SECONDDIVISI ON January 11, 2011

No. 1-10-1623 CESAR GAM BOA, RUBEN NA VA and MAURO LOPE Z, Plainti ffs-Appell ants,
v. JOSE ALVARADO and MARCO’S DIGITAL VIDEO AND PH OTOGRAPH Y, INC.,

Defendants-Appel lees. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County
No. 09 CH 48728
Hon ora ble William Ma ki, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE KARNE ZIS delivered the judgm ent of the court, w ith opinion. Presiding Justice Cunningham and Justice Connors co ncurred in the judgm ent and opinion. OPIN ION Plaintiffs Cesar Gam boa, Ruben Nava an d Mauro Lopez filed a com plaint alleging comm on law fraud, unj ust enrichm ent, civil conspiracy, intentional infl iction of emotional di stress and viol ation of the Illi nois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Busi ness Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq . (W est 2008)) (Con sumer Fraud Act) against defendants Jose Al varado and Marco’s Di gital Video & Photography, In c. (Marco’s Di gi ta l Ph ot og ra ph y) . P l ai nt i ff s a l l eg ed th ey wer e t he vi ct i ms o f a n “ i mmi gr at i on sc am” per pet uat ed b y de fen dan ts wher ein d efe nda ntsfals ely p rom ised plain tiff s th ey w ould obtain le galiz atio n or

cit izen shipdoc um ents fo r pla intif fs. Pla intif

fs e ach paid1-10-1623

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defendants $15,000 but d efendants did not deliver on their promises an d refused to return plaintiffs’ money. The court dism issed the com plaint, finding the underlying contract was illegal and thus unenforceable. On appeal, plaintiffs argue the court erred in dismissi ng their complai nt because (1) i lleg alit y of contract is no t a proper defen se against the causes of ac tion pled in their complaint; (2) illegal ity of contract is not a defense to the Cons umer Fraud A ct’s regulation of imm igration service providers; and (3) the court’s public policy determ inations were inconsistent w ith the public policy of the Illinois l egislature and Illi nois precedent. We reverse. Background On Decem ber 7, 2009, plaintiffs (individual ly referred to as Gam boa, Nava and Lopez) filed a five-count verified complaint against defendants alleging (count I) viola tions of the Consu mer Fraud Act; (count II) comm on law fraud; (count III) unjust enrichment; (count IV) civil conspiracy; and (count V ) intentional infl iction of emotional distress. Th e foll owing course of deal ings between the par ties is ta ken from plainti ffs’s
com plaint. In ear ly 20 06, Alv ara do told p laint iffshe could obtain “ aut hen tic citi zen ship doc um ents” f

or p laint iffs

thr oug h a contact

at t he U nite d S tates C ons ulate of ficein Ciud ad J uar

ez, Me xi co, and plain tiff s w ould be a ble to us e th e do cum ents toobtain social security numbers . He stated his contact could influence both Am erican and Mex ican imm igration official s to exp edite the application process but would need to pay employees in the different departm ents to obtain the necess ary releases. The cost for1-10-1623

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adjustm ents to legal permanen t residency status w ould be $12,000 per person and to obtain United States citizenship wo uld add an additional $3,000 per person. Alvarado stated he and his brother w ere obtaining their citizenship documents through the contact and invited plainti ffs to j oin their group. He explained that once the contact obtained the neces sary docum ents, the group w ould travel across the Mex ican border and pick up the docum ents at the consulate off ice after having photos and fingerprints taken and a short interview. If plaintiffs could get their money tohim by t he end of J une200 6, t hey cou ld ha ve t heir

doc um ents by

Octobe r. O the rw ise t her e would be a six-m onth delay. Plaintiffs each ma de paym ents totaling $15,000 to Alvarado over a pe riod of
m ont hs a nd r

ece ived rec eipts fr

om Ma rco ’s Dig ital P hotogr aph y in ret urn for

the ir paym ents. Alvaradoexp lained he w as prov iding receiptsfromhis busines s to as sure plaintiffs that the process was legitimate. Gam boa m ade som e of his paym ents at Alvarado’s hom e and at Marco’ s Digital Photography. Nava and L opez alleged Alvarado used “high-pressure tactics” to get the paym ents by the June d eadline, calli ng the m w eek ly un til t hey

had paid in full. Nava did not m akehis fina l pay m ent unt il October 2006. Alvarado inform ed plaintiffs that, because the deadline had not been
m et, the re w

ould be adela y an d pla intif fs w ould not rec eivethe ir do cum ents un til Decem ber 2006. In February 2007, Alvarado told Gam boa that Gam boa’s docum ents were ready and Gam boa needed to m ake plane reservations to fly to El Pas o in order to cross the1-10-1623

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border an d get th e docum ents. Gam boa went to M arco’sDigital Pho tography whe re Alv ara do “ purcha sed ” th e re ser vat ionsfor

$50 0 plu s a $25cre dit card fee . S hor tly bef ore Gam boa w as to lea ve, Alv ara do told h im his Me xi can con tac t w ould not be a ble to get the docum ents and the trip was cancelled. Alvarado refunded Gam boa’s $500 but not the $25 fee. Plaintiffs regularly call ed Alvarado inquiring about the status of their docum ents. Alv ara do a void ed p laint iffs . A fte r re pea ted call s fr

om plain tiff

s, h e to ld th em tha t his contact had suffere d a heart attack which would de lay obtai ning the do cuments. He gave Lopez hi s contact’s phone number in Mexico. Lopez spoke to the contact, “Jose de Jesus Caste llanos,” who confirm ed Alvarado’s version of heart a ttack-induced dela y. At

som e later p oint , A lvar adosta ted thedela ys w ere dueto p rob lem s in Ph oen ix
an d E l Pa so , wh i ch “C as te l l an os ” c on fi rme d wh en Ga mbo a c al l ed hi m. In March 2009, Alvarado m et with plaintiffs and told them that there was nothing he could do for them . He stated the y had all been swindled by Castellanos and it was necessary to bring legal action in Mexico. H e requested plaintiffs each pay him $200 to hire a Mexican law

yer and sign a power of attorney. Lopez and Nava paid and signed the power of

attorney. Gam boa refused and dem anded his m oney back. Alvarado subsequently called Nava and Lopez, as king if they knew what Gam boa was planning and thre atened t hem that if A lvarado “f ell, they w

ould all fall.” Plaintiffs pressed Alvarado to return their m oney. In Septe mber 2 009, Alvarado told Nava and Lopez the law suit was no longer a viable option and ex plained his new1-10-1623

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plan was to hire thugs in M exico to kidnap Castellanos and get the m oney back from Castell anos in retu rn for Castel lanos’ rel ease. If Castell anos did not return the money, Alvarado implied the kidnappers w ould kill Castell anos. Nava and Lo pez told Alvarado they were opposed to the violence and did not w ant to be part of the k idnaping scheme. On October 29, 2009, A lvarado told Nava and Lopez the kidnaping w as on hold. Pla intif fs’ com plain t alle ged def end ants en gag ed in num ero us in sta nce s of unf air and de cepti ve prac tice s in th e condu ct of tra de or co mm erce i n vio lati on of se ctio n 2AA of the Consum er Fraud Act (815 ILCS505/2AA (West 2008)), which governs p rivate providers of imm igration assistance services. Plaintiffs also alleged defendants
comm itted common law fraud by inducing plain tiffs to rel y on their misrepre sentation s; defendants were unjustly enriched by the m onies plaintiffs paid them; defendants engaged i n a civil conspiracy to d efraud pl ainti ffs; and defendan ts intended to infl ict
em otio nal d istr

esson p laint iffsby m akin g th e m alici oussta tem ents th at if Alv ara do f

ell, the y w ould all f all. Pla intif

fs r equ ested t he cour

t en j oin d efe nda ntsfro m eng agin g in conduct rel ating to the provisi on of immigration servi ces or in any of th e deceptive practices cha rged and payment of assorted damages, incl uding $45 ,000 to each pl ai nt i ff as th e c i vi l pe na l ty pr ov i de d f or by se ct i on 2A A( m) ( 81 5 I LC S 5 05 /2 AA (m) (W est 200 8)). Def end ants fi led am otio n todism iss pur sua nt to se ctio n 2- 619 of t he I llinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 et s eq. (W est 2008)). Defendantsasserted that count I should be dism issed pursuant to section 2-619(a)(5) becaus e it was not1-10-1623

6

com menced within the three-year stat ute of limitations for causes of action arising under the Consum er Fraud Act. They as serted the entire com plaint should be dismissed pursuant

to section 2-619(a)(9) because the a greement between t he parties was an illegal contract that violated the law a nd public policy and courts refuse to enforce a contract w hen the purpose of the contract violates the law. The court granted defendants’ mo tion to dismiss on all counts on M ay 17, 2010. It filed an amended order granting defendants’ m otion to dismiss on all counts on J une 9, 2010, ex plaining “thi s Court finds the facts , as pleaded in Plaintiffs’ verified
com plaint, show that P laintiffs and Defendants entered into an illegal contract that violates the law and public policy.” It declared the order final and appealable. Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal from the court’ s orders on June 9, 2010 . The court having disp ose d of

all m attersbef

ore thecou rt, w e ha ve j uris dict ion to co nsid er t his t im ely app eal. An alys is Ille gali ty of Contract The court granted defendants’ mo tion to dismiss as to all counts of the com plaint pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the C ode, finding the facts as pleaded in the
com plaint showed the parties entered into an illegal contract that violates the law and public policy, and thus, per defendants’ argum ent, is unenforceable. Section 2- 619(a)(9) of the Code permits invol untary dismissal where “the clai m asserted against defendant is barred by other affirm ative mat ter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating1-10-1623

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the claim.” 735 ILC S 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2008); Van Meter v. Darien Park District , 207 Ill. 2d 3 59, 367 (20 03) . A n “ ‘ aff irm ative m atter, ’ in a s ect ion 2 -61 9(a )(9 ) m otio n, is
som ething in the nature of a defense” w hich, although the m oving party adm its the legal sufficiency of the com plaint, negates the cause of act ion completely. Van Meter , 207 Ill. 2d at 367; Borowiec v. Gateway 2000, Inc. , 209 Ill. 2d 376, 383 (2004); Neppl v. Murphy , 316 Ill. App. 3d 581, 584 (2000). The defect, defense or af firmative m atter
mus t be apparent on the face of the pleading attacked or be supported by affidavit. Borowi ec , 209 Ill. 2d at 383. In reviewing a grant of a m otion to dismiss, w e accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff’s com plaint, draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the plai ntiff and i nterpret al l plea dings and sup porting documents in the li ght most favorable to the plaintiff. Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich , 231 Ill. 2d 474, 48 8 (2008); Borowi ec , 2 09 Il l. 2d at 38 3. As wi th an ap pe al fr om a g ra nt of summar y jud gmen t, we must consider “whether the existence of a genuine i ssue of material fact sho uld have precluded the dismissal or, absent such an issue of fact , whether d ismissal is proper as a matter of law,” and we review a court's grant of a secti on 2-619 motion to di smiss de
novo Kedz

ie & 103rd Currency Ex

change, Inc. v. Hodge , 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116-17 (1993) ; Borowi

ec , 209 Ill. 2d at 383. Taking the well-pleaded facts in plaintiffs’ comp laint as true, there is no question that the verbal contract betw een defendants and plaintiffs wa s illegal. Indeed, defendants adm it that the parties entered into a contact t hat violates Illinoi s and1-10-1623

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Federal law and publi c policy. They correctl y describe the parties’ agr eement as a “schem e” wherein the five m embers of the group agreed to obta in their residency or citi zen shipdoc um ents “b y c ircu m ven ting thenor m al, le gal p roc esstha t th e pu blic follows in obtaining such docum ents” such as by paying bribes and paying off governm ent officials in violati on of assorted crim inal codes. Courts w ill not enforce an illegal contract, a contrac t that ex pressly contravenes either Illinois or Federal law and thus violates public policy. Kim v. Ci tigroup, Inc. , 368 Ill. App. 3d 298, 307 (2006). Illegali ty of contract is, theref ore, a defense to act ions seeking enforcem ent of a contract. Kim , 368 Ill . App. 3d at 307. Arguabl y, therefore, th e ill egali ty of the contract between plaintiffs and defendantswould be a defens e to plaintiffs’ enforcem ent of the contract. But plaintiffs are not seeking to enforce the contract. Rather, they are seeking to be r eim bur sed for them onie s th ey p aid d efe nda ntson t he b asisof t he a ppa ren tly fraudul ent contract, costs the y incurred as a result of the contract and assort ed puniti ve damages i nclu ding those p rovi ded for by secti on 2AA of th e Consumer F raud Act . As the basis for plaintiffs’ claimed relief, they are asserting (1) violations of section 2AA of theCon sum er F rau d Act; (2)com m on law fra ud; (3)unj ust

enr ichm ent ; (4 ) civ il conspiracy; and (5) intentional inflicti on of em otional distress. They do not, in any of these counts, se ek enforcem ent of the agreem ent they had w ith defendants or assert a breach of contra ct claim. Ille gali ty of contract, there fore, would not be a val id defense to plaintiffs’ claims.1-10-1623

9

W e do not find, notw ithstanding defendants’ argum ent to the contrary, t hat allowing plaintiffs to proceed with their claims w ould be tantam ount to allowing them to enf orc e an illega l con tac

t. Pla intif

fs s eek com pen sat ion f

or d efe nda nts ’ ac

tion s in violating the Consumer Fraud A ct and in m isleading them, in prom ising something they had no ability or intent to deliver with full knowledge that plaintiffs would be harm ed financi ally an d emotionall y by their acti ons. W e do not find th at all owing plai ntiffs’ case to proceed would, as defendants assert, give “the parties’ m eeting of the m inds legit im acy .” N or d o we fin d th at it w ill “s end a m ess ageto t hos e w ho law fully eng agein the process of obtaining im migration papers that if you do not accom plish your goal legally and through proper channels, then it is okay to do it by illegal means such as bribery and paying off corrupt officials within a governm ent.” On the contrary, allowing plaintiffs’ claims to proceed w ill send a message to t hose unscrupulous individuals who mislead and prey on others by prom ising them im migration services they cannot deliver that there are ram ifications for this antisocial behavior. These indi viduals cannot be allowed to use the very illegal ity of their agreement as a way to avoid the consequences of th eir actions. Granted, generally, “parties to a void contract w ill be l eft where t hey have placed them selves w ith no recovery of the m oney pa id for illegal service s.” Ransburg v. Haase , 224 Ill. App. 3d 681, 686 (1992). However, exceptions tothis rule have been recognized where (1) the person who paid for the services was not in pari deli cto(“in1-10-1623

1 Black’ s Law

Dictionary

794 (7th ed. 199 9).

10 equal fault” 1 ) with the offender and (2) the law in question w as passed for the protection of the person w ho paid for the services and the purpos e of the law w ould be better served by granting relief than by denying it. Ransbu rg , 224 Ill. App. 3d at 686. On the facts as they stand now , it appears plaintiffs were not in pari deli ctowith defendants: plaintiffs spoke little English, did not know defendants were lying/unable to deliver on their promises and w ould not necessarily know theagreem ent was illegal or that, as w ill be described below, they had recourse under sec tion 2AA. Further, sec tion 2AA w as clearly passed for the protection of pers ons such as plaintiffs and w ould be best served ifplain tiffs are al lowed to proceed with thei r clai ms. Section 2AA w

as created to deter the abuses allegedly comm itted by defendants her e. I n se ctio n 2A

A, theGen era l As sem bly, give n th e su bstant ial ef fec t on thepub lic interest o f private i ndivi duals pro vidin g or offeri ng to provid e imm igrati on assistance services, established rules of practice and conduct f or such individuals in order to promote honesty and fair dealing with Illinois residents and preserve public confidence. 815 ILCS 505/2A

A(a-1), (a-5) (West 2008). Licensed attorneys, legal interns under the direct supervision of a licensed attorney, not-for-profit organizations recognized by the Bo ard of I m m igra tion Ap pea ls, em ployeesof s uch org aniz atio ns a nd cert ain organizat ions em ploying or s eeking toem ploy an alien o r nonim m igrant alien are
exem pt from the requirements of section 2AA. 815 ILCS 505/ 2AA(a-5) (West 2008).1-10-1623

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There is no thing to s how defenda nts w

ere exem pt from

section 2AA nor do th ey ass ert such. Under section 2AA , any nonexempt person who

provides or offers to provide imm igration assistance service m ay perform only services such as trans lating and completing govern ment form s, transcrib ing and/or translati ng responses to such fo rms, securing supporting docum ents, notarizing signatures and assorted other s ervices. 815 ILCS 505/2A

A(b) (West 2008). He may no t m ake any statem ent that he “can or will obtain special favors from or has special influence with the United States Imm igrati on and Natural izati on Service or an y other governmental ag ency” (815 ILCS 505/2AA(j )(1) (W est 2008)); retain any com pensation for service not perform ed (815 ILCS 505/2A

A(j)(2) (West 2008)); provide legal advice, recomm end a specific course of legal action or provide any other assistance that requires legal analysis, legal judgm ent or inter pretatio n of the law or accept payment in exchange of such ad vice or assi stance (815 ILCS 505/2A

A(j)(2.5), (j)(5) (West 2008)); or “[m]ake any m isrepresentation of false statem ent, directly or indirectly, to influence, persuade, or induce patronage” (815 ILCS 505/2A

A(j)(6) (West 2008)). Any person perfom ing any of the authorized services m ust register with the Illinoi s Attorney General and su bmit verification of m alpractice insurance or a surety bond (815 ILCS 505/2AA(c) ( W est 2008)); pr ovide the custo mer w ith a written con tract explaining the services and costs in E nglish and in the custom er’s native language before perform ing any services (815 ILCS 505/2AA(d), (f) (West 2008)); and post a1-10-1623

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sign, a separ ate sign for each langua ge in which he offe rs imm igrati on assistance services, at his place of business stat ing he is not attorney licensed to practice law and disclosing his fee schedule and assorted other inform ation. 815 ILCS 505/2A A(e) (W est 2008). Perso ns violating s ection 2A A sha ll be guilty of aClass A m isdem eanor fo r a first offen se and Class 3 fel ony for second or sub sequent offenses. 81 5 ILCS 505/2AA(m ) (W est 2008). If the A ttorney General or State’s Attorney fails to file an action under this section, any person m ay file a civil action to enforce the provisions of the section and m aintain an action for injunctive relief, com pensatory dam ages to recover prohibited fees. 815 ILCS 505/2AA(m ) (W est 2008). A prevailing pl aintiff may be awarded th ree times t he prohibited fees. 815 ILCS 50 5/2AA(m ) (W est 2008). Plaintiffs filed such a civil action here, seeking tripl e the am ount they paid defendants pursuant to section 2AA(m). Again taking the we ll-pleaded facts in plai ntiffs’ com plaint as true, there is no que stio n th at d efe nda ntsw ere pro vide rs o f im m igra tion ass ista nceser vic es. The re is also no ques tion that th ey, as pl aint iffs assert ed in thei r complai nt, vi olat ed secti on 2AA when they

(1) failed to provide plainti ffs with a written contract ex plaining services to be performed and com pensation to be charged in violation of section 2AA(d); (2) failed to provide plaintiffs with a written contract in English and Spanish, the language spoken by plaintiffs, in violati on of section 2AA (f); (3) failed to post signs with the m andated disclosures at Marco’s Digital Photography in violation of section 2AA(e); (4) retained1-10-1623

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plaintiffs’ money after failing to obtain the promised docum ents, m isrepresented to plaintiffs they could assist them in obtaining imm igration documents a nd
m isre pre sen ted tha t C astellan os w as e m ployed b y th e Un ited St ate s C ons ulate in Juarez, Mex ico in violati on of section 2AA (j); and (5) failed to file the required reg istr atio n state m ent

or v erificat ion of m alpr act ice s tatem ent

or s ure ty b ond in violation of section 2AA(c). As plaintiffs point out, defendants are ess entially arguing that the very actions that section 2AA

attem pts to curtail can be used as a defense to claims brought under section 2AA. S ection 2AA w as passed for the protection of people such as plaintiffs. The purpose of section 2AA can best be effec

tuated by recognizing plaintiffs’ right to recovery. We find, therefore, that the court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ com plaint on the basis of illegali ty of contract. Statute of Lim itations for Count I In its order dismissing the complai nt, the court di d not mention defendants’ alternate argument

for dismissal of coun t I. Defendantshad argued, pursuant to section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code, that the Consum er Fraud Act count s hould be dismissed becau se it was filed beyond the t hree-year statute of lim itations for filing such actions. Neither party raises t his ground for dismissal on appeal, so w e need not consider it. However, since it may com e up again on rem and and there is no m erit to this argument , we w ill address it bri efly. Under section 2-619(a)(5), dism issal may be ha d upon a show ing that the1-10-1623

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plai ntiffs’ acti on was not comm enced within the time limit provid ed by law. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(5) (W est 1992); Streeter v. Chi cago Transit

Authori ty , 272 Ill. App. 3d 921, 923, 651 N.E.2d 579, 580 (1995). The statute of limitations for an action under the Consum er Fraud Act is three years and begins to run when the cause of action accrues. 815 ILC S 505/10a(e) (West 2008); Kopley Group V ., L.P. v. Sheridan Edgewater Propert

ies, Lt d. , 376 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1020-21 (2007). A cause of a ction that is not filed within the statute of lim itations is time barred. 815 ILC S 505/10a(e) (W est 2002); Kopley Group V ., L.P., 376 Ill. App. 3d at 1021. Plaintiffs filed their cause of action on Decem ber 7, 2009. Accordingly, in order to m eet the three-year statute of limitations for their Consum er Fraud Act claim , the claim had to accrue on or after December 7, 2006. Defendants asse rted plai ntiffs’ cause of action accrued in Octo ber 2006, whe n Nava m ade his final payment. W e disagree. A cause of ac

tion under the Consum er Fraud Act accrues “ ‘when aperson know s or rea son ably

sho uld k now

of h is inj ury

and alsoknow s or

rea son ably

sho uld know tha t it was w rongfully caused. At that point the bu rden is upon the injured person to inquire fu rther asto the existence of a caus e of ac

tion.’ ” (Em phasis om itted.) Kopley Group V

., L.P., 376 Ill. App. 3d at 1021 (quoting Witherell v . Weimer

, 85 Ill. 2d 146, 156 (1981)). Taking the w ell-pleaded facts in plai ntiffs’ com plaint as true for the purposes of the motion to di smiss, it is clea r plai ntiffs had no reason to know or suspect th at th ey ha d b ee n i nj ur ed , l et al on e d ef ra ud ed , i n O ct ob er 20 06 . T hr ou gh ou t t he ti me1-10-1623

15

that plaintiffs were m aking their payments , April 2006 through October 2006, A lvarado
con sis ten tly calle d on e or all o f th em , so m etim es w eek ly, ask ing f

or t he m one y. He told plain tiff s th at if theJun e 20 06 d ead line f or p aym ent

w as m iss ed, thedoc um ents w ould be delayed by up to six mo nths, and he even us ed the supposed delay as a form of threat on occasion. There w ould be no reason for plaintiffs to suspect in October 2006 that they w

ere the victims of fraud: they knew the June deadline had been m issed and therefore would not ex pect any docum ents until Decem ber 2006, at the earliest. Alv ara do r

einf orc ed t his exp ectatio n w hen , af ter rec eivin g th e las t “la te” pay m ent in Octobe r 20 06, he told G am boa tha t, d ue to th e de lay i n pa ym ent , th e do cum ents w ould not be ready until Novem ber or Decem ber 2006. It w as, therefore, reasonable for plaintiffs to continue thinking through Decemb er 2006 that their agreem ent with Alvarado would be honored. It was not until som etime after Decem ber 2006, whe n plaintiffs still had not received the prom ised docum ents and Alvarado stopped responding to their phone calls, that plaintiffs might have had reason to suspect som ething was w rong, that Alvarado m ight not deliver on the agreement s. It is not clear fromplaintiffs’ complaint when suc h occurred, but it clearly occurred after December 2006, spanning a period of
m onths, and ultim ately yea rs. A lvarado s till strung Ga m boa along a s late asFebruary 2007, when he told Gam boa he had to go to E l Paso, “booked” Gam boa’s airline reservations and then cancelled his trip at the last m inute. From m id-2007 through 2009, A lvarado s poradically ga ve plaintiffsadditional ex cusesfor his f

ailure to proc ure1-10-1623

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the docum ents, put themin contact w ith Castellanos to verify the exc uses, told them he’d been swindl ed too and much, much m ore. But, by that time, plai ntiffs shoul d have be en awa re th at th ey ha d b ee n i nju re d a nd ha ve in ve st ig at ed fu rt he r. Acc or di ng ly , we find plain tiff

s’ cau se of ac

tion und er t he C ons um er F rau d Act a ccr ued som etim e in 2007, within th e three-year statute of li mitations for such acti ons. For the reasons stated above, we reverse the order of the trial court and rem and for further pr oceeding s. Reversed and rem anded.1-10-1623

17 REPORTER OF DECISIONS - ILLINOIS APP ELLATE COURT

(Front Sheet to be A

ttached to Eac h case)
CES AR GA MBOA, RU BEN NAV A and M AUROLOPE Z, Plainti ffs-Appell ants,
v. JOSE A LVARA DO and MA RCO’S D IGITAL VID EO AND PHOTOGRA PHY, IN C.,

Defendants-Appel lees.
No. 1-10-1623

Ap pella te C our

t of Illin ois First District, Second Division January 11, 2011
JUSTICE KARNE ZIS delivered the opinion of the court. CUNNINGH AM, P .J., and CONN ORS, J., concurred. Appeal from the Circui t Court of Cook County. The Honorable W illi am Maki, Judge Pres iding.
For APPE LLANTS: R ivas & Becerra, of Chicago (Alonzo Rivas and Carlos G. Becerra, of coun sel) For APPE LLEES: Frank J. Del Medico, Ltd. , and Hennessy & Cihak, P.C., of North Riv ers ide ( Fran k J . D el M edico, of co uns el)