United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

10:00 a.m., EST,

Thursday,

October 23, 1997

NATO ENLARGEMENT

Cost Implications for the

United States Remain

Unclear

Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller

General, National Security and International Affairs

Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-50

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

We are pleased to be here today to help the Committee sort through some

of the issues related to the cost and financial obligations of expanding the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Our testimony today will

address three issues: (1) current U.S. costs to support NATO’s common

budgets and other funding that supports relations with Central and East

European nations and promotes NATO enlargement; (2) NATO’s defense

planning process, which will form the basis for more definitive cost

estimates for an enlarged alliance; and (3) our evaluation of the recent

Department of Defense (DOD) study of NATO expansion and a comparison

of DOD’s study with studies of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and

the Rand Corporation.

Summary of

Observations

The ultimate cost of NATO enlargement will be contingent on several

factors that have not yet been determined. Specifically, NATO has yet to

formally define (1) its strategy for defending the expanded alliance,

(2) force and facility requirements of the newly invited states, and (3) how

costs of expanding the alliance will be financed. Also unknown is the

long-term security threat environment in Europe. NATO’s process for

determining the cost of enlargement is underway and expected to be

completed by June 1998.

In fiscal year 1997, the United States contributed about $470 million

directly to NATO to support its three commonly funded budgets, the NATO

Security Investment Program (NSIP), the military budget, and the civil

budget. This is about 25 percent of the total funding for these budgets. It is

through proposed increases to these budgets, primarily the NSIP and to a

lesser extent the civil budget, that most of the direct cost of NATO

enlargement will be reflected and therefore where the United States is

likely to incur additional costs.

Additionally, over $120 million was programmed in fiscal year 1997 for

Warsaw Initiative activities in the three countries that are candidates for

NATO membership and other Partnership for Peace (PFP) countries.1 This

money was provided to help pay for Foreign Military Financing grants and

loans, exercises, and other PFP-related activities. Funding for these

1

In 1994, NATO launched a wide-ranging cooperative effort—known as PFP—with nonmember

countries to promote democracy, expand cooperation, and strengthen relationships between NATO

and nonmember countries. Participation of countries in PFP plays a role in NATO’s decisions

regarding expansion. For further information see NATO Enlargement: U.S. and International Efforts to

Assist Potential New Member States (GAO/NSIAD-97-164, June 27, 1997).

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-50
activities will continue, but the allocation between the candidates for NATO

membership and all other PFP participants may change over time. This

funding is strictly bilateral assistance that may assist the candidate

countries and other countries participating in PFP to meet certain NATO

standards, but it is not directly related to NATO decisions concerning

military requirements or enlargement.

NATO defense planners are now developing military requirements through

their defense planning process and are close to completing their analyses.

These requirements will ultimately be translated into costs eligible for

common funding. NATO officials plan to present their cost estimates for

these items for approval at the NATO defense ministerial meeting in early

December 1997. However, it will not be until June 1998 that NATO will

make decisions about whether or how much to increase the common

budgets, which would then be shared among current and new members.

Until this has been done, the implications for the U.S. contributions to

NATO’s common budgets will be unclear.

As you know, DOD, CBO, and Rand developed cost estimates for enlarging

NATO before invitations were extended to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech

Republic and therefore before NATO had assessed its current military needs

or developed military requirements that could be used to make more

accurate cost estimates. Thus, the ranges of these estimates—from

$10 billion to $125 billion—are substantially different, depending on the

assumptions used. In some instances, the cost range estimates overlap;

however, this may be coincidental, since the assumptions and force

postures used to develop the estimates were different. Thus, it is not

surprising that the debate on this issue has been surrounded by some

confusion.

Our analysis of DOD’s cost estimate to enlarge NATO indicates that its key

assumptions were generally reasonable and were largely consistent with

the views of U.S., NATO, and foreign government officials.2

 In particular, the

assumption that large-scale conventional security threats will remain low

significantly influenced the estimate. However, DOD’s lack of supporting

cost documentation and its decision to include cost elements that were

not directly related to enlargement call into question its overall estimate.

Because of the uncertainties associated with enlargement and DOD’s

estimating procedures, the actual cost of NATO enlargement could be

2

See our report NATO Enlargement: Cost Estimates Developed to Date Are Notional

(GAO/NSIAD-97-209, Aug. 18, 1997).

Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-50
substantially different from DOD’s estimated cost of about $27 billion to

$35 billion.

Rand and CBO cost estimates are no more reliable than DOD’s, based on our

comparison of the three studies. CBO and Rand developed a range of cost

estimates for NATO enlargement, including estimates that employ a defense

strategy similar to DOD’s. Several factors account for the differences

between DOD’s estimate and the CBO and Rand estimates, including those

estimates that employed defense strategies similar to DOD’s. For example,

CBO assumed a much larger reinforcement force and much more extensive

modernization, infrastructure, and training costs than DOD did. Rand

assumed a somewhat larger reinforcement force and higher training and

air defense modernization costs than DOD did.

U.S. Contributions to

Common Budgets and

Other Funding

Sources

As it does now, the United States will fund its share of NATO enlargement

primarily through contributions to the three common budgets. NSIP pays

for infrastructure items that are over and above the needs of the member

nations, including communications links to NATO headquarters or

reinforcement reception facilities, such as increased apron space at

existing airfields. The military budget pays for NATO Airborne Early

Warning Force program and military headquarters costs, and the civil

budget pays primarily for NATO’s international staff and operation and

maintenance costs of its civilian facility in Brussels. For fiscal year 1997,

the U.S. contribution for the three common budgets was about

$470 million: $172 million for the NSIP, $252 million for NATO’s military

budget, and $44.5 million for NATO’s civil budget. Any increases to the U.S.

budget accounts would be reflected primarily through increased funding

requests for the DOD military construction budget from which the NSIP is

funded, the Army operations and maintenance budget from which the

military budget is funded (both part of the National Defense 050 budget

function), and the State Department’s contributions to international

organizations from which the civil budget is funded (part of the

International Affairs 150 budget function).

While NATO will not have finalized its common infrastructure requirements

for new members until December 1997 or decided whether or how much

to increase the common budgets until June 1998, DOD and State

Department officials told us that the civil and NSIP budgets are likely to

increase by only 5 to 10 percent and the military budget will probably not

increase at all. This would mean an increase of about $20 million annually

for the U.S. contribution to NATO. However, as we indicated, NATO has yet

Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-50
to make decisions on these matters. In addition, the United States could

choose to help new members in their efforts to meet their NATO

membership obligations through continued Foreign Military Financing

grants and/or loans, International Military Education and Training grants,

and assistance for training activities. The three candidate countries and

other PFP countries have been receiving assistance through these accounts

since the inception of the PFP program, and this has enabled some of these

countries to be more prepared for NATO membership. In fiscal year 1997,

over $120 million was programmed for these activities, and about

$60 million of this amount went to the three candidates for NATO

membership. Any increased funding for such assistance would be funded

through the International Affairs and Defense budget functions.

NATO’s Defense

Planning Process

It is through NATO’s defense planning process that decisions are made on

how the defense burden will be shared, what military requirements will be

satisfied, and what shortfalls will exist.

NATO’s New Strategic Concept, adopted in Rome in 1991, places greater

emphasis on crisis management and conflict prevention and outlines the

characteristics of the force structure. Key features include (1) smaller,

more mobile and flexible forces that can counter multifaceted risks,

possibly outside the NATO area; (2) fewer troops stationed away from their

home countries; (3) reduced readiness levels for many active units;

(4) emphasis on building up forces in a crisis; (5) reduced reliance on

nuclear weapons; and (6) immediate and rapid reaction forces, main

defense forces (including multinational corps), and augmentation forces.

Although NATO has not defined exactly the type and amount of equipment

and training needed, it has encouraged nations to invest in transport, air

refueling, and reconnaissance aircraft and improved command and control

equipment, among other items.

NATO’s force-planning and goal-setting process involves two interrelated

phases that run concurrently: setting force goals and responding to a

defense planning questionnaire. The force goals, which are developed

every 2 years, define NATO’s requirements. The major NATO commanders

propose force goals for each nation based on command requirements.

Each nation typically has over 100 force goals. NATO and national officials

frequently consult one another while developing force goals and national

defense plans. NATO commanders are unlikely to demand that member

nations establish units or acquire equipment they do not have.

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-50
In its annual response to NATO’s defense planning questionnaire, each

member verifies its commitment for the previous year, defines its

commitment for the next year, and lays out plans for the following 5 years.

Alliance members review each nation’s questionnaire and, in meetings, can

question national plans and urge member nations to alter their plans. After

finishing their reviews, generally in October or November, NATO staff write

a report summarizing each nation’s plans and assessing national

commitments to NATO. Once NATO members approve this report, it becomes

the alliance’s consensus view on each country’s strengths and weaknesses

and plan to support the force structure. It is through this process that NATO

determines what shortfalls exist, for example, in combat support and

combat service support capabilities.

According to U.S. officials, NATO is preparing several reports to be

presented for approval at the defense ministerial meetings in

December 1997. One report will discuss the additional military capability

requirements existing alliance members will face as a result of the

alliance’s enlargement. According to officials at the U.S. mission and

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, it is unlikely that any

additional military capability requirements will be placed on NATO

members over and above the force goals they have already agreed to

provide. In other words, if current force goals are attained, NATO will have

sufficient resources to respond to likely contingencies in current and new

member countries. Therefore, it can be concluded that although

enlargement of the alliance is another reason for current allies to attain

their force goals, it will not add any new, unknown costs to existing

members’ force plans.

Other reports resulting from this process will discuss the requirements for

commonly funded items in the new nations and their estimated costs.

These items include infrastructure that will enable the new allies to

receive NATO reinforcements in times of crisis, communication systems

between NATO and their national headquarters, and a tie-in to NATO’s air

defense system. How these projects will be financed by NATO, for example,

whether they will be financed within existing budgets or by increasing the

size of NATO’s common budgets, will not be determined until June 1998.

Therefore, the impact of these costs on the U.S. contributions to NATO’s

common budgets and the U.S. budget will be unknown until next spring.

Another report will present an assessment of the capabilities and shortfalls

in the military forces of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. NATO

does not and will not estimate the costs of the shortfalls of either the

Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-50
current or the new member states, but once these shortfalls are identified,

cost estimates can be made by others. However, even though new

members’ capabilities and shortfalls will be identified in December, these

countries’ force goals will not be set until the spring. These force goals

will, in effect, be a roadmap for the new members on how to address their

shortfalls. (See app. I for a timeline illustrating these events.)

Key Assumptions and

Cost Estimates for

NATO Enlargement

Studies

When the DOD, CBO, and Rand studies were completed, many key cost

determinants had not been established. Consequently, each study made a

series of key assumptions that had important implications for each studies’

results.

DOD made the following key assumptions:

• Specific nations would be invited to join NATO in the first round of

enlargement.3

• NATO would continue to rely on its existing post-Cold War strategy to carry

out its collective defense obligations (that is, each member state would

have a basic self-defense capability and the ability to rapidly receive NATO

reinforcements).4

• NATO would not be confronted by a significant conventional military threat

for the foreseeable future, and such a threat would take many years to

develop.

• NATO would continue to use existing criteria for determining which items

would be funded in common and which costs would be allocated among

members.5

Using these assumptions, DOD estimated the cost of enlarging NATO would

range from about $27 billion to $35 billion from 1997 to 2009. The estimate

was broken down as follows:

3

DOD assumed that four countries would be invited to join NATO, but the actual countries that were

the basis for the estimate are classified information.

4

NATO adopted a new post-Cold War strategic concept at its Rome summit meeting in 1991. The

concept provides for substantial reductions in the size and readiness of NATO’s forces but increased

force mobility, flexibility, and ability to adapt to the changed threat environment.

5

NATO funds only those facilities or portions of facilities that are over and above the needs of an

individual country’s national security requirements. For example, NATO would fund only the portion

of infrastructure at an air base that is beyond the host nation’s own needs, such as hangars for

reinforcing aircraft, but not hangars for the host country’s aircraft.

Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-50
• about $8 billion to $10 billion for improvements in current NATO members’

regional reinforcement capabilities, such as developing mobile logistics

and other combat support capabilities;

• about $10 billion to $13 billion for restructuring and modernizing new

members’ militaries (for example, selectively upgrading self-defense

capabilities); and

• about $9 billion to $12 billion for costs directly attributable to NATO

enlargement (for example, costs of ensuring that current and new

members’ forces are interoperable and capable of combined NATO

operations and of upgrading or constructing facilities to receive NATO

reinforcements).

DOD estimated the U.S. share of these costs would range from about 

$1.5 billion to $2 billion—averaging $150 million to $200 million annually

from 2000 to 2009. The estimated U.S. share chiefly consisted of a portion

of direct enlargement costs commonly funded through NATO’s Security

Investment Program. DOD assumed that the other costs would be borne by

the new members and other current member states and concluded that

they could afford these costs, although this would be challenging for new

members. (See app. II.)

DOD’s Key Assumptions

Were Reasonable, but Cost

Estimates Are Speculative

In our review of DOD’s study of NATO enlargement, we (1) assessed the

reasonableness of DOD’s key assumptions, (2) attempted to verify pricing

information used as the basis for estimating enlargement costs, (3) looked

into whether certain cost categories were actually linked to enlargement,

and (4) identified factors excluded from the study that could affect

enlargement costs.

We concluded that DOD’s assumptions were reasonable. The assumption

regarding the threat was probably the most significant variable in

estimating the cost of enlargement. Based on information available to us,

we concluded that it was reasonable to assume the threat would be low

and there would be a fairly long warning time if a serious threat

developed. This assumption, and the assumption that the post-Cold War

strategic concept would be employed, provided the basis for DOD’s

judgments concerning required regional reinforcement capabilities, new

members’ force modernization, and to a large extent those items

categorized as direct enlargement costs.

DOD also assumed that during 1997-2009, new members would increase

their real defense spending at an average annual rate of 1 to 2 percent.

Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-50
Both private and government analysts project gross domestic product

(GDP) growth rates averaging 4 to 5 percent annually for the Czech

Republic, Hungary, and Poland during 1997-2001. Thus, projected

increases in defense budgets appear affordable. Analysts also point out

that potential new member countries face real fiscal constraints, especially

in the short term. An increase in defense budgets at the expense of

pressing social concerns becomes a matter of setting national priorities,

which are difficult to predict. If these countries’ growth rates do not meet

expectations, their ability to increase real defense spending becomes more

problematic.

DOD further assumed that current NATO members would on average

maintain constant real defense spending levels during 1997-2009.6

 Analysts

have expressed somewhat greater concern about this assumption and

generally consider it to be an optimistic, but reasonable projection. Some

analysts indicated that defense spending in some current member states

may decline further over the next several years. Such declines would

partly be due to economic requirements associated with entry into the

European Monetary Union.7

Despite our conclusion that DOD’s underlying assumptions were sound, for

several reasons we concluded that its estimates are quite speculative.

First, DOD’s pricing of many individual cost elements were “best guesses”

and lacked supporting documentation. This was the case for all three

categories of costs: direct enlargement costs, current members’

reinforcement enhancements, and new members’ modernization

requirements. Most of the infrastructure upgrade and refurbishment cost

estimates were based on judgments. For example, DOD’s estimate of

$140 million to $240 million for upgrading a new member’s existing air

base into a NATO collocated operating base was not based on surveys of

actual facilities but on expert judgment. We were told that the actual cost

could easily be double—or half—the estimate.

DOD’s estimated costs for training and modernization were notional, and

actual costs may vary substantially. DOD analysts did not project training

6

In 1996, defense spending as a percent of GDP was 2 percent for Italy, 1.7 percent for Germany,

2.9 percent for the United Kingdom, and 3 percent for France. If GDP increases in real terms, these

percentages will decline under DOD’s assumption of constant real defense spending.

7

Under the European Monetary Union, scheduled to go into effect January 1, 1999, the European Union

would have a common central bank and monetary policy and a single currency called the euro.

According to the Maastricht Treaty, the primary goal of the common central bank is price stability. The

treaty requires that the economies of the participating countries converge toward certain performance

goals in terms of inflation, long-term interest rates, exchange rate stability, and budget deficits (no

greater than 3 percent of GDP) and debt (no greater than 60 percent of GDP).

Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-50
tempos and specific exercise costs. Instead, they extrapolated U.S. and

NATO training and exercise costs and evaluated the results from the point

of view of affordability. DOD’s estimate for modernization and restructuring

of new members’ ground forces was also notional and was based on

improving 25 percent of the new members’ forces. However, it did not

specify what upgrades would be done and how much they would cost.

Second, we could find no linkage between DOD’s estimated cost of

$8 billion to $10 billion for remedying current shortfalls in NATO’s

reinforcement capabilities and enlargement of the alliance. Neither DOD

nor NATO could point to any specific reinforcement shortfalls that would

result from enlargement that do not already exist. However, existing

shortfalls could impair the implementation of NATO’s new strategic

concept. DOD officials told us that while reinforcement needs would not be

greater in an enlarged NATO, enlargement makes eliminating the shortfalls

essential. This issue is important in the context of burdensharing because

DOD’s estimate shows that these costs would be covered by our current

NATO allies but not shared by the United States.

Finally, NATO has yet to determine what military capabilities,

modernization, and restructuring will be sought from new members.

Consequently, DOD had little solid basis for its $10 billion to $13 billion

estimate for this cost category. Moreover, DOD and new member

governments have noted that new members are likely to incur costs to

restructure and modernize their forces whether or not they join NATO.

Indeed, some countries have indicated that they may need to spend more

for these purposes if they do not become NATO members. DOD showed

these costs as being covered entirely by the new members.

Potential Additional Costs

of Enlargement

NATO enlargement could entail costs in addition to those included in DOD’s

estimates, including costs for assistance to enhance the PFP or other

bilateral assistance for countries not invited to join NATO in July 1997. In

addition, the United States may provide assistance to help new members

restructure and modernize their forces. For example, Polish officials said

they may need up to $2 billion in credits to buy multipurpose aircraft.

While not an added cost of enlargement, such assistance would represent

a shift in the cost burden from the new member countries to the countries

providing assistance. DOD did not include such costs in its estimate of the

U.S. share, though it acknowledged that the cost was possible. Moreover,

U.S. and NATO officials have stated that additional countries may be invited

to join NATO in the future, most likely in 1999. DOD’s cost estimate did not

Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-50
take into account a second or third round of invitations. If additional

countries are invited, cost of enlargement would obviously increase.

Comparison of the DOD,

CBO, and Rand Estimates

CBO and Rand estimated the cost of incorporating the Czech Republic,

Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia into NATO. They based their estimates on a

range of NATO defense postures, from enhanced self-defense with minimal

NATO interoperability to the forward stationing of NATO troops in new

member states. However, they also noted that the current lack of a major

threat in Europe could allow NATO to spend as little as it chose in enlarging

the alliance.

Because of the uncertainties of future threats, and the many possible ways

to defend an enlarged NATO, CBO examined five illustrative options to

provide such a defense. Each option built on the pervious one in scope

and cost. CBO estimated that the cost of the five options over the 15-year

period would range from $61 billion to $125 billion. Of that total, CBO

estimated that the United States might be expected to pay between

$5 billion and $19 billion. CBO included in its range of options a $109-billion

estimate that was predicated on a resurgent Russian threat, although it

was based on a self-defense and reinforcement strategy similar to that

used by DOD.

8

 Of this $109 billion, CBO estimated that the United States

would pay $13 billion.

Similarly, Rand developed estimates for four options to defend an enlarged

NATO that build upon one another, from only self-defense support at a cost

of $10 billion to $20 billion to the forward deployment of forces in new

member states at a cost of $55 billion to $110 billion. These options

include a middle option that would cost about $42 billion that was also

based on a self-defense and reinforcement strategy. Rand estimated that

the United States would pay $5 billion to $6 billion of this $42 billion in

total costs.

Several factors account for the differences between DOD’s estimates and

the CBO and Rand estimates, even those that employed defense strategies

similar to DOD’s. (App. III illustrates the major results and key assumptions

of the three estimates.)

CBO’s cost estimate is significantly higher than DOD’s for the following

reasons:

8

CBO’s lowest estimate is based on a low-threat assessment; the additional costs are predicated on a

resurgent Russian threat.

Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-50
• DOD assumed reinforcements of 4 divisions and 6 wings, whereas CBO

assumed a force of 11-2/3 divisions and 11-1/2 wings and a much larger

infrastructure for this force in the new member states.

• CBO’s modernization costs are much higher than DOD’s and include the

purchase of 350 new aircraft and 1,150 new tanks for the new member

states. DOD assumed that about 25 percent of the new member states’

ground forces would be modernized through upgrades and that each

nation would procure a single squadron of refurbished Western combat

aircraft.

• CBO assumed much higher training costs, $23 billion, which include annual,

large-scale combined exercises. DOD included $2 billion to $4 billion for

training.

• CBO included the purchase of Patriot air defense missiles at a cost of

$8.7 billion, which is considerably higher than DOD’s assumed purchase of

refurbished I-HAWK type missiles at $1.9 billion to $2.6 billion.

• CBO’s infrastructure costs were much higher than DOD’s and included new

construction, such as extending the NATO fuel pipeline, which CBO assumed

would meet U.S. standards. DOD assumed planned refurbishment of

existing facilities that would meet minimal wartime standards.

Rand’s cost estimate is somewhat higher than DOD’s, although both were

based on similar threat assessments. First, its reinforcement package was

larger—5 divisions and 10 wings—and therefore infrastructure costs were

higher. Second, it assumed new members would purchase the more

expensive Patriot air defense system rather than the refurbished I-HAWKs.

Finally, it assumed greater training costs than did DOD. The author of the

Rand study stated that if he had used DOD’s assumptions, the cost range

would have been almost identical to DOD’s.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared remarks. We would be happy

to answer any questions you or the Committee members may have.

Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-50
Appendix I 

NATO Enlargement Timeline

Date Activity

September 1995 NATO issues study on enlargement.

July 1997 NATO issues invitations to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to begin

accessions talks.

October/November 1997 NATO prepares several reports:

 • additional military capability requirements for existing alliance members that

 will result from the alliance’s enlargement;

 • requirements for commonly funded items in the new member nations, including 

 • infrastructure that will enable the new allies to receive NATO reinforcements in

 times of crisis, 

 • communication systems between NATO and their national headquarters, and

 • a tie-in to NATO’s air defense system;

 • cost estimates for items eligible for common funding presented by NATO officials;

 and

 • the capabilities and shortfalls in the military forces of Poland, Hungary, and the

 Czech Republic.

Early December 1997 NATO defense ministerial meeting to approve the above reports.

Spring 1998 New members’ force goals set.

June 1998 NATO decides whether or how much to increase the common budgets, which would

then be shared among current and new members.

April 1999 Target date for new member accession into NATO.

Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-50
Appendix II 

Categories and Share of Costs

Table II.1: Estimates From the Executive Branch Report to the Congress, February 1997

Dollars in billions

Cost category

New members’

share

Current allies’

share U.S. share Total

New members’ military restructuring and modernization $10 to $13 0 0 $10 to $13

Current members’ reinforcement enhancements 0 $8 to $10 0 8 to 10

Direct enlargement 3 to 4.5 4.5 to 5.5 $1.5 to $2 9 to 12

Total $13 to $17.5 $12.5 to $15.5 $1.5 to $2 $27 to $35

Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-50
Appendix III 

Comparison of DOD, CBO, and Rand

Estimates

Dollars in billions

Assumption DOD CBO Rand

Total cost $27-$35 in

constant 1997

dollars

$61-$125 in

constant 1997

dollars ($109 for a

defense strategy

similar to DOD’s)

$10-$110 in

constant 1996

dollars ($42 for a

defense strategy

similar to DOD’s)

U.S. cost share $1.5-$2.0 $13.1a $5-$6a

Notional new NATO

members

A small group

(details classified)

Poland

Hungary

Czech Republic

Slovakia

Poland

Hungary

Czech Republic

Slovakia

Time period 1997-2009 1996-2010 Approximately

1995-2010

Threat assessment Low threat A resurgent Russiaa Low threata

Comparable force

posture options

4 divisions/6 wings 11.7 divisions/11.5

wingsa

5 divisions/10 wingsa

aThese assumptions correspond to the estimate based on a defense strategy similar to DOD’s.

(711305) Page 14 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-50
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