### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A pr i l 22, 2004 S e s s i on
T . G R E E N , ET AL 

### . v . C I T Y O F M E M P H I S , ET AL 

### . A Dire ct A ppeal f

romthe Chancer y Court for Shelby Cou nty No. CH-01-1566- 1 The Hon orable Walter L. Evan s, Chancellor

No. W2003-01334-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Jul y 15, 2004

Plaintiffs, police offic ers a long w ith a num b er of others, we re pr omoted to serg eant a fter passing a promotional test. Subsequently , the test was decla red invalid by the fede ral court a nd the city announce d its int ention to restore the af fec ted offic ers to their pr evio u s rank pe nding the administration of a ne w promotional test. Plaintiffs, along with others, filed suit in chanc ery court to enjoin this action on the part of the city . The c hance ry court issued a

tem p o rary

injunction, enjoining the city

from re moving plaintiffs f rom their rank o f s er gea n t or from re ducing their pay pending final judgm en t

. The c hance llor clarif ied the injunction by

order which provide d that the injunction would be in eff ect only “until such t ime as promoti ons are made f rom the 2001 ser g eant promotional proce ss.” Of the fifty -four plaintiffs in the chancery court taking the new pr omotional t e s t , t h e s e v e n p l a i n t i f

f s
- ap p e l l a n t s d i d n o t r a n k h i g h e n o u g h f o r p r o m o t i o n

. O n m o t i o n o f t h e c i t y, the chancery

court dissolved the preliminary injunction previously

issued and, by

consent orde r, allowed the pla intiffs full cre dit of time served a s serg eant a s a result of the first promotional pr oc e ss. Pla int if

fs ha ve app e a le d. We a ff ir m.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed

W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J . and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.

Th oma s E . H a ns om o f M e mph is f or Ap pe llants , J. Ma c k, R. B urton , D . Pa rk e r, a ndV. Nc Ne il Kathlee n L . Caldwell of Memphis for A ppellants, G. B ennett, L . Be nnett and W. Tay lor

L ou is P. B ri tt, Th oma s J. Wa lsh , Jr. a nd Ma ry H. B e ard of Me mph is fo r Ap pe lle e s, City of Me mph is and Memphis Police Service s Division
OP IN ION

L aFranc ine B ennett, Gay niece Be nnett, Wy ley Tay lor, J . Mack, R

. Bu rt on, D. Parke r and V. McNe il (“Appe llants” or “Plaintiffs” ) ar e employ ees of the Cityof Memphis Police Service s Division (“MPD”). In the spring of 2000, Plain t i ff s wer e patr ol office rs ra nking just below
s e r g e a n t

. O n M ar c h 2 0 , 2 0 0 0 , t h e C i t y o f M e m p h i s ( “ C i t y ” ) a n d t h e M P D ( t o g e t h e r w i t h C i t y, “Appe llees” or

“De fendants”) a nnounced a promotional proce ss for the se rg eant r ank thatT he d i st ri ct c o urt lat er clar i f i ed it s rul i ng a t a heari ng on A ugust 13 , 20 0 1 and m ad e cl ear t hat i t had not o rdered t he 1 C i t y t o d em o t e the se rge an t s. A n A m en d ed C o m p l aint, f i l ed A p ril 8 , 2 0 0 3 , ad d ed t hre e m o re p l ainti f f s. 2

-2- c on sis te d o f a

job kn ow le dg e e xam, a pr a c tic a l tes t (vi de o) , a ndpe rf orma nc e e va luatio ns

. Seniority was a lso a fac tor in the promotion proce ss. Howeve r, the City l ea rn ed that the integ rity of the process had been c ompromised by certain office rs’ obtaining the video portion befor ehand. T he City

proce eded w ith the proce ss, but delet ed t h e compromi sed portion and r eweig hted the rema ining sections. The City then promoted 63 applicants to se rg ean t , i n cl u d ing the se Pla int if

fs

. On Ju ly 1 1 , 2 0 0 0 , tw o u n s u c c e s s f u l c a n d id a te s f

o r p r o mo ti o n f

il e d s u it inth e U n it ed State s Di stric t Co urt f

or the Wes te rnDi stric t of

Te nn e sse e , c halle ng ing thepr omo tio na l pr oc e ss on s everal g rounds and se eking a tempora ry restraining or der a g ainst the Cityprohibiting the promotion of the succ essful candidates to serg eant. The court de nied t he tempora ry restraining order , and the City

proce eded w ith the promotions on J uly 12, 2000.

The Ci t y t h en hired a n expert, Dr. Richar d J eanne ret, to dete rmine whe ther the modified prom o ti o n a l te s t w a s v a li d

. D r

. Je a n n e r e t c o n c lu d e d th a t d u e to th e tain ti n g o f th e in te g rityof the promoti o nal proc ess, the City should start over with an e ntirely new pr ocess. Ha ving be en advis e d o f

D r

. Je a n n e r e t’ s f

in d in g s , o n Ju n e 2 5 , 2 0 0 1 , th e d is tric t c o u r t g r a n te d th e u n s u c c e s s ful candidates’ motion for partial summary judgme nt, find i n g that the 2000 promotional proce ss was invalid.

On J uly 3, 2001, the Cityinformed the Plaintiffs a nd other succ essfu l candidates that their promotions would be re scinded a s a re sult of the district court’s finding th at t h e 2000 proce ss was i nvalid. Howeve r, the City did offer them the opportunity

to draw “ out-of-r ank” 1 pay , which amounted to an additional 5% compe nsation over their patrol off

icer pay

. OnJuly 26 , 2 00 1, 51 se rg e a nts , in c lud ing the app e llants he re in, fi le d a pe tit ionin Chanc e ry Co urt to enj ointheCity fr om d e mot ing the m, o r i n th e a lte rn a tiv e fr om r e du c ing the ir pay a ndbe ne fi ts t o p re -p ro mot ionle ve ls. 2

Th e Chanc e ry Cou rt

g rante d th e inj un c tio n b y Or de r e nte re d A ug us t 21 , 2 00 1. Th is Or de r dir e c t e d t h e C i t y

“ t o r e t a i n [th e p l a i n t i f

f s ] i n t h e s e r g e a n tp o s i t i o n f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g , wi th full pay and bene fits of the ra nk.” On Septembe r 7, 2001, the Cha n ce ry Court entere d a sec ond Orde r, which he ld that the injunction was to remain in ef fec t only “until such time as promotions
are made f

rom the [newly

devised a nd implemented] 2001 S erg eant pr omotional process.”

Du e to a nu mbe r o f c omp lic a tio ns , th e 20 01 pr omo tio na l pr oc e ss w a s n ot c om pl ete d u nti l November

2002. As a re sult of that proce ss, the Citypromoted 264 candidates t o s erge ant. Of the 54 plaintiffs in the original Chanc ery Court proce eding s, one did not participate in the proce ss and seve n (appe llants) did not rank hig h enoug h for pr omotion. On April 8, 2003, the City petitioned the Chance ry Court to di s s o l v e t he pre liminary injunction and to allow it to return these e ight of fice rs to the ra nk o f p at ro l o ff icer . The c ourt g rante d th e City ’s re qu e st o n th e g ro un ds that th e y we repr omo te d a s th e re su lt of an in va lid-3-

proce ss. The court found that they did not obtain a vested prope rty interest in their 2000 pr o mo ti o n , w h ic h w o u ldw arr a n t o r e n ti tl e th e m t o a n y

p r o c e d u r a l d u e p r o c e s s r ig h ts b e f o r e the position was taken aw ay . The trial c ourt noted that i t wo u l d be inequitable f or the City

to allow these off icer s to hold t h ei r s er gea n t rank “ in light of their f ailure to rank within the chosen perc ent i l e as determined by the Cityto rec eive a

promotion in the 2002 serg eant pr omotional proce ss.” The c ourt furthe r fo u n d that the re turn of the Plaintiffs to their former rank did not constitute a demotion bec ause the chang e occ urre d not as a re sult of misconduct or di sciplinary
a c t i o n , b u tr a t h e r

d u e t o w h a th a d b e e n a n i n v a l i d p r o m o t i o n a l p r o c e s s o r i g i n a l l y. On May 23, 2003, the court entere d a Consent Orde r whe rei n ea ch P l ai ntiff was g iven fu ll c re dit

fo r t ime se rv ed as se rg e a nt, a ndthe c a se wa s c on c lud e d. Pla int if fs fi le d ti me ly
ap p e a l s o n M a y

2 3 , 2 0 0 3 ( M a c k , B u r t o n , P ark e r a n d M c N e i l ) a n d J u n e 1 7 , 2 0 0 3 ( G

. B e n n e t t , L. Be nnett, Tay lor).

The Plaintiffs submit two iss ues for revie w:
1. W h ether

the trial court erre d in ruling that the Plaintiffs do not ha ve a ve ste d in te re st i n th e ir

pr omo tio ns to the rank

of se rg e a nt.
2. Whether the trial c ourt er re d in holding that Plaintiffs have no rig ht to a hearing be fore being demoted.

Th e tria l c ou rt ’s ru lin g s th a t th e P lain tif fs do no t ha ve a

ve ste d p ro pe rty

int e re st i n th e ir prom o t i o n s an d that the Plaintiffs have no right to a he aring befor e being demoted ar e questions of law. A s su c h, ou r r e vie w o f the tria l c ou rt ’s or de r i s de novo upon the re cord w ith no p r e s u mp ti o n o f c o rr e c tn e s s a c c o mp a n y in g th e tria l c o u r t’ s c o n c lu s io n s o f law. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Waldron v. Delffs , 9 88 S.W. 2d18 2, 18 4 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 8) ; Sims v . St e war t , 973 S.W .2d 597, 599-600 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1998).

The Plaintiffs’ c onstitut io n al claim of deprivation of a pr operty interest without due pr oc e ss d e pe nd s f

ir st o n w he the r the y

ha ve a ves ted pro pe rty

ri g ht i n e mpl oyme nt a s se rg e a nts

. Se e Boa rd

of Re ge nts v . Ro th , 4 08 U. S. 5 64 , 5 76 -5 78 (1 97 2) ; Reagan v. United States , 1 82 U. S. 419, 425 (1901). I f the Plaintiffs have such a pr operty interest, the Cit y ca n n o t d eprive them of this right wit h o u t p ro cedural due pr ocess. Cle v e lan d Bd . o f E duc ation v . L oud

e rmill , 4 70 U. S. 53 2, 53 8 ( 19 85 ); see Goss v. Lopez , 419 U.S. 565, 573-574 (1975) . We will now address e ach of the Plaintiffs’ issues in turn.

I. Do th e Plaintif

fs h ave a vest ed property inter est in their prom otions to the rank of serge ant?

To su stain a

du e pr oces s cla im , the Pla int if fs mus t de mon str a te that th e y ha ve a pr op e rty in te r e s t s u f

f ic ie n t to trig g e r th e p r o c e d u r a l s a f e g u a r d s

. Ro th , 408 U.S. at 571-573. F ollowing t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S u p r e m e C o u r t , t h e T e n n e s s e e S u p r e m e C o u r th a s d e f i n e d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l ypr ote c te d p ro pe rty

int e re sts a s f

oll ow s:-4- The F ourtee nth Amend m ent’s proc edura l protection of property safe g uards the se curity

of intere sts that a person has alre ady

acquir ed in spec ific bene fits. Rot h , 4 0 8 U. S

. at 576, 92 S.Ct . at 2708. Property interests are not cr eate d by the fe dera l constituti on. I nstead they are cre ated a nd define d “by

exis ting r

ules or under standing s that s t em from an indepe ndent sourc e such a s state law.” Rot h, 40 8 U .S. at 57 7 , 92 S.Ct . 2709. To be e ntitled to procedural due proce ss protection, a pr operty interest must be more tha n a

“ u n i l a t e r a l e x p e c t a t i o n ” o r a n “ ab s tr a c tn e e d o r

d e s i r e

. ” It
mus t be a

“ le g iti ma te cla im of

e nti tle me nt” to a

sp e c if ic benef it. Id. I ndeed it is the purpose of the anc ient instit ution of property

to protec t those expectations upon wh ic h p e op le re ly

in the ir da ily liv e s. Rowe v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chat tanooga , 938 S.W .2d 351, 354 (Tenn. 1996)

. I n support of their a

rg ument, Plaintiff s o ff

er much ca se law f

or the proposition that they h a v e a p r o p e r ty in te r e s t in th e ir s e r g e a n t r a n k

. H o w e v e r , in e a c h o f th e s e c a s e s , th e e xis te n c e of a prope rty

interest wa s not at issue or was e stab l i s h ed b y s t atute. Consequently , the ca ses cited
are not relevant to th e p resent discussion. See Cooper v. William son Cou nty Bd. of Edu c. , 803 S.W. 3d20 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 0) (p ro te c tio n o f t e a c he r’ s te nu reby stat ut e c re a te d p ro pe rty

ri g ht) ; Cas e v. Shelby Coun ty Civ. Serv. Merit Bd. , 9 8 S. W.3 d 1 67 (Ten n. Ct . App . 2 00 2) (i nv olv e d s ta tut e g ranting property

rig ht to employ ee r equiring termination only with just cause).

Pla int if fs ha ve a lso faile d to sh ow that ru le s or un de rs ta nd ing s “ se c ur e c ert ain ben e fi ts and . . . support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Rot h , 408 U.S. at 577. As ea rl y as t he J une 25, 2001 Or d er f

rom J udg e McCalla de claring that the 2000 promotional proce ss was invali d , t h e P l aint iffs we re on notice that their positions may not be permanent. F urthermor e, on J uly 3, 2001, the Cityadvised the Plaintiffs that their pr omotions wo u l d b e re scinded due to the invalidityof the 2000 test. That the Plain t i ff s we re a war e that their te nure a s serg eant wa s potential l y l i m i t ed evidences the absenc e of any constitutionallyprotec ted prope rty interest and does not demonstrate a “unilate ral e x pectation ” t hat they would rema in serg eants without completing the valid test comp l eted in 2002. Row e , 9 38 S.W. 2da t 35 4; see Rot h , 408 U.S. at 57 8 ( c oll e g e pr of

e sso r o n n oti c e that hi s p os iti on wa s li mi ted in d ur a tio n h a s n o p ro pe rty int e re st in his posit ion to merit procedur al due pr ocess pr otection).

Plaintiffs are c orre ct in asserting that the Me mphis Ci ty Code of Or dinance s provides property i n t er es t rig hts in one’s position in certain situations. For e x ample, § 9-41 authorizes the Cityto “terminate , suspend, or de mote an employ ee f or just cause , and the e m p l o y ee sha ll be g iven a written notice of the r easons f o r t he ac tion.” Like the statute c ited in Case v. Shelby Co u nty Civ. Serv. Merit Bd. , e mp lo y e e s te r mi n a te d , s u s p e n d e d , o r d e mo te d f o r ju s t c au s e have a property rig ht in their p o s i t i o n . This property rig ht is given due proce ss protection by having the terminati o n , s u s p e n s io n , o r d e mo ti o n “ ap p e a la

b le to th e c iv il s e r v ic e c o mm is s io n a s p r o v id e d f or in this chapter.” Memphis Cit y Code of Or dinance s, § 9-41. Howe ver, the par t i es have stipulated that § 9-41 only applies to terminations, suspensions, and demotio n s which we re theT he P l ai nt i f f s di d purs ue t hei r comp l ai nt i n t he C i t y ’ s Ci vi l Ser vi ce C om mi s s i on. H owever , becau s e t hey ha d not been 3 t er mi nat ed, s us pended, or dem ot ed as t he r es ul t of di s ci pl i ne, t he C om mi s s i on r ul ed t hat i t l ack ed j ur i s di ct i on t o hea r t he i r co m p l aints.

-5- result of discipline. There fore, t h o s e officer s that have be en terminated, suspended or demoted 3
as a r esult of discipline have been g iven the rig ht to a Lo ude rmill -ty pe hea rin g. However, the prese nt case does not involve terminations, s u s p en s i o n s , and demotions as the r esult of discipline, but rather

re as s i gn m en t as the re sult of an invalid test. There fore , § 9-41 of the Memphis Cit y

Code of Or dinance s does not creat e p roperty interests in the Plaintiff’s promotion to s e rg e a nt a s th e re su lt o f an in va lidte st.

I nd e e d, we ha ve he ld that e mpl oy e e s d o n ot h a ve pr op e rty int e re sts in the ir po si ti ons in the most factua l l y analog ous case s. I n How e ll v . City of Col umbia , No. M2001-00620-COAR3-CV, 2002 Tenn. App. L EXI S 7 4 3 (T en n

. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2002), this Court rejec ted the due p r o c e s s c laim o f a p o li c e o f f ic e r d e mo te d to p a tr o l o f f ic e r

. I n th a t c a s e , th e Ci ty c r e a te d a new department and named a s its Deputy Ch i ef t h e plaintiff. F our y ear s later, the City abolished the department and the plaintiff’ s De p u t y C hief position. I n reje cting the plaintiff’s c laim of a due proce ss violation, we noted that the plaintiff did not have a p ro p er t y i n t ere st in either his rank or
sa lary , a s th e City

ha d th e auth ority

to c re a te a nd

abo lis h d e pa

rt me nts a ndind ivi du a l po sit ion s.
Simi larly , we he ld in Mil ler v. Ci ty of

Mur fr e e sb or o , 122 S.W .3d 766 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), cert. de nied , M2001-01478-SC-R11-CV, 2003 Tenn. L exis 1269 (Tenn. 2003) , that the Cityof Murfreesbor o could demote police office rs from the r ank of d et ective to patrol office r as a part of a major de partment re org anization. Cl aims from t h e p o l i ce o fficers that the City had vio late d th e ir

du e pr oc e ss rights were w ith ou t me ri t, a s th e plaint if fs “ ha ve no pr ote c te d p ro pe rty interest such a s would require due proc ess consider ations.” Id. at 775.

Constit utionally -protec ted prope rty interests ar e cr eated and def ined by rules or under s t an d i n gs stemming fr om state law. Row e , 938 S.W .2d at 354. The Plaintiffs havenot shown any

rules or unde rstanding s to supp o rt t h ei r cl aim of a pr operty interest in their rank as serg eants. In fa ct , prec edent a nd city ordinanc es undermine that claim. Ther efor e, we hold that thePla int if

fs ha ve no pr op e rty

ri g ht i n th e ir

rank a s se rg e a nts

. II. Do the P laintif

fs h a v e a ri ght to a hearing before being returned to theirpatrol off icer pos it ion s?

Where a particula r state law , rule or unde rstanding secur es p ro p er t y i ntere sts, courts have quickly moved to the sec ond prong of the due p ro ce s s analy sis: whether the pa rties wer e aff orded the “opportunity

to be hea

rd ‘at a m ea n i ng ful time and in a meaningf ul manner.’ ” Mathews v. Eldr idge , 4 2 4 U. S

. 3 1 9 , 3 3 3 ( 1 9 7 6 ) ( q u o t i n g Armstr ong v . M anz o , 380 U.S. 545, 554 (1965)) . This “opportunity to be hea

rd” i s guaranteed by

a full and f

air he aring prior to the deprivation of a vested pr operty rig ht. Lo ude rmill , 470 U.S. at 5 3 8

. Because the Plaintiffs have not been de prived of a

vested prope rty

rig ht, they

have no right to a Lo ude rmill h ea ri n g. III. Conclusi on
To su stain a

du e pr oc e ss c la im, the Pla int if fs m us t dem on strate that th e y ha ve a pr op e rty interest suff

icient to trigger the proc edura l safeg uards. Rot h , 408 U.S. at 571-573. Such-6-

property interests orig inate in state law , rules or unde rstanding s. Row e , 938 S.W .2d at 354. Be cause Plaintiffs have not put forth suff icient st at e law, r

ules or under standing s in support of their cla im of a prope rt y i n t er est and bec ause c ase la w is in conflict with that claim, we f ind that P l ai n t i ffs do not have a prope rty interest in their rank of ser g eant rising to the leve l of
c on sti tut ion a lly

pr ote c te d p ro pe rty

ri g hts

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

didno t e rr

in h old ing that th e Ap pe llants do no t ha ve a ves ted in ter e st i n their prom o t i o n s to the rank of serg eant and, there fore , have no right to a Lo ude rmill h ea ri n g. Acc ording ly , the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed. Costs of this appeal ar e asse ssed
e qu a lly to the Ap pe lla nts , L a F ranc ine B e nn e tt, Gay nie c e B e nn e tt, Wy le y Tay lor , J

. Mack, R. Burton, D. Parker

and V. Mc Neil, and their respe ctive sure ties.

__________________________________________ W. FRANK CRAWFORD, P RESI DING JUDGE, W.S.