GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Secretary of Defense, the 

Attorney General, and the Secretary of 

the Treasury

August 1999 DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE

Military Assistance 

Provided at Branch 

Davidian Incident

GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-276428 Letter

August 26, 1999

The Honorable William S. Cohen

The Secretary of Defense

The Honorable Janet F. Reno

The Attorney General

The Honorable Lawrence H. Summers

The Secretary of the Treasury

In 1993, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) received 

assistance from the U.S. military, including counterdrug program support, 

while investigating violations of federal firearms laws by members of an 

obscure sect, the Branch Davidians, and their leader, Vernon Howell (also 

known as David Koresh), in Waco, Texas. On February 28, 1993, as the ATF 

tried to serve warrants on the sect’s compound, a gunfight erupted, killing 

and wounding agents and Davidians. A standoff ensued that soon involved 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The military provided support to 

the two federal law enforcement agencies (LEA) throughout the 51-day 

standoff, which ended April 19, 1993, when the compound was destroyed 

by fire.

In August 1996, the House Committees on Government Reform and 

Oversight and on the Judiciary issued a report, “Investigation into the 

Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch 

Davidians” (Report 104-749).1

 The report recommended that we review 

certain aspects of the military assistance provided to the LEAs in this 

incident. We have reviewed the nature and extent of the assistance, 

including that from counterdrug programs, provided to these operations, as 

well as the counterdrug aspects of ATF’s plans to serve a search warrant at 

the Davidian compound. We pursued three specific objectives:

• Determine whether the ATF’s requests for support from military 

counterdrug programs met requirements for authorizing that support.

1

 This report was based on a joint investigation by the Subcommittee on National Security, International 

Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, and the 

Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee of the Judiciary.

Letr
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• Identify the measures ATF took to deal with any drug activity it might 

find during its warrant service, and determine whether those measures 

were appropriate for such operations where a methamphetamine 

laboratory might be encountered.

• Account for the types, costs, and reimbursements of all military support, 

including that from counterdrug programs, provided to the ATF and the 

FBI.

Results in Brief ATF’s two requests for military counterdrug support of its Davidian 

operations met requirements to authorize provision of that support under 

the relevant statutes.2

 The ATF cited possible drug-related activity at the 

compound in both its written requests—the first to the Texas National 

Guard and the second to Operation Alliance, a coordinating center for 

counterdrug assistance. The military’s decision in both cases to provide the 

counterdrug support was a reasonable exercise of agency discretion and 

was authorized under the relevant statutes.

ATF’s planning for the warrant service addressed the possibility of 

encountering hazardous drug materials. ATF agents were made aware of 

the suspected drug laboratory and the appropriate precautions. Moreover, 

a team from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was at the 

command post the day of the operation to handle any drug-related 

materials that might be found. This planning was consistent with ATF’s 

own policies—and those of other federal LEAs—governing operations to 

secure armed suspects and facilities, including those where a drug 

laboratory is present.

Military assistance (both counterdrug and other) to the ATF and the FBI 

included surveillance, reconnaissance, and transport; equipment and 

supplies; training and instruction; and maintenance and repairs. The 

military provided several items of major equipment, including helicopters 

and unarmed tactical ground vehicles. We estimated the total cost of 

military assistance to be about $1 million, of which nearly 90 percent was 

incurred by the Texas National Guard and active Army units and the rest by 

the Alabama National Guard and active Air Force. Under the Economy Act, 

2

 The military is authorized to provide support to LEAs under a number of statutes. Generally, these 

agencies must reimburse the military for the cost of its assistance. However, the active military can 

support counterdrug activities on a nonreimbursable basis under section 1004 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act of 1991, as amended (P.L. 101–510), and the National Guard can do so under 32 U.S.C. 

§112. 

Letr
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the ATF and the FBI reimbursed the Texas National Guard, the Army, and 

the Air Force for about three-quarters of the support. Repayment of 

another 14 percent, which came from counterdrug programs, was waived 

by the military, which has the authority to do so if the supported agency 

suspects a drug connection. These nonreimbursable expenses represented 

less than $140,000. The military also mistakenly undercharged these two 

agencies by a comparatively small amount (about 10 percent of the total), 

which should have been reimbursed. The Army does not plan to collect 

these undercharges, as it would realize no current benefit—it would have 

to apply any collection to prior-year obligations. Finally, under applicable 

statutes,3

 the military gave the ATF and the FBI without charge some 

excess military items, mostly office and camp equipment, clothes, and 

tools.

Scope and 

Methodology

The events we examined occurred several years before we performed our 

work. Moreover, the ATF’s investigation of Vernon Howell during 1992–93 

focused on firearm violations, not on illegal drugs; neither the ATF nor any 

other agency, federal or state, performed a comprehensive, in-depth drug 

investigation of Howell or any other Davidian residing at the compound at 

the time.

For our first two objectives, we interviewed many current and former 

employees of the military and of those federal, state, and local LEAs that 

had dealings with the case. We also reviewed pertinent case files and 

material provided to the Waco Administrative Review.4

 We did not try to 

substantiate actual drug activity by Howell or other compound residents. 

To obtain information concerning the authority under which their 

components assisted the LEAs, we contacted the Department of Defense 

(DOD), the National Guard Bureau, Joint Task Force Six, and the Texas 

National Guard.

For our third objective, we sought to determine the types and costs of 

military assistance provided to the ATF and the FBI. To this end, we 

reviewed available records maintained by DOD, the Army, and the Texas 

National Guard (requests and authorizations for assistance, hand receipts, 

3

 P.L. 101–189 § 1208 and P.L. 102–484 § 1044.

4

A group convened by the Department of the Treasury to review all aspects of ATF’s investigation of 

Howell and the Davidians, including the ATF’s effort to serve the arrest and search warrants on Feb. 28, 

1993.
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flight logs, DOD reports, etc.). We also interviewed officials at Operation 

Alliance, Joint Task Force Six, the Texas National Guard counterdrug 

program, and the Army. In addition, we reviewed the military’s 

documentation concerning cost and reimbursement by the LEAs, including 

the accounting and recovery records. This information we compared with 

our data on the support rendered by the military.

For all objectives, we visited or contacted various military and law 

enforcement organizations, reviewed hundreds of pertinent documents, 

and viewed other relevant media. Appendix I describes our contacts and 

sources in greater detail. 

We conducted our work between January 1997 and February 1999 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Background Throughout the ATF’s investigation and the standoff at the compound, the 

military provided the ATF and the FBI a wide variety of assistance. A 

detailed discussion of the statutes authorizing the support is provided in 

appendix II.

LEAs operating in Texas may obtain military assistance for investigations 

having a counterdrug component from the Texas National Guard 

counterdrug program. This program can provide a range of investigative 

support services, from aerial reconnaissance to logistics.5

 In accordance 

with regulations,6 requests for support from National Guard counterdrug 

programs must cite in writing a suspected drug connection. LEAs can also 

seek military counterdrug assistance via Operation Alliance, a 

clearinghouse representing the counterdrug interests of many federal, 

state, and local LEAs.7

 The Alliance only accepts requests that cite in 

writing a suspected drug connection.

5

Program personnel will not normally become involved in arrests of suspects, chain-of-custody of 

evidence, searches, interdiction, or the physical security of law enforcement officers.

6

National Guard Regulation 500–2.

7

The Alliance comprises state and local representatives from several states and agents from the DEA, 

the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, Coast Guard, the FBI and the ATF, the Internal Revenue 

Service, U.S. Marshal’s Service, the Secret Service, and U.S. Attorneys. Representatives from DOD and 

the National Guard serve on the group as advisors only.
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Requests that the Alliance approves can be referred to military 

organizations, which review the requests to ensure, among other things, 

that a suspected drug connection is explicitly stated.8

 Each military 

organization can decline to provide the support despite the referral. In 

addition to the National Guard program, the Alliance may refer the request 

to Joint Task Force Six. This task force, an active service organization, 

identifies military units that can provide the assistance and coordinates 

with the requester.9

 It also has a rapid support unit to respond to any 

immediate need.

Finally, LEAs can receive items without charge from DOD’s Regional 

Logistics Support Office; these items come from its excess inventory. The 

agencies can request this support directly, and their operations need not 

have a counterdrug component.

According to the ATF, the drug connection in this operation was a possible 

clandestine methamphetamine laboratory, perhaps active, that it suspected 

was somewhere on the extensive Davidian compound. Drug laboratories, 

active or not, are extremely volatile and toxic, and specialized training and 

equipment are necessary to safely deal with the chemical materials. The 

DEA, having lead responsibility for counterdrug activities, provides 

extensive, highly detailed procedures that its agents are supposed to follow 

when dealing with clandestine laboratories. These procedures, which cover 

planning, entry, assessment, processing, exit, and follow-up, include such 

requirements as

• planning with a lab-certified chemist the entry of the suspect premises, 

• assigning safety officers for the entry,

• having self-contained breathing apparatus and lab-certified teams on 

hand, 

• giving specific warnings to the entry team, and

• supplying the entry team with full heat- and chemical-resistant clothing.

However, other federal LEAs, including the ATF, which do not have drugs 

as their primary focus and which lack DEA’s extensive training and 

equipment have less elaborate drug-lab policies. In ATF’s case, its 

instructions in this matter are quite explicit—agents are to call upon DEA 

8

The statutes, however, do not require a full discussion of the possible connection.

9

Joint Task Force Six neither plans nor coordinates civilian operations, and active Army units can 

perform only support roles, not law enforcement functions.
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to handle any possible drug evidence they encounter during their 

investigations. ATF entry teams must be made aware of the drug laboratory 

and of standard precautions. There is, however, no requirement that ATF 

teams making a “dynamic entry”10 wear fully protective counterdrug suits 

with self-contained breathing apparatus. This is also true for DEA entry 

teams. According to officials from both agencies, such equipment would 

restrict an entry team’s vision and mobility and place it at unacceptable 

risk, as suspects are often armed.

Military Counterdrug 

Support to ATF’s 

Davidian Operation 

Was Authorized Under 

Statutes

The ATF made two requests for military counterdrug support to its 

Davidian operations. The first was made directly to the Texas National 

Guard counterdrug program, and the second was later made to Operation 

Alliance, which approved and forwarded the request to the Texas National 

Guard counterdrug program and Joint Task Force Six for their 

consideration. Some counterdrug support to the ATF during its attempt to 

serve the warrant extended through the ensuing standoff, constituting a 

continued response to the agency’s second request.

For both of its requests, ATF cited a possible drug connection to its Howell 

investigation. Although ATF conducted a firearms investigation of Howell 

and other Davidians, it also acquired information on possible drug activity 

when it decided to seek support from military counterdrug elements. Not 

all of this information was shared with the military, but it formed the 

backdrop to and reinforced the data that was shared.

During our review and in the following narrative, we focused on what the 

ATF knew about a possible drug connection, when the ATF knew it, and 

what information the ATF provided to the military counterdrug programs. 

These points are central to determining whether the military was 

authorized to provide counterdrug assistance under the relevant statutes.

10A very rapid, vigorous, sudden, unexpected entry. It is intended to surprise suspects and prevent them 

from getting to their guns or from destroying evidence and is used to prevent harm to agents and 

civilians alike.
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ATF’s First Counterdrug 

Request: Assistance From 

the Texas National Guard 

Counterdrug Program

In 1992, the local sheriff’s office discovered that, between March and June 

of that year, Howell and other Davidians at the Waco compound had 

received frequent shipments of weapons, explosive components, and 

related materials.11 By June 1992 those shipments totaled more than 

$40,000. Realizing that matters were now beyond its capabilities, the local 

sheriff’s office contacted the ATF and on June 4, 1992, briefed it on (1) the 

situation at the compound, including armed guards at the site and (2) the 

group’s violent history, including a 1987 gun battle between Howell and the 

Davidians’ former leader. On June 9, 1992, the ATF formally opened an 

investigation of Howell and his associates.12 The agency focused on the 

conversion and manufacture of weapons and explosives, gathering 

information on Davidian connections and gun related deliveries that 

continued to arrive at the compound.

In late June, the sheriff’s office notified ATF of a recent delivery to the 

compound of “chemicals, instruments, and glassware.” The sheriff’s 

explosives technician did not regard these items as consistent with the 

manufacture of explosives; an ATF agent thought these items could be used 

to manufacture drugs, suggesting a current operation. Later, in November 

1992, while pursuing its firearms investigation, the ATF acquired 

information about a possible drug connection when the sheriff’s office told 

the agency about one of Howell’s associates. A search of criminal 

databases showed that this individual had a long history of drug 

involvement and had been paroled to the Waco area in April 1992 after 

serving time for his latest drug conviction.

From the first months of the investigation, ATF had kept in touch with the 

DEA office in Waco, seeking information it might have about the suspects. 

The DEA agents offered their help on the case, including undercover work, 

and performed some minor investigative assistance. In the summer or fall 

of 1992, the ATF and DEA agents speculated on how the Davidians were 

financing their heavy gun purchases and substantial building projects while 

supporting 100 or so compound residents. Based on their enforcement 

11Assault rifles and conversion kits, ammunition, inert grenades, sensors, night-vision devices, 

chemicals, combat vests, etc. According to the Treasury Department report, some of these items could 

be used to illegally manufacture and possess machine guns and destructive devices contrary to the 

National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. § 5845).

12 The sheriff’s office gave ATF the names of more than 30 current residents of the compound, which 

ATF checked for criminal histories.
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experience, it seemed possible to the agents that a resident might be 

dealing in illegal drugs.

Having decided that it needed military assistance, on December 4, 1992, 

ATF discussed with a liaison from DOD13 how the military might help. The 

liaison suggested that the military could provide aerial thermal (infrared) 

photography of the site. He also informed ATF that it would have to 

reimburse the military unless there was a drug connection to its 

investigation. 

On December 11, 1992, ATF contacted officers of the Texas National Guard 

counterdrug program to learn what aid it could provide to the Howell 

investigation. The Texas National Guard discussed the types of assistance 

available, including surveillance overflights, but explained that, to receive 

help from this program, the investigation must have a drug connection. The 

Texas National Guard advised the ATF to determine whether it might have 

a drug connection and, if so, to send a formal written request citing that 

connection.

On December 14, 1992, ATF wrote the Texas National Guard counterdrug 

program, requesting it to support the investigation with aerial photography 

and surveillance but mentioning no drug connection. The Texas National 

Guard told ATF it must submit a revised request that contained a possible 

drug connection.14

The ATF decided to inquire of all its contacts in this case whether they had 

knowledge of any drug activity in connection with the suspects. The first to 

be asked was a former resident of the compound; on December 16, 1992, 

this individual responded in writing with the following statements.

• Howell had told him that drug trafficking was a desirable way to raise 

money.

• Howell had told him about finding a methamphetamine laboratory when 

he took over the compound.

13This position was filled by a military officer under the Office for Drug Enforcement Policy and 

Support; he was stationed at ATF’s Special Operations Division, Washington, D.C.

14According to Texas National Guard counterdrug officers, it is not unusual for LEAs to make requests 

without stating a drug connection. In those cases the Texas National Guard returns the request with an 

explanation of the need for a written statement of possible drug activity.
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• Howell had told him that he turned the laboratory over to the sheriff’s 

office, but another former resident maintained to this individual that 

Howell had not surrendered any drug materials.

• Another former resident was rumored to have trafficked in drugs while 

living at the compound.

ATF discussed this information with the sheriff’s office, which confirmed 

that a methamphetamine laboratory was thought to have existed at the 

compound at one time. The sheriff’s office denied ever receiving drug 

evidence from Howell or any other Davidian.15 This raised the possibility 

that the illegal equipment might still be at the compound.

The sheriff’s office also confirmed for ATF that the alleged drug trafficker 

named by the former resident had lived at the compound along with 

another suspicious person. ATF searched the state’s criminal database and 

found that (1) the first individual had an extensive history of narcotics and 

firearms violations and was in prison and (2) the second had violated 

federal firearms laws and was in prison for possessing a firearm during a 

drug-trafficking crime. It may also be at this time that the ATF learned of a 

third former resident who had produced methamphetamine at the 

compound. ATF’s computer checks also showed that several current 

compound residents had prior drug involvement, including possession of 

marijuana, cocaine, and “tablets of dangerous drugs.”

This information suggested to ATF that there were reasonable grounds to 

suspect a drug connection to its investigation. Consequently, on

December 17, 1992,16 ATF notified DEA to that effect, informing it of the 

suspected laboratory, and asked DEA to handle all drug evidence when the 

warrants would be served. ATF also informed the DOD liaison that a 

methamphetamine laboratory might be at the compound. The next day the 

ATF sent a revised request for aid to the Texas National Guard counterdrug 

program, this time citing a drug connection—specifically, that Howell was 

“suspected of unlawfully being in possession of firearms and possibly 

narcotics.”

Since its requirement for a drug connection was met in this new letter, the 

Texas National Guard approved the request. In all, six reconnaissance 

15 In our discussions with the sheriff’s office, it denied receiving drug material from Howell.

16Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 

Investigation of Vernon Wayne Howell, also known as David Koresh (Sept. 1993).
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overflights would be made, with thermal imaging used on at least two 

flights to search for armed guards and drug-manufacturing facilities.17

ATF’s Second Counterdrug 

Request: Assistance From 

Joint Task Force Six and the 

Texas National Guard 

Counterdrug Program

By late January 1993, the ATF had taken statements from other former 

Davidians and their relatives that suggested a drug connection:

• Information about affidavits and testimony in a 1992 court case that a 

methamphetamine laboratory was still at the compound after it had 

supposedly been turned over to the sheriff’s office.

• Reports that Howell may have used the laboratory.

• Reports that Howell gave illegal drugs to some of his followers.

At the same time, an ATF undercover agent reported that Howell had told 

him, in conversation at the compound, that (1) the site would be a good 

place for making methamphetamine and (2) the sheriff suspected him of 

manufacturing drugs. Another Davidian resident, according to two 

undercover ATF agents, told them that he himself had been involved in 

drugs at one time. In addition, thermal images made by National Guard 

overflights had shown a “hot spot” inside the compound, possibly 

indicating a methamphetamine laboratory.

Meanwhile, in preparation for serving warrants at the compound, ATF 

sought operational and logistical help from other agencies, including the 

military. It updated the DOD liaison on its case, mentioning that 

counterdrug support would soon be requested, and it gave information on 

the drug connection to the head of the Texas National Guard counterdrug 

program. On January 22, 1993, after some confusion over the appropriate 

route to take, the ATF’s written request for military support of the 

upcoming warrant service arrived at Operation Alliance. It asked for 

certain training, as well as a loan of Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and 

other equipment, for “a continuation of the firearms and drug case.”18 When 

the ATF filled out the Alliance’s request form, it noted that the operation 

involved a “possible meth lab.”

17At that time, clandestine manufacture of methamphetamine was thought to produce considerable 

heat, which infrared imaging could pick up. LEAs, including the DEA, sometimes used aerial thermal 

imaging to detect the heat produced in illegal narcotics manufacture.

18The letter noted that no weapon systems on the Bradleys would be used; it requested floodlights, 

loudspeakers, smoke generators, gas masks, night-vision goggles, and office and camping gear.
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On February 2, 1993, the Alliance and its military advisers met to consider 

the request for support. The ATF discussed some of the indications of a 

drug laboratory—statements by former residents; the suspicious delivery 

of materials possibly intended for use in making drugs (sometimes referred 

to as “precursor materials”);19 and the hot spot, which was identified on an 

aerial photograph of the compound. Since its requirement for a possible 

drug connection was met, the Alliance referred the request to Joint Task 

Force Six and the Texas National Guard counterdrug program. In its letter 

forwarding the request, the Alliance cited “a dangerous extremist 

organization believed to be producing methamphetamine.”

On February 4, 1993, representatives of the Texas National Guard 

counterdrug program and Joint Task Force Six met with the ATF to discuss 

the request that Operation Alliance had passed on to them. This meeting 

concentrated on parameters, limits, and training objectives but did discuss 

the drug connection. The ATF presented indications of a possible 

methamphetamine laboratory at the Davidian compound: reports by 

former residents, deliveries of possible precursor materials, and thermal 

images from reconnaissance overflights that indicated the possible location 

of the laboratory. The ATF also noted in its presentation that some current 

residents had recent drug-related arrests. According to one military 

attendee, the evidence of a possible drug connection was not the strongest 

they had ever seen, nor was it the weakest.

At this meeting the Texas National Guard agreed to provide the ATF 

operation with vehicles, office and camp equipment.20 Approval by Joint 

Task Force Six took somewhat longer. After its parent organization, the 

Army Forces Command, had reviewed and modified the support requested, 

Joint Task Force Six agreed on February 17, 1993, to provide range practice 

and some limited training. During February 25–27, Joint Task Force Six’s 

rapid-support unit trained ATF agents at Fort Hood, Texas.21

19The glassware, instruments, and chemicals mentioned earlier (p. 7).

20This request to the Texas National Guard was later modified (February 24, 1993) because the ATF now 

needed support for a dynamic entry rather than a siege, as earlier planned.

21They did not receive training on securing or removing drug material. Texas National Guard helicopters 

and crews also traveled to Fort Hood (February 27) to practice with the ATF their support of the 

operation.
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Continuation of Military 

Assistance During the 

Standoff

On the day that the ATF attempted to serve arrest and search warrants at 

the compound, the Texas National Guard joined several local, state, and 

federal LEAs to support the operation. ATF had planned a dynamic entry to 

secure the Davidians before they could get to their weapons. However, the 

Davidians were warned of the ATF’s approach and met the agents with 

gunfire. A 51-day standoff resulted, from February 28 to April 19, 1993, 

during which the ATF and the FBI (which took control of the operation) 

requested and received a range of support from the active military and the 

Texas National Guard.

The bulk of support during the standoff qualified as military assistance to 

civilian authorities, which requires no connection to drugs in order to be 

provided but which generally must be repaid. However, Texas National 

Guard counterdrug assistance (mainly helicopters and personnel) 

continued to be provided after the attempted warrant service became a 

standoff because, upon the Davidians’ eventual surrender, this support 

would be needed to finish the counterdrug mission.22

Approval of Military 

Counterdrug Support Was 

Reasonable and Authorized

DOD provided support for counterdrug activities of the Davidian operation 

under section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1991 (P.L. 

101–510). The Texas National Guard also provided counterdrug support 

under 32 U.S.C. § 112. These laws authorize certain types of support of 

LEAs’ counterdrug activities.23 However, neither law provides a formal 

standard for determining the level of counterdrug activity that a particular 

operation must include for authorization of such support. Because there is 

no formal standard, the military officials involved have considerable 

discretion in determining the degree of counterdrug activity necessary to 

approve the support. Based on our review of the relevant statutes, events 

leading up to the decision by military officials to approve the support, and 

interviews with key personnel, we found no basis to conclude that the 

officials involved abused that discretion. We also found no indication that 

ATF officials misrepresented the information provided to the military in 

order to obtain the support. Therefore, we conclude that the military’s 

decision to approve the counterdrug support was reasonable and 

authorized under the relevant statutes.

22According to the Texas National Guard, this counterdrug support did not require a new request, as it 

was provided as a continuation of the ATF’s second request approved February 4, 1993.

23See app. II for a more detailed discussion of these laws.
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ATF Planning for 

Warrant Service 

Included Measures for 

Drug Laboratory

ATF spent several months planning the operation to serve warrants at the 

Davidian compound. Although the possible drug laboratory was not a 

major part of this effort, ATF did plan and take certain measures to deal 

with it.

As recounted earlier, in December 1992 the ATF had already asked the DEA 

to handle the illegal drug laboratory that it thought might be hidden on the 

compound.24 By the end of January 1993, its plans reflected that agreement: 

A team of DEA agents, including one certified to handle clandestine 

laboratories, would be on hand the day of the warrant service specifically 

to deal with drug evidence. If ATF agents should encounter any drug 

materials while securing people or weapons/explosives evidence, they 

were to pull back from that particular location, cordon it off, and call in the 

DEA team. The DEA agents would manage the drug evidence and supervise 

cleanup. This solution was in keeping with standard practice by ATF and 

other federal LEAs.

These plans were shared with the military organizations supporting the 

operation. At the February 4 meeting between ATF and the military, 

participants discussed the dangers of operating around volatile substances 

(chemicals for making methamphetamine and explosives are very volatile), 

especially with gunfire and diversionary devices.25 The ATF also assured 

the military representatives that it would have a DEA team ready to “take 

down the lab.” Indeed, some days before the warrant service occurred, the 

ATF informed DEA of the date, time, and place of the operation and 

confirmed that DEA would have a certified clandestine-laboratory agent at 

ATF’s command post to handle the drug evidence.

ATF also took certain standard measures to guard against explosives, 

weapons, and hazardous chemicals: 

• During final training for the operation, according to ATF and military 

sources, ATF leaders discussed with their agents the suspected 

laboratory and urged caution in the use of weapons. Those few agents 

24Its location was not known.

25These devices, sometimes referred to as “flashbangs,” are useful in diverting criminal suspects. Their 

explosions create a very brilliant flash and a very loud noise to disorient or stun people in the 

immediate vicinity.
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carrying diversionary devices were reminded to look before deploying 

them.

• Before ATF attempted to serve the warrants, at least one ATF leader 

went over routine cautions with the agents—do not taste, smell, or 

touch anything, do not interfere with any chemical reaction, be sure to 

undergo decontamination if you get drug material on yourself or 

weapons, etc.

• During the attempted warrant service, ATF teams wore helmets, 

anti-ballistic vests, protective gloves, sturdy boots, and eye protection. 

They also had first-aid kits and fire extinguishers on hand.

These measures also conform in large part with DEA’s drug-laboratory 

safety measures for initial-entry teams. They differ only in that the entire 

clothing of DEA teams (hoods, gloves, pants, and jackets) are made of 

Nomex,26 whereas only the gloves of ATF agents are made of this material.

ATF planners acknowledged that their entry teams were not heavily 

protected against hazardous drug materials. This did not concern them, 

however, because the laboratory was not a tactical consideration. They 

believed they could eliminate some parts of the main residence (e.g., 

bedrooms, dining room, and entrances) as likely sites for a drug laboratory. 

Moreover, the need to secure the weapons and armed suspects overrode 

the hazards of a possibly disassembled laboratory.

On the day of the warrant service, DEA agents with special gear were at the 

command post specifically to handle any drug laboratory ATF might 

encounter. According to the DEA, it had arranged for a state chemist to be 

on standby to assist it, and its hazardous-materials van was on standby that 

day at its Waco office. Moreover, DEA agents, including the 

laboratory-certified individual, remained part of the law enforcement 

support during the standoff to handle any drug evidence that might be 

uncovered once the residence had been secured and vacated.27 At DEA’s 

request, the state chemist was also at the command post at least 1 day 

during the siege.

26Nomex is a highly fire-resistant commercial material used in protective clothing.

27At some point in the standoff, the DEA asked to be part of the final clearing of the site after removal of 

the Davidians, but that task was later assumed by another LEA in the aftermath of the fire.
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Page 15 GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense

Types, Cost, and 

Reimbursement of 

Military Support to the 

Davidian Operation

Military support of the Davidian operation came from both active and 

National Guard units. The cost of all that support amounted to almost

$1 million, of which about 76 percent was reimbursed to the military and 

another 14 percent ($137,400) waived as counterdrug support. The 

remaining 10 percent represent the military’s billing discrepancies.

Types and Costs of Military 

Support

Military support for the Davidian operation ranged from aircraft and 

vehicles to equipment, supplies, and services (training, maintenance, etc). 

We have estimated the cost of this support to be at least $982,400.28 The 

Alabama and Texas National Guard, the Army (including Special Forces 

units), the Air Force, and other DOD activities—the Uniformed Services 

University of the Health Sciences, the Regional Logistics Support Office 

and its Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices—all provided some 

form of military assistance.

Table 1 summarizes the types and costs of this support. The FBI incurred 

the largest single costs—about $230,000 for damages to an Army UH-1 

helicopter and $170,000 in operational costs for three Army UH-1s. In these 

two instances, assistance was provided during the standoff; the helicopter 

damage was due to pilot error, not Davidian gunfire.

28This total does not include a cost for medical support from the Uniformed Services University of the 

Health Sciences (which provided 133 staff days of services to the FBI during the standoff) because the 

military no longer has documents available. The total also does not include the value of material 

provided by the Regional Logistics Support Office and Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices, 

since those items, as excess inventory, were provided free of charge.
B-276428

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense

Table 1: Types and Costs of Military Assistance to the ATF and the FBI in Their Branch Davidian Operations

Note: In figuring costs for active-duty military participants, incremental costs alone—per diem and 

travel, but not pay and benefits—were used.

Source: DOD and the Texas National Guard.

Reimbursement of Support As required by the Economy Act, the ATF and the FBI reimbursed the 

military for most of its assistance. Reimbursements covered 76 percent 

(about $747,300) of the costs, of which the FBI paid about 96 percent 

(about $718,300) and the ATF the remainder (about $29,000). The FBI also 

paid directly for the services of the Uniformed Services University of the 

Health Sciences. Appendix III provides more detail on reimbursements.

Billing Discrepancies In five instances the active Army failed to properly bill the FBI for services, 

equipment, and supplies, resulting in undercharges totaling about $100,000. 

The largest instance was an undercharge of $73,000 in operational 

expenses for the UH-1 and CH-47 helicopters lent by Fort Hood. According 

to a Fort Hood official, the Army does not plan to collect these 

undercharges, since it would realize no current benefit—that is, it would 

have to apply any collection to prior-year obligations. There were also two 

minor Texas National Guard overcharges for vehicle parts and helmets. 

Appendix IV provides more details on these billing discrepancies. 

Waivers of Reimbursement 

for Counterdrug Support

The military waived reimbursement for the costs of support from its 

counterdrug programs. This assistance represented a small part of the 

overall military support to the Davidian operation, accounting for only

Types of support Description Cost

Aircraft Reconnaissance and surveillance overflights, aerial diversion, transportation, standby 

for medical evacuation, and recovery of loaned items (helicopters and fixed-wing 

aircraft) $548,400

Vehicles Surface transportation, protection, and recovery (tanks and other combat vehicles, 

utility vehicles, and various tracked and wheeled transport and recovery vehicles) 196,600

Equipment and supplies Flak vests, helmets, masks, night-vision goggles, cameras, binoculars, electronic 

jammers, cellular telephones, ammunition for grenade launcher, tents, generators, 

lighting, clothing, fuel for vehicles and generators, and medical dressings 68,200

Personnel Coordination, liaison, logistics, maintenance, 24-hr. medical and health clinic, 

operation of classified equipment, driver training, grenade-launcher training, 

mine-detector training, communications training, medical training, and firing-range 

support 169,200

Total $982,400
B-276428

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense

14 percent of costs (about $137,400) and consisting of aerial overflights, 

helicopter logistical support, fuel, telephone service, and training. Most of 

this nonreimbursable assistance was provided by the Texas National Guard 

counterdrug program at a cost of about $130,600 (about 37 percent of the 

Texas National Guard’s total support). The Alabama National Guard and 

Joint Task Force Six waived the minor costs of the counterdrug support 

they provided—$1,200 and $5,600, respectively. Appendix V contains more 

details on these waivers. 

Conclusions The ATF requests for assistance from military counterdrug programs met 

the requirements of the relevant statutes for authorizing such support. In 

these written requests, ATF cited its suspicions of drug activity. In both 

cases, the military reasonably exercised its discretion in providing that 

support as authorized under the relevant statutes. 

In planning how it would serve warrants at the compound, ATF planned for 

the possibility of encountering a methamphetamine laboratory or other 

hazardous drug materials. As required by agency policy, ATF agents in the 

operation were made aware of the suspected laboratory and of the 

appropriate precautions. Moreover, DEA agents were at the command post 

to handle any drug-related materials.

Agency Comments In oral comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense 

stated it accepted the report as presented and the Department of Justice 

(including the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation) stated it concurred with the substance of the report. In 

written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of the Treasury 

(including the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) stated it 

concurred with the report’s conclusions. All three departments provided 

technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees. We are also sending copies to the Honorable Louis Caldera, 

Secretary of the Army; the Honorable Russell C. Davis, Chief of the 

National Guard Bureau; the Honorable John W. Magaw, Director of the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the Honorable Louis J. Freeh, 

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the Honorable
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Page 18 GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense

Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator of the Drug Enforcement 

Administration. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you have any questions concerning 

this report.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, National Security and

 Preparedness Issues
Page 19 GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense

Letter
Page 20 GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense

Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I

Organizations Visited 

and Documents 

Reviewed

22

Appendix II

Statutes Related to 

Military Support of 

Branch Davidian 

Operations

24

Appendix III

Reimbursements to the 

Military From the ATF 

and the FBI for 

Assistance to Their 

Branch Davidian 

Operations

27

Appendix IV

Discrepancies in 

Billing the FBI for 

Military Support to Its 

Branch Davidian 

Operations

28
Contents

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense

Appendix V

Costs Waived by the 

Military in Support of 

the Branch Davidian 

Operations

29

Appendix VI

Comments From the 

Department of the 

Treasury

30

Table Table 1: Types and Costs of Military Assistance to the ATF and

the FBI in Their Branch Davidian Operations 16

Abbreviations

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

DOD Department of Defense

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

LEA law enforcement agencies
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense

Appendix I

Organizations Visited and Documents 

Reviewed ApenxIdi

To obtain the information needed for our review, we visited or contacted 

the following organizations: 

• Military organizations

• The Office of the Deputy General Counsel, the Department of 

Defense (DOD); the Office of the Coordinator for Drug Enforcement 

Policy and Support, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense; and the National Guard Bureau, all in Washington, D.C.

• Joint Task Force Six, Fort Bliss, Texas.

• Texas National Guard, Camp Mabry, Texas.

• U.S. Army Aviation and Troop Command, St. Louis, Missouri.

• U.S. Army, III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas.

• Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Fort Monmouth, New 

Jersey.

• Law enforcement organizations

• Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and 

Customs in Washington, D.C.

• Local offices of federal law enforcement agencies (LEA) (ATF, DEA, 

and the U.S. Attorney’s Office) in Texas.

• Operation Alliance, Fort Bliss, Texas.

• State and local LEAs—the McLennan County Sheriff’s Department 

and District Attorney’s Office, the Texas Department of Public Safety, 

and the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services.

We also reviewed hundreds of documents and other media, including the 

following:

• Investigation into the Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies 

toward the Branch Davidians, Committee on Government Reform and 

Oversight in conjunction with the Committee on the Judiciary, House of 

Representatives Report 104–749 (Aug. 2, 1996), Union Calendar No. 395.

• Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies toward the Branch 

Davidians, Joint hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime of the 

Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on National Security, 

International Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the Committee on 

Government Reform and Oversight, Committee on the Judiciary Serial 

No. 72 (July 19–21, 24–28, 31, and Aug. 1, 1995), in three parts.

• Events Surrounding the Branch Davidian Cult Standoff in Waco, Texas,

House Judiciary Committee hearing (Apr. 28, 1993).
Appendix I

Organizations Visited and Documents 

Reviewed

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense

• Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, and Firearms Investigation of Vernon Wayne Howell, also 

known as David Koresh (Sept. 1993).

• Guidelines for the Cleanup of Clandestine Drug Laboratories, Joint 

Federal Task Force of the Drug Enforcement Administration, 

Environmental Protection Agency, and Coast Guard (March 1990).

• “ATF Policy Regarding Investigations Involving Clandestine 

Laboratories,” dated April 25, 1990 (subsequently incorporated into ATF 

Order 3210.7B).

• Excerpts from the DEA agent’s manual.

• All Waco Administrative Review documents.

• ATF investigative files.

• Final report by Brigadier General Sagsveen on the Waco/Mt. Carmel 

incident (July 30, 1996).

• Results of the focal group review of Texas National Guard support to the 

ATF, known informally as the “Spence Report” (Apr. 28, 1993).

• After-action report of Texas National Guard counterdrug support in 

Waco, Texas (Apr. 29, 1993).

• Other relevant DOD provisions, policies, and procedures as well as 

information on the National Guard counterdrug program, other Guard 

material, and the operational support planning guide for Joint Task 

Force Six.

• Operation Alliance procedures for reviewing counterdrug requests.

• Videotapes of overflights of the Davidian compound and of selected 

operational briefings.
Page 24 GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense

Appendix II

Statutes Related to Military Support of Branch 

Davidian Operations ApenxIdi

National Defense 

Authorization Act of 

1991

Section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1991 authorized 

the Secretary of Defense to provide the support of active military units for 

the counterdrug activities “of any other department or agency of the 

Federal Government or of any State, local, or foreign law enforcement 

agency.”1 In 1993, when the Davidian operations occurred, the act limited 

active military support for counterdrug activities to the following nine 

categories:2

• Maintenance and repair of equipment made available by DOD to a 

federal department or agency or to a state or local government.

• Maintenance, repair, and upgrading of non-DOD equipment to ensure 

that it will be compatible with equipment used by DOD.

• Transportation of personnel, equipment, or supplies.

• Establishment and operation of bases of operation or training facilities.

• Training of law enforcement personnel, including associated support 

expenses for trainees and the provision of materials necessary to carry 

out such training.

• Detection, monitoring, and communication of movement of air, sea, and 

surface traffic.

• Construction of roads and fences and installation of lighting to block 

drug-smuggling across international boundaries of the United States.

• Establishment of command, control, communication, and computer 

networks to improve integration of law enforcement, active military, and 

National Guard activities.

• Provision of linguist and intelligence analysis services.

10 U.S.C. §§ 371–382 Sections 371–382 of title 10 of the U.S. Code authorize the Secretary of 

Defense to provide certain types of support by active military units to 

federal, state, or local law enforcement officials. LEAs are not required to 

reimburse DOD for the support if it (1) is provided in the normal course of 

military training or operations or (2) results in a benefit to DOD that is 

“substantially equivalent” to that which would otherwise be obtained from

1

 P.L. 101–510, div. A, title X, § 1004, as amended. Congress was extended the authority through 2002. 

See P.L. 105-261, div. A, title X, § 1021

2

 In 1993, Congress added a tenth purpose for which the Secretary may provide support—aerial and 

ground reconnaissance. See P.L. 103–160, div. A., title XI, § 1121(b).
Appendix II

Statutes Related to Military Support of 

Branch Davidian Operations

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense

military operations or training.3 Otherwise, DOD must be reimbursed as 

required by the Economy Act.4

Title 10 authorizes the following types of support:

• Any information collected during the normal course of training or 

operations that may be relevant to a violation of any federal or state law 

within the jurisdiction of the officials supported.

• Equipment (including associated supplies or parts) and base or research 

facilities.

• Training in the operation and maintenance of DOD equipment.

• Relevant expert advice.

• Maintenance of equipment.

• The operation of military equipment for (1) monitoring air and sea 

traffic; (2) monitoring surface traffic outside U.S. borders, as well as

25 miles within U.S. borders if the initial detection occurred outside the 

United States; (3) aerial surveillance; (4) intercepting vessels or aircraft 

detected outside the land area of the United States; (5) facilitating 

communications with federal LEAs; and (6) transporting and staffing an 

operational base for civilian law enforcement personnel.5

32 U.S.C. § 112 Under 32 U.S.C. § 112, the Secretary of Defense may provide funds 

appropriated for National Guard activities to the governor of a state who 

submits a drug-interdiction and counterdrug-activities plan that meets 

certain statutory requirements. To obtain funding, a state’s plan must

(1) specify how National Guard personnel and equipment will be used in 

such activities, (2) certify that the use of the National Guard of the state is 

consistent with state law, and (3) certify that the activities included in the 

plan serve a state law enforcement purpose. If a state’s plan is approved 

and DOD provides funding, the state may use the funds to pay expenses 

related to the use of its National Guard personnel (while not in federal

3

 10 U.S.C. § 377.

4

 The Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535, generally mandates prompt repayment for goods and services 

provided by one agency to another.

5

 See 10 U.S.C. § 374. Federal LEAs responsible for enforcing the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 

801 et seq.), certain Immigration and Naturalization Act provisions (8 U.S.C. §§ 1324–1328), section 401 

of the Tariff Act of 1940, and the Maritime Law Enforcement Act may request such aid.
Appendix II

Statutes Related to Military Support of 

Branch Davidian Operations

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense

service) and equipment for drug interdiction and counterdrug activities.6

DOD considers support requests that are not specifically included in the 

original plan on a case-by-case basis if accompanied by a certification from 

the state’s attorney general that the operations requested are consistent 

with state law.7

 LEAs are not required to reimburse the National Guard for 

this support. 8

National Defense for 

Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 1990

Section 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act9 allowed DOD to 

give federal and state agencies equipment—free of charge—that the 

Secretary of Defense had declared excess to the military’s needs. Under 

this statute, the Secretary of Defense was required to determine that the 

equipment was suitable for use in counterdrug activities.

6

 The act defines “drug interdiction and counter drug activities” as “the use of National Guard personnel 

in the drug interdiction and counter-drug law enforcement activities authorized by the law of the State 

and requested by the Governor of the State.” 

7

 National Guard (NGR) 500–2.

8

 P.L. 101–189.

9

 In 1996, Congress repealed § 1208. P.L. 104-201, div. A., title X, section 1033(a) contained similar 

language now codified as 10 U.S.C.§ 2576a.
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense

Appendix III

Reimbursements to the Military From the ATF 

and the FBI for Assistance to Their Branch 

Davidian Operations ApenxIdi

a

A flat rate plus all travel was used under a Memorandum of Understanding between the two parties. 

All travel vouchers were sent directly to the FBI for payment; FBI paid for expendable medical supplies.

Support Recipient Reimbursement

Aircraft

Active Army—3 UH-1 utility helicopters and 3 CH-47 helicopters FBI $375,179

Active Air Force—C-141 transport of FBI’s hostage rescue team (and its equipment) to and from 

Waco

FBI 73,112

Vehicles

Texas National Guard—2 M-35A2 21⁄2-ton cargo trucks with transport trailers, 5 M-818 5-ton tractor 

trucks with trailers, 12 M-1009 high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles

ATF 6,858

Texas National Guard—10 M-2 Bradleys (infantry fighting vehicles), 3 M-332 tractor trailers, 5 

M-728 combat engineer vehicles, 1 M-88A1 tracked recovery vehicle (tank retriever), miscellaneous 

vehicles

FBI 174,313

Active Army—8 M-998 high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles, an M35A2 21⁄2-ton cargo 

truck, 2 5-ton trucks, 14 heavy equipment transports, miscellaneous vehicles

FBI 15,466

Equipment

Texas National Guard—unrecovered photographic and observation equipment, 100 canteens, 50 

first-aid dressings, 130 empty magazines for M-16A1 rifles, assorted field clothing

ATF 5,022

Texas National Guard—16 helmets, 13 helmet covers, 12 M-16A1 rifle slings, 54 empty magazines 

for M-16A1s, an M-25A1 protective mask, 180 tent pins

FBI 5,190

Active Army—2,488 gallons of generator fuel, fencing, 200 sandbags, 6 boxes of chemical lights, 

cellular-phone charges

FBI 5,523

Supplies

Texas National Guard—286 cases of field rations and 2,036 gallons of diesel fuel ATF 17,015

Texas National Guard—62 cases of field rations, 10,529 gallons of diesel fuel, and transportation 

costs of tracked vehicles

FBI 19,133

Personnel (per diem, transportation, and travel costs)

Active Air Force—electronic jammers and travel costs FBI 34,340

Active Army—liaison to LEAs and HQs; maintenance of aircraft, vehicles, and equipment; operation 

of equipment; and local transportation costs for DOD personnel

FBI 16,135

Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences—24-hr. medical control, 24-hr clinic, drafting 

of Waco medical plan

FBI Reimbursed

133 staff-daysa

Total of known amounts reimbursed $747,286
Page 28 GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense

Appendix IV

Discrepancies in Billing the FBI for Military 

Support to Its Branch Davidian Operations ApenxIVdi

Undercharges Amount

Active Army used the wrong flying-hour rates when determining charges for:

• flights by UH-1 helicopters for transport, deployment, medical evacuation support, and recovery

• flight by CH-47 helicopter on medical standby

$73,073

Active Army did not bill for the loss of two night-vision goggles 9,168

Active Army did not bill for 40-mm grenade-launcher ammunition (200 target-practice rounds, 50 illumination rounds, 

and 250 high-explosive rounds)

5,066

Active Army did not bill for 9 cases of field rations consumed by Army personnel while supporting the siege 164

Active Army (Special Operations) did not bill for the following services provided during the siege:

• observers and technical liaisons to the FBI’s hostage rescue team

• operation of classified/special equipment

• training federal agents in use of classified equipment

10,793

Total undercharges $98,264

Overcharges

Texas National Guard overcharged for vehicular parts $41

Texas National Guard overcharged for the loss of 8 Kevlar ground-troop helmets 498

Total overcharges $539

Net undercharges $97,725
Page 29 GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense

Appendix V

Costs Waived by the Military in Support of the 

Branch Davidian Operations ApenxVdi

a Includes costs for flying hours, personnel, and special maintenance contract.

b Includes repair of gunshot damage sustained in warrant service.

c Total pay, per diem, and travel (896 staff-days). All personnel were in title 32 (counterdrug program) 

status.

Support Recipient Cost Authority for waiver

Alabama National Guard

2 overflights for reconnaissance photography of the 

compound

ATF $1,238 32 U.S.C. § 112 (counterdrug)

Subtotal $1,238

Active Army (Joint Task Force Six)

Counterdrug training

• Communications

• Medical evacuation

• First aid

• Firing-range support

• Minor construction

ATF 5,610 10 U.S.C. § 377 (substantial training benefit)

P.L. 101–510 § 1004 (b) 4–5

10 U.S.C. § 373

Subtotal $5,610

Texas National Guard

UC-26 aircraft

• 4 overflights of the compound for reconnaissance 

photography

• 1 flight in support of siege

ATF 8,032a 32 U.S.C. § 112 (counterdrug)

Helicopter flights in support of warrant service ATF 15,388b 32 U.S.C. § 112 (counterdrug)

Helicopter flights in support of siege ATF 2,454 32 U.S.C. § 112 (counterdrug)

Personnel services in siege

• Liaison, command and control

• Helicopter flight crews, drivers of various vehicles

• Vehicle and equipment maintenance

ATF and FBI 102,301c 32 U.S.C. § 112 (counterdrug)

Fuel for non-tracked vehicles ATF and FBI 410 32 U.S.C. § 112 (counterdrug)

Landline and cellular telephone service ATF and FBI 1,995 32 U.S.C. § 112 (counterdrug)

Subtotal $130,580

Total amount of expenses waived by the military $137,428
Page 30 GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense

Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of the 

Treasury ApenxVdiI
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of the 

Treasury

(703183) Lert Page 31 GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
Appendix VI

Comments From the Department of the 

Treasury

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133 Department of Defense
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