NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 16-3616

____________

AURORA KIM PARADISIS,

Appellant

v.

ENGLEWOOD HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER

__________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civ. No. 2-13-cv-05936)

District Judge: Honorable Madeline C. Arleo 

__________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

February 17, 2017

Before: RESTREPO, SCIRICA and FISHER, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 24, 2017)

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OPINION*

____________

PER CURIAM

Kim Paradisis appeals from an order of the District Court granting summary 

judgment to her former employer. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

Paradisis began working for Englewood Hospital & Medical Center in 1995 as a 

student nurse intern. Between 1995 and 2001, she worked at the Hospital as a nursing 
2

assistant, a Maternal Child Health (“MCH”) division float nurse, Care Manager of the 

Pediatric Unit, and Patient Care Director of the Mother/Baby Unit. In 2001, she left fulltime employment at the Hospital to pursue other career opportunities, but continued at the 

Hospital as a casual per diem nurse.

On January 18, 2012, Paradisis was terminated from her casual per diem position 

for failing to make herself available to work on a winter holiday, specifically New Year’s 

Day. She filed a grievance with her Union, Health Professionals and Allied Employees 

Local 5004, for unlawful termination. Documentation was provided to the Hospital 

showing that Paradisis had missed work because she had pneumonia and she was 

reinstated to her per diem status. She did not immediately return to work, however. 

Instead, on August 29, 2012, she sent a letter to Filmore Flores, her supervisor, and 

Shaija George, the Patient Care Director of the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (“NICU”), 

stating that, before she could return to work, the Hospital needed to provide her with 

additional training. Specifically, Paradisis requested: (1) registration for the September 

17, 2012 Neonatal Resuscitation Program (“NRP”) course; (2) registration for either the 

October 20 or 27, 2012 Pediatric Advanced Life Support (“PALS”) course; and (3) 

computer training and shadowing of an MCH float member through the neonatal, 

pediatric, and Mother/Baby Unit. 

The Hospital met some but not all of Paradisis’ demands. She received NRP 

training on September 17, 2012, but the Hospital told her that float nurses were not 

required by the Hospital to obtain PALS certification. The Hospital also scheduled 

Paradisis for eight (8) hours of computer training during the first week of November 
3

2012. Due to Superstorm Sandy, however, Paradisis received only four (4) of those 

hours of computer training. 

Paradisis returned to work in January 2013. On January 31, 2013, she worked an 

overnight shift in the Mother/Baby Unit. During and following that shift, three nurses, 

Barbara Kontos, Anne Marie Ayala, and Gillian Rothenberg, brought certain 

administrative and safety issues regarding Paradisis’ performance to the attention of 

Patient Care Director George. The nurses reported that Paradisis had failed to submit an 

OptiVox report on all patients,1failed to provide a Hepatitis B vaccine to a patient prior 

to discharge, and failed to administer the Hospital’s Postpartum Depression Screening to 

a patient prior to discharge. George initiated an investigation into the allegations and 

confirmed that Paradisis had not fulfilled these requirements. George also received 

additional complaints from a patient who reported that Paradisis was uncaring and did not 

visit her room as often as the other nurses. Due to these allegations, George further 

investigated whether Paradisis had complied with the Hospital’s Department of Nursing 

Rounding Standard. George learned that Paradisis failed to sign the rounding sheets for 

her patients on January 31, 2013, as required by Hospital policy. George’s investigation 

revealed further that Paradisis inaccurately reported a baby’s weight and then failed to 

alert medical staff to a potentially dangerous weight loss.

On February 5, 2013, Flores emailed Paradisis to schedule a meeting to discuss the 

issues that had arisen on her January 31st shift. Paradisis replied that she was not 

available on the dates provided by Flores, and that she was confident that the care she had 

 

1 OptiVox is the name of the system that Hospital nurses use for non-urgent, routine shiftto-shift reporting.
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provided to her patients was “stellar.” She also stated that “[i]dle gossip rooted in a gang 

mentality from the Mother/Baby staff is not of interest to me.” On February 12, 2013, 

Paradisis emailed George, Flores, and the Local President of the Union, complaining 

about the training she had received upon her return to the Hospital, and on February 21, 

2013, she filed a grievance through the Union, alleging that the Hospital had failed to 

provide her with adequate education and training.

On March 13, 2013, Paradisis, her union representative, George, and Flores met to 

discuss the performance issues noted when Paradisis had worked the January 31st shift. 

Following the meeting, the Hospital determined that Level 1 discipline, specifically, a 

verbal warning, was justified. In a letter dated March 18, 2013, Paradisis was issued a 

notice of discipline for violating the Hospital’s service excellence standards, 

communication standards, and code of conduct safe clinical practice standards. The 

notice of discipline was issued for Paradisis’ failure to enter an OptiVox shift report for 

the incoming nurses; failure to administer a Hepatitis B vaccine, Postpartum Depression 

Screening, and discharge screening on a patient; improper weighing of a baby without 

adequate follow-up; complaints of an uncaring attitude towards a patient; and a failure to 

properly perform and document rounding as required by Hospital policy. Meanwhile, 

Paradisis’ grievance over inadequate training, although denied, resulted in the Hospital’s 

agreeing to schedule an additional eight (8) hours of training, the date to be determined in 

the future.

On April 12, 2013, Paradis filed a charge with the U.S. Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), asserting that the Hospital had retaliated against her 

by unjustly disciplining her for demanding additional training. On April 19, 2013, 
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Paradisis’ union representative initiated a new grievance for unjust discipline and 

retaliation for filing the inadequate training grievance. Following a grievance hearing on 

May 2, 2013, the verbal warning-Level 1 discipline was upheld.

On May 14, 2013, Patient Care Director George sent Paradisis her annual 

performance evaluation for 2012. In the evaluation, Paradisis received a “Successful” 

mark in every reviewable category except “Communication,” where she received a 

“Needs Improvement.” In the category of “Expectations for Performance Improvement,” 

George noted that Paradisis should “[r]eview and comply with Service excellence 

standards, code of conduct and communication standards.” On June 7, 2013, Paradisis 

notified the Hospital that she would be filing a grievance based on her 2012 performance 

evaluation. On June 18th, however, her union representative advised her that the 

grievance would be held in abeyance because the Union and Hospital were working on a 

settlement. 

The Hospital then scheduled the previously promised additional training for 

Paradisis for the evening of June 28, 2013. Patient Care Director George emailed

Paradisis’ union representative to confirm that Paradisis would be attending the training, 

and Flores, her supervisor, emailed Paradisis seeking confirmation that she would attend 

the June 28th training. On June 26th, Paradisis, instead of responding to the Hospital, 

emailed her union representative and asked that representative to remind George and 

Flores “of appropriate protocol during the grievance process.” Paradisis then failed to 

attend the June 28 training, and, after this failure, the Hospital never scheduled her to 

work again. 
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On October 4, 2013, Paradisis filed a civil action pro se in the United States 

District Court for the District of New Jersey under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964 (“Title VII”). Paradisis alleged that the Hospital, in eliminating her per diem work,

had discriminated against her on the basis of her brown skin color and Puerto Rican 

heritage. She also alleged that she was unjustly disciplined and given a poor performance 

evaluation for demanding training and filing grievances with her Union. The Hospital 

answered the complaint and discovery ensued. Paradisis was deposed and numerous 

Hospital employees were deposed, including Patient Care Director George and Nurse 

Kontos. At the close of discovery, the Hospital moved for summary judgment. Paradisis 

opposed the motion. In an Order entered on September 6, 2016, the District Court 

awarded summary judgment to the Hospital and explained its reasoning in a thorough 

Opinion.

Paradisis appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a 

District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 

F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2007). In her brief, Paradisis argues specifically that the verbal 

warning she received was fraudulent and contrived by the Hospital and based on events 

which should not have resulted in discipline, and that her 2012 performance evaluation, 

to the extent that she was criticized, was based on the contrived verbal warning. She 

further argues that the Hospital retaliated against her and ultimately terminated her for 

filing grievances, and that the Hospital’s actions were motivated by discriminatory 

animus. 

We will affirm. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
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matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the initial burden of 

identifying evidence that shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact, Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In addition, the District Court is required to 

view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and make all 

reasonable inferences in her favor, see Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d 

Cir. 1994). Furthermore, credibility determinations on material issues cannot be made in 

the context of a motion for summary judgment, nor may a District Court weigh the 

evidence. See Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 998 

F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1993). 

Nevertheless, the nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials, 

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e)(2), (3). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

256 (1986). To defeat the Hospital’s motion for summary judgment, Paradisis was 

required to designate specific facts by use of affidavits, depositions, admissions, or 

answers to interrogatories showing that there was a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c) (setting forth requirements for supporting or opposing party’s assertion that 

a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed). Ultimately, “[w]here the record taken as a 

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 

genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 

U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

To prevail on a Title VII claim of discrimination, a plaintiff must first establish a 

prima facie case. A prima facie case of discrimination based on skin color or national 

origin requires that a plaintiff show the following: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) 

she is qualified for the position; (3) she suffered some form of adverse employment
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action; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances that give 

rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 

U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993); Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 

253 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). To prevail 

on a claim of Title VII retaliation, a plaintiff is required to show that: (1) she engaged in 

activity protected by Title VII; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) 

there was a causal connection between her participation in the protected activity and the 

adverse employment action. Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d 

Cir. 2006).

If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie claim of discrimination and/or retaliation, 

the burden shifts to the defendant, who must “articulate one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment decision.” Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 

491, 494 (3d Cir. 1995). If the defendant is able to articulate such a reason, the burden 

shifts back to the plaintiff, who must demonstrate that the employer’s proffered reasons 

were merely a pretext for intentional discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 

804. Specifically, to survive a motion for summary judgment in a Title VII case, a 

plaintiff must point to evidence which: (1) “casts sufficient doubt upon each of the 

legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could reasonable 

conclude that each reason was a fabrication;” or (2) allows the factfinder to reasonably 

conclude that “discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative 

cause of the adverse employment action.” Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 

1994). A plaintiff can demonstrate the latter by “showing that the employer in the past 

had subjected [her] to unlawful discriminatory treatment, that the employer treated other, 
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similarly situated persons not of [her] protected class more favorably, or that the 

employer has discriminated against other members of [her] protected class or other 

protected categories of persons.” Id. at 765.

The District Court noted the appropriate legal standards, reviewed the summary 

judgment record, and concluded that: (a) the Hospital’s decision not to provide Paradisis 

with PALS training or the other requested training did not constitute an adverse 

employment action because Paradisis failed to show that the training was required as a 

condition of her employment as a per diem nurse; (b) the verbal warning issued 

pertaining to Paradisis’ work on January 31, 2013 did not constitute an adverse 

employment action, and, even if it did, Paradisis did not show that the Hospital’s reasons 

for the verbal warning were a pretext for discrimination; (c) the 2012 performance 

evaluation did not constitute an adverse employment action, and, even if it did, Paradisis 

did not show that the Hospital’s reasons for the evaluation were a pretext for 

discrimination; and (d) Paradisis did not show that the Hospital’s reason for removing her 

from the work schedule – her failure to attend the June 28th orientation – was a pretext 

for discrimination.

We conclude that Paradisis’ arguments on appeal do not persuasively show that 

the District Court erred in its determination that a trial was not warranted on her claim of 

discrimination. We agree with the District Court that the Hospital’s decision not to 

provide Paradisis with PALS training and the other requested training was not an adverse 

employment action because it had no impact on the terms of Paradisis’ employment. An 

actionable adverse employment action is “a significant change in employment status, 

such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different 
10

responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Burlington 

Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). Paradisis’ qualifications were never 

at issue and she was permitted to work without the requested education and training. She 

was not otherwise reprimanded, docked pay, suspended, or terminated due to her failure 

to receive such training. Accordingly, this was not an adverse employment action within 

the meaning of Title VII.

As the District Court concluded in the alternative, we will assume that the verbal 

warning-Level 1 discipline and the portion of Paradisis’ performance evaluation that was 

not positive constitute adverse employment actions. In addition, the termination plainly 

was an adverse employment action. Accordingly, having sufficiently established adverse 

employment actions, Paradisis was required to show that the verbal warning, 

performance evaluation, and her eventual termination occurred under circumstances that 

give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Center, 509 U.S. 

at 506-07. We agree with the District Court that the Hospital proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for each adverse action. The summary judgment record 

establishes that the violations found by the Hospital in connection with Paradisis’ January 

31st shift were based in fact and were not pretextual, fraudulent, or fabricated. That 

Paradisis’ patients may not have been in any real danger or distress as a result of her 

actions or omissions, as she appears to have asserted, does not mean that the violations 

were “fraudulent.” Paradisis provided no evidence to show that the verbal warning was 

improper besides her subjective belief that it was unwarranted, and thus she failed to cast 

doubt on its validity. The “Needs Improvement” notation in the performance evaluation 

regarding Paradisis’ communication skills was based on the verbal warning and notice of 
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discipline issued to her, wherein it was concluded that she had violated the Hospital’s

service excellence and communication standards and code of conduct. Because the 

verbal warning was legitimate, the “Needs Improvement” notation also was legitimate. 

Last, Paradisis’ termination was based on her plainly inexcusable failure to attend the 

additional training scheduled for June 28, 2013, which she herself had demanded in 

connection with a grievance.

Moreover, Paradisis did not provide competent evidence to show that her brown 

skin color and/or Puerto Rican heritage was the motivating force behind the three adverse 

employment actions. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 762. 

We thus agree with the District Court that she did not satisfy the fourth element of a 

prima facie case of discrimination for any of these adverse employment actions. 

Paradisis’ evidence of unlawful discriminatory treatment was scant indeed. She testified 

in her deposition that, in November 2012, upon meeting her for the first time, Patient 

Care Director George said “Oh, you’re Kim Paradisis? I pictured you big and tall.” She 

further testified that, at a meeting on May 2, 2013 to discuss the requested training (and 

other issues), Ann Marie Shears, the Vice President of Clinical Services, “mouthed” to 

her “[w]hy don’t you pay for it yourself,” and “[y]ou people want everything handed to 

you.” She testified that, at the close of the meeting, Shears gave her a handshake that was 

much too hard. None of this even remotely demonstrates that the adverse employment 

actions occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of intentional 

discrimination based on skin color and/or national heritage. Even the statement “you 

people” is too ambiguous to constitute evidence of discrimination where, as here, Shears 

just as easily could have been referring to all nurses or all MCH float nurses, see
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Anderson v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2010). Accordingly, 

summary judgment on Paradisis’ claim of discrimination was proper.

With respect to Paradisis’ retaliation claim, the District Court concluded, and we 

agree, that, in part, Paradisis did not engage in protected activity, and where she did, she 

failed to produce any evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that 

the Hospital retaliated against her for engaging in protected activities. The “antiretaliation” provision of Title VII protects those who participate in certain Title VII 

proceedings and those who oppose discrimination made unlawful by Title VII. See

Moore, 461 F.3d at 341. Opposition to discrimination can take the form of informal 

protests of discriminatory employment practices, including making complaints to 

management. Id. See also Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Academy of Wilmington, Del., 

Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2006). 

Filing grievances unrelated to discrimination does not, however, constitute 

protected activity for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim. See Barber v. CSX 

Distribution Services, 68 F.3d 694, 701-02 (3d Cir. 1995). We agree with the District 

Court’s “protected activity” determinations. Paradisis’ first grievance challenging her 

January 2012 termination did not constitute protected activity. The Hospital terminated 

her because she failed to work a winter holiday and she established that she was sick with 

pneumonia and thus unable to work. The grievance she filed through her Union properly 

made no reference whatever to discrimination based on skin color or national origin, and, 

thus, it failed to identify any conduct proscribed by Title VII. Paradisis’ second 

grievance asserted that the Hospital failed to provide her with adequate education and 

training. This grievance also made no mention of any type of discrimination protected by 
13

Title VII and thus does not constitute protected activity. With respect to Paradisis’ 

grievance concerning unjust discipline (the verbal warning), the sole reference to 

discrimination in this grievance was the reference to a contract section entitled “NonDiscrimination.” The mere mention of discrimination, however, does not transform a 

general grievance into opposition to unlawful activity under Title VII. See Slagle v. 

County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 2006) (even though Title VII sets a “low 

bar” for employees seeking protection against retaliation, vague allegations of 

discrimination do not meet even this “low bar”). Since Paradisis’ unjust discipline 

grievance barely mentioned discrimination, and she did not provide competent evidence 

to show that she actually pursued a claim of discrimination when meeting with hospital 

staff to resolve this grievance, it too does not constitute protected activity, id.

Accordingly, Paradisis’ earliest protected activity was the filing of her first claim 

with the EEOC on April 12, 2013.

2

 To establish the required causal connection between 

an employee’s participation in a protected activity and an adverse employment action, a 

plaintiff must show that the employer took “an adverse employment action after or 

contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity.” Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers 

Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 2000). We agree with the District Court that any adverse 

employment action which occurred before April 12, 2013, that is, the verbal warningLevel 1 discipline, cannot form the basis of a retaliation claim. Accordingly, summary 

judgment was proper on this aspect of Paradisis’ retaliation claim. 

 

2 Paradisis subsequently filed two more charges with the EEOC and eventually alleged 

discrimination on the basis of skin color and national origin.
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With respect to the partially negative performance evaluation, which George sent 

to Paradisis on May 14, 2013, the Hospital asserted in its summary judgment motion that 

it did not learn of the EEOC case until May 22, 2013, and thus there could not possibly 

be a causal connection between the EEOC charge and the performance evaluation. We 

note, however, that the close proximity of the two dates – when the Hospital says it 

learned about the EEOC charge and when the performance evaluation was delivered to 

Paradisis – might suggest a genuine issue for trial. Nevertheless, even assuming that 

Paradisis could show for summary judgment purposes that the Hospital knew of the 

EEOC filing before it evaluated her 2012 performance (which we do not decide), in the 

circumstances presented here the temporal connection would not be enough to make a 

showing of causation. The sole issue is whether the Hospital’s justification for the 

performance evaluation was a pretext for retaliation. Paradisis has not met her burden 

under McDonnell Douglas to show that the Hospital’s proffered reason for the 

performance evaluation was pretextual. She neither presented evidence that would 

permit a reasonable factfinder to doubt the legitimacy of the Hospital’s proffered reason, 

nor has she adduced evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that an 

“invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not” the motivating or 

determinative force behind the performance evaluation. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764.

3

 The 

summary judgment record establishes that the “Needs Improvement” notation regarding 

Paradisis’ communication skills was based on the verbal warning and notice of discipline 

 

3 We need not decide whether Paradisis failed to show pretext under the “but for” 

causation standard applied to Title VII retaliation claims in University of Texas 

Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013), because she failed 

to make the required causation showing even under the traditional and less onerous 

McDonnell Douglas framework.
15

that were legitimately issued to her. Because Paradisis failed to cast doubt on the validity 

of the verbal warning-Level 1 discipline (which was issued to her before she filed the 

EEOC charge), she necessarily could not cast doubt on the validity of the performance 

evaluation. A reasonable factfinder could not conclude, see Matsushita Electric 

Industrial Co., 475 U.S. at 587, that the Hospital gave Paradisis a partially negative 

performance evaluation because she engaged in the protected activity of filing an EEOC 

charge of retaliation.

Last, Paradisis’ termination indisputably occurred after the Hospital learned of the 

original EEOC charge, but the summary judgment record shows, also indisputably, that 

Paradisis was removed from the per diem nurse’s work schedule because she inexcusably 

failed to attend the June 28th training, which had been arranged specially for her. The 

summary judgment record shows that the date was acceptable to Paradisis, and that both 

a nurse educator and MCH float nurse were to conduct the training, just as Paradisis had 

requested. We agree with the District Court that no reasonable factfinder could conclude 

that Paradisis’ termination was anything other than the result of her failure to attend this

training session, and was not in retaliation for her pursuit of a charge before the EEOC.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court awarding 

summary judgment to the Hospital. Appellant’s motions for leave to file amended 

supplemental appendix volumes I and II, an amended reply brief, an over-length amended 

reply brief, and motion with exhibits to strike documents from Appellee’s supplemental 

appendix all are denied.