IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

May 1, 2024 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAMES PHILLIP RICKMAN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lake County

No. 20-CR-10717 Tony A. Childress, Chancellor

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No. W2022-01272-CCA-R3-CD

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A Lake County jury convicted the Defendant, James Phillip Rickman, of one count of 

attempted first degree premeditated murder resulting in serious bodily injury, one count of 

employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and three counts of 

aggravated assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-one years in 

the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the 

evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for attempted first degree murder with 

serious bodily injury and one count of aggravated assault; and (2) the trial court erred when 

it dismissed his motion to suppress. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W.

CAMPBELL, SR., and JILL BARTEE AYERS, JJ., joined.

Charless Agee, Dyersburg, Tennessee (at trial); and Brennan M. Wingerter, Assistant 

Public Defender – Appellate Director, Franklin, Tennessee (on appeal), for the appellant, 

James Phillip Rickman.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Ronald L. Coleman, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General; Danny H. Goodman, Jr., District Attorney General; and Lance E. Webb, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts

08/02/2024
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This case arises from the Defendant shooting his son, Joshua Rickman. Joshua 

Rickman,1 was married to Kayla Rickman and the couple shared one six-year-old child, 

N.R.2 Joshua had three children from a previous marriage: Shelby, age eighteen; J.R., age 

fifteen; and D.R., age fifteen. Kayla had two children from a prior relationship: C and J. 

All the children lived with Joshua and Kayla except for J.R. and D.R. The underlying 

dispute between the Defendant and Joshua was about J.R. and D.R, who had lived with the 

Defendant and his wife for most of their lives due to Joshua’s and his ex-wife’s drug use. 

A Lake County grand jury indicted the Defendant for attempted first degree premeditated 

murder resulting in serious bodily injury, employing a firearm during the commission of a 

dangerous felony, aggravated assault of his son, Joshua Rickman, aggravated assault of his 

daughter-in-law, Kayla Rickman, and aggravated assault of his grandson, N.R.

On the morning of trial, before jury selection, the Defendant lodged an oral motion 

to suppress the Defendant’s statements made to law enforcement. The Defendant’s 

attorney stated he wanted to file a motion to suppress based on a violation of the Fifth 

Amendment right against self-incrimination. The trial judge and the parties moved outside 

the presence of the jury into the hallway, and the State argued that it was not prepared to 

argue the motion due to the last-minute notice, referencing Rule 12 of the Tennessee Rules 

of Criminal Procedure. It appears there may have been some discussion held among the 

parties that is not included in the transcript. Nonetheless, the trial court denied the motion 

“because it would put the State in a prejudicial position for not being able to prepare for 

and have their witnesses together.” After jury selection, the trial proceeded, and we 

summarize the evidence presented therein. 

On Christmas Eve 2019, J.R. and D.R. were at Joshua and Kayla’s residence. 

Joshua believed the boys were to spend the night and then the entire family would go to 

the Defendant’s house the next day on Christmas. The Defendant had a different 

understanding and arrived at Joshua’s house demanding that J.R. and D.R. go home with 

him. The argument escalated, and Joshua called the Obion County Sheriff’s Department 

to assist in removing the Defendant from Joshua’s property. 

The following day, Joshua and his family went to the Defendant’s residence as 

planned at around noon. Joshua denied that there had been any discussion about the family 

shooting guns that day. The children opened Christmas gifts, and, at some point, Kayla, 

Joshua, and the Defendant went out to the shed to retrieve bicycles that were Christmas 

gifts for the boys. The Defendant and Joshua went inside the shed and engaged in normal 

 

1 The Defendant and the victims share the same surname so, for purposes of clarity, we will refer 

to the family members by their first names. In so doing, we intend no disrespect to the parties.

2

It is the policy of this court to refer to minors by their initials.
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familial conversation with no mention of the previous day’s argument. The Defendant 

asked Joshua if he wanted some lanterns and Joshua indicated that he did but would take 

them the next time he was at the Defendant’s when he had more room in his vehicle. After 

fifteen to twenty minutes, Joshua stepped outside the shed and bent down to pick up a cat. 

Kayla was outside the shed with N.R. standing in front of her. N.R. began speaking to 

Joshua when the Defendant called Joshua back inside the shed. Joshua set the cat down 

and turned his attention to N.R. when “next thing [he] kn[e]w, [he] got shot in the back.” 

Joshua felt “a burning pain” when the bullet moved through his shoulder, and he fled to his 

neighbor’s house. Joshua did not yet know the extent of his injuries, but he felt the blood 

running down his side.

Joshua was transported to Dyersburg Regional Medical Center where he was 

released at about 7:30 p.m. The bullet entered Joshua’s back and exited right above his 

armpit, causing some nerve damage. He lost the feeling in his left arm for about two 

months before he could resume using his arm. The bullet did not hit any organ or bones,

and his treatment did not require rehab or surgery; however, Joshua lost his job as a diesel 

truck mechanic because he could no longer perform two of his required duties due to his 

shoulder injury. Since then, Joshua obtained employment at Triple T Tire, doing a job that 

accommodated his limitations. At the time of trial, Joshua still experienced “tingling in 

[his] fingers all the time, like they’re asleep.” 

Joshua believed the Defendant generally had been a “kind, gentle, reasonable, 

nonviolent person.” The Defendant had no prior involvement with the police, but Joshua 

had prior arrests for domestic assault and possession of drugs. 

Ridgely Police Department (“RPD”) Sergeant Brandon Bishop responded to a 

“shots fired” call at the Defendant’s residence. Shelby met Sergeant Bishop at the patrol 

car door notifying him that Joshua, her father, had been shot. Sergeant Bishop located the 

Defendant at the edge of his shed behind the house. Sergeant Bishop approached the 

Defendant with his weapon drawn. The Defendant followed Sergeant Bishop’s commands 

and told Sergeant Bishop that the gun, a .38 Smith and Wesson, was in his back right 

pocket. Sergeant Bishop unloaded the gun and then placed the Defendant in handcuffs “for 

safety purposes.” The gun had “four rounds that were live and one spent cartridge still 

inside the cylinder.” Sergeant Bishop wore a bodycam during the course of his interactions 

at the shooting scene.

Lexie Smith lived across the street from the Defendant. On Christmas morning, the 

Defendant’s wife, Denise Rickman, asked Ms. Smith if she could borrow her pistol. Denise 

explained that the family planned to “go down to the levee and shoot guns” after opening 

Christmas gifts. The family only had shotguns and Denise wanted to learn to shoot a pistol. 

Ms. Smith loaned Denise her five-shot .38 Smith and Wesson after showing Denise how 
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to properly use the weapon. The gun was fully loaded when Ms. Smith gave it to Denise; 

however, Ms. Smith offered Denise additional ammunition. Denise responded that “five 

shells would be enough.” After the shooting, Ms. Smith identified the gun collected by the 

police from the Defendant’s back pocket as her gun.

Ms. Smith had known Joshua for many years and believed Joshua had a reputation 

for violence based upon domestic assault arrests and the fact that Joshua “was constantly 

jumping on [the Defendant].” The Defendant, however, had a reputation for being kind, 

gentle, and generous. 

Shelby was sixteen years old at the time of these events and living with Joshua and 

Kayla. On Christmas day 2019, she and her family went to the Defendant’s home to 

celebrate Christmas with her grandparents. When they arrived, the Defendant directed 

them to the living room where the presents were located. At some point, the Defendant 

and Joshua went outside to get presents that were stored in the shed. N.R. ran outside after 

Joshua, and Denise told Shelby to go outside and get N.R. because she did not want him to 

ruin “the surprise.” Shelby went outside to call N.R. back in the house. As she stood on 

the steps of the house, Kayla and N.R. stood in the yard, Joshua was exiting the shed, and 

the Defendant was inside the shed. N.R. was “about to start walking” toward Shelby when 

“the gun went off.” 

Joshua, who was unarmed, began yelling, “You shot me,” and ran through the 

neighbor’s (Carol Morgan) backyard to another neighbor’s (Cotton Baker) house. Shelby 

“freaked out” and began “screaming” that she was going to call the police. The Defendant 

told Shelby “that if [she] was to say anything, he was going to end up shooting [her], too.” 

Shelby called 911. 

During Kayla and Joshua’s nine-year marriage, D.R. and J.R. had primarily lived 

with the Defendant, with occasional visits to the home Kayla shared with Joshua. Kayla 

was unaware of any discussion of the living arrangements changing even though the boys 

spent Christmas Eve at Joshua and Kayla’s house. According to Kayla, the boys were to 

return to their grandparents’ home the following day on Christmas. 

As planned, the family went to the Defendant’s residence in Ridgely to celebrate 

Christmas. Kayla did not know of any plan to go to the levee and shoot guns on Christmas. 

The familial interactions appeared normal to Kayla, and she did not perceive anyone was 

angry nor did she hear Joshua threaten or provoke the Defendant. When the family arrived 

at the Defendant’s house, the children went directly to the living room where they waited 

to open presents. The children began opening presents and, at some point, the Defendant, 

Kayla, and Joshua went outside to retrieve bicycles for the boys. The Defendant and Joshua 

went inside the shed while Kayla remained just outside the shed where she could hear the 
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two men talking about routine things. The Defendant showed Joshua the pecans he had 

shelled that were “in the deep freeze.” Then the two men discussed two lanterns that were 

in the shed. Kayla and Joshua rolled the bikes out and then Joshua went back into the shed. 

N.R., who was then four, had come outside by this time. Kayla and N.R. stood two to three 

feet from the shed when Joshua walked out of the shed and picked up a cat. The Defendant 

called Joshua back in the shed, Kayla heard a pop, and Joshua came out of the shed, holding 

“himself,” and saying, “He shot me.” Joshua then ran to a neighbor’s house. 

The Defendant exited the shed holding a gun. He pointed it at Kayla, stating he 

would shoot her too. Kayla begged the Defendant not to shoot her, and the Defendant 

turned the gun on N.R. saying, “I kill that em-ef-er (phonetic) too.” Kayla jumped in front 

of N.R. and pushed him down to protect him from any gunfire. Kayla was genuinely afraid 

that the Defendant would shoot her and/or N.R. By this point, D.R. had come out of the 

house and was asking the Defendant questions about what had occurred. To which, the 

Defendant responded, “shut up, or I’ll kill you too.” 

Both the Defendant and Joshua would get upset at times but would usually “calm 

down after they talk[ed] it out.” Kayla agreed that Joshua had a reputation for violence 

and that she had requested police intervention in their home when Joshua had grabbed her 

hand and twisted it. 

Several Lake County residents testified on the Defendant’s behalf that the 

Defendant was mild-mannered, kind, gentle, and quick to help others.

After hearing this evidence, the jury convicted the Defendant as charged of one 

count of attempted first degree premeditated murder resulting in serious bodily injury, one 

count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and three 

counts of aggravated assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-one 

years of confinement. It is from these judgments that the Defendant appeals.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his 

convictions and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The State asks 

us to affirm the trial court in all respects.

A. Motion to Suppress

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his oral motion 

to suppress as untimely. The State asks us to affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.
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The Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate that a motion to suppress “must be raised 

prior to trial.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2). Courts have interpreted the phrase “prior to 

trial” to mean “sometime earlier than ‘the day of the trial when the jury is waiting in the 

hall.’” See State v. Hamilton, 628 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tenn.Crim.App.1981) (quoting and 

approving of interpretation of Rule 12(b) by trial judge); State v. Clark, 67 S.W.3d 73, 76 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) (“[D]efendant was obligated to file a motion to suppress evidence 

on such a basis before the day of trial.”). Failure to timely raise a suppression issue results 

in waiver. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(f). However, the trial court for cause shown may grant 

relief from the waiver. Id.

The rationale behind Rule 12(b) is discussed in Feagins v. State, 596 S.W.2d 108 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1979), and State v. Davidson, 606 S.W.2d 293 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). 

This court in Feagins, supra, stated:

[The practice of requiring pre-trial motions] avoids interrupting a trial in 

progress [and] . . . inconveniencing jurors and witnesses by requiring them 

to stand by idly while the court hears a motion to suppress. It is to the 

advantage of both the prosecution and defense to know prior to trial whether 

certain items will or will not be admitted into evidence. Granting the pretrial motion might result in abandonment of the prosecution; if the pre-trial 

motion is denied, then the defendant may either plead guilty and gain 

whatever concession might be obtained from the State, or change his trial 

strategy.

The Davidson court stated the broad discovery rules now used make it a rare incidence for 

the defense not to be aware of evidence which will be introduced at trial. For this reason,

compliance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 should be the rule rather than 

the exception.

As the State correctly notes, even though the oral motion to suppress was made

before the jury was sworn, the motion was made on the day of trial while the jury pool was 

in the courtroom. Therefore, the timing of the suppression motion caused the probability 

of inconveniencing jurors and presumably witnesses as stated in Feagins. Additionally, 

the State did not receive adequate notice to be prepared to litigate the suppression issue. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing the motion. 

The Defendant, in his reply brief, asks this court to review the issue under plain 

error review. We decline to do so. Considering the weight of the evidence against the 

Defendant, consideration of this issue is not “necessary to do substantial justice.” State v. 

Smith v. Martin, 505 S.W.3d 492, 504 (Tenn. 2016). Any alleged error was not of sufficient 
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magnitude that it “probably changed the outcome of the trial.” State v. Smith, 492 S.W.3d 

224, 232-33 (Tenn. 2016). The Defendant is not entitled to relief as to this issue.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the State’s evidence was insufficient as to his 

conviction for attempted first degree murder with serious bodily injury and aggravated 

assault of N.R. 

When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court’s standard 

of review is whether, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, 

“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see Tenn. R. App. P. 

13(e); State v. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tenn. 2004) (citing State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 

247, 276 (Tenn. 2002)). This standard applies to findings of guilt based upon direct 

evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of both direct and circumstantial 

evidence. State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 392-93 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (citing 

State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990), overruled on other 

grounds). In the absence of direct evidence, a criminal offense may be established 

exclusively by circumstantial evidence. Duchac v. State, 505 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Tenn. 

1973). “The jury decides the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence, and ‘[t]he 

inferences to be drawn from such evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are 

consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, are questions primarily for the jury.’” 

State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting Marable v. State, 313 S.W.2d 

451, 457 (Tenn. 1958)). “The standard of review [for sufficiency of the evidence] ‘is the 

same whether the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.’” State v. 

Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 

275 (Tenn. 2009)). 

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court should not re-weigh or 

reevaluate the evidence. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). 

Nor may this Court substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from the 

evidence. State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Liakas v. State, 286 

S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tenn. 1956)). “Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the 

weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the 

evidence are resolved by the trier of fact.” State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 

1997). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony 

of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.” 

State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). The Tennessee Supreme Court stated 

the rationale for this rule:
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This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the 

jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their 

demeanor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary 

instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be given 

to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human 

atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a 

written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 523, 

527 (Tenn. 1963)). This Court must afford the State of Tennessee the “strongest legitimate 

view of the evidence” contained in the record, as well as “all reasonable and legitimate 

inferences” that may be drawn from the evidence. Goodwin, 143 S.W.3d at 775 (quoting 

State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tenn. 2000)). Because a verdict of guilt against a 

defendant removes the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the 

convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was legally 

insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn. 

2000) (citations omitted).

1. Attempted First Degree Murder with Serious Bodily Injury

In order to convict Defendant of attempted first degree murder with serious bodily 

injury, the State had to prove that Defendant acted “with the kind of culpability otherwise 

required for the offense . . . [and] [a]ct[ed] with intent to cause a result that is an element 

of the offense, and believe[d] the conduct w[ould] cause the result without further conduct 

on the person’s part[.]” T.C.A. § 39-12-101(a)(2). Relevant to this case, first degree 

murder is the unlawful, intentional, and premeditated killing of another. T.C.A. § 39-13-

202(a)(1). While serious bodily injury is not an element of attempted first degree murder, 

when a victim of attempted first degree murder suffers serious bodily injury as a result of 

the crime, a defendant must serve a minimum of 85% of his sentence. T.C.A. § 40-35-

501(k)(5). “Serious bodily injury” includes bodily injury that involves: (A) a substantial 

risk of death; (B) protracted unconsciousness; (C) extreme physical pain; (D) protracted or 

obvious disfigurement; or (E) protracted loss or substantial impairment of function of a 

bodily member, organ or mental faculty. . . . T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(36). “Protracted” 

means “delayed or prolonged in time.” State v Ronald L. Carroll, No. E2013-01781-CCAR3-CD, 2014 WL 1759101, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 30, 3014), perm. app. denied

(Tenn. Oct. 15, 2014). According to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(a)(3) 

“bodily injury” includes a “cut, abrasion, bruise, burn or disfigurement, and physical pain 

or temporary illness or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental 

faculty.” This court has held that the subjective nature of pain is a fact to be determined 

by the trier of fact. State v. Dedmon, No. M2005-00762-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 448653, 

at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 23, 2006), no perm. app. filed.
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The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, shows that the 

Defendant, through his wife, procured a weapon from a neighbor prior to Joshua’s arrival 

at his home. The Defendant and Joshua went out to the shed, and when Joshua attempted 

to leave, the Defendant called him back and shot the victim. The bullet entered Joshua’s 

back and exited the front of his body right above his arm pit. With blood streaming down 

his side, Joshua fled to a neighbor’s home. The Defendant rendered no aid to the unarmed 

victim, nor did he call 911 for medical help. The victim was transported to the hospital for 

treatment, lost use of his left arm for two months, and at the time of trial, almost two years 

later, still had residual nerve damage to the arm. 

The Defendant does not attack any element of the first degree murder offense. He 

only argues that the State failed to prove “serious bodily injury.” The distinction between 

bodily injury and serious bodily injury is generally a question of fact for the jury to 

determine. See State v. Barnes, 954 S.W.2d 760, 765-66 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Joshua 

testified that the bullet struck his back, causing a burning sensation. This court has 

previously noted that “a gunshot wound to the upper torso of the body, almost without fail, 

constitutes a substantial risk of death given the number of vital organs in that region of the 

body.” State v. Sullivan, No. M2004-03068-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 644021, at *8 (Tenn.

Crim. App. Mar.10, 2006). 

The Defendant relies upon our supreme court’s decision in State v. Farmer, 380 

S.W.3d 96 (Tenn. 2012), in which our court clarified the definition of serious bodily injury 

and held that a gunshot wound does not necessarily cause bodily injury that involves “a 

substantial risk of death.” In that case, the victim was shot in the leg and the bullet passed 

through the victim’s leg. The wound required minimal medical treatment and did not cause 

the victim to suffer a loss of consciousness, extreme pain, disfigurement, or impairment. 

The court noted that hospital records classified the victim’s pain as “mild” to “moderate” 

and that the victim did not testify as to the degree of pain he experienced. Id. at 101. Our

supreme court ultimately concluded that the gunshot wound did not meet the statutory 

definition of “serious bodily injury” because the injury, as it occurred, did not involve a 

substantial risk of death, the victim did not lose consciousness, the victim did not suffer 

extreme pain, and because nothing in the victim’s testimony supported an inference that 

his injury involved protracted or obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or substantial 

impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty. Id. at *4-5.

We conclude that this case is distinguishable from Farmer, in that Joshua suffered 

a protracted loss or substantial impairment of a function of a bodily member, and that the 

State proved the necessary elements of “serious bodily injury.” Joshua testified that he was 

shot in the back and that the bullet traveled through his body, causing a burning sensation. 

Joshua’s hospital treatment was not prolonged, but he lost the use of his left arm for two 
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months, causing his employer to release him due to his inability to complete the required 

tasks of his job. Before the shooting, Joshua was a diesel mechanic. Due to limitations 

caused by his injuries, he sought employment at Triple T Tires.

The Defendant argues that loss of the use of an arm for two months is not sufficient 

to support a protracted loss. We disagree. This Court has found protracted loss of use of 

a body part when the victims suffered impairment for four to twelve weeks. See State v. 

London, No. W2017-01396-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 3996886, at *1-4 (Tenn. Crim. App. 

Aug. 21, 2018) (forearm placed in a cast for six weeks) no perm. app. filed; State v. 

Beauregard, No. M2012-02312-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 6047026, at *15 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. Nov. 14, 2013) (fractured elbow required four to twelve weeks to heal with the aid of 

a splint and then a cast); State v. Johnson, No. W2002-01333-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 

22794530, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 2003) (a severe limp for two months after the 

injury, and weakness in the victim’s leg two years after the offense). In this case, the victim 

lost the use of his arm for two months. Almost two years after the injury, he still 

experienced a tingling sensation in his arm. 

The distinction between bodily injury and serious bodily injury is generally a 

question of fact for the jury to determine. See Barnes, 954 S.W.2d at 765-66. Accordingly, 

we conclude that the evidence is sufficient for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, 

the Defendant guilty of attempted first degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury.

2. Aggravated Assault

The Defendant was charged with intentionally or knowingly causing N.R., his then 

four-year-old grandson, to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury through the use or 

display of a deadly weapon. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iii). Aggravated assault 

based on fear requires the victim to have a “well-grounded apprehension of personal injury 

or violence.” State v. Jones, 789 S.W.2d 545, 550-51 (Tenn. 1990). Circumstantial 

evidence is sufficient to establish a victim’s fear of imminent bodily injury. State v. Austin, 

No. W2001-00120-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 32755555, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 25, 

2002). “The element of ‘fear’ is satisfied if the circumstances of the incident, within reason 

and common experience, are of such a nature as to cause a person to reasonably fear 

imminent bodily injury.” State v. Whitfield, No. 02C01-9706-CR-00226, 1998 WL 

227776, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 8, 1998) (citing State v. Pittman, No. 03C01-9701-

CR-00013, 1998 WL 128801, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 24, 1998)). Even though a 

victim does not testify about being afraid, as was the case here, “a victim’s fear may be 

inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense.” State v. Whited, No. M2005-

00167-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 548228, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2006), perm. 

app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 28, 2006).
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The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, showed that N.R., the 

four-year-old victim, followed his mother outside to where his grandfather, the Defendant, 

and father, Joshua, were in a shed. The Defendant fired a gun at Joshua while N.R. stood 

a short distance away. Joshua began yelling that he’d been shot and fled. N.R.’s older 

sister, Shelby, began yelling that she would call the police. The Defendant exited the shed 

holding the gun, pointed it at N.R.’s mother, threatened her, then threatened to shoot N.R. 

N.R.’s mother jumped in front of N.R. and knocked him to the ground. This is sufficient 

evidence from which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

an aggravated assault against N.R., beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defendant is not 

entitled to relief as to this issue.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

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ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE