PKSOI Papers

HARNESSING POST-CONFLICT

TRANSITIONS:

A CONCEPTUAL PRIMER

Nicholas J. Armstrong

Jacqueline Chura-Beaver

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PKSOI PAPER

HARNESSING POST-CONFLICT TRANSITIONS:

A CONCEPTUAL PRIMER

Nicholas J. Armstrong

Jacqueline Chura-Beaver

September 2010

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ISBN 1-58487-464-3
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FOREWORD

Today’s security environment undoubtedly tests 

the boundaries of conventional international and military responses to persistent interstate conflict. New 

challenges are continuously emerging that pose vexing dilemmas and question the assumptions of actors 

engaged in post-conflict stability operations. Furthermore, recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that the often-indistinct concept of transition urgently requires a greater collective understanding by 

all actors participating in stability operations. As operations move toward a “clear, hold, build, transition” 

strategy, a widely accepted and understood definition 

is necessary to unite U.S. military, interagency, and 

multinational planners to foster greater collaboration 

and unity of effort. To evaluate transition strategies 

and make recommendations for future stability operations, researchers and policymakers require both a 

common understanding and way ahead for advancing the concept as a critical doctrinal and operational 

objective.

This monograph offers an unparalleled analysis on 

current research and available tools for transition in 

post-conflict situations. The authors make a significant 

contribution to the field by providing a broadly applicable definition of transition and a comprehensive 

assessment of the existing approaches and literature 

on the topic. Most importantly, their analysis lays the 

groundwork for future conceptual development and 

improved implementation of post-conflict transitions. 

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and the Strategic Studies Institute are pleased to 

offer this analysis as a leading article in helping to 
iv

clarify, define, and advance transition as one of the 

most critical, but least understood, aspects of stability 

operations.

STEPHEN T. SMITH

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director

Peacekeeping and Stability

 Operations Institute

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute
v

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

NICHOLAS J. ARMSTRONG is a National Security Fellow at the Institute for National Security and 

Counterterrorism (INSCT), a nonprofit, research and 

academic center jointly sponsored by the Maxwell 

School of Citizenship and Public Affairs and College 

of Law at Syracuse University. In this capacity, he supervises a number of research projects and programs, 

to include INSCT’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction, and 

Resilience and Security projects. Before joining INSCT, 

Mr. Armstrong served for 8 years as a U.S. Army officer. In that time, he held multiple leadership and staff 

assignments in the 10th Mountain Division, to include 

serving as Aide-de-Camp to the Deputy Commanding 

General (Support) and Speechwriter to the Commanding General. He is a combat veteran of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Bosnia. Mr. Armstrong is a graduate of the 

U.S. Army Ranger, Airborne, and Air Assault Schools, 

holds a B.S. in engineering management from the U.S. 

Military Academy at West Point, and an M.P.A. and a 

Certificate of Advanced Study in security studies from 

the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. He is currently pursuing a security-focused Ph.D. in social science at the Maxwell School. His dissertation topic will 

focus on the sustainability of internationally led security sector reconstruction and reform in fragile states.

JACQUELINE CHURA-BEAVER joined the U.S. 

Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) in 2009 and supports the Stabilization, 

Reconstruction, and Transition (STR) branch. She 

has undertaken significant research projects on topics including leadership in provincial reconstruction 
vi

teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan, governance 

issues in fragile states, and successes and failures of 

the Vietnam-era Civil Organization and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program. Ms. 

Chura-Beaver is currently exploring issues of transition in stability operations. She previously served as 

an intern and later a Foreign Affairs Officer (FAO) 

at the U.S. Department of State Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs in support of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). Ms. Chura-Beaver holds a B.A. 

in political science and Spanish from the University 

of Dayton and a master’s degree in public and international affairs, with a concentration in security and 

intelligence studies, from the University of Pittsburgh 

Graduate School of Public and International Affairs.
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SUMMARY

Since the end of the Cold War, members of the international community have undertaken more than 

20 major operations to stabilize post-conflict societies, 

yielding mixed results. Stability operations are tremendously complex and demand successful direction 

of multiple, simultaneous transitions that range from 

transforming violent conflict to a sustainable, peaceful environment, to the process of forging sustainable 

governing institutions from fragile or nonexistent infrastructure. Yet, the very notion of transition eludes 

policymakers, professionals, and scholars because 

the concept lacks precise meaning, and its application varies according to context and conditions. At no 

other time has understanding transition been more 

critical, especially as “clear, hold, build, transition” 

becomes the dominant theme for ongoing operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. Together, professionals and 

academics share the challenge and opportunity to 

improve how the international community conducts 

stability operations—through the comprehensive understanding and implementation of transition.

This monograph addresses the challenging topic 

of transition in post-conflict stability operations and 

is intended for a wide audience that includes military 

and civilian policymakers, international development 

experts, and scholars in academe. It is a primer, systematic review, and comprehensive assessment of 

the fields of research and practice. From a sample of 

more than 170 sources, the monograph presents and 

appraises the major lenses (process, authority transfer, phasing, and end state), categories (war-to-peace, 

power, societal, political-democratic, security, and 
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economic), approaches, and tools under which postconflict transitions are conceived. Considering these 

wide and often diverse perspectives, the authors present a holistic definition of transition in the context of 

complex stability operations:

Transition is a multi-faceted concept involving the application of tactical, operational, strategic, and international level resources (means) over time in a sovereign 

territory to influence institutional and environmental 

conditions for achieving and sustaining clear societal 

goals (ends), guided by local rights to self-determination and international norms. Transition is inherently 

complex, and may include multiple, smaller-scale 

transitions that occur simultaneously or sequentially. 

These small-scale activities focus on building specific 

institutional capacities and creating intermediate conditions that contribute to the realization of long-term 

goals.

This monograph lays the groundwork for both future research and greater collaboration among diverse 

international and local actors who operate in postconflict environments—specifically to develop a comprehensive definition of transition and adequate tools 

to address all facets of the concept. Recommendations 

for future research and improved transition policy include a more focused emphasis on areas that include: 

• Cross-institutional (political, security, economic) 

and multi-level (local, regional, national) studies that explore the interdependencies between 

simultaneous transitions;

• Underlying assumptions of current transition 

tools and indicators;

• Relationships between transition and institutional resilience; and,
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• Thresholds and tipping points between transition phases.

The exploration of the foundations and actual 

workings of transition detailed in this monograph 

hope to encourage the interagency and multinational 

community to provide greater attention to the importance of transition in current operating environments. 

This piece is intended to provide the baseline for more 

in-depth and relevant analysis.

1

HARNESSING POST-CONFLICT TRANSITIONS:

A CONCEPTUAL PRIMER

INTRODUCTION

Today, the United States and members of the international community find themselves wrestling 

with the grim dangers—security, economic, and humanitarian—posed by fragile states. Almost 60 fragile states are unable to meet the basic standards for 

statehood (Brookings Institute, 2008; Foreign Policy, 

2010). Not only do these nations experience difficulties providing their citizens basic civil protections and 

services, many suffer from repeating cycles of intrastate conflict. Without question, these problems are 

complex, multifaceted, and pervade all aspects of social life. Yet, state fragility is invariably linked to weak 

or ineffective political, economic, and societal institutions (Fukuyama, 2004; Ghani & Lockhart, 2008; Paris, 

2004; Paris & Sisk, 2009, p. 3; Rotberg, 2004a, 2004b; 

van de Walle, 2004). 

Given the mixed record of accomplishment of 

interventions in recent history, how can the international community improve its efforts to assist in transforming the domestic institutions of fragile states? 

Certainly, institution building is a slow, evolutionary, 

and transitional process. Accordingly, international 

organizations, government agencies, and militaries 

have recognized this reality. Yet, one missing, critical 

piece is a clearer understanding of transitions in the 

context of stability operations. This paper is a modest 

attempt toward developing clarity of an often-indistinct concept.

In the last 2 decades, interstate conflict and state 

fragility have led to a groundswell of United Nations 
2

(UN) and U.S.-led interventions (e.g., humanitarian, 

peacekeeping, stabilization, and reconstruction operations). Since the end of the Cold War, scholars and 

practitioners have drawn together to explore and better understand the nature of these operations and the 

challenges facing those tasked to design and implement them. Although contingent on many factors that 

range from history and culture to root causes, one 

common theme has emerged in these operations: a 

fundamental, normative goal of transforming a state 

and society in ways that promote sustainable peace, 

good governance, and economic prosperity. An expanding body of literature addresses distinct, but 

related, research in peace-building and conflict transformation (Berdal, 2009; Dayton & Kriesberg, 2009; 

Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Paris, 2004), state-building 

(C. Call, Wyeth, & International Peace Institute, 2008; 

Fukuyama, 2004; Ghani & Lockhart, 2008; Paris & 

Sisk, 2009; Rotberg, 2004b), and stabilization and reconstruction operations (Brinkerhoff, Johnson, & Hill, 

2009; Christoff & St. Laurent, 2007; Durch, 2008b; 

Englebert & Tull, 2008; Kramer, Megahan, & Gaffney, 

2008; Looney, 2008; Szayna et al., 2009; U.S. Department of Defense, 2003; U.S. Department of the Army, 

2009a). While many studies and field reports among 

these research programs address transition elements, 

no attempt has been made to systematically review 

the transitional dimensions of stabilization, reconstruction, and peace-building operations as a defined, 

holistic concept.

Additionally, practitioners have struggled with 

creating a conceptual framework and adequately operationalizing activities inherent to transition. Several 

attempts have been made to codify the term by assigning concrete attributes and qualities to transition 
3

mechanisms, but this has caused much consternation 

in the actual application of the term to stability operations. In 2009, the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), based at the U.S. Army War 

College, attempted to bridge the gap between policy 

and practice by creating a transition definition based 

on the insights of domestic and multinational collaborators involved in these operations. The result was a 

working definition of the term:

Transition is defined as both a multi-disciplinary process and points of change, in time, when conditions 

for stability are achieved in security, justice and reconciliation, infrastructure and economic development, 

humanitarian and social well-being, and governance 

and reconciliation, through the enabling and empowering of Host Nation Institutions, in order to facilitate 

enduring positive effects and improved quality of life 

for citizens (Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute, 2009).

While there have been substantial efforts to define 

transition, its implementation provides an equally 

troubling set of problems to practitioners. The fundamental challenge in providing guidance, creating 

doctrine, and planning operations is the term’s application to diverse and adapting stability situations. 

Each level of interaction in transition—tactical, operational, and strategic—maintains its own vantage 

point in regards to the goals, desired outputs/outcomes, and significance in achieving transition. While 

the diversity in responses and understanding of the 

causes and consequences of transition is appreciated 

for dealing with the term’s complexity, this differentiation can cause significant problems in planning and 

implementing transition policy at the national level, 
4

and even significantly complicate collaboration with 

interagency and multinational partners. The ambiguity in many of the terms, as well as the differing ways 

to interpret and activate them, may cause significant 

confusion and setbacks if not defined for all actors involved in the transition process. A better definition of 

transition is needed to create a more comprehensive 

meaning and better understanding of the term for all 

actors engaged in stability operations.

This monograph is a primer on the concept of transition, a systematic review of literature found in both 

academic and practitioner circles, and an assessment 

on the state of these fields in terms of understanding 

transition in stability operations. The authors have 

reviewed numerous books, edited volumes, journal 

articles, think-tank reports, field experts’ commentary, conference, and workshop proceedings, and 

government documents to map the current intellectual landscape on transitions. While this piece draws 

upon many foundational texts from peacebuilding, 

state-building, and stabilization operations, it is not a 

comprehensive review of these subfields, but rather a 

focused, targeted appraisal of how research and practice currently address the concept of transition and 

transitional aspects of rebuilding fragile states and 

societies directly. As a result, it provides a useful contribution to transitional studies to further inform and 

guide research and policymaking.

The monograph begins with an attempt to reconcile 

the definitional challenges mentioned above and posits a more useful definition of transition in the context 

of stability operations. It follows with a detailed literature review and typology of transitions, organized by 

the six different forms (or levels) in which transitions 

are most typically explored. This is followed by a sur-
5

vey of the various approaches and tools that governments (civilian and military agencies) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) currently use in practice 

to identify, measure, and assess transition in stability 

operations. The authors conclude with an assessment 

of the current state of transition literature and provide 

recommendations to guide future research and policy 

development.

DEFINING “TRANSITION” IN CONTEXT

One of the major challenges of confronting the notion of transition is forming a satisfactory definition. 

In common usage, “transition” is defined broadly as 

“a passage from one state, stage, subject, or place to 

another” or “a movement, development, or evolution from one form, stage, or style to another” (Merriam Webster, 2010). This indicates that transition is 

an evolutionary concept. However, without sufficient 

context, this definition is too abstract. A useful definition should strike a balance between both abstraction 

and reality and complexity and parsimony. Especially 

in the field of stability operations, transition can be 

defined and operationalized to fit more accurately 

the complex issues and problems facing practitioners 

creating policies and implementing transition initiatives. To better appreciate the multifaceted nature of 

transition, the definition is best explored by honing 

in on different qualities of the concept and how these 

characteristics interact in the context of stabilization 

operations. This section concludes with a working 

definition of transition.
6

Transition as Process.

For many organizations working in stability operations, transition is defined as a procedural process 

that shapes the dynamic environment characterizing 

leadership and operational mechanisms (Dubik, 2009; 

Hadaway, 2009; Kardos, 2008; Koops & Varwick, 

2008; Leika, 2007; Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2008a; Schnaubelt, 2009; Serafino, 2009; 

U.S. Department of Defense, 2003; U.S. Department of 

State - S/CRS, 2005b; U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting 

Laboratory, 2008a, 2008b; Walter, 1999). Standard operating procedures (SOPs) and personnel task assignments that characterize transition are often the signature traits of this process, which ultimately define 

leadership authorization, tasks, and necessary outputs 

for the program and project streams according to the 

goals of individual organizations. The interactions between staff participating in transition initiatives shape 

the process by creating defined channels and lines of 

authority for implementing and overseeing projects. In 

many respects, transition processes directly relate to a 

“chain of command” structure since defined authority 

and responsibilities are outlined throughout program 

implementation. Transition actors operate according 

to defined steps to meet certain goals, benchmarks, 

and outputs that feed into more specific tactical and 

operational activities. 

The process approach to transition is a mechanism 

that provides clear steps to measure progress and 

address issues of complexity in stability operations. 

Because of their explicitly defined characteristics, the 

military is particularly fond of using processes to guide 

practitioners through specific applications to achieve 

transition. Clear and concise procedures outline the 
7

activities needed to achieve operational success, and 

lead to more long-term outcomes when sequenced correctly. This systematic approach to transition directly 

attributes certain inputs with desired outputs in both 

the short and long term. By viewing transition as a process, practitioners can shape the responsibilities and 

resources needed to accomplish cyclical procedures to 

complete transitional processes within defined tactical 

and operational goals, specifically through the allocation of responsibilities and oversight. The process approach provides specific guidelines to organize entities to deal with transitional activities. 

Transition as Authority Transfer.

Stability operations professionals also view transition as a legitimization of authority when power sharing or transfer takes place (Agüero, 1998; Bellamy & 

Williams, 2005; Bertram, 1995; Byman, 2003; Chesterman, 2002; Cliffe, Guggenheim, & Kostner, 2003; Englebert & Tull, 2008; Gow, 2009; Hadaway, 2009; Kotze 

& Toit, 1995; Krasner, 2004; Nagl, 2008; Peacekeeping 

and Stability Operations Institute, 2006; Swaminathan, 1999; Szayna et al., 2009; U.S. Department of 

Defense, 2005a, 2005b, 2007, 2009b; U.S. Department 

of State - S/CRS, 2005a, 2005b; U.S. Department of 

State, 2009; U.S. Department of the Army, 2009a; U.S. 

Institute of Peace (USIP) & U.S. Army Peacekeeping 

and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), 2009; U.S. 

Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2008b). In this 

particular model, transition is achieved when a host 

nation’s administrative agencies or security forces assume responsibility for specific governmental functions in a post-conflict environment. The transfer of 

authority from state building institutions to the host 
8

nation signals a change in the power relationship 

between the entities, and thus constitutes a shift in 

how authority will be wielded over key actors in stabilization activities. The U.S. Marine Corps espouses 

this authority-based approach to transition in many 

of its operational manuals, specifically its 2008 Joint 

Urban Warrior exercise: transition is “the process of 

shifting the lead responsibility and authority” in order 

to achieve larger operational objectives for the organization (U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 

2008b, p. 1). The assumption of responsibilities by the 

host nation is a key component of measuring success 

in transition in several types of stability operations. 

However, transition success assumes that the host 

nation is both fully capable and willing to carry out 

responsibilities previously overseen by intervening 

forces. Authority transfer is one of the most prominent strategic indicators for transition in stabilization 

operations literature, specifically that related to counterinsurgency operations (a subset within the broader 

scope of stability operations).

Transition as Phasing.

Transition can also be thought of as phasing, specifically highlighting the concept’s important relationship with strategic benchmarks and goals (Adekanye, 

1997; Avni-Segre, 1969; Barnett, 2006; Bell & Keenan, 

2004; Bernabeu, 2007; Byman, 2003; Carothers, 2002a, 

2002b; Durch, 2008b; Feng & Zak, 1999; Huth, 1998; 

B. Jones, Gowan, & Sherman, 2009; Nixon & Ponzio, 

2007; Papagianni, 2009; Ratner, 2009; Riekhoff, 2003; 

U.S. Department of Defense, 2009b; U.S. Department 

of State - S/CRS, 2005b; U.S. Department of State & 

U.S. Department of Defense, 2009; U.S. Department 
9

of the Army, 2009a, 2009b; USIP & PKSOI, 2009; U.S. 

Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2008b; Walter, 1999; Wittkopf, 1994; Zinecker, 2009). Transition 

phasing is best described as a continuum of activities 

that span the political, economic, social, and military 

realms of state building over a period, often overlapping and transforming in tandem. Unlike transition 

processes, phasing lacks the defined regulations and 

procedures that are required to achieve defined tactical and operational objectives. 

Phasing, in contrast, highly depends on its environment and responds directly to environmental factors. 

Stability operations become defensive in nature when 

host nation forces are able to create and maintain stable 

structures and functions to ensure the integrity of the 

newly developed state. As stability operations shift 

from offensive to defensive planning and execution, 

certain intermediate “transition points” exist along the 

phasing continuum that mark an incremental transfer of resources, authority, and responsibility to host 

nation authorities. Often, these “transition points” 

are not acknowledged or understood until well after 

they have occurred, but they provide benchmarks of 

progress to guide future initiatives. Transition, in this 

respect, is dynamic in its evolutionary nature and direct response to environmental factors in stabilizing 

environments, and can thus be overlooked by both 

practitioners and policy planners who become caught 

in responding to emerging issues. 

Transition phasing greatly informs the many complex changes that occur during stability operations, 

specifically at the strategic level. The use of transition 

points aids practitioners in pinpointing causal effects 

of operational and tactical initiatives, and allows them 

to gauge success over the transition continuum (or 
10

strategic timeline). Current U.S. Army doctrine grapples with the transition spectrum and codifies key 

attributes of the definition for use in operations: “A 

transition is not a single event where all activity happens at once. It is a rolling process of little handoffs between different actors along several streams of activities. There are usually multiple transitions for any one 

stream of activity over time” (U.S. Department of the 

Army, 2009b, p. 52). By noting that transition is an ongoing and insular process, transition must be viewed 

as a phased initiative, rather than as a particular tipping point during stability operations. Furthermore, 

the input of several streams of activity (better known 

as processes) informs the phasing of strategic activities—creating concrete benchmarks at both operational and strategic levels for overall transition success.

Transition as End State.

Transition is also characterized as an end state in 

stability operations. Transition as an end state indicates that certain ground conditions are measurably 

different than preceding conditions and usually conform with more acceptable standards of governance, 

economic stability, and security (Brinkerhoff et al., 

2009; Bush, 2005; Cliffe et al., 2003; Dempsey & Nichols, 2009; Durch, 2008a; Gow, 2009; Kotze & Toit, 1995; 

Kramer et al., 2008; Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2006, 2008a, 2008b; U.S. Department 

of Defense, 2009b; U.S. Department of State - S/CRS, 

2005b; U.S. Department of State, 2009; Zielinski, 1999). 

In many respects, host nations transitioning to more 

legitimized and internationally acceptable norms are 

the ultimate goal for intervention actors. Transition 

that strengthens legitimate governing capacity and 
11

societal institutions is the target goal for stability operations, especially since it ensures the establishment 

of viable and credible governed states. End state structures add to the strategic value of stability outcomes, 

most notably by fostering host nation compliance with 

international norms and standards.

Transition as end state is increasingly used by 

agencies and organizations searching for success 

benchmarks in operational activities. By defining a 

particular event or tangible result—usually related 

to authority and responsibility transfer—as a benchmark, stability operations actors are able to better 

gauge mission effectiveness and accomplishment of 

tactical and operational goals. As such, end states subsume process, authority transfer, and phasing aspects 

of transition. 

Using Context to “Define” Transition.

The various ways of viewing transition outlined 

above should be considered in reaching an appropriate definition of the concept. Yet, despite the current 

discussion about transition, no single definition exists that encompasses its complexity. Even the most 

proactive institutions in transition activities have been 

unable to produce a conceptual framework to guide 

practitioners in grappling with the complex and multidimensional dilemmas inherent to transition. Several different working documents on transition exist 

to guide practitioners in the field, but few have similar 

concepts that cross organizational and functional lines 

to provide a holistic and multidisciplinary meaning. 

The most encompassing transition definition 

is found in the U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-07, 
12

Stability Operations. In this manual, the military pulls 

together all the concepts outlined in this paper:

Transitions mark a change of focus between phases 

or between the ongoing operation and execution of a 

branch or sequel. The shift in relative priority between 

the elements of full spectrum operations—such as 

from offense to stability—also involves a transition . . . 

transition between phases. . . . Stability operations include transitions of authority and control among military forces, civilian agencies and organizations, and 

the host nation. Each transition involves inherent risk. 

That risk is amplified when multiple transitions must 

be managed simultaneously or when the force must 

conduct a series of transitions quickly. . . . Transitions 

are identified as decisive points on lines of effort; they 

typically make a significant shift in effort and signify 

the gradual return to civilian oversight and control of 

the host nation (U.S. Department of the Army, 2009a, 

p. 80).

The definition found in FM 3-07 is a good starting 

point for defining transition, but does not fully encompass all of the caveats discussed in this monograph. In 

many respects, the U.S. Army transition definition is 

purely kinetic, focusing exclusively on transition process and phasing in lieu of its occasionally static properties. End states and authority transfers are missing 

in the field manual, but these concepts must be included to fully understand transition’s complexity. A 

more comprehensive approach to transition must be 

addressed and embraced by academics and practitioners for a more comprehensive understanding of the 

term.

In light of the concepts and activities defining transition, a single definition is needed to further explore 

the conceptual frameworks of the term, more fully 
13

comprehend its complexity, and apply it to different 

transition situations. For the purpose of this paper, 

transition will be defined as follows:

Transition is the multi-faceted application of tactical, operational, strategic, and international level resources (means) over time in a sovereign territory to 

influence institutional and environmental conditions 

for achieving and sustaining clear societal goals and 

legitimate statehood (ends), guided by local rights to 

self-determination and international norms. Transition is inherently complex, and may include multiple, 

smaller-scale transitions that occur simultaneously 

or sequentially. These small-scale activities focus on 

building specific institutional capacities and creating 

intermediate conditions that contribute to the realization of long-term goals. 

The definition remains broad in order to provide 

wide application and analytical flexibility for both 

scholars and practitioners addressing transitional issues. It is neutral to all actors (i.e., military, civilian, 

local, and international) involved in transition, and it 

incorporates local and international norms as part of 

transitional activities. By using the definition above, 

several types, or combinations, of transition can be 

better understood and addressed. 

TYPES OF TRANSITION

The extant literature on transition is significantly 

broad in scope and reflective of the difficulties surrounding its definition, described above. What exactly is to be transitioned? From what pre-condition 

to what post-condition? Conceptual ambiguity can 
14

potentially lead to miscommunication and complicate 

analysis, particularly for comparative analysis. Part of 

this challenge lies in specifying the object of transition, 

be it a major conflict, political system, institution, or 

society. While authors do not always explicitly state 

the “type” of transition in their work, the context and 

level(s) of institutional analysis do provide an indication of the type(s) of transition under examination. 

This section lays out the various objects, or types, of 

transition found in the literature.

It is worth noting, however, that the act of categorizing transitions into ideal types reveals layers 

of complexity. In the context of stabilization and reconstruction operations, transitions actually proceed 

on multiple levels simultaneously. For instance, postconflict societal transitions aimed at reconciliation and 

conflict resolution typically occur alongside major 

political transitions (i.e., institutional reforms, elections). Further complicating matters are the interdependencies between types of transitions. For example, 

the transition from a tightly-controlled economy to a 

free-market system requires the protection of property rights—made possible only through an effective 

security sector and judicial system. If these sectors are 

transitioning as well, but inadequate to provide the 

conditions necessary for economic growth, the economic transition may stall. Transitional interdependencies naturally lead to questions over timing and 

sequence. 

Altogether, six types of transition emerge from 

the literature: war-to-peace, power, societal, politicaldemocratic, security, and economic. Some scholars collapse these categories. Charles-Phillipe David (1999) 

describes stability and peacebuilding activities as the 

combination of three overarching transitions: security, 
15

democratic, and socio-economic. Parsimony is a sensible objective, yet due to the extent of literature falling across these institutional categories and that this 

is a review of existing studies, it is important, for this 

paper at least, to outline the extent to which authors 

characterize and examine the concept of transition. 

We also recognize that these classifications overlap—particularly political and democratic transitions. 

A democratic transition is surely a political transition, 

but not necessarily the other way around. Yet, Roland 

Paris’ (1997) influential argument for “institutionalization before liberalization” directly challenges the 

idea that, from the very outset, interventions must 

be designed with democratic goals in mind. Such a 

distinction from non- and/or quasi-democratic transitions is essential to understanding which forms of 

government are most likely to succeed in different environments. The diagram below provides a basic, but 

useful, visualization of how the various types of transitions explored in the literature relate to each other. 

Each transition type is described in further detail in 

the following section.

War-to-Peace Transitions.

War-to-peace transitions are the broadest form of 

transition because they encompass both interstate and 

intrastate conflict and range in scope across global, regional, and domestic levels of analysis. In addition to 

traditional nation-states, international organizations 

like the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), and the World Bank are noted as critical actors in war-to-peace transitions (Bellamy & Williams, 

2005; Campbell, 2008; Cliffe et al., 2003; Durch, 2008a, 

2008b; Dzinesa, 2004; B. Jones et al., 2009; Ripsman, 

2005). 
16

On a global, interstate level, war-to-peace transitions describe changes in the international system, 

mainly with respect to the relations between nationstates and international organizations. Wittkopf (1994) 

characterizes the changes in the international system 

in the wake of the Cold War, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, as an element of a war-to-peace transition, 

while noting that contrasting foreign policy beliefs 

(cooperative versus militant internationalism) tend to 

lag behind systemic changes. 

Regional war-to-peace transitions center on the 

stability of specific regions around the globe, such as 

Europe after World War II, post-colonial Africa, and 

the Middle East. These studies range from exploring 

war-to-peace transitions in stable and unstable regions 

of the world and the influence of cooperation and 

competition between major state powers on peaceful 

outcomes (Miller, 2001) to investigating international 

organizations and the connection between the recent 

regionalization of UN peacekeeping interventions 

and its impact on both global and regional security 

(Bellamy & Williams, 2005). Ripsman (2005) uses a 

combined approach, concluding that regions stabilize 

over time due to a mix of both realist mechanisms 

(e.g., great international powers, common threats) and 

liberal mechanisms (e.g., democratic political regimes 

and cooperative international institutions).

Intrastate war-to-peace transitions are predominantly considered in terms of both domestic conflict 

resolution and peace processes, and reconstruction 

and development efforts. While part of a much larger 

body of literature on peacebuilding, designing peaceful transitions begins with the development and implementation of credible commitments to peace between 

belligerent factions (Walter, 1999). Both state and 
17

nonstate intermediaries play a role in the constructive 

management of intrastate conflicts and peace processes, but the extent of their influence remains unknown 

due to a research deficiency in actor relationships and 

stability outcomes (Dayton, 2009). Moreover, human 

rights NGOs typically face many challenges, which 

change in form over time from overt violence to tactics 

of intimidation and marginalization as nations transition away from conflict (Bell & Keenan, 2004). 

Peacebuilding and conflict transformation are undoubtedly difficult in practice. Maney et al. (2006) provide a valuable examination of the breakdowns of the 

Oslo, Norway, and Belfast, Ireland, Good Friday peace 

talks and the importance of participant empowerment, 

grass-roots legitimacy, and coping with “spoilers” (see 

also Menkhaus, 2006; Stedman, 1997) in achieving an 

agreement and, ultimately, a peaceful transition. Corruption is also a major challenge to peacebuilding and 

one factor that requires greater depth of research (Le 

Billon, 2008). Political and economic motives of belligerents (Muggah & Krause, 2009) and organizational 

characteristics, such as structural features, ideologies, 

relationships with other organizations, and attachments to violence (Kriesberg & Millar, 2009), influence whether or not competing groups choose strategies that foster peace consolidation. Leadership styles 

also play a role in the collective decisions of groups 

to engage in violence or peaceful political processes 

(Hermann & Gerard, 2009). Both Cliffe et al. (2003) 

and Atashi (2009) note the importance of combining 

bottom-up and top-down approaches to ensure the 

sustainability of peace processes and development.

In addition to formal peace processes, demilitarization of military-dominated regimes and the disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating (DDR) of 
18

combatants into society are critical aspects of warto-peace transitions (David, 1999; Lyons, 2009). The 

prevention of criminal violence and a “climate of impunity” is critical in the time immediately following a 

peace agreement (Berdal, 2009). Lyons claims that “for 

a successful, sustainable transition from war to peace, 

the warring parties need to demobilize and create new, 

accountable security forces” (2009, p. 100). These key 

tasks thus serve as an important link to, and overlap 

with, security transitions, particularly security sector 

reform (below).

Power Transitions.

While war-to-peace transitions are defined broadly and vary based on the level of analysis (global, 

regional, and domestic), power transitions pertain 

to the relative change of power among states in the 

international system. This is not to be confused with 

the concept of power relations in domestic politics, 

which is subsumed within the institutional-specific 

transitions below. Classic balance of power theory 

and neo-realism (Waltz, 1979) are two closely related 

preconceptions in the field of international relations 

that rest on a substantial body of literature, well beyond the scope of this review. However, the few studies that address power transitions center on power 

relations as predictors of interstate war (Chan, 2004; 

De Soysa, Oneal, & Park, 1997) and the likelihood of 

stability and order during peaceful power transitions 

from declining to rising global powers (Kupchan, Davidson, & Sucharov, 2001). Scholars have also used the 

terms “security transition” and “security transformation” in the context of geopolitics, explaining changes 

in the foreign and security policies of states relative to 
19

domestic political and social change and power shifts 

in the international system (Riekhoff, 2003).

It is important to note here that, to an extent, power transitions are tangential to the study of intrastate 

transitions due to their exclusion of domestic political and societal issues. However, for the sake of this 

review and for clarity, a power transition is a type of 

transition found in the peace and security studies literature and one that researchers should be mindful of 

in relation to other forms of transition. 

Societal Transitions.

Generally stated, societal transitions are the transformations of relationships and rules of interaction 

among people and groups in a given society. Implicit 

in this type of transition is the normative goal of peace; 

thus, it shares significant overlap with war-to-peace 

transitions on the intrastate level mentioned above. 

As a distinct category, societal transition diverges 

from the broader war-to-peace transitions by focusing 

heavily on humanitarian action and the development 

of civil society, or community-oriented groups and 

institutions that provide additional public goods outside the control of the state.

Reconstruction and development of a post-conflict 

civil society entails the strengthening of organizations 

and institutions that foster social cooperation and improve quality of life (David, 1999; Posner, 2004). In 

post-conflict societies, civil society groups perform 

a substitution role by providing critical services in 

place of a weakened, transitional state (Posner, 2004). 

“During transitions, they tend to be especially prominent, either because of their ability to control or mobilize masses of people, or because they are able to fill 
20

policy voids through expertise” (Cawthra & Luckham, 

2003a, p. 313). More important to societal transition is 

the very creation of social groups, regardless of their 

function, as trust and norms of reciprocity (e.g., social 

capital) are the byproduct of successful cooperation 

over time (Posner, 2004). 

This can be extremely difficult, particularly in 

societies that lack a cohesive identity (Byman, 2003). 

Yet, as previously mentioned, challenges also emerge 

when development projects are not inclusive of local 

input or designed to ensure long-term local engagement and ownership (Cliffe et al., 2003; Kramer et 

al., 2008). Furthermore, and despite these efforts and 

good intentions, relief programs have an historical 

propensity to inadvertently create local dependencies 

on foreign assistance (David, 1999), or undermine the 

legitimacy of reconstructed government institutions 

(Narten, 2009). 

For development practitioners, cultural competence is a critical element for effectively building 

social capital and conditions of local empowerment 

and ownership, all of which facilitate societal transition. Rubinstein et al. (2008) provides seven principles 

of action for peacekeepers to better understand and 

use culture to increase success: (1) an awareness to 

interpret meaning and interact in a culturally positive manner; (2) attentiveness to cultural symbols 

(i.e., colors, birds, plants); (3) avoiding assumptions 

that locals share the similar motives; (4) awareness of 

any differences in local conflict management practices 

from international norms; (5) strong emphasis on ensuring mutual expectations are explicitly understood 

by locals and peacekeepers; (6) avoiding displays of 

partiality towards different social groups; and (7) an 

informed understanding of the hierarchies of power, 

influence, and expertise in a given community.
21

Political and Democratic Transitions.

Quite possibly the largest body of work on transitions, political and democratic transitions pertain to 

the process of transformation and/or (re)construction 

of formal institutions of the state from one regime type 

to another. In fact, the study of democratic transitions 

that occurred during the second half of the 20th century is commonly referred to as the “transition paradigm” (Carothers, 2002a) and remains an established 

topic in the field of comparative politics. 

Political and democratic transitions take place in 

a variety of forms. They can occur internally through 

violent uprisings, coups d’état, and revolutions or 

peaceful negotiations, or, as seen in recent years, 

through intervention by the international community. 

Transitional arenas of reform in political and democratic transitions include decisions on new constitutions, electoral systems, structures of governance (e.g., 

unitary versus federalist), new political elites and the 

reallocation of power, security sector, justice and rule 

of law, reconciliation and restitution of past injustices, 

and the media sector (Agüero, 1998; Bernabeu, 2007; 

Brinkerhoff et al., 2009; Byman, 2003; Welsh, 1994). 

NGOs providing democracy assistance on local levels play an important role in supporting democratic 

transitions (Mendelson, 2001). Admitting that there 

are variations in speeds of transition at different levels 

(national down to the individual), Welsh (p. 381) describes five characteristics that pertain to all political 

and democratic transitions: (1) an urgent need to address issues of major concern, (2) a great deal of uncertainty in both process and outcome, (3) conflict over the 

methods and procedures for changing authoritarian
22

structures, (4) elite-centered decisionmaking over 

transitional processes, and (5) negotiation.

We point out that there is a distinction between a 

political transition and a democratic transition. A political transition is more general, pertaining to changes 

in regime type, institutional structure, and/or policies 

(usually, but not always, away from authoritarianism), whereas a democratic transition is a specific process of political and institutional liberalization with 

a more definitive end-state. Studies on political transitions tend to examine transformations of political 

institutions and processes in relation to other institutions such as the military, civil society, and economy, 

but not necessarily democratization or liberal reforms. 

Welsh (1994, p. 381) makes this clear, stating “whereas 

liberalization is a controlled opening of the political 

space, democratization—that is, extrication from the 

authoritarian regime and constitution of a democratic 

one—is a process that subjects different interests to 

competition.” 

Part of the difficulty of parsing out distinctions 

between political and democratic transformations is 

that earlier scholars make the assumption that any 

country moving away from authoritarianism is transitioning toward democracy (Huntington, 1991; G. A. 

O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; G. A. O’Donnell, Schmitter, & Whitehead, 1986; Schmitter, 1995). Much of the 

research focused on explaining why and how roughly 

30 countries initiated a “third wave of democratization” from approximately 1974 to 1990 (Huntington, 

1991). Schmitter (1995, pp. 541, 562) provides a very 

useful representation of regime change from authoritarian rule to democracy noting four necessary processes with variable timing to achieve democratic consolidation: 
23

(1) the formation of a party system; 

(2) the formation of an interest association 

system; 

(3) drafting and approval of a constitution; and, 

(4) submission of the military to civilian control. 

He also notes six key events whose occurrences 

(sequence) are unpredictable during democratic transition: 

(1) “the formation of a provisional government; 

(2) the negotiation of a pact of military extraction from power; 

(3) the imposition of changes in the structure of 

property; 

(4) the negotiation of a pact among political 

parties; 

(5) the negotiation of a social pact with the participation of interest associations; and,

(6) the revision of the territorial distribution of 

power.” (p. 563)

Schmitter’s theoretical work on democratic transitions is perhaps the most relevant literature toward 

a more sophisticated understanding of transitions in 

stability operations.

However, the incompleteness of some of these 

transitions and weak performance of these new democracies have led some scholars to challenge this 

core assumption and debate the very utility of the 

“transition paradigm” (Carothers, 2002a, 2002b; Hyman, 2002; Nodia, 2002; G. O’Donnell, 2002; Wollack, 

2002). 

Casting further doubt, it is noted more recently that 

“the average time required to transit the path from 
24

extreme autocracy to coherent, albeit precarious, democracy has been 50 years, and only two have managed this transition in fewer than 25 years” (Moon, 

2009, p. 115). There is also a strong correlation between 

democratic transitions and conflict and instability, 

due in part by societal mistrust and fear of exercising 

democratic freedoms in the absence of adequate security and strong democratic institutions (Byman, 2003).

Domestic Political Transitions. As mentioned above, 

political transitions occur both internally through 

peaceful or coercive means and externally through 

interstate warfare and internationally led interventions. Many of the earlier studies (1945-90) on political 

and democratic transitions fall into the former category, focusing on internal transitions in Europe, Latin 

America, South Asia, and the Middle East. The “third 

wave” has been attributed to a lag in development of 

political institutions rather than social and economic 

institutions (Huntington, 1968, p. 5). 

Several scholars have provided theoretical accounts on phases, processes, and modes of democratization. Dankwart Rustow (1970) describes democratic 

transitions evolving along three phases: a preparatory 

phase that entails deep divisions between political actors, a decision phase that formally institutionalizes 

specific democratic procedures, and a final habituation phase in which political actors and the public 

adjust to new rules. Carothers (2002a, p. 7) highlights 

three processes central to democratization: “opening,” 

a period of democratic tumult and divisions within 

the authoritarian political regime; “breakthrough,” 

the collapse of the authoritarian regime and the emergence of democratic institutions, elections, and constitutional reforms; and “consolidation,” a slow period 
25

of institutionalization and accumulation of democratic 

substance as society and politics adjust to new democratic rules. Huntington offers three different modes 

of democratization:

Transformation . . . occurred when the elites in power 

took the lead in bringing about democracy. Replacement . . . occurred when opposition groups took the 

lead in bringing about democracy, and the authoritarian regime collapsed or was overthrown . . . transplacement . . . occurred when democratization resulted 

largely from joint action by government and opposition groups (1991, p. 114).

While these theories are helpful in describing the 

phases, processes, and mode of transition to democracy, it is important to note that some, if not many, of 

these democratic transitions have been half-measures. 

Indeed, semi-transitioned states have come to be 

known as “hybrid regimes” (Diamond, 2002; Zinecker, 2009) and, as such, researchers should be mindful 

to make careful distinctions between the political elite 

who maintain the locus of power and formal state institutions (Fishman, 1990). Schedler (2002) argues that 

free elections are hardly a sufficient qualifier for inclusion, pointing out how elites can manipulate elections to display a veneer of democratic governance. 

Similarly, Cook (2007) highlights how the militarydominated regimes in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey use 

“pseudo-democratic” institutions to present a public 

façade of democratic norms and outlet for societal disputation while disguising and protecting their own 

elite interests and control over the existing political 

order. 

Worse yet, some seemingly democratic transitions 

lapse back into periods of instability. The reasons 
26

why some democratic transitions end in violence are 

largely subjective. Zielinski (1999) cites that violence 

in these circumstances is triggered by miscommunication within the government rather than the resistance of the opposition. However, Huntington makes 

a strong proposition that “the stability of any given 

polity depends upon the relationship between the 

level of political participation and the level of political institutionalization” (Huntington, 1968, p. 79). In 

other words, as a society becomes more politically active (less oligarchic or elite-centric), the more a state’s 

political institutions must be effective at channeling 

public participation to maintain a stable political order. The importance here is Huntington’s emphasis on 

linking institutionalization with stability.

Externally Assisted/Imposed Political Transitions. 

Externally assisted or imposed political transitions 

typically occur in the midst of extreme conflict and/

or a state’s failure to provide basic governance to its 

citizens. Structural conditions of ineffective, illegitimate governance and poor security not only provide 

fuel for conflict, but also serve as breeding grounds 

for illicit activities that can potentially threaten the 

international order, thus increasing the likelihood of 

outside intervention (S. G. Jones, 2008). Depending on 

the scope of the operation, actors involved, and stated 

goals, these interventions are often given labels like 

nation-building, state-building, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations, conflict transformation, peace operations, peacekeeping, and liberal 

peacebuilding (C. T. Call & Cousens, 2007). These operations are typically large, complex, and are conducted in concert with other simultaneous transitions 

(i.e., security transitions, war-to-peace transitions). 
27

They also typically involve a transitional administration which provides a temporary governing mechanism before a host nation government is put in place 

to authorize state activities. Large, UN-led operations 

(i.e., Timor Leste) often carry mandates to temporarily 

exercise sovereign powers until the host nation builds 

the requisite security and administrative conditions 

needed for sustainable development (Chesterman, 

2002). Operational phases for transitional administrations overlap and include restoring peace and security, establishing conditions for self-rule, providing 

development assistance, and transferring the day-today operations of governance over to local authority. 

“These are not necessarily sequential phases, nor are 

they mutually exclusive, but they do represent discrete 

aspects of a transitional administration” (Chesterman, 

2002, p. 72). Chesterman also makes an important 

point that not enough serious research has been conducted on when and how sovereign power should be 

transferred to local hands.

Given recent experience, both scholars and experts 

are acutely aware of the complexities associated with 

externally-driven political transitions. Imperatives for 

operations include a clear political end-state and timeframe established by all parties; sufficient time to plan, 

resource, train personnel, and establish local credibility; and a flexible mandate to adjust to changing 

local conditions (Chesterman, 2002). However, these 

operations are fraught with flawed assumptions, dilemmas, and challenges such as the notion that Western political institutions can be transplanted in nonWestern states (such as post-World War II Germany; 

see Sa’adah, 2006), that locals and political elites share 

their benign understanding and desires for reconstruction, and that reconstruction is actually within their 
28

means, and have often led to failure, particularly in 

Africa (Englebert & Tull, 2008). David (1999, pp. 33-34) 

cites more pitfalls of externally led political interventions noting that introducing democratic competition 

can be destabilizing in societies without a long tradition of civic-participation; redistributions of power 

between groups in conflict can create tensions where 

democracy’s shortcomings become fuel for groups to 

advance political blame games (see also Byman, 2003); 

and that the implementation of a democratic election 

does not automatically create democracy (e.g., Fareed 

Zakaria’s “illiberal democracy”). 

Other Considerations. Some evidence suggests that 

liberal peacebuilding actually contributes to conflict 

rather than promoting peace and democratic governance. An argument based in recent experience, but 

closely related to that put forth in Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies (1968), is Roland Paris’ “institutionalization before liberalization” 

thesis that democratic reforms will not succeed in a 

state without strong institutions preceding this process (Paris, 1997, 2004; Paris & Sisk, 2009). An alternative is “republican peacebuilding” which centers on 

principles of deliberation, constitutionalism, and representation that helps lay the institutional foundations 

for follow-on liberal political reforms (Barnett, 2006). 

A more recent study highlights tensions between 

building strong democratic institutions at national 

and local levels in Afghanistan and reiterates the need 

for an integrated state-building approach (Nixon & 

Ponzio, 2007). Papagianni (2009) heeds Roland Paris’ 

argument that strong institutions are necessary before 

political liberalization, but insists, nevertheless, that 

political participation and inclusion of belligerents in 

transitional outcomes is still possible and warranted. 
29

Questions over sovereignty become major obstacles to political transitions (Bertram, 1995). Krasner 

(2004) challenges the conventional wisdom that governance assistance and transitional administrations 

are the best models for failing states, stating that they 

are often ineffective. Instead, he calls for power sharing arrangements such as trusteeships or shared sovereignty agreements with international organizations 

or more stable states to ensure that state stability is 

overseen. However, Kosovo, as an exception, is an 

ongoing case of a transition in flux because the UNmandated transitional administration assumed responsibility for exercising sovereign rule that created 

a problem of local ownership (Gow, 2009). Others simply call for scholars and the international community 

to accept the fact that the great majority of transitional 

countries are somewhere in between authoritarianism 

and democracy, asserting that teleological, ideal-type 

democracy is no longer realistic (Carothers, 2002a).

Methods. The literature on political and democratic 

transitions contains a diverse panoply of research 

methods (quantitative and qualitative) beyond the 

standard case study approach. Przeworski (1991) classifies studies on political and democratic transitions 

into two groups: macro-studies that center on overarching, objective, and structural conditions of political transition, and studies on political strategy and 

choice. A significant majority of this research consists 

of inductive case studies. However, scholars have also 

applied empirical and formal modeling techniques to 

explore both elements of structure and agency. These 

studies tend to align along one of two theses: the modernization thesis that posits democratic transitions result from economic development and modernization, 
30

and the political agent thesis that makes the claim that 

democratic transitions are the result of strategic interactions among political actors (Kugler & Feng, 1999).

Focusing largely on structural conditions, a small 

handful of studies apply econometric models to democratic transitions (Feng & Zak, 1999; Ratner, 2009; Ulfelder & Lustik, 2005; Zak & Feng, 2003). These explore 

the socio-economic determinants of transition, citing 

that factors such as low education, income inequality, 

and a weak democratic heritage are statistically linked 

to failed or stalled transitions (Feng & Zak, 1999). Zak 

and Feng (2003) integrate the dynamics between political transition and economic development, citing that 

additional factors such as the growth and distribution 

of economic development, authoritarian policies, and 

legitimacy determine if and when transitions occur. 

Ulfelder and Lustik (2005) implement a model of transition that shows significant results on factors such as 

civil liberties and resource rents, or extra economic 

profits from natural resources. Other tools applied 

include factor analysis (Kotze & Toit, 1995) and spatial analysis (Lin, Chu, & Hinich, 1996). Taking a more 

international approach, Ratner (2009) uses regression 

analysis to explore the connection between democratic transition and foreign policy alignment along U.S. 

goals. Starr and Lindborg (2003) study the impact of 

diffusion on the rise in democratic transitions across 

the international system from 1974 to 1996.

Scholars in the latter category tend to turn to rational choice and game-theoretical models to better 

understand why some democratic transitions end in 

violence and others are pursued peacefully. Rational 

choice and game theory examine the strategic nature 

of the decision of an authoritarian regime to pursue 

a transition toward liberalization. Przeworski (1991) 
31

was one of the first to use basic game-theoretical models to explain transition processes as signaling behavior between the regime and opposition groups. Subsequent models integrate the element of uncertainty 

in the transition outcome (Crescenzi, 1999; Gates & 

Humes, 1997). Swaminathan (1999) specifies a timing 

game to highlight the significance of relative power 

distributions as indicators that can predict when opposition groups mobilize and when negotiations will 

take place. Wantchekon (1999) explores the strategic 

choices of voters and the likelihood of violence in the 

wake of a transitional state’s first democratic election.

Security Transitions.

In the outset of a conflict intervention, the first priority is security. Initially provided by a stabilization 

force, the establishment of a safe and secure environment is central to sustainable peace and development 

(Brzoska, 2003, 2007; Jean, 2005; McFate, 2008; Meharg, 

Arnush, & Merrill, 2010; Schnabel & Ehrhart, 2005; 

U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID], 

U.S. Department of Defense, & U.S. Department of 

State, 2009). Yet, in time, the responsibility for maintaining security must be transferred back to the host 

nation—ideally under democratic civilian control—at 

a time when it holds the sovereign capacity to preserve security through a legitimate monopoly on the 

use of force (Bruneau & Tollefson, 2006; Cawthra & 

Luckham, 2003a, 2003b; Huntington, 1957; Luckham, 

2003; U.S. Agency for International Development 

[USAID] et al., 2009). The security sector “plays an 

important and indispensible role in helping post-conflict societies secure a transition to a more productive 

and peaceful life” (Ehrhart & Schnabel, 2005, p. 320). 
32

Accordingly, a security transition is the turbulent process from a condition of insecurity to one of stability 

with legitimate host nation control over an effective 

security sector. This can occur internally, as a state’s 

political and coercive institutions (e.g., armed forces 

and police) build sufficient capacity to provide a safe 

and secure environment, or with external support 

through international peacekeeping forces, security 

sector reform, and security force assistance programs.

Security transitions are broad in scope, complex, 

lengthy, and require a vast array of resources (human, 

institutional, and financial). Brzoska notes that the 

overarching post-conflict security transition agenda 

consists of a focus on the “prevention of renewed conflict, establishment of rule of law, democratization, 

and sustainable development . . . all [of which fall] 

eventually under full domestic ‘ownership’” (2007, p. 

i). Citing South Africa as an ideal type of a successful 

security transition, Cawthra and Luckham note the actual sequence of reforms as (2003a, p. 308):

1. The lifting of repressive security legislation;

2. The reform of the police service to ensure that 

the political process can be freed up; and,

3. Reform of the defense forces.

It is important to observe that despite the literature’s contemporary emphasis on security transitions as internationally led security reform, many of 

the prescriptive concepts, such as civilian control of 

the armed forces and professionalization of the officer corps, are grounded in the subfield of comparative civil-military relations (Bruneau & Tollefson, 

2006; Cook, 2007; Feaver, 2003; Huntington, 1957, 

1968; Janowitz, 1960; Taylor, 2003). Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies (1968) is a 
33

particularly relevant text to the study of multilevel 

transitions. He makes a strong case that a nation’s stability is determined by the balance between the capacity of political institutions and the degree of a society’s 

demand for participation in the political activities of 

the state. As societies move from oligarchic political systems toward democratic systems and demand 

more political participation, political institutions must 

adapt in order to channel participation in a way that 

stymies instability, or worse, military intervention in 

politics (e.g., a coup d’état).

Security transitions are critically linked to other domestic-level transitions (war-to-peace, political-democratic, societal, and economic) as security, on a basic 

level, provides a necessary, but insufficient, condition 

through which other transitions occur. “It is argued 

that the policy choices made about the management 

and control of military and security forces at moments 

of crisis or transition . . . are decisive for the consolidation of democracy, the prevention of conflict and the 

building of a sustainable peace” (Luckham, 2003, p. 

3). Moreover, its connection to democratic transition 

is particularly strong due to the close proximity between security institutions and political power as well 

as the capacity of security institutions to manage any 

negative consequences of democratization (Cawthra 

& Luckham, 2003a, p. 305). 

This claim has its limits, however. While security 

sector reconstruction and reform can enhance domestic administrative capacity and legitimacy, it does not 

necessarily mean it alone will impel regime change or 

democratic consolidation (Brzoska, 2007, p. vi). Nor 

do democratic transitions necessarily drive security 

reform. While much of the literature on democratic 

transitions suggests that free elections, transparency, 
34

and accountability should lead to greater civilian control, justice, and human rights protections, the emergence of hybrid regimes and illiberal democracies 

show that this is not necessarily the case (Cook, 2007; 

Diamond, 2002; Zinecker, 2009). A great deal of the 

literature on security sector reform centers on objective goals and recommendations for implementation; 

much less thought has been given to the impacts of 

the economic and political circumstances of Security 

Sector Reform (SSR) outcomes (Luckham, 2003, p. 17). 

We cannot overstate the fact that the strengths and 

directions of interdependence among these different 

forms of transition are underexplored and ripe for future research.

In light of the broad security transition agenda, the 

literature tends to focus specifically on two dominant 

subthemes: the (re)construction of security institutions 

(i.e., military, police, intelligence, courts) to achieve a 

legitimate monopoly of force, and the reform of these 

institutions to achieve normative goals of civilian 

oversight and the protection of basic human rights 

(Luckham, 2003). These distinct, but closely related, 

aspects are typically conflated by the oft-used terms 

“security sector reform,” “security sector reform and 

reconstruction,” and “security sector transformation.” 

Military and law enforcement experts who help train 

and equip security forces distinguish their functional 

role as different from the broader security sector reform mission, labeling it “security force assistance” 

(Dubik, 2009). Vagueness aside, security sector reform 

“is essential in the transition from war to peace in 

conflict-afflicted countries” (McFate, 2008, p. 1). Definitions of security sector reform include the following: 
35

the complex task of transforming the institutions and 

organizations that deal directly with security threats 

to the state and its citizens (McFate, 2008, p. 2).

the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that 

a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice . . . [with] the overall 

objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public service that 

is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and 

responsive to the needs of the public (U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) et al., 2009, p. 2).

U.S. Army Lieutenant General James Dubik makes 

a point to emphasize that security transitions should 

not be viewed as the simple authority transfer to the 

host nation government to train and equip security 

forces. Rather, it is the dual process of creating a security enterprise that combines both security force assistance (training and equipping military and police 

forces) with SSR, or the institutional development of 

the administrative agencies that provide oversight of 

the security sector (Dubik, 2009).

Challenges and Strategies. Experts in the field have 

provided critical insight into implementation challenges and strategies for transition unknowingly. 

There are many factors for consideration in evaluating 

the potential for transition success. First, the relative 

balance between belligerent forces is a structural consideration for security transition. David (1999, p. 30) 

notes that the closer an interstate conflict resembles a 

civil war the “more resistant it is to a peaceful settlement.” “A realistic strategy for peacebuilding must 

take into account the fact that the balance of forces may 

have a greater bearing on the chances for a peaceful
36

security transition than does a negotiated agreement” 

(p. 31). Second, effects of the security dilemma on 

ex-combatants, particularly lack of trust, introduces 

uncertainty. Third, control and final resolution over 

territory is also a contentious issue for security transitions, especially after civil war; evidence suggests that 

arbitrary separation of belligerents and division of 

territory does not often work to sustain peace (p. 32). 

Fourth, corruption, often pervasive in post-conflict 

societies, gives cause for great concern in the process 

of rebuilding security forces. For example, substandard conditions and weak accountability procedures 

aid criminal and insurgent groups in obtaining arms 

(Dickey, 2007). Fifth, the resilience and competing 

legitimacy of informal institutions creates confusion 

and difficulty for institution building. Locals in fragile 

states view the parallel or informal institutions as legitimate proxies for security and governance, making 

it difficult to build legitimacy for newly created stated 

institutions (David, 1999). Finally, old “institutional 

and ideational legacies of military power” can also be 

either a hindrance to or facilitate security reforms and 

transition (Golts & Putnam, 2004). Long-lasting societal attitudes (positive or negative) toward military 

forces, the degree to which people view their military 

as a symbol of national pride and prestige, and the degree of operational autonomy that old security establishments use to help can be seen as factors influencing the ultimate success of a security transition (Golts 

& Putnam, 2004). 

In terms of security force assistance, the reality of 

the security situation places a heavy demand on the 

rapid development of security forces. Dubik (2009) 

notes that the quantity versus quality argument over 

security force development is a futile debate as neither 
37

are individually sufficient strategies. Quantity alone 

will not result in security; likewise, a focus on quality 

will take too long to develop adequate security forces 

and result in a strategic defeat for external actors in 

the short term. Instead, he argues, in the case of Iraq a 

focus on “sufficiency” is the appropriate guideline and 

a first order task for security force trainers to define at 

the outset of such a mission. It has also been observed 

that rebuilding effective police forces is as important 

(if not more important) than building military forces 

to maintain security (S. G. Jones, 2008). 

Strengthening linkages between national, regional, 

and local institutions is critical to building capacity and 

resilience. Experts highlight a multilevel “circuit-rider 

approach” (the deployment of advisor teams that rotate to different locations to provide on-site technical 

assistance) to advising courts and justices as an effective tool for strengthening judicial systems (Dempsey 

& Nichols, 2009). A circuit-rider approach refers to assistance and training. However, some have called for 

permanently institutionalizing security force training 

and assistance functions within the U.S. Army in the 

form of an “Advisor Command,” which would create 

a specialized cadre of military personnel to oversee 

the training of host nation officials (Nagl, 2008).

Finally, timelines and expectations are also important considerations in determining time horizons 

for building sufficient security forces and sufficient 

ministerial administrative capacity (Dubik, 2009). It 

takes much longer to build administrative and institutional norms and operational capacity for a ministry 

than it does to create a battle-ready infantry battalion. There are four main purposes for a ministry of 

defense: to structure the power relationships between 

politically elected and appointed leadership and an 
38

armed force’s senior leadership; define, and establish 

the responsibilities between civilian and uniformed 

military service personnel; to maximize the effectiveness of the armed forces; and to ensure the efficient 

use of resources across the security sector (Bruneau & 

Tollefson, 2006, pp. 78-82). It is reasonable to infer that 

institutionalizing relationships between the executive and legislative branches of government and key 

procedures (i.e., grand strategy and doctrinal review, 

budgeting, and oversight) will take longer than training tactical level units.

Economic Transitions.

The literature on economic transitions includes a 

rich body of theoretical and empirical studies, but is 

well beyond the scope of this paper. Transitional economics is actually considered by some economists as a 

distinct topic that overlaps between broader subfields 

of institutional economics and development economics (Roland, 2000; Todaro & Smith, 2009). Much of the 

work on economic transitions centers on nations that 

have experienced, or are simultaneously experiencing, 

internal conflict and the social, political, and security 

transitions described above. 

In the more general, macro-economic sense, economic transitions have to do with the change and dynamics a nation experiences as its economic system 

transforms, typically from a more centrally controlled 

system toward a more liberal, open, market-based 

economy. From this perspective, the most contested 

aspect of transition is the speed at which the economy 

liberalizes, which has generated debate among experts who either advocate shock therapy, in the form 

of rapid and radical economic institutional reforms, or 
39

those who argue for a gradual approach to economic 

liberalization (Popov, 2000).

However, in a post-conflict economic transition 

the goals are more short-term and are typically focused on “a revival of economic growth and restoring the quality of life and per capita consumption to 

pre-conflict levels as soon as possible” (Snodgrass, 

2004, p. 260). Theory suggests that economic reforms 

in post-conflict stabilization operations ought to follow a path toward market liberalization, but should 

be implemented in three phases (pp. 260-262):

1. a financial stabilization phase that focuses on 

drastically reducing inflation and increasing international trade through currency boards and assistance 

with deficits; 

2. a rehabilitation and reconstruction phase 

centered on restoring and reopening infrastructure 

to facilitate trade and training people in key development skills including economic and financial policy 

management; and,

3. a more long-term, comprehensive development phase that increases capital, both human and 

natural resources, but maintains adequate regulatory 

mechanisms for sustained growth.

Despite this pragmatic approach, externally 

planned economic transitions can be equally problematic. David (1999, pp. 35-36) notes three major dilemmas:

1. the forced economic liberalization and introduction of competition typical of capitalist markets 

can have an adverse effect on social inequalities and 

fuel tensions; 

2. humanitarian and other forms of external assistance are essential to economic development, but 
40

also hold great potential for creating local dependencies and become counterproductive to goals of local 

sustainability, legitimacy, and ownership; and, 

3. well-intended international organizations 

such as the UN, the World Bank, and the International 

Monetary Fund have a tendency to implement economic and security programs with objectives that run 

counter to each other by taking different approaches 

(e.g., top-down versus bottom up).

Nevertheless, economists have argued that economic transitions hinge more upon effective institutions and the rule of law, than the type of regime 

(e.g. democratic versus authoritarian). Economic “liberalization alone, when it is not complemented with 

strong institutions, cannot ensure good performance 

. . . institutional capacities in turn, depend to a large 

extent on the combination of the rule of law and democracy: the data seem to suggest that both—authoritarian and democratic regimes with the strong rule of 

law can deliver efficient institutions” (Popov, 2000, 

p. 44). China, the world’s second largest economy, is 

the clearest example of an authoritarian regime with 

a strong economy, strong institutions, and the rule of 

law, providing much of the same support for economic 

transitions as its democratic counterparts. At the very 

least, this provides support to the claim that political, 

security, and economic transitions are strongly interdependent.

Crosscutting Studies.

The authors note that there are several studies 

that purposefully tackle transitional aspects of stability operations, but this area is still in need of greater 
41

scholarly focus and research. Mentioned several times 

above, Charles-Philippe David (1999) explicitly notes 

the simultaneity of security, political, and socioeconomic transitions. Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, authored by USIP and PKSOI 

(2009), is perhaps the most useful guide in gaining 

an appreciation for the multiinstitutional and transitional aspects of stability operations. It indirectly, if 

not directly, covers each of the domestic level transitions (political, societal, security, and economic) and 

recognizes the complexities and dilemmas between 

them. Haggard and Kaufman (1997) look at how economic performance influences democratic transitional 

outcomes, specifically constitutional rules, political 

alignments, and institutions. Kotze and Toit (1995) 

explore the linkage between a robust civil society and 

democratic transitions in South Africa, demonstrating 

that the calming of societal tensions in deeply divided 

societies tends to lag behind constitutional and institutional reforms during transition. Using Taiwan as a 

case study, Lin et al. (1996) shows that displacement of 

power and the realignment among the political elites 

can be a positive development for political transitions 

in countries with strong national identities and socioeconomic justice.

There are several monographs and edited volumes 

that recognize the interdisciplinary and multi-institutional nature of stability operations and state-building 

(Berdal, 2009; C. Call et al., 2008; Fukuyama, 2004; 

Ghani & Lockhart, 2008; Paris, 2004; Paris & Sisk, 

2009; Rotberg, 2004b). However, these works do not 

directly focus on the transitional aspects of building 

institutions and do not provide additional information to this study. 
42

Transitions do not occur in isolation within institutional boundaries. In other words, a war-to-peace 

transition does not occur without changes in security 

and politics. Rather, transitions occur simultaneously 

and are inherently interdependent. Future research on 

transitions should strive for a greater understanding 

of the complexities between multiple transitions. 

APPROACHES TO TRANSITION

Stability operations are inherently about transitions, encompassing the contextual and functional 

roles in stabilization activities. While doctrine and 

best practices/lessons learned are provided to guide 

practitioners in the field, little exists to help individuals foster transition in these complex environments. 

As the need for concrete strategies to address issues 

of transition persists, government agencies and independent think tanks have created their own sets 

of procedures, guidelines, and assessment tools to 

grapple with issues that inform the many meanings 

of transition. Yet, similar to the different definitions 

presented in this literature review, the mechanisms 

used to stimulate and measure transition correspond 

to the level of response—whether tactical, operational, 

or strategic.

Whole of Government Approach.

As one of the most popular strategic approaches to 

transition, the whole of government (WOG) approach 

encompasses the multiple stream method to measure 

the concept (Bush, 2005; Nixon & Ponzio, 2007; PKSOI, 2007; Serafino, 2009; Szayna et al., 2009; U.S. Department of Defense, 2005a; U.S. Department of State 
43

- S/CRS, 2005b; U.S. Department of State, 2009; U.S. 

Department of State & U.S. Department of Defense, 

2009; U.S. Department of the Army, 2009a). The WOG 

approach relies on the collaborative efforts of agencies 

dealing with defense, diplomacy, and development 

specifically related to stability operations in order to 

address the mechanisms of governance, all affected 

by transition. Brokered by the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), the WOG approach is meant to provide both military and civilian 

support to issues dealing with the transition of fragile 

states to more stable forms of governance.

The WOG approach tries to combine the functions of multiple government agencies supporting 

transition initiatives to provide common definitions, 

frameworks, and procedures at the strategic level. 

This common framework assists U.S. Government 

(USG) agencies in planning operational and tactical 

activities that complement overall strategic goals. The 

WOG approach is run through interagency working 

groups and civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) 

to decipher and address transitional issues that span 

civil and military realms of authority. This multidisciplinary approach provides a more encompassing 

mechanism to deal with complexity in transitional issues. While the WOG process is still being developed, 

the hope is that a greater spectrum of capabilities will 

be able to inform doctrine and strategy related to transition. The top-down approach of WOG provides the 

backbone for streamlining processes in stabilization 

initiatives to better achieve strategic goals through the 

use of specific operational tools that vary by agency.
44

Mentoring and Advising.

At tactical and operational levels, mentoring and 

advising is used to create the leadership and capabilities needed to support transition activities. Several government agencies, most prominently the 

U.S. military, have used mentoring and advising as a 

staple to ensure that host nation authorities are both 

able and willing to support transition, most specifically in security and governance functions (Brinkerhoff et al., 2009; Dubik, 2009; Durch, 2008a; Hadaway, 

2009; Lauria; Leika, 2007; Miklaucic, 2009; Nagl, 2008; 

Netherlands Ministry of Defence, 2008; PKSOI, 2009b; 

Rubinstein et al., 2008; U.S. Department of the Army, 

2009a). Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and 

military transition teams (MiTTs) are most notable in 

this endeavor, as groups work to stabilize environments through quick impact projects and one-on-one 

interaction with host nation entities to teach them how 

to sustain long-term benefits of stabilization aid. By 

integrating all the tools of the USG—now referred to 

as “smart power”—PRTs, MiTTs, and similar groups 

are able to more aptly address the complex dynamics 

of transition.

The military plays a prominent role in the mentoring/advising strategy in transition missions. Civil 

Affairs (CA) components of the military can greatly 

add to sector expertise and provide mentor support to 

host nation nationals by matching military forces with 

particular skill sets and capabilities to their respective 

host nation counterparts. This greatly adds to the capability for stabilization components to create credible and capable leaders for transition while building 

the potential to sustain institutions. CA plays a very 
45

important role in bolstering this aspect of stability operations, since it provides expertise to stability situations that lack adequate civilian input or capabilities 

to mentor the host nation. Despite the WOG approach 

discussed earlier in the paper, CA and other military 

personnel often address discrepancies when WOG 

approaches do not work or exist to deal with transition. Lack of holistic effort is less prevalent among 

multilateral partners, who can sometimes provide just 

as much or better civilian expertise to stability operations than military forces to deal with integrated civilian and military matters.

Comprehensive Approach.

Similar to the WOG approach, the comprehensive 

approach focuses on the capabilities of partners and 

allies to augment whole of government support in operations dealing with transition (Bellamy & Williams, 

2005; Bobrow & Boyer, 1997; Campbell, 2008; Durch, 

2008a; Fishman, 1990; Gow, 2009; B. Jones et al., 2009; 

Krasner, 2004; Leika, 2007; Netherlands Ministry of 

Defence, 2008; Nixon & Ponzio, 2007; Rubinstein et al., 

2008; Schnaubelt, 2009; U.S. Department of Defense, 

2003; U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 

2008a; Wittkopf, 1994). The comprehensive approach 

spans all three levels of collaboration (tactical, operational, and strategic), but is most concentrated at operational and tactical levels; this results from a common 

inability to form consensus on multinational strategic 

goals. Past stability operations prove that partner 

and ally support are crucial in providing unique skill 

sets to transitional mechanisms. By promoting an approach that focuses not only on USG capabilities, but 

also the unique skill sets of other international actors, 
46

coalitions can better address the complexities of transition at some of the most critical operating levels.

The comprehensive approach to transition is exemplified through NATO-led PRTs in Afghanistan. 

Although PRTs were originally an American concept, other NATO allies quickly latched on to this 

structure to capitalize on particular civil strengths for 

reconstruction and stabilization activities, with the 

benefit of having the military provide security. Independently run PRTs have become staples in some 

regions by ensuring security while providing key 

services and training promoting transition to more 

stable and effective phases. Each PRT runs different 

stability programs, reflective of the strategic goals of 

the implementing country. Countries that actively 

participate in PRTs often provide expertise based on 

their capabilities; for some, civilian expertise is far 

more advanced to provide support to stabilization activities as compared to military components. Despite 

the personnel differences, comprehensive approaches 

provide a single guide to all elements of stabilization 

initiatives, creating operational support that draws on 

the best characteristics of each actor.

The comprehensive approach to transition is 

meant to further expand on the WOG approach presented above, but on an international level. While 

both approaches are optimistic in the ability to combine civilian and military forces to achieve a state of 

transition, the difficulties in pursuing this approach 

are substantial. Unity of command and combined efforts are often obstacles in achieving a comprehensive 

approach to transition initiatives, especially since 

different bureaucratic structures compete for influence of missions and overall strategy; this is further 

compounded by governing forces that sometimes 
47

advocate differing approaches to transition activities. 

Competition over resources and command authority 

can greatly inhibit the effectiveness of these types of 

operations, especially if no strategic plan for transition is adequately created for planners. In effect, the 

comprehensive approach is the most apt to encounter 

problems in planning for and executing transitional 

activities, and is most often effective only at the operational and tactical levels.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) Approach.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy uses transition as a key component of its three-prong approach 

to attaining stability in insurgencies (S. G. Jones, 2008; 

U.S. Department of Defense, 2009a, 2009b; U.S. Department of State, 2009; U.S. Department of State & 

U.S. Department of Defense, 2009; U.S. Department 

of the Army, 2009b; U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting 

Laboratory, 2009). As part of the “clear-hold-build” 

strategy outlined in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24, 

Counterinsurgency, transition is both an end-state and 

a process that is achieved through carefully crafted 

strategy and tactics to defeat insurgent groups who 

threaten the establishment of a viable and legitimate 

national government (U.S. Department of the Army, 

2009b). Maintaining unity of effort is a key part of successful transition, as COIN initiatives gain support 

and legitimacy from the population, thus creating a 

baseline for effective, and preferred, host nation institutions to grow.

The COIN approach to transition assumes that all 

components of the strategy are integrated and calibrated at the national level to provide, and eventually transfer, essential services to the host nation. All 
48

USG agencies play important roles in the execution of 

COIN, providing expertise in both civilian and military functions to the host nation. However, unlike the 

strategy outlined in the WOG and comprehensive approaches, transition is the key goal or end state in any 

stabilization activity since COIN seeks to build host 

nation capacities for long-term sustainability—especially in policies that parallel USG goals. Host nation 

institutions and leaders are the critical nodes ensuring 

that transition initiatives are capable of succeeding in 

post-conflict environments. Transition is, in effect, the 

desired end goal for any COIN operation, making it 

inherently strategic in its outlook and execution.

Developmental Transition.

Despite the emphasis on military transitions, the 

foreign aid community uses transition as a key indicator of success for development and aid programs 

(Cliffe et al., 2003; Crane et al., 2009; Crichton, 2009; 

Feng & Zak, 1999; Frumin, 2009; Moon, 2009; PKSOI, 

2009a; U.S. Agency for International Development 

[USAID], 2009). Foreign aid success is highly dependent on its ability to change or alter conditions on the 

ground, especially in conjunction with agency goals 

and desired outcomes in stabilizing environments. 

Transitions establish a benchmark for the aid community as to when to begin projects that bolster stabilizing societies, as well as the appropriate time to alter 

programs to meet changing societal needs. In many 

respects, development approaches depend heavily on 

phased transition in order to gauge the success and 

usefulness of programs by assessing results at different stabilization levels and times. 
49

Developmental transitions are focused more on 

the process and phasing of transitioning communities to more sustainable livelihoods than on transition 

as a viable end-state. Often, the aid community likes 

to ensure that the transition process is successfully 

completed before discontinuing aid or implementing 

more advanced programs for economic development. 

USAID frequently refers to transition as the main period of concern for aid communities, especially since 

transitional periods are considered highly destabilizing in post-conflict environments. Transition is 

viewed more as an obstacle or window of opportunity to achieve development goals rather than a pure 

process of change. Transitional periods are a starting 

point for aid communities as they gauge how to handle complex issues endemic to stabilization initiatives. 

The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) at USAID 

deals exclusively with this concept, pinpointing transitional periods that need assistance for development. 

The organization’s flexible and adaptive planning 

helps USAID tailor U.S. assistance in support of transitional initiatives primarily to accelerate the timeline 

to achieve stability.

AVAILABLE TOOLS FOR TRANSITION

Both academics and practitioners have tried to 

cope with transition issues by creating standards for 

stability activities. The efforts to create viable tools—

in the form of metrics, indicators, guidebooks, and 

field manuals—have contributed to available tools, 

but often lack a solid base definition to substantiate 

these projects. The measurements currently available 

to stability operation practitioners individually span 

the extent of transitional issues, but no single toolkit 
50

adequately encompasses all of the challenges inherent 

to grappling with the concept’s complexity.

Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments.

The Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments 

(MPICE) framework provides an outcome-based metric system that measures operational and strategic advancements in stabilization environments (Dziedzic, 

Sotirin, & Agoglia, 2008). This framework is meant to 

directly support the stated goals and initiatives of policy, specifically as outlined by individual policymakers 

in the planning process. MPICE is a guidebook that is 

used to tailor stability measures to specific strategic 

goals, using a top-down approach to reach local level 

actors in stabilizing environments.

MPICE uses both quantitative and qualitative 

measures to indicate trends in stability indicators 

throughout three key levels of stability building: imposed stability, assisted stability, and self-sustaining 

peace. Each of these phases is marked by indicators or 

concepts that address elements of the stability building process, mainly governance, cessation of violence, 

and economic and social well-being. All of these indicators are considered transferrable to stability environments by being broad enough to adjust for cultural 

and social uniqueness. General categories of MPICE 

indicators facilitate individual application on the operational level, specifically to measure stability directly related to community indicators. For example, delivery of public goods and services may be measured 

by quality of life perception and public satisfaction to 

indicate the strength of this category (Dziedzic et al., 

2008). The change in these specific indicators, marked 

by a “+” (indicating a positive trend), a “-” (indicating
51

a negative trend), or a “d” (indicating condition dependent trends) is meant to measure the impact of 

stabilization policies on diminishing short- and longterm threats.

MPICE provides insights in measuring transition 

during stability operations. In one sense, it provides 

strategic and operational guidance in the types of 

characteristics to consider when assessing transition 

policy effectiveness. This assumes that transition is 

a phased process that can be achieved by changing 

environmental trends, specifically those directly impacting the population. However, MPICE fails to look 

beyond transition as something other than a phased 

process of factors over a long time horizon. The transitional element of MPICE is barely measured by the 

indicators because of their lack of proven causality. 

Transition must first be understood before attempting 

to measure it in variables which may exclude more 

causal mechanisms of stability. 

Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Task Matrix.

The U.S. Department of State (DoS) created the 

Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Task Matrix as 

a living document to capture some of the recurring 

tasks in post-conflict operations. DoS implemented 

this matrix, which was created in 2005, as a way to 

better conceptualize the tactical missions feeding into 

operational requirements for three key phases of postconflict transition: initial response, transformation, 

and sustainability. The matrix is divided into particular operational areas (including security, governance 

and participation, humanitarian assistance and social 

well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, 

and justice and reconciliation) that help divide tasks 

according to goals at each of the three stages. The 
52

matrix is a check list for practitioners to match tactical 

and operational goals with specific and defined activities.

The Essential Task Matrix is an extensive document embracing the dynamic complexity of transition, 

mostly by covering a broad range of “transitional areas.” The Matrix covers topics ranging from elections 

and establishing a judiciary to creating electrical grids 

to hiring and training teachers for education. Many 

of the tasks assume a direct relation to achieving a 

higher level of stability—for example, elections will 

lead to the new task of creating public offices. However, while the indicators are helpful to practitioners, 

many are open to interpretation in both meaning and 

operationalization depending on implementer experiences. Practitioners undertaking stability tasks act as 

the arbiters during transitional planning, truly providing authority at the tactical level. This oversight 

mechanism can result in either very complex planning 

(if coordination and partnerships take place) or isolated planning (if the planner is focused on one or two 

activities) that can affect how transition is handled in 

these environments.

Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework.

The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework 

(ICAF) was created in 2004 in response to the United Nations (UN) Working Group on Transition. The 

group, which analyzed the activities needed to secure 

stability, provided several recommendations for coordinated planning and implementation. As followon action to several of these recommendations, the 

USG determined that a common, planned interagency 

mechanism was needed to address issues affecting 
53

fragile states. The working group specifically highlighted the necessity to create a common framework to 

assess contextual factors of conflict mitigation. ICAF 

provides this standardized analytical framework to 

guide operational mechanisms and address the causes 

of transition.

The ICAF uses a number of key assumptions in 

guiding policymakers in the planning of stability operations. Specifically, the framework addresses the importance of transition in creating viable foundations 

for authority transfer to host nation governments. 

ICAF assumes:

1. Each transition is unique, so that the analysis 

needs to be context-specific;

2. Conflicts are not mono-causal phenomena 

and arise from a set of interconnected conflict factors 

and dynamics;

3. Transition programming of the UN system 

should aim at “doing no harm” and minimizing unintended negative impacts;

4. Transition programming of the UN system 

should aim at maximizing its peace building impact in 

the aftermath of the crisis, as well as over the longerterm;

5. Efforts should be made to ensure national 

ownership and seek the participation of all conflict 

parties in the process of the analysis (United Nations, 

2004; 2).

In many respects, transition is used as an indicator 

in this framework to measure conflict abatement strategy effectiveness. The use of transition as a benchmark in planning indicates its importance in stability 

operation strategic goals—most notably by serving 

as a concrete end-state. However, ICAF does not 
54

exclusively focus on the process of transition, but instead the mechanisms of collaboration and their effectiveness in addressing stabilization factors. The 

ICAF critiques organizational mechanisms through 

three key stages of the stabilization process: conflict, 

ongoing responses, and strategic and programmatic 

conclusions for transition planning. The ICAF intends 

to unify not only agencies, but stages of the transition 

process by feeding mechanisms into each other. Assessment of coordination is not rigidly separated by 

the three stages, but instead impacts subsequent stages of the process.

The Sphere Project.

The Sphere Project evolved in 1997 from a group 

of humanitarian nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs) and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Society as a 

way to standardize humanitarian responses to natural 

disasters and conflict, explicitly drawing on the principles of the Humanitarian Charter. The first rendition 

of the Sphere Project, launched in 2000, outlined five 

key areas of humanitarian response: water supply and 

sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter, and health services. A second Sphere Project manual was released in 

2004 upon suggestions from the international community; the second edition includes a sixth sector—food 

security.

The Sphere Project’s significance is based on the 

NGO assertion that stability is progressed through 

certain minimum standards. The six indication areas 

provide benchmarks for achieving a stability baseline; this baseline demarcates the tipping point to 

transition societies from danger to viability through 
55

the use of humanitarian aid. The Sphere handbook 

places tremendous emphasis on host nation participation in planning and implementing disaster response 

programs. The handbook uses tactical techniques to 

achieve these transitional phases during periods of instability. The hands-on approach championed by the 

literature is particularly informative, especially since 

feedback from the host nation is essential to program 

success. The Sphere Project provides insights into how 

to achieve transition by incorporating the help of the 

host nation in every aspect of the response process, 

making responses truly organic and directly responsive to the situation. 

Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework.

USAID and DoD created the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF) for use in stability environments, specifically on the tactical level. The TCAF 

is a response to USAID observations that civilian and 

military response team members had little guidance 

for actions in stability operations. The TCAF provides 

a basic framework of preliminary response mechanisms for these teams.

The TCAF is unique because of its tactical focus in 

addressing causes of conflict and combines military 

and civilian efforts into a single, standardized tool. 

“The TCAF is a simple and standardized diagnostic 

tool used to gather information from local inhabitants to identify the causes of instability or conflict in 

a unit’s area of operation. This information can help 

identify, prioritize, monitor, evaluate, and adjust civil-military programming targeted at diminishing the 

causes of instability or conflict” in an area (USAID, 

2010, p. 1). To accomplish this, the tool focuses on four 
56

key areas: (1) identifying the cause of instability, (2) 

addressing the local context, (3) gathering information, and (4) designing programs that effectively address the situation. Each of these stages is reliant on 

the direct interactions between local inhabitants and 

tactical commanders to collect appropriate information for stability activities. Specifically, TCAF highlights the importance of informed tactical activities in 

gauging and ensuring transition progress. It depends 

highly on environmental factors and responses to provide accurate assessments of transition.

United Nations Transition Strategy.

The UN has been very proactive in writing best 

practices and planning guidelines on transitional issues. Founded under the UN Development Group 

(UNDG), the “UN Transition Strategy” refers to the 

organization’s contingency response plans to conflict 

situations. The UN is careful to make the distinction 

that the transition strategy is not a long-term solution to managing conflict and instability; instead, it 

is meant to bridge the gap between failing and sufficient responses to disaster by employing specific 

stabilization tools. The transition strategy makes use 

of extensive response networks to draw on the most 

applicable services and activities to stabilize fragile 

environments.

The UN developed the Working Group on Transitions to analyze and change UN responses to crises, 

specifically by creating tools that more directly address stabilization. The Working Group pinpoints 

specific transition indicators that help to better measure stability in conjunction with broader national 

reconstruction goals. The Working Group depends 
57

highly on host nation capabilities to implement transition, using authority transfer as the primary goal of 

stability plans to foster longer-term collaboration with 

international actors. “The aim of the UN System in 

transition should be to assist national authorities to 

initiate immediate, priority crisis resolution and recovery actions, and to lay the ground work, including 

the capacity, systems and relationships needed to embark on a longer term development path” (UN, 2007, 

p. 1). In effect, the organization assists the host nation 

in establishing the foundations to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the UN’s most 

prominent international standards and goals.

The UNDG Toolkit is one of the most referenced 

metrics for assessing and responding to conflict. The 

Toolkit provides both step-by-step and work stream 

prescriptions to guide practitioners in planning stability responses. While the indicators are specific in 

which conditions UN actions address, the Toolkit is 

meant to strategically guide the organization vis-à-vis 

the host nation’s mandate and responsibilities. The 

majority of work streams outlined in the Toolkit focus on joint capabilities that work hand-in-hand with 

the host nation, including the provision of common 

services, communication, budgetary framework, and 

leadership. The implications for this type of collaboration are substantial: by relying on the host nation as 

part of the planning and implementation process, the 

host nation is held responsible for sustaining transitional conditions created by stability operations.
58

Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and 

Multinational Tools.

Recently, coordination for stability operations 

across joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and 

multinational lines has been a primary goal for policy 

planners. As fragile states and governments become a 

prominent concern for the international community, 

states, government agencies, and partners must interact at the strategic level to determine the causes of, 

and solutions to, instability using a multinational and 

comprehensive approach. The U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has taken the lead on exploring and 

collaborating on ways to increase the effectiveness of 

stability and reconstruction planning, specifically by 

ameliorating some of the inhibitions of actors to work 

in a multilateral environment.

The most prominent initiative launched by JFCOM 

is the Multinational Experiment, which analyzes the 

difficulties in collaborating across joint, interagency, 

intergovernmental, and multinational boundaries. 

This initiative, which brings together NATO officials 

and representatives from more than 18 different countries, seeks to bridge the gap between individual country capabilities and collaborative styles to respond to 

complex operating environments as a holistic community. As of 2009, six different experiments had been 

conducted to review various warfighting capabilities 

in response to many different threat environments. 

JFCOM is prepared to continue these experiments to 

cull more lessons from joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations, and address 

strategic guidance for future stability operations. The 

experiments are intended to create guidelines and 

metrics for actors from all sectors of this collaborative 

community. 
59

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

On the whole, the academic research on transitions is broad and varies in depth along the lines of 

the six types of transitions. By far, the democratic transitions literature provides the most depth of analysis 

and employs the widest range of methodologies. The 

academic research on transitions also tends to be compartmentalized within the six types of transitions. This 

compartmentalization is a natural reflection of the disciplinary nature of social science research and existing research programs—international relations and 

security studies, comparative politics, anthropology 

and peace studies, and economics, for example. More 

scholarly attention should be given specifically to the 

topic of security transitions as much of the present research focuses on broad lessons learned and prescriptive aspects of security sector reform. Little is understood about sequencing aspects of security transition 

beyond macro, institutional-level analyses. Even less 

is known about thresholds and tipping points between 

critical phases of stability operations or the degree of 

resilience necessary to sustain institutional reforms in 

the long term. Also, due to the often-noted complexity and indeterminacy of transitions in general, more 

research exploring interactions across social, political, military, and economic institutions in transition 

is needed as well. Certainly, all of these future areas of 

research would be best addressed through an interdisciplinary approach. 

We find that there is much to be gained from all 

forms and methods of future inquiry (inductive generalizing vs. deductive particularizing and qualitative 

vs. quantitative) on transitions. For those interested in 
60

pursuing more generalized knowledge, the literature 

is full of case studies and edited volumes on countries, 

conflicts, and specific aspects of transition, but no attempt has been made to squarely and systematically 

address transition itself in stability operations across 

a range of cases. Alexander George’s (2005) method 

of “structured, focused comparison” which demands 

researchers clearly define their research objective and 

ask the same specific questions to standardize data collection and analysis would be an ideal approach. Once 

a baseline program is established, more researchers 

would be able to contribute and conduct cross-case 

comparisons. 

Likewise, more particularized, subjective-oriented 

methods of research (i.e., content and document analysis, ethnography, interviews, and focus groups) will 

add depth and richer understanding of the complex 

nature of transitions, particularly with regard to the 

gaps noted above. Practitioners often characterize 

transition according to their own subjective experience. These experiences are shaped by their particularized location, role, and influence on stabilization 

activities as well as the broader context of the stability 

operation they operate within. Their experiences are 

essential to capturing lessons learned and individualized explanations of transitions. However, because 

these actors are often from other countries, their views 

retain a degree of objectivity as they are outsiders and 

thus have no ethnocentric bias. As such, researchers 

must also seek out local actors in these operations. 

While more difficult to access, members of critical institutions would provide important information that 

will act as an important hedge against hidden assumptions and bias. Both sources of information (practitioner and indigenous) on transitions should be captured 

in a systematic manner.
61

Of the numerous tools available to policymakers 

to measure and assess transition, no single tool fully 

captures the dynamic nature of the concept. Many of 

the measures are based on very narrow and concrete 

definitions of transition that are often not applicable 

to other actors undertaking similar or parallel activities. Often times, these tools intend to serve particular 

goals of an agency rather than solve transitional issues 

on a strategic and interagency level. More research 

must be undertaken to test underlying assumptions 

of presently popular transition indicators and explore 

other potentially influential factors affecting transition. In addition, transition community actors should 

collaborate on this pertinent topic to develop a more 

comprehensive tool for stability actors.

CONCLUSION

Transition continues to be one of the most pervasive and elusive aspects of stability operations. There 

is little question that the international community will 

remain charged and challenged with the responsibility of stabilizing fragile states now and for the near 

future. This will be true as long as post-conflict stability operations involve myriad actors and are each 

unique in their specific and circumstantial complexity, and, most important, while they each share one 

desired outcome: long-term stability. As academics 

and practitioners alike wrestle with figuring out how 

to achieve stability, the inherent transitional nature of 

these operations will continue to be a burning question. 

This monograph has provided an exhaustive catalog and assessment of the state of research and practice on transition as it relates to stability operations. It 
62

offers a rudimentary system of classification through 

mapping characteristics (process, phasing, authority transfer, and end-state) and types of transitions 

(war-to-peace, power, societal, political-democratic, 

security, and economic) in the current literature. The 

conceptual clarity and systematized focus areas that 

such an endeavor provides will allow scholars and decisionmakers to think more concretely and critically 

about all aspects of transition. Moreover, our definition of transition makes a significant and innovative 

contribution to this field of research and ongoing 

policy debates between joint, interagency, and multinational actors conducting stability operations and 

evaluating roles and responsibilities abroad. While 

this monograph has not evaluated specific hypotheses, explanations, or predictions on transitions in stabilization operations, it sufficiently carves out a line 

of scholarly and professional inquiry and provides a 

solid foundation for future research.

Academics and professionals have both the challenge and opportunity to improve how stability operations are conducted in the future. Transition is one 

among many issue areas requiring more attention to 

adequately confront this larger task. This work sheds 

light on an often-imprecise subject matter. As the international community continues to rebuild fragile 

states, it is our hope that the concepts outlined herein 

contribute to an improved understanding and implementation of stability operations.

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Mr. Nicholas J. Armstrong

Ms. Jacqueline Chura-Beaver

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil