UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

KELVIN JENKINS,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No.: 15-12126

 Honorable George Caram Steeh

v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford

 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security,

 

Defendant. 

__________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ON PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL OF DENIAL OF SSI BENEFITS

Plaintiff Kelvin Jenkins appeals a final decision of Defendant 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application 

for supplemental security income benefits (“SSI”) under the Social Security 

Act (the “Act”).1 Jenkins, proceeding pro se, did not file a motion for 

summary judgment, but did submit “additional information” and medical 

records. [R. 9; R. 17]. The Commissioner filed a motion for summary 

judgment. [R. 21]. The Court finds that the Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”) did not err in finding Jenkins not disabled, and

 1 This matter was referred to this Court for a Report and Recommendation 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). 

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thus RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner’s motion [R. 21] be 

GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Jenkins’ Background and Disability Application

Jenkins was 43 years old on his alleged disability onset date of July 

15, 2011. [R. 14-5, Tr. 201]. He worked as a truck driver and general 

laborer until about 2006 or 2008. [R. 14-2, Tr. 48-49; R. 14-6, Tr. 226-27]. 

Jenkins’ application alleged that he was disabled due diabetes mellitus, 

high blood pressure, lumbar spine disorder, stomach pain, right knee pain, 

traumatic brain injury, adjustment disorder, depression, and mental 

impairment. [R. 14-6, Tr. 225].

Jenkins’ initial application for SSI benefits was denied on July 14, 

2011. [R.14-3, Tr. 122-133]. His current application alleges disability 

beginning the next day, July 15, 2011. [R. 14-2, Tr. 24]. After a January 

28, 2014 hearing, his application was again denied in a written decision on 

April 4, 2014. [Id., Tr. 24-39, 44-64]. The Appeals Council denied review, 

making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. [Id., Tr. 

1-4]. Jenkins timely filed for judicial review. [R. 1].

B. The ALJ’s Application of the Disability Framework Analysis

A “disability” is the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful 

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activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or 

can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).

The Commissioner determines whether an applicant is disabled by 

analyzing five sequential steps. First, if the applicant is “doing substantial 

gainful activity,” he or she will be found not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920(a)(4). Second, if the claimant has not had a severe impairment or 

a combination of such impairments2 for a continuous period of at least 12 

months, no disability will be found. Id. Third, if the claimant’s severe 

impairments meet or equal the criteria of an impairment set forth in the 

Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments, the claimant will be found disabled. 

Id. If the fourth step is reached, the Commissioner considers its 

assessment of the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), and will 

find the claimant not disabled if he or she can still do past relevant work. 

Id. At the final step, the Commissioner reviews the claimant’s RFC, age, 

education and work experiences, and determines whether the claimant 

could adjust to other work. Id. The claimant bears the burden of proof 

throughout the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner if 

 2 A severe impairment is one that “significantly limits [the claimant’s] 

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” § 920(c).

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the fifth step is reached. Preslar v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 14 

F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994). 3

Applying this framework, the ALJ concluded that Jenkins was not 

disabled. At the first step, he found that Jenkins had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since his application date. [R. 7-2, Tr. 26]. At the 

second step, he found that Jenkins had the severe impairments of diabetes 

mellitus, iron deficiency anemia, hypertension, major depressive disorder 

and cognitive disorder. [Id., Tr. 26]. Next, the ALJ concluded that none of 

Jenkins’ impairments, either alone or in combination, met or medically 

equaled the severity of the listed impairments. [Id., Tr. 26-28]. 

At the fourth step, the ALJ found that Jenkins had the residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”)

to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) involving 

occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling 

and climbing ramps and stairs. The claimant cannot operate 

foot or leg controls, and he can only occasionally reach 

overhead. He is able to frequently, but not constantly use his 

hands for fine and gross manipulation. He is unable to climb 

ladders, ropes or scaffolds and he must avoid all exposure to 

work at unprotected heights or near dangerous moving 

machinery. The claimant is restricted to unskilled, simple, 

routine and repetitive work tasks with no fast-paced work or 

high production quotas. Socially he can have only occasional 

interaction with supervisors, co-workers and the general public. 

 3 Opinions analyzing applications for Disability Insurance Benefits are 

applicable because the same standards apply to SSI claims. See 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920.

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[Id., Tr. 28-29].

The ALJ found that this RFC precluded Jenkins from performing his 

past relevant work as a truck driver or general laborer. [Id., Tr. 38]. After 

considering Jenkins’ age, education, work experience, RFC, and the 

testimony of the VE,

4 the ALJ found at step five that Jenkins could perform 

a significant number of other jobs in the national economy, including sorter, 

inspector and hand packager. [Id., Tr. 39]. Thus, the ALJ found that 

Jenkins was not disabled.

II. ANALYSIS

A.

Pursuant to § 405(g), this Court’s review is limited to determining 

whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence 

and was made in conformity with proper legal standards. Gentry v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 722 (6th Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence is 

“more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 

(6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Only the 

 4 The VE’s testimony addressing the availability of jobs for individuals with 

the above RFC is found at R. 14-2, Tr. 61-63.

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evidence in the record below may be considered when determining 

whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Bass v. 

McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 512-13 (6th Cir. 2007). 

The significant deference accorded the Commissioner’s decision is 

conditioned on the ALJ’s adherence to governing standards. “Chief among 

these is the rule that the ALJ must consider all evidence in the record when 

making a determination, including all objective medical evidence, medical 

signs, and laboratory findings.” Gentry, 741 F.3d at 723. See also Rogers, 

486 F.3d at 249. In other words, substantial evidence cannot be based 

upon fragments of the evidence, and “must take into account whatever in 

the record fairly detracts from its weight.” Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 

388 (6th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The Commissioner must also adhere to its own procedures, but 

failure to do so constitutes only harmless error unless the claimant has 

been prejudiced or deprived of substantial rights. Rabbers v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 654 (6th Cir. 2009). On the other hand, 

substantial errors like ignoring evidence in the record or failing to follow the 

treating physician rule are not harmless. Id.; Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 

940 (6th Cir. 2011); Gentry, 741 F.3d at 729.

Jenkins did not raise any specific arguments to challenge the ALJ’s 

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determination that he was not disabled during the relevant time period. 

Instead, he reiterated his claims regarding his limitations and submitted 

some new medical records. [R. 9; R. 17]. However, because Jenkins is 

proceeding pro se, the Court has construed his filings liberally and in his 

favor. Ford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 143 F. Supp. 3d 714, 717 (S.D. Ohio 

2015). Despite this liberal review, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s 

motion for summary judgment should be granted because Jenkins has not 

sustained his burden of demonstrating that he meets a listing or that the 

ALJ’s assessment of his RFC was insufficiently restrictive.

B.

The ALJ found Jenkins’ claims regarding his impairments to be not 

fully credible. [R. 14-2, Tr. 30]. The Court agrees with the ALJ that the 

evidence in the record does not substantiate his claims of disabling 

symptoms and limitations. He alleged that his conditions caused him 

fatigue, dizziness, weakness, fogginess, drowsiness, sweating, rapid 

breathing, rapid heartbeat, memory loss, lack of concentration, a need to 

lay down and take frequent rest breaks, stomach problems, sleep 

disturbance, social isolation, headaches, poor grip, a popping knee, and 

limitations with respect to lifting, squatting, bending, standing, reaching, 

walking, sitting, kneeling, stair climbing, seeing, memory, concentration, 

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completing tasks, understanding, following instructions, and getting along 

with others. [R. 14-2, Tr. 50-53; R. 14-6, Tr. 212-18]. He testified that he 

uses a cane four to five times per week (although it was not prescribed by a 

doctor), and he appeared for an independent medical examination using a 

cane and limping. [R. 14-2, Tr. 54; R. 14-7, Tr. 282]. Jenkins’ function 

report and a third-party function report that was submitted on his behalf 

portrayed Jenkins as being dependent on his sister, with whom he lived, for 

food preparation, household chores, driving, shopping, and reminding him 

to perform activities of personal care. [R. 14-6, Tr. 212-19, 234-39].

Yet, by the time of the hearing, Jenkins’ sister had moved out and he 

was living by himself, preparing his own meals, doing laundry, going 

shopping, driving to the store and to medical appointments, and taking care 

of his own personal needs. [R. 14-2, Tr. 48, 57-59]. Jenkins testified to still 

being very limited, [id.], but a bigger problem for him is that the medical 

reports do not support his claims of disabling symptoms. 

Records from May to August 2011 show that Jenkins was diagnosed 

with internal hemorrhoids, iron deficiency anemia, diverticulosis of the colon 

and gastritis. [R. 14-7, Tr. 257-70]. He was prescribed antibiotics, advised 

to incorporate a high fiber diet and urged to quit smoking (which he never 

did). [Id., Tr. 257-58]. No evidence of functional limitations emerges from 

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these records.

Jenkins’ next appointment was his first with treating physician Yari 

Campbell, M.D., on May 22, 2012, when he reported having a problem 

controlling his diabetes and requested a letter to support his disability 

claim. [Id., Tr. 278-80]. But his “Problem List” stated, “Nothing to Report,” 

his examination findings were all normal (including his gait), and his 

glucose levels were not recorded. [Id.]. He denied chest pains, shortness 

of breath, lightheadedness or dizziness. [Id.]. 

Jenkins next saw Dr. Campbell on June 19, 2012. [Id., Tr. 274-77]. 

During that visit, he registered no new complaints and has examination was 

again entirely normal. [Id.]. When Jenkins returned to Dr. Campbell on 

November 9, 2012, again requesting a letter to support his disability claim, 

he was cooperative, well groomed, not in acute distress or sickly, well 

nourished, had normal posture and gait, and his chest and lung, 

cardiovascular, abdominal, neurologic and musculoskeletal examinations 

were normal. [Id., Tr. 272-73]. His blood pressure was elevated because 

he had been out of medication for a week. [Id., Tr. 272]. Jenkins was 

diagnosed with uncontrolled diabetes, but his glucose levels were once 

again not recorded. [Id.].

Jenkins did not again see Dr. Campbell until May 28, 2013. She 

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noted that, during this visit, Jenkins’ blood pressure was again elevated, 

but he had no major complaints; was well groomed, in no acute distress 

and well nourished; had normal chest and lung, cardiovascular, and 

abdominal examinations; and had normal posture, gait, strength, tone and 

otherwise normal neurologic and musculoskeletal examinations. [Id., Tr. 

294-95]. His diagnosis of uncontrolled diabetes was not accompanied with 

a description of his glucose levels. [Id.]. 

At Jenkins’ next appointment with Dr. Campbell, in October 2013, his 

examinations were normal, including those of his musculoskeletal and 

cardiac systems. [Id., Tr. 291-93]. His blood pressure was high, but Dr. 

Campbell noted that he was not taking Doxazosin (a blood pressure 

medication) due to the cost. [Id.]. After she emphasized the importance of 

Jenkins complying with his medications, she indicated that he would start 

taking that medication. [Id., Tr. 292]. Dr. Campbell reported that Jenkins 

was not sure what his blood sugars were, but that he had nonetheless 

reduced his intake of Novolin (insulin). [Id.]. This was Jenkins’ last 

appointment with Dr. Campbell prior to the January 28, 2014 hearing. 

The only record concerning Jenkins’ alleged mental disability is from 

Atul Shah, M.D., an independent psychiatric examiner, who examined 

Jenkins in April 2013. [R. 14-7, Tr. 282-84]. This is the examination at 

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which Jenkins arrived limping and using a cane. [Id., Tr. 282]. Jenkins 

reported that he was not sure whether he had seen a psychiatrist or 

psychologist previously, but he was never psychiatrically hospitalized. [Id.]. 

Dr. Shah diagnosed Jenkins with major depressive disorder, recurrent with 

psychotic features, but in partial remission. He issued a Global 

Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of 59, which suggests moderate 

impairment,5 and opined that Jenkins’ prognosis was fair.

This medical evidence does not support Jenkins’ claims of disabling 

symptoms and, as described more fully below, it provides substantial 

evidence for the ALJ’s determinations.

C.

The ALJ considered whether Jenkins met Listings 1.04 

(musculoskeletal disorders), 4.00H (hypertension), 9.00B (diabetes), 12.02 

(organic mental disorder) and 12.04 (affective disorders). [R. 14-2, Tr. 26-

28]. With respect to Listing 1.04, the ALJ accurately determined that the 

record did not demonstrate that Jenkins had imaging studies revealing a 

 5 “The GAF scale is a method of considering psychological, social, and 

occupational function on a hypothetical continuum of mental health. The 

GAF scale ranges from 0 to 100, with serious impairment in functioning at a 

score of 50 or below. Scores between 51 and 60 represent moderate 

symptoms or a moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school 

functioning.” Norris v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 11–5424, 461 Fed. Appx. 

433, 436 n. 1 (6th Cir.2012) (citations omitted).

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disorder of the spine, nor clinical findings such as diminished strength, 

sensation deficits, or an inability to ambulate effectively. [Id., Tr. 26-27]. 

The ALJ noted that the record did not demonstrate that Jenkins’ use of a 

cane was medically necessary. [Id., Tr. 27]. 

Listings 4.00H and 9.00B, pertaining to hypertension and diabetes 

respectively, require consideration of the effect those conditions have on 

body systems. The ALJ opined that Jenkins’ hypertension and diabetes 

may have affected his functioning, but that the RFC could accommodate 

any limitations and that the effects were not of the severity to necessary to 

meet a listing. [Id.].

Turning to Jenkins’ mental impairments, the ALJ found that Jenkins 

had not demonstrated marked impairments or repeated episodes of 

decompensation, which are necessary in order to meet Listings 12.02 or 

12.04. [Id, Tr. 27-28]. 

All of these findings are supported by the evidence outlined in the 

preceding section. However, the Court notes that the ALJ did not obtain a 

state agency medical opinion; a state agency single decision maker (SDM) 

had initially determined that Jenkins’ conditions did not meet or equal a 

listing. [R. 14-2, Tr. 37; R. 14-3, Tr. 110-17]. The ALJ noted that the SDM 

was not entitled to any particular deference. [R. 14-2, Tr. 27]. However, 

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she failed to follow SSR 96–6p, which “requires that the judgment of a 

physician (or psychologist) designated by the Commissioner on the issue of 

equivalence on the evidence before the administrative law judge or the 

Appeals Council must be received into the record as expert opinion 

evidence and given appropriate weight.” SSR 96–6p, 1996 WL 374180, at 

*3 (July 2, 1996). Most courts in this district agree that, when a SDM 

renders the initial denial, a medical opinion on the issue of equivalency is 

necessary at the administrative hearing stage. See, e.g., Fowler v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., No. 12-12637, 2013 WL 5372883, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 

2013) (“[O]nce a hearing is requested, SSR 96–6p is applicable, and 

requires a medical opinion on the issue of equivalence.”). 

This type of error is usually not harmless. “[C]ourts generally should 

exercise caution in conducting harmless error review in this context” 

because “it may be difficult, or even impossible, to assess . . .” 

Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 657-58. See also Harris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 

12-10387, 2013 WL 1192301, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2013) (court 

lacked medical expertise to determine whether impairments met 

equivalency requirement). But failure to obtain a medical opinion on the 

question of whether a claimant meets a listing constitutes harmless error 

when the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the claimant could 

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not meet the elements of a given listing. See e.g. Bukowski v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., No. 13-CV-12040, 2014 WL 4823861 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 

2014) (“While the failure to obtain an expert opinion on the issue of medical 

equivalence will often require remand . . . the administrative record in this 

case is neither inconclusive nor contradictory, and by all indications, 

remand for further medical opinion would yield the same conclusions 

already reached by the ALJ.”) (citation omitted).

In this case, the lack of a medical opinion was harmless. The record 

demonstrates unequivocally that, from July 15, 2011 until the April 4, 2014 

hearing decision, Jenkins had not been diagnosed with a spinal disorder, 

his clinical findings were generally normal, there was little if any evidence 

that his hypertension and diabetes were affecting his body systems, and 

there was no evidence of marked mental impairments or episodes of 

decompensation. There is overwhelming evidence to support the ALJ’s 

finding that Jenkins did not meet a listing and remand would yield the same 

conclusion.

D.

The next question is whether there was substantial evidence to 

support the ALJ’s assessment of Jenkins’ RFC – an assessment that was 

impacted by the prior decision. If a final decision of the Commissioner “on 

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a prior disability claim contains a finding of a claimant’s residual functional 

capacity, [the Commissioner] may not make a different finding in 

adjudicating a subsequent disability claim with an unadjudicated period ... 

unless new and additional evidence or changed circumstances provide a 

basis for a different finding of the claimant’s residual functional capacity.” 

See Acquiescence Ruling 98-4(6), 1998 WL 283902, at *3 (June 1, 1998); 

see also Drummond v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 126 F.3d 837, 842-43 (6th Cir. 

1997) (citations omitted) (“When the Commissioner has made a final 

decision concerning a claimant’s entitlement to benefits, the Commissioner 

is bound by th[at] determination [when adjudicating a subsequent claim] 

absent changed circumstances.”). 

The ALJ here found the prior RFC assessment to be “extraordinarily 

restrictive and [ ] considerably deferential to the claimant’s subjective 

complaints in light of the minimal evidentiary findings.”6

 [R. 14-2, Tr. 30]. 

Nonetheless, the ALJ considered herself bound by the prior RFC absent a 

 6 The previously assessed RFC indicated that Jenkins could perform light 

work with a sit/stand option; that he could not operate foot controls, climb 

ladders, ropes or scaffolds; that he could occasionally stoop, crouch, kneel, 

crawl, climb, or reach overhead; that he was limited to occasional gross 

and frequent fine manipulation; that he must avoid exposure to hazards; 

that he was limited to occupations that do not require complex 

communication; and that he was limited to a specific vocational preparation 

(SVP) of one or two. [R. 14-3, Tr. 127]. An SVP one or two corresponds to 

unskilled work. SSR 00–04p, 2000 WL 1898704.

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finding of new and material evidence. [Id., Tr. 31]. She determined that 

new evidence demonstrated that Jenkins had normal examination findings; 

voiced no complaints that would support limitations in his ability to stand, 

walk or use his hands and feet; and had denied any chest pains, shortness 

of breath, light-headedness or dizziness. [Id.]. Deeming this new evidence 

material, the ALJ removed from Jenkins’ assessed RFC the previously 

imposed limitations to a sit/stand option and less than frequent handling 

and fingering. [Id.]. Taking into consideration Dr. Shah’s opinion regarding 

Jenkins’ mental impairments, the ALJ added pace and social restrictions to 

the previously assessed RFC. [Id.]. The Court finds no error with this 

reasoning and that it accurately reflects the record. 

More fundamentally, Jenkins bears the burden of proving that he 

requires a more restrictive RFC. Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 

391 (6th Cir. 1999); Jordan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 548 F.3d 417, 423 (6th 

Cir. 2008). He has not done so.

E.

Jenkins submitted evidence to the appeals counsel after the hearing

and to this Court after he filed his complaint. [R. 9, PgID 39; R. 14-2, Tr. 7-

17; R. 14-7, Tr. 296-331; R. 17, PgID 395-405]. This new evidence cannot 

be considered here, but the Court has the authority to remand for 

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consideration of the new evidence pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) if good 

cause and materiality are shown. Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695-96 

(6th Cir. 1993); Snider v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 328 F. Supp. 2d 703, 709-

11 (E.D. Mich. 2004). The good cause requirement is met with evidence 

that the claimant could not obtain the evidence prior to the hearing, and the 

Sixth Circuit takes a hard line with this requirement. Cotton, 2 F.3d at 695-

96 (reversing district court’s consideration of new evidence when claimant 

failed to address good cause); Oliver v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 

804 F.2d 964, 966 (6th Cir. 1986) (upholding denial of remand for 

consideration of new evidence when claimant did not show good cause). 

For materiality, the evidence must relate “to the period on or before the 

date of the administrative law judge decision.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b). 

“[E]vidence of a subsequent deterioration or change in condition after the 

administrative hearing is deemed immaterial.” Wyatt v. Sec’y of Health &

Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 685 (6th Cir. 1992). New evidence is 

“‘material’ only if there is a reasonable probability that the Secretary would 

have reached a different disposition of the disability claim if presented the 

new evidence.” Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 357 (6th Cir.2002) (citing 

Sizemore v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 865 F.2d 709, 711 (6th Cir.

1988)). 

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Here, Jenkins has not addressed good cause, so the Court has no 

authority to order remand for consideration of his new evidence. Cotton, 2 

F.3d at 695-96. Even if he had good cause, the new evidence is not 

material because there is no reasonable probability that the ALJ would 

have reached a different disposition regarding Jenkins’ functionality during 

the relevant period; the records from the relevant period showed almost 

entirely normal examination findings. 

There were new findings in June and July of 2014 – after the ALJ’s 

decision – but nothing supporting total disability. Specifically, in June 2014, 

testing at the Heart and Vascular Institute did render some new diagnoses, 

including severe asymmetric left ventricle hypertrophy and diabetic 

neuropathy. [R. 14-7, Tr. 296, 330, 311]. But these diagnoses say nothing 

about their severity or impact on his ability to perform work activities. Higgs 

v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir.1988); Kennedy v. Astrue, 247 Fed. 

Appx. 761, 767 (6th Cir. 2007). To that point, although Jenkins was found 

the following month to have leg pain with exertion and swelling, as well as 

numbness and tingling in his hands and feet, he was not fatigued, not tiring 

easily, showing no dizziness or fainting, had no abdominal pain, no anxiety,

no depression, and a normal neurologic examination, including a normal 

gait. [R. 10-7, Tr. 308-11]. To the extent that these finding from June and 

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July of 2014 represent that Jenkins’ conditions worsened since the April 

2014 decision, they are not relevant. Wyatt, 974 F.2d at 685.

Since Jenkins has not shown good cause and the new evidence is 

not material, a remand for consideration of his new evidence is not 

warranted.

F.

A final question is whether the ALJ violated the “treating physician 

rule,” which ordinarily requires an ALJ to give controlling weight to a 

treating physician’s opinions regarding the nature and severity of a 

claimant’s condition when those opinions are well-supported by medically 

acceptable clinical and diagnostic evidence, and not inconsistent with other 

substantial evidence. Gentry, 741 F.3d at 723, 727-29; Rogers, 486 F.3d 

at 242-43. If an ALJ gives less than controlling weight to a treating 

source’s opinion, she must provide “good reasons” for doing so that are 

“supported by the evidence in the case record, and ... sufficiently specific 

to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave 

to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” 

Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 375 (6th Cir. 2013)

(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); SSR 96–2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 

(July 2, 1996)). Courts will not hesitate to remand when the ALJ failed to 

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articulate “good reasons” for not fully crediting the treating physician's 

opinion. Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2004).

In this case, Dr. Campbell wrote a letter on Jenkins’ behalf in May 

2013 stating that his fluctuating sugars made it difficult for him to work. [R. 

14-7, Tr. 286). The ALJ gave this opinion little weight, reasoning that an 

opinion that a claimant is totally disabled relates to an issue that is reserved 

for the Commissioner, that Dr. Campbell’s opinion did not identify Jenkins’ 

functional limitations, and that Dr. Campbell’s treatment notes revealed 

normal examination findings except with respect to Jenkins’ blood pressure 

and sugar readings. These are good reasons.

A finding of disability is an issued reserved for the Commissioner. 

Kidd v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 283 Fed. Appx. 336, 340 (6th Cir. 2008).

Further, Dr. Campell’s letter was not an opinion to which controlling weight 

is required. “Under Social Security regulations, medical opinions are 

‘judgments about the nature and severity of ... impairment(s), including ... 

symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [one] can still do despite 

impairment, and [an individual’s] physical or mental restrictions.’” Hall v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 148 Fed. Appx. 456, 462 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing § 

404.1527(a)(2)). Finally, the ALJ correctly noted that Dr. Campbell’s 

reports showed mostly normal examination findings. For these reasons, 

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the ALJ was not bound by Dr. Campbell’s opinion.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS that the 

Commissioner’s motion [R. 21] be GRANTED and that judgment be 

entered in her favor. 

s/Elizabeth A. Stafford

ELIZABETH A. STAFFORD

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: July 29, 2016

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Either party to this action may object to and seek review of this 

Report and Recommendation, but must act within fourteen days of service 

of a copy hereof as provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any 

further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. 

Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 

638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections which raise some issues but 

fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all objections that party 

might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Secretary of 

HHS, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers 

Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). A copy of any objection 

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must be served upon this Magistrate Judge. E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2).

Each objection must be labeled as “Objection #1,” “Objection #2,” 

etc., and must specify precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than fourteen days after 

service of objections, the non-objecting party must file a response to 

the objections, specifically addressing each issue raised in the objections in 

the same order and labeled as “Response to Objection #1,” “Response to 

Objection #2,” etc. The response must be concise and proportionate in 

length and complexity to the objections, but there is otherwise no page 

limitation. If the Court determines that any objections are without merit, it 

may rule without awaiting the response.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF 

System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on July 29, 2016.

s/Marlena Williams

MARLENA WILLIAMS

Case Manager

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