# FILED
March 13, 2000 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Cou rt Clerk 

### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT NASHVILLE

WILLIAM J. REVIS, ) ) Plaintiff/Appell

ant, )

) Appeal No. ) M1999-00658-COA-R3-CV VS. ) ) Dickson Circuit ) No. CV-677 GRAHAM J. MCCLEAN, ) QUEBECOR PRINTING (USA) ) CORP., BIL

L MAHONEY

and ) QUEBECOR PRINTING ) DICKSON, INC., ) ) Defendants/Appel

lees. )
APPEALED FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DICKSON COUNTY

AT CHARLOTTE, TENNESSEE THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. BURCH, JUDGE

ANN BUNTIN STEINER 214 Second Avenue N

orth Nashville, Tennessee 37201-1644 Attorney for P

laintiff/Appella

nt W. STEPHEN GARDNER HEATHER R. GUNN One Comm

erce Square, S uite 2380 Memphis, Ten

nessee 38103 Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

BEN H. CANTRELL, PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S. CONCUR: KOCH, J. CAIN, J.-2- 

### O P I N IO N

In this defamatio

n action, the appell

ant filed suit

against Quebecor Printing (USA) Corporation, Graham McClean, the Pres id ent and Chief Operating

Officer of the c

orporation, Quebe

cor Printing Dickson, I

ncorporated, and Bil l Mahoney, the G eneral Manager of

Quebecor Dickson , for alleged defamatory

state ments m

ade by Mr. Mc

Clean at a com

pany meeti

ng and in a letter posted in the Dickson p

lant. In granting th

e appellee’s m

otion for summary judgment,the trial court found that the statem ents were not defa

matory as a matter of law and that there was no publication of such statements under the law of defamation. For the reasons sta ted, we find

the stat ements were

not defamatory

and affirm th

e judgment of t

he trial court.

I. W illiam J. Revis worked a

t the Dickson, Te

nnessee plant for Quebecor Printing. In 1994, he was one of sever al employe

es who helpe d organize an unsuccessful effort to elect a union at the Dickso n plant. In 1995, M r. Revis was involved in another effort to unionize the plant. Duri ng th e campaign,McClean organize d company m

eetings with various

employees

to discuss the issues regarding unionization of the plan t an d plant produc tivity. Some of these m

eetings were one- on-one with emp loyees and

some were team meetingsattended b y large groups of employ ees. Pamel

a Brown, a Queb

ecor employee, testified that at a one-on-one mee

ting with McClean, McClean stated that there was no room at the plant for someone like Revis. In addition, Robert Brown, another Q

uebecor employ

ee, testified tha

t at one of the team

meetings, McClean stated that there was no r oom in the plant for Revis’attitude. Witnesses-3-

that attended othert eam meet ings denied that any

reference wa

s made to the appellant.

On November 7, 1995, the National Labor Relations Boardheld the election. As the vote count progressed , it became c lear to McClean th

at the union would lose. As he r elated the story

later to several p

lant supervisors, M cCl ean looked around the room and made eye contact with Revis. McClean described Revis ’ faci al expression as demeaning, insubordinate, and hostile. Later, McClean composed a letter and allegedly posted it in an area of the plant where it would like

ly be seen. T

he letter in releva

nt part states: On Tuesday, No

vember 7, 1995,

at approx ima tely 7:30 a.m. to 8:00 a.m., I was in the cafeteria observing the counting of the ballots in the NLRB election. I estimate that thirty to fo

rty employ

ees were presen

t in the c afeteria at this time. I was standing towar d th e front of the group of em

ployees on the

left side of the room (facing the voting area). My attention primarily was foc used on the vote co unt. At one point, I happened to glance around the room at the crowd. My thoughts were on the vote count, but I hap pened t o catch the eye of Mr.

Revis. He was s

taring intently

at me with a stern, dete

rmined, and a

ngry expression on his face. As soon as he saw that he h ad made e ye contactwith me, Mr. R e vis proceeded to make an overt, dramatized, facial

expression towards

me. Mr. Revis made

no attempt to hide his facial gesture from the other employ

ees present. The facial expression Mr. Revis made at m e is difficult to desc ribe in words. Ho wever, in an eff

ort t o communica

te what this expression

looked like

to me, I would describe i t as being of a me nacing, t hreatening, denigrating, contemptuous an d i nsubordinate

nature. Knowing of Mr. Revis’ r ecent suspension

for displaying

a “ temper” and m

aking abusiveand intimidating c omments to ot hers, his facial expression immediately caused me to fe el concern for my safety, as w ell as the safe ty of the others in the room. Mo reover, I felt i

nsulted and offended by Mr.

Revis’ conduct.-4- After the events describe

d in the letter, the

company fired Revis, but th e NLRB ordered his reinstatement. Subsequently, he filed this act ion fo r defamation.

II.

Upon review o f a grant of sum mary jud gment, this Cour

t must determine whether the requi

rements of Te

nn. R. Civ. P. 5 6 have been satisfie d. See Hunter v. Brown , 955 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn . 1997). As this inquiry involves purely a question of law, our revi

ew is de novo without a

presumption of correctness. Robinson v. Omer , 952 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn. 1997); McClung
v. Delta Square Ltd. P

artnership , 937 S.W.2d

891, 894 (Tenn. 1996). Summary judgments

are appropriate o

nly where there is no g

enuine issue of material fact relevant to the claim or

defense contained in the m

otion and the

moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the undisp uted facts. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03; Bain v. Wells , 936 S.W.2d 618 , 622 (Tenn. 1997) ; Carvell v. Bottoms , 900 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995). C ourts review ing summary judgments

must view the

evidence in

the light most fa

vorable to the nonm

oving party and draw all

reasonable

inferences in the non moving party’s favor. Omer , 952 S.W.2d at 426; Byrd v. Hall , 847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993 ). In view of these standards, w

e turn now to the lega

l principles involved i

n this appeal.

III.

With respect to defamatory statements, this Court has pre viou sly held that-5- For a communication to be lib elous, i t must constitute a serious threat to the plaint iff’s reputation. A lib el does not occur simply

because the subje

ct of a publicatio

n finds the pu blication annoying, offensive or embarrassing. The words must reasonably be construable as holding the plaintiff up to public hatred, contempt or ridicule. They must carry with them an elem ent “of disgrace.” Stones River Motors, Inc. v. Mid -South Publishing Co., Inc. , 651 S.W.2d 713 , 719 (Tenn. Ct. App
. 1983) (citations omitted). In addition, “t he damaging wor

ds must be factually false. If the w ords are true, or essentially tru

e, they are n

ot actionable

even though the statement contains other inaccuracies which are not damaging.” Id. at 719.

Whether a communication is ca

pab le of conveying a defamatory meaning is a question of law. Pate v. Service Merchandise Co., Inc. , 959 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). Review by the a ppellate c ourt of th e trial cou rt’s determination

is de novo. Baner v. Murphy , 530 N.W .2 d 1 (Wis. App. 1995). Allegedly defamatory statem ents should be judged within the context in which they are made. Norse v. Henry H olt & Co. , 991 F.2d 563 (9th Ci r. 1993). They shouldbe read as a person of ordinary intelligen ce would understand them in light of the surrounding circu mstances. Pate v. Service Merchandise Co., Inc. , 959 S.W.2d

569 (Tenn. Ct. A

pp. 1996); McKethan

v. Texas Farm B

ureau , 996 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1993).

Opinions are not automa tically protec

ted b y th e United States C onstituti on, Milkovich v. Lora in Journal Co. , 497 U .S. 1 (1 990) , but s ome states still hold that s tatements of opinion al one are not actionab le. See 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 161 . The Restatement (foll owed b y the Su preme Courtin Milkovich ) pos ition i s that an opinion ma y be actionable if the-6-

communicated

opinion may reasonably be understood to imply the existence of undisclosed defam

atory facts j ustifying

the opinion. Restatement (2d) of Torts § 566
. Using these principles, we will exam ine the stateme

nts made by McClean. First, he allege dly told Revis’ fellow employ ees (in the presenc

e of supervisory e mployee s) that there was no room at the pla nt for someone l

ike Revis or that there was no room at the plan t for Revis’ atti

tude. In our opinion, in the context of a union e lection at a ma

nufacturing plant the se wor d s are not
a ctionabl e. They consist entirely of McClean’s opinion about Revis’ attitude, and they do not hold Rev

is up to public hatred, c

ontempt, or ri

dicule. The

other employees would

probably applaud

Revis’ anti-management attitude and rejoice that it had had the desi

red effect.
Second, McClean allegedly posted the letter sta

ting that Revis had made a mena cing, threatening, denigrating, conte

mptuous, and insub

ordinate face athim, causing him

to fear for his saf

ety and the safe

ty of others. T

he basis for his concer n was Revis ’ recent susp ension for having a te mper and m

aking abusiveand intimidating comments to others. The description of t he look on Revis’ face is nothing more thanMcClean’s opinion , and the effect itproduced
on him is an opinion

based on the disclosed non-defamator y fact that Re

vis had been suspended for threatening and cursing another employee. We hold that as
amatter of law

the statements

in the letter did not seriously th reaten Revis’ reputation or hold him up to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.As we find the sta tementsat issue were not de famatory , we find

no need to address the is sue of the publication of such stateme nts.

The judgment of the

court below is aff

irmed and t

he cause re manded to the Circuit Court of Dickson County for any further proceedings nec essar y. Tax the costs on appe

al to the appellant,

William J.Revis.

______________________________ BEN H. CANTRELL, PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.
CONCUR:

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE

WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE