THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION:

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Frederick J. Vogel

January 8, 1997
ii

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iii

FOREWORD

On January 13, 1993, in Paris, 130 countries signed the

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to ban the entire class of

chemical weapons. Many of those nations have since ratified it.

In this country, debate continues on the strategic implications

of the convention, as drafted, and whether it is in the U.S.

national security interest. Once gain, that debate comes before

the Senate for ratification consideration in 1997.

@FOREWORDTXT = In the following monograph, Frederick Vogel

explores the historical, moral, and legal aspects of chemical

warfare, and the strategic implications of the convention,

including operational, policy, constitutional, and industrial

impact for the United States. He concludes that, although

"imperfect," the convention will contribute to U.S. national

security.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish Mr.

Vogel's monograph to inform the debate on this important subject.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

FREDERICK J. VOGEL is a Foreign Service Officer with the

Department of State and a 1996 graduate of the Army War College.

He is a 1965 gradute of the U.S. Naval Academy, and served 7

years on active duty with the U.S. Marine Corps, including 42

months in the Republic of Vietnam. As an active duty and later

Reserve officer, he attended a number of military schools on

chemical weapons use and defense. He retired as Colonel, USMCR,

in 1995. Mr. Vogel has served in the foreign affairs community

since 1972 at embassies overseas to include Bangkok, London, and

Vienna, where he was Deputy Chief of Mission from 1991-93. He

participated in the CWC negotiations in Washington and Geneva

from 1988-90. Mr. Vogel is presently assigned to the Office of

the Under Secretary of State for Management in Washington, DC.
1

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION:

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Introduction.

On January 13, 1993, in Paris, 130 countries signed the

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), a landmark treaty which will

ban the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling,

retention and direct or indirect transfer of chemical weapons.1

On November 23, 1993, President Clinton submitted the treaty to

the Senate for its advice and consent, with a call for the Senate

to move expeditiously to ratify the convention.2

However, since submission of the convention and despite

intensive administration action to achieve the requisite advice

and consent, the treaty has languished in committee under three

separate sessions of Congress. The CWC, for which the United

States has been one of the principal proponents, has been the

subject of some considerable controversy. The debate continues on

the strategic implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention, as

drafted, and whether it is in the national security interest. The

author concludes that, although imperfect, the CWC represents a

significant contribution to U.S. security objectives, and

therefore it is in the national interest to proceed with

ratification and implementation. However, there are tangible

costs and strategic implications for the United States which must

be addressed.

Historical Background.

A 1960 Army Chemical Corps handbook on chemical weapons (CW)

states that "the annals of history show that down through the

ages man has sought to enlist the aid of chemistry and disease in

his conduct of warfare, but it was not until the 20th century

that science made it possible."3

 A deeper analysis would prove

this statement to be not so. Toxic fumes were used in warfare in

India as early as 2000 B.C. and during the Sung Dynasty in China.

Thucydides recounts the use of poisonous fumes from burning pitch

and sulfur in the Peloponnesian War, during the seiges of Plataea

in 429 B.C. and of Delium in 424 B.C. Chemicals were also used in

warfare during the Middle Ages, as in the seige of Belgrade which

was saved from the Turks by the burning of noxious chemicals. At

the end of the 19th century, the English used artillery shells

laced with picric acid against the Boers, but this proved fairly

ineffective.4 The revolutionary scientific advancements of the

20th century brought chemical warfare to its highest, and

current, state of art.

 The use of poison gas in warfare in its most invidious form

dates from its initial use in World War I at the battle of Ypres,
2

April 22, 1915.5 Despite major international agreements

prohibiting the use of poisonous gases in warfare, by war's end,

some 1.3 million casualties, including 91,000 fatalities, were

attributed to the total of 124,200 tons of phosgene, chlorine,

and mustard gas used by all belligerents.6 Subsequently, chemical

weapons were used aggressively by Italy in Ethiopia in 1935-36.

Mustard gas bombs and aerial spraying caused most of the 15,000

reported chemical casualties, including an indeterminate number

of civilians who were intentionally targetted.7 The Japanese Army

used mustard gas, phosgene, lewisite and other agents

indiscriminately in China from 1937 to 1945, against both

unprotected military forces and civilians, in over 900 reported

incidents.8 Although chemicals were not otherwise deliberately

used by the major belligerents in World War II, poisonous gases

were used extensively by Germany in the concentration camps where

millions perished.

Egypt was later reported to have employed CW in the Yemeni

civil war (1963-67), during which phosgene and mustard aerial

bombs killed at least 1,400 people. Libya has also been accused

for years of having waged CW warfare in Chad. The most egregious

CW use of recent times, however, occured during the Iran-Iraq War

(1983-88) and in the Iraqi suppresion of its Kurdish minority

(1987-88). Although both Iran and Iraq used CW aggressively

against one another, Iraq used CW most effectively in breaking up

Irani mass assaults, and in targetting Irani border villages. In

its suppression of Iraqi Kurdistan, Iraq unwittingly provided the

single most compelling impetus to the CWC negotiations. On March

17, 1988, Iraq attacked the Kurdish village of Halabja with

suspected nerve agents, killing hundreds of civilian refugees.9

News reports of the attack, with graphic pictures of the victims,

caused universal revulsion and generated a worldwide demand for

elimination of chemical warfare.

The United States has also been accused in some quarters of

having waged chemical warfare in Southeast Asia, 1961-72, where

riot control agents and chemical defoliants and herbicides were

used extensively. The morality, legality, and medical pathology

of the U.S. use of chemicals remains a matter of continuing

debate.10 Also unresolved are controversial allegations of the use

of chemical agents ("yellow rain") by communist governments in

Southeast Asia against opposition forces and civilians, and by

the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. These allegations have not been

confirmed, and subsequent investigation and physical evidence

have proved inconclusive on the "yellow rain" hypothesis.11

Chemical Weapons: Morality and Legality.

Morality. The quest for abolition of chemical weapons has

been driven in general by an almost universal revulsion of this
3

entire class of weapons, and a perception, at least in the

Western democracies, that their use is somehow "immoral" in

comparison with other classes of weapons. Is this in fact the

case?

Just war theorists argue that among the seven conditions for

a just war is the principle that "the particular means employed

to wage the war must be themselves moral."12 Since the state has

the responsibility and authority to protect its citizens and

territory from unprovoked aggression, some theorists argue that

even immoral or illegitimate means may be employed if the

aggressor uses them first.13 The question remains, however,

whether chemical weapons are less humane than conventional

weapons, and hence proscribed on moral grounds. Again, some just

war theorists argue that chemical weapons, such as nerve agents,

kill quickly and prevent superfluous suffering,14 and as such are

not an immoral class of weapons. This is held in contrast to

conventional and nuclear weapons which can and have caused

horrendous suffering among combatants and, collaterally, within

noncombatant civilian populations. Thus the debate continues, and

the question of the morality of CW remains unresolved. This is

not the case for the legal implications of CW, for which there is

a lengthy historical record.

Legality. In general, the rights of states to employ any

weapon in warfare fall under two broad categories: specific

international agreements and international custom. Article 38 of

the Statute of the International Court of Justice notes that, in

addition to the general principles of law which pertain to all

civilized nations, there are two overriding principles of

international law: international convention, whether general or

specific, establishing rules expressly recognized by the

contesting states; and international custom, as evidence of a

general practice accepted as law.15

Although the use of chemicals in warfare can be traced to

the earliest records, as noted earlier, concerted efforts to

legally constrain such use began only relatively recently. The

Brussels Declaration of 1874 and the Hague Conven- tions of 1899

and 1907, among others, banned the use of poison gas and poisoned

bullets. The Hague Gas Declaration of 1891 banned the use of

"projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of

asphyxiating or deleterious gases."16 Following the horrors of CW

use in World War I, the Washington Arms Conference Treaty was

signed on February 6, 1922, prohibiting "the use of asphyxiating,

poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or

devices..." France, however, objected to other provisions of the

treaty and it never went into effect.17 The 1925 Geneva Protocol

also prohibited the use of poison gas and bacteriological methods

of warfare. Although this Protocol had been adopted at the urging

of the United States, obstacles were raised at that time by the
4

American chemical industry, Army chemical officers, and some

veterans groups.18 The Protocol languished in the U.S. Senate

until 1975 when it was finally ratified, with the reservation

permitting retaliation to an adversary's first use.19 However,

the United States continued to pursue a policy of renunciation of

CW, and at the Geneva Disarma-ment Conference of 1932, President

Hoover urged the abolition of all chemical warfare.20

In 1937, prior to the onset of World War II, President

Franklin D. Roosevelt stated:

It has been and is the policy of this Government to do

everything in its power to outlaw the use of chemicals

in warfare. Such use is inhumane and contrary to what

modern civilization should stand for. I am doing

everything in my power to discourage the use of gases

and other chemicals in any war between nations.21

In 1943, in the middle of World War II, President Roosevelt

further stated,

. . . I have been loath to believe that any nation,

even our present enemies, would or would be willing to

loose upon mankind such terrible and inhumane weapons .

. . Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the

general opinion of civilized mankind. This country has

not used them. I state categorically that we shall

under no circumstances resort to the use of such

weapons unless they are first used by our enemies.22

Roosevelt's reservation on "first use" reflects U.S. policy

as it has been interpreted since World War II, and as enshrined

in the U.S. reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. It would

appear then that under the International Court of Justice

definition a case could be made that the use of CW is prohibited

by both international convention and custom. This recognizes, of

course, that both international convention and custom are perhaps

more often observed in the breach than in practice. For the

United States, at least, the questions of morality and legality

are blurred. There remains a visceral abhorence in the U.S.

Government and its population for CW, as there appears to be in

the Western and developed world in general. This may reflect

merely a cultural bias, as other cultures, non-Western, nonJudeo-Christian, ex-colonial peoples of Asia and Africa may take

issue with the Western imposition of its own morality.23 However,

the United States and others continue to codify in law their

right to employ this class of weapons in retaliation against an

enemy's first use.

U.S. National Policy on Chemical Weapons.
5

In May 1991, President Bush committed the United States to

destroy all CW and to renounce the right to CW retaliation, the

U.S. long-standing reservation to the Geneva Protocol, once the

CWC enters into force.24 Earlier, in 1989, the United States had

declared a moratorium on further production of CW, and Congress

has since passed legislation requiring the destruction of the

entire U.S. CW stockpile by December 31, 2004.25 The United States

is thus effectively committed to elimination of any CW

capability, either for deterrence or retaliation. The U. S.

declared policy is to support the Chemical Weapons Convention as

a means to achieve a global ban on this class of weapons and to

halt their proliferation.26

In parallel with the negotiation of the CWC, the United

States has pursued bilateral agreements with the former Soviet

Union and the Russian Federation. These discus- sions culminated

in the signature of two interrelated agreements aimed at

eliminating the CW stockpiles of both parties.27 The first

agreement, the U.S.-Russian Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding

(MOU) on Chemical Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on

September 23, 1989, provides for a bilateral verification

experiment and data exchange. The purpose of the Wyoming MOU was,

and remains, to facilitate the negotiation, ratification and

implementation of the CWC.28

The second agreement, the Bilateral Destruction Agreement,

dated June 1, 1990, calls for the destruction and nonproduction

of CW and measures to facilitate the conclusion of the CWC as a

global ban on the entire class of weapons. The second agreement

has not been finalized and ratified, pending agreement on the

conversion of former CW production facilities in Russia. There

are also serious concerns over the technical and financial

capability of the Russian Federation to actually carry out a

comprehensive destruction program.29

In March 1994, the United States declared a stockpile of

31,000 agent tons of CW stored in nine locations, while Russia

has declared a stockpile of 40,000 metric tons, stored in seven

locations. There are serious reservations about the accuracy of

the Russian declaration, with independent estimates of the true

size of its stockpile as much as 80,000 metric tons or more.30

Both the United States and Russia have expressed serious

concerns over whether Russia can safely destroy its CW stockpile,

and a massive infusion of money and technology will be necessary

to do so. In January 1994, the two countries agreed to hire a

U.S. contractor to develop a comprehensive plan for the Russian

destruction program. Also, in March 1994, the U.S. Department of

Defense expressed its willingness to provide $300 million or more

to help build a pilot destruction plant in Russia, contingent
6

upon Russian commitment to destroy its most modern CW bombs

there.31

The United States continues to work closely with the Russian

Federation on the CW destruction program and on implementation of

the 1989 and 1990 agreements. However, the U.S. General

Accounting Office has concluded that while some progress has been

made, significant technical, political, and financial obstacles

remain in implementation of the agreements.32

The United States has also pursued policy options to achieve

important counterproliferation objectives. These call for

measures to deny the means of producing chemical weapons through

export controls; deter CW production and storage by international

convention (i.e., the CWC); deny the utility of CW by employing

active and passive defense measures; and deter CW use by threat

of retaliation, including sanctions against offending states.33

Perhaps the most effective counterproliferation mecha- nism

developed to date is the Australia Group. This is an informal

forum of states, chaired by Australia, whose goal is to

discourage and impede CW proliferation by harmonizing national

export controls of CW precursor chemicals, sharing information on

target countries, and seeking other ways to curb the use of CW.

The group was formed in 1984 in reaction to CW use in the IranIraq War. The 28 members of the group, including the United

States, control a list of 54 chemical precursors and related

produc- tion equipment.34

By policy and practice, and independently of the Chemical

Weapons Convention, the United States has in effect already

foresworn a CW capability. The United States, through unilateral,

bilateral, and multilateral efforts, has focused over the past

decade on minimizing the CW threat from potential adversaries,

reducing the proliferation of CW, and seeking an effective,

verifiable and truly global ban on CW. If all the world community

agrees on the nobility of that objective, why then is it so

difficult to achieve?

Putting the Genie Back into the Bottle: A First Try.

The horrors of poison gas, or chemical weapons, in World War

I were etched into the memories of the very governments which had

actively employed them, and the populations which had suffered

most from them. This prompted the international community to

negotiate the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which outlawed the use of

chemical weapons in warfare. However, the Geneva Protocol was

inherently flawed in that it banned only first use of chemical

weapons. Furthermore, many signatories, including the United

States, retained the reservation to retaliate in kind in response
7

to an adversary's own first use. The Protocol also contained no

provisions for either enforcement or verification, and relied

primarily on the good faith of the signatories to deter chemical

weapons use.35 This good faith was ill-placed, and chemical

weapons use has been widely reported in regional conflicts

worldwide ever since, in contravention, if not in defiance of the

Geneva Protocol.36

Putting the Genie Back into the Bottle: A Second Try.

In recognition of the inadequacies of the Geneva Protocol,

on April 18, 1984, then-Vice President Bush tabled a draft treaty

on the comprehensive ban on all chemical weapons at the Genevabased Conference on Disarmament (CD). Although such a treaty had

been under discussion in the CD for many years, the U.S. proposal

was the first to call for a total ban on the entire class of

chemical weapons.37 This was a major foreign and defense policy

initiative at the time, and it was reemphasized by Bush as part

of his political platform during the 1988 Presidential campaign.

After almost another full decade of very difficult and highly

technical negotiations, on January 13, 1993 in Paris, 130

countries including the United States signed the convention on

the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 

Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the "Chemical

Weapons Convention" or CWC).38

Despite the active support for such a ban from all U.S.

presidents since Richard Nixon and the entreaty by President

Clinton for expeditious Senate action,39 the treaty has languished

in the Congress. Since the treaty opened for signature in January

1993, the Senate has failed to take action on it, despite

expressions of support and same political party control in both

the Senate and the White House. Although the treaty has raised

serious concerns among a number of key Senators and their staffs,

it has also suffered from congressional preoccupation with

domestic affairs and a general failure of both the public

leadership and private community to focus on such a technical and

esoteric issue.40

Why the Resistance?

President Clinton has said, "This treaty is one of the most

ambitious in the history of arms control, banning an entire class

of weapons of mass destruction. It is a central element of my

Administration's non-proliferation policy. The treaty will

significantly enhance our national security and contribute to

greater global security."41 In addition, the CWC furthers the

universal goal of preventing proliferation of chemical weapons,

and ultimately eliminating them entirely.42 Who could possibly

argue against that?
8

Perhaps the CWC goes too far, or not far enough. The CWC

goes beyond merely banning the use, including retaliatory use, or

threat of use of chemical weapons, but also prohibits the

development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and

direct or indirect transfer to anyone of chemical weapons; the

engagement in military preparations to use chemical weapons; and

any assistance to any non-party in activities prohibited to

States Parties.43 The CWC also requires the total destruction of

all existing chemical weapons stocks, chemical weapons production

facilities, and abandoned chemical weapons stocks in third

countries.44 The convention further provides for the most

comprehensive verification and enforcement regime in arms control

history.45 It is on these two points that the contention has

arisen: the comprehensive nature of the convention and the

question of verification and enforcement.46

Critics have argued that the treaty cannot "go far enough,"

and will leave the United States vulnerable to rogue states which

either will not accede to the convention or will clandestinely

violate it. The convention could thereby subject U.S. forces and

allies to chemical weapons attack, without a capability to

respond in kind. Lacking a chemical weapons capability itself,

they argue, the United States will be unable to either deter

their use or retaliate proportionately. Furthermore, its critics

argue, the convention cannot be verified or effectively

enforced.47

Supporters, however, respond that "although no treaty is 100

percent verifiable, the CWC's extensive verification measures

will significantly increase the chances that a violation will be

detected, raising the political cost of illicit chemical weapons

activities and thus helping to deter them."48 Its rigorous

enforcement provisions will also significantly increase the

difficulty of acquiring chemical weapons and thus impede the

proliferation of chemical weapons by isolating the rogue states

which might refuse to accede to the treaty or violate its terms.49

All of this, supporters say, acts to provide the protection to

U.S. forces and allies which treaty critics have found lacking.

Furthermore, the convention has won the endorsement of senior

military leaders, including General John Shalikashvili, Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who testified to the Congress that

the CWC is "clearly in the national interest." General

Shalikashvili stated that the CWC would render U.S. troops less

likely to face CW threats in future wars, and that the United

States did not need the option of retaliating in kind to CW.50

In fact, during the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. response to

the Iraqi capability to employ chemical weapons was, on the one

hand, to disavow any chemical weapons use, but, on the other, to

threaten "disproportionate response" to any Iraqi use. This was
9

reportedly interpreted by Saddam Hussein as a threat to retaliate

with nuclear weapons.51 The deterrent effect of U.S. capability to

employ either massive conventional weapons or to threaten nuclear

retaliation (even though unstated U.S. policy had been to rule

out this option entirely) appeared sufficient to dissuade Saddam

Hussein from chemical weapons use. While the United States has

elected to forego a chemical weapons capability, treaty

supporters argue that its capability to respond

"disproportionately" as in Iraq would seem sufficient to deter

future chemical weapons use as well.52

Congress and U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy.

According to H. Martin Lancaster, Special Advisor (through

December 1995) to the President and the Director of the U.S. Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency on the Chemical Weapons

Convention, the CWC had only about a "50-50" chance of

ratification by the end of the last session of the Congress. The

problem was that the Congress is "disproportionately" preoccupied

with domestic issues and had neither the time nor the energy to

focus on the CWC. In addition, Lancaster stated that there were

critics in the Senate who were adamantly opposed to the treaty

and committed to killing it.

Lancaster stated that other political considerations also

had the potential to impede ratification of the CWC. He

emphasized that it would require some strong presidential

intervention to energize the Senate to focus on the treaty, but

that this was unlikely while the President was embroiled in

other, more pressing political battles. In 1996, both Congress

and the White House became even further distracted by the

presidential elections. It would have been a high political risk

at such a time for either the President or any member of the

Senate to expose him/herself on the issue of chemical weapons. In

addition, Lancaster opined that there was very little public

interest in the issue, thus little motivation for elected

officials to tackle it. Lancaster concluded that, ultimately, if

the treaty were not ratified in the last session of Congress,

then the "window of opportunity" to do so might be closed for

good. By the time the 1996 elections had sorted themselves out,

it would be too late in the chemical weapons destruction schedule

for the United States to comply. Without the United States as a

signatory to the CWC, Lancaster predicted that the treaty would

fail and become nothing more than a futile effort in a lost

cause.53

Cassandra-like, Prognosticating Woe.

And so now what happens since the U.S. Senate failed to

ratify the CWC? The author posed this question to Lancaster, and
10

asked if this would signal a return to the "bad old days" of

unbridled proliferation and chemical weapons use. Lancaster

responded that such activity is a distinct possibility. He added

that while the CWC could survive the absence of Russia, it could

not survive without the accession of the United States. Without

active U.S. participation, the most fundamental premise of the

CWC, which is universality, is lost and the treaty becomes

untenable. Other states, in particular current and intending

chemical weapons possessors, can be expected to revert to form

and resume chemical weapons-related activities. Proliferation

will thus become more prevalent, and chemical weapons use,

including use against the United States and its allies, will

become inevitable. The treaty and its international organization

may survive for a time, but its collapse will become inevitable

and unavoidable.54

Counterpoint--Is the CWC an Adequate Instrument?

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) has made its

own studied assessment of the CWC as drafted, and remains

concerned on a number of significant points. On December 18,

1995, the author interviewed Mr. Marshall Billingsley, senior

staff for arms control on the SFRC, for the committee's views on

the CWC.

The committee's primary concerns are that the CWC in its

present form would in the first instance remove a flexible

deterrence option for the United States in the event of hostile

CW use against the United States or its allies, and would

eliminate any future capability for retaliation in kind.

Secondly, the CWC could prompt a reduction in spending on

defensive measures. Thirdly, and very importantly, Russia, the

world's preeminent CW power, has failed to initiate a

comprehensive schedule of CW destruction in the spirit of the

Bilateral Destruction Agreement.55

Specifically on flexible deterrence, the SFRC takes note

that in the absence of any CW capability for either deterrence or

retaliation, the United States will have no option to respond to

an adversary's CW use other than nuclear weapons employment. But

there is a limit to our nuclear capability. The United States is

committed to arms control measures governing nuclear weapons

stockpiles, with the final end-state numbers of U.S. nuclear

warheads set at the absolute minimum to satisfy U.S. national

security requirements with regard to nuclear deterrent strategy.

In the event of a future requirement to divert nuclear weapons to

CW deterrence or retaliation, there may not be a sufficient

nuclear capability remaining for the United States to respond to

a nuclear threat.56

Additionally, the committee questions whether the threat of
11

nuclear retaliation would truly deter an adversary from CW use.

Those states or idealogical entities which pose the greatest CW

threat, such as North Korea, Iran, or terrorist organizations,

might not be swayed by a nuclear threat to their own or other

innocent populations, nor might they find a U.S. threat of

nuclear retaliation credible. Despite U.S. experience in the Gulf

War, in which Saddam Hussein appeared to have been deterred from

CW use by threat of nuclear retaliation, such success in

deterrence might not be replicated in the future, and there are

those of hostile intent toward the United States, waiting in the

wings, who may very well call the U.S. bluff the next time.57

On the question of spending on CW defensive measures, the

SFRC takes note of the general reduction in defense spending

among those countries now committed to the CWC. It appears that

these reductions will carry over into CW defensive measures as

well. The perception among the most hopeful signatories is that

the CWC will eliminate the CW threat, and therefore further

spending on CW defensive equipment, measures, and training will

no longer be necessary. The CWC thus has the potential to lull

signatories into a "false sense of security," and leave those

actually complying with the treaty more rather than less

vulnerable to CW threat or attack. The United States presently

retains an adequate CW protective capability, but that capability

could itself be eroded should too much faith be placed in the

good will of all CW-capable states. In addition, as our allies

reduce their own CW defensive spending, they could come to rely

more on the United States to provide protection, thus imposing an

increased burden on it.58

The SFRC is also concerned that Russia, the world CW

superpower, is not complying with its commitments to destroy its

CW stocks. In accordance with the Bilateral Destruction Agreement

(not yet in force), the United States and the former Soviet Union

agreed to a schedule of CW destruction which would totally

eliminate the declared CW stockpiles of both states. Although the

government of the Russian Federation originally stated its

commitment to the principles of that agreement, Moscow has

informed the United States that it does not have the money,

technology, or level of expertise necessary to undertake the

destruction of its declared stocks. There remains doubt and

debate over the actual size of the Russian stockpile, but some

experts believe it to be far greater than that which has been

declared. Furthermore, there are reports considered credible by

the SFRC that the Russian military has continued research,

development, production, and illicit diversion of chemical

weapons, in violation of the spirit of the bilateral agreements

and the CWC.59

The committee also believes that although the U.S. Chemical

Manufacturing Association (CMA) has voiced its support for the
12

CWC, a number of significant cost and technical factors for both

the chemical industry and the U.S. Government need to be studied.

The verification regime itself, which provides for routine and

challenge inspections of chemical production facilities, could

become very costly. The CWC establishes an Organization for the

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) which shall be funded in

accordance with the UN scale of assessments (CWC Article III,

Para A.1.). However, the CWC further provides for "contributions

to the voluntary fund for assistance" to be administered by the

Technical Secretariat of the OPCW (CWC Art X, para 7.(a)). The

SFRC understands that the OPCW expects the United States, Russia,

and perhaps one other yet to be identified state to provide the

bulk of such contributions related to destruction.60

The committee is concerned that the verification regime will

be expensive for the chemical industry and will also pose a

threat to proprietary information. The CWC provides for managed

access to chemical facilities, which will allow some measure of

protection for the industry. However, it remains technically

feasible for an inspector on a formal OPCW routine or challenge

inspection to divert chemical samples for unauthorized analysis.

Such action could expose the U.S. chemical industry to loss of

proprietary information, thus allowing an advantage to

international competitors. Furthermore, the SFRC estimates that

costs of the technical inspections themselves will range from US

$50,000 to $70,000 per inspection.61 By contrast, the U.S. Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) conducted a trial

inspection of a commercial facility producing schedule 3

chemicals in 1992, at a cost of approximately $5,000. ACDA

estimates the cost to industry of $4 million in the first year of

the CWC and less so in subsequent years.62

The committee further understands that many of the CWC

signatories expect conclusion of this treaty to help bring down

trade barriers, and ease controls on dual-use chemicals.

Inadvertently, the United States may find itself contributing to

hostile CW programs through facilitation of trafficking in

commercial chemicals.63

In general, the SFRC believes that the present state of the

art for verification is not adequate for the purposes of the CWC.

U.S. agencies have stated publicly that the United States cannot

verify, with confidence, the most stringent provisions of the

CWC, even with the most advanced national technical means. The

committee is concerned that while no treaty is completely

verifiable, the CWC is weakest in this area. In this context, a

false perception of security, i.e., an effective worldwide ban on

CW, could be more dangerous that a continuation of the perilous

status quo.64

Is the CWC then hopelessly flawed? Should the United States
13

refuse to ratify? Mr. Billingsley said that, in fact, the CWC is

not a lost cause. The House passed a "Sense of the Congress"

resolution on June 15, 1995, and the Senate passed a "Sense of

the Senate" resolution on September 5, 1995, both urging prompt

ratification and implementation of the treaty. However, the SFRC

remains concerned that technical adjustments must be made to the

language of the treaty, to strengthen it and to provide greater

protection for U.S. interests, both government and industry. Mr.

Billingsley stated that the most likely scenario would involve

recommendations by the SFRC on specific adjustments to the

language of the treaty, as a condition for U.S. ratification. He

recognized that this would require renegotiation of the CWC in

the Conference on Disarmament, but he felt that this would be

necessary to satisfy the committee's and U.S. concerns.65

But Do We Really Need Chemical Weapons?

While the debate on the deterrent and retaliatory capability

of CW is certainly valid, perhaps the most fundamental question

is the combat effectiveness of this class of weapons.

Specifically, what is the advantage to the United States of

employing CW, and what is the hostile threat that an enemy use

them? As stated earlier, during World War I, more than a million

combatants were wounded by poisonous gas and some 90,000 died as

a result. These statistics, however, are misleading. U.S. forces

suffered 34,249 immediate deaths on the battlefield, of whom an

estimated 200 were caused by gas, with a further 1,221 dying in

hospital wards. The total number of wounded and evacuated was

224,089, of whom 70,552 suffered from gas and other wounds.66

The American casualty rate from CW appears to have arisen

from a lack of defensive preparedness. By the time of the U.S.

entry into the war, the British, French, and Germans had

developed fairly sophisticated training, doctrine, and equipment

to operate in a chemical environment. Consequently, their

casualty rates were far lower. By way of comparison, the Russians

had devoted few resources to CW preparedness and suffered

severely as a result. For example, in one attack in June 1915,

two Russian regiments suffered some 90 percent gas casualties. In

September and October 1916, almost 5,000 gas casualties were

reported in two separate incidents, and a later incident in 1917

caused over 9,000 gas casualties.67

The difference appears to be in preparedness. After the war,

British analysts reported that fewer gas victims died of their

injuries than from other weapons, thus allowing many to return to

full combat duty following convalescence. The analysts also

determined that gas caused a proportionately greater number of

casualties than high explosives, among unprepared troops, and was

more effective in demoralizing an enemy and reducing the battle

efficiency among such troops.68
14

General John J. Pershing, in his Final Report on the

American experience in World War I, wrote that "Whether or not

gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture,

but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared (emphasis added)

that we can never afford to neglect the question." He concurred

with the British analysts who stated that while CW was a

significant factor on the battlefield, it was not a major cause

of battle deaths.69 Preparedness is thus the key to survival in a

CW environment. The consensus among analysts appears to be that

while CW use can be a serious impediment to combat operations, it

will not cause extensive casualties among properly trained and

equipped troops.

CW can equally impede the combat operations of the

belligerent employing them. During World War II, all

participating nations had developed CW capabilities, but the

Germans were technologically far ahead of their adversaries.

However, the Germans elected not to employ CW, even though they

reeled from attacks on all quarters. After the war, a senior

German CW officer, Lieutenant- General Hermann Ochsner, told his

Allied interrogators that CW had not been considered an efficient

weapon to support the doctrine of rapid movement of armies.

Although it could be effective against unprepared troops, it

restricted movement of one's own forces. As a result, CW was not

integrated into German military doctrine, training, or planning.

Furthermore, he stated that the Wehrmacht was under strict orders

not to move CW stocks outside of German territory for fear of

accidental use or capture.70 Aversion to CW use during World War

II arose partially from fear of retaliation and also from the

constraints of the much flawed 1925 Geneva Protocol: "Treaty

prohibitions, though imperfect, reinforced both public and

military dislike and fear of chemical warfare . . ." (Major R.J.

Brown, Chemical Warfare: A Study in Restraints).71

CW, even for the prepared, is a potentially lethal nuisance.

This axiom applies for both the attacker and the defender, where

both or either have the proper training, equipment, and

discipline. Where then is the advantage of possessing or

employing CW? Is deterrence a factor when U.S. forces are already

prepared to operate effectively in a CW environment? Is

retaliation a factor when the potential adversary is equally

prepared, or does not care if his forces or population are

subject to CW attack?

For the United States, it would appear that CW is not a

particularly effective option for combat operations. At present,

the United States has already committed to destruction of its

entire CW stockpile and has foresworn CW use upon entry into

force of the CWC. No CW stocks are forward deployed, nor

effectively available for combatant commanders in the event of
15

hostile threat.72 Even in the absence of the CWC, the United

States has no operational capability nor a credible deterrent or

retaliatory capability for chemical weapons.

The Nuclear Threshold.

A compelling argument often cited for retaining chemical

weapons is to provide flexible response to an adversary's first

use. The main point of this position is that in the absence of

CW, the United States will have no option short of nuclear

weapons to retaliate to hostile CW attack against U.S. or allied

forces. In the annual Global Wargame conducted at the Naval War

College in July 1995, such a scenario was developed and

participants recommended a nuclear response to CW employment.

During the exercise, the national command authority ultimately

declined this option, but concern remained that conventional

response would have been inadequate.73

The counterpoint to the flexible response argument is that

not everyone among our allies agrees on either the CW or nuclear

option. With respect to CW, for example, within NATO at least 13

governments have imposed stringent conditions on the shipment of

U.S. CW stocks to their territory in a crisis, and 6 have

insisted that they will never permit such shipments under any

circumstances. Others have asserted their right of veto.74

Germany, the only country in which U.S. CW was previously forward

deployed, required the United States to remove these stocks in

1990.75 It is reasonable to presume that other allies, in the

Middle East and the Pacific most prominently, would hold similar

ambivalence toward U.S. CW capabilities in their regions.

The conclusion is that a U.S. CW response, even if the

United States were capable of such, is not necessarily a viable

option. Moreover, the United States does not now possess such a

capability nor will it in the foreseeable future. This situation

prevails, whether the United States likes it or not. The United

States by policy has foresworn a CW capability, and must rely on

its massive conventional capability or nuclear response to deter

or retaliate against aggression. Consequently, should the United

States unilaterally disarm its CW capability, or should it ratify

the Chemical Weapons Convention?

The U.S. Constitution and The Role of Congress.

The Congress, within its constitutional authority, can exert

a decisive influence over the implementation of the foreign and

defense policy of the United States. The U.S. Constitution states

that, "all Treaties made . . . under the authority of the United

States" to be the "the supreme Law of the Land," binding on both

the Federal government and the various states.76 The Constitution
16

further requires that all international agreements be subject to

the advice and consent of the Senate, two-thirds of whom are

present and voting.77 Congress has also indicated its desire and

intent to be involved in the approval of any serious arms control

agreements. Article 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of

1961 provides:

That no action shall be taken under this or any other

law that will obligate the United States to disarm or

to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of

the United States, except pursuant to the treaty-making

power of the President under the Constitution or unless

authorized by further affirmative legislation by the 

Congress of the United States.

If full implementation of a treaty imposes a burden or

requirement on a private person, then Congress and the President

must also enact "implementing legislation."78 In the case of the

CWC, private U.S. citizens and chemical manufacturers will be

constrained from producing chemicals for "prohibited purposes,"

and in quantities beyond that "consistent with the intended

purpose."79 Reporting requirements will be imposed on the

manufacture of chemicals in general. In addition, broad access to

the private sector for both routine and challenge inspection will

be required. As such, the Congress will be required to enact

implementing legislation to provide the treaty full effect under

U.S. law.80

It is clear then that the Congress will have a definitive

and central role not only in the ratification of the CWC, and

U.S. accession to it, but also in the formulation of domestic

legislation to implement it in the United States. It will be the

responsibility of the Congress to ensure that U.S. implementation

of the CWC conforms to the Constitution and the law of the land.

The American Law Institute, in a 1987 Restatement of Foreign

Relations Law, provided the following analysis:

A rule of international law or a provision of an

international agreement of the United States will not

be given effect as law in the United States if it is

inconsistent with the United States Constitution. . . .

No provision of an agreement may contravene any of the

prohibitions or limitations of the Constitution

applicable to the exercise of authority by the United

States.81

However, even if a treaty entered into by the United States

is in violation of the Constitution, that does not relieve the

United States of its obligations under international law.82 This

apparent dichotomy emerges on the issue of routine and challenge

inspections and the Constitution's Fourth Amendment restrictions
17

on searches. The question is how to reconcile U.S. domestic law

with its obligations under a Chemical Weapons Convention.

In the first instance, the Bill of Rights was created to

protect the people from actions of the Federal government and, by

extension, of the state governments as well. Secondly, the Fourth

Amendment protects "the people," not the U.S. Government itself,

and only "unreasonable" searches and seizures are prohibited.83

Thus, any facility of the U.S. Government could be inspected

under the CWC without further authority. Also, official

inspections by regulatory agencies of business premises licensed

by the inspecting agency are already authorized, and business

owners can be compelled to permit entry, without a search

warrant, as a condition for licensing.84 This would appear to

cover the chemical industry for both routine and challenge

inspection.

Challenge inspection for a facility or for private property

not specifically licensed for the purposes stated in the

paragraph above presents a more complex Constitutional question.

Such a search could require a finding of "probable cause" and

issuance of a search warrant.85 This process could be extremely

difficult and time-consuming, and would probably negate the

purpose and intent of a short-notice inspection. However, "the

fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent abuses

of power by the United States Government."86 A challenge

inspection conducted by the Organization for the Prohibition of

Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on behalf of a foreign government does

not appear to violate the Fourth Amendment.87 U.S. ratification of

the CWC would not of itself imply an act of the U.S. Government.

In fact, the U.S. Government regularly and routinely cooperates

with foreign governments in carrying out international treaty

obligations, in acts which might violate the Constitution if

carried out by the U.S. Government on its own behalf (extradition

treaties, prisoner exchange treaties, for example).88

The above discussion is by no means intended as the

definitive analysis of the Constitutional issues posed by the

CWC. In the final analysis, however, it would appear that the CWC

can be implemented domestically in the United States, without

violation of Fourth Amendment rights under the Constitution. The

onus will be on the Congress to draft implementing legislation in

conformance with both the CWC and the Constitution.

Verification: A Central Concern.

Can the CWC verification regime provide absolute certainty

of compliance by all member states? The simple answer is no. In

fact, the U.S. intelligence community has indicated that it

cannot verify with complete confidence the declarations of states
18

party to the CWC, nor their compliance with its provisions. Also,

the SFRC is concerned that clandestine production or stockpiling

could go undetected and thus expose U.S. troops to CW threat or

attack.89

However, without undertaking an exhaustive analysis of the

technical considerations involved in this issue, it is accurate

to say that the CWC has the most stringent verification regime

ever attempted in an international agreement.90 Furthermore, an

analysis of the CWC verification regime conducted in December

1991 by the Center for National Security Studies, Los Alamos

National Laboratory, concluded that the proposed regime should be

considered:

. . . as part of a larger security framework that

includes (1) national intelligence means, which provide

additional detection capabilities to those of the

multinational system; (2) defensive and protective

measures that can mitigate to some degree the risks of

treaty violation, whether detected or undetected; (3)

political, diplomatic, and military measures to deter

violations; and (4) confidence- and security-building

measures (e.g., notification and observation of

European military activities pursuant to the 1986

Stockholm Document).91

No arms control regime can ever be absolutely verifiable,

but CWC supporters believe that it provides an acceptable 

measure of risk. John D. Holum, Director of the U.S. Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), has stated that "the Convention

increases our odds of detecting clandestine activity," and, "by

putting into place a global legal norm outlawing possession as

well as use, it will increase the financial and political costs

of acquiring or retaining chemical weapons."92 In addition, the

CWC contains both incentives and disincentives, to reward

countries who comply and punish those who do not.93

In sum, while verification remains a justifiable concern,

the associated risks appear to fall within acceptable limits.

Rigorous enforcement of the verification regime will be required

throughout the life of the convention, to ensure compliance by

all states party. "Trust, but verify" was never a more

appropriate truism.

The Chemical Industry--What Does It Think?

A principal concern among CWC opponents is that it would be

prohibitively expensive and possibly threatening to the interests

of the U.S. chemical industry. It has been argued that treaty

costs of the CWC would be borne primarily by U.S. companies,

which would also incur excessive reporting requirements and work
19

stoppages due to inspections. Operational costs of the

convention's OPCW would also impose additional costs on the U.S.

taxpayer.94

Proponents of the CWC make the counterargument that

excessive cost may not necessarily be the case. They point out

that the U.S. Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) has been

"an early and consistent supporter" of the CWC, and was in fact

awarded the fourth W. Averell Harriman Award in May 1995 for its

work in support of the convention. The CMA was instrumental in

mobilizing international support for the CWC, including the

support of the chemical industries of Western Europe, Canada,

Australia and Japan.95 Representatives of the CMA and the U.S.

chemical industry were also major participants in the Australia

Government-Industry Conference on Chemical Weapons held in

September 1989 in Canberra. Over the course of the negotiations,

the CMA and U.S. negotiators consulted regularly on the draft

text, and the CMA and foreign trade associations contributed

specifically to the verification regime of the convention.

The two areas of greatest concern to the chemical industry

have been the costs of compliance and the possibility of loss of

confidential business information. Given the industry's

significant role in drafting the treaty, the compliance costs are

expected to be "manageable," and can be integrated into the

normal cost of doing business.96

With respect to protection of proprietary information,

measures have been incorporated into the verification regime

which will provide a balance between the intrusiveness necessary

to verify compliance and the protection of legitimate trade

secrets. The "Managed Access" provisions of the treaty are a

direct result of CMA contributions to its drafting.97

Ultimately, the CMA, as the trade association representing 

those in the private sector most affected by the CWC, has the

final say on whether or not the U.S. chemical industry supports

the treaty. CMA President Fred Webber has written, "Accepting new

regulations and opening up plants to inspectors isn't something

we agreed to lightly. But we've come to the conclusion that the

convention is a sound investment. It will yield solid returns at

a cost we can and will bear."98 Webber has further written that,

"Honest businesses have nothing to fear. Anyone with other

motives will run the risk of getting caught in the act. The

treaty is the best means available to prevent legitimate

chemicals from falling into the wrong hands."99

Treaty proponents further point out that many wealthy states

with large chemical industries, such as Japan, Germany,

Switzerland, and the Netherlands, have already ratified the

treaty.100 These countries, with their own chemical industries,
20

are presumably no less aware than the United States of the risks

and costs of the CWC. That they have chosen to commit their

governments, industries, and peoples to the international

obligations of the CWC implies a decision that, on balance,

treaty benefits outweigh costs and risks. Having made the same

considerations, the U.S. CMA reached an identical conclusion and

publicly stated its own support for the CWC.

The CWC--Should the United States Ratify?

In the final analysis, yes. Although treaty opponents

present a strong case against, particularly on verification,

enforcement, and industry concerns, on balance the treaty is in

the U.S. national interest. Can the CWC be verified with absolute

confidence, and if violated, enforced effectively? No, it cannot

be verified with 100 percent confidence, any more than any other

treaty to which the United States is a party. However, it does

provide a rigorous, highly intrusive, and comprehensive

verification regime. This verification regime will make it

extremely difficult for any state or transnational entity to

produce, stockpile, weaponize, or employ chemical weapons, to the

extent that U.S. forces would be subject to significant threat or

would be significantly constrained from executing an operational

mission. This does not preclude a terrorist attack, such as the

1995 Tokyo subway attack. It also does rule out entirely isolated

incidents of tactical employment of CW. However, the CWC

verification regime will make such incidents prohibitively

difficult, and compel prospective violaters to channel their

aberrant energies and resources to courses of action other than

CW.

Can the treaty be enforced? Again, the enforcement regime

cannot guarantee absolute compliance, but it is extremely

rigorous, making provision for sanctions and other trade measures

against violators. In the inextricably interconnected and

interdependent global marketplace, the threat of trade sanctions

alone can be a particularly effective disincentive to the

clandestine production of chemical weapons or their use.

What about the impact on the chemical industry? Yes, the CWC

 will impose additional reporting requirements and inspection

burdens on the industry, and this will entail additional costs.

But the U.S. chemical industry, and its major trading partners,

have expressed their support for the CWC and have explicitly

stated their ability and willingness to accept the burden and

operate effectively under it. There are also concerns about the

protection of proprietary information. Again, the U.S. Chemical

Manufacturers Association has indicated that the "Managed Access"

and other provisions of the treaty verification regime provide

sufficient confidence to the industry that confidential business

information will remain precisely "confidential."
21

The destruction of existing CW stockpiles remains a

technological challenge, not only for the United States but for

Russia and for any other state on whose territory such stockpiles

exist. The issue then is whether such stocks represent a threat

to the integrity of the convention. However, all such stockpiles

must be declared, and remain subject to monitoring throughout the

destruction schedule. Even if that schedule is delayed or

extended for technological or financial reasons, the CW stocks

would be effectively denied to a potential violator. The

possibility of clandestine CW stockpiles not otherwise declared

is addressed in part by the treaty challenge inspection

provisions. Furthermore, significant tactical employment of

clandestine stocks would be severely constrained by the

requirement that they remain "clandestine." While the

verification regime cannot guarantee discovery of clandestine

stocks, the unique requirements for safe CW production,

containment, weaponization, deployment, employment, and

ultimately decontamination by a potential treaty violator would

be particularly susceptible to a host of national technical and

other means of detection.

Will the CWC lower the "nuclear threshold," in the absence

of a CW retaliatory capability? Even in Global Wargame 1995,

where nuclear retaliation was recommended in response to CW

attack, the notional national command authorities withheld

approval. In the real world, the United States and its allies

disavowed any chemical or nuclear option in the Gulf War. Given

demonstrated U.S. and Western abhorence for chemical weapons, it

is very unlikely that CW retaliation would be an option in the

future, even if a CW capability existed. Does this imply that the

only other recourse is nuclear? It did not in the Gulf War, where

the United States declared from the outset that any such use

would be met by "disproportionate response." The U.S.

conventional capability, particularly in precision guided

munitions and related technology, remains unequalled, and has

been demonstrated to provide the United States a massive,

effective, and flexible deterrent and retaliatory option. Nuclear

retaliation to CW use does not appear to be the only viable

option.

Ultimately, perhaps the strongest argument in favor of the

CWC is that the United States has already abrogated any possible

CW capability, retaliatory or otherwise. All moral or legal

considerations aside, the United States has unilaterally

committed by law to the complete destruction of its own CW

stockpile. Further, the United States has disavowed a CW

retaliatory option, once the CWC enters into force, but this is a

moot point given practical constraints on U.S. CW production and

deployment. The United States has undertaken these commitments on

its own, without a treaty in place. On balance, the United States
22

can only gain by imposing the same constraints, burdens, and

respon-sibilities on the rest of the international community. The

final conclusion then must be that it is in the U.S. national

strategic interest to ratify the CWC. The Senate should be

encouraged to provide its advice and consent at the earliest

possible date.

The Strategic Implications for the United States.

The United States must recognize that the CWC does not imply

an end to the CW threat. If anything, the CWC requires a greater

commitment to defensive measures, including detection, training,

equipment, decontamination, and research. This will have the dual

result of both protecting U.S. personnel and rendering obsolete

or ineffective CW use by an adversary. U.S. conventional

capabilities must likewise be enhanced to provide that

"disproportionate response" which will act as both deterrent and

retaliation to hostile CW employment. Defense budgets must

reflect an undiminished commitment to a strong and viable CW

defensive and conventional deterrent capability.

On the political level, the United States and its allies

must continue to coordinate their activities within the

organization of the CWC and within the Australia Group to monitor

and/or control the flow of precursor chemicals in world commerce.

International pressures must be brought to bear on nonsignatories to accede to the treaty, and on signatories to

comply. Potential violators must be made aware of the

transparency of their actions and of the consequences of

violation. In the event of armed conflict, potential adversaries

must have no doubt that chemical weapons use or threat of use

will invite the most massive and focused response against the

person, personnel and resources of the perpetrator.

Finally, perhaps the most important "strategic implication"

for the United States is that it must become totally committed to

the CWC and take a major leadership role in its implementation.

This will require a significant commitment to the OPCW, in terms

of finances, resources and personnel. Only by its active and

aggressive participation, can the United States ensure that the

verification and enforcement regimes of the treaty are fully

implemented, and that controls and protective measures for

industry are adequately applied. Imperfect though it may be, the

CWC represents a major step forward in arms control, but the

utility of it resides with the world community. The ultimate

proof will be in the unreserved commitment of signatories and

non-signatories equally and alike to the international standards

of behavior embodied by the convention.

ENDNOTES
23

1. "Chemical Weapons Convention Signatories/Ratifiers," U.S.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fact Sheet, August 22, 1995.

2. The White House Statement on President Clinton's

submission of the Chemical Weapons Convention to the Senate, by

the Press Secretary, November 24, 1993.

3. Seymour M. Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare:

America's Hidden Arsenal, Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill

Company, Inc., 1968.

4. Ibid.

5. "Chemical Weapons: A Global Call to Action," an address

by Secretary of State George Shultz at the Conference on Chemical

Weapons, Paris, France, January 7, 1989.

6. Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare: America's Hidden

Arsenal.

7. Rodney J. McElroy, Briefing Book on Chemical Weapons,

Boston: Council for a Livable World Education Fund, October 1989.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Joseph C. MacKenna, S.J. "Ethics and War: A Catholic

View," The American Political Science Review, September 1960, p.

651.

13. Richard J. Krickus, "The Morality of Chemical/Biological

War: Its Arms Control Implications," Second International Arms

Control and Disarmament Symposium, Ann Arbor, MI, January 1964.

14. Ibid.

15. The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volume

III: CBW and the Law of War, Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute, 1973.

16. Richard D. McCarthy, M.C., The Ultimate Folly: War by

Pestilence, Asphyxiation, and Defoliation, New York: Alfred A.

Knopf, 1969.

17. Ibid.
24

18. Ibid.

19. McElroy, Briefing Book on Chemical Weapons.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Walter Schmeir, "The Campaign to Make Chemical Warfare

Respectable," Reporter, Reprint, October 1, 1959.

23. Krickus, "The Morality of Chemical/Biological War: Its

Arms Control Implications."

24. Brad Roberts, "Chemical Disarmament and International

Security," Adelphi Papers 267, International Institute for

Strategic Studies, 1992.

25. The Honorable John D. Holum, Director, Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency, "The CWC: Time for the Harvest," remarks to

an ABA Seminar on Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention,

February 7, 1995.

26. President Clinton letter to the Senate of the United

States of November 23, 1993, transmitting for advice and consent

the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,

Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

(the "Chemical Weapons Convention" or CWC). Also see The

Honorable John D. Holum, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency, "Remarks to an ABA Seminar on Implementing the Chemical

Weapons Convention."

27. Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements and the Chemical

Weapons Convention, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign

Relations, U.S. Senate, (GAO/NSIAD-94-136), Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Accounting Office, March 1994.

28. "U.S.-Russian Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding on

Chemical Weapons Fact Sheet," U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency, Washington, DC, August 1, 1994.

29. Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements and the Chemical

Weapons Convention.

30. Ibid. Also, Michael E. Ruane, "Pentagon Discloses its

Chemical Arsenal," Philadelphia Inquirer, January 23, 1996.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.
25

33. Maurice Eisenstein, "Countering the Proliferation of

Chemical Weapons," National Defense Research Institute, RAND,

1993, prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

34. "Australia Group," Fact Sheet, U.S. Arms Control and

Disarma- ment Agency, Washington, DC, February 10, 1995.

35. H. Martin Lancaster, Special Advisor to the President

and the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,

Speech to Business Executives for National Security, New York,

August 16, 1995.

36. "U.S. Efforts Against the Spread of Chemical Weapons,"

statement by Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State for

Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, before the

Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the

Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,

Washington, DC, June 22, 1989.

37. "The Chemical Weapons Convention," U.S. Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency Fact Sheet, July 24, 1995.

38. Ibid.

39. President Clinton letter to the Senate of the United

States of November 23, 1993, transmitting for advice and consent

the "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their

Destruction" (the "Chemical Weapons Convention" or CWC).

 40. Interview with H. Martin Lancaster, Special Advisor to

the President and the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency, Washington, October 2, 1995. Lancaster is a

former Congressman (D-NC), whose reelection bid failed in the

November 1994 elections.

41. President's Clinton statement upon submission of the CWC

to the Senate, The White House Statement by the Press Secretary,

November 24, 1993.

42. Ibid.

43. "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their

Destruction," opened for signature in Paris on January 13, 1993.

44. Ibid.

45. Ioanna Iliopulos, "Ten Myths about the Chemical Weapons

Convention," Business Executives for National Security, March
26

1995.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Lancaster, Speech to Business Executives for National

Security.

49. Interview with H. Martin Lancaster, October 2, 1995.

50. The Honorable John D. Holum, Director, Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency, "The CWC: Time for the Harvest."

51. President Bush's "brink of war" letter to Saddam

Hussein, presented by Secretary of State James Baker to Iraqi

Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva, January 9, 1991. Also,

interview with H. Martin Lancaster, Special Advisor to the

President and the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency, Washington, October 2, 1995; Bob Woodward,

The Commanders, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991.

52. Interview with H. Martin Lancaster, October 2, 1995.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Interview with Marshall Billingsley, Senior Staff for

Arms Control, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington,

December 18, 1995.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid.

62. Rick D'Andrea, Acting Director, ACDA/MA/CBP, written

comment on draft SRP, dated February 6, 1996.

63. Interview with Marshall Billingsley, December 18, 1995.

64. Ibid.
27

65. Ibid.

66. Harry L. Gilchrist, A Comparative Study of World War

Casualties From Gas and Other Weapons, Edgewood Arsenal, MD:

Chemical Warfare School, 1928.

67. Major(P) Charles E. Heller, USAR, Chemical Warfare in

World War I: The American Experience, 1917-1918, Leavenworth

Papers No. 10, September 1984.

68. Krickus, "The Morality of Chemical/Biological War: Its

Arms Control Implications."

69. John J. Pershing, Final Report of General John J.

Pershing, Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces,

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1920.

70. McElroy, Briefing Book on Chemical Weapons.

71. McCarthy, The Ultimate Folly, War by Pestilence,

Asphyxiation, and Defoliation.

72. Chemical Warfare: DOD's Successful Effort to Remove U.S.

Chemical Weapons From Germany, U.S. General Accounting Office,

Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO/NSIAD-91-105, February

1991. Also, Ruane, "Pentagon Discloses its Chemical Arsenal"; and

Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements and the Chemical Weapons

Convention.

73. Global War Game 1995 Executive Summary, Center for Naval

Warfare Studies, Newport: Naval War College, August 1995.

74. Julian Perry Robinson, "NATO Chemical Weapons Policy and

Posture," ADIU Occasional Paper No. 4, Sussex, United Kingdom:

Armament and Disarmament Information Unit, Science Policy

Research Unit, University of Sussex, September 1986.

75. Chemical Warfare: DOD's Successful Effort to Remove U.S.

Chemical Weapons From Germany, February 1991.

76. U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Para 2.

77. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2.

78. Burrus Carnahan, Constitutional Implications of

Implementing a Chemical Weapons Convention, Science Applications

International Corporation, April 4, 1990.

79. Rick D'Andrea, Acting Director, ACDA/MA/CBP, written

comment on draft SRP, February 6, 1996.
28

80. Carnahan, Constitutional Implications of Implementing a

Chemical Weapons Convention.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Interview with Marshall Billingsley, December 18, 1995.

90. The Honorable John D. Holum, Director, Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency, "The CWC: Time for the Harvest."

91. Criteria for Monitoring a Chemical Arms Treaty:

Implications for the Verification Regime, Center for National

Security Studies, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Report No. 13,

December 1991.

92. Holum, "The CWC: Time for the Harvest."

93. Ibid.

94. Kathleen C. Bailey, "Chemical Weapons: Say No to This

Troubled Treaty," The Washington Post, December 12, 1995.

95. Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the President, "Keynote

Address to Lawyers Alliance for World Security and Committee for

National Security," dinner in Honor of the Chemical Manufacturers

Association, Washington, DC, May 8, 1995.

96. Ibid.

97. Holum, "The CWC: Time for the Harvest."

98. Ibid.

99. Mikva, "Keynote Address to Lawyers Alliance for World

Security and Committee for National Security."

100. E.J. Hogendoorn, Human Rights Watch Arms Project, "Time
29

to Ratify the Chemical Weapons Treaty," letter to The Washington

Post, December 26, 1995.
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