[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

State ex rel. Floyd v. Formica Corp., Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3614.] 

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 

an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested 

to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 

65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 

other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-3614 

THE STATE EX REL. FLOYD, APPELLANT, v. FORMICA CORPORATION ET AL.,

APPELLEES. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, 

it may be cited as State ex rel. Floyd v. Formica Corp., 

Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3614.] 

Workers’ compensation—Temporary-total-disability compensation—Voluntary 

abandonment of the work force—Court of appeals’ judgment denying a 

writ of mandamus affirmed. 

(No. 2013-0042—Submitted May 13, 2014—Decided August 27, 2014.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 11AP-928, 

2012-Ohio-5769. 

____________________

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} The claimant-appellant, Darwin Floyd, applied for temporary-totaldisability compensation in 2010, almost ten years after he had left his 

employment with appellee Formica Corporation. Appellee Industrial 

Commission determined that Floyd was no longer eligible to receive temporary-
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2 

total-disability compensation because he had abandoned the entire job market 

when he left Formica and retired. The commission denied his application. 

{¶ 2} Floyd sought relief in mandamus in the Tenth District Court of 

Appeals. The court of appeals concluded that the commission had not abused its 

discretion, because the evidence supported its decision that Floyd had voluntarily 

abandoned the workforce in 2001 after his employment with Formica ended. The 

court denied Floyd’s request for an extraordinary writ. 

{¶ 3} We agree and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 

Facts 

{¶ 4} On March 11, 2000, Darwin Floyd was injured while working for 

the Formica Corporation, a self-insured employer. A worker’s compensation 

claim was allowed for various shoulder conditions. Following surgery on his left 

shoulder, he returned to light-duty work in September 2000, until his light-duty 

assignment ended on January 21, 2001. At that time, Formica no longer had any 

position to accommodate Floyd’s medical restrictions, so he began receiving 

temporary-total-disability compensation. Shortly afterward, Floyd, at age 63, 

applied for and began receiving Social Security retirement benefits, effective 

April 2001. 

{¶ 5} Floyd’s temporary-total-disability compensation continued until 

June 21, 2006, when the commission determined that his condition had reached 

maximum medical improvement and terminated his compensation.1

 A year later, 

he applied for permanent-total-disability benefits but withdrew his application. 

Following additional surgery on July 18, 2008, Floyd began receiving temporary-

 

1

 “Maximum medical improvement” is defined as “a treatment plateau * * * at which no 

fundamental functional or physiological change can be expected within reasonable medical 

probability in spite of continuing medical or rehabilitative procedures.” Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-

32(A)(1). Temporary-total-disability compensation terminates when a claimant reaches maximum 

medical improvement. R.C. 4123.56. 
January Term, 2014 

3 

total-disability compensation until the commission concluded that his condition 

had again reached maximum medical improvement on May 26, 2009. 

{¶ 6} Floyd’s current request for temporary-total-disability 

compensation followed surgery on November 26, 2010. A staff hearing officer 

denied his request, finding that Floyd was ineligible because he was not in the 

workforce as of November 26, 2010. The order stated: 

 

The Staff Hearing Officer notes that in 2001, the Injured Worker 

was working for the Employer on a light duty basis when the SelfInsuring Employer informed the Injured Worker they no longer 

had light duty work available for him. The Staff Hearing Officer 

finds that the Injured Worker was placed on temporary total 

disability and later was found to have reached maximum medical 

improvement for the recognized conditions in the claim. The 

Injured Worker testified that he had not worked anywhere since he 

had stopped working in 2001 when there was no light duty work 

available. He applied for and began receiving social security 

retirement benefits in May, 2001. Although the Injured Worker 

testified at the hearing he would have kept working for the 

Employer if light duty work had remained available, he 

acknowledged he did not attempt to return to work anywhere else 

after 2001. 

{¶ 7} The hearing officer found that there was no evidence that Floyd 

had tried to find any employment since 2001. According to the hearing officer, 

who cited State ex rel. Pierron v. Indus. Comm., 120 Ohio St.3d 40, 2008-Ohio5245, 896 N.E.2d 140, Floyd’s failure to look for any other employment was 
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4 

evidence that he did not intend to reenter the workforce after leaving Formica, 

thus making him ineligible for further compensation. The commission agreed. 

{¶ 8} Floyd filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. A magistrate 

determined that it was “insufficient for the commission to find that [Floyd] has 

not worked or searched for work since 2001 without reliance upon medical 

evidence that relator was medically capable of employment.” 2012-Ohio-5769, 

¶ 85. The magistrate recommended that the court issue a writ ordering the 

commission to appropriately determine Floyd’s eligibility for temporary-totaldisability compensation. 

{¶ 9} In a split decision, the court of appeals sustained objections to the 

magistrate’s decision filed by the commission and Formica. The appellate court 

concluded that in light of the claimant’s having received Social Security 

retirement benefits in 2001, the commission had properly addressed the issue of 

voluntary abandonment. The court further concluded that the evidence supported 

the commission’s decision that Floyd intended to voluntarily abandon the 

workforce in 2001 when his employment with Formica ended. The court denied 

the writ. 

{¶ 10} The dissenting judge agreed with the magistrate that the case 

should be returned to the commission to determine whether Floyd was medically 

capable of working after his light-duty position ended. 

{¶ 11} Floyd’s appeal is before this court as of right. 

Legal Analysis 

{¶ 12} To be entitled to extraordinary relief in mandamus, Floyd must 

establish that he has a clear legal right to the relief requested and that the 

commission has a clear legal duty to provide it. State ex rel. Rouch v. Eagle Tool 

& Machine Co., 26 Ohio St.3d 197, 198, 498 N.E.2d 464 (1986). To do so, Floyd 

must demonstrate that the commission abused its discretion by entering an order 

not supported by the evidence in the record. State ex rel. Avalon Precision 
January Term, 2014 

5 

Casting Co. v. Indus. Comm., 109 Ohio St.3d 237, 2006-Ohio-2287, 846 N.E.2d 

1245, ¶ 9. Thus, the issue before the court is whether the commission’s order 

denying temporary-total-disability compensation was supported by evidence in 

the record that Floyd had voluntarily abandoned the entire job market and was no 

longer eligible for compensation when he applied in 2010. 

A. Temporary Total Disability 

{¶ 13} R.C. 4123.56 provides for compensation for temporary total 

disability when an industrial injury prevents a claimant from performing the 

duties of his position of employment. State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm., 89 

Ohio St.3d 376, 380, 732 N.E.2d 355 (2000). The purpose is to compensate the 

injured worker for lost earnings during a period of disability while an injury heals. 

State ex rel. Hoffman v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., 137 Ohio St.3d 129, 2013-

Ohio-4538, 998 N.E.2d 442, ¶ 14. 

B. Effect of Abandonment of Employment on Eligibility 

{¶ 14} An injured worker’s eligibility for temporary-total-disability 

compensation depends not only on whether the claimant is unable to perform the 

duties of the position of employment, but also on whether the claimant continues 

to be a part of the active workforce. Baker at 380. Because temporary-totaldisability compensation is intended to compensate an injured worker for the loss 

of earnings while the industrial injury heals, a claimant who is no longer part of 

the workforce can have no lost earnings. Pierron, 120 Ohio St.3d 40, 2008-Ohio5245, 896 N.E.2d 140, ¶ 9; State ex rel. Ashcraft v. Indus. Comm., 34 Ohio St.3d 

42, 43-44, 517 N.E.2d 533 (1987). 

{¶ 15} A claimant who voluntarily retires for reasons unrelated to the 

industrial injury may no longer be eligible for temporary-total-disability 

compensation to which he otherwise might be entitled if, by retiring, he has 

voluntarily removed himself permanently from the workforce. Baker at 383. 

Moreover, if the departure is related to the industrial injury, “it is not necessary 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6 

for the claimant to first obtain other employment, but it is necessary that the 

claimant has not foreclosed that possibility by abandoning the entire workforce” 

in order to remain eligible for temporary-total-disability compensation. State ex 

rel. Lackey v. Indus. Comm., 129 Ohio St.3d 119, 2011-Ohio-3089, 950 N.E.2d 

542, ¶ 11; Baker at 383-384. 

{¶ 16} Thus, the critical issue for postretirement eligibility for temporarytotal-disability compensation is whether the injured worker permanently 

abandoned the entire job market after retirement. This is a factual question for the 

commission that depends primarily on what the claimant intended. State ex rel. 

Diversitech Gen. Plastic Film Div. v. Indus. Comm., 45 Ohio St.3d 381, 383, 544 

N.E.2d 677 (1989). The commission may infer a claimant’s intent “ ‘ “from 

words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts.” ’ ” Id., quoting State v. 

Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 297, 414 N.E.2d 1044 (1980), quoting United States 

v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir.1973). The commission must consider all 

relevant circumstances existing at the time of the alleged abandonment, including 

evidence of the claimant’s intention to abandon the work place as well as acts by 

which the intention is put into effect. Id. 

C. Inaction or Failure to Seek Employment as Evidence of Abandonment 

{¶ 17} A claimant’s failure to search for other employment following 

retirement may be evidence that he or she has permanently abandoned the entire 

workforce. Pierron, 120 Ohio St.3d 40, 2008-Ohio-5245, 896 N.E.2d 140, ¶ 10. 

In Pierron, the claimant was working in a light-duty position when his employer 

gave him the option to retire or be laid off. Pierron retired and, other than a brief 

part-time job, never worked again. Six years after he retired, Pierron filed for 

temporary-total-disability compensation. The commission concluded that he was 

no longer eligible because he had voluntarily abandoned his employment. This 

court upheld the commission’s decision. The court reasoned that Pierron’s failure 

to search for employment in the years that followed his retirement was evidence 
January Term, 2014 

7 

that he had intended to leave the entire workforce; thus, he could not allege that 

any lack of income was due to his industrial injury. Id., ¶ 10-11. 

{¶ 18} In Lackey, 129 Ohio St.3d 119, 2011-Ohio-3089, 950 N.E.2d 542, 

this court agreed with the commission that the claimant’s failure to look for work 

in the 17 months after he retired from his former position was evidence that he 

had retired from the entire labor market. Id., ¶ 12. The court reasoned that when 

Lackey filed for retirement, there was no evidence that he was medically unable 

to work, id, ¶ 13; thus, he would have been eligible for postretirement temporarytotal-disability compensation only if he were gainfully employed elsewhere and 

unable to perform the duties of that job because of his industrial injury, id., ¶ 15. 

{¶ 19} Likewise, in State ex rel. Corman v. Allied Holdings, Inc., 132 

Ohio St.3d 202, 2012-Ohio-2579, 970 N.E.2d 929, the claimant voluntarily retired 

from employment while he was receiving temporary-total-disability compensation 

for a 2002 industrial injury. When his condition reached maximum medical 

improvement (and compensation was terminated by law), he did not obtain other 

work. In 2009, Corman applied to have temporary-total-disability compensation 

reinstated, but the commission denied his request on the basis that he had 

voluntarily retired and never again looked for work. This court agreed, reasoning 

that like Pierron, Corman chose to not work; consequently, he could not allege a 

loss of wages as the result of his industrial injury. Id., ¶ 7. 

{¶ 20} The commission’s findings in the case before us are consistent 

with those in Pierron, Lackey, and Corman. Like Corman, Floyd was receiving 

temporary-total-disability compensation when he began receiving retirement 

benefits. Both Corman and Floyd eventually reached maximum medical 

improvement. Neither produced evidence that he was medically unable to 

perform other work and neither made any effort to find other employment. The 

commission, consistent with Pierron, found that neither one remained eligible for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8 

temporary-total-disability compensation, because they had permanently 

abandoned the workforce. 

D. The Commission’s Order was Supported by the Evidence 

{¶ 21} Floyd contends that he was not required to look for work while he 

was receiving temporary-total-disability compensation and that during those 

periods he was not receiving compensation, he was not medically able to work. 

The numerous surgeries he underwent after leaving Formica in 2001, he argues, 

prevented him from performing any gainful employment. 

{¶ 22} There is no requirement under R.C. 4123.56 that a claimant must 

search for alternative employment during periods of temporary total disability, 

and the commission’s order did not impose such a duty on Floyd. Nevertheless, 

even for those periods after the commission found that his condition had reached 

maximum medical improvement in 2006 and in 2009, there was no evidence that 

Floyd intended to reenter the workforce.2

 Floyd even applied for permanent total 

disability in 2007, but later withdrew his application.3 

{¶ 23} Instead, the evidence demonstrates that when Floyd left Formica 

he was medically capable of light-duty work. Floyd had been performing lightduty work at Formica until the position was no longer available. He began 

receiving temporary-total-disability compensation because he could not return to 

his former position at Formica and Formica had no light-duty position available. 

 

2

 The commission twice determined that Floyd’s condition reached maximum medical 

improvement—in 2006 and 2009. A third-party administrator for Formica had agreed to pay 

temporary-total-disability compensation in 2008 following an additional surgery. It does not 

appear from the record that the issue of voluntary abandonment was raised at that time. Each 

application is considered separately, and the claimant is required to establish temporary total 

disability at the time of each application. See State ex rel. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Indus. 

Comm., 81 Ohio St.3d 56, 689 N.E.2d 30. 

3

 “Permanent total disability” is the inability to perform sustained remunerative employment as a 

result of the allowed conditions in the claim. Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(1). 
January Term, 2014 

9 

But there was no medical evidence at that time that he was no longer capable of 

doing light-duty work. 

{¶ 24} The evidence further demonstrated that he applied for and began 

receiving retirement benefits. Within months of leaving Formica, Floyd applied 

for Social Security retirement benefits, although he was receiving temporarytotal-disability compensation at the time. He was not required to apply for Social 

Security benefits; rather, this was a personal choice. Had Floyd intended to return 

to the workforce after leaving Formica, he had no reason to file for retirement 

benefits at that time. 

{¶ 25} The evidence also demonstrates that he chose not to seek other 

work when his temporary-total-disability compensation terminated. After he 

began receiving retirement benefits in 2001, Floyd did not look for other 

employment before applying for temporary-total-disability compensation in 2010. 

When he reached maximum medical improvement and his temporary-totaldisability compensation was statutorily terminated, Floyd had a choice to either 

search for other work or to no longer work. He admitted that he did not attempt to 

work anywhere else. 

{¶ 26} Thus, the court of appeals properly determined that the 

commission’s order was supported by evidence in the record that Floyd had 

already abandoned the entire workforce when he applied for temporary-totaldisability compensation in 2010. 

{¶ 27} Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 

Judgment affirmed. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY,

FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

____________________ 

Casper & Casper and Douglas W. Casper, for appellant. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Latawnda N. Moore, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 

Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., and Joan M. Verchot, for appellee Formica 

Corporation. 

_________________________