Office of Inspector General

Audit Report

IMPROVEMENTS TO STEWARDSHIP AND OVERSIGHT 

AGREEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO ENHANCE 

FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Federal Highway Administration

Report Number: MH-2013-001

Date Issued: October 1, 2012
U.S. Department of

Memorandum

Transportation

Office of the Secretary

of Transportation

Office of Inspector General

Subject: ACTION: Improvements to Stewardship and 

Oversight Agreements Are Needed To Enhance 

Federal-aid Highway Program Management

Federal Highway Administration

Report No. MH-2013-001

Date: October 1, 2012

From: Joseph W. Comé

Assistant Inspector General for

Highway and Transit Audits

Reply to 

Attn. of: JA-40

To: Federal Highway Administrator

The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) oversees billions of dollars in 

Federal-aid Highway Program (FAHP) funds provided annually to the States and 

local public agencies (LPAs)1 and American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 

(ARRA) funds for highway infrastructure investments.

2 To oversee this substantial 

investment, FHWA relies greatly on the States to monitor the thousands of 

projects receiving Federal funds. Stewardship and Oversight Agreements 

(Agreements), which are required by law, formalize the roles and responsibilities

of FHWA Division Offices and the States to ensure adequate oversight of Federal 

funds, project quality, and safety.3 FHWA formalized its process for developing 

Agreements in its April 2006 and August 2011 Stewardship and Oversight 

Agreement Guidance.4

As part of our ongoing ARRA oversight, we conducted this audit to assess

whether FHWA Stewardship and Oversight Agreements address Federal 

requirements and program risks, including those required by the Recovery Act. 

The objectives of this audit were to determine the extent to which FHWA

(1) established Agreements that fully reflected Federal requirements and its own 

 1 LPAs include counties and cities. 2 Pub. L. No. 111-5 (2009). 3 FHWA has 55 Agreements nationwide, one with each State, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, Guam,

American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands. A current Agreement with Puerto Rico has not been executed. 4 FHWA’s April 14, 2006, “Federal-aid Highway Program Stewardship/Oversight Agreement Guidance,” was in 

effect when we started our review, and was revised on July 1, 2011, and transmitted to Division Administrators on 

August 16, 2011.
2

key program risks and priorities and (2) provided sufficient Headquarters guidance

and oversight of the development and timely update of Agreements. To conduct 

our audit, we analyzed all 55 Agreements, interviewed Division Administrators 

from a random sample of 9 States, and evaluated FHWA’s April 2006 and August 

2011 Guidance. Exhibit A contains a detailed description of our scope and 

methodology.

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted 

Government auditing standards.

RESULTS IN BRIEF

While FHWA fulfilled the statutory mandate to enter into Agreements with each 

State, the Agreements do not consistently reflect Federal requirements, or program 

risks and priorities that FHWA has identified and communicated to its Division 

Offices. Specifically, Agreements did not consistently address risks related to 

ARRA implementation and LPAs’ management of FHWA funds, Federal highway 

safety priorities, and use of performance and compliance indicators to measure the 

impact of the FAHP. For example, only 9 of 55 Agreements refer to ARRA, 

despite it being major legislation that imposed extensive financial and reporting 

requirements. Also, we found that FHWA was not fully implementing its statutory 

oversight responsibilities on about 600 of 2,500 Interstate Highway System 

projects, which included about $5 billion in Federal funds, by allowing States to 

assume project oversight responsibilities reserved to FHWA by law. For example, 

Texas was allowed to assume oversight of a bridge reconstruction project that 

included about $110 million in Federal funds. Collectively, these exclusions and 

inconsistencies reduce the ability of the Division Offices and States to utilize the 

Agreements as an internal control tool to carry out ARRA and FAHP oversight 

responsibilities effectively.

FHWA Headquarters has not provided sufficient guidance and oversight to 

Division Offices for the development and update of Agreements to ensure that 

inconsistencies reflect valid differences among the States and to ensure that legal 

issues are identified. We found a wide variation in the detail included in each 

Agreement, ranging from high-level to more detailed descriptions of roles and 

responsibilities for overseeing federally funded projects, and none of the 

Agreements cited a clear systematic methodology for the inclusion or exclusion of

certain program risk areas. FHWA’s 2006 Guidance, which was used to develop 

the Agreements we reviewed, did not clearly state what Division Offices were 

expected to include in Agreements or when to update them. While FHWA 

Headquarters intended the Guidance to be more than suggestions, it only states 

that Division Offices were required to address 5 specific elements—environment, 

right-of-way, safety, systems operations and preservation, and design and 

construction; but even then, only 32 of the 55 Agreements included all 5 elements. 
3

The Guidance did not require Division Offices to document their rationale for 

omitting certain elements. In comparison, the 2011 Guidance is even less 

prescriptive and does not contain requirements for including elements or updating 

Agreements. While we agree with FHWA that the Guidance should be flexible to 

allow Division Offices to tailor Agreements to meet the specific conditions in each 

State, we maintain that prescriptive guidance would provide FHWA with greater 

assurance that Agreements address key requirements and priorities, reflect current

conditions in each State, and promote FHWA’s commitment to a risk-based 

oversight approach. Furthermore, the Guidance does not address important control 

steps such as whether Agreements should be reviewed by Headquarters or legal 

experts before Agreements are signed, and it is not clear who in FHWA has the 

authority to sign an Agreement.

We are making a series of recommendations to strengthen FHWA’s oversight of 

Stewardship and Oversight Agreements.

BACKGROUND

Agreements are one of several risk-based oversight tools FHWA employs to 

leverage Division Office resources by allowing States to assume oversight 

responsibility and approval authority to manage the great majority of FAHP 

projects. The Agreements between FHWA and the States cover oversight of the 

FAHP and formally communicate Federal requirements, policy concerns, Federal 

and State roles and responsibilities, and individualized priorities to each State—

all in one document. In addition, the Agreements commit FHWA and the States to 

agreed-upon roles and responsibilities for an indefinite time period.

FHWA first introduced agreements with the States in response to the Intermodal 

Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA).5 However, formal 

agreements were not required until 1998, when the Transportation Equity Act for 

the 21st Century (TEA-21)6

FHWA outlined its approach to Agreements in its 2006 Guidance, which was 

revised in its 2011 Guidance. Both versions of the Guidance refer to the 

Agreement as a “road map” for effective oversight and stewardship of the FAHP, 

and note that FHWA intended to outline basic stewardship concepts and 

required FHWA to enter into formal agreements with 

States—relating to the extent to which States assume FAHP oversight 

responsibilities. For these Agreements, FHWA defined “stewardship” as the 

efficient and effective management of the public funds entrusted to FHWA, and 

“oversight” as the act of ensuring that the FAHP is delivered consistent with 

applicable laws, regulations, and policies. 

 5 Pub. L. No. 102-240. 6 Pub. L. No. 105-178, Section 1305.
4

approaches, rather than mandate specific procedures. Both versions also provide 

Division Offices wide discretion in tailoring Agreements to meet the needs of 

individual States. According to the 2011 Guidance, with the passage of the Safe, 

Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users 

(SAFETEA-LU) 7

FHWA is accountable for ensuring that FAHP projects meet Federal requirements 

and for performing responsibilities that by law cannot be assigned to States or 

LPAs. For example, under 23 United States Code 106, FHWA must perform 

certain roles and responsibilities, such as approval and oversight on certain types 

of projects. To help accomplish its oversight, each FHWA Division Office

assesses State oversight accordingly and does this through annual risk 

assessments, program assessments, program reviews, certification reviews, 

recurring reviews, and project inspections to identify State oversight and program 

areas with the greatest risk.

in 2005 “...the overall program has evolved requiring a more 

comprehensive Agreement that covers project delivery and financial controls of 

the FAHP.”

FHWA AGREEMENTS WITH STATES DO NOT CONSISTENTLY 

REFLECT REQUIREMENTS, PROGRAM RISKS, AND FHWA 

PRIORITIES 

While FHWA fulfilled the statutory mandate to enter into Agreements with States, 

the Agreements do not consistently reflect Federal requirements, program risks,

and priorities. In particular, Agreements do not consistently reflect a 

comprehensive FHWA and State approach to oversight of the $27.5 billion ARRA 

investment, oversight of multi-billion dollar LPA investments, critical Federal 

highway safety priorities, and the use of performance and compliance indicators.

Agreements are a key internal control in managing the FAHP. Exclusions and 

inconsistencies in Agreements could reduce the ability of Division Offices and 

States to fully utilize the Agreements as a road map for carrying out ARRA and 

FAHP oversight responsibilities or risk-based management. Further, FHWA is not 

fully implementing its statutory oversight responsibilities for certain projects by 

allowing States to assume areas of project oversight that were mandated by law to 

FHWA.

Agreements Did Not Consistently Address ARRA, LPAs, Safety 

Priorities, and Performance and Compliance Indicators

FHWA has issued numerous regulations, policies, memoranda, studies, and 

guidance outlining program risks and priorities related to ARRA, LPAs, highway 

 7 Pub. L. No. 109-59.
5

safety, and performance and compliance indicators. However, these FHWAidentified risks and priorities were not reflected consistently in the Agreements

between FHWA and the States. Table 1 below identifies four areas of Agreements 

that we reviewed in depth and summarizes the results found.

Table 1. Summary Results of 55 Agreements Reviewed

FHWA Program 

Risks and Priorities 

Reviewed

Agreement 

Did Not 

Include

Agreement 

Included But 

Not In Depth

Agreement 

Included

In Depth

Not 

Applicable

ARRA Legislation 46 4 5 0

LPA Oversight 3 25 22 5a

Safety Priorities 9 40 2 4b

Performance and 

Compliance Indicators 27 0 28 0

Source: OIG analysis.

a According to FHWA, there are no LPA-related activities. b According to FHWA, these safety priorities do not apply to the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the 

Northern Mariana Islands.

Agreements frequently did not reflect the additional oversight risks and 

requirements that ARRA posed. Only a few of the Agreements we reviewed 

included any specific ARRA requirements that were statutorily imposed, such as 

new financial reporting requirements, even though ARRA presents an ongoing 

oversight risk for over a 61⁄2-year period. Further, ARRA increased Division Office 

and State workloads—investing in about 13,000 highway infrastructure projects

across the Nation. FHWA’s April 2009 ARRA Risk Management Plan identified 

potential risk areas in the oversight of ARRA projects, including, for example,

LPA oversight, States’ oversight of contract administration, quality assurance, use 

of disadvantaged business enterprises, and improper payments.

Although ARRA imposed extensive certification, reporting, and financial 

requirements, 46 of the 55 Agreements we reviewed did not mention ARRA. Of 

the remaining nine Agreements, four mentioned ARRA, but only in a cursory 

manner. For example, the Agreement for California, which received about 

10 percent of ARRA highway infrastructure grants, simply made a few brief 

background-related references to ARRA, while providing no detail of related 

FHWA and State roles and responsibilities. For the other five Agreements, the 

Division Offices responsible for Colorado, Louisiana, South Carolina, Virginia,

and West Virginia recognized ARRA’s significant oversight risks and updated 

their Agreements accordingly. 

FHWA did not agree that the Agreements should have been updated to reflect 

ARRA, believing that the 2009 Risk Management Plan was sufficient to address 

this new program since this document is used by the Division Offices to plan their 
6

oversight actions. FHWA’s Risk Management Plan, however, is an internal 

planning document that discusses risks associated with ARRA and risk mitigation 

strategies. The plan does not focus on how ARRA may have altered State roles 

and responsibilities, or whether ARRA may have resulted in the need to adjust 

Agreements accordingly. The lack of attention to ARRA in most Agreements also 

runs counter to FHWA’s 2009 ARRA guidance on Federal-aid Program 

Stewardship and Oversight, which recommended that Division Offices adjust their 

stewardship and oversight activities “...to account for the high visibility and 

degree of risk that is associated with delivering this large infusion of funds.”

Furthermore, the 2011 Guidance now recognizes the necessity to update 

Agreements, stating that “...updates to an Agreement should be 

considered...when significant new legislation...occurs,” which would certainly 

apply to ARRA. By not amending Agreements to address changes in FHWA and 

State roles and responsibilities due to ARRA, FHWA leaves itself vulnerable to

misunderstandings on how risk mitigation strategies would be implemented and on 

each party’s responsibilities in carrying out ARRA requirements.

Agreements did not consistently reflect LPA oversight risks. Each year, States 

entrust approximately $8 billion in FAHP funds to LPAs. In addition to the annual 

FAHP funding, ARRA invested an estimated $8 billion in LPA projects over a

61⁄2-year period. FHWA has identified, and our prior work has pointed out,8

Additionally, in December 2006, FHWA’s Office of Professional and Corporate 

Development recommended that States implement Local Project Stewardship 

Agreements with LPAs, but we found that only 12 States had done so.

Accordingly, Agreements did not consistently detail how LPA oversight risks

should be addressed, despite being a concern of FHWA management for many 

years.

key 

LPA program oversight risks, including inadequate contract administration,

quality assurance processes, and noncompliance with Federal requirements. 

Despite the risks FHWA identified and the long history of internal control 

weaknesses in the management of LPAs, only 22 of the 55 Agreements we 

reviewed addressed State and LPA roles and responsibilities in depth, while an 

additional 25 only cursorily included LPA oversight. The Connecticut Agreement, 

for example, included a detailed matrix of the roles and responsibilities of LPAs in 

the administration of the FAHP. In contrast, the Illinois Agreement makes a 

general reference to State responsibilities to ensure Federal requirements are met 

on locally administered projects, but no specifics are provided. 

Agreements did not consistently reflect FHWA’s safety priorities. FHWA 

considers safety of such importance that FHWA’s National Highway Institute 

 8 OIG Report Number MH-2011-146, “Federal Highway Administration’s Oversight of Federal-aid and Recovery Act 

Projects Administered by Local Public Agencies Needs Strengthening,” July 15, 2011. OIG reports are available on 

our Web site: www.oig.dot.gov.
7

training emphasizes that stewardship and oversight responsibilities, especially as 

related to “...the Highway Safety Improvement Program, as well as other critical 

safety considerations, should be reflected in the stewardship and oversight 

agreements developed by each Division.”9 FHWA’s Office of Safety guidance to 

Division Offices identified five critical safety areas to be included in Agreements, 

including the Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP), Strategic Highway 

Safety Plan, Crash Data Systems and Analysis, Required Safety Program, and 

Focused Safety Program. FHWA also provided a fully worded, ready-to-use 

“Sample Agreement” template addressing elements within each of the five safety 

areas that could be incorporated into Agreements. For example, the HSIP template 

section includes agreement language that the “State will annually submit required 

reports on the effectiveness of the HSIP program....” Although safety is one of 

FHWA’s priorities and FHWA emphasized the importance of it in Agreements in 

a separate memorandum, our review found that only 2 of the 51 Agreements 

included all of the 5 critical safety areas, while 40 Agreements 

(78 percent) included some elements, and 9 Agreements (18 percent) did not 

include any.

10 The two Agreements that included all five safety areas, Indiana and 

North Carolina, closely followed the template provided by FHWA’s Office of 

Safety and included most of the recommended language in each safety area.

Agreements did not consistently provide performance and compliance 

indicators. FHWA’s 2006 and 2011 Guidance recommend that the States and 

Division Offices use indicators, such as project cost escalation, level of oversight, 

or project delivery, to assess the effectiveness of State-assumed responsibilities,

and evaluate performance and compliance with Federal requirements. FHWA 

envisioned a joint State and Division Office examination and discussion of

performance data at least annually to effectively manage and improve program 

delivery. Further, the establishment and review of performance measures and 

indicators help ensure that actions are taken to address risks. Yet, we found that 

only 28 of the 55 Agreements we reviewed included some form of data-driven 

performance and compliance indicators to track whether FAHP processes are 

working as intended. By not establishing such indicators in Agreements, FHWA 

limits its ability to carry out a risk-based oversight approach and assess 

performance.

FHWA’s agreement with Georgia provides an example of an Agreement that 

included performance indicators. The Georgia Agreement identified

38 performance indicators, such as “Percent of contracts (completed) with less 

than 10 percent cost increase” and “Value engineering annual cost savings.” 

Indicators such as the ones identified in the Georgia Agreement are necessary to 

 9 Module 10 from the National Highway Institute course, Federal-aid 101, “Safety.” 10 According to FHWA, these critical safety considerations do not apply to the following 4 of the 55 Agreements: 

the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands.
8

support FHWA’s risk-based oversight approach, alerting Division Offices and 

States to implement countermeasures or adjust oversight when performance data 

are not moving in the desired direction.

FHWA Had Not Fully Implemented Its Statutory Oversight 

Responsibilities for Projects on the Interstate Highway System

In 1998, TEA-21 required FHWA to enter into agreements with States regarding 

the extent to which each State can assume FAHP oversight responsibilities.11

In regard to the Agreements, FHWA explained that it had simply pre-approved 

projects that it considered “inherently low-risk” projects, in advance of actual 

delivery of the projects’ designs, plans, specifications, estimates, contract awards, 

contract administration, and inspections. FHWA stated that pre-approving 

inherently low-risk projects fulfilled FHWA’s oversight responsibilities through 

risk management.

Based on our review, the language of TEA-21 did not extend oversight authority 

to States on new or reconstruction projects on the Interstate Highway System that 

cost $1 million or more. Oversight for these projects was the responsibility of the 

Federal Government. However, we found that FHWA had agreed to a practice of 

pre-approving projects in lieu of States assuming full oversight responsibilities,

and nine Division Offices had entered into Agreements that allowed States to 

assume such responsibility.

12

FHWA has entered into Agreements that allow States to assume oversight 

authority on new or reconstruction projects on the Interstate Highway System that 

cost well in excess of $1 million. For example, FHWA’s Agreement with Texas 

allowed the State to assume “FHWA’s responsibilities for all project approval and 

oversight for Federal-aid projects...except those designated as Federal oversight 

projects.” The Agreement states that the established threshold for designating an 

Interstate project as a Federal oversight project is that the project costs are equal to 

or greater than $4 million, $10 million, or $30 million, depending on the project’s 

location in Texas. With FHWA overseeing only those projects with costs that far 

While FHWA’s policy of pre-approving “inherently low-risk” 

projects might be consistent with its risk-based approach to oversight, we are still 

concerned that FHWA’s practice of entering into Agreements that substitute State 

oversight for FHWA oversight was inconsistent with Federal law. We do not agree 

with FHWA’s position, as we found no practical difference between FHWA’s preapproval approach and States’ assumption of oversight responsibilities reserved to 

FHWA by law. Regardless of how this practice was labeled, FHWA is 

relinquishing significant oversight responsibility to the States.

 11 Our work was performed prior to the July 6, 2012, Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (Pub. L. No. 

112-141). 12 FHWA’s February 22, 2007, memorandum, “Inherently Low-Risk Oversight Projects on the Interstate System -

Programmatic Agreement,” defines for the Division Offices inherently low-risk projects. 
9

exceeded the statutory threshold of $1 million, FHWA’s Agreement allowed 

Texas to assume oversight authority beyond that allowed by law.

Furthermore, based on data in the FHWA Fiscal Management Information System 

(FMIS), we identified about 600 of 2,500 new or reconstruction projects on the 

Interstate Highway System, receiving $5 billion of Federal funds, that cost 

$1 million or more each.13 FHWA improperly allowed States to assume oversight

responsibilities on these projects. For example, Texas was allowed to assume 

oversight of a bridge reconstruction project even though it included about 

$110 million in Federal funds. We also found that FHWA was not consistently 

applying its approach of limiting pre-approval to inherently low-risk projects. For 

instance, FHWA allowed States to assume oversight of 23 “design-build”

Interstate projects, totaling $302 million in Federal funds, which are specifically 

excluded from being defined as inherently low-risk in FHWA’s 2007 guidance.14

FHWA GUIDANCE AND OVERSIGHT ARE NOT SUFFICIENT FOR 

DEVELOPMENT AND UPDATE OF AGREEMENTS 

FHWA Headquarters did not give sufficient guidance to Division Offices or 

adequately oversee the development and update of Agreements. Neither the 2006 

nor the 2011 Guidance is sufficiently clear as to what the Agreements are required 

to contain. Additionally, FHWA oversight has not been sufficient to make sure 

Agreements are updated when conditions change and that Agreements reflect 

FHWA’s commitment to its risk-based oversight approach.

Guidance for the Development of Agreements Was Not Clear

FHWA’s 2006 Guidance was not clear as to what elements were expected to be 

included in the Agreements. An FHWA Headquarters official responsible for the 

development of the Guidance stated that that the Guidance is intended to be more 

than suggestions and expects Division Offices to follow the Guidance to the 

maximum extent applicable, consistent with the unique conditions in their States. 

However, this intent was not stated in either the 2006 or the 2011 Guidance, which 

gave Division Offices wide discretion in determining the level of information to 

include in Agreements, as well as the process for developing them. As a result, 

individual Agreements varied widely in how key program areas and program risk 

areas were included. Specifically: 

• FHWA’s 2006 Guidance required that Agreements contain five program 

areas—environment, right-of-way, safety, systems operations and preservation, 

and design and construction. Of the 55 Agreements we reviewed, 23 (about 

 13 Includes new and reconstruction projects in FMIS designated as “active” projects, as of October 24, 2011. 14 The design-build approach is an innovative construction technique that allows a single procurement for the design 

and construction of projects.
10

42 percent) did not address all of the 5 required program areas, which reflects 

the limited oversight FHWA provided over Agreements. FHWA’s 2011 

Guidance identifies 11 program areas, but no longer requires that any of them 

be included in Agreements. Furthermore, neither the 2006 nor the 2011 

Guidance clearly describes what elements of the program areas Division 

Offices should address in Agreements, or requires Division Offices to 

document their rationale for including certain areas in their Agreements or for 

excluding others. 

• None of the Agreements we reviewed cited a clear systematic methodology for 

including or excluding program risk areas. Program risk areas could reflect 

actual oversight conditions and management priorities in a particular State, or 

could simply be the negotiated result of what was acceptable to the State. In 

addition, neither the 2006 nor the 2011 Guidance required Division Offices to 

directly link the results of their annual risk assessments to their Agreements, 

despite FHWA’s considerable emphasis on its risk assessment process and 

commitment to ensuring risk-based oversight. 

• We found a wide variation in the level of detail Division Offices included in 

their Agreements. For example, while the number of pages in an Agreement is 

not an indicator of the quality of an Agreement, the 9-page Agreements with 

Montana and Rhode Island provided only high-level descriptions of Division 

and State roles and responsibilities, compared with the more detailed 

descriptions provided in the nearly 200 pages in the Agreement with South 

Dakota. 

While we recognize that Division Offices should have flexibility to tailor 

Agreements based on individual State oversight programs and processes, the 2011 

Guidance lacks a clear methodology for developing consistent Agreements that 

would specify required program areas and priorities that must be included in 

Agreements.

Guidance for Updating Agreements Was Not Clear 

Neither the 2006 nor the 2011 Guidance were clear as to when Division Offices 

are required to update Agreements to reflect changes in the FAHP and State 

oversight. The 55 Agreements we reviewed were executed between calendar years 

2004 and 2011, with most executed in 2009 or earlier. The Michigan Agreement

was the oldest agreement, which dated back to 2004, had not been revised at the 

time of our review despite FHWA’s instructions to the Divisions to update the 

Agreements to conform to the 2006 Guidance as appropriate, and to reflect major 

legislation enacted in 2005 (SAFETEA-LU) and 2009 (ARRA). In contrast,

Colorado and Florida each updated their Agreements three times after the passage 

of SAFETEA-LU to reflect changing circumstances.
11

In another instance, FHWA set aside its 2001 Agreement with Puerto Rico15

Finally, according to the 2006 Guidance, the State and FHWA Division Office 

should sign the Agreement to signify that it constitutes a Memorandum of 

Agreement regarding how the FAHP will be administered in the State. However, 

the 2006 Guidance did not require the update of an Agreement when leadership 

changes or a formal assessment as to whether leadership changes in a State 

warrant modifications to the existing agreement, which we found frequently led to 

Agreements that did not reflect changes in State leadership. While changes in 

leadership do not necessarily negate the validity of an Agreement, a change in 

leadership could significantly impact State controls and the oversight roles and 

responsibilities addressed in an Agreement.

in 

2003, due to ongoing problems with administering the FAHP. Since then, all 

FAHP projects have been under FHWA’s full oversight. In 2005, FHWA 

designated Puerto Rico a “high-risk” grantee, but when it lifted the designation in 

2008, it did not execute a revised Agreement. A “high-risk” designation increased 

the importance of a revised Agreement to make sure Puerto Rico had clearly 

identified oversight roles and responsibilities. However, Puerto Rico still has 

critically important project roles and responsibilities that have not been identified 

in an updated Agreement, based on the 2006 Guidance. 

As shown in table 2 on the following page, our review of a random sample of 

9 Agreements out of 55 found that 6 of the Division Administrators and 8 of their 

State transportation counterparts who had signed the Agreements no longer hold 

those positions. According to the 2011 Guidance, Division Offices are now to 

consider updating an Agreement when leadership changes or priorities shift as a 

result of changes in staffing at the State or FHWA Division Office. However, 

FHWA Headquarters has not provided a mechanism by which to determine

whether a Division Office assessed the effect a leadership change would have on 

the State’s program.

 15 Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority.
12

Table 2. Review of Sample of Agreements for FHWA and State 

Signatory Approvals

Division/State

Year of 

Agreement

Agreement 

Length

(Pages)

FHWA Division

Administrator 

Signatory 

Still Present

State 

Transportation 

Signatory 

Still Present

California 2010 76 No No

Colorado 2010 99 Yes No

Georgia 2008 55 Yes No

Kansas 2007 14 Yes Yes

Maine 2007 40 No No

Michigan 2004 15 No No

Minnesota 2007 100 No No

Rhode Island 2006 9 No No

Tennessee 2006 45 No No

Source: OIG analysis.

Guidance Does Not Detail a Role for Headquarters in Overseeing the 

Development and Review of Agreements

FHWA Headquarters does not routinely review individual Agreements, even 

though these reviews could serve as a key control to ensure that Agreements 

reflect the intent of the Guidance, address FHWA’s oversight priorities, and are 

updated based on changes in oversight conditions. Specifically, while the 

Directors of Field Services (DFS) are responsible for monitoring Division Offices 

and representing FHWA Headquarters, neither the 2006 nor the 2011 Guidance 

defines roles for the DFS in overseeing Division Offices’ implementation of the 

Guidance. Because they report directly to Headquarters, the three DFS are 

uniquely positioned to take an active role in monitoring Agreements to increase 

the likelihood that they are properly developed and implemented, in accordance 

with the intent of the Guidance.

We also found that Division Administrators are signing agreements, but FHWA

has contradictory guidance for Agreement signature authority. Both the 2006 and 

2011 Guidance specify that Agreements be signed at the Division Office level for 

FHWA, which is contrary to guidance in FHWA’s Delegation and Organization 

Manual.16

 16 FHWA’s Delegations and Organization Manual documents the official, approved delegations of authority vested in 

FHWA by law, regulation, or delegation from the Secretary of Transportation. 

The Manual authorizes DFS, but not Division Administrators, to sign 

Agreements with States, thereby providing an appropriate level of executive 

review. By not requiring DFS to sign Agreements, or to formally document

elsewhere their review and approval of Agreements, FHWA bypassed an 
13

important internal control to review Agreements from an FHWA-wide perspective 

for appropriate stewardship and oversight of Federal funds.

Finally, Agreements are usually prepared by a team consisting of Division Office 

management, subject matter experts, and technical staff, along with State 

personnel. Two Division Offices stated they used on occasion an FHWA attorney 

to review Agreements, even though neither the 2006 nor the 2011 Guidance 

requires that Agreements receive a legal expert review before signature. While 

there are no specific requirements to have a legal expert review Agreements, in 

our opinion, it would be beneficial for FHWA to employ this type of control 

process in developing Agreements since these are binding agreements between the 

Federal Government and States that could involve billions of dollars in FAHP 

funds and have no defined concluding date. The scrutiny that would be applied by 

a legal expert would ensure Agreements consistently contain appropriate language 

regarding States’ assumption of Federal oversight authority and are written in 

accordance with Federal law.

CONCLUSION

A key to effective stewardship and oversight of the billions of dollars provided 

under ARRA and the FAHP is the establishment of clearly defined Federal and 

State oversight roles and responsibilities, which address program risks and 

priorities. As Division Offices are just starting to implement the recently issued,

expanded Guidance on preparing Agreements, FHWA has an opportunity to 

further strengthen its Agreements with the States. Our review identified elements 

that FHWA could add to its Guidance to promote nationwide consistency in 

Agreements and ensure that higher risk programs and priorities are addressed. If 

FHWA’s intent is to support its risk-based approach to oversight, inclusion of key 

requirements into the Guidance will standardize FHWA’s approach and help to

better target its limited resources.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Federal Highway Administrator:

1. Establish basic Agreement requirements and standards that:

a. Include Federal requirements, FHWA program risks, and priorities; 

b. Require Division Offices to document their rationale for not addressing 

significant requirements, risks, and priorities in their Agreements; and

c. Require DFS approval for such actions.
14

2. Modify FHWA’s policy of pre-approval of new or reconstruction projects on 

the Interstate Highway System that cost $1 million or more, to meet statutory 

requirements for FHWA to perform oversight of these projects.

3. Implement a coordinated and effective data-driven, risk-based approach for 

Division Offices and Directors of Field Services to review Agreements 

annually and make timely revisions, when appropriate.

4. Enforce the requirement for Directors of Field Services to sign Agreements, as 

specified in FHWA’s Delegation and Organization Manual, or change the 

Delegation and Organization Manual to allow Division Administrators to sign 

the Agreements and require Directors of Field Services to formally document

elsewhere that they reviewed and approved the Agreements.

5. Develop and implement a process for FHWA to conduct a legal expert review 

of Agreements, before they are signed, to determine whether Agreements are 

in accordance with Federal law.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

RESPONSE

We provided FHWA our draft report on July 3, 2012, and received its response on 

September 13, 2012. FHWA’s response is included in its entirety in the appendix 

to this report. In its response, FHWA indicated that it was conducting a national 

scan of Division-level management approaches to oversight, including the 

effectiveness of Stewardship and Oversight Agreements. Based on the issues we 

encountered in the course of our audit, we agree with this action. In addressing our 

recommendations, FHWA concurred with recommendation 5 and concurred in 

part with our remaining 4 recommendations. We consider recommendations 4 and 

5 to be resolved but open pending receipt of documentation supporting the actions 

taken. 

Regarding recommendations 1 and 3, FHWA partially concurred, but stated that, 

in its opinion those recommendations were overly prescriptive and did not 

adequately address the differences between States. According to FHWA, no 

further actions are needed because other oversight documents, methods, and tools, 

particularly each Division Office’s Program of Oversight Initiatives (POI), address 

the issues raised in our report. While we disagree that our recommendations would 

impose a “one size fits all” set of prescriptive requirements, we recognize that 

alternative approaches exist for improving the development and implementation of 

Agreements. However, FHWA’s response emphasizes a much larger role for POIs 

than the Agency previously described to us, and we have no evidence that FHWA 

has effectively spelled out the relationship between POIs and Agreements or 

ensured that POIs are integrated into the Agreement process for all States. For 
15

example, the 2011 Agreement Guidance has only a cursory reference to POIs. 

Thus, while we accept FHWA’s increased emphasis on the use of POIs as a key 

oversight mechanism in lieu of making changes to its Agreement process, we 

require additional evidence to support the claims FHWA made in its response. 

Accordingly, we consider recommendations 1 and 3 unresolved until FHWA has 

provided an action plan that (1) further clarifies the intended relationship between 

Agreements and POIs, and (2) identifies the criteria to be used by the DFS for 

approving POIs. We also request that FHWA demonstrate it has integrated POIs

into the Agreement process by providing us with FHWA guidance that reflects this 

process and copies of POIs executed for all Division Offices. The POIs should 

reflect FHWA’s emphasis on the role of POIs in the guidance and show the DFS 

have appropriately approved them.

For recommendation 2, FHWA partially concurred, stating that the Moving Ahead 

for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) now allows the States to assume 

authority for projects on the Interstate Highway System and clarified 

congressional intent to be consistent with FHWA’s existing practices. MAP-21, 

which became law on July 6, 2012, revised FHWA’s statutory oversight 

framework. However, it requires that FHWA define high-risk categories and 

prohibits States from assuming FHWA responsibilities within that category of 

projects. Given that we found FHWA previously developed policies inconsistent 

with Federal law, we are concerned similar issues may arise as FHWA develops 

policies to implement MAP-21 oversight requirements. As a result, we consider 

this recommendation to be unresolved until FHWA provides us a date when it will 

update its policy that defines high-risk Interstate projects.

ACTIONS REQUIRED

In accordance with follow-up provisions in Department of Transportation Order 

8000.1C, we request that FHWA provide documentation demonstrating 

completion of its planned actions for recommendations 4 and 5 within 30 days 

after they are completed. For recommendation 2 we request a target action date 

within 30 days. For recommendations 1 and 3 we request that FHWA provide the 

additional information requested and target action dates within 30 days.

We appreciate the courtesies and cooperation of FHWA representatives during this 

audit. If you have any questions concerning this report, please call me at 

(202) 366-5630 or David Pouliott, Program Director, at (202) 366-1844.

#

cc: DOT Audit Liaison (M-1)
16

Exhibit A. Scope and Methodology

EXHIBIT A. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2011 through June 2012, in 

accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions, based on our audit 

objectives.

To assess the extent to which Agreements fully reflected Federal requirements, 

FHWA risks, priorities, and appropriate monitoring and timely update, we 

reviewed all of the current 55 Agreements. In this review, we performed a 

descriptive analysis of the Agreements, compared the content of the Agreements, 

and evaluated whether Agreements included selected FHWA oversight program 

risks and priorities. Our analysis also focused on risk areas relating to (1) the 

implementation of ARRA, which added new FHWA and State oversight roles and 

responsibilities for administering funds, transparency, and reporting; (2) LPA 

oversight, which FHWA has identified as a significant ARRA oversight challenge 

and had received significant ARRA funds; (3) the Highway Safety Improvement 

Program, which FHWA separately identified as a major element of Agreements 

and established specific areas to be addressed; and (4) the use of performance and 

compliance indicators to manage the FAHP and improve program delivery.

Further, to assess the extent to which States may have improperly assumed 

oversight over certain Interstate highway projects, we performed a legal review of 

pertinent legislation, laws, and FHWA policy, supported with an analysis of data 

obtained from FHWA’s FMIS.

To assess the extent to which FHWA’s guidance and oversight were sufficient for 

the development and update of Agreements, we interviewed FHWA Headquarters 

staff and the three DFS. In addition, we randomly selected nine Agreements for 

review and interviewed the Division Administrators and their staff involved in 

developing and reviewing those nine Agreements. We also interviewed other 

Division Offices, when necessary, to clarify information contained in Agreements. 

Additionally, we examined FHWA’s Stewardship and Oversight Guidance and 

compared it to actual Agreements. We also reviewed other FHWA and Office of 

Management and Budget guidance and memoranda relating to ARRA and

stewardship and oversight. 
17

Exhibit B. Major Contributors to This Report

EXHIBIT B. MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT

David Pouliott Program Director

Name Title

Stephen Gruner Project Manager 

Cynthia Auburn Senior Analyst 

Jeffrey Ong Senior Auditor 

Fritz Swartzbaugh Associate Counsel

John Long Director, ARRA Investigations

Petra Swartzlander Statistician 

Megha Joshipura Statistician

Harriet E. Lambert Writer-Editor
18

Appendix. Agency Comments

APPENDIX. AGENCY COMMENTS

Memorandum

Subject: INFORMATION: Federal Highway 

Administration Response to Office of Inspector 

General (OIG) Draft Report on Stewardship and 

Oversight Agreements

Date: September 13, 2012

From: Victor M. Mendez In Reply Refer To:

Administrator HIF/HCF

To: Calvin L. Scovel III

Inspector General (J-1)

Over the past 2 decades, Congress has shifted the oversight approach of the Federal Highway 

Administration (FHWA) away from the individual project level to a broader program-based 

model. The Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 assigned many FHWA 

responsibilities to the States, an initiative furthered in 1998 by the Transportation Equity Act 

for the 21st Century, which also required FHWA and the States to enter into an agreement 

relating to the extent to which the State assumes the responsibilities of FHWA. In response, 

FHWA required Stewardship and Oversight Agreements (Agreements) to formalize the 

respective roles and responsibilities of FHWA and the State departments of transportation 

(DOT) for the federally assisted, State-administered Federal-aid highway program (FAHP).

The FHWA continues to evaluate the recent changes enacted within the most recent surface 

transportation funding authorization, Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act 

(MAP-21).

Stewardship and Oversight Agreements Delineate Roles and Responsibilities

The OIG draft report does not accurately portray the role of Stewardship and Oversight 

Agreements, or how Agreements fit within FHWA’s overall oversight context.

Stewardship and Oversight Agreements with the States are intended to delineate oversight 

responsibilities among the FAHP participants. They are not intended to provide a one-stopshop for all matters relating to the working relationship between FHWA and the States, nor are 

they expected to provide comprehensive guidance with regard to the FAHP. In order to 

provide a more accurate understanding of what the Agreements are and what they are not, it is 

necessary to examine FHWA’s oversight actions from the overall context of its complete 

system of internal controls.

With the general devolution of authority for the conduct of highway projects moving from the 

Federal Government to the States over a series of surface transportation authorizations at 

Congress’ direction, these documents are intended to suit the needs of unique State 
19

Appendix. Agency Comments

circumstances and the FHWA Division Offices with which they interact. These Agreements 

were intended to simply outline roles and responsibilities in whatever way was most useful to 

the States and Division Offices based on each State’s needs – they were not intended to be 

consistent from State to State or enforce requirements that do not add value to the program.

For example, it is not constructive to require the States to explain the rationale for not 

including discussion of requirements that are not applicable to their given circumstances, such 

as including locally administered projects when a State does not normally allow them. As a 

result, it is important to understand and expect that for example, the Stewardship and 

Oversight Agreement with California is different from the Agreement with Delaware.

Stewardship and Oversight Agreements are just one of many documents outlining the detailed 

requirements, risks, and priorities involved in administering the FAHP. Agreements therefore 

serve as a compendium of elements that go beyond statutory requirements, making reference 

to the many other control documents that are continually reviewed and updated – such as 

Leadership Dashboard targets, Unit Plans, the Risk Register, Financial Integrity Review and 

Evaluation reports – along with State DOT manuals and procedures reviewed by FHWA.

Together, these documents enable FHWA to assess how State DOTs fulfill their respective 

responsibilities.

Since Stewardship and Oversight Agreements are intended to serve the direct needs of the 

States and the FHWA offices providing oversight, they are afforded flexibility under guidance 

to address those needs important to State and local conditions. While the OIG draft report cites 

as an inconsistency the fact that 9 of 55 Agreements referenced the American Recovery and 

Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act), FHWA considers it a demonstration of the strength of the 

Agreements and their inherent flexibility. From a national perspective, it was not necessary to 

adjust oversight requirements due only to the source of project funding. Recovery Act funds, 

by statute, were to be spent within the context of existing programs, which have established 

internal controls. The fact that 9 States and FHWA Division Offices considered their programs 

and saw it useful to adjust their Stewardship and Oversight Agreements demonstrates the 

utility and resiliency of these Agreements. The OIG draft report does not include an evaluation 

of the rationale behind these decisions, nor does it evaluate States’ reasons for not revising 

Agreements, which likely saw existing systems as sound and adequate for Recovery Act 

implementation. Further, by not conveying a sense of the context in which these Agreements 

function, particularly in the Recovery Act environment, the report does not acknowledge 

FHWA’s enhanced internal controls for the Recovery Act, such as the FHWA National 

Review Teams.

Stewardship and Oversight Agreements Are Only One Element of FHWA Oversight 

Planning 

The utility and effectiveness of Stewardship and Oversight Agreements should be considered 

within the context of each Division Office’s Program of Oversight Initiatives (POI). The POI 

conveys the oversight schema describing how each FHWA Division Office implements 

oversight within an overall context of national and State requirements, risks, and priorities.
20

Appendix. Agency Comments

Much of the specific content that the OIG draft report concluded was missing from 

Agreements is included in the POI, risk registers, and the unit plans. The POI references 

identified risks and oversight initiatives and is updated annually in accordance with established 

guidance. The POI’s linkage to Stewardship and Oversight Agreements and other key 

oversight documents provide clear traceability between the Division Offices’ risk analysis and 

planned program management initiatives—including progress tracking systems, national and 

division-level reviews, results of performance indicator trend analyses, and comprehensive 

lists of priority risks and progress toward mitigation. Agreements provide the outline of 

responsibilities between the State DOT and FHWA and should not be considered independent 

of all the other aspects of FHWA’s comprehensive, risk-based oversight approach, such as the 

POI, risk registers, and the unit plans. 

FHWA Refining Stewardship Agreement Requirements, Implementation, and Oversight 

Due to New Authorizing Legislation

The FHWA has conducted periodic reviews to ensure that Stewardship and Oversight 

Agreements fulfill their role as effectively as possible, resulting most recently in the 2011 

revision of FHWA’s Stewardship and Oversight guidance, which called for more 

comprehensive Agreements covering project delivery and financial controls of the FAHP. The 

revisions implemented in 2011 are increasing the utility of these Agreements and providing 

greater clarity for them. At a minimum, Agreements updated since the release of the guidance 

should cover how the Division Office and the State DOT will develop and implement program 

reviews to evaluate compliance with established procedures and policies, including 

documentation of States’ internal controls and pre-determined schedules for regular reviews of 

specific programs or components, such as project management plans, initial and annual 

finance plan submissions, cost estimate reviews, internal evaluations, and risk assessments.

For projects where oversight is assumed by the State DOT, FHWA retains authority for 

submission of risk assessment materials, sharing of reviews and strategic performance 

information, and reviewing the adequacy of the documentation to support the appropriate 

expenditure of Federal-aid funds.

Since FHWA issued the 2011 guidance, 34 FHWA Division Offices, in coordination with their 

respective States, have identified a need to update their Stewardship and Oversight 

Agreements and plan to complete the updated Agreements by 2013. All 7 completed 

Agreements to date conform to the guidance template, including reference to performance 

measures and internal control documents such as risk assessments, program reviews, quality 

assurance reviews, project and process evaluations, and performance management indicators.

The OIG draft report, in its call for prescriptive requirements and national uniformity, seems 

somewhat retrospective in its perspective, and ignores the Federal Government’s overall 

movement away from one-size-fits-all requirements and toward more functional requirements 

that enable locally appropriate solutions that can be fulfilled in a manner that makes sense to 

those doing the work. The utility of these Agreements is measured by whether they include 

elements useful to Division Offices and States in fulfilling overall national requirements, and 

not in counting the presence or absence of specific elements.
21

Appendix. Agency Comments

To ensure that Division Offices and States are effectively implementing requirements for 

Stewardship and Oversight Agreements, and to best position FHWA to be able to 

accommodate the continued evolution of Federal and State roles envisioned in MAP-21, the 

FHWA Program Management Improvement Team (PMI Team) is conducting a national scan 

of division-level management approaches to oversight, including the effectiveness of 

Agreements. Specifically, it will review relevant strategic planning and risk management 

documents, Agency and division-level guidance, and external audit reports; interview 

leadership and staff to gauge how they implement and measure oversight initiatives and track 

the implementation of planned initiatives presented in the POI; and assess the use of 

Agreements and Agreement guidance in providing an oversight framework for State and 

locally administered activities. Upon completion of this review, the PMI Team will identify 

recommendations to help improve future FHWA oversight.

OIG Recommendations and FHWA Responses

Recommendation 1: Establish basic Agreement requirements and standards that:

a. Include Federal requirements, FHWA program risks, and priorities;

b. Require Division Offices to document their rationale for not addressing significant 

requirements, risks, and priorities in their Agreements; and

c. Require Director of Field Service (DFS) approval for such actions.

FHWA Response: Concur in Part. The FHWA does not agree that these Agreements should 

be based on a one-size-fits-all set of prescriptive requirements. In other words, one should 

expect that for example, the Stewardship and Oversight Agreement with California is different 

from the Agreement with Delaware. Stewardship and Oversight Agreements, as required by 

Federal statute, are an outline of roles and responsibilities for administering the FAHP; they 

are not required to contain specific requirements, risks, or priorities. Rather, Agreements 

reference documents that do contain this information or methods that will be considered, such 

as the POI, unit plans, risk assessments, and review programs. The POIs require the DFS’ 

agreement and approval and are used by the DFSs to monitor and assess the Division Offices 

proposed oversight activities over FAHP recipients. Since the Agreements include reference to 

the POI and other oversight planning tools, which serve as more practical means to capture 

requirements, program risks and priorities, they fulfill the actions and intent outlined in the 

OIG recommendation. Based on actions already taken by FHWA relating to this 

recommendation, FHWA requests OIG close the recommendation upon receipt of this 

response.

Recommendation 2: Modify FHWA's policy of preapproval of new or reconstruction projects 

on the Interstate Highway System that cost $1 million or more, to meet statutory requirements 

for FHWA to perform oversight of these projects.

FHWA Response: Concur in Part. Section 1503 in the MAP-21 legislation allows States to 

assume FHWA’s authority for projects on the Interstate System at the discretion of the 

Secretary. As this legislation clarified congressional intent, which is consistent with FHWA’s
22

Appendix. Agency Comments

practice, FHWA requests OIG close the recommendation upon receipt of this response.

Recommendation 3: Implement a coordinated and effective data-driven, risk-based approach 

for Division Offices and Directors of Field Services to review Agreements annually and make 

timely revisions, when appropriate.

FHWA Response: Concur in Part. The FHWA already does this through the POIs, which is a 

data-driven, risk-based approach for annually reviewing FHWA Division Offices’ oversight 

initiatives. To identify opportunities for improvement, POIs are reviewed by the DFSs and 

Division Offices. The FHWA guidance encourages Agreement revisions according to these 

identified opportunities as appropriate when priorities change. Based on FHWA already 

having completed the work necessary to satisfy the recommendation and for reasons 

exemplified in response to recommendation 1, FHWA requests OIG close the recommendation 

upon receipt of this response.

Recommendation 4: Enforce the requirement for Directors of Field Services to sign 

Agreements, as specified in FHWA's Delegation and Organization Manual, or change the 

Delegation and Organization Manual to allow Division Administrators to sign the Agreements 

and require Directors of Field Services to formally document elsewhere that they reviewed and 

approved the Agreements.

FHWA Response: Concur in part. The FHWA Delegations and Organization Manual 

provides the authority for Division Administrators to sign Stewardship and Oversight 

Agreements. Though Agreements are not explicitly mentioned, Chapter 5 of the Manual on the 

FAHP authorizes Division Administrators to approve projects at all levels of development, and 

Chapter 1 regarding “Residual Authorities” asserts that “authorities not specifically delegated 

to FHWA officials...may be exercised by...Division Administrators.”

While FHWA’s practices have been consistent with our current delegations of authorities, 

FHWA recognizes the benefit of being more explicit in our FHWA Order regarding the 

signature level of Stewardship and Oversight Agreements. Therefore, FHWA plans to clarify 

the authority of Division Administrators to sign Agreements with State DOTs in the Manual or 

through issuance of a guidance memo. To allow for adequate review of the results and 

recommendations from the PMI Team’s national efforts, the FHWA plans to perform this 

update by December 31.

Recommendation 5: Develop and implement a process for FHWA to conduct a legal expert 

review of Agreements, before they are signed, to determine whether Agreements are in 

accordance with Federal law.

FHWA Response: Concur. The Stewardship and Oversight Agreement Guidance developed 

in 2011 received legal review, and FHWA intends to formalize a process to include a legal 
23

Appendix. Agency Comments

review to ensure that Agreements are consistent with laws, regulations, and policies, especially 

in light of MAP-21. To allow for adequate review of the results and recommendations from 

the PMI Team’s national efforts, by December 31, FHWA will establish through guidance or 

memo procedures to include a legal review as part of the concurrence process before 

Agreements are signed by the Division Administrator and the State DOT.

-- -- -- -- -- --

The FHWA appreciates the opportunity and time afforded to respond to the draft report. If you 

have any questions or comments regarding this response, please contact David Nicol, Director 

of Program Administration, Office of Infrastructure, at 202-366-5530.