alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions 
  under delegated authority
  Applications and reports:Boston
 |
New York
 |
Philadelphia
 |
Cleveland
 |
Richmond
 |
Atlanta
Chicago
 |
St. Louis
 |
Minneapolis
 |
Kansas City
 |
Dallas
 |
San Francisco

# District: 4
Federal Reserve Bank of: Cleveland

## Filings received during the week ending July 18, 2009

|Filer                        | Filing Type    | Filing Proposal                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | End of Comment Period                                  
|---------------------------- | -------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------
|Columbus First Bancorp, Inc. | 3A1            | Columbus First Bancorp, Inc., Worthington, Ohio to acquire Columbus First Bank, Worthington, Ohio and form a one-bank holding company, pursuant to the notice section 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act and the notice procedures described in section 225.17 of Regulation Y | Newspaper:Not applicableFederal Register:Not applicable
|Newspaper:                   | Not applicable
|Federal Register:            | Not applicable

## Availability of CRA Public Evaluations

|Institution / Location | RSSDID | Exam Date | CRAPublic Date | CRARating | Exam Method
|---------------------- | ------ | --------- | -------------- | --------- | -----------
|NONE                  

## CRA Examinations scheduled for     Quarter of

|Institution | Location
|----------- | --------
|NONE       

* Subject to the provisions of the Community Reinvestment Act

Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions 
  under delegated authority
  Applications and reports:Boston
 |
New York
 |
Philadelphia
 |
Cleveland
 |
Richmond
 |
Atlanta
Chicago
 |
St. Louis
 |
Minneapolis
 |
Kansas City
 |
Dallas
 |
San Francisco

---

Home Banking information and regulation  Accessibility Contact 
  us
#### In re Disqualification of Jackson. Angles *v.*Angles.

[Cite as *In re Disqualification of Jackson*(1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 1232.]

(No. 98-AP-126

Decided November 23, 1998.)

Moyer, C.J.

This affidavit of disqualification filed by defendant Christopher L. Angles seeks the disqualification of Judge S. Farrell Jackson from further proceedings regarding the above-captioned case.

Affiant contends that Judge Jackson should be disqualified because plaintiff Natalie H. Angles’s father has an “overwhelming financial, political, and social presence” in the community who comes in regular contact with important community business and political leaders. Because of his father-in-law’s position in the community and because affiant has claims in the divorce that involve businesses owned by his father-in-law, affiant questions whether Judge Jackson can fairly and impartially preside over this case.

*1233I decline to establish a rule, as is suggested by affiant, that requires the disqualification of a judge based simply on the business, social, or political prominence of a party or potential party to a pending lawsuit. Affiant offers no evidence of a business or social relationship between the judge and affiant’s father-in-law that would mandate the judge’s disqualification and, in fact, states his belief that Judge Jackson is an honorable judge. He simply speculates that the judge will be unable to set aside, the status of the plaintiffs father in considering issues in this case.

Affiant does allege that the plaintiffs father and attorneys involved in the underlying ease were contributors to Judge Jackson’s 1994 campaign committee, and this allegation is not disputed by Judge Jackson. However, the mere fact that a party or lawyer in a pending case campaigned for or against a judge is not grounds for disqualification. *In re Disqualification of Celebrezze*(1991), 74 Ohio St.3d 1231, 657 N.E.2d 1341; and *In re Disqualification of Cleary*(1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 1246, 674 N.E.2d 357; see, also, *In re Disqualification of Ney*(1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 1271, 657 N.E.2d 1367. In view of the amount of the contributions in question and the fact that they occurred more than four years ago, I cannot conclude that the contributions create a reasonable question regarding Judge Jackson’s impartiality.

For these reasons, the affidavit of disqualification is found not well taken and is denied. The case shall proceed before Judge Jackson.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-7099
PETE SMITH, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus GREENSBORO CHIEF OF POLICE, DAUGHTRY; S. LANGHOLE, Officer, Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Sr., District Judge. (CA-96-459-2) Submitted: September 20, 1996 Decided: Occtober 2, 1996 Before NIEMEYER, HAMILTON, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Pete Smith, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals from the district court's order adopting themagistrate judge's order and dismissing without prejudice Appellant's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint. The district court's dismissal without prejudice is not appealable at this time, given the fact that Appellant could save his complaint through amendment. Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers' Local Union 392 , 10 F.3d 1064 (4th Cir. 1993). This court may exercise jurisdic tion only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The order here appealed is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory order. We dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Hall *v.*Smith *& a.*

The widow of a testator, who leaves surviving him any child, or the issue of any child by her, having waived the provisions of the will in her favor, and released her right of dower and homestead, is entitled, after the payment of debts and expenses of administration, to receive one third of all the personal estate, and one third, in fee, of all the real estate, unlimited by other provisions of the will.

After the widow has received her part of the estate, the rest is to be so apportioned and administered as to carry out the provisions of the will, so far as possible.

Bill in Equity, by an executor, to obtain the direction of the court. The testator made certain provisions for his widow, and devised certain real and personal estate in trust for his children. The widow, having waived the provisions of the will in her favor, and released her right of dower and homestead, clainik one third of all the personal estate, and one third, in fee, of all the real estate, and desires to have assigned to her, as a part thereof, the real estate devised in trust for the children.

Sail, for the plaintiff.

*Sackett*and Smith, for the defendants.

Bingham, J.

If the widow of a testator, who leaves surviving him any child, or the issue of any child by her, waives the provisions of the will in her favor, she is entitled, after the payment of debts and expenses of administration, to receive one third of all his personal property, in addition to dower and homestead, the same as if there were no will. If she also releases her right of dower and homestead, she is entitled to receive instead thereof, in fee, one third of all his real estate. Gen. Laws, *c.*202, *ss.*7, 9. The statute, in effect, declares that a will is void as to the widow if she waives the benefit of its provisions, and she shall have the same rights in her husband’s estate that she would have had if he had died intestate. In this case the widow is entitled to one third of *316all the personal estate, and, having released her right of dower and homestead, one third, in fee, of all the real estate, unlimited by the other provisions of the will. In setting off her real estate, some discretion may be exercised so as not to break up unnecessarily the devises to the children. After her part of the estate is set off and paid over, the rest is to be so divided, distributed, and administered as to carry out the provisions of the will so far as possible, preserving to all the devisees their relative rights.

*Case discharged.*

Clark, J., did not sit: the others concurred.
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

The undersigned, Sterling H.McDonald, Vice-President and Chief Financial Officer of Evolution PetroleumCorporation (the “Company”), certifies in connection with the filing with theSecurities and Exchange Commission of the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-Kfor the year ended June 30, 2010 (the “Report”) pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, tohis knowledge, that:

 

1. The Report fully complieswith the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2. The information containedin the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of the Company.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, theundersigned has executed this certification as of the 27th day of September, 2010.

 
|   | /s/  STERLING H. MCDONALD                   |
|--------|---------------------------------------------|
|   | Sterling  H. McDonald                       |
|   | Vice-President  and Chief Financial Officer |

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by Section 906 has been provided to EvolutionPetroleum Corporation and will be retained by Evolution Petroleum Corporationand furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff uponrequest.  The foregoing certificate isbeing furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission as an exhibit to thisForm 10-K and shall not be considered filed as part of the Form 10-K.

 

----
#### § 50.20-33 [Reserved]
Exhibit
23.1














Consent of Independent
Registered Public Accounting Firm







Dynex
Capital, Inc.


Glen
Allen, Virginia




We hereby
consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form
S-3 Nos. 333-22859, 333-10783, 333-10587, 333-35769 and 333-149475 and
Form S-8 No. 333-32663 of Dynex Capital, Inc. of our reports dated March 13,
2009, relating to the consolidated financial statements, and the effectiveness
of Dynex Capital Inc.’s internal control over financial reporting, which appear
in this Annual Report on Form 10-K.

















BDO
Seidman, LLP





Richmond,
Virginia


March 13,
2009
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>      5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
THE COMPANY'S FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31,
1996, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>   1,000

<S>                              <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                          12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                 DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                      DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                 22,023
<SECURITIES>                                0
<RECEIVABLES>                           5,667
<ALLOWANCES>                                0
<INVENTORY>                               110
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                       29,893
<PP&E>                                 94,484
<DEPRECIATION>                        (39,684)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                         84,957
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                  10,715
<BONDS>                                     0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                       0
<PREFERRED>                                 0
<COMMON>                                  108
<OTHER-SE>                             68,775
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>           84,957
<SALES>                                18,182
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                       41,663
<CGS>                                   6,605
<TOTAL-COSTS>                          20,333
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                            0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                      2,254
<INCOME-PRETAX>                        21,330
<INCOME-TAX>                            5,760
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                    15,570
<DISCONTINUED>                              0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                             0
<CHANGES>                                   0
<NET-INCOME>                           15,570
<EPS-PRIMARY>                            1.45<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                            1.45<F1>
<FN>
<F1>  Per share
</FN>


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT
10.2





EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT











































SECTION I.
EMPLOYMENT OF EMPLOYEE




Executive Vice
President Executive Vice
President




SECTION II.
EMPLOYEE’S PERFORMANCE









SECTION III.
COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEE






























































































SECTION IV.
INDEMNIFICATION OF EMPLOYEE









SECTION V.
COMPANY POLICIES









SECTION VI.
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT





















SECTION VII.
TERM AND TERMINATION





























SECTION VIII.
COMPLETE AGREEMENT









SECTION IX.
WAIVER; MODIFICATION









SECTION X.
SEVERABILITY









SECTION XI.
NOTICES









SECTION XII.
REPRESENTATIONS OF EMPLOYER









SECTION XIII.
REPRESENTATIONS OF EMPLOYEE









SECTION XIV.
COUNTERPARTS









SECTION XV.
BENEFIT









SECTION XVI.
ARBITRATION














SECTION XVII.
LEGAL REPRESENTATION









SECTION XVIII.
GOVERNING LAW





























































Exhibit
IV




Form of
Indemnity Agreement




INDEMNITY
AGREEMENT





























































































































































































































































































Exhibit
VI(A)




Form of
Confidentiality Agreement





































































































AGREED AND
ACCEPTED as




of the date
first written above:
**
***The Terrorism Threat and U.S. Government Response: Operational and Organizational Factors***
**
#### § 1150.8 Additional support.

Any additional facts or reasons to show that the public convenience and necessity require or permit approval of this application. The Board may require additional information to be filed where appropriate.
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions 
  under delegated authority
  Applications and reports:
Boston
 |
New York
 |
Philadelphia
 |
Cleveland
 |
Richmond
 |
Atlanta
Chicago
 |
St. Louis
 |
Minneapolis
 |
Kansas City
 |
Dallas
 |
San Francisco

# District: 1
Federal Reserve Bank of: Boston

## Filings received during the week ending August 28, 2010

|Filer | Filing Type | Filing Proposal | End of Comment Period
|----- | ----------- | --------------- | ---------------------
|NONE 

## Availability of CRA Public Evaluations

|Institution / Location                                 | RSSDID | Exam Date  | CRAPublic Date | CRARating | Exam Method
|------------------------------------------------------ | ------ | ---------- | -------------- | --------- | -----------
|BANK OF EASTON, NORTH EASTON, MASSACHUSETTS            | 956376 | 10/02/2006 | 01/20/2007     | S         | Small Bank 
|BANK OF FALL RIVER CO-OP BK, FALL RIVER, MASSACHUSETTS | 121576 | 04/27/2009 | 09/13/2009     | S         | Small Bank 

## CRA Examinations scheduled for     Quarter of

|Institution | Location
|----------- | --------
|NONE       

* Subject to the provisions of the Community Reinvestment Act

Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)Actions by the Board | Actions 
  under delegated authority
  Applications and reports:
Boston
 |
New York
 |
Philadelphia
 |
Cleveland
 |
Richmond
 |
Atlanta
Chicago
 |
St. Louis
 |
Minneapolis
 |
Kansas City
 |
Dallas
 |
San Francisco

---

Home Banking information and regulation  Accessibility Contact 
  us
#### § 370.2 General policy.

( a ) Time-barred claims shall be rejected, except as follows: ( 1 ) A time-barred claim which could be asserted in court by way of set-off against a claim in favor of the United States arising out of the same contract may be considered in an overall settlement where settlement will result in a net payment to the United States, provided claimant releases the United States from all claims arising from or in any way connected with said contract.
( 2 ) Time-barred claims in favor of friendly foreign governments shall not be rejected solely because they are time-barred. However, should any such government adopt the practice of asserting the statute of limitations as a defense against claims of the United States, the time-barred claims of that government shall be rejected.
( 3 ) Time-barred claims arising under Second Seamen's War Risk insurance (or similar earlier types of crew insurance) where the policy was issued or the risks were assumed by the Maritime Administration (or its predecessors), shall not be rejected where the beneficiaries were precluded from receiving the proceeds of the policy by reason of regulations or orders of the U.S. Government ( i ) by reason of the beneficiary being physically or mentally unable to present the claim,
( ii ) by the beneficiaries being unaware of their entitlement to the proceeds in question, or
( iii ) where the claim is not “stale” under general principles of equity.

( b ) For the purpose of a claim by a General Agent under General Agency Agreements set forth in 32A CFR AGE-1 for reimbursement by the Maritime Administration on account of a timely payment made to a third party within a period of limitations running from the date the claim of the third party accrued, the period of limitations applicable to the General Agent shall run from the date of such payment. In all other cases involving claims arising under General Agency Agreements, including third-party claims, the policy provided in paragraph (a) of this section shall apply.

( c ) Consideration of any claim governed by applicable regulations in this chapter II, including without limitation parts 272, 292, and 205 of this chapter, shall be controlled by the time limitations expressly provided for with respect to the submission of such claims.

(Sec. 204, 49 Stat. 1987, as amended; 46 U.S.C. 1114)

[G.O. 102, 34 FR 6928, Apr. 25, 1969]
1

The Honorable Gary A. Fenner, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 00-3911

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Randy L. Woods, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: October 5, 2001

 Filed: October 10, 2001

___________

Before HANSEN, FAGG, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Randy L. Woods pleaded guilty to conspiring to manufacture

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Overruling his drug-quantity

objection, the district court1

 sentenced Woods to 92 months imprisonment and 4 years

supervised release. Woods renews his drug-quantity argument on appeal.

We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in determining Woods’s

drug quantity. See United States v. Milton, 153 F.3d 891, 898 (8th Cir. 1998)
-2-

(standard of review), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1165 (1999). The court properly relied

on expert evidence, see United States v. Hunt, 171 F.3d 1192, 1196 (8th Cir. 1999),

and properly estimated the capacity of Woods’s laboratory based on an amount of

precursor chemicals, see United States v. Anderson, 236 F.3d 427, 429 n.5 (8th Cir.

2001) (per curiam). The court was entitled to believe the defense expert’s testimony

that Woods’s laboratory could have theoretically produced the drug quantity urged

by the government, while disbelieving the expert’s testimony about the unlikelihood

that a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory would have been able to do so. See

United States v. Moore, 212 F.3d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 2000).

We decline to consider Woods’s argument that the purity of a small quantity

of methamphetamine seized from the laboratory should be used to estimate the

laboratory’s capacity because he presents it for the first time on appeal. See Tarsney

v. O’Keefe, 225 F.3d 929, 939 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1364 (2001).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### Hastings et al., Appellants, v. First National Bank of Longmont, Appellee.

Practice.

Judgment upon the pleadings should not he entered where material issues have heen raised.

*Appeal from the District Court of Boulder County.*

Messrs. Minor & Stockton, for appellants.

Mr. B. L. Carr and Mr. F. P. Secor, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

This appeal was taken from a judgment rendered on the pleadings in a suit between the parties concerning sundry shares of stock in certain ditch companies. The respective claimants asserted title as transferees and holders of the stock, without notation on the hooks of the company, and as attaching creditors levying the writ while the title stood on the books of the company in the name of the assignor. According to the construction of the statute concerning this matter, established by a recent decision of the Supreme Court, the judgment ought not to have been entered without a. disposition by either the court or a jury of some issues of fact raised by the pleadings.

Under these circumstances, the cause must he sent back for a trial of the issues, and a determination of the legal questions presented on this appeal must await that trial.

The cause wilj. he reversed and remanded.

*Reversed.*
Exhibit 23


              Consent of Ernst & Young LLP, Independent Auditors


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-8 No. 33-39446) pertaining to the 1987 Incentive Stock Option and
Appreciation Plan, 1990 Stock Option Plan for Non-Employee Directors and Options
Granted to Certain Officers, Directors, Consultants and Scientific Advisory
Board Members under Written Compensation Agreements; (Form S-8 No. 33-48044)
pertaining to Options Granted to Certain Officers, Directors, Consultants and
Scientific Advisory Board Members under Written Compensation Agreements; (Form
S-8 No. 33-50156 and No. 33-82310) pertaining to the 1992 Stock Option/Stock
Issuance Plan; (Form S-8 No. 333-36879) pertaining to the 1997 Stock Incentive
Plan; (Form S-3 No. 33-55520, No. 33-61935, No. 333-08659, No. 333-62955, No.
333-82683, No. 333-46508 and No. 333-73824) of our report dated January 26,
2002, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Advanced Tissue
Sciences, Inc., and our report dated January 26, 2002, with respect to the
combined financial statements of the Dermagraft Joint Venture included in the
Annual Report (Form 10-K) of Advanced Tissue Sciences, Inc. for the year ended
December 31, 2001.


                                                            ERNST & YOUNG LLP



San Diego, California
March 26, 2002