J-S39009-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SCOTT A. NOLL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 925 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 21, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-MD-0000467-1988

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 2, 2023

Scott A. Noll appeals from the judgment of sentence of an aggregate 

sentence of 45 years to life imprisonment imposed upon his resentencing. Noll 

argues that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence without properly 

accounting for his juvenile status at the time of the offenses and his 

rehabilitative needs. We affirm.

In April 1987, the Commonwealth charged Noll with three counts of 

criminal homicide, one count of arson, and one count of burglary, after Noll 

set fire to a mobile home, and killed the three occupants of the home, Dawn 

Leingang and her two young sons. Noll was 14 years old at the time he 

committed the offenses. On August 1, 1988, Noll entered a plea of nolo 

contendere to three counts of second-degree murder. The trial court 

sentenced Noll to an aggregate term of life imprisonment without parole. This 
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Court affirmed the judgment of sentence and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

denied allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Noll, 564 A.2d 262 (Pa. 

Super. 1989) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 569 A.2d 1365 (Pa. 

1989).

In 2010, Noll filed a petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (“PCRA”), which the PCRA court denied. This Court affirmed the 

denial. See Commonwealth v. Noll, 2001 MDA 2010 (Pa. Super. filed Jul. 

27, 2011).

On August 8, 2012, Noll filed a PCRA petition, alleging that Miller v. 

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (holding that “the Eighth Amendment 

forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of 

parole for juvenile offenders.”), rendered his sentences unconstitutional.

Subsequently, in March 2016, Noll filed an amended PCRA petition, asserting 

Miller applied retroactively to his case based upon Montgomery v. 

Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016) (holding that Miller announced a new 

substantive rule that applied retroactively on collateral review). In June 2017, 

our Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 

2017) (“Batts II”), which devised a procedure to implement Miller and 

Montgomery. The Batts II Court held that Miller and Montgomery

“unambiguously permit the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence upon 

a juvenile offender only if the crime committed is indicative of the offender’s 

permanent incorrigibility; that the crime was not the result of the ‘unfortunate 
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yet transient immaturity’ endemic of all juveniles.” Batts II, 163 A.3d at 435

(citation omitted).

On August 8, 2017, in light of Batts II, the PCRA court held a status 

conference. Thereafter, Noll filed a motion for appointment of a forensic 

evaluator for resentencing. The PCRA court granted the motion and appointed 

Amy Taylor, Psy.D., to complete an evaluation on Noll’s behalf. The 

Commonwealth retained the services of Frank Datillio, Ph.D., who also 

evaluated Noll. Following several status conferences, the PCRA court 

scheduled a resentencing hearing for August 30, 2021. However, in the 

interim, the United States Supreme Court decided Jones v. Mississippi, 141 

S. Ct. 1307 (2021). The Jones Court reaffirmed the holdings of Miller and

Montgomery but held that “a separate factual finding of permanent 

incorrigibility is not required” by the Eighth Amendment, Miller, or 

Montgomery “before a sentencer imposes a life-without-parole sentence on 

a murderer under 18.” Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1318–19. Subsequently, our 

Supreme Court issued Commonwealth v. Felder, 269 A.3d 1232 (Pa. 2022), 

wherein it held that the Batts II procedural requirements are not 

constitutionally required. See id. at 1244. The Felder Court concluded that 

“sentencing courts are required to consider only the relevant sentencing 

statutes, which will guarantee that the sentencer considers the juvenile’s 

youth and attendant characteristics as required by Miller.” Id. at 1246; see 

also id. (noting that “[s]o long as the sentence imposed is discretionary and 
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takes into account the offender’s youth, even if it amounts to a de facto life 

sentence, Miller is not violated.”). The Court further pronounced that 

“permanent incorrigibility is not an eligibility criterion akin to sanity or a lack 

of intellectual disability, rather it is a sentencing factor akin to a mitigating 

circumstance.” Id. at 1245 (citation, brackets, and quotation marks omitted).

At the sentencing hearing for Noll, the trial court heard victim impact 

testimony from Leingang’s brothers, and testimony from a police officer 

regarding the crimes. Thereafter, the parties filed sentencing memoranda. 

Ultimately, the trial court resentenced Noll to 221⁄2 years to life imprisonment 

for each of the three counts and ordered that two of the counts were to run 

consecutively and the remaining count was to run concurrently. Noll filed a 

post-sentence motion to modify the sentence, which the trial court denied. 

This timely appeal followed.

On appeal, Noll raises the following question for our review:

Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion when it resentenced [] Noll in three counts of Second-Degree Murder to a 

period of concurrent twenty-two and one-half years (221⁄2 years) 

to life in counts 1 and 2, and a consecutive sentence of twentytwo and one-half years (221⁄2 years) to life in count 3, where such 

a sentence will have the [] Noll not reaching parole eligibility until 

he is fifty-nine years (59 years) old, thereby depriving him of the 

benefit of a years-to-life sentence?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.
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Noll challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.1 “Challenges 

to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an appellant to review 

as of right.” Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(citation omitted). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing 

issue, this Court conducts a four-part analysis:

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has 

a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a 

substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). 

Moury, 992 A.2d at 170 (citation and brackets omitted).

Here, Noll filed a timely appeal and preserved his claim in his postsentence motion. Noll also included a separate Rule 2119(f) Statement in his 

brief; accordingly, we will review his Rule 2119(f) statement to determine 

whether he has raised a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. 

Provenzano, 50 A.3d 148, 154 (Pa. Super. 2012) (stating that “we cannot 

look beyond the statement of questions presented and the prefatory 2119(f) 

statement to determine whether a substantial question exists.” (citation 

omitted)).

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1 As noted above, under Felder, “the sentencing court’s consideration of the 

factors of youth goes to its sentencing discretion and not to the legality.” 

Commonwealth v. Schroat, 272 A.3d 523, 526 (Pa. Super. 2022). 
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“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 71 A.3d 

323, 330 (Pa. Super. 2013). “A substantial question [exists] only when the 

appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions 

were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; 

or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing 

process.” Id. (citation omitted).

In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Noll argues that the trial court’s sentence 

was excessive and did not give proper weight to evidence that he was a low 

risk to the community and his rehabilitative needs. See Appellant’s Brief at 

12-13. Noll’s claims raise a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. 

Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1042-43 (Pa. Super. 2013) (finding that a 

substantial question was presented where appellant alleges sentence was 

manifestly excessive because court did not consider all sentencing factors).

Our standard of review of a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a 

sentence is well settled:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that 

the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 936-37 (Pa. Super. 2020) 

(citation omitted).
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Sentencing is individualized in Pennsylvania and requires that the trial 

court fashion a sentence that is consistent with the protection of the public, 

the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim 

and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). When sentencing to total confinement, the court must 

consider “the history, character, and condition of the defendant[.]” 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9725. “The balancing of the sentencing factors is the sole province 

of the sentencing court.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 275 A.3d 530, 535 (Pa. 

Super. 2022). Further, the trial court, which is present at the hearing and 

observes all witnesses and the defendant firsthand, “is in the best position to 

view a defendant’s character, displays of remorse, defiance, or indifference 

and the overall effect and nature of the crime.” Commonwealth v. Harper, 

273 A.3d 1089, 1097 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted).

Noll contends that the trial court should have imposed an aggregate 

sentence of 40 years to life in prison instead of 45 years to life in prison based 

upon the facts in this case. See Appellant’s Brief at 22-23, 28. While conceding 

that total confinement was proper and that the trial court did not have to 

review the factors set at 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1 in fashioning his sentence, 

Noll argues that more incarceration was not required to ensure that a juvenile 

who was 14 years old at the time of the crimes has paid his debt to society. 

See id. at 24. Noll acknowledges that he was solely responsible for the deaths 

but asserts that he did not purposefully kill the three people because he 
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believed that the home was empty. See id. Noll further claims that he was 

amenable to treatment in the juvenile system at the time he entered his plea. 

See id. at 24-25. Noll also notes that he obtained his GED and held 

employment while in prison, his mental capacity was not negatively impacted 

in prison, and he did not exhibit antisocial behavior. See id. at 13-14, 25-26. 

Noll highlights that Dr. Taylor opined that he would not be served by serving 

a longer prison sentence. See id. at 26-27. Noll argues that the trial court’s 

reasoning of needing additional time (10 years from the time of resentencing)

in prison to participate in programs to prepare him for reintegration into the 

community was not supported by the record. See id. at 27-28. Indeed, Noll 

suggests that he could complete these programs in 5 years, which would result 

in an aggregate sentence of 40 years to life in prison. See id. at 28.

As an initial matter, Section 1102.1(c) states that “[a] person who has 

been convicted after June 24, 2012, of a murder of the second degree ... and 

... who at the time of the commission of the offense was under 15 years of age 

shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment the minimum of which shall be 

at least 20 years to life.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(c). Because Noll was convicted 

of second-degree murder prior to June 24, 2012, the trial court was not 

required to consider section 1102.1(c) when imposing the sentence. However, 

a trial court may consider the factors set forth at Section 1102.1(d) for 

guidance. See Miller, 275 A.3d at 535; Commonwealth v. Summers, 245 

A.3d 686, 693 (Pa. Super. 2021).
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Section 1102.1(d) states the following: 

In determining whether to impose a sentence of life without parole 

under subsection (a),[

2] the court shall consider and make 

findings on the record regarding the following:

(1) The impact of the offense on each victim, including oral and 

written victim impact statements made or submitted by 

family members of the victim detailing the physical, 

psychological and economic effects of the crime on the 

victim and the victim’s family. A victim impact statement 

may include comment on the sentence of the defendant.

(2) The impact of the offense on the community.

(3) The threat to the safety of the public or any individual posed 

by the defendant.

(4) The nature and circumstances of the offense committed by 

the defendant.

(5) The degree of the defendant’s culpability.

(6) Guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted by the 

Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing.

(7) Age-related characteristics of the defendant, including:

(i) Age.

(ii) Mental capacity.

(iii) Maturity.

(iv) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the 

defendant.

(v) The nature and extent of any prior delinquent or criminal 

history, including the success or failure of any previous 

attempts by the court to rehabilitate the defendant.

(vi) Probation or institutional reports.

(vii) Other relevant factors.

Id. § 1102.1(d) (footnote added).

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2 Subsection (a) relates to juvenile defendants who have been convicted of 

first-degree murder after June 24, 2012.
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Here, the trial court considered the factors set forth at subsection (d)

and took into account, inter alia, the pre-sentence memoranda by both 

parties; the initial incident report and supplemental reports; depositions of 

investigators; the transcript of the nolo contendere plea hearing and original 

sentencing hearing; work history for Noll; GED and Certificates of Completion; 

juvenile lifer packet; the August 30, 2021 resentencing hearing transcript; 

Noll’s evaluations by Dr. Taylor and Dr. Datillio; and victim impact statements 

from Leingang’s brothers and parents. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/2/22, at 5-

9; see also N.T., 8/30/21, at 35-48 (wherein Leingang’s brothers testified at 

the sentencing hearing). More specifically, the trial court noted that Noll was 

14 years old at the time of the offenses, and that he was 49 years old at 

resentencing. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/2/22, at 7. The trial court highlighted 

that Noll was the sole perpetrator of the offenses and was responsible for the 

death of a young mother and her children. See id. at 7, 8. The trial court 

noted that Noll denied knowing the victims were in the home when he burned 

it down. See id. at 8. Nevertheless, the trial court observed that the murders 

had a serious impact on the community with respect to the community’s sense 

of safety and security in their homes. See id. at 7. Further, the trial court 

considered that Noll had previously been diagnosed with conduct disorder with 

aggressive tendencies, but Dr. Taylor had found Noll obtained his GED and 

held employment in prison, and that he had matured during his time in prison 

and there were no concerns about his mental capacity. See id. at 8, 9; see 
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also Taylor Report, 5/17/19, at 24, 26. The trial court also stated that Dr. 

Taylor found that Noll had expressed genuine remorse and that in her opinion, 

public interest would not be served by keeping Noll in prison for decades. See 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/2/22, at 9; see also Taylor Report, 5/17/19, at 28. 

Additionally, the trial court noted Dr. Datillio’s concern regarding Noll’s 

apathetic attitude toward therapeutic intervention and lack of emotional 

content underlying his remorse; Dr. Datillio felt the best time to address these 

concerns was in prison to take advantage of treatment by the Department of 

Corrections. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/2/22, at 9; see also Datillio Report, 

10/16/19, at 29, 30. 

In addressing Noll’s claims, the trial court concluded as follows:

Based upon the foregoing, [the trial court] found the facts and 

circumstances of [Noll’s] offenses necessitated a lengthy 

sentence. We weighed the differing reports and opinions the two

evaluators provided in this case, specifically, Dr. Taylor’s opinion 

that it is not in the public interest to keep [Noll] in prison for 

decades to come, and Dr. Datillio’s opinion that there are

significant concerns for which [Noll] requires additional time in 

prison to allow him to take advantage of treatment options 

available through the Department of Corrections prior to being

considered for release into the community. Significantly, [the trial 

court] determined that all of the information available ...

suggested, rather than be released now, [Noll] and the public

would be best served by [Noll] serving a minimum of ten more 

years during which he will have the opportunity to participate in 

programs intended to prepare him for reintegration into the

community. We explicitly made as a special condition of sentence 

participation in any program deemed necessary to reentry or 

rehabilitation, and further recommended anger management and

mental health evaluation and/or treatment. As the discussion 

above further reveals, we took due consideration of the relevant 

mitigating factors as well, and the unfortunate history of this case
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through the court system, and accordingly decided an opportunity 

for parole was warranted.

It is [the trial court’s] belief that the sentence imposed reflects an 

appropriate balance between these findings, as well as the 

remainder of the facts and concerns raised in this matter. [The 

trial court] note[s] that there is no contention or indication that 

we failed to consider any relevant information or that we did not 

give any relevant factor its due weight. Rather, [Noll] makes clear

he is simply dissatisfied with the result. However, for the reasons 

[the trial court] put on the record and set forth here, [the trial 

court] continue[s] to find the sentence appropriate and see no 

compelling reason to alter it now.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/2/22, at 9-10.

Here, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

imposing the aggregate sentence, as it considered and weighed all the 

relevant sentencing factors. Indeed, the trial court considered the protection 

of the public, the gravity of the murders and the impact on the community, 

and the rehabilitative needs of Noll. Moreover, the trial court acknowledged

Noll’s age at the time he committed the murders, Noll’s belief that there was 

no one in the home when he set it on fire, and Noll’s efforts at rehabilitation 

and that fact he received his GED and was employed while in prison. However, 

the trial court found that Noll’s rehabilitative needs and his potential reentry 

and reintegration into society required the services provided by the 

Department of Corrections and a longer sentence. Accordingly, because it is 

within the trial court’s province to weigh the evidence and sentencing factors, 

we conclude that Noll’s aggregate sentence of 45 years to life in prison is not 

manifestly unreasonable and the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See 
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Miller, 275 A.3d at 536 (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in imposing a sentence of 55 years to life in prison on a juvenile 

offender who killed a person, as the trial court considered and weighed the 

relevant sentencing factors); Harper, 273 A.3d at 1098 (holding that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence of 35 years to life in 

prison on a juvenile defendant, where the trial court gave full consideration of 

the sentencing factors, including defendant’s personal and criminal history, 

his rehabilitative needs, and his positive rehabilitation performance during his 

incarceration).

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 02/02/2023