### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE A T ME MP H IS Fe br ua ry 19, 200 9 S es sio n WAY NE B. GILLA RD v. JA MES A. TAYLOR, ET A L 

### . Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forShelb y County No. CT-001065-04 R ita L. Stotts, Judge

No. W2008-00937-C OA-R9-C V - Filed Mar ch 18, 2009

Pol ic e of fi c e r who wa s in

jur e d w hil e dr ivi ng his patr ol c ar br ou g ht thi s a c tio n a g a ins t his a uto mob ile insurer to re cover

uninsured motorist benef its under his persona l p o l i cy
. The trial c ourt denied insurers’ motion for summary judgme nt, finding that the regular use e x ception found in the policy
was ambiguous. The insurance company appea ls. W e re verse and re mand.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 . A ppe al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Ci r c uit

Co ur t R e ve r se d and Rem anded
J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W .S. and H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., joined.
Gary H. Nichols, Michae l R. F lynn, Memphis, TN, for Appe llant, Nationwide Insur ance Company Eugene A. Laur enzi, Me mphis, TN, for Appe llee, Wayne B. Gillard
OP IN ION
Th e re le va

nt f a c ts of thi s ca se are un dis pu te d. Ap pe lle e Way ne Gi lla rd be g an w or

kin g a s a police off icer for the City of Memphis in Aug ust of 1999. On April 21, 2002, Off icer Gillard wa s assig ned to patrol t he 221 Ward in a 1998 Crown Vic toria police c ruiser ( the “Cruiser ”) ow ned by st the City of Memphis. The rec ord indicates that Offic er Gillard would drive the Cruiser whe never it was assig ned to him, which was approximately six ty perc ent of the time. I f Off icer Gillard wa s no t a ssi g ne d th e Cr

uis e r, he wo uld

be a ssi g ne d a

no the r c ru ise r f

ro m th e fl e e t. On April 21, 2002, duringhis shift, Office r Gillard’ s Cruiser wa s involved in a t hree -ca r acc ident, which wa s cause d by Def endant J ames Tay lor. At the t ime of t he accident, Mr. T aylor was uninsur ed

. As a re s u l t of the ac cident, Of fice r Gillard sustained injurie s to his neck. The City of Memphis paid Offic er Gillard’s m edica l expenses in the amount of $41,000, and also paid Off icer Gi l l ar d h i s re gu l ar

s al ary wh i l e h e w as re cup er at i n g.-2-

Fo l l o wi n g t h e a cc i d en t , Of fi ce r G i l l ar d

gav e n o t i ce u n d er

t h e u n i n s u re d

m o t o ri s tco v er age provision of a Nationwide I nsuranc e Compa ny ( “ A p p ellant”) policy . This policy was he ld by

Offic er Gillard’s wife ’s uncle, Purne ll Blac kwell. Offic er Gillard was a named insured on Mr. B lackwe ll’s policy . Nationwide de nied cove rag e to Off icer Gillard on g rounds th at his use of the City of Memphis Cruiser constit uted a “re g ular use” and was therefor e ex cluded from cover ag e under the Nationwide uninsure d motorist poli cy
. On Fe bruar

y 25, 2004, Offic er G illard filed a per sonal injury lawsuit ag ainst Mr. Taylor, and a dec laratory

judgme nt action ag ainst Nationwide. The decla ratory judgme nt action gives rise to the instant appea l. Nationwide answ ere d the complaint on M ay 4 , 2 0 0 4, and the tria l court issued an order sever ing the decla

ratory judgme nt action from the pe rsonal injury suit ag ainst Mr. Taylor. On May 1, 2006, Nationwide f

iled a mot i o n fo r summary judgme nt in the declar atory judgme nt action. Off

icer Gillard filed a response in oppositi on to Nationwide’s motion on May 31, 2006. The fir st hearingon the motion for summary judgme nt was held on F ebrua ry 23, 2007. The pa rt ie s w e re g ive n a

n o pp or tun ity to f ile su pp le me nta l me mor and a

of law i n s up po rt

of the ir respe ctive positions on the summary judgme nt motion. A second hea ring was he ld on April 5, 2007. At this hearing , the trial cour t ag ain re quested more rese arc h and advise d that judgme nt would be
rese rved until furthe r hea

ring . On J une 3, 2007, the pa rties wer e ag ain bef

ore the court for a he aring
on the motion for summary judgme nt. On Aug ust 14, 2007, the trial court e ntere d its order, de ny ing Nationwide’ s motion for summary judgme nt. On Aug ust 24, 2007, Nationwide filed a motion for int e rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l, whic h mo tio n th e tr ia l c ourt g ra nte d b y or de r of Nov emb er 16, 2 00 7. Th is Court gr anted Na

tionwide’s Tenn. R. App. P. 9 application for inter locutory appea l on May

2, 2008.
Nationwide r aises two issues for revie w as stated in its brief :
1. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in denying the motion for summary judgme nt of Nationwide by holding as a matter of law that the re g ular
us e e xclu sio n c on ta ine d in the Natio nw id e un ins ur e d mo tor ist ins ur anc e po lic y

is a mbi g uo us
. 2. Whether the trial court err ed in holding as a matter of la

w that the offse t pr ovision c ontained in the Nationwide insurance policy is not applicable to this case.

I t is well settled that a motio n fo r s u m m ar y judgme nt should be g rante d when the mova nt demonstrates that there a

re no g enuine issues of material fa ct and that the movingparty is entitled to a judg ment as a matter of law

. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The party moving for s u mmary judgme nt bear s the burden of demonstrating that no g enuine issue of materia l fac t exi sts. Se eBai n v . W e lls , 936 S.W .2d 618, 622 (Tenn.1997) . On a motion for summary judgme nt, the court must take the str on g e st le g iti mate vie w of the e vid e nc e in favo r of the no nmo vin g pa rt y , all ow a ll r e a so na

ble-3-

infere nces in f

avor of that party , and disca rd all counte rvailing evidenc e. Se eid

. I n By rd v . Ha ll , 847 S.W .2d 208 (Tenn.1993) , our Supreme Court state d:

Once it is shown by

the moving pa

rty that t h er e i s no g enuine issue of mater ial fac t, the nonmoving pa rty must then demonstrate, by aff idavits or discovery

materia l, that the re is a

g enuine, mate rial fa ct dispute to warr ant a tria l. I n this reg ard, Rule 56.05 provides that the nonmoving party cannot simply rely upon his ple ading s but must set forth specific facts s howing that there is a genuine issue of mater ial fa c t f or tr ia l.
Id . at 211 (c itations omi tted). Summary judgme nt is only

appropr iate whe n the fac ts a nd the leg al conclusions dra wn from the fa cts rea sonably

permit only

one conc lusion. S

e eC a r v e l l v . B o t to ms , 900 S.W .2d 23, 26 (T e nn .1 99 5) . B e c a

us e only qu est io ns of

law a re inv olv e d, the re is n o p re sumpt ion of c or re c tne ss reg ardinga trial c ourt' s g rant or de nial of summary judgme nt. Se eBai

n , 936 S.W .2d at 622. Th e re fo re , our re vie w of the tr ia l c ourt ' s g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt i s de novo on the re cord be fore this Court. Se eWa rre n v . Es tat eof Kir k , 954 S.W .2d 722, 723 (Tenn.1997)

. I n Naifeh v. V

alley Forge Life

Ins. C o. , 204 S.W .3d 758 (Tenn.2006) , the Tenne ssee Supreme Court re stated the followingprinciples that guide our c ourts in the interpret at i o n of an i n s u r an c e p o l i c y:

I n interpre ting a

n insurance contra ct, we must dete rmine the intention of the pa rties and g ive ef

fe ct to that intention. Chri stenberry v. Tipton , 1 60 S.W. 3d

48 7, 49 4 ( Te nn . 2 00 5) ; Bob Pe ar sa ll M oto rs, Inc. v. R egal Chrysler-Plymou th, In c. , 521 S.W .2d 578, 580 (Tenn. 1 9 7 5 )

. A ni n s u r an c e p o l i c y m u s t b e i n t e r p r e t e d f a i r l y an d r e a s o n a b l y, g iving th e languag e its usual and ordina ry meaning

. Parker v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. , 582 S.W .2d 380, 383 (Tenn.1979)

. When there is doubt or ambiguity as to its meani n g, an insurance contr a c t m

u s t b e c o n s tr

u e d f a v o r a b ly to p r o v id e c o v e r a g e to the insured. Chri

ste nbe rry , 160 S

. W.3d at 494. However , the contra ct may not be re written by

the Court. Id .; se eals o T

e nn. F ar mers Mut. Ins. Co . v . W itt , 857 S.W .2d 26, 32 (Tenn.1993)

. Naifeh , 204 S.W .3d at 768.
Th e po lic y

at is su e he re re a ds , in

re le va nt p art , a s f

oll ow s:
COVERAGE EXCLUSI ONS This cover ag e does not a

pply to:-4- * * * 4. Bodily injury suffe red w hile occupy

ing a motor vehicle:

a
. o w n e d b y; b. furnished to; or
c. ava ilable for the regular use of y ou or a re lativ e , bu t no t ins ur e d fo r Auto L iab ility
c ov e ra g e un de r t

his po lic y . I t a lso do e s n ot a pp ly to bodily inju ry fr om being hit by any such motor vehicle. Tenn. Code Ann. §56- 7-1201(a )(2) provides th at any named insure d may

reje ct uninsured motorist covera ge. This provision of the Tenne ssee Code ha s been f ound to be valid and enfor cea ble. See, e.g., We iss v. State Farm Fire & Cas. C o. , 107 S.W .3d 503, 505 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). In Terry v

. Aetna Cas . & Su r. Co. , 51 0 S.W.2 d 509 (T e nn . 1 97 4) , o ur Sup re me Court

he ld tha t T e n n e s s e e ’ s u n in s u r e d mo to r is t s tatute s d o n o t p r o v id e f o r b r o a d c o v e r a g e , b u t e f f e ctuate a limit ed and na

rrow pur pose. Id . at 513-14. As discusse d by our Sup re m e C o urt in Hill v. Nationw ide Mut. In s. Co. , 535 S.W .2d 327 (Tenn. 1976) :

Authorities acc epting the [ n ar ro w coverag e theor y ] poi nt out that vehicular liability insurance is ordinar i l y

written upon and f

ollows particul ar schedule d vehicles. It is not written upon named indivi d u als, and is not like g ener al hea lth or acc ident insurance
cover ag e. The liability policy cover s a sche duled vehicle , and extends its protection, t h ro ug h omnibus clauses, not only to the named insured but to members of his family

and other p er s o n s using the vehicle w ith permissio n , s u bject to pre scribed c onditions and
e xclu sio ns
.

Hil l , 535 S.W .2d at 220 (footnote o m i t t ed ). More over, this Court has held that a “re g ular use” exclusion i n insurance policies does not contra vene public policy

. She phe rd v. Fre

go zo , 175 S

. W

. 3 d 2 0 9 , 2 1 7 ( T e n n
. C t

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Sandozv. State Farm Mut. A uto. In s. Co. , 620 So.2d 441 (L a.App. 3 Cir.1993))

. I n She phe rd, this Court addre ssed a fac tually simil ar situation to the one at bar, in which a p o l i c e o f f i c e r w a s i n j u r e d i nan a u t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n tw h i l e o n - d u t y i nh i s a s s i g n e d

c r u i s e r
. In aff irming the trial court’ s g rant of s ummary judgme nt in favor of

the insurer

on g rounds that the regular use e x clusion was enf orce able, the She

phe rd Court stated: [T] he standa

rd “r egular use” exclusion “predate s the adve nt of uninsured motorist cover ag e, it being born and matured by case s int e rp re tin g ba sic a ll y the same e xclu sio na ry langua g e a s to lia

bil ity-5- c ov e ra g e . T he F ourt

h Ci rc uit Court of Ap pe a ls prov id e s th e re a dil y a pp are nt p ur

po se of the e xce pti on, whi c h is sta nd ard in a uto mob ile lia bil ity po lic ie s and in po lic ie s pr ov idi ng un ins ured moto ri st cover ag e.
T h e gre at weig ht of authority is in accor d with the interpre tation of t h i s p ro v i s i o nb y

J u d ge Che stn

ut i nAler v. Trave lers Indem nity Co. , D.C.Md., 92 F.Supp. 620, 623, wher e he sa id:
This case involved the construction and application of the s o-ca lled “drive other a utomobiles” clause of

the prese nt standar d automobile liability policy . The g ener al purpose a

nd eff ect of this provis i o n o f t he po lic y is t o g ive cov era g e to t he ins ur e d w hil e eng ag ed in the only

infreque nt or mere ly

casua l use of
an automobile other than the one descr ibed in t he po lic y , b ut n ot to c ov e r him a g a ins t pe rs on a l li a bil ity with respec t to his u s e of a nother a utomobile which he fr equently

uses or ha s the opportunity to do so....
She phe rd , 1 7 5 S

. W

. 3 d

at 2 1 2 (c i t i n g Cam

pbell v. Aetna Cas. & S ur. Co. , 211 F .2 d 732 , 736 (4 th Cir.1954)).
The She phe rd Court did muc h of the wo rk of a c c umu latin g and ana ly zing the re le va

nt c a se l aw o nr e g u l ar

u s e e x c e p t i o n s t o u n i n s u r e d m o t o r i s tc o v e r a g e , an d

w e qu o t e i te x t e n s i v e l y:
F ur the r e xpos iti ve of

the “ re g ula

r u se ” e xclu sio n in

its a pp lic a bil ity to the case at bar

are those ca ses wher e an e mploy er pr ovides a fle et of vehic les which may

be ra ndoml y a ssigne d to a par

ticular e mploy ee. I n City of Ja c ks on v . Fre e man-H

owi e , I nc ., 239 Miss. 84, 121 So.2d 120, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held: The proof

clea rly shows that insured' s emp loy er furnished for t he reg ular use of insured a truck, e ither
on e of a bo ut t e n, alth ou g h in sure d d id n ot r e g ula rl y use any particula r one of the flee t of ten trucks. Tw o o r thr e e tr ip s a

w e e k w e r e ma d e b y

in s u r e d a s driver of one of the ten trucks of his e mploy er, a nd he made other trips as helper on one of the truc ks. I t cannot be said that insured' s use of the e mploy er' s trucks wa s other than r egular use.-6- The que stion narrows to this: Does the term “r egular
us e ” in t he e xclu sio na

ry c la us e refer t o one sp e c if

ic automobile? As stated, the obvi ous purpose of the exclu s i o n ary

clause is to li mit the ex tension of
me dic a l pa

y me nts c o v e r a g e t o c a su a l or inf re qu e nt u se of occ upancy

of automobil es other tha n the one d ef i n edi nt h e p o l i cy , i nt h i s ca s e t h e i n s u re d 's Chev r o le t. I t i s r e g u la

r u s e o f o th e r a u to mo b il e s that br ing s th e ex clu siona

ry c la us e int o o pe ratio n, and

if ins ur e d' s e mpl oy e r a ssi g ns him on e spe c if

ic automobile for regular use or a number

of automobiles, any one of which may be assig ned for a pa rt ic ula r t ri p, the re su lt i s th e same . A n a utom ob ile is fu rn ish e d ins ur e d “ fo r r e g ula r u se ” in e ith e r e ve nt. W e kn o w o f

n o a u t h o r i t y h o l d i n g t o t h e c o n t r ar y.
Moore v. State Farm Mutu al Au tom obile Ins. C o. , 239 Miss. 130, 121 So.2d 125, 126-27 (1960).
Whil e Te nn e sse e c ourt s h a ve no t de a lt s pe c if ic a lly wi th a c a se involving the “ regular use” exc l u s i o n as it relate s to uninsured
m o t o ri s tco v er age , t h i s C o u rt h as m ad e it cl ea r as t o l i ab i l i t y co v er age that the “r egular use” exclusion i s applicable and enf orce able. [ United Servs. Aut

o. Ass'n v. Couch , 643 S.W .2d 668 (Tenn. Ct. App.1982)]....
* * *

I n sister jurisdictions, a body of law has de veloped unde r the “ regular
us e ” e xclu sio n as it r e late s to po lic e ve hic le s ava ila ble fo r r e g ula

r u se to policemen.... In O'Br ien v. H ali fa x I ns. Co. of

Ma ssa c huse tts , 141 So.2d 307, Pl aintiff wa s a police of fice r empl o y ed by

Ormond Be ach, Florida, and was insured as to his personal a utomobile by

the Def endant insura

nce c om pany . I n his work as a police off

icer , Plainti ff wa s expected to and did use whic hever one of f

our city -owne d ca rs was assigne d to him. W hile driving one of suc h vehicl es, he was involved in an ac cident and sustaine d various persona l injuries. He sued his private insura nce c ompany

for medic al benef its under his policy

of in s u ra n ce
. The trial c ourt, applying the “re g ular use” exclusion, direc ted a verdic t for the de fenda nt, and the District Court of Appeals of F lorida, re ly ing on Mo orev . St ate Far m Mutu a l A u to . Ins. C

o. , 239 Miss. 130, 121 S o.2d 125 (1960)
a ff ir me d th e jud g me nt.-7- The holding in the Moore c ase that an exclusi o n ary clause involved in that c ase, identical to tha t i n t he ins tant c a se , is no t ambi g uo us wh e n r e a d in conjunction wit h the gene ral covera g e cla use, appe ars to repre sent the m aj ority opinion in thi s country , as pointed out by

the L ouisiana Co u rt o f Appea ls in an exhaustive discussion of t his are a of the law in Letef f v. Maryland Casual

ty Co. , 91 So.2d 123 (1956)....
O' Brien v . Ha lif ax Ins. Co . o

f M as s. , 141 So.2d 307, 308 (F la.Dist.Ct.App.1962).
Galvin v. Am ica Mutu al Ins. C o. , 11 Mass.App.Ct. 457, 417 N.E.2d 34 (1981) is a c ase that on its facts closely p ar all els the ca se at ba r. Ga lvi n w a s a

B os ton p ol ice of

fi c e r who ow ne d a

pe rs on a l ve hic le insured b y

Amica Mutual Insuranc e Company . His policy included uninsured motorist cover ag e. Whil e on duty and oper ating his police
c ru ise r, he wa s in volve d in a c oll isi on
.. .. He br ou g ht s uit a g a ins t Amica unde r his uninsured motorist c overa g e, and the insurer de nied
cover ag e under

the “r egular use” exclusion i n the p o licy . The particula r cr uiser that Ga lvin was driving was one of a pool of twe lve
or mor e B os ton

po lic e c ru ise rs wh ic h c ou ld h a ve be e n a ssi g ne d to Galvin at ra

ndom on any

g iven duty

shift....
The trial court enter ed judg ment for the de fenda nt, and the Court of Ap p ea l s af

fi rm edan d

s t at edt h e f

o l l o wi n g:
Galvin' s counsel conte nds that t h e langua g e of the regular use e x clusion, “an a uto ... regularly

used by y ou,” should be take n as re fer ring only to a par ticular vehicle a nd not to a ll the vehicles in a pool of vehicle s regularly available to the i nsured motorist. We do not agree a nd see no a

mbiguity in the words used. A heavy majority of the decision elsewhe re interpre t such wor d s (in closely

simil ar policy

lang uag e) a s treating a ll motor vehicles in a pool, any one of w hich is available to the pe rson insured, as within the regular use exclusion. The authorities ar e collec ted in 13 Couch §§ 45:1050 to 45:1065, e specia lly §§ 45:1055 and 45:1059 (1965 & Supp.1980). SeeAnnot. 86 A.L .R.2d 937, especia lly

§ 7(b).-8- On e deci sion e lse wh e re up on the re g ula

r u se exclusion i s very close on its fa cts to the prese nt case

. See Kenney v. Em

ployers' Liab. Assur

. Corp. , 5 Oh io St.2d 131, 132, 134-135, 214 N.E.2d 219 ( 1966). There , as in this case, a policeman wa s injured in one of sever al cruiser s available in a pool. T he policema n was not allowe d to rec over unde r his own policy . The opinion (at 134-135) sa id, “[O] n the fac ts of this case, we do not believe that the wo rds ‘an automobile ... furnished f

or t he re g ular use’ of plaintiff a re ambig uous or ca

n rea sonably

be int erpr eted so as not to de scribe the cruiser

in which plaintiff wa s riding at the time of his injury

.... I n order to be excluded under this e x clusionary

clause , an automobile nee d not be a single particula

r automobile regularly furnished to the named insu red. Thus it i s well settled that an automobile will be excluded under s u ch policy provisions although it is only one of a

g roup of
a uto mobiles fr om whic h a n a uto mob ile is r e g ula

rl y furnished to the na

med insured by

his employ er....
Galvin v. Am ica Mut. In s. Co. , 11 Mass.App.Ct. 457, 417 N.E.2d 34, 35-37 (1981) . (footnotes omitted [and additional citations] .).
She phe rd , 175 S.W .3d at 212-16.

I n United Servs. A u to . Ass'n v. Couch , 643 S.W .2d 668 (Tenn. Ct. App.1982), U nited Service s Automobile Association issued a liability insurance poli cy t o M s
. Couch on her ve hicle. He r s on , w ho liv e d with he r, wa s ope ratin g a no n- ow ne d v e hic le , w hic h w a s p ro vid e d to him by his employ er, w hen he w as involved in an acc ident. The trial court de clar ed cove rag e, findingthat the son’s use of the work vehicle was not contemplated in the re g ular use e x clusion of the policy . On appea l, this C ourt reve rsed the tr ial court, finding that it was clea r that the a

utomobile driven by

the son was used by

him in his work on a

regular ba sis. This C ourt rea soned:
The i s s ue of r egularity

hinge s not so much upon the
re gu l ar ity of the wor

king time of

the oper ator, but upo n the re g ularity

with which the vehic le was fu rn ish e d or avail a

ble . In th e pr e se nt c a se , it is uncontrove rted that the vehicle wa s regularly , i.e.,
con s tantly , available to the employ ees of Mr. Canterb u ry , including William Couch, I I I , when he
wa s o n d uty . In th is s e ns e , th e ve hicle was re g ula rl y-9- ava i l able to Couch within the mea ning of the policy exclusion.
Couch , 643 S.W .2d at 672.

I n Mur phy v . Ch ad we ll , No. 02A01-9705- CV-00105, 1998 WL117407 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 1998) , the plaintiff wa s injured when she was involved in an a utomobile accide nt with the defe ndant, who wa s uninsured. Id . at *1. In Mur phy , as in the case at bar, the plaintiff ar g ued that the term “ regular use” was ambiguous a nd cre ated a

g enuine issue of

materia l fa ct. Id . at *4. Although w e noted that authority conce rning the def

inition of “regular use ‘ is scant,”’ relying upon both Couch and Mo ore , we f ound that the term “ regular use” as used in an uninsure d motorist poli cy is unambiguous. Id . at *5.

I n the rec ent case of Hostott le v. Nationw ide M

ut. In s. Co. , No. 89036, 2007 WL3203063 (Ohio C t. App. 8 Dist. Nov. 1, 2007), t he Ohio Court of Appeals addre ssed the mea ning of the term “re g ular use” i n a Nationwide uninsured motorist insurance policy . Rely ing upon pr ior ca se law, the Ohio Court noted that the term “ regular use” has been define d as “f reque nt, steady , constant or sy stematic.” Id . at *2. The H o s tot tle C o u rt conclude d that a police of fice r’s use of

a police c ar n e ar l y e v e r

y d ay h e w o r

k e d c o n s t i tu t e d r e g u l ar u s e , s o a s t o f a l l w i t h i nt h e e x c e p t i o ni nt h e p o l i c y. Id . at *4. Consequently , the cour t reve rsed the tr ial court’s de nial of Nationwide’s motion for summary judgme nt, seekingto have uninsure d motorist covera g e denie d. Id

. I n a re c e nt P e nn sylva

nia c a se , th e Sup e ri or

Court c on c lud e d th a t th e te rm

“ re g ula r u se ” in an uninsured m o t o ri s t p o licy was not ambig uous and that the wor ds “sug g est a princ ipal use as distinguished from a casual or incidental use.” Bri nk v . Erie Ins. G ro up , 940 A.2d 528, 532 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Tenne ssee c ourts have similarly define d the term. In United Servs A uto Ass’n v. Cou ch , 643 S.W .2d 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982), w e stated:

Def initions of the wor d, “re g ular” include:
3a ste a dy or un if

or m in c ours e , pra c tic e or

oc c ur re nc e ; no t su

bje c t to un e xpla ine d o r i rr a tio na l va ri a tio n; s te a dil y

purs ue d; o rd e rl y , me tho dic a l. b ( 1) re tur

nin g , r e c ur

ri ng or r e c e ive d at st a te d, fi xed or un if or m int e rv a ls, (2 ) f

un c tio nin g a t un if

or m in te rv a ls,
4a c on sti tut e d, sel ect e d, ma de or oth e rw ise ha

nd le d in c on fo rm ity with established or pre scribed usa g es, rules or discipline. (Webster' s Third I nternational Dictionary , Unabr idge d.)-10- Ste a dy or un if or m in cours e , p ra c tic e or

oc c ur re nc e ; no t su

bje c t to u n ex plained or irr ational var iation. [ Ro o ne y ] Ro d ne y v . Ci tyof Omaha , 1 04 Ne b. 26 0, 17 7 N.W. 16 6. Ma de a c c or din g to r ule , d uly
a uth or ize d, fo rm e d a ft e r u

nif or m ty pe , buil t or ar

ra ng e d a c c or din g to established plan, law

or principle. M

er ch ant's Nat. Bank of Los Angeles v. Continental Nat. Bank of Los An geles , 98 Cal.App. 523, 2 7 7 P

. 354, 361. Antony m of “c asual” or “oc casiona l.” P a ll ev. Indu strial C

om m ission , 7 9 U tah 4 7, 7 P .2 d 2 84 , 2 90 , 8 1 A .L .R. 1222. (B lack’ s L aw Dic tionary

Four th Edition)
Couch , 643 S.W .2d at 671-72.
Bla ck’s L aw Dic tionary

define s “re g ular use,” as used in a n insurance policy context, to be “[a] use that is usual, normal, or customary , as opposed to a n occa sional, specia l, or

incidental use.” Bla ck’s L aw Dictionary ,1540-41 (7 th ed. 1999) . This definition succinctly states the mea

ning of

“ re g ula r us e ,” and c omp or

ts w ithoth e r d e fi nit ion s se t out in the pr e vio us ly

de c ide d c a se s. B e c a

us e of its plain and simple lang uag e, we adopt the B lack’ s L aw Dictionary definition of “r egular use.” The question now becomes whether Offic er Gillard’s particular use of the Cruiser constitutes

“ re g ula r u se ” un de r t

he a bo ve de fi nit ion

. At

his de po sit ion , O ff

ic e r G ill ard

te sti fi e d, in r e le va

nt p art , a s f oll ow s: Q. How many times a month wer e y ou assig ned that vehic le [i.e., the

Cruiser] in J anuar

y , Fe bruar

y , Marc h, April of 2002?
A. Iwo uld

say a bo ut 6 0 p e rc e nt. Q. I f y ou wer en’t a ssigne d that v eh icle we re you assig ned anothe r ve hic le in t

he po ol?
A. Ye s. Q. Was there a

ny other pa rticular ve hicle that y ou wer e assig ned?
A. No. Q. I s th e re any

g e ne ra l c us tom

that take s p lac e in t

he Me mph is Police Depa

rtment reg ardingassig nment of vehicles? What Imean by custom is are the y

assig ned on a se niority

basis, on regu l ar i t y

of
us e ? I s th e re any

c us tom wh a tso e ve r o n a ssi g nme nt?-11- A. They are assig ned to a wa

rd. Q. On ea ch day

when yo u repor

ted to work in 2002 we re you assig ned some ve hicle fr om that ward?
A. Ye s. Q. An d th a t ve hic le wa s p ro vid e d to y ou by the City of Me mph is?
A. Ye s. Q. And it wa s provided to y ou for your use [in] y our employ ment as a police of

fice r?
A. Ye s.
* * * Q. Was there a

ny day when you wer en’t a ssigne d to a vehicle

. A. No. Q. Was that vehicle a ssigne d to y ou only when y o u we re o n the [j o b ]?
A. Ye s. Q. Was the ve hic le re tur

ne d a ft e r e a c h s hif

t?
A. Ye s.
Fr om this t estimony , we conclude that a reasonable jury could onl y find that Off

icer Gillard’s use of the Cruise r mee ts the definition of regular use set out above. B y his own testimony , Offic er Gillard wa s assig ned a ve hicle fr om the flee t ever y day that he wa s on duty . His use of a flee t vehicle, the ref

ore, w as “usua l, normal, [an d ] cust omary , as opposed to occ asional, spec ial, or incidental.” B ased upon our discussion above, the fac t that Offic er G illard was a ssigne d a diffe rent vehicle a pproxi mately

forty perc ent of the tim e, does not ne g ate a finding of “r egular use.” As stated by this Court i n She

phe rd, “ ‘i t is re g ula

r use of oth e r autom ob ile s tha t br ing s th e e xclu sio na ry c la us e in to o p e r a ti o n , an d if in s u r e d ' s e mp lo y e r a s s ig n s h im o n e s p e c if ic a u to mo b il e f

o r r e g u la r u s e or a number of a

utomobiles, any

one of which may be assigned for a pa rticular tr ip, the result is the same. An a uto mob ile is f

ur nis he d in sure d ‘ fo r r e g ula r u se ’ i n e ith e r eve nt . We kn owof no a uth or ity holding to the c ontrary .’” She phe rd v . Fre go zo , 1 7 5 S

. W

. 3 d

at 2 1 3 (q u o t i n g Mo orev

. St ate Far m-12-

Mut. Aut o. Ins. C o. , 239 Miss. 130, 121 S o.2d 125, 126-27 (1960) ). Consequently , we f ind that the trial court e rre d in denying N ationwide’s motion for summary judgme nt.
Be cause we have dete rmined th a t the Nationwide policy

does not provide c overa g e to Off icer Gillard in this case, w e dec line to addre ss Nationwide’s se cond issue.

Fo r t h e fo re go i ng rea sons, we re verse the orde r of the tr ial court, a nd rema nd the ca se for entry of an or der g rantingsummary judgme nt in favor of

Nationwide. Costs o f t h i s ap p eal a re a s s e s s e d a g a i n s tt h e A p p e l l e e , W ayn e B

. G i l l ar d , f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ J. STE VE N ST AFF OR D, J.