PKSOI Papers

LESSONS LEARNED FROM

U.S. GOVERNMENT LAW ENFORCEMENT

IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

Dilshika Jayamaha

Scott Brady

Ben Fitzgerald

Jason Fritz

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PKSOI PAPER

LESSONS LEARNED FROM

U.S. GOVERNMENT LAW ENFORCEMENT

IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

Dilshika Jayamaha

Scott Brady

Ben Fitzgerald

Jason Fritz

December 2010

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ii

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ISBN 1-58487-470-8
iii

CONTENTS

Foreword .....................................................v

Summary .................................................vii

Chapter 1. Introduction.....................................1

Chapter 2. Panama ..............................................11

Chapter 3. Colombia ........................................45

Chapter 4. Kosovo ..........................................89

 Chapter 5. Conclusion ..................................147

Acronyms .....................................................159

About the Contributors ................................165

v

FOREWORD

The role of law enforcement is becoming increasingly prominent in the conduct of international operations involving the U.S. Government (USG), including 

counterinsurgency, peace operations, and reconstruction and stabilization. Hence, it is important for practitioners (military and civilian) and policymakers to 

understand how law enforcement can contribute to 

the achievement of U.S. strategic objectives and how it 

integrates into a wider interagency mission structure. 

This Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 

(PKSOI) Paper should add to the body of knowledge 

in this field by presenting the findings from an analysis of U.S. law enforcement contributions to three major post-Cold War commitments.

This report is the product of a year of research 

conducted by Noetic, under contract by the Emerging Capabilities Division Ground Portfolio Director, 

Colonel Patrick N. Kelleher, U.S. Marine Corps, within the Rapid Reaction Technology Office of the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense. This was part of the Law 

Enforcement Capabilities Project (LECP) which aims 

to inform USG agencies about issues relevant to law 

enforcement capabilities on international operations. 

The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) also contributed to the project, with Mr. William Simpkins playing a key role in the research phase. The project team 

particularly acknowledges the United States Marshals 

Service (USMS) and the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 

Program (ICITAP), whose support was invaluable in 

facilitating research visits to Colombia and Kosovo, 

respectively. The team also received research and liai-
vi

son support from representatives of: the Department 

of State, the Department of Defense, the Department 

of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the 

United States Agency for International Development, 

and the United States Army. Input obtained from these 

representatives has been critical in the preparation of 

this document; however, the views expressed here are 

Noetic’s, are not official government statements, and 

are not the official views of the USG. Any errors in this 

paper are the responsibility of the authors and not any 

representative of the USG.

The approach taken by the project team and the 

access facilitated by the interagency participants have 

permitted a unique and detailed analysis of the subject 

matter based on recent USG experience. The lessons 

learned are invaluable for informing future USG endeavors to integrate the full range of law enforcement 

capabilities, authorities, and perspectives into international operations to achieve national objectives.

STEPHEN T. SMITH

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director

Peacekeeping and Stability

 Operations Institute

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute
vii

SUMMARY

Law enforcement (LE) personnel, agencies, techniques, equipment and priorities have been an increasingly prominent feature within U.S. Government 

(USG) commitments to international operations.1

 This 

is a reflection of the increased human and societal 

complexity of the operational environments in which 

the USG has intervened and the multifaceted nature 

of the objectives often sought by the USG in these international operations. 

The most obvious manifestation of LE on international operations is the presence of American police 

officers working as a part of uniformed international 

police missions (U.S.-led, coalition, or multinational). 

However, these interim policing missions are only 

part of the contribution to international operations 

that can be made by LE. U.S. LE agencies may also be 

involved directly in international operations as a part 

of their standing authorities related to the enforcement of U.S. domestic law; contribute LE expertise in 

capacity building and institutional reform efforts; or 

as support and assistance to U.S. military forces employed in LE-related roles and in the conduct of their 

military tasks.

Given the complexity of USG LE involvement in 

contemporary international operations, it is important 

to understand how these agencies work, what roles 

they play, or could play, in the conduct of operations, and how their various initiatives relate to one 

another. As such, this analysis specifically examines 

lessons from four relevant aspects of LE involvement 

in international operations, recognizing that observations that are discussed in this paper do not constitute 
viii

the entirety of lessons from each of the operations. 

These aspects include three operational case studies 

from USG post-Cold War experience in international 

operations: Panama (1989-99), Colombia (1989-Present), and Kosovo (1998-Present). These three operations were selected because they provided examples 

across a wide spectrum of U.S. involvement and have 

either already been completed or are nearing completion—allowing for analysis of their results as mature 

operations. Additionally, this analysis included an 

investigation of technological capabilities used by the 

military and law enforcement organizations that undergird the provision of LE and military capabilities 

in international operational environments in order to 

analyze capability gaps and points of technological 

synchronization between the two communities.2

LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES PROJECT

This paper has been produced as a part of the Law 

Enforcement Capabilities Project (LECP). The LECP 

is an initiative of the Emerging Capabilities Division 

(ECD) within the Rapid Reaction Technology Office (RRTO) of the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD). The RRTO has funded this project in order to 

help inform policy and capability development decisions related to the contributions and integration of 

USG agencies and bureaus with law enforcement responsibilities and expertise, and the employment of 

U.S. military elements in law enforcement-related or 

supporting roles in international operations. 

This paper will be used to inform further research 

and concept development and is being published 

independently to contribute to the advancement of 

thinking in this area. The second phase of the LECP 
ix

will consist of a series of exercises, each examining a 

component of USG law enforcement in international 

operations: LE support to the U.S. military, interim 

expeditionary LE, and host nation LE capacity building and institutional reform. These exercises will be 

followed by an exercise that will examine the total 

problem space of U.S. LE in international operations.

METHODOLOGY

This paper presents the results of the analysis 

conducted in relation to the case studies of USG LE 

involvement in international operations. For each element (three operations and the technology section), 

the analysis was based on unclassified information 

and was conducted in three stages: 

• Desk research. Baseline desk research relying 

heavily on advice, support, and access to information made possible by engagement with 

representatives from numerous USG agencies.

• Primary source research. Included extensive 

outreach to subject matter experts (SMEs), practitioners, and policymakers within USG agencies who participated in the three operations or 

with involvement in employment of relevant 

military and LE technologies. For Kosovo and 

Colombia, the primary research was augmented by in-country field research.

• Lessons learned workshops. The observations 

and lessons developed through desk research 

and primary source research were subjected to 

structured examination and discussion in a series of workshops with SMEs. The workshops 

served two purposes: to share and validate observations, and to develop recommendations.
x

CASE STUDIES

This paper will consider three case studies.

Panama. 

Coming right after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Panama is considered the first “post Cold War” USG military intervention. Though launched primarily to oust 

Manuel Noriega from power and bring him to trial in 

the United States (Operation JUST CAUSE), the operation quickly became an institution-building exercise, 

with the United States both providing LE capabilities 

and rebuilding Panamanian law enforcement institutions over several years (Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY and subsequent USG operations). The effort in 

Panama was executed primarily by the Department of 

Defense (DoD) in the form of military units, the U.S. 

Marshals Service (USMS), the International Criminal 

Investigations Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), 

the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the 

Department of State (DoS). The analysis of operations 

in Panama was conducted along three lines of operation (LOO):

• Law enforcement-related LOOs for Operation 

JUST CAUSE, including the Noriega extradition, exercising detainee warrants, passenger 

screening, and airport security;

• Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY and the transition phase, including the maintenance of law 

and order and the reestablishment of host nation law enforcement capacity; and,
xi

• Civilian-led reconstruction and stabilization, 

focused on building host nation civilian law 

enforcement capabilities.

Colombia. 

USG LE work in Colombia stemmed from efforts 

to stop the flow of narcotics into the United States. The 

Andean Counter Drug Initiative, a counternarcotics 

plan devised in the late 1980s, extended USG LE and 

other counternarcotics assistance to Peru, Bolivia, and 

Colombia. Over almost 2 decades, U.S. support to Colombia, in particular, has shifted into a comprehensive 

government-to-government partnership to disrupt 

drug networks, including through the reform and improvement of domestic LE capabilities. Plan Colombia and subsequent and parallel efforts have required 

cooperation across USG departments and agencies to 

help Colombia build military, paramilitary, and civilian LE institutions. The major agencies engaged in 

Colombia were the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the DoS (Western Hemisphere 

Affairs, International Narcotics Affairs and Law Enforcement Affairs [INL]); the DoD; the Department of 

Justice (ICITAP); the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI); the DEA (U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration); the ATF (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 

and Explosives); the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial 

Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT); the 

USMS; and the Department of the Treasury. 

Analysis of these operations focused on three 

LOOs:

• Counternarcoterrorism operations, including 

aerial and manual eradication and interdiction 

operations; U.S.-led maritime, aerial, and riverine interdiction and support; border security; 
xii

the Judicial Wire Intercept (Wiretap) Program; 

and the use of extraterritorial laws to prosecute 

drug crimes;

• Law enforcement and rule of law training, including ICITAP general purpose training and 

specific training from the FBI, DEA, and USMS; 

and,

• Capacity and institution building focused on 

legal reforms and mentoring and advising host 

nation institutions.

Kosovo. 

Unlike the other two operations, USG involvement 

in Kosovo had no direct linkage to U.S. law enforcement concerns. Rather, it is an example of the necessity 

of LE contributions as a part of a wider multinational 

operation in support of USG foreign policy objectives. 

It also required the need to establish security in the 

host nation as part of an international coalition while 

simultaneously building a new nation’s LE institutions 

from scratch. The key USG players in Kosovo operations are the DoD; ICITAP and OPDAT; and the DoS 

(INL and the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs). These operations were analyzed in three LOOs:

• Deployed law enforcement operations; observers and advisers, focusing on the observer mission; interim law enforcement and monitoring, 

mentoring, and advising (MMA); and post-independence MMA and the continued executive 

mandate;

• Capacity-building of Kosovo ministries and 

agencies, divided into multilateral and bilateral 

programs; and,
xiii

• Military Kosovo Force (KFOR) operations, such 

as legal reform, mentoring and advising, and 

employment of general purpose forces.

Conclusions.

The analysis in this project shows the pervasive 

and complex role that law enforcement and related 

issues have played in U.S. involvement in contemporary international operations. The analysis also 

revealed some of the cross-cutting issues involved in 

the employment of technology on such operations involving both military and law enforcement agencies.3

Despite the unique circumstances and history of each 

operation, there were key findings that are common to 

all operations considered:

• In all operations considered, the length of commitment of USG resources to deal with law 

enforcement issues has exceeded original planning estimates—often by many years.

• Capacity building in law enforcement has been 

a required and substantial element of all of 

these operations.

• Military forces played a key role in law enforcement and related issues, even if not specifically 

tasked with a law enforcement mandate.

• Much of the required expertise and authority 

for law enforcement operations and related capacity building/institutional reform currently 

exists in civilian agencies across the USG, but 

coordinating across the USG has been ad hoc 

with mixed results.
xiv

ENDNOTES - SUMMARY

1. “International operations” is used here as a term to describe 

the range of USG commitment of resources as an intervention in 

another nation in support of U.S. national objectives. It involves 

all commitments beyond the normal conduct of state-to-state diplomacy but beneath the threshold of conventional conflict. As 

such, this includes military operations other than war (including 

reconstruction and stabilization, counterinsurgency, peace support, and humanitarian assistance operations), as well as comprehensive support of a less predominantly military nature provided 

to another state.

2. The Technology Case Study is only available as a supplementary annex to the electronically-published version of this report, and is available from pksoi.army.mil/.

3. Ibid.
1

LESSONS LEARNED FROM

U.S. GOVERNMENT LAW ENFORCEMENT

IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION 

Law enforcement (LE) personnel, agencies, techniques, equipment, and priorities have been an increasingly prominent feature within the United States 

Government (USG) commitment to numerous international operations,1

 particularly since the end of the 

Cold War. This is a reflection of the increased human 

and societal, as opposed to military or geostrategic, 

complexity of the operational environments into 

which the USG has intervened and the multifaceted 

nature of the objectives often sought by the USG in 

these international operations. In recent decades, the 

use of military force alone has rarely been sufficient to 

achieving the desired end states sought by the USG. 

Often, there is a requirement to establish both security 

and stability as a part of the operation and to provide 

support to, expand the capacity of, or reestablish host 

nation authority to sustain this stability. LE is a critical 

element of security and is also a bridge toward building an effective Rule of Law (RoL) system that helps 

restore and maintain legitimate civil governance.

The most obvious manifestation of LE on international operations is the presence of American police 

officers working as a part of uniformed international 

police missions (USG-led, coalition, or multinational) 

that are used to maintain law and order in support 

of or in the absence of host nation authority. This has 

been seen in many recent operational environments. 
2

However, these interim policing missions are only part 

of the contribution to international operations that can 

be made by LE. U.S. LE agencies may also be involved 

directly in international operations as a part of their 

standing authority related to the enforcement of U.S. 

domestic law; this is often conducted in conjunction 

with host nation and/or international police. Another 

contribution of LE expertise is in the capacity building 

and institutional reform efforts to enhance or rebuild 

a host nation’s (HN) LE and related institutions that 

are necessary to sustain security and effective governance. Furthermore, U.S. military forces are increasingly employed in LE-related or supporting roles and 

simultaneously using LE assistance in the conduct of 

their military tasks in these environments.

Given the complexity of USG LE involvement in 

contemporary international operations, it is important 

to understand how these agencies work, what roles 

they play, or could play, in the conduct of operations, 

and how their various initiatives relate to one another. 

Such an understanding will help guide thinking about 

how to conduct and coordinate these efforts in future 

international operations.

Aim.

This paper presents the results of an examination 

of various applications of USG LE capabilities in several contexts and offers a series of observations and 

recommendations. The lessons analyzed in this paper 

are only those regarding strategic and operational 

levels; identification of tactical-level lessons was not 

in the scope of this project. This analysis is presented 

with the aim of informing decisions about policy and 

capability development and integration relating to the 
3

employment of LE capabilities/expertise and the use 

of military in LE-related roles and in supporting LE on 

international operations. 

This report specifically examines lessons from 

three case studies of LE involvement in international 

operations, in particular USG post-Cold War experience in international operations.2

 The three case studies are: 

• Panama (1989-99). Coming right after the fall of 

the Berlin Wall, Panama is considered the first 

“post Cold War” USG military intervention. 

Though launched primarily to oust Manuel 

Noriega from power and bring him to trial in 

the United States, the operation quickly became 

a state-building exercise, with the United States 

both providing LE capabilities and rebuilding 

Panamanian law enforcement institutions over 

several years. The effort in Panama reshaped 

the USG organizational landscape for such operations.

• Colombia (1989-present). USG LE work in Colombia began with efforts to stop the flow of 

narcotics into the United States. The Andean 

Counter Drug Initiative, a counternarcotics 

plan devised in the late 1980s, extended USG 

LE and other counternarcotics assistance to 

Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. Over almost 2 decades, U.S. support to Colombia in particular, 

has shifted into a comprehensive governmentto-government partnership to disrupt drug 

networks, including through the reform and 

improvement of domestic LE capabilities. Plan 

Colombia and subsequent efforts have required 

unparalleled cooperation across USG departments and agencies to help Colombia build 
4

military, paramilitary, and civilian LE institutions.

• Kosovo (1998-present). Unlike the other two 

operations, USG involvement in Kosovo had 

no direct linkage to U.S. law enforcement concerns. Rather, it is an example of the necessity 

of LE contributions as a part of a wider multinational operation in support of USG foreign 

policy objectives. It also required the need to 

establish security in the host nation as part of 

an international coalition while simultaneously 

building a new nation’s LE institutions from 

scratch.

Law Enforcement Capabilities Project.

This paper has been produced as a part of the Law 

Enforcement Capabilities Project (LECP). The LECP 

is an initiative of the Emerging Capabilities Division 

(ECD) within the Rapid Reaction Technology Office 

(RRTO) of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). 

The RRTO has funded this project to help inform policy and capability development decisions related to the 

contributions of USG agencies and bureaus with law 

enforcement responsibilities and expertise and the 

employment of U.S. military elements in LE related 

or supporting roles. It is also interested in the integration of various interagency (IA) initiatives as a part of 

international operations.

This paper will be used to inform further research 

and concept development and is being published independently for others to use in support of further 

developing LE capabilities. 
5

Methodology.

The chapter presents the results of the analysis that 

was conducted in relation to the aforementioned case 

studies of USG LE involvement in international operations. For each case study, the analysis was conducted 

in three stages: 

• Desk research. Baseline desk research provided the context of each operation, analysis of the 

policymaking processes surrounding each, data 

on strategic and operational implementation, 

and an existing set of lessons learned through 

available academic and practitioner literature. 

This phase of research relied heavily on advice, 

support, and access to information made possible by engagement with representatives from 

numerous USG agencies.

• Primary source research. This included extensive outreach to subject matter experts, practitioners, and policymakers within USG agencies 

who participated in the three operations or 

with involvement in employment of relevant 

military and LE technologies. The project team 

conducted 70 interviews in support of this research. In addition, many interviewees made 

additional primary source documentation 

available to the project team. All interviews 

and documentation for this analysis are unclassified. The U.S. Army Military Police Historian 

also made further information available. For 

Kosovo and Colombia, the primary research 

was augmented by in-country field research 

to study operational practice first-hand. This 

enabled further discussions and interviews 

with USG subject-matter experts (SMEs) and 
6

practitioners in the field, as well as HN counterparts working on the relevant issues. The observations that were drawn through interviews 

and site visits were collated, and lessons were 

drawn out at the macro level for further discussion.

• Lessons learned workshops. Finally, the observations and lessons developed through desk 

research and primary source research were 

subjected to structured examination and discussion in a series of workshops with SMEs. In 

addition to Panama, Colombia and Kosovo, a 

functional workshop was held on technology 

to examine the employment of technology by 

LE personnel and military forces and their potential application in international operations.3

A wide range of agencies and SMEs, practitioners, and individuals with experience in the 

various operations participated in the workshops. The workshops served two purposes:

— Share and validate observations. Each of 

the strategic and operational level observations that were drawn through research, 

interviews, and site visits were shared with 

participants during the discussions for them 

to validate and provide additional insights.

— Develop recommendations. The various 

SMEs from across the IA developed the 

recommendations documented herein in a 

structured workshop. The LECP team have 

undertaken additional analysis and structured the recommendations, but the base 

recommendations represent the unofficial 

views of SMEs with direct policy, leadership, or operational experience in the areas 

covered.
7

Interagency Participation.

This project would not have been possible without 

significant support from across the IA, think tanks, 

and individuals who have since retired from government service. The project team would like to recognize 

the support of the following organizations:

• Department of State. Office of the Coordinator 

for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS); 

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Bureau of 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs (INL); Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS); 

Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (Office 

of Andean Affairs, Office of Policy Planning 

and Coordination); and Bureau of European 

and Eurasian Affairs (Office of South Central 

European Affairs and Office of U.S. Assistance 

Coordinator for Europe and Eurasia).

• Department of Justice. International Criminal 

Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP); Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT); the 

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the 

U.S. Marshals Service (USMS); and the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

• Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense-Policy (Special Operations/

Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent 

Capabilities [SO/LIC&IC]); Joint Staff; Headquarters Department of the Army, Office of the 

Provost Marshal General (OPMG); U.S. Army 

Military Police Corps School; U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI); United States Marine Corps, Center for 
8

Irregular Warfare (USMC CIW); United States 

Southern Command (SOUTHCOM); Joint Interagency task Force South (JIATF-S); and the 

Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA).

• Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

Office for State and Local Law Enforcement 

(OSLLE); United States Coast Guard (USCG); 

and Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA).

• Department of the Treasury. Office of Foreign 

Assets Control (OFAC).

• United States Agency for International 

Development (USAID).

• Embassy of the United States of America in 

Bogota, Colombia.

• Embassy of the United States of America in 

Pristina, Kosovo.

Qualifications and Limitations.

The observations that are discussed in this paper 

do not constitute the entirety of lessons from each of 

the operations. For purposes of focusing on LE and related topics, the observations contain only the primary 

themes observed through research and interviews. In 

addition, the background information is not intended 

to be a definitive history of each of the case studies. 

The information and descriptions are used to try to 

understand what happened in each of the operations 

rather than presenting a definitive narration of events. 

In order to be able to account for and analyze each 

of the various strands of law enforcement initiatives 

conducted by the USG, this research has identified 

distinct Lines of Operation (LOO) for each operation. 

These LOOs were developed by the project team pure-
9

ly to guide research and to allow coherent consideration of the aims of separate initiatives and the role 

played by various agencies in contributing to each. It 

must be stressed that these LOOs were developed by 

the LECP project team for analytical purposes and do 

not reflect any contemporary planning approach used 

by the USG in the operations considered. 

The project team encountered some important 

gaps in information in relation to the strategic and 

operational decisions taken by the agencies, especially 

in relation to Panama due to the time that has lapsed 

since the end of the operation. The analysis was also 

limited to the unclassified information domain, reducing the ability to examine classified records of senior 

policymaking (National Security Council decision 

memorandum, operations orders, etc.). These gaps 

have resulted in limitations in the level of detail that 

can be provided in some areas, but have not undermined the team’s ability to analyze the fundamental 

areas of interest of the project.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. “International operations” is used here to describe the 

range of USG commitment of resources as an intervention in another nation in support of U.S. national objectives. It involves all 

commitments beyond the normal conduct of state-to-state diplomacy but beneath the threshold of conventional conflict. As such, 

this includes military operations other than war (including reconstruction and stabilization, counterinsurgency, peace support, 

and humanitarian assistance operations), as well as comprehensive support of a less predominantly military nature provided to 

another state.

2. The Law Enforcement Capabilities Project (LECP) also 

conducted a study examining issues related to the employment 

of technological capabilities that undergird the provision of LE 
10

and military capabilities in international operational environments. This case study looks at technology needs of LE entities 

and military forces in population-centric operations, the potential 

for sharing of military and LE capabilities to support respective 

priorities, and differing approaches to the employment of technology between the military and law enforcement communities. 

The Technology Case Study is only available as a supplementary 

annex to the electronically-published version of this report, and is 

available from www.pksoi.army.mil.

3. Ibid.
11

CHAPTER 2

PANAMA

INTRODUCTION 

In December 1989 when President George H. W. 

Bush directed U.S. military forces to “protect the lives 

of American citizens in Panama and to bring General Noriega to justice in the United States,” he did 

not commit to rebuilding the Panamanian state from 

the ground up. He chose a goal that would be easily 

understood. He hinted at the tasks to come only by 

saying “the United States is eager to work with the 

Panamanian people in partnership and friendship to 

rebuild their economy.”1

Yet within hours of the commencement of Operation JUST CAUSE (and before the military operation 

was complete), it was clear that the U.S. Government 

(USG) would need a broad interagency (IA) effort to 

enable and rebuild vital structures within the host nation, especially its law enforcement capabilities. The 

efforts that were started in 1989 would continue for 10 

years. The security vacuum created by rapid military 

success had to be filled by the victors. The Panamanian police and the Rule of Law (RoL) system both 

had to be recreated, and these massive tasks stretched 

the USG entities in the country at the time. The U.S. 

military, which had the most resources and personnel 

in country, had to fill the void by providing interim 

security and limited amounts of law enforcement and 

capacity building through deployment of Military Police (MPs) and some civil affairs soldiers. The military 

had not, however, planned for such an effort and did 
12

not have the legal authority to build civilian law enforcement entities overseas. 

Operations in Panama forced the United States 

to quickly adapt to the challenges of integrated civilmilitary post-combat reconstruction and stabilization 

operations. The U.S. military established new entities 

in the field, and civilian agencies took on new missions. The Department of Justice (DoJ) International 

Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program 

(ICITAP) was tasked to rapidly change its mission 

and duties and begin reconstituting the Panamanian 

police—this unexpected change led to the ICITAP remaining in the country for the next 10 years to rebuild 

the police system and train personnel. 

The Panama operation highlights challenges that 

the USG continues to face at the strategic and operational levels for any comprehensive effort to support 

law enforcement (LE) needs of international operations. The Panama example showed a certain level of 

adaptation among USG entities that were involved in 

the mission, but its lessons remain applicable today as 

IA coordination, military and civilian integration, and 

significant gaps in capacities and authorities continue 

to cause the United States great difficulties in these 

missions.

This section contains the following areas: (1) A 

synopsis of the Panama operation and LE Lines of Operation; (2) Observations drawn through research and 

interviews; and (3) Recommendations drawn through 

workshop discussion and analysis.

SYNOPSIS (1989-99)

Operation JUST CAUSE (OJC) was in planning for 

more than 2 years prior to actual U.S. intervention. 

OJC was launched after the failure of efforts to re-
13

move General Manuel Noriega from power following 

his indictment in the United States on drug trafficking 

charges and as his domestic popularity plummeted in 

the wake of allegations of stolen elections. Tensions 

increased with Noriega’s consolidation of power and 

his allowing the Panama Defense Force (PDF) to act 

with impunity, including the killing of an unarmed 

U.S. service member by forces under Noriega’s command. Events like these provided the justification first 

for an increased U.S. military presence, and then for 

U.S. military action to take Noriega into custody and 

to put in power the elected but never seated government of President Guillermo Endara.

The United States had the following objectives for 

OJC:

• Protect American lives (nearly 30,000 U.S. citizens resided in Panama at the time)

• Bring Noriega to justice

• Neutralize the PDF

• Ensure implementation of Panama Canal Treaties

• Protect the 142 U.S. defense sites in Panama

• Restore Panamanian democracy.2

On December 20, 1989, operating under the authority of the Commander of the U.S. Southern Command 

(SOUTHCOM), Joint Task Force-South (JTF-SOUTH) 

managed and led the operation with a combined force 

of 22,000 Soldiers, 3,400 Airmen, 900 Marines, and 700 

Sailors.3

Shortly after the successful launch of OJC, which 

lasted under a month, the United States launched the 

planned follow-on stabilization initiative, Operation 

PROMOTE LIBERTY (OPL) to secure Panama in the 

wake of chaos and looting in some cities and support 
14

efforts to restore services and reconstitute the PDF in 

a new, democratically controlled security sector. Despite OPL being a military creation, its planners made 

every effort to make it an IA effort once the operation got underway. While this was more than partly 

due to a realization of deficiencies in planning, the 

military was able to adapt quickly. The SOUTHCOM 

Joint Plans Officer (J-5) was named commander of the 

new Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF), 

which was placed under the operational control of the 

U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Panama.4

 The CMOTF began work under OPL on December 22, 1989. OPL ran 

parallel with OJC for a short period and continued its 

work after OJC concluded on January 11, 1990. OPL 

(and CMOTF by extension) was expected to support 

the requirements identified by the Embassy team and 

the new government of Panama. The intent for some 

level of civil-military coordination, which was not apparent during the planning stage of OPL, can be seen 

by CMOTF being brought under operational control 

of the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires. Although CMOTF was 

nominally under the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires and a new 

Panamanian government had been established, neither the understaffed Embassy nor the new Panamanian government had the required capacity or plans 

for managing a complex stabilization operation. 

Initially, CMOTF personnel were combined with 

active duty soldiers and reservists.5 Shortly thereafter, 

MP companies joined four Brigade Task Forces from 

the 82nd Airborne Division and 193rd Infantry Brigade to reinforce OPL. The U.S. military brought in 

MP and infantry units to help calm the cities under 

OPL and left residual forces behind after the conclusion of OJC to enable the transition back to Panamanian civilian control. 
15

U.S. efforts in Panama had an important law enforcement component from the beginning. A key 

part of the mission in OJC was the apprehension of 

a fugitive: Manuel Noriega. The core of the stabilization mission in OPL was restoring law and order and 

building new civilian law enforcement capabilities. 

Over the course of the initial operations and their aftermath, the USG deployed at least five departments 

and agencies to achieve these missions. Key among 

these were the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), the 

Department of State (DoS), and agencies of the DoJ including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 

the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), and the ICITAP.

LINES OF OPERATION

The wide range of USG entities involved in Panama brought diverse authorities, resources, expertise, 

and cultures to a complex mission. For purposes of 

drawing a distinction between military and LE tasks, 

it is useful to consider USG involvement in terms of a 

number of distinct, but interrelated lines of operation 

(LOOs).6

The first LOO covers OJC, which had narrow LE 

lines of operation and during which larger LE needs 

became apparent to many involved with the mission. 

The second LE LOO looks at the transitional phase 

where there was increased need to conduct and build 

LE capabilities among the host nation (HN) personnel. 

LOO 3 reflects the transition into long-term capacity 

building measures. See Table 2-1.
16

Table 2-1. Summary of Lines of Operation (LOO) 

for Panama.

LOO 1—LAW ENFORCEMENT-RELATED LINES 

OF OPERATION FOR OPERATION JUST CAUSE

Noriega Extradition.

Taking custody of Noriega and extraditing him on 

a federal narcotics warrant was a key objective of OJC. 

In the immediate pre-invasion planning, it became 

apparent to military planners that, although Noriega could be captured and detained by U.S. military 

forces, the formal arrest was an LE mission; this was 

eventually delegated to the USMS. A team of personnel from the USMS Special Operations Group (SOG) 

responded to the request for assistance from the U.S. 

military and deployed within a couple of days of the 

start of OJC. 

In theory, the SOG can conduct self-sufficient operations, but in practice for this extradition mission in 

an overseas combat zone, they were heavily reliant on 

LOO 1

LE-Related LOOs for Operation JUST CAUSE

1a.	 Noriega Extradition

1b.	 Detainee Warrants

1c.	 Passenger Screening and Airport Security

LOO 2

Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY and 

Transition Phase 

2a.	 Maintain Law and Order

2b.	 Reestablish HN LE Capacity

LOO 3 

Civilian-led Reconstruction and 

Stabilization 

3.	 Building HN civilian LE capabilities
17

the U.S. military. The military provided the Marshals 

with air transport to Panama and additional logistics 

and related support once they arrived in country. The 

USMS team worked closely with the military to conduct Noriega’s extradition successfully. After Noriega 

surrendered to U.S. Army Soldiers, he was then handed to the USMS SOG Team, which formally arrested 

him. USMS SOG personnel accompanied Noriega on 

a U.S. Air Force (USAF) C-130 flight to the United 

States. One of the DEA agents onboard the flight read 

Noriega his rights. A few weeks after Noriega was 

extradited to the United States, the rest of the USMS 

team also returned home (by the end of January 1990). 

Detainee Warrants. 

In addition to Noriega, there were numerous other 

outstanding U.S. Federal warrants for persons believed to be residing in Panama. Given the availability 

of sufficient SOG personnel beyond the immediate 

requirement for extraditing Noriega, the USMS team 

saw the opportunity to clear some of these warrants.7

Clearing warrants became an important aspect of the 

OJC mission that, while not planned for in advance, 

was readily performed by deployed U.S. personnel. 

Organization and accomplishment of this line of 

operation required close USMS and military collaboration. The USMS team worked with MPs to check the 

identities of prisoners of war against the warrants. 

Some SOG deputies accompanied the military to prisons and detention centers to seek out and arrest those 

with outstanding warrants issued against them.

As the detention mission was larger than expected, 

it became a challenge for the USMS team. The task 

grew to include processing several thousand detain-
18

ees. Normally, U.S. personnel supporting host-nation 

officials would accomplish this, but the collapse of the 

Panamanian government left this entirely to a small 

group of U.S. officials. 

Logistics also proved to be a challenge for an expanded USMS mission. The lack of satellite phones 

and vital technology such as surveillance equipment 

posed significant problems in conducting the tasks 

taken on by the USMS. 

Passenger Screening and Airport Security. 

Once the military secured the Torrijos-Tocumen International Airport in Panama City, it became quickly 

apparent that there was a need to extend screening for 

wanted persons to passengers traveling in and out of 

the airport. This task fell primarily to USMS personnel 

who were already screening detainees for outstanding 

warrants. The USMS team began to screen passengers 

traveling through the airport to ensure that they were 

not among those on USG wanted lists and to prevent 

the smuggling of contraband. MP canine units supported the search for contraband. The USMS team also 

maintained coordination and communication with the 

DEA and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

One of the challenges to conducting passenger 

screenings resulted from the technology that was used 

to convey the wanted lists. The warrants were sent to 

the USMS team in the form of computer printouts, 

and the team looked through reams of printouts during the identification process at the airport. The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at USMS Headquarters in Washington, DC, helped the team run names 

of detainees through databases so that the team on 

the ground could either clear or formally arrest those 
19

being detained on suspicion. The procedure involved 

long periods of processing time since the USMS had 

to conduct most of the checks manually. The team 

members sent details and fingerprint cards to Miami 

for analysis and database checks. 

Only after the U.S. Embassy was back up and running could the USMS team use computers to access 

the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database and other resources, which helped the team accomplish its tasks more efficiently. 

The military provided airport security (U.S. Army 

Rangers provided perimeter security) while agents 

from the USMS, DEA, and FBI operated inside. Some 

MPs and regular army personnel conducted static post 

and roving patrols inside the airport premises (including MP dog handlers). MPs also manned checkpoints 

at the airport’s perimeter. Basic airport security by the 

military was well within standard doctrine and the 

MPs and other units were well equipped for this line 

of operation.

LOO 2—OPERATION PROMOTE LIBERTY AND 

THE TRANSITION PHASE 

Though highly successful militarily, OJC sparked 

several days of looting and relative anarchy in Panama for which the United States and the newly empowered democratic Panamanian leadership was 

unprepared. The original plan for stabilization in 

Panama called Operation BLIND LOGIC (and renamed OPL) was developed by the military as a civil 

affairs operation in support of the U.S. Embassy and 

Panamanian government. The plan assumed an Embassy team and new Panamanian government would 

have the capacity to work together with the military to 
20

accomplish OPL. Although they would ultimately 

have operational control over the mission, the State 

Department and Country Team had no role in the 

planning of OPL. Within the military uneven integration was also a problem: OPL was begun shortly after OJC was launched and ran parallel with OJC for a 

short while. However, these two operations were not 

planned to easily integrate with each other.8

 This revealed a significant gap in U.S. planning, which had 

not adequately taken the challenges of post-combat 

efforts into account. But as the circumstances on the 

ground demanded it, SOUTHCOM initiated the J-5 

led Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF) 

under OPL and used improvised measures to address 

challenges related to the lack of HN civilian capacities. 

The CMOTF, which was not staffed to address law 

and order issues,9

 focused on coordinating the restoration of basic services, organization of government 

departments and standing up ministries.

However, with law and order remaining in a precarious situation the U.S. military also took measures 

to deal with this challenge. The military established 

the U.S. Forces Liaison Group (USFLG) and Judicial 

Liaison Group (JLG) to take on the tasks of training and 

setting up a new police force to address the issues in 

maintaining law and order10 and standing up the court 

systems. By early January 1990, with a host of ad hoc 

bodies functioning in Panama, the Commander, U.S. 

Special Operations Command, proposed the establishment of a Military Support Group (MSG) to bring 

the CMOTF and all SOUTHCOM and JTF-SOUTH 

organizations involved with the civil-military operations under a single command. The MSG was stood 

up under SOUTHCOM on January 17, 1990, with support from Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Civil 
21

Affairs (CA), the Police Force Liaison Division (PFLD, 

the former USFLG), the Joint Special Operations Task 

Force (JSOTF), and Military Police Brigades.11

Under at least formal U.S. Embassy control, which 

was part of the effort to create some level of civil-military coordination, the CMOTF, USFLG, and eventually the MSG assumed the entire range of government 

functions, acting on behalf of the government where 

no local capability existed and transitioning long-term 

capacity building to U.S. civilian organizations and 

the Panamanian government. In the LE arena, two 

supporting lines of operation led or supported by U.S. 

military and civilian organizations can be discerned 

(Maintain Law and Order, and Reestablish Host Nation LE Capability). The analysis below looks at how 

U.S. entities were prepared to conduct these two supporting LE lines of operation and what types of coordination occurred. 

Maintain Law and Order.

In the immediate aftermath of the launching of 

OJC, it became apparent that the HN lacked both law 

and order and civilian capacities. Since the CMOTF 

did not have the capability to conduct this larger mission on its own, the U.S. military, as the only entity 

in the country with the capacity to provide the level 

of stability required, had to deal with the lack of a viable and functioning HN security and LE apparatus. 

While some of the military personnel through the 

CMOTF concentrated on reviving civilian capacities, 

the military set up the USFLG to deal with law and order issues. Absent a clear and defined mission set with 

relevant authorities and solid planning and doctrine, 

the military pieced together available authorities in 
22

a combat situation to stand up interim structures to 

plug critical gaps. 

From January through June 1990, approximately 

200 U.S. army personnel patrolled the streets of Panama City and the outlying provinces to maintain order. 

The new Panamanian government with U.S. assistance 

screened former PDF personnel and after weeding 

out those who were known to have been corrupt or 

violated human rights, incorporated the screened personnel into the new forces.12 When these new Panama 

National Police (PNP) personnel became available, 

the U.S. military began to conduct joint patrols with 

them.13 At first the U.S. Army personnel were mostly 

general-purpose forces (GPF), and included a minority of MPs and reservists/National Guard who were 

police in civilian life. The GPF were untrained for the 

tasks of either providing law and order or partnering 

with local forces. The MPs had LE training, but were 

not trained in community and related policing skills.14

The MPs, using available resources and personnel, 

filled-in gaps relating to law and order until the ICITAP program started to graduate recruits of the new 

PNP academy able to take over some of these duties 

by themselves. MPs provided installation law enforcement, quick reaction forces, protective services, and 

inner-city courtesy patrols.15 By mid 1990, the training 

program was being conducted by the ICITAP, while 

the military continued joint patrols with HN police.

(Re)-Establish Host Nation Law Enforcement

Capacity.

An urgent task for the United States and the newly-installed Panamanian government was to set up 

a new police force consisting of vetted former PDF 
23

personnel in the wake of the PDF’s collapse. At the 

outset, U.S. forces were effectively an occupying force. 

To get beyond this dynamic, the military had to ensure the mobilization of a Panamanian governmentsupported police and a functioning judicial and penal 

system. The challenges as with the other LOOs began 

with the planning phase. OPL was designed to run for 

only 30 days—in this case until late January 1990. By 

then, U.S. forces had begun to address the breakdown 

in law and order by securing the country. Despite this 

achievement, there were inadequate numbers of local 

Panamanian forces out on the streets providing security, so the U.S. military had to address this issue. 

The USFLG assisted the Panamanian government 

in setting up the Panamanian Fuerza Publica (Public 

Force) and oversaw its division into the PNP, air service and maritime service, investigative arm, immigration service, port police, presidential guard, and prison guards. The USFLG ensured that the Public Force 

began to deploy vetted forces by the end of January 

1990.16 The USFLG also coordinated equipping and 

setting up the prison system and set up the JLG under 

a U.S. Army South (USARSO) civilian international 

lawyer tasked with getting the court system functioning again.17 Under its immediate task of setting up a 

new police force to address law and order issues, the 

USFLG began to work on getting HN personnel to assume this task. As such, one of the USFLG’s first activities under its key task of addressing enforcement and 

maintenance of law and order was to develop a basic 

20-hour curriculum for a transition training course for 

the HN forces, which it later transferred to the MSG 

(the USFLG became the Public Force Liaison Division 

under the MSG when the latter body was set up in 

January 1990).18 The development of the course by the 
24

USFLG was not ideal, but the staff found reservists 

who were police officers in their civilian lives to help 

shape it.

Once established, the MSG took over the multiple 

efforts of entities like the CMOTF and USFLG and became the body that formulated a strategy for restoring 

basic government functions, reconstituting security 

services, and bringing order to the many ad hoc efforts underway. By the end of January 1990, civilmilitary efforts had succeeded in providing security 

to the point that U.S. infantry forces could redeploy to 

the United States.19 But even this was probably premature. Though the MSG was stood up with a view to a 

1-year mission, it depended heavily on CA reservists. 

Because the reserves had not been called up, the CA 

reservists’ tours continued to be 30-day tours, causing 

chronic staffing problems.20

As a means of reconstituting the PNP, the MSG 

used MPs to administer the 20-hour basic police 

training course to PNP personnel.21 In February 1990, 

Congress invoked the Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 which limits U.S. assistance 

for the training of foreign police, causing the military 

to curtail the training of the PNP. The U.S. military 

continued to mentor the PNP under an FAA Section 

660 provision that permitted the use of residual security assistance funds to equip a police force. The MSG 

was left in a difficult situation—with no civilians to 

transition the mission to and restricted authority for 

providing direct support to police efforts in Panama, 

the urgency to find a civilian answer increased. The 

DoS approached the ICITAP to advise and support 

the transition of the former PDF into the new PNP. 

Before this, the ICITAP had not been involved in a capacity and skills building program on this scale. This 
25

led to several changes within the ICITAP and its training doctrine.22 With the Panama mission, the ICITAP’s 

role was broadened through a special congressional 

authorization in February 1990, allowing the agency 

to implement a comprehensive reconstitution and 

training program for the PNP. 

Once again, the organizational work was under civilian control (in this case, placing the Deputy Chief of 

Mission [DCM] in charge of the CMOTF). The ICITAP 

would run the programs and be in charge of training, 

and the MSG would conduct operations, including 

joint patrols with the Panamanian Forces. The MSG 

continued to provide mentors and to monitor the PNP 

and other forces through joint patrols, and officially 

ended its involvement with the PNP in June 1991.23

The military proved able to adapt to overcome organizational chaos and several gaps in doctrine, training and shortfalls in personnel, particularly the failure 

to mobilize reserve civil affairs units early on. But all 

of these areas could have been addressed with consultations and preparations with civilian counterparts 

in the preoperational planning stages before OPL got 

under way.

LOO 3—CIVILIAN-LED RECONSTRUCTION 

AND STABILIZATION 

Prior to 1989, the ICITAP’s standard operating 

procedures were mostly limited to delivering training 

in criminal investigations, forensics, and administrative and management capabilities in relation to career 

advancement for federal law enforcement bodies. It 

could not provide lethal equipment or deliver training or assistance in relation to arrests, use of force, and 

related police techniques. After Congress changed the 
26

ICITAP’s mandate, the task of training and setting up 

the PNP was handed over to the ICITAP, which gradually began to take over from the MSG and the MP-led 

efforts to reconstitute and train the PNP.

Building Host Nation Civilian Law Enforcement 

Capabilities. 

In January 1990, the ICITAP was tasked to develop 

a 2 1/2-year project plan to assist in the restoration of 

LE in Panama through the development of the PNP 

and Judicial Technical Police (PTJ). The ICITAP was 

granted $13.2 million through several congressional 

authorizations, including the Urgent Assistance for 

Democracy in Panama Act and supplemental funds.24

Prior to Panama, the ICITAP had never deployed personnel permanently in support of its training operations. The ICITAP manager hired U.S. contractors25 to 

conduct initial training and field evaluations. 

The 20-hour MSG-run basic police course continued for a short while, as the ICITAP prepared for the 

handover. The MSG worked towards building a basic 

national police and managed through the creative use 

of certain legal provisions to give the new police uniforms and other basic equipment. The collapse of the 

PDF had allowed vehicles and equipment to be misappropriated or destroyed, so the U.S. military had to 

provide everything for new recruits, including transportation.

Apart from logistical and administrative support 

and some planning in early stages after it took over 

the training of the PNP, the ICITAP did not coordinate or work with any military. The MSG continued to 

conduct joint patrols, but as Panamanian forces grew, 

MSG involvement shrank. 
27

Other agencies, including the DEA, played a role 

in providing substantial assistance to counternarcotics 

units and operations of the Panamanian police. The 

Legal Attaché Office at the Embassy, which also represents the FBI, worked with the PNP on cases that were 

of interest to the United States (but did not provide 

the police with assistance).26

Between 1990 and 1999, the United States provided 

more than $43 million to help enhance the capabilities 

of Panamanian judges, prosecutors, investigators, and 

public defenders and their organizations. The U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID) provided about $9.6 million in rule of law assistance to 

help improve judicial institutions, while the ICITAP 

provided about $33.7 million to support the establishment and strengthening of a national police force.27

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

The observations from the research were grouped 

into seven main thematic areas. In this section, a series 

of recommendations follows each observation statement.

1. Coordination / Planning. 

There was a lack of interagency planning to coordinate 

the full force of the U.S. Government capabilities, expertise, 

responsibilities and authority to respond to complex operational needs. 

At the strategic level, coordination and planning 

in relation to the Panama mission revealed some unevenness in thinking about overall objectives and 

consideration of second- and third-order effects of operations. There were gaps in the allocation of roles for 

tasks that required interagency involvement. Despite 
28

the fact that Noriega’s arrest was a primary mission 

objective, military planners did not build a relevant 

LE response element into the original plan. 

Shortly after the launch of OJC, the DoD requested 

the USMS to conduct Noriega’s arrest and extradition 

and additional LE requirements that occurred after the 

initial combat phase of the mission. After just a few 

days, the PDF was successfully dismantled, and the 

U.S. military wrested all control of the country from 

Noriega supporters, enabling the new government to 

assume power. However, the USG planners had not 

taken the potential for civil chaos into account. Planning had focused primarily on the military-led combat 

operations. The dismantling of the PDF left a security 

vacuum in the domestic security apparatus, and there 

was a planning deficit in relation to dealing with the 

possible effects of this security vacuum. The military 

was ordered to destroy all PDF-related infrastructure 

during military operations and to dismantle the remaining PDF after the cessation of combat operations. 

After combat operations ended, the military had 

to rebuild infrastructure and provide equipment for 

the new PNP. The cascade effect of this gap in planning led to MPs having to move quickly to provide infrastructure and support to the PNP in the short-term 

until civilian LE agencies were capable of taking over 

the task of reorganizing and training the police. 

There is a direct correlation between strategic 

planning gaps and the pointed lack of IA planning 

prior to the Panama mission. Most of the planning 

was conducted by the military. The inadequate IA 

planning and coordination also meant that there was 

no entity allocated to deal with civilian LE and RoL 

needs such as revitalizing the police, justice and corrections systems. The military stepped in and formed 
29

ad hoc bodies like the Justice Liaison Group, consisting of USARSO lawyers, to support the Panamanian 

courts, and the Civil Military Operations Task Force 

and U.S. Force Liaison Group to manage the transition. The U.S. civilian and LE agencies that arrived in 

the country after the end of combat operations spent 

a considerable amount of effort to work with these 

entities and transition to a civilian-led recovery and 

stability operation. 

Recommendations:

1.1. Institute a comprehensive, flexible, coordinated IA strategic planning framework with clear role 

allocation, valid contextual assumptions, and related 

IA responsibilities and capabilities. 

1.2. Create a common LE entity and LE planning 

framework to respond to the range of LE requirements.

1.3. Account for funding availability and restrictions during the planning stage.

1.4. Create capacity in civilian organizations for 

“overhead teams” with the ability to conduct assessments and provide oversight and relevant operational 

expertise before and during operations.

1.5. Consider whether the DoS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) 

Civilian Response Corps could resolve some of these 

issues.

2. Organizational Capability. 

No one organization had the authority/capability to rehabilitate or create host nation law enforcement entities.

With the Panama mission, the ICITAP’s role was 

broadened through a special congressional authorization in February 1990, allowing the organization 
30

to implement a comprehensive reconstitution and 

training program for the PNP. The new and broadened mandate forced a change in the ICITAP’s core 

doctrine, and it was compelled to undergo rapid reorientation in terms of its mission and operational tasks.

The military assumed LE tasks and capacity building in the interim as ICITAP personnel began arriving 

in the country and setting up operations. The initial 

MP-led training focused mainly on providing the new 

PNP with basic skills relating to law enforcement. The 

training focused on civil order, patrolling, searches, 

and detention. The MPs did not have the doctrine and 

requisite capacity to provide additional training like 

community policing. 

The lack of a selected USG LE agency to plan and 

implement training and capacity building also resulted in systemic gaps such as the lack of a standard process to vet the new PNP personnel. The ICITAP, which 

took over the task from the MPs, found that it had to 

re-vet some of the personnel as the procedure had been 

conducted in ad hoc fashion by the MPs, who mainly 

used existing police rosters that were located in some 

of the police stations to assist in the vetting process. 

Unlike during the Panama operation, there are now 

several agencies that conduct LE-related tasks, both at 

the operational and capacity building levels. While no 

one agency conducts a full suite of LE training and 

capacity building, the USMS, the ICITAP, the Department of State’s Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), and 

a range of other agencies and departments conduct 

capacity building and training in investigations, forensics, witness and judicial security, eradication, and 

interdiction-related operational tasks. 

The responsibility for different elements of LE lies 

with several departments including the DoJ, the DoS, 
31

and the USAID. Oversight and control of these various 

agencies is fragmented. While there have been many 

improvements in IA cooperation in international operations, some of the fundamental problems that arose 

during the Panama effort continue. 

Recommendation: 

2.1. Create an official lead agency or entity with 

designated authority and capacity to conduct LE-related tasks with the coordination and support of other 

Departments and Agencies as relevant.

3. Command and Control. 

Different approaches to command and control (C2) exhibited by military and law enforcement. 

The flexibility permitted in the internal authorities 

of LE agencies allowed for these agencies to widen 

or narrow the scope of their operation with minimal 

internal debate or need to review authorities. The 

USMS, for example, was able to take on additional 

tasks (within its accepted scope of work), at short notice with minimum formal procedure. The statutory 

authority given to LE agencies gave the USMS team 

leader the ability to interpret the specific circumstances and respond. The military, in turn, despite more 

formal authorities, was able to set up structures with 

mandated leadership and hierarchies like the CMOTF 

and USFLG to react to the requisite needs.

However, all these adaptations were ad hoc and 

based on the extent of flexibility available to the entities in question. This raises several issues in relation 

to having the military assume civilian tasks, or even 

of having multiple civilian agencies with overlapping 

roles and responsibilities. Faced with unforeseen requirements, the various U.S. agencies adjusted their 
32

procedures and organization; but not in close coordination with one another. Although the DCM was 

notionally in charge of the effort, the bodies like the 

USFLG and JLG set up by the military had more control over specific actions and plans. With the creation 

of a JLG, for example, the provision of advice to the 

justice-sector was largely in the hands of an expert 

hired by the military without consultation with civilian agencies. The command and control relations were 

left vague, and informal coordination worked relatively well in Panama, but the process was less than 

optimal. 

Recommendations:

3.1. Define C2 in advance and clearly articulate 

and convey it to personnel who need to execute the 

operation.

3.2. Structure training, education, and increased 

interagency exchanges to promote understanding 

about available capabilities, responsibilities, roles, 

and limitations in relation to C2 and Rules of Engagement (ROEs).

3.3. Develop a system of command relationships 

and trigger points for when military and LE occupy 

and alternate between supporting/supported roles. 

3.4. Conduct clear assessments of host nation C2 

capability to ensure that military and civilian agencies 

have the necessary information to make relevant operational decisions.

4. Operational Sustainability. 

Most civilian agencies lacked organic logistics and were 

dependent on the military for key logistic and communications support.
33

USG civilian agencies lacked organic logistics for 

this operation, and there were no existing arrangements for support from the military (which did end 

up providing all critical support). Agencies, such as 

the USMS in Panama, did not have logistics outside 

of their team equipment and capabilities. The gaps 

meant that the operators had to spend a considerable 

amount of time and effort organizing these aspects 

once in theater. The military was able to provide much 

of the needed support and assistance, but on an ad hoc 

and often personality-dependent basis.

Many agencies depended on the military to provide airlift, ground transport, accommodation, and 

other necessary support. Nonmilitary organizations 

also depended on the military for secure communication. LE agencies like the USMS mostly used secure 

military communications platforms to contact and 

communicate with USMS headquarters. Once the U.S. 

embassy reopened, the USMS team was able to use 

the communications through the embassy as well. In 

both cases, the need for civilian secure communications was not planned for in advance and depended 

on available military capabilities.

Recommendations: 

4.1. Pre-arranged agreements for military support 

to civilian organizations for contingencies should include pre-established points of contact (POCs) to deal 

with logistics and lines of communication prior to 

deploying. Also ensure the POCs are made aware of 

future plans and are able to work together prior to a 

crisis deployment. 

4.2. Set up an IA system of early identification of 

elements (capabilities, logistics, and support) in theater.
34

4.3. Educate the military on capabilities available 

outside the military and what is required to support 

the organizations providing those capabilities.

4.4. Require interoperability across IA operating 

systems, communications platforms, etc., to enable 

coordination of efforts (and staff and technical placements).

5. Operational Planning. 

Gaps in the planning process were responsible for an 

inability to harness expertise across the IA to establish a 

comprehensive operational plan.

At the time of OJC, there were few formal mechanisms established to manage and conduct IA communication and planning (such as National Security 

Policy Directive [NSPD] 44, DoD Instruction 3000.05). 

The consequences of a lack of an IA planning process 

became obvious early in the operation—a gap in LErelated planning, in particular, proved to be the most 

difficult to overcome. Planning for Panama was mostly 

conducted by the military, which focused on the combat operation. Despite the lack of a plan for the follow 

up operation, the military was able to maintain order 

in response to the domestic security vacuum created 

by the dismantling of the PDF. The MPs who had the 

closest and most compatible skills with civilian agencies assumed the burden of training in the short term 

until they were able to hand off to the ICITAP. 

The lack of access to useful intelligence/general 

information about the environment, organizations, 

and individuals led to incorrect assumptions prior to 

the Panama operation. The lack of civilian planning 

meant that information and intelligence generated 

mostly pertained to the PDF and locations and sup-
35

port for U.S. military bases to the exclusion of key law 

enforcement or other civilian-related indicators. This 

was a failure that affected all the agencies working in 

the country. The planning gap that left out IA expertise meant that skills and capabilities needed for reconstruction and stabilization efforts were introduced 

on an ad hoc basis. 

Recommendations: 

5.1. Ensure that agencies communicate and coordinate to enable clarity of purpose and establish mission 

objectives and are able to create the necessary “buyin” across the IA. 

5.2. Ensure flexible funding to allow agencies to 

undertake collateral duties in addition to planned 

mission tasks.

5.3. The country plan should address RoL objectives and milestones in coordinating an integrated approach—not just “laundry lists.”

5.4. Consider a “Federal Coordinating Officer”28

model to include liaison ability across the IA.

6. Operational Coordination. 

Few pre-existing and organized mechanisms exist for 

integrating operations by different agencies.

The lack of standard integration mechanisms was 

apparent from the start of the Panama operation. 

Those efforts that worked in theater were mostly ad 

hoc. Again, the initial lack of combined planning set 

the stage. When the embassy was reopened and the 

country team began establishing its presence, there 

was inadequate communication and coordination 

with the military and the country team, which was expected to take over civilian tasks. 
36

Recommendations:

6.1. Clearly articulate roles/objectives in general 

and standardize them for specific operations. Consider leveraging people who have worked together in 

missions and on deployments. 

6.2. Have an agreed, binding system for dispute 

resolution and a dedicated person to manage authority (e.g., POC with authority).

7. Capacity Building. 

There was a varied range of authorities, expertise, entities, and capabilities for rebuilding host nation law enforcement.

Due to the absence of any other entity capable of 

reconstituting the HN police at the end of combat operations, the military assumed the task. Some civilian 

LE agencies like the FBI, provided limited assistance 

in screening former PDF personnel. However, the 

military did not have formal background in or preparation for such large-scale capacity building outside 

of Special Operations Forces. Using available authorities, including temporary authorities, the military set 

up ad-hoc entities like the USFLG and the JLG. Again, 

this was not an area in which the military had doctrine, training, or other preparation.

The military was also the only entity available to 

provide support and assistance to HN law enforcement entities. MPs provided training that was based 

on their capabilities and doctrine, and military advisors tried to work with civilian ministry officials. While 

the training led by the MPs was a suitable interim response, there remained a need for a civilian agency 

with the relevant capabilities to accept the task. In the 

absence of such an agency, one had to be allocated and 

created. The ICITAP was brought into the operation 
37

and provided with a congressionally-approved mandate change to reconstitute the HN police. But even 

this did not provide a well-prepared response since 

the mission was new to the ICITAP.

Without organizations with the right authorities 

and resources, the lack of preparation led to waste of 

both resources and labor. The military had to provide 

assistance and support and also delay the redeployment of many of its personnel because the needs on 

the ground could not be met without U.S. military 

support. 

Recommendations:

7.1. Include capacity building as a primary component in military and civilian plans. 

7.2. Include assessment of the HN criminal justice 

environment in pre-operation planning to enable understanding of problem space and response design.

7.3. Benchmarks from the USG to inform military 

actions should include criteria for an exit plan. There 

must be IA agreement on benchmarks, which should 

be regularly reassessed/revised as relevant. 

7.4. Determine supported-supporting relationships between USG agencies in relation to working 

with HN agencies.

7.5. Ensure prior assessment of the impact of disbanding/neutralizing HN LE and HN extant capability.

CONCLUSION 

The Panama operation revealed some significant 

challenges that USG agencies continue to grapple 

with at varying levels across different operations. The 

challenges inherent in IA planning and C2 within 
38

and between agencies underlie many of these issues. 

The lack of combined, clear and responsive planning 

between civilian and military agencies revealed some 

crucial gaps, which are not limited to the Panama operation. While subsequent efforts through presidential 

mandates and agency-level efforts like the creation 

of S/CRS have succeeded in improving the IA planning process, gaps remain and often become critical in 

post-conflict settings. 

At the operational level, the organizational, structural, and tasking differences between LE and military 

agencies suggest ways that coordination could support the larger mission effectively. The different ROEs 

and C2 between military and LE highlight the different ways the two types of entities react to emerging 

challenges in theater. Reasonably flexible authorities 

provide LE entities, like the USMS, the ability to react 

to situations with minimal senior leadership guidance, 

while the military response is accompanied by semiformal or formal structures that are hierarchical, strictly guided and mandated by leadership. This does not 

stop the military from adapting, but it means the most 

durable military adaptation is structural and is institutionalized from the top down, often involving the 

creation of new organizations rather than just changes 

in behavior or tasks. Bottom up adaptation in the military from tactical innovation and informal decisions 

made by individual commanders and soldiers is often 

effective, but generally ad hoc and not immediately 

incorporated into practice. The inherent adaptability 

of both LE and the military, as illustrated through the 

case of Panama, revealed the ability of such entities 

to work together in dynamic environments. Without 

clear operational tasking, however, redundancies, 

overlap and even conflict are more likely. While the 
39

Panama operation does not provide the optimal example for military-LE coordination, it reveals some 

significant possibilities for collaboration on LE-type 

tasks. The civilian LE agencies and the military collaborated to secure the airport and screen passengers. 

Detainee processing by all accounts worked well as 

LE agencies and the military through ad hoc measures 

worked out their roles in relation to this task. 

The other crucial area is defining and allocating 

LE roles prior to an operation. While the military can 

and has stepped into many contexts to conduct LErelated tasks in the absence of any alternatives, the 

clear pre-allocation of LE roles and capabilities in a 

new mission would help operational preparation and 

bring the appropriate capabilities into theater more 

efficiently. Most stabilization-type operations now 

demand a strong LE component since a wide array 

of countries that require such interventions have inadequate or poor LE capabilities that cannot easily 

be used to support a mission, even when the overall 

objective is supporting and building up the host nation’s LE system. The LE component requires a wide 

range of tools to conduct short and long-term capacity 

building for a HN.

Prior allocation of operational requirements 

through POCs is also crucial to any operation and the 

Panama operation revealed some crucial gaps in this 

area that needed to be addressed. Improved and consistent measures to maintain communications, logistical coordination, support and interoperability should 

be prioritized among the agencies. Pre-planned agreements on communication platforms, logistics and 

agency-wide integration at the operational level have 

the potential to help overcome systemic problems that 

often undermine responses to complex operations. 
40

The Panama example provides a clear illustration of 

the capabilities that were required. 

A transition plan that takes into account the changing roles and responsibilities and a strong grasp of 

contextual needs and capacities should be institutionalized as part of the IA process. This should include 

discussion of capabilities that need to be introduced 

to maintain sustainability of an operation if the environment demands it. Consideration of formalizing 

overhead/advance teams is another recommendation that could prove key to complex operations and 

enable closer military and civilian LE cooperation. A 

designated agency or group of agencies, which are 

mandated and structured to provide LE advice, assistance, and long-term capacity building, is increasingly 

relevant. 

See Table 2-2 for summary of Panama observations 

and recommendations.

OBSERVATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS

1) Coordination and Planning There was a lack of interagency 

planning to coordinate the full force 

of the U.S. Government capabilities, 

expertise, responsibilities and authorities to respond to complex operational 

needs. 

1.1 Institute comprehensive, flexible, coordinated IA strategic planning 

framework with clear role allocation, valid contextual assumptions, and 

related IA responsibilities and capabilities. 

1.2 Create common LE entity and LE planning framework to respond to 

the range of LE requirements.

1.3 Account for funding availability and restrictions during the planning 

stage.

1.4 Create capacity in civilian organizations for “overhead teams” with 

ability to conduct assessments, and provide oversight and relevant 

operational expertise before and during operations.

1.5 Consider whether the S/CRS Civilian Response Corps could resolve 

some of these issues.

2) Organizational Capability No one organization had the authority / 

capability to rehabilitate or create host 

nation law enforcement entities.

2.1 Create an official lead agency or entity with designated authority and 

capacity to conduct LE-related tasks with the coordination and support 

of other Departments and Agencies as relevant.

Table 2-2. Summary of Observations and 

Recommendations from Panama.
41

Table 2-2. Summary of Observations and 

Recommendations from Panama. (Cont.)

3) Command and Control Different approaches to command and 

control (C2) exhibited by military and 

law enforcement. 

3.1 Define C2 in advance and clearly articulate and convey it to personnel who need to execute the operation.

3.2 Structure training, education and increased interagency exchanges 

to promote understanding about available capabilities, responsibilities, 

roles and limitations in relation to C2 and ROE.

3.3 Develop a system of command relationships and trigger points for 

when the military and LE occupy and alternate between supporting /

supported roles.

3.4 Conduct clear assessments of host nation C2 capability to ensure 

that military and civilian agencies have the necessary information to 

make relevant operational decisions.

4) Operational Sustainability Most civilian agencies lacked organic 

logistics and were dependent on the 

military for key logistic and communications support.

4.1 Pre-arranged agreements for military support to civilian organizations for contingencies should include pre-established POCs to deal 

with logistics and lines of communication prior to deploying.

4.1 (a) Also ensure the POCs are made aware of future plans and are 

able to work together prior to a crisis deployment.

4.2 Set up an IA system of early identification of elements (capabilities, 

logistics, and support) in theater.

4.3 Educate the military on capabilities available outside the military 

and what is required to support the organizations providing those 

capabilities.

4.4 Require interoperability across IA operating systems, communications platforms, etc. to enable coordination efforts [and staff and 

technical placements].

5) Operational Planning Gaps in the planning process were 

responsible for an inability to harness 

expertise across the interagency to 

establish a comprehensive operational 

plan.

5.1 Ensure that agencies communicate and coordinate to enable clarity 

of purpose and establish mission objectives and are able to create the 

necessary “buy-in” across the IA.

5.2 Ensure flexible funding to allow agencies to undertake collateral 

duties in addition to planned mission tasks.

5.3 The Country plan should address RoL objectives and milestones in 

coordinating an integrated approach—not just “laundry lists.”

5.4 Consider a “Federal Coordinating Officer” model to include liaison 

ability across the IA.

6) Operational Coordination Few pre-existing and organized 

mechanisms exist for integrating 

operations by different agencies.

6.1 Clearly articulate roles / objectives in general and standardize them 

for specific operations. Consider leveraging people who have worked 

together in missions and on deployments.

6.2 Have an agreed, binding system for dispute resolution and a dedicated person to manage authority (e.g., POC with authority).

7) Capacity Building There was a varried range of 

authorities, expertise, entities, and 

capabilities for rebuilding host nation 

law enforcement.

7.1 Include capacity building as a primary component in military and 

civilian plans.

7.2 Include assessment of the HN criminal justice environment in 

pre-operation planning to enable understanding of problem space and 

response design.

7-3. Benchmarks from the USG to inform military actions should include 

criteria for an exit plan. There must be IA agreement on benchmarks. 

which should be regularly reassessed /revised as relevant.

7-4. Determine supported-supporting relationships between USG agencies in relation to working with HN agencies.

7-5. Ensure prior assessment of the impact of disbanding/neutralizing 

HN LE and HN extant capability.
42

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. President George H. W. Bush, Address to the Nation on 

Panama Invasion, New York Times, December 20, 1989, available 

from www.nytimes.com/1989/12/21/world/fighting-panama-presidenttranscript-bush-s-address-decision-use-force-panama.html. 

2. John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the 

Restoration of Panama, 1992, p. 4, available from Defense Technical 

Information Center Web Site, oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&

metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA251124; Wiliamson Murray, 

ed., Transformation Concepts for National Security in the 21st Century, September 2002, p. 392, available from Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College Web Site, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=252; Ronald H. Cole, 

Operation Just Cause: Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in 

Panama February 1988—January 1990, 1995, p. 29, available from 

Small Wars Journal Web Site, smallwarsjournal.com/documents/justcause.pdf.

3. Cole.

4. Major William J. Conley, Jr., (USMC), Operations Just Cause 

and Promote Liberty: The Implications Of Military Operations Other 

Than War, Thesis, 2001, p. 21, available from Small Wars Journal 

Web Site, smallwarsjournal.com/documents/conley.pdf.

5. Richard H. Shultz, In the Aftermath of War: U.S. Support for 

Reconstruction and Nation Building in Panama Following Just Cause,

Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1993, p. 29, 

available from Air University Press Web Site, aupress.maxwell.

af.mil/books/Shultz_Aftermath/Aftermath.pdf.

6. This is not to suggest that the USG involvement was 

planned in this way or even that the USG managed its involvement in Panama in terms of LOOs. Rather, the LOOs are presented here purely as a (post facto) means to understand the continuity and breadth of ways in which LE contributed to achievement 

of USG objectives in Panama. See Qualifications and Limitations 

section on p. 4 for the explanation on how this study formulated 

the Lines of Operation.
43

7. After arriving in Panama, the USMS team leader cleared 

with USMS headquarters and the DoJ the expansion of their intended role from just facilitating and conducting Noriega’s extradition to include looking for fugitives.

8. Lawrence A. Yates, The U.S. Military’s Experience in Stability Operations 1789-2005, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies 

Institute Press, 2006, p. 18, available from U.S. Army Combined 

Arms Center Web Site, www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/

yates.pdf. 

9. Shultz, p. 29. 

10. Ibid.

11. Conley, pp. 11, 21-22. 

12. ICITAP Panama Project Evaluation Report, Washington, 

DC: Office of Planning, Evaluation and Audits, 1992, p. 8.

13. Ibid., p. 20. 

14. Two augmentation companies and a platoon-size unit of 

National Guard soldiers supported MP commitment well into 

1991. These included the 534th and 549th MP companies, which 

combined operations under the 92nd MP Battalion.

15. Stephen J. Green, Augmentation Units in Panama, Military 

Police PB 19-93-1, Fort Leonard Wood, MO: U.S. Army Military 

Police Corps, June 1, 1993, p. 11.

16. Murray, pp. 222-223. 

17. John T. Fishel, Civil Military Operations in The New World, 

Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997, pp. 70-71. 

18. Shultz, p. 37.

19. James H. Embrey, “OPERATION JUST CAUSE: Concepts 

for Shaping Future Rapid Decisive Operations,” in Murray, pp. 

222-223. 
44

20. Shultz, p. 16. 

21. ICITAP Panama Project Evaluation Report, p. 20. 

22. Shultz, p. 48. 

23. ICITAP Panama Project Evaluation Report, p. 20. 

24. Ibid., pp.1-2, 19. 

25. These were mostly bi-lingual former FBI and LE officers.

26. National Center for State Courts, ICITAP/Panama Police 

Training Project Evaluation—Final Report, Arlington, VA: National 

Center for State Courts, August 23, 1994, p. 9.

27. Government Accountability Office, Foreign Assistance: U.S. 

Rule of Law Assistance to Five Latin American Countries, Washington, DC: Government Accounting Office, August 1999, p. 5, available from www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99195.pdf.

28. See 41 USC 5143, Sec 5143. A Federal Coordinating Officer 

is appointed by the President to coordinate federal assistance in 

the event of a major disaster or emergency. 
45

CHAPTER 3

COLOMBIA

INTRODUCTION 

Much of the U.S. Government (USG) interest in 

and response to the law enforcement (LE) situation in 

Colombia was driven by domestic U.S. concerns about 

the increasing influx of cocaine to the United States in 

the 1980s and concerns about imminent state failure in 

Colombia in the late 1990s. Initial USG assistance efforts in Colombia, which focused primarily on eradication and interdiction, evolved into comprehensive 

LE, Rule of Law (RoL) and economic and community 

development efforts as the USG and Colombian governments refined and improved their approach over 

time. 

Colombia offers several unique lessons, especially 

in relation to successes and challenges in long-term LE 

training and capacity building efforts across the USG 

interagency (IA). The current efforts consist primarily 

of combined USG agency responses that deliver skills 

building, training, mentoring, and advice to a range of 

host nation (HN) military and LE agencies; that provide equipment and intelligence, technical and development support; and that involve USG-led, but HN 

executed, combined military and LE efforts.

A close study of USG involvement in Colombia 

reveals that a range of wide-scale and comprehensive 

efforts, which are the results of long years of trial and 

error, have been successful in developing Colombian 

LE capabilities and RoL systems, and improving governance. The Colombia example shows the value of 

a comprehensive, long-term commitment to a partner 

nation and highlights successes of years of involve-
46

ment and increasingly well-integrated USG IA efforts. 

Colombia also reveals the value of a HN government 

taking the lead in developing its capabilities and running operations. USG efforts in Colombia depend on 

HN commitment to improving security and development and the political will to make necessary changes 

within the HN domestic system. 

However, as the core narcotics problem is being 

addressed, other emerging challenges that demand 

an improved LE/RoL response are coming to the fore. 

Among these is the growing problem of criminal gangs 

(Bandas Criminales Emergentes [BACRIM]), consisting 

of former paramilitaries and other criminals. These 

well-armed gangs have experience and links with 

drug cartels and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 

Colombia (FARC). This emerging threat to LE and RoL 

is showing similar characteristics to the development 

of the FARC. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, as drug 

cartels were attrited under consistent U.S.–backed Colombian military and LE operations, the FARC, which 

was then a revolutionary insurgent group, began to 

take over the drug trade. The Colombians, with U.S. 

support, then began to target the FARC. Initially, the 

Colombian government followed the same strategy 

it had used with the drug cartels: target areas controlled by the cartels, destroy their operations in that 

area, and move on to the next one. This strategy did 

not work well with the FARC. Each time the government vacated an area, the FARC would move back 

and punish anyone from the civilian population suspected of helping the government. This increasingly 

alienated the civilian population, making people reluctant to help the government undermine the FARC. 

Comprehensive measures that combine security and 

development like the Colombian Strategic Develop-
47

ment Initiative (CSDI) are responses to the morphing 

nature of the FARC threat. Adapting a more sophisticated response, the Colombian government began to 

establish security and a permanent presence in areas 

wrested back from the FARC. The government then 

began to introduce baseline public services to these 

areas, many of which were located deep in rural areas 

with little infrastructure and access to basic services. 

As this strategy began to show some success, the Colombian government, with U.S. assistance, has begun 

to extend it across a wider geographic area.

The FARC and now BACRIM reveal the manifest 

challenges of insurgency, which is often followed by 

more traditional organized crime and related challenges. As an insurgency dies down and basic services are 

established, many former fighters may turn to crime, 

especially if economic opportunities are inadequate 

and LE remains weak. Where the drug cartels and the 

FARC were cohesive organizations, the BACRIM consists of diffuse networks with links to many criminal 

outfits and well-armed criminal gangs. The Colombian military, which led operations against the FARC, 

believes the BACRIM is an LE problem that needs to 

be dealt with by the Colombian National Police (CNP). 

The CNP, however, remains under capacity and is yet 

unable to successfully take on the BACRIM. This suggests the need to shift resources and attention to the 

police quickly as progress is made against the FARC. 

While there are many qualitative successes in Colombia, fundamental challenges, such as a viable solution for the BACRIM, remain and need to be addressed 

in the long term, including Colombian capabilities in 

relation to managing their own efforts without U.S. 

assistance and U.S. domestic concerns about ongoing 

support for Colombia. 
48

This section contains the following areas: (1) A 

synopsis of the Colombia operation and LE Lines of 

Operation; (2) Observations drawn through research 

and interviews; and (3) Recommendations drawn 

through the validation process.

SYNOPSIS (1989-PRESENT)

Plan Colombia emerged out of the Andean CounterDrug Initiative (ACI), which was launched in 1989 to 

provide military, economic, and law enforcement aid 

to Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. U.S. officials launched 

the ACI in response to the vast amount of drugs that 

were being smuggled into the United States from these 

three countries. In the late 1990s, the USG was facing 

realistic fears that Colombia was not only becoming 

the biggest coca producing country in the region, but 

could possibly come apart with the government under 

siege by drug cartels. As a result, the United States 

approved a focused joint effort with Bogota known as 

“Plan Colombia,” which was a diplomatic, military, 

LE, and economic engagement, initially with a heavy 

focus on narcotics trafficking through interdiction and 

eradication.

Former Colombian President Andres Pastrana initially developed Plan Colombia as a 5-year (2000-05) 

plan, with the objectives of ending Colombia’s long 

armed conflict, eliminating drug trafficking, and promoting peace, security, and economic and social development. However, Plan Colombia,1

 while undergoing 

changes over the years, continues in the present with 

no significant break in U.S. support. The primary U.S. 

objective in supporting Plan Colombia was to prevent 

the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. The 

United States also had a strong interest in helping 
49

Colombia promote peace and economic development 

because that would contribute to regional security.

U.S. support for Plan Colombia began in 2000, 

when Congress passed legislation providing $1.3 billion for the region in interdiction and development 

assistance over 5 years.2

 The Colombian government 

drafted the initial strategic plan with support from 

many U.S. agencies, resulting in a process and a plan 

with broad U.S. commitment. 

For implementation, American and Colombian 

officials formulated an Interagency Action Plan. The 

focus for the first 2 years of the Plan specifically targeted regions in the country that were considered 

high-threat areas. The new measures were expected to 

reduce coca production by 50 percent within the initial 2 years. The U.S. plan included five components of 

proposed assistance:

• Improving governing capacity and respect for 

human rights

• Expansion of counternarcotics operations in 

Southern Colombia

• Alternative economic development

• Increased interdiction in Colombia and the region

• Assistance for the Colombian National Police.3

For the U.S. side, the relevant departments and 

agencies followed the doctrinal directive set out in 

Presidential Decision Directive 73 (PDD 73), which remains classified but mandated closer IA coordination 

and planning.4 The planning that resulted from PDD 

73 is often cited as an example of successful IA coordination. The Executive Committee (EXCOMM) was 

a direct result of PDD 73. The EXCOMM, comprised 

of Assistant Secretary-level representatives from the 
50

Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), the 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 

and the Departments of State (DoS), Justice (DoJ), Defense (DoD), Treasury (DoT), and Commerce (DoC), 

was set up to plan and discuss with the Colombian 

government how to best support its efforts.5

 By many 

accounts, the close IA coordination generated by this 

process led to a solid plan and integrated USG effort for assisting Colombia..

 The initial plan included 

strong stabilizing measures, followed by economic 

and social development. The plan set out funding and 

objectives of the various agencies early in the process. 

The largest funding components were allocated to the 

counternarcotics and interdiction operations.6

Among the agencies’ concerns were LE needs, the 

need for a new code of justice in Colombia, ways to 

respond to and mitigate money laundering, and, of 

course, how to undermine and prevent vast drug trafficking networks. Over the years, human rights, justice, and peace have come to undergird the provision 

of assistance. The U.S. Congress continues to direct 

that U.S. agencies do not work with military/police 

units that are associated with human rights violations, 

and Congress makes funding conditional on observing human rights. At the inception of Plan Colombia, 

using interagency cooperation, agencies divided and 

took up key tasks and agreed to collaborate on others. 

When work on U.S. support to Plan Colombia 

began, the DoS was designated the lead U.S. agency, 

with Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) and International Narcotics Affairs and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) functioning as the key bureaus. Currently, 

INL continues to coordinate DoS LE assistance for 

Colombia, while WHA helps formulate policy and 

integration across the interagency. DoS continues to 
51

control funding for most of the civilian and LE-related 

projects, and coordinates programs with other departments and agencies including the DoD, DoJ, USAID 

and DoT. 

From the program’s inception, the DoD continues 

to manage large programs in the provision of U.S. support for Colombia, both for operational support and 

specific types of training. The DoD conducts its tasks 

in coordination with other agencies and though State 

is the lead agency, the Military Group (MilGroup) in 

the U.S. Embassy Bogotá manages Defense counternarcotics support.7

After the DoS and DoD, the agency that plays a 

significant role in Plan Colombia, particularly in relation to LE efforts, is the DoJ. The department is involved in training and capacity building for the entire 

Colombian LE and justice system. Some DoJ agencies 

such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the 

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

(ATF), conduct their operations independently of Plan 

Colombia funding and within their organizational 

structures. Some of these same agencies also provide 

varied amounts of training to Colombian LE personnel. In such instances, they often collaborate with other USG agencies.

USG support to Colombia involves ongoing collaboration among several DoJ entities, including the 

Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section; the Office of 

International Affairs; the Asset Forfeiture and Money 

Laundering Section; the Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section; the U.S. Marshals Service 

(USMS); the FBI; the Office of Foreign Assets Control 

(OFAC); the ATF; and the DEA. The DoJ has a full-time 

staff based in Bogotá to oversee and manage their as-
52

sistance programs. Each of the agencies has an attaché 

at the embassy and works within the Country Team. 

Currently, the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT), the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 

Program (ICITAP), the USMS, INL’s Narcotics Affairs 

Section (NAS), and the MilGroup manage the bulk of 

training, technical assistance and capacity building to 

HN LE personnel as part of Plan Colombia, through 

various security assistance and support tools. 

The USAID works mostly on development programs and has a full-time staff based in Bogotá to 

oversee and manage their assistance programs, which 

include economic and social assistance to Internally 

Displaced Persons and farmers. The USAID also provides some support to RoL programs through institution and capacity building efforts.8

Since 2000, U.S. support to Colombia has undergone several changes. Initially, significant funding 

and U.S. efforts were directed towards coca eradication and interdiction of drug producers and traffickers. In the years since, the U.S. Congress adjusted the 

focus of these efforts in the budgets, and in 2008, Congress mandated more work on “soft side” issues like 

human rights and RoL. As a result, project funds for 

the USAID and the DoJ increased in the last year.9

In 2003, following the election of President Alvaro Uribe, the Colombian Government expanded 

its security component of Plan Colombia (PC) to include a “clear, hold and consolidate” strategy under 

Uribe’s “Defense and Democratic Security Policy.”10

Its objective was to establish a government presence 

and control over the entire country, especially in areas affected by armed groups and drug traffickers. 

Expanded authority provided by the U.S. Congress 
53

coincided with this emphasis in Colombian Government security strategy and allowed U.S. agencies to 

support the clear, hold, and consolidate strategy.11 As 

this strategy matured, the government of Colombia 

implemented additional follow-on strategies. In January 2007, it announced the “Plan Colombia Consolidation Phase (PCCP),”12 with the goal of consolidating 

gains made under the Defense and Democratic Security Policy through continued military action and increased social and economic development programs. 

The Colombian government pledged to provide $44 

billion while U.S. support involves approximately $4 

billion for fiscal years 2007 through 2013. During this 

period, the United States intends to and has begun a 

slow drawdown and handing off of many of the ongoing assistance programs to Colombia.13

U.S. support for Colombia’s current strategy, the 

CSDI,14 combines a synchronized and comprehensive 

approach to securing areas, providing policing and 

public services in tandem with economic and social 

development projects. The CSDI relies on three main 

USG entities: the MilGroup, the NAS, and the USAID. 

Under the CSDI, these USG entities alternate with 

each other in leading USG support to Colombian efforts. To implement the CSDI, the country is divided 

into regions and, depending on the level of security 

needed for each region, one of these agencies takes the 

lead support role with Colombian counterparts and 

agencies. For regions that require a strong military/

LE response, the MilGroup takes the lead in providing support and assistance to the Colombians. If the 

level of need is related towards eradication of extensive coca cultivation, then the NAS takes the lead on 

the U.S.-side and provides support to the Colombians 

with their eradication and interdiction efforts. In areas 
54

that have a stable security situation and an increased 

government presence in the form of police stations and 

small courts, the USAID takes the lead in providing 

necessary support to set up economic and community 

development projects alongside Colombian ministries 

and regional actors (see Figure 3-1).

Figure 3-1. Timeline and Key USG-Colombia 

Strategies.15

Between 2000 and 2008, the U.S. Government has 

provided $6 billion in aid to Colombia ($4.8 billion to 

reduce illicit narcotics and increase security; $1 billion 

for Social and Economic Justice and $239 million to 

promote rule of law).16

There is a formal IA coordination mechanism 

in relation to Plan Colombia, with all U.S. agencies, 

through long practice, reporting to the chief of mission. Weekly Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) meetings are held at the embassy to coordinate PC support 

and include discussion on oversight of PC funding. 
55

DEA chairs a separate meeting, which focuses mostly 

on operations-related LE. 

LINES OF OPERATION 

Plan Colombia involves a complex program of 

assistance, technical support, capacity, and institution building that ranges across all local agencies and 

involves as many as 20 U.S. departments and agencies, some working directly through PC funding and 

guidance, others with their own funding lines (including DoD counternarcotics funds), but still operating 

within the USG goals for the country. For purposes of 

drawing a distinction between military and law enforcement tasks, it is useful to consider USG involvement in terms of a number of distinct, but interrelated 

lines of operation (LOOs). 17 This section describes the 

three major LOOs identified: (1) Counter narcoterrorism operations; (2) LE training; and (3) Capacity and 

institution building. See Table 3-1.
56

Table 3-1. Summary of Lines of Operation (LOO) 

for Colombia.

LOO 1 - COUNTER NARCOTERRORISM OPERATIONS

One of the key tenets of U.S. assistance to Colombia is the provision of equipment, training, and support to the Colombian military and police to conduct 

combined operations to eradicate coca fields and interdict drug producers and traffickers. The level and 

extent of USG support and training provided to interdiction and eradication efforts in Colombia is unique 

to the region. While the USG provides assistance to 

other countries in the region, Colombia is the recipient 

of the majority of funds, equipment, training, support, 

and technical assistance. The U.S. strategy in Colombia involves providing targeted commando training, 

interdiction training, aerial surveillance, and technical 

LOO 1

Counter Narcoterrorism 

Operations 

1a.	 Aerial/Manual Eradication and Interdiction

Operations

1b.	 U.S.-Led Maritime, Aerial, Riverine Interdiction

and Support

1c.	 Border Security

1d.	 LE Response

o	 Judicial Wire Intercept (Wiretap)

Program

o	 Use of Extraterritorial Laws to

Prosecute Drug Crimes

LOO 2

LE and RoL Training 

2a.	 ICITAP General Purpose LE Training/ FBI, DEA

Training

2b.	 USMS Witness Security and Judicial Security

Training

LOO 3

Capacity and Institution 

Building

3a.	 Legal Reform, Mentoring and Advising
57

assistance to Colombian security forces. These efforts 

include facilitating Colombian military and police 

joint eradication operations. In some instances, U.S. 

LE agencies collaborate with the Colombian police by 

providing intelligence and information in addition to 

technical assistance and non-lethal equipment. This 

many-layered eradication and interdiction strategy is 

supported by the involvement of several U.S. agencies, which provide support and training through 

combined efforts. In addition, the U.S. agencies conduct and support maritime and riverine interdiction 

efforts and pursue the use of robust extraterritorial 

laws to extradite and prosecute narcoterrorists. 

Aerial/Manual Eradication and Interdiction 

Operations.

Aerial and manual eradication and Colombian LE 

and military combined interdiction operations in coca 

growing areas is one of the mainstays of USG IA assistance efforts in Colombia. The NAS oversees eradication support operations for the CNP and works closely 

with the CNP’s Anti Narcotics Directorate (DIRAN) 

by providing equipment (i.e., helicopters and fixedwing aircraft), related logistics, and training to conduct these operations. The DEA, MilGroup, and NAS 

coordinate and support Colombian-led eradication 

and interdiction missions. The DEA and the MilGroup 

provide intelligence and the NAS helps coordinate 

operations with the Colombian Army’s Counter Drug 

(CD) Brigade and the CNP’s commando unit, known 

as Junglas. The Colombians lead the eradication missions while U.S. agencies (DEA, MilGroup) develop 

target packets, which they provide to the Junglas. The 

Junglas conduct their own planning and command and 
58

control (C2) for the mission. The CD Brigade provides 

ground cover for aerial eradication missions. In addition to operational support and coordinate eradication 

efforts, the NAS provides support (e.g., flight-related 

support and funding), while the CNP provides security for manual eradication. The U.S. Army 7th Special 

Forces (SF) Group delivers training to Junglas to conduct these complex operations. The DoS Office of Aviation supports the NAS to provide U.S. assistance to 

the CNP’s Air Service (ARAVI). ARAVI provides air 

mobility support for a range of CNP functions including aerial and manual eradication efforts, airlift for the 

Junglas, and the provision of rotary-wing aircraft.18

To ensure long-term police presence in areas that 

have been cleared of FARC presence, the NAS and 7th 

SF Group train mobile squadrons of rural (Carabineros) police. These Carabineros units have established a 

police presence in all 1,098 municipalities in the country, the vast majority of which did not have a police 

presence in the past. The Carabineros units patrol the 

countryside regularly and provide a visible police 

presence and by extension a government presence in 

rural areas. 

To support the police presence, the USAID and OPDAT have begun supporting the setting up of “Casas 

Justicia” (small units to deal with basic justice-related 

issues such as divorce, land-titling, etc.) in cleared 

areas. These combined U.S. supported efforts have 

improved security in conflict areas and also provide 

vital information and support to Colombian efforts at 

extending government presence to rural areas.
59

U.S.-Led Maritime, Aerial, Riverine Interdiction, 

and Support. 

In addition to combined IA efforts to assist HN 

agencies, the U.S. military and LE agencies conduct 

maritime and aerial interdiction operations, engage 

in related intelligence-gathering efforts, and provide 

support and training to riverine interdiction efforts. 

SOUTHCOM and the Joint Inter-Agency Task ForceSouth (JIATF-S) support a range of maritime and 

aerial LE interdiction operations by providing coordination, logistics (aerial warning and control system 

[AWACS], aircraft, frigates, personnel, assistance with 

training, and liaison with military from other countries), C2, communications, and intelligence through 

operations centers to U.S. and Colombian LE/military agencies. The JIATF-S integrates its efforts with 

foreign LE agencies in other countries in the region 

to enable it to identify, monitor, track, and hand over 

targets to LE agencies in these countries, depending 

on the location of the arrest. Most often U.S. Coast 

Guard (USCG) law enforcement detachments19 are 

embedded with U.S. Navy frigates to ensure that the 

boarding team includes an LE team rather than only 

military personnel. The JIATF-S also coordinates and 

pools resources with other nations (including co-locating personnel from other nations within the JIATFS) and with USG agencies like Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP). The JIATF-S also uses military platforms to convey information to multiple countries in 

real time and coordinate responses to ensure successful interdiction. The USCG attaché in Bogota and the 

JIATF-S, work together closely to provide information 

and liaison assistance to USCG teams, especially in relation to high seas intercepts. The JIATF-S collaborates 
60

with the DEA and the USCG to interdict smugglers 

using submersible craft while the DEA and the MilGroup collaborate on Tactical Analysis Teams (TATs) 

(all source intelligence fusion teams) to pursue drug 

traffickers. The military provides logistics and intelligence support while the DEA brings its authorities/

intelligence efforts to assist the military in these operations. Agencies such as the DEA maintain synergies with the MilGroup and FBI, and communicate 

regularly with the U.S. embassy’s defense attaché and 

judicial attaché and collaborate on extraditions, serving arrest warrants, and related legal advice. Through 

these multi-layered efforts, the USG has been able to 

regularly detain, arrest, and prevent large numbers of 

cocaine shipments in transit zones from reaching the 

United States. 

In addition to these efforts, the NAS supports 

the Colombian Air Force with its Air Bridge Denial 

Program, which works on intercepting small aircraft 

used by drug smugglers. The NAS provides training 

in maintenance, logistics systems and equipment. Due 

to the Air Bridge Denial Program’s high level of success, it has been extended to provide maritime surveillance.20 The Colombian navy gets assistance from the 

MilGroup and the CBP through training and support 

to improve its ability to patrol the vast networks of 

rivers in the country and conduct riverine interdiction 

operations. 

Border Security. 

Providing border security assistance and support 

is another area where U.S. Agencies are increasingly 

collaborating and orienting their efforts. Colombia 

shares 6000 kilometers of land borders with five coun-
61

tries and seaboards overlooking the Caribbean Sea 

and Pacific Ocean. In addition, the country has a vast 

network of rivers that are increasingly being used by 

traffickers to smuggle drugs out of the country. Securing Colombia and preventing drug trafficking is a 

massive challenge. Various USG agencies work with 

DIRAN, Airport Police, and private seaport operators 

to prevent narcotics trafficking and the smuggling of 

contraband items, explosives and counterfeit currency 

through Colombia’s seaports and airports. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the CBP 

work, with the NAS to deliver training and technical 

assistance to improve the ability of Colombian border 

control agencies to combat drug trafficking, money 

laundering, contraband smuggling, and commercial 

fraud. Through these programs, U.S. agencies deliver 

training in counternarcotics capabilities, passenger 

processing, rail interdiction, and container security 

measures.21

In addition, the NAS provides funds for a port security initiative, which is a combined effort between 

the Colombian government, the CNP and private industry. Through this initiative, port employees receive 

training, support and logistical assistance including 

offices and equipment to conduct port security. 

Law Enforcement Response. 

A strong USG-backed combined LE and military 

strategy has supported Colombia to move its Counternarcotic/Counter Drug campaign from a purely national security/military focused effort, to focus on using more LE measures against criminals and narcoterrorists. This change of strategy has provided Colombia 

with enhanced abilities and access to diverse means 
62

to prosecute drug cartels, rising numbers of criminal 

gangs, organized crime, and the FARC. However, 

USG agencies and the military are concerned over the 

rising levels of organized crime and the demands on 

the HN police to respond to the new types of criminal 

outfits (e.g., BACRIM). The CNP remains under capacity to deal with organized crime, and the Colombian 

military is reluctant to engage these groups as they 

consider the BACRIM and other criminals an LE issue. 

USG personnel working with the CNP have indicated 

that the CNP needs to build up its operational/tactical 

capabilities further (intelligence, weapons, airpower, 

manpower, and other resources) if it is to take on these 

groups and provide an LE response to the challenge. 

Judicial Wire Intercept Program. The DEA-led Judicial Wire Intercept Program is a U.S.-Colombian combined LE effort against drug cartels and criminals. 

Through this program, the DEA trains and mentors 

Colombian LE personnel to conduct wiretapping and 

related investigations. The DEA’s International Drug 

Flow Attack Strategy (IDFAS), which was implemented to actively disrupt drug flows to upend the drug 

market, is a key component of the U.S. LE agencies’ 

counternarcotics strategy. The DEA, operating under 

21 USC 959/960 and Act 960 A of the Patriot Act, uses 

the Judicial Wire Intercept Program as one of its primary operational tools in implementing the IDFAS. 

Neither of these Acts requires the crime committed to 

necessarily have a nexus in the United States, which 

gives the DEA wide latitude to accomplish the IDFAS 

strategy. The DEA works with DIRAN’s Heroin Task 

Force on bilateral heroin investigations and has incorporated Sensitive Investigations Units (SIUs) (which 

include vetted national police personnel) and works 

to dismantle criminal organizations by gathering and 
63

using evidence that can be upheld in U.S. and Colombian courts. Through these and related efforts, the 

DEA and Colombian authorities have succeed in gathering vital information to arrest, extradite and convict 

drug traffickers. 

Use of extraterritorial laws to prosecute drug crimes.

The USG utilizes a range of extraterritorial laws to 

prosecute drug-related crimes committed outside the 

United States. This has provided an effective LE tool 

for U.S. federal agencies to take action (offensive judicial action rather than defensive) against the FARC 

and related criminals and narcoterrorists. USG agencies work closely with Colombian agencies to prosecute transnational criminals, narcoterrorists, and drug 

cartels. 

In particular, 21 USC 959/960 and Act 960A of the 

Patriot Act are useful in these efforts since these laws 

do not require commission of defined acts to have a 

nexus with the United States. These have facilitated 

extraditions of wanted persons; the use of the Judicial 

Wire Intercept Program; and have provided the ability to use evidence gained through wiretaps in U.S. 

courts. The ability to share some of the relevant technology with vetted/trusted Colombian police has led 

to successful operations.22 The vetted units and the LE 

measures that are currently being used and expanded 

have provided the Colombians with a vastly expanded set of tools to target the FARC and other criminals. 

USMS efforts to extradite wanted criminals to the 

United States have provided vital leverage for Colombian and U.S. LE, and has created a deterrent effect 

among Colombian narcoterrorists. In addition, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) conducts civil 

investigations to target drug traffickers and their businesses, and uses the “Clinton List”23 to develop sanc-
64

tions against Colombian criminal entities. The OFAC 

collaborates with the DEA and ICE to identify targets. 

Colombian banks and LE take action based on these 

sanctions to pursue drug traffickers’ extended support networks. OFAC synchronizes its activities with 

the CNP, vetted units of the Directorate of Judicial Police and Investigations (PIJIN), and the Fiscalia General 

de la Nacion (National Prosecutor’s Office) to leverage 

all their capabilities against the drug traffickers. The 

OFAC has sanctioned the FARC as a narcotrafficking 

organization using the “Kingpin Act”24 rather than using Global War on Terror legislation. The Kingpin Act 

has provided the OFAC with an expanded ability and 

an effective means to target the FARC, its supporters, 

and enablers. The OFAC also works closely with Colombian asset forfeiture organizations to support and 

assist them in asset forfeiture efforts targeting drug 

traffickers and their associates. 

LOO 2—LAW ENFORCEMENT AND RULE OF 

LAW TRAINING 

When Plan Colombia was launched, Colombian 

police and courts were prone to high levels of corruption and ineffectiveness that resulted in impunity for 

drug traffickers. Addressing these systemic problems 

in the Colombian RoL system while building basic 

LE/RoL capabilities is a key focus of U.S. assistance. 

Since 1999, the USG has trained more than 70,000 police and military personnel.25 The restructuring of the 

judicial system is closely related to efforts aimed at 

improving LE. Several of the U.S. agencies involved 

in these efforts collaborate and work closely to ensure 

the work complements their efforts.
65

Through the provision of general purpose and specialized training, the ICITAP and USMS continue to 

provide the bulk of LE-related training for Colombian 

LE agencies. A range of USG agencies provide varied 

levels of training to HN LE agencies through joint and 

specialized training as relevant. The OPDAT provides 

oversight and policy and budgetary direction to both 

ICITAP and USMS programs. 

While U.S. agencies deliver a range of training and 

capacity building measures, overall training program 

priorities are set or changed based on joint review and 

decisions of the U.S. and Colombian governments.

ICITAP General Purpose Law Enforcement Training

/FBI, DEA Training. 

The provision of general and specialized LE training for Colombian police is a cornerstone of USG efforts to support and reinforce local LE and improve 

HN police capabilities to conduct effective LE. The 

USG agencies involved in these efforts also deliver 

training on how to work with the RoL system. 

The ICITAP delivers training to CNP investigators (patrolmen and crime scene investigators) on 

basic skills such as gathering evidence and providing 

testimony; this training directly addresses a fundamental gap in local police capabilities. The ICITAP 

collaborates with other agencies such as the DEA to 

conduct Undercover Operations Training Courses 

for trusted units of CNP personnel. The ICITAP also 

provides training for several other agencies including, 

the National Prosecutor’s Office and the Administrative Department of Security (DAS, the Colombian Security Service). In addition to training and technical 

assistance to the Colombian police and other LE enti-
66

ties, the ICITAP provides equipment that can be used 

in investigations, communications gear and a limited 

number of vehicles to some of the Colombian agencies. Other USG Agencies including the USMS, ATF, 

and ICE collaborate with the ICITAP to deliver training as relevant to HN LE agencies. 

USMS Witness Security Training and Judicial 

Security Training.

In the past, witnesses and the Colombian judiciary 

have been heavily targeted for violence and killings 

by drug cartels and the FARC. The USMS delivers 

training through the Judicial Security (JudSec) and the 

Witness Security (WitSec) Training Programs to close 

off some of the big gaps in relation to HN LE capabilities to address these challenges. The USMS trains 

CNP, the National Prosecutor’s Office, DAS, and CTI 

(Investigations Unit of the National Prosecutor’s Office) personnel in the provision of protection for, and 

facilitating relocation of judiciary personnel and witnesses. In addition to protection measures, the USMS 

also trains Colombian personnel in threat assessment 

and management and other logistical considerations 

that are involved in ensuring closure of cases. The 

USMS also provides vehicles, bulletproof vests, and 

other nonlethal equipment to the trainees.

LOO 3—CAPACITY AND INSTITUTION 

BUILDING 

From the inception of Plan Colombia, the DoJ has 

advocated building a strong justice system to stabilize 

and develop RoL in Colombia. There is continuous 

dialogue between the DoJ and the U.S. Congress to 
67

renew funding, and the changed funding measures 

over the years have reflected the growing recognition 

of the need to develop a comprehensive Colombian 

RoL and justice system. At the start of Plan Colombia, 

funding for justice sector reform was in the range of 

$ 6-7 million; currently this has been increased and is 

now between $25-30 million.

Legal Reform, Mentoring, Advising. 

Assistance and support on legal reforms and justice sector development is another important aspect 

of U.S. efforts in Colombia. This assistance is primarily provided by the OPDAT (the primary DoJ agency 

with doctrine and capability to conduct justice sector 

institution building, technical assistance and training 

for foreign countries). OPDAT support is primarily 

delivered through technical assistance, institution and 

capacity building for the Justice Sector Reform Program (JSRP). The OPDAT manages and coordinates 

the subordinate Technical Assistance Program (TAP) 

for the JSRP as well. This support and assistance extends to training, mentoring, and advice. The OPDAT 

works closely with other U.S. LE agencies and HN 

counterparts, especially the National Prosecutor’s Office and the CTI, and maintains a close relationship 

with the Colombian Ministry of Justice to identify 

trainees. 

One of the singular achievements of this comprehensive legal reform assistance effort is Colombia’s 

transition to a new Criminal Procedure Code (which 

changed the existing inquisitorial system into an accusatory system of justice).26 The transition was completed in January 2008. There is a direct correlation 

between the new system and the increase in public 
68

satisfaction in the judiciary due to open trials and 

new transparency in the system. Part of the OPDAT’s 

implementing capabilities consists of the provision of 

technical advice by Resident Legal Advisors (RLAs) to 

their Colombian counterparts to implement this new 

Code of Justice, to strengthen the Colombian judiciary, 

and to enhance the courts’ working relationships with 

other criminal justice sector institutions. In addition, 

the OPDAT collaborates with agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the ICE to conduct 

joint training on anti-money laundering measures and 

also collaborates with the USAID to support victim assistance efforts as part of implementation of the new 

code of justice. The DEA has supported changes to 

the law that allow more robust use of HN undercover 

agents, and the FBI’s Criminal Investigations Division supports the DAS through capacity building and 

mentoring for vetted units. 

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

The observations from this research have been 

grouped into six main areas. In this section, a series of 

recommendations follows each observation.

1. Planning and Formal Mechanisms 

2. Capacity Building: Institutional Reform and 

Advising

3. Relationship Between Crime, Terrorism, and 

Drug Trade

4. Commitment to Partnership 

5. Collaboration, Informal Execution 

6. Relative Advantage of Running a Supporting 

Mission. 
69

1. Planning and Formal Mechanisms.

Comprehensive IA planning conducted with HN and 

focused on HN objectives at strategic and operational levels. Plans are developed, assessed, reviewed and amended 

through a pre-agreed system. 

USG IA planning continues to be fine-tuned with 

strong Colombian involvement. This has worked in 

current and previous capacity building efforts and 

continues to work in relation to new strategies like the 

CSDI. USG agencies ensure that the Colombians are in 

the lead. By all indications, the successful joint planning and program execution is a sign that the delegation of the decisionmaking process to the field staff and 

away from the headquarters in Washington has been 

effective. This is also an indication that the experience 

and capacity that has been built up over the years has 

been effective in enabling USG agencies’ field staff 

to make the relevant decisions. This cooperation has 

improved at the USG IA level with increasingly close 

cooperation between LE and the intelligence and military communities. 

The Colombian example also reveals the importance to the mission of having strong and effective 

personalities (both HN and USG) involved. The interactive and close cooperation between serious and 

honest military and LE leaders and USG agencies has 

succeeded in integrating planning processes and leveraging capabilities to ensure successful military and 

LE efforts against the drug cartels and the FARC. This 

joint and collaborative process has also succeeded in 

building HN capacities to better plan and execute a 

wide range of operations. 

Despite these successes, there are some gaps in the 

long-term process such as the need to define, identify, 
70

and plan for military to LE transition and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and to clearly identify 

and build the capacity of the Colombian entities that 

will be responsible for these activities. Currently, there 

are serious concerns about the rise of criminal gangs 

and cartels that are replacing the FARC. The BACRIM 

presents a new kind of challenge for LE. These groups 

have more firepower than regular criminal gangs and 

also have more experienced fighters, who have faced 

the Colombian military in previous encounters. However, the Colombian military, which has been the lead 

element in the fight against the FARC and succeeded 

in hastening its attrition, views the BACRIM as an LE 

problem. Colombian LE remains under capacity, both 

numerically and in relation to training and equipment, making it difficult for the police to take on the 

BACRIM on its own without more capacity building 

assistance. Questions remain about how to increase 

LE capacities and the role of the Colombian military 

in taking on this emerging challenge. 

As the USG begins drawing down its assistance 

to Colombia, one of the frequent questions revolves 

around metrics. The original metrics included a 50 percent reduction in coca cultivation, which has not been 

accomplished. In fact, metrics based on the number of 

hectares eradicated have proven to be of little value. 

However, qualitatively, more parts of the country are 

secure, have a government presence through police 

and public services, and the FARC’s ability to retake 

control of these areas has been reduced dramatically. 

The need for realistic metrics that can be revisited 

and modified as appropriate over time will be important to the long-term success of the USG mission. 

Authorities and funding are eventually connected to 

such metrics and inadequate attention will lead to 

poor resource decisions. 
71

Recommendations:

1.1. Establish granular, meaningful metrics early in 

the mission that can be shared with other similar operations (such as Plan Merida, which is U.S. support 

for Mexico’s battle against violent drug trafficking).

1.2. Establish metrics that can gauge whether the 

HN Government has adequately established effective 

governance (including diminishing corruption) over 

the country.

1.3. Provide regular feedback to appropriators to 

ensure earmarks enhance (and do not unduly constrain) programs. 

1.4. Develop more effective mechanisms to share 

program successes among the U.S. IA.

1.5. Plan beyond (U.S. and HN) political cycles 

(that can drive short-term goals) in order to prevent 

backsliding, and develop funding mechanisms to facilitate long-term plans.

1.6. Plan for sustainment on the ground if USG 

commitment is reduced and ensure that HN agencies 

are able to operate with limited external support.

1.7. Consider increased specialization (purposebuilt units) among HN LE.

2. Capacity Building: Institutional Reform and 

Advising. 

There are multiple elements to the capacity-building 

approach to include training and equiping, mentoring, 

institutional reform, and enabling HN capabilities. These 

mutually-reinforcing elements have significantly increased 

HN capacity, but Colombia is not yet self-sufficient.
72

The duration of USG active involvement in Colombia is still under consideration. The Plan Colombia 

Consolidation Phase involves a 6-year period during 

which the USG agencies plan to hand over programs 

to Colombian counterparts and agencies. However, 

there are concerns that domestic U.S. considerations 

may hasten the handover of some programs, which the 

Colombians may not be willing or able to sustain on 

their own. It is likely that USG agencies like the DEA, 

which conducts an increasingly successful Judicial 

Wire Tap program jointly with the Colombians, will 

remain engaged with HN agencies in the long-term, 

especially since the program’s success also affects the 

shipment of drugs to the United States. However, other agencies involved in providing capacity and support to Colombian LE as part of Plan Colombia may 

have to scale back or draw down their programs in the 

next few years. Creating adequate capacity among the 

Colombians to transition programs to their control is a 

primary requirement, and building Colombian capabilities as needed remains a challenge. 

The question of transition to the HN also brings 

up debate about extraditions. Many narcoterrorists 

and drug dealers end up in U.S. jails rather than in 

Colombian ones. While this has had some deterrent 

effects, the status quo has not resulted in an adequate 

build up of Colombian prisons to fully take over from 

the United States. Colombian prisons remain under 

capacity and are yet unable to take over the task of 

imprisoning and holding narcoterrorists, many of 

whom have been able to continue to operate their networks even while in prison due to Colombian prison 

officials’ corruption and inefficiency. In addition, an 

option of transitioning to Colombian-led programs 

also brings up concerns about U.S. domestic policy 
73

regarding drugs and how it needs to be more effective 

to curtail demand in the United States. 

In addition, USG agencies’ ability to use expanded 

authorities to engage in counterinsurgency training 

and support has improved Colombians’ ability to take 

on the narcoterrorists and other criminal elements. 

However, the need to renew these authorities each 

year is not a smooth process and sometimes results in 

USG agencies having to suspend their work until the 

authority is renewed in Congress. This is another aspect of the USG-Colombian cooperation process that 

needs to be reviewed to accommodate transition to 

the Colombians. 

Recommendations: 

2.1. Conduct holistic security sector assessment 

to be able to better identify and articulate the needs 

around transitioning programs to the HN through a 

strong build-up of HN capabilities.

2.1.(a). Ensure that all concerned parties understand the cost-benefit analysis and required length of 

efforts. 

2.2. Analyze legitimate concerns and defend 

against false or inflated accusations of human rights 

violations, which are sometimes used by political opponents (and even illegitimate entities like narcoterrorist and insurgent groups) to undermine HN LE and 

military personnel and could potentially influence 

how the USG will set conditions for a transition. 

2.3. Build and improve HN institutions’ abilities to 

avoid and prevent human rights violations. U.S. agencies need to ensure relevant training is provided for 

HN police in these areas. 

2.4. Make clear to U.S. policymakers the secondary 

and tertiary benefits of staying engaged in long-term 

USG LE efforts in countries that directly affect drug 

trafficking and related issues.
74

2.5. Develop capacities evenly across the spectrum 

of HN justice systems.

3. Relationship Between Crime, Terrorism, and 

Drug Trade. 

Comprehensive approaches to address the nexus between narcoterrorism, the broader drug trade, and general 

lawlessness have proven more successful than initiatives to 

deal with any of these three elements in isolation. 

Limiting ungoverned spaces is crucial to the policy surrounding a comprehensive approach. Isolated 

communities continue to be fertile areas for coca 

cultivation and FARC control. Increased Colombian 

military and LE coordination in operations has helped 

provide the requisite security in many remote areas 

of the country to enable introduction of a permanent 

government presence in the form of police and public 

services. However, there still remain areas that require 

security and government presence. One of the more 

successful initiatives in relation to setting up a permanent government presence in areas liberated from the 

FARC is the Center for Coordinated and Integrated 

Action. This unit is part of the Colombian President’s 

office and works on coordinating and setting up government services and offices in secured areas. The 

comprehensive approach also involves predicting and 

preparing for the next iteration of the enemy. The gap 

in predictive analysis prevented to some extent the 

anticipation of smaller cartels that replaced the larger 

ones of the 1980s and 1990s and thereby prevented a 

more comprehensive response to the morphing threat. 

In addition to predictive shortfalls, limitations on legal authorities such as short-term expanded authori-
75

ties and the inability to easily redirect funds away 

from tasks of original intent also make it challenging 

to use a flexible approach to what is a complex set of 

problems. 

Recommendations.

3.1. From a tactical perspective, counterdrug efforts are similar to counterinsurgency efforts. Adapt 

these measures and training to the context. 

3.1. (a) Understand and ensure that drug cartels 

and related problems warrant the use of LE rather 

than specialized tactics.

3.2. Enable skill sets that are widely applicable and 

adaptable, especially among HN LE, to ensure an effective comprehensive approach to narcoterrorism 

and general lawlessness. 

3.3. Communicate more effectively to the U.S. Congress and the HN population that many of the crimes 

committed by various actors are connected to the narcoterrorists and their cartels and networks.

3.4. Draw more assistance from other nations that 

share the drug problem and related effects of diffuse 

cartels and criminals.

3.5. Improve understanding in relation to the demand side of the drug trade and develop domestic 

U.S. policy to combat the drug problem in the United 

States.

4. Commitment To Partnership. 

A historical relationship between U.S. and Colombian 

agencies combined with a long-term resourced plan, reinforced by HN commitment, has resulted in significant successes.

USG efforts in Colombia are unique in comparison 

to many other contexts. Several USG agencies have 
76

been involved in the country for more than 2 decades, 

and this has built up trust and improved the ability to 

share information, especially in relation to LE efforts. 

This is especially relevant at the higher levels of the 

HN agencies’ leadership. The DEA works with vetted units on its Judicial Wiretap Program; this was not 

easily achievable in the past given the large amount 

of HN individuals who were compromised by their 

involvement with the drug cartels. Many of the most 

successful working relationships between the USG 

and Colombian agencies are based on personal relationships and trust. These successes have been enhanced by strong Colombian commitment to establishing long-term relationships. However, more needs 

to be done especially by the Colombians to deal with 

corruption, which continues to have the potential to 

undermine these combined efforts. In addition, it is 

important to ensure that capable staff and the right 

persons are placed in jobs on the U.S.-side of the effort as well. This includes personnel with the relevant 

experience and ability to work across cultural barriers. 

All these efforts are also closely linked to funding 

and political changes within Colombia. A change in 

the Colombian government may result in different priorities from the current one. Furthermore, inadequate 

funding commitments, especially from the Colombians, have adverse impacts on the long-term partnership since the USG often has to provide the bulk and 

mainstay of many programs. 

Recommendations.

4.1. Adjust approaches based on circumstances 

(i.e., what level of vetting you undertake and how you 

work with HN units of varying levels of trust) and determine the limits to U.S. involvement with partners 
77

who may not adhere to U.S. professional ethics and 

standards. 

4.2. Manage and include HN personnel outside 

of vetted units to increase capabilities of the broader 

government and prevent backsliding of unit cohesiveness and cooperation.

4.3. Adjust relationships to accommodate evolving U.S. financial restrictions and maintain a dialogue 

with the HN to establish priorities so that the HN can 

utilize focused support for important initiatives and 

make arrangements to gradually take over and manage programs on its own.

4.4. Set up additional sustainable measures to 

ensure competent people remain in their positions 

within HN agencies. Some examples of such measures 

include setting up a Judge Advocate General (JAG) 

school for HN lawyers and other measures such as 

ensuring that U.S.-trained HN personnel do not rotate 

out of their positions to prior Military Occupational 

Specialties (MOS) without being given the option to 

specialize in their position and remain at their posts, 

thereby preventing attrition of trained HN personnel. 

4.5. Understand and accommodate the reality that 

U.S. doctrine and approaches do not necessarily replicate themselves exactly in foreign contexts. 

4.6. Prioritize building and maintaining relationships and mentoring personnel over providing resources.

5. Collaboration, Informal Execution. 

There is a high degree of collaboration within the U.S. 

country team and with the HN, which allows for optimized 

use of capabilities and resources.
78

The high degree of collaboration and level of personal relationships between Colombians and U.S. staff 

have endured despite political changes, changing 

governments and staff turnover. However, in some 

cases these arrangements remain fragile since external 

events, actions, and adverse statements could affect or 

undermine collaboration between the Colombians and 

the U.S. IA staff. There remains a need for even more 

collaboration within the U.S. Country Team in order 

to maximize the impact of IA support for Colombia. 

One of the key areas where there needs to be more 

collaboration and communication between the relevant U.S. agencies is in funding. For example, many 

DoJ agencies, which have created direct operational 

benefits through foreign assistance, have to rely on 

other USG agencies for their funding since they do 

not have direct access to the foreign assistance budget. Foreign assistance authorities are limited because 

of the complexity of coordinating actions across the 

existing authorities. Having fewer entities, such as the 

DoS in this case, to channel requisite funds reduces 

the complexity involved in potentially coordinating 

funding and resources through several agencies. This, 

however, also places the DoS in the position of having 

to ensure that it is sensitive to other agencies’ needs in 

foreign LE assistance to be able to adequately react to 

those needs.

Recommendations: 

5.1. Institutionalize successful IA and HN relationships and responsibilities.

5.1.(a) Actively support specific HN individuals, 

mentor them, build the relationships and where possible help HN personnel succeed and rise in seniority.
79

5.1.(b) Ensure that there are USG officials who are 

capable of nurturing long-term relationships by placing them in key positions. 

5.2. Ensure programming consistency and provide 

a sense of certainty and continuity that will enable the 

HN to capitalize on opportunities and active cooperation. This includes providing incentives both at institutional and personal levels. 

5.3. The USG LE community needs to improve and 

cultivate personnel within their own agencies so that 

they develop strong and successful career paths that 

can include foreign postings, to enable successful outcomes for the USG. 

6. Relative Advantage of Running a Supporting 

Mission. 

The USG is purely an enabler in Colombia. Colombian 

leaders determine policy objectives and Colombian entities 

lead operations. This has forced the growth of Colombian 

capacity and assured HN ownership while allowing a relatively small USG footprint.

The USG role as an enabler has come about more 

by default than through a focused plan. Legislative restrictions on the USG Agencies’ role in Colombia have 

provided the platform for them to mentor and grow 

relevant capabilities among the HN agencies. The 

small (relative to deployments of military forces) USG 

footprint is also the result of reluctance on the part of 

the USG to get inextricably involved in Colombian internal dynamics and to minimize the number of possible U.S. targets for violence. While not necessarily 

planned, these actions have resulted in enabling improved capacities and abilities between Colombian LE 

and its military, which have learned to take the lead 

in all operations with U.S. support. This is especially 
80

relevant in COIN operations, where it is more beneficial for the HN to be able to operate and manage the 

mission and tasks. The wide-scale involvement and 

lead taken by Colombian personnel has increased the 

HN agencies’ legitimacy. From the perspective of the 

USG agencies, the legal restrictions have forced these 

agencies to prioritize their focus and responses. These, 

in turn, have ensured that the U.S. IA has focused on 

promoting sustainable measures such as using the 

training-of-trainers’ method to deliver instruction enabling the Colombians to take on a wide array of tasks. 

This has also ensured that the USG agencies consider 

problems in linear fashion since an open-ended USG 

involvement is not necessarily guaranteed. 

Recommendations:

6.1. Regularly assess HN capacity and leadership 

and incorporate findings into U.S. strategic planning.

6.2. Assess the expected impact of USG capacity 

building and reform on HN power structures and 

assess the threat-level and challenges inherent in retaining a small group of USG entities to provide these 

capabilities.

6.3. Ensure there is balance in maintaining a small 

footprint with support and ability to respond to threats 

or crises such as widespread violence. 

6.4. Coordinate niche capabilities, especially among 

HN LE personnel, to maintain or control a situation 

until better-equipped or specialized forces arrive. 

CONCLUSION

USG involvement in building Colombian LE capabilities involves a complex mix of IA strategies 

and tasks, which has resulted in relatively successful 

outcomes over an extended period of time. The long-
81

term involvement in that country has given the USG 

an opportunity to revise and fine-tune its efforts over 

the years. The USG’s sustained efforts have created 

significant capacity, especially in building up skills of 

Colombian military and LE personnel. 

The strong collaboration between USG agencies in 

providing combined support to HN LE and military 

is a key pillar of the overall effectiveness of the USG 

efforts. NAS and MilGroup training and equipment 

support and DEA/MilGroup intelligence support has 

been invaluable for Colombian LE and military in their 

eradication and interdiction efforts. The fact that USG 

entities coordinate their efforts closely in support of a 

common plan is a key factor in their largely successful 

efforts. The Colombian government’s strong commitment to the partnership is another pillar in improving 

overall governance and security. The USG strategy of 

maintaining a limited presence in Colombia has resulted in a small and sustainable USG footprint and 

ensured that USG agencies’ efforts focus on building 

up Colombian capacities through training and mentoring rather than the direct conduct of operations. 

Colombia is unique among contexts where the 

USG is involved in several other ways, especially in 

relation to structural aspects. Central among these is 

the structure of Colombia’s national police, which is 

under a single command structure and has authority across the country (from border to border). This 

has made it easier for U.S. agencies to work with the 

police through a comprehensive and coordinated set 

of training and skills building measures. In addition, 

police personnel are regularly moved from one area to 

another making it harder for the FARC and other drug 

cartels to co-opt or coerce individual police personnel. 

This has provided many opportunities to develop the 

police and reduce corruption (though it remains a sig-
82

nificant problem). In addition to the operational strategy, the U.S. policy and related approach to Colombia 

has been strong in its consistency of commitment despite the long duration, successive changes in U.S. administrations, and evolving domestic considerations. 

None of these have seriously affected or undermined 

U.S. commitment to Colombia. 

However, without a longer term view, especially 

in relation to the Colombian police who face the full 

force of the BACRIM, the United States could see 

years of progress start to slip. USG programs continue 

to deliver training and assistance to the Colombian 

police, but they should likely be expanded as military 

support is reduced. More police and additional training for Colombians will be needed for them to reach a 

point of self-sustainability with the police able to deal 

with the BACRIM and other threats. 

In addition, Colombia continues to need support 

to build niche capabilities and investigative capabilities to maintain or control crises until better-equipped 

or specialized forces can be positioned, and to be 

able to drive prosecutions effectively. Police intelligence capabilities are also important for sustainable 

progress. Most USG agencies have taken a long-term 

view, with the idea of maintaining their relationships 

in Colombia over decades. Programs like the DEA’s 

Judicial Wiretap Program and the OPDAT-supported 

overhaul of the Colombian justice system will give Colombia resilient and effective institutions over time. In 

fact, Colombians are already being called on to advise 

other developing nations in LE and counter narcotics 

given their recent success.

There also needs to be more focus both at the strategic and operational level on support to the Colombian Navy, which, while having a large jurisdiction (all 
83

national waterways come under its purview), remains 

(like the police) under capacity. As drug smugglers increasingly look to alternative routes to airborne smuggling, the internal river network is fast emerging as 

the next geographical front in interdiction efforts and 

the Colombian Navy is in the frontline of these efforts. 

Furthermore, the United States should continue 

to support Colombia in prioritized areas to secure 

the gains made against the FARC and narcotraffickers. Ongoing assessments should look at the security 

sector as a whole and define needs according to local 

contexts. 

At the IA level, it is useful to analyze and further 

scope out the benefits of maintaining a small footprint 

and presence, while providing assistance and enabling HN capabilities. The successful collaboration 

between the DEA, the MilGroup, and the NAS in providing targeted intelligence, assistance, advice, and 

equipment to the HN police and military are among 

successful U.S. efforts that merit further analysis and 

possible replication and institutionalization for USG 

LE assistance.

See Table 3-2 for a summary of Colombia observations and recommendations. 
84

Observations Recommendations

1) Planning and Formal 

Mechanisms 

Comprehensive IA planning conducted 

with the HN and focused on HN objectives at strategic and operational levels. Plans are developed, assessed, 

reviewed and amended through a 

pre-agreed system.

1.1. Establish granular, meaningful metrics early in the mission that can 

be shared with other similar operations (such as Plan Merida).

1.1 (a) Establish metrics that can gauge whether the HN Government 

has established adequately effective governance (including diminishing 

corruption) over the country.

1.2 Provide regular feedback to appropriators to ensure earmarks 

enhance (and do not unduly constrain) programs.

1.2 (a) Develop more effective mechanisms to share program successes among the U.S. interagency.

1.3 Plan beyond (U.S. and HN) political cycles (that can drive short-term 

goals) in order to prevent backsliding, and develop funding mechanisms 

to facilitate long-term plans.

1.4 Plan for sustainment on the ground if USG commitment is reduced 

and ensure that HN agencies are able to operate with limited external 

support.

1.5 Consider increased specialization (purpose-built units) among HN 

LE.

2) Capacity Building: Institutional Reform and Advising There are multiple elements to the 

capacity-building approach to include 

training and equiping, mentoring, 

institutional reform, and enabling 

HN capabilities. These mutuallyreinforcing elements have significantly 

increased HN capacity, but Colombia 

is not yet self-sufficient.

2.1 Conduct holistic security sector assessment to be able to better 

identify and articulate the needs around transitioning programs to HN 

through a strong build-up of HN capabilities.

2.1 (a) Ensure that all concerned parties understand the cost-benefit 

analysis and required length of efforts.

2.2 Analyze legitimate concerns and defend against false or inflated 

accusations of human rights violations, which are sometimes used by 

political opponents (like narcoterrorist and insurgent groups) to undermine HN LE and military personnel and could potentially influence how 

the USG will set conditions for a transition.

2.3 Build and improve HN institutions’ abilities to avoid and prevent 

human rights violations. U.S. agencies need to ensure relevant training 

is provided for HN police in these areas.

2.4 Make clear to U.S. policy makers the secondary and tertiary benefits 

of staying engaged in long-term USG LE efforts in countries that directly 

affect drug trafficking and related issues

2.5 Develop capacities evenly across the spectrum of HN justice 

systems.

3) Relationship Between 

Crime, Terrorism, Drug 

Trade

Comprehensive approaches to 

address the nexus between narcoterrorism, the broader drug trade, and 

general lawlessness have proven 

more successful than initiatives to 

deal with any of these three elements 

in isolation.

3.1 From a tactical perspective, Counter Drug efforts are similar to 

Counter Insurgency efforts. Adapt these measures and training to the 

context.

3.1 (a) Understand and ensure that drug cartels and related problems 

warrant the use of LE rather than specialized tactics.

3.2 Enable skill sets that are widely applicable and adaptable, especially 

among HN LE, to ensure an effective comprehensive approach to 

narcoterrorism and general lawlessness.

3.3 Communicate more effectively to the U.S. Congress and the HN 

population that many of the crimes committed by various actors are 

connected to the narcoterrorists and their cartels and networks.

3.4 Draw more assistance from other nations that share the drug 

problem and related effects of diffuse cartels and criminals.

3.5 Improve understanding in relation to the demand side of the drug 

trade and develop domestic U.S. policy to combat the drug problem in 

the U.S.

Table 3-2. Summary of Colombia Observations and 

Recommendations. 
85

Table 3-2. Summary of Colombia Observations and 

Recommendations. (cont.)

4) Commitment to Partnership A historical relationship between U.S. 

and Colombian agencies combined 

with a long-term resourced plan, 

reinforced by HN commitment has 

resulted in significant successes.

4.1 Adjust approaches based on circumstances (i.e. what level of 

vetting you undertake and how you work with HN units of varying levels 

of trust) and determine the limits to U.S. involvement with partners who 

may not adhere to U.S. professional ethics and standards.

4.2 Manage and include HN personnel outside of vetted units to 

increase capabilities of the broader government and prevent backsliding 

of unit cohesiveness and cooperation.

4.3 Adjust relationships to accommodate evolving U.S. financial restrictions and maintain a dialogue with the HN to establish priorities so that 

the HN can utilize focused support for important initiatives and make 

arrangements to gradually take over and manage programs on its own.

4.4 Set up additional sustainable measures to ensure competent people 

remain in their positions within HN agencies. Some examples of such 

measures include setting up a JAG school for HN lawyers and other 

measures such as ensuring that U.S.-trained HN personnel do not 

rotate out of their positions to prior Military Occupational Specialties 

(MOS) without being given the option to specialize in their position 

and remain at their posts, thereby preventing attrition of trained HN 

personnel.

4.5 Understand and accommodate for the reality that U.S. doctrine and 

approaches do not necessarily replicate themselves exactly in foreign 

contexts.

4.6 Prioritize building and maintaining relationships and mentoring 

personnel over providing resources.

5) Collaboration, informal 

execution

There is a high degree of collaboration 

within the U.S. country team and with 

the HN, which allows for optimized use 

of capabilities and resources. 

5.1 Institutionalize successful IA and HN relationships and responsibilities.

5.1 (a) Actively support specific HN individuals, mentor them, build the 

relationships and where possible help HN personnel succeed and rise 

in seniority.

5.1 (b) Ensure that there are USG officials who are capable of nurturing 

long-term relationships by placing them in key positions.

5.2 Ensure programming consistency and provide a sense of certainty 

and continuity that will enable the HN to capitalize on opportunities 

and active cooperation. This includes providing incentives both at 

institutional and personal levels.

5.3 The USG LE community needs to improve and cultivate personnel 

within their own agencies so that they develop strong and successful 

career paths that can include foreign postings, to enable successful 

outcomes for the USG.

6) Relative Advantage 

of Running a Supporting 

Mission 

The USG is purely an enabler in Colombia. Colombian leaders determine 

policy objectives and Colombian entities lead operations. This has forced 

the growth of Colombian capacity and 

assured HN ownership while allowing 

a relatively small USG footprint.

6.1 Regularly assess HN capacity and leadership and incorporate findings into U.S. strategic planning.

6.2 Assess expected impact of USG capacity building and reform on HN 

power structures and assess the threat-level and challenges inherent in 

retaining a small group of USG entities to provide these capabilities.

6.3 Ensure there is balance in maintaining a small footprint with support 

and ability to respond to threats or crises such as widespread violence.

6.4 Coordinate niche capabilities, especially among HN LE personnel, 

especially to maintain or control a situation until better-equipped or 

specialized forces arrive.
86

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. The term “Plan Colombia” is commonly used to refer to Colombian and U.S. efforts over an extended period. The initial Plan 

Colombia ended in 2005 and subsequent extensions and efforts 

have been known by a variety of terms, including Plan Colombia 

Phase II, and by the names of component strategies like the Plan 

Colombia Consolidation Phase, the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative, etc. This study uses “Plan Colombia” to encompass the collection of relevant strategies and initiatives from 2000 

onwards.

2. CRS Report for Congress, Plan Colombia: A Progress Report, 

Order Code RL32774, Washington, DC: Congressional Research 

Service, January 11, 2006, p. 1, available from University of North 

Texas, digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-8270:1. 

3. United States Support for Colombia Fact Sheet, Washington, 

DC: Department of State, March 28, 2000, available from www.

state.gov/www/regions/wha/colombia/fs_000328_plancolombia.html. 

4. PDD 73 was replaced after 26 months by National Security 

Policy Directive (NSPD)-18, which also remains classified.

5. Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Affairs, statement before the Senate Caucus 

on International Narcotics Control, September 21, 1999, available 

from Library of Congress Online Catalog, frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/

cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_house_hearings&docid=f:69868.pdf.

6. United States Support for Colombia Fact Sheet. 

7. Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, But 

Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans For 

Reducing Assistance, (GAO 09-71), Washington, DC: Government 

Accountability Office, October 2008, pp. 14-15, available from 

www.gao.gov/new.items/d0971.pdf. Also note that the MilGroup 

manages Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Foreign Military Sales 
87

(FMS) programming. These programs, which are funded through 

the DoS under the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, are 

not specific to Colombia, but are provided by the USG to other 

countries as well.

8. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs, Counternarcotics and Law Enforcement Country Program: 

Colombia, Washington, DC: Department of State, January 2009, 

available from www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/113707.htm. 

9. For Social and Economic Justice Programs, funds were increased from $139.7 million to $194.4 million; Rule of Law programs received an increase to $39.4 million from $7.8 million the 

previous year. Funds for eradication and interdiction were reduced from $591.1 million to $423.4 million. See Plan Colombia: 

Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, But Security Has Improved, p. 15. 

10. Peter DeShazo, Johanna Mendelson Forman, Phillip 

McLean, Countering Threats to Security and Stability in a Failing 

State: Lessons from Colombia, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, 2009, p. 18, available from csis.org/publication/countering-threats-security-and-stability-failing-state.

11. Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, 

But Security Has Improved, p. 13.

12. PCCP is also known by other names: “Strategy for 

Strengthening Democracy and Promoting Social Development” 

and the “Policy of Consolidation of Democratic Security.”

13. Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, 

But Security Has Improved, pp. 12-13. 

14. CSDI is also known by other names: “Strategic Leap,” and 

“National Consolidation Plan.”

15. The initial operations in relation to Colombia were mostly conducted by the DEA (between 1976 and 1989). Since then, 

a large number of USG agencies, including the DEA (which has 

continued its assistance) are supporting the Colombians. 
88

16. Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, 

But Security Has Improved, p. 15. 

17. This is not to suggest that the USG involvement was 

planned in this way or even that the USG manages its involvement 

in Colombia in terms of LOOs. Rather, the LOOs are presented 

here purely as a (post facto) means to understand the continuity 

and breadth of ways in which LE contributed to achievement of 

USG objectives in Colombia. See Qualifications and Limitations 

section on p. 4 for the explanation on how this study formulated 

the Lines of Operation.

18. Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, 

But Security Has Improved, pp. 1, 43. 

19. The USCG is the lead federal agency for narcotics interdiction.

20. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 

Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I, 

Drug and Chemical Control, Washington, DC: U.S. Department 

of State, 2009, p. 205, available from www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2009/index.htm. 

21. Ibid., p. 206.

22. With judicial authorization, mobile phones can be tapped 

anywhere in Colombia. 

23. This list, which was introduced during President Clinton’s 

tenure, is used to name and target for sanctions designated nationals and blocked persons.

24. See 21 U.S.C. ‘1901-1908, 8 U.S.C. ‘1182, available from 

www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/narco/drugs.pdf. 

25. “Just the Facts,” available from justf.org/All_Trainees_

Country. 

26. Plan Colombia: A Progress Report. 
89

CHAPTER 4

KOSOVO

INTRODUCTION

From 1999 to the present, the United States Government (USG) has continuously supported operations on 

the ground in Kosovo, in addition to a shorter, smaller 

commitment from October 1998 until the commencement of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

air operations in March 1999. USG engagement involves a multifaceted commitment that includes Law 

Enforcement (LE) operations and expertise as part of 

the comprehensive range of multinational and bilateral, military and civilian missions and programs. The 

purpose of the LE involvement in these programs and 

missions has been to support the wider aims and objectives of the respective missions as well as reinforcing the rule of law (RoL) which has been an inherent 

part of establishing effective governance in the province when it came under international administration 

after the withdrawal of Yugoslavian security forces 

from the area in 1999.

The Kosovo example provides valuable insights 

into the implementation of LE measures in what was 

a complex operational environment. Part of this complexity results from the duration and the scale of the 

undertaking. Over the course of more than a decade, 

the United States and international partners have 

been involved in the process of establishing security 

in Kosovo while building effective state institutions 

(including LE and related ministries and agencies) 

in a territory that had no recent history of maintaining these institutions. Although the more recent op-
90

erations in Iraq have exceeded the scale of the Kosovo 

commitment and have included a large institution 

building commitment, Kosovo was considered a major commitment at the time and both the United States 

and the international community still have substantial 

resources committed in Kosovo.

The international nature of the commitment is 

an important aspect of the operations in Kosovo. Although the United States has been one of the largest 

and most consistent contributors of military and civilian resources to Kosovo, most of this commitment has 

been made through USG contributions to missions run 

by multinational organizations, principally the United 

Nations (UN), NATO, the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the European 

Union (EU). This has meant that the U.S. involvement 

has been under the direct leadership of officials from 

other nations on each of these missions and has been 

shaped by the need to cooperate with international 

partners. The differing priorities of international partners has also affected the conduct of these missions 

with some nations (particularly from Western Europe) 

having a direct interest in dealing with transnational 

crime issues in Kosovo, while other nations disagree 

on Kosovo’s status (either as an independent nation or 

still a province of Yugoslavia). 

The USG involvement in LE operations and development programs in Kosovo has also been interagency 

in nature. The impetus for involvement in Kosovo has 

been driven by foreign relations imperatives, while 

relying on expertise from the LE community and on 

the military to ensure stability and logistic support. 

This has meant that agencies within the Departments 

of State, Justice, and Defense have all been involved in 

planning, funding, conducting, and/or managing op-
91

erations there. The use of contractors has been the primary means that USG agencies have used to deploy 

civilian LE expertise in Kosovo; this was one of the 

earliest operations in which the USG made extensive 

use of contractors in this manner.1

This section investigates the involvement of the 

USG in the conduct and use of LE to support its strategic objectives in Kosovo. It contains the following 

material:

• A synopsis of the U.S. operational involvement 

in Kosovo and LE Lines of Operation

• Observations drawn through research and interviews

• Recommendations drawn through a validation 

process

• Conclusion

SYNOPSIS (1998-PRESENT)

Unlike the other case studies in this project, Panama and Colombia, the USG had very little direct LE 

interest in Kosovo, but rather became involved as a 

part of its wider engagement in the Balkan region. 

The USG had been involved in the region (including 

the provision of LE capacity-building expertise) since 

the commencement of the UN Mission in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina (UNMIBH) in 1995 and the UN Transitional Authority for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) in 

1996. While already committed to dealing with other 

aspects of the breakup of the Yugoslav Federation, the 

USG did not become involved with Kosovo until 1998. 

The impetus for involvement came from a desire to 

end ethnic violence and atrocities in the region, but 

the primary strategic imperatives driving USG interest were related to stabilizing the region and support-
92

ing European security arrangements (such as NATO 

and the OSCE). The creation of a stable, developing 

economy and a multi-ethnic democracy in the region 

was also consistent with the USG’s 1989 Support for 

East European Democracy (SEED) Act. Although 

these actions would help to reduce the potential for 

organized crime and terrorism to take root in the area, 

the direct impact on domestic LE within the United 

States was not a major consideration.

Yet since committing to operations in Kosovo in 

1998, the USG commitment has almost always contained a significant LE component. The initial USG 

commitment was made as a part of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), an unarmed OSCE-led peace 

monitoring mission that deployed in October 1998. 

This mission was to monitor compliance of the Yugoslav security forces and the Kosovo Liberation 

Army (KLA) with the terms of the Kosovo Verification Agreement of October 12, 1998. Given the need 

to monitor Yugoslav Ministry of Interior forces, the 

KVM included international police observers (including from the United States) as a part of its contingent. 

However, the KVM was unable to prevent another 

outbreak of fighting in December 1998. The KVM 

monitors were eventually withdrawn in March 1999. 

The next phase in USG commitment to Kosovo was 

leadership of Operation ALLIED FORCE, the NATO 

air campaign against Serbia and Yugoslav forces in 

Kosovo to force a Yugoslavian withdrawal from the 

province and acceptance of the Rambouillet Accords. 

This air campaign was conducted between March 22 

and June 11, 1999, and marked the only period of U.S. 

operational commitment that did not have an LE component.
93

The success of Operation ALLIED FORCE set the 

conditions for the entry of NATO forces, designated 

as the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to oversee the withdrawal of Yugoslav army and police forces and to accept 

responsibility for security in the province. The Yugoslav withdrawal (in accordance with the Rambouillet 

agreement) also required the international community to take responsibility for transitional authority 

in Kosovo and the international presence was authorized under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 on June 10, 1999. In addition to the existence of separate military and civilian components of 

the international response, the civilian responsibilities 

were further complicated by the involvement of several multinational organizations in its composition. 

Initially, the OSCE was expected to take the lead on 

the mission and had developed much of the planning 

for civil governance and capacity building. However, 

in an 11th-hour agreement, all civilian multinational 

involvement was to be brought under the overall coordination of the UN Interim Administration Mission 

in Kosovo (UNMIK), with specific responsibilities for 

different areas (known as “Pillars”) allocated among 

the multinational organizations as follows:

• Pillar I: Initially, Humanitarian Assistance (led 

by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees), 

but was redesignated as Police and Justice (UNled) after June 2000

• Pillar II: Civil Administration (UN-led)

• Pillar III: Democratization and Institution 

Building (led by the OSCE)

• Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic Development (EU-led)

See Figure 4-1.
94

Figure 4-1. Timeline of the Various Multinational 

Missions in Kosovo.

The United States did not provide the leadership 

of KFOR (initially led by British General Sir Michael 

Jackson), UNMIK (the initial Special Representative 

for the Secretary-General [SRSG] was French Diplomat Bernard Kouchner), nor for any of the four pillars, but was and remained a major contributor to the 

success of the international commitment throughout 

this period. The United States provided leadership of 

and the main component of one of KFOR’s five Multinational Task Forces, as well as the largest contingent 

of police officers (not including Formed Police Units) 

in the UNMIK and the leadership of the OSCE police 

training mission.

The United States has maintained continuous support to Kosovo even beyond the nation’s declaration of 

independence on February 17, 2008. However, Kosovo’s independence was accompanied by substantial 

changes in the way this support has been provided. 
95

On the one hand, it has seen the commencement (on 

December 1, 2009) of the EU Rule of Law Mission in 

Kosovo (EULEX) as the primary multinational monitoring, mentoring, and assistance (MMA) mission 

in Kosovo, focusing on support to Kosovo’s police, 

judges, and prosecutors, and inheriting many of the 

responsibilities of the UNMIK and the OSCE Mission. 

Although not a member of the EU, the United States is 

a contributing partner in the EULEX (along with four 

non-EU nations). However, due to opposition from 

member states (including Turkey within NATO, Spain 

within the EU, Russia in the OSCE, and both Russia 

and China in the UN) none of the four multinational 

organizations with missions in Kosovo (NATO, EU, 

OSCE, and UN) have recognized Kosovo’s independence, instead they have maintained a “status neutral” position which effectively accepts that Kosovo is 

still a part of Serbia. This has complicated the ability of 

the main donor states (including the United States and 

Germany) to pursue a long-term development strategy for law enforcement in Kosovo. Hence, while still 

retaining a major commitment to both NATO and the 

EULEX, the USG also provides important capacitybuilding assistance programs to Kosovo on a bilateral 

basis.

Overall, the U.S. involvement in Kosovo, particularly in support of developing law enforcement capacity, has been successful. As a result of the efforts 

of the multinational missions (all of which have had 

substantial U.S. involvement) and of the bilateral assistance (of which the United States has been the largest donor), Kosovo has been relatively stable and developing to the point where, with (albeit incomplete) 

international recognition, the province was able to 

declare its independence in 2008. In particular, the 

development of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), es-
96

tablished from scratch since 1999 and formally known 

as the Kosovo Police since 2008, has been a substantial 

achievement in which (despite some shortcomings in 

senior leadership and specialized investigative capabilities) the service is highly regarded by the population, has the lowest reported levels of corruption in 

the Balkans, and has maintained an ethnic balance 

that approximates that of the wider population.

Even though the U.S. commitment was not motivated by law enforcement priorities, law enforcement 

operations and capacity building have been, and continue to be, an important component of the U.S. contribution to the Kosovo intervention. The enforcement 

of law and the maintenance of order have been important in the establishment of a safe and secure environment. Also, supporting the development of RoL in 

Kosovo is a vital part of achieving the wider objectives 

of the international mission in that country.

LINES OF OPERATION

Given the length of the U.S. involvement in Kosovo, the involvement of such a variety of agencies and 

multinational missions with different agendas, and 

the major phases that the international intervention 

has progressed through, it is useful to consider the 

USG involvement in terms of a number of distinct, but 

interrelated lines of operation (LOOs).2 This section 

describes the three major LOOs identified: 

1. Deployed Law Enforcement Operations, Observers and Advisers,

2. Capacity-building of Kosovo Ministries and 

Agencies, and

3. Military (KFOR) Operations.

See Table 4-1.
97

Table 4-1. Summary of Lines of Operation (LOO) 

for Kosovo.

LOO 1—DEPLOYED LAW ENFORCEMENT 

OPERATIONS, OBSERVERS, AND ADVISERS.

The most direct involvement of law enforcement 

in a mission is by the deployment of civilian law enforcement professionals for operational tasks. During 

the course of U.S. involvement in Kosovo, this activity has had three main phases: deployment of police 

observers as a part of the OSCE-led KVM; the U.S. 

contribution to the civilian police component of the 

UNMIK (with Executive Authority for law enforcement); and the employment of U.S. civilian police (in 

both the UNMIK and the subsequent EULEX mission) 

for MMA of the fledging KPS.

Observer Mission. 

The KVM was the short-lived OSCE-led mission 

that deployed to Kosovo in October 1998 to monitor 

adherence to the Kosovo Verification Agreement by 

LOO 1

Deployed Law Enforcement 

Operations, Observers and 

Advisers 

1a.	 Observer Mission

1b.	 Interim Law Enforcement and MMA

1c.	 Post-Independence MMA and Continued

Executive Mandate

LOO 2

Capacity-building of Kosovo 

Ministries and Agencies

2a.	 Multilateral Programs

2b.	 Bilateral Programs

LOO 3

Military (KFOR) Operations

3a.	 Legal Reform, Mentoring and Advising

3b.	 Employment of General Purpose Forces
98

the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Yugoslavian security forces. Although this was a primarily military 

mission, the need to monitor the activity of Yugoslav 

police forces (who had played an important role in 

the campaign to suppress the Kosovo independence 

movement prior to international intervention) meant 

that there was the requirement for police expertise 

among the 2,000 verifiers authorized.

The police contingent among the KVM was small 

and largely staffed by European police. Even though 

many of these officers returned to Kosovo after the 

NATO bombing to work with the UNMIK or OSCE 

Mission, their relatively small numbers did not have 

a large impact on the follow-on missions. Precise details of numbers and activities of U.S. involvement in 

the KVM are not available, but the main impact of the 

KVM was to get the international LE focused agencies 

of the Department of State (DoS) and Department of 

Justice (DoJ) involved in initial planning for a potential follow-on commitment in Kosovo. The USG support to the KVM was managed by the Department of 

Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training 

Assistance Program (ICITAP). In addition to its monitoring task, this USG element was also tasked to investigate options for establishing police training centers 

under the assumption that a follow-on mission was 

likely.

Interim Law Enforcement and MMA. 

This line of operation refers to U.S. support for the 

multinational missions in Kosovo that had responsibility for enforcing law under the executive mandate 

and for MMA of the KPS. This was accomplished by 

deployment of contracted American police officers to 

serve with the UNMIK and continued (albeit on an 
99

incrementally reduced scale of direct operational activity) until the U.S.-recognized declaration of independence by Kosovo in February 2008.

UNSCR 1244 was one of few occasions where 

the UN Security Council has authorized Executive 

Authority for an armed police mission. This unprecedented decision by the UN was largely due to U.S. 

initiative in proposing it and developing a concept of 

operations that helped overcome initial reluctance by 

European powers. This made the UNMIK responsible 

for all aspects of governance in Kosovo and gave the 

international community great latitude in its decisionmaking and authority to effect its objectives.

However, the extent of the responsibilities implicit in this mandate created numerous problems for 

the international commitment. One problem was in 

bringing sufficient numbers of officers with a range 

of capabilities from UN member states into Kosovo 

in an appropriate timeframe. The UN International 

Civilian Police (UNPOL) was to be the LE authority 

in the province and was expected to be in position in 

sufficient numbers to take over internal security responsibilities from the KFOR within 3 months after 

the initial military deployment. However, the UNPOL 

did not have sufficient capability to deploy into many 

parts of Kosovo until early 2000 and did not reach its 

peak strength of over 3,300 officers (from more than 

50 nations) until 2001.3

 Part of the delay was due to 

the late decision to make the UN responsible for international police commitment (rather than the OSCE, 

which had done most of the preparations for the role). 

The UN made this decision shortly before issuing 

UNSCR 1244, so the UN had not invested much time 

in preliminary planning for the task before the commencement of the operation. Also difficult was the 
100

need to identify (from the various UN member states) 

and deploy sufficient numbers of personnel across the 

full range of LE capabilities necessary to maintain this 

comprehensive responsibility. This included the need 

for specialist roles such as border control, judicial protection4

 and prisoner transportation. Drawing on police from such a wide variety of nations also created 

discrepancies in the quality, capabilities and approach 

to law enforcement of the personnel deployed. As 

with the commitments to the KFOR, caveats imposed 

by contributing nations provided further limitations 

on coordination.

The creation and deployment of Stability Police 

Units (SPUs)5

 was a particular development of interest 

in the UNMIK. The inclusion of SPUs in the UNMIK 

was envisaged to provide the UNPOL with formed 

bodies of police to fulfill riot control and high-risk policing functions to relieve the reliance on military forces in order maintenance functions. The first SPU did 

not deploy until April 2000, and, given shortcomings 

in the capability of these units and the deployment by 

NATO of Multinational Specialized Units (MSUs)6

, 

SPUs were often used in more static facility and protective security roles rather than on riot control tasks.7

Hence, the efficacy of civilian policing on the operation was often dependent upon the availability of the 

KFOR back-up (including MSUs) in periods of escalating tension,8

 even after the deployment of SPUs.

The United States was the largest contributor of 

police personnel to the UNMIK mission. At its peak, 

the United States had 605 officers (all as individuallydeployed personnel; the United States did not provide an SPU) in Kosovo. All personnel were recruited 

(mostly from a variety of U.S. state and local agencies), 

trained and administered by a contracting company 
101

for 12-month deployments to the UNMIK. Using this 

means, the United States was able to provide a wellregarded, well-equipped contingent of police officers 

to the mission. However, recruitment of police professionals by contractors draws from a relatively small 

pool of qualified and available personnel, so there 

were a few cases of less than suitable personnel (unfit 

or inappropriately qualified) deployed with the contingents. Another recruitment problem was attracting 

the right range of law enforcement personnel; although 

salaries offered by the contractor were very competitive for generalist officers from smaller departments, 

they were less attractive to still-active personnel from 

big city departments or officers with management or 

specialist expertise. Use of a contracting company as 

an intermediary also created difficulties in dismissing 

and disciplining officers, and still required government involvement in, and close supervision of, the 

predeployment training provided in order to ensure 

the required standards were maintained. In addition, 

this did not provide a way to institutionalize knowledge and provide for long-term capacity. 

Several offices from two bureaus within the DoS 

were mostly responsible for managing this program. 

Policy oversight for Kosovo and communication with 

the U.S. diplomatic mission was by the Office of South 

Central European Affairs (EUR/SCE). The Office of 

Regional Political-Military Affairs (EUR/RPM) was 

responsible for coordinating with the EU and OSCE. 

Another office in the Europe bureau, the Office of 

the Assistance Coordinator for Europe and Eurasia 

(EUR/ACE), was responsible for allocating SEED Act 

funding to the State-run programs. The Bureau for 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

(INL) provided advice on law enforcement matters 
102

and managed the support to the UNMIK UNPOL via 

its Office of Civilian Police and Rule of Law (INL/

CIV). The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs played 

a coordinating function and, under National Security 

Council (NSC) guidance, chaired the Inter-Agency 

Working Group on Kosovo which was first convened 

in early 1999. This Working Group brought together 

representatives (at the Assistant Secretary or Deputy 

Assistant Secretary level) from the NSC, the DoS, the 

Department of Defense (DoD), and the DoJ to manage the USG response to the developing crisis. At the 

higher level, this working group contributed to the 

development (under the direction of the DoS Special 

Advisor for the Balkans) of the Political-Military Plan. 

At the height of the Kosovo crisis (during the NATO 

bombing campaign and initial deployment of the 

KFOR and UNMIK), this Working Group met daily or 

at least every other day. 

From the perspective of developing a plan for 

USG law enforcement support to the UN mission, 

this working group worked well. This was aided by 

the significant, firm, and long-term commitment and 

policy guidance on Kosovo from the USG leadership 

at that time. Further, due to the experience of previous missions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Eastern Slovenia, 

the personnel in the various agencies already had high 

degrees of familiarity with each other and the likely 

LE issues that could arise. As a reflection of this, the 

INL had drafted a concept of operations for LE in the 

province which became the LE annex to the Rambouillet Agreement; this was rejected by the Serbs, 

but served as the basis for USG shaping of OSCE and 

UN planning for LE in Kosovo and was the genesis 

of the proposal for international armed police with 

Executive Authority. However, due to the separate 
103

planning for the KFOR conducted by the DoD (which 

was outside DoS channels of coordination), the INL 

was unable to have civilian policing and deployment 

issues included in the KFOR planning. As the situation in Kosovo stabilized and operations reached a 

steady state, coordination for Kosovo was eventually 

delegated to working level desk officers, primarily 

within the DoS, the DoD, and the NSC, for routine 

conferences and the ability to refer decisions via the 

hierarchy of less-regular Initial Planning Conferences, 

Deputies Committees, Principals Committee, and the 

NSC as required.

Although the police officers who were the U.S. 

contribution to the UNPOL were formally working 

under UNMIK direction, the DoS had a mechanism 

to provide in-country oversight of the deployed U.S. 

police contingent through a deployed INL Police Advisor. The Police Advisor was a USG employee who 

reported directly to the INL about both the UNPOL 

commitment and initially the capacity building support to the OSCE (see LOO 2a). This position also fulfilled an important communication link between the 

operational deployment and the USG Head of Mission. By 2003, the U.S. contingent was also filling the 

position of Deputy Commissioner for Operations in 

the UNPOL hierarchy. 

Within Kosovo, many of the relationships between 

the UNMIK police and the other various elements of 

the international presence were built primarily on 

interpersonal relationships and the initiative of individuals involved. Given the division of responsibilities for executive authority, policing, and LE capacity 

building, the cooperation between the UNMIK and 

the OSCE mission on issues of recruitment and selection (an OSCE responsibility) and mentoring trained 
104

junior HN police (an UNMIK responsibility) was 

very important. The close relationship between the 

first UNMIK police commissioner and the American 

head of the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS, see 

LOO 2a) resulted in an arrangement in which senior 

UNPOL personnel were consulted in the recruitment 

of Kosovo police, and the OSCE provided training at 

the KPSS for UNPOL Field Training Officers (FTOs) to 

better them for the MMA role. The UNPOL link to the 

KFOR was particularly important given the mutual 

reliance on each other in the conduct of security tasks 

and this required not only cooperation at the national 

level, but also coordination at the local level. At the 

highest level, the closeness of this relationship fluctuated over the course of time based on the personalities 

of the respective UNPOL Commissioners and KFOR 

Commanders. These missions exchanged liaison officers and held regular meetings, but had no unified 

command or standing arrangements for integrated 

planning to mitigate the effects of personality. At the 

lowest level (station-level), UNPOL-KFOR relations 

were also personality-driven and in the Americanled KFOR sector (Multi-National Task Force-East 

[MNTF-E]), American military personnel found that 

this cooperation could be better facilitated when they 

had American (or German, United Kingdom [UK] or 

other Western national) UNPOL officers assigned to 

their districts. In some cases early in the deployment, 

the quality of these relationships led to the establishment of stations staffed jointly by KFOR and UNPOL 

personnel. 
105

Post-Independence MMA and Continued Executive 

Mandate. 

This line of operation is the continuation of LOO 

1b beyond the declaration of independence by Kosovo in February 2008. By this stage, the UNMIK had 

already handed over most LE responsibilities to the 

KPS (known as the KP since independence) by the end 

of 2004 so the operational capabilities of the UNPOL 

had already been drawn down to that of a primarily 

MMA commitment. However this stage was different 

largely because of the complicated circumstances of 

Kosovo independence which was not recognized by 

the UN. Hence the UNMIK still formally retained the 

executive authority granted under UNSCR 1244.9

Another major feature of this LOO was the commencement of the EU-led EULEX mission in December 2008. The EULEX has a much narrower mandate 

than the UNMIK. It has concentrated on support to 

the RoL system and has three main components: Police (initially the EULEX had 400 international personnel in MMA roles and several hundred in executive 

roles), Justice (100 personnel), and Customs (approximately 25 personnel). The EULEX has also inherited 

the residual UNSCR 1244 Executive Authority from 

the UNMIK and has an Executive Department which 

operates in three areas. First, the EULEX still provides 

the policing authority (including command over KP 

personnel) in several enclaves in the north and over 

two check points on the border with Serbia. Second, 

the international police presence maintains a Rapid 

Reaction Force (with Special Weapons and Tactics 

[SWAT] and riot control capabilities) to provide backup to the KP when required. Finally, EULEX police 

retain capabilities for investigation and intelligence, 

particularly related to war crimes, trafficking, and 
106

organized crime. MMA personnel have no authority 

over their KP counterparts and cannot intervene in KP 

actions, even when then may be counterproductive. 

Many of the EULEX police personnel are former UNPOL personnel (from EU and partner nations) who 

remained in Kosovo and transferred to the EULEX.

The United States is a major contributor to the 

EULEX, with personnel assigned to both the Police 

and Justice areas. Support to the latter consists of up 

to four prosecutors or judges provided by the DoS 

(EUR/ACE). The commitment of police is much more 

substantial with 80 U.S. personnel deployed (as of August 2009) of which 60 percent were in MMA roles, 

most of the remainder in the Executive and a small 

commitment of police to the Justice area (for prisoner transportation, etc). The United States provides 

key leadership positions in the EULEX, including the 

Head of the Executive Department (one of the Deputy 

Commissioners) and the Deputy Head of the Organized Crime Investigation Unit.

The USG management of this LOO is a direct continuation of LOO 1b. A desk officer within the DoS 

(INL/CIV) provides the oversight from Washington 

and coordinates with other agencies within the Department. In Kosovo, the INL/CIV is represented by 

an In-Country Contract Officer Representative (ICOR, 

a USG employee), who deals directly with the contracting company and their office in Pristina. The ICOR is 

located in the Embassy and also reports to the Ambassador on issues related to the EULEX commitment as 

well as acting as an advisor on law enforcement issues (the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] has no 

representative in Kosovo because criminal activities in 

Kosovo are judged to have little direct effect on the 

U.S. domestic law enforcement situation).
107

LOO 2—CAPACITY-BUILDING OF KOSOVO 

MINISTRIES AND AGENCIES. 

The components of this line of operation involve 

capacity building support to Kosovo law enforcement 

and related institutions. Capacity building includes 

formal training, recruitment, capability development, 

administrative assistance, provision of materiel, and 

other support required to build new capabilities or 

agencies or to expand the size of existing capabilities. 

This is to be distinguished from MMA, which works 

to assist and observe existing capabilities or capabilities that are being developed by the host nation (HN) 

or a third party.

A priority for capacity building for both the United 

States and the multinational missions in Kosovo has 

been to create a multi-ethnic, effective police service 

(and associated institutions) that operate in accordance with democratic governance principles. No 

indigenous Kosovo police service or supporting ministry and judicial and corrections system existed in 

the province when the multinational missions started 

in 1999. The United States has been a major contributor to the development of these institutions, both in 

its support of the multinational missions and through 

direct support to the Kosovo government. 

Multilateral Programs. 

This line of operation involves the USG in the law 

enforcement capacity building components of the 

multinational missions in Kosovo. This support commenced in 1999 and had concluded by 2008 with the 

withdrawal of OSCE support to the KPSS.
108

At the commencement of the UNMIK mission in 

1999, the OSCE had responsibility for “Democratization and Institution Building” as Pillar III of the mission. (The OSCE provided one of the four Deputy Special Representatives to the Secretary-General [DSRSG] 

to lead this pillar within the wider UNMIK structure). 

As a part of this role, the OSCE mission was responsible for establishing the institutions for maintenance 

of rule of law in the province, including the creation 

of the KPS.

The main element of the U.S. commitment to the 

OSCE mission was in the development of the KPS. 

From the outset of the mission, the ICITAP seconded 

to the OSCE a senior police manager to fill the position of Director of Police Development and Education (working directly under the DSRSG) and has also 

since contributed several hundred instructors (mostly 

U.S. or host nation contractors, but also including several USG employees) over the course of the commitment.10 This commitment commenced in Kosovo in 

early July 1999 (within 2 weeks after the cessation of 

the NATO air campaign) and immediately focused on 

the priorities of recruitment and the establishment of 

the KPSS. With a staff of 12 international personnel, 

including several who were part of the KVM deployment, the Police Development and Education element 

of the OSCE Mission was able to commence training 

the first class of KPS officers on September 7, 1999. In 

order to achieve this, the staff needed to coordinate 

with the KFOR for security, transportation and the allocation of a site in Vushtrri11 for the school and with 

the UNPOL for KPS recruiting and initial planning 

for KPS mentoring and employment. There were no 

formal procedures governing this coordination in the 

initial stages, rather precedents and protocols were 
109

established effectively due to the unity of effort and 

cooperative nature of relationships between individuals in each organization.

The training of the KPS faced manifold problems 

at these early stages. The creation of a multiethnic, effective, democratic service was complicated by a very 

fragmented post-war society as well as by the legacy 

of Yugoslavian governance in which police were seen 

to serve the state rather than to protect the population. 

The students were also products of a Communistera education system based on rote learning, which 

also made teaching concepts difficult. As an OSCE 

Mission, the international instructors were provided 

mainly from developed Western European and North 

American nations and thus not marked by the great 

differences in the quality of personnel experienced by 

the UNPOL. Yet even among these nations, there were 

substantial differences in the approaches to and organization of policing, and the conditions under which 

it is conducted which was reflected in some inconsistencies and contradictions in the training provided. 

There were also disagreements over the appropriate 

length of training for KPS officers. These divergent 

views also existed among the U.S. agencies involved, 

with the DoS advocating for a 6-week course (to grow 

numbers quickly) and the DoJ supporting a 6-month 

program (as the ideal length of training). The compromise made was for an initial 5-week basic course, followed by 7 weeks of advanced training, which was 

incrementally delivered in rotation between the field 

and the KPSS, as well as a structured FTO Program. In 

later courses, 20 weeks became the standard.

The training of the KPS is now considered one of 

the greatest successes of the Kosovo intervention. The 

KPS was one of the first institutions to transition to 
110

HN control, is one of the most respected Kosovo institutions among the population, and has the lowest 

reported corruption levels compared with other police forces in the region. The Community Policing program was one of the legacy achievements in the training provided to the KPS. Community Police, coupled 

with competent police development, was a pioneering program and one emulated throughout the region, 

which accounts for the trust and confidence the people 

have in “their” police.

The OSCE handed over control of the school to HN 

control in 2006. It was renamed the Kosovo Center for 

Public Safety Education and Development (KCPSED) 

and also became responsible for training emergency 

services, customs and corrections personnel. The last 

U.S. personnel assigned to the KCPSED were withdrawn by 2008. 

Within the USG, the personnel and technical expertise to manage this LOO was provided by the ICITAP. 

However, the funding and policy direction for the 

ICITAP’s involvement were provided via the INL’s 

Office of Asia, Africa and Europe Programs (INL/

AAE) and allocated and managed above that level by 

the same mechanisms as for LOO 1b. However in the 

initial stages of the operation, due to the instability of 

the situation on the ground and their status as a secondment to the OSCE, the senior ICITAP manager on 

the ground had a great degree of latitude for action 

with little direct involvement by U.S.-based agencies.

Bilateral Programs. 

This line of operation refers to capacity building 

support to law enforcement and related institutions 

by USG agencies provided directly to the Kosovo 
111

Government ministries and agencies. The number of 

programs supporting this LOO has increased since 

2004, and the LOO continues to the present time. All 

capacity building support to Kosovo from the USG is 

now provided via bilateral programs.

Although USG agencies had commenced bilateral 

programs prior to 2008, in the post-independence period they have become the only mechanisms by which 

the USG provides capacity building support to Kosovo. Furthermore, the United States is recognized as not 

only the largest provider of capacity-building support 

to Kosovo, but also the only nation to have been consistently involved in these efforts (both multinational 

and bilateral) since 1999. The range of U.S. agencies 

involved in capacity building in post-independence 

Kosovo also reveals the breadth of engagement necessary for various aspects of LE to work effectively 

within a functioning RoL system. 

The DoJ has two agencies committed in Kosovo. 

The ICITAP has maintained a continuous presence in 

the country since its initial involvement in the OSCE 

Mission (see LOO 2a), but has become increasingly 

involved in bilateral programs in support of the KPS 

(later Kosovo Police [KP]) as well as support to the 

Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA) which oversees 

the KP. The ICITAP currently has five Program Activities in Kosovo: MOIA Assistance which includes 

assistance in drafting legislation and policies relevant 

to law enforcement; Border Security and Immigration Control; Trafficking in Persons; Policing Across 

Ethnic Boundaries; and Integrated Data Management. 

Previous specific achievements under ICITAP bilateral programs include the establishment and building of 

the Central Kosovo Police Forensic Laboratory. These 

reflect the current capabilities and needs for the KP in 
112

that basic policing skills are no longer a development 

priority, but the needs are now for management of the 

force, specialist policing skills and reinforcing the multiethnic nature of the service. It also reflects a greater 

focus on institution-building rather than individual 

training. To run these programs, the ICITAP has one 

direct hire USG employee and seven U.S. contractors 

in Kosovo, with all other staff being locally employed. 

The other DoJ presence is from the Office of Overseas 

Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training 

(OPDAT). Like the ICITAP, the OPDAT has been involved in Kosovo since 1999 and has maintained between one and three Resident Legal Advisors (RLAs) 

in the country.The OPDAT’s focus is on assisting with 

the development of the Kosovo criminal justice system, including legislation (criminal codes and procedural codes) and training for prosecutors and judges. 

Most of this work has been conducted on a bilateral 

basis since 1999, but coordinated with OSCE, UNMIK, 

and other multinational programs. The poor cooperation between investigators and prosecutors in Kosovo 

is an important problem; hence efforts in these areas 

have a direct effect on law enforcement. Furthermore, 

the ICITAP and OPDAT programs coordinate their efforts (including the conduct of joint training), particularly in initiatives targeting the trafficking of persons 

and narcotics. Both ICITAP and OPDAT programs are 

run in accordance with the Embassy’s Mission Strategic Plan (MSP) and the in-country representatives 

of each agency contribute to the development of that 

plan. Both agencies report back to their respective DoJ 

agencies for technical and administrative support, 

but are funded by SEED funding via the INL. Unlike 

LOO 1c, this is managed by the INL/AAE, rather than 

the INL/CIV. Since August 2009, the INL/AAE has 
113

had a representative in the Kosovo Embassy to oversee the ICITAP and OPDAT programs.

Other agencies manage capacity-building programs that, although not involved directly in law 

enforcement, contribute to the effectiveness of host 

nation law enforcement. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is not permitted to be involved in building police or criminal justice capacity, 

but runs programs in Kosovo aimed at building effectiveness of the wider RoL system. Current major programs are: the Justice Support Program which builds 

the institutional effectiveness of the court system (including administration, improving public access to 

the justice system and professionalization of judges 

and other court staff); the Lawyer Development Program with training for lawyers (not including criminal 

prosecutors) and developing the local bar association; 

and Anti-Trafficking in Persons which concentrates 

on prevention, public awareness and prosecution by 

working with at risk communities. The DoS’s Bureau 

of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) 

also maintains a presence in Kosovo as a part of its 

Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) 

program. The EXBS is specifically focused on restricting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 

and dual-use technologies. However, this is achieved 

by building host nation capacity (including the provision of specialist equipment developed in cooperation with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency) for 

border control including the KP border division and 

the Customs Service, thereby contributing directly to 

law enforcement effectiveness in border security. The 

EXBS receives its funding directly from the ISN rather 

than from SEED funding and although their represen-
114

tative consults in development of the MSP, the EXBS 

does not justify its Kosovo funding via the MSP. 

The DoD also has the ability to support training 

of host nation security forces. Under the International 

Military Education and Training (IMET) program, the 

U.S. Defense Attaché (DATT) is able to fund training 

of Kosovo personnel; this has primarily been used to 

send officers for specialist training (such as counterterrorism) at the Marshall Center. Although the Kosovo 

Security Force (KSF) is the primary recipient of Defense assistance, IMET funds can be used for training 

of personnel from any of the security forces, including 

the KP and Customs Service.

LOO 3—MILITARY (KFOR) OPERATIONS 

Although the U.S. military role was not specifically 

focused on enforcing law, experience in Kosovo (and 

other recent operations) has seen an increasing convergence of military and LE responsibilities, operations, 

and areas of interest. This has been due to both the 

applicability of specific military capabilities to support LE activity and the fact that early in the operation 

the KFOR was the only element of the operation with 

sufficient capability and capacity to maintain law and 

order across Kosovo.

Employment of Military Police in Legal Reform, 

Mentoring, and Advising. 

U.S. Army Military Police (MP) have played a 

prominent role in law enforcement (both military and 

civilian) as a part of the international commitment in 

Kosovo. Although the size, role and extent of the MP 

commitment have declined since 1999, the U.S. Army 
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has maintained an MP presence in Kosovo until the 

present time. 

The first MP presence in Kosovo was an MP Task 

Force (designated as TF 79312) which deployed as a 

part of the MNTF-E (see LOO 3b). The TF was a composite MP battalion, consisting of three MP companies (from different battalions) reinforced by military 

working dog teams and 10 Special Agents from Criminal Investigation Command (CID). 

On the initial occupation of Kosovo, TF 793 was 

tasked to support the MNTF-E in the traditional MP 

roles of battlefield circulation (i.e. military traffic control), area security and prisoner of war operations, 

but with additional specific tasks to occupy and operate the border control point from Macedonia, assist in the occupation of the two largest towns in the 

MNTF-E sector (Ferizaj and Gjilan) and to occupy the 

police stations. The role for the MPs quickly evolved 

into four main functions: deterring looting and other 

crime; running detention facilities; running the police 

stations; and facilitating the return of refugees (who 

started to cross back into Kosovo within a month of 

the KFOR’s arrival). Although the requirement for a 

border security task was identified prior to deployment, the complexity of dealing with the role (including checkpoint control, immigration, and customs) 

which fell to the MPs was not adequately accounted 

for in pre-deployment planning. Border security and 

battlefield circulation issues were exacerbated by the 

lack of a UN plan to deal with refugees, who returned 

to Kosovo earlier and in greater numbers than expected. The MPs maintained substantial responsibility for 

law and order within the MNTF-E sector during the 

first years of the KFOR commitment. Predeployment 
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planning had assumed that this would be required 

until the arrival of sufficient international civilian 

personnel, but the UNPOL did not take over executive authority in the sector until early 2000. The MPs, 

by virtue of their domestic garrison law enforcement 

role, did have some experience in these duties, but 

were a small force which limited their capacity to deal 

with crime in the community. The size and limited 

authority of the CID element imposed further restrictions. Furthermore, effective Executive Authority also 

relied on an RoL system that was under-developed, 

meaning that MP commanders had to deal with issues 

related to the applicability of various versions of the 

local criminal code. The military detention system was 

primarily trained for prisoner of war handling, and although able to detain persons of security concern this 

was a short-term expedient that had to suffice until 

the civilian criminal justice system was rehabilitated. 

Handling civil disturbances was another important role for the MPs before the establishment of effective UNPOL capability in the U.S. sector. Although 

riot control is a core MP competency, the scale and 

intensity of disturbances in early 2000 had not been 

anticipated. Even after the UNPOL assumption of executive authority, the MPs continued to be involved 

in this role as they offered a more robust riot control 

capability than the UNPOL in the sector. 

The MPs needed to work closely with the UNPOL 

even after the latter established presence at stations in 

the sector. However, the process for coordination between the civilian and military police had not been articulated in advance, so these systems were developed 

on the basis of local initiative and hence the extent and 

quality of cooperation varied. The closest working 

relationships were developed with UNPOL officers 

and leadership from the U.S. and other nations, such 
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as Germany and the U.K., that have similar policing 

approaches and standards. During the early period 

of the KFOR commitment (at least until late 2001), in 

some areas the MPs would man stations jointly with 

UNPOL and KPS officers, with MPs providing security for the station, ability to reinforce UNPOL/KPS, 

and a liaison conduit to the KFOR. The MPs had no 

formal role in training KPS personnel, but did on occasion provide assistance to collocated UNPOL personnel in their advisory role, as well as providing ad hoc 

mentoring to collocated KP personnel.

Since 2002, the scope of MP responsibilities and 

the size of the commitment have been drawn down. In 

line with the rest of U.S. KFOR, the MP contingent has 

been largely staffed by National Guard personnel. The 

current U.S. MP commitment to the MNTF-E consists 

of the Provost Marshal Office (PMO) which has LE 

and security responsibilities for Camp Bondsteel and 

MNTF-E personnel. The MNTF-E also has a Joint Law 

Enforcement Liaison Team (JLELT) which conducts 

liaison with the KP in their sector, and one CID agent. 

Throughout the period of U.S. commitment, the 

MP contingent has remained under the direct command of the U.S.-led component of the KFOR (MNTFE). However, they do also have reporting responsibilities to the KFOR Provost Marshal.

Employment of General Purpose Forces. 

This line of operation describes the use of non-MP 

U.S. military forces in roles that supported the establishment and maintenance of law and order in Kosovo. This commenced in 1999 with the initial KFOR deployment and continues to the present time. The peak 

strength of U.S. military forces in the KFOR was 7,000 

and is currently approximately 1,400.
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The U.S. military has remained a major contributor to the KFOR since the mission’s inception and has 

retained leadership of one of the five subordinate formations (MNTF-E) within the KFOR for that entire period. Task Force Falcon (as the U.S. contingent within 

MNTF-E was initially called) was a brigade sized 

force consisting of three maneuver battalions and an 

MP battalion. MNTF-E Headquarters also had command over a Polish/Ukrainian battalion and a Greek 

battalion and tactical control over a Russian airborne 

brigade and an attack helicopter unit from the United 

Arab Emirates (UAE). 

MNTF-E entered Kosovo on June 12, 1999, and 

among its tasks was “ensuring public safety and order until the international civilian presence can take 

responsibility for this task.”13 As discussed in LOOs 

1b and 3a, the UNPOL was not in a position to accept 

this responsibility in this sector until early 2000, effectively leaving the KFOR with Executive Authority for 

this period. Although the MP battalion had primary 

responsibility for explicit law and order tasks, due to 

their presence patrolling across the sector, the nonMP components of MNTF-E work involved, in part, 

responding to security and crime concerns of the population. Even when the UNPOL had a more effective 

presence, the MNTF-E continued to run presence operations and to detain criminals, often without coordination with the UNPOL. When liaison did occur, it 

was the result of the strength of working relationships 

between proactive officers. Following the reduction of 

the strength of the KFOR after 2002, U.S. KFOR personnel have played a less direct, active role in population security. Presence patrols are much less frequent 

and U.S. forces will only intervene in extremis.
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Due to the security mandate of the KFOR, U.S. 

forces in Kosovo have had responsibilities as a part of 

the response to civil disturbances. Prior to the arrival 

of the UNPOL and the establishment of the KPS, the 

KFOR was the only agency able to respond to riots. 

Even though the main element within the MNTF-E 

for conducting this role was the MP Task Force (LOO 

3a), the general purpose elements contributed to these 

operations by controlling approaches to the scene of 

unrest, command and control, assistance in removing 

obstacles, and providing a final line of security in case 

the MPs became hard-pressed. At the theater-level, 

the KFOR also had the MSU (a unit consisting of personnel from European gendarmerie forces) specifically 

to deal with these types of incidents. However, the 

MSU elements were usually deployed in higher threat 

sectors of Kosovo, such as Pristina and in the north. 

When they did operate together, U.S. forces generally 

had good working relationships with and respect for 

the MSUs, but difficulties identified were a lack of 

understanding of the MSU capability by some subordinate commanders, different rules of engagement 

(RoE), and language differences.14 The international 

response to a series of riots in 2004 was marked by 

confusion about the respective roles of and coordination between KFOR elements, the MSU, UNPOL’s 

SPUs, and the KPS. Since that time, protocols have established a three-tiered response to a major security 

event with the KP as the first responders, the UNPOL 

(later EULEX) to provide first level of back-up, and 

the KFOR to intervene only if the police response is 

likely to be overwhelmed. A formal request needs to 

be made between the top leadership of each agency 

before the next tier of support can be provided. However, KFOR elements can pre-position in anticipation 
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of the possible need for such support and can provide 

outer cordon security (in cooperation with the police) 

prior to any formal request.

Border security, combating organized crime and 

explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) are other areas in 

which U.S. KFOR elements and law enforcement agencies share interests. The conduct of “border monitoring duties” was a specific responsibility of the KFOR 

at the commencement of the operation.15 The security 

and operation of border checkpoints is no longer managed by the KFOR, but the patrolling of the international borders remains a KFOR task until 2011 when 

the KP will assume this responsibility (except for the 

Administrative Boundary Line between Serbia and 

Kosovo, which will remain a KFOR task). The KFOR 

is currently mentoring KP border police during the 

conduct of joint border patrol operations. In the conduct of their “safe and secure environment” mission, 

the KFOR was specifically interested in preventing the 

flow of weapons into Kosovo and also the potential 

for weapons being smuggled out into neighboring 

Macedonia. This concerned border security as well as 

driving the KFOR’s interest in eradicating organized 

crime. The U.S. military had substantial intelligence 

assets that could contribute to the counter organized 

crime task, but issues with sharing classified material 

prevented full participation in the UNPOL’s organized crime task force. Finally, despite the KP having 

EOD units, as late as 2009 the KP have no element 

stationed in the MNTF-E sector, hence the U.S. Army 

EOD capability has the task as primary responder to 

all EOD incidents there.

The MNTF-E is under the command of Headquarters KFOR, which is a multinational headquarters 

staffed by NATO nations. Command of the KFOR has 
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not been held by a U.S. officer; however the U.S. Army 

has provided officers to fill senior staff appointments 

(such as Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence) among the rotation of U.S. personnel since 

1999. The KFOR is a NATO operation and comes under 

command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 

via the subordinate command of Allied Joint Force 

Command Naples. The United States has a DATT in 

the Embassy at Pristina, however this officer has reporting channels to the U.S. European Command and 

to the Ambassador and has no command relationship 

with the KFOR or with the U.S. elements of the KFOR.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

The observations from the research and workshop 

on Kosovo were grouped into six main thematic areas: 

(1) Control and Coordination, (2) Executive Authority, 

(3) Use of Contractors, (4) Military Role, (5) Organized 

Crime, and (6) Border Security. In this section, a series 

of recommendations follows each observation.

1. Control and Coordination.

Numerous USG agencies were involved in interdependent parts of the mission, with disparate funding lines and 

strategic oversight. In-country coordination and planning 

between the USG and international partners often relied 

on informal and ad-hoc personal relationships and mutual 

willingness to cooperate.

Most of the USG funding for the Kosovo mission 

was channeled through the DoD and DoS (particularly SEED funding via EUR/ACE). The UN and OSCE 

also provided funding and resources for the missions. 

These varied organizational structures with separate 
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funding sources created a diverse set of views and different prioritizations of missions. These entities also 

had a varied set of expectations regarding possible 

mission outcomes in Kosovo. 

At the outset, the international community developed four pillars or sets of priorities that were divided between the participating entities. Essentially, 

this meant that the the UN’s direct responsibilities (in 

addition to coordination of all the pillars) included 

administering the region, preparing it for self-government, and providing interim law enforcement. The 

OSCE took on institution building and democratization, which included developing the KPS, and the EU 

was allocated economic development. Meanwhile, 

this entire structure was parallel to the KFOR, which 

was in charge of providing security in close coordination with the UNMIK. This complex set of tasks called 

for close cooperation and coordination, but this often 

fell short due to the structural differences and the lack 

of consensus on uniform coordination mechanisms 

between the entities. 

The UNMIK’s mandate added to the overall complexity. While the mandate for the international mission in Kosovo provided the foundation for a strategic 

plan that was broadly agreed on by the participating 

countries/organizations, as events unfolded the structure revealed some weaknesses. This was particularly 

clear in relation to the violence that occurred in 2004 

between the Albanian and Serb populations in Kosovo. The lack of an adequate response to this crisis revealed gaps in command structures, the weakness of 

the multilayered organizational structures between 

and within the entities providing security to the region (KFOR and UNMIK). The chaos and inadequate 

response to the violence on the part of the KFOR and 

the UNMIK also revealed a lack of agreement about 
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uniform crisis response, which should have been part 

of the overall international strategy. Until a protocol 

had been determined by the KFOR, UNPOL, and 

KPS—as late as 2006 through a process of trial and 

error—whenever these challenges were overcome, it 

was often due to personal relationships between individuals working within the different entities. 

The KFOR and UNMIK were additionally hampered by having to set up local operating structures 

from scratch since very little (including databases 

and institutional structures) remained intact from the 

Yugoslavian regime. In addition, there was confusion over which legal system could be used to deal 

with warlords and criminal elements. Even when the 

UNMIK and KFOR chose to use a system to deal with 

these issues, the local political establishment (due to 

the complicity of some members of the local elite with 

some of the targeted elements) was reticent and required substantial international persuasion to accept 

it. 

Despite many challenges, KFOR and UNMIK efforts (usually on local or personal initiative) to set up 

viable structures to assist and collaborate on operational coordination were reasonably successful. These 

included communication between the civilian administrators and regional police commissioners on how to 

deal with the transition process, and regular meetings 

between the UNMIK’s Deputy Police Commissioner, 

the Deputy Country Representative (DCR) for MSU, 

and the UNMIK’s Strategic Military Planner. The individuals involved in these attempts at communication 

dealt mostly with responses to lingering violence in 

the region. In these and other instances, personal relationships between individuals in the various agencies/entities helped overcome structural issues, bu-
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reaucratic obstacles, and the complex array of control 

and coordination mechanisms used by each country 

involved in the mission. 

From the beginning it was apparent that the international community working in Kosovo required a 

structure that would support unity of effort. Without 

that, key actors relied on a set of ad hoc measures and 

personal relationships that had uneven results. A similar situation prevailed within the USG interagency 

as well. In this instance, the agencies created ad hoc 

structures. The U.S. Country Team held regular meetings on justice sector assistance. These meetings were 

discontinued but were restarted when it became apparent that they were necessary to deal with reviving 

the justice sector. Oversight of justice sector programs 

have since been handed to the Kosovo MOIA. 

Each country involved in the mission set up structures according to its own assessment of needs rather 

than making an effort to coordinate with other countries. Intelligence gathering operations were mostly 

done in this manner with an uneven regimen for information sharing between countries. This situation 

began to change as protocols were developed with the 

KP to enable regular information sharing with the international police, although sharing of sensitive intelligence material is still problematic (both with the KP 

and with partner nations). 

Having a diverse array of countries participating 

in the mission presents challenges even now. Of fundamental importance is the “status neutral” positions 

that NATO, the OSCE, the EU, and the UN (all of which 

continue to provide assistance to Kosovo) maintain on 

the issue of Kosovo’s independence. This complicates 

the working relationships, not only between the Kosovo government and these entities (which technically 

still see Kosovo as a province of Serbia), but also in the 
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development of a coherent approach to capacity building between the multinational missions and the major 

donors, most of which (including the U.S., Germany 

and the UK) have recognized Kosovo’s independence.

Recommendations

1.1. Ensure the USG has specific leadership positions within the mission, which can enable and ensure 

overall operational integration efforts. 

1.2. Enforce unity of effort in policy and doctrine 

both within and between organizations with a special 

focus on USG efforts. At the baseline, USG agencies 

should set up tasks based on common policy and doctrine. 

1.3. Ensure that deployed USG personnel are given 

a comprehensive understanding of the organizations 

and structures they have to interact and collaborate 

with prior to deployment. 

1.4. Understand the overlap and/or conflict between pursuing USG goals and international goals. 

Include relevant participation from among local leaders to ensure “buy-in,” and ensure that U.S. officials 

while in leadership positions do not impose U.S. policies and pursue U.S. interests to the exclusion of wider 

considerations and goals. 

1.5. Develop a single, accepted system to facilitate 

intelligence cooperation and responses to criminal 

networks.

2. Executive Authority. 

The UNMIK’s mandate to operate under Executive 

Authority exposed some of the problems of working in a 

multinational environment. These included delays in and 

divergent approaches to: achieving the build-up of a mature 
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UNPOL contingent; development of a unified set of applicable laws and procedures; and priorities for building Host 

Nation institutions and capability. 

The mandate of Executive Authority (and thus the 

breadth of responsibilities of the multinational commitment) meant that the countries involved in providing personnel and implementing the U.N. mandate 

had to find acceptable, unanimous solutions to a host 

of issues. By its very nature, the multinational environment with its diverse regulations, organizations, 

structures and personnel, made this task difficult. 

This challenge was reflected across several issues. 

The UN plan was that interim law enforcement operations would be fulfilled by the UNPOL within 3 

months of the KFOR intervention. In practice, this did 

not occur smoothly. The delays in deploying adequate 

numbers of UNPOL personnel created a situation in 

which the KFOR, including U.S. military and other 

contingents, had to assume responsibility for law and 

order. 

The debate about which legal system to use in the 

region—the extant Serb system or the Kosovo legal 

code from the period of autonomy—became a significant issue of contention. (This was resolved in the interim by the UN’s adoption of the Serb system, but this 

raised historic ethnic issues in a way that undermined 

Kosovarian belief that justice would be administered 

in an equitable manner). An unresolved question remains about whether the United States and the rest of 

the international community should consider setting 

up and using an interim system of laws in such crisis 

situations when local laws are nonexistent, subject to 

manipulation, ineffective, or too controversial in the 

local environment. 
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The RoL system also led to many questions about 

the efficacy of processes and procedures. At the 

ground level, KFOR troops lacked uniform procedures to maintain and enforce order. These military 

personnel used available authorities to detain individuals who posed a threat to a safe and secure environment, but often had to release these detainees after 

a short duration (usually less than 72 hours) since the 

military was not given a clear role in the justice and 

corrections process. This led to a “revolving door” 

situation, where criminals were detained and released 

on a regular basis with the KFOR unable to effect an 

enduring solution to the problem.

An effective response to political violence and how 

to deal with “spoilers” was another key issue that was 

not adequately addressed in the Executive Authority, 

leaving the various national contingents to come up 

with their own responses. Other issues of significance 

that demanded enduring responses included questions about the most effective way to transition from 

military operations to international civilian-led and finally local multi-ethnic civilian-led operations. These 

concerns were closely tied to the conduct of operations that simultaneously exert Executive Authority 

and build local capacities to take over from the international community. 

Recommendations: 

2.1. Define a comprehensive RoL system at the outset of an operation, to include a process for transitions 

across all phases (from military-led to international 

civilian-led and finally to domestic civilian-led transition).

2.1.(a). An existing system could be used in the interim to respond to immediate challenges and also be 
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retained as transitions from military to international 

civilian-led operations take place. 

2.1.(b). Consider development of an international 

model code to deal with major and violent crimes 

while the domestic system is built up to take over 

from the international community. 

2.2. Establish clear standards for recruiting local 

police, taking into account the complex multiethnic 

context. 

2.3. Conduct a comprehensive local security sector assessment and threat assessment prior to deployment of military personnel, and have these assessments drive force organization/training changes as 

necessary and relevant. 

2.4. Develop a combined USG interagency response 

to assess LE requirements and develop plans to deal 

with interim requirements as local capacity is revived.

2.5. Deploy a full-spectrum of capabilities in relation to LE requirements, regardless of what USG entities are deployed. 

2.5.(a). Ensure the military is prepared to conduct 

some law enforcement tasks and that deployed international civilian police personnel are prepared for the 

risks in setting up robust policing. 

2.6. Develop a transition plan that includes a longterm component for developing local capabilities and 

ensure that the HN population understands and supports any system that is implemented. 

2.7. Define clear roles for the USG military and civilian entities as part of Executive Authority mandate.

3. Use of Contractors. 

The USG provided a sufficient number of qualified contracted law enforcement professionals to the mission. Over-
129

all they performed their tasks well, but there were challenges 

in recruiting, securing specific expertise, and management 

overhead.

While using contracted LE professionals has had 

both benefits and challenges, currently a contractordependent system is the only means by which the 

USG deploys large numbers of police to international 

operations. Existing legislation (particularly under the 

Tenth Amendment to the Constitution) limits USG 

ability to deputize state or local employees to federal 

roles; so these individuals can only work as advisors, 

contractors, or be added to the permanent federal 

work force. In addition, while the DoS can develop 

relationships with local/state LE to recruit LE personnel for overseas deployment, often local/state police 

stations cannot easily release their personnel and will 

not agree to do so absent some form of legal mandate 

(e.g., for National Guard and Reserve military forces). 

Finally, some relevant skills required in overseas contingencies are not commonly available in state and local LE forces. 

For the DoS, one of the primary benefits of maintaining a contracting system means that it does not 

have to permanently employ more people. Contracting allows the DoS to avoid permanently hiring personnel who may only be required for a few years and 

also reduces the management overhead to vendors 

who oversee payroll, benefits, and other issues. The 

DoS is limited to ensuring the contracts are legal and 

current and to providing some oversight to the overall 

operation. 

While not a prevalent problem, one of the related 

challenges of using contractors includes discipline 

and accountability. In some cases, companies providing contractors are reluctant to take disciplinary action 

against their contractors even in the face of clear vio-
130

lations because they want to maintain the mandated 

number of personnel in country. Contracts often do 

not specify the steps to be taken in such cases, making it difficult to take adequate disciplinary measures 

against offenders. This can foster a dangerous kind of 

impunity under which no system exists to deal with 

actions that are illegal or are contrary to USG strategic 

priorities and guidelines.

Recommendations:

3.1. The USG should continue to investigate all options for deploying civilian LE personnel, while continuing to field contractors in the interim. This may 

include utilizing new structures (including the Active 

Response Corps) to deploy personnel as necessary. 

3.2. Whatever option is adopted for deploying civilian LE personnel, it will need to include a mechanism for coordinated planning between the LE contingent and the military to integrate efforts and priorities. 

Consider embedding some law enforcement personnel with the military Joint Staff and Combatant Commands to ensure effective transition from military to 

civilian LE operations. 

3.3. Set up and standardize procedures for reconciling military rules of engagement with LE requirements, especially in relation to the use of force, appropriate use of contractors in complex operational 

settings, and authorities.

3.4. Establish standard structures that deploy federal employees alongside contractors and ensure that 

the contracts support USG strategic objectives. 
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4. Military Role. 

U.S. military forces were required to fulfill substantial 

law and order functions, particularly in the period before 

the arrival of sufficient UN Police, and continued to share 

responsibilities since then. Although effective, lack of a consistent shared approach to law enforcement and detention, 

informal liaison protocols, and the slow and uneven UNPOL build-up created difficulties for the establishment of 

law and order.

The initial U.S. military response was focused on 

combat operations rather than on LE responsibilities, 

but this changed as the military focused on stabilization. Even after the arrival of the UNMIK civilian LE 

personnel and the establishment of the KPS, the military had to continue to share responsibilities and coordinate with these two entities at the operational level 

due to inadequate UN and local capacities. 

These responses, which included measures to accommodate international military and police working 

together in areas of responsibility, had to be built up 

over time, despite expectations that there would be 

adequate UN civilian LE capabilities to take over the 

mission from the military. In addition, the lack of a 

robust civilian system and capacity, especially in relation to adequate detention facilities, forced the military to take on additional LE roles in relation to investigations, arrest and detention. In several cases, after 

detaining high value targets (HVTs) the military had 

to release them because the prisons and courts were 

unable to deal with prosecutions.

The lack of any doctrine on collaboration between 

the MSUs and SPUs added to the complications in coordination between LE and the military. There was no 

joint training or exercises to set up and reinforce coor-
132

dination. Operational decisions were often driven by 

national agendas rather than a uniform international 

agenda. Different countries managed different sectors 

within the region and took different approaches to 

law enforcement. These differences became especially 

apparent in relation to military coordination since all 

operations involving more than one national contingent had to be conducted with consideration of various restrictive national caveats and involved a lengthy 

process of consultation and agreement on individual 

measures, which undermined the ability to respond 

quickly to crises.

However, the U.S. military was able to assist the 

UNMIK and local police. Though not governed by 

clear procedures, such support was important for 

boosting law enforcement capabilities at the local level, including through the conduct of joint patrols and 

other operational support. This cooperation differed 

by sector, depending on which country was in charge 

of the specific KFOR sector. 

Recommendations:

4.1. Establish protocols for utilizing capabilities 

within the DoD with respect to maintenance of law 

and order during the transition from military to civilian authority to fill any gap prior to the arrival of international police forces. 

4.2. Consider the development of an exportable 

stopgap RoL system. This would be an internationally accepted set of capabilities that could take into 

account the specific mandate and situation and allow 

military forces to deal with major acts of violence and 

serious crime in conflict contexts. 

4.2.(a). The USG response to the RoL needs to include a system (which could potentially be a deploy-
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able capability with a “fly away” prison and court 

system) that could be located either within the DoS, 

DoJ, or DoD, and provide one of these agencies with 

the ability to address crime and related issues that are 

often present in transition settings. 

4.2(b). An exportable/“fly away” RoL system 

needs to include clear communication with the local 

population to ensure that they understand that the 

system is not a military court, but an interim measure 

that will be discontinued once the local RoL system is 

able to deal with cases. 

4.2.(c). These courts must be structured to deal 

mainly with serious crime and not all manner of petty 

crime. This would involve an expansion of the military’s current ability to detain (but not arrest) people. 

In conceiving and implementing this system, it is important to ensure that the local RoL system is able to 

take charge of detainees and prosecute them as relevant. 

5. Organized Crime. 

Organized crime continues to be a potentially destabilizing element and has added to the complexity of the environment. It also exacerbates complications in coordination 

between international, multinational, and domestic groups. 

Organized crime is a growing concern for the region and continues to impact Kosovo and other neighboring countries in diverse ways. The nexus between 

organized crime and politics is also of concern to the 

international community. Due to the impact organized crime has in the wider region and into western 

Europe, some countries are more concerned with tackling organized crime rapidly while other members of 

the international community take a longer view. Italy, 
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for example, is concerned with the vast amount of 

contraband that enters its territory through organized 

criminal gangs, including from Kosovo and other 

countries in the region. 

For the international community this involves a series of choices about whether and what action should 

be taken to deal with crime and the complexity of 

the region. For example, there is little agreement on 

whether the bulk of the efforts should be focused on 

serious crime rather than petty crime, which is also 

prolific, and impacts the everyday lives of Kosovars 

and their confidence in their government. These needs 

have also to be balanced against local concerns about 

the imposition of foreign value systems on the domestic system. 

Recommendations: 

5.1. Set up a system to analyze and address the 

relationship between organized crime and political 

power, which may have an impact on national stability or have the potential to create/drive conflict.

5.2. Increase HN law enforcement organizations’ ability to deal with organized crime, including 

through the creation of domestic crime task forces and 

related measures. 

5.3. Develop clear programs and resources to help 

local police deal with petty crimes to prevent the perception of impunity.

5.4. Enable HN capability to address organized 

crime independently, but with ongoing support from 

the international community. 
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 6. Border Security. 

The complexity and importance of border security demanded comprehensive multiple responses across a series 

of agencies. This was not adequately recognized in predeployment military planning and insufficient control over 

elements of the border continues to create problems for the 

Kosovo Government.

The Kosovo government continues to face shortcomings in facilities and adequate infrastructure to 

deal with border controls and security. This gap in the 

government’s ability to monitor and control its borders is further complicated by the fact that Kosovo is 

landlocked and shares international boundaries with 

four countries.16 The lack of effective border controls 

aids the growth and impunity of organized criminals 

who use these borders to traffic in contraband and 

people. In addition, the movement and return of displaced people creates a host of issues relating to border recognition and citizenship; all of this undermines 

effective governance. The UNMIK and the rest of the 

international community involved in the Kosovo Mission have responded to the issue and succeeded in 

building some capacity among Kosovo government 

entities. 

The issue of border controls and security extends 

as far back as 2001 when NATO attempted to seal the 

border with Macedonia, which showed signs of sliding into violence, but the international military personnel involved in the effort quickly realized there 

was not enough manpower to respond to this demand 

effectively. While direct border controls remain insufficient in Kosovo, sections of the border where controls have improved with international help have led 

to other problems, including criminals using other 
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means (including traditional transportation methods) 

to transport contraband through unofficial crossings 

and forcing their way through checkpoints using the 

threat of force. These challenges have required the 

international military to support and often manage 

checkpoints and provide additional surveillance and 

controls. In addition, the existing border checkpoints 

remain under capacity and unable to check vehicles 

and passengers adequately due to shortages in technology and trained customs inspection personnel. 

Despite the many challenges, coordination is 

working well between USG agencies involved in providing assistance, training or capacity building to the 

HN personnel. However, more improvements are 

required including the sequencing of training so that 

capacities are built to serve the border requirements 

in the long term while also ensuring that the required 

agencies and expert personnel are brought in as part 

of a long-term solution.

Recommendations:

6.1. Deal with the issue of border security and controls in terms of long-term efficacy while considering 

its impact on internal stability. This includes setting 

up applicable laws, customs and tariff measures (to 

increase revenue collection), counter-trafficking, and 

systems to deal with displaced persons crossing borders. 

6.2. Ensure that applicable laws associated with 

border security (e.g., taxes/tariffs on petroleum or 

cigarettes, immigration procedures, and organic laws 

for border security forces) are considered and addressed comprehensively. 

6.3. Consider using U.S. Customs and Border Patrol expertise to assist border management forces. 
137

This includes building in and providing the relevant 

skill sets, capacities, and technology, and introducing 

relevant international expertise. 

6.4. Leverage available technology (sensors, scanners and unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs]), and especially affordable and sustainable technology that can 

be left behind and supported once the international 

community leaves. 

6.4.(a). Deploy new technologies in a deliberate 

manner. This should be sequenced so that HN personnel will have the capability and willingness to use and 

maintain them. 

6.5. Develop a framework for transition of borderrelated tasks to HN agencies. The framework should 

be based on a consensus within the UN and the nations involved in supporting border operations.

6.6. Use the military to secure border crossing 

points only as an interim and when no other alternatives are available. The military, however, has advantages in deploying cross-country, maritime/riverine, 

and aerial mobility and technical surveillance platforms which are of invaluable assistance to border patrolling and thus can continue to support and provide 

operational assistance to international and/or HN civilian LE agencies working on border security. 

6.7. Develop regional funding mechanisms to support both sides of a given border. This can help ensure that border security is a shared responsibility and 

valuable to populations on both sides.

6.8. Use border security and management as an intelligence gathering opportunity. This includes placing international experts with HN personnel to ensure 

accurate and effective information, data gathering and 

sharing.
138

CONCLUSION 

Despite LE issues not being a major reason for the 

USG’s involvement in Kosovo, LE and related aspects 

of the operation have together been an important part 

of the U.S. commitment and will continue to be. It is 

also a reflection of the prominence that the three interrelated strands seen here (interim international 

enforcement of law, host nation LE capacity building, 

and support to law enforcement by military forces) 

are likely to have in other post-conflict intervention 

missions. The protracted length, the magnitude, and 

the various levels of complexity of the U.S. law enforcement commitment to Kosovo are worth noting.

The USG has maintained a substantial and unbroken commitment in Kosovo for more than 10 years. Although the size of the overall commitment has drawn 

down over the course of that time, the United States 

still remains the largest single contributor, and there 

are few indications of when all elements of the commitment will be withdrawn completely. This length of 

commitment is significant given that the United States 

has had two changes of administration and has seen a 

dramatic change in its global security circumstances 

and priorities in the intervening period. Internationally, the period has also seen fluctuations in the levels of 

support to and interest in Kosovo by the main partner 

nations involved, and the decline of UN and OSCE 

involvement there has changed the nature of the mission markedly. Despite these factors, the United States 

has kept a consistent policy line toward support for 

Kosovo.

The magnitude of the operation in Kosovo is reflected in all three aspects of the LE commitment 

there. The commitment of a reinforced brigade (most 
139

of which remained in Kosovo as of 2009) as a component of a NATO force consisting of a further four 

brigades (numbering 50,000 at its peak) was, by the 

standards of the late 1990s, a large military commitment (of course, it has been dwarfed by the size of the 

U.S. military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan) 

and the remaining force is still large, considering that 

Kosovo is a nation of less than two million inhabitants. 

The establishment of the KP and the rehabilitation/

establishment of the necessary bureaucracy and rule 

of law infrastructure was a substantial undertaking 

in its own right and occurred while simultaneously 

maintaining security with the international military 

and police presence.

The complexity of the involvement in Kosovo occurred on several levels and created technical, coordination, and diplomatic demands for the USG agencies involved. Beyond the complexity of the tasks 

undertaken within Kosovo, the range of USG agencies 

involved, including bureaus and agencies related to 

three major government departments, required the 

establishment of temporary working groups among 

these agencies to coordinate the necessary cooperation, liaison, and funding mechanisms in order to 

ensure the appropriate breadth of expertise and capabilities could be provided. Given the high profile of 

the Kosovo operation at its inception and the recent 

experiences in cooperating on Haiti and similar operations, this was relatively successful at the highest level. 

However, the detailed military and civilian planning 

were conducted by different channels. Internationally, 

even though the United States was a major contributor to operations in Kosovo and was prominent in the 

diplomacy that led up to the intervention, the USG 

was willing to work through multinational organi-
140

zations (NATO, UN, OSCE, and EU) for most of its 

involvement and worked under foreign leadership in 

each of the missions. This meant that on the ground 

in Kosovo, the development of formal arrangements 

for cooperation between the various LOOs was left in 

the control of the multinational missions. In practice, 

the coordination and cooperation necessary to deal 

with this complexity occurred due to local arrangements and relationships. Although solutions were 

found, this creates the potential for inconsistencies 

in approach across the theater and leaves cooperation at the mercy of personal relationships. Working 

with international partners also required dealing with 

different long-term objectives (the issue of Kosovo’s 

independence is the most marked example), and the 

effect of national caveats on the conduct of operations, 

as well as problems with the sharing of intelligence 

material and developing an HN capability assisted by 

partner nations with different approaches to and procedures for the conduct of LE. These are all issues that 

will need to be addressed in any future multinational 

mission.

Kosovo is an interesting case study of USG involvement in LE as a component of a wider international commitment. The USG may not again face the 

same specific set of circumstances involved in Kosovo 

on future operations. However, the range of observations that can be drawn from a commitment that was 

so comprehensive in what it sought to achieve and 

involved such a number of interagency and international actors should be useful in decisionmaking and 

planning for other theaters and for capability development.

See Table 4-2 for summary of Kosovo observations 

and recommendations.
141

Observations Recommendations

1) Control and Coordination Numerous USG agencies were 

involved in interdependent parts of 

the mission, with disparate funding 

lines and strategic oversight. Incountry coordination and planning 

between the USG and international 

partners often relied on informal 

and ad-hoc personal relationships and mutual willingness to 

cooperate.

1.1 Ensure the USG has specific leadership positions within the 

mission, which can enable and ensure overall operational integration efforts. 

1.2 Enforce unity of effort in policy and doctrine both within and 

between organizations with a special focus on USG efforts. At the 

baseline, USG agencies should set up tasks based on common 

policy and doctrine.

1.3 Ensure that deployed USG personnel are given a comprehensive understanding of the organizations and structures they have to 

interact and collaborate with prior to deployment.

1.4 Understand the overlap and / or conflict between pursuing 

USG goals and international goals. Include relevant participation 

from among local leaders to ensure “buy-in,” and ensure that U.S. 

officials, while in leadership positions, do not impose U.S. policies 

and pursue U.S. interests to the exclusion of wider considerations 

and goals.

1.5 Develop a single, accepted system to facilitate intelligence 

cooperation and responses to criminal networks.

2) Executive Authority The UNMIK’s mandate to operate 

under Executive Authority exposed 

some of the problems of working in 

a multinational environment. These 

included delays in and divergent 

approaches to: achieving the buildup of a mature UNPOL contingent; 

development of a unified set of applicable laws and procedures; and 

priorities for building HN institutions 

and capability. 

2.1 Define a comprehensive RoL system at the outset of an 

operation, to include a process for transitions across all phases 

(from military-led to international civilian-led and finally to domestic 

civilian-led transition).

2.1(a) An existing system could be used in the interim to respond 

to immediate challenges and also be retained as transitions from 

military to international civilian-led operations take place.

2.1(b) Consider development of an international model code to deal 

with major and violent crimes while the domestic system is built up 

to take over from the international community.

2.2 Establish clear standards for recruiting local police, taking into 

account the complex multi-ethnic context.

2.3 Conduct a comprehensive local security sector assessment 

and threat assessment prior to deployment of military personnel, 

and have these assessments drive force organization / training 

changes as necessary and relevant.

2.4 Develop combined USG interagency response to assess law 

enforcement requirements and develop plans to deal with interim 

requirements as local capacity is revived.

2.5 Deploy a full-spectrum of capabilities in relation to law enforcement requirements, regardless of what USG entities are deployed.

2.5(a) Ensure the military is prepared to conduct some law enforcement tasks and that deployed international civilian police personnel 

are prepared for the risks in setting up robust policing.

2.6 Develop a transition plan that includes a long-term component 

for developing local capabilities and ensure that the HN population 

understands and supports any system that is implemented.

2.7 Define clear roles for the USG military and civilian entities as 

part of the Executive Authority mandate.

Table 4-2. Summary of Observations and 

Recommendations from Kosovo.
142

3) Use of Contractors The USG provided a sufficient 

number of qualified contracted law 

enforcement professionals to the 

mission. Overall they performed 

their tasks well, but there were 

challenges in recruiting, securing 

specific expertise, and management 

overhead. 

3.1 The USG should continue to investigate all options for deploying civilian law enforcement personnel while continuing to field 

contractors in the interim. This may include utilizing new structures 

(including the Active Response Corps) to deploy personnel as 

necessary.

3.2 Whatever option is adopted for deploying civilian law enforcement personnel, it will need to include a mechanism for coordinated 

planning between the law enforcement contingent and the military 

to integrate efforts and priorities. Consider embedding some law 

enforcement personnel with the military Joint Staff and Combatant 

Commands to ensure effective transition from military to civilian law 

enforcement operations.

3.3 Set up and standardize procedures for reconciling military rules 

of engagement with law enforcement requirements, especially 

in relation to the use of force, appropriate use of contractors in 

complex operational settings, and authorities.

3.4 Establish standard structures (such as the model used by 

ICITAP) that deploy federal employees to manage contractors and 

ensure that the contracts support USG strategic objectives.

4) Military Role US military forces were required 

to fulfill substantial law and order 

functions, particularly in the period 

before the arrival of sufficient UN 

Police, but continued to share 

responsibilities since then. Although 

effective, lack of a consistent, 

shared approach to law enforcement and detention, informal liaison 

protocols, and the slow and uneven 

UNPOL build-up created difficulties 

for the establishment of RoL.

4.1 Establish protocols for utilizing capabilities within the DoD 

with respect to maintenance of law and order during the transition 

from military to civilian authority to fill any gap prior to the arrival of 

international police forces.

4.2 Consider the development of an exportable stopgap RoL system. This would be an internationally accepted set of capabilities 

that could take into account the specific mandate and situation and 

allow military forces to deal with major acts of violence and serious 

crime in conflict contexts.

4.2(a) The USG response to the RoL needs to include a system, 

that could potentially be a deployable capability with a “fly away” 

prison and court system that could be located either within the 

DoS, DoJ, or DoD and provide one of these agencies with the 

ability to address crime and related issues that are often present in 

transition settings.

4.2(b) An exportable/fly away RoL system needs to include clear 

communication with the local population to ensure that they 

understand that the system it is not a military court, but an interim 

measure that will be discontinued once the local RoL system is 

able to deal with cases.

4.2(c) These courts must be structured to deal mainly with serious 

crime and not all manner of petty crime. This would involve an 

expansion of the military’s current ability to detain (but not arrest) 

people. In conceiving and implementing this system, it is important 

to ensure that the local RoL system is able to take charge of 

detainees and prosecute them as relevant.

Table 4-2. Summary of Observations and 

Recommendations from Kosovo. (cont.)
143

Table 4-2. Summary of Observations and 

Recommendations from Kosovo. (cont.)

5) Organized Crime Organized crime continues to be a 

potentially de-stabilizing element 

and has added to the complexity 

of the environment. It also exacerbates complications in coordination 

between international, multinational 

and domestic groups.

5.1 Set up a system to analyze and address the relationship 

between organized crime and political power, which may have an 

impact on national stability or have the potential to create / drive 

conflict.

5.2 Increase HN law enforcement organizations’ ability to deal with 

organized crime, including through the creation of domestic crime 

task forces and related measures.

5.3 Develop clear programs and resources to help local police deal 

with petty crimes to prevent the perception of impunity.

5.4 Enable host nation capability to address organized crime 

independently but with ongoing support from the international 

community.

6) Border Security The complexity and importance 

of border security demanded 

comprehensive multiple responses 

across a series of agencies. This 

was not adequately recognized in 

predeployment military planning 

and insufficient control over elements of the border continues to 

create problems for the Kosovo 

Government.

6.1 Deal with the issue of border security and controls in terms of 

long-term efficacy while considering its impact on internal stability. This includes setting up applicable laws, customs and tariff 

measures (to increase revenue collection), counter-trafficking, and 

systems to deal with displaced persons crossing borders.

6.2 Ensure that applicable laws associated with border security 

(e.g., taxes/tariffs on petroleum or cigarettes, immigration procedures and organic laws for border security forces) are considered 

and addressed comprehensively.

6.3 Consider using U.S. Customs and Border Patrol expertise to 

assist border management forces. This includes building in and 

providing the relevant skill sets, capacities, and technology, and 

introducing relevant international expertise.

6.4. Leverage available technology (sensors, scanners and UAVs), 

and especially affordable and sustainable technology that can be 

left behind and supported once the international community leaves.

6.4.(a) Deploy new technologies in a deliberate manner. This 

should be sequenced so that HN personnel will have the capability 

and willingness to use and maintain them.

6.5 Develop a framework for transition of border-related tasks to 

HN agencies. The framework should be based on a consensus 

with the UN and the nations involved in supporting border operations.

6.6 Use the military to secure the border crossing points only as an 

interim and when no other alternatives are available. The military, 

however, has advantages in deploying cross-country, maritime/

riverine and aerial mobility and technical surveillance platforms 

which are of invaluable assistance to border patrolling and thus 

can continue to support and provide operational assistance to 

international and/or HN civilian law enforcement agencies working 

on border security.

6.7 Develop regional funding mechanisms to support both sides 

of a given border. This can help ensure that border security is a 

shared responsibility and valuable to populations on both sides.

6.8 Use border security and management as an intelligence gathering opportunity. This includes placing international experts with 

HN personnel to ensure accurate and effective information, data 

gathering and sharing.
144

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. In all cases the contractors were under more direct supervision from active duty police or federal employees, rather than 

other contractors.

2. This is not to suggest that the USG involvement was 

planned in this way or even that the USG now manages its involvement in Kosovo in terms of LOOs. Rather, the LOOs are presented here purely as a (post facto) means to understand the continuity and breadth of ways in which law enforcement contributed 

to achievement of USG objectives in Kosovo.

3. United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 

UNMIK—Fact Sheet, June 2008, available from www.unmikonline.

org/docs/2008/Fact_Sheet_July_2008.pdf.

4. Halvor A. Hartz and Laura Mercean, “Safeguarding a Viable Peace: Institutionalizing the Rule of Law,” in Jock Covey, 

Michael J. Dziedzic and Leonard R. Hawley, eds., The Quest for 

a Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict 

Transformation, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 

2005.

5. Each SPU was a unit of UN police provided by a single nation which was organized, tasked, and equipped to operate as a 

formed body, primarily in crowd/riot control tasks (but also used 

for protective operations). The UN now refers to these types of 

units as Formed Police Units (FPUs), and FPUs now make up a 

substantial proportion of the UNPOL strength in most major UN 

operations.

6. In contrast to SPUs, MSUs were under military (KFOR) 

command and were formed bodies of personnel drawn from European Gendarmerie and Carabinieri forces (i.e., military personnel/units that are employed in a comprehensive LE role in their 

home nations).

7. Robert M. Perito, “Odd Jobs: Constabulary Forces in Kosovo,” in Robert M. Perito, ed., Where is the Lone Ranger When We 

Need Him: America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2004.
145

8. Hartz and Mercean.

9. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 

1244, June 10, 1999, available from www.unhcr.org/refworld/

docid/3b00F27216.html. As long as UNSCR 1244 remains in effect, 

the UNMIK retains a staff of some 50 personnel in Kosovo. These 

are mainly support staff for the SRSG, but also includes 8-10 international police (no Americans) in protective security roles.

10. “Europe and Eurasia,” ICITAP, Department of Justice, 

available from www.justice.gov/criminal/icitap/programs/europe/eurasia.html.

11. Vushtrri (known as Vucitrn in Serbian) is located approximately 16 miles north of Pristina.

12. TF (Task Force) 793 was a battalion sized MP task force 

based on the headquarters of 793rd MP Battalion. Subsequent MP 

TFs retained this naming convention; for example, TF 793 was relieved by TF 709 (based on the 709th MP Battalion).

13. UNSCR 1244.

14. Perito.

15. UNSCR 1244.

16. Kosovo shares borders with Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, and Serbia. The border with Serbia is known as the Administrative Boundary Line by the UN, OSCE, EU, and nations that 

do not recognize Kosovo’s independence.

147

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The analysis in the previous case studies has 

shown the pervasive and multifaceted role that law 

enforcement (LE) and related elements have played 

in U.S. involvement in contemporary international 

operations. Even though the set of operations investigated is not exhaustive, the three operations selected 

show a range of ways and conditions in which law enforcement can impact the pursuit of operational objectives; in this way, these three operations collectively 

are representative of how the U.S. Government (USG) 

can expect LE issues to impact on other operations in 

the future. All of these operations (even though Colombia and Kosovo are continuing) can be considered 

“successful” and show that the USG, either alone or 

in conjunction with other nations, has the range of 

expertise, if not always the coordination or capacity, 

for these tasks and has been able to find solutions to 

the LE issues encountered either through deliberate 

interagency cooperation or by a process of trial and 

error by practitioners to bring the appropriate suite of 

capabilities and expertise to bear.

WHY ARE USG LAW ENFORCEMENT

ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN THESE 

OPERATIONS?

From these three operations, there can be seen two 

broad reasons for USG LE operational capabilities or 

expertise to become involved in international operations. The difference between these reasons impacts 

on the types of USG agencies that are likely to become 
148

involved in the LE aspects of an operation, what roles 

the agencies fulfill, and how they receive their funding to support the operation. These reasons for USG 

involvement are not mutually exclusive. 

• USG agencies may have interest in elements 

of the operational environment that directly 

impact law enforcement in the United States. 

In some cases, domestic LE concerns may be a 

major consideration in the USG’s decision to 

become involved in an international operation. 

In the Panama operation, the enforcement of a 

U.S. Federal warrant (for Manuel Noriega) was 

an important consideration in the decision to 

launch the operation. During the course of the 

operation, U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) personnel were also able to check detainees and 

airport patrons against outstanding U.S. warrants. Similarly, the commitment to support 

Plan Colombia was made primarily to address 

the flow of illicit drugs (and hence the consequent domestic law enforcement issues) into the 

United States. This type of operation requires 

not only LE expertise and capability present in 

theater, but also needs the authority resident in 

specific U.S. law enforcement agencies. Hence, 

these operations will require involvement of 

U.S. (usually Federal) LE agencies; in both Panama and Colombia, this has been in the form of 

direct involvement by several Federal agencies 

in the operational theater. 

• The USG may be required to provide/contribute to the maintenance of law and order and development of sustainable LE capability in the 

host nation (HN) as a component of the comprehensive responsibilities assumed by the 
149

international operation. In contrast to Panama 

and Colombia, the USG involvement in Kosovo 

was prompted primarily by geo-strategic and 

political considerations, however LE aspects 

became a major component of the interagency 

and multinational campaign design. In Panama, after U.S. forces had ousted the Noriega 

Government, the USG needed to both maintain 

order in the country and rebuild HN LE agencies. In this context, LE capability and expertise 

are considerations but they do not need to be 

provided by agencies and personnel that have 

authority to enforce U.S. law. In these cases, the 

LE demands have been met by a mixture of direct USG-run bilateral development programs, 

the deployment of USG-facilitated contractors 

(in both operational and instructional roles) 

and cooperation with multinational missions 

(such as relying on the United Nations Interim 

Administration Mission in Kosovo [UNMIK] to 

provide the civilian LE capability in Kosovo). 

KEY FINDINGS

Despite the unique circumstances and history of 

each operation, there are some key findings that are 

common to all operations considered. 

In all these operations the length of commitment 

of USG resources to deal with law enforcement issues has exceeded original planning estimates—often by many years. A common theme that emerged 

across the three operations was the long-term nature 

of commitment necessary, requiring roughly 10 or 

more years to meet each operation’s objectives, which 

exceeded initial planning estimates. Appreciating the 

reality that these types of missions will last a decade 
150

or more will give future USG leaders and officials a 

better frame of reference for planning these operations and will set more realistic expectations for U.S. 

commitment. Additionally, the length of these commitments has spanned at least two U.S. presidential 

administrations and required numerous budget justifications to extend and modify the commitment as 

necessary. The relative length of the USG commitment 

to each operation is represented in Table 5-1. 

Table 5-1. Duration of USG Commitment to 

Operations Investigated.

Capacity building in law enforcement has been a 

required and substantial element of all of these operations. In all of the operations considered, capacity 

building of HN LE (and related institutions), whether 

by design or necessity, was a key element contributing 

to the overall success of the mission. In Panama (the 

earliest of the three operations), the USG became involved in capacity building when faced with the need 

to rebuild Panamanian LE agencies from the ground 

Country Duration Comment

Panama Approximately 10 years

(December 20, 1989—late

1999)

Calculated from the launch of Operation JUST CAUSE (OJC)

until withdrawal of the International Criminal Investigative

Training Assistance Program (ICITAP).

Colombia Almost 10 years—ongoing

(Late 2000—present)

Calculated from the commencement of USG commitment

to Plan Colombia. (Although it must be noted that USG

operational activity in Colombia predated Plan Colombia,

particularly in the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative which was

in place since 1989.)

Kosovo Over 11 years—ongoing

(October 1998—present)

USG involvement Kosovo began in 1998 with a short-term

commitment under the Kosovo Verification Mission to

monitor compliance of the Kosovo Verification Agreement.

The USG remains a major contributor to the international

commitment to Kosovo.
151

up. A commitment to capacity building was included 

in the preliminary planning for Colombia and Kosovo, but involvement was marked by limitations on 

direct USG action. In Kosovo (where there was again 

a need to build agencies from scratch), the initial capacity building efforts were conducted as a part of the 

contribution to the multinational missions. In Colombia, capacity building was conducted in support of a 

functioning government. But from all cases, it is clear 

that capacity-building requires more than organizing, 

training, and equipping HN LE agencies. Two additional, related considerations are apparent:

• Institutional Reform. In all cases, commitment 

was made to institutional reform efforts that 

aimed to promote effective democratic policing and to address corruption, political/ethnic 

partiality, and abusive practices. In addition to 

introducing these aspects into training, these 

efforts have included the development of oversight mechanisms, procedures, and organizations (including working closely with relevant 

HN ministries); and the use of vetted HN personnel and units.

• Reforming Other Rule of Law (RoL) Sectors.

Capacity-building of LE agencies will be insufficient if the other components of the RoL system are dysfunctional. In all three operations, 

inadequacies in (or absence of) the HN judicial, corrections, and legal code systems also 

required USG/multinational attention so they 

could effectively work with an increased HN 

LE capability. Furthermore, the effective functioning and perceived fairness of these systems 

sometimes also rely on programs that address 

underlying causes of instability, access to the 

justice system, and court administration.
152

Military forces played a key role in law enforcement and related issues, even if not specifically 

tasked with a law enforcement mandate. In the three 

operations that were analyzed in this project, it is apparent that the military has a key role to play in supporting LE priorities and objectives within an operation. Most often, military forces are first on the ground 

and have the greatest capability and manpower to 

secure and administer an area of operations. General 

purpose military units can also support an array of LE 

functions, including riot control support, patrolling of 

populated areas, targeting organized crime, and the 

provision of security to enable the conduct of LE tasks. 

The military also has the resources to conduct some 

training including skills such as patrolling, shooting, 

and basic investigations, and supply materiel to HN 

or coalition LE agencies (within the limitations of their 

mandate and standing USG legislation). Specialist 

military LE assets like military police (MPs) and the 

Criminal Investigation Division (CID), while primarily trained, organized, and tasked to police military 

operations, have an ability to fill gaps in overseas contingencies until international or HN civilian LE can 

take over. Given the usual disparity between military 

and civilian manpower, resources, capabilities, and 

logistics, military forces often need to retain important LE responsibilities in support of, in cooperation 

with, or in lieu of civilian law enforcement. The military also brings additional specialist abilities that are 

increasingly necessary, especially in the types of contexts into which USG personnel are being deployed. 

These include explosive ordnance demolition (EOD); 

intelligence gathering and coordination; strong kinetic backup and support for LE missions; logistics; 
153

and strong command and control (C2) platforms and 

technologies. In addition, the military is able to draw 

upon a range of capabilities and law enforcement 

experience resident in National Guard and Reserve 

personnel. Military and LE collaboration is especially 

important in areas that straddle civilian LE and military responsibilities, such as border security, dealing 

with significant violent crime and terrorism, and in 

establishing and maintaining security in conflict situations. As the usual first USG (or international) presence on the ground, military forces find themselves 

dealing with criminal investigations in the absence of 

functioning court and corrections systems. The military’s actions in resolving these issues will shape the 

environment of and lay the foundation for later efforts 

to build more sustainable local LE capabilities. Whom 

the military chooses to work with and how it builds 

temporary LE structures all have implications for the 

long-term success of the effort.

Much of the required expertise and authority 

for law enforcement operations and related capacity building

/institutional reform exists in civilian 

agencies across the USG, but coordination across the 

USG has been ad hoc and has yielded mixed results.

The key to further enhancing LE capabilities lies in 

bringing together military and LE skills and ensuring they are able to collaborate more effectively. LE 

capabilities are most important in building RoL and 

civil governance capabilities and capacities. The case 

studies highlight clearly the need for an enhanced 

and coordinated policy and combined planning as 

precursors to USG operations. While working groups 

often coordinate policy at the Assistant Secretary or 

Deputy Assistant Secretary levels, there is often inadequate coordination at levels below these where the 
154

operational-level tasks are organized and managed. 

When effective coordination takes place, it is often 

due to the personalities involved rather than due to 

functioning systems. Most often, military and civilian planning takes place separately and with different objectives and approaches. The military planning 

culture is not shared by civilian agencies, which have 

less formalized procedures and fewer resources. It 

is important to ensure the military has improved 

awareness of the strategic context, which is driven by 

civilian leadership to avoid being ahead of or out of 

synch with U.S. policy objectives. However, the civilian agencies in turn require enhanced abilities to provide the requisite guidance and communication to the 

military and must actively pursue collaboration with 

military planners.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 

IN LAW ENFORCEMENT ASPECTS OF 

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

The analyses conducted in previous chapters and 

the key findings above highlight a number of issues 

related to LE roles and responsibilities that can expect 

to impact on the conduct of future international operations. From this can be drawn some implications 

for the USG to consider in its approaches to planning 

for international operations.

Without broader mandates and more flexible resourcing mechanisms for civilian USG LE agencies, 

the USG will continue to face complications in using 

these USG LE agencies as part of an interagency (IA) 

international operation. Current arrangements, under which USG agencies have funding tied to domestic law enforcement and/or specific contributions to 
155

international operations, make it difficult for the USG 

to fully capitalize on the capabilities and expertise already resident in these agencies and to integrate their 

efforts into an IA approach. Consideration should 

be given to determining mechanisms for permitting 

a more comprehensive contribution to international 

operations by expertise/capabilities from USG LE 

agencies in a manner that is not limited to supporting 

domestic LE priorities. Ideally, an agency’s mission, 

tasks and resources for involvement in an international operation should be allocated in a manner that 

supports planning over the entire likely course of the 

operational involvement.

Military forces can expect that they will need to 

play a legitimate and substantial law enforcement 

role on future operations. Military forces need to accept as a legitimate part of their role that they will often be required to make a necessary and substantial 

contribution in aspects of LE, particularly early in an 

operational intervention. Despite any extant policy 

limiting the use of military forces in LE roles or the 

planned deployment of international civilian police, 

military forces (as the first responder and with the 

most substantial manpower and logistic capacities) 

will often be the sole security force in a theater and 

many of their security responsibilities and operations 

will approximate LE. Even after the arrival of any international or HN police capability, a military force 

can expect to share many security responsibilities, 

and to coordinate operations, with the police. Furthermore, the actions of military forces in the initial stages 

of a deployment can, and often will, shape the development of efforts to establish/reestablish HN law enforcement and RoL capability. Once this responsibility 

is accepted, it also becomes necessary to review and 
156

set up the contours of the tasks that will need to be accomplished. These will include supporting the shape 

and direction of the training and support to local LE. 

These responsibilities should be accepted as likely and 

legitimate for military forces and explicitly recognized 

in guidance and planning for international operations. 

Military forces need to be prepared to be responsible for providing logistics and communications for 

the USG IA commitment in the initial stages of an 

international operation. Civilian agencies can be expected to transition their communications to their own 

arrangements and are likely to establish arrangements 

for tactical and operational-level logistics as their own 

operational footprint develops. However, early military-civilian planning and cooperation will facilitate 

the efficient build up of civilian LE expertise in theater 

and facilitate coordination between USG agencies in 

theater and in the Continental United States (CONUS).

Effective cooperation between military forces 

and agencies with an LE focus will be facilitated by 

better understanding of their respective inherent 

differences in cultural /organizational imperatives 

and perspectives. Despite overt similarities in organization (as uniformed and armed representatives of 

the state), military and USG LE agencies have different roles and purposes. This results in differences in 

perspectives and operational conduct, which can often create complications for cooperation. A common 

theme throughout all elements of the research was the 

impact of national security classifications on information sharing. This is a specific issue warranting further 

investigation, but it is also symptomatic of a difference 

in perspective between military organizations (which 

have a priority on maintaining both operational security and the integrity of collection assets) and LE 
157

organizations (which have a priority on maintaining 

the integrity of the criminal justice system; hence the 

need to be able to present information as evidence in 

an open court).

Military joint headquarters staffs should take 

the lead in seeking out USG civilian expertise in 

law enforcement resident in the USG as a routine 

part of their operational planning. This needs to extend beyond Department of Defense (DoD) involvement in IA working groups dealing with determining policy for LE cooperation and coordination, and 

into the realm of theater-level planning. This is not to 

suggest that the civilian role should be subordinated 

to military planning; rather, this will allow the IA to 

benefit from the military capacity for detailed planning. It will also permit the deployed military force 

to have better understanding of the complexities of 

law enforcement aspects of the operational environment and mission and plan to most effectively set the 

conditions for commencement of civilian programs. 

Specific areas for military planners to seek civilian 

expertise from USG LE agencies include LE capacity 

building/institutional reform programs; the relevant 

local RoL system (including LE, judicial, and corrections institutions); international civilian police (mandate, authorities, capabilities, and likely limitations); 

organized crime; and border management (including 

security, immigration, customs, and quarantine). This 

expertise should, where possible, be provided by representatives of USG agencies that will be responsible 

for each of these aspects on an operation. This will assist military planners to develop expedient solutions 

while ensuring a link with follow-on initiatives.
158

A common approach by USG agencies to the development and fielding of technologies that have 

relevance to law enforcement on international operations would contribute to better integration of 

military and civilian operations. Given the size of 

their budgets and their facility for supporting expeditionary operations, the DoD and military services 

should promote initiatives in this area. The facilitation of transition (to international civilian control and 

eventually to HN control) should be a consideration 

in military acquisition decisions for equipment or systems that contribute to the maintenance of security in 

an area of operations (AO); this may often mean consideration of equipment that is suitable to be left behind after the withdrawal of military forces or able to 

be substituted with equipment used by civilian agencies. Another consideration should be interoperability 

with equipment and systems used by civilian agencies; a particular area of interest is in the facilitation of 

military communications with nonclassified systems 

used by USG, international, and HN security forces.
159

ACRONYMS

ACI Andean Counter-Drug Initiative

AO area of operation

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms, and Explosives

ARAVI CNP’s Air Service

AWACS aerial warning and control systems

BACRIM Bandas Criminales Emergentes

(criminal gangs from Colombia)

C2 command and control

CA civil affairs

CBP Customs and Border Protection

CD the Colombian Army’s Counter 

Drug Brigade

CID Criminal Investigation Division

CMOTF Civil-Military Operations Task 

Force

CN counternarcotics

CNP Colombian National Police

COIN counterinsurgency

CONUS Continental United States

CSDI Colombian Strategic Development 

Initiative

DAS Administrative Department of 

Service (Colombian Security 

Service)

DATT Defense Attache

DCM Deputy Chief of Mission

DCR Deputy Country Representative 

for Multinational Specialized Units 

(MSUs)

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DIRAN CNP’s Anti-Narcotics Directorate

DoC Department of Commerce
160

DoD Department of Defense

DoJ Department of Justice

DoS Department of State

DoT Department of the Treasury

DSRSG Deputy Special Reprsentative to 

the UN Secretary-General

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

ECD Emerging Capabilities Division

EOC emergency operations center

EOD explosive ordnance demolition

EU European Union

EULEX European Union Rule of Law 

Mission in Kosovo

EUR/ACE Office of the Assistance 

Coordinator for Europe and 

Eurasia (DoS)

EUR/RPM Office of Regional Political-Military 

Affairs (DoS)

EUR/SCE Office of South Central European 

Affairs (DoS)

EXBS Export Control and Related Border 

Security (Kosovo)

EXCOMM Executive Committee

FAA Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of 

Colombia

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

GPF general purpose forces

HN host nation

HQ headquarters

IA interagency

ICE Immigation and Customs 

Enforcement

ICITAP International Criminal 

Investigations Training Assistance 

Program
161

ICOR In-Country Contract Officer 

Representative

IDA Institute for Defense Analyses

IDFAS International Drug Flow Attack 

Strategy (of the DEA)

INL International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs (of the DoS)

INL/AAE International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs/Office of 

Asia, Africa, and Europe Programs

ISN Bureau of International Security 

and Nonproliferation, Department 

of State

HVT high value targets

JAG Judge Advocate General

JIATF-S Joint Interagency Task Force South

JLELT Joint Law Enforcement Liaison 

Team

JLG Judicial Liaison Group

JSRP Justice Sector Reform Program

JTF-SOUTH Joint Task Force South

KCPSED Kosovo Center for Public Safety 

Education and Development

KFOR Kosovo Force

KLA Kosovo Liberation Army

KPSS Kosovo Police Service School

KSF Kosovo Security Force

KVM Kosovo Verification Mission

LE law enforcement

LECP Law Enforcement Capabilities 

Project

LOO line of operation

MilGroup Military Group

MMA monitoring, mentoring, and 

assistance
162

MNTF-E Multi-National Task Force-East

MOIA Ministery of Internal Affairs (of 

Kosovo)

MOS military occupational specialty

MSU Multinational Specialized Unit

NAS Narcotics Affairs Section

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCIC National Crime Information Center

NSC National Security Council

NSCR National Security Council 

Resolution

NSPD National Security Policy Directive

OFAC Office of Foreign Assets Control

OJC Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama)

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control 

Policy

OPDAT Office of Overseas Prosecutorial 

Development, Assistance and 

Training

OPL Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY 

(Panama) 

OPMG Office of the Provost Marshal 

General

OSCE Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PC Plan Colombia

PCCP Plan Colombia Consolidation 

Phase

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

PDF Panama Defense Force

PFLD Police Force Liaison Division 

(formerly USFLG)
163

PKSOI Peacekeeping and Stability 

Operations Institute

PMO Provost Marshal Office

PNP Panama National Police

PTJ Judicial Technical Police (Panama)

PSYOPS psychological operations

RLA resident legal advisers

RoL rule of law

RRTO Rapid Reaction Technology Office

S/CRS Office of the Coordinator for 

Reconstruction and Stabilization 

(DoS)

SEED Support for East European 

Democracy Act

SIU Sensitive Investigations Unit

SME subject matter expert

SO/LIC&IC Special Operations/Low Intensity 

Conflict and Interdependent 

Capabilities (Office of the Secretary 

of Defense for Policy)

SOG USMS Special Operations Group

SPU Stability Police Unit

SRSG Special Representative for the UN 

Secretary General

SWAT special weapons and tactics

TAP Technical Assistance Program

TAT Tactical Analysis Team

U.S. United States

UAE United Arab Emirates

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina
164

UNMIK United Nations Interim 

Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNPOL United Nations International 

Civilian Police

UNSCR United Nations Security Council 

Resolution

UNTAES United Nations Transitional 

Authority for Eastern Slavonia

USAF U.S. Air Force

USAID U.S. Agency for International 

Development

USARO U.S. Army South

USFLG U.S. Forces Liaison Group (became 

PFLD)

USG U.S. Government

USMC U.S. Marine Corps

USMC CIW USMC Center for Irregular Warfare

USMS U.S. Marshals Service

USSOUTHCOM U.S. Southern Command

WHA Western Hemisphere Affairs
165

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

DILSHIKA JAYAMAHA is a senior associate with 

Noetic. She supports Noetic’s analysis of transitional 

law enforcement capabilities and concept development. 

Ms. Jayamaha has extensive experience managing 

programs to rebuild communities in the aftermath 

of conflict and natural disaster, and researching and 

analyzing policing in peacekeeping and stablization 

operations. She has run development programs in 

Liberia, Sri Lanka, and Colombia. With the United 

Nations, she ran economic revival and infrastructure 

projects in Sri Lanka and was an electoral officer in 

East Timor. Prior to that, Ms. Jayamaha worked as a 

journalist in Sri Lanka, India, and New York for both 

domestic and international agencies.

SCOTT BRADY is a senior consultant with Noetic 

based in Washington, DC. With Noetic, he has led 

two major projects looking at the employment of law 

enforcement on international operations. Prior to 

that time, Mr. Brady had served as an officer in the 

Australian Army for over 12 years, including two 

operational deployments on stabilization missions, 

senior staff appointments, and experience as a strategiclevel analyst and an instructor of officer candidates. 

BEN FITZGERALD is the country manager for Noetic’s 

U.S. operations, having established the Washington, 

DC, office in November 2005. He has broad experience 

in strategic analysis, having worked with a wide 

variety of organizations in both Australia and the 

United States. These organizations include large federal 

and state government departments, defense and 

intelligence groups, emergency management services, 
166

and large corporations. Much of Mr. Fitzgerald’s early 

experience was gained working for large technology 

organizations, helping public sector clients achieve 

operational outcomes through their use of technology.

JASON FRITZ is a consultant with Noetic based in 

Washington, DC. He has been involved in several 

projects providing strategic insight and analysis for 

various government departments and agencies. Prior to 

joining Noetic, Mr. Fritz served for 6 years as a cavalry 

officer in the U.S. Army and saw operational service 

on three tours of duty in Iraq. He has also provided 

various consulting services to the Department of State 

while working for other consulting firms.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Authors

Dilshika Jayamaha

Scott Brady

Ben Fitzgerald

Jason Fritz

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil