L.A. COURTHOUSE

Initial Project Justification 

Is Outdated and Flawed 

Statement of Mark L. Goldstein, Director 

Physical Infrastructure Issues

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Economic 

Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency 

Management, Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. PDT

Friday, August 17, 2012

GAO-12-968T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-968T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Economic 

Development, Public Buildings, and 

Emergency Management, Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, House of 

Representatives 

August 17, 2012 

L.A. COURTHOUSE

Initial Project Justification Is Outdated and Flawed

Why GAO Did This Study

The federal judiciary and the GSA are 

in the midst of a multibillion-dollar 

courthouse construction initiative. In 

2010, GAO found that more than a 

quarter of the new courthouse space 

was unneeded, costing $835 million to 

construct and $51 million annually to 

rent, operate, and maintain. 

As part of this initiative, construction 

has not yet begun on the L.A.

courthouse project that was proposed 

to address perceived space, 

operational, and security deficits in Los 

Angeles, California. Specifically, the 

L.A. Court is split between two different 

buildings—the Roybal and Spring 

Street Courthouses—causing security 

and operational problems. Congress 

has appropriated about $400 million for 

the L.A. courthouse project. For this 

testimony, GAO was asked to review

the L.A. Courthouse project and (1)

explain its history and status, (2) 

determine the extent to which 

previously identified challenges related 

to courthouse construction apply to the 

project, and (3) determine if the 

analysis that made it the highest 

priority construction project still applies.

This testimony is based primarily on 

GAO’s prior work on federal 

courthouses, for which GAO analyzed 

courthouse planning and use data, 

visited key sites in Los Angeles and 

other locations, modeled courtroomsharing scenarios, and interviewed 

judges and GSA officials. This 

information was updated through GSA 

and judiciary documents and 

interviews. GSA and judiciary provided 

technical comments on GAO’s updated 

work. 

What GAO Found

Because of delays and cost increases, the General Services Administration

(GSA) canceled the authorized 41-courtroom Los Angeles (L.A.), California,

courthouse project in 2006. Since then, GSA and the judiciary have been slow to 

agree upon how to proceed with the project, for which about $366 million in 

appropriated funds remains available. In 2012, with the judiciary’s support, GSA 

issued a request for proposal for contractors to design and build a 24-courtoom, 

32-chamber courthouse, which would be used in conjunction with 25 existing 

courtrooms in the Roybal Courthouse. However, this new plan will not address 

one of the principal justifications for the original project—that the L.A. Court be 

centralized at one site. Instead, it would increase the distance between the 

Roybal Courthouse and the planned second court location and the distance to 

the federal detention center from which prisoners must be transported.

Each of the challenges leading to extra space—and the associated extra costs—

in courthouses that GAO identified in 2010 apply to the L.A. courthouse project. 

First, the initial design of the L.A. courthouse project exceeded the 

congressionally authorized size by 13 courtrooms and over 260,000 square feet. 

Second, 16 fewer judges are located in Los Angeles than were originally 

projected, a change that calls into question the space assumptions that the 

original proposals were based on. Third, officials did not fully take into 

consideration the advantages of courtroom sharing, again planning more 

courtrooms than necessary. According to the courtroom sharing model that GAO

developed for a 2010 report using the judiciary’s courtroom usage data, the 45 

current district judges in Los Angeles would need 25 courtrooms to adequately 

address all scheduled courtroom time—roughly half of the 49 courtrooms 

currently planned. 

It is not clear if the L.A. project remains a high priority. The judiciary chose not to 

reassess the L.A. project under a new prioritization process it began 

implementing in 2009. The process was changed to address concerns about the 

growing cost of courthouse projects and incorporate industry standards and best 

practices. However, there is evidence that the L.A. project justification from the 

old process is outdated and flawed based on the amount of space needed and 

the security assessment. Two high-priority projects that were reassessed under 

the new system were subsequently removed from the list. GAO is currently 

studying the judiciary’s new prioritization process as it relates to projects 

currently on the judiciary’s 5-year plan for this subcommittee and will continue to 

review these issues as part of that work. 

View GAO-12-968T. For more information, 

contact Mark L. Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 

or goldsteinm@gao.gov. 
 

Page 1 GAO-12-968T 

Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Norton, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here to discuss our recent work on federal courthouse 

construction issues and on the Los Angeles (L.A.) courthouse in 

particular. Since the early 1990s, the General Services Administration 

(GSA) and the federal judiciary (judiciary) have undertaken a multibilliondollar courthouse construction initiative. According to GSA, that initiative 

has resulted in 76 new courthouses or annexes, and 18 additional 

courthouses in various stages of development. However, in 2010, we 

reported that more than a quarter of new courthouse space—then costing 

$835 million to construct and $51 million annually to operate—was 

unneeded.1

For this testimony, we were asked to (1) explain the history and current 

status of the L.A. courthouse project, (2) determine the extent to which 

previously identified planning issues related to overall courthouse 

construction specifically apply to the L.A. courthouse, and (3) determine 

whether the analysis that made the L.A. courthouse the judiciary’s highest 

priority courthouse construction project still applies. This testimony is 

based primarily on our prior work on federal courthouses,

We found the new extra courthouse space was the result of 

poor oversight and planning. Meanwhile, construction has not yet begun 

on the L.A. courthouse project, ranked by the judiciary as its top priority 

for construction since fiscal year 2000.

2

 

1

GAO, Federal Courthouse Construction: Better Planning, Oversight, and Courtroom 

Sharing Needed to Address Future Costs, 

for which we 

analyzed courthouse planning and data; reviewed relevant laws, 

regulations, and project planning and budget documents; visited

courthouse sites in Los Angeles and other locations; analyzed selected 

courthouses as case studies; modeled courtroom-sharing scenarios; 

contracted with the National Academy of Sciences to convene a panel of 

GAO-10-417 (Washington, D.C.: 

June 21, 2010).

2

See GAO, Federal Courthouse Construction: Nationwide Space and Cost Issues Are 

Applicable to L.A. Courthouse Project, GAO-12-206T (Washington, D.C.: November 4, 

2011); GAO, Federal Courthouse Construction: Better Planning, Oversight, and 

Courtroom Sharing Needed to Address Future Costs, GAO-10-417 (Washington, D.C.: 

June 21, 2010); GAO, Federal Courthouse Construction: Estimated Costs to House the 

L.A. District Court Have Tripled and There Is No Consensus on How to Proceed, 

GAO-08-889 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2008); GAO, Federal Courthouses: Rent 

Increases Due to New Space and Growing Energy and Security Costs Require Better 

Tracking and Management, GAO-06-613 (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2006). 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-968T 

judicial experts; conducted structured interviews with district and 

magistrate judges about the challenges and opportunities related to 

courtroom sharing; analyzed nationwide judiciary rent data generated 

from GSA’s billing system; and interviewed judges, GSA officials, and 

other relevant stakeholders. Information was updated though GSA and 

judiciary documents and interviews. To determine whether the judiciary’s 

prioritization of the L.A. courthouse project still applies, we reviewed 

judiciary planning documents and interviewed judiciary officials. Our prior 

work was conducted from June 2004 through June 2010, and our 

additional work was conducted during July and August 2012. GSA and 

judiciary provided technical comments to our additional work. All of our 

work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. More detail on our scope and methodology is 

available in the full reports on which this testimony is based.

The judiciary uses a 5-year plan to define its priorities for courthouse 

construction. From fiscal year 1996 through 2008, the judiciary used a 

process to prioritize and score projects for inclusion in this plan based on

1. caseload and estimated growth in the number of judges and staff,

2. security concerns, and

3. any operational inefficiencies that may exist with the current facilities.

GSA uses the judiciary’s plan to develop construction proposals and cost 

estimates for congressional authorizations and appropriations.3

Under the old prioritization process, the judiciary had identified the L.A. 

courthouse project as high-priority for several reasons. The federal court 

in downtown Los Angeles (L.A. Court) is split between two buildings—the 

In 2009, 

the judiciary began applying a new process for prioritizing courthouse 

projects that will apply to future 5-year plans. Judiciary officials said that 

the new process was developed in part to address concerns about 

growing costs and incorporate industry standards and best practices. The 

judiciary is currently evaluating its 94 federal judicial districts and 11 

courts of appeal under the new process. We are reviewing this new 

process as part of an ongoing engagement for this subcommittee.

 

3

For purposes of this testimony, we refer to approval of these projects or prospectuses by 

the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and the House Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure as “congressionally authorized.” See 40 U.S.C. § 3307. 

Background
 

Page 3 GAO-12-968T 

United States Courthouse on North Spring Street (Spring Street 

Courthouse) built in 1938 and the Edward R. Roybal Federal Building and 

United States Courthouse (Roybal Courthouse) built in 1992. The Spring 

Street Courthouse consists of 32 courtrooms—11 of which do not meet 

the judiciary’s minimum design standards for size.4

Figure 1: U.S. District Courthouses in Los Angeles

The Roybal 

Courthouse consists of 34 courtrooms (10 district, 6 magistrate, and 18 

bankruptcy). (See fig. 1.)

 

4

The judiciary considers three of the courtrooms in the Spring Street Courthouse to be 

hearing rooms and not courtrooms. 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-968T 

In 1996, the judiciary concluded that having the L.A. Court split between 

two courthouses created security and operational problems, that the 

judiciary needed additional space in downtown Los Angeles, and that the 

Spring Street Courthouse had obsolete building systems and poor 

security conditions. One of the security challenges created by the split 

court is that prisoners must be transported from the Metropolitan 

Detention Center along surface streets to the Spring Street Courthouse. 

The Roybal Courthouse, however, is connected to the detention center by 

a secure tunnel.

In fiscal year 2000, the judiciary requested and GSA proposed building a 

new courthouse in downtown Los Angeles. From fiscal year 2001 through 

fiscal year 2005, Congress made three appropriations for a new L.A. 

courthouse, to remain available until expended.

• In fiscal year 2001, Congress authorized $35.25 million and later 

provided funding to acquire a site for and design a 41-courtroom, 

1,016,300-square-foot building based on a GSA prospectus.5

• In fiscal year 2004, Congress also appropriated $50 million to 

construct a new L.A. courthouse.

• In fiscal year 2005, Congress appropriated an additional $314.4 

million.

As we reported in 2008, GSA spent $16.3 million designing a new 

courthouse for the L.A. Court and $16.9 million acquiring and preparing a 

new site for it in downtown Los Angeles, leaving about $366.45 million 

available for the construction of a 41-courtroom courthouse.

 

5

This authorized funding amount refers to a GSA reported amount in its courthouse 

project funding data. The $35.25 million amount reflects the amount approved by the 

House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure in July 2000 and is less than the 

$36.20 million approved by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works also 

approved in July 2000. 
 

Page 5 GAO-12-968T 

As we first reported in 2008, the L.A. courthouse project remains un-built 

because of delays and cost increases. The project was delayed in part 

because GSA decided to design a 54-courtroom, 1,279,650-square-foot 

building based on a request from the judiciary, instead of designing the 

congressionally authorized 41-courtroom, 1,016,300-square-foot 

courthouse. GSA completed the proposal for the 54-courtroom design in 

2003, but the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) rejected the 

proposal and did not include it in the President’s budget request for fiscal 

year 2005. GSA then designed a 41-courtroom building—the originally 

authorized size—but by the time that design was completed, the schedule 

for constructing the building had been delayed by 2 years, according to a 

senior GSA official involved with the project. With this delay, inflation then 

pushed the project’s cost over budget, forcing GSA to further reduce the 

scope of the project in order to construct it within the authorized and 

appropriated amounts. However, the cycle continued as GSA and L.A. 

Court officials were slow to reduce the project’s scope, causing additional 

delays, which in turn necessitated additional reductions. For example, 

GSA did not simplify the building-high atrium that was initially envisioned 

for the new courthouse until January 2006, even though the judiciary had 

repeatedly expressed concerns about the construction and maintenance 

costs of the atrium since 2002. As a result, cost estimates for the project 

tripled to over $1.1 billion, and GSA ultimately cancelled the 41-courtroom 

L.A. courthouse project in 2006.

Since 2006, GSA and the judiciary were slow to agree upon how to 

proceed with the L.A. courthouse project for which appropriated funds still 

remain available. As we reported in 2008, the judiciary supported a 

scaled-back option that included constructing a new 36-courtroom, 45-

chamber courthouse and returning the Spring Street Courthouse to GSA 

for other uses. GSA also considered two less costly options, such as 

simply continuing to house the L.A. Court in both the Roybal and Spring 

Street Courthouse locations. In 2012, with the judiciary’s support, GSA 

issued a request for proposal for contractors to design and build a 

600,000 square-foot courthouse with 24 courtrooms and 32 chambers, 

which would be used in conjunction with 25 of the existing courtrooms in 

the Roybal Courthouse. However, this new plan will not address one of 

the principal justifications for the original project—that the L.A. Court be 

centralized at one site. Instead, it will increase the distance between the 

Roybal Courthouse and the planned second court location as well as the 

distance to the Metropolitan Detention Center from where prisoners must 

be transported.

L.A. Courthouse 

Project Was 

Repeatedly Delayed 

and Estimated Costs 

Increased
 

Page 6 GAO-12-968T 

The three causes of extra space in courthouses—and the associated 

extra cost—that we identified in 2010 also apply to the L.A. courthouse 

project. These include:

1. exceeding the congressionally authorized size,

2. overestimating the number of judges a courthouse would have, and

3. not planning for courtroom sharing among judges.

First, as previously mentioned, the initial design of the L.A. courthouse 

exceeded the congressionally authorized size by 13 courtrooms and more 

than 260,000 square feet. In addition, we found in 2010 that large 

atriums—like the one in the L.A. courthouse design—contributed to size 

overages in several courthouses completed since 2000. Because the 

courthouse design exceeded the congressionally authorized size, this led 

to delays that contributed to the tripling of estimated costs and to GSA’s 

ultimately canceling the project in 2006.

Second, judiciary overestimated how many judges the L.A. Court would 

need and therefore designed a courthouse with more courtrooms than 

necessary. Specifically, we reported in 2004 that the proposed L.A. 

courthouse was designed to include courtrooms for 61 judges—the 47 

existing district and magistrate judges and 14 additional judges expected 

authorized or appointed by 2011. However, in 2012, rather than having an 

additional 14 judges, the L.A. Court has just 45 district and magistrate 

judges—2 fewer than we reported in 2004.6

Third, judiciary did not fully take advantage of courtroom sharing by 

judges, which led to building more courtrooms than necessary. Our 2010 

analysis indicated that the judiciary could reduce the number of 

courtrooms it needs by having judges share courtrooms. Table 1 

illustrates the basic courtroom sharing that is possible based on 

judiciary’s courtroom usage data.

This outcome calls into 

question the assumptions made in the original proposals.

 

6 According to the judiciary, the L.A. Court currently has 30 authorized district judgeships 

including 2 vacancies, plus 17 magistrate judgeships.

Planning Issues GAO 

Previously Identified 

that Cause Extra 

Space in Courthouses 

Also Apply to the L.A. 

Courthouse Project
 

Page 7 GAO-12-968T 

Table 1: Courtroom-Sharing Possibilities Based on GAO Model and Analysis

Judges Dedicated courtrooms needed

3 district judges 2 district courtrooms

3 senior judges 1 district courtroom

1 district and 1 senior judge 1 district courtroom

2 magistrate judges 1 magistrate courtroom

Source: GAO.

According to GSA in November 2011, the new plan would bring the total 

number of district courtrooms in Los Angeles to 49, even though there are 

only 45 district judges currently located and working in Los Angeles.

Applying the courtroom-sharing model that we developed, the 45 current 

district judges would need 25 courtrooms to adequately address all 

scheduled courtroom time—the number of district courtrooms that GSA 

currently has planned for the Roybal Courthouse. Even this model would 

leave the courtrooms unused much of the time, since 60 percent of 

scheduled court events are canceled or postponed within one week of the 

event’s original date. Additional efficiencies might also be realized if the 

L.A. Court’s judges were to use a centralized courtroom scheduling 

system.

Judiciary officials said the judiciary has not applied its new process for 

prioritizing projects to the L.A. courthouse project because it was 

grandfathered under the old process and, like 10 of the 12 courthouses 

on the current 5-year plan for construction, will not be reevaluated under 

the new process. However, if the L. A. courthouse project were 

reevaluated, it is not clear that it would retain the same high priority status 

from when it was first justified in 2000.

• Judiciary’s projected increase in judges has not occurred. As we 

mentioned previously, none of the 14 additional judges expected by 

2011 have been authorized or appointed. In fact, the L.A. Court has 2 

fewer judges than we reported in 2004. This suggests that the 

previous space projections are currently outdated.

• The original security assessment did not include the Roybal 

Courthouse. The security score under the old prioritization process 

indicated that the L.A. Court lacked proper circulation routes for 

prisoners, but this problem does not apply to the Roybal Courthouse, 

a key court location being considered for continued use.

It Is Unclear Whether 

the L.A. Courthouse 

Project Remains a 

High Priority Project
 

Page 8 GAO-12-968T 

• The old prioritization process did not consider the potential for 

reducing the number of needed courtrooms by having judges share 

courtrooms.

• Other potential construction projects that were also rated high priority 

in 2012 under the original prioritization process have been 

reevaluated and have subsequently dropped in priority. Specifically, 

the judiciary applied its new prioritization process to two of the 

courtrooms on the list of projects in its 2010 5-year plan—San Jose, 

California, and Greenbelt, Maryland—and decided to remove both of 

them from the high-priority, 5-year construction plan. Formerly among 

the top 12 most urgent courthouse projects, the San Jose project now 

ranks 79th and the Greenbelt project now ranks 91st among potential 

courthouse projects.

In conclusion, the L.A. courthouse construction project has been 

repeatedly delayed and costs have increased for more than a decade.

The current plan to build a new 24-courtroom courthouse would provide 

more courtrooms than are needed and will not solve the problem of a split 

court posed by two separate buildings—one of the key justifications for 

the project. We are currently studying the judiciary’s new prioritization 

process as it relates to projects currently on the judiciary’s 5-year plan for 

this subcommittee and will continue to review these issues as part of our 

ongoing work. Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Norton, and 

Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our testimony. I would be 

pleased to answer any questions you might have at this time.

For further information on this testimony, please contact Mark L. 

Goldstein, (202) 512-2834 or by e-mail at goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key 

contributions to this testimony include Keith Cunningham (Assistant 

Director), George Depaoli, James Leonard, and Amy Rosewarne.

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