NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0702n.06 No. 09-5202 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. MARVI N D. KI NSEY, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) On Appeal from the United States Di strict Cou

rt fo r t he Mid dle District of Tenne ssee

B e fo re : B OG GS, MO OR E, and SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. BO GGS, Circuit J udg e. Mar vin Kinsey , a fe dera l prisoner, fai l ed t o return to a halfwa y house and, a fter be ing a

pprehe nded, pled guilty

to a violation of 1 8 U.S .C. § 751(a), the fe de ra l e sc a

pe statut e . T he se nte nc ingjud g e de te rm ine d th a t K ins e y ’s of fe ns e c on sti tut e d a

“ c ri me of violence ” for

purposes of the SentencingGuidelines and, pur suant t o t h e “car eer offe nder” provisions, sentence d him to 37 mont hs in custody . We reve rse. I Kinsey ’s escape conviction arose out of his brief stay at a ha lfway

house in Nashville. On Dec ember

28, 2007, the Fe dera l Bure au of Prisons tra nsfer red Kinsey to the halfwa

y house to serve the balanc e of his 51-month sentenc e for an ea rlier conviction. Kinsey

was pe rmitted to leave the halfwa y house to work, a n d althoug h Kinsey understood that it was a crime not to re turn to the halfwa y house at the de signated t i m e, on Marc h 25, 2008, he fa iled to return a s require d and wa sNo. 09-5202

United States v. Marvin Kinsey

- 2 - place d on esca

pe status. On Apr il 4, 2008, an office r stopped Kinsey ’s vehicle . Kinsey fled on foot and wa s appre hended thr ee w eeks later by the United States Marsha ls Service. Kinsey was c harg ed with fede ral e scape in J une 2008, and he pled g uilty as cha rg ed on August 11, 2008. Th e pr ob a tio n o ff

ic e r c a lc ulate d K ins e y ’s Gu ide lin e s r ang e to b e 27 to 3 3 mo nth s. Th e ba se offe nse leve l for Kinsey ’s violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) is 13, and afte r subtracting two levels for Kinsey ’s acce p t an ce o f re sponsibili ty , the offic er a ttributed to Kinsey

a total offe nse leve l of 11. Ki ns e y ha d a lon g c ri min a l hi sto ry , e nc omp a ssi ngov e r t we nty ind ivi du a l c on vic tio ns . As a re su lt, the pr ob a tio n o ff

icer det erm in ed th a t K ins e y ha d 1 9 c ri min a l hi sto ry

po int s, wh ic h p la c e d h im i n criminal history

cate g ory VI

. The sentencing table therefor e indicate d a re commended se ntence of 27 to 3 3 mo nth s. Kinsey ’s sentenc ing hear ing was held on October 31, 2008. At the hea ring , the district court jud ge determined that, if Kinsey ’s esc ape qua lified as a “ crime of violence” for pur

poses of the Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s, the n h e wo uld be c la ssi fi e d as a “c are e r of fe nd e r, ” wh ic h w ou ld i nc re a se his offe nse leve l to 14 and his corre sponding G u i d el i n es ra n ge to 37 to 46 months . Noting that the Sup re me Court

wa s a bo ut t o d e c ide a ca se on

the iss ue of

wh e the r a

fa ilure to r e po rt

c on sti tut e s a
c ri me of vio le nc e , th e c ourt

su sp e nd e d the h eari ng un til a ft e r t he Sup re me Court

ha d is su e d it s decision. I n J anuar y 2009 , t h e S upreme Court decided Chambers v. United States and he ld t hat a failure to report is not a “violent felony ” for purposes of the Armed Car eer Criminal Act (“A CCA”). 129 S. Ct . 687, 693 (2009).No. 09-5202

United States v. Marvin Kinsey

- 3 - T h e d i s t ri ct co u rt re co n v en edt h e s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g o n Fe b ru ary 9 , 2 0 0 9

. At t h e h ea ri n g, the se nte nc ingjud g e re vie we d Kin se y ’s ple a c oll oq uy and de c ide d th a t K ins e y ’s e sc a pe wa s a c ri me of vio le nc e be c a

us e “ the a c t of e sc a

pe un de r the fa c ts of thi s c a se wa s f ar m or e tha

n ju st a fa ilure to return, pa rticularly g iven his flight a

nd resistanc e of the office r who stopped him.” Acc ording ly , the

s e n t e n c i n g j u d g e i n c r e a s e d K i n s e y’ s o f

f e n s e l e v e l t o 1 4 an d

s e n t e n c e d h i m t o 3 7 m o n t h s i nc u s t o dy, which wa s at the bottom of the incre ased G uidelines range, b u t four months above the top of the unadjusted ra

ng e. On a pp e a l, K ins e y

argue s th a t th e se nte nc ingjud g e erro neo us ly c la ssi fi e d h is conviction as a crime of

violence. T his court has jurisdiction to review the district court’s se ntence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) a nd 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II The district cour

t’s interpre tation of “c rime of violenc e” in the Guidelines is a ques t ion of law that this court reviews de novo. United States v. Amos , 501 F.3d 524, 526 ( 6th Cir. 2007). The SentencingGuidelines provide f or har sher penalties if “the inst ant offense of conviction is a felony that is . . . a crime of

violence . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 4 B1

. 1 (a) . A cr ime of violence is defined a s an of fe ns e that: “ (1 ) h a s a s an e le me nt the us e , a tte mpt e d us e , or thr e a te ne d u se of ph y sic a l f

or c e a g a ins t the pe rs on of

ano the r, or

(2 ) i s b ur g lary

of a dw e lli ng , a

rs on , o r e xtor

tio n, inv olv e s u se of

e xplos ive s, or other wi s e i n v o lves conduc t that presents a serious potential risk of phy sical injury to another.” U.S.S.G. §4B1.2(a ). I f the c onviction is of one of the enumerated crimes or a crime with one of the e numerated

e le me nts , th e n it

is a cr ime of vio le nc e . Othe rw ise , the c ourt mus t un de rt a ke a

mor e pr ob ingana ly sis to determine w hether

the cr ime “other

wise involves conduc t that pr esents a se rious potential risk ofNo. 09-5202

United States v. Marvin Kinsey

- 4 - phy sical injury

to another.” For

tunately , the steps of this analy sis have bee n exhaustively analy zed in pr ior decisions of the Supreme Court a nd this circuit. See , e.g. , Un ite d S tates v . A ng lin , 601 F.3d 523, 526-27 (6th Cir. 2010). Gene rally , a court must c onduct two inquiries. First, the c ourt must determine whe ther the crime involves c onduct that cr eate s a ser ious potential r isk of injury

. Un ite d S tates v . F or d , 560 F.3d 420, 421 (6th Cir. 2009). And sec ond, the cour t must de termine whe ther the c rime involves “the same kind of ‘ purposef

ul, violent, and aggr essi ve conduc t’ as the listed cr imes.” Ib id . (quoting Begay v. United States , 553 U.S. 137, 144-45 (2008))

. Guiding these inquiries is the “categ orica l approa ch,” in which the court looks to “the statutory definition of t he crime of conviction, [ but] not the fa cts underly

ing that conviction, to determine the nature of the c rime.” Id . at 422. Sometimes, however, the court must g o further , as some cr iminal statutes can be violate d either by conduct that amounts to a crime of violence or

by conduct that doe s not. Ib id . I f this is the

ca s e, t h en t he cour

t must l ook at the indictment, g uilty plea, a nd simil ar doc uments to determine wh e the r t ho se do c ume nts ne c essa ril yestablis h t h e natur e of the committed crime. Ib id . (citing Shepard v. U

nited States , 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005)). N otably , the Sh e pa rd documents may

not be used to examine “‘how a

n individual offende r m i gh t have c ommitt ed [the offe nse] on a particula r
occa sion,’ but only

how an offe nse i s ordinarily committed based upon its elements.” United States

v . Y oung , 5 8 0 F. 3 d

3 7 3 , 3 8 1 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Jame s v. United States , 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007)) . Thus, if a de fenda nt commits a crime that is ordinar ily nonviolent in a violent manner, the

c ri me is no t conver

ted into a cr ime o f v i o l ence for pur poses of the Sente ncing Guidelines. See Cha mb e rs , 12 9 S. Ct. a t 69 0 ( no tin g the ne e d to “ a vo id[ ] th e pr a c tic a l di ff ic ulty of tryingtoNo. 09-5202

United States v. Marvin Kinsey

- 5 - asce rtain at sente ncing . . . whether the pre sent defe ndant’s prior crime, as committed on a par ticular

occa sion, did or did not invol ve violent behavior”). The Sh e pa rd inquiry is r equire d if the statute expli citly lists m ultiple forms of conduc t. Even though a ll forms are criminalized under the same statute, they are treated di ffe rently for pur poses of deter mining whe ther the crime is a crime of vi olence under the SentencingGuidelines. In Cha mb e rs v. United States , for e x ample, the Supre me Court considere d an I llinois esca pe st atut e that sp e c if ic a lly inc lud e d s e ve n d if

fe re nt t y pe s o f e sc a

pe , f ro m “ e sc a

pe fr om a penal ins tit

uti on ” to

“ fa ili ngto a

bid e by the te rm s o f h ome c on fi ne me nt. ” 12 9 S. Ct. a t 69 1. Th e Court he ld t hat a “fa ilure to repor

t” categ ory

of crime, althoug h it is criminalized by a st atute that also includes violent

c on du ct, is no t a “ vi ol ent fel on y ” un der A CC A, w hi ch i s– for th ese p urp os es– tr eat ed ex act ly the sa me as a “ crime of

violence” under the Guidelines. Id. a t 69 3; Fo rd , 560 F.3d at 421. Al te rn a tiv e ly , a

c ri min a l st a tut e may

be so br oa dly wor de d th a t it e nc omp a sse s mu lti ple cate g ories of c rimes eve n though it does not li s t them separ ately , and a Sh e pa rd inq uir y is a lso

nece ssary in this situation. For example, in Fo rd , this c ourt consider ed the Ke ntucky esca pe statute, which broa dly

define s esca

pe to include a

ny unpermitted depar

ture or failure to r eturn. 560 F.3d at 422. Noting that the Sh e

pa rd documents established that the defe ndant committed a walka way ty pe of esc ape, the court he ld that–like a fa ilure to repor t–a walk aw ay t y

p e of escape is not a crime of violence. Id . at 426 (“ For d committed a ‘wa lkaway ’ esc ape, which no doubt may cre ate a g reater risk of phy sical i njury than a failure to repor t, but which remains differ ent from a jailbreak and other crimes of violence both in kind and in its risk of phy sical injury to others.”)

.No. 09-5202

United States v. Marvin Kinsey

- 6 - III Kinsey was c onvicted of a

violation of the fe dera l esca pe statute. Our

inquiry into whether Kinsey committed a cr ime of vi olence beg ins with the tex t of that statute, which pr ovides, in releva nt pa rt : Whoever e scape s or attempts to esca pe fr om the custody

of the Attorne y

Gene ral or his a uth or ize d r e pr e se ntativ e , o r f ro m any ins tit uti on or fa c ili ty in whic h he is confine d by

direc tion of the Attorney

Gene ral, or f

rom any custody under or by virtue of any proce ss issued under the la ws of the United States by any court, judge , or mag istrate judge , or fr om the custody of an of fice r or e mploy ee of

the United States purs ua nt t o la wf ul a rr e st, sh a ll, if the c us tod

y or c on fi ne me nt is by vir tue of an a

rr e st on a cha rg e of f elon y , or convic tion of any offe nse, be f

ined under

this ti tle or imprisoned not more than five y ear s, or both . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). B e c a us e e sc a pe is n ot o ne of

the e nume ra

te d c ri me s in the Gu ide lin e s’ de fi nit ion of “ c ri me of vio le nc e ” and , a s w ri tte n, do e s n ot c on ta in a ny of th e de fi nit ion ’s e nume rate d e le me nts , it is a crime of violence only

if it “oth er wi s e involves conduc t that presents a serious potential risk of ph y sic a l injury

to a no the r. ” U. S.S. G. § 4 B 1. 2( a ); se e Fo rd , 560 F.3d at 421. This court has held that § 751(a) broadly prohibits diff ere nt c ateg ories of conduct, at least some of which are not crimes of violence. An gli n , 601 F.3d at 529 (“L ike the Ke ntucky statute at issue in Fo rd , § 75 1( a ) p ro hib its a broa d rang e of be havior, includingan esc ape w ith the use of forc e at one end and a f ailure to re port at the other .”). In An gli n , this court held that § 751(a) encompasses at least t hree distinct categ ories of crimes: “(1) failure to r eport, (2) so-ca lled walkaw ay esca pes, and (3) other e scape s.” 601 F .3d at 5 2 9

. Ap p l y i n g Cha mb e rs and Fo rd , the An gli n court held that, under § 751( a), f ailures to re port and wa lkaway

esca pes ar e not cr imes of violence

. Ib id

. B e c a u s e th e An gli n co u rt lacke d anNo. 09-5202

United States v. Marvin Kinsey

- 7 - a de qu a te re c or d f

ro m w hic h to de te rm ine the natur e of the de fe nd ant’ s § 75 1( a ) c on vic tio n, it

rema nded the c ase to the district c ourt to d et er m i n e wh ether the underly ing c rime wa s a cr ime of viol e n c e , n o ti n g th a t th e g o v e r n me n t b e ar s th e b u r d e n o f p r o v in g th a t th e d e f e n d an t’ s esca

pe wa s such a c rime. Id . at 529-30. Wit h that backg round, the only rema ining que stion is whether the Sh e pa rd documents in the

re c or d e sta

bli shthat K ins e y ’s c ri me wa s of a no n- vio le nt ty pe . A ple a

c oll oq uy is a va lid Sh e pa rd document, S

h ep a rd, 544 U.S. at 26, and her e, the plea colloquy conclusively

establishes that Kinsey ’s esc ape w as of the “ failure to report” ty pe. The plea c olloquy

transcr ipt re fl ec ts that the parties a cce pted the fol l o wing fac ts: “On Marc h 25, 2008, Kinsey was pe rmitted to leave [the halfwa y house] to go to work, a

nd he was due to return at 8:00 p.m. Kinsey failed to re turn to [t he halfwa y house] on March 25th, 2008[,] as required, and as a result, he was place d on esca pe status.” The Supreme Court has define d a fa ilure-to-r eport c rime as “a failure to present onese lf for de tention on a spec ified occ asion.” Cha mb e rs , 129 S. Ct . at 691. Kinsey was supposed to prese nt himself at 8:0 0 p .m. on

Marc h 2 5, 20 08 , a

nd he fa ile d to do so . A c c or din g ly , h is § 75 1( a ) v iol a tio n w a s a failure to report. This cour t has held t hat a failure to repor t under § 751(a) is not a crime of violence , and this ends the inquiry

. An gli n , 601 F.3d at 529. Although the plea c olloquy also indicates that Kinse y later f led from a police off

icer , which arguably cre ated a ser ious risk of violence, the rele vant inquiry is what categ ory

of esc ape K insey committed, and whethe r t h at cate g ory of esc ape–a s ordinarily

committed–constitutes a crime of violence. T he inquiry

is not the risk of violence that Ki n s ey actua lly cre ated, a

nd the fa ct that he later f led from a

n office r is there fore immaterial to the issue at ha nd. Notably , by

flee ing f rom theNo. 09-5202

United States v. Marvin Kinsey

- 8 - office r, Kinsey may have committed another crime–se parate from his § 751(a ) fa ilure to repor t–and that separate crime may

indeed c onstitut e a c rime of violenc e. B ut Kinsey was not so convicted, and his rele vant conviction her e wa s for e scap e, wh i ch i n this case doe s not constitute a crime of vio le nc e . B e c a

us e we ho ld that Kins e y ’s c on du c t wa s of a ty pe that is no t a cr ime of vio le nc e , it is not nece ssary

for this court to decide whether a § 751(a ) convic tion could ever , under a differ ent set of circ umstances, c onstitut e a c rime of violenc e. Cf. Un ite d S tates v . H ar t , 5 78 F .3 d 6 74 , 6 81 (7 th Cir. 2009) (holding that, as a c ateg orica l matter, a violation of § 751( a) is neve r a c rime of violenc e); b u t s ee United States v. Hughe s , 6 0 2 F

. 3 d 6 6 9 , 6 7 6

- 7 7 ( 5 th Ci r . 2 0 1 0 ) ( h o ld in g th a t a § 751(a) conviction for an escape from a detention cente r i s a viol ent felony under ACCA, but not reac hing the question of whe ther other forms of c onduct re ache d by § 751(a) constitute violent felonies). Th e g ov e rnme nt a

rgue s t hat , beca

us e the Sup re me Court

ha s h e ld t

hat § 7 51 (a ) i s a “continuing offe nse,” the court must c onsider the risk of violence when rea pprehe nding the esc apee , and that this risk establishes that a failure to report is a c rime of violenc e. United States v. Bailey , 444 U.S. 394, 413 (1980) (holding“that [beca use] escape from fe dera l c ustody as define d in § 751(a) is a continuing offe nse,” a nece ssity o r d u re s s defe nse must excuse both the defe ndant’s initial

esca pe fr om custody

and h i s fa i l ure to re turn). Howe ver, Anglin ha s a lr e a dy ru le d th a t f

a ilure s to repor t unde r § 751(a ) ar e not cr imes of violence for pur poses of the se ntencingg uidelines. 601 F.3d at 529. Fur

ther, in Cha mb e rs , the Supreme Court itself for eclose d any argu m en t t h at t h e risk of vio le nc e duri ngre a

pp re he ns ion

e sta bli sh e s th a t a

fa ilure to r e po rt

is a c ri me of vio le nc e . 12 9 S. Ct.

a t 69 2- 93 (h old ingtha

t th e pr op e r inq

uir y is “w he the r suc h a

n o ff e nd e r i s si g nif

ic antl y mor e lik e ly than others to . . . produc [e] a ‘se rious potential risk of phy sical i n jury ,’” a nd that the SentencingNo. 09-5202

United States v. Marvin Kinsey

- 9 - Com mis sio n’ s r e po rt

ind ic a te s th a t vi ole nc e wh e n a pp re he nd ing

fa ilur e -t o- re po rt

of fe nd e rs is extremely rar e). IV For these re asons, we REVE RSE the decision of th e district court and REMAND for

re se nte nc in g i n acc or da

nc e wi th o ur

de te rm inatio n th a t K ins e y ’s vio latio n o f § 75 1( a ) w a s n ot a crime of violence.No. 09-5202

United States v. Marvin Kinsey

- 10 - KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circ uit Jud ge, concurr ing in the judgm ent. Ic on c ur in the jud g me nt.