death

notification, parents and other family members

often had questions about what to tell their children, how children at various ages might react,

and how to manage their own grief in front of

their children (American Psychological

Association, July 1997).

As stress and work took their toll on rescue personnel, crisis intervention on their behalf became

necessary. When rescue workers switched from

saving lives to retrieving bodies and body parts,

separate staff were provided to offer stress management services. More than 12,000 volunteer

and professional rescue personnel were involved

in the rescue operation. Compassion Center staff

also recognized that many media representatives

were becoming secondary victims experiencing

long work hours, competing intensely for stories,

and undergoing prolonged exposure to the bomb

site, shattered survivors, and stressed rescuers. 

When the Center closed, Governor Frank

Keating named the Oklahoma Department of

Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services

(ODMHSAS) as the lead agency to coordinate

and conduct mental health crisis response services. The Center became Project Heartland on

May 15, 1995, and was supported by grants from

FEMA and the Office for Victims of Crime

(OVC). Project Heartland continued to provide

an extensive array of victim services. 
6

Supplies

In the aftermath of the bombing, the donation

for victims and rescue workers from organizatio

and individuals were overwhelming. Donations

poured in from fellow Oklahomans and from ci

zens across the Nation. Citizens donated appro

mately $14 million to the Oklahoma City

Disaster Relief Fund. Storage and inventory co

trol of the massive amounts of contributions lef

at drop-off locations became a major logistical

problem. Nearby streets were crowded with pri

vate cars, commercial tractor-trailers, pickup

trucks, and other vehicles loaded with goods ra

ing from wheelbarrows to football helmets. AR

received $15 million for its relief work with the

bombing victims (Kriner, April 20, 2000). Late

special purpose funds—such as the fund for vic

tims’ travel to Denver—also attracted generous

contributions from private citizens, corporation

and a huge range of organizations, large and sm

The creation of the Murrah Fund by the state l

islature was necessary to allow the Oklahoma

Crime Victim Compensation Program to accep

public and private donations that would assist t

victims and provide additional flexibility to the

program to pay lost wages and cover grief coun

ing for family members of the victims. In additi

to using $129,363 in state funds to assist victim

with medical and mental health expenses, fune

and burial costs, and lost wages, the compensat

program received $100,000 in donated funds fr

the Iowa crime victim compensation program

and supplemental federal grants totaling roughl

$70,000 from OVC. In total, the special Murra

Fund received more than $300,000 in funding 

help compensate the bombing victims. 

Oklahoma City bombing case, but it was critical

that victims’ families received adequate explanations for delays in notification and the release of

bodies, including information about the legal requirement to conduct autopsies in all homicide

cases. When some families objected to the autopsy process, counselors explained the importance of

the autopsy in collecting important evidence and

in answering any questions families may have in

the future about the cause of death. In addition,

as many surviving family members looked back

later, they regretted taking the advice of several

officials who recommended that they not view

the bodies of their loved ones.

For some families, the fact that the official death

notifications took place at the Compassion Center

created an additional hardship. Some families indicated they would have preferred to be notified

in their homes. Other families objected to the

practice of designating funeral home directors to

notify families rather than using clergy to handle

this responsibility. The presence of funeral home

directors at the Compassion Center and priests 

arriving to give last rites was disconcerting to many

family members who were still waiting for news

of their loved ones. As in other mass-casualty

events where significant destruction to the

bodies of victims happens, unidentified

“One of the difficulties for death notification team

members was the long hours spent waiting to do notifications because of the delays in body recovery and positive identifications.”

—American Psychological Association
7

Ongoing Victim Needs and

Vicarious Victimization

V

ictim services needed to be adjusted and expanded to help victims and families after the

immediate crisis as they began to stabilize

their lives and cope with the impact of the event.

Victims and survivors had to deal with a wide

range of emotional, psychological, physical, legal,

and financial consequences. For example, custody

decisions and legal processes were necessary for

children who were left without a parent or both

parents as a result of the bombing. As time passed,

victims and families experienced new issues and

challenges. In addition, it became evident that

victims were not limited to the injured and the

families of and others close to those killed in the

bombing. Playing a role in responding to the

bombing had a traumatic impact upon the men

and women who were involved in the emergency

response, such as rescue workers who participated

in the recovery of victims and bodies, and those

As Oklahoma City responded to victims during this postcrisis phase following the immediate crisis, the following victims’ needs were

identified:

✧ Mental health services to ease the transition for those involved with the criminal

event when the immediate crisis ended

and they returned to “normal” work and

family conditions.

✧ Recognition by employers and service

providers of the traumatic impact on first

responders and others working with victims and efforts to provide opportunities

for debriefing, counseling, and other assistance to help them cope.

✧ Streamlining service requests and benefit

claims so that the process of and documentation for accessing services and benefits are simpler for victims and enable

agencies to cope with the increased demands of responding to a terrorist crime.

✧ The ability to increase or supplement

the number of victim assistance staff in

agencies faced with responding to mass

casualties.

✧ Experienced staff aware of the unique

needs of terrorism victims.

✧ Access to an experienced prosecutor who

is sensitive to victim-witness issues and

provides victims with information about

the status of the case and the legal issues.

✧ A resource plan developed by OVC and

other U.S. Department of Justice components that provides guidance in managing

personnel resources for future disasters.

✧ Information sharing and identification of

victims to enable prompt extension of

legal rights and services to victims and 

notification about the status of the 

investigation.
8

The U.S. Attorney’s Office and other agencies involved with the victims faced the emotional hardship of working with anguished family members,

ensuring orphaned children were appropriately

placed, and accompanying the Medical Examiner

to report often gruesome findings to families. This

situation was compounded by personal losses

within the offices themselves. Within the U.S.

Attorney’s Office, a husband and a grandchild

were killed in the bombing. Staff members in

many offices continued to put in a full day’s

work when friends remained among the missing.

Throughout Oklahoma City, wrenching decisions

faced survivors, family members, friends, and fellow employees as multiple funerals took place 

simultaneously. Difficult decisions about which

service to attend added guilt to grief. One employee who lost most of the agents in his office attended 30 funerals. Caregiving professionals and

victim advocates, while skilled in dealing with

victims’ severe emotional distress, were not prepared for the scope and intensity of the traumatic

reactions experienced in the weeks, months, and

years after the bombing. Mental health support services were provided through the

Employee Assistance Program (EAP) and

Project Heartland.

y, 

trauma psychologist who went to Oklahoma on

several occasions to meet with interested emplo

ees. Initially, many employees did not use these

resources at the time they were offered.5 In add

tion, no consistent link was established with

local mental health professionals, such as Proje

Heartland staff, who were also working with fed

eral workers. Many new federal managers were 

assigned to Oklahoma City as a result of the

bombing. These managers were not always sens

tive to the needs of their fragile and traumatize

work force. Employee needs were not addressed 

effectively as they could have been. An ongoin

liaison between the various federal personnel o

fices, EAPs, and Project Heartland might have

been helpful in meeting employee needs in the 

aftermath of the bombing.6 Within the U.S.

Attorney’s Office, some staff members later requested debriefings, noting that other “trauma

veterans” such as rescue workers, police, firefigh

ers, and treatment providers were offered or required to participate in debriefing sessions on a

weekly basis. 

Project Heartland

Created by the Oklahoma Department of Men

Health and Substance Abuse Services, Project

Heartland was the immediate mental health re

sponse to the bombing. FEMA provided initial

funding for “crisis counseling, crisis interventio

support groups, outreach, consultation, and edu

tion to individuals who were affected by emotio

al or physical proximity to the bombing,” and

on May 15, 1995, Project Heartland opened.7

Because Project Heartland was the first commu

ty mental health response to a large-scale terro

event in the United States, there was no previo

experience to guide and establish the appropria

ing re-creating documents, procedures, and records that

were destroyed. Sometimes, simply finding a report by

a colleague who was killed or seeing a picture in a

newsletter produces a flood of tears. Many managers—

some who weren’t even around at the time of the

bombing—can’t understand why people are still so 

affected.”

—Linda Wagner, Project Heartland
and weekend appointments available on request.

After hours, calls to the Center were transferred

to the ODMHSAS crisis hotline, enabling clients

to have 24-hour access to services.

Streamlining Procedures To

File for Claim Benefits

Federal and state agencies made special efforts to

streamline procedures for obtaining benefits and

other assistance for victims. Agencies such as the

state’s crime victim compensation program, administered by the Oklahoma District Attorney’s

Council, assisted victims with crime-related expenses. This program made special efforts to simplify the compensation application and award

process by waiving the usual law enforcement verification requirements and by dedicating one staff

member to exclusively process all claims. Special

attention was given to compensating lost wages

for the victim and loss of support for the victim’s

family. The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)

within the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) administers the Public Safety Officers’ Benefit program, which provides aid to survivors of slain and

injured federal and state safety officers. In response to the Oklahoma City bombing, BJA not

only streamlined its application procedure but also

sent staff to Oklahoma to meet with surviving

family members and assist them in applying for

benefits. These are only two examples of special

efforts taken to provide easy access to public benefits for victims of this terrorist act. Recognizing

the horrific trauma experienced by the bombing

victims, other special efforts were also undertaken

by agencies such as the Federal Emergency

Management Agency and the Social Security

Administration.

9

Mental Health Services, ND). FEMA awarded

$4,092,909 to Oklahoma Regular Services.

On March 11, 1997, Project Heartland received

notification from OVC that $234,930 had been

awarded to fund crisis-counseling activities at

the Safe Havens during the trials in Oklahoma

City and at the trials in Denver, Colorado.

Since FEMA guidelines do not allow funding

of long-term mental health services outside of

the federally declared disaster area, OVC funded

the necessary mental health services during the

trials. The Safe Havens served as places of respite

for the victims’ family members and survivors 

attending the trial proceedings in Denver or the

closed-circuit television (CCTV) broadcasts of

the trials in Oklahoma City. On February 28,

1998, OVC extended the grant and awarded an

additional $264,000. OVC’s grants to Project

Heartland allowed services to continue for the

many survivors, family members, other individuals

affected, and an increasing number of rescue

workers and rescue worker family members seeking help with problems stemming from the bombing.8 Among the most innovative services

provided by Project Heartland were the OVCfunded activities related to the trials—availability

of crisis counseling at Safe Havens during the trials in Denver and CCTV broadcasts in Oklahoma

City (American Psychological Association, July

1997). (See further description of mental health

services under chapter IV, “The Criminal Pretrial

and Trial Phases.”)

Between June 1, 1995, and February 28, 1998,

Project Heartland reported providing 8,869

clients with counseling, support group, or crisis intervention services. Approximately 186,000 contacts were made, which included reaching out to
1 0

created a database of victim contact informatio

Some agencies refused to supply contact inform

tion for clients (victims), citing organizational

policies of nondisclosure. Underlying most agen

cies’ unwillingness to share client (victim) inform

tion was the fear that the identifying informatio

might be used by criminal justice agencies for 

purposes beyond victim notification. The U.S.

Attorney’s Office had to rely on obituaries in th

local newspapers and information from FEMA

and other sources to identify victims and survivors, a process that the staff found to be a fru

trating and unnecessary obstacle in implementi

victim services. (See Privacy Act discussion un

chapter VI, “Legal Issues Pertaining to Victims

of Terrorism.”) The U.S. Attorney’s Office prov

ed victims’ rights and services through its Victim

Witness Assistance Unit and through the

appointment of an Attorney Liaison.

Identification and Notification of

Victims

Beyond the need to identify who the deceased

victims were for the sake of their families, there

also was the need to identify surviving victims

and family members of the deceased to provide

them with information and services. This need

made it essential for agencies to exchange 

information about their clients, otherwise some

victims would receive duplicated services and o

ers would received none at all. The Internation

Business Machine (IBM) Corporation donated

electronic equipment, software, and training to

create and manage a database of services provid

to individual victims. The victim database even

tually included approximately 3,000 family mem

bers and survivors that victim-witness coordinat

and others involved with distributing victim 

ages and situations.10 A critical task for the U.S.

Attorney’s Office involved identifying the victim

population and developing a plan for providing

appropriate assistance. While the definition of a

federal crime victim includes anyone who suffers

direct physical, emotional, or financial harm,

there is a potentially wider range of individuals

who suffered psychological harm. The Oklahoma

City bombing victims directly affected by the

event included the injured and killed and their

families as well as employees of agencies in the

Murrah Building. Beyond this core group of victims are other victims who suffered: rescue workers, police officers, and other responders to the

scene; coworkers; people who worked in nearby

office buildings; taxi and bus drivers who were in

the area when the bombing occurred; and many

others who were exposed to the event and to the

traumatic aftereffects. Over time, investigators,

prosecutors, victim services personnel, and others

who worked closely with the details of the criminal case or with the surviving victims and victim

families also became significantly affected. While

core services should be provided to the federally

defined victims, the Oklahoma City experience has shown that many other victims 

“The circle of care should encompass caregivers, out-ofstate responders, jurors, attorneys on both sides,

Salvation Army volunteers, clerks who typed up the 

victims’ statements, hospital personnel, janitors, U.S.

Marshals, FBI personnel who accompanied witnesses

and families—all those whom we now know were often

vicariously victimized by this catastrophe.”

—Linda Wagner, Project Heartland
1 1

The Victim-Witness Assistance Unit also established a toll-free telephone information line for

victims to obtain assistance and initiate regular

group meetings with survivors and family members.

This toll-free telephone line alleviated the need

for staff to make hundreds of calls to victims to

provide trial-related and other information and gave

victims the freedom to obtain information at times

that were appropriate and convenient for them.

Victim-Witness Assistance Unit

Going beyond the requirements of federal laws,

the Victim-Witness Assistance Unit addressed

immediate needs for food and shelter, organized

large-scale resource coalitions, and engaged in

personal troubleshooting for individual victims.

It also gathered federal job vacancy announcements for federal employees, helped create a “job

fair” for nonfederal employees, and worked with

small federal agencies to arrange extra administrative leave and waive administrative barriers for a

donated leave program. In compliance with federal law and U.S. Department of Justice policy, the

U.S. Attorney’s Office kept victims informed

about the progress of the criminal case and available services with frequent case status letters.

(See chapter VI, “Legal Issues Pertaining to

Victims of Terrorists.”)

Within the first few weeks, the Victim-Witness

Assistance Unit held group or individual meetings

to explain victims’ rights and determine the availability of resources with the following: Social

Security Administration staff, the Western District

Court Clerk’s Office, U.S. Department of Housing

and Urban Development staff, displaced residents

of a nearby apartment building damaged by the

organizing community resources while still handling other existing case responsibilities of that 

office. The Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys

(EOUSA) immediately moved to supplement the

resources of the Victim-Witness Assistance Unit

by obtaining permission from the U.S. Attorneys’

Offices in Kansas and in the Northern and

Eastern Districts of Oklahoma to detail their 

victim-witness coordinators temporarily to the

Western District office.11 EOUSA then provided

financial assistance to pay for the travel and lodging

of additional staff members detailed to Oklahoma

City. Initially, all victim-witness coordinators

worked together to contact victims and assess

needs. Later, those from other offices were able to

rotate their assistance to the Western District of

Oklahoma office—working in shifts to keep up

with their own caseloads. For each coordinator,

the Oklahoma City bombing was an additional

responsibility rather than a replacement of existing

responsibilities.

“The Attorney General Guidelines were ver

important—they were the basic structure for 

be accomplished. But there was so much more 

in the beginning and no staff to carry it out, so 

what the crisis demanded—go out and meet 

We interpreted ‘best efforts’ as the vehicle to g

beyond the Guidelines.And by intervening to 

practical, absolutely critical needs like food and 

victims were aware of our concern and compa

from the beginning.”

—K. Ly

Assistant 
1 2
1 3

Challenges to Victims’ Rights

and Services as a Result of

Change of Venue

T

he focus of victim services shifted to trialrelated activities when the change of venue

hearing was held in January 1996. Long before the judicial decision to change the venue in

the cases of United States v. Timothy McVeigh and

United States v. Terry Nichols, however, speculation over a possible new venue aggravated victim

tensions and apprehension regarding the upcoming

trials. The pretrial and trial phases raised concerns about ensuring victims’ observation and/or

The criminal pretrial and trial phases presented significant challenges to safeguarding crime

victims’ rights especially with the change of

venue decision in February 1996.As Oklahoma City and Denver responded to the

bombing victims, the following victims’ needs

were clear:

✧ Ability to observe trial proceedings.

✧ Accommodations for travel and housing.

✧ Accommodations for CCTV broadcasts.

✧ Legal explanation of trial events.

✧ Emotional support for trial decisions,

evidence, and testimony.

✧ A notification process that informs victims

of the ongoing criminal justice process.

✧ A process for determining which victims

can attend the trial each day.

✧ A waiting area separate from defendants

and their families.

✧ Seating in the court separate from defendants’ families.

✧ A process to identify and coordinate resources and volunteers to assist victims

traveling to the trial.

✧ An intermediary who coordinates media

interviews with victims and families and

debriefs the victims and families after the

interview to reduce the possibility of 

retraumatization.

y g 

Trial Phases

participation at the trials, informing victims of the

criminal justice process, and continuing to provide

mental health services.

A new set of challenges emerged as a result of

moving the trials of Terry Nichols and Timothy

McVeigh to Denver. Attorney General Janet

Reno announced to the victims Judge Matsch’s

decision that the criminal trials of defendants

Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols would not

take place in Oklahoma but in Denver, Colorado.

Attorney General Reno pledged, however, that

the U.S. Department of Justice would work to

support the victims.
1 4

ter a fund to help victims travel to the Denver 

als. In a coordinated effort on February 27, 199

Attorney General Janet Reno augmented

Governor Keating’s announcement by announc

ing an OVC grant for $200,000 to the U.S.

Attorney’s Office for victims’ travel expenses re

lated to attendance or observation of the trials.

To help coordinate travel and other activities,

OVC provided funding for two temporary staff

members for the Victim-Witness Assistance Un

and funded additional victim-witness personne

in the Colorado District U.S. Attorney’s Office

Denver-Based Support Services

The change of venue to Denver unleashed a

storm of activity in that city among public and

private groups wishing to be of assistance to the

victims. Social service, mental health and publ

safety agencies, churches, businesses, victim adv

cates, and private citizens offered a wealth of pe

sonal goods and services to the Oklahomans.

Some 600 people volunteered rooms in their

homes for relatives and survivors of the bombin

Fueled by local media, which clamored for a

major demonstration of civic hospitality, victim

groups in Denver and the U.S. Attorney for

Colorado concluded that a single, local coalitio

was necessary to coordinate services and donations. Simultaneously, the U.S. Attorneys’ Offi

in Oklahoma City and Denver and the U.S.

Department of Justice recognized the need for a

single coalition given the fervor of media reque

the outpouring of contributions, and the risk fo

another venue change if the response was not 

organized. On March 14, 1996, the Colorado

Oklahoma Resource Council (CORC) was bor

CORC brought together 18 agencies including

representatives of the city of Denver, federal 

✦ A new federal statute established that, where

a Federal Court changes the trial venue out

of the state in which the case was initially

brought by more than 350 miles from the 

location in which the proceedings originally

would have taken place, the court must

order closed-circuit televising of the proceedings to be broadcast at the original location to permit victims who qualify under the

statute to watch the trial proceedings [42

U.S.C. § 10608]. 

✦ Congress passed legislation prohibiting the

U.S. district judge from ordering victims excluded from the trials of the defendants because the victim may testify or make a

statement during the sentencing about the

effect of the offense on the victim and the

victim’s family [18 U.S.C. § 3593].

Travel Assistance to Denver

Plans to facilitate victim attendance at the trials

in Denver began at the U.S. Attorney’s Office

for the Western District of Oklahoma. The

Office was committed to enabling as many

victims and support persons as possible

to travel to Denver without personal

“We want to be sure that victims can exercise their

right to attend court proceedings. In doing that, we

carry out the Justice Department’s responsibilities under

the Victims of Crime Act and the Victims’ Rights and

Restitution Act.”

—Attorney General Janet Reno
1 5

Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) contained in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 [42 U.S.C. § 10603b]. Under the grant

agreement, OVC extended federal antiterrorism

funding to the Denver Victim Assistance and Law

Enforcement (VALE) Board because of VALE’s

commitment to the victim assistance effort already under way and its capacity to oversee

CORC activities.

OVC coordinated meetings in Denver and

Oklahoma City that included EOUSA, the

Victim-Witness Assistance Unit, VALE, and

CORC. OVC identified responsibilities for

CORC that reflect concern about providing comprehensive service delivery to victims without

compromising the legal case or hindering legitimate media demands:

✦ Identify, coordinate, collect, and inventory

local resources, including funds, staff, and

services, for the survivors and victim family

members. 

✦ Maintain records regarding donations and

resources and compile a resource directory

containing food, lodging, transportation, and

local victim service information.

✦ Coordinate medical and mental health assistance to the victims, including recruiting

and training qualified mental health professionals to work as volunteers at the Safe

Haven.

✦ Supervise a volunteer coordinator and support staff at the Safe Haven.

✦ Help coordinate the response of Denver

businesses, agencies, and community groups

According to many members of CORC, having a

year between the organization’s founding and the

beginning of the first trial to prepare proved extremely helpful. Among the materials developed

were procedures and rules governing the volunteers’ schedules, transportation, security, safety,

debriefing, media contact, insurance, liability, and

confidentiality. A statement defining the Safe

Haven’s position on mandatory disclosure and

recordkeeping by mental health professionals was

also developed. Other handouts addressed ways 

of responding to victims or included maps, restaurant and entertainment guides, and other resources. 

The change of venue required a great deal of cooperation and understanding on the part of the

agencies and organizations working with the victims in both cities. Time and effort were required

to develop trust and to address differences in roles

and perspectives among these agencies and organizations. With OVC’s active intervention and the

victims’ arrival for the first trial, tensions eased

among the key agencies working with the victims. 

The need to clarify roles illustrated the unique

circumstances that emerge from a change in

venue, particularly when the new venue is so far

from the jurisdiction trying the case. In addition,

it was critical to carefully balance the needs and

rights of victims and the need to maintain the integrity of the criminal justice process. The U.S.

“The change of venue required a nontradition

proach to mental health services, victim advoc

spiritual support.”

—Krista Flannigan, Di
1 6

Matsch’s Admission Order and commencemen

the CCTV reservation system, the Unit notifie

the entire victim database (2,100 persons) of th

eligibility to attend the CCTV broadcasts and 

complished the following:

✦ Certified more than 1,100 persons to view

the CCTV broadcasts.

✦ Transmitted forms of ineligible applicants 

Judge Matsch.

✦ Notified certified persons of “badging” dat

✦ Staffed badging operations on 7 days when

850 victims received their badges.

✦ Learned to operate the reservation system

✦ Mailed instructions on how to use the sys

tem to all certified victims. 

Attendance fluctuated, but some victims attend

every day of the court proceedings. During the

sentencing phase of the McVeigh trial, as many 

300 victims attended the CCTV broadcast sessions. During the Nichols trial, CCTV broadcas

attendance totaled 1,062 (Oklahoma Departme

of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Service

May 31, 1998).

Victims appreciated the presence of Judge

Perricone and his assistance in explaining legal

proceedings. Many expressed disappointment,

however, in the quality of the CCTV picture. 

Not only was the picture somewhat fuzzy but als

fixed camera built into the back wall of the cou

room eliminated variety in focus and prohibited

viewers from observing the defendants’ faces.16 

Victims’ Rights and Services

During the Trials

Once the trials began, the victims needed support

services in both Oklahoma City and Denver. This

assistance included CCTV broadcasts of the trial

in Oklahoma City, an explanation of the trial

events, and information and emotional support to

help victims cope with testimony, evidence, and

court decisions.

Closed-Circuit Television Broadcasts

In deference to victim wishes, the Victim-Witness

Assistance Unit began searching for a secure facility in Oklahoma City that could accommodate

large numbers of victims who might want to

watch CCTV broadcasts of the trial. The Federal

Aviation Administration (FAA) offered its auditorium and additional space in the FAA building

for a “Safe Haven” for the bombing victims.

Prosecutors then requested the court to transfer

the CCTV broadcasts to the FAA site. Judge

Matsch granted the motion. The Attorney

Liaison assisted the trial team in preparing

two motions: one urging adoption of victim 

tion and relationships between government and nongovernment agencies, between for-profit and nonprofit

groups, with each piece playing a valued part.These

principles go beyond lessons to deal with acts of terrorism.They apply to many cases when there’s a change in

venue.”

—Steve Siegel, Denver Victim Assistance and

Law Enforcement Board
1 7

g q, g

warned survivors and family members observing

the trial about upcoming potentially painful testimony or exhibits. These debriefings allowed individuals to prepare psychologically or to choose

not to attend the session. These meetings generally concluded with a brief discussion of ways in

which the victims could take care of themselves

emotionally. Project Heartland counselors were

present to assist, if needed, in this phase of the 

debriefings.

Through the Attorney Liaison, the victims had a

direct link with the prosecution team. As a member of the team, she not only advocated for the

victims’ interests, but also explained the prosecution’s issues and procedures to the victims. One of

the issues the Attorney Liaison was not able to resolve, however, was the lack of sufficient seating

for victims in the courtroom. The fact that the

media were assigned more seats than family members caused considerable irritation. Even worse,

seating arrangements sometimes placed victims

next to the defendant’s family—a source of stress

and pain.

The Victim-Witness Center, Denver

The Victim-Witness Center was created through

the joint efforts of the victim-witness coordinators

from the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for the Western

District of Oklahoma and the District of Colorado.

Located next to the courthouse, the Center was

comfortably furnished and provided free local and

long-distance telephone service. Here, prosecutors

met with witnesses prior to testifying. The victimwitness coordinators were responsible for making

travel and lodging arrangements for witnesses, 

coordinated duties with the FBI witness coordinator 7 days a week, and fielded calls from witnesses

traveling to Denver. In addition, the victim-witness

Mental Health Support and the 

Safe Havens

Over the 11 weeks of the McVeigh trial and during

the Nichols trial, the Safe Havens in Oklahoma

City and Denver provided mental health services,

food, free telephone service, and privacy to victims and family members. Project Heartland

counselors addressed victims’ apprehensions before appearing in court and provided counseling

and debriefings to victims after upsetting testimony, exhibits, rulings, or other aspects of the trial.

In the case of the Denver Safe Haven, Project

Heartland counselors were able to communicate

to the Victim-Witness Assistance Unit possible

concerns the witnesses may have had based on

what family members were communicating in the

Safe Haven facility. Project Heartland activities

also included training and sensitizing staff and

volunteers who would be involved with victims,

family members, and support people at CORC,

the Victim-Witness Center in Denver, and the

CCTV trial broadcast facility in Oklahoma City.

Again, OVC support enabled Project Heartland

staff to travel to Denver to meet these critical

needs. 

The Safe Havens were also designed to be secure

havens for the victims and families of victims.

Security procedures were carefully planned.

Volunteers and member groups were barred from

speaking with the media, and the press agreed to

maintain its distance from the Safe Havens. With

few exceptions, the media respected victims’ privacy. Some victims, however, initiated their own

contacts with reporters.

—Diane Leonard, widow of a bo
1 9

Ongoing Mental Health

Support

F

or many individuals associated with the

events of April 19, 1995, the bombing was a

life-altering event (Kight, 1998). Long after

the last piece of rubble was hauled away, the disaster continues to propel many primary, secondary,

and tertiary victims17 into grief, bouts of severe depression, substance abuse, rage, domestic violence,

and stress-related physical disorders. Nightmares,

loss of short-term memory, hallucinations, and a

recurrent sense of “going insane” are among the

symptoms reported by individuals whose lives

were relatively untroubled and productive before

the bombing. 

An often overlooked population affected by the

Oklahoma City bombing includes those who responded to the crime and offered some measure

of assistance with the rescue-and-recovery efforts.

Along with working under very difficult and 

dangerous conditions, some rescue workers were

bombing have revealed the often ravaging

emotional effects of exposure to traumatized

victims and the importance of providing ongoing intervention and emotional support to 

disaster victims, including secondary and tertiary victims.The following victim needs have

been recognized during this phase of the

bombing recovery:

✧ Long-term mental health services for

posttraumatic responses to the criminal

event.*

understand posttraumatic stress disorder

and to support victims who are returning

to the workplace.

✧ Recognition of restitution for victims.

✧ Participation in decisionmaking processes

when possible.

✧ Ongoing information about posttrial

events.

*Long-term posttraumatic responses can be triggered by

anniversaries, memorial events, reminders of slain colleagues in the workplace, birthdays, or birth of a second

child.

injured and many handled bodies or body parts.

As a direct result of their experiences in Oklahoma City, experts predict as much as 20 percent

of the 12,984 rescue workers and volunteers may

need help in dealing with the psychological impact (Oklahoma Department of Mental Health

and Substance Abuse Services, May 31, 1998).

New emotional pressures arose when the pace of

work with bombing victims slowed and employees returned to “normal” work and family conditions. The difficulty of this transition is widely

acknowledged by mental health experts (Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and

Substance Abuse Services, May 31, 1998) but

considerably less recognized by employers and 

supervisors. 

With research confirming the intense psychological impact of intentional disasters on communities

and individuals (Oklahoma Department of

Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services,

May 31, 1998), Oklahoma City faced a long-term
2 0

experiences. The ability to talk about traumatic

experiences with colleagues appears to be very

helpful to rescue and other public safety person

who are traditionally reluctant to acknowledge

the profound effects of what they have seen an

done.19 Sometimes this reluctance to acknowled

and address symptoms of stress is reinforced by

agency policies that penalize employees who se

psychological help, labeling them “unfit for dut

Twenty-eight workshops have been held since 

VOCA grant in 1998 began with a total of 255 p

ticipants: 168 rescue workers, 27 survivors, 28 fa

ily members, 26 volunteers, and 6 others (King

January–March 2000).

Many of the rescue personnel, for whom the

workshops were primarily designed, reported ov

whelming relief at the opportunity to unburden

themselves and to voice the guilt they felt for

“not doing enough” to save those who died in t

bombing. Often the response of rescuers is to k

silent, believing their families should be protec

from the horrible images imprinted in their me

ories. It was reported that after sharing at the

workshop, many returned home with new hope

for healing and recovery.20 A surprising benefit

from the workshops, which was reported by par

ticipants from different agencies, was that, as

they expressed similar fears and hardships, they

discovered a kinship and a bond not shared before. OVC funding is making it possible to offe

free workshops in Oklahoma, Maryland, and C

fornia, allowing all the rescue team members w

came from distant states to attend.

Restitution

Restitution for victims presented complications

for both victims and the prosecution team, give

that things will never be the same and loved ones

are not coming back. Experts say that every effort

should be made to ensure victims arrive at the

fourth phase, the “Reconstruction” phase, within

5 years. After 5 years, it is far more difficult for individuals to overcome the psychological impact

of a criminal disaster (Faberow and Frederick,

1978).18

Efforts to help with these long-term symptoms included special services for first responders, consideration of some form of restitution for the victims,

and postconviction notification of victims.

Assistance to First

Responders

The Critical Incident Workshops began in 1996,

and OVC awarded $356,000 through a Victims

of Crime Act grant in June 1998. These workshops are designed to help first responder victims address the difficulty they may feel in

acknowledging their emotional needs.

“Federal, state, and local authorities, Red Cross chapters, and mental health professionals need to understand that mass casualty incidents are different from

other disasters.The psychological impact of these incidents appears to be more extreme than from other 

disasters.This severity also seems to lead to more immediate and long-term traumatic stress reactions. Broad

community reaction is also common and will be particularly likely in the aftermath of a terrorist incident”

—American Psychological Association
2 1

which does not allow criminals to profit from

their crimes, prosecutors proposed a restitution

plan calling for the donation of any funds earned

by Nichols to the U.S. Department of Justice’s

Crime Victims Fund. The sum, $14 million, allocated for Nichols’ restitution obligation represented the cost of rebuilding the Murrah Building.21

To determine an equitable solution to the question of restitution in this particular case, prosecutors polled the victims for answers. The victims

agreed to waive their statutory rights to individual

restitution payments, acknowledging no amount

of money could conceivably restore them.22

Postconviction Notification

of Victims

The end of a trial and sentencing are not the end

of the criminal justice process. Federal law requires

federal officials to notify victims of a defendant’s

posttrial status including parole hearings, any type

of release of the defendant (including escape),

and the death of the defendant while in custody.

The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) operates a

notification program to meet this responsibility.

The BOP notification program is strictly voluntary,

and victims can enroll through the U.S. Attorney’s

Office. In addition, the 2000 edition of the

Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness

Newly drafted U.S. Department of Justice regulations also include victims in the pardon and

clemency processes followed by DOJ’s Office of

the Pardon Attorney. The regulations provide for

victim notification of the filing of a petition for

pardon or clemency, the opportunity to submit a

written statement or make an oral statement to

the Office of the Pardon Attorney, and notice of

the final decision. At the time of this report, those

regulations had not been finalized. In cases involving the death penalty, such as that of convicted

Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh, victims

may request the opportunity to be present and

observe the defendant’s execution. In a terrorism

case with hundreds or thousands of victims, developing a fair procedure for victims to view the execution presents another challenge to ensuring

victims’ rights.

The Federal trials of those who masterminde

bombing are over.The national spotlight has lo

shifted from Oklahoma City. But it is now, mor

three years after the worst case of domestic t

American history, that many survivors are ente

bleakest period of grief.”

—“The Blast Fallout,” 

Au
2 3

T

are important to consider in responding to

terrorism victims.

Funding Authorization

As a result of the need for federal monetary assistance to victims of the Oklahoma City bombing,

Congress, in 1996, gave OVC the authority to access the Victims of Crime Act emergency reserve

fund of $50 million to assist victims of terrorism

and mass violence. The Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 amended

VOCA by adding 42 U.S.C. § 19693(b) to allow

OVC access to the emergency reserve fund in

both domestic and international terrorist incidents. In domestic terrorism incidents, the OVC

Director is authorized to use the reserve funds to

supplement existing grants to state crime victim

compensation and assistance programs, to provide

funds to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for use in coordination with the state programs, and to provide

emergency relief to terrorism and mass-violence

victims. In international terrorism incidents, the

OVC Director can supplement grants to state

crime victim compensation and assistance programs to provide compensation and assistance to

state residents who are victims of terrorism while

outside the United States. OVC has used emergency reserve funds to provide supplemental

grants in support of victims of the Oklahoma City

bombing, the Khobar Towers bombing, the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, the bombing of the

United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,

and the Columbine High School shooting incident. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 also contained a provision

requiring state crime victim compensation programs to include in their compensation programs

state residents who are victims of terrorism while

outside of the United States. 

§ 10603b to VOCA created a new capability for

OVC to provide funding to assist victims in both

domestic and international terrorism and massviolence cases, in practice, the limits of section

10603b’s language have caused difficulties in providing funding effectively. The statute’s limitations on the recipients of grants, the types of relief

that could be funded, the timeframe covered, and

problems inherent in sending victims from the

same event to a multitude of different state compensation programs have seriously affected OVC’s

ability to provide effective funding support for terrorism victims. To overcome these restrictions in

specific cases, Congress passed special legislation

broadening OVC’s authorization to provide additional assistance to victims of both the Oklahoma

City bombing and the bombing of Pan Am Flight

103. Currently, Congress is considering legislation

that would expand OVC’s authority to provide

funding from the emergency reserve fund in the

future. The proposed legislation would also authorize OVC to develop and administer a compensation program for victims of international

terrorism. 

Victims’ Rights During the

Criminal Justice Process

Under federal law, U.S. Government agencies involved in investigating and prosecuting crime

have certain responsibilities to crime victims. In

addition, since 1983, the U.S. Department of

Justice has maintained policy guidelines called the

Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness

Assistance, which establish how the Department

expects its employees to treat crime victims and

witnesses. During the investigation and prosecution of the Oklahoma City bombing case, the FBI

and the United States Attorney’s Office operated
2 4

y 

Confusion about the coverage of the Privacy A

resulted in several agencies’ refusal to forward l

of victims to federal law enforcement agencies,

and that significantly impeded Federal Governm

agencies’ ability to provide victims with legally

required rights and services. In the immediate

aftermath of the bombing, the American Red

Cross had the lead role in assisting the victims a

gathering information about the identities of

the victims. When the Federal Bureau of

Investigation and the U.S. Attorney’s Office

asked ARC for a list of victims, to comply with

federal law that requires law enforcement to ide

tify the victims of the crime, ARC declined to

provide the information, citing its belief that th

Privacy Act, which generally prohibits government agencies from disclosing records about an

individual without that individual’s consent,

prevented ARC from turning the information

over to federal law enforcement officials (see 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)). It is unclear whether ARC 

a government agency covered by the Act.23 Mo

over, the Privacy Act contains a clear exceptio

allowing agencies to transfer personal records fo

investigative purposes

to another agency or to an instrumentalit

of any governmental jurisdiction within o

under the control of the United States for 

civil or criminal law enforcement activity 

the activity is authorized by law, and if th

head of the agency or instrumentality has

made a written request to the agency whic

maintains the record specifying the particu

portion desired and the law enforcement

activity for which the record is sought. 

[5 U.S.C. § 552a (b)(7)] 

criminal case against the suspects; facilitating

victim participation in the criminal case through

trial attendance; and presenting impact information during the sentencing.

In January 2000, the Attorney General issued a

new, revised edition of the AG Guidelines that

makes it clear that some of the statutory victim

services are mandatory. Thus, federal law enforcement personnel must (1) identify the victims of a

crime; (2) provide the victims with referral information and information about the status of the

investigation and the major case events in the

prosecution; and (3) arrange for reasonable protection for the victims from intimidation and harassment. The revised AG Guidelines also contain

several new sections with guidance about how to

provide victim services in large cases, new guidance on attorney consultation with victims about

major case events including plea bargains, and

a new notification provision for posttrial case

events. Moreover, the Oklahoma City bombing

case led to two new laws establishing enhanced

victim rights in federal criminal cases, which have

been incorporated into the 2000 AG Guidelines.

First, the Oklahoma City bombing victims lobbied

Congress for the right to attend the trial if the

victim would be a witness only during the sentencing phase of the trial. Judge Matsch had ruled that

victims who were providing impact information at

the sentencing hearing were barred from watching

the trial. In response, Congress passed 18 U.S.C.

§ 3510(a), which gives federal crime victims the

right to attend the trial regardless of whether the

victim intends to make a statement or provide

any information in relation to the sentence.

Second, because the venue of the

Oklahoma City bombing trial was
2 5
2 7

S

OVC has been directly involved in providing assistance to victims in several international terrorism events affecting American citizens.

OVC became involved in these cases at different

stages, and each case presented unique issues and

challenges. In one case, special legislation was

passed to enable OVC to provide the assistance

needed by victim families. The following are examples of the types of assistance OVC has provided in recent major terrorist cases.

Bombing of Khobar Towers,

Saudi Arabia, June 1996

✦ OVC worked with the FBI to fund and organize a 2-day briefing for victim families in

December 1998. The briefing provided families with information about the status of the

investigation and about victim assistance

resources. In addition, U.S. Department of

Defense representatives were on hand to answer questions about military benefits and

autopsy issues.

✦ OVC provided funds to the U.S. Attorney’s

Office for the District of Columbia to operate

a toll-free telephone line for surviving families and injured victims and to provide a parttime victim specialist to maintain contact

with victims.

✦ OVC developed a special resource handbook

and mailed it to victims.

Bombings of United States

Embassies, Kenya and

Tanzania,August 1998

✦ OVC provided onsite assistance to the U.S.

Department of State when the families of

the arrival of the bodies of their loved ones.

✦ OVC transferred Emergency Reserve Funds

to the U.S. Department of State to assist

victims with emergency needs, such as uncompensated medical expenses and funeral

and transportation costs, and to pay the

salary of a temporary person to serve as liaison with victims.

✦ OVC provided funding and staff assistance

to sponsor a 2-day informational briefing in

Washington, D.C., in May 1999, for injured

victims and families of deceased victims.

✦ OVC provided staff assistance to help identify resources and coordinate requests for crime

victim compensation and other services for

individual victims with available programs in

their states. 

✦ OVC provided technical assistance and funding to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the

Southern District of New York for victim assistance during the upcoming trial.

Bombing of Pan Am Flight

103, Lockerbie, Scotland,

December 1988

When Pan Am Flight 103 was bombed in 1988,

few traditional victim assistance resources were

available to Americans who were victimized outside the borders of the United States. Almost 12

years after the crime occurred, the trial of two men

accused of the bombing began in a special Scottish

Court in the Netherlands under unique circumstances. In April 1999, the Attorney General

asked OVC to provide assistance to the victim

families during the trial, and Congress passed 
2 8

communicate with one another.

✦ OVC developed a trial briefing book for v

tim families.

✦ OVC provided funding for onsite support

services at the Scottish Court in the

Netherlands, including a Crown Office pro

ecutor to serve as the legal liaison to the fa

ilies to explain Scottish law and procedure

✦ OVC provided funding to create a secure

waiting area for victim families at the

Scottish Court in the Netherlands.

✦ OVC provided funding and coordination 

the Scottish Court Service to establish fou

remote sites in the United States and the

United Kingdom for closed-circuit viewin

of trial proceedings by victim families.

✦ OVC provided travel assistance for two fa

ily members per victim to attend the tria

for 1 week in the Netherlands or travel to

one of the remote closed-circuit viewing

sites.

✦ OVC established a fund to pay for uncom

pensated mental health counseling for im

mediate family members throughout the t

process.

assistance was viewed as a significant contribution

to the trial. By establishing a unique partnership

with the Scottish police, prosecutors, and court

personnel, OVC ensured that the information and

assistance provided to the families was appropriate.

OVC coordinated with Scottish authorities to assist Pan Am Flight 103 victims and families in

many ways. 

✦ OVC created a comprehensive database containing updated contact information for almost 700 family members of the 270 victims.

✦ OVC established an international, toll-free

telephone assistance and information line

accessible from the 16 countries where victim families are located.

✦ OVC provided funding assistance and coordination for case briefing meetings held for

victim families prior to the trial. Meetings 

formed about the Pan Am103 prosecution and arrangements are greatly appreciated. Your efforts have been a

reminder that there are people in Washington who also

have not forgotten and who are working hard to see

that some measure of justice is obtained and that the

families of the victims are included in the process.”

—Brother of Pan Am Flight103 victim
2 9

port. Although victims of terrorism have much in

common with other violent crime victims and

with disaster victims, they appear to experience

higher levels of distress that are in part due to the

unique issues related to the traumatic elements,

and often the magnitude, of these politically motivated events. Witnessing the murder of people

as they go about the everyday tasks of daily life

creates a sense of horror and vulnerability that

may last a lifetime. It may also put people at risk

for significant and long-term psychological difficulties. A number of factors increase the level of

traumatic stress for terrorism victims and present

special challenges to victims and to the professionals charged with responding to them:

✦ The realization that the act and the resulting

emotional and physical devastation was an

intentional act directed not at individuals

but at the government.

✦ The scope and extent of the physical and

emotional damage to victims, the age of

the victims, and the defenselessness of the

victims. 

✦ The often extraordinary financial cost of the

damage and losses associated with the crime.

✦ The duration of the event, including the

length of time it took to rescue the injured,

to identify victims, and to recover and release victim remains, and the inability to 

recover the remains of some victims. 

✦ The extent of the intrusiveness of news coverage, especially the repetitive publication or

broadcast of disturbing visual images.

✦ The involvement of the criminal justice system, especially when the process is significantly delayed, or is lengthy and convoluted,

or when a trial is held in another region or

country.

✦ The difficulty in obtaining information

about compensation, services, and the investigation in cases where the event occurred

outside the boundaries of the United States

and/or involve many victims from many different geographical locations.

✦ The difficulty in identifying and taking into

custody perpetrators, particularly in crimes

that occur outside the United States.

✦ The difficulty in finding victim services and

mental health professionals with experience

and expertise in dealing with the issues and

needs related to terrorism victimization.

Like other victims of violent crime, victims of terrorism need help in handling the crisis created by

the terrorist event, in stabilizing their lives, and in

dealing with the criminal justice process, whether

there are an arrest and a trial or an arrest and a

trial are delayed for years. Because each victim’s

coping abilities and support systems are different

and his or her loss is individual, the needs of individual victims may vary. A process should be in

place to help victims assess their specific needs

and find appropriate sources of help and support.

Most victims will be able to function and stabilize

after a period of time with moderate assistance,

but a percentage of victims will continue to need

assistance for years after the event. 
3 0

7. Services and support must be victim sensi

tive and easily accessible. 

8. Cases involving large numbers of victims 

quire special measures to ensure that adequate information and support to all victi

is provided in a timely and effective mann

Creative application of existing technolog

such as Web sites, may help overcome cha

lenges presented by large numbers of victi

who are scattered geographically.

9. The impact of terrorism is not limited to

physical injury and property damage.

Consideration and resources must be given

to the emotional and psychological impac

of terrorism, and decisions must be made

early in the process regarding the delivery 

appropriate mental health services to vict

and responders, e.g., who is responsible fo

funding, for how long, and what should be

the qualifications of those providing the

services.

10. Victim notification about and participatio

in the criminal justice process is an impor

tant aspect of how many victims come to

terms with the criminal event. 

The above lessons form the basis for the follow

policy recommendations made to help improve

future responses to acts of terrorism. A more pr

pared response to terrorism will provide for the

needs of victims not only in the immediate afte

math of the crime but also during the judicial

process and following the final case disposition

lessons learned along the way were taught by victims, victim advocates, criminal justice professionals, mental health professionals, clergy, the media,

and outside observers and include the following: 

1. An effective response to victims of terrorism

is dependent upon prior planning and coordination. Understanding the needs of victims, clarifying the roles of responders, and

building trust among responding agencies are

essential to developing and implementing

workable and effective interventions with

victims.

2. The victim population must be broadly defined to include not only the primary victims

and their families, but also first responders

and rescue workers, law enforcement, clergy,

victim assistance personnel, and others who

are exposed to traumatized victims.

3. Identifying, setting aside, and effectively

managing resources are key to providing a

comprehensive response. Encouraging cooperative efforts between the public and private sector can maximize resources, leverage

expertise, and build a stronger sense of community support.

4. State and federal laws mandate that certain

rights and services be afforded to victims.

Agencies and individuals charged with responding to terrorism must be familiar with

what the law requires.
3 1

States military barracks in Saudi Arabia, the 1998

bombing of the United States embassies in Kenya

and Tanzania, and the murders of two Americans

as part of a terrorist attack in Uganda. Lessons

were learned in response to these acts of terrorism

along with those drawn from the trial of two

Libyans charged with the 1988 bombing of Pan

Am Flight 103. Lessons from these later experiences in addition to those from the Oklahoma

City bombing combine to frame a more complete

and informed set of policy recommendations

about responding to victims of terrorism.

State and Local Victim

Assistance

Recommendation 1

State and local authorities developing domestic

emergency response plans should consider applicable legal requirements regarding the rights of

crime victims and should include victim services

representatives in planning and testing response

protocols.

Discussion

A number of efforts are ongoing involving federal,

state, and local authorities to ensure that communities are in position to respond to terrorism. State

and local agencies should identify victim compensation and assistance resources available at the

local, state, and federal levels to assist in responding

to acts of terrorism. OVC is working with the Office

for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support

(OSLDPS) to coordinate the development of training and other tools focused on assisting victims. In

addition, OVC and the U.S. Department of State

have been working with an interagency task force

to develop protocols for responding to victims of

Whenever possible, responding agencies should

take steps to avoid unnecessary delays in death

notification and the release of victim remains to

families and to handle notification in a sensitive

manner.

Discussion

The processes of recovery and identification of

remains may be extremely difficult and prolonged

in terrorism crimes with mass casualties. Evidence

has to be gathered for the investigation and may

further delay the process, causing frustration and

anger on the part of grieving families. The guiding

principle should be to provide as much information as possible without jeopardizing either the 

accuracy of the identification or the evidencegathering process. Death notification should be

handled by professionals with training and experience. Whenever possible, surviving families

should be consulted and their wishes honored

concerning issues including whether to view the

remains of their loved ones, how to inter human

tissue that cannot be identified, and the timing

of official ceremonies and memorial services.

Recommendation 3 

In the immediate aftermath of a terrorism disaster,

local officials should consider establishing a centralized “compassion center” where victims can go

for information, crisis counseling, and privacy.

Discussion

In addition to addressing comfort and privacy

needs of victim families, officials need to be able

to quickly reach families to obtain critical information necessary for identification and handling

of remains and for the investigation. The creation

of a victim information center may have benefits

for both victims and responding agencies. 
3 2

private benefits available to crime victims shou

develop necessary protocols and procedures to

simplify application processes without comprom

ing necessary checks and balances. In addition,

they should offer assistance in completing form

and coordinate benefits to victims and survivor

Within the Guide to Responding to Mass-Casualt

Incidents, members of the National Association 

Crime Victims Compensation Boards (NACVC

have included a special protocol for handling

compensation claims for victims of terrorism ca

Agencies and organizations should consider est

lishing contractual relationships with service pr

viding entities such as hospitals, funeral homes

and mental health providers to facilitate direct

billing whenever possible, thereby relieving the

victim of additional and often confusing paperwo

Recommendation 6

Local, state, and federal agencies responding to v

tims of a terrorist act should consider establishi

an “unmet needs” committee or task force that

includes private organizations to ensure that th

needs of victims are identified and addressed an

that all of the available resources are coordinat

and used on behalf of victims. 

Discussion

In addition to creating a special task force to r

view unmet needs and coordinate resources in 

aftermath of a terrorist incident, the NACVCB

Guide to Responding to Mass-Casualty Incidents

recommends that state compensation programs

consider establishing an advisory group to creat

a directory of resources with local, state, and 

national information about benefits and service

available to victims of crime and mass disasters

✦ Service providers should be screened, trained,

and certified in the provision of mental

health services to victims of human-caused

disasters.

✦ Mental health services should be culturally

sensitive and address diverse needs, beliefs,

and lifestyles of all affected victims. 

✦ Mental health services should provide for

immediate needs and long-term needs.

Immediate needs may include services provided by a trained counselor or chaplain

during death notification at a hospital or at

a compassion center whereas long-term

needs may be served at a special, nontraditional counseling center for victims. 

✦ Crime victims compensation programs

should have guidelines for funding mental

health services and should make the process

as simple and accessible as possible. 

The Office for Victims of Crime and the Center for

Mental Health Services (CMHS) at the Substance

Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration

(SAMHSA) are working together to develop materials and training for community mental health

providers about the impact of victimization and

effective models for treating victims and responders.

Experience with violent victimization and terrorist

incidents have shown that mental health services

need to be in place for years, especially if the

criminal justice process is ongoing. States should

allocate funding for these services and maximize

public and private resources for providing

mental health services. 
3 3

ppg

to accept public and private donations to create a

special fund to provide compensation and assistance to the bombing victims and surviving family

members. The program was also given the flexibility to pay lost wages and cover grief counseling for

family members of the victims. The creation of

this special fund enabled the Oklahoma Crime

Victim Compensation program to help victims

with expenses not traditionally covered by the

program. Policymakers should determine in advance if legislation is required to establish a special

fund, what kinds of additional expenses will be

covered by the fund, how much funding should be

held in reserve, and what financial resources are

available to support special fund efforts.

Recommendation 8

Agencies serving victims should work together to

develop protocols for recruiting, screening, training,

and supporting volunteers who work with terrorism victims and their families. 

Discussion

To avoid confusion and conflict in the aftermath

of a large-scale terrorism incident, guidelines

should be developed ahead of time that determine

which volunteers will be utilized, minimal qualifications and training of volunteers, and volunteer

documentation. Qualified mental health professionals should be teamed with victim advocates

and present at all sites serving terrorism victims.

Because a terrorism event may include the elements

of a large-scale disaster and criminal victimization,

greater efforts should be made to link ARC staff

and volunteers with victim assistance professionals and volunteers. Each brings critical areas of

knowledge and expertise to the victim response.

OVC should host a series of regional training

Discussion

A crime that occurs in a foreign country often

presents unique challenges to victims and victims’

families or can exacerbate situations typically

faced by most victims. These factors may include

the cost of emergency overseas travel for families

to go to the victim or for the victim to return

home, emergency medical costs in countries where

payment is expected instead of insurance, the cost

of transporting bodies, legal assistance in a foreign

country, and the cost of traveling to criminal justice proceedings.

Federal Victim Assistance

The Federal agencies charged with responding to

acts of terrorism, both domestically and abroad,

should develop detailed protocols or a coordinated

crisis response plan with the Office for Victims of

Crime to ensure that the rights and needs of terrorism victims are adequately supported. 

Recommendation 1

Investigators, prosecutors, victim-witness coordinators, and court personnel should receive training

on basic victims’ rights laws and services.

Discussion

The Attorney General Guidelines on Victim and

Witness Assistance provides a basis for training on

legal requirements. Supplemental training should

include basic information on the mental health

consequences of victimization and available resources and services for victims. 
3 4

Recommendation 4 

Federal agencies should maintain a “fly-away”

team of victim assistance experts, including an

OVC representative, to provide onsite support

and technical assistance in developing the response to terrorism victims.

Discussion

OVC has identified individuals in federal and

state agencies and nonprofit programs with kno

ledge and expertise in working with mass-casua

and violent crime victims. Also, OVC has iden

fied people with the capacity to activate or loca

funding and other resources to assist communit

in coping with a criminal disaster. OVC may b

able to use VOCA funds to help support the co

of support teams for immediate assistance and o

going technical assistance.

Recommendation 5 

Prosecuting offices should establish mechanism

to ensure that victims are kept informed of case

events, ongoing services, and support througho

the trial process.

A. U.S. Attorneys’ Offices should appoint an

Attorney Liaison as an advisor for victims

and the trial team. Prior to the trial and d

ing the trial, the Attorney Liaison should

maintain regular contact with victims to e

sure that they understand the prosecution

process.

B. Victims should have the opportunity to m

with the trial team on a periodic basis to

ensure that prosecutors fulfill the requirement to use their best efforts to consult w

victims about major case events and make

g

responsibility transfers to the relevant U.S.

Attorney’s Office. Whenever possible, victims

should be informed of critical case events by the

investigative agency before that information is 

released to the media. The FBI should work closely

with the Office for Victims of Crime to coordinate

supplemental funding and assistance in dealing

with large numbers of victims. In cases of airline

disasters, the FBI will need to coordinate with the

Family Assistance Program in the National

Transportation Safety Board. Cases that occur

overseas require coordination with the U.S.

Department of State, because that department is

charged with taking the lead in the emergency

response to terrorism against Americans abroad.

Not all terrorism cases will result in an arrest and

trial as quickly as these events occurred after the

bombing of the Murrah Building.24 It is not always

immediately clear if a mass-casualty event is the

result of a criminal act as illustrated by the crash

of TWA Flight 800. In addition, cases involving

chemical and biological agents may affect thousands of people and create huge challenges for

disseminating critical information about the medical impact of exposure, safety, and availability of

services.25

Recommendation 3

Federal agencies need to ensure that identification

of victims and access to victim contact information

are established and maintained. 

Discussion

The FBI, EOUSA, and OVC should work with

ARC, NTSB, and others to ensure that victim

contact information is available to responding

investigative and prosecuting agencies in a

timely fashion. Privacy laws intended to
3 5

Discussion

Prosecutors and victim-witness coordinators are

required to follow the AG Guidelines to ensure

that they are in compliance with federal laws and

U.S. Department of Justice policy regarding victims. Cases involving large numbers of victims

and victims living in many parts of the country

or the world may require special funding and the

development of creative measures. Offices may

consider tools such as toll-free information lines,

special Web sites for victims, and the development of specific information guides for keeping

victims informed of case events and for providing

information about services.26 Prosecutors should

work with the court to facilitate victim participation. Large numbers of victims may pose challenges for enabling victims to present victim impact

information at sentencing. Prosecutors should

work with the victims to develop a plan that will

allow as many victims as possible to present their

information orally or in writing. 

D. In cases where there is a change of venue,

prosecutors should work with the court to

ensure that reasonable efforts are made to

make a closed-circuit telecast of the trial

available to as many victims as possible, to

identify resources for travel assistance, and

to identify and put into place support for

victims in the community in which the trial

is being held. 

Discussion

Facilities for closed-circuit viewing by victims

should be designed or selected with sensitivity to

the needs of victims for privacy, reasonable comfort, and safety. Resources for victims’ travel may

come from private or public funds. In the 

these activities. The Denver community established an effective and extensive network of support for the Oklahoma City bombing victims

traveling to the trial. In the case of the Pan Am

Flight 103/Lockerbie trial, which is being held in

the Netherlands, OVC has been able to provide

funding for victim support staff and station them

at the special court and to create a secure family

waiting area in the court building.

E. When a terrorism act results in multiple trials, prosecutors and victim assistance professionals should coordinate their activities to

reduce the demands and stresses on victims,

surviving families, and witnesses. 

Discussion

Maintaining consistent communication between

prosecutors and victim assistance professionals will

help reduce confusion and duplication of efforts and

ensure that the needs of both victims and the trial

prosecutors are met in a timely manner.

Recommendation 6

The U.S. Department of Justice should assist victims with media requests by providing a media liaison with expertise in working with victims to

reduce unnecessary trauma to victims and to ensure that journalists have access to the information they need to cover the story without

negatively affecting victims.

Discussion

High-profile cases, such as terrorism cases, elicit

intense media attention. The following issues

must be considered when giving media what they

need without overwhelming victims or violating

their privacy and freedom of movement:
3 6

ment, and timing. 

Recommendation 9

Federal agencies whose employees may be targe

by acts of terrorism, including those with embass

and installations abroad, should have informati

and procedures for responding to employee vict

and their families. Information about various b

efits and the processes for obtaining those bene

should be streamlined.

Discussion

OVC and the U.S. Department of State are

cochairing an interagency task force to address

the complex needs of victims of terrorism abroa

One of the tasks identified by this group 

to improve access to information and coordina

tion among agencies related to employee benef

Recommendation 10

Federal agencies with funding for victim suppor

and mental health services should determine

which types of services and for what length of

time they will provide funding support for these

services to state and local agencies. 

Discussion

Federal agencies need to develop an appropriat

plan for supporting assistance to victims of terr

ism that takes into account the long-term need

of these victims and the need for significant investment in services by the affected state and

local jurisdictions. Federal agencies should 

coordinate funding and services and ensure tha

the effectiveness of the services is evaluated. Th

FEMA–CMHS approach to providing mental

health services in the aftermath of presidentiall

Federal court personnel should have policies and

procedures that reflect current law and relevant

court decisions affecting victim participation in

judicial proceedings. 

Discussion

New statutes were passed in the wake of the

Oklahoma City bombing, and there have been

changes related to restitution and other victimrelated issues. OVC is supporting a project by the

National Center for State Courts to develop a

bench book for state and local judges and court

personnel on victim participation in court proceedings. The federal courts should consider developing

a similar bench book or include victim issues in

the standard bench book already in use. 

Recommendation 8 

The U.S. Department of Justice should develop

and implement a plan for support and assistance

to minimize the vicarious trauma impact on investigators, prosecutors, and victim assistance personnel who are directly involved with primary victims. 

Discussion

Being involved in a mass-casualty terrorism case is

an intense experience at physical, emotional, and

psychological levels. The closer an individual

works with traumatized victims, the more likely

he or she will experience secondary trauma.

Agencies ask a great deal of employees who handle

these cases, and they should ensure that assistance and support is available to their employees.

Efforts should be made to provide information

about vicarious trauma to personnel and supervisors, and mechanisms should be enacted 
3 7

response agencies are aware of the existence of

OVC’s Emergency Reserve Fund and the ability

of OVC to assist in coordinating services and information for victims of crime. 

for International Development, and to use the

funds to cover a broader range of services, including emergency travel expenses, mental health

services, and trial support.
3 9

of resources for victims of terrorism, and the capacity of victim services networks. The Oklahoma

City experience was a step in developing a more

effective crisis response plan for victims and their

families. The bombing has been the impetus for

congressional hearings; passage of special funding

legislation for victim relief; the confluence of experts in emergency preparedness, medical and

mental health, victim assistance, and other fields

to examine their crisis response capacity and

plans; training development; and identification

and coordination of resources.

Many of the lessons learned from the Oklahoma

City bombing response have helped shape the response of federal, state, and local officials in other

cases of terrorism including the school shootings

at Columbine High School and the terrorist attacks on Khobar Towers and the United States

embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; these lessons

have also been wed during the preparations for

the trial concerning the bombing of Pan Am

Flight 103. Involvement in these subsequent cases

has significantly added to a knowledge of what

needs to be done to assist the victims of terrorism.

their losses would not be in vain. 

Now that terrorism has crossed the borders of the

United States, it poses a very real threat within

the United States while continuing to be a threat

to Americans abroad. The goal of terrorism is not

just to kill people but to send a message to the

public and to the government. The devastating

impact of a single act of terrorism can last for generations. Federal, state, and local governments

must be prepared to respond to all aspects of terrorist acts, including finding ways to mitigate the

physical, emotional, and psychological impact on

victims and those professionals who are charged

with responding to these terrible crimes.

The recommendations presented in this report are

not comprehensive, but they are intended to be

practical and useful steps that will help refine and

improve the crisis response to terrorism. Public officials at all levels of government can implement

these recommendations to ensure that this

Nation’s communities and agencies are better

equipped to respond to the victims of future acts

of terrorism.
4 1

2. Some officials observed that the arrival of

OVC-sponsored crisis intervenors came too soon

after the explosion and recommended agencies

delay this kind of assistance until the immediate

rescue effort is completed.

3. The defense argued that an unidentified leg

could have belonged to the perpetrator. The leg

was later identified as belonging to one of the 

victims.

4. The Employee Assistance Program at the U.S.

Department of Justice has now developed Peer

Support Team Training including a section on

Critical Incident Trauma.

5. After the suicide of a colleague, some employees took advantage of Project Heartland’s counseling and debriefing resources.

6. Christy Prietsch, Administrator, U.S. Attorneys

Employee Assistance Program.

7. Under its own guidelines, FEMA could only

provide funding for crisis response services in the

presidentially declared disaster area and for a limited period of time. FEMA funds could not be

used for trial support.

8. OVC’s grant, awarded on March 11, 1997,

funded crisis counseling during the trials at the

Safe Haven in Oklahoma City and the Safe

Haven in Denver, operated by the Colorado

Oklahoma Resource Council, including volunteer

training. Project Heartland staff also assisted U.S.

Attorney’s Office staff in debriefing prosecution

witnesses when they completed testimony.

the case of a victim that is an institutional entity,

an authorized representative of the entity; and (B)

in the case of a victim who is under 18 years of

age, incompetent, incapacitated, or deceased, one

of the following (in order of preference): (i) a

spouse; (ii) a legal guardian; (iii) a parent; (iv) a

child; (v) a sibling; (vi) another family member;

or (vii) another person designated by the court.”

10. Because the bomb blast made the 26-story

apartment building unstable, all residents were

forced to move to hotels for 6 months. Many were

elderly and disabled, and most knew parents or

grandparents of children killed in the explosion.

Following several other attempts, Project

Heartland initiated a support group for residents.

On completion of renovations, all Project

Heartland staff helped tenants move back to

their apartments.

11. Under a later Interagency Agreement (March

4, 1997) between EOUSA, OVC, and the FBI,

EOUSA agreed to “assign its personnel and/or

Victim-Witness Coordinators from other USAs’

[U.S. Attorneys’] offices to assist with victim services on location at the discretion of the USA” in

the case of a catastrophic event. OVC agreed to

provide financial and technical support for emergency victim services and to “commit staff time

and funds necessary to enable the staff of the U.S.

Attorney’s Office and the FBI to receive onsite

technical assistance.”

12. Assistant United States Attorney K. Lynn

Anderson.

13. To protect victim privacy and avoid any possibility of tainting the jury pool, the U.S. Attorney’s

Office in consultation with Project Heartland 

recommended against private-housing offers. 
4 2

unduplicated count of 8,869 persons received

counseling, support group, or crisis intervention

services.

18. According to the National Institute of Men

Health (Faberow and Frederick, 1978), there is

also a fifth and final stage, the “recovery” stage

where life has returned to a state of normalcy a

victims draw strength from the fact that they h

survived and were able to mend their lives. 

19. Interview with James Horn, Critical Incide

Workshop Groups, Inc.

20. Interviews with James Horn, Diane Leonar

and Col. Jack Poe, Critical Incident Workshop

Groups, Inc.

21. Interview with K. Lynn Anderson, Assistan

U.S. Attorney.

22. In 1996, Congress passed the Mandatory

Victim Restitution Act, which requires Federal

Courts to award restitution for most crimes defined in title 18 U.S.C.

23. The Privacy Act only covers Federal Gover

ment agencies defined as “any Executive depar

ment, military department, Government

corporation, Government controlled corporatio

or other establishment in the executive branch

of the [Federal] Government (including the

Executive Office of the President), or any inde

pendent regulatory agency” (5 U.S.C. § 552a(1

Private organizations that have many “links” to

the Federal Government are not covered by th

Privacy Act (see Dong v. Smithsonian Institution

125 F.3d 877, 879–80 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. 

denied, 524 U.S. 922 (1998) (Smithsonian

Institution)).

Executive Board, Governor Roy Romer’s Office,

Lutheran Family Services/Lutheran Disaster

Response, Mayor Wellington Webb’s Office,

Mile High United Way, American Red Cross,

District Attorney’s Victim/Witness Programs,

and Volunteers of America. The U.S. Attorney’s

Office for the Western District of Oklahoma participated in an advisory capacity.

15. With judicial approval established, the

Attorney Liaison and Colorado District Court

Clerk convened FAA representatives, judicial administrators, U.S. Marshals Service representatives,

media representatives, Judge Perricone, and others

to plan logistics including security, meals, privacy,

and mental health needs during the broadcasts.

Later meetings on mental health support took

place with FAA staff, Safe Haven and Project

Heartland counselors, and victim-witness coordinators. Planning involved both facilities—the

CCTV site in the auditorium and the Safe Haven.

The Attorney Liaison also participated in training

programs for the mental health and community

volunteers who would staff the FAA Safe Haven.

16. In establishing the four remote court sites in

the Pan Am Flight 103/Lockerbie trial, the issue

about the quality of the transmission of the trial

broadcasts was addressed by using a high band

width, positioning six movable cameras in the

courtroom, and using an audio-visual director to

choreograph the detailed images appearing on the

screen.

17. “Secondary” and “tertiary” victims include 

social service and mental health professionals;

volunteers; fire, police, and other emergency 

response-and-rescue personnel; colleagues

and friends; attorneys who worked with
4 3

vide information to large numbers of victims. NTSB

contracts with a private company that specializes

in crisis response, has the ability to quickly establish

and maintain a toll-free victim assistance hotline,

and provides ongoing notification. The FBI and

OVC should consider utilizing the same type of

resources in terrorism cases, particularly when the

victims are not from one geographic region.

Human-Caused Disasters: Recommendations for the

Crisis Counseling and Assistance Program (Center

for Mental Health Services, ND). This report contains important and detailed recommendations for

improving the mental health response to victims

of terrorism and other human-caused disasters. OVC

staff participated in the development of the report. 
4 5

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Responding to Terrorism Victims:

Oklahoma City and Beyond

For copies of this report and/or additional information, please contact:

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P.O. Box 6000

Rockville, MD 20849–6000

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