NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________ No. 19-2438

______________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. CASEY CUNNINGHAM, Appellant

______________ On Appeal from the United St ates District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2-12-cr-00137-001) District Judge: Hon. Robert F. Kelly

______________ Submitted Pursuant t o Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) April 2, 2020 Before: GREENAWAY, JR., PORTER, and MATEY, Circuit Judges

. (Filed: April 29, 2020)

______________ OPINION *

______________

* This disposition is not an opinio n of the full Court and, purs uant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute bi nding precedent.2 MATEY, Circuit Judge

. Casey Cunningham appeals from an order modifying the terms of his supervised release. While we find no abuse of discretion, the scope of the District Court’s order warrants clarification. So we w ill affirm in part and vacate in part, and remand to the District Court for further proceed ings consistent with this opi nion.
I. B ACKGROUND In 2012, Cunningham pleaded gu ilty to three counts of bank rob bery. Prior to sentencing, the Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investi gation Report (PSR) detailing Cunningham’s past crim inal record, including a 1997 p lea of nolo contendere for sexual assault against a minor l eading to seven and a half year s imprisonment. The District Court sentenced him to 96 months’ imprisonment followed by thre e years’ supervised release. Just before Cunningham’s release, the Probation Office sought additional conditions on the terms of his supervised release. Citing Cunningham’s 201 2 PSR and the 1997 sexual assault conviction, the Office characterized Cunningham as “a ‘ hands on’ sex offender” who “has a mental health history of suicide ideation and attemp ts, as well as being sexually abused as a child.” (App. at 102.) The Office requested that Cu nningham participate in a sex offender and mental health evaluation program and, while in treatment, undergo a psychosexual evaluation. Before ruling on the petition, t he District Court ordered Cunn ingham to undergo a psychosexual evaluation. The psychologist’s report recommended that Cunningham (1) attend sex-offense-specific indi vidual and group therapy, unles s he could provide3 documentation that he had completed sex offense mental health t reatment; (2) engage in and complete relapse-prevention counseling and therapeutic exer cises; (3) take a polygraph within the first six months of t reatment; (4) be strictly limit ed from contact with minors; (5) abstain from drugs and alcoho l; (6) adhere to restrictions and requirements of probation/parole; and (7) receiv e routine medical care. Followi ng the evaluation, the Probation Office renewed its petition to modify the terms of Cu nningham’s supervised release, requesting that the Cou rt impose each of the report’s recommendations. The District Court granted the motion. Along with Cunningham’s original terms of supervised release, the Court or dered him to complete a “sex of fender/mental health program” and to submit to any asse ssments or testing deemed nec essary to monitor compliance with his supervised r elease and treatment conditions . (App. at 9.) The Court also barred Cunningham from any “unmonitored or unsupervised co ntact with minors.” (App. at 9.) Cunningham a ppeals from that Order. 2
II. T HE D ISTRICT C OURT D ID N OT A BUSE ITS D ISCRETION W HEN IT

M ODIFIED THE T ERMS OF C UNNINGHAM ’ S S UPERVISED R ELEASE As part of a criminal sentence, a court may impose a term of su pervised release after imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). A term of supervised release comes with c ertain conditions, some mandatory and s ome the court may impose at its discretion. See id. § 3583(d). But any conditions imp osed beyond those mandated by statute must be

2 The District Court had original jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and jurisdiction to modify Cunningham’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). This Court has jurisdiction to review that sentence modification under 28 U.S. C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review modificati ons of the terms of supervised r elease for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Wilson , 707 F.3d 412, 414 (3d Cir. 2013).4 reasonably related to factors listed in § 3553(a), and involve no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary. See id. §§ 3583(d)(1)–(2). We have noted that § 3553(a) factors levy “real restriction[s] on the district court’s freedom to impose conditions on supervised release.” United States v. Pruden , 398 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2005). They req uire “‘some evidence’ that the special conditions imposed are ‘tangibly related’ to the goals of supervised release.” United States v. Holena , 906 F.3d 288, 290 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Voelker , 489 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 2007). While “not an especially h igh standard” it has “teeth.” Pruden , 398 F.3d at 249. Cunningham argues that the sentence modification is not reason ably related to his crimes or characteristics, and argues the change is not narrowl y tailored. Nor, he claims, do the new conditions serve a le gitimate purpose. He notes that the prior conviction supporting the changes occurred more than twenty years ago and is therefore “too remote to justify” new conditions. (Opening Br. at 13.) In support, Cu nningham cites cases rejecting similar modifications. See, e.g., United States v. Carter , 463 F.3d 526, 527 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. T.M. , 330 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Dougan , 684 F.3d 1030, 1031 (10th Cir. 2012). But we conclude Cunningham’s case fits within § 3553(a). First , while the underlying sexual offense is not r ecent, a new psychosexual eva luation recommended that Cunningham both participate in s ex offender treatment, and be b arred from unsupervised contact with minors. And after ser ving his prison term for the sexual assault, Cunningham fled from supervision and faile d to register as a sex offender for four years until he was eventually arrested. Despite his contention that he had complet ed sex offender treatment5 as part of his sentence for th e 1997 sexual assault conviction, Cunningham could not produce evidence confirming this f act. Moreover, Cunningham is ordered to undergo sex offender treatment only until he is successfully discharged. Based on these circumstances, the sentence modification imposed by the District Court is tail ored enough to Cunningham’s history and characteristics, affords adequate dete rrence, and protects the public. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B )–(C). The modification also ensures that Cunningham receives needed medical care and rehabilitative trea tment. See id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). In sum, ample ev idence shows the conditions ar e “tangibly related to the goals of supervised release” and “justif[ied] . . . [by] suppor ting facts.” Holena , 906 F.3d at 290 (internal qu otation marks and citations omitted).
III. T HE D ISTRICT C OURT S HOULD D ETERMINE THE P ROPER S COPE OF THE S ENTENCE M ODIFICATION Cunningham also argues that the portion of the sentence modifi cation that bars him from unsupervised contact with a ny minors denies him the abilit y to see his minor son. Because of the “severe intrusio n on . . . family life” that res ults from that possibility, we seek a “clear[] sign” from the District Court that it considere d the issue. United States v. Loy , 237 F.3d 251, 270 (3d Cir. 20 01). As the record here is uncle ar, a point all but conceded by the Government, 3 we will remand this portion of the sentence modification so the District Court may engage i n fact-finding and determine the proper scope of its order.

3 ( See Response Br. at 38–39.)6 IV. C ONCLUSION For the above reasons , we will affirm in pa rt and vacate in par t, and remand in part the District Court’s sentence modification order.