United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-30355

____________

Tiffany Latres’ Stamper, 

Plaintiff—Appellant, 

versus

Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant—Appellee. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:21-CV-460

______________________________

Before Wiener, Stewart, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Tiffany Latres’ Stamper applied for social security disability benefits. 

An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied the application, and a 

magistrate judge recommended dismissing her subsequent challenge. The 

district court agreed and affirmed. We affirm as well.

When reviewing a “final decision” of the Commissioner, we ask if the 

decision was “supported by substantial evidence” and if “the Commissioner 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 19, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 23-30355

2

used the proper legal standards to evaluate the evidence.” Kneeland v. 

Berryhill, 850 F.3d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). This standard 

is “exceedingly deferential.” Taylor v. Astrue, 706 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 

2012). It is even more deferential when, as here, the plaintiff fails to object 

to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. In such cases, we will 

only reverse if there is plain error. See Sneed v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 50 

F.4th 483, 490 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). An error is plain if it is 

“clear or obvious” and “affects [a plaintiff’s] substantial rights.” Baisden v. 

I’m Ready Prods., Inc., 693 F.3d 491, 506 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Puckett v. 

United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)).

Stamper cannot show any error, let alone clear error. To begin, she 

argues that the ALJ failed to consider the proper disability onset date. But he 

did. And that determination is supported by substantial evidence, including 

Stamper’s admission that the onset date was 2018 and documents indicating 

that she was earning wages before that date. 

Stamper also points to the statement of a vocational expert declaring 

her to be disabled. Yet that testimony was responding to a hypothetical 

question posed by the ALJ. We have explained that “[w]hen hypothetical 

testimony by a vocational expert is unsupported by the evidence, the ALJ 

may properly disregard that testimony.” Jenkins v. Astrue, 250 F. App’x 645, 

647 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). That is what happened here. 

Stamper’s remaining claims either lack merit or are waived. For 

instance, Stamper raises vague, conclusory allegations of constitutional and 

civil rights violations and judicial misconduct. Because she never raised these 

issues before the district court, we decline to address them. See Castillo v. 

Barnhart, 325 F.3d 550, 552 (5th Cir. 2003). Stamper also contends that 

there were inaccuracies in the administrative record and in the ALJ’s 

decision, but she does not explain what those inaccuracies were. Her failure 

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to “adequately [] brief” this issue “constitutes waiver of that argument.” 

Proctor & Gamble v. Amway Corp., 376 F.3d 496, 499 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004); see

also United States v. Fernandez, 48 F.4th 405, 412 (5th Cir. 2022). And, while 

Stamper contends that certain exhibits submitted by her attorney were 

improperly excluded, the record shows the ALJ permitted her attorney to 

submit those exhibits and even referenced some of them in the decision 

denying her relief. 

AFFIRMED.

Case: 23-30355 Document: 00516936747 Page: 3 Date Filed: 10/19/2023