United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 23, 2005

Decided June 30, 2005

Before

 Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 04-3794

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LANCE D. STEWART,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of

Wisconsin

No. 04-CR-99-C-01

Barbara B. Crabb, 

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Lance Stewart entered unconditional guilty pleas to two counts of possessing

firearms as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court

deemed the sentencing guidelines advisory and imposed a discretionary sentence of

84 months’ imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. Appointed counsel

filed a notice of appeal, but now seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967), because he cannot find a nonfrivolous issue to present. Counsel’s

Anders brief is facially adequate, and Stewart did not respond to our notice under

Circuit Rule 51(b). Thus, our review is limited to those potential issues identified

in counsel’s brief. See United States v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 584 (7th Cir. 1997). 

Counsel first asks whether Stewart could challenge his guilty pleas. Counsel

concludes that no argument would be possible because the district court

substantially complied with the dictates of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

11(b) in taking the pleas. It is true that compliance with Rule 11 would render

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 04-3794 Page 2

frivolous a challenge to Stewart’s guilty pleas, United States v. Blalock, 321 F.3d 

686, 688 (7th Cir. 2003), especially since our own review would be for plain error

given that Stewart did not move to withdraw those pleas in the district court,

United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002). We have held, however, that

appointed lawyers seeking to withdraw under Anders should not even explore the

propriety of a guilty plea unless the defendant has said he wants to unwind the

plea. United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670-71 (7th Cir. 2002). In this case we

have no indication that Stewart would want his guilty pleas set aside. 

Counsel next considers whether any grounds exist to challenge the

reasonableness of Stewart’s sentence, which the district court imposed in

accordance with our decision in United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 

2004), aff’d, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). The district court, after taking into consideration

the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), sentenced Stewart to total of 84 months’

imprisonment, within his guideline range of 77 to 96 months. As counsel notes, a

sentence imposed under an advisory guideline scheme is reviewed for

reasonableness, see Id. at 765; United States v. Tedder, 403 F.3d 836, 844 (7th Cir.

2005), and it would be frivolous for Stewart to argue that the term imposed—at less

than the midpoint of the range—was unreasonable, see United States v. George,

403 F.3d 470, 472-73 (7th Cir. 2005).

Finally, counsel correctly observes that any claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel is best brought in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Massaro v. United

States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003); Cooper v. United States, 378 F.3d 638, 640 n.1

(7th Cir. 2001). Moreover, Stewart’s counsel on appeal was also his trial counsel,

and thus is not in a position to argue that Stewart received ineffective assistance at

trial. See United States v. Martinez, 169 F.3d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 1999). 

We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.