NO. 4-99-0951

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT

	OF ILLINOIS

	FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

          Plaintiff-Appellee,

          v.

DARREN RANSOM,

          Defendant-Appellant.	)

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)

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)	   Appeal from

   Circuit Court of 

   Sangamon County

   No. 99CF596

   Honorable

   Donald M. Cadagin,

   Judge Presiding.

______________________________________________________________

		PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of

the court:

		In June 1999, the State charged defendant, Darren

Ransom, with attempt (murder) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West

1998)), home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(1) (West 1998)), and

armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a) (West 1998)).  In September

1999, a jury found defendant guilty of all counts.  In November

1999, the trial court sentenced him to 15 years in prison for

home invasion, 20 years for armed robbery (to run consecutively

to the home invasion sentence), and 35 years for attempt (to run

concurrently with the armed robbery and home invasion sentences). 

		On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the trial court

erred by (a) denying his motion in limine seeking to bar the State from introducing evidence of his flight and (b) admitting

certain evidence; (2) the prosecutor made improper statements

during closing argument; and (3) section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified

Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West

1998)) is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).  We affirm.

	I. BACKGROUND

		The evidence at defendant's jury trial showed the

following.  On the night of May 15, 1999, the victim, Donna Hill,

was out with her friend, Alexis Bell.  At 11:30 p.m., Donna

returned to her home, which she shared with her mother, Denise

Wilborn, her brother, Carl Hill, and her three sons.  Her mother

and youngest son were the only ones at home when she arrived. 

Around midnight, Wilborn invited Dewayne Bias and his sister,

Diane, into the home to visit with Donna.  Wilborn then went next

door to a friend's house.  Dewayne and Diane stayed for about 15

minutes.  Around 3 a.m., Bell honked the horn of her car in front

of the home, and Donna talked to Bell out of her bedroom window

for about 15 minutes.

		Around 4 a.m., Donna's baby became fussy, and Donna

started downstairs to prepare a bottle.  Halfway down the stairs,

she heard someone come in the front door.  When she got to the

living room, she saw defendant with one foot in the living room

and one on the porch.  Donna recognized defendant because he had

been at her home several times in the previous weeks to see

Wilborn, who braided his hair.  A week before, Donna and defen

dant had argued at Donna's home, and she told defendant not to

come there again.  

		Donna asked defendant to leave, and he left.  She

closed the door but did not lock it.  After fixing the bottle,

she returned to her bedroom, fed the baby, and put him in bed.  Donna then got undressed and lay down on her bed to watch televi

sion and count her rent money.  As she was counting the money,

she heard someone coming up the stairs.   

		Donna then saw defendant and another man, whom she did

not recognize, standing at her door, and she asked defendant to

leave.  Defendant had a hammer in his hand.  Carl testified that

a day before the incident, he and his cousin, Shantel Williams,

had used a hammer to install a door on Donna's bedroom and had

left it on the floor nearby.  Defendant attacked Donna with the

hammer, first striking her on the side of her face and then on

her forehead.  As she lost consciousness, the money fell out of

her hands.  

		When she regained consciousness, Donna went to her

bedroom window and yelled for help.  She then crawled down the

stairs and tried to leave the house.  She made it to the kitchen,

where she lost consciousness again.  

		Later that morning, Donald McClain, a former boyfriend

of Donna and the father of her oldest child, entered the home and

found Donna lying in the kitchen.  He then went to his cousin's

house where he called 911.       

		When Springfield police detective James Young, an

evidence technician, arrived on the scene, he found blood on the

bed and walls of Donna's bedroom that continued in a path to the

kitchen, where a considerable amount of blood had collected on

the floor and walls.  Young also found Donna's purse in the

bedroom and its contents strewn on the floor.  The hammer was never found.

		During the night of May 15, 1999, and the early morning

of May 16, James Jones and Monte Turner were at Mac's Lounge with

defendant.  Around 1 or 1:30 a.m., Jones could not find defen

dant.  Jones and Turner left the lounge and returned to their

home.  When Jones entered the home, he placed his car keys on top

of his entertainment shelf.  

		Around 8 a.m., Jones and Turner were awakened by

defendant, who was knocking on the window and calling Jones'

name.  Turner testified that defendant knocked on the window and

repeated "let me in" in a "panicky, rushing, [and] hurrying"

manner for 5 or 10 minutes.  Eventually, Turner opened one door

and asked defendant what he wanted.  Defendant offered $20 if

someone would open the door.  Turner opened a second door and let

defendant inside.  Jones and Turner did not notice any blood on

defendant.  Defendant, carrying a black gym bag, asked Jones if

he could drop defendant off at defendant's father's house and

offered him another $20.  Jones denied defendant's request, and

he and Turner went back to sleep.  Turner described defendant as

panicky, jumpy, and nervous that morning.  

		At 9:30 a.m., Turner's brother stopped by Jones and

Turner's home to drop their child off and mentioned that Jones

and Turner's car was gone.  Jones and Turner then noticed that

the keys were missing from the entertainment shelf.  Approxi

mately one week later, the car was found in St. Louis, Missouri. 

When it was returned, the car did not contain any blood or tools.

		On May 23, 1999, a St. Louis police officer arrested

defendant, and in June 1999, the State charged him as stated. 

Before trial, defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit the State from offering any evidence of his flight.  The

trial court denied the motion, finding sufficient circumstantial

evidence of defendant's flight.

		At trial, the State sought to use a hammer similar to

the one used in the attack to illustrate that Donna's injuries

were consistent with those a hammer would cause.  The trial court

overruled defense counsel's objection to the use of the hammer.

		The State also sought to show how Donna initially

identified defendant by using a book of mug shots, which con

tained arrest photographs of defendant and other individuals. 

Defense counsel made a motion in limine to prohibit the State from introducing the mug shot book.  The trial court denied the

motion.  However, the court directed the State not to refer to

the book as a "mug book" or "police book" and ruled that the book

would not go back to the jury during deliberations.

		Defense counsel made another motion in limine to prohibit the State from introducing evidence that Donna became

physically ill upon seeing defendant's photograph.  The trial

court denied the motion, stating that the police officers could

testify to what they observed when Donna saw the photograph. 

		At the trial's conclusion, the jury found defendant

guilty of all counts.  Defendant subsequently filed motions for

merger and a new trial.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial but never

ruled on the merger motion.  The court then sentenced defendant

as stated.  This appeal followed.

	II. ANALYSIS

	A. Evidence of Flight

		Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by

denying his motion in limine seeking to prohibit the State from introducing evidence of his flight.  Specifically, he asserts

that no evidence showed or raised the inference that defendant

knew he was a suspect in a crime or that the police were pursuing

him.  We disagree.

		Evidentiary rulings lie within the trial court's sound

discretion, and this court will not disturb them unless the trial

court abused its discretion.  People v. Boclair, 129 Ill. 2d 458, 476, 544 N.E.2d 715, 723 (1989).  The fact of flight is a circum

stance that a jury may consider as tending to prove guilt. 

People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 349, 651 N.E.2d 72, 93 (1995).  The inference of guilt that may be drawn from flight depends upon

the suspect's knowledge that (1) the offense had been committed,

and (2) he is or may be suspected.  Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d at 349, 651 N.E.2d at 93.  Although evidence that a defendant was aware

that he was a suspect is essential to prove flight, actual

knowledge of his possible arrest is not necessary to render such

evidence admissible where evidence exists from which that fact

may be inferred.  Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d at 350, 651 N.E.2d at 93.  

		The State's evidence of flight consisted of Turner's testimony that a few hours after the May 16, 1999, incident,

defendant was at her home in a panicked state, trying to get a

ride.  Defendant offered Turner $20 to enter her home and offered

Jones $20 for a ride.  After Jones refused to give defendant a

ride, his car keys and car turned up missing.  The car was later

found in St. Louis, where defendant was arrested.  Moreover, the

evidence showed that defendant would be motivated to flee because

he had attacked a person who knew him and could identify him.

		We conclude that based on the evidence presented, the

jury reasonably could have inferred that defendant knew that he

was a suspect and he consciously avoided police.  We therefore

hold that the trial court did not err by denying defendant's

motion in limine.

	B. Other Evidence

		Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by

allowing the State to (1) present testimony regarding (a) the

book of mug shots and (b) Donna's becoming physically ill when

she viewed defendant's photograph, and (2) use a hammer as

demonstrative evidence.  For the following reasons, we disagree.  

		The admissibility of evidence at trial lies within the

trial court's sound discretion, and we will not overturn its

decision absent a clear abuse of discretion.  People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364, 583 N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991).    

	1. The Book of Mug Shots

		Defendant contends that the State's presentation of

evidence regarding the book of mug shots was prejudicial.  We disagree.  

		At trial, Donna identified defendant's photograph in

the book and identified the book as the one police showed her

when she was in the hospital following the incident.  However,

the trial court did not allow the State to refer to the book as

either a "mug book" or a "police book."  Instead, the State

referred to it as a "photo book."  See People v. Ayers, 264 Ill. App. 3d 757, 759, 636 N.E.2d 600, 601-02 (1993) (trial court did

not abuse its discretion in allowing mention of "photos," "photo

graphs," and "photo books" while admonishing the State not to

refer to the defendant's prior arrest photo as a "mug shot" or

"mug photo").  Further, the court did not allow the book to go

back to the jury room during deliberations.  

		Contrary to defendant's contention, the State did not

use the book to suggest that he committed the instant crime

because he had been previously arrested.  Instead, the trial

court took appropriate measures to prevent such prejudice from

occurring.  We therefore conclude that the court did not err by

admitting this evidence.  

	2. The Hammer as Demonstrative Evidence

		Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by

permitting the State to use a hammer as demonstrative evidence. 

Specifically, he contends that the use of the hammer was (1)

unnecessary because a hammer is a "familiar object" and (2)

inflammatory.  

		In People v. Burrows, 148 Ill. 2d 196, 252, 592 N.E.2d 997, 1022 (1992), the Supreme Court of Illinois wrote the follow

ing on the use of demonstrative evidence:

			"Courts look favorably upon the use of

demonstrative evidence, because it helps the

jury understand the issues raised at trial. 

'The overriding considerations in admitting

demonstrative evidence are relevancy and

fairness.  [Citations.]  The question of the

admissibility of such exhibits is a matter

within the trial court's discretion and will

be disturbed only on a showing of clear

abuse.'[Citation.]"  

		Here, the State's expert witness testified that Donna's

injuries were consistent with those that would result from blows

inflicted by a hammer similar to the one the State presented. 

This testimony might have laid to rest any doubts the jury held

regarding whether Donna's description of the attack was consis

tent with the injuries she received.  Given the other extensive

and sometimes gruesome evidence of the brutality of the attack

and the injuries Donna suffered, we hold that the State's use of

the hammer as demonstrative evidence was not so inflammatory as

to unfairly prejudice defendant and the trial court did not abuse

its discretion by allowing it.	

	3. The Victim's Reaction to Defendant's Photograph

		Defendant next asserts that the trial court erred by

admitting evidence that Donna became physically ill after viewing defendant's photograph.  Specifically, he claims this evidence

was not relevant.  We disagree.  

		Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the existence

of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the

case more probable than it would be without the evidence.  Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d at 329, 651 N.E.2d at 83.  However, even when evi

dence is relevant, the trial court may, in its discretion,

exclude it if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its

probative value.  Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d at 329, 651 N.E.2d at 83. 

		The evidence of Donna's reaction to the photograph was

highly probative of the identity of the attacker in that her

violent reaction makes it more probable that the person in the

photograph was her attacker.  Accordingly, we conclude that the

trial court acted within its discretion by admitting the evidence

of Donna's reaction to defendant's photograph.

	C. Prosecutor's Statements in Closing Arguments

		Defendant next argues that the prosecutor made improper

statements during closing argument.  We disagree.  

		A prosecutor is allowed a great deal of latitude in

closing argument and may comment on the evidence presented and on

reasonable inferences arising therefrom, even if those inferences

are unfavorable to the defendant.  People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 441, 626 N.E.2d 161, 178 (1993).  Because the trial court is

in a better position than a reviewing court to determine the

prejudicial effect of a given remark, determining the permissible

scope of closing argument lies within the trial court's discre tion, and we will not disturb that determination unless a clear

abuse of discretion occurred.  Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d at 441, 626 N.E.2d at 178.

		During closing arguments, the prosecutor made the

following statement:

			"This isn't a case of maybe I'm mistaken

about who he is.  She knows specifically who

he is[,] and she pointed to him[,] and she

knows that is who he is.  For her to point

the finger at him and say that he is the man

that's responsible for this with such cer

tainty and with such definite--definitiveness

in her testimony, if she's not to be believed

it must mean that she's framing him for some

reason, and don't you think we'd have heard

some cross[-]examination about a motivation

for her to lie about his--about his--about

motivation to lie?  Excuse me because I did

n't state that real well.  Let me try again.

Don't you think we would have heard some

cross[-]examination if there were any reason

at all for her to make this up and to frame

him?"

Defendant objected, and the trial court held a side-bar confer

ence.  After the conference, the trial court reminded the jury

that the State has the burden of proof.

		The prosecutor later remarked:

			"And we know not only that he fled to

Missouri, but we know why.  You heard a lit

tle bit of testimony about the fact there was

a second person in the house that day.  We

were never able to determine who it was be

cause Donna said she didn't recognize the

man, but the defendant committed this crime,

beat her, leaving her for dead in front of a

witness.  That's the reason why he ran to

Missouri, ladies and gentlemen."

Defense counsel also objected to this statement, and the trial

court sustained the objection. 

		Finally, the prosecutor commented:

		"At least twelve separate brutal, brutal

hammer strikes to the face.  The sheer bru

tality of this crime speaks volumes as to

what was in the defendant's mind at the time

he committed these offenses."

Defense counsel again objected, and the trial court told the jury

to disregard any statements not based on facts.   

		When viewed in the context of the closing arguments as

a whole and the evidence presented at trial, the prosecutor's

remarks were neither improper nor substantially prejudicial to

defendant.  Defendant contends that the first comment, regarding

Donna's identification of defendant, shifted the burden of proof.  We disagree.  The prosecutor commented on the absence of any

evidence that Donna was motivated to lie.  Moreover, even if the

prosecutor's remark misled the jury on the burden of proof, the

trial court cured the error by contemporaneously reminding the

jury that the burden of proof remained with the State.

		The second remark of which defendant complains was not

improper.  As the State points out, the prosecutor was entitled

to comment on the evidence of defendant's flight.  

		Finally, defendant contends that the prosecutor's

reference to 12 blows of the hammer was not based on evidence

because the State's expert witness did not testify that Donna had

suffered 12 lacerations.  In light of the evidence presented at

trial, we conclude that this remark did not substantially preju

dice defendant.  The State's expert witness testified to the

existence of nine lacerations, with underlying depressed skull

fractures beneath three or 4four of them.  He also testified that

one laceration extended from Donna's forehead to the bridge of

her nose and that brain matter had come through one of the

lacerations on the side of her head.  In addition, the jury heard

testimony regarding the amount of blood discovered at the crime

scene and a paramedic's description of Donna's condition immedi

ately after she was discovered.  Given that the jury heard this

extensive and graphic evidence on the severity of Donna's inju

ries and the brutality of the attack, the prosecutor's remark

that defendant inflicted 12 blows was not substantially prejudi

cial.  Again, the court instructed the jury to disregard any statements not based on facts.  

	D. Consecutive Sentences

		Last, defendant argues that the mandatory consecutive

sentencing provision of section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code is

unconstitutional under Apprendi, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63, which was decided while defen

dant's case was pending on direct appeal.  Specifically, he

contends that section 5-8-4(a) violates his right to due process

and trial by jury.  We disagree.

		We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo.  People v. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d 441, 448, 705 N.E.2d 67, 71-72 (1998).

		Section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-8-

4(a) (West 1998)) provides as follows:

		"The court shall not impose consecutive sen

tences for offenses which were committed as

part of a single course of conduct during

which there was no substantial change in the

nature of the criminal objective, unless, one

of the offenses for which defendant was con

victed was a Class X felony or a Class 1

felony and the defendant inflicted severe

bodily injury *** in which event the court

shall enter sentences to run consecutively. 

Sentences shall run concurrently unless oth

erwise specified by the court."		

Thus, pursuant to section 5-8-4(a), a trial court must impose

consecutive sentences when (1) the defendant commits multiple

offenses within a single course of conduct, (2) one of the

offenses was a Class X felony, and (3) the defendant inflicted

severe bodily injury.  730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1998). 

		In Apprendi, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63, the Supreme Court held that "[o]ther than the

fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty

for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."  The

Court further explained:

		"'[I]t is unconstitutional for a legislature

to remove from the jury the assessment of

facts that increase the prescribed range of

penalties to which a criminal defendant is

exposed.  It is equally clear that such facts

must be established by proof beyond a reason

able doubt.'"  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2363, quoting

Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311, 332, 119 S. Ct. 1215,

1228-29 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring).

		Disagreement exists regarding the meaning of an "in crease [in] the prescribed range of penalties" (Apprendi, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2363).  Here,

defendant asserts that the "increase" to which Apprendi refers includes the aggregate years of imprisonment resulting from the

imposition of consecutive sentences.  For the following reasons,

we conclude that Apprendi does not support defendant's argument.

		The Apprendi decision clearly indicates that the Court was concerned only with increases in the sentencing range for a single, discrete conviction--that is, the conviction for which the State sought an enhanced sentence.  Apprendi focused solely upon the increase in the sentencing range for a particular

offense and not the aggregate years of imprisonment to be served

as a result of a trial court's imposing consecutive sentences. 

Indeed, the Court recognized that the defendant in Apprendi could have received consecutive sentences.  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 445, 120 S. Ct. at 2354.  Consequently, the cumulative effect of a defendant's sentences, including consecu

tive sentences, is irrelevant under Apprendi.

		Unlike the statute in Apprendi, section 5-8-4(a) does not actually increase any of defendant's individual sentences.  Here, defendant was convicted of home invasion and armed robbery,

both Class X felonies (720 ILCS 5/12-11(c), 18-2(b) (West 1998)). 

The statutory maximum sentence for a Class X felony is 30 years

in prison (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 1998)).  The trial

court's sentences of 15 and 20 years respectively are clearly

within the prescribed statutory range.   

		Section 5-8-4(a) merely addresses the manner in which the sentence for each individual offense is to be served.  That section has nothing to do with the length of each discrete sentence.  730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1998); see also People v. Primm , slip op. at 26, No. 1-97-3685, slip op. at 26 (December 29, 2000), slip op. at 26, ___ Ill. App. 3d ___, ___, ____ N.E.2d ___, ___ (consecutive sentenc

ing affects only the manner in which each sentence is to be

served and has nothing to do with the length of each sentence). 

Our supreme court made this clear in Thomas v. Greer, 143 Ill. 2d 271, 278, 573 N.E.2d 814, 817 (1991), where it held that when

sentences are "made consecutive to one another, a new single

sentence [is] not formed."  The Thomas court supported its holding by noting, in part, that "'[t]he term "consecutive

sentences" means sentences following in a train, succeeding one another in a regular order, with an uninterrupted course of succession, and having no interval or break.'"  (Emphasis in

original.)  Thomas, 143 Ill. 2d at 278, 573 N.E.2d at 817, quoting 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law §552 (1981).  Further, the supreme court has held that the imposition of consecutive sen

tences does not constitute an increase in penalty.  See People v. Wendt, 163 Ill. 2d 346, 355, 645 N.E.2d 179, 183 (1994).

		Moreover, the imposition of consecutive sentences has

historically been within the trial court's discretion (See People v. Vraniak, 5 Ill. 2d 384, 386, 125 N.E.2d 513, 515 (1955)), and the factors set forth in section 5-8-4(a) of the Unified Code

merely limit that discretion.

		The Apprendi Court was concerned that the New Jersey hate-crime statute gave the trial judge the ability to decide an

element of the crime because that statute required the court to make a finding as to the defendant's mental state, i.e., that he acted out of hate.  Thus, the statute was "the functional equiva

lent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by

the jury's guilty verdict."  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at ___ n.19, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 457 n.19, 120 S. Ct. at 2365 n.19. 

		These concerns are not implicated under the mandatory

consecutive sentencing provisions of section 5-8-4(a) of the

Unified Code.  The findings trial courts make under this section

are not akin to additional elements of the crime charged. 

Rather, they are the type of considerations that trial courts

typically take into account when weighing aggravating and miti

gating evidence to determine an appropriate sentence.

		Last, in support of our conclusion, we note the recent

decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (rejecting an

Apprendi argument regarding the imposition of consecutive sen tences), as follows:

		"[T]he Supreme Court's concern in Apprendi was whether the sentencing court had, on the

basis of facts found by the court and not the

jury, exceeded the sentence for a particular

count.  Here, the district court did not

exceed the maximum for any individual count. 

It cannot therefore be said that, as to any

individual count, the court's findings re

sulted in the imposition of a greater punish

ment than was authorized by the jury's ver dict. [Citations.]

			Second, and perhaps more important, we

are aware of no constitutionally cognizable

right to concurrent, rather than consecutive,

sentences."  United States v. White, No. 00- 1113 (2d Cir. Feb. 13, 2001), 240___ F.3d 127___, 135___ (2d Crikrir. 2001).

	III. CONCLUSION

		Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

		Affirmed.

		McCULLOUGH and COOK, JJ., concur.