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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

YOLANDA SANTANA, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 15-cv-12017 

 Hon. Matthew F. Leitman 

v. 

CAMP BRIGHTON, 

 Defendant. 

_________________________________/ 

 

ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE (ECF #1) 

INTRODUCTION 

 Plaintiff Yolanda Santana (“Santana”) is in the custody of the Michigan 

Department of Corrections. On June 3, 2015, Santana filed a pro se civil-rights 

Complaint in this Court (the “Complaint”). (See ECF #1.) Santana appears to allege 

that she was exposed to contaminated water while housed at the Camp Brighton 

facility. (See id. at 3, Pg. ID 3.) She names a single defendant, Camp Brighton. (See 

id.) For the reasons stated in this Order, the Court DISMISSES the Complaint 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted. 

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ANALYSIS 

 On July 24, 2015, the Court granted Santana’s application to proceed in forma 

pauperis in this matter. (See ECF #7.) Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the 

“PLRA”), the Court is required to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint 

before service of a defendant if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, 

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against 

a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. 

See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 

 In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint set forth “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” as well as “a demand for the relief 

sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (3). The purpose of this rule is to “give the defendant 

fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 

47 (1957) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). While this notice pleading standard does not 

require “detailed” factual allegations, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, it does require more 

than the bare assertion of legal conclusions or “an unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A 

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements 

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of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a 

complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 

enhancement.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). A pro 

se complaint should be liberally construed and held to a “less stringent standard” than 

one drafted by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 

 To state a federal civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege (1) the deprivation of 

a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the 

United States, and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of 

state law. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978). 

 Santana’s entire Complaint, in which she attempts to state a civil-rights claim, 

states as follows: 

I was being housed at a [sic] M.D.O.C. 

prisoner camp. I was exposed to 

contaminated water. (Can’t remember exact 

date or year, please check [roster]). 

I was exposed to drinking contaminated water 

which effected [sic] my physical health (such 

as liver and kidney). It made me sick and 

break [sic] out in rashes. 

I was exposed to drinking contaminated water 

which effected [sic] my mental state causing 

me to have anxiety and having to talk to a 

therapist. 

I want the Defendant to be held responsible 

for their [sic] actions and I would like to 

receive monetary damages for having to 

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receive mental and medical help because of 

this. 

(Compl. at 2-4, Pg. ID 2-4.) 

 In her Complaint, Santana names Camp Brighton as the sole Defendant in this 

action. That prison facility, however, was an institution operated by the Michigan 

Department of Corrections and is not a “person” or legal entity subject to suit under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Parker v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 65 Fed. App’x 922, 

923 (6th Cir. 2003) (“the [Michigan Department of Corrections] is not a ‘person’ 

within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983”); Hix v. Tennessee Dept. of Corrections, 196 

Fed. App’x 350, 355–356 (6th Cir. 2006) (and cases cited therein) (holding that 

neither the state department of corrections, as an “administrative department of the 

state,” nor the state prison's medical department, which “may be seen as nothing more 

than an arm” of the department of corrections, is a “person” within the meaning of § 

1983); see also McCoy v. Chesapeake Corr. Ctr., 788 F. Supp. 890 (E.D. Va.) 

(reasoning local jails are part of the Commonwealth of Virginia and are not 

appropriate defendants in a § 1983 action). Indeed, this Court has recently dismissed 

two lawsuits brought by other prisoners against Camp Brighton – similar to the one 

Santana has filed here – on the basis that Camp Brighton cannot be sued under § 

1983. See Walker v. Camp Brighton Prison, No. 15-12153, 2015 WL 3968229 (E.D. 

Mich. June 30, 2015); McIntosh v. Camp Brighton, 14-11327, 2014 WL 158173 (E.D. 

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Mich. Apr. 21, 2014). The Court must therefore dismiss Santana’s Complaint because 

she has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against the only 

defendant identified in this action. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Complaint 

(ECF #1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1915(e)(2)(B). This dismissal is without prejudice to Santana filing a new Complaint 

against a properly-named defendant. Any such new Complaint must comply with the 

afore-mentioned federal pleading standards. The Court further concludes that an 

appeal from this order would be frivolous and cannot be taken in good faith. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th 

Cir. 1997). 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 s/Matthew F. Leitman 

 MATTHEW F. LEITMAN 

Dated: July 29, 2015 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the 

parties and/or counsel of record on July 29, 2015, by electronic means and/or ordinary 

mail. 

 s/Holly A. Monda 

 Case Manager 

 (313) 234-5113 

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