United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Task Force on International Affairs,

Committee on the Budget, U.S. Senate

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

10:00 a.m., EST

Thursday,

February 26, 1998

EXPORT PROMOTION

Issues for Assessing the

Governmentwide Strategy

Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Associate Director,

International Relations and Trade Issues, National

Security and International Affairs Division

GAO/T-NSIAD-98-105

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Task Force:

We are pleased to be here today to discuss issues related to the U.S.

government’s role in promoting exports. In enacting legislation in 1992

calling for a coordinated national strategy for promoting and financing

U.S. exports, the Congress was aware of the vital and ever-increasing role

that exports play in creating the new jobs driving the economic growth of

the United States. The legislation established in statute the Trade

Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC), comprised of more than a

dozen federal departments and agencies, to bring coherence and direction

to the federal government’s efforts to help U.S. companies export more

goods and services. Export promotion efforts include diverse programs,

such as providing U.S. businesses with market research and trade leads,

business counseling, high-level government advocacy through the use of

trade missions, and export finance.

Our comments today will address two points: (1) the evolution of the

government strategy designed to reshape federal export promotion

activities and (2) the results and issues related to our past work on U.S.

government efforts to improve U.S. export promotion programs. Our

remarks are based largely on past GAO reports and testimonies, a list of

which is attached.

Summary The Congress, in enacting the Export Enhancement Act of 1992, required

the TPCC to take steps to improve the delivery of export assistance to U.S.

firms. The TPCC efforts have focused on three broad areas: (1) devising a

governmentwide strategy and a unified budget that would set priorities,

(2) developing partnerships with all levels of government and the private

sector, and (3) dealing with obstacles that U.S. businesses encounter as

they compete against businesses supported by their foreign governments.

The TPCC has taken a number of steps in each of these areas, but some of

their goals remain elusive. With respect to the strategy, the cooperating

agencies have established priority foreign markets and increased the

visibility of the components and distribution of the aggregate federal

expenditures on export promotion activities. Partnerships have been

developed through a number of initiatives, including a network of export

assistance centers to help unify the delivery of export promotion services,

and making the U.S. Export-Import Bank’s (Eximbank) and the Small

Business Administration’s (SBA) working capital program procedures more

Page 1 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-105 Export Promotion
consistent to enable exporters to receive financing more easily. The TPCC

has also worked to keep U.S. financing programs fully competitive.

Our work also suggests that outstanding issues remain regarding the

effectiveness of the cooperative efforts of the agencies under the TPCC to

achieve the congressional objectives of the 1992 legislation. For example,

while the expenditures of federal export promotion agencies are now

clearly presented in one place, major challenges remain for achieving the

unified budget that would align resources with national priorities and

program performance. While the Department of Commerce and the SBA

have colocated in 19 cities, with some closer ties with Eximbank officials,

no evaluation has been completed on how effectively these centers are

operating to achieve the intended objective of streamlining the delivery

and quality of services to small- and medium-sized businesses. The

elapsing of 5 years since the passage of the Export Enhancement Act1

provides a good opportunity for the Congress to assess the achievements

and remaining challenges of the effort to strategize, streamline, and

coordinate the wide array of federal export promotion efforts through the

institutional mechanism of the TPCC.

Evolution of

Government Strategy

for Addressing Export

Needs of U.S.

Businesses

When the Congress passed title II of the Export Enhancement Act of 1992,

it was concerned that the existing federal export promotion programs

lacked coordination and an overall strategy.2

 Before 1992, a business

desiring to export goods or services faced a bureaucratic labyrinth of

federal and state agencies to get information on markets, financing,

insurance, methods, and restrictions on exporting. In addition, a business

might have noted that there were over a dozen federal agencies with more

than 100 export promotion programs. To improve export services, the

Congress mandated, in the 1992 act, that the TPCC develop a

governmentwide strategic plan that establishes priorities for federal

activities supporting U.S. exports, and propose an annual unified federal

trade promotion budget that supports the plan.3

 The Congress also

directed the Commerce Department to set up centralized export

1

Public Law 102-429 (Oct. 21, 1992).

2

We have previously reported that the absence of a governmentwide strategy had resulted in an ad hoc

approach to export promotion. This approach lacked clear priorities and overlooked opportunities for

improved delivery of services to exporters. See Export Promotion: Federal Programs Lack

Organizational and Funding Cohesiveness (GAO/NSIAD-92-49, Jan. 10, 1992).

3

The TPCC was originally established by the President in May 1990. The 1992 act provided a statutory

basis for the TPCC to give it more permanence and a stronger role in bringing coherence and direction

to federal export promotion efforts.

Page 2 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-105 Export Promotion
assistance centers. In addition, the act specified that the TPCC,

4

 chaired by

the Secretary of Commerce, would report annually to the Congress on the

national export strategy and its implementation.

The first TPCC strategy, issued in 1993, identified impediments to effective

delivery of export promotion services and made 65 recommendations to

improve export promotion programs.

Specifically, the TPCC expected that

• development of a government strategy would be helped by devising

performance measures as a means to reallocate resources and attain a

unified budget;

• establishment of partnerships with the public and private sectors would be

assisted by such actions as simplifying federal services, setting up

“one-stop shops” for exporters, and streamlining the export working

capital programs of the Eximbank and the SBA; and

• provision of export services for U.S. exporters similar to those received by

foreign competitors would help U.S. companies compete on a “level

playing field” abroad.

The TPCC has subsequently issued four further National Export Strategy

reports. In these reports, the TPCC continued to highlight its pursuit of the

major themes that emphasized achieving efficient delivery of export

services. The later strategies also focused on specific initiatives such as

improving trade data, establishing an advocacy network, and eliminating

barriers to fair competition such as bribery and corruption.

Results of Our Past

Work on Government

Efforts to Improve

U.S. Export

Promotion Programs

Our past work has focused on several elements of the governmentwide

strategy to improve the delivery of export promotion programs. We will

highlight the results of our work concerning the three broad and

continuing themes of the TPCC strategy and then outline some issues that

may be raised in the context of the overall governmentwide strategy.

4

The TPCC membership includes representatives from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce,

State, Defense, Energy, the Interior, Labor, Transportation, and the Treasury; the Agency for

International Development; the Environmental Protection Agency; the U.S. Trade and Development

Agency; the U.S. Information Agency; the SBA; the Eximbank; and the Overseas Private Investment

Corporation (OPIC).

Page 3 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-105 Export Promotion
Efforts to Develop a

Governmentwide Strategy

and a Unified Budget

In 1996, we examined the TPCC’s progress toward establishing a

governmentwide strategy for promoting exports and toward devising an

annual unified federal budget to promote exports that reflects these

priorities.5

 At that time, we reported that governmentwide export

promotion priorities were being identified in terms of foreign markets,

export programs, and export policies and that agencies were exercising

flexibility in focusing their efforts. The centerpiece of the strategy was the

identification of the “big emerging markets” as priority markets for U.S.

goods and services.6

 We also examined whether the TPCC had proposed to

the President an annual unified budget, as required by the Export

Enhancement Act, that would support the strategic plan and eliminate

funding for any areas of overlap and duplication. As we have testified in

the past, one of the indicators of whether the unified budget is working

would be whether the budget changed the distribution of resources to the

various priorities, programs, and agencies.7

We found that the TPCC had prepared and included in the National Export

Strategy budget presentations that displayed each member agency’s

historical and prospective export expenditures on export promotion, using

tables showing spending from different perspectives. For example, the

1997 National Export Strategy displayed the distribution of federal

spending by budget authority and across various trade promotion

categories, such as providing information counseling and export services,

combating foreign export subsidies, and providing government advocacy.

We observed that this step had helped foster a better understanding of

federal expenditures for export promotion. However, we emphasized that

performance measures would be needed to provide a basis for the

allocation of export promotion resources. According to TPCC officials, they

recently reviewed TPCC agency strategic plans as a step toward ensuring

that the budget priorities are fully aligned with the TPCC’s commercial

policy goals.

5

National Export Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-96-132R, Mar. 26, 1996).

6

These markets include the Chinese economic area (including Taiwan and Hong Kong); South Korea;

India; the Association of South East Asian Nations (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,

Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam); South Africa; Brazil; Argentina; Mexico; Poland; and Turkey.

7

See Export Promotion: Initial Assessment of Governmentwide Strategic Plan (GAO/T-GGD-93-48,

Sept. 29, 1993).

Page 4 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-105 Export Promotion
Steps Taken to Help U.S.

Businesses Through Public

and Private Sector

Partnerships

Another major thrust of the TPCC’s efforts was to improve the delivery of

federal export promotion services by developing greater cooperation

among federal, public, and private entities. One significant effort was the

creation of a nationwide network of 19 “one-stop-shops,” called U.S.

Export Assistance Centers. The TPCC sought to present exporters with a

“seamless” delivery of services rather than a confusing network of federal

programs with multiple domestic offices.

Another initiative was to help small- and medium-sized businesses by

increasing the availability of export working capital and making the

Eximbank’s and the SBA’s export working capital programs and procedures

more streamlined, consistent, and simple. This “harmonization” initiative

was to address exporter and lender concerns about overlap and confusion

over federal program parameters and procedures.

Export Assistance Centers In creating the nationwide network of one-stop shops, representatives of

the Department of Commerce and the SBA—two federal agencies with

extensive export promotion field networks—were combined and, in some

cases, the Eximbank representatives were included as well. These export

assistance centers were designed to (1) provide exporters with

information on all U.S. government export promotion and export finance

services, (2) assist exporters in identifying which federal programs may be

of greatest assistance, and (3) help exporters make contact with those

federal programs.

We reviewed the implementation of the first four export assistance centers

and reported to the Congress in July 1996 on both the benefits realized as

well as the opportunities for improving their operations.8

 In general, we

found that staff and customers of the four centers we visited believed that

colocating agency staff helped U.S. firms gain access to and become more

knowledgeable about a broader range of federal export services. We also

identified specific initiatives at the centers that demonstrated the potential

benefits that can be derived through working more closely with federal

and nonfederal partner organizations.

In addition, we identified steps that were needed to improve the delivery

of services. For example, we found that the export assistance centers’

Directors did not have (1) the ability to affect interagency cooperation and

teamwork and (2) adequate authority over center expenditures and an

8

The first four centers were established in Baltimore, Chicago, Long Beach, and Miami. See U.S.

Export Assistance Centers: Customer Service Enhanced, but Potential to Improve Operations Exists

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-213, July 25, 1996).

Page 5 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-105 Export Promotion
export assistance centerwide accounting system that would enable them

to accurately identify and allocate costs and better manage expenditures.

Moreover, we found that the assistance centers did not have an integrated

client tracking system.

Harmonization According to the TPCC, one of the greatest obstacles to increased U.S.

exports faced by small- and medium-sized businesses is the lack of

sufficient working capital—capital that is used to finance the manufacture

or purchase of goods and services. Since the Eximbank and the SBA have

programs designed to increase the availability of export working capital

for businesses, the TPCC recommended that the Eximbank and the SBA

harmonize their programs and procedures to make them more

streamlined, consistent, and simple.

In February 1997, we reported9

 that the Eximbank and the SBA had made

progress in harmonizing certain aspects of their respective programs,

including the loan guarantee coverage, the application form, and initial

loan application fee. We also noted that each agency had taken other steps

to improve program delivery, such as providing staff with export financing

training, conducting seminars that were attended by lenders, and

developing partnerships with both the private and public sectors. These

partnerships include programs in which (1) exporters can have working

capital guarantees processed and approved by a network of private sector

lenders located in various states and (2) federal resources are leveraged

through coguarantee agreements with state agencies. In addition, we had

identified eight states that provided export working capital guarantees for

small businesses during fiscal year 1996.10

Although the Eximbank and SBA programs were still not fully standardized

at the time our report was issued, the steps toward harmonization and

other program initiatives had helped to simplify the lending process,

increase the number and value of loans guaranteed, and expand the

number of exporters and lenders who participate in the programs.

9

See Export Finance: Federal Efforts to Support Working Capital Needs of Small Business

(GAO/NSIAD-97-20, Feb. 13, 1997).

10California had the largest program of the eight states. The seven other states with export working

capital programs were Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and South

Carolina.

Page 6 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-105 Export Promotion
Potential for Greater

Sharing of Investment Risk

Our past work has also highlighted another potential opportunity to

develop partnerships with public and private sector entities by sharing

investment risk. In 1993, the TPCC recommended raising OPIC’s project

limits for loans, guarantees, or insurance to better meet the rising demand

by U.S. firms to finance major capital projects overseas. The increase in

OPIC insurance cover from $100 million to $200 million (as well as its

project financing limits) and the private sector’s willingness to have

greater involvement in some emerging markets had created opportunities

for OPIC to further reduce the risk in its insurance program by sharing the

risk with other private or public partners. In recent work,11 we identified

three potential options for sharing project risks. For example, OPIC could,

on a case-by-case basis, share the risk of losses by reinsuring or coinsuring

projects with the private insurers and sharing project risk with investors.

Under the reinsurance scenario, OPIC could insure part of its high- and

medium-risk portfolio with private sector insurance companies at

mutually acceptable rates. OPIC could also coinsure projects with private or

other public insurers. A third option could involve sharing project risk

with investors by offering less then the 20-year standard insurance cover,

as is the practice with other public insurers. In commenting on our report,

OPIC officials told us that while reinsurance, coinsurance, and greater

risk-sharing may be good risk mitigation strategies, they cautioned that

they should maintain flexibility about when to use them so that OPIC can

continue meeting U.S. foreign policy objectives and the needs of the

customers.

Efforts to Ensure Foreign

Competition Does Not

Disadvantage U.S.

Businesses

According to the TPCC, the competition for major procurements by foreign

countries is fierce. Major foreign competitor nations, which have

subsidized export programs, have become increasingly aggressive in

helping their firms expand exports. In particular, the TPCC noted that the

availability and competitiveness of export financing often played a

decisive role in the export success of U.S. companies. In general, the U.S.

approach has been to help neutralize foreign competitor nation support of

its exporters by providing similar financing for U.S. exporters. This

requires accurate information on the nature and extent of the foreign

competitor programs. The U.S. approach has also involved working

through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

11See Overseas Investment: Issues Related to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation’s

Reauthorization (GAO/NSIAD-97-230, Sept. 8, 1997).

Page 7 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-105 Export Promotion
(OECD)12 to seek international agreements to standardize practices, with

the ultimate goal of reducing and eliminating export subsidies.

Past GAO work has addressed the nature and extent of U.S. foreign

competitors’ export finance programs, a key U.S. effort to combat foreign

competitor practices, and opportunities for reducing the cost of the

Eximbank’s programs while remaining competitive with programs of

competitor export credit agencies.

Other Countries’ Programs Over 70 countries have export credit agencies designed to help businesses

export.13 Various methods can be used to measure the level of support

provided by export credit agencies. One way is to look at support in terms

of the share of financing commitments extended. About half of all export

credit support extended in 1995 (the latest year for which comparable data

are available) was provided by the seven largest industrial nations. Of this

amount, Japan (56 percent), France (20 percent), and Germany (9 percent)

accounted for the largest shares. The United States (the Eximbank)

ranked fourth with Canada (each with 5 percent), followed by the United

Kingdom (3 percent) and Italy (2 percent).

Another way is to look at the percentage of national exports financed by

the seven export credit agencies. Using this approach, the Eximbank is

tied for last with 2 percent of total exports. In contrast, Japan supported

32 percent of its country’s exports, with France second at 18 percent. The

support provided by Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy

ranged from 7 to 2 percent. Although these measurements do not show the

Eximbank near the top of the highest Group of Seven countries providers,

other measures present a different picture. For example, the Eximbank

data show that it remains preeminent with respect to the number of

markets for which unrestricted medium- and long-term cover is

provided—more than twice as many markets as Canada, its nearest

competitor.

Although comparing the export credit agency programs is difficult, we

studied the five largest exporting countries of the European Union and

12The OECD, created in 1960, is a forum for monitoring economic trends and coordinating economic

policy among 29 countries, including the United States. It serves as the forum for negotiating

limitations on government export credit subsidies and developing guidelines for export-financing

assistance programs.

13Euromoney publishes an annual survey of world export credit agencies.

Page 8 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-105 Export Promotion
found that there is no single export finance model.14 One fundamental

difference between the Eximbank and these export credit agencies is the

concept of risk sharing. The Eximbank provides 100-percent,

unconditional political and commercial risk protection on most of the

medium- and long-term coverage it issues. The European agencies (with

the exception of the United Kingdom) generally require exporters and

banks to assume a portion of the risks (usually 5 to 10 percent) associated

with such support.

On the multilateral front, the United States has participated in negotiations

with the OECD to implement agreements or initiate efforts to limit

government subsidies and provide common guidelines for national

export-financing assistance programs. The OECD’s Arrangement on

Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits set terms and

conditions for government-supported export loans. The agreement has

been progressively strengthened since it was first established in 1978.

U.S. Efforts to Combat

Tied Aid Practices

Competitor’s tied aid15 practices are also of concern to the United

States—in particular when contract awards for overseas projects are

based on the availability of such concessional financing rather than on the

basis of price and quality of the goods or services exported. Such practices

can distort recipient countries’ development decisions and place U.S.

exporters at a competitive disadvantage. Since the early 1980s, the United

States has negotiated a series of increasingly stronger agreements within

the OECD to restrict the use of distorting tied aid. In addition, in 1986 the

Congress authorized the Eximbank to create a “war chest” fund to counter

other countries’ use of tied aid offers.

To meet foreign competitors’ use of tied aid, the TPCC recommended the

development and implementation of strategies to further reduce the use of

tied aid worldwide. In 1994, the Eximbank announced a new policy for

responding to competitors’ tied aid offers. Rather than using the fund to

enforce the OECD agreement, Eximbank was to become more actively

involved in trying to deter tied aid at an earlier stage in a project’s

development. The Eximbank’s policy was to issue tied aid “willingness to

14Our review covered the programs of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United

Kingdom. See Export Finance: Comparative Analysis of U.S. and European Union Export Credit

Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-1, Oct. 24, 1995).

15“Tied aid” refers to foreign assistance that is linked to the purchase of exports from the country

extending the assistance. Tied aid can consist of (1) foreign aid grants alone, (2) grants mixed with

commercial financing or official export credits (“mixed credits”), or (3) concessional

(low-interest-rate) loans.

Page 9 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-105 Export Promotion
match” indications and “letters of interest,” which are contingent

commitments to match foreign tied aid should it be offered. In 1995, we

testified that although it was too early to determine the effect of the U.S.

strategy, there were initial indications of progress.16

Reducing Eximbank Costs Our past work has also highlighted two broad options—raising fees for

services and reducing program risks—that would allow the Eximbank to

reduce subsidies while remaining competitive with foreign export credit

agencies.17 These options would not require a change in the Eximbank’s

present authority. However, we acknowledged that these options would

need to be considered within the full context of their trade and foreign

policy implications.

One option for reducing subsidy costs at the Eximbank would be to

increase the fees charged for its financing programs while still satisfying

the congressional mandate for setting fees at levels that are fully

competitive with competitor nation programs. To illustrate, we estimated

that the Eximbank could have saved about $84 million in fiscal year 1995 if

it had raised its fees to a level where they were at the mid-range (as low as

or lower than 45 percent to 50 percent rather than at about 75 percent) of

the fees charged by competitor nation programs in the same importing

country.

The U.S. government continues to use international forums such as the

OECD to work toward reducing and eventually eliminating subsidized

export finance programs. Since our report was issued, the OECD countries

have made progress in establishing minimum fees across all major export

credit agencies. In 1997, the OECD set a minimum fee for services, effective

in April 1999. Given concerns about keeping the Eximbank’s programs

competitive with its competitor nations’ programs, this agreement should

provide the Eximbank with a greater opportunity to further reduce the

costs of its operations by raising fees.

Another option for reducing subsidy costs involves reducing program

risks. As stated earlier, the Eximbank provides 100-percent, unconditional

political and commercial risk protection on virtually all of the mediumand long-term cover that it issues. Some of the Eximbank’s major

16See International Trade: U.S. Efforts to Counter Competitors’ Tied Aid Practices

(GAO/T-GGD-95-128, Mar. 28, 1995.

17See Export-Import Bank: Options for Achieving Possible Budget Reductions (GAO/NSIAD-97-7,

Dec. 20, 1996).

Page 10 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-105 Export Promotion
competitors, such as the European export credit agencies, on the other

hand, generally require exporters and banks to assume a portion of the

risks associated with such support and do not absorb 100 percent of the

risks themselves. Instead, they require that exporters or banks assume a

minimum percentage (usually 5 percent to 10 percent) of the risks.

Conclusions Five years have passed since the Congress mandated that the TPCC develop

a governmentwide strategy for federal export promotion activities. A key

question is whether federal export programs and resources are

strategically focused to help U.S. businesses effectively compete in foreign

markets.

The federal strategy targets markets, centralizes export services, and

addresses unfair barriers to exports. However, a driving force behind the

passage of the Export Enhancement Act was to identify areas of overlap

and duplication among the various federal export promotion activities and

propose means of eliminating them. A key requisite to allocating export

promotion resources is performance measures. The TPCC agencies have

developed measures that indicate outputs such as volume of loans or

number of clients and outcome measures such as numbers of exports

generated by individual programs. However, these measures are not

sufficient to address a core objective of whether these programs meet the

TPCC’s strategic goals and efficiently and effectively serve their customers.

Another key element of the act was to identify ways to develop closer

partnerships with federal and nonfederal entities that provide similar

export promotion services. While a number of initiatives have been taken,

our past review of the export assistance centers raised several issues

related to the integration of the delivery of services. The TPCC agencies

have not since evaluated how effectively these centers are operating to

achieve the intended objective of streamlining the delivery and quality of

services to small- and medium-sized business. The TPCC plans to review the

effectiveness of the centers in 1998. Until such a review occurs, we cannot

know if these colocated agencies have integrated their services to

effectively serve U.S. exporters.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared remarks. We would be happy

to respond to any questions you or other Task Force members may have.

Page 11 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-105 Export Promotion
Related GAO Products

Government Export

Strategy

National Export Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-96-132R, Mar. 26, 1996).

Export Promotion: Rationales for and Against Government Programs and

Expenditures (GAO/T-GGD-95-169, May 23, 1995).

Export Promotion: Governmentwide Plan Contributes to Improvements

(GAO/T-GGD-94-35, Oct. 26, 1993).

Export Promotion: Initial Assessment of Governmentwide Strategic Plan

(GAO/T-GGD-93-48, Sept. 29, 1993).

Export Promotion Strategic Plan: Will it Be a Vehicle for Change?

(GAO/GGD-93-43, July 26, 1993).

Export Promotion: Governmentwide Strategy Needed for Federal

Programs (GAO/T-GGD-93-7, Mar. 15, 1993).

Export Promotion: Federal Approach Is Fragmented (GAO/T-GGD-92-68,

Aug. 10, 1992).

Export Promotion: Overall U.S. Strategy Needed (GAO/T-GGD-92-40, May 20,

1992).

Export Promotion: U.S. Programs Lack Coherence (GAO/T-GGD-92-19, Mar. 4,

1992).

Export Promotion: Federal Programs Lack Organizational and Funding

Cohesiveness (GAO/NSIAD-92-49, Jan. 10, 1992).

Export Finance and

Investment

Overseas Investment: Issues Related to the Overseas Private Investment

Corporation’s Reauthorization (GAO/NSIAD-97-230, Sept. 8, 1997).

Export Finance: Federal Efforts to Support Working Capital Needs of

Small Business (GAO/NSIAD-97-20, Feb. 13, 1997).

Export Import Bank: Options for Achieving Possible Budget Reductions

(GAO/NSIAD-97-7, Dec. 20, 1996).

Export Finance: Comparative Analysis of U.S. and European Union Export

Credit Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-1, Oct. 24, 1995).

Page 12 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-105 Export Promotion
Related GAO Products

Export Promotion: Improving Small Businesses’ Access to Federal

Programs GAO/T-GGD-93-22, Apr. 28, 1993).

Federal Export

Assistance

U.S. Export Assistance Centers: Customer Service Enhanced, but Potential

to Improve Operations Exists (GAO/T-NSIAD-96-213, July 25, 1996).

One-Stop Shops (GAO/GGD-93-IR, Oct. 6, 1992).

Foreign Competition U.S. Agricultural Exports: Strong Growth Likely, but U.S. Export

Assistance Programs’ Contribution Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-97-260, Sept. 30,

1997).

Export-Import Bank: Key Factors in Considering Eximbank

Reauthorization (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-215, July 17, 1997).

Export-Import Bank: Reauthorization Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-147, Apr. 29,

1997).

International Trade: U.S. Efforts to Counter Competitors’ Tied Aid

Practices (GAO/T-GGD-95-128, Mar. 28, 1995).

International Trade: Combating U.S. Competitors’ Tied Aid Practices

(GAO/T-GGD-94-156, May 25, 1994).

(711316) Page 13 GAO/T-NSIAD-98-105 Export Promotion
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