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NEWS FROM THE FRONT 5 January 2018

 

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News from the Front:

Hurricane Maria Relief Operations

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as Army Regulations (ARs), Field Manuals (FMs), and Technical Manuals (TMs), must

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Table of Contents

DSCA Lessons Page 4

Tactical Level Best Practices Page 14 

The contents of this document were acquired during a collection in Puerto Rico 

during the Hurricane Maria emergency relief efforts from 7-19 October 2017.

Unless otherwise attributed, photographs provided by LTC George Chigi, Center for 

Army Lessons Learned.
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Disaster Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Lessons

The purpose of this article is to share initial lessons and best practices observed by the 

units supporting the relief efforts in Puerto Rico following the landfall of Hurricane Maria. 

The intended audiences for the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) outputs are 

Major Commands (MACOMs), interagency partners, and Commanders and staffs 

executing Disaster Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions. 

On 20 September 2018, a category 5 hurricane made landfall on the U.S. island territory 

of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Hurricane Maria’s 155 mile per hour winds and 

rain overwhelmed Puerto Rico’s emergency response capabilities. The Puerto Rico 

Emergency Management Agency (PREMA) headquarters building was destroyed 

further complicating the territory’s response. Twenty-four hours after Maria’s landfall

United States Army North (ARNORTH) assets were in Puerto Rico to help coordinate 

and provide military assets for the recovery. This initial force would eventually grow to 

over 15,000 Soldiers and Department of Defense (DOD) personnel. Within hours of 

Hurricane Maria’s winds dropping to acceptable limits, Air Force aircraft landed under 

night vision conditions, set up infra-red beacons, and established minimal power 

requirements to begin landing follow on aircraft. In the initial three weeks, the Joint 

Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) was responsible for flying more than 1,400 

sorties in support of relief efforts. Naval and Marine assets supported off shore with the 

U.S.S. Comfort hospital ship and support to the Virgin Islands. One of the primary goals 

for the DSCA operations is to get the state or territory into a position where it can get 

back to daily life sustaining operations.

Two CALL analysts deployed to Puerto Rico to collect direct observations, lessons, and 

best practices. ARNORTH’s mission was to serve in the role of a JFLCC conducting 

Hurricane Maria DSCA. At the request of the Army North (ARNORTH) commander 

CALL was integrated into the JFLCC staff to collect insights across the entire island of 

Puerto Rico. Hurricane Maria disabled nearly all communications, making coordination 

with any entity impossible. This had a great impact on how the territory of Puerto Rico 

and its municipalities were able to direct Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) and DOD assets.

"We're working in direct support of FEMA. The military is not in charge here. The 

governor is in charge. They're supporting the governor, and we're supporting FEMA." 

 LTG Jeffery Buchanan

 Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC)

Source MSN News: https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/other/lt-gen-jeffrey-buchananpushes-back-on-criticism-of-trump-e2-80-99s-puerto-rico-response/ar-AAsCH4T
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Figure 1-1 Satellite photos from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 

show Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands visible lights before Hurricane Maria (24 July 2017) and 

after (25 September 2017). Source: NOAA Twitter site.

JFLCC Assessment. The overall assessment from the JFLCC leaders and staff is that 

there must be a strong situational understanding of the environment to affect change. 

As the local capabilities were crippled, FEMA and the JFLCC’s bottom-up refinement on 

situational understanding had to be heavily augmented by military units and often word 

of mouth. Additionally, the JFLCC needed a clear idea of what transitions must take 

place to quickly return control to the local government. This provided the chain of 

command with a guide to measure progress in the relief efforts and the local authorities’ 

ability to manage the operation. The slow build of capability from the scattered Puerto 

Rican National Guard and Reserve forces caused active duty military forces to regularly 

By October 8, 2017 the number of DOD generators installed in Puerto Rico had 

exceeded what was installed from the combined Florida and Texas hurricane relief, 

and had brought Puerto Rico’s power generation to pre-hurricane levels (albeit in 

limited areas).

Before Hurricane Maria: Visible lights of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands

After Hurricane Maria
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re-evaluate how they employed Title 10 and 32 forces with the authorities they were 

granted.

The 2017 hurricane season (1 June – 30 November) had not been the most active ever 

recorded, it comes at the end of a fairly long quiet period of Atlantic (North Atlantic 

Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea) hurricane activiety. It had produced not only two 

back to back major hurricane landfalls (Harvey and Irma) along the U.S. coast with 

devasting results, it also propduced the thrid strongest hurricane ever to hit the U.S., 

Hurricane Maria, which is regarded as the worst natural disaster on record in Puerto 

Rico.

The National Weather Service defines a hurricane as "an intense tropical weather 

system with well-defined circulation and sustained winds of 74 miles per hour (mph) (64 

knots) or higher." 

Figure 1-2 Soldiers prepare to distribute food and water (courtesy FEMA/Hurricane Maria 

DVIDS site)
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Hurricanes are rated according to intensity on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane 

Wind Scale:

Category 1 74-95 mph Very dangerous winds will produce some damage:

Well-constructed frame homes could have damage to roof, shingles, vinyl siding and 

gutters. Large branches of trees will snap and shallowly rooted trees may be toppled. 

Extensive damage to power lines and poles likely will result in power outages that 

could last a few to several days. 

Category 2 96-110 mph Extremely dangerous winds will cause extensive 

damage: Well-constructed frame homes could sustain major roof and siding 

damage. Near-total power loss is expected with outages that could last from several 

days to weeks. 

Category 3 (major) 111-129 mph Devastating damage will occur: Well-built 

framed homes may incur major damage or removal of roof decking and gable ends. 

Electricity and water will be unavailable for several days to weeks after the storm 

passes. 

Category 4 (major) 130-156 mph Catastrophic damage will occur: Well-built 

framed homes can sustain severe damage with loss of most of the roof structure 

and/or some exterior walls. Fallen trees and power poles will isolate residential 

areas. Power outages will last weeks to possibly months. Most of the area will be 

uninhabitable for weeks or months. 

Category 5 (major) 157 mph or higher Catastrophic damage will occur: A high 

percentage of framed homes will be destroyed, with total roof failure and wall 

collapse. Power outages will last for weeks to possibly months. Most of the area will 

be uninhabitable for weeks or months.
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Figure 1-3 Representation of the 2017 hurricane season depicting the five named

storms, their path, their strength, along with which Defense Coordinating Officer

(DCO) and Element (DCO/E) were activated. Along with the hurricanes, this figure

also depicts the western states wildfires and the United Nations support in New

York.

Hurricane Maria Timeline

• September 16, 2017 - Tropical Storm Maria forms about 620 miles eastsoutheast of Lesser Antilles.

• September 17-18, 2017 - Maria rapidly intensifies from a tropical storm into a 

Category 5 hurricane.

• September 18, 2017 - The storm hits the Caribbean island of Dominica as a 

Category 5 hurricane and devastates the area.

• September 20, 2017 - Makes landfall near Yabucoa in Puerto Rico as a 

Category 4 hurricane. It is the strongest storm to hit Puerto Rico in 85 

years. The energy grid was heavily damaged, with an island-wide power 

outage.
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• September 22, 2017 - The National Weather Service orders the evacuation of 

about 70,000 people living near the Guajataca River in northwest Puerto Rico 

because a dam is in danger of failing. The storm continues to churn northward, 

making landfall in the Caribbean islands of Turks and Caicos as a Category 3.

• September 26, 2017 - Maria weakens to a tropical storm as it heads northeast 

out to sea.

Trends Common to all Units in support of Puerto Rico’s DSCA operations

Common Operational Picture varied by unit (COP). For enduring or static missions 

the Google - Situation Awareness Geospatial Enterprise (SAGE) software COP that the 

JFLCC employed was functional and provided FEMA the situational awareness (SA) it 

required. The COP required a constant network connection, and at times was 

challenged in those missions that were quick response, required movement, or constant 

updates. FEMA's disparate COP existed in various, unsynchronized pieces throughout 

the Joint Field Office (JFO) floor, and conversations with key staff members in FEMA 

suggested that they did not have a strong understanding of what JFLCC missions were 

ongoing. Units subordinate to the JFLCC used various COP formats such as an analog 

map, a PowerPoint concept sketch, Blue Force Tracking (BFT) / Joint Capability 

Release (JCR), or Google-SAGE (as network strength improved). These individual 

COPs functioned as desired for the units, but the less capable COPs did have the risk 

of becoming overwhelmed if information flow improved. 

Situational Understanding: Analysis of the Joint Operating Area (JOA). Units 

operating in support of this mission all agreed that an in-depth analysis of the JOA is 

necessary to identify the right kind of unit to employ, and to ensure their roles are 

defined and understood. The units that were most noticeably effected by this trend were 

aviation, logistic, and medical. Numerous units commented that they felt unprepared, or 

that they did not bring the right resources for the mission. In some cases, this was 

connected to not understanding the scope of the disaster. In other cases, this ambiguity 

was connected to receiving guidance that detailed "who" and "what" kind of capability 

was needed as opposed to what results were desired. 
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Figure 1- 4 Soldiers and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers repair damage to the Guajataca

Dam.

Liaison Officer (LNO) use in the FEMA Joint Field Office. LNOs proved a success in 

this environment. They provided subject matter expertise level understanding to FEMA. 

Nearly every subordinate JFLCC organization had LNOs with FEMA. It is unclear if the 

JFLCC will need as many LNOs in a different DSCA mission where the State is more 

prepared. In the case of Hurricane Maria's DSCA response, the LNOs were a necessity 

as the State was not yet capable, and FEMA needed more expertise to help coordinate 

and plan down to the tactical level.

Mission Command. All units quickly realized that they would have to rely on Mission 

Command over mission command systems. Over-the-horizon communications were in 

short supply, units were separated by as much as 60 miles, and individual missions 

could be lengthy. Commanders began with detailed planning and intelligence 

preparation of the battlefield IPB to prepare the team. This was followed with clear task,

purpose, and intent. These steps clearly gave leaders the understanding they needed to 

execute with disciplined initiative. Several commanders commented to CALL that they 

appreciated the level of trust they were given by the JFLCC chain of command.
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Figure 1-5 Soldiers from the 2-501st General Aviation Battalion, 1st Combat Aviation Brigade, 

1st Armored Division, prepare a CH-47 for relief operations at the Roosevelt Roads Naval Air 

Station

FEMA Mission Assignment tasks to DOD. FEMA uses a Mission Assignment Tasking 

Order (MATO) to describe task and purpose for a mission concept or a specific mission. 

The MATO is similar to a task to subordinate units within an operations order. After the 

overarching MATO is approved, FEMA Emergency Support Functions (ESF) are 

comfortable with non-standard forms of directly communicating task and purpose 

(phone call, e-mail, post-it notes) to the military units. This created a potential for 

unnecessary staff work. From the FEMA and DCE point of view, this method worked, 

but to the executing units, it was received as last minute planning that never got beyond 

a 24-hour planning horizon. Units newly assigned to DSCA will have to be prepared 

for this different method of planning and execution when working with FEMA and 

local authorities.

“Don’t let the process frustrate you. Continue to work the mission towards 

success as opposed to becoming discouraged by details and roadblocks in 

the planning process.” --- Colonel Sharon Miller, Defense Coordinating 

Officer (Region 5)
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Figure 1-6 Portable mobile phone repeater van in Costa Azul, Puerto Rico

Communication Equipment. DSCA units are expected to operate in an austere 

environment, often-needing over-the-horizon capability and compatibility with civilian 

systems; Army Modified Table of Organization & Equipment (MTOE) does not account 

for a DSCA communication system(s). Several units expressed a need for an update to 

their MTOE that would allow for this added capability, or a communication suite 

package that is available for units on DSCA missions to draw. The equipment would 

require periodic re-evaluation as technology improves or older equipment fails to work 

well.

“When deployed, the satellite band-with is very high, in Continental United 

States (CONUS) and Puerto Rico the satellite availability is much lower, 

creating gaps in capability.” --- Colonel Jay Hopkins, Commander 1st

Combat Aviation Brigade, 1st Armored Division.
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Current Conditions in Puerto Rico as of 02 Jan 2018

Water Production 86.36% AAA

Power Generation 65.40% AEE Generation

Tele Com 95% JRTC

Cell Sites 89.55% JRTC

Gas Stations 88% DACO

Supermarkets 92% MIDA

Business Processing PAN 76% Departamento de 

la Familia

Shelters (Open) 18 Vivienda

Sheltered Individuals 298 Vivienda

Assisted Hospitals 68

100%

Departamento de 

Salud Federal y 

Local

Assisted Dialysis Centers 96% Departamento de 

Salud Federal y 

Local

Processing Pharmacies 95% ASES

Open Ports 100% Puertos

Diesel Supplied 1,163,245

Barrels

DACO

Gasoline Supplied 1,455,531

Barrels

DACO

AMA Routes (Public 

Transportation)

100% DTOP

Post Offices 100% USPS

Milk Industry 97.24% Departamento de 

Agricultura de 

PR

Air Traffic

Commercial/Domestic/International

Normal AeroStar

Tourism Hotels – 76%

Casinos – 83%

Compañía de 

Turismo

Source: http://status.pr/ © 2017 Government of Puerto Rico.
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In the days leading up to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria (Texas, Florida, Puerto 

Rico/Virgin Islands ) CALL sent push packages of lessons, best practices, and 

handbooks to units that would be conducting hurricane DSCA. Over the next year, the 

Army Lessons Learned Forum General Officer Steering Committee will be addressing 

emerging problems and assigning the appropriate authority to produce solutions from a 

Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy 

(DOTMLPF-P) perspective. 

Before the June 2018 hurricane season begins, CALL will produce and update a 

number of written products to help the Army improve and prepare for disaster 

operations:

• Combined hurricane report for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria.

• Hurricane Maria collection report.

• Update of DSCA CALL publications.

• A number of News from the Front articles and bulletins from the senior- leader 

level interviews and data gathered.
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Tactical Lessons, Best Practices, and Recommendations

Recommendation. Before executing the DSCA operation the joint command element 

would benefit from a deliberate and collaborative planning process with all of the major 

commands within the JFLCC. This would allow all elements to identify what equipment 

and supplies were needed for initial entry into the DSCA JOA, and what resources could 

wait for follow-on echelons.

Best Practice. Consider those forces already on the ground. Rather than ask for 

additional assets and units to be deployed, identify what local units (National Guard, 

Reserve) are already in place that can be officially ordered to support the mission. A 

deliberate Emergency Management Agreement Compact between states can also be 

used to posture nearby units to support.

Best Practice. Maximize life-sustaining supplies on every helicopter. 1st Armored 

Division (AD) combat aviation brigade (CAB) personnel prepared food, water, and baby 

formula to be distributed. Soldiers provided every rotary wing asset (military, DOD, local 

law enforcement) with basic necessities to distribute. This specific effort was the direct 

guidance of the CAB commander to utilize every air mission, no matter the destination 

or purpose, to take food and water to those in need. Before departing the airfield nearly 

every helicopter does a quick landing at the supply point and loads up.

Figure 1-7 1st CAB, 1st AD Soldiers prepare food and water for every helicopter that 

departed the airfield.
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Best Practice: Key medical capabilities are needed in DSCA. (1) A Preventive 

Medicine Detachment is crucial as many of the medical conditions in a DSCA 

environment are the result of hygiene, poor living conditions, and follow-on injury 

recovery. (2) A Veterinary Detachment is helpful for providing guidance on food 

preparation and inspecting local contracts for food distribution. (3) Situational 

awareness of unit organic medical capabilities that come with subordinate level units 

(medical platoons, physician’s assistants, surgeons, ROLE 1 capabilities, etc.).

Lesson: Class 8 into theater. The combat support hospital (CSH) deploys into a 

DSCA theater of operation with personnel, equipment, and very little Class 8 medical 

supplies. Bulk Class 8 meets the CSH in theater (approximately 24 hours after CSH 

personnel arrive) with following echelons to maximize haul capability as the theater 

builds capability. Planners should be aware that initial medical capability is minimal until 

combat power builds.

Best Practice: Daily Airfield/Point of Distribution Synchronization meeting. Both 

aviation and logistics units were in locations where they shared real estate with joint 

forces, DOD, and numerous government agencies. A daily meeting to coordinate assets 

and efforts was necessary to avoid friction and redundancy.

Figure 1-8 68th CSSB (4 ID) Tactical operations center (TOC) expando-vans and equipment on 

the Auguadilla airfield
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Airlift Lesson. DOD and FEMA were competing for the same haul capabilities. The 

military and FEMA each knew what they needed to get onto the island for their specific 

mission sets. These priorities were not aligned and synchronized across the greater 

fight, resulting in capabilities that the military wanted, but FEMA may not have 

necessarily seen as crucial at that point in time.

Lesson: Aviation Tactical Cross-load. The 2-501St General Aviation Battalion

leadership recommended that the airlift of rotary wing assets should send packages that 

allow the lift of assets to become mission capable upon arrival. Initial plans for deploying 

the general support aviation battalion (GSAB) were based on getting all “like” equipment 

and units into Puerto Rico. This created C5 lifts that had groups of resources. After the 

first two lifts were cancelled due to maintenance issues, 2-501St quickly realized that 

the third C5 lift (that became the first) would land on the island and not be mission 

capable without follow on lifts.

Lesson: Torch Party. Soldiers of the 2-501St Arrived at the Roosevelt Roads Naval Air 

Base where there was virtually no infrastructure to support a military unit. The 2-501St

recommended that the first echelon of personnel include a pay agent, a contracting 

officer’s representative, and a legal capability to work through establishing minimum life 

support to begin receiving the organization.

Best Practice: Air Space Coordination System. Puerto Rico had air space 

management through the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), but only in and around 

managed airports. The 1st AD CAB commander and staff quickly realized this, and built 

corridors and promulgated their plan with the JFLCC and FEMA to synchronize rotary 

wing missions throughout the island. A CAB commander and staff provided a necessary 

level of experience and authority to represent aviation requirements.

Figure 1-9 The Roosevelt Roads Naval Airfield had to accommodate and synchronize both

military and civilian aircraft.
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Best Practice. The CH-47 helicopter has rollers on the floor of the cargo area to move 

supplies. The rollers are not compatible with the civilian wooden pallets. Units deploying 

to a DSCA environment would benefit by arriving with pre-cut plywood sections (48” x 

40”) to place under civilian pallets for quick on and off loading.

Best Practice. The 2-501St placed additional personnel on their aircraft to rapidly load 

and unload supplies. While there was slightly less cargo that could be transported with 

the extra off load team, the gain in efficiency and time made a huge impact.

Military Equipment for Civilian Applications. The 2-501St recommended that 

aviation units purchase a disposable sling load capability. Military slings, nets, and 

hooks are expensive and require recovery. This may not be an option in the event that 

supplies for relief are being dropped into remote locations (mountain passes, small 

villages without LZs, blocked roads). The 2-501St is in the process of purchasing 100-

foot sling cables (from the “Helihook” company) that allow rotary wing to hover at a 

distance and detach loads of commodities into remote areas where landing or low hover 

is not an option.

Figure 1-10 Major Ben Jackson shows CALL Analyst Mike Robinson a disposable 

cargo bag used for dropping supplies into remote areas, and delivering dirt to repair the 

Guajataca Dam.
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Best Practice: Sustained Maintenance. Most of the recent hurricane DSCA 

operations did not extend beyond 2 weeks. It is recommended that units plan for 

phased maintenance of equipment if the mission lasts more than a month. A 

maintenance plan where equipment can be echeloned on and off mission, while still 

having a capability available for relief efforts, will be necessary in lengthy DSCA 

operations.

Best Practice. 4th Sustainment Brigade (4 ID) sent teams of logisticians into the 

community to understand the demand signal for life sustaining commodities. 

Additionally, they identified how long each supply run would sustain that community and 

built a recurring package to be delivered every 24-72 hours. 

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Figure 1 - 11 Soldiers provided 15,000 gallons clean drinking water, daily, to the people of 

Guajataca using a Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit.
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