The fire came as a shock to the 1st ANGLICO teams maneuvering outside the

city alongside the Saudis and Qataris,

since Colonel Turki and Colonel Admire

had agreed that all fire would be coordinated through the supporting arms liaison teams. Lieutenant Colonel William

C. Grubb, Jr., 1st ANGLICO commander,

went to the 3d Marines combat operations center and fixed the fire support coordination problem, which led to the

order that all fire missions be approved by

the air-naval gunfire teams. Despite these

attempts to avoid firing on Coalition

forces, the Qatari's claimed one of their

AMX-30s was disabled by Marine artillery fire, although it was not confirmed. 177

Meanwhile, the 7th Battalion, 2d Saudi

Arabian National Guard Brigade, was

preparing another attempt to storm alKhafji and relieve the reconnaissance

teams. This time, the attack was more

carefully prepared, with artillery support

from both Saudi and Marine artillery

units and extensive Marine close air support coordinated by the teams working

alongside the Saudi Arabian National

Guard units. Despite the air and artillery

support, the Iraqis still put up a fierce

fight, destroying three Saudi V-150 armored cars.'78 "Tank main gun, recoilless

rifle, TOW [antitank missile], and small

arms fire came thick and furious," 1st ANGLICO later reported. "The Saudis and

Qataris charged through the streets firing

at everything and anything and in every

direction:"79

The battle raged through the southern

half of al-Khafji, while Marine AV-8B

Harriers and AH-1W Cobras provided

direct support to the Saudi and Qatari

troops. Air-naval gunfire teams directed

the Cobras in a strafing run against the

town's water tower, and Harriers destroyed Iraqi vehicles at the major road

intersection in that quarter of the city.'8°

The Marine reconnaissance teams took

advantage of the confusion of this assault

to withdraw safely from al-KhaIji, one on

foot, the other team in humvees that had

sat inside a courtyard, undetected by the

Iraqis since the first hours of the battle.'8'

In the afternoon, the 7th Battalion

withdrew to rest and resupply, and the

8th Battalion, 2d Saudi Arabian National

Guard Brigade, took its place clearing alKhafi buildings. By this point the Saudis

had lost 7 Cadillac Gage V-150 Armored

Cars, 18 dead, and 50 wounded. The

clearing operation continued throughout

the night. "Saudi urban operations were

different than what Americans practice,"

Captain Braden later noted. "Instead of

room-by-room clearing, they simply occupy a block and if they take fire they target with TOWs and heavy machine guns

until resistance stops and then move to

the next building of street. As a result of

these techniques there were numerous

pockets of Iraqis left in the city that would

be killed or captured over the next few

days:"82

In the north, 5th Battalion, 2d Saudi

National Guard, and its attached air-naval

gunfire teams under Captain Kleinsmith

and First Lieutenant Paul B. Deckert

stopped Iraqi units trying to reinforce

their forces in al-Kha!Ji. At Observation

Post 7, a battery of Iraqi self-propelled

howitzers had taken up position, supported by infantry and armored personnel carriers. A division of four Cobras

destroyed the battery under Captain

Kleinsmith's direction, but their arrival

coincided with the destruction by enemy

fire of two Saudi armored cars and an ambulance. Convinced that they had suffered friendly fire, the Saudis withdrew,

leaving Captain Kleinsmith and his team

to stabilize the line with air support.

When the immediate Iraqi threats were

removed, Kleinsmith's team rejoined the

5th Battalion. 83

As the ground fight for al-KhafJi drew

to a close, the air effort continued to devastate the Iraqi forces. After a slow start,

Coalition air forces claimed hundreds of

tanks, armored personnel carriers, and

artillery tubes destroyed during the five

The Battle of al-Khafji 31

Operating in their doctrinal role as part of the Marine air-ground task force, AV-8B Harriers provided needed close air support during the Battle of al-Khafji.

History Division Photo
days that al-Khafji remained the main effort. An Air Force post war study highlighted the effect of the air attacks: "pilots

described the frantic maneuverings of

surviving Iraqi vehicles as visually equivalent to the results of 'turning on the light

in a cockroach-infested apartment." The

report added: "perhaps the most revealing comment of all came from a member

of the Iraqi 5th Mechanized Division who

had fought in the Iran-Iraq War. This veteran soldier stated that Coalition airpower imposed more damage on his

brigade in half an hour than it had sustained in eight years of fighting against

the Iranians." 184

The next morning, 1 February, Saudi

units advanced all the way through alKha1i, encountering only light resistance.

They cleared the city of remaining Iraqi

troops, although solitary holdouts would

appear to surrender over the next few

days, and established a defensive position

north of the city. The Battle of al-Khafji

had ended.'85

Every battle has losses. During the

Battle of al-Khafji, 25 Americans lost their

lives, 11 Marines and 14 airmen. Three

Marines were wounded and two soldiers

captured by the enemy. One LAV-25, one

LAy-AT, and one AC-130 gunship were

destroyed. The Saudis and Qataris suffered 18 killed and 50 wounded. Ten armored cars and two tanks were destroyed.

After the war, the Iraqis claimed to have

destroyed 4 helicopters, 30 tanks, and 58

armored personnel carriers, as well as

capturing 13 prisoners.'86 They listed

their losses as 71 dead, 148 wounded, and

702 missing, as well as 186 vehicles destroyed, but their actual losses were likely

higher. In the immediate vicinity of alKhalJi alone, 1st ANGLICO reported 90

vehicles destroyed, at least 300 Iraqi soldiers killed, and 680 captured. By most

accounts, the 6th Brigade, 3d Armored Division was badly mauled and the 15th,

20th, and 26th Brigades of the 5th Mechanized Division were nearly destroyed.'87

The Battle of al-Khafi had some immediate consequences. The deaths which

occurred in the early morning hours of 30

January, when an Air Force A-b fired the

missile into the Marine LAV-25, were one

of several similar events during January.

As a result, General Boomer ordered an

investigation to determine what measures

could be taken to prevent future casualties. The investigation team's report was

completed prior to the invasion of Kuwait

and its recommendations implemented.

Otherwise, Marines, Saudis, and Iraqis

all took differing views of the battle.

Marines generally took away an increased

confidence in techniques and doctrines,

and a clearer idea of the enemy they

would face. Lieutenant Colonel Myers

felt that the screening forces along the

border had exceeded expectations and the

battle "proved the concept, philosophically" of the light armored vehicle.'88 Captain Braden saw al-Khafi as proof of the

value and importance of the air-naval

gunfire liaison company, and long after

the battle ended, he was using al-Khafi as

an example to argue against its disbandment: "Without ANGLICO, it is difficult

to envision another successful Battle of alKhafi," he wrote.'89

Marines gained confidence in their

Saudi allies. Colonel Admire, for one,

now felt there was "no doubt in the Marine Corps force's mind that when the

time would come to in fact attack into

Kuwait, the Saudis and the Qataries and

the Coalition forces would be with us.

Absolutely no doubt."9° Captain Molofsky agreed because "when push came to

shove, without any real plan, any real direction, those Saudi soldiers obeyed their

orders and went forward. And, they did

so courageously."9'

General Boomer saw al-Khafji as further proof that the Iraqi military was a

hollow force. "We knew they weren't motivated even by the time al-Khafji occurred, and it confirmed it. We were

beginning to pick up POWs who said, 'I

don't want any part of this deal. I am

down here getting the heck pounded out

of me everyday, food and water are short.

Why am I here?' In essence they were

saying, 'I don't want to die here, in this

conflict.' We were getting enough of that

so that I really came to believe that there

was a significant morale problem on the

other side."92 But for Captain Molofsky,

the view at the tactical level was somewhat different: "My opinion was that; if

that's what it was gonna take to get started

in the recovery of a small town like alKhafJi, that we were gonna be involved in

32 The Battle of al-Khaf)i

Photo courtesy of CpI Charles H. Ingraham III

Cpl Jeffery D. Brown of3d Platoon, Company A, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, stands in

one of his team's humvees. The humvee's tires were punctured and its windshield shattered by shrapnel from a Marine artillery barrage called in on Iraqi forces near the reconnaissance teams' positions. Cpl Brown was wounded by the same artillery strike.
"Cleaning up Khafji" by Capt Charles G. Grow.

a prolonged and bloody struggle:"93

The U.S. Air Force saw the Battle of alKhalJi as the proof of air power: "The Battle of Khalji was preeminently an airpower

victory." Close air support and battlefield

interdiction had isolated the battlefield and

inflicted great destruction upon the Iraqis.

The result was a "devastating defeat" for the

Iraqi military and "airpower was the decisive element"94

General Khaled bin Sultan explained

that while the battle was such an important

victory for the Saudis had it gone badly,

"the blow to our morale would have been

severe. But victory changed the mood of

our soldiers to an amazing degree. They

had been given a chance to prove themselves and had done so splendidly.... Our

forces were now equal partners with our allies, ready to play a full role in any future

battle:"95

Perhaps the most surprising conclusion

concerning the Battle of al-Khaiji came

from the Iraqis. Iraqi post-war studies

present al-Khalji as a victory whose techniques and procedures should be emulated

to ensure future success. The Iraqis were

able to plan and launch a major offensive

despite the Coalition's air power advantage.

They succeeded in capturing al-Khafji and

held it for two days against an enemy superior in technology and numbers)96 As General Salah Aboud concluded: "The al-Khalji

conflict is on the list of the bright confficts

in Iraqi Army history.... one of the thousands recorded in the Iraqi Army history

for the new generations:"97

In the end everyone but the dead and

wounded won the Battle of al-Khaiji. Although the battle did not accomplish any of

the Iraqi objectives, it presented enough of

an appearance of success that Saddam was

able to claim a credible propaganda victory.

After the war, the Iraqis were convinced

that the battle had somehow influenced the

Coalition's decision to end the war after

evicting the Iraqis from Kuwait, but before

removing Saddam Hussein from power.

The Saudis faced an invasion of their

territory and defeated it. Although Coalition air power undoubtedly played a key

role in the defeat of the Iraqi offensive, it

was the bravery of the Saudi ground troops,

with American advisors, who actually

ejected the Iraqis from Saudi soil. AlKhalJi has entered Saudi military history as

a great victory.

For the Americans, al-Khaf5i was won

almost by accident. American forces

proved so superior that it did not completely register that a major Iraqi offensive

had occurred. As a result, U.S. Central

Command planners did not expect the

Iraqis to collapse as quickly as they did in

the February iflvasiofl.'98

At al-Khai, all of the Marine deaths

were caused by U.S. fire, but that should not

detract from their sacrifice, nor from the

bravery of the Marines who survived the

battle through luck and training. Endorsing the final report on the Marines killed

by the A- 10's missile, General Boomer said:

"The technological marvels that helped the

Coalition forces defeat Iraq sometimes fail,

and with disastrous results.... Marines, heroes in my heart, lost their lives while repelling an enemy force. They were good

Marines."99

The Battle of al-Khaiji 33

Marine Corps Art Collection

Marines of3d Battalion, 3d Marines, search al-Khafji for Iraqi stragglers and examine the battle damage as depicted in the painting
AI-Khafji Order of Battle

u.s. Marine Forces

I Marine Expeditionary Force

1st Surveillance. Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group

1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

1st Marine Division

1st Reconnaissance Battalion

1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion (Task Force Shepherd)

Ist Battalion, 12th Marines

3d Marines

2d Marine Division

2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion

3d Marine Aircraft Wing

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 367

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369

Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer

Colonel Michael V. Brock

Lieutenant Colonel William C. Grubb. Jr.

Major General lames M. Myatt

Lieutenant Colonel Michael L. Rapp

Lieutenant Colonel Clifford O. Myers III

Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Rivers

Colonel John H. Admire

Major General William M. Keys

Lieutenant Colonel Keith T. Holcomb

Major General Royal . Moore, Ir.

Lieutenant Colonel Terry I. Frerker

Lieutenant Colonel Michael M. Kurth

Joint Forces Command

Joint Forces Command East

Saudi Arabian and Qatari Forces

General Khaled bin Sultan bin Saud

Major General Sultan 'Adi al-Mutairi

2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade

5th Battalion, 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade

7th Battalion, 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade

8th Battalion, 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade

Qatari Brigade

Iraqi Forces

III Corps

5th Mechanized Division

15th Mechanized Brigade

26th Mechanized Brigade

20th Mechanized Brigade

3d Armored Division

6th Armored Brigade

IV Corps

1st Mechanized Division

34

Colonel Turki Abdulmohsin al-Firmi

Lieutenant Colonel Naif

Lieutenant Colonel Hamid Matar

Lieutenant Colonel Hamud

Lieutenant Colonel Ali Saeed

Major General Salah Aboud Mahmoud

Brigadier General Flyeh Yaseen

Colonel KhalifHamid

Colonel Amid Abduljabir

Brigadier General Hussan Zedin

Colonellbdil Raziq Mahmoud

Major General Yaiyd Khalel Zaki

Brigadier General Hussen

The Battle of aJ-Khafji
This section based on material from

LtCol James R. Braden, "The Battle of Kha1i:

A Coalition Air Ground Task Force Victory"

(Paper, USMC Command and Staff College,

1999), p. 11-12, hereafter Braden, "Khafji";

see also Wffliamson Murray, Air War in the

Persian Gulf (Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation

Publishing Company, 1995), hereafter Murray, Air War in the Persian Gulf, Lieutenant

General Bernard E. Trainor and Michael R.

Gordon, The Generals' War (Boston: Little,

Brown and Company, 1995), hereafter Gordon and Trainor, Generals' War.

2 James Titus, "The Battle of Khat)i: An

Overview and Preliminary Analysis" (Paper,

Air University, 1996), p. 7, hereafter Titus,

"Khaf5i."

Northrop Grumman Corp., "Joint Stars

Data Analysis: The Battle of Khai" (Paper,

USAF Studies and Analysis Agency, 1997), p.

18.

This section based on material from

Kevin M. Woods, et al., Iraqi Perspectives

Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom

from Saddam's Senior Leadership (Joint Center for Operational Analysis, u.d.), hereafter

Iraqi Perspectives; Captured Iraqi War College Study, Al-Khalji Conflict (ISGQ-2003-

0004603 1), hereafter Iraqi War College Study;

Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military

Effectiveness 1948-1 991 (London: University

of Nebraska Press, 2002), hereafter Pollack,

Arabs at War.

Iraqi Perspectives, p. 6. 6 Ibid., pp. 15, 20.

7lbid.,p. 16.

8 Ibid., p. 95.

9lbid.

1011 Ibid. 12 Ibid., p. 96.

13 Edgar O'Ballance, The Gulf War (New

York; Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1988),

summary of discussion on pp. 94, 143-145,

164-166, 173-174, 194; Gordon and Trainor,

Generals' War, p. 268-269; LtCol Peter J.

Palmer, "Battle of Khaf)i: A Gulf State Perspective" (Paper, Marine Corps University,

u.d.), hereafter Palmer, "Gulf State:' 14 How They Fight: Desert Shield Order of

Battle Handbook, AIA-DS-2-90 (1990); DOD,

Iraq Country Handbook, DOD-2600-642794,

(1994).

War College Study; Captured Iraqi

Training Pamphlet, Battle of al-Khafji (ISGQ2003-00054592), hereafter Iraqi Training

Pamphlet.

16 Iraqi War College Study, pp. 104-105.

17 Air War College Study, "EPW Interviews" (Maxwell AFB: Air Force Historical

Research Agency); Palmer, "Gulf State."

War College Study, p. 101.

' Bruce R. Nardulli, "Dance of Swords:

U.S. Military Assistance to Saudi Arabia,

1942-1964" (unpublished Phd Dissertation,

The Ohio State University, 2002). 20 Mohamed Heikal, Illusions of Triumph

(New York: HarperCollins, 1992).

21 Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia,

(Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 122, hereafter Cordesman, Saudi Arabia; Palmer, "Gulf

State."

22 Cordesman, Saudi Arabia, p. 137;

Palmer, "Gulf State"; Martin Stanton, Road to

Baghdad (New York, Ballantine Books, 2003),

hereafter Stanton, Road to Baghdad. 23 Stanton, Road to Baghdad, pp. 14-18;

Braden, "Khafji," pp. 5, 23, 29-30; Palmer,

"Gulf State' 24 General Khaled bin Sultan, Desert Warrior (New York:, Harper & Collins Publishers, 1995), hereafter Khaled, Desert Warrior. 25 Ibid., p. 379.

26Col Joseph Molofsky intvw with author,

30Jun06 and 16Aug06 (MCHC, Quantico,

VA), hereafter Molofsky intvw, 30Jun06 or

Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06. 27 Stanton, Road to Baghdad, pp. 23-25. 28 LtCol D. P. Hughes, "Battle for KhaIJi:

29Jan/1 Feb 1991' Defense Quarterly, pp. 15-

22; Palmer, "Gulf State."

29 BGen Thomas V. Draude intvw with

author and Dr. Fred Allison, 21Jun06

(MCHC, Quantico, VA). 30 Col John A. Admire intvw, CD 10234

(Grey Research Center, Quantico, VA), hereafter Admire intvw.

31 Molofsky intvw, 30Jun06, 16Aug06;

Braden, "Khali' p. 8

32Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06.

Braden, "Khai," pp. 8-9.

34Ibid., pp. 6-7.

35Titus, "Khali," p.9; Gordon and Trainor,

Generals' War, pp. 268-269.

36Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06.

1st Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company/ist Surveillance, Reconnaisance, Intelligence Group After Action Report for the

Battle of Khafji, 29Jan91 - 1Feb91 (MCHC,

Quantico VA), hereafter ANGLICO AAR.

38LtCol Clifford 0. Myers intvw by LtCol

Charles H. Cureton, 8Mar91 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Myers intvw, 8Mar91.

n Khaled, Desert Warrior, Braden, pp. 7-8;

Palmer, "Gulf State:' 40 Maj Steven M. Zimmeck, US. Marines

in the Persian Gulf 1990-1 991: CombatService Support in Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

(Washington, D.C.: History and Museums

Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,

1999), p. 108. 41 Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06. 42 Braden, "Khai," p. 8.

Leroy D. Stearns, US. Marines in the

Persian Gulf 1990-1 991: With the 3d Marine

Aircraft Wing in Desert Shield and Desert

Storm (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine

Corps, 1999), p.122; LtCol Charles H. Cureton, US. Marines in the Persian Gulf 1990-

1991: With the 1st Marine Division in Desert

Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.:

History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1993), pp. 26-28.

Iraqi War College Study, p. 97.

u Ibid., pp. 99-101.

Ibid., p. 98. '

Ibid., p. 99.

Ibid., p. 103.

n Gordon and Trainor, Generals' War, p.

269.

50lraqi War College Study, pp. 104-107.

51 Titus, "Khai," p. 7.

52 Braden, "Khai' p. 13.

Ibid. 54n Ibid., pp. 13-14.

56ANGLICO AAR.

Braden, "KhaIJi' pp. 13-14. 58 David J. Morris, Storm on the Horizon

(New York Free Press, 2004), p. 145, hereafter

Morris, Storm.

War College Study. 60 Morris, Storm, p. 145.

61 Iraqi War College Study, pp. 108-109. 62 Ibid., pp. 144-146. 63 Ibid., pp. 108-109.

64Braden, "Khat)i," p. 14.

65ANGLICO AAR. 66 Braden, "Khai," p. 14. 67 Morris, Storm, pp. 3 1-32.

68Ibid., Ch. 1. 69 Ibid., pp. 3, 31-34.

70Morris, Storm p. 50; Roger Pollard, "The

Battle for Op-4: Start of the Ground War,'

Marine Corps Gazette, Mar92, hereafter Pollard, "Op-4"; Myers intvw, 8Mar91; 1st LAI

ComdC, Jan-Feb9l (Gray Research Center,

Quantico, VA).

71 Pollard, "Op-4"; Myers intvw, 8Mar91;

1st LAI ComdC, Jan-Feb9l (Gray Research

Center, Quantico, VA). 72 Iraqi War College Study, pp. 120-125.

Morris, Storm, pp. 1-6.

74Pollard, "Op-4"; Myers intvw, 8Mar91.

75Morris, Storm, pp. 66-73. 76 Pollard, "Op-4."

Ibid. 78 Lt David Kendall intvw, 7Feb91 (Gray

Research Center, Quantico, VA).

79Pollard, "Op-4."

80Pollard, "Op-4"; Pollard, Capt Roger L.

intvw with LtCol Charles H. Cureton, CD#

10441 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA),

hereafter Pollard, intvw.

81 Lt David Kendall intvw, 7Feb91 (Gray

Research Center, Quantico, VA). 82 Pollard, "Op-4"; 1st LAI ComdC, JanFeb91 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA). 83 Fratricide - Investigation into USAF AtThe Battle of al-Khafji 35
tack on Marine LAy, SWA-0062, Seq. No.

01980 (MCLLS, Quantico, VA)

intvw. 85 Ibid. 86 Myers intvw, 8Mar91. 87 Pollard, "Op-4"; Pollard intvw; Myers

intvw, 8Mar91. 88 Iraqi War College Study, pp. 120-125.

89Ibid., PP. 144-146. 90 Ibid., PP. 120-125. 91 2d LAI ComdC, Jan-Feb9l (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA). 92 Ibid. '

Titus, "Khafji' P. 12; Dennis P. Mroczkowski, US. Marines in the Persian

Gull; 1990-1991: With the 2d Marine Division

in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington: HQMC, 1993), pp. 20-23; Gordon and

Trarnor, Generals' War, pp. 2 74-275.

Morris, Storm, pp. 114-118. 96 Titus, "Khaf)i' p. 12; Gordon and

Trarnor, Generals' War, p. 275; Morris, Storm,

PP. 119-125.

Titus, "KhalJi," p. 12. 98 Pollard, "Op-4"; 1st LAI ComdC, JanFeb91 (Gray Research Center, Quantico,

VA).

15.

' ANGLICO AAR; Braden, "Khai," p.

'°°ANGLICO AAR.

101 Ibid.

102 Braden, "Kha!Ji," p. 14.

'°3ANGLICO AAR. 104 Khaled, Desert Warrior, p. 366. 105 Palmer, "Gulf State."

106 Titus, "KhaIji' p. 13; Gordon and

Trainor, Generals' War, pp. 279-286; Khaled,

Desert Warrior, pp. 381-387; Rick Atkinson,

Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf

War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), pp.

208-2 13, hereafter Atkinson, Crusade.

'°7Braden, "Khai," p. 14.

'°8ANGLICO AAR.

'°9Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06. 110 Khaled, Desert Warrior, p. 368. 11! Ibid., p. 365. 112 Ibid., p. 368. 113 Braden, "KhaIJi' p. 15. 114 Titus, "KhalJi," p. 11. 115 Titus, "Khaf)i," p. 11; Gordon and

Trainor, Generals' War, pp. 273, 278. 116 HMLA-367 ComdC, Jan91, and

HMLA-369 ComdC, Jan91 (Gray Research

Center, Quantico, VA). 117 Leroy D. Stearns, US. Marines in the

Persian Gulf 1990-1 991: With the 3d Marine

Aircraft Wing in Desert Shield and Desert

Storm (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine

Corps, 1999), pp. 124-125. 118 Morris, Storm, p. 150-158.

119 Clifton A Barnes, "In Every Clime and

Place," Leatherneck, Aug91, pp. 16-20.

'20Titus "Khai," p. 10; Friedman, pp.192'-

198; 160; Gordon and Trainor, Generals' War,

pp. 268-269; Shield and Sword, p. 227-229.

121 ANGLICO AAR; Braden, "Khafji," p.

15. 122 Ibid.

123 Ibid.

124 125 Iraqi War College Study, p. 111. 126 Ibid., pp. 120-125. 127 Ibid., pp. 147-148. 120 Ibid., pp. 125-126. 129 Morris, Storm, pp. 166-169.

130 1st Recon ComdC, Jan-Mar9l and 3d

Recon ComdC, Jan-Feb9 1, (Gray Research

Center, Quantico, VA).

131 Molofsky intvw, 30Jun06. 132 Morris, Storm, PP. 159-166. 133 I Marine Expeditionary Force Commander's Morning Briefing, 30Jan91.

'34Boomer intvw 27Jul06.

Khaled, Desert Warrior, p. 364. 136 Ibid., p. 376.

'37ANGLICO AAR. 138 Ibid.

'39

'40Braden "Khafli' p. 16.

'41ANGLICO AAR.

'42ANGLICO AAR; Braden, "Khafji," pp.

16-17.

'43ANGLICO AAR.

'

1/12 ComdC, Jan-Feb9l (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA). 145 HMLA-367 ComdC, Jan91 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA). '

Braden, "Khai' pp. 19-20.

'47

'4 Admire intvw.

"v Ibid.

ISO Morris, Storm, Pp. 194.

'5' Ibid., pp. 193-196. 152 Ibid., pp. 196-197.

R. R. Keene, "In Every Clime and

Place' Leatherneck, Mar91, pp. 22-27; Morris, Storm, pp. 196-198; Otto Lehrack, America's Battalion (Tuscaloosa: University of

Alabama Press, 2005), pp. 128-13 1.

H. Mould, "Press Pools and Military-Media Relations in the Gulf War: A

Case Study of the Battle of Khafji, January

1991' Hi stori cal Journal of Film, Radio & Television, Jun96, p. 133.

Khaled, Desert Warrior, p. 374. 156 Gordon and Trainor, Generals' War,

p.279. 157 Khaled, Desert Warrior, p. 374. 158 Boomer intw, 27Jul06.

159 Khaled, Desert Warrior, p. 378.

'60Braden, "Khai' p. 20; Khaled, Desert

Warrior; pp. 362-390. LtCol Martin N. Stanton, "The Saudi Arabian National Guard Motorized Brigades," Armor, Mar-Apr96, pp.

6-11. 161 Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06.

162

'63ANGLICO AAR. 164 Stanton, Road to Baghdad, p. 261. 165 Ibid., p. 262.

'66Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06.

'67Stanton, Road to Baghdad, pp. 262-264;

Braden, "Khai," pp. 20-22.

'68Molofsky intvw, 30Jun06. 169 Braden, "Khafji," pp. 22-23. '° Stanton, Road to Baghdad, p. 266.

171 Palmer, "Gulf State."

172 Titus, "KhafJi," pp. 13-14. " Titus, "KhaI5i," pp. 17-20; Gordon and

Trainor, Generals' War, p. 284. The most detailed secondary account of the shoot down is

in Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story

of the Gulf War (Boston:Houghton Mifflin,

1993), p. 210.

Gordon and Trainor, Generals' War, pp.

283, 285-287. 175 Morris, Storm, p. 253; ANGLICO

AAR. 176 1/12 ComdC, Jan-Feb9l (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA). " Morris, Storm, pp. 253-258.

178 ANGLICO AAR; Braden, "Khafji," p.

17. 179 Braden, "Khafi," pp. 22-23.

'80ANGLICO AAR.

181 Ibid.

182 Morris, Storm, pp. 258-266.

183 Braden, "KhaOi," p. 23-24.

'84ANGLICO AAR.

'85Titus "Khai," pp. 17-20; General Mahmoud's comments and the references to Iraqi

radio communications are taken from Gordon and Trainor, Generals' War, pp. 283,285-

87; the "cockroach" analogy appears in H.

Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero

(New York: Linda Grey, Bantam, 1992), P.

429.

'06ANGLICO AAR. 187 Training Pamphlet.

'88ANGLICO AAR. 189 Myers intvw, 8Mar91. 190 Braden, "Khafji," p. 32. 191 Admire intvw.

'92Molofsky intvw, 30Jun06. 193 Boomer intvw, 27Jul06 (MCHC,

Quantico, VA).

'94Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06.

Titus, "KhaIji"; Barry D. Watts, et al.,

"Effects and Effectiveness," The Gulf War Air

Power Survey Volume II, Eliot A. Cohen, et

al. 6 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government

Printing Office, 1993), p. 240. 196 Khaled, Desert Warrior, p. 390.

Iraqi War College Study, p. 97. 198 and Trainor, Generals' War, p.

288.200 Fratricide - Investigation into USAF

Attack on Marine LAV, SWA-0062, Seq. No.

01980 (MCLLS, Quantico, VA).

36 The Battle of al-Khafji
About the Author

And Acknowledgements

Paul W Westermeyer received a Master of Arts degree in history from the Ohio State University in 1996, and is

pursuing a doctorate in history from the same institution. He joined the staff of the History Division in 2005.

The Iraqi documents used as sources for this project were translated by Ali al Saadee; the project could not have

been completed without his excellent work. The finished manuscript also benefited from the aid and advice of

David J. Morris, Dr. Kevin Osterloh, and Dr. Amin Tarzi. History DiVision interns Alexander N. Hinman, Nicholas

J. Ross, Evan Sills, and Paul R. Zimmerman provided invaluable research assistance.

This work could not have been published without the professional efforts ofthe staff ofthe History Division. Dr.

Nathan S. Lowrey provided invaluable professional advice and support. The author would like to thank Charles

D. Melson, Chades R. Smith, Greg Macheak, and Major Valerie A. Jackson for their comments and revisions. W.

Stephen Hill designed and produced the layout, including maps. Peggy f. Frierson prepared the art and photographs

for this publication.

Back Cover: The logotype reproduced on the back

cover has as its major element the oldest military

insignia in continuous us.e in the United States. It

first appeared, as shown here) on Marine Corps

buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed

to five points, the device has continued on Marine

Corps buttons to the present day.

History Division

United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C.

2008

PCN 106 000 400

Background Photo: For w.ounds suffered during the Battle ofal-Khajji, (j;plleff,~ry 9. Brown

'of3d Platoon; Compqny A, 3d l1econnaissance

Batt~lion, recei.es the Purple Heart at Manifa

Ba)\ $au1fi ArabIa, hI/OWing the war.

Photo cQurtesy oTCpl<;harles kl.lograham IU