J-A06019-16

2016 PA Super 229

ALISHA SICILIANO, CASSIE STARETZ, 

SAMANTHA LYNN EARLY AND JUSTIN 

ECK, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF 

ALL SIMILARLY SITUATED PERSONS

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellees

v.

ALBERT/CAROL MUELLER, T/A 

MCDONALDS; ALBERT AND CAROL 

MUELLER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS; 

ALBERT MUELLER, INDIVIDUALLY; AND 

CAROL MUELLER, INDIVIDUALLY

Appellants No. 1321 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered May 29, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County

Civil Division at No(s): 2013-07010

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and DUBOW, J.

OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 21, 2016

Albert and Carol Mueller, Albert and Carol Mueller Limited 

Partnerships, and Albert/Carol Mueller t/a McDonalds (collectively “the 

Muellers”) appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne 

County denying their motion for summary judgment. After careful review, 

we affirm.

The Muellers, through their limited partnership, own and operate 

sixteen McDonalds franchises in Pennsylvania. On August 26, 2013, 
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Plaintiffs, a class consisting of current and former McDonalds’ hourly 

employees1, filed an action against the Muellers alleging violations of the 

Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law (WPCL). 43 P.S. § 260.3. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that the Muellers violated the WPCL by paying 

their wages from November 2010 to July 2013 through a mandatory JP 

Morgan Chase Payroll Card rather than by cash or check. Plaintiffs sought, 

inter alia, compensatory and punitive damages as well as counsel fees and 

litigation costs.

On May 14, 2015, the trial court certified this matter as a class action. 

Shortly thereafter, on May 29, 2015, the court denied the Muellers’ motion 

for summary judgment; the court included in the order a statement that the 

matter involved a controlling question of law, as to which there is substantial 

ground for difference of opinion, the immediate appeal of which might 

materially advance the ultimate termination of the matter. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 

702(b) (interlocutory appeals by permission).2 The Muellers filed a petition 

to appeal the May 29, 2015 order, which this Court granted on August 3, 

2015.

3

____________________________________________

1

Plaintiffs averred that Appellants allowed managerial employees to be paid 

wages by direct deposit. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, 8/26/13, at ¶ 9. 

2

Plaintiffs’/Appellees’ motion to dismiss this interlocutory appeal is denied.

3 On October 19, 2015, the Muellers filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief 

in the Supreme Court, which was denied on December 10, 2015.
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The sole issue on appeal, a question of first impression, is whether 

mandatory payment of wages by payroll debit card (“payroll card”) meets 

the requirement of section 260.3 of the WPCL that “wages shall be paid in 

lawful money of the United States or check.” 43 P.S. § 260.3. We conclude 

that it does not, and, therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order.

Our standard of review of an order granting or denying summary 

judgment is well-settled:

We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of 

material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only 

where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is 

clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 

of law will summary judgment be entered. Our scope of review 

of a trial court’s order granting or denying summary judgment is 

plenary, and our standard of review is clear: the trial court’s 

order will be reversed only where it is established that the court 

committed an error of law or abused its discretion.

Daley v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc., 37 A.3d 1175, 1179 (Pa. 2012) (citation 

omitted).

Section 260.3(a) of the WPCL provides, in relevant part:

Wages other than fringe benefits and wage supplements. Every 

employer shall pay all wages, other than fringe benefits and 

wage supplements due to his employes on regular paydays 

designated in advance by the employer. . . . The wages shall 

be paid in lawful money of the United States or check.

43 P.S. § 260.3(a) (emphasis added). 

As our analysis involves interpreting section 260.3 of the WPCL, we 

begin by considering the Statutory Construction Act. 1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1501,

et seq. The Statutory Construction Act is clear: the objective of all 
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interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the 

intention of the legislature. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). Our Supreme Court has 

found that “the best indication of the General Assembly’s intent is the plain 

language of the statute.” Ario v. Ingram Micro, Inc., 965 A.2d 1194, 

1201 (Pa. Super. 2009), citing Martin v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of 

Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 905 A.2d 438, 443 (Pa. 2006). See

1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b) (when words of statute are clear and unambiguous, 

there is no need to look beyond plain meaning of statute “under the pretext 

of pursuing its spirit.”). Only where the words of a statute are not explicit, 

or they are ambiguous, is there need to resort to consideration of the factors 

in aid of construction enumerated in 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c). See

Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66, 74 (Pa. 2008).

The WPCL states that wages “shall be paid in lawful money of the 

United States or check.” 43 P.S. § 260.3. The language is clear. A debit 

card is not “lawful money” and it is not a “check” as contemplated by the 

drafters of the WPCL. We agree with the learned trial judge, the Honorable 

Thomas Burke, Jr., that the Legislature obviously did not contemplate the 

concept of a payroll debit card when it adopted the language of section 

260.3 in 1961. 

The term “check” is defined in the WPCL as follows: “A draft drawn on 

a bank and payable on demand.” 43 P.S. § 260.2(a). A “draft,” though not 

defined in the WPCL, is “[a]n unconditional written order signed by one 

person (the drawer) directing another person (the drawee or payor) to pay a 
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certain sum of money on demand or at a definite time to a third person (the 

payee) or to bearer. A check is the most common example of a draft.” 

Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 

The term “lawful money” is not defined in the statute; however, its 

common definition or approved usage does not include a debit card. See 1 

Pa.C.S. § 1903 (where terms are not defined in statutes, Statutory 

Construction Act requires words and phrases to be construed by their 

common and approved usages). The Statutory Construction Act itself 

defines “money” as: “Lawful money of the United States.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 

1991. Black's Law Dictionary defines “lawful money” as: “Money that is 

legal tender for the payment of debts.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 

2014). “Legal tender” is defined as follows: “The money (bills and coins) 

approved in a country for the payment of debts, the purchase of goods, and 

other exchanges for value.” Id. The dictionary defines “money” as: 

“something generally accepted as a medium of exchange, a measure of 

value, or a means of payment: officially coined or stamped metal currency.” 

See Merriam-WebsterDictionary http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/money. None of these definitions includes a debit 

card or a payroll debit card.4

____________________________________________

4 Shortly after this litigation was instituted, Representative Gerald J. Mullery 

(Luzerne County) introduced legislation to amend the WPCL. The bill was 

referred to the Committee on Labor and Industry on June 2, 2015. See

2015 Pennsylvania House Bill No. 1274, Pennsylvania One Hundred Ninety-

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The Muellers’ argument that a debit card is the “functional equivalent” 

of a check or lawful money is unavailing, particularly because the payroll 

cards, which were mandatory for hourly employees, forced users to incur 

fees, including over-the-counter cash withdrawal fees and inactivity fees, 

unless the employees complied with the requirements of the bank/company 

issuing and managing the debit cards. For example, the fee schedule 

indicates the cardholder was limited to one free withdrawal per deposit, and 

thereafter each withdrawal carried a $5.00 fee. See Amended Complaint, 

8/26/13, at ¶¶ 61, 96, 118, 143, 154. 

In an amicus brief in support of the Muellers, the American Payroll 

Association (APA) argues that the Legislature has made clear that an 

employer may satisfy the requirements of the WPCL when “lawful money or 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Ninth General Assembly - 2015-2016 (June 02, 2015). The proposed 

amendment allows employers to pay an employee’s wages in the form of a 

payroll debit card. The bill adds “payroll card” to the manner in which wages 

shall be paid under the WPCL, provided the “employe voluntarily provides 

advance authorization, in writing, permitting payment of the employe’s 

wages in this manner.” See H.B. 1274, June 2, 2015, Section 3(4) 

(emphasis added). The bill also proposes definitions of “Lawful money” and 

“[p]ayroll card,” defining “[l]awful money” as “legal tender of the United 

States[,]” and “Payroll card” as “[a] prepaid card or other device used by an 

employe to access wages from a payroll card account.” See H.B. 1274, June 

2, 2015, Section 2.1. The proposed legislation “establishes requirements and 

parameters for employers using payroll debit cards in the payment of 

employee wages, ensuring increased protection for workers. Required 

guidelines will not only ensure that employees have access to the full 

amount of their wages, but are provided with unlimited, no-cost access to 

their accounts.” Mullery, Co-Sponsorship Memoranda, 2/3/15 (emphasis 

added). 
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a check is not involved by depositing an employee’s wages into an account 

at a financial institution[.]” See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Payroll 

Association, at 10. The APA cites to section 6121 of the Banking Code, 

which provides:

For the purposes of any statute, rule or regulation requiring any 

payment to be made in lawful money or by check, whether for 

wages, salaries, commissions or other claims of any kind, such 

payment may be made by credit to an account in a bank, credit 

union or other financial institution authorized to accept deposits 

or payments designated by the recipient of such payment if the 

recipient has requested such method of payment in writing. 

7 P.S. § 6121 (emphasis added). Amicus argues that, “[b]y definition, 

payroll cards involve the deposit of wages into an employee’s account at a 

financial institution.” Id. at 11. However, what the Muellers fail to address 

is the fact that the statute clearly requires the written request of the 

recipient. We emphasize that Plaintiffs here alleged they were required to 

“receive their employment wages exclusively by a Chase Payroll Card.” 

Amended Complaint, supra, at ¶ 7. 

The use of a voluntary payroll debit card may be an appropriate 

method of wage payment. However, until our General Assembly provides 

otherwise, the plain language of the WPCL makes clear that the mandatory 

use of payroll debit cards at issue here, which may subject the user to fees, 

is not. See note 4, supra. 
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We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

the Muellers’ motion for summary judgment, Daley, supra, and, therefore, 

we affirm the trial court’s order. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/21/2016