United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

January 1998 DOD’S MOBILITY

REQUIREMENTS

Value of Intratheater

Lift Analyses Can Be

Enhanced

GAO/NSIAD-98-53

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-277182 

January 30, 1998

The Honorable Strom Thurmond

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

As requested, we are providing you with the results of our review of the Department of

Defense’s 1996 Intratheater Lift Analysis. We reviewed the Department’s analysis to determine

whether (1) the analysis and recommendations in the study were appropriately linked, (2) the

study considered all options in meeting the requirements for various lift assets, and

(3) improvements could be made to enhance the study’s value as a decision-making tool.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the

House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and the House National Security Committee;

the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, and the Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management

and Budget. We will also make copies available to others on request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this

report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues
Executive Summary

Purpose Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm highlighted the need to quickly

deliver combat forces and their support to theaters of operation other than

Europe. To ensure that a sufficient amount of mobility assets would be

available to support contingencies in the post-Cold War environment,

Congress directed the Department of Defense (DOD) in fiscal year 1991 to

assess both intertheater (from one theater of operations to another) and

intratheater (within the same theater of operations) lift requirements and

develop an integrated plan to meet them. In its 1992 Mobility Requirements

Study and 1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update,

DOD addressed the intertheater portion of the directive. According to Joint

Staff officials, the 1996 Intratheater Lift Analysis addressed the

intratheater portion of the directive. DOD is planning to update this analysis

as part of its 1999 Mobility Requirements Study.

Army officials told us that DOD plans to spend $1.7 billion through fiscal

year 2003 to implement the Army’s tactical wheeled vehicle acquisition

plan, as recommended in the Intratheater Lift Analysis. If the airlift

recommendations in the analysis were implemented as well, another

approximately $2.7 billion (fiscal year 1996 dollars) could be spent.

Because these recommendations are intended to serve as a basis for

proposed intratheater lift acquisitions, the Chairman and Ranking Minority

Member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services requested that GAO

report on the results of the 1996 Intratheater Lift Analysis. Specifically, GAO

determined whether (1) the analysis and recommendations in the study

were appropriately linked, (2) the study considered all options in meeting

the requirements for various lift assets, and (3) improvements could

enhance the study’s value as a decision-making tool.

Background Members of the defense community agree that intratheater lift

requirements are more difficult to establish than intertheater

requirements. The type, amount, and timing of lift that will be needed

within the theater of operations depend on the theater infrastructure and

the course of the contingency, which can change rapidly. Five modes of

intratheater transportation—airlift, highway, rail, coastal waterways, and

pipeline—present several options for lift, all of which must be considered

as the contingency progresses. For example, if outsize cargo—the largest

items in the Army’s inventory such as the M1 battle tank—need to be

delivered by air, the availability of outsize-capable airlifters must be

considered. The C-5 and the C-17 are the only airlifters capable of

transporting outsize cargo. The Air Force plans to procure 120 C-17s. The

final 80 aircraft are being procured under a June 1996 multiyear contract.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Executive Summary

The C-130, with a smaller payload capacity, is the Air Force’s primary

intratheater airlifter.

The 1996 Intratheater Lift Analysis was led by the Joint Staff with support

from other DOD agencies, the military services, and theater commands. The

study assessed lift requirements for a nearly simultaneous Korea and

Southwest Asia scenario. It also determined the mobility assets needed to

move troops and equipment from the airfields and seaports in the theaters

of operation to destination air bases, staging areas, and tactical assembly

areas.

Results in Brief The Intratheater Lift Analysis does not adequately fulfill the congressional

directive to determine lift requirements and develop an integrated plan to

meet them. The study contains recommendations that would cost billions

of dollars to implement, but the study’s analysis generally did not support

these recommendations. The disconnect between the analysis and

recommendations is especially evident in the information regarding

tactical wheeled vehicles and outsize airlift capability.

In addition, the study’s analysis did not incorporate several assets that can

contribute significantly to the intratheater lift mission; as a result, the

study’s requirements and solutions may be overstated. The analysis did not

consider (1) commercial vehicles provided by host nation support; (2) the

use of the current and planned fleet of outsize-capable intertheater

airlifters such as the C-5 and C-17; and (3) the extent to which Army

watercraft could reduce the need for alternative sources of lift.

Furthermore, improvements could enhance the study’s value to

decisionmakers. These improvements include requirements stated as a

range rather than as absolute numbers and tradeoff assessments based on

the cost and capability of the various lift assets. A range would have better

reflected the dynamic nature of intratheater requirements, and system

tradeoff assessments would have provided choices based on cost and

capability.

The 1999 Mobility Requirements Study and updated Intratheater Lift

Analysis will afford DOD a good opportunity to address these issues and

provide Congress with a basis for acquisition decision-making in future

budget cycles.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Executive Summary

Principal Findings

Intratheater Lift Analysis

Contains Unsupported

Recommendations

The Secretary of Defense’s 1997 Annual Report to the President and the

Congress cited the Intratheater Lift Analysis as a basis for DOD’s future

force structure and investment decisions. However, the study does not

adequately fulfill congressional direction to determine intratheater lift

requirements and establish an integrated plan to meet those requirements.

The recommendations in the Intratheater Lift Analysis support the Army’s

current procurement plans but are not based on the requirements

identified in the study. The disconnect occurred in some cases because of

invalid assumptions, but in other cases the cause for the disconnect is

unclear. Assumptions about the mission of the Heavy Equipment

Transporter System, for example, did not reflect the way the Army plans to

use this asset. As a result, the recommendation for the system’s acquisition

supports the Army’s planned acquisitions but is not supported by the

study. The Intratheater Lift Analysis also identified a requirement for 

16 Palletized Load System companies but recommended that the Army

continue its planned procurement of 32 companies. In addition, the study

recommended that excess Heavy Equipment Transporter Systems and

Palletized Load Systems, as well as host nation support, be used to offset

shortfalls in other categories of tactical wheeled vehicles. However, the

study did not include a cost-effectiveness analysis that assessed the

relative cost and capabilities of using potential excesses to offset

shortages.

The 442 C-130s currently in the fleet exceed the requirement identified in

the Intratheater Lift Analysis for the Korea and Southwest Asia scenarios

as well as other lift requirements generated by theater commanders

outside of these scenarios. However, the study recommended that

additional C-17s beyond the planned procurement of 120 (a squadron of

14, according to DOD officials) should be used to augment C-130 capability

primarily by transporting outsize cargo. Although this recommendation is

not currently a DOD acquisition objective, it has been supported by the

Defense Science Board and theater commanders. The cost to implement

the recommendation could be about $2.7 billion (fiscal year 1996 dollars).

The study’s analysis, however, does not support the need to procure more

than the planned 120 C-17s. The combat units relocated by the C-17 in the

two scenarios were considered apart from the rest of the battle, and the

time frames for delivery of the units were neither incorporated into the

overall mobility scheme nor directly related to a specified intratheater lift

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Executive Summary

requirement. The Air Force has asserted that the currently planned

procurement of 120 C-17s, along with the current C-130 fleet, will be

sufficient to meet intratheater lift requirements as they arise.

Intratheater Lift Analysis

Does Not Consider All

Intratheater Lift Assets

Commercial vehicles provided by host nation support were not considered

in the Intratheater Lift Analysis, although such support is cited throughout

the study as a potential offset to U.S. mobility force structure. The theater

commanders’ current operation plans for the Korea and Southwest Asia

scenarios rely extensively on host nation support to provide transportation

of cargo, heavy tracked vehicles, and fuel within the theater. Host nation

support was instrumental in transporting heavy tracked vehicles and other

cargo during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Furthermore, the

1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update, which

identified the intertheater requirements for the same war-fighting scenario

as the Intratheater Lift Analysis, assumed that commercial cargo trucks,

fuel tankers, and heavy equipment transporters would be provided by the

host nations. Such support would limit the amount of equipment that the

United States would have to transport into the theater. The defense

community is currently debating the appropriate level of host nation

support to offset U.S. force structure, but agreements have not been

reached. A study that considers U.S. intratheater requirements with and

without host nation support offsets, as opposed to only one scenario with

no host nation support, would provide decisionmakers with more

flexibility as they consider acquisition plans.

The Intratheater Lift Analysis also did not consider the potential

contribution of the C-5 airlifter. Air Mobility Command officials said that

the C-5, although an intertheater asset, would be a candidate for

intratheater lift of outsize cargo if destination airfields can accommodate

the aircraft. The Command has surveyed 46 of the 67 airfields used in the

Intratheater Lift Analysis to determine whether they are accessible to the

C-5. The survey results show that the C-5 can land on 34, or 74 percent, of

the 46 airfields. This number would likely be higher during a contingency,

when airfields that have not yet been surveyed would be made available.

The ability to rely on both the C-5 and the planned 120 C-17s to deliver

outsize cargo as needed could increase flexibility and eliminate the need

for additional large airlift capability dedicated to an intratheater role.

Finally, even though the Intratheater Lift Analysis modeled the assets

currently in the inventory, it did not consider that additional watercraft

could offset requirements for other lift assets. The Army’s logistics support

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Executive Summary

vessels and landing craft transport personnel and cargo from large

strategic sealift ships to the shore and provide intratheater transport

capability. Army watercraft were successfully used in Operations Desert

Shield and Desert Storm and could be a significant means of transporting

tracked vehicles, ammunition, and other cargo via coastal waterways in

Korea and Southwest Asia. However, the study did not include any

tradeoff or cost-effectiveness analyses to identify the benefits of additional

watercraft. A separate watercraft study, completed in November 1996,

found that theater commanders have not identified their intratheater

requirements for watercraft. The role, capability, and requirements for

Army watercraft, and potential tradeoffs with ground transportation

assets, have not been determined.

Use of Ranges and

Cost-Effectiveness

Analysis Could Enhance

Study’s Value

Because intratheater requirements are subject to change based on the

combat situation and theater infrastructure, requirements stated as ranges,

rather than as absolute numbers, would better reflect the dynamic nature

of intratheater lift. DOD’s 1988 Worldwide Intratheater Mobility Study

recommended that all future statements of intratheater mobility

requirements be expressed in ranges when possible and that those

requirements not expressed as ranges should be understood to be

approximations. The Intratheater Lift Analysis, however, stated

requirements as absolute numbers, which lessens the study’s value as a

management tool. A range of requirements would allow decisionmakers to

consider different factors, such as the effect of damage to airfields or

seaports, weather, or various threat scenarios, on the number and type of

lift assets needed.

The Intratheater Lift Analysis also failed to conduct a tradeoff analysis

among various lift assets based on cost-effectiveness, thereby limiting the

information available to those making investment decisions within a

sensitive budget environment. For example, the analysis identified excess

Palletized Load Systems in the Army’s acquisition objectives for fiscal 

year 2003 but recommended that the doctrine for the system be revised to

allow the system to carry cargo other than ammunition so that it could

alleviate shortfalls in 22.5-ton line haulers. The ammunition role was the

sole mission on which the Palletized Load System originally was

determined to be cost-effective, and a new cost-effectiveness analysis has

not been done to justify the system’s expanded role. A company of

Palletized Load Systems costs about $18.8 million (1996 dollars) compared

with only $9.5 million (1996 dollars) for a company of 22.5-ton line haulers,

according to an analysis performed by the Tactical Wheeled Vehicles

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Executive Summary

Requirements Management Office. According to Joint Staff officials,

limited tradeoff assessments were discussed in carrying out the

Intratheater Lift Analysis, but these assessments did not consider cost and

were not documented.

Recommendations GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct that the planned

1999 update of the Intratheater Lift Analysis

• link the study’s recommendations to its analysis and include assumptions

that consider current Army doctrine, if acquisition plans are to be based

on the doctrine;

• consider host nation support as a means of accomplishing intratheater lift

and ensure that host nation support assumptions are consistent with those

in intertheater studies;

• include the potential contribution of the C-5 airlifter and planned fleet of

120 C-17s;

• reflect the role, capability, and requirements for Army watercraft in an

intratheater role, including an analysis of the extent to which these assets

can alleviate identified shortfalls in tactical wheeled vehicles;

• state intratheater requirements as ranges to reflect their dependence on

the combat situation; and

• include cost-effectiveness analyses that examine tradeoffs among lift

assets to reflect capability, cost, and requirements.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred with

GAO’s report and agreed to take into account GAO’s recommendations in

conducting its 1999 mobility study. However, DOD did not agree with GAO’s

finding that the recommendations of the Intratheater Lift Analysis are not

supported by the study’s analysis. DOD stated that the study used

computationally-derived data, along with additional analysis and military

judgment, to develop the study’s recommendations. DOD cites service

acquisition programs, input from theater commanders, and substitution of

one type of intratheater asset for another as examples of the additional

analysis considered in developing the requirements and recommendations

in the Intratheater Lift Analysis. DOD points to the study’s recommendation

to use excess Heavy Equipment Transporter Systems in place of 34-ton

line haulers as being based on service acquisition programs and theater

commander input.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Executive Summary

The Intratheater Lift Analysis does not link its requirements to its

recommendations. Rather, its recommendations merely support the

Army’s acquisition plans with no explanation of the disconnect between

those plans and the study’s requirements. In discussing GAO’s draft report,

agency officials acknowledged that the Joint Staff had difficulty linking the

Army’s fiscal year 2003 acquisition program to the Intratheater Lift

Analysis requirements and that, for this reason, the study’s reliance on the

acquisition program is not clearly explained. Furthermore, during GAO’s

review, Joint Staff officials asserted that the decisions reached by the

study’s working groups concerning, for example, tradeoff assessments and

the airlift tactical unit moves analysis, were not documented. Without an

explicit link in the Intratheater Lift Analysis between the study’s

requirements and recommendations, and without a means of reviewing the

factors or additional analyses that led to the final recommendations in the

study, GAO has no basis on which to concur that a link exists. Moreover,

GAO questions the reliability and independence of a DOD requirements study

that bases its requirements and recommendations on service acquisition

programs without examining the disconnects between those programs and

the study’s own findings.

Concerning DOD’s example, the number of Heavy Equipment Transporter

Systems identified as a requirement in the Intratheater Lift Analysis is less

than the number reflected in the study’s recommendation. According to

theater commanders’ input to the study and GAO’s discussions with Army

officials, the Heavy Equipment Transporter System is not an effective or

economical substitute for 34-ton line haulers. GAO agrees with DOD’s

statement that service acquisition programs were used to support the

study’s recommendations for Heavy Equipment Transporter Systems. It is

this fact that leads GAO to conclude that the recommendations in the

Intratheater Lift Analysis were not based on the requirements identified by

the study’s analysis, but rather were based on service acquisition programs

that had already been established.

DOD’s comments are addressed at the end of each chapter, and the

complete text of DOD’s comments is in appendix II.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

12

Modes of Intratheater Lift 14

ILA Methodology 15

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 16

Chapter 2 

ILA

Recommendations

Are Not Based on the

Study’s Analysis

19

Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Recommendations Are Not Based on

the Study’s Requirements

19

Recommendation for Additional Airlift Is Not Supported 22

Conclusions 25

Recommendations 25

Agency Comments 25

Chapter 3 

ILA Did Not Include

the Potential

Contribution of Some

Lift Assets

27

Host Nation Support Can Significantly Contribute to Intratheater

Lift

27

Intertheater Airlifters Can Help Meet Outsize Intratheater

Requirements

28

Potential Contribution of Army Watercraft Was Not Determined 29

Conclusions 31

Recommendations 31

Agency Comments 31

Chapter 4 

Opportunities Exist to

Improve Study’s Value

as a Decision-Making

Tool

32

Lift Requirements Were Not Stated as Ranges 32

Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Is Needed to Assess Tradeoffs

Between Lift Assets

33

Conclusions 34

Recommendations 34

Agency Comments 35

Appendixes Appendix I: Intratheater Lift Assets 36

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense 44

Appendix III: Major Contributors to This Report 47

Tables Table 2.1: ILA Requirements and Recommendations 20

Table I.1: Number of Tactical Wheeled Vehicles per Company 39

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Contents

Figures Figure 1.1: Fort-to-Foxhole Deployment 13

Figure I.1: C-130 Hercules 36

Figure I.2: C-17 Globemaster 37

Figure I.3: C-5 Galaxy 38

Figure I.4: Heavy Equipment Transporter System 39

Figure I.5: Palletized Load System 40

Figure I.6: 34-ton Line Hauler 40

Figure I.7: Logistics Support Vessel 41

Figure I.8: Logistics Support Vessel Unloading Trucks 42

Figure I.9: Landing Craft, Utility-2000 43

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

HETS Heavy Equipment Transporter System

HNS Host Nation Support

ILA Intratheater Lift Analysis

LCU-2000 Landing Craft, Utility-2000

PLS Palletized Load System

SUMMITS Scenario Unrestricted Mobility Model for Intratheater

Simulation

TACWAR Tactical Warfare Model

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Chapter 1 

Introduction

In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Congress

directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to determine intertheater (from

one theater of operations to another) and intratheater (within a theater of

operations) mobility requirements for the armed forces and develop an

integrated plan to meet those requirements. DOD assessed its intertheater

requirements in the 1992 Mobility Requirements Study. This study was

updated in 1995 based on the results of the 1993 Bottom-Up Review.

According to Joint Staff officials, intratheater requirements were

addressed in the July 1996 Intratheater Lift Analysis (ILA), which was DOD’s

first published intratheater lift requirements study since the 1988

Worldwide Intratheater Mobility Study. The ILA was sponsored by the Joint

Staff, with representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for

Program Analysis and Evaluation, military services, U.S. Central

Command, U.S. Forces Korea, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S.

Transportation Command. At the time of our review, the ILA had not been

submitted to Congress.

Historically, DOD has focused on intertheater lift requirements because

intratheater lift requirements are more difficult to establish. The

time-phased force deployment data process, which sets out the mode and

timing of transportation of each unit, typically concentrates on the

intertheater leg of the deployment. Intratheater lift requirements depend

more on the combat situation and the theater concept of operations,

which may not be known until the start of hostilities and are always

subject to change. Intertheater lift transports troops, equipment, and

supplies from U.S. airfields and seaports or prepositioned locations to the

airfields and seaports in the theater of operations. The intratheater lift

phase transports the troops and equipment from these airfields and

seaports to the tactical assembly areas and foxholes in the theater. 

Figure 1.1 illustrates “fort-to-foxhole” deployment.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Figure 1.1: Fort-to-Foxhole Deployment

United

States

Foxhole

Port

Fort

Airport

Seaport

Tactical 

Assembly Area

Intertheater

Airlift

Sealift

Ground Transportation

Railroad

Pipeline

Foxhole

Intratheater

Airlift

The Secretary of Defense’s 1997 Annual Report to the President and the

Congress states that the mobility objectives identified in the updated 1995

Mobility Requirements Study and the 1996 ILA will guide future force

structure and investment decisions. Officials from the Joint Staff and the

Office of the Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation

said that the ILA is the official DOD study that the military services should

use in developing their procurement plans for intratheater lift assets. The

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Army plans to spend about $1.7 billion through fiscal year 2003 to

implement the ILA’s recommendations for tactical wheeled vehicles; if the

airlift recommendations were implemented as well, another approximately

$2.7 billion (fiscal year 1996 dollars) could be spent.

According to Joint Staff officials, a new Mobility Requirements Study is

expected to be completed in 1999. That study is expected to incorporate

the Quadrennial Defense Review scenarios and force structure,1

 include an

update to the ILA, and examine intertheater and intratheater lift

requirements simultaneously rather than separately.

Modes of Intratheater

Lift

Five alternate modes of transportation—airlift, highway, coastal

waterway, rail, and pipeline—present several options for intratheater lift.

The availability of these options depends on the combat situation and

theater infrastructure. For example, if the 176 bridges and 11 tunnels

between Pusan and Seoul, South Korea are damaged or destroyed or if the

bridges cannot accommodate heavy tracked vehicles, such as main battle

tanks, alternative modes of transportation must be arranged.

Airlift enables immediate positioning and delivery of unit equipment and

sustainment, but it is costly and provides limited cargo capacity. The C-130

airlifter is the primary aircraft used for intratheater lift. Large intertheater

airlifters, such as the C-17 and C-5, can also be used for intratheater lift if a

larger payload capacity or the transport of outsize cargo—the largest items

in the Army’s inventory—is needed and airfields can accommodate the

aircraft.

Tactical wheeled vehicles are key to (1) moving units to assembly areas in

the theater of operations in preparation for combat and (2) sustaining

forces with supplies essential for successful operations. The tactical

wheeled vehicles included in the ILA were the Heavy Equipment

Transporter System (HETS), the Palletized Load System (PLS), 5,000- and

7,500-gallon fuel tankers, and 22.5- and 34-ton line haulers. The Army’s

watercraft fleet consists of 245 craft that transport cargo and combat

vehicles from ship to shore or to locations in the theater of operations via

intracoastal waterways. The Logistics Support Vessel can accommodate 

1

In May 1997, DOD issued the Quadrennial Defense Review, its fourth comprehensive review of the

military since the end of the Cold War. This review, required by the Military Force Structure Review

Act in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, examined U.S. defense needs from

1997 to 2015. The Quadrennial Defense Review continued to base force structure requirements on

nearly simultaneous scenarios in Korea and Southwest Asia, but it also noted that the demand for

smaller contingency operations is expected to remain high over the next 15 to 20 years. A limited

mobility analysis, focusing on intertheater lift requirements, was done for the study.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Chapter 1 

Introduction

24 M1 main battle tanks and has the capacity to carry 2,000 tons. Rail, an

important mode of transport in Korea, can alleviate some highway

transportation requirements, according to the ILA. Appendix I shows some

intratheater lift assets.

ILA Methodology The war-fighting requirements on which the ILA was based were

established in the updated 1995 Mobility Requirements Study. That study,

which formed the basis for DOD’s current intertheater lift program,

developed a requirement that would accomplish, with moderate risk, U.S.

objectives established by the Joint Staff’s Tactical Warfare model (TACWAR)

for a nearly simultaneous Korea and Southwest Asia scenario.2

 The study

assessed intertheater lift requirements to deliver combat and support

forces to airfields and seaports in the two theaters of operations. The 1995

study, however, did not address the intratheater lift requirements needed

to transport the units to their final destinations within the theaters.

The ILA, through the Scenario Unrestricted Mobility Model for Intratheater

Simulation (SUMMITS), modeled the intratheater lift—including airlift,

tactical wheeled vehicles, Army watercraft, and rail—needed to transport

the troops and equipment from the airfields and seaports and

prepositioning sites in the theater to destination air bases, staging areas,

and tactical assembly areas.3 SUMMITS considers required delivery date,

payload, rate of movement, loading and unloading times, and the available

transportation assets and network capabilities; examines every feasible

path from origin to destination; and selects the fastest path through the

network, subject to user-defined mode selection rules. For example, the

mode selection rules direct that airlift, which is more expensive than

ground transportation, is to be used only if ground transportation would

be late and airlift would result in an improvement of at least 24 hours.

2

Developed by the Joint Staff for a North Atlantic Treaty Organization-Warsaw Pact conflict, TACWAR

is a theater-level combat model that examines the interaction of strategic and tactical forces in a

conventional and chemical environment. TACWAR is a deterministic model; that is, for a given set of

input data, the model provides an associated set of output results. TACWAR has recently been

criticized by the National Defense Panel, appointed to review the Quadrennial Defense Review, and

the Air Force Chief of Staff for failing to account for the contributions of military activity beyond

force-on-force direct attack scenarios. A new model, planned to be fully operational by 2001, is

expected to better represent future warfare.

3

SUMMITS is an intratheater deployment simulation model that quantifies the lift needed to deliver a

specified force to its final destination in the theater of operations and then to sustain that force. The

model moves commodities, such as ammunition, bulk fuel, unit equipment, and personnel through an

interconnected network of air routes, roads, pipeline, railroads, and coastal waterways.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

Because its recommendations are intended to serve as the basis for

proposed DOD acquisitions, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of

the Senate Committee on Armed Services requested that we report on the

results of the 1996 ILA. Specifically, we determined whether (1) the

analysis and recommendations in the study were appropriately linked,

(2) the study considered all options in meeting the requirements for

various lift assets, and (3) improvements could enhance the study’s value

as a decision-making tool. To determine whether the ILA’s analysis and

recommendations were appropriately linked, we reviewed the ILA, its

Catalogues of Data and Assumptions, and other information supporting

the study; theater command input to the ILA; Army and Air Force doctrine

and procurement plans for tactical wheeled vehicles and airlifters;

information on intratheater mobility in Operations Desert Shield and

Desert Storm and Operation Joint Endeavor; the 1997 and 1998 Air

Mobility Master Plans; RAND’s 1997 Documented Briefing, “Should C-17s

Be Used To Carry In-Theater Cargo During Major Deployments?”; and

other relevant documents. We reviewed our prior reports on Operations

Desert Shield and Desert Storm, PLS, HETS, and C-17. We visited the tactical

wheeled vehicles training facility at Fort Eustis, Virginia. We discussed the

ILA’s assumptions, analysis, and recommendations with officials from the

following organizations:

• Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.;

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and

Requirements, Washington, D.C.;

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for Program Analysis

and Evaluation, Washington, D.C.;

• U.S. Central Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida;

• U.S. Forces Korea;

• U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii;

• U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois;

• Air Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C.;

• Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia;

• Air Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois;

• Army Headquarters, Washington, D.C.;

• Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia;

• Army Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, Virginia;

• Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicles Requirements Management Office, Fort

Eustis, Virginia; and

• Boeing Corporation (formerly McDonnell Douglas Corporation), Rosslyn,

Virginia.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Chapter 1 

Introduction

To determine whether the ILA considered all options in meeting the

requirements for various lift assets, including host nation support, the C-5,

and Army watercraft, we reviewed the ILA and its supporting Catalogues of

Data and Assumptions; DOD’s 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review; theater

commands’ operation plans for Southwest Asia and Korea; DOD documents

concerning host nation support in Operations Desert Shield and Desert

Storm; the DOD Inspector General’s 1997 report on host nation support in

Southwest Asia; the Air Mobility Command’s May 1997 Airfield Suitability

and Restrictions Report; Air Force and contractor documents concerning

C-5 operations and capabilities; the Logistics Management Institute’s

November 1996 report, “Joint Logistics Over The Shore Causeway Systems

and Support;” the November 1996 Army Watercraft Master Plan; and other

documents. We obtained information on the potential contribution of

these lift assets from officials at the Joint Staff; theater commands; the

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for Program Analysis

and Evaluation; the U.S. Transportation Command; Army Headquarters;

the Army Training and Doctrine Command; the Army Combined Arms

Support Command; the Air Combat Command; the Air Mobility Command;

and Lockheed Martin Corporation, Crystal City, Virginia. We also toured

the Army watercraft docked at Fort Eustis.

To determine whether improvements could enhance the study’s value as a

decision-making tool, we reviewed the 1988 Worldwide Intratheater

Mobility Study, 1992 Mobility Requirements Study, 1995 Mobility

Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update, and the 1996 Defense

Science Board Task Force Report on Strategic Mobility. We also reviewed

the theater commands’ input into the ILA, information on tactical wheeled

vehicle cost and capability from the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle

Requirements Management Office, and our prior reports on the 1992 and

1995 Mobility Requirements Studies. We obtained additional information

from the Joint Staff; the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for

Policy for Program Analysis and Evaluation; the Office of the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements; Air Force

Headquarters; Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency; Air Combat

Command; Air Mobility Command; Army Headquarters; and Army

Combined Arms Support Command.

We did not assess the validity of the requirements or objectives identified

in the fiscal year 2003 Total Army Analysis and did not independently

verify the computer-generated data from the SUMMITS or TACWAR models.

Our analysis focused on the decisions that were justified based on the

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Introduction

output of these models. Our assessment of whether the outputs were

properly used did not require a determination as to the accuracy of the

models and the data they produce. We evaluated the links between the

ILA’s recommendations and the requirements generated by the models.

We performed our review between September 1996 and November 1997 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

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The ILA contains several recommendations that are not based on

requirements developed by the study’s analysis. In some cases, this

disconnect appears to be the result of invalid assumptions. For example,

assumptions about how the Army would use HETS were not consistent with

Army doctrine. In other cases, the cause of the disconnect is unclear.

Further, the recommendations for tactical wheeled vehicles supported the

Army’s planned acquisition objectives, but the study’s analysis would have

resulted in a different recommendation for most types of tactical wheeled

vehicles (e.g., the PLS and the 34-ton line hauler). Finally, the ILA found that

the current C-130 fleet is more than sufficient to meet airlift requirements

but recommended that an additional squadron of C-17s, beyond the

planned procurement of 120 aircraft, should be used for intratheater lift,

particularly for outsize cargo. This recommendation is not supported by

the analysis in the study.

Tactical Wheeled

Vehicle

Recommendations

Are Not Based on the

Study’s Requirements

The tactical wheeled vehicle acquisition plan recommended by the ILA

does not reflect the requirements determined by the study’s analysis. The

ILA recommended that the Army continue with its tactical wheeled vehicle

acquisition objectives based on the biennial Total Army Analysis for fiscal

year 2003,1

 even though the ILA requirements differed significantly from

that analysis. The ILA recommended that shortfalls in some types of

tactical wheeled vehicles be alleviated either by host nation support or

tradeoffs with other types of excess vehicles. However, because the ILA

requirements differ significantly from the Army’s acquisition objectives,

the excesses asserted in the ILA may not actually exist. Further, the ILA did

not consider tactical wheeled vehicle host nation support (the treatment

of host nation support is discussed in ch. 3) or include a cost-effectiveness

analysis of the tradeoffs among various types of vehicles. Table 2.1 shows

the ILA requirements (number of companies) and recommendations for

tactical wheeled vehicles. Appendix I shows the number of assets in each

company.

1

We did not assess the requirements or objectives of this Army-generated analysis and thus cannot

comment on their validity.

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Table 2.1: ILA Requirements and

Recommendations Asset ILA requirementa ILA recommendationb

HETS 4 companies The ILA recommended supporting the

Army’s doctrinal requirement of 18

companies and using HETS to offset a

shortfall in 34-ton line haulers. (The study

identified excess HETS capability.)

5,000-gallon fuel

tanker

12 companies The ILA recommended 12 companies as

the absolute minimum. (The Army’s

acquisition objective is 43 companies.)

7,500-gallon fuel

tanker

41 companies The ILA recommended 41 companies as

the absolute minimum. (The Army’s

acquisition objective is 48 companies.)

PLS 16 companies The ILA recommended that the Army’s

acquisition objective of 32 companies be

continued and that the PLS doctrine be

changed so that the additional capability

could alleviate the 22.5-ton line hauler

shortfall.

22.5-ton line hauler 54 companies The ILA recommended continuing the

Army’s acquisition program of 33

companies but stated that 54 companies

should be the minimum. Additional PLS

capability could be used to alleviate the

shortfall.

34-ton line hauler 87 companies The ILA recommended 87 companies as

an objective and that the Army’s acquisition

objective of 49 companies be continued.

(These companies are already on hand.)

The study recommended using HETS,

7,500-gallon fuel tanker tractors, and host

nation support to offset the shortfall.

aThe ILA refers to the requirements as “workloads.”

bThe Army acquisition objective is for fiscal year 2003.

HETS Assumptions Are

Not Consistent With Army

Doctrine

The ILA’s recommendation for the procurement of HETS is not consistent

with the requirement identified in the study. The ILA requirement is for 

4 HETS companies, but the recommendation supports the Army’s plan to

buy 18 companies. The ILA did not model the use of HETS according to

current Army doctrine and thus derived a much lower HETS requirement

than the Army’s analysis. The ILA Catalogue of Data and Assumptions

states that HETS were used to transport tracked vehicles only when the

vehicles’ time to self-deploy would exceed the time required to load them

on a HETS, transport them, and unload them. According to Army officials,

however, under current Army doctrine, battle tanks do not self-deploy

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unless the distance to be traversed is 3 miles or less. This mission was

added in 1991, before which time HETS only evacuated tanks from the

battlefield. The Army’s objective of 18 HETS companies reflects the Army’s

plan to procure enough HETS to relocate a heavy brigade and its support in

a single lift. Another reason for ILA’s lower HETS requirement is that the

study assumed a steady, even flow of heavy equipment arrivals by sea,

with no surges as a result of weather or chance.

Fuel Tanker Requirements

Are Not Accurate

The ILA identified a need for fewer 5,000-gallon fuel tankers than the Army

plans to procure, but it recommended that the Army’s acquisition program

be continued. The ILA acknowledges that its 5,000-gallon fuel tanker

requirements are understated. According to Joint Staff and Army officials,

one reason for the inaccuracy is that the ILA did not factor in fuel

requirements for the tankers or the additional cargo line haulers that the

analysis showed were needed to meet requirements. Another reason for

the difference between the Army and ILA estimates is that the TACWAR

battle on which the ILA was based was fought at a low-to-moderate

intensity level. If the level of intensity had been higher, fuel requirements

would have been greater.

PLS Recommendation Is

Not Supported

The ILA’s recommendation to continue the Army’s plan to procure 32 PLS

companies is not based on the ILA’s requirement of 16 companies. Rather

than recommend a reduced number of PLS to reflect the requirements, the

ILA recommended that the Army continue toward its acquisition objective

and use the surplus PLS to help alleviate the 22.5-ton line hauler shortfalls.

However, on the basis of a cost and operational effectiveness analysis, the

cost-effectiveness of the PLS was determined only for an ammunition role.

Further analysis has not been done to determine the cost-effectiveness of

the PLS in a cargo-carrying role. One PLS costs about $391,000 (1996 dollars)

compared with $158,000 (1996 dollars) for one 22.5-ton line hauler,

according to an analysis by the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Requirements

Management Office. Because alternative uses for the PLS have not been

assessed for cost-effectiveness, the ILA’s recommendation for the PLS is

premature and not supported by analysis.

Line Hauler

Recommendations Are Not

Consistent

The ILA identifies a minimum requirement for 54 22.5-ton line hauler

companies but also supports the Army’s acquisition objective of 33

companies. The ILA states that excess PLS assets can help alleviate this

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shortfall. However, the PLS mission would have to be changed, and a

cost-effectiveness analysis for such a change has not been done.

The ILA also identified a large shortfall in the 34-ton line haulers, but the

Army believes enough of these assets are already in its inventory and

therefore does not plan to procure any more. The ILA recommends 87 of

these companies as an objective but supports the Army’s plan not to

procure any additional trucks, stating that shortfalls can be offset with

excess HETS assets, 7,500-gallon fuel tanker tractors (the same tractor used

with the 34-ton line hauler), and host nation support. None of these

options, however, were modeled.

Recommendation for

Additional Airlift Is

Not Supported

The number of C-130s in the fleet exceeds the number that the ILA

identified as a requirement for the Korea and Southwest Asia scenarios.2

To determine the number of additional C-130s that would be needed

worldwide for contingencies unrelated to these scenarios, the Joint Staff

surveyed the theater commanders. Even with their additional requirement,

the C-130 fleet still exceeds the number needed for intratheater lift.

However, on the basis of analyses by the Air Force Studies and Analyses

Agency, the ILA recommended using additional C-17s beyond the planned

procurement of 120 (a squadron of 14, according to DOD officials) to

augment the C-130s by providing outsize cargo capability. This

recommendation has been supported by the Defense Science Board Task

Force on Strategic Mobility (in a 1996 report) and by theater commanders.

The Air Force analyses, however, do not support this recommendation

because they only demonstrated that the C-17 could move cargo more

quickly than the C-130 under certain circumstances. No intratheater

requirement was established based on the C-17’s contribution to meeting

TACWAR timelines, and the relative cost-effectiveness of the two aircraft

was not taken into account.

The Air Force is not currently planning to acquire more than the planned

120 C-17s so that a squadron could be dedicated to an intratheater role. An

Air Force document shows that no C-17s are allocated solely for

intratheater lift but that the U.S. Transportation Command would continue

to support the intratheater lift needs of war-fighting commanders, as

demonstrated in Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia. RAND’s National

Defense Research Institute evaluated intratheater concepts of operations

2

As of fiscal year 1997, the Air Force had 442 C-130s in its fleet. This number does not include the

additional aircraft used for training and as backup for aircraft undergoing maintenance.

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for the planned C-17 fleet of 120 aircraft. In a 1997 Documented Briefing,3

RAND identified the advantages of using the C-17 in an intratheater role

and concluded that about one squadron of C-17s could be used effectively

in each of the two theaters of operation. These C-17s would be part of the

planned procurement of 120 aircraft and would be based in the theater,

unavailable to fly intertheater missions. RAND acknowledged that

deploying these C-17s as intratheater assets would slow the flow of

intertheater cargo, but stated that this effect would be offset by the

improved intratheater deliveries afforded by the C-17. DOD officials

commented that, during the halting phase, a delay in the strategic airlift

flow may not be acceptable. RAND also determined that fewer C-17s

would need to be dedicated to the theater if some C-17s arriving in the

theater were delayed to perform intratheater missions and then re-entered

the intertheater airlift flow. According to RAND, this concept could allow

nondedicated C-17s to fly most of the missions that would otherwise

require theater-assigned C-17s.

Further Analysis of

Potential C-17 Role Is

Warranted

In support of the ILA, the Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency used its

own models, along with SUMMITS, to determine the number of C-130s

needed to meet TACWAR requirements after the addition of a squadron of

C-17s beyond the 120 planned aircraft. The analysis found that about

50 percent more cargo could be delivered with only two-thirds as many

sorties. However, because the C-130 fleet was more than sufficient to

deliver the ILA workload, the faster deliveries resulting from the addition of

C-17s were not necessary to meet the TACWAR battle requirements.

The ILA also stated that, on the basis of its capability to deliver bulk cargo,4

every additional C-17 could replace three C-130s. However, the ratio of

three C-130s to one C-17 does not take into account either cost or the

reduced flexibility that would be provided to a theater commander who

may need three C-130s for multiple deliveries rather than one C-17 for a

single delivery.

Finally, dedicating a squadron of large airlifters, such as the C-17, for

intratheater use could be an inefficient use of the asset. Intratheater

missions typically involve small loads. In Operations Desert Shield and

Desert Storm, for example, the average C-130 load was only 3.2 tons per

sortie, although the C-130 can carry 17 tons. During the three peaks in the

airlift operation—August and September 1990 and February 1991—the

3

“Should C-17s Be Used To Carry In-Theater Cargo During Major Deployments?” RAND, 1997.

4

Bulk, or palletized, cargo includes ammunition, supplies, and food.

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average C-130 load was 3.5 tons per sortie, which is only 5 percent of the

C-17’s 65-ton cargo-carrying capacity.

The Air Force stated that more analysis is needed before a definitive

conclusion on the intratheater contribution of C-17s can be reached. The

ILA notes that, due to SUMMITS’ limited ability to model airlift, C-17 and

C-130 capability tradeoffs warrant further analysis. The Air Force Studies

and Analyses Agency had planned to complete a more detailed study of

C-17 and C-130 capability in September 1996, but, according to an Air

Force official, that study has been delayed indefinitely.

Unit Relocation Analysis

Used Questionable

Assumptions and Was Not

Tied to the TACWAR

Requirement

The Air Force also performed an analysis of the advantages and necessity

of the C-17 in theater airlift operations by identifying ways the C-17 could

augment the C-130 in conducting specific unit relocations in the theater.

This analysis was conducted outside of the SUMMITS and TACWAR models

because the TACWAR battle plan does not relocate specific units once they

have arrived at their target destinations. An ILA working group determined

the units that should be relocated to specific airfields based on how the

move could improve the theater commander’s tactical advantage. On the

basis of these discussions, the Air Force modeled 11 different unit moves,

including Patriot batteries, Multiple Launch Rocket System battalions, and

the 101st Air Assault Division.

The Air Force analysis showed that, if a squadron of C-17s were dedicated

to the theater, the selected units could be delivered to their destinations

more rapidly than they could by the C-130. However, because the time

frames in the analysis were not directly related to a specified requirement

in the TACWAR battle plan, the benefit of the units’ earlier availability was

not measured. For example, even if the analysis showed that a Patriot

battery could reach its destination 3 days earlier on the C-17 than it would

by other means, the analysis did not assess the effect of this unit’s move

on the rest of the battle. In addition, the analysis did not assess the ripple

effect of earlier delivery of the selected units on other units because the

analysis was intended only to examine how the C-17 could speed the

arrival of the 11 selected units.

Further, the C-17 unit relocation analysis assumed that the aircraft could

land on 18 planned fields. However, according to the May 1997 Air

Mobility Command Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report,5

 only 9 of

5

This report is updated quarterly and includes factors such as airfield dimensions, obstructions, lights,

and other potential limitations to airlifter use.

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the 18 airfields have been surveyed for airlift operation suitability, and

only 7 have been determined to be suitable for use by the C-17. The

remaining two airfields have not been assessed for C-17 operations.

Conclusions The ILA does not adequately fulfill congressional direction to develop

intratheater lift requirements and establish an integrated plan to meet

them because the study’s recommendations are not supported by the

analysis. The ILA’s tactical wheeled vehicle recommendations, even though

they support the Army’s acquisition objectives, are not consistent with the

requirements identified in the ILA. In addition, some ILA assumptions are

either not consistent with Army doctrine or are invalid for other reasons.

These discrepancies call into question the basis for the study’s

recommendations. Due to the inconsistencies between the ILA

requirements and the Army’s acquisition objectives, for example, excess

HETS and fuel tanker tractor assets may not actually exist. In addition, the

ILA’s recommendation to use another squadron of C-17s, beyond the

planned procurement of 120 aircraft, for intratheater lift is not based on

sound analysis. The ILA did not establish a relationship between the use of

the C-17 in a dedicated intratheater role and the rest of the battle, so the

effect of the faster C-17 deliveries was not measured. Furthermore, even

though the Air Force’s analysis assumed that the C-17 would be able to use

all of the airfields identified by the ILA working group, there is no

guarantee that they would be accessible to the C-17. The updated ILA,

planned as part of the 1999 Mobility Requirements Study, will provide a

good opportunity for DOD to reconsider the basis for intratheater lift

requirements and ensure that they are linked appropriately to the study’s

analysis.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the 1999 ILA

update (1) link the study’s recommendations to its analysis and (2) include

assumptions that consider current Army doctrine when acquisition plans

are based on the doctrine.

Agency Comments DOD concurred with our recommendations. DOD noted that, although study

assumptions are generally based on military service doctrine, DOD must be

free to analyze changes to that doctrine in the interest of enhancing joint

capability. However, DOD did not agree with our finding that the ILA’s

recommendations are not supported by the study’s analysis. DOD stated

that the study used computationally derived data, along with additional

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analysis and military judgment, to develop its recommendations. DOD cites

service acquisition programs, input from theater commanders, and

substitution of one type of intratheater asset for another as examples of

the additional analysis considered in developing the requirements and

recommendations in the ILA. DOD points to the study’s recommendation to

use excess HETS in place of 34-ton line haulers as being based on service

acquisition programs and theater commander input.

The ILA does not link its requirements to its recommendations. Rather, its

recommendations merely support the Army’s acquisition plans with no

explanation of the disconnect between those plans and the study’s

requirements. In discussing our draft report, agency officials

acknowledged that the Joint Staff had difficulty linking the Army’s fiscal

year 2003 acquisition program to the ILA requirements and that, for this

reason, the study’s reliance on the acquisition program is not clearly

explained. Furthermore, Joint Staff officials told us during our review that

the decisions reached by ILA working groups concerning tradeoff

assessments and the airlift tactical unit moves analysis were not

documented. Without an explicit link in the ILA between the study’s

requirements and recommendations, and without a means of reviewing the

factors or additional analyses that led to the final recommendations in the

study, we have no basis on which to concur that a link exists. Moreover,

we question the reliability and independence of a DOD requirements study

that bases its requirements and recommendations on service acquisition

programs without examining the disconnects between those programs and

the study’s own findings.

Concerning DOD’s example, the number of HETS identified as a requirement

in the ILA is less than the number reflected in the study’s recommendation.

According to theater commanders’ input to the study and our discussions

with Army officials, the HETS is not an effective or economical substitute

for 34-ton line haulers. We agree with DOD’s statement that service

acquisition programs were used to support the study’s recommendations

for HETS. It is this fact that leads us to conclude that the recommendations

in the ILA were not based on the requirements identified by the study’s

analysis, but rather were based on service acquisition programs that had

already been established.

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ILA Did Not Include the Potential

Contribution of Some Lift Assets

The ILA did not incorporate the potential contribution of several lift assets

that could assist in meeting intratheater lift requirements. Specifically, the

ILA did not include (1) the potential contribution of host nation-provided

tactical wheeled vehicles, (2) the ability of the C-5s currently in the

inventory and the planned fleet of 120 C-17s to meet outsize intratheater

airlift requirements as needed, and (3) the potential for Army watercraft to

supplant tactical wheeled vehicle requirements. As a result, the study’s

requirements and solutions may be overstated.

Host Nation Support

Can Significantly

Contribute to

Intratheater Lift

Host nation support (HNS) is the civil or military assistance provided by a

nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis, or war

based on agreements mutually concluded between the nations. In

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, HNS included commercial

cargo line haulers, fuel tankers, personnel transporters, and HETS. Of the

1,404 HETS used in the Persian Gulf conflict, 333 were provided by Saudi

Arabia. DOD reported that support from host and other nations during the

conflict was critical and that it gave the United States the flexibility to

deploy substantial amounts of combat power early in the

contingency—when the risks were the greatest—while reducing the

amount of tactical wheeled vehicles that needed to be deployed from the

United States.

The 1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update, based

on the same TACWAR battle as the ILA, assumed that HNS in Southwest Asia

and Korea would include commercial cargo line haulers, fuel tankers, and

HETS. However, the potential HNS tactical wheeled vehicle contribution to

intratheater lift was not modeled in the ILA. Thus, ILA assumptions are

inconsistent with the assumptions made in the updated 1995 Mobility

Requirements Study. According to the ILA, HNS was not modeled because of

a lack of signed agreements with some of the host nations. In addition,

theater commanders wanted the ILA to model a worst case scenario

without any HNS offsetting U.S. force structure. The ILA, however, notes

repeatedly that HNS has the potential to reduce some of the reported lift

shortfalls in several categories of tactical wheeled vehicles. HNS would also

limit the amount of equipment required to be moved into the theater.

Because it did not reflect HNS, the ILA depicted the worst case scenario as

the only scenario for intratheater lift.

The theater commanders’ operation plans portray HNS as very important, if

not critical, to the successful outcome of wars in Southwest Asia and

Korea. Even the lack of formal HNS agreements in Southwest Asia does not

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limit the operation plans’ expectations of substantial HNS. The Southwest

Asia operation plans assume that HNS will be available in either the

amounts received during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm or in

amounts negotiated and approved bilaterally between the host nations and

the United States. The plans note that outsourcing logistical requirements

within the theater of operations may completely preclude the need to

deploy some logistical assets or units from the United States. The

operation plans for a war in Korea state that U.S. Pacific Command forces

can expect to receive significant wartime HNS from the Republic of Korea.

The United States negotiated a wartime HNS agreement with the Republic

of Korea in 1991. Cargo transportation was one of the components of this

agreement, which also included medical, bulk fuel transport, maintenance,

engineering, and ammunition support.

The key factors in making HNS successful are availability of the right

numbers of assets when and where they would be needed and the

commitment of host nation drivers and other equipment operators to

perform their assigned missions. Members of the defense community,

including the military services, theater commanders, the Joint Staff, and

the Office of the Secretary of Defense, are debating the extent to which

HNS should offset U.S. force requirements. This debate is not likely to be

resolved in the near future.

Intertheater Airlifters

Can Help Meet

Outsize Intratheater

Requirements

The current intertheater airlift fleet includes the C-5 and C-17, which are

capable of carrying outsize cargo. The C-5 Galaxy is the Air Mobility

Command’s largest intertheater airlifter, with the capacity to carry 89 tons

of cargo and 36 pallets, and the smaller C-17 is capable of carrying 65 tons

of cargo and 18 pallets. Although the C-5 and C-17 are intertheater lift

assets, they can also be used for intratheater lift if warranted, assuming

that airfields can accommodate them. However, the ILA did not model the

potential contribution of the C-5 and considered the planned 120 C-17s as

an offset to the C-130 fleet only in Southwest Asia. Use of the existing

airlift fleet for intratheater missions as needed could increase flexibility

and decrease the need to procure additional outsize airlift capability.

Although the C-5 and C-17 are primarily intertheater airlifters, the ability to

divert them for intratheater missions is recognized in Air Force

operational documents.

The Air Force has highlighted the C-17’s ability to deliver outsize cargo to

small, austere airfields as a key factor in its dual role as an intertheater

and intratheater airlifter. Small, austere airfields usually have a short

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runway and are limited in one or a combination of the following factors:

taxiway systems, ramp space, security, materiel handling equipment,

aircraft servicing, navigation aids, weather observing sensors, and

communications. If delivering outsize cargo to small, austere airfields is

necessary, the C-17 would likely be needed. However, if the airfields could

accommodate the C-5, it could accomplish the mission. For example, the

C-5 can quickly facilitate unit relocations. A Patriot battalion requires only

9 C-5 sorties compared with 15 sorties for the C-17.

Of the 67 airfields in the ILA, 46 have been surveyed by the Air Mobility

Command and are listed in its Airfield Suitability and Restrictions Report.

Analysis of the 46 airfields common to the ILA and the Airfield Suitability

and Restrictions Report showed that 34 airfields, or 74 percent, are

suitable for all types of airlifters, including the C-5. In Korea, the C-5 can

use 70 percent of the airfields, and in Southwest Asia, the C-5 can use

77 percent of the airfields. Further, the number of airfields available to the

C-5 would likely be higher during a contingency, since other airfields that

have not been surveyed would be available at that time.

Potential Contribution

of Army Watercraft

Was Not Determined

Due to their cargo capacity and demonstrated multiple mission capability,

Army watercraft could be used for intratheater transportation and could

reduce the need for reliance on rail, tactical wheeled vehicles, and HNS.

However, the ILA did not identify a requirement for Army watercraft and

deferred a recommendation on these assets pending a planned study by

the Logistics Management Institute. That study, issued in November 1996

(4 months after the ILA), found uncertainty among planners at the theater

commands about the capability and availability of watercraft for

intratheater operations. The Army has developed a long-range fleet

management plan that includes an acquisition strategy to procure more

watercraft, but the role and capability of watercraft to help meet

intratheater requirements have not been addressed at the joint level.

At the end of fiscal year 1997, the Army had 245 watercraft in its fleet,

according to an Army official. Some of these watercraft, such as the

Logistics Support Vessel and the Landing Craft, Utility-2000 (LCU-2000),

provide intratheater movement of equipment, cargo, and combat vehicles

and transport cargo from ship to shore. The Logistics Support Vessel can

self-deploy anywhere in the world to provide intratheater transport of

large quantities of cargo, tracked and wheeled vehicles, and equipment.

These vessels provided intratheater transport during Operations Desert

Shield and Desert Storm. The LCU-2000 can perform tactical resupply

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missions to remote or underdeveloped coastlines and inland waterways.

During Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, this vessel transported

about 38,548 tons of equipment and supplies to fishing villages that had

small piers or ramps.

Army watercraft employment is phased to meet the theater commanders’

requirements to offload combat and support forces during major regional

contingencies. During the first 3 weeks of a conflict, Army watercraft

operations would focus on port operations and offloading combat and

support equipment from prepositioned ships and large strategic sealift

ships. After the first 3 weeks, watercraft would continue port operations

and begin to transition to sustainment operations, which include

establishing intracoastal main supply routes and transporting equipment

and cargo to forward areas in the theater. During Operations Desert Shield

and Desert Storm, for example, watercraft delivered main battle tanks,

ammunition, and other cargo to several locations on the Persian Gulf

coast. Thus, although the port operations are the key mission for Army

watercraft during the first part of a contingency, watercraft can contribute

significantly to intratheater lift missions during later phases.

In several cases, the ILA demonstrated how Army watercraft could be used

to offset reliance on rail, tactical wheeled vehicles, and HNS by

repositioning forces in the theater of operations and moving tanks

prepositioned on land to tactical assembly areas. However, the ILA did not

recommend that these potential offsets be implemented, and the

contribution of watercraft to intratheater lift was not reflected in the ILA’s

recommendations for tactical wheeled vehicles as part of a tradeoff

analysis.

The Logistics Management Institute study evaluated the role of watercraft

for logistics-over-the-shore and intracoastal main supply route operations

in the Korea and Southwest Asia scenarios. The study did not establish an

intracoastal transportation requirement, however, because of a lack of

data from theater commanders regarding the types and amounts of cargo

and equipment that could be transported on watercraft. The study

recommended that the Joint Staff provide theater command planners the

analytical tools to match intratheater lift requirements with intracoastal

transportation capability.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Chapter 3 

ILA Did Not Include the Potential

Contribution of Some Lift Assets

Conclusions Because several potentially significant contributions to intratheater lift

were not thoroughly considered in the study, the requirements in the ILA

may be overstated. Given the experience of Operations Desert Shield and

Desert Storm, the inclusion of HNS in the theater commanders’ operation

plans, and the fact that the 1995 Mobility Requirements Study update

assumed HNS would be available, it is unreasonable to exclude HNS from

the analysis. A more flexible mobility study that reflected requirements

with and without HNS would better assist decisionmakers in determining

the effects of HNS on U.S. mobility requirements. U.S. Central Command

officials agree, acknowledging that requirements stated with and without

HNS would have added flexibility to the ILA. In addition, the C-5s and the

planned fleet of C-17s could be considered as needed if an outsize

intratheater airlift requirement is identified. Use of these airlifters would

ensure that the potential contributions of DOD’s current assets are fully

taken into account. Finally, Army watercraft has the potential to reduce

reliance on tactical wheeled vehicles and HNS, but a requirement for these

assets that reflects their intratheater role has yet to be defined. The

potential contributions of tactical wheeled vehicle HNS, the current

outsize-capable airlift fleet, and Army watercraft to meeting intratheater

lift requirements warrant incorporation into the 1999 ILA update.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the 1999 updated

ILA (1) consider HNS as a means of accomplishing intratheater lift and

ensure that HNS assumptions are consistent with those in intertheater lift

studies; (2) include the potential contribution of the C-5 airlifter and

planned fleet of 120 C-17s; and (3) reflect the role, capability, and

requirements for Army watercraft in an intratheater role, including an

analysis of the extent to which these assets can alleviate identified

shortfalls in tactical wheeled vehicles.

Agency Comments DOD concurred with our recommendations and added that, as the potential

intratheater role of the C-17 and C-5 are investigated, an analysis should be

done to assess the impact on the warfight of taking these assets out of the

intertheater airlift flow. We agree that such an analysis would be an

important part of future studies that consider the use of these airlifters in

an intratheater role.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Chapter 4 

Opportunities Exist to Improve Study’s

Value as a Decision-Making Tool

Intratheater lift requirements depend on the course of the battle and

theater infrastructure and thus are difficult to quantify. However, because

the ILA requirements and solutions were stated as absolute numbers rather

than ranges, the study does not reflect the dynamic and often

unpredictable nature of intratheater lift requirements. In addition, the ILA

did not include a cost-effectiveness analysis to assess tradeoffs between

various lift alternatives. Such an assessment would provide

decisionmakers with information needed to make investment decisions in

a sensitive budget environment.

Lift Requirements

Were Not Stated as

Ranges

The 1995 updated Mobility Requirements Study determined lift

requirements through an iterative modeling process that examined various

war-fighting and mobility schemes. However, the ILA did not use an

iterative modeling process to determine requirements, which precluded

the ILA from stating lift asset requirements and solutions as ranges. Rather,

the ILA stated the requirements and solutions as absolute numbers. Given

the dependence of intratheater lift requirements on the course of the battle

and the theater infrastructure, requirements stated as ranges would

provide a more accurate depiction of the dynamic intratheater situation. It

would also allow decisionmakers the flexibility to determine the type and

quantity of lift assets needed to meet requirements while accounting for

such factors as potential enemy actions to disrupt airfields and seaports,

chemical or biological warfare, weather, HNS, and various threat scenarios.

DOD’s 1988 Worldwide Intratheater Mobility Study noted that intratheater

mobility requirement statements are extremely dependent on the theater

concept of operations. The study recommended that all intratheater

mobility requirements be expressed as ranges when possible and that

those requirements not expressed as ranges be understood as

approximations. The 1996 Report of the Defense Science Board Task

Force on Strategic Mobility noted that the deployment phase most subject

to disruption by the adversary is the intratheater movement of troops and

equipment to their final destinations.

DOD officials said that the ILA could not express requirements as ranges

because SUMMITS would have had to be rerun with a different input

requirement. The officials told us that only one concept of operations was

available—the TACWAR battle established for the 1995 updated Mobility

Requirements Study. They stated that expressing the ILA requirements as

ranges could have required amending the TACWAR battle timelines after the

1995 study had been completed and that this option was not seriously

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Chapter 4 

Opportunities Exist to Improve Study’s

Value as a Decision-Making Tool

considered. The officials said, however, that SUMMITS and TACWAR are

capable of interacting and that iterations can be modeled.

Cost-Effectiveness

Analysis Is Needed to

Assess Tradeoffs

Between Lift Assets

The 1995 updated Mobility Requirements Study, which is the basis for

DOD’s procurement strategy for intertheater lift assets, included a

cost-effectiveness analysis that assessed tradeoffs between various

intertheater lift assets. The study developed a set of options consisting of

possible additions to current airlift, sealift, and afloat prepositioning

programs. Life-cycle cost estimates were developed for each option, and

cost was a factor in the analysis leading to the final recommendations.

However, a cost-effectiveness analysis that examined tradeoffs between

the assets was not done to support the ILA recommendations. According to

Joint Staff officials, limited tradeoff assessments were discussed as part of

the ILA, but these assessments did not include cost and were not

documented.

The ILA states that the study’s workloads for the 34- and 22.5-ton line

haulers can be met by other means, such as excess HETS or PLS. However,

tradeoff assessments were not made to determine whether these

alternatives would be cost-effective uses of the HETS or PLS. The ILA

identified a requirement for fewer HETS and PLS than the Army’s acquisition

objectives for fiscal year 2003, but the study did not recommend that the

Army procure fewer of these expensive assets. As of January 1996, each

HETS cost $414,000 compared with $118,000 for the 34-ton line hauler,

according to the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Requirements Management

Office’s Catalog of U.S. Army Tactical Wheeled Vehicles. Army officials

noted that the HETS would provide excess capacity in a line-haul role. In

addition, even though a PLS company can carry 17 percent more cargo, it

costs almost twice as much as the 22.5-ton line hauler. A PLS company

costs $18.8 million (1996 dollars) compared with $9.5 million (1996

dollars) for a company of 22.5-ton line haulers, according to an analysis

performed by the Requirements Management Office. DOD officials noted,

however, that the PLS can self-load and unload containers, thereby

requiring fewer personnel than the 22.5-ton line hauler.

In addition, a cost-effectiveness analysis was not conducted on the ILA’s

proposed use of a squadron of 14 C-17s, beyond the planned procurement

of 120 aircraft, for intratheater lift. Since the C-130 fleet is more than

sufficient to meet requirements, according to the ILA, and outsize airlift

capability exists with the planned procurement of C-17s and the current

fleet of C-5s, it is important for a recommendation to procure additional

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Chapter 4 

Opportunities Exist to Improve Study’s

Value as a Decision-Making Tool

C-17s beyond the currently planned 120 aircraft to be based on an analysis

that includes cost-effectiveness as a criterion. In addition, a tradeoff

assessment has not been conducted to consider the extent to which C-130s

could be retired if additional C-17s were procured for intratheater lift.1

Conclusions The value of DOD’s future lift studies as decision-making tools can be

strengthened if they state intratheater requirements and solutions as

ranges rather than as absolute numbers to reflect the uncertainty

associated with predicting lift requirements within the theater of

operations. An iterative process resulting in requirements ranges may have

shown, for example, that allied forces would not lose key objectives or

incur additional casualties under a range of intratheater delivery schemes

that required fewer lift assets to accomplish. Since the planned 1999

Mobility Requirements Study and ILA update are expected to be conducted

simultaneously, concerns about changing the TACWAR battle by establishing

a requirements range should be alleviated. Furthermore, if future mobility

studies are to be the basis for the services’ acquisition plans, it would be

prudent to determine the appropriate type and number of mobility assets

to procure based on a tradeoff analysis of the capability and

cost-effectiveness of different options. Tradeoff assessments of the lift

alternatives considered in the study would provide decisionmakers the

flexibility to take into account competing investment options within a

constrained budget. The 1999 updated ILA will provide an opportunity to

address these concerns so that decisionmakers can have a more

substantive basis on which to determine DOD acquisition strategies.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct that the 1999 updated

ILA

• determine intratheater requirements and solutions as ranges to reflect

their dependence on the combat situation and

• include a cost-effectiveness assessment of the alternatives considered in

the study that examines tradeoffs among the lift assets to reflect

capability, cost, and requirements.

1

RAND’s 1997 Documented Briefing noted that outsize cargo items that require a C-17 for air transport

could be delivered over roads if their delivery dates allowed. RAND noted that the lack of a tradeoff

assessment that considered alternative modes of transportation was a limitation of its analysis.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Chapter 4 

Opportunities Exist to Improve Study’s

Value as a Decision-Making Tool

Agency Comments DOD concurred with our recommendation concerning requirements ranges.

DOD stated that cost-effectiveness analysis would be accomplished if

appropriate and that DOD has in place an acquisition process that considers

cost-effectiveness when making programmatic decisions. DOD officials

explained that detailed cost-effectiveness analyses would significantly

expand the time frame and cost of mobility studies. Our recommendation

is directed at system tradeoff analyses that would provide decisionmakers

information on the relative costs and capabilities of systems in light of

identified requirements. The ILA made programmatic recommendations

that included, to an extent, tradeoffs among lift assets. We believe that

cost-effectiveness should be a part of a requirements study that makes

acquisition recommendations.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Appendix I 

Intratheater Lift Assets

Airlifters, tactical wheeled vehicles, and watercraft are all used for

intratheater lift. The following sections provide information these assets.

Airlifters The C-130 Hercules is the Air Force’s primary intratheater airlifter. It can

carry 6 pallets and 17 tons of cargo and accommodate 90 passengers. The

C-17 Globemaster, being produced by the Boeing Corporation, can carry

18 pallets and 65 tons of cargo and accommodate 102 passengers. The C-5

Galaxy can be loaded with 36 pallets and can carry 89 tons of cargo and 73

passengers. Figures I.1 through I.3 show the C-130, C-17, and C-5 airlifters,

respectively.

Figure I.1: C-130 Hercules

Source: Lockheed Martin Corporation.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Appendix I 

Intratheater Lift Assets

Figure I.2: C-17 Globemaster

Source: Boeing Corporation (formerly McDonnell Douglas Corporation).

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Appendix I 

Intratheater Lift Assets

Figure I.3: C-5 Galaxy

Source: Air Force.

Tactical Wheeled

Vehicles

The primary mission of the Heavy Equipment Transporter System is to

(1) deliver main battle tanks to forward assembly areas fully fueled,

armed, and ready for combat and (2) evacuate tanks from the battlefield.

The tank’s crew rides in the cab of the system. The Palletized Load System

consists of a truck, trailer, and removable cargo beds. It is used by

artillery, ordnance, and transportation units to move ammunition to and

from transfer points. The 7,500-gallon fuel tanker and the 34-ton line

hauler use the same tractor and transport fuel and cargo, respectively,

from ports to corps supply points, which are located farthest from the

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Appendix I 

Intratheater Lift Assets

battle front. The 5,000-gallon fuel tanker and the 22.5-ton line hauler also

use the same tractor and operate primarily in the division and brigade

areas, which are closer to the battle front where roads are generally less

developed. Table I.1 shows the number of tactical wheeled vehicles per

company.

Table I.1: Number of Tactical Wheeled

Vehicles Per Company System Number per Company

Heavy Equipment Transporter System 96 trucks and 96 trailers

Palletized Load System 48 trucks and 48 trailers

22.5-ton line hauler 60 tractors and 120 trailers

34-ton line hauler 60 tractors and 120 trailers

5,000-gallon fuel tanker 60 tractors and 60 5,000-gallon tankers

7,500-gallon fuel tanker 60 tractors and 60 7,500-gallon tankers

Figures I.4 through I.6 show the Heavy Equipment Transporter System, the

Palletized Load System, and the 34-ton line hauler, respectively.

Figure I.4: Heavy Equipment

Transporter System

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Appendix I 

Intratheater Lift Assets

Figure I.5: Palletized Load System

Source: Army.

Figure I.6: 34-Ton Line Hauler

Source: Army.

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Appendix I 

Intratheater Lift Assets

Army Watercraft The Logistics Support Vessel has the capacity to carry 2,000 tons and

accommodate 24 M1 main battle tanks or 25 20-foot containers (50 if they

are double-stacked). Each Landing Craft, Utility-2000 has the capacity to

carry 350 tons and accommodate 5 M1 main battle tanks or 12 20-foot

containers (24 if double-stacked). Figures I.7 through I.9 show the

Logistics Support Vessel and the Landing Craft, Utility-2000.

Figure I.7: Logistics Support Vessel

Source: Army.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Appendix I 

Intratheater Lift Assets

Figure I.8: Logistics Support Vessel Unloading Trucks

Source: Army.

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Appendix I 

Intratheater Lift Assets

Figure I.9: Landing Craft, Utility-2000

Source: Army.

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 7 and 25.

Now on pp. 7 and 31.

Now on pp. 7 and 34.

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Thomas J. Denomme

Michele Mackin

Jose A. Ramos

Kansas City Field

Office

Gregory J. Symons

(707262) Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-98-53 DOD’s Mobility Requirements
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