COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Alston, Cha fin and Senior Judge Haley

JAMES McGRIFF MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 0872- 18-3 PER CURIAM DECEMBER 11, 2018 CITY OF ROANOKE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE David B. Carson, Judge (Thomas E. Wray, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitt ing on brief. (Daniel J. Callaghan, City Att orney; Heather P. Ferguson, Ass istant City Attorney; Shannon L. Jones, Guardian ad litem for the minor child, on brief), for appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on brief.
James McGriff (father) argues that the circuit court erred in terminating his parental rights to his child. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties , we conclude that the circuit court did not err. Accordingly, we affi rm the decision of the circui t court. BACKGROUND “On appeal, ‘we view the evidenc e and all reason able inferences in the light most favorable to the prevailing part y below, in this case the Department.’” Farrell v. Warren Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 59 Va. App. 375, 386, 719 S.E.2d 329, 334 (2012) (quoting Jenkins v. Winchester Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 12 Va. App. 1178, 1180, 409 S. E.2d 16, 18 (1991)).

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this op inion is not designated fo r publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - Father and Loren Hunt (mother) are the biological parents of t he child, J.M. 1 At the time of J.M.’s birth, father and moth er were married, but they divor ced when J.M. was approximately two years old. After father and m other separated, he infrequen tly visited with J.M., and then, father moved out of the area whe n J.M. was three years old. In March 2016, mother was partic ipating in drug court, stemmin g from a charge of selling leased property. She a nd her two childre n, J.M. and M. H., were living at the Rescue Mission. On March 18, 2016, she tested positive for drugs and was incarcerated for thirty days. Mother told the City of Roanoke D epartment of Social Services ( the Department) that the children could not stay with their biological fathers because f ather was incarcerated and she recently had obtained a protective order against Eric Hunt. Mo ther indicated that a friend could care for the children w hile she was incarce rated. Mother also advised that J.M. was diagnosed with ADHD, oppositional defiant di sorder (ODD), and sensory pro cessing issues, and he was taking prescription medicine for his behavioral issues. After speaking with mother’s fri end who agreed to care for the children, the Department transported J.M. and M.H. to the friend’s home on March 18, 201 6. At the time, J.M. was six years old, and M.H. was two year s old. The Department visited the friend’s home on March 21, 2016, and found that J.M. was “extr emely hyperactive and defian t.” Mother’s friend informed the Department that she only coul d care for the children for a few more days because she did not have child care for the childre n while she was at work and the children required constant supervision. Mother did not have any other family or friends w ho could act as alternative placements, so on March 22, 2016, the Department obtained tempo rary legal custody of the children. The Department placed the children in separate foste r homes because of J.M.’s behaviors toward M.H. The Roa noke City Juvenile and Domestic R elations District Court (the

1 Mother has another minor chil d, M.H., whose biological father is Eric Hunt.- 3 - JDR court) adjudicated that J.M . was abused or neglected, and o n May 17, 2016, it entered the dispositional order. From October 28, 2015 until May 5, 2017, father was incarcerat ed for felony drug distribution and possession, c onspiracy, and possession of a fi rearm. Although father was incarcerated, he wrote l etters to the Department to inquire abo ut J.M. Shortly after his release, on May 12, 2017, father contacted the D epartment, which informe d him that to be able to assume custody of J.M., father had to participate in individual counse ling, a substance abuse assessment, and a parenting course. The Depart ment required father to obta in and maintain employment and housing, which he did. 2 Although father had stable empl oyment, he did not comply with t he remainder of the Department’s requests. The De partment acknowledged that father ’s housing was appropriate for him, but was concerned that it might not have been appropriate for J.M. Father lived in a two-bedroom residence with som eone he had met at Narcotics Anon ymous. The Department explained that father’s friend w ould have to submit to a backgr ound check and child protective services check. Father told the Department that the background checks were not necessary because he did not plan to stay at the residence long-term. Father also told the Departmen t that after he had been released from jail, he had not used drugs for approximately two year s and had been a member of Narc otics Anonymous since 1991, so he did not believe that he need ed the substance abuse assess ment. Despite the Department explaining to father that, because of his criminal charges, it was concerned about the possibility of a relapse after he was relea sed from jail, father never comp lied with the substance abuse assessment. The Department referred father to a specific paren ting class with a “hands on portion,” but the class interfer ed with father’s work schedule. Instead, father completed a

2 Stable employment and housing als o were part of father’s proba tion requirements.- 4 - different parenting class that he could coordinate with his work schedule, which did not have a “hands on portion.” The Departmen t also referred father to Fam ily Services for individual counseling; however, f ather told the Depar tment that he did not need counseling and refused to
go. The Department provided father with additional services, inclu ding visitation with J.M., which began after father was rel eased from incarceration. J.M. did not want to visit father because he did not know father and had believed that his stepfa ther was his biological father. Although J.M. was “very hesitant” and anxious during the first visit with father, the visits slowly improved. The visitations were “essentially uneventful” becaus e J.M. spent a lot of time watching videos on father’s phone. Fa ther tried to engage with J.M., but J.M. was not very responsive. After J.M. starte d visiting with fat her, the Depar tment noticed that J.M.’s anxiety and hyperactivity increased. In August 2017, the Department ha d to intervene during a visit between father and J.M. because father made inappropriate state ments to J.M. Father became “very frustrated” with the socia l worker and told her that she could not tell him how to parent and what to say to J.M. Meanwhile, J.M. became “visibly upset. ” Since father became so emotional, the Department ende d the visit. Father went outside and “was just yelling and very loud and very angry and cursing,” wh ile the social worker took J.M. to the car. On August 22, 2017, the JDR court deni ed the Department’s peti tion to terminate father’s parental rights and disapproved t he foster care plan with the g oal of adoption. The Department appealed the JDR court’s ru lings to the circuit court. The parties appeared before th e circuit court on January 24 an d April 3, 2018. The Department presented evidence th at when J.M. entered foster car e, he “really struggled with any type of boundaries” and rules. J.M . continued his m edication a nd seeing his previous doctor for medication management. Due to his foster care placement, J.M. switched schools and- 5 - participated in therapeutic day t reatment services. The Department also arranged for counseling for J.M., beginning in September 2016, and his therapist diagno sed him with post-traumatic stress disorder. In June 2017, J.M.’ s therapist met with fathe r, and they discussed J.M. and parenting strategies. J.M. did notreact well af ter visiting w ith father, and J.M . regressed with some of his behavioral issues. The Department stated that it was seeking termination of fathe r’s parental rights because father was incarcerated for ove r a year while J.M. was in foste r care. Then, once father was released from jail, he refused t o participate in many of the se rvices required by the Department. The Department also was concerne d that despite having consisten t visitation, father and J.M. had “no connection.” Father testified that he did not t rust the Department and its services. He explained that he did not need to take a substance abuse assessment because he ha d been clean for years and was actively participating in Narcotics Anonymous meetings. Furthe rmore, father testified that he did not need individual couns eling, so he was not going to go. He further explained that he could not go to the parenting class that t he Department recommended b ecause of his work hours, so he chose a different parenting cla ss to attend. Father regularly attended visitations until March 2018, when the Department stopped father’s visits. Lastly, fat her informed the circuit court that he had just paid a security depos it on his own one-bedroom apar tment, but could qualify for a larger unit if necessary. Father told the circuit court that h e loved J.M. and wan ted to take care of him. At the conclusion of all of the e vidence, the circuit court re quested that the parties submit their closing arguments in wr iting, which they did. On April 2 4, 2018, the circuit court issued a letter opinion finding that it was in J.M.’s best interest to t erminate mother and father’s parental- 6 - rights and approve the goa l of adoption. On April 27, 2018, th e circuit court entered final orders memorializing its rulings . This appeal followed. 3
ANALYSIS “On review, ‘[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly wei ghed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its determinati on based on the child’s best interests.’” Castillo v. Loudoun C ty. Dep’t of Family Servs., 68 Va. App. 547, 558, 811 S.E.2d 835, 840-41 (2018) (quoting Logan v. Fairf ax Cty. Dep’t of Huma n Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991)). “Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus , its finding is entitled to great weight a nd will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Fauquier Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Ridgeway, 59 Va. App. 185, 190, 717 S.E.2d 811, 814 (2011) (quoting Martin v. Pittsylvania Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986)). Father argues that the circu it court erred by terminating his parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C)(2). Fathe r admits that he did not c omply with all of the Department’s requests, but he e mphasizes that he has a job and housing and participates in Narcotics Anonymous. He also cont ends that completing a parent ing class, albeit not the one recommended by the Department, should have been sufficient. Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) states that a court may terminate parent al rights if: [t]he parent or parents, w ithout good cause, have been unwillin g or unable within a reasonable period of time not to exceed 12 months from the date the child was placed in foster care to remedy substantially the condi tions which led to or required continuat ion of the child’s foster care p lacement, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental h ealth or other rehabilitative agencies to such end.

3 Mother also appealed the circu it court’s rulings. See Hunt v. City of Roanoke Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Record No. 0811-18-3.- 7 - “[S]ubsection C termination d ecisions hinge not so much on the magnitude of the problem that created the origi nal danger to the child, but on t he demonstrated failure of the parent to make reasonable changes.” Toms v. Hanover Dep’t of S oc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 257, 271, 616 S.E.2d 765, 772 (2005). The Department referred father to numerous services after he w as released from jail. Father, however, chose not to part icipate in many of those serv ices, including a substance abuse assessment, individual counseli ng, and a “hands on” parenting c lass. By not complying with these requirements, father had not substantially remedied the c onditions that required the continuation of foster care for J.M. At the time of the April 3, 2018 hearing, J.M. had been in fos ter care for more than two years. The Department’s eviden ce proved that J.M. had special needs. His counselor testified that J.M. was “very sensitive t o changes” and needed structure, a routine, and a “safe [and] stable home.” His counselor opined that it was important for J.M.’s c aregivers to “understand how to work with a child who has a tra uma history and how to handle hi s tantrums, how to sort of provide kind and firm boundaries with him.” Father acknowledge d that he had not been involved in J.M.’s life for a num ber of years and was not aware of the trauma that he had experienced. Father was not i n a position to care for J.M. at the time of the circuit court hearings. “It is clearly not i n the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or even i f, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.” T ackett v. Arlington Cty. Dep’t of Human Se rvs., 62 Va. App. 296, 322, 746 S.E.2d 509, 522 (2013) (quoting Kayw ood v. Halifax Cty. Dep’t o f Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990)). Considering the totality of the evidence, the circuit court di d not err in terminating father’s parental rights purs uant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). “W hen a trial court’s judgment is- 8 - made on alternative grounds, we need only consider whether any one of the alternatives is sufficient to sustain the judgme nt of the trial court, and if s o, we need not address the other grounds.” Kilby v. Culpeper Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 55 Va. App. 106, 108 n.1, 684 S.E.2d 219, 220 n.1 (2009); see also Fields v . Dinwiddie Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 8, 614 S.E.2d 656, 659 (2005) (the Court affirmed termination of p arental rights under one subsection of Code § 16.1-283 and di d not need to address termi nation of parental rights pursuant to another subsection). Therefore, we will not consid er whether the circuit court erred in terminating father’s paren tal rights pursuant to Code § 16.1 -283(B).
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s ruling is affirm ed. Affirmed.