U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

71–624 DTP WASHINGTON : 2001

DOD CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

PROGRAM: MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 24, 2000

Serial No. 106–209

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250

Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

DOUG OSE, California

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin

HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

DAVID A. KASS, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian

LISA SMITH ARAFUNE, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

TOM LANTOS, California

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

LAWRENCE J. HALLORAN, Staff Director and Counsel

R. NICHOLAS PALARINO, Senior Policy Analyst

JASON CHUNG, Clerk

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on May 24, 2000 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Chan, Kwai-Cheung, Director, Special Studies and Evaluation Group,

National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, accompanied by Sushil K. Sharma, Assistant Director,

and Jeffrey K. Harris, Senior Evaluator ..................................................... 6

Johnson-Winegar, Anna, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

for Chemical/Biological Defense, Department of Defense .......................... 27

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Chan, Kwai-Cheung, Director, Special Studies and Evaluation Group,

National Security and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared statement of ....................................................... 9

Johnson-Winegar, Anna, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

for Chemical/Biological Defense, Department of Defense:

Information concerning HNSC/SASC sample ......................................... 45

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 29

Chenoweth-Hage, Hon. Helen, a Representative in Congress from the

State of Idaho, prepared statement of ......................................................... 5

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut, prepared statement of ........................................................ 3

(1)

DOD CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE

PROGRAM: MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT

WEDNESDAY, MAY 24, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS

AFFAIRS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room

2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays, Blagojevich, and Tierney.

Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and counsel;

R. Nicholas Palarino, senior policy advisor; Robert Newman and

Thomas Costa, professional staff member; Jason M. Chung, clerk;

David Rapallo, minority counsel; and Earley Green, minority clerk.

Mr. SHAYS. I’d like to call this hearing to order and welcome our

witnesses and guests.

The Persian Gulf war taught many important lessons about the

effective use of our military strength, and about weaknesses in our

chemical and biological—CB—defenses. Poor detection capability,

bulky protective clothing, and limited supplies of medicines and

decontaminants, among other problems, increased the vulnerability

of U.S. forces to unconventional attack.

Since then, Congress and the Department of Defense [DOD],

have sought to improve the Chemical and Biological Defense Program by integrating previously disparate research, development

and acquisition efforts into a coordinated, joint service approach.

CBDP spending, $791 million this fiscal year, has more than doubled since 1996.

In the most recent Annual Report to Congress, the Chemical and

Biological Defense Program claims success in meeting statutory

mandates to consolidate program management, expand jointness

among the service branches, and improve force protection against

immediate and future CB threats.

But according to the General Accounting Office [GAO], the program may be mistaking motion for progress. CBDP has not yet

fully complied with one important congressional mandate: to measure program performance in terms of real outcomes rather than

mere activities. The Government Performance and Results Act

[GPRA], requires adherence to an overall strategic plan, explicit

program goals, and measurable performance benchmarks. Despite

an August 1999 GAO recommendation to complete a Results Actcompliant performance plan, the March 2000 CBDP Annual Report

2

contains little more than the relabeling of last year’s goals and the

promise of a more complete effort next year.

The Results Act is more than an academic or civics exercise. According to DOD, the chemical and biological threat to U.S. forces

is very real. Those charged to design, procure and deploy defensive

capabilities to meet that threat should know, and be able to demonstrate, their efforts are working; yet GAO concludes, ‘‘In the absence of explicit and measurable goals, it is difficult to assess the

impact of the program on warfighters’ ability to survive, fight and

win in a chemical and biological environment.’’ Without those performance measures, the program risks losing

sight of its real objectives as jointness gives way to service-specific

demands and the competing priorities of a very complex management and oversight bureaucracy dilute program focus. By ignoring,

delaying or claiming exemption from Results Act requirements, the

program risks settling for marginal improvements to existing technologies when those on the battlefield need much more.

This subcommittee spent the past year looking at one aspect of

current chemical and biological defense strategy, the Anthrax Vaccine Immunization Program. Today we begin an examination of the

broader force protection effort, encompassing detection, agent identification, warning, individual protection, collective protection, and

decontamination. On June 21st we plan to look specifically at current inventory controls, training protocols, and service life of individual protective clothing and masks.

We appreciate the cooperation of all our witnesses in this effort,

and we look forward to their testimony.

[The prepared statements of Hon. Christopher Shays and Hon.

Helen Chenoweth-Hage follow:]

3

4

5

6

Mr. SHAYS. We have two panels. The first panel is Kwai Chan,

Director, Special Studies and Evaluation Group, National Security

and International Affairs Division, U.S. General Accounting Office,

accompanied by Dr. Sushil K. Sharma, Assistant Director, Special

Studies and Evaluation Group, and Dr. Jeffrey K. Harris, Senior

Evaluator at National Security and International Affairs Division.

I would invite all of our witnesses on the first panel to come up,

and we will swear you in.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record that our witnesses have responded in the affirmative.

We welcome your testimony and welcome you here.

STATEMENT OF KWAI-CHEUNG CHAN, DIRECTOR, SPECIAL

STUDIES AND EVALUATION GROUP, NATIONAL SECURITY

AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY SUSHIL K. SHARMA,

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, AND JEFFREY K. HARRIS, SENIOR

EVALUATOR

Mr. CHAN. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I

am pleased to be here today to discuss our report on the Department of Defense application of the Results Act in its Chemical and

Biological Defense Program.

Before I discuss our findings, let me briefly describe the context.

Subsequent to the Gulf War, concerns were raised about the adequacy of technologies used to detect and protect troops against

chemical and biological weapons. The growth in appropriations for

the program, from $388 million in fiscal year 1996 to $791 million

in the current fiscal year, reflects a continuing and increasing Congressional interest in the protection of our servicemembers.

In 1993 Congress enacted the Government Performance and Results Act. The legislation was designed to have agencies focus on

the results of their programs rather than on program activities and

resources, as they had traditionally done. Congress drafted this legislation in frustration over vague agency goals and inadequate program performance information. The absence of articulated strategic

performance goals and associated performance measures was

viewed as a serious impediment to policymaking, spending decisions, and oversight.

The Results Act requires that agencies at all levels set multiyear

strategic goals and annual performance goals, measure performance, and report on the degree to which those goals are met. Specifically, each activity is expected to, one, establish quantifiable,

measurable outcome-oriented goals and related performance measures; two, develop strategies for achieving these goals; three, ensure that goals align within each agency; and finally, identify the

resources that will be required to achieve those goals.

I will now turn to the following four issues, which you asked us

to address, and our findings and recommendations: First, whether

Results Act principles can and should be applied to the program’s

R&D activities; second, whether current Chemical and Biological

Defense Program planning and evaluation practices follow the Results Act framework; third, whether organizations executing the

program’s R&D activities have incorporated Results Act principles

7

in their planning and evaluation practices; and, finally, I will quote

DOD’s response to our recommendation from August of last year,

that DOD should develop a performance plan for the Chemical and

Biological Defense Program.

First, congressional reports and administrative guidance clearly

indicate that programs such as the Chemical and Biological Defense Program should follow the Results Act’s outcome-oriented

principles. We found that research organizations, such as the Research Roundtable, the National Academy of Sciences, the National

Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine have concluded that both applied and basic research programs could be

evaluated meaningfully using the Results Act’s principles.

Second, we found that program managers have not incorporated

key Results Act principles in the planning or in the execution of

the program. The five program goals, as stated in its 1999 report,

are either vague and unmeasurable, or fail to articulate specific desired impacts. For example, measuring the first goal, which is to

deter chemical and biological weapon use by denying military advantage, because determining a deterrent effect is problematic, and

attributing the specific rationale for the deterrent is unrealistic.

Three of the five goals addressed the size, focus, and coordination

of the program, not program outcomes. Together, these goals direct

that the program be sufficiently large to address the needs resulting from two major theater wars; be sufficiently focused to address

likely validated threats, and be sufficiently coordinated to capitalize on efficiencies and other benefits of joint requirement determination, research, development, and procurement.

The fifth goal, to complete R&D, is measurable, but addresses

program output rather than outcomes.

Third, we found that only one of the three organizations executing the program’s R&D activities has adopted Results Act planning

and evaluation tools. The remaining R&D organizations cited either the utilization of equivalent planning tools, or the unique challenges of evaluating R&D activities, as reasons why they had not

or could not adopt the Results Act processes.

Fourth, DOD has yet to implement our recommendation that it

develop a performance plan for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program. In its response to GAO, DOD stated that it ‘‘would

develop a strategic plan more closely aligned with the tenets of the

Results Act,’’ and that it ‘‘would publish that plan in the program’s

next Annual Report to Congress.’’ Nevertheless, its March 2000 report to Congress does not contain a performance plan.

DOD has instead defined seven new program goals and stated

that ‘‘specific technology and systems goals will be provided’’ in its

performance plan, under development.

It is important to note that the steps taken and promised in the

March 2000 report to the Congress still reflect only partial compliance with the first of the four outcome-oriented principles, by failing even to identify quantifiable, measurable outcome-oriented performance goals.

DOD has not begun to address the other three principles of the

Results Act. Consequently, in the absence of explicit and measurable performance goals, a strategy for achieving those goals, alignment of those goals within each agency, as well as the resources

8

required, the Congress and the DOD cannot assess the impact of

the Federal funding for this program on warfighters’ ability to survive, fight, and win in a chemical or biological contaminated environment.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. We will be happy

to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Chan follows:]

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Mr. SHAYS. When I was first elected to Congress, I was exposed

to a report about our protective gear, and it was alarming. What

was alarming was that test studies would indicate that the protective gear wasn’t doing the job it was designed to do. At the time,

it was a classified document, and it was very frustrating for me to

be aware of this document.

I went to other Members to share it with them, as I could, which

is to say that I am going to see that a good deal of this committee’s

energy and time is spent understanding the quality of our protective gear, and hold the DOD and others accountable for what is required.

But what I would like to ask you first, Mr. Chan, is this. I would

like to know what is the general attitude of DOD when you get into

these issues. Do they take GPRA seriously? Do they feel that they

are doing important work? Do they take seriously, in your judgment, the value of the program?

Mr. CHAN. Well, our initial experience was when we did our

work, the person in charge of the program was quite vehement in

the sense that he didn’t think it was necessary for them to follow

the Results Act.

Mr. SHAYS. So to start with, they didn’t take the view that they

came under GPRA, under the Results Act, or that they felt they

weren’t compatible, that the Results Act wouldn’t be helpful to

them—besides being a legal requirement, that it wouldn’t be helpful to them?

Mr. CHAN. First, the belief was that the QDR itself, the

Quadriennial Report Review, would answer the questions on what

this is all about, but second, I think there was some concern on

how you apply GPRA to the research and development side.

Subsequent to that, I think the next leadership felt that it is important to apply it, and I think that’s why you see some progress

in the March 2000 report.

To me, there is sort of a conflict between what seem to be good

management tools versus the utilization of those tools. It’s sort of

good management principles to have these tools so that one can tell

what is the mission of this program, and how do you go about implementing it, how do you measure it, so that at the end we understand what the outcome is, and the report will reflect outcome of

the spending of the dollars on.

Mr. SHAYS. Describe to me in general terms what you think the

role of CBDP is.

Mr. CHAN. Well, I think in 1993 and 1994 Congress was concerned about lack of capability of our soldiers to fight in a contaminated environment, and had in fact decided to focus on giving sufficient funding in this program to actually manage all RD&A—that

is, research, development and acquisition—systems by which it can

help in terms of its mission. So it has a very far-reaching mandate.

Mr. SHAYS. I know that you stated this in your report, but I

would like to ask you specifically—well, you answered that, so I

don’t need to go over it.

What are the difficulties of translating the annual goals into a

performance plan?

Mr. CHAN. Mr. Chairman, the issue that is yet unaddressed to

our satisfaction in the presentation of program goals in the annual

23

report is that it can’t be determined from the information available,

whether or not the program goals are threat-driven, and if they’re

measurable. We think that we need an entire packet of information, beginning with strategic goals, annual performance goals, performance measures for those annual goals, and a plan to address

any deficiencies that may be identified—to put a package together

to identify what is or is not adequate.

The concept of the Results Act, with its layout of the steps that

the Congress has articulated, I think is quite easy to understand

and conceptualize, but the articulation of measurable goals is the

hurdle that has to be overcome first. And right now, it cannot be

determined if the goals presented in the plan are simply asking for

incremental improvements in existing capabilities, or is there an

ideal capability that the users require to avoid the chemical and biological threats where they need to have a goal of a capability versus an incremental improvement over existing equipment.

Mr. SHAYS. But the bottom line is that you are not able to determine whether or not they are meeting goals and certain strategies

because you are not sure, in every instance, what their goals and

strategies are? Is that correct?

Mr. CHAN. Correct.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Before welcoming our two members, let me just get two housekeeping measures out of the way.

I ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee

be permitted to place any opening statement in the record, and

that the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without

objection, so ordered.

I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted

to include their written statements in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

Let me just say before recognizing both Mr. Blagojevich and Mr.

Tierney, that we view this first hearing as kind of ‘‘putting the ball

in play.’’ We’re not going to get in any great depth today, but the

purpose is just to begin this process. We don’t anticipate that this

is going to be a particularly long hearing, but, Mr. Chan, when

you’re done, I hope that you or your staff can stay to hear what

is said and to make some comment on it as well.

Mr. Blagojevich, welcome.

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just intend to listen for a little while. I have no questions at this point, but perhaps

later.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Let me just ask the three of you, is there any question that we should be asking you before sit down? And if there is,

you can tell me what it is and I’ll ask it again, so that you will

feel like I’ve asked you.

Dr. Sharma, I’ve never known you to be here and not say something. [Laughter.]

Mr. SHARMA. I was going to pass, but now I have to speak.

[Laughter.]

I think I have a comment rather than a question, in anticipation

that you would ask me to answer, so let me sort of describe to you

what our expectations are in terms of the Results Act.

24

As we understand, in the CB defense area, threat is the guiding

force, that is validated threats. Based on validated threats, the

users—which are the services and various commands—may develop

some requirements to deal with those threats, and the funding that

you are providing is to make sure that we have enough capabilities

so that our soldiers could survive in a contaminated environment

and accomplish the mission.

In order for us to evaluate what our money is buying, one needs

to show that the technologies that are coming out, or the various

equipments that we are supplying to our fighters—what effect, if

any, they are having on the threat. And when you look at the existing plan, it appears that the focus is on commodity areas, on technologies, on improvements over existing technologies. Although

they have pieces in place that can answer the question for you, it

hasn’t really been put together by the Department at this point so

that you could evaluate the outcome of the funding—that is, what

is our money buying? We have had very detailed discussions with

the program level people, who agreed with us that it should be

done this way. We have let the Department know that we will be

available to them to assist them at various points in time when

they feel they have something to share with us.

It is a new thing for them to do, and we will be very happy to

assist them. However, at this point they have a long way to go.

Mr. TIERNEY. That raises the question—I mean, we’ve asked this

of all Departments, of all units within Departments, and so on, to

do the Results Act, correct? I mean, throughout Government, it’s

Government-wide?

Mr. SHARMA. That is correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. Is it GAO’s responsibility to assist in that effort,

or is it something that you all have just taken on as something you

think you can do?

Mr. SHARMA. I don’t think it is our responsibility. We have, in

this particular case, offered assistance to them.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK.

Mr. SHARMA. It is the agency’s responsibility to develop the plan

and evaluate it itself, and show it to the Congress, the results of

their efforts in accomplishing the mission.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chan, maybe I should ask you this, in that I’m

prepared to move on to the next panel.

You’re not saying that they are not meeting their goals, you’re

saying that in some cases we don’t know what their goals are. It

may be that we’re doing really great, but if we are, it’s more by accident than by planning—those are my words. In other words, you

can’t make an assessment of where we are because you don’t have

the measurement tools in place without them following—— Mr. CHAN. Well, I can make an assessment. I think they haven’t

done that, unfortunately.

Mr. SHAYS. They haven’t what?

Mr. CHAN. They have not done that, because I think what we

have right now is an assessment whereby we are pursuing based

on threat, and what technology we have, and we’re putting a lot

of eggs in different baskets, and hopefully something will come out

of there at the end. But I don’t think it makes a good strategy in

terms of——

25

Mr. SHAYS. Well, that’s a different issue. I’m not trying to get

them off the hook; I’m just trying to assess—you’re not claiming

that we are unprepared and that we are not doing a good job; the

claim is that without these measuring tools, we don’t know? And

it seems to me that your claim is also that without specific focus

on the Results Act, we clearly aren’t maximizing the resources that

we have to get there as quickly as we can, correct?

Mr. CHAN. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Dr. Harris, did you have any comments you wanted

to make?

Mr. HARRIS. I just wanted to add what Dr. Chan and Dr. Sharma

said, a couple points. One is that the way the program is described

right now, it is very easy to say that we are making progress in

achieving our goals because we are producing a better piece of

equipment tomorrow than we had yesterday, and we can say that

we can buy more of that with the moneys available from Congress

than we had yesterday, and say that this is progress.

But the plan that the Results Act requires should identify is,

what are the pieces of equipment that are needed? What are the

descriptions of the ideal equipment, the ideal capabilities that

warfighters need? And we don’t know exactly where we need to get

to, so we don’t know exactly how far away from that ideal we are

today.

Another element that should be this, in the spirit of the Results

Act, is that we have goals identified in the report that are commodity area-specific, to detect, to protect, to decontaminate. There is no

system in place to relate the relative benefits of competing goals.

We don’t know, without a Results Act implementation, if we might

better spend our money for procurement or research and development—or, within research and development, what area is in the

most need of additional assistance.

So these are things we think will be there when the full implementation of the Results Act is completed.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, Mr. Chan?

Mr. CHAN. I would like to say that the Results Act itself is a

management tool by which the Government sort of ‘‘mandates’’ the

agencies to determine how they are spending the money, and how

well they are spending the money.

In this case here, as we stated, from 1996 to the year 2000, the

budget itself had doubled over that period of time. And without

knowing what we’re getting out of this money or this investment,

then there’s no way to account for—have we, in fact—where are we

in terms of achieving the goals or providing that the mission of protecting our soldiers in the contaminated CBW environment? That’s

really the final outcome that you want to see.

So as a result, without doing that, there’s a lack of accountability.

Mr. SHAYS. Why don’t you go ahead?

Mr. HALLORAN. In your testimony you said that you found that

only one of the three organizations was executing the program’s

R&D activities as a result of Results Act planning. May I ask you

to name names there, what the other two are?

Mr. HARRIS. OK. We identified three key Department of Defense

organizations that are executing research and development on beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:21 May 29, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\71624.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
26

half of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program. Those three

organizations are the Soldier Biological Systems Command, which

is an element of the Army Materiel Command, Department of the

Army; the second is the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency [DARPA]; and the third is the Joint Project Office for Biological

Defense.

The Soldier Biological Systems Command is the organization

that has been applying the Results Act in detailed steps for a number of years, identifying strategic goals, annual goals, measures, assessing their performance, and writing reports feeding back on how

well they’re doing. It is a template that is—it’s the best template

we found for a research and development organization in this area

for executing Results Act principles.

In DARPA, they made the argument that what they do is so farreaching and so long-term that an annual assessment is impractical, and the DOD Management Council agreed with that.

The Joint Program Office is an office that conducts system-specific development activities, often in the form of Advanced Concept

Technology Demonstrations. And they, again, thought that what

they were doing in terms of developing new equipment and making

equipment better, that would be an inappropriate application of the

Results Act.

Mr. HALLORAN. Do you agree with that?

Mr. HARRIS. No. We think it can be done, and it’s simply a

change in philosophy and attitude that has to be accepted by those

who are executing the program, that they have to identify where

they’re going before they can determine how well they are achieving those goals.

Mr. SHAYS. Is that an option, that they are allowed to ignore the

Results Act?

Mr. HARRIS. The one example that we have, where the organization argued that it was inappropriate and was exempted internally

within DOD, is DARPA, and they argued that they are such a

unique organization that it wouldn’t apply—even though before

that exemption was allowed, they had developed internal measures

that they were going to apply in terms of peer review, in terms of

progress toward meeting milestones, that they thought might be

applicable and in accordance with Results Act requirements. But in

the end, they turned out to be granted an exemption.

Mr. SHAYS. I would think, frankly, that DARPA would need it

more than others. What’s the budget of DARPA?

Mr. HARRIS. I don’t believe I have those figures. It’s a considerable percent of the entire DOD R&D budget.

Mr. SHARMA. If I may add to this, Mr. Chairman, it is our understanding that there are no exemptions. At the agency level, at the

top level, they have to have a plan; and then every entity within

that organization has to follow and to be able to account for the

money that they are receiving, to be very precise. However, in this

case, DOD has given an exemption to DARPA.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, unless there is anything else

any of you want to add. Any other comments?

[No response.]

Mr. SHAYS. OK, thank you.

27

I would like to call our second panel, Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar,

Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical/Biological Defense, Department of Defense.

Dr. Winegar, we welcome anyone else; it’s not like you have lawyers next to you, it’s not in any way a disadvantage.

I just want to say again, if you think there is someone who might

answer a question, I would love to swear them in. They can remain

in the back, but even if they don’t, it would help us out.

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Not today.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. If you would raise your right hand, please?

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. I welcome you here and am happy to

have you make any statement you want.

STATEMENT OF ANNA JOHNSON-WINEGAR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other

members of the subcommittee for this opportunity to speak to you

today.

Just a brief bit of history so that can put into context my relationship to the Chemical and Biological Defense Program. I am a

career Government servant, having worked for the Department of

Defense for over 30 years, and just moved into my position in October 1999.

I would like to talk just for a minute about what I think is an

improved management structure in our Chemical and Biological

Defense Program in response to guidance from the Congress and

from within the Department.

As has been pointed out, Public Law 103–160 mandated that the

Secretary of Defense identify a single office that would be responsible for chem/bio programs, and that is indeed my office. I would

also like to acknowledge, as was pointed out before, that there has

been considerable growth in the funding for the program, and we

think that has been very successful in helping us to achieve some

of our goals.

Before I go any further I would like to clarify what I think is a

misperception on the part of this committee, and perhaps others,

in that the DARPA program is not—I repeat, not—part of the

Chemical and Biological Defense Program, as defined by the law,

as covered in our annual report, and as covered in the budget figures that you have been quoted.

The DARPA expenditure for fiscal year 2000 is indeed $145 million, and you can compare that to our overall expenditure in the

chem/bio core program, which is approximately $791 million.

As was pointed out by the GAO, we have indicated in our March

2000 report to Congress that we have taken the first steps toward

implementing GPRA. I believe that it is important legislation and

will help us to make a better assessment of our programs. We have

identified a mission statement and have outlined goals which we

hope will help us to achieve our program.

I would like to reiterate also that our program is a threat-driven

program and is responsive to requirements that are developed for

us. It is very easy to talk about the ultimate piece of equipment

28

that would help us be perfect; however, I think all of us are very

well aware that science and technology does move in small increments, and I think I can honestly say that we have better equipment in the field today than we had at the time of the Gulf war.

Some of those are, indeed, incremental improvements. We are, obviously, always on the lookout for that ‘‘great leap ahead.’’ I think

in some cases that’s probably unrealistic.

I think that the quality of our program is measured in a number

of different ways. We have outside review panels that help us to

review our science and technology objectives. We look every year at

the strategy of how we invest our funds. We develop an internal

strategy guidance that helps us to shape our budget for the upcoming year, and we have to make hard choices in making decisions

on how much money will be spent on procurement—that is, buying

equipment for the forces in the field today—versus our investment

in research and development, the long-term program.

I think all of you are probably aware that the threat is changing.

There are new and emerging threats that demand that we invest

some of our science and technology there, and we have to balance

that with the amount of money that we have, how much we can

spend on procurement, and how much is available for long-term investment.

I am very proud to be a part of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program. I think it is one of the shining stars in the Department of Defense. I think there has been a tremendous amount of

increased interest in our program over the past few years, and I

clearly think that the addition of a representative from the Joint

Staff onto our OSD Steering Committee has provided that connection that we need with the warfighters. This year for the first time

we had a video teleconference with representatives from the CINCs

so that we could go over with them exactly what their requirements were and how our Chemical and Biological Defense Program

is working to meet their requirements.

I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson-Winegar follows:]

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

Mr. SHAYS. Do you have this document in front of you?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Yes, I believe I do.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

I am looking at page 8.

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Maybe you could just kind of talk to me about that.

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. OK.

Mr. SHAYS. And discuss all the entities. I mean, I see DARPA

there. We got it from you; I’m just curious how it fits in.

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Certainly. I’d be happy to explain that

to you.

The OSD Steering Committee, as shown in the blue box on the

left, is comprised of five members. That’s chaired by Hans Mark,

the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. The other members are Jay Davis, the Director of DTRA; Dr. Gary Resnick, who

is Director of the Chemical/Biological Directorate at DTRA; myself;

and Admiral Costello, representing the Joint Staff. And I think, as

I mentioned before, that that’s been a very important addition.

We have a representative from OSD Policy, Strategy and Threat

Reduction as a non-voting member, and this is the group that annually puts out the guidance for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program as we develop our budgets and our programs for the

upcoming years.

What this chart is meant to show, with the DARPA interaction—

and you’ll see that on the right-hand side of the chart—is that the

DARPA organization also reports to Hans Mark. They develop their

budget entirely separately, and DARPA has been investing in the

area of bio defense for the past few years, and has had a rapid

growth in their program, also.

You will see that the area where the programs meet and ‘‘marry

up’’ is in sort of a pale oval in the center, where representatives

from DARPA meet with service representatives, representatives

from DTRA, and talk about their investment in the science and

technology part of the program.

We have taken an additional step in that we have identified specific transition funding. As I know you are aware, DARPA invests

in basic research and a little bit of applied research, but does not

have the mandate nor the wherewithal to carry programs through.

We have set aside special funding so that when DARPA is finished

with their investment, we can continue the advanced development

and further evaluation. For example, in the area of medical products, DARPA does not have the resources or the personnel to take

things from basic research into the required kinds of pre-clinical

animal studies, and ultimately into clinical trials. And that’s where

our programs are going to marry up.

Mr. SHAYS. I have a philosophy in my office, that when I say

‘‘Who’s handling this, who’s in charge,’’ and three hands go up, I

know no one is in charge. So I always, always make sure one person is in charge.

Now, my sense of your responsibility is that you are basically in

charge of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program; I mean,

that’s your responsibility.

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Yes.

38

Mr. SHAYS. So for you to tell me that somehow DARPA is not

really involved is not clear to me. I don’t understand your opening

statement; in fact, I wasn’t even ready to go in that direction, but

you seemed to really want to make that point.

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. You put it on the table.

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Yes, I did, and I did that deliberately.

The point that I want to make is that DARPA develops their own

budget—— Mr. SHAYS. I’d like you to restate what you stated in the beginning. Maybe I misunderstood you. What was your point when you

started?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. That the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, as defined by Public Law 103–160, and as reported

in our annual report, does not cover the investment made by

DARPA. That is not to say that we don’t coordinate our programs

with DARPA—— Mr. SHAYS. Well, aren’t there a lot of things that are done that

don’t come directly under you, that are related to chemical and biological?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. That’s correct, but—— Mr. SHAYS. Isn’t your job to coordinate it?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. To the best of my ability, if I do that,

yes.

Mr. SHAYS. I don’t know what you mean by ‘‘to the best of your

abilities.’’ Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. I think the differentiation that I’m trying to make is on the money, because it is a significant investment

from DARPA. And these other programs, TSWG program and some

of the other ones, are relatively small and pale in comparison to

the DARPA investment.

Mr. SHAYS. So what you’re telling me is that you’re going to focus

on the small stuff, and the big stuff is out of your reach?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. No, sir, that’s not what I’m saying at all.

I do have responsibility for coordinating the Department’s Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.

Mr. SHAYS. That’s clear to me.

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. That’s clear, yes.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And so that does not include DARPA, as a coordinating effort?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. It does include DARPA as a coordinating

effort. It does not mean that I provide any direct management of

the DARPA programs. So perhaps I’m making a——

Mr. SHAYS. But that’s true for all the other things you coordinate, isn’t it? There are other parts within DOD that you don’t

have their budget, and it’s not part of your $791 million, but your

job is to bring all these disparate groups together so that we have

a coordinated effort?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. So, I’m sorry, I don’t get your point.

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Well, the point, as was made by the

GAO, is that there are three organizations that are primarily conducting the work of the Chemical and Biological Defense

Program——

39

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR [continuing]. And they identified

SBCCOM, DARPA, and the JPO for Biological Defense, and made

a very distinct point of saying that DARPA was excluded from having GPRA apply to them, and had been granted an exception by

the Defense Executive Management Council.

Mr. SHAYS. Right. I heard them say that.

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. And that’s the point I was trying to

make. While DARPA may have been excluded from GPRA, I do not

feel that the rest of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program

falls under that same analysis, and we certainly do intend to comply. I just want to make it perfectly clear that if DARPA has already been excluded, I don’t know if I can then enforce a GPRA

evaluation on top of them.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. That’s a different—if that were true—I don’t

know if I would agree with that, but let me let my colleagues—let

me think about what you said so that I don’t come to a rash judgment here, and then we’ll go on.

Mr. Blagojevich.

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Nothing, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. What I really want to have is a sense of what you

think the GAO report was saying, and how you respond to what

GAO was saying. And I don’t mean to rush you, but I don’t want

to dig other holes; I’d just like to know in general what your view

is.

I’ll tell you my view, to start with. My view is that you have a

very important task, that chemical and biological threats are serious, and that DOD has not done it in an effective and coordinated

way, and that we end up wasting extraordinary resources and we

don’t get the job done in the way that it needs to get done. And

I think, as a result, our men and women in the armed forces are

vulnerable.

I will tell you that I come with some anger about this aspect, and

that is that I have been aware of the vulnerability of our military

and could share it with no one because it was classified at the time.

And I took some comfort in knowing that your office had been established to start to begin to do a better job.

It may be that we have a hearing on DARPA and we get a better

sense of that element, the sense that somehow they didn’t come

under the Results Act, because if anyone needs it, they need it.

And I will say further that I don’t think any of what we’re talking

about is all that technical; it’s just basic, common-sense kind of approach to know what we want to do and how we’re going to do it.

We want to know why we want to do it.

So I’d like to ask you how you react to what the GAO report has

said, and I will say to you as well that I think they were rather

gentle. I don’t think that they tore your agency apart; they may

have been tempted to, but I think they were rather gentle in their

assessment, rather matter-of-fact. They were just saying that

‘‘you’re not doing it, and I’d like to help you do it,’’ and I want to

know what you want to do.

40

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Well, first of all let me say that I absolutely agree with you. I, too, am concerned about the vulnerability

of our forces. As I said in my opening comments, I’ve been involved

in the Chemical and Biological Defense Program for essentially my

entire career, and have made an effort to do what I can and to

make what contributions I can to getting us past that hurdle of our

forces being vulnerable.

So I do take very seriously the mission and the mandate of our

program.

I appreciate the comments that you’ve provided and having had

the opportunity to review the GAO report, I certainly think there

will be some additional value added to our program if we can apply

metrics so that we can come up with quantitative measures of how

we’re doing.

I think we do have some good examples. I know you don’t want

to go into a lot of detail today about these types of things, but we

can look at improvements in the program in a number of different

ways, and you have those briefing charts in front of you that we

have provided before that show where we were in 1990, at the time

of the Gulf war, where we are today, and where we plan to go in

the future.

While some of those things at the present may be subjective— for example, we need detectors that can identify more agents, or we

need to be able to detect things at a lower level of sensitivity, or

we need to be able to do it faster—these are all driven by the requirements, as was mentioned before. The requirements address

the threat; as the threat changes, we need to be able to respond

to that; and as the requirements documents are written, we need

to develop a material solution to fix that requirement. It may not

always be the perfect requirement, and sometimes that is an

iterative process, and sometimes we field interim pieces of equipment. When the BIDS was first deployed, it could detect four biological agents. Then it was eight, and the goals continue to increase.

So if those are some of the types of measures and metrics on how

well our program is performing and how valuable our investment

is going to be, I certainly welcome and look forward to those types

of evaluations and assessments.

Mr. SHAYS. Who is in charge of CBDP? Is it Dr. Gansler, the

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics? Dr. Mark, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering?

The Steering Committee? Or you?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. On a day-to-day basis, my office is the

office that is responsible for the Chemical and Biological Defense

Program. I do, of course, have bosses in the Pentagon, and report

up the chain to both Dr. Mark and Dr. Gansler, and ultimately to

the Secretary and Deputy Secretary.

Mr. SHAYS. What authority do you have as the focal point of the

program?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. My authority is to provide the oversight

and management to the elements of the program that are executing

the various phases of the program, and to serve as the senior staff

to the Secretary and to Dr. Gansler for all issues related to Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.

41

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Agents, you said?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Agencies.

Mr. SHAYS. All agencies. Is DARPA one of them?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Yes, it is.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And do they know that?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. I believe they do.

Mr. SHAYS. What additional authority do you need?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. I’m not sure I understand exactly what

you mean.

Mr. SHAYS. In other words, in my work I find that some people

are responsive and some aren’t. When, for instance, we were looking at—my previous committee was looking at the Gulf war illnesses, I found the Department of Veterans Affairs very responsive,

because I had direct oversight over them. I found DOD not as responsive, and it is the very reason why I changed committee assignments. So I now chair this committee, and have DOD responsive to me.

Do you have any feeling that when you do your work, you aren’t

getting a quick response from the various agencies within DOD? Or

do you feel you are getting all the response you need? Is there anyone out of the loop?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. I would certainly say that in the approximately 6 months or so that I have been in the job, I certainly

see a tremendous improvement in responsiveness and cooperation

among the various agencies. I am not attributing that to me personally, but I think it is to the general—— Mr. SHAYS. Which agency is the least responsive?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Well, it varies on a given issue, what the

particular problem might be.

Mr. SHAYS. Would you describe your coordinating effort as ‘‘herding cattle’’ or ‘‘herding cats?’’ Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Probably somewhere in between.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Well, we’d like it to be cattle.

Would you like to get to the chart?

Mr. HALLORAN. Before I get to the chart, what does the JPO, the

Joint Program Office, do that SBCCOM doesn’t?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. The Joint Program Office has responsibility for the 6–4, 6–5, advanced development, and the procurement aspects. They work very closely with SBCCOM; as a matter

of fact, some of the particular program managers for specific items

reside at SBCCOM and are essentially matrix-managed to the

Joint Program Manager.

Mr. HALLORAN. So does that suggest some redundancy? Must

they be unique?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. The JPO?

Mr. HALLORAN. Yes.

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. They were specifically created, as you

know, to bring focus and attention to bio defense only. They don’t

do any work on the chemical side. But bio defense, again, in the

areas of advanced development and procurement, so that they

could bring about a synergism between the medical and the nonmedical aspects of bio defense, and provide a focal point, again, for

the attention needed to bring many of these bio systems to full

fielding.

42

Mr. HALLORAN. I understand what the chart says, but is there

a unique bio threat? My understanding was that the battlefield

threat was both, or a combination, that we need to prepare for

both. Well, the JPO may have been a nice idea; is it still relevant?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Well, it’s certainly my assessment, and

I’m not an intelligence analyst or threat assessor by trade, but it’s

certainly my assessment that the bio threat is a much larger threat

for us today than it has been in the past, for a number of reasons:

the diversity of the number of agents there; the relative ease in

producing them; and the fact that I think we have better defenses

against the chemical threat, certainly the traditional chemical

threat, than we do for the bio threat.

Mr. HALLORAN. Turning to page 14 of your briefing slide presentation, you see the defense deficiencies identified in Operation

Desert Storm. I would like to address an issue raised by Dr. Harris, which is that you identify goals, near-term and long-term goals,

in each commodity area, each of these areas.

I wonder if you could give us a sense of, given those goals, the

tradeoffs that are involved here, or the impacts that one might

have on the other. That is, for example, if you made a breakthrough in standoff detection and you had the capability to identify

specifically agents at some specific and tactically significant distance, would that change your goals in terms of protection or medical intervention or some other element down the line? Or would

they all just proceed apace without impacting each other?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Well, clearly they are interrelated, and

as we make improvements and advances in one area, that will

allow us, hopefully, to decrease our investment or focus our energies elsewhere. If we had the one universal solution to the problem,

we could collapse our various investment areas.

These are not just arbitrary commodity areas or investments.

They are things that are well thought-out. And I think you can find

examples of interaction between the groups as we go forward now.

So you are absolutely right; if we improve our capability for standoff detection, then that makes an impact on what we would need

for some of the other aspects of the program. That’s why it is an

iterative process and evaluated on an annual basis, both from the

science and technology side of things, where we are investing in

what new programs and products are coming along that will be

ready for transition, and we balance that with what we have in the

field today.

Mr. HALLORAN. Again, in the absence of any specific goals, how

would you know when to make a tradeoff? How would you know

you had achieved sufficient capacity—in detection, for example—to

allow you to back off a requirement in either individual or collective protection?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Well, again, those are program management decisions that are impacted by all the traditional factors that

program managers use, cost schedule and performance. And as we

see one particular approach either being very successful or not

being very successful, we can make adjustments to our investment

accordingly.

Mr. HALLORAN. I notice in your report you describe DARPA as

focused particularly on broad-range or multiagent defense capabiliVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:21 May 29, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\71624.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
43

ties. Where do I find that focus in here? As you know, coming out

of the Anthrax vaccine, there is an agent-specific intervention.

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Yes.

Mr. HALLORAN. Is that a priority goal in here someplace, in your

program—— Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Yes.

Mr. HALLORAN [continuing]. General protection versus specific?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Yes. You will see a couple of Defense

technology objectives that look at a multivalent vaccine, for one,

and also in the area of detectors, they are what I would call not

agent-specific, but more generic, and we are investing in technologies that will help us identify classes of agents rather than specific agents.

So you will find that primarily in the R&D section of the program. We don’t have anything fielded right now that I would call

a generic detector or a generic solution, other than that you could

apply that type of logic to things like the masks and the suits

which protect, presumably, against all the known threats.

Mr. HALLORAN. That we know now?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Right.

Mr. HALLORAN. Where in the organizational charts provided

here—you mentioned technology objectives. Where are they developed, and what is your role in that?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. The Defense technology objectives are

developed by the performers, the people that are doing the science

and technology work in the laboratories. They propose them on an

annual basis.

Mr. HALLORAN. Who are they?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Who are the laboratories?

Mr. HALLORAN. Yes.

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Well, for example, SBCCOM is one. The

Navy, the Marines, the Army Medical Command. Any of them can

propose a certain segment of their work to have it identified as a

Defense technology objective, and with that comes a certain set of

criteria. And they do have measurable goals. And I think that’s one

area in which our program is attempting to comply with GPRA, in

that when we identify something as a Defense technology objective,

we have a timeline—this work will be completed by a certain time;

we have identified the budget—this is how much money we are

going to invest in that; and we have what are called ‘‘exit criteria.’’

At the end of this particular piece of work we will have enough

science and technology to be able to say that it will do thus-andsuch, it will identify things, it will neutralize things, it will stop

things, whatever the specific criteria might be.

Mr. HALLORAN. Who makes that determination? Is it TSWG, or

where is that?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. On the DTOs?

Mr. HALLORAN. Yes.

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. That’s done across the Department of

Defense, and chem-bio is just 1 of 12 science and technology areas.

Those are cumulatively found in a separate document called ‘‘Defense Technology Objectives’’ of which there are over 300 now. We

have approximately 20 or so in the chem-bio defense area. And

there is a separate document that addresses all those; I would be

44

happy to provide you either a copy of that, or information where

it is available on the Web.

Mr. HALLORAN. OK. I’d like to see just your 20.

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. OK.

[The information referred to follows:]

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

Mr. HALLORAN. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Blagojevich.

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. Yes. Hi. I have been listening. We voted for

legislation that requires your agency to conform to the Results Act.

Can you tell us when you expect you will be conforming with the

Results Act?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Well, I think it is an evolving process.

Obviously, it will be something that we come to agreement on within the Department as to when we have reached what we consider

compliance. I think we have taken the first steps toward that in

identifying our mission and our goals, and we are now in the process of refining that a little bit further. We hope to have most of

that work completed this year.

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. Good. So that next year, when you come back

before this committee, it is reasonable to think that we can expect

that you will be conforming to the Results Act?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Well, certainly that will be your interpretation, as to whether we’re conforming, but we certainly hope to

be well along the way, if not completely there.

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. OK. All right. So of course, the objective ultimately would be that a year from now, you can come back before

this subcommittee and say, ‘‘We’ve conformed?’’

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. I would certainly like to be able to say

that, in my opinion, we’re conforming. Of course, other people could

always develop their own opinions, although I would hesitate to

presuppose that because I think I’m conforming, that everyone else

would naturally agree with me.

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. OK. Well, your interpretation of conforming

next year would certainly be a first step, I would think?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Yes. Certainly. [Laughter.]

Mr. BLAGOJEVICH. OK. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me put it a different way.

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. OK.

Mr. SHAYS. It may be that Rod is the chairman of this committee, or it may be that I am, but whoever it is, you have to

comply——

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS [continuing]. And when I chaired the Human Resources Committee and we had the tainted blood supply that had

resulted in the death of individuals from AIDS and the contamination because of Hepatitis-C, we could have really nailed HHS, but

that wasn’t our motive. Our motive was to see bad practice become

good practice.

I have that same feeling here. You have to conform, and it’s not

just for the $791 million that you’re spending, but it’s what DARPA

spends, it’s what all DOD spends. And you are our hope that it will

be spent well. And it’s not going to be your opinion; it’s going to

be whether or not you conform to the law.

I would feel a lot better about this if your answer to Mr.

Blagojevich had been simply, ‘‘We know we have areas where we

have to improve, and we’re going to do it; and next year, when we

come here, we will have done it.’’ The Results Act doesn’t mean

that all the results are good; it means that now we have a system

65

to know what our goals and objectives are, and we have a way to

evaluate it. And we don’t feel we have that.

There is really not much more that we need to say today about

that. You have a wonderful reputation. You’ve worked there for

years. But we have wanted to get DOD to change practices that

have existed for years. It’s not really a debatable issue, I don’t

think. And in terms of DARPA, this will be something this committee will look at. You clearly have oversight over DARPA as it relates to chemical and biological responsibilities, and this committee, Mr. Blagojevich and myself and our staff, we stand ready to

help you, and so does GAO. GAO is not there throwing darts; they

are there to point out what needs to be done, and they will help

you. And I would say to you that being the focal point does not

mean that you aren’t in charge. You are in charge of this responsibility, and I have the confidence that you will be able to make

sure that it is done, I really do.

I don’t have anything else to add. Do you have anything you

would like to say?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Well, I would just like to clarify—perhaps I was a little too negative when I said we would be in compliance, and I perhaps implied that we wouldn’t. I certainly commit

to you and to everyone that is involved in the program that I am

certainly committed to making our program as compliant as I can,

with the understanding, of course, that it is an evolving

process—— Mr. SHAYS. No, that’s not acceptable. It’s not an evolving process.

I’m not saying that we’re going to see chemical and biological success in all those areas, that you are going to have met all your

goals. But the process needs to be in place now, tomorrow, the next

day. You need to sit down with your people and say, ‘‘Where are

we conforming with the Results Act and where aren’t we? And

where we’re not, we’re going to do it.’’ And if you need help from

GAO or anyone else, you need to get it. That’s the bottom line.

There really is a bottom line. It can’t be an evolving process.

If I let you get away with that statement, that basically is like

saying that no one is in charge. No, you are in charge; the law is

clear; and I would like to hear you say that you will make sure it’s

done. With all the experience that you have—and I sound like I’m

lecturing; I don’t mean to be, I just have to say, please say that.

When we had the Secretary of HHS here and she came—she could

have had someone else come to describe and defend the failure to

protect the blood supply—she came and said, ‘‘We haven’t done it

correctly, that’s obvious; it will get done.’’ Now, I admit that she

happens to be the Secretary, so she carries a lot more authority.

I will say this to you: you are in charge of this program. If you

do not think you can do it, I would like to know, because then we

will ask whoever is not enabling you to do that to come before the

committee.

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Oh, I certainly can do it, and I commit

to you that I will do it—— Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR [continuing]. And I guess my evaluation

of the evolution and the evolving process was meant to say that we

will set very high goals for our program, and we may have to comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:21 May 29, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\71624.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
66

promise and accept interim goals, but we will have measurable

goals so that we are in compliance.

I take your comment that maybe we won’t make all our goals as

a personal challenge because I would certainly like to see us—— Mr. SHAYS. I understand that, if that’s the context in which you

meant it. But the bottom line question is, does your agency intend

to follow the Results Act?

Ms. JOHNSON-WINEGAR. Certainly. For the Chemical and Biological Defense Program, I make that commitment to you, yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

With that, we will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

Æ