UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

 

TAMMY DEE TAYLOR-WALTON, 

 Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-12419 

 v. 

COMMISSIONER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE MONA K. MAJZOUB

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 

 Defendant. 

_______________________________/ 

 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [21] AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [22] 

Plaintiff Tammy Dee Taylor-Walton seeks judicial review of Defendant Commissioner of 

Social Security’s determination that she is not entitled to Social Security benefits for her physical 

and mental impairments under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Docket no. 1.) Before the Court are 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 21) and Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (docket no. 22). With consent of the parties, this case has been referred to the 

undersigned for final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 73. (Docket no. 18.) The Court has reviewed the pleadings, dispenses with a hearing 

pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2), and is now ready to rule. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 Plaintiff protectively filed applications for a period of disability and disability insurance 

benefits on August 9, 2012, alleging that she has been disabled since April 2, 2010, due to her 

physical and mental impairments. (TR 26, 135-41.) The Social Security Administration denied 

2:15-cv-12419-MKM Doc # 23 Filed 03/07/17 Pg 1 of 14 Pg ID 729
2 

Plaintiff’s claims on November 8, 2012, and Plaintiff requested a de novo hearing. (TR 92, 99-

100.) On December 13, 2013, Plaintiff appeared with a representative and testified at the hearing 

before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Ramona Fernandez. (TR 42-77.) In a January 31, 2014 

decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits because she was capable of 

performing a significant number of jobs in the national economy. (TR 37.) The Appeals 

Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision (TR 1-6), and Plaintiff commenced this action for 

judicial review. The parties then filed cross motions for summary judgment, which are currently 

before the Court. (Docket nos. 21, 22.) 

II. HEARING TESTIMONY AND MEDICAL EVIDENCE

In her brief, Plaintiff sets forth a short summary of the procedural history of this matter 

and highlights a few points from the medical record. (Docket no. 21 at 2-3.) Defendant (docket 

no. 22 at 6-10) and the ALJ (TR 31-36) each set out a detailed, factual recitation with regard to 

Plaintiff’s medical record and the hearing testimony. Having conducted an independent review 

of Plaintiff’s medical record and the hearing transcript, the undersigned finds that there are no 

material inconsistencies among these recitations of the record. Therefore, the undersigned 

incorporates the factual recitations by reference. Additionally, the undersigned will include 

comments and citations to the record as necessary throughout this Report and Recommendation. 

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S DETERMINATION

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security 

Act through September 30, 2015; that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since the alleged onset date of April 2, 2010; and that Plaintiff suffered from the following 

severe impairments: headaches, osteoarthritis, hypertension, chronic pulmonary disease (COPD), 

non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, obesity, depression, and anxiety. (TR 28.) Next, the 

2:15-cv-12419-MKM Doc # 23 Filed 03/07/17 Pg 2 of 14 Pg ID 730
3 

ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments, either individually or when combined, did not meet or 

medically equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 

1. (TR 28-30.) The ALJ then found that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the extent of her 

symptoms were not “entirely credible” and that Plaintiff had the following Residual Functional 

Capacity (RFC): 

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as 

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b), with the following limitations: the claimant can 

stand and/or walk for no more than six hours of an eight-hour workday. She can 

lift no more than twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently. The 

claimant can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and can only occasionally 

stoop, kneel, crawl, balance, or climb ramps or stairs. She must be able to change 

positions after sitting or standing for twenty minutes. The claimant can frequently 

(but not constantly) handle, finger, and grip. She must avoid concentrated 

exposure to fumes or other respiratory irritants, as well as work at unprotected 

heights. The claimant is limited to unskilled work with simple instructions; no 

more than routine changes; only occasional contact with supervisors; and only 

brief or superficial interaction with coworkers or the public. 

(TR 30.) Subsequently, in reliance on the testimony of the Vocational Expert (VE), the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff was capable of performing a number of jobs in the national economy. 

(TR 37.) Therefore, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act 

at any time from April 2, 2010, through the date of the decision. (TR 38.) 

IV. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s 

final decisions. Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decisions is limited to determining 

whether his findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether he employed the proper 

legal standards. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Walters v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but 

less than a preponderance; it is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

2:15-cv-12419-MKM Doc # 23 Filed 03/07/17 Pg 3 of 14 Pg ID 731
4 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 

NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Walters, 127 F.3d at 528. It is not the function of this Court 

to try cases de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility. See 

Brainard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989); Garner v. 

Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). 

 In determining the existence of substantial evidence, the Court must examine the 

administrative record as a whole. See Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 

536 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). If the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, even if the reviewing court would decide 

the matter differently, Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), and even if 

substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. See Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 

F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) 

(noting that the substantial evidence standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within 

which the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts”).

B. Framework for Social Security Determinations

 Plaintiff’s Social Security disability determination was made in accordance with a fivestep sequential analysis. In the first four steps, Plaintiff was required to show that: 

(1) Plaintiff was not presently engaged in substantial gainful employment; and 

(2) Plaintiff suffered from a severe impairment; and 

(3) the impairment met or was medically equal to a “listed impairment;” or 

(4) Plaintiff did not have the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform relevant 

past work. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). If Plaintiff’s impairments prevented Plaintiff from doing past 

work, the Commissioner, at step five, would consider Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and past 

2:15-cv-12419-MKM Doc # 23 Filed 03/07/17 Pg 4 of 14 Pg ID 732
5 

work experience to determine if Plaintiff could perform other work. If not, Plaintiff would be 

deemed disabled. See id. § 404.1520(g). The Commissioner has the burden of proof only on 

“the fifth step, proving that there is work available in the economy that the claimant can 

perform.” Her, 203 F.3d at 391. To meet this burden, the Commissioner must make a finding 

“supported by substantial evidence that [the claimant] has the vocational qualifications to 

perform specific jobs.” Varley v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 

1987). 

C. Analysis

 The Social Security Act authorizes “two types of remand: (1) a post judgment remand in 

conjunction with a decision affirming, modifying, or reversing a decision of the [Commissioner] 

(a sentence-four remand); and (2) a pre-judgment remand for consideration of new and material 

evidence that for good cause was not previously presented to the [Commissioner] (a sentence-six 

remand).” Faucher v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Under a sentence-four remand, the Court has the authority to “enter upon 

the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, denying, or reversing the 

decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the cause for a hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Where there is insufficient support for the ALJ’s findings, “the appropriate remedy is 

reversal and a sentence-four remand for further consideration.” Morgan v. Astrue, No. 10-207, 

2011 WL 2292305, at *8 (E.D. Ky. June 8, 2011) (citing Faucher, 17 F.3d at 174). The court 

can only “reverse the [ALJ’s] decision and award benefits . . . if all essential factual issues have 

been resolved and the record adequately establishes a plaintiff’s entitlement to benefits.” 

Faucher, 17 F.3d at 176. 

2:15-cv-12419-MKM Doc # 23 Filed 03/07/17 Pg 5 of 14 Pg ID 733
6 

 Plaintiff asserts that this matter should be reversed and remanded for an award of 

benefits, or in the alternative for further development of the record under sentence four because: 

(1) “[t]he Administrative Law Judge had no basis” for giving Plaintiff’s treating physician’s 

opinions “little weight;” (2) the ALJ erred in relying on Plaintiff’s “GAF” (Global Assessment of 

Functioning) score; (3) the ALJ also erred in relying on the fact Plaintiff completed online 

college classes; and (4) the “ALJ’s conclusion the claimant was employable because she told a 

counselor she wanted to attend school on a full time basis is erroneous.”1 (Docket no. 21 at 5-6.) 

 1. The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s Treating Physician’s Opinions

An ALJ must give a treating physician’s opinion complete deference if it is supported by 

clinical and laboratory diagnostic evidence and it is not inconsistent with the other substantial 

evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). When an ALJ determines 

that a treating source’s medical opinion is not controlling, he must determine how much weight 

to assign that opinion in light of several factors: (1) length of the treatment relationship and the 

frequency of examination; (2) nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) supportability 

of the opinion; (4) consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; (5) specialization of the 

treating source; and (6) other factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6). 

There is no per se rule that requires an articulation of each of the six regulatory factors 

listed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6). Norris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 

11-CV-11974, 2012 WL 3584664, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 2012) (citing Tilley v. Comm’r of 

 

1

 Plaintiff also states, without further argument, that “[t]he Administrative Law Judge improperly 

evaluated Plaintiff’s credibility.” (Docket no. 21 at 4.) The extent of Plaintiff’s “argument” on this issue 

is a citation to Social Security Ruling 96-7p, which is applicable to credibility determinations made prior 

to the issuance of SSR 16-3p, and a recitation of the two steps involved in a credibility analysis. (Docket 

no. 21 at 4-5.) “Issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed 

argumentation, are deemed waived. It is not sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the 

most skeletal way, leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its bones.” McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 

995-96 (6th Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

2:15-cv-12419-MKM Doc # 23 Filed 03/07/17 Pg 6 of 14 Pg ID 734
7 

Soc. Sec., 394 F. App’x 216, 222 (6th Cir. 2010)). An ALJ’s failure to discuss the requisite 

factors may constitute harmless error (1) if “a treating source’s opinion is so patently deficient 

that the Commissioner could not possibly credit it;” (2) “if the Commissioner adopts the opinion 

of the treating source or makes findings consistent with the opinion;” or (3) “where the 

Commissioner has met the goal of [§ 1527(c)]—the provision of the procedural safeguard of 

reasons—even though she has not complied with the terms of the regulation.” Nelson v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 195 F. App’x 462, 470 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 547 (6th Cir. 2004)). 

The Commissioner requires ALJs to “always give good reasons in [their] notice of 

determination or decision for the weight [they] give [a] treating source’s opinion.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). Those good reasons must be “supported by the evidence in the 

case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the 

weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that 

weight.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544 (quoting SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (1996)). The 

district court should not hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has failed to identify the 

weight assigned to a treating physician’s opinion and provide good reasons for that weight. See 

Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 939 (6th Cir. 2011) (“This Court has made clear that ‘[w]e do not 

hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has not provided ‘good reasons’ for the weight given 

to a treating physician’s opinion and we will continue remanding when we encounter opinions 

from ALJ’s that do not comprehensively set forth the reasons for the weight assigned to a 

treating physician’s opinion.”) (citing Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 2009)). 

Plaintiff’s long time treating physician is Dr. Ali A. Fadel, M.D. (TR 32.) Dr. Fadel 

provided a number of “disability claim forms” to Plaintiff, indicating that Plaintiff was unable to 

2:15-cv-12419-MKM Doc # 23 Filed 03/07/17 Pg 7 of 14 Pg ID 735
8 

work at various points from April 2010 through June 2011. (TR 229-32.) Regarding these 

opinions, the ALJ stated: 

Although Dr. Fadel is a long-time treating source, little weight is given to 

his opinions that the claimant was disabled from April 2010 through June 2011. 

The claimant requested excusal from work due to stress. Dr. Fadel’s treatment 

records do not support his opinion that the claimant’s impairments were severe 

enough to render her unable to work. There are no tests or lab work supporting 

the alleged severity of the claimant’s impairments. The claimant was not 

receiving any mental health treatment for depression. Dr. Fadel stated in 

December 2010 that the claimant would likely be unable to work for a year, but 

he cleared her to return to work in April 2011. It was noted in March 2011 that 

the claimant was independent in her activities of daily living. 

(TR 32.) Plaintiff does not dispute any of these findings, but argues that the ALJ nevertheless 

erred by relying on “the lack of diagnostic testing.” (Docket no. 21 at 4.) Plaintiff argues that 

Dr. Fadel “is in the best position to decide her present condition,” because Dr. Fadel “treated 

Plaintiff regularly, prescribed her medications, and referred her to a specialist for further 

evaluation of her depression and COPD.” (Id.) 

 The ALJ did not err in relying on, among other reasons, the “lack of tests or lab work 

supporting the alleged severity of the claimant’s impairments.” (TR 32.) To the contrary, it is 

well-settled that the Commissioner “is not bound by the treating physician’s opinions, and that 

such opinions receive great weight only if they are supported by sufficient clinical findings and 

are consistent with the evidence.” Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1993) 

(citation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(c)(2). Plaintiff does not point to any specific 

medical evidence in Dr. Fadel’s treatment records, or any other medical records, which would 

support his opinion regarding the severity of Plaintiff’s symptoms. Near the end of her decision, 

the ALJ specifically notes that there are no “images” to support Plaintiff’s allegations of knee 

and back pain, that the evidence shows her carpal tunnel syndrome is “mild” and that she had no 

2:15-cv-12419-MKM Doc # 23 Filed 03/07/17 Pg 8 of 14 Pg ID 736
9 

neurological abnormalities, and that her headaches and dizziness were controlled by medication. 

(TR 36.) 

 Moreover, it is clear that the lack of diagnostic evidence was not the only relevant point 

in the ALJ’s analysis regarding the weight of Dr. Fadel’s opinion. The ALJ also relied on the 

inconsistencies in Dr. Fadel’s “diagnoses” of disability. On December 22, 2010, Dr. Fadel stated 

in one of the “disability forms,” that Plaintiff could be released to work on January 1, 2011. Just 

eight days after giving that opinion, on December 30, 2010, Dr. Fadel indicated in a letter that 

Plaintiff would be unable to work for at least one year, if not permanently. (TR 228.) Then, in 

April 2011, Dr. Fadel released Plaintiff to work. (TR 232.) The ALJ also noted that, while 

Plaintiff requested excusal from work due to her stress, she was not receiving any mental health 

treatment at the time. (TR 32.) 

 Finally, the undersigned notes that it is well-settled that the ultimate issue of disability is 

reserved to the Commissioner and not the treating or examining physician. Kidd v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 283 Fed. App’x 336, 341 (6th Cir. 2008). Thus, when a medical or non-medical 

source offers an opinion on “an issue reserved to the Commissioner, such as whether the 

claimant is disabled, the ALJ need not accord that opinion controlling weight.” Id. (citing Bass 

v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2007)). 

 In addition to the disability claims forms, Dr. Fadel also completed a State of Michigan 

Department of Human Services “Medical Needs” form. (TR 492-93.) Regarding this form, the 

ALJ stated: 

Dr. Fadel completed a Michigan Department of Human Services medical 

needs form in September 2013 (Exhibit 12F). He gave diagnoses of hypertension, 

asthma, COPD, dizziness, and chronic lumbago. He opined that the claimant 

needed someone to transport her to medical appointments, and assist her with 

shopping, laundry, and household chores. Dr. Fadel opined that the claimant 

2:15-cv-12419-MKM Doc # 23 Filed 03/07/17 Pg 9 of 14 Pg ID 737
10 

could not work at her usual occupation or any job, and noted “12 months” next to 

the question. 

Some weight is given to Dr. Fadel’s statements. The claimant did testify 

that she needs help with laundry and housework. However, the treatment records 

reflect only mild carpal tunnel syndrome, and there are no images reflect[ing] any 

back or knee abnormalities. Her cardiac workup was normal. While the claimant 

may need some assistance with her household chores, the record does not support 

the opinion that her impairments are severe enough to render her incapable of any 

work. Her alleged musculoskeletal pain, dizziness, and breathing difficulties are 

accounted for in the residual functional capacity. 

(TR 34.) Plaintiff claims that the ALJ did not give “good reasons” for discounting Dr. Fadel’s 

opinion. (Docket no. 21 at 5.) This argument fails for essentially the same reasons stated above. 

Plaintiff does not identify any evidence in the record supporting Dr. Fadel’s opinion regarding 

the severity of Plaintiff’s medical conditions. It is clear that the ALJ considered the length of 

Plaintiff’s relationship with Dr. Fadel (see TR 32 “[a]lthough Dr. Fadel is a long-time treating 

source”), but found that factor outweighed by the fact that Dr. Fadel’s opinions were not 

supported and were not consistent with Plaintiff’s medical record. 

 The undersigned concludes that the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to Dr. Fadel’s 

opinions in the disability forms, and her decision to give some weight to Dr. Fadel’s statements 

in the Michigan DHS form, are both supported by substantial evidence and do not violate the 

“treating physician rule.” 

 2. Plaintiff’s remaining arguments

 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC because the ALJ 

relied on 1) two Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores; 2) the fact that Plaintiff 

completed five online college classes in a six-month period; and 3) the fact that Plaintiff 

informed a counselor that she wanted to attend school full time. (Docket no. 21 at 5-6.) 

Plaintiff’s arguments fail. 

2:15-cv-12419-MKM Doc # 23 Filed 03/07/17 Pg 10 of 14 Pg ID 738
11 

 First, the ALJ thoroughly discussed Plaintiff’s medical record, and it is clear from the 

ALJ’s discussion that her decision is not based entirely on Plaintiff’s GAF scores and 

educational achievements/goals. For example, the ALJ discusses how an electromyography 

revealed only “mild” carpal tunnel syndrome, and an electroencephalogram, conducted after 

Plaintiff’s complaints of dizziness and headaches, “was normal in wakefulness and sleep.” (TR 

34.) The ALJ further discusses how Plaintiff’s “allegations of back and knee pain are not 

supported by any images,” and her “cardiac and neurological workups did not reveal any 

significant abnormalities.” (TR 36.) The ALJ also points out that Plaintiff was prescribed 

physical therapy in late 2011, but that Plaintiff provided no records showing any treatment by a 

physical therapist beyond an initial evaluation. (TR 33.) Plaintiff does not dispute any of these 

findings. 

As for Plaintiff’s mental health records, the ALJ discussed how Plaintiff’s treating 

psychiatrist, Dr. Phillip Parker, M.D., prescribed Zoloft, and how Plaintiff’s discussions with her 

counselor “revolved around family and relationship issues.” (TR 35.) The ALJ also discussed 

Plaintiff’s mental consultative examination, noting the examiner’s description of Plaintiff as 

sitting “with her head in her hands and her eyes closed for most of the session,” but also noting 

that Plaintiff reported to the examiner that she “takes her children to school, goes on 

appointments and errands, picks her children up from school, . . . is able to independently care 

for her hygiene and grooming needs, cook, do laundry once a month, . . . and is able to 

independently manage her financial matters.” (TR 35; 402.) The ALJ also notes that Plaintiff 

had a gap in mental health treatment between July and October 2013. 

Finally, the ALJ discussed inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s testimony and her medical 

records. For example, the ALJ notes Plaintiff’s testimony that she only smoked marijuana “a 

2:15-cv-12419-MKM Doc # 23 Filed 03/07/17 Pg 11 of 14 Pg ID 739
12 

couple of years ago, to celebrate a birthday,” but that Dr. Parker diagnosed Plaintiff with 

“cannabis dependence” in April 2013. (TR 31, 35.) The ALJ also points out Plaintiff’s 

inconsistent testimony regarding Plaintiff’s efforts to find work since 2010; at first, Plaintiff 

claimed that she did not look for work due to her carpal tunnel syndrome symptoms, but she later 

admitted that she did look for work in 2012 while she was collecting unemployment benefits. 

(TR 31.) 

 Moreover, the ALJ did not err by relying on the GAF scores and Plaintiff’s educational 

history and future goals. Dr. Parker assigned Plaintiff a GAF score of 50 in May 2013, which 

took into consideration the fact that Plaintiff had economic and housing problems. (TR 501.) 

State disability examiner Terrance A. Mills, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, also assigned a GAF 

score of 50. (TR 403.) Without disputing the accuracy of the scores or pointing to contradictory 

evidence, Plaintiff simply argues that a GAF score “is nothing more than a subjective 

determination that represents the clinician’s judgment of the individual[’]s functioning. It is not 

medical evidence and should not [be] a substitute for medical evidence.” (Docket no. 21 at 5.) 

As the ALJ points out, the Sixth Circuit has relied on GAF scores, and specifically stated that a 

GAF score “in the high 40s to mid 50s . . . would not preclude [a person] from having the mental 

capacity to hold at least some jobs in the national economy.” Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 

F.3d 873, 877 (6th Cir. 2007). 

 Regarding Plaintiff’s education, the ALJ stated that the “ability to attend school part-time 

and desire to attend fulltime are inconsistent with the claimant’s allegations of disabling mental 

and physical impairments.” (TR 36.) Plaintiff argues that her ability to complete the online 

classes has “no correlation” with “one[’]s ability to concentrate, and function in a normal work 

environment,” because Plaintiff was not required to follow a “schedule with deadlines,” in her 

2:15-cv-12419-MKM Doc # 23 Filed 03/07/17 Pg 12 of 14 Pg ID 740
13 

online classes. Regardless of the specific nature of the coursework, the record supports the 

ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff did complete five classes in a six-month period. Moreover, the ALJ 

specifically found that despite Plaintiff’s ability to complete this amount of coursework, Plaintiff 

nevertheless had moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, and pace, and the ALJ 

accounted for this limitation in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC by limiting Plaintiff to “unskilled 

work with simple instructions; no more than routine changes; only occasional contact with 

supervisors; and only brief or superficial interaction with coworkers or the public.” (TR 30.) 

 Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ’s reliance on Plaintiff’s desire to attend school full time 

is “erroneous,” because “there is no testimony in the record that the Plaintiff was capable of 

performing or attending school on a full time basis.” (Docket no. 21 at 6.) However, as the ALJ 

points out, Plaintiff did inform her counselor that she wanted to attend school full time. (TR 

509.) She later testified that “someone” told her that she “couldn’t go to school and try to get 

Social Security.” (TR 47.) Regardless, and more importantly, it is clear from the ALJ’s decision 

that she relied on more than Plaintiff’s stated desire to attend school full-time when formulating 

Plaintiff’s RFC. 

 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [21] is 

DENIED, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [22] is GRANTED. 

Dated: March 7, 2017 s/ Mona K. Majzoub 

 MONA K. MAJZOUB 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

 

2:15-cv-12419-MKM Doc # 23 Filed 03/07/17 Pg 13 of 14 Pg ID 741
14 

PROOF OF SERVICE

 I hereby certify that a copy of this Report and Recommendation was served upon counsel 

of record on this date. 

 

Dated: March 7, 2017 s/ Lisa C. Bartlett 

 Case Manager

2:15-cv-12419-MKM Doc # 23 Filed 03/07/17 Pg 14 of 14 Pg ID 742