United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Ranking Minority Member,

Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate

May 1997 WELFARE REFORM

States’ Early

Experiences With

Benefit Termination

GAO/HEHS-97-74

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Health, Education, and

Human Services Division

B-276396 

May 15, 1997

The Honorable Daniel P. Moynihan

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Finance

United States Senate

Dear Senator Moynihan:

This report, prepared at your request, examines states’ early experiences with benefit

terminations under welfare reform. The report focuses on the extent to which states have used

benefit termination provisions, what happens to families after termination, and states’

experiences in implementing these provisions.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairman, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate; the

Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members, Committee on Ways and Means and its

Subcommittee on Human Resources, House of Representatives; the Secretary of Health and

Human Services; the Assistant Secretary for Children and Families; and other interested parties.

We will also make copies available to others on request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call me at (202) 512-7215

or David P. Bixler, Assistant Director, at (202) 512-7201. Other GAO contacts and major

contributors to this report are listed in appendix XIII.

Sincerely yours,

Mark V. Nadel

Associate Director

Income Security Issues
Executive Summary

Purpose The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act

(P.L. 104-193) was enacted in August 1996, instituting the most

fundamental reform of welfare since the program’s inception. The new law

ends the individual entitlement to federally supported cash assistance to

needy families with children and provides for terminating benefits to

families failing to comply with program rules or after a certain time period.

With few exceptions, prior federal welfare law has not allowed states to

terminate benefits to an entire household on the basis of sanctions for

noncompliance or a time limit.1

 Since 1987, however, most states had

received waivers from statutory requirements to experiment with such

provisions.

The Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Finance asked

GAO to review states’ early experiences with waiver provisions for benefit

termination to provide information useful to other states as they

implement the new law. Specifically, this report describes (1) those

families whose benefits have been terminated under waivers and why,

(2) federal or state benefits that are available and are being received after

termination, and (3) states’ experiences in implementing these provisions.

Background Since its inception in 1935, the Aid to Families With Dependent Children

(AFDC) program provided benefits to economically disadvantaged families

with children lacking support from one or both parents because of death,

absence, or incapacity. AFDC was funded with federal and state dollars;

states administered the program and HHS had federal oversight

responsibility. States were required to provide aid to all people eligible

under federal law whose income and assets were within state-prescribed

limits. In fiscal year 1996, AFDC paid benefits of over $20 billion in

combined state and federal funds to about 4.6 million families a month

(average nationwide caseload).

Before the recent reform, federal welfare law limited states’ ability to

terminate benefits on the basis of sanctions or time limits. Since

welfare-to-work programs were initiated in 1968, certain categories of

recipients were required to work or participate in other specified

activities; however, if recipients failed to comply as required, benefits

1

Although referred to here as “prior law,” in general, the law in effect before passage of the new

welfare reform law remains in effect until July 1, 1997, or 6 months after the date the U.S. Department

of Health and Human Services (HHS) receives a state plan regarding certain provisions. Effective dates

could be accelerated at state option.

Page 2 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Executive Summary

could not be terminated but merely reduced. With one minor exception, no

time limits on benefits were allowed.2

The new welfare reform law replaces AFDC with block grants to the states

under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). To encourage

work and end welfare dependence, the law has provisions for terminating

benefits for families’ failure to comply with work and child support

enforcement requirements and for teen parents’ failure to comply with

school attendance and living arrangement requirements. In addition, the

new law imposes a 5-year lifetime time limit on receiving federal benefits.

Even before this new welfare reform law was passed, states had been

allowed to experiment with benefit termination under section 1115 of the

Social Security Act, which provides authority for HHS to waive the

statutory requirements for AFDC. Between January 1987 and passage of the

new federal welfare reform law in August 1996, 46 states had received

approval for waiver provisions experimenting with their AFDC and

welfare-to-work programs, including 33 states with benefit termination

provisions similar to the new federal law’s.3

 With increased flexibility

under the new law, many states have incorporated their benefit

termination waiver provisions into the state plans required by the new law.

To obtain information for this request, GAO reviewed the law and discussed

benefit termination issues with federal officials and experts from private

research organizations. GAO surveyed states with waiver provisions for

benefit termination based on sanctions or time limits to (1) determine

whose benefits have been terminated and on what basis and (2) select

three states with large numbers of terminations for more detailed study. In

each of these three states—Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin—GAO

analyzed statewide automated and case file data to determine which

families were being terminated and why and federal or state benefits that

were available and were being received after termination (see app. I). To

explore states’ experiences in implementing benefit termination

provisions, GAO staff talked to state officials, caseworkers, and

representatives of welfare advocacy groups.

2

Under the Unemployed Parent program, 12 states were allowed to impose time limits on benefits for

two-parent families.

3

The term “state” includes the District of Columbia in this report.

Page 3 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Executive Summary

Results in Brief So far, states have seldom used benefit termination provisions. Moreover,

of the 18,000 families whose benefits were terminated under waivers

through December 1996, more than 99 percent failed to comply with

program requirements. Most terminations took place in Iowa,

Massachusetts, and Wisconsin (referred to as “case study” states).

Through June 1996, prior recipients’ failure to comply with new

enrollment requirements accounted for over half the terminations

nationwide. By the end of December 1996, failure to comply with work

requirements increased by one-third and became the most significant

reason for termination. Recipients’ explanations for this noncompliance

included wanting to stay at home with their children and an unwillingness

to do community service or work for low wages.

Terminating a family’s AFDC benefit represented the loss of a significant

source of monthly income. Although more than 80 percent of the families

in the cases GAO studied in Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin were

subsequently found to have some source of support or had returned to

welfare, the percentages of such families receiving food stamps and

Medicaid declined significantly after termination. Before termination, the

percentage of cases receiving these benefits ranged from 84 to

100 percent; after termination, it ranged from 26 to 61 percent. Many

families did not take the steps necessary to continue to receive these

program benefits after losing AFDC, even though the waivers provided for

program eligibility to be unaffected unless other family circumstances

changed.

Officials in the three states studied generally believed their benefit

termination provisions had improved program effectiveness by

contributing to increases in work activity, job placements, and families

moving off welfare more quickly. These officials emphasized that only a

small percentage of cases had been terminated. Nevertheless, they

acknowledged that implementing these provisions had been challenging.

For example, states had to develop systems to accurately track hours

worked to monitor compliance and to correctly and adequately notify

recipients of pending termination actions. In addition, states had to

provide certain activities and services before they could terminate a

family’s benefits. These states’ experiences with benefit termination

provisions under waivers highlight the challenges all states may face in

implementing similar provisions of the new welfare reform law.

Page 4 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Executive Summary

Principal Findings

Most Families’ Benefits

Terminated on the Basis of

Sanctions in a Few States

Through December 1996, 14 of the 33 states with benefit termination

provisions had not terminated any families’ benefits. Of the 19 states that

had terminated benefits, 7 had terminated benefits in fewer than 100 cases,

according to available data.4

 In addition to relatively small, less urban

caseloads, many states had a gradual phase-in of the program, which

limited the number of families whose benefits were terminated. In

addition, the program’s structure—which either required a minimum

amount of time to elapse before termination or excluded large portions of

the caseload from coverage—limited the number of terminations. States’

view of the role of benefit termination in their programs also affected the

number of cases terminated. For example, some states continued to

assume primary responsibility for ensuring that recipients complied with

program requirements and viewed benefit termination as a failure of their

programs to work as intended. These states established rigorous processes

to keep the number of terminations low. In contrast, other states sought to

shift primary responsibility for compliance to recipients and viewed

benefit termination as a needed strengthening of their sanctions to enforce

recipients’ obligation to move toward self-sufficiency. Most terminations

took place in the latter states. The three states with the most

terminations—Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin—all shared this view

and accounted for about 13,000 of the approximately 18,000 (or about

72 percent) terminations nationwide through December 1996.

Between June and December 1996, the proportion of terminations

nationwide based on failure to comply with enrollment requirements

decreased from 57 to 44 percent; terminations based on failure to comply

with work requirements increased from 34 to 47 percent. The proportion

of terminations for failure to comply with other requirements—such as

child support enforcement, teen parent school attendance, and teen parent

living arrangements—remained constant at about 8 percent. Less than

1 percent lost benefits because of a time limit, although this percentage

will probably change as increasing numbers of families begin reaching

their time limits.

State surveys and discussions with caseworkers in selected sites provided

various explanations for families’ failure to comply. For example, state and

local officials suggested that some families may have had unreported

4

Neither North Carolina nor Ohio had data on the number of cases terminated; data from Oregon were

available only through Nov. 15, 1996 (see app. II).

Page 5 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Executive Summary

employment, extended family support, or other sources of income.

According to state surveys and case file notes, families did not comply for

such reasons as not feeling well; caring for a sick household member;

wanting to stay home with their children; wanting to follow their own

career plans, including higher education; and an unwillingness to do

community service or work for low wages.

In general, the demographic characteristics of families whose benefits had

been terminated in Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin were similar to

the characteristics of families in the states’ overall caseloads. The most

significant variations resulted from the structure of states’ programs. For

example, a disproportionately high number of parents under age 20 had

their benefits terminated in Massachusetts, which imposed school

attendance and living arrangement requirements on teen parents.

After Loss of AFDC,

Families Had Various

Sources of Support

Under most states’ waiver provisions, families whose benefits were

terminated for noncompliance could have had their AFDC cases reopened if

they subsequently complied with program requirements. From 18 to

47 percent of such families returned to welfare, according to available data

from seven states. In Massachusetts and Wisconsin, about one-third of

families whose benefits had been terminated after enrollment

subsequently had their cases reopened because of demonstrated

compliance or documented exemption or because their cases had been

closed due to administrative error, according to an analysis of state data.

In Iowa, families whose benefits are terminated must wait 6 months before

reapplying; however, once this period had elapsed, about one-third of

families studied also had returned to welfare.

AFDC provided a significant source of income for most families before

termination, including those studied in Iowa, Massachusetts, and

Wisconsin. After AFDC benefits had been terminated, between 43 and

48 percent of the cases studied in these three states included household

members who reported income from wages, pensions, or child support;

and most likely, additional households had support that did not have to be

reported. In addition, about 75 percent of terminated cases studied

included household members who were receiving benefits from one or

more other federal programs—such as food stamps, Supplemental

Security Income, housing assistance, or Medicaid.5

5

GAO used household as the unit of analysis, which may include household members not included in

the AFDC family unit used for determining AFDC eligibility and calculating AFDC benefit levels before

termination.

Page 6 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Executive Summary

Although in many cases the sources of support were a continuation of

income or benefits that were being received before termination, the

percentage of cases receiving food stamps and Medicaid declined

significantly. Reductions ranged from 23 to 70 percent among cases not

returning to welfare. According to waiver provisions of all three states,

termination was not to affect eligibility to receive these program benefits,6

but many families did not take the steps necessary to keep their benefits

after losing AFDC, even though they may have continued to be eligible.

Because reported income and receipt of benefits provide only a limited

indication of the well-being of families losing AFDC, states tried to locate

such families and determine their status.

Termination Provisions

Were Effective but Posed

Challenges

In all three case study states, benefit termination provisions had

encouraged those with other means of support to move off welfare more

quickly and those who truly needed assistance to cooperate more fully

with program requirements, according to state officials. Declines in all

three states’ caseloads exceeded the national average. While crediting the

economy as a major factor, state officials believed at least some of the

decline was due to their waiver programs and that the threat of benefit

termination had significantly improved program participation. Officials

reported increases in job placements in all three states.

In implementing these provisions, however, states faced challenges in

establishing systems to track recipients’ work participation to accurately

determine when benefits should be terminated for noncompliance and in

adequately notifying recipients of these actions. This was particularly true

in Wisconsin, where monthly benefits and sanctions were based on the

number of hours worked in a previous month and the state tried to

implement its complex provisions statewide with no pilot program. In

Milwaukee County, 44 percent of benefit termination notices through

August 1996 were subsequently reversed because county officials

determined that program requirements had been met or the sanctions had

been based on inaccurate data.

Providing enough services to afford recipients a reasonable opportunity to

comply with requirements and avoid termination posed another challenge

for states. To meet increased demand for activities and services under

their new programs, all three states opened or expanded job centers to

help with job search activities, created new partnerships with employers

6

In Wisconsin, however, termination of AFDC benefits could result in a sanction reducing the food

stamp allotment to $10 per month.

Page 7 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Executive Summary

to provide placements, and increased funds for child care. Despite such

efforts, however, both welfare advocates and state officials raised

concerns that workers were not adequately trained in case management.

In addition, high caseloads and complex new program rules prevented

workers from paying enough attention to individual cases to ensure that

recipients, many with barriers to employability, were assigned appropriate

work requirements and provided sufficient supports. For example, state

reviewers in Iowa found that 50 percent of the cases referred for sanction

for noncompliance with work requirements had not received sufficient

case management and the cases had been sent back to the caseworkers for

more services.

Although state officials acknowledged these challenges, they maintained

that the guiding principle of their new programs—consistent with the new

federal reform law—is that it is ultimately the recipients’ responsibility to

either comply with program requirements, inform their caseworkers of any

barrier to employment or service need, provide good cause reason for

noncompliance, or have their benefits terminated.

Recommendations GAO is not making recommendations in this report.

Agency Comments GAO obtained comments on a draft of this report from the three case study

states: Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. The states generally agreed

with the report’s findings and made technical comments, which were

incorporated as appropriate. Comments were requested but were not

received from HHS.

Page 8 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Page 9 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

14

The Welfare System Before Recent Federal Reform 15

Benefit Termination Under Welfare Reform 16

States’ Waiver Provisions for Termination Generally Similar to

New Law

17

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 19

Chapter 2 

Most Families’

Benefits Terminated

on the Basis of

Sanctions in a Few

States

20

Most States Had Few, If Any, Terminations 20

Most Terminations Were Based on Failure to Meet Enrollment

and Work Requirements

26

Chapter 3 

After Losing AFDC,

Families Had Various

Sources of Support

33

Many Families Had Returned to Welfare 33

Families Lost Income, but Many Had Some Sources of Support 35

Other Indicators of Family Well-Being 45

Chapter 4 

Termination

Provisions Were

Effective but Posed

Challenges

48

Provisions Resulted in Increased Compliance and Declining

Caseloads

48

Establishing Tracking and Notification Systems Challenged

States

50

Providing Sufficient Case Management Services Also Challenged

States

53

Chapter 5 

Conclusions and

Comments From the

States

56

Conclusions 56

Comments From the States 57

Page 10 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Contents

Appendixes Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 58

Appendix II: Overview of States Terminating Benefits Under

Waivers as of December 31, 1996

60

Appendix III: Full-Family Sanction Provisions in State Welfare

Waivers Approved Between January 1987 and August 1996

63

Appendix IV: Time-Limit Provisions in State Welfare Waivers

Approved Between January 1987 and August 1996

76

Appendix V: Reasons for Excluding Cases From Coverage in

Selected States

88

Appendix VI: Overview of Waiver Programs in Iowa,

Massachusetts, and Wisconsin

91

Appendix VII: Bases for Terminations Nationwide, by State 95

Appendix VIII: Demographic Profile of Total Caseload Compared

With Terminated Cases Studied in Iowa, Massachusetts, and

Wisconsin

98

Appendix IX: Massachusetts Data on High School, Work

Experience, and Primary Language

100

Appendix X: Reported Income and Benefits Received by

Terminated Cases Studied in Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin

102

Appendix XI: Average Benefits, Child Support Payments, and

Unemployment Rates in States Terminating Benefits Under

Waivers

105

Appendix XII: AFDC Caseload Participation in Selected Programs

in States Terminating Benefits Under Waivers

107

Appendix XIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 108

Bibliography 109

Related GAO Products 112

Tables Table 3.1: Sources of Income Before Termination for Households

Studied

36

Table 3.2: Reported Wages Before and After Termination 39

Table VII.1: Terminations as of June 30, 1996 95

Table VII.2: Terminations as of December 31, 1996 96

Figures Figure 1.1: Percentage of Families Nationwide Receiving Benefits

From Aid to Families With Dependent Children, 1970-95

14

Figure 2.1: States Terminating Benefits to Families as of

December 31, 1996

21

Page 11 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Contents

Figure 2.2: Bases for Terminations Nationwide 27

Figure 3.1: Percentage of Cases Reopened After Termination for

Noncompliance

34

Figure 3.2: Percentage of Households Reporting Income After

Benefit Termination

38

Figure 3.3: Percentage of Households Receiving Benefits After

Termination, by Program

41

Figure 3.4: Percentage of Households Receiving Food Stamps and

Medicaid Before and After Termination

43

Figure 4.1: AFDC Caseload Declines in Case Study States

Exceeded National Average, 1993-96

49

Abbreviations

AFDC Aid to Families With Dependent Children

CWEP Community Work Experience Program

HHS Department of Health and Human Services

HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development

JOBS Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training

LIHEAP Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program

SSI Supplemental Security Income

TANF Temporary Assistance for Needy Families

TEEM Training, Education, Employment, and Management

Page 12 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Page 13 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Chapter 1 

Introduction

With the stated intent of making our nation’s welfare system “more

consistent with fundamental American values—by rewarding work and

self-reliance, encouraging personal responsibility, and restoring a sense of

hope in the future,” the Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and

Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (P.L. 104-193) in August 1996. The

law was passed amid a growing number of families receiving benefits and

increasing dissatisfaction with the system (see fig. 1.1). Although more

recently, caseloads had begun to decline, many people continued to

criticize a system that they believed discourages work and encourages

dependency and that, according to the Congress, failed to promote

personal responsibility.

Figure 1.1: Percentage of Families

Nationwide Receiving Benefits From

Aid to Families With Dependent

Children (AFDC), 1970-95

Percentage

0

5

10

15

20

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

Sources: Social Security Bulletin, “Annual Statistical Supplement - 1995,” table 9.G1; Statistical

Abstract of the United States - 1996; and the U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports,

Series P20-488, “Household and Family Characteristics: March 1995” and earlier reports.

The new federal welfare reform law ended an individual’s entitlement to

welfare benefits and replaced it with a block grant to the states, changing

the fundamental structure of the more than 60-year-old welfare system.

Among its provisions, the new law allows states to terminate benefits to a

Page 14 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Chapter 1 

Introduction

family on the basis of penalties (called sanctions) for noncompliance and

requires states to terminate federal benefits to a family who has reached a

5-year time limit. With few exceptions, prior federal welfare law did not

allow states to terminate a family’s benefits on the basis of sanctions or

time limits; however, it did allow for states to obtain waivers to

experiment with termination provisions.7

The Welfare System

Before Recent Federal

Reform

Since its inception in 1935, AFDC provided benefits to economically needy

families with children lacking support from one or both parents because of

death, absence, or incapacity. AFDC was funded with federal and state

dollars. States administered the program, and HHS had federal oversight

responsibility. States were required to provide aid to all people eligible

under federal law whose income and assets were within state-prescribed

limits. In fiscal year 1996, over $20 billion in combined state and federal

funds were paid in benefits to a nationwide caseload that averaged about

4.6 million families a month. Families with children could receive benefits

if they conformed with income eligibility criteria and lacked parental

support, until 1968 when work incentives and welfare-to-work programs

were established.8

 These programs introduced the ideas of mutual

obligation and transitional benefits, reflecting an expectation that the

recipient should move toward self-sufficiency in exchange for welfare

benefits and that receiving benefits should be temporary—not a way of

life. With passage of the Family Support Act of 1988, the Congress

combined elements of these earlier programs into a single, more

comprehensive program: Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training

(JOBS). The act also expanded the Unemployed Parent program,

introducing time-limited benefits for two-parent families in some states.9

The purpose of the JOBS program was to ensure that AFDC families obtained

the education, training, and employment that would help them avoid

7

Although referred to here as “prior law,” in general, the law in effect before the new welfare reform

law was passed remains in effect until July 1, 1997, or for 6 months after the date HHS receives a state

plan regarding certain provisions. Effective dates could be accelerated at state option.

8

See Welfare to Work: States Begin JOBS, but Fiscal and Other Problems May Impede Their Progress

(GAO/HRD-91-106, Sept. 27, 1991), pp. 10-11.

9

Beginning in 1961, states were given the option of providing AFDC to two-parent families who were

needy due to the unemployment of the principal wage earner. The Family Support Act of 1988 required

all states to implement such programs, and those states that did not already have a program in place

were allowed to impose a time limit on the receipt of benefits. The 29 states and territories with

programs already in place were required to continue operating their programs with no time limit.

However, remaining states implementing new programs were allowed to deny benefits to two-parent

families once they had received benefits for at least 6 of the preceding 12 months. As of February 1996,

12 of these states had chosen to impose time limits on benefits for two-parent families.

Page 15 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Chapter 1 

Introduction

long-term welfare dependence. JOBS required states to develop

employability plans based on assessments of each recipient’s

employability skills and supportive services needs. JOBS also required

states to offer a broad range of education, training, and work-related

activities. States were further required to guarantee child care if necessary

for the recipient to work or participate in education and training or other

activities specified under JOBS and to pay or reimburse recipients for

transportation and other work-related expenses. Recipients, on the other

hand, who were able-bodied individuals aged 16 or older were required to

participate in the activities specified in their employability plans. If a

recipient failed to comply with program requirements without good cause,

benefits could be reduced by the amount attributable to the noncomplying

recipient, but the entire family’s benefits could not be terminated.

More than half of AFDC recipients were exempt from participating in JOBS,

however, most often because they were caring for a young child,10 and a

large portion of the nonexempt recipients were not required to participate

due to limited state funding. Historically, less than a third of those required

to participate actually participated in JOBS because, according to program

administrators, the states could not provide all the needed services and

assistance.11

Benefit Termination

Under Welfare Reform

The new federal welfare reform law ended the AFDC program, including

JOBS, and replaced it with block grants to the states under a new title,

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). TANF allows states more

flexibility to operate programs designed to end dependence on

government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage.

To accomplish these goals, states must submit plans reflecting the

obligations of both the state and the recipient. These plans must outline

how the state intends to conduct a program that provides recipients with

job preparation, work, and support services enabling them to leave

welfare and become self-sufficient as well as how the state intends to

require recipients to engage in work.

10Other recipients exempted from participation in JOBS included those who were ill, incapacitated, or

of advanced age; needed in the home because of the illness or incapacity of another family member;

the parent or other relative of a child under age 3 (or younger than 3 but not younger than age 1 at

states’ option) who was personally providing the care for the child; employed 30 or more hours a

week; a child under age 16 or attending an elementary, secondary, or vocational school full time; a

woman who was in at least the second trimester of pregnancy; or residing in an area where the

program was not available.

11Federal matching funds for JOBS were available as a capped entitlement, set at $1.0 billion in fiscal

year 1996. See also Welfare to Work: Current AFDC Program Not Sufficiently Focused on Employment

(GAO/HEHS-95-28, Dec. 19, 1994), pp. 5-8.

Page 16 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Chapter 1 

Introduction

To encourage recipients to fulfill their obligations, the law includes

provisions allowing states to terminate benefits to a family for failure to

comply with work and other requirements. After no more than 24 months

of receiving benefits (whether or not consecutive), parents and caretakers

must engage in work. The recipient must work a minimum average of 20

hours a week (increasing to 30 hours a week by the year 2000) in most

circumstances to meet this requirement. Unmarried teen parents under

age 18 who do not attend high school (or its equivalent), or who do not

live with their parents, legal guardian, or other adult relative, may not

receive assistance under TANF unless extenuating circumstances exist, as

specified in the law.12 In addition, states are allowed to deny TANF benefits

to a family for not cooperating with child support enforcement actions,

including establishing paternity, or establishing, modifying, or enforcing a

support order. The new law generally allows states to use their discretion

in establishing criteria for exempting families from these requirements;

however, the extent to which states exercise this discretion could affect

their ability to meet prescribed participation rates and avoid financial

penalties.

To ensure that assistance is temporary for most recipients, the law also

includes provisions for a 5-year lifetime time limit on benefit receipt. After

no more than 60 months of benefit receipt (whether or not consecutive) by

an adult in the family, the family may no longer receive any federal

assistance under the program. By allowing up to 20 percent of the

caseload to be exempt from the time limit, the law intends to protect those

who experience genuine and intractable hardship.

States’ Waiver

Provisions for

Termination Generally

Similar to New Law

Although prior law limited states’ ability to terminate benefits to entire

households on the basis of sanctions or time limits, it did provide a way

for states to experiment with such provisions. Section 1115 of the Social

Security Act authorizes the Secretary of HHS to grant states waivers of

statutory requirements for the AFDC program, including JOBS. Between

12The new welfare reform law specifies that requiring teen parents to live with their parents, legal

guardians, or other adult relatives would not be appropriate when (1) the teen parent has no living

parents, legal guardian, or other appropriate adult relative with whom to live or the whereabouts of

such individuals are unknown; (2) such individuals will not allow the teen parent to live with them;

(3) the state determines that the teen parent is, has been, or may be subject to serious physical or

emotional harm, sexual abuse, or exploitation in such individuals’ home; or (4) the state determines it

is in the best interest of the teen to waive the requirement. In cases in which living with parents, legal

guardians, or other adult relatives is not an option for the teen parent, the state must help the teen

locate an alternative adult-supervised living arrangement, unless it determines that the teen parent’s

current living arrangement is appropriate.

Page 17 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Chapter 1 

Introduction

January 1987 and the passage of welfare reform in August 1996, 46 states13

had received approval to implement waiver provisions experimenting with

changes to their AFDC and JOBS programs, including 33 states that had

provisions to terminate benefits to entire families either for failure to

comply with program requirements or for reaching a time limit.14 Such

provisions reflected states’ belief that they needed stronger measures to

deal effectively with recipients who fail to meet program requirements.15

With their increased flexibility under the new federal reform law, many

states have incorporated their benefit termination waiver provisions into

their new state plans.16

Thirty-one states had received approval to implement waiver provisions

terminating benefits to entire families (referred to as full-family sanctions)

for failure to comply with one or more requirements similar to those in the

new welfare reform law. In most cases, such families could have had their

benefits restored upon compliance with the requirements; but in some

cases families must wait several months before being eligible to reapply.

(For a more detailed description of states’ full-family sanction provisions,

see app. III.)

Fourteen states had received approval to implement waiver provisions

terminating benefits to a family after a specified of time period, somewhat

similar to the time-limit provision in the new welfare reform law. However,

states’ waiver provisions to terminate benefits due to a time limit differed

from the new law in significant ways, such as allowing an unlimited

percentage of cases to be exempt and providing for extensions or the

opportunity to reapply after a certain time period had elapsed.17 (For a

more detailed description of states’ time-limit provisions, see app. IV.)

13The term “state” includes the District of Columbia in this report.

14Under prior law, states could also choose to terminate a family’s benefits on the basis of failure to

comply with teen living arrangements without a waiver.

15See Welfare Waivers Implementation: States Work to Change Welfare Culture, Community

Involvement, and Service Delivery (GAO/HEHS-96-105, July 2, 1996), pp. 30-32.

16In addition, the new law provides states the option of continuing under certain conditions to

implement any waiver provisions in effect or requested before enactment of the new law if approved

by July 1, 1997.

17In addition, several of these and other states had time-limit provisions that called for imposing some

consequence other than benefit termination upon reaching a time limit, including work requirements,

benefit reduction, or use of vouchers. (See app. IV.)

Page 18 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

The Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Finance asked

us to review states’ early experiences with benefit termination provisions

under waivers to provide information useful to other states as they

implement the new law. Specifically, this report describes (1) those

families whose benefits have been terminated under waivers and why,

(2) federal or state benefits that are available and are being received after

termination, and (3) states’ experiences in implementing these provisions.

To obtain information for this request, we reviewed the law and discussed

benefit termination issues with federal officials and experts from private

research organizations. To determine which states had terminated benefits

under waivers and the bases for those terminations, we examined waivers

approved from January 1987 through passage of the new law in

August 1996 and surveyed all states with approved benefit termination

provisions. To determine whose benefits had been terminated, identify

what federal or state benefits were available and were being provided after

termination, and describe states’ experiences in implementing these

provisions, we selected Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin (three states

with large numbers of terminations) for more detailed study. In each of

these states, we chose a group of families whose AFDC benefits had been

terminated and relied upon state and federal automated records to

determine if these families were receiving benefits from various programs,

including food stamps, Supplemental Security Income, housing assistance,

and Medicaid. We also identified other sources of income to the extent

such information was reported, including partial data on wages, pensions,

and child support. (See app. I for a more detailed discussion of case

selection and analysis of automated data.) To identify implementation

issues, we discussed the provisions with state officials and representatives

of welfare advocacy groups and caseworkers in selected sites.

We conducted our work between April 1996 and April 1997 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 19 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Chapter 2 

Most Families’ Benefits Terminated on the

Basis of Sanctions in a Few States

Of the 33 states with waiver provisions to terminate AFDC benefits on the

basis of full-family sanctions or a time limit, most had terminated the

benefits of few, if any, families through December 1996. Iowa,

Massachusetts, and Wisconsin had the highest number of terminations. Of

the 18,000 families whose benefits were terminated nationwide, over

99 percent had failed to comply with program requirements. Most failed to

comply with new JOBS enrollment or work requirements. The demographic

characteristics of families losing their AFDC benefits in these three states

were generally comparable to the characteristics of families in the states’

overall caseloads. The most significant variations were due to the state

programs’ structure.

Most States Had Few,

If Any, Terminations

Through December 1996, 14 of the 33 states with benefit termination

provisions had not terminated the benefits of any families on the basis of

such provisions. (See fig. 2.1.) Of the 19 states that had terminated

benefits, 7 had terminated fewer than 100 cases, according to available

data.18 Less than half of the 19 states had terminated benefits for families

living in large urban areas with populations over 500,000—either because

the state had no large urban areas or because the waiver provisions had

not been implemented statewide. (For a more detailed description of

states terminating benefits, see app. II.)

18Neither North Carolina nor Ohio had data on the number of cases terminated; data from Oregon were

available only through Nov. 15, 1996 (see app. II).

Page 20 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Chapter 2 

Most Families’ Benefits Terminated on the

Basis of Sanctions in a Few States

Figure 2.1: States Terminating Benefits to Families as of December 31, 1996

Note: NA = not available.

aAccording to state officials surveyed, North Carolina and Ohio had terminated benefits for some

families because of noncompliance with program requirements under waivers as of Dec. 31,

1996, but their data systems could not provide the number of families losing benefits.

bData from Oregon were available only through Nov. 15, 1996.

Page 21 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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Most Families’ Benefits Terminated on the

Basis of Sanctions in a Few States

Program Structure Led to

Few Terminations in Most

States

In addition to some states’ having relatively small, less urban caseloads,

many had a limited number of terminations because of the program’s

being gradually phased in, requiring a minimum amount of time to elapse

before termination, or excluding large portions of the caseload from

coverage. States’ views of the role of benefit termination in their programs

also affected the number of families losing benefits.

Not Enough Time Had Elapsed Most of the 33 states with benefit termination provisions based on either

full-family sanctions or a time limit began implementing their programs in

1995 and 1996. Because of this, not enough time had elapsed through

December 1996 for families to have been in the programs long enough to

have had full-family sanctions imposed or to have reached a time limit. In

some states, no terminations were yet possible due to the structure of the

programs. In addition, for recipients cycling on and off welfare, the length

of time required to reach a time limit is extended beyond when it would

have been met if benefits had been received continuously.19

Among the 26 states with termination provisions based on noncompliance

with work requirements, most terminated benefits only after a specified

time period had been reached (referred to as a “work trigger”)20 or

graduated sanctions imposed. For example, Delaware and North Dakota

had work trigger time limits of 24 months; Vermont had a 30-month time

limit for most families.21 Other states, such as Illinois, had graduated

sanction processes lasting 6 months to a year before terminating benefits.

These states had terminated the benefits of relatively few, if any, families.

Among the 14 states with termination provisions based on a time limit,

most allowed families to receive benefits for at least 24 months or longer

before termination. Only one state, Florida, had implemented its program

19Researchers using monthly data have found that no more than 30 percent of recipients receive

welfare in 24 consecutive months. Many recipients leave welfare for a month or two and then cycle

back on. (See LaDonna Pavetti, The Number and Characteristics of Families Who Will Potentially Be

Affected by Policies to Time-Limit AFDC Benefits, The Urban Institute (Washington, D.C.: 1996)).

20Of the 26 states terminating benefits on the basis of work requirements, 12 provided for the

requirements to be imposed after work triggers ranging from 60 days to 60 months of receiving

benefits. The other 14 states either imposed the work requirement immediately on families entering

the program or set the length of time before imposing the requirement on a case-by-case basis.

21Vermont had a work trigger time limit of 15 months for two-parent families.

Page 22 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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Basis of Sanctions in a Few States

long enough to have terminated the benefits of any families because of a

time limit through December 1996.22

Large Portions of Caseloads

Excluded

Some states limited implementation of their waiver programs to selected

sites; those implementing their programs statewide generally phased in

implementation over periods lasting up to a year. Thus, these states

initially excluded large segments of their caseloads.

In addition, some states initially excluded large portions of their caseloads

from benefit termination primarily on the basis of exemptions.23 Variation

in states’ exemption provisions, especially regarding the age of the

youngest child, significantly affected the portion of the caseload exempted

from work requirements. For example, Iowa set its age-of-youngestchild exemption at 6 months and excluded 24 percent of its caseload from

having to comply with work requirements; Massachusetts set its

age-of-youngest-child exemption at 6 years and excluded 69 percent of its

caseload from having to comply with work requirements. (See app. V.)

Under the new welfare reform law, states still have discretion in

establishing criteria for exempting families from work and other

requirements, with few exceptions.24 The extent to which they exercise

this discretion, however, will affect their ability to meet the prescribed

participation rates and avoid financial penalties.25

22In addition, Florida initially implemented its program in only 2 of its 67 counties (Alachua and

Escambia), covering no large urban areas. Because of the program’s structure, terminations through

December 1996 based on Florida’s time limit were restricted to these two initial counties, which

covered only about 8,000 families (or about 4.3 percent) of a statewide caseload of about 187,000

families.

23Families were also excluded from the waiver provisions because they were assigned to a control

group for evaluation purposes or for other reasons (see app. V).

24For example, the law stipulates that a state may not reduce or terminate assistance on the basis of a

refusal to work if the household includes a single parent and a child under 6 years old and child care is

unavailable due to (1) unavailability of appropriate child care within a reasonable distance from the

individual’s home or work site, (2) unavailability or unsuitability of informal child care by a relative or

under other arrangements, and (3) unavailability of appropriate and affordable formal child care

arrangements. Although exempted, such families must still be counted in determining the state’s

participation rate. The law also allows states not to require a single parent caring for a child under 1

year old to engage in work and to disregard such families in determining the state’s participation rate.

25The new law requires prescribed percentages of a state’s caseload to participate in specified work

and work-related activities for the state to avoid financial penalties. In fiscal year 1997, 25 percent of a

state’s caseload must participate; by fiscal year 2002, 50 percent must participate. Separate, higher

rates are prescribed for two-parent families. For further discussion of these issues, see Welfare

Reform: Three States’ Approaches Show Promise of Increasing Participation Rates (GAO/HEHS-97-80,

forthcoming report).

Page 23 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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Most Families’ Benefits Terminated on the

Basis of Sanctions in a Few States

Role of Benefit Termination Prior law placed primary responsibility for acting to move recipients

toward self-sufficiency on the states by requiring states to provide

specified activities and support services. Under waivers, some states

sought to shift primary responsibility for such action to the recipients;

other states continued to assume primary responsibility for ensuring that

recipients complied with program requirements. The latter states often

viewed benefit termination as a failure of their program to work as

intended. Their waiver programs required caseworkers to provide

intensive case management services, including home visits if possible, and

established a rigorous conciliation and review process before termination.

Such states terminated benefits only after they had determined that

recipients were making an informed choice, were mentally and physically

able to participate, and barriers to participation had been identified and

addressed. Florida established a review panel consisting of seven

community members to advocate for recipients by reviewing cases of

those not meeting program requirements and finding ways to help,

including requiring provision of additional or new services when

appropriate. After 2 years of implementation, 74 families had reached their

time limits and had their benefits terminated; of these, 31 had a family

member who had found a job or who was working before termination.26 In

Michigan, rigorous conciliation efforts resulted in continued benefits for

727 (81 percent) of the first 895 cases nearing benefit termination.

In addition to intensive case management services and rigorous review

processes, some states also had flexible definitions of the activities

required to meet participation requirements, lessening instances of

noncompliance. For example, Utah exempted no one over age 15 from

program participation but defined a wide range of activities as meeting the

requirements. Utah allowed such activities as attending postsecondary

education programs, drug and alcohol counseling, parenting classes, and

even weight-reduction programs for 2 or 3 hours a week, to qualify as

meeting the work requirement. These activities, however, would not meet

the more restrictive definition of participation under the new federal

26These families had continued to be eligible for benefits until reaching their time limit due to the

increased amount of earned income disregarded under the waiver program. In addition, under

Florida’s waiver, officials had to determine whether terminating a family’s benefits could result in a

child being placed in an emergency shelter or foster care; if so, the family’s benefits would be reduced

but not terminated. Through December 1996, three Florida families who had reached their time limits

continued to receive reduced benefits because the state determined the children to be at risk.

Page 24 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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Most Families’ Benefits Terminated on the

Basis of Sanctions in a Few States

welfare reform law.27 After more than a year of using these flexible

definitions of participation, Utah had terminated 180 families’ benefits.

Nebraska also used a flexible definition of participation, allowing the

hourly participation requirement to be individually based and requiring

families with a child under 6 months to participate part time in such

activities as family nurturing and pre-employment skills. After more than a

year of implementation, Nebraska had terminated 59 families’ benefits for

failure to participate.

Three States Account for

Most Terminations

Most terminations based on implementation of full-family sanction or time

limit waiver provisions nationwide took place in three states: Iowa,

Massachusetts, and Wisconsin.28 Through June 1996, these three states

accounted for about 7,700 of the nearly 9,800 terminations or about

78 percent. Through December 1996, these states still accounted for about

13,000 of the approximately 18,000 terminations or about 72 percent,

according to available data.

All three states placed requirements on recipients immediately upon entry

into their new waiver programs. In Iowa, a family’s failure to comply

meant placement in a Limited Benefit Plan, leading to benefit termination.

Families in the Limited Benefit Plan were to receive 3 months of full

benefits (this period of receiving full benefits was eliminated in

February 1996), followed by 3 months of reduced benefits and then 6

months of no benefits.29 Families whose benefits had been terminated

could reapply only after the 6-month period of no benefits had elapsed.

Massachusetts and Wisconsin terminated benefits more quickly for

27The new law requires the recipient to work a minimum average of 20 hours a week (increasing to 30

hours a week by the year 2000) and stipulates the following limited list of activities as meeting its

definition of work activities: unsubsidized employment, subsidized private-sector employment,

subsidized public-sector employment, work experience (including work associated with the

refurbishing of publicly assisted housing) if sufficient private-sector employment is not available,

on-the-job training, job search and job readiness assistance, community service programs, vocational

educational training (not to exceed 12 months for any individual), job skills training directly related to

employment, education directly related to employment in the case of a recipient without a high school

diploma or certificate of high school equivalency, satisfactory attendance at secondary school or in a

course of study leading to a certificate of general equivalence in the case of a recipient who has not

completed secondary school or received such a certificate, and the provision of child care services to

an individual who is participating in a community service program.

28On the basis of data provided in April 1997 as this report went to press, Virginia also had a large

number of terminations, nearly as many as Massachusetts (see app. II).

29After February 1996, families in Iowa’s Limited Benefit Plan immediately entered the 3-month period

of reduced benefits, followed by 6 months of no benefits. In addition, if families entered a second or

subsequent Limited Benefit Plan, they would immediately enter the 6 months of ineligibility without

the initial 3 months of reduced benefits.

Page 25 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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Most Families’ Benefits Terminated on the

Basis of Sanctions in a Few States

noncompliance, but families could reapply at any time and have benefits

restored once they had demonstrated compliance.

Both Massachusetts and Wisconsin had large urban areas; therefore,

although Massachusetts excluded a large portion of its caseload from

coverage, it still had a large number of terminations. Finally, all three of

these states sought to shift primary responsibility for moving toward

self-sufficiency from the state to the recipient and viewed benefit

termination as a needed strengthening of their sanctions to enforce

recipients’ obligation to move toward self-sufficiency. Although the states

provided support services to help recipients become self-sufficient,

recipients were responsible for using these services if they wished to

continue to receive AFDC benefits. With the increased flexibility provided

under the new federal welfare reform law, all three states planned to

continue implementing the basic provisions of their programs. (For a more

detailed description of the benefit termination provisions implemented as

part of the reform programs in Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin, see

app. VI.)

Most Terminations

Were Based on Failure

to Meet Enrollment

and Work

Requirements

Nearly all families having their AFDC benefits terminated through

December 1996 failed to comply with various program requirements. Over

90 percent of terminations were based on failure to comply with either

JOBS enrollment or work requirements, although the proportions shifted

between June and December (see fig. 2.2). In our three case study states,

the demographic characteristics of the families losing AFDC benefits were

generally comparable to those of families in the states’ overall caseloads,

with the most significant variations attributable to the state programs’

structure.

Page 26 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Chapter 2 

Most Families’ Benefits Terminated on the

Basis of Sanctions in a Few States

Figure 2.2: Bases for Terminations Nationwide

Failure to Comply With Enrollment Requirements

Failure to Comply With Work Requirements

Failure to Comply With Child Support Enforcement Requirements

Failure to Comply With Teen Parent School Attendance Requirements

Failure to Comply With Teen Parent Living Arrangement Requirements

Through June 1996 Through December 1996 a

57.1%

34.4%

3.8%

2.2%

2.3%

44.2%

47.0%

4.8%

1.3%

2.2%

a

aTerminations based on reaching a time limit were 0.2 percent through June 1996 and

0.4 percent through Dec. 1996 (not included in figure).

Many Families Had

Benefits Terminated in

Transition to New

Programs

Over half the families losing their AFDC benefits nationwide failed to meet

new JOBS enrollment requirements under waiver programs, but, by the end

of December 1996, the percentage had dropped below half (see fig. 2.2). Of

the 11 states with termination provisions for failure to comply with

enrollment requirements, 4 states—Iowa, North Carolina, Virginia, and

Page 27 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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Most Families’ Benefits Terminated on the

Basis of Sanctions in a Few States

Wisconsin—had terminated benefits to families on the basis of these

provisions.30

In Wisconsin, converting the existing caseload of families to the new

program accounted for the relatively large proportion of terminations for

failure to appear and enroll in JOBS. Once the program was fully

implemented, the state expected that other reasons for termination would

predominate. In the first 4 months of program implementation, Wisconsin

terminated 1,634 ongoing cases for failure to meet this requirement (about

74 percent of families whose benefits had been terminated). For the most

part, such cases included recipients who had been under partial sanction

for failure to participate in the previous program but got a second chance

to comply with the new program. When told to enroll in JOBS and

participate up to 40 hours per week, about half of these recipients chose

not to do so. Once the state converted ongoing cases to the new program,

cases terminated for failure to enroll in JOBS were limited to existing cases

involving families who failed to appear after losing an exempt status (such

as families whose youngest child reached the age of 1 year). The state did

not identify new applicants’ cases as terminations for failure to enroll in

JOBS because they were not eligible for AFDC benefits unless they first

completed 60 hours of JOBS activities; because these families had received

no AFDC benefits, none had benefits terminated. As expected, over time

monthly caseload statistics reflected a sharp drop in terminations for

failure to enroll—from about 1,300 in May 1996 to about 300 in

September 1996. A Wisconsin program official predicted the number

would level off at a few hundred per month.

Iowa’s waiver required families to enter into a Family Investment

Agreement and stipulated a time frame and specific JOBS activities leading

to self-sufficiency. If they failed to enter into an agreement, families would

be placed in a Limited Benefit Plan, leading to benefit termination. Under

Iowa’s waiver, however, families could receive benefits for a limited time

even when they failed to enroll. As a result, although Iowa implemented

the program more than 2 years ago, over 80 percent of terminations

continued to result from families’ failure to enter into such agreements.

30For more details, see app. III for the states with termination provisions based on enrollment

requirements and app. VII for the number of families whose benefits were terminated due to these

requirements, by state.

Page 28 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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Most Families’ Benefits Terminated on the

Basis of Sanctions in a Few States

Increasing Proportion of

Terminations Based on

Failure to Comply With

Work Requirements

Between June and December 1996, the proportion of families losing their

AFDC benefits due to failure to comply with work requirements increased

nationwide from 34 to 47 percent (see fig. 2.2). Of the 26 states with

termination provisions for failure to comply with work requirements, 15

had terminated benefits to families on the basis of these provisions. Most

states based compliance on recipients’ participation in activities specified

in an individualized contract or plan, with failure to participate resulting in

termination. In addition, some states also terminated benefits for

recipients’ failing to accept job offers or quitting jobs. Explanations for

families’ failure to comply varied.

The proportion of families losing their AFDC benefits due to failure to

comply with other requirements remained constant at about 8 percent,

with less than 1 percent losing benefits due to reaching a time limit (see

fig. 2.2). These proportions are most likely to change, however, over time

and after existing cases are converted to the new programs. (For details

on the bases for termination, by state, see app. VII.)

Noncompliance Due to Various

Reasons

Recipients cited various reasons for not complying with work

requirements, according to state surveys of families losing AFDC benefits

and our review of case files in Des Moines, Boston, and Milwaukee. For

example, recipients said they would not participate because they

• wanted to continue an activity that no longer qualified, such as attending

beauty school or college;

• were unwilling to do community service or work for low wages;

• wanted to stay home with their children;

• had other means of support;

• did not feel well enough to work; and

• needed to care for a sick household member.

In the three case study states, caseworkers generally believed that families

who allowed their benefits to be terminated had sufficient other sources of

income—such as from unreported employment, extended family support,

or other benefit programs. Caseworkers believed that if such families truly

needed the assistance, they would call, come back into the office, and try

to comply. According to surveys and case file notes, those families whose

benefits were terminated often believed that the work activity available

through the program was beneath them or the family simply disappeared.

Many cases were later reopened or had other sources of support (see ch.

3). Welfare advocacy groups have raised concerns that some families may

truly need the assistance and have good cause for their failure to comply

Page 29 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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Most Families’ Benefits Terminated on the

Basis of Sanctions in a Few States

but nevertheless fail to contact the office to explain their situation. State

officials maintain, however, that it is recipients’ responsibility—not the

caseworker’s—to either comply or to inform caseworkers of any good

cause reason for noncompliance.31

States Have Limited Experience

With Terminations Based on

Time Limits

Of the 14 states with termination provisions based on time limits, only 1

state, Florida, had families reaching their time limits through

December 1996. Under Florida’s waiver, families reaching their time limits

were allowed extensions and a job guarantee if they had substantially

complied with program requirements. Of the 74 Florida families whose

benefits were terminated due to reaching a time limit as of

December 1996, 43 families had substantially complied with program

requirements and 31 families had not. All 43 families who complied

nevertheless had their benefits terminated: 31 were employed and had

continued to be eligible for AFDC until reaching their time limits only

because of the waiver’s higher earned income disregard provisions, and

the remaining 12 recipients got job offers from the state upon reaching

their time limits) that they declined for various reasons. The 31 families

who did not comply with program requirements had their benefits

terminated and received no job offers upon reaching their time limits.32 In

addition, more than 30 families left the program voluntarily before

reaching the time limit because of employment or to retain some months

of eligibility for the future.

Proportions Will Most Likely

Change Over Time

The proportion of families whose benefits are terminated due to time

limits will most likely increase significantly over time, although this

proportion was negligible in the early stages of program implementation.

As more families in Florida and the other 13 states with time-limit waiver

provisions begin to reach their time limits, the number of such

terminations will most likely increase significantly. Under the new federal

welfare reform law, families in all 50 states will begin to reach the 5-year

federal time limit and have their benefits terminated in the year 2001 or

2002.

In addition, the proportion of terminations based on failure to comply with

work requirements will most likely increase over time, compared with

31For further discussion of these issues, see Evelyn Z. Brodkin, “The State Side of the ‘Welfare

Contract’: Discretion and Accountability in Policy Delivery,” Social Security Administration Working

Paper No. 6, Social Security Administration (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1995.)

32Another four Florida families who had not complied with program requirements also had reached

their time limit as of Dec. 1996 but did not have their benefits terminated: three families continued to

receive reduced benefits because the state determined that the children may be at risk for placement

in foster care, and one family had benefits reinstated upon appeal.

Page 30 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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other nonwork requirements. Many states’ waivers called for work

requirements to be imposed after a specified time period, allowing

families—including new applicants—to be enrolled in the program and to

receive benefits for a time without having to comply. As a result, states

would almost always identify cases closed due to failure to comply with

work requirements as terminations. In contrast, those states with waivers

calling for benefit termination for failure to comply with other, nonwork

requirements often treated those other requirements as eligibility criteria.

As a result, states would identify as terminations only ongoing cases that

became subject to the requirements and failed to comply. Thus, like the

proportion of terminations for failure to appear and enroll, the proportion

of terminations for failure to comply with these nonwork requirements

often primarily reflected the conversion of existing cases to the new

programs during initial implementation and will most likely decline once

programs are fully implemented. This trend will most likely continue

under the new federal welfare reform law as well because states may still

provide up to 24 months of federal benefits to families before imposing

work requirements; while states must impose school attendance and living

arrangement requirements on teen parents immediately as eligibility

criteria.33

Characteristics of Families

Losing AFDC Varied Due

to State Programs’

Structure

The characteristics of families losing AFDC benefits were generally

representative of states’ overall caseloads. In Iowa, Massachusetts, and

Wisconsin, most of the families studied reflected the states’ overall

caseloads: they had been receiving assistance less than 3 years and

comprised a female head of household aged 20 to 39, with one or two

children (see app. VIII). The most significant variations resulted from the

structure of states’ programs regarding requirements placed on teen

parents and the age-of-youngest-child exemption.

In Massachusetts, for example, which had termination provisions for

families headed by teen parents who fail to comply with requirements for

school attendance and living arrangement, a disproportionately high

percentage of terminated cases studied were headed by a parent under age

20. Although teen-headed families constituted about 6 percent of the

state’s overall caseload, they accounted for almost 19 percent of the

terminated cases studied as of June 1996.

33Under the new law, states have an incentive to keep the period of time brief for which they provide

benefits to families before imposing work requirements, however, because participation rates and

federal funding levels under the block grant could be affected (see footnote 25).

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In addition, states’ provisions for the age-of-youngest-child exemption

resulted in disproportionately fewer families with children under the

designated age having their benefits terminated. For example, in

Wisconsin, families were exempt if their youngest child was under age 1.

Such families constituted more than 18 percent of the state’s total

caseload but less than 3 percent of the terminated cases studied.34

Similarly, Iowa exempted families if their youngest child was under 6

months old.35 Families with a child under age 1 constituted about

12 percent of the state’s total caseload but less than 7 percent of the

terminated cases studied. Massachusetts did not impose a mandatory

work requirement on families if their youngest child was under age 6. Such

families constituted 61 percent of the state’s total caseload but less than

33 percent of the terminated cases studied.36

Most states had little information on family characteristics, such as

education, work experience, and primary language, for their overall

caseloads compared with those families losing benefits. In Massachusetts,

which did gather such data, recipients in families losing their benefits

were less likely to have finished high school or to have worked in the past

10 years. (See app. IX.) Most of these differences could be attributed,

however, to the disproportionately large percentage of teen parents among

the families losing their benefits. In Michigan, where state officials also

compiled data on the educational background of heads of household, the

data indicated that although 38 percent of the total caseload was headed

by a recipient who had not completed high school or its equivalent, this

was true in 61 percent of cases terminated as of April 1996. Unlike in

Massachusetts, however, this difference could not be attributable to

benefit termination provisions for teen parents failing to comply with

school attendance and living arrangement requirements because Michigan

had not yet implemented such provisions.

34According to a state analyst who examined these cases, Wisconsin’s terminations of families with a

child under 1 year old were mostly because these were two-parent families. Two-parent families could

only exempt one parent for the care of a child under age 1, and noncompliance by the other parent

resulted in benefit termination.

35Iowa’s age-of-youngest-child exemption was lowered to under 3 months of age in a waiver

amendment implemented on Nov. 1, 1996.

36Massachusetts families with children under age 6 still had other requirements, such as the teen

school attendance and living arrangement requirements, for which noncompliance resulted in benefit

termination.

Page 32 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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After Losing AFDC, Families Had Various

Sources of Support

Families losing AFDC benefits lost a significant source of monthly income.

Although more than 80 percent of families in our analysis were

subsequently found to have one or more sources of support, or had

returned to welfare, the number of families continuing to receive food

stamps and Medicaid after losing AFDC dropped significantly in all three

states. Because reported income and receipt of benefits provide only a

partial indication of families’ well-being after losing AFDC, states tried to

locate such families and determine their status.

Many Families Had

Returned to Welfare

Under most states’ waiver provisions, families whose benefits were

terminated for noncompliance could have had their AFDC cases reopened if

they had subsequently complied with program requirements. In addition,

families reaching a time limit could generally have had their AFDC benefits

extended (at least temporarily) if they had complied with program

requirements or could have had their cases reopened after a specified time

period. A few states had variations to these basic provisions. For example,

in Iowa, families placed in the Limited Benefit Plan leading to benefit

termination for not signing a Family Investment Agreement may choose to

comply and sign such an agreement at any point before termination; once

terminated, however, all families must wait 6 months before their AFDC

cases may be reopened. Under the new federal welfare reform law,

families may have their cases reopened upon compliance only until they

reach their 5-year lifetime time limit, after which no further federal cash

benefits may be provided under the TANF grant.

Several states had many families (ranging from about 18 to 47 percent)

who lost AFDC benefits due to noncompliance and subsequently had their

cases reopened (see fig. 3.1).37 In Massachusetts and Wisconsin, about

one-third of enrolled families whose cases had been closed for

noncompliance were subsequently receiving AFDC. States reopened cases

on the bases of demonstrated compliance and documented exemption or

because cases had been closed due to administrative error. In Iowa, once

the 6-month benefit termination period had elapsed, about one-third of the

families studied also had returned to AFDC rolls.

37We gathered data on case status between Sept. and Dec. 1996, which in most instances represented

the case status 2 to 8 months after case closure but varied by state (see app. I).

Page 33 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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After Losing AFDC, Families Had Various

Sources of Support

Figure 3.1: Percentage of Cases

Reopened After Termination for

Noncompliance

Percentage

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Iowa

Massachusetts

Michigan

Mississippi

South Dakota

Utah

Wisconsina

32.8 32.1

21.0

33.7

47.0

17.8

37.7

aIn Wisconsin, this figure represents the percentage of cases reopened for those whose benefits

were terminated for noncompliance after enrolling in JOBS. Those families whose benefits were

terminated for failure to enroll had a much lower percentage of their cases reopened—about

4 percent.

The number of reopened cases demonstrated that the stronger sanctions

were working as intended—to reinforce the need for recipients to comply

with requirements if they wished to continue receiving benefits, according

to state officials. As one Boston caseworker said, “Many clients don’t take

the program seriously until the checks stop. Loss of just the adult portion

of the grant isn’t enough to get their attention. [But] when they get no

benefits at all, they’re on the phone with their caseworker right away.”38 In

most cases, recipients agreed to comply or provided a reason for an

exemption; in some cases, however, administrative errors were revealed

(see “Establishing Tracking and Notification Systems Challenged States” in

ch. 4).

38Under the JOBS program, the sanction for noncompliance was removing the adult portion of the

grant, commonly referred to as “reduced benefits” (rather than terminated benefits) or a “partial

sanction” (rather than a full-family sanction).

Page 34 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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After Losing AFDC, Families Had Various

Sources of Support

Families Lost Income,

but Many Had Some

Sources of Support

Although AFDC represented a significant source of income for most families

before they lost their benefits, after AFDC benefits were terminated, at least

75 percent of families studied in Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin

reported having some source of income or benefits.39 In many cases,

families’ sources of support were a continuation of income or benefits

received before AFDC termination, though the amount of reported income

increased after termination. The number of families receiving food stamps

and Medicaid significantly decreased after termination, however, despite

waiver provisions that eligibility was to be unaffected. Although some of

these decreases may have been due to increases in household income, at

least some decreases may have been due to families’ no longer receiving

benefits for which they may still have been eligible.

Families Lost a Significant

Source of Income

The AFDC monthly benefit represented a significant source of income for

families in states terminating benefits under waivers—not only because of

the average dollar amount of the AFDC benefit, but also because AFDC was

the only reported source of income for some families (see apps. XI and

XII). Among the households studied in Iowa, Massachusetts, and

Wisconsin whose cases remained closed, average AFDC payments were

smaller than other sources of income before termination, but AFDC was the

only source of income received by all families (although most also

received food stamps). Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and wages

were the largest income sources, but relatively few households reported

such income.40 (See table 3.1.)

39We used household as our unit of analysis, which may include household members not included in

the AFDC family unit used for determining AFDC eligibility and calculating AFDC benefits before

termination. (See app. X for a summary table of the percentage of households studied receiving

reported income and benefits and app. I for more details on the methodology used in conducting the

data matches.)

40However, the percentage of families losing AFDC benefits who had a household member receiving

SSI was significantly higher than the percentage of families in the general AFDC caseload who had a

household member receiving SSI (see apps. X and XII).

Page 35 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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After Losing AFDC, Families Had Various

Sources of Support

Table 3.1: Sources of Income Before Termination for Households Studied

AFDC Food stamps SSI Reported wages

State

Average

monthly

amounta

Percent of

households

receiving

Average

monthly

amount

Percent of

households

receiving

Average

monthly

amount

Percent of

households

receiving

Average

monthly

amount

Percent of

households

receiving

Iowa $277 100.0 $279 83.6 $490 9.8 $692 17.4

Massachusetts 390 100.0 215 95.9 482 12.7 394 14.3

Wisconsin 369 100.0 246b 76.2 554 12.6 551c 35.9

aAverage monthly AFDC benefits lost were lower than the statewide averages (see app. XI)

mainly because many families had been sanctioned and were receiving reduced benefits before

termination. In addition, under benefit determination standards, families with earned income often

received a reduced AFDC benefit.

bDoes not include those households under food stamp sanction receiving $10 per month.

cMay include other income such as pensions.

During winter months, fuel assistance provided through the federal

Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program was also a significant

source of income. Families on AFDC were generally also enrolled in this

program, but the amount of assistance varied by state as determined by

the state allocation plan. In 1995, households received fuel assistance

averaging $197 a month in Iowa, $348 in Massachusetts, and $300 in

Wisconsin.41 In addition, about 25 percent of the households studied in

Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin lived in subsidized housing.42

In households in which the amount of the AFDC benefit was low compared

with the amount of other available benefits, states had less leverage for

encouraging compliance through threats of terminating AFDC benefits.

Among cases closed for noncompliance in our case study states,

25 percent or more of the households were receiving benefits from two or

more other programs before termination, so that the combined amount

perhaps minimized the loss of the AFDC benefit.43

41No data were gathered for the amount of fuel assistance benefits received by the individual

households in our study because these benefits were mainly provided only during winter months, and

we conducted our analysis before implementation of the 1997 winter benefit allocation.

42At the time of our review, some families also received $50 per month from a child support

pass-through; however, no data were available from Iowa and Wisconsin indicating which families

received such payments. The new welfare reform law has eliminated the $50 child support

pass-through requirement.

43Analysis of benefits received included food stamps, SSI, and housing assistance. The percentage of

cases receiving benefits from two or more of these programs before termination were 27.9 percent in

Iowa, 33.2 percent in Massachusetts, and 24.6 percent in Wisconsin.

Page 36 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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After Losing AFDC, Families Had Various

Sources of Support

Many Families Reported

Having Wages, Pensions, or

Child Support

Between 43 and 48 percent of the households whose AFDC cases remained

closed in Iowa,44 Massachusetts, and Wisconsin reported having some

income from wages, pensions,45 or child support after losing AFDC.

Between 23 and 32 percent of households had reported wages (see fig.

3.2). Because not all households had to report such income, these

percentages are likely to be understated. Households not applying for or

receiving AFDC or other benefits did not have to report such income (about

25 percent of cases studied). In addition, neither Iowa nor Wisconsin had

data on pensions,46 and all three states had only partial data on child

support.47 As a result, households in our study were likely to have

additional unreported income, according to state officials we spoke with.48

44At the time of our analysis, 6 months had not yet elapsed and all the Iowa cases included in our study

were still closed.

45Pension income includes Social Security, Veterans’ Benefits, and employment-related pensions.

46Wisconsin’s wage data may include some pension data.

47Once no longer receiving AFDC, some families may receive child support payments privately, which

they do not have to report to the state and local offices of Child Support Enforcement, where we

obtained the child support data.

48Even when reporting is required, households sometimes fail to report wages and other income. See

Christopher Jencks and Kathryn Edin, “The Real Welfare Problem,” The American Prospect, No. 1

(1990), pp. 31-50; and Kathryn Edin, Single Mothers and Absent Fathers: The Possibilities and Limits of

Child Support Policy, Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University (New Brunswick, N.J.:

1994).

Page 37 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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After Losing AFDC, Families Had Various

Sources of Support

Figure 3.2: Percentage of Households

Reporting Income After Benefit

Termination

Although in many cases households had reported these sources of income

both before and after termination, some reported changes in income

sources after termination. For example, of those households with reported

wages after termination, about half had reported no wages before

termination, suggesting that household members found new jobs or that

household composition changed.49 Of those reporting wages both before

49In Iowa, the percentage of households that reported wages after termination but none before

termination was 52.6 percent; in Massachusetts, 61.5 percent; and in Wisconsin, 39.5 percent.

(Wisconsin data may include other income, such as pensions, which was a likely income source before

termination.)

Page 38 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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After Losing AFDC, Families Had Various

Sources of Support

and after termination, the amount of monthly wages increased

significantly.50 (See table 3.2.)

Table 3.2: Reported Wages Before and

After Termination Of cases with

reported wages after

termination

Of cases with reported wages both before

and after termination

Average monthly

wage

Average monthly

wage before

Average monthly

wage after

Iowa $667 $648 $741

Massachusetts 594 373 540

Wisconsin 754 607 870

Note: Includes wages of all household members, including those who may not have been part of

the AFDC family unit before termination.

Despite the increases for some families, the amount of reported average

monthly wages among families losing AFDC still placed them below the

poverty level, even for the smallest family unit of one adult and one child.

This level is $875 a month, according to the Census Bureau’s 1995 poverty

thresholds. Wisconsin state officials pointed out, however, that a low-wage

job, combined with the earned income tax credit, would result in a

significantly higher income than the average AFDC grant—which was $465 a

month for a three-person family in Wisconsin in 1995. Massachusetts state

officials agreed with this observation and noted further that income would

be even greater for families using child care services, Medicaid benefits,

and food stamps (for which earned income is treated more generously

than AFDC income). In addition, officials noted that families with earned

income also realize self-esteem benefits from working and being

productive members of society.

Of those with reported child support income after termination, average

monthly payments received were $274 in Iowa, $249 in Massachusetts, and

$217 in Wisconsin. In accordance with prior federal law, any child support

payments received before termination would have been signed over to the

state, and the families would have only received a pass-through of up to

$50 a month. The new welfare reform law has eliminated the $50 pass50Although some households had members who were working before the family’s benefits were

terminated, these families’ benefits were, nevertheless, terminated for noncompliance and are not

included in the statistics on those leaving welfare to go to work. Many of these families’ benefits were

terminated for failure to enroll in JOBS. In other cases, either (1) the household members who were

working were not part of the AFDC assistance unit, (2) those who were working were part of the

assistance unit but were not working consistently enough to meet states’ work requirements or had

not reported their wages to their caseworkers, or (3) the family’s benefits were terminated for failure

to comply with some other requirement such as failure to attend school.

Page 39 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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After Losing AFDC, Families Had Various

Sources of Support

through requirement, and states are allowed to keep the full amount of

payments received for families on welfare.

Consistently in all three states, a lower percentage of households in the

urban areas studied had reported income from wages, pensions, and child

support than households in the rest of the state. The percentage of cases

reporting child support revealed the most significant variations: 10 to

14 percent in Des Moines, Boston, and Milwaukee, compared with 18 to

29 percent in cases outside these urban areas. (See app. X for complete

data on reported income and benefits received by cases in urban areas

compared with cases studied in other areas.)

Many Receive Benefits

From Other Federal and

State Programs

As under the waivers, under the new federal welfare reform law, families

whose AFDC benefits are terminated for noncompliance generally continue

to be eligible for benefits from other federal and state programs.51 In the

case of fuel assistance and housing, the benefit amount may even increase

when income falls from loss of AFDC. At the time of our review, families

continuing to receive food stamps after their AFDC benefits were

terminated also often had an increase in their monthly food stamp

allotment due to losing AFDC.

52 However, federal law now prohibits any

increase in food stamps to families losing AFDC (or TANF) benefits due to

sanctions.53

After losing AFDC, about 75 percent of households studied in Iowa,

Massachusetts, and Wisconsin received benefits from one or more other

federal programs—including food stamps, SSI, housing assistance, and

Medicaid. Analyzing benefits received separately for each program

revealed variations among states (see fig. 3.3). The ranges of percentages

were fairly consistent for housing, SSI, and Medicaid but varied

significantly for food stamps, partly reflecting the states’ different food

stamp policies.

51The new law, however, provides that states may terminate Medicaid eligibility for adults who fail to

comply with work requirements under TANF and that states may terminate food stamps to an entire

household if adults fail to comply with work requirements under TANF, with some restrictions.

52On average, the increase ranged from $21 to $51 per month for households studied in Iowa,

Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. Households with other sources of income had lowered the average

amount of increases.

53Federal regulations (7 C.F.R., Parts 272 and 273) were effective May 31, 1996; however, states had

until Nov. 27, 1996, to implement the provisions.

Page 40 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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After Losing AFDC, Families Had Various

Sources of Support

Figure 3.3: Percentage of Households

Receiving Benefits After Termination,

by Program

Percentage

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Food Stamps SSI Housing Medicaid

Iowa

Massachusetts

Wisconsin

Percentage of Families

Receiving Food Stamps and

Medicaid Decreased

Significantly

In general, according to program policies, termination of AFDC benefits due

to noncompliance was not to affect a family’s eligibility for SSI,

54 housing

assistance, and Medicaid—and, in most states, food stamps—unless the

family’s circumstances changed. Consistent with these policies, the

percentages of households studied in Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin

receiving SSI and housing assistance did not change before and after

termination in all three states; however, the statewide percentages of

cases receiving food stamps and Medicaid decreased significantly, with

even greater reductions in the urban areas. Michigan’s study of terminated

cases found similar decreases.55 While some of the decreases in each state

may legitimately be due to families’ finding employment and no longer

meeting income eligibility standards, at least some of the decreases reflect

families’ no longer receiving benefits for which they were still eligible.

54Aged, blind, and disabled individuals are eligible for SSI benefits if they meet specified criteria and

federal income standards. Individuals receiving SSI may not receive AFDC and were excluded from the

benefit calculation for an AFDC family unit; SSI recipients were included in our analysis of income and

benefits of household members (see footnote 39).

55Of those families whose benefits were terminated as of Apr. 1996 in Michigan, after 3 months, food

stamp receipt had dropped to 57 percent and active Medicaid status had dropped to 59 percent.

Page 41 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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After Losing AFDC, Families Had Various

Sources of Support

To maintain eligibility for food stamps and Medicaid after losing AFDC

benefits, families must continue to meet monthly reporting requirements

and appear for periodic eligibility reviews. To maintain eligibility for food

stamps in Massachusetts, families must also appear for recertification.

When families lose their AFDC grant, some recipients fail to take the steps

necessary to maintain eligibility even though they would be eligible for

continued food stamp and Medicaid benefits, explained officials in our

case study states. On the basis of an internal review of cases closed for

failure to comply with work requirements over a 2-month period,

Massachusetts state officials concluded that most of such families might

have believed it not worth the effort to seek benefits or, in fact, might not

have been eligible for continued benefits due to changes in their

circumstances following case closure.56 Nevertheless, officials in all three

states expressed surprise at the amount of the decline in receipt of food

stamps and Medicaid among households losing AFDC benefits (see fig. 3.4).

56For a more detailed description of this case review and its findings, see “Other Indicators of Family

Well-Being” in this chapter.

Page 42 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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After Losing AFDC, Families Had Various

Sources of Support

Figure 3.4: Percentage of Households

Receiving Food Stamps and Medicaid

Before and After Termination

Before losing AFDC, virtually all families were covered by Medicaid, as

required under prior federal law. In addition, due to comparable income

eligibility criteria, a high percentage of families receiving AFDC also

received food stamps: the national average was 90 percent in 1995. After

AFDC benefit termination, under most states’ waivers (including Iowa’s and

Massachusetts’s) eligibility for food stamps was to continue unaffected. In

Iowa, state officials viewed continued receipt of food stamps as part of a

safety net for families during the 6-month period they must wait to reapply

for AFDC benefits.

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After Losing AFDC, Families Had Various

Sources of Support

In contrast, other states’ waivers required food stamps to be sanctioned

along with AFDC for failure to meet work requirements.57 In Wisconsin,

waiver provisions linked the two programs so that cases closed due to

failure to comply with JOBS enrollment and work requirements would have

their food stamp allotment reduced to $10 per month indefinitely (that is,

no 2-month limit) if they were not exempt from the food stamp

employment and training program.58 As shown in fig. 3.4, this food stamp

sanction affected 8.1 percent of the AFDC cases studied in Wisconsin before

closure and 16.3 percent after closure. Under the new federal welfare

reform law, states may still choose to link the work requirements of the

food stamps and TANF programs.59

Availability of Other Services

and Benefits Varied

In addition to the programs discussed above—food stamps, SSI, housing,

fuel assistance, and Medicaid—states offered other benefits and services

to terminated families; such services varied somewhat by state. For

example, states generally offered mental health and substance abuse

counseling and treatment programs, often within the same departments

administering the AFDC program and with priority given to AFDC recipients.

Massachusetts administered such programs by a separate department with

no direct eligibility links to AFDC. Of the households whose cases remain

closed in Massachusetts, 33.6 percent had used such counseling and

treatment services either before or after termination, with 12.7 percent

using services after termination (including 3.9 percent who began

receiving services only after termination).

In addition, the availability of child care or transportation assistance for

those losing AFDC benefits varied by state. States generally provided child

care and transportation subsidies linked to the AFDC program, including

transitional help for those leaving AFDC due to employment in all three of

our case study states; however, for those families losing AFDC benefits due

to noncompliance, state-provided subsidies varied. In Iowa, non-AFDC

recipients could receive state-assisted child care if they met the income

57Similar to AFDC, the food stamp program also provided for work requirements, but the requirements

were generally more lenient than those included in states’ AFDC waivers. For example, families with

children under age 6 were exempted from the food stamp work requirements, and the sanction for

failure to meet the requirement was limited to 2 months.

58Wisconsin cases sanctioned but not closed for noncompliance with AFDC work requirements would

have their food stamp benefits reduced on the basis of hours not worked, similar to the sanctions

under AFDC (see app. VI).

59In addition, if states had submitted waiver requests to lower the age-of-youngest-child exemption,

and such requests had been denied as of Aug. 1, 1996, states were allowed to lower the age of youngest

child to 1 year for the food stamps work requirement, providing for greater comparability in the two

programs’ requirements as an experiment for up to 3 years. Furthermore, the law stipulated that the

food stamp sanction may last up to 6 months but not longer.

Page 44 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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After Losing AFDC, Families Had Various

Sources of Support

criteria (less than 110 percent of the federal poverty level), according to a

state official. Wisconsin also provided child care assistance on a sliding

scale. Although Massachusetts offered a similar child care assistance

program for non-AFDC recipients, funding was limited and waiting lists

were long. Non-AFDC families could expect to wait several months, or even

years, for a subsidized child care slot depending on the location and type

of care needed.

Although many states have general assistance programs (state- and

county-funded assistance programs, generally for adults), families losing

AFDC benefits do not always qualify for such assistance.60 In

Massachusetts, less than 1 percent of the families studied were receiving

general assistance after losing AFDC. Iowa had no statewide data on its

county-funded general assistance program, and Wisconsin had

discontinued its statewide general assistance program in January 1996.

Other Indicators of

Family Well-Being

Reported income and benefits receipt only partially describe the

well-being of families after losing AFDC. Some families may not report

income, and no data were available for some families. Also, despite

receiving some income and benefits, total household income may still fall

short of the poverty threshold, and children’s well-being may be at risk. In

response to concerns about the well-being of families losing AFDC for

noncompliance under waivers, states have tried to locate such families

and determine their status.

In Iowa, the state public health workers have routinely tried to visit

families 1 month after benefit termination to check on their well-being and

make referrals for other services as needed. Of the 5,333 families they tried

to visit in the year ending in June 1996, they contacted less than half

(2,270). Of those contacted, caseworkers found no cases of severe

deprivation. Results of their contacts were as follows:

• 37 percent no longer need assistance,

• 18 percent planned to go back on AFDC when eligible,

• 29 percent received information or referral for other services, and

• 16 percent refused to cooperate.

60Of the 42 states with general assistance programs, 12 states provide assistance to all financially needy

people who qualify; 30 states provide assistance only to certain categories of people. Of these 30, 19

states provide assistance to low-income children or families with children. (See State General

Assistance Programs 1996, The Urban Institute (Washington, D.C.: 1996.))

Page 45 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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After Losing AFDC, Families Had Various

Sources of Support

In addition, Iowa’s contracted evaluators, Mathematica Policy Research,

Inc., and the Institute for Social and Economic Development, conducted a

survey of recipients whose cases had been terminated between November

1995 and January 1996 to determine what happened after termination.

Tentative findings from this study indicate that the effects of losing cash

assistance varied widely. Forty percent of families’ incomes increased

after benefit termination, but nearly half the families’ incomes decreased.

Despite such decreases, the study did not find evidence of extreme

economic distress among the survey’s 137 respondents.

Massachusetts made a special effort to locate minor teens whose benefits

had been terminated. As of February 1997, state officials reported that 192

of the 314 teens referred for follow-up (about 61 percent) had returned to

welfare or had been located by the two contractors hired to find and

interview these teens. As of our review, however, data on the status of

those not returning to welfare had not yet been compiled.

In addition, in December 1996, Massachusetts released the results of a

state study to determine the status of families who had left welfare during

September and October 1996. Data on those families whose benefits had

been terminated for noncompliance with work requirements and who had

not returned to welfare showed the following:

• 51 percent had new jobs,

• 16 percent had new living arrangements,

• 14 percent had new unearned income,

• 6 percent had moved out of state, and

• 13 percent were in an “other” category.

Michigan gathered data on the 168 families whose AFDC benefits had been

terminated as of April 1996, surveying the 126 families whose cases had

not been reopened after 3 months. Interviewers did not complete surveys

with 59 (or about 47 percent) of these families mainly because they could

not be located or refused to cooperate. Of the 67 families interviewed,

when asked about their problems and how they were managing without

cash assistance, 22 percent responded that they were having no problems.

A few commented that closing their case was the best thing that ever

happened, that it was the push they needed, and that it gave them the

opportunity to better their lives. The study concluded that of those

interviewed, however, many faced serious problems, with 27 percent

indicating a problem providing enough food for their family and 29 percent

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After Losing AFDC, Families Had Various

Sources of Support

with insufficient money to provide for personal needs. One family had

been evicted, and seven had received eviction notices. Families said they

were getting by financially by finding jobs and relying on help from family,

friends, or community resources, and some were receiving child support

or SSI; 3 percent said they were “not getting by.”

A wide variety of family histories and characteristics may affect a family’s

prospects after benefit termination. On the one hand, according to

caseworkers, families with previous work experience or unreported

income are most likely to be doing well. On the other hand, caseworkers

were less optimistic about other families’ prospects. In some cases,

because the caseworkers believed the families’ situations were tenuous,

they tried repeatedly but to no avail to contact the families and encourage

compliance.

Page 47 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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Termination Provisions Were Effective but

Posed Challenges

Benefit termination provisions have improved the effectiveness of welfare

programs in Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin by increasing work

activity and job placements and decreasing the number of families on the

welfare rolls, state officials believed. In addition, the percentage of the

caseload terminated for noncompliance was small compared with the total

number of cases—generally about 1 percent or less per month.

Nevertheless, implementing benefit termination provisions has posed

significant challenges. First, states had to develop systems to accurately

track hours worked to monitor compliance and to correctly and

adequately notify recipients of pending termination actions. Second, states

had to provide certain activities and services or they could not terminate a

family’s benefits.

Provisions Resulted in

Increased Compliance

and Declining

Caseloads

Benefit termination provisions in all three states encouraged those with

other sources of income to move off welfare more quickly and those who

truly needed assistance to cooperate more fully with program

requirements, according to state officials. With an improving economy,

welfare caseloads nationwide have generally declined over the past 3

years; however, the declines in Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin have

exceeded the average decline for the country’s 54 states and territories

(see fig. 4.1). Wisconsin’s decline for the period was 38 percent, nearly

three times the national average of 13 percent. While crediting the

economy as the major factor, officials in all three states believed at least

some of the declines were due to their waiver provisions. Iowa’s program

has succeeded, in part, because the prospect of benefit termination is a

much more effective motivator than the previous adult sanction, which

was a relatively minor grant reduction, according to the state program

administrator. Massachusetts’s caseload fell after the provisions of the

new program were publicized in the press and in mailings to and

discussions with recipients. In Wisconsin, when staff explained the benefit

termination policy for noncompliance with work requirements to new

applicants, many chose to accept jobs rather than go on welfare in the first

place, explained state officials. According to data compiled in one county,

46 percent of 880 applicants deemed likely to have gone on welfare

between March and July of 1996 were diverted from welfare through this

process.

Page 48 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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Termination Provisions Were Effective but

Posed Challenges

Figure 4.1: AFDC Caseload Declines in

Case Study States Exceeded National

Average, 1993-96

AFDC Caseloads (in Thousands)

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

1993

1994

1995

1996

Sept. 1996

Nationwide Averagea

Iowab

Massachusetts

Wisconsin

aTotal caseload nationwide divided by 54 states and territories (District of Columbia, Guam,

Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands).

bThe increase in Iowa’s caseload in 1994 was due to the increase in the amount of income

disregarded, which allowed more people to be eligible for assistance, and the expansion of the

program for two-parent families, according to the program coordinator.

Sources: 1993 to 1996, HHS data on states’ total caseloads representing the average of monthly

caseloads during the fiscal year; Sept. 1996 HHS and state monthly caseload data.

The threat of benefit termination significantly affected program

participation, stated officials in Wisconsin and Massachusetts. In

Wisconsin, in the first 3 months after implementation, participation in JOBS

sessions increased by 36 percent compared with the previous 3 months,

according to staff at a Milwaukee job center we visited. In addition, job

placements at the center more than doubled between 1995 and 1996, from

about 1,000 to about 2,500. Statewide, Wisconsin reported 24,000 job

Page 49 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Chapter 4 

Termination Provisions Were Effective but

Posed Challenges

placements in 1996. In Massachusetts, in less than a year after

implementing the waiver provisions, cases with earned income had

increased from 8 to 13 percent, and about 12,000 recipients left the rolls by

finding work, according to state officials. In addition, among recipients

required to work, the number participating in work activities increased

28 percent between June and October 1996. In Iowa, where

noncompliance did not result in immediate termination of benefits, the

percentage of recipients participating in JOBS sessions had not increased

significantly, and state officials said they were considering program

changes to impose sanctions more quickly. Nevertheless, after 2 years of

implementation, state officials reported that 35,000 recipients had been

placed in jobs.

Establishing Tracking

and Notification

Systems Challenged

States

The states faced challenges in establishing systems to track recipients’

work activity to accurately determine when benefits should be terminated

for noncompliance and in adequately notifying recipients of these actions.

This was particularly true for Wisconsin’s Pay for Performance project,

which determined the amount of each month’s benefits and imposed

sanctions on the basis of the number of hours worked in a previous

month. Wisconsin implemented the project statewide without first pilot

testing its provisions and encountered many start-up difficulties. While

Iowa and Massachusetts phased in implementation over 7 to 10 months,

these states also faced challenges in accurately tracking cases and

adequately notifying recipients of pending sanctions.

In Wisconsin and Massachusetts, recipients and employers sometimes

failed to submit time stubs or verify hours on a timely basis, and often pay

periods did not correspond with calendar months. In addition, work hours

for recipients in low paying jobs often fluctuated from week to week and

month to month, making it difficult for states to determine how many

hours a recipient was required to work and, if the hours dropped below

that amount, what if any additional requirements the recipient must fulfill

to avoid a sanction.

In Wisconsin, JOBS and AFDC workers, who often worked for different

organizations and were located at different sites, split responsibility for

handling cases. The JOBS workers determined the number of hours each

recipient must work and tracked the hours of JOBS activities for their

caseloads of up to 200 or more. The AFDC workers received pay stubs from

employers and entered hours worked for their caseloads of up to 400. Both

had difficulty gathering and entering data in the short time frames

Page 50 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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Termination Provisions Were Effective but

Posed Challenges

required, and communication between the two was often lacking. The

computer system in Wisconsin was fairly new, and the eligibility workers

and case managers entered information differently. As a result, sometimes

the data they entered conflicted and they often had a hard time

determining the status of individual cases.61

Massachusetts, also initially split responsibilities between JOBS and AFDC

workers, but generally these workers were collocated at the sites we

visited. JOBS workers monitored hours worked, and AFDC workers

determined if recipients met requirements. Sometimes difficulties arose

because JOBS and AFDC workers did not know of each others’ actions, but

workers we spoke with generally liked this arrangement. To streamline

operations, however, in September 1996 the state began integrating these

two roles—expanding the AFDC workers’ job duties to include employment

functions. Because of this, Massachusetts’s most significant

implementation issues involved training AFDC workers to assume these

functions. Several AFDC workers noted a dramatic increase in their

workload due to the need to constantly monitor recipients’ participation in

work activities on a biweekly basis in addition to assessing compliance

with other eligibility requirements.

Due to the difficulties of accurately tracking recipients’ hours worked, as

well as training workers to understand and apply all the new program

rules correctly, all three states had problems notifying recipients of

sanctions during initial program implementation. Milwaukee County,

Wisconsin, issued 5,182 sanctions through August 20, 1996. Of these,

44 percent were later reversed because recipients had met program

requirements or inaccurate data had been corrected. During the 2 months

when the system converted to automatically issuing sanction notices, the

error rate was as high as 70 percent. In addition, staff had reopened cases

on the computer with no evidence that the recipient had begun to comply

with program requirements, according to our case file review. Because so

many incorrect sanction notices had been sent out, recipients were

confused by what was required of them and overwhelmed workers with

calls. Even when accurate, the notices confused recipients because of the

system’s prospective aspect: hours worked in any given month determined

the amount of benefits 2 months in the future. Thus, when recipients

61As part of its 1997 implementation plan, Wisconsin planned to have one case manager handle both

JOBS and AFDC functions. State officials believed this would lead to reduced caseloads and eliminate

the work and confusion between the two staffs. In Dane County (Madison) and in a few instances in

Milwaukee County, where the AFDC and JOBS workers have been collocated at one JOBS center,

administering cases has become easier, and program managers believe that fully integrating the two

roles would further facilitate case management.

Page 51 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Chapter 4 

Termination Provisions Were Effective but

Posed Challenges

received a sanction notice and then began to participate, they did not

understand why they did not get any benefits the following month.

In Massachusetts, program staff and welfare advocates also reported

initial difficulties in tracking recipients’ work hours, applying new

program rules correctly in individual cases, and adequately notifying

recipients of termination actions. Initially, if multiple actions took place,

Massachusetts’s computer system combined these into a single notice to

the recipient. This sometimes resulted in notices that did not make sense.

For example, we found one notice that informed the recipient, “The

Department will raise your [AFDC] benefits from $55 to $343 . . . because

you or a household member failed to comply with the requirements of the

work program without good cause.” State officials eventually resolved

these problems by issuing separate notices for each action. In addition,

welfare advocates raised concerns that termination notices did not

provide enough information on good cause reasons for failure to

participate, requirements for recipients to have benefits reinstated, and on

the continuation of food stamps and Medicaid eligibility. The notices did

state, however, that Medicaid benefits would continue (subsequently

revised to include food stamps), that recipients could call their

caseworker with questions, and that free legal services were available.

When the state learned of instances of its failure to accurately track work

hours or apply program rules correctly in individual cases, those cases

were reopened and recipients given another opportunity to comply. As of

December 1996, recipients appealed 978 actions, and records show that

47 percent of actions resolved had been decided, at least in part, in the

recipients’ favor.

Iowa officials also reevaluated their notification procedures because of

concerns about recipients being overloaded with information and

instructions and the effectiveness of procedures in giving recipients

informed choice. Of the 2,073 cases entering the Limited Benefit Plan

between November 1995 and January 1996, about 28 percent subsequently

enrolled in the Family Investment Program before termination due to

either (1) recipients signing a Family Investment Agreement or (2) the

state determining that recipients had been enrolled in the Limited Benefit

Plan in error.

Page 52 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Chapter 4 

Termination Provisions Were Effective but

Posed Challenges

Providing Sufficient

Case Management

Services Also

Challenged States

Another challenge facing the states was providing sufficient services to

afford recipients a reasonable opportunity to comply with requirements

and avoid termination. States had to provide certain activities and services

to recipients consistent with JOBS requirements. If states failed to meet this

obligation, they could not terminate a family’s benefits. To meet increased

demand for activities and services under their new programs, all three

states opened or expanded job centers to help in job search activities,

created new partnerships with employers to provide placements, and

increased funds for child care. Despite such efforts, however, both welfare

advocates and state officials raised concerns that workers were not

adequately trained in case management and that large caseloads and

complex new program rules prevented workers from paying enough

attention to individual cases to ensure that recipients, many with barriers

to employability, were assigned appropriate work requirements and

provided sufficient support services.

In Iowa, for example, JOBS workers were to develop an individualized

Family Investment Agreement with each recipient. In most terminated

cases, however, recipients failed to come in and sign the agreement, and

workers had minimal contact with these recipients. For recipients who did

sign agreements, the prescribed activity in many cases was “individual job

search,” according to our case file review. Recipients had to make four

face-to-face job contacts per day and were recommended for sanction if

they did not do so. State reviewers concluded that not enough casework

had been done in 50 percent of these cases to determine whether the

recipient knew about the proposed action and its consequences and

whether the barriers to the recipient’s participation had been adequately

addressed. As a result, the program required caseworkers to provide more

case management services before relegating cases to the Limited Benefit

Plan leading to benefit termination. In addition, Iowa had established a

special program to provide intensive case management services to families

identified with many or severe barriers to employment. However, funding

allowed less than 3 percent of the state’s caseload to participate in this

program, and insufficient contact with recipients hindered caseworkers’

ability to identify candidates for referral.

Massachusetts tried to implement a subsidized job program in which the

value of a recipient’s AFDC and food stamp grants was paid as subsidized

wages from a private employer rather than provided directly to the

recipient as benefits. The state, however, found it difficult to effectively fill

job placements created through such partnerships. Up to 2,000 slots had

Page 53 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Chapter 4 

Termination Provisions Were Effective but

Posed Challenges

been authorized, but the state had placed fewer than 200 recipients in

positions at the time of our review.

Finding a good match between employers and recipients presented

problems, according to state officials. About 40 to 50 percent of recipients

had no high school diploma or equivalent, and placing recipients in jobs

required them to have job development and training. What a welfare

caseworker was expected to do had its limits, according to officials.

Welfare advocates criticized the state program, however, for terminating

benefits to families for noncompliance with work requirements without

providing recipients specific, available placements. As in Iowa, many

Employment Development Plans simply called for “60 days of job search”

or “20 hours per week of work or community service.” In some cases, the

state terminated benefits after recipients had received referrals for

community service assignments where no positions were actually

available. After the state decided an appeal in a recipient’s favor in

August 1996 and the action to terminate voided for failure to offer a

specific job placement, the state provided guidance to workers

emphasizing the importance of securing a placement before sanctioning

recipients for noncompliance. As of December 1996, 121 appeals regarding

work requirements and Employment Development Plans had been decided

or withdrawn in the recipients’ favor.

In addition, some raised concerns about caseworkers’ ability to identify

needs and inform families of available services. Welfare advocates cited

examples of families being allowed child care assistance only when other

family members were not available to provide free care, contrary to

program policy. Records show that 25 appeals regarding denials of child

care services were later decided or withdrawn in the recipients’ favor.

Wisconsin’s biggest implementation challenges occurred in Milwaukee,

where workers’ caseloads were the largest and, according to state

officials, the number of recipients with multiple barriers to employment

was disproportionately large.62 In 1996, Milwaukee County had 58 percent

of the state’s AFDC caseload but accounted for 44 percent of the 24,500 job

placements. Large caseloads made it difficult for caseworkers to pay

personal attention to each case to help recipients meet program

requirements and move toward self-sufficiency rather than terminate

62One reason Milwaukee’s caseworkers’ caseloads were the largest is because the county had a hiring

freeze due to uncertainty over its role in future program administration. As part of its 1997

implementation plan, other public and private agencies would be allowed to submit bids to administer

the program. Some of the JOBS programs had already been contracted to private organizations such as

Goodwill and the Young Men’s Christian Association.

Page 54 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Chapter 4 

Termination Provisions Were Effective but

Posed Challenges

benefits for noncompliance. In addition to handling as many as 200 to 400

cases, caseworkers had to spend time learning new roles and

responsibilities and performing such tasks as tracking hours of

participation. Caseworkers had little time left to understand the particular

circumstances of each case and identify services recipients might need to

comply with program requirements and avoid termination.

In all three states, officials acknowledged the challenges inherent in the

culture shift required of their caseworkers—from determining eligibility to

emphasizing work,63 the difficulty of learning and accurately applying

complex new program rules, and of handling a large number of cases.

Nevertheless, state officials maintained that the guiding principle of their

waiver programs—consistent with the new federal reform law—was that it

is ultimately the recipient’s responsibility to either comply with program

requirements, inform their caseworkers of any barrier to employment or

service need, provide good cause reason for noncompliance, or have their

benefits terminated.

63For more discussion of these changes, see Welfare Waivers Implementation: States Work to Change

Welfare Culture, Community Involvement, and Service Delivery (GAO/HEHS-96-105, July 2, 1996).

Page 55 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Chapter 5 

Conclusions and Comments From the States

Conclusions States’ early experiences with benefit termination provisions reveal that

such provisions have seldom been used. Nevertheless, state officials we

spoke with consider these provisions successful in discouraging those

with other adequate means of support from receiving benefits and

encouraging those on welfare to comply with requirements so that they

might move toward self-sufficiency. Although our analysis yielded little

information on implementing time-limit provisions, it provided several

insights for states implementing full-family sanction provisions under the

new federal welfare reform law.

First, states will probably experience relatively low percentages of cases

terminated for noncompliance with program requirements as compared

with their total caseloads. Although the states we studied in detail were

chosen for their relatively large numbers of terminations, these states still

terminated on average about 1 percent or less of their monthly caseloads.

Second, depending on program structure, states will probably have a

relatively higher proportion of terminations due to noncompliance with

enrollment and other nonwork requirements when initially converting

their existing caseloads to their new programs. Once programs are fully

implemented, the proportion of such terminations will most likely

decrease, while the proportion of terminations due to failure to comply

with work requirements and, eventually, that due to reaching a time limit,

will most likely increase.

Third, states will probably see a significant percentage of families whose

benefits are terminated for failure to comply with requirements return to

welfare. In the three states we studied, about one-third did so. In most

cases, families returning to welfare demonstrated compliance with

program requirements or provided a basis for exemption. Although the

federal 5-year lifetime limit on benefit receipt will probably affect

decisions to return to welfare, its impact is not yet known.

Fourth, states will probably see significant reductions in the number of

families continuing to receive food stamps and Medicaid after AFDC

benefits are terminated. Many families do not take the steps necessary to

maintain food stamp and Medicaid benefits after losing AFDC, even though

they may continue to be eligible. Many families not returning to welfare,

however, do have some sources of support according to data from federal

and state programs—and most likely, additional families have support they

have not reported.

Page 56 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Chapter 5 

Conclusions and Comments From the States

Fifth, states will probably face challenges in establishing reliable tracking

and notification systems and ensuring that families get adequate case

management and support services to meet program requirements and

avoid having benefits terminated.

Our analysis yielded little information on implementing time-limit

provisions. Only one state, Florida, had terminated benefits due to

reaching a time limit through December 1996. Of the 74 Florida families

losing benefits, those who complied with program requirements and were

not already employed upon reaching their time limit received job offers

from the state (which all declined); those who failed to comply were not

offered jobs. Once a family reaches the new federal 5-year lifetime time

limit, compliance with program requirements neither secures more time

on welfare nor a job guarantee. To protect those experiencing genuine and

intractable hardship, the law allows up to 20 percent of a states’ caseload

to be exempt from the time limit. Under waivers, however, states generally

excluded more than 20 percent of their caseloads from coverage. The

number of families who will ultimately reach the new federal 5-year

lifetime time limit under TANF is unclear. Also unclear is whether states

will devise other programs for addressing the needs of these hard-to-serve

families.

Comments From the

States

We obtained comments on a draft of this report from our three case study

states: Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. The states generally agreed

with the report’s findings and provided technical clarifications about their

programs and data interpretation. We incorporated their comments in the

report as appropriate. We requested but did not receive comments from

HHS.

Page 57 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix I 

Scope and Methodology

This appendix details our methodology, including information about our

AFDC case selection process and databases used in determining (1) the

number and characteristics of families with benefits terminated in Iowa,

Massachusetts, and Wisconsin; (2) the number of cases later reopened;

and (3) the number of cases with other reported income and benefits.

We obtained data on all cases terminated in Iowa through the Limited

Benefit Plan from April through June 1996, a total of 408 cases. The data

included cases assigned to the Limited Benefit Plan for failure to sign a

Family Investment Agreement and for failure to fulfill such agreements. To

determine benefits and reported income after termination, we obtained

data for the month of August 1996. At the time of our analysis, none of the

terminated cases had been reopened. (Under Iowa’s waiver, states could

not reopen terminated cases for 6 months, and 4 months or less had

elapsed when we obtained post-termination data.)

We obtained data on all cases terminated and in closed status in

Massachusetts for failure to meet work, school attendance, or teen living

arrangement requirements as of the end of June 1996, a total of 1,292

cases. We included in our analysis all cases closed for failure of parents

(including teen parents) and caretakers to comply with these

requirements, a total of 936 cases.64 We obtained data for these cases as of

the end of September 1996 to determine the number of cases reopened as

well as benefits and reported income for the 636 cases remaining closed.

We obtained data on all cases terminated in Wisconsin in May 1996 for

failure to enroll in the JOBS program and all cases closed in July and August

for failure to meet work requirements under the program for 3 consecutive

previous months (March through May or April through June), a total of 759

cases. We obtained October 1996 data to determine the number cases

reopened as well as benefits and reported income for the 651 cases

remaining closed.

For cases chosen, we analyzed and matched data from electronic

databases provided to us by the states, as well as from the following

federal databases: HUD’s Multifamily Tenant Characteristics System and

Tenant Rental Assistance Certification System and the Social Security

Administration’s SSI database. State databases matched included AFDC,

food stamps, Medicaid, child support enforcement, and child protective

64We did not include in our analysis the 356 cases closed for failure of dependent children aged 16 to 18

to comply with work or school attendance requirements.

Page 58 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix I 

Scope and Methodology

services.65 To determine what benefits families had received before

termination, we obtained data for the month preceding termination.

Although we did not independently evaluate the overall validity of the

databases received from other federal and state programs, we consulted

with state database and program staff to correct discrepancies in the data,

and we reviewed case files for a sample of cases from Des Moines, Boston,

and Milwaukee.

For benefits and income matches, we obtained data not only for AFDC

recipients, but also for household members not in the AFDC assistance unit

who might have been receiving housing, SSI, or food stamp benefits or who

might have reported income from wages, pensions, or child support. For

most matches, we used heads’ of household and individual household

members’ Social Security numbers. For state database matches, we also

used state identification or case numbers.

We did our review between April 1996 and April 1997 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.

65We determined that data obtained from child protective services on substantiated reports of abuse or

neglect and foster care placements for terminated cases were too limited and inconclusive to include

in the report.

Page 59 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix II 

Overview of States Terminating Benefits

Under Waivers as of December 31, 1996

State

Date waiver

implemented Coveragea

AFDC caseload in

covered

jurisdictions as of

June 30, 1996

Arizona 11/95 Statewide 61,538

Connecticut 1/96 Statewide 56,017

Delaware 10/95 Statewide 10,253

Florida 2/94 Two countiesi 9,083j

Illinois 1/96 Statewide 221,632

Iowa 10/93 Statewide 28,581

Massachusetts 11/95 Statewide 82,237

Michigan 4/95 Statewide 174,176

Mississippi 10/95 Six countiesk 11,697

Missouri 6/95 Statewide 80,426

Nebraska 10/95 Five countiesl 2,423

North Carolina 7/96 Statewide 110,451

Ohio 7/96 Statewide 203,442

Oregon 7/96 Statewide 31,851

South Dakota 5/94 Statewide 5,891

Utah 11/95

7/96

Pilot sitesp

statewide

14,320

Vermont 7/94 Statewide 8,965

Virginia 7/95 Statewide 63,399

Wisconsin 3/96 Statewide 52,765

Total

Page 60 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix II 

Overview of States Terminating Benefits

Under Waivers as of December 31, 1996

Number of cases terminatedc

Cities covered with

populations over

150,000b

Population in

1994b

Basis for

termination

Month first

terminated cases

As of June 30,

1996,

statewided

As of June 30,

1996, in urban

areasd

As of Dec. 31,

1996, statewide

Glendale

Mesa

Phoenix

Scottsdale

Tucson

168,000

314,000

1,049,000

152,000

435,000

Sanction 11/95 66e f 50e

None g Sanction 6/96 11h g 477h

None g Sanction 10/96 0 g 68

Nonei g Time limit 4/96 19 g 74

Chicago 2,732,000 Sanction 7/96 0 g 8

Des Moines 194,000 Sanction 10/94 4,174 f 5,288

Boston

Worcester

548,000

165,000

Sanction 11/95 1,292 258

50

1,969

Detroit

Grand Rapids

992,000

190,000

Sanction 4/96 307 56

58

765

Jackson 193,000 Sanction 11/95 279 118 699

Kansas City

St. Louis

444,000

368,000

Sanction 6/95 73 f 279

Lincoln 203,000 Sanction 3/96 8 5 59

Charlotte

Greensboro

Raleigh

Winston-Salem

438,000

196,000

237,000

155,000

Sanction 7/96 0 g m

Akron

Cincinnati

Cleveland

Columbus

Dayton

Toledo

222,000

358,000

493,000

636,000

179,000

323,000

Sanction 10/96n 0 g m

Portland 451,000 Sanction 9/96n 0 g 60o

None g Sanction 5/94 289 g 413

Part of Salt Lake

Cityp

172,000 Sanction 12/95 62 26 180

None g Sanction 1/96 3 g 3

Arlington

Chesapeake

Newport News

Norfolk

Richmond

Virginia Beach

175,000

181,000

179,000

241,000

201,000

430,000

Sanction 7/95 985 20

13

27

43

19

11

1955

Madison

Milwaukee

195,000

617,000

Sanction 4/96 2,208 84

1,020

5,700

9,776 18,047

Page 61 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix II 

Overview of States Terminating Benefits

Under Waivers as of December 31, 1996

aStates implementing programs statewide generally phased in implementation over periods

lasting up to a year.

bBased on 1994 data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, as published in table no. 46 in

Statistical Abstract of the United States - 1996.

cIncludes cases terminated in states implementing benefit termination waiver provisions before

passage of the new federal welfare reform law in August 1996. In some states, such as

Massachusetts and Wisconsin, data represent cases in terminated status as of the date shown. In

other states, such as Iowa and Connecticut, data represent cumulative totals that may include

cases that have subsequently been reopened and may double count some cases.

dData requested as of June 30, 1996, but data provided were from June 15, 1996, to July 2, 1996.

eAccording to the official surveyed, the most significant reason for the drop in terminations over

time is that many teen parents become old enough to no longer have to meet living arrangement

requirements.

f

Breakdown for urban area(s) not available.

gNot applicable.

hData do not include those cases terminated for failure to comply with teen living arrangement

requirements (not tracked).

i

The two Florida counties covered were Alachua and Escambia. As of June 1996, seven

additional counties were participating, but no families in these counties could reach their time

limits as of Dec. 31, 1996.

j

Cohort entering program through June 1994 that could possibly reach a time limit as of

June 1996 comprised 353 cases. Cohort entering program through Dec. 1994 that could possibly

reach a time limit as of Dec. 1996 comprised 1,442 cases.

k

The six Mississippi counties covered included Adams, Harrison, Jones, Lee, Hinds, and

Washington.

l

The five Nebraska counties included Adams, Clay, Lancaster, Nuckolls, and Webster.

mEntire families’ benefits had been terminated, but data system did not track and no estimate

could be provided, according to officials surveyed.

nThe first month a family’s benefits could be terminated after waiver was implemented.

oTerminations as of Nov. 15, 1996. Data as of Dec. 31, 1996, were not available.

pThe pilot sites in Utah included Kearns office (covering part of Salt Lake City), St. George,

Roosevelt, Kanab (Kane County), Cedar City, Beaver, Panguitch, American Fork, and Brigham

City.

Page 62 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix III 

Full-Family Sanction Provisions in State

Welfare Waivers Approved Between January

1987 and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Basis for full-family sanction (for cases without

good cause for noncompliance) Sanction provisions

ARIZONA

Employing and Moving

People Off Welfare and

Encouraging

Responsibility (5/95)

Teen living arrangement: Failure of minor parents to

live in an adult-supervised setting.

Termination of family’s eligibility for AFDC.

CONNECTICUT

A Fair Chance (9/94) Work: After 24 cumulative months of AFDC receipt,

failure to comply with activities required by

employability plans.

Assistance unit is ineligible for an AFDC payment.

Case can be reinstated through compliance.

Work: Voluntarily quitting a job after 24 months of

AFDC receipt under Pathways.

Assistance unit is ineligible for AFDC cash

assistance for 3 months.

Reach for Jobs First

(12/95)

1. Work: Not cooperating with JOBS requirements;

quitting a job.

2. Child support: Not cooperating with child support

enforcement requirements.

3. Other: Not cooperating with quality control

programs.

First sanction: AFDC benefit reduced 20 percent for

3 months. Second sanction: AFDC benefit reduced

35 percent for 6 months. Third and subsequent

sanctions: No AFDC benefit paid for 3 months.

Teen living arrangement: Failure of minor parents to

live in a supervised setting.

Termination of family’s eligibility for AFDC.

Enrollment: Failure to complete redetermination of

eligibility.

AFDC benefit terminated for failure to complete

6-month redetermination. AFDC, food stamp, and

Medicaid benefits terminated for failure to complete

other redeterminations. Families may reapply for

benefits at any time.

DELAWARE

A Better Chance (5/95) 1. Enrollment: Not cooperating in developing of

Contract of Mutual Responsibility.

2. Work: Not cooperating with employment-related

provisions of contract.

First sanction: One-third reduction in AFDC benefit

until compliance. Second sanction: Two-thirds

reduction in AFDC benefit until compliance. Third

sanction: Termination of AFDC benefit for duration

of demonstration.

Other: Failure to comply with

nonemployment-related requirements of Contract of

Mutual Responsibility, such as immunizing children

and attending parenting classes.

AFDC benefit initially reduced by $50. Reduction

increases by $50 every month until compliance with

requirements if the state finds that adult has not

taken reasonable steps to fulfill the requirement.

Child support: Failure to comply with child support

enforcement requirements.

AFDC benefit terminated until compliance.

Teen living arrangement: Failure of minor parents to

live in adult-supervised setting.

Termination of family’s eligibility for AFDC.

Amendments to A Better

Chance (12/95)

1. Enrollment: Not cooperating in developing

Contract of Mutual Responsibility.

2. Other: Failure to comply with

nonemployment-related requirements of contract,

such as immunizing children and attending

parenting classes.

AFDC benefit initially reduced by $50. Reduction

increases by $50 every month until compliance with

requirements.

(continued)

Page 63 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix III 

Full-Family Sanction Provisions in State

Welfare Waivers Approved Between January

1987 and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Basis for full-family sanction (for cases without

good cause for noncompliance) Sanction provisions

1. Work: Not cooperating with employment-related

provisions of Contract of Mutual Responsibility.

2. Other: Failure of dependent children under age

16 to comply with school attendance requirements.

First sanction: One-third reduction in AFDC benefit

for 3 months or until compliance, whichever is

sooner. Second sanction: Two-thirds reduction in

AFDC benefit for 3 months or until compliance,

whichever is sooner. Third sanction: Termination of

AFDC benefit for duration of demonstration.

Sanctions for failure to meet school attendance

requirements will not be imposed if parent or

caretaker is working with school officials or other

agencies to remedy situation.

Child support: Failure to comply with child support

enforcement requirements.

AFDC benefit terminated until compliance.

Teen living arrangement: Failure of minor parents to

live in adult-supervised setting.

Termination of family’s eligibility for AFDC.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Project on Work,

Employment, and

Responsibility (8/96)a

Teen living arrangement: Failure of unmarried minor

parents or pregnant minors to live in

adult-supervised setting.

Termination of family’s eligibility for AFDC.

IDAHO

Temporary Assistance for

Families in Idaho (8/96)

Work: Being fired from a job, quitting a job, or

turning down a job offer that would provide income

equal to or greater than the AFDC benefit.

Family is ineligible for AFDC benefits for 90 days or

until compliance. Eligibility for the family may be

reestablished during the sanction period if the adult

secures new employment comparable in gross

wages to the job he or she quit, becomes exempt

from the work requirements, or the adult who

caused the sanction leaves the family.

Work: Failure to participate in work or JOBS

activities.

First sanction: Entire family’s needs removed in

determining the amount of AFDC benefits for 1

month or until compliance, whichever is longer.

Second sanction: Entire family’s needs removed in

determining the amount of AFDC benefits for 3

months or until compliance, whichever is longer.

Third sanction: Entire family’s needs removed in

determining the amount of AFDC benefits until the

end of the demonstration.

Teen living arrangement: Failure of minor,

unmarried parents or minors who are pregnant to

live in adult-supervised setting.

Termination of family’s eligibility for AFDC.

ILLINOIS

Work and Responsibility

(9/95)

Work: Not cooperating with Targeted Work Initiative

requirements, such as participation in job search

and subsidized work positions; not cooperating with

Get a Job Initiative requirements, such as

participation in job search, community work

experience, and short-term training.

Sanctions for first three instances of noncooperation

are in accord with JOBS policy for noncooperation.

Sanction for fourth and subsequent instances of

noncooperation is loss of entire AFDC benefit for 6

months or until individual complies, whichever is

longer.

Work: Failure to accept a full-time or part-time job

offer.

Termination of family’s AFDC benefit for 3 months or

until individual complies, whichever is sooner.

(continued)

Page 64 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix III 

Full-Family Sanction Provisions in State

Welfare Waivers Approved Between January

1987 and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Basis for full-family sanction (for cases without

good cause for noncompliance) Sanction provisions

Enrollment: Failure to cooperate in developing and

signing a self-sufficiency plan within 30 days of

application or redetermination.

Termination or denial of AFDC cash benefits for the

entire family until compliance.

INDIANA

Amendments to Indiana

Manpower Placement and

Comprehensive Training

Program (8/96)

Work: Failure to register for work with local

employment and training office.

Termination of family’s AFDC benefits until

compliance.

Teen living arrangement: Failure of minor parents

and their children to live in an adult-supervised

setting.

Termination of family’s eligibility for AFDC.

IOWA

Family Investment

Program (8/93)

1. Enrollment: Failure to enter into a Family

Investment Agreement.

Family is placed in the Limited Benefit Plan: For 3

months, the family is eligible for full benefits,

followed by a 3-month benefit period reflecting the

needs of the children only. At the end of this period,

the AFDC grant is terminated and the family is not

eligible to apply for assistance for 6 months. During

the Limited Benefit Plan, the state will review the

well-being of the children. Before termination,

participants are allowed to develop a Family

Investment Agreement and leave the Limited

Benefit Plan.

1. Work: Failure to comply with terms of the Family

Investment Agreement.

2. Teen school attendance: Failure to comply with

terms of the Family Investment Agreement.

Family is placed in the Limited Benefit Plan: For 3

months, the family is eligible for full benefits,

followed by a 3-month benefit period reflecting the

needs of the children only. At the end of this period,

the AFDC grant is terminated and the family is not

eligible to apply for assistance for 6 months. During

the Limited Benefit Plan, the state will review the

well-being of the children. Participants have no

reconsideration rights, that is, they are not allowed

to redevelop a Family Investment Agreement and

leave the Limited Benefit Plan.

Amendments to Family

Investment Program (2/95)

Enrollment: Failure to enter into a Family Investment

Agreement.

Family is placed in the Limited Benefit Plan: For 3

months, adults’ needs are removed in calculating

AFDC benefit, followed by 6 months of AFDC

ineligibility for the family. During the Limited Benefit

Plan, the state will review the well-being of the

children. At any time in the first 3 months of the

Limited Benefit Plan, participants are allowed to

develop a Family Investment Agreement and leave

the Limited Benefit Plan. If a participant enters the

Limited Benefit Plan for a second or subsequent

time, the family will be immediately ineligible for

AFDC for 6 months with no 3-month period of

reduced benefits.

(continued)

Page 65 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix III 

Full-Family Sanction Provisions in State

Welfare Waivers Approved Between January

1987 and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Basis for full-family sanction (for cases without

good cause for noncompliance) Sanction provisions

1. Work: Failure to comply with the terms of the

Family Investment Agreement.

2. Teen school attendance: Failure to comply with

terms of the Family Investment Agreement.

Family is placed in the Limited Benefit Plan: For 3

months, adults’ needs are removed in calculating

AFDC benefit, followed by 6 months of AFDC

ineligibility for the family. During the Limited Benefit

Plan, the state will review the well-being of the

children. Participants have no reconsideration

rights, that is, they are not allowed to redevelop a

Family Investment Agreement and leave the Limited

Benefit Plan. If a participant enters the Limited

Benefit Plan for a second or subsequent time, the

family will be immediately ineligible for AFDC for 6

months with no 3-month period of reduced benefits.

Teen living arrangement: Failure of minor parents to

live in adult-supervised setting.

Termination of family’s eligibility for AFDC.

KANSAS

Kansas Actively Creating

Tomorrow for Families

(8/96)

Work: Failure to attend a job interview if referred,

failure to accept a bona fide offer of suitable

employment, or termination of employment.

If the noncomplying individual is a parent or

spouse, the family will not receive AFDC cash

benefits for 3 months for each occurrence or until

compliance.

Work: Failure to comply with JOBS requirements,

including participation in substance abuse

screening and treatment when deemed necessary.

The needs of a noncomplying parent or spouse are

not taken into account in determining the amount of

AFDC cash benefits for up to 2 months. If individual

is not cooperating after 2 months, family’s AFDC

cash benefits are eliminated for 2 months with no

cure. If individual is not cooperating after this

additional 2-month period, family’s AFDC cash

benefits continue to be eliminated until individual

cooperates.

Child support: Failure to cooperate with child

support enforcement requirements.

The needs of the caretaker are not taken into

account in determining the amount of AFDC cash

benefits for 2 months. If the individual is still not

cooperating after 2 months, the family’s AFDC cash

benefits are eliminated until compliance.

LOUISIANA

Individual Responsibility

Project (2/96)

Work: Failure to accept a full-time job offer. The family’s eligibility for AFDC benefits is

terminated for a mandatory 3-month period, after

which the sanction ends.

MAINE

Welfare to Work (6/96) Teen living arrangement: Failure of unmarried minor

parents or married minor parents not living with their

spouses to live in an adult-supervised setting.

Termination of family’s eligibility for AFDC.

MARYLAND

Family Investment

Program (8/95)

1. Work: Failure to participate in job search.

2. Teen living arrangement: Failure of unmarried

minor parents to live in adult-supervised setting.

Termination of family’s eligibility for AFDC.

(continued)

Page 66 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix III 

Full-Family Sanction Provisions in State

Welfare Waivers Approved Between January

1987 and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Basis for full-family sanction (for cases without

good cause for noncompliance) Sanction provisions

Work: Failure to comply with requirements of JOBS

program.

Removal of the noncooperating individual from the

grant. This sanction remains as long as the

cumulative months of sanction for noncooperation

do not exceed 6 months. The sanction for

noncooperation after the sanctions have been

imposed for 6 cumulative months is case closure.

Once the case has been closed, the family may

reapply for AFDC and will be reinstated after

cooperation with JOBS requirements for 30 days.

Families whose cases have been closed may

receive up to 3 months of transitional noncash

assistance.

Amendments to Family

Investment Program (8/96)

Work: Failure to participate in job search. Case is closed.

Work: Failure to comply with requirements of the

JOBS program.

Case is closed. The family may reapply for AFDC

and be reinstated immediately upon compliance

with JOBS requirements in the first instance of

noncompliance, after 10 days of compliance in the

second instance, and after 30 days of compliance

in the third and subsequent instances. Families

whose cases have been closed may receive up to 3

months of transitional noncash assistance.

Child support: Failure to cooperate with child

support enforcement requirements.

Case is closed. Once the case has been closed,

the family may reapply for AFDC and will be

reinstated immediately upon compliance.

Other: Commission of fraud by a member of the

assistance unit.

The entire family is ineligible for cash assistance.

The sanction period for the first conviction is 6

months or until full restitution is made, whichever is

less; for the second conviction, 12 months or until

full restitution is made, whichever is less; and for the

third conviction, the sanction is permanent.

MASSACHUSETTS

Welfare Reform ’95 (10/95) Work: Failure to comply with requirements of

Employment Development Program, including

participation in specified JOBS components.

Initial instance of noncompliance results in a

warning. If noncompliance continues, participant is

required to participate in community service.

Sanction for failure to participate in community

service is reduction of AFDC benefit by portion of

benefit attributable to participant. Sanction for

subsequent instances of noncompliance is

termination of AFDC benefit until participant

complies.

Work: Failure of participants in the Full Employment

Program to maintain a job after at least three

attempts.

Participants may be required to participate in

community service. Sanction for failure to

participate in community service is reduction of

AFDC benefit by portion of benefit attributable to

participant. Sanction for subsequent instances of

noncompliance is termination of AFDC benefit until

participant complies.

(continued)

Page 67 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix III 

Full-Family Sanction Provisions in State

Welfare Waivers Approved Between January

1987 and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Basis for full-family sanction (for cases without

good cause for noncompliance) Sanction provisions

Work: Failure to participate in community service

when required in the work program.

First sanction: Reduction of AFDC benefit by portion

of benefit attributable to participant. Second and

subsequent sanctions: Termination of AFDC benefit

until participant complies.

Teen school attendance: Failure of teen parents to

attend at least 75 percent of assigned educational

activities in any month.

First sanction: AFDC benefit reduced by teen

parent’s portion of benefit. If noncompliance

continues for more than 30 days, and for any

subsequent instances of noncompliance, family

becomes ineligible for AFDC. Sanctions will be

removed if participant demonstrates compliance for

at least 2 consecutive weeks.

Teen living arrangement: Failure of teen parents to

live in adult-supervised setting.

Termination of family’s eligibility for AFDC.

MICHIGAN

Amendments to

Strengthen Michigan

Families (10/94)

Work: Failure to participate in job search; failure to

meet JOBS program requirements.

First sanction: AFDC benefit reduced by 25

percent, and if no child in case is younger than age

6, food stamp benefit is also reduced by 25 percent

for 12 months or until individual complies,

whichever is sooner. Subsequent sanction: If

participant does not comply during the 12-month

period, the AFDC case is closed until the individual

complies and the food stamp sanction discontinued.

Amendments to

Strengthen Michigan

Families (6/96)

Teen living arrangement: Failure of minor parents

and their children to live in adult-supervised setting.

Termination of family’s eligibility for AFDC.

Teen school attendance: Failure of minor parents

who have not completed high school to attend

school.

Case is closed for at least 1 month.

Work: Failure to participate in job search; failure to

meet JOBS program requirements.

First sanction: AFDC benefit reduced by 25

percent, and if no child in case is younger than age

6, food stamp benefit is also reduced by 25 percent

for 12 months or until individual complies,

whichever is sooner. Subsequent sanction: If

participant does not comply during the 12-month

period, the AFDC case is closed until the individual

complies and the food stamp sanction discontinued.

MINNESOTA

Work First (8/96) Work: Failure to comply with community work

experience program requirements.

The entire family’s needs are removed in

determining the amount of AFDC benefits for at

least 6 months.

MISSISSIPPI

Mississippi New Direction

Demonstration Project

(12/94)

Work: Refusal of a Work First job placement,

termination of a placement within a 2-week trial

period or a pattern of accepting placement but

requesting early termination.

AFDC grant terminated until participant complies.

MISSOURI

Missouri Families Mutual

Responsibility Plan (4/95)

Teen living arrangement: Failure of minor parents to

reside in an adult-supervised setting.

Termination of family’s eligibility for AFDC.

(continued)

Page 68 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix III 

Full-Family Sanction Provisions in State

Welfare Waivers Approved Between January

1987 and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Basis for full-family sanction (for cases without

good cause for noncompliance) Sanction provisions

NEBRASKA

Welfare Reform

Demonstration Project

(2/95)

Work: Continued failure to comply with terms of the

self-sufficiency contract.

First sanction: AFDC cash benefit terminated for 1

month or until participant complies, whichever is

longer. Second sanction: AFDC cash benefit

terminated for 3 months or until participant

complies, whichever is longer. Third sanction:

AFDC cash benefit terminated for remainder of

demonstration or until 48-month time-limit benefit

period expires, whichever is sooner.

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Employment Program

(6/96)b

Work: Failure to comply with JOBS requirements or

work requirements or, within 60 days of application,

being fired from a job, quitting a job, voluntarily

reducing hours, or turning down a bona fide offer of

an unsubsidized job.

For the first occurrence of noncompliance, or for

occurrences more than 6 months after the end of

the most recent sanction period, the needs of the

noncomplying participant are not taken into account

in calculating the AFDC benefit amount for one

payment period or until the failure to comply

ceases, whichever is longer. After 3 months of

continued noncompliance, the adjusted payment

standard (the payment standard with the needs of

the noncomplying participant removed) is reduced

by one-third for one payment period or until the

failure to comply ceases, whichever is longer. After

an additional 3 months of continued

noncompliance, the adjusted payment standard is

reduced by two-thirds for one payment period or

until the failure to comply ceases, whichever is

longer. After an additional 3 months of continued

noncompliance, the AFDC case is closed.

Enrollment: Failure to attend the employability

assessment meeting.

Termination of AFDC benefits.

NORTH CAROLINA

Work First Program (2/96) Enrollment: Failure to sign the personal

responsibility contract.

Case is closed.

(continued)

Page 69 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix III 

Full-Family Sanction Provisions in State

Welfare Waivers Approved Between January

1987 and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Basis for full-family sanction (for cases without

good cause for noncompliance) Sanction provisions

NORTH DAKOTA

Training, Education,

Employment, and

Management Project (9/95)

Enrollment: Failure to sign or cooperate in

developing the social contract within 2 months of

eligibility.

Termination of the family’s Training, Education,

Employment, and Management (TEEM) benefit—a

cash payment constituting the family’s AFDC, food

stamps, and Low-Income Home Energy Assistance

Program (LIHEAP) benefit. Households may apply

for food stamps and LIHEAP benefits under the

regular programs. If a family whose TEEM benefit is

terminated reapplies for assistance under TEEM

within 10 months of the month of closure, the family

would not be eligible for TEEM benefits until the

social contract is signed. If a family whose case

had been closed for failure to complete the social

contract within the 2-month period reapplies for

assistance under TEEM more than 10 months after

the month of closure, the household, if found

eligible under TEEM, will be allowed another

2-month period to develop and sign the social

contract.

1. Work: Failure to comply with self-sufficiency

requirements of the social contract.

2. Child support: Failure to comply with child

support enforcement requirements.

The AFDC portion of the TEEM benefit has the

following sanctions: First sanction: The needs of the

noncomplying individual are removed for a

minimum of 1 month; if the individual fails to comply

for 6 consecutive months, the entire AFDC portion

of the TEEM benefit is terminated. Second sanction:

The needs of the noncomplying individual are

removed for at least 2 months; if the individual fails

to comply for 3 consecutive months, the entire

AFDC portion of the TEEM benefit is terminated.

Third and subsequent sanctions: The needs of the

noncomplying individual are removed for at least 3

months; if the individual fails to comply for 3

consecutive months, the entire AFDC portion of the

TEEM benefit is terminated. AFDC eligibility can be

reestablished when the individual complies with the

original program requirement or an alternative

approved activity.

OHIO

Ohio First (3/96) Work: Failure to comply with JOBS requirements. First sanction: The needs of the noncomplying

individual are removed in calculating the AFDC

benefit for the assistance unit for 1 month or until

compliance, whichever is longer. Second sanction:

No AFDC cash benefit is issued for the assistance

unit for 1 month or until compliance, whichever is

longer. Third sanction: No AFDC cash benefit is

issued for the assistance unit for 2 months or until

compliance, whichever is longer. Fourth and

subsequent sanctions: No AFDC cash benefit is

issued for the assistance unit for 6 months or until

compliance, whichever is longer.

(continued)

Page 70 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix III 

Full-Family Sanction Provisions in State

Welfare Waivers Approved Between January

1987 and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Basis for full-family sanction (for cases without

good cause for noncompliance) Sanction provisions

Work: Voluntary termination of employment. AFDC ineligibility for the assistance unit for 6

months.

Child support: Failure to cooperate with child

support enforcement requirements.

Caretaker relative’s needs are removed in

calculating the AFDC benefit for the assistance unit.

If the caretaker does not request to be added back

to the assistance unit and does not cooperate with

the requirements within 2 years of the date of being

penalized for noncooperation, the AFDC cash

benefit for the remaining assistance unit members

is terminated. The caretaker relative may reapply for

AFDC at any time. However, the assistance unit

members will not be eligible to receive AFDC cash

benefits until the caretaker relative cooperates with

child support enforcement requirements.

Other: Refusal of pregnant recipients to cooperate

with substance abuse assessment or treatment.

First sanction: Recipient is ineligible for AFDC cash

benefits for 1 month or until compliance, whichever

is longer. Second sanction: The entire assistance

unit is ineligible for AFDC cash benefits for 1 month

or until compliance, whichever is longer. Third

sanction: The entire assistance unit is ineligible for

AFDC cash benefits for 2 months or until

compliance, whichever is longer. Fourth and

subsequent sanctions: The entire assistance unit is

ineligible for AFDC cash benefits for the longest of

the following: 36 months, for the remainder of the

recipient’s 60-month time period, or until

compliance.

OREGON

Oregon Option (3/96) 1. Work: Failure to meet JOBS participation

requirements.

2. Other: Failure to comply with mental health and

substance abuse diagnosis, counseling, and

treatment requirements.

For individuals who have not been previously

sanctioned or have been sanctioned in only 1

previous month, the first 2 months of

noncompliance result in a $50 decrease in the

grant. Individuals who have been sanctioned in 2 or

3 previous months will be removed from the grant,

except that cases including a work-eligible

alien parent continue to be subject to a $50

decrease in the grant for this sanction period. For

individuals who have been sanctioned in 4 or more

previous months, the sanction is the closure of the

AFDC grant. All sanctions are removed, at any point

in the sanction process, when an individual

complies.

Teen living arrangement: Failure of minor parents to

live with their parents or in another safe living

environment.

Termination of family’s eligibility for AFDC.

(continued)

Page 71 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix III 

Full-Family Sanction Provisions in State

Welfare Waivers Approved Between January

1987 and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Basis for full-family sanction (for cases without

good cause for noncompliance) Sanction provisions

SOUTH CAROLINA

 South Carolina

Self-Sufficiency and

Parental Responsibility

Programc (1/95)

1. Enrollment: Failure to sign an Individual

Self-Sufficiency Plan.

2. Work: Failure to comply with the work

requirements of the plan.

First instance of noncompliance: The caretaker’s

needs are removed from the calculation of the

AFDC benefit for a maximum of 30 days, curable at

any time by compliance. If at the end of 30 days the

caretaker has not complied, he or she is notified

that at the end of the next 30 days, the whole family

will be removed from AFDC. During the second 30

days, the sanction can be removed at any time by

compliance. Second instance of noncompliance:

The family’s AFDC grant is terminated for at least 30

days. After 30 days, the sanction can be removed

at any time by compliance. Third instance of

noncompliance: The family’s AFDC grant is

terminated for at least 90 days, after which the

caretaker would be given the opportunity to comply.

At the end of 90 days, the sanction continues until

the caretaker complies. Fourth and subsequent

instances of noncompliance: The family’s AFDC

grant is terminated for at least 180 days, after which

the caretaker would be given the opportunity to

comply. At the end of 180 days, the sanction

continues until the caretaker complies.

Family Independence Act

(5/96)

1. Enrollment: Failure to comply with developing an

Individual Self-Sufficiency Plan.

2. Work: Failure to comply with the terms of the

plan; refusing an offer of employment.

First instance of noncompliance: The caretaker’s

needs are removed from calculation of the AFDC

benefit for 30 days, curable at any time by

compliance. If at the end of 30 days the caretaker

has not complied, he or she is notified that at the

end of the next 30 days, the family’s AFDC grant will

be terminated, curable when the adult

demonstrates compliance for 30 days. Second and

successive instances of noncompliance: The

family’s AFDC grant is terminated, curable when the

adult demonstrates compliance for 30 days.

SOUTH DAKOTA

Strengthening South

Dakota Families Initiative

(3/94)

Work: Voluntarily quitting a job of 20 hours or more

per week.

The family’s AFDC benefit is terminated for 3

months or until the participant complies with the

requirement to find a job comparable to the one

quit, whichever is sooner.

(continued)

Page 72 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix III 

Full-Family Sanction Provisions in State

Welfare Waivers Approved Between January

1987 and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Basis for full-family sanction (for cases without

good cause for noncompliance) Sanction provisions

TENNESSEE

Families First (7/96) Work: Refusal or failure to participate in

employment, training, or other work preparation

activities.

First sanction: The assistance unit is ineligible for an

AFDC payment until compliance. Second and

subsequent sanctions: The assistance unit is

ineligible for AFDC for 3 months or until compliance,

whichever is longer. The state will take action to

monitor and protect the safety and well-being of the

children in families whose benefits are terminated. If

the state certifies that AFDC assistance is needed

to prevent a child’s loss of housing, heat, light, or

water or to prevent removal of the child from the

custody of a parent, a cash or vendor payment will

be issued to meet the child’s needs.

Work: Voluntarily quitting a job. The assistance unit is ineligible for AFDC for 3

months. AFDC eligibility may be reestablished

during the disqualification period if the caretaker

secures new comparable employment, becomes

exempt from work requirements, or leaves the

assistance unit. The state will take action to monitor

and protect the safety and well-being of the

children in families whose benefits are terminated. If

the state certifies that AFDC assistance is needed

to prevent a child’s loss of housing, heat, light, or

water or to prevent removal of the child from the

custody of a parent, a cash or vendor payment will

be issued to meet the child’s needs.

1. Child support: Failure to comply with child

support enforcement requirements.

2. Enrollment: Failure to sign a Personal

Responsibility Plan.

Ineligibility for the entire assistance unit until

compliance.

UTAH

Amendment to Single

Parent Employment

Demonstration Project

(8/95)

1. Work: Failure to participate in JOBS or other

Single Parent Employment Demonstration activities.

2. Child support: Failure to cooperate with child

support enforcement requirements.

AFDC benefit is reduced by $100 per month until

individual complies. However, if individual is a child

aged 16 to 18 who is not in school or working full

time, the needs of the child will instead be removed

from the grant calculation until the individual

complies. In instances where the $100 sanction has

been applied for 2 months and nonparticipation

continues, the case may be closed. The case will

be reopened immediately upon compliance.

VERMONT

Welfare Restructuring

Project (8/94)

1. Work: Failure to participate in community service

jobs program; quitting, failing to accept, or being

fired from an unsubsidized job; or failure to

participate in required job search.

2. Teen school attendance: Failure of pregnant or

parenting minors to attend school or participate in

an alternative education or training activity.

AFDC benefits are issued in the form of vendor

payments for the assistance unit’s expenses for

housing, food, fuel, and other utilities, and any

undisbursed balance is issued to the assistance

unit. Failure to comply with any of the requirements

under the penalty, such as monthly reporting on the

individual’s circumstances, results in termination of

all AFDC benefits until the individual complies with

work requirements for 2 weeks.

(continued)

Page 73 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix III 

Full-Family Sanction Provisions in State

Welfare Waivers Approved Between January

1987 and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Basis for full-family sanction (for cases without

good cause for noncompliance) Sanction provisions

Teen living arrangement: Failure of pregnant or

parenting minors who are not living in a supervised

setting to attend meetings with caseworkers on 3

separate days each month, at least 1 of which must

take place at teen’s place of residence.

Termination of family’s eligibility for AFDC.

VIRGINIA

Virginia Independence

Program (11/93)

Enrollment: Refusing to sign an agreement of

personal responsibility.

AFDC cash benefit terminated for entire case until

case head of household complies.

Teen living arrangement: Failure of minor parents to

live in adult-supervised setting.

Termination of family’s eligibility for AFDC.

Work: Failure to participate in required work

program activities.

First sanction: AFDC cash benefit terminated for 1

month, or until compliance, whichever is longer.

Second sanction: AFDC cash benefit terminated for

3 months, or until compliance, whichever is longer.

Third and subsequent sanctions: AFDC cash

benefit terminated for 6 months, or until compliance,

whichever is longer.

Child support: Failure to cooperate with efforts to

establish paternity.

AFDC cash benefit terminated for at least 1 month

and until caretaker relative cooperates with

paternity establishment.

WEST VIRGINIA

Joint Opportunities for

Independence (8/95)

Work: Failure of a nonexempt adult in

AFDC-Unemployed Parent case to participate in the

alternate work experience program.

First sanction: Adult’s needs are removed in

determining the amount of the AFDC cash benefit

for 3 months or until the failure to comply ceases,

whichever is longer. Second sanction: The AFDC

cash benefit is terminated for 6 months or until the

failure to comply ceases, whichever is longer. The

AFDC cash benefit is reinstated upon successful

participation in the alternate work experience

program for 10 consecutive days.

WISCONSIN

Pay for Performance (8/95) Enrollment: Failure of active cases to enroll in the

JOBS program as assigned.

Termination of a family’s eligibility for AFDC.

Work: Failure to complete assigned hours of JOBS

activities.

The AFDC grant is reduced by the hourly federal

minimum wage for each hour of assigned activity a

recipient fails to complete without good cause. The

food stamp allotment is reduced by the minimum

wage for each uncompleted hour of assigned JOBS

activity that has not been taken into account in

reducing the AFDC grant. If a recipient fails to

complete at least 25 percent of hours assigned to

JOBS activities, he or she receives no AFDC

payment and the food stamp payment is $10.

Parents responsible for the care of a child under 6

years of age do not have their food stamp allotment

reduced due to failure to complete their assigned

hours of JOBS activity.

(Table notes on next page)

Page 74 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix III 

Full-Family Sanction Provisions in State

Welfare Waivers Approved Between January

1987 and August 1996

aIn September 1996, HHS withdrew approval for the work requirement and time limit components

of the District of Columbia’s Project on Work, Employment, and Responsibility but let stand the

teen parent component.

bThe waiver terms and conditions stipulate that New Hampshire may choose not to implement this

provision or choose to discontinue it once implemented.

cSouth Carolina chose not to implement program.

Source: GAO analysis of the terms and conditions of approved state waivers supplemented by

information obtained from the states and HHS.

Page 75 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix IV 

Time-Limit Provisions in State Welfare

Waivers Approved Between January 1987

and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Type of time limit

(amount of time before

limit is reached) Time-limit provisions Provisions for extending time limit

ARIZONA

Employing and Moving

People Off Welfare and

Encouraging

Responsibility (5/95)

Benefit reduction

(24 months)

Nonexempt adults are limited to 24

months of AFDC receipt during a

consecutive 60-month period. After time

limit is reached, family’s benefits are

reduced by adult’s portion of grant.

Extensions for 6-month periods can

be granted to those who

demonstrate good cause for not

being able to find and accept work

with a specified level of earnings. Up

to two 4-month extensions may be

granted to allow for completion of an

education or training program.

CALIFORNIA

California Work Pays

Demonstration Project

Amendment (9/95)

Work trigger with

sanctions (22 months)

Mandatory JOBS participants are

required to participate 100 hours per

month in the Community Work

Experience Program (CWEP)(or if less,

the number of hours equal to the AFDC

grant divided by the federal minimum

wage) if they have received AFDC for 22

of the last 24 months, are unemployed or

employed fewer than 15 hours per week,

have received the services to meet their

employment goals, and have completed

CWEP or are participating in CWEP for

less than 100 hours per month.

None

CONNECTICUT

A Fair Chance (9/94) Work trigger with

full-family sanction

(24 months)

After receiving benefits for the first 24

cumulative months under Pathways,

assistance units may continue to receive

benefits only if nonexempt participants

comply with the activities required by

their employability plans. Noncompliance

results in the assistance unit being

ineligible for AFDC.

None

Reach for Jobs First

(12/95)

Benefit termination

(21 months)

AFDC receipt for all assistance units with

a mandatory JOBS participant is limited

to 21 months, except for units where

minor parents are heads of household.

After time limit is reached, assistance

units’ benefits are terminated.

Extensions for 6-month periods can

be granted to those who have been

unable to obtain or retain

employment despite a good faith

effort to substantially comply with all

JOBS requirements.

(continued)

Page 76 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix IV 

Time-Limit Provisions in State Welfare

Waivers Approved Between January 1987

and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Type of time limit

(amount of time before

limit is reached) Time-limit provisions Provisions for extending time limit

DELAWARE

A Better Chance (5/95) Work trigger with

sanctions up to

full-family sanction

(24 months)

Benefit termination

(48 months)

After receiving benefits for 24 months,

nonexempt households headed by

employable adults age 19 and older may

continue to receive AFDC only if adults

participate in a work experience program

and job search or are working and the

household’s income is below 75 percent

of the federal poverty level. Sanctions for

noncompliance without good cause are

increasing reductions in grant, followed

by termination of families’ benefits. After

receiving AFDC for 4 years, household

benefits are terminated if the adult is

determined to be employable.

Extensions to the 4-year time limit

may be granted if the state has failed

to provide services specified in

recipients’ contracts; no suitable

unsubsidized employment is

available in the local economy,

despite recipients’ good faith efforts

to obtain employment; or other

unique circumstances prevent

recipients from obtaining

employment.

FLORIDA

Family Transition Program

(1/94)

Benefit termination

(24 or 36 months)

AFDC receipt is limited to 36 months in

any 72-month period for nonexempt

families that have a caretaker relative or

adult under age 24 who does not have a

high school diploma or equivalent, is not

in high school and has little work history

in the past year, or has received AFDC

for 36 of 60 months before entering the

program. AFDC benefit receipt for other

nonexempt families is limited to 24

months in any 60-month period. If the

state determines that benefit termination

would most likely result in children being

placed in emergency shelter or foster

care, only the parent’s or caretaker’s

needs will be removed from grant.

Transitional employment program

provides private-sector employment

possibilities for recipients who have

diligently completed their employment

plans but have been unable to obtain

employment.

Extensions for up to two 4-month

periods can be granted if the state

has substantially failed to provide

services, the recipient would benefit

from additional education or training

regarding immediate employment

prospects, or the recipient has

encountered extraordinary difficulties

in obtaining employment or

completing his or her plan.

GEORGIA

Work for Welfare (10/95) Work trigger with

sanctions (24 months)

After receiving AFDC for 24 of the last 36

months, nonexempt adult recipients and

noncustodial parents under court order

are required to participate in up to 20

hours of work per month at an assigned

agency. Sanction for failure to participate

without good cause is withholding of

individual’s portion of grant for increasing

lengths of time.

None

(continued)

Page 77 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix IV 

Time-Limit Provisions in State Welfare

Waivers Approved Between January 1987

and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Type of time limit

(amount of time before

limit is reached) Time-limit provisions Provisions for extending time limit

HAWAII

Pursuit of New

Opportunities (8/96)

Benefit termination

(60 months)

AFDC receipt limited to 60 months for all

nonexempt families.

Extensions for 3-month periods may

be granted if recipients who have not

found employment have made a

good faith effort to find a job and

satisfactorily fulfilled approved

employment training activity

requirements.

ILLINOIS

Work and Responsibility

(9/95)

Work trigger with

sanctions (12 months)

Benefit termination

(24 months)

After 12 months in the Targeted Work

Initiative program, participants who are

unemployed and have completed

approved JOBS activities are required to

participate in subsidized work positions.

Sanction for failure to participate without

good cause is nonpayment of wages by

employer. Nonexempt cases that receive

a total of 24 months of AFDC are

ineligible to reapply for assistance for 24

months.

Extensions to the 24-month time limit

can be granted if recipients cannot

find or maintain full- or part-time

employment at least equal to the

maximum AFDC benefit for a family

of that size, plus the appropriate

work expense deductions.

INDIANA

Indiana Manpower

Placement and

Comprehensive Training

Program (12/94)

Benefit reduction

(24 months)

For any family that includes an adult in

the placement track, the amount of AFDC

cash benefits taking into account the

needs of the adult is limited to 24 months

from the time of entry to this track,

followed by a 36-month period of the

adult not receiving AFDC.

Extensions can be granted to

individuals who have cooperated

with the JOBS program and

substantially complied with the

requirements of their self-sufficiency

plans if (1) a temporary physical or

mental condition prevents the

individual from attaining and

maintaining employment that would

provide the family at least a

specified level of income; (2) the

state has substantially failed to

provide services specified in

self-sufficiency plans; (3) despite all

appropriate efforts, the person has

been unable to find, or has lost

without cause, employment that

would provide at least a specified

level of income; or (4) other unique

circumstances prevent obtaining or

retaining employment.

(continued)

Page 78 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix IV 

Time-Limit Provisions in State Welfare

Waivers Approved Between January 1987

and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Type of time limit

(amount of time before

limit is reached) Time-limit provisions Provisions for extending time limit

Amendments to Indiana

Manpower Placement and

Comprehensive Training

Program (8/96)

Benefit reduction

(24 months)

AFDC receipt for adults who are not

exempt from JOBS is limited to 24

months in the demonstration period.

An individual’s assistance unit may

earn 1 month of AFDC benefits

beyond the time limit for each period

of 6 consecutive months during

which an individual was employed

full time. Renewable extensions of up

to 1 year can be granted to

individuals who have cooperated

with the JOBS program and

substantially complied with the

requirements of their self-sufficiency

plans if (1) the state has substantially

failed to provide services specified

in self-sufficiency plans; (2) despite

all appropriate efforts, the person

has been unable to find, or has lost

without cause, employment that

would provide at least a specified

level of income; or (3) other unique

circumstances prevent obtaining or

retaining employment.

LOUISIANA

Individual Responsibility

Project (2/96)

Benefit termination

(24 months)

Nonexempt families are limited to 24

months of AFDC cash benefits in a

60-month period. After time limit is

reached, families’ benefits are terminated.

Extension can be granted for up to 1

year to enable adults to complete

employment-related education or

training.

MARYLAND

Family Investment

Program (8/95)a

Work trigger with

sanctions up to

full-family sanction

(3 months)

Nonexempt recipients may not receive

more than 3 months of AFDC benefits

unless they meet a work requirement:

full-time unsubsidized employment, 30

hours of subsidized employment, a

minimum of 20 hours of community

service, or a minimum of 20 hours of

community service combined with

employment. Sanctions for

noncompliance are removal of

noncooperating person from grant,

followed by case closure after 6

cumulative months.

Extensions can be granted if a

recipient cannot find necessary and

adequate child care, has a verified

illness, or is attending an educational

or training program that will

substantially improve his or her

prospects of obtaining a job.

(continued)

Page 79 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix IV 

Time-Limit Provisions in State Welfare

Waivers Approved Between January 1987

and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Type of time limit

(amount of time before

limit is reached) Time-limit provisions Provisions for extending time limit

MASSACHUSETTS

Welfare Reform ’95 (10/95) Work trigger with

sanctions up to

full-family sanction

(60 days)

Nonexempt adults whose child is of

mandatory full-time school age are

required to work at least 20 hours per

week after receiving AFDC for 60 days.

Requirement may be met through

working 20 hours per week in

unsubsidized employment, working full

time in a subsidized employment

program, participating 20 hours per week

in the community service program, or

combining work and participation in the

community service program for 20 hours

per week. Sanction for noncompliance

without good cause is reduction in

benefit payment equal to adult’s portion

of benefit. For recipients required to

participate in the community service

program, the sanction for repeated failure

to participate is termination of the family’s

AFDC benefit.

None

MINNESOTA

Work First (8/96) Work trigger with

full-family sanction

(60 days)

If, at the end of the required 60 days of

job search, a participant assigned to the

immediate employment track has not

been hired for at least 32 hours per week

or does not earn a net income from

self-employment equal to his or her

AFDC grant, the individual is required to

participate in CWEP and continue job

search. If participants do not comply with

CWEP requirements within the time

specified in their conciliation conference,

the entire family’s needs are removed in

determining the amount of AFDC benefits

for at least 6 months.

None

(continued)

Page 80 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix IV 

Time-Limit Provisions in State Welfare

Waivers Approved Between January 1987

and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Type of time limit

(amount of time before

limit is reached) Time-limit provisions Provisions for extending time limit

MISSOURI

Missouri Families Mutual

Responsibility Plan (4/95)

Work trigger with

sanctions (24 months)

Benefit reduction (36

months)

After reaching the 24-month time limit

specified in their self-sufficiency

agreements, JOBS-mandatory individuals

may be required to participate in a job

search or CWEP. Noncompliance without

good cause is subject to sanctions in

accord with federal regulations.

Individuals who reapply for benefits after

completing a self-sufficiency agreement

entered into after July 1, 1997, will be

denied AFDC if they received benefits for

at least 36 months; however, other

eligible family members may receive

AFDC.

The 24-month time limit can be

extended an additional 24 months

when necessary to allow individuals

to complete their self-sufficiency

agreements.

MONTANA

Families Achieving

Independence in Montana

(4/95)

Work trigger with

sanctions (18 or 24

months)

Nonexempt single-parent families have a

24-month time limit and nonexempt

two-parent families have an 18-month

time limit after which adult recipients are

required to participate an average of 20

hours a week in community services

program activities if such activities are

available. The sanction for

noncompliance is removal of the adult’s

needs from the grant for increasing

periods of time.

None

NEBRASKA

Welfare Reform

Demonstration Project

(2/95)

Benefit termination

(24 months)

AFDC receipt for families assigned to the

time-limited program is limited to 24

months in a 48-month period. After the

time limit is reached, benefits are

terminated.

Benefits will not be terminated if (1)

no job that provides at least a

specified level of income is available

to a recipient, (2) termination would

result in the family’s experiencing

extreme hardship, (3) adult family

members can no longer meet the

conditions of their self-sufficiency

contracts, or (4) the state has failed

to meet the terms of a recipient’s

self-sufficiency contract.

(continued)

Page 81 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix IV 

Time-Limit Provisions in State Welfare

Waivers Approved Between January 1987

and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Type of time limit

(amount of time before

limit is reached) Time-limit provisions Provisions for extending time limit

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Employment Program

(6/96)

Work trigger with

sanctions up to

full-family sanction

(26 weeks)

After 26 weeks of job search, adults

nonexempt from JOBS who are able to

work are required to work for 26 weeks,

provided that work is available. The work

requirement may be fulfilled by

unsubsidized work, subsidized work,

on-the-job training, community service,

alternative work experience programs,

work supplementation, or other approved

employment-related activities. Sanctions

for noncompliance without good cause

are increasing reductions in AFDC grant,

culminating in case closure.

None

NORTH CAROLINA

Work First Program (2/96) Benefit termination

(24 months)

AFDC receipt for families in the Work First

employment and training program is

limited to 24 months. After the time limit is

reached, families are ineligible for

benefits for 36 months.

Extensions may be granted if

recipients have substantially

complied with their personal

responsibility contracts (or have

good cause reasons for not doing

so) and through no fault of their own

have been unable to obtain or

maintain employment to provide a

specified level of subsistence.

NORTH DAKOTA

Training, Education,

Employment, and

Management Project (9/95)

Work trigger with

sanctions (24 months, 42

months, or 43 months or

longer)

Nonexempt families are required to sign

a social contract that sets an expected

time limit for self-sufficiency based on

factors related to employability: 24

months, 42 months, or 43 months or

longer. Individuals not employed full time

in unsubsidized employment by end of

time limit are placed in a work experience

position or granted an extension.

Not specified

OHIO

Ohio First (3/96) Benefit termination

(36 months)

AFDC receipt for nonexempt assistance

units headed by adults is limited to 36

months out of any 60-month period. After

the time limit is reached, assistance unit’s

benefits are terminated.

None cited

(continued)

Page 82 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix IV 

Time-Limit Provisions in State Welfare

Waivers Approved Between January 1987

and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Type of time limit

(amount of time before

limit is reached) Time-limit provisions Provisions for extending time limit

OKLAHOMA

Mutual Agreement—A

Plan for Success (3/95)

Work trigger with

sanctions (36 months)

After 36 cumulative months of AFDC

receipt out of 60 months for recipients

nonexempt from JOBS, participation in

workfare (or other JOBS components

leading to employment if workfare

positions are unavailable) becomes

mandatory. JOBS sanctions may be

imposed on individuals who fail to meet

the minimum hourly requirement.

Extensions may be provided to

individuals who are making

satisfactory progress in the program

and are within either one semester of

completing an educational program

or 4 months of completing a training

program expected to lead directly to

employment.

OREGON

Oregon Option (3/96) Benefit termination

(24 months)

Nonexempt families are limited to 24

cumulative months of AFDC receipt in

any period of 84 consecutive months.

Extensions can be granted to the

following recipients: (1) a dependent

child in a two-parent household in

which the primary wage earner has

died; (2) a dependent child living

with a person other than the

parent(s) with whom the child lived

at the time the child was receiving

AFDC; or (3) a parent of a

dependent child receiving AFDC,

and his or her dependent children, if

the state determines that the parent

is making good faith efforts to obtain

permanent employment.

SOUTH CAROLINA

Family Independence Act

(5/96)

Benefit termination

(24 months)

Nonexempt families are limited to 24

months of AFDC receipt.

An extension of up to 6 months may

be granted if an individual is

involved in a training program that

will not be completed by the 24th

month. An extension of up to 12

months can be granted if an

individual has completed training

and has diligently complied with the

self-sufficiency plan but cannot

obtain or maintain employment that

provides at least a specified level of

subsistence. When the 6- or

12-month extensions expire,

month-by-month extensions may be

granted if an individual has complied

with the self-sufficiency plan and the

county determines either that benefit

termination will have detrimental

effect on the welfare of the children

or that the family has no other source

of financial support sufficient to

provide at least a specified level of

subsistence.

(continued)

Page 83 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix IV 

Time-Limit Provisions in State Welfare

Waivers Approved Between January 1987

and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Type of time limit

(amount of time before

limit is reached) Time-limit provisions Provisions for extending time limit

SOUTH DAKOTA

Strengthening South

Dakota Families Initiative

(3/94)

Work trigger with

sanctions (24 or 60

months)

Nonexempt adults assigned to the

employment track are limited to 24

months of AFDC receipt. Nonexempt

adults assigned to the education track

are limited to 60 months of AFDC receipt.

When the time limits are reached, adults

who are not working 30 hours per week

are required to perform 30 hours per

week of approved volunteer service.

Noncompliance is subject to either a

JOBS sanction or the grant being

reduced in any month of noncompliance

to an amount equal to what the family

would receive if the adult’s needs were

not taken into account.

An extension can be granted if the

state fails to make available services

it agreed to provide as part of an

individual’s self-sufficiency plan and

determines that an individual needs

additional time to complete his or her

plan.

TENNESSEE

Families First (7/96) Benefit termination (18

months and 60 months)

Receipt of AFDC cash benefits by an

assistance unit is limited to 60 months,

and periods of eligibility within the 60

months are limited to 18 months. An

assistance unit whose benefit is

terminated after receiving AFDC cash

assistance for 18 months within an

18-month period of eligibility is eligible to

reapply for AFDC no sooner than 3

months from the last month of receipt of

AFDC, with the following exception. The

assistance unit will not be subject to the

3-month waiting period if the caretaker

was employed when the case was

terminated, loses the job through no fault

of his or her own, and the assistance unit

meets all other AFDC eligibility

requirements. The state will act to monitor

and protect the safety and well-being of

the children in families whose benefits

are terminated. If the state certifies that

AFDC assistance is needed to prevent a

child’s loss of housing, heat, light, or

water or to prevent removal of the child

from the custody of his or her parent, a

cash or vendor payment will be issued to

meet the child’s needs.

The 18-month eligibility period may

be extended for an additional 6

months for families in which the

caretaker is living in an economic

hardship county and is in substantial

compliance with the Personal

Responsibility Plan. The 18-month

and 60-month periods can also be

extended on a case-by-case basis if

good cause exists or the state has

failed to provide timely services.

Good cause exists when all of the

following criteria are met: (1) the

participant is in compliance with the

plan, (2) the participant has been in

substantial compliance with the plan

during the entire current period of

eligibility, (3) the assistance unit’s

income is less than the payment

standard plus $90 (or a higher

amount), and (4) the participant is

not currently refusing employment or

voluntarily quitting employment

without good cause.

(continued)

Page 84 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix IV 

Time-Limit Provisions in State Welfare

Waivers Approved Between January 1987

and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Type of time limit

(amount of time before

limit is reached) Time-limit provisions Provisions for extending time limit

TEXAS

Achieving Change for

Texans (3/96)

Benefit reduction (12, 24,

or 36 months)

On the basis of availability of JOBS

positions, AFDC receipt is time limited for

caretakers, second parents in

AFDC-Unemployed Parent cases, and

teen parents certified as caretakers. The

length of the time limit—12, 24, or 36

months—depends on the extent of the

individual’s education and work

experience. After the time limit is

reached, a family’s benefits are reduced

by the individual’s portion for 5 years.

Extensions of no longer than 6

months at a time can be granted

upon request if the individual lives in

an area of economic hardship or

experiences severe personal

hardship and has complied with all

work-related requirements.

VERMONT

Family Independence

Project (4/93)

Work trigger with

sanctions (15 or 30

months)

Nonexempt parents who have not

accepted an unsubsidized job will be

required to participate in community

service jobs after 30 months

(single-parent families and two-parent

families with incapacitated adults) or 15

months (other two-parent families). The

sanction for failure to participate is a

reduction of the AFDC benefit based on

the number of hours the parent was

required to work under the community

service jobs component.

None

Welfare Restructuring

Project (7/94)

Work trigger with

sanctions up to

full-family sanction

(15 or 30 months)

Nonexempt parents who have not

accepted an unsubsidized job or who are

working in an unsubsidized job for fewer

than the required hours will be required

to participate in community service jobs

after 30 months (single-parent families

and two-parent families with

incapacitated adults) or 15 months (other

two-parent families). The sanction for

failure to participate is issuance of the

AFDC benefit in the form of vendor

payments for housing, food, fuel, and

utilities (with any remaining balance paid

in cash). Failure to comply with any

requirements while under the sanction

will result in termination of a family’s

AFDC benefit.

None

(continued)

Page 85 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix IV 

Time-Limit Provisions in State Welfare

Waivers Approved Between January 1987

and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Type of time limit

(amount of time before

limit is reached) Time-limit provisions Provisions for extending time limit

VIRGINIA

Virginia Independence

Program (7/95)

Work trigger with

sanctions up to

full-family sanction

(90 days)

Benefit termination

(24 months)

Within 90 days of signing personal

responsibility agreements, nonexempt

recipients are required to participate in

work activities such as unsubsidized

employment, subsidized employment, or

CWEP. The sanction for noncompliance

is termination of families’ benefits for

increasing periods of time. In addition,

cases headed by nonexempt caretakers

are limited to 24 cumulative months of

AFDC cash benefits.

Hardship exceptions to the 24-month

time limit can be granted for up to 1

year if factors relating to job

availability are unfavorable or an

exception would enable a caretaker

to complete employment-related

education or training. Hardship

exceptions can also be granted for

up to 90 days if an individual has

been actively seeking unsubsidized

employment and cannot find a job

that pays at least a specified amount

or the individual demonstrates

extreme hardship because of a job

loss resulting from factors unrelated

to job performance. Extensions to

hardship exceptions may be granted

in very limited circumstances.

WASHINGTON

Success Through

Employment Program

(10/95)

Benefit reduction (48

months)

Assistance units in which adults have

received AFDC for 48 months in any

60-month period will have benefits

reduced by 10 percent. Until an

assistance unit has been off assistance

for 1 month or more, benefits will be

reduced by an additional 10 percent for

each additional 12 months of AFDC

receipt.

None

WISCONSIN

Work Not Welfare (11/93) Work trigger with

sanctions up to

full-family sanction (1

month and 12 months)

Benefit termination (24

months)

After the first month, nonexempt

recipients are required to earn their

benefits through education, training, or

work activities; after 12 months of AFDC

receipt, they must engage in work

activities. The sanction for

noncompliance without good cause is a

reduction of the combined AFDC/food

stamp grant based on the number of

hours of assigned activity not completed.

Nonexempt cases are limited to 24

months of AFDC receipt within a

48-month period. After this time limit is

reached, families’ benefits are terminated

for 36 months.

Extensions to the 24-month time limit

can be granted to those who (1)

cannot work for reasons such as

personal disability or incapacity, (2)

need to care for a disabled

dependent, or (3) have made all

appropriate efforts to find work but

cannot find work because local labor

market conditions preclude a

reasonable job opportunity.

(continued)

Page 86 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix IV 

Time-Limit Provisions in State Welfare

Waivers Approved Between January 1987

and August 1996

Waiver program

(approval date)

Type of time limit

(amount of time before

limit is reached) Time-limit provisions Provisions for extending time limit

WYOMING

New Opportunities and

New Responsibilities (9/93)

Benefit reduction (varies) Nonexempt individuals who complete an

associate’s or bachelor’s program while

receiving AFDC will be eligible for no

more than 6 additional months of

benefits. In addition, nonexempt

individuals will be ineligible for AFDC if

they are pursuing a bachelor’s degree

beyond a sixth year; a vocational or

associate’s degree beyond a fourth year;

or a second associate’s or bachelor’s

degree or any kind of graduate degree.

One 6-month extension may be

granted to individuals to update an

expired certification, take a licensing

or certification examination, or obtain

a license or certificate to practice the

trade or profession for which they

have been trained.

Note: The District of Columbia’s Project on Work, Employment, and Responsibility, approved

Aug. 19, 1996, contained a time-limit provision. HHS withdrew approval for this provision in Sept.

1996.

aThe time-limit provision was eliminated when Maryland’s Family Investment Program was

amended in Aug. 1996.

Source: GAO analysis of the terms and conditions of approved state waivers, supplemented by

information obtained from the states and HHS.

Page 87 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix V 

Reasons for Excluding Cases From

Coverage in Selected States

AFDC caseload in jurisdictions covered as of June 30,

1996

State Number Percent

Arizona 61,538 100.0

Connecticut 56,017 100.0

Delaware 10,253 100.0

Floridae 9,083 100.0

Illinois 221,632 100.0

Iowa 28,581 100.0

Massachusetts 82,237 100.0

Michigan 174,176 100.0

Mississippi 11,697 100.0

Nebraska 2,423 100.0

Utah 14,320 100.0

Vermont 8,965 100.0

Virginia 63,399 100.0

Wisconsin 52,765 100.0

Page 88 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix V 

Reasons for Excluding Cases From

Coverage in Selected States

Cases exempta

Cases assigned to a

control groupb

Cases excluded for other

reasons

Cases subject to benefit

termination

Number Percent

Age-ofyoungestchild

exemption Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent

0 0 (none) 1,100 1.8 0 0 60,438 98.2

7,595c 13.6 1 year 1,900 3.4 24,110d 43.0 22,412 40.0

1,161 11.3 3 months 1,676 16.3 5,353d 52.2 2,063 20.1

1,499 16.5 6 months 3,732 41.1 826f 9.1 3,026 33.3

575g 0.3 13 yearsh 5,694 2.6 0 0 215,363i 97.2

6,777 23.7 6 months 918 3.2 0 0 20,886 73.1

57,109c 69.4 6 years 1,692 2.1 7,976d 9.7 15,460 18.8

46,806 26.9 4 months 12,888 7.4 0 0 114,482 65.7

5,248 44.9 3 years 1,297 11.1 0 0 5,152 44.0

319 13.2 6 monthsj 878 36.2 0 0 1,226 50.6

0k 0 none 5,230 36.5 32l 0.2 9,058 63.3

61 0.7 18 months 3,545 39.5 0 0 5,359 59.8

5,600 8.8 18 months 3,000 4.7 0 0 54,800 86.4

9,424 17.9 1 year 675 1.3 3,306m 6.3 39,360 74.6

aTypical categories of exemptions to work requirements under states’ waiver programs were

similar to those provided under the JOBS program: having a disability, caring for a young child or

a disabled household member, or household headed by caretaker relatives (also referred to as

“ineligible grantees”) with no legal obligation of support. Some states provided exemptions for

seniors (aged 62 or older), for those in their last 3 or 4 months of pregnancy, or for those lacking

transportation or child care. Categories of exemptions for other types of requirements leading to

full-family sanctions varied by the requirements. For example, exemptions relating to the teen

living arrangement requirement generally dealt with conditions in the teens’ parents’ homes, and

exemptions relating to child enforcement requirements generally dealt with the unavailability, or

risk to the child of providing, information on the absent parent.

bAs a standard condition of obtaining HHS approval for a waiver, states were required to provide

for an evaluation based on a comparison of those subject to the waiver provisions (treatment

group) versus those subject to previous program provisions (control group). Cases were to be

randomly assigned to the control groups in each state, generally to be spread incrementally

through the first few years of implementation. As a result, the number of cases excluded as

control cases in each state depended on the number of waivers being implemented and how

long the state had been implementing each of its waiver programs. Under the new federal welfare

reform law, states are no longer required to evaluate their waiver programs, and they may

discontinue maintaining their control groups for study. As of April 1997, 16 states had requested

HHS funding to continue evaluations of their waivers, including maintenance of control groups. Of

these, 10 were states that had implemented benefit termination waiver provisions.

cThe exemption data included here represent those who were not subject to a nonmandatory

work requirement; exemption data are different for other requirements in which noncompliance

can result in full-family sanction, such as the teen living arrangement and teen school attendance

requirements.

dPending review for conversion to new program.

Page 89 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix V 

Reasons for Excluding Cases From

Coverage in Selected States

eData included here are for Alachua and Escambia counties only, the two pilot counties where all

terminations as of Dec. 31, 1996, had taken place.

f

Nonvolunteers in Alachua County where participation was voluntary.

gRepresents the number exempt among the 15,000 cases otherwise subject to work requirements

under the Targeted Work Initiative and Get a Job components of Illinois’s Work and Responsibility

waiver.

hAge-of-youngest-child exemption among those subject to work requirements. No exemptions

provided for requirement to sign self-sufficiency plan.

i

Of the total caseload, about 14,425 cases were subject to provisions potentially leading to benefit

termination on the basis of noncooperation with work requirements; and the entire caseload

(except control cases) was subject to provisions potentially leading to benefit termination on the

basis of noncooperation with signing a self-sufficiency plan.

j

However, cases with the youngest child age 12 weeks to 6 months must participate part time in

activities such as family nurturing or pre-employment skills.

k

According to the waiver, no one over age 15 was exempt. However, according to a May 1996

report prepared by the Utah Department of Human Services, approximately 4 to 5 percent of

families are at any one time temporarily excused from active participation because of a recent

birth, personal illness, or unforeseen circumstance.

l

Seasonal fluctuation.

mRepresents cases in other waiver demonstration projects, such as Work Not Welfare, Parental

and Family Responsibility, and Learnfare.

Page 90 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix VI 

Overview of Waiver Programs in Iowa,

Massachusetts, and Wisconsin

Iowa’s Family

Investment Program

Iowa was the first of the three case study states to implement benefit

termination provisions statewide under its waiver, called the Family

Investment Program. The goal of the program, as stated in Iowa’s waiver

application, was to transform its welfare system from one of income

maintenance to one of self-sufficiency. The program was designed to make

welfare a transition to work by requiring participants’ involvement in some

work or training activity and providing consequences for those not

participating. Iowa began implementing some provisions under this waiver

in October 1993 but did not begin implementing its benefit termination

provisions statewide until April 1994.

At the core of Iowa’s program was the Family Investment Agreement, an

individualized plan designed to help each family achieve self-sufficiency.

This plan generally called for entry into the workforce as soon as possible,

with state assistance in job search activities and child care provision. In

some cases, however, a recipient’s plan may have called for a period of

education, training, rehabilitation, or work experience to prepare the

recipient for the job market. As circumstances changed, the plan,

including a time table for achieving self-sufficiency, could be altered on

the basis of client and caseworker consultations. Recipients who failed to

sign the agreement, or who signed it but failed to subsequently fulfill the

terms of the agreement, had their benefits phased out under a Limited

Benefit Plan. Initially, the Limited Benefit Plan consisted of 3 months of

full benefits, followed by 3 months of reduced benefits (eliminating the

adult portion of the grant), then benefit termination. In February 1996, the

state shortened the phase-out period by eliminating the 3 months of full

benefits. Before termination, recipients in the Limited Benefit Plan who

had not previously signed a Family Investment Agreement could request

having their full benefits reinstated by signing an agreement. Once a case

had been terminated, however, families were required to wait 6 months

before reapplying for benefits.

Iowa contracted with Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., and the Institute

for Social and Economic Development to evaluate its program as required

under the waiver. At the time of our review, the evaluators were

conducting a study including (1) a flow analysis to obtain data on the

number of and reasons why recipients entered and exited the Limited

Benefit Plan program and (2) a survey of recipients whose benefits have

been terminated to determine what happened to them after termination.

For the survey, the evaluators contacted 137 of the 172 recipients whose

benefits had been terminated between November 1995 and January 1996.

The state received the draft report summarizing the results of this study in

Page 91 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix VI 

Overview of Waiver Programs in Iowa,

Massachusetts, and Wisconsin

October 1996, but the final report had not yet been released as this report

went to press. In addition, a request for funding from HHS to continue the

evaluation of Iowa’s waiver program was pending at the time of our

review.

Massachusetts’s

Welfare Reform ’95

Program

As stated in Massachusetts’s waiver application, the underlying goal of its

program, called Welfare Reform ’95, was to replace traditional cash

assistance with work or community service requirements for all ablebodied AFDC recipients with school-aged children. At the core of this

program was the expectation that recipients would assume responsibility

for moving toward self-sufficiency. Ongoing recipients as well as new

applicants had to appear for an eligibility assessment under the new

program requirements. Similar to Iowa’s Family Investment Agreement,

Massachusetts required caseworkers to develop an Employment

Development Plan for each recipient subject to the work requirement and

for each teen parent.

Recipients subject to the work requirement had 60 days for job search

activities before the requirement was imposed. If recipients did not find

employment after 60 days, or if they subsequently lost their job, their plans

required participation in community service to meet the 20 hours per week

mandatory work requirement, and caseworkers provided a list of

community service work sites. Teen parents’ plans required enrollment in

high school (or an equivalent program) and at least 75-percent attendance;

caseworkers provided referrals to programs as needed. For both adults

and teens, the plans also allowed recipients to request support services

such as transportation or child care. If recipients failed to comply with

their plans, their benefits were reduced (removal of the adult portion of

the grant); continued noncompliance meant benefit termination for the

entire family. The state could reopen cases and restore full benefits

retroactively if recipients demonstrated compliance with plan

requirements for 2 consecutive weeks. The waiver explicitly eliminated

any formal reconciliation process before notifying recipients of or

implementing sanctions.

Although required under the waiver, the state had not yet contracted with

evaluators to study its program before the new federal welfare reform law

was enacted. At the time of our review, the state was developing plans to

evaluate the program under the new law; however, the state did not intend

to continue to maintain its control groups for study.

Page 92 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix VI 

Overview of Waiver Programs in Iowa,

Massachusetts, and Wisconsin

Wisconsin’s Pay for

Performance Project

Wisconsin implemented its benefit termination provisions statewide in

March 1996 as part of the waiver demonstration project called Pay for

Performance. This project had two major components: provisions for

diverting AFDC applicants from ever receiving benefits and provisions for

requiring AFDC recipients to work in exchange for benefits.

The diversion component was designed to help applicants become selfsufficient without going on welfare. Applicants met with a financial

planning resource specialist who would explain the alternatives to going

on welfare and the services available to help them find a job, secure child

care, or address other barriers to self-sufficiency. Those seeking further

assistance had to enroll in Wisconsin’s JOBS program and begin looking for

work. If applicants completed 60 hours of JOBS participation and were still

not self-sufficient, they then became eligible to receive welfare benefits.

Although statewide data on the effectiveness of these provisions were not

yet available, the number of applicants diverted from the welfare rolls due

to these provisions was significant, according to state and county officials.

Data compiled in one county revealed that 46 percent of 880 applicants

deemed likely to have gone on AFDC between March and July of 1996 were

diverted from receiving benefits.

The work-in-exchange-for-benefits component was designed to replicate

working-world situations for those receiving benefits by reducing benefits

proportionately to the number of required hours not worked. The program

required recipients to work 20 to 40 hours per week. Each month,

caseworkers determined hours of participation in assigned JOBS activities

and calculated a monetary sanction for any missed hours by multiplying

the number of missed hours by the federal minimum wage. If a recipient’s

participation fell below 25 percent of the scheduled hours, the entire AFDC

grant was reduced to zero, and, because the AFDC and food stamp work

requirements were linked, food stamps were reduced to $10 for those who

had no basis for exemption under the food stamp employment and training

program (such as having a child under 6 years old).66 Because calculating

these sanctions is difficult, sanctions were not to be imposed until the

second month after the month in question to allow a 30-day period for data

processing and for the recipient to request adjustments based on good

cause for failure to participate or on reporting and processing errors. The

state closed cases if the recipient failed to enroll in the Pay for

Performance JOBS program or received a full sanction (for participation

below 25 percent) for 3 consecutive months. Once the state closed a case,

66Under the new federal welfare reform law, Wisconsin was allowed to lower the age-of-youngest-child

exemption for the food stamp sanction from 6 years to 1 year of age for 3 years because the state had

previously submitted a waiver request to do so that had been denied.

Page 93 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix VI 

Overview of Waiver Programs in Iowa,

Massachusetts, and Wisconsin

a recipient would generally have to meet the program requirements for

new applicants in the diversion component—60 hours of participation in

JOBS—before becoming eligible to receive benefits again.

Wisconsin had contracted with MAXIMUS to conduct the required

evaluations of the Pay for Performance waiver program. Although the

contract was canceled after passage of federal welfare reform, a request

for funding from HHS to continue the evaluation was pending at the time of

our review. In addition, a broader study group, including the University of

Wisconsin, had been formed to evaluate the state’s comprehensive reform

effort, called Wisconsin Works, of which Pay for Performance is one part.

Phased-in implementation of Wisconsin Works began in October 1996, and

officials expected to have the program fully implemented by

September 1997.

Page 94 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix VII 

Bases for Terminations Nationwide, by State

Table VII.1: Terminations as of June 30, 1996

Due to failure to comply with

Number of families with benefits terminateda

State Total

Enrollment

requirements

Work

requirements

Child

support

enforcement

requirements

Teen parent

school

attendance

requirements

Teen parent

living

arrangement

requirements

Other

requirements

Due to

reaching a

time limit

Arizona 66 66

Connecticut 11b 2 7 b 2c

Florida 19 19d

Iowa 4,174 3,756e 418e

Massachusetts 1,292 1,036 217f 39g

Michigan 307 307

Mississippi 279 279

Missouri 73 73

Nebraska 8 8

South Dakota 289 289

Utah 62 59 3

Vermont 3 3

Virginia 985 191 390 362 42

Wisconsin 2,208 1,634 574

Total 9,776 5,581 3,365 372 217 220 2 19

aIn some states, such as Massachusetts and Wisconsin, data represent cases in terminated

status as of the date shown. In other states, such as Iowa and Connecticut, data represent

cumulative totals that may include cases that have subsequently been reopened and may double

count recipients in some cases.

bData do not include those cases terminated for failure to comply with teen living arrangement

requirements, which are not tracked, according to the state official surveyed.

cTerminations for failure to comply with fingerprinting requirements.

dOf the 19 cases terminated upon reaching their time limit, 10 had complied and 9 had failed to

comply with program requirements.

eBased on state official’s estimates.

f

Does not include the 25 cases in which closure was for failure to comply with living arrangement

requirement as well as failure to attend school.

gIncludes the 25 cases in which closure was for failure to attend school as well as failure to

comply with living arrangement requirement.

Page 95 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix VII 

Bases for Terminations Nationwide, by State

Table VII.2: Terminations as of December 31, 1996

Due to failure to comply with

Number of families with benefits terminateda

State Total

Enrollment

requirements

Work

requirements

Child

support

enforcement

requirements

Teen parent

school

attendance

requirements

Teen parent

living

arrangement

requirements

Other

requirements

Due to

reaching a

time limit

Arizona 50 50b

Connecticut 477c 460 12 c 5d

Delaware 68 15e 40 0f 13g

Florida 74 74h

Iowa 5,288 4,691i 597i

Illinois 8 0 8

Massachusetts 1,969 1,708j 235k 26l

Michigan 765 765

Missouri 279 279

Mississippi 699 699

Nebraska 59 59

North Carolina m n

Ohio m n n

Oregon 60o 60o

South Dakota 413 413

Utah 180 177p 3q

Vermont 3 3

Virginia 1,955 704r 390s 810t 51

Wisconsin 5,700 2,577 3,123

Total 18,047 7,972 8,477 865 235 406 18 74

aIn some states, such as Massachusetts and Wisconsin, data represent cases in terminated

status as of the date shown. In other states, such as Iowa and Connecticut, data represent

cumulative totals that may include cases that have subsequently been reopened and may double

count recipients in some cases.

bData do not include those cases terminated for failure to comply with teen living arrangement

requirements, which are not tracked, according to the state official surveyed. The most significant

reason for the drop in terminations over time is because many teen parents become old enough

to no longer have to meet living arrangement requirements.

cData do not include those cases terminated for failure to comply with teen living arrangement

requirements (not tracked).

dTerminations for failure to comply with fingerprinting requirements.

eOf the 15, 6 cases terminated until the end of the demonstration project; 9 cases could still be

reopened on the basis of compliance with requirement.

Page 96 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix VII 

Bases for Terminations Nationwide, by State

f

According to the official surveyed, provisions for terminating cases for failure to comply with teen

living arrangement requirement predated implementation of the waiver. Although the number of

cases terminated for this reason has not been tracked, the official believed it was probably zero.

gOther reasons included nine cases for failure to attend parenting classes; three cases for failure

to provide proof that children had been immunized; and one case for failure to attend a family

planning session.

hOf the 74 cases terminated upon reaching their time limit, 43 had complied and 31 had failed to

comply with program requirements.

i

Based on state official’s estimates.

j

Includes a partial estimate for terminations due to noncompliance by dependent children aged

16 to 18.

k

Does not include the 16 cases in which closure was for failure to comply with living arrangement

requirement as well as failure to attend school.

l

Includes the 16 cases in which closure was for failure to attend school as well as failure to

comply with living arrangement requirements.

mAccording to the official surveyed, families have had benefits terminated under waiver

provisions, but the number of cases terminated has not been tracked. Efforts are under way to

begin collecting such data.

nState’s waiver included provisions for terminating benefits on this basis, and, according to the

official surveyed, cases have been terminated. However, the number of cases terminated on this

basis has not been tracked.

oNumber of cases terminated as of Nov. 15, 1996. According to the official surveyed, data as of

Dec. 31, 1996, were not yet available as this report went to press.

pMay include some cases terminated for failure to comply with child support enforcement

requirements (see table note q).

qNumber of cases terminated for failure to comply with child support enforcement requirements

as of June 30, 1996; data not tracked and could not be updated through Dec. 31, 1996,

according to the official surveyed.

r

Does not include 23 cases that also had failed to comply with work requirements.

s

State officials could not update the number of terminations based on failure to comply with work

requirements past June 30, 1996.

t

Does not include three cases that also had failed to comply with work requirements.

Page 97 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix VIII 

Demographic Profile of Total Caseload

Compared With Terminated Cases Studied in

Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin

Terminated cases studied

Iowa

Total statewide

AFDC

caseload

(1995)a Statewide Des Moines

Statewide -

no benefits or

reported

incomeb

Number of cases 36,435 408 77 56

Household characteristics - percentc of cases with

Number of

children

0 - 1

2

3

4 or more

48.4

32.1

13.5

6.0

39.7

34.8

16.7

8.8

44.2

26.0

18.2

11.7

46.4

30.4

7.1

16.1

Youngest child 

under age 1

age 1-2

age 3-5

age 6-11

age 12-15

age 16-18

12.1

24.6

24.2

25.4

9.6

3.9

6.6

30.2

29.7

24.5

6.6

2.4

2.6

39.0

23.4

28.6

3.9

2.6

10.7

32.1

26.8

19.6

8.9

1.8

Length of current

stay

0-6 mos.

7-12 mos.

13-24 mos.

25-36 mos.

37-48 mos.

49-60 mos.

over 60 mos.

25.4

12.9

18.5

9.1

7.0

5.9

21.3

0.7

21.3

23.0

14.9

15.7

24.3

0.0

0.0

22.1

22.1

7.8

11.7

36.4

0.0

0.0

19.6

17.9

16.1

10.7

35.7

0.0

Head-of-household characteristics - percentc of cases with head of household

Under age 20

age 20-29

age 30-39 

40 and over

6.7

48.5

36.1

8.8

6.4

51.7

33.8

8.1

5.2

48.0

42.9

3.9

5.4

62.5

32.1

0.0

Female 85.7 84.3 89.6 82.1

Nonwhite 16.7 12.1 21.1 5.4

Page 98 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix VIII 

Demographic Profile of Total Caseload

Compared With Terminated Cases Studied

in Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin

Terminated cases studied Terminated cases studied

Massachusetts Wisconsin

Total statewide

AFDC caseload

(1995)a Statewide Boston

Statewide -

no benefits or

reported

incomeb

Total statewide

AFDC

caseload

(1995)a Statewide Milwaukee

Statewide -

no benefits or

reported

incomeb

100,852 936 196 138 72,366 759 280 123

45.5

31.3

15.7

7.6

53.4

29.0

11.4

6.2

61.7

21.0

12.2

5.1

68.1

19.6

6.5

5.7

40.8

28.9

17.0

13.3

39.1

29.9

19.5

11.5

38.6

28.2

21.4

11.8

51.2

26.8

15.4

6.5

9.6

25.3

26.6

24.0

11.8

2.6

3.6

22.0

7.1

37.0

18.5

11.8

3.1

19.9

10.7

31.1

20.9

14.3

5.1

38.4

11.6

26.8

8.7

9.4

18.4

28.2

21.0

21.1

7.8

3.6

2.6

32.0

29.8

23.2

8.8

3.6

2.9

30.4

27.1

24.3

11.1

4.3

4.1

22.8

26.0

23.6

13.0

10.6

17.0

11.9

15.1

13.4

10.4

9.2

23.0

45.7

16.9

13.9

5.6

3.2

3.5

11.2

45.9

16.8

12.7

4.6

2.6

4.1

13.3

46.4

13.0

20.3

5.8

2.2

3.6

8.7

24.9

11.6

20.6

12.4

7.7

7.0

15.8

30.7

20.2

19.0

12.1

6.6

4.3

7.1

32.5

16.4

17.1

11.0

7.9

5.7

9.3

30.9

31.7

18.7

8.9

5.7

0.0

4.1

5.7

43.8

37.1

13.5

18.9

19.8

39.8

21.5

19.9

16.8

38.8

24.5

38.4

25.4

23.2

13.0

6.2

50.6

32.4

10.7

2.4

50.1

36.2

11.3

1.4

49.6

36.0

12.9

2.4

43.9

37.4

16.3

90.5 87.8 85.7 88.4 88.5 92.2 90.4 83.7

55.0 57.6 82.7 55.8 56.6 45.6 80.4 45.6

aThese data are from Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of AFDC Recipients - Fiscal

Year 1995, HHS (Washington, D.C.: June 1996). Number of children data are from table 6. Age of

youngest child data are from table 11. Length of current stay data are from table 12. Age of

head-of-household percentages calculated on the basis of combined figures from table 21.1

(mothers aged 11-17), table 22 (adult female recipients), and table 25 (adult male recipients). Sex

of head-of-household percentages calculated on the basis of combined figures from tables 22

and 25. Race of head-of-household data are from table 10 (race of natural or adoptive parent).

bData on demographic characteristics not broken down for “No benefits or reported income”

category for cases studied in selected urban areas due to the small number of cases in the

category: Des Moines, 16; Boston, 37; and Milwaukee, 50.

cPercentages exclude unknowns, which were generally less than 1 percent, except for race.

Unknown percentages for race ranged from 0 to 8.4 percent.

Page 99 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix IX 

Massachusetts Data on High School, Work

Experience, and Primary Language

Statewide Boston

Statewide - no benefits or

reported income

Terminated cases studied

Total

statewide

AFDC

caseload

(Feb. 1996) All reasons

Noncompliance

with work

requirements All reasons

Noncompliance

with work

requirements All reasons

Noncompliance

with work

requirements

Number of cases 87,945 936 680 196 138 138 67

Percent of cases with head of household

Not completing

high school or

equivalent 49.6 65.3 54.1 65.8 52.9 71.0 46.3

Not working in last

10 years 41.5 47.4 42.4 51.0 43.5 45.7 34.3

Primary language

not English 18.4 21.9 23.5 23.5 25.4 27.5 31.3

Page 100 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Page 101 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix X 

Reported Income and Benefits Received by

Terminated Cases Studied in Iowa,

Massachusetts, and Wisconsin

Iowa

Total cases

statewide

Des Moines

cases

Rest of state

cases

Number of terminated

cases 408 77 331

Number of cases

reopened a a a

Number of cases

remaining closed 408 77 331

Of cases remaining closed, percent with reported income fromb

Wages 30.4 24.7 31.7

Pensionsd e e e

Child support 19.1 14.3 20.2

Of cases remaining

closed, percent with any

of the above reported

income 42.9 33.8 45.0

Of cases remaining closed, percent receiving other non-AFDC benefits from

Food stamps 60.8 55.8 61.9

SSI 9.8 18.2 7.9

Housing 27.2 24.7 27.8

General assistance f f f

Percent receiving any of

the above non-AFDC

benefits 71.8 71.4 71.9

Of cases remaining

closed, percent with

active Medicaid status 54.4 45.5 56.5

Percent receiving any of

the above non-AFDC

benefits, including

Medicaid 74.3 74.0 74.3

Percent with any of the

above non-AFDC benefits,

including Medicaid, or

reported income 86.3 83.1 87.0

Percent with none of the

above non-AFDC benefits

or reported income 13.7 16.9 13.0

Page 102 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix X 

Reported Income and Benefits Received by

Terminated Cases Studied in Iowa,

Massachusetts, and Wisconsin

Massachusetts Wisconsin

Total statewide

cases

Boston

cases

Rest of state

cases

Total statewide

cases

Milwaukee

cases

Rest of state

cases

936 196 740 759 280 479

300 65 235 108 70 38

636 131 505 651 210 441

23.0 22.9 23.0 31.5c 27.1c 33.6c

16.0 6.1 18.6 e e e

16.4 9.9 18.0 24.0 13.8 28.8

48.3 38.2 50.9 47.2 38.1 51.5

25.6 20.6 26.9 39.3 34.8 41.5

12.7 10.7 13.3 12.6 10.5 13.6

26.4 33.6 24.6 22.1 16.7 24.7

0.3 0.0 0.4 g g g

47.3 50.4 46.5 57.6 51.9 60.3

58.5 52.7 60.0 53.5 44.8 57.6

75.5 73.3 76.0 75.4 69.0 78.5

78.3 73.3 79.6 81.1 76.2 83.4

21.7 26.7 20.4 18.9 23.8 16.6

Page 103 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix X 

Reported Income and Benefits Received by

Terminated Cases Studied in Iowa,

Massachusetts, and Wisconsin

Note: See app. I for details on scope and time frames of cases studied in each state.

aNot applicable, as data analysis was conducted before 6 months had elapsed, the minimum

time period required in Iowa before an AFDC case could be reopened.

bFamilies not applying for, or receiving, AFDC or other benefits were not required to report their

wages or other income. In addition, once no longer receiving AFDC, some families may receive

child support payments privately, which they are not required to report to the state and local

offices of Child Support Enforcement, where we obtained our data. For these reasons, the figures

on wage, pension, and child support income are likely to be understated.

cThese figures may include other income, such as from pensions.

dIncludes Social Security, Veterans’ Benefits, and employment-related pensions.

eNo data available.

f

In Iowa, the general assistance program was administered at the county level, and statewide

data were not available.

gNot applicable. Wisconsin discontinued its statewide general assistance program in Jan. 1996,

though some counties have programs.

Page 104 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix XI 

Average Benefits, Child Support Payments,

and Unemployment Rates in States

Terminating Benefits Under Waivers

State

AFDC

average

monthly

grant amount

(1995)a

Food stamp

average

monthly

benefit

(1995)b

SSI average

monthly

benefit

(1996)c

Housing

assistance

average

maximum

monthly

benefit (1996)d

Fuel

assistance

average annual

household

benefit (1995)e

Child

support

average

monthly

payment

(1995)f

Unemployment

rate (1995)g

Arizona $293 $202 $347 $508 $163 $235 5.1

Connecticut 523 141 355 730 411 266 5.5

Delaware 301 187 328 549 194 169 4.3

Florida 263 178 342 518 92 194 5.5

Illinois 317 172 378 407 267 235 5.2

Iowa 371 154 310 401 197 290 3.5

Massachusetts 551 152 342 701 348 334 5.4

Michigan 413 165 372 442 182 334 5.3

Mississippi 122 174 308 363 150 156 6.1

Missouri 273 172 332 361 187 288 4.8

Nebraska 317 150 318 377 173 283 2.6

North Carolina 243 159 299 435 80 199 4.3

Ohio 313 155 369 427 97 292 4.8

Oregon 394 155 342 493 215 268 4.8

South Dakota 331 181 300 401 394 207 2.9

Utah 371 173 346 446 219 246 3.6

Vermont 510 146 300 533 281 272 4.2

Virginia 273 163 319 493 174 138 4.5

Wisconsin 465 161 334 424 300 226 3.7

National average 378 172 339 h 172 238 5.6

aAverage monthly AFDC payment for a family with two children. (Source: Table 34 in

Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of AFDC Recipients - Fiscal Year 1995, HHS

(Washington, D.C.: June 1996)).

bAverage monthly value of the food stamp benefit in dollars. (Source: Table 6 in Characteristics of

Food Stamp Households: Fiscal Year 1995, (Advance Report) U.S. Department of Agriculture

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1996)).

cAverage monthly federal SSI payment, Dec. 1996. (Source: Social Security Administration, Office

of Research and Statistics.)

Page 105 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix XI 

Average Benefits, Child Support Payments,

and Unemployment Rates in States

Terminating Benefits Under Waivers

dThe unweighted average of the fair market rent for a two-bedroom unit as of Feb. 22, 1996,

established by Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) housing authorities for

each county in the state. HUD will pay up to the fair market rent for a subsidized family, less the

“total tenant payment,” which is based on the family’s gross income, less specified deductions.

(Deductions include $480 for each dependent, $400 for any elderly family or a person with a

disability, and some medical deductions.) The formula used in determining the tenant payment is

the highest of (1) 30 percent of monthly income (including AFDC cash payments) less

deductions; (2) 10 percent of monthly income; (3) welfare rent, if applicable; or (4) a $25 minimum

rent or higher amount (up to $50) set by the housing authority. Therefore, a family losing AFDC

benefits with no other income would fall into this last category and be eligible to receive a housing

subsidy up to the amount of the fair market rent minus the minimum rent payment set by the

housing authority.

eGenerally includes only heating assistance provided during winter months under the

Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) during fiscal year 1995. The program

also provides cooling assistance, and winter and summer crisis assistance. According to the

program official contacted, income standards for the program are fairly high, and AFDC families

were likely to receive amounts greater than the amounts indicated here. (Source: HHS,

Administration for Children and Families, Fiscal Year 1995 Summer LIHEAP Telephone Survey

Results, Mar. 1996.)

f

Based on preliminary data reported by the states: total collections divided by total cases with

collections, monthly average. (Source: Child Support Enforcement FY 1995 Preliminary Data

Report, HHS (Washington, D.C.: May 1996)).

gPercent unemployed in the civilian labor force in 1995. (Source: Statistical Abstract of the United

States - 1996, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (Washington, D.C.:

Oct. 1996)).

hAccording to a HUD Issue Brief, HUD Reinvention From Blueprint to Action, HUD (Washington,

D.C.: Mar. 1995), the average cost of serving families through housing certificates nationwide was

$440 per month; and the average cost of a public housing subsidy nationwide was $481 per

month based on fiscal year 1995 appropriations.

Page 106 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix XII 

AFDC Caseload Participation in Selected

Programs in States Terminating Benefits

Under Waivers

AFDC caseload

State Number Percent

Percent

receiving food

stamps

Percent

receiving SSIa

Percent receiving

housing

assistanceb

Percent

receiving child

supportc

Arizona 69,609 100 92.1 3.1 15.1 0.2

Connecticut 60,985 100 88.7 3.2 33.0 10.7

Delaware 10,775 100 83.6 3.1 36.4 11.4

Florida 230,807 100 93.6 6.0 15.4 2.0

Illinois 236,205 100 93.7 8.5 19.5 0.5

Iowa 36,435 100 88.3 5.1 26.8 11.8

Massachusetts 100,852 100 78.6 4.9 33.7 8.7

Michigan 201,696 100 94.4 10.4 10.5 1.6

Mississippi 52,528 100 93.5 13.4 22.5 12.3

Missouri 89,289 100 89.9 6.8 25.3 8.6

Nebraska 14,828 100 86.4 6.5 36.6 1.2

North Carolina 125,503 100 77.7 10.9 23.7 12.0

Ohio 228,171 100 91.3 9.2 25.3 8.4

Oregon 39,264 100 91.1 1.4 17.5 9.7

South Dakota 6,286 100 83.7 6.9 27.5 8.8

Utah 16,648 100 85.9 0.7 25.6 11.9

Vermont 9,648 100 97.7 0.7 21.7 11.2

Virginia 72,147 100 86.6 7.7 28.9 7.5

Wisconsin 72,366 100 85.5 9.8 15.1 4.1

U.S. total 4,873,398 100 89.8 5.4 20.1 4.8

aData for SSI also include workers compensation.

bData include families in public housing or receiving a HUD rent subsidy. Families receiving other

rent subsidies were not included.

cAt the time of our review, states were required to pass through to AFDC recipients up to $50 per

month of child support collected by the state from absent parents. This pass-through requirement

was eliminated under the new federal welfare reform law.

Source: Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of AFDC Recipients - Fiscal Year 1995, HHS

(Washington, D.C.: June 1996). Food stamps data are from table 5; housing assistance data are

from table 4; and child support data are from table 42; SSI data are from tables 33 and 42.

According to the program official contacted, table 42 includes only adults on SSI and must be

combined with the number of children on SSI from table 33 for the approximate total number of

families with an SSI recipient.

Page 107 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Appendix XIII 

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts David P. Bixler, Assistant Director, (202) 512-7201

Margie K. Shields, Evaluator-in-Charge, (415) 904-2228

Staff

Acknowledgments

The following individuals also made important contributions to this report:

Donald J. Porteous conducted the analysis of automated data, led the

fieldwork in Wisconsin, and coauthored the draft; Andrew Sherrill

conducted the analysis of waivers; and Christina L. Warren led the

fieldwork in Iowa.

Page 108 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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Bibliography

Page 111 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
Related GAO Products

Welfare Reform: Three States’ Approaches Show Promise of Increasing

Work Participation Rates (GAO/HEHS-97-80, forthcoming report).

Welfare Waivers Implementation: States Work to Change Welfare Culture,

Community Involvement, and Service Delivery (GAO/HEHS-96-105, July 2,

1996).

Employment Training: Successful Projects Share Common Strategy

(GAO/HEHS-96-108, May 7, 1996).

Welfare to Work: Approaches That Help Teenage Mothers Complete High

School (GAO/HEHS/PEMD-95-202, Sept. 29, 1995).

Welfare to Work: Child Care Assistance Limited; Welfare Reform May

Expand Needs (GAO/HEHS-95-220, Sept. 21, 1995).

Welfare to Work: State Programs Have Tested Some of the Proposed

Reforms (GAO/PEMD-95-26, July 14, 1995).

Welfare to Work: Most AFDC Training Programs Not Emphasizing Job

Placement (GAO/HEHS-95-113, May 19, 1995).

Welfare Dependency: Coordinated Community Efforts Can Better Serve

Young At-Risk Teen Girls (GAO/HEHS/RCED-95-108, May 10, 1995).

Welfare to Work: Participants’ Characteristics and Services Provided in

JOBS (GAO/HEHS-95-93, May 2, 1995).

Welfare to Work: Measuring Outcomes for JOBS Participants (GAO/HEHS-95-86,

Apr. 17, 1995).

Child Care: Recipients Face Service Gaps and Supply Shortages

(GAO/HEHS-95-96, Mar. 1, 1995).

Community Development: Comprehensive Approaches Address Multiple

Needs but Are Challenging to Implement (GAO/RCED/HEHS-95-69, Feb. 8, 1995).

Child Care: Child Care Subsidies Increase Likelihood That Low-Income

Mothers Will Work (GAO/HEHS-95-20, Dec. 30, 1994).

Welfare to Work: Current AFDC Program Not Sufficiently Focused on

Employment (GAO/HEHS-95-28, Dec. 19, 1994).

(106611) Page 112 GAO/HEHS-97-74 Welfare Benefit Termination
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