COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Frank and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

FLOYD MARTIN LANE, SOMETIMES KNOWN AS 

 FLOYD MARTIN LANE, SR. 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2161-98-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 SEPTEMBER 28, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY 

William H. Ledbetter, Jr., Judge 

 Andrea C. Long (Charles C. Cosby, Jr.; Boone, 

Beale, Cosby & Long, on brief), for 

appellant. 

 Jeffrey S. Shapiro, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; 

John H. McLees, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Floyd Martin Lane, Sr., (appellant) appeals from his jury 

trial convictions for rape and forcible sodomy of the victim, 

who was his stepdaughter. Appellant contends that the trial 

court erred in admitting the testimony of an expert concerning 

victim recantation, as well as the testimony of the victim's 

mental health counselor. Appellant also challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. Finding 

no error, we affirm. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
I. 

ADMISSIBILITY OF LANZAFAMA'S TESTIMONY 

 Appellant contends that the trial court erred in ruling 

that Detective Lanzafama was qualified to testify as an expert 

witness on the subject of recantation by alleged victims of 

sexual abuse.1 We disagree and affirm the ruling of the trial 

court. 

 "In any proper case, an expert witness may be permitted to 

express his opinion upon matters not within common knowledge or 

experience." Cartera v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 516, 518, 248 

S.E.2d 784, 786 (1978). "The record must show that the 

proffered expert possesses sufficient knowledge, skill, or 

experience to render him competent to testify as an expert on 

the subject matter of the inquiry." King v. Sowers, 252 Va. 71, 

78, 471 S.E.2d 481, 485 (1996). A witness need not have 

specialized training in a particular field and may gain his 

expertise solely through work experience. See Wileman v. 

Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 642, 647-48, 484 S.E.2d 621, 624 

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 Appellant's only contention in his petition for appeal, 

and on brief, was that the trial court erred in qualifying 

Lanzafama as an expert on recantation in child abuse cases. 

Under Rule 5A:12(c), "[o]nly questions presented in the petition 

for appeal will be noticed by the Court of Appeals." See Cruz 

v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 661, 664 n.1, 406 S.E.2d 406, 407 

n.1 (1991). Further, unlike Rule 5A:18, Rule 5A:12 contains no 

"good cause" or "ends of justice" exception. See Thompson v. 

Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 620, 626, 500 S.E.2d 823, 826 (1998). 

Therefore, no appeal was granted on any other aspect of 

Lanzafama's testimony, and we may not consider any other 

challenges to it on appeal. 

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(1997) (qualifying bank official as expert in comparing 

signatures to determine authenticity). "Whether a particular 

witness is qualified to testify as an expert is 'largely a 

matter in the discretion of the trial court, and its rulings 

allowing a witness to testify will not be disturbed unless it 

clearly appears that [the expert] was not qualified.'" Id. at 

647, 484 S.E.2d at 624 (citation omitted). 

 Lanzafama testified that, in his six years as a detective, 

he had investigated approximately three hundred sexual assault 

cases. In addition, he had undergone many hours of training in 

the area of alleged sexual abuse, which had incorporated about 

ten hours of specialized training on the issue of a child's 

recanting allegations of abuse. Finally, he testified that he 

had read about twelve articles on the subject of recantation in 

conjunction with his formal training. We cannot say from the 

evidence in this record that the trial court abused its 

discretion in permitting Detective Lanzafama to give an expert 

opinion on the likelihood of recantation based on a hypothetical 

question. 

II. 

ADMISSIBILITY OF HOBBS' TESTIMONY 

 Appellant contends the trial court erred in allowing Karen 

Hobbs to testify that J.D. suffered from post-traumatic stress 

disorder (PTSD) and that it could result from sexual abuse. He 

contends that Hobbs was not competent to testify on these 

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issues; that her testimony was more prejudicial than probative; 

and that her testimony constituted impermissible "bolster[ing]" 

of J.D.'s testimony. Again, we disagree. 

 We note first that appellant raised no objection at the 

trial level to Hobbs' competency to give expert testimony. In 

fact, even after the trial court specifically pointed out that 

appellant had not objected to Hobbs' competency to testify, 

appellant articulated no objection on these grounds. Appellant 

also did not contend that Hobbs' testimony was more prejudicial 

than probative. Therefore, Rule 5A:18 bars our consideration of 

these issues on appeal. Further, under the principles 

enunciated above regarding the admissibility of expert 

testimony, we hold that neither the good cause nor the ends of 

justice exception to Rule 5A:18 justifies our consideration of 

these issues. 

 Appellant properly preserved for appeal his argument that 

Hobbs' testimony regarding J.D.'s PTSD diagnosis and the 

possible link between sexual abuse and PTSD constituted 

impermissible bolstering of J.D.'s testimony. However, this 

objection is without merit. Under settled principles, 

"[e]vidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency, however 

slight, to establish a fact at issue in the case." Ragland v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 913, 918, 434 S.E.2d 675, 678 (1993). 

As we held in Taylor v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 557, 565, 466 

S.E.2d 118, 122 (1996), "evidence of an emotional or 

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psychological injury such as posttraumatic stress disorder, like 

medical evidence of physical injury, is relevant as 

circumstantial evidence of the occurrence of a traumatizing 

event." 

 For these same reasons, Hobbs' testimony that sexual 

assault is one of several traumatic events that could trigger 

PTSD also was proper. Hobbs did not opine that J.D. had been 

sexually abused.2 See Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 333, 

338-40, 492 S.E.2d 131, 134 (1997) (reversing conviction for 

sexual battery on ground that trial court erroneously permitted 

expert witness to opine that victim had been sexually abused and 

 2

 Hobbs also testified that J.D. reported having been 

sexually assaulted "[b]y her stepfather," but Hobbs provided no 

further details. At trial, prior to Hobbs' testifying, the 

Commonwealth asserted that the fact of J.D.'s report to Hobbs 

was "admissible as a fresh complaint." Appellant registered no 

objection to the admissibility of such statements at that time, 

and he made no contemporaneous objection to their admissibility 

when Hobbs testified to them before the jury. Finally, he did 

not challenge this portion of Hobbs' testimony in his petition 

for appeal, on brief, or in oral argument to this Court. 

Therefore, assuming without deciding that admission of Hobbs' 

testimony regarding J.D.'s statements to her was error, see

Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 333, 338-40, 492 S.E.2d 131, 

134 (1997) (in reversing conviction for sexual battery on other 

grounds, noting that trial court erroneously permitted expert 

witness to repeat hearsay statement of non-testifying child 

victim "that he had been 'sexed'"), this issue is not properly 

before this Court on appeal. See Rule 5A:12(c); Cruz, 12 Va. 

App. at 664 n.1, 406 S.E.2d at 407 n.1 (noting that issue was 

not raised in petition for appeal and, therefore, that no appeal 

was granted by this Court on that issue); see also Thompson, 27 

Va. App. at 626, 500 S.E.2d at 826 (noting that Rule 5A:12, 

unlike Rule 5A:18, contains no "good cause" or "ends of justice" 

exception). 

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that erroneous admission of opinion was not harmless). Hobbs' 

testimony amounted, at most, to an opinion that the victim's 

PTSD diagnosis was consistent with sexual abuse, and it did not 

exclude the possibility that some other stressor had triggered 

the PTSD. See Hussen v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 93, 99, 511 

S.E.2d 106, 109 (1999) (in affirming rape conviction, holding 

that expert testimony that victim's injury was "not consistent

with consensual, first time intercourse" was not comment on 

ultimate issue of whether encounter occurred "against the 

victim's will"); see also Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 

508, 517-18, 471 S.E.2d 785, 790 (1996) (en banc) (holding that 

expert testimony on PTSD was improper comment on ultimate issue 

because expert "opined not as to what could have been the 

causative stressor but rather what was the causative stressor"), 

rev'd on other grounds, 254 Va. 333, 492 S.E.2d 131 (1997). 

 Therefore, we hold the trial court did not err in admitting 

the challenged portions of Hobbs' testimony. 

III. 

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

 Appellant's last contention is that J.D.'s testimony was 

uncorroborated and inherently incredible, rendering the evidence 

to support his convictions insufficient as a matter of law. 

Again, we disagree and affirm appellant's convictions. 

 On appellate review, we must examine the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and we may not disturb 

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the jury's verdict unless it is plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support it. See Traverso v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. 

App. 172, 176, 366 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1988). The conclusions of 

the fact finder on issues of witness credibility "may only be 

disturbed on appeal if this Court finds that [the witness'] 

testimony was 'inherently incredible, or so contrary to human 

experience as to render it unworthy of belief.'" Robertson v. 

Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 854, 858, 406 S.E.2d 417, 419 (1991) 

(quoting Fisher v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 296, 299-300, 321 

S.E.2d 202, 204 (1984)). In all other cases, we must defer to 

the conclusions of "the fact finder[,] who has the opportunity 

of seeing and hearing the witnesses." Schneider v. 

Commonwealth, 230 Va. 379, 382, 337 S.E.2d 735, 736-37 (1985). 

These same principles apply in cases involving rape and sodomy 

convictions, which may be sustained solely upon the testimony of 

the victim, even in the absence of corroborating evidence. See

Fisher, 228 Va. at 299, 321 S.E.2d at 203. 

 Here, the victim testified very specifically that on 

October 17, 1997, appellant had sexual intercourse with her 

against her will and forced her to perform fellatio on him. The 

jury clearly believed her testimony, as it was entitled to do, 

despite its knowledge that she previously had made and recanted 

allegations that appellant sexually abused her. Contrary to 

appellant's assertion, the medical evidence did not disprove the 

victim's allegations, for medical evidence established that her 

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hymen, due to its shape, would permit sexual intercourse without 

any tearing. Further, although no corroboration was necessary, 

other evidence supported J.D.'s testimony. First, she made a 

tape recording of the incident and explained to the jury what 

was happening as the tape played. Second, she reported that 

appellant had a distinctive mole just above his pubic hairline, 

a fact confirmed by police. Although appellant attempted to 

provide an innocent explanation for J.D.'s knowledge of the 

mole's location, the jury was free to reject his testimony and 

conclude he was lying to conceal his guilt. Third, J.D. 

received a diagnosis of PTSD, which was consistent with her 

allegations of ongoing abuse. Although the jury, as the finder 

of fact, was free to reject the victim's testimony, it also was 

free to believe the victim's testimony, for no evidence 

compelled the conclusion that she was lying. 

 Appellant contends that his convictions must be reversed 

because the Commonwealth failed to exclude all reasonable 

hypotheses of appellant's innocence. Appellant misconstrues the 

law applied on appellate review. This principle applies only 

when the Commonwealth attempts to prove its case with 

circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Burrows v. Commonwealth, 

224 Va. 317, 319, 295 S.E.2d 893, 894 (1982) (evidence 

insufficient to prove accused was criminal agent in robbery and 

malicious wounding because victim could not affirmatively 

identify his assailant and circumstantial evidence did not 

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exclude all reasonable hypotheses of appellant's innocence). 

When the Commonwealth offers direct evidence from an eyewitness 

whose testimony is not inherently incredible, the jury may 

accept that testimony as credible and reject all conflicting 

evidence, thereby determining, in essence, that no reasonable 

hypotheses of innocence remain. 

 For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err 

in admitting the challenged testimony of Lanzafama or Hobbs or 

in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to prove 

appellant committed rape and sodomy. Therefore, we affirm 

appellant's convictions. 

Affirmed. 

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