* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 99-40196

Summary Calendar

 

NOEL GONZALEZ; RUDY MOLINA;

ENRIQUE MENDIOLA; HILARIO ACEVEDO,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS; THOMAS R. PHILLIPS, 

Chief Justice; RAUL A. GONZALEZ; NATHAN I. HECHT,

Justice, Individually and official capacities;

DEBORAH G. HANKINSON, Justice Individually and

official capacity; CRAIG ENOCH, Justice Individually

and official capacity; ROSE SPECTOR, Justice in their

individual and official capacity; PRICILLA R. OWEN; 

JAMES A. BAKER, Justice Individually and official 

capacity; GREG ABBOTT, Individually and in his 

official capacity; DAN MORALES, Attorney General,

Individually and in his official capacity; BOARD OF

LAW EXAMINERS OF TEXAS; RACHEL MARTIN, Executive 

director of Texas Board of Law Examiners; ROBERT

ROLLER, Chairman, Texas Board of Law Examiners;

individually and in their official capacity; OFFICE

OF ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of

USDC No. B-98-CV-28

--------------------

December 9, 1999

Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Noel Gonzalez, Rudy Molina, Enrique Mediola, and Hilario 
No. 99-40196

-2-

Acevedo appeal the dismissal of their federal anti-trust claim. 

Plaintiffs, by and through an attorney, filed suit in district

court against 15 defendants who represented the Supreme Court of

Texas, the Board of Law Examiners of Texas, and the Office of

Attorney General of Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that these

entities and their representatives, in both their individual and

official capacities, violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15

U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2, when they denied plaintiffs admission to the

Texas bar by using a system for grading bar examinations which

was not approved by the Texas Supreme Court.

This Court must examine the basis of its jurisdiction on its

own motion if necessary. Mosley v. Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th

Cir. 1987). An examination of the record in this case discloses

that no final judgment has been entered as a separate document as

required by FED. R. CIV. P. 58. 

In an order entered on November 4, 1998, the district court

granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Thereafter, on

December 4, 1998, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration. 

On January 15, 1999, the district court entered an order denying

the motion for reconsideration. On February 16, 1999, plaintiffs

filed a notice of appeal.

If we were to treat the November 4th order as a Rule 58

judgment, plaintiffs’ notice of appeal would be untimely because

it was filed more than 30 days after entry of the order of

dismissal. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(B); Baker v. Mercedes

Benz of North America, 114 F.3d 57, 61 (5th Cir. 1997). 

Therefore, we DISMISS the appeal. See Townsend v. Lucas, 745
No. 99-40196

-3-

F.2d 933, 934 (5th Cir. 1984). 

Plaintiffs may rectify the lack of a separate document

judgment by a motion to the district court for entry of judgment. 

After entry of the judgment, they may appeal within the time

prescribed by Rule 4(a)(1)(A). 

APPEAL DISMISSED.