United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Subcommittee on

Personnel, Committee on Armed

Services, U.S. Senate

January 1998 MILITARY

RECRUITING

DOD Could Improve

Its Recruiter Selection

and Incentive Systems

GAO/NSIAD-98-58

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-278680 

January 30, 1998

The Honorable Dirk Kempthorne

Chairman

The Honorable Max Cleland

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Personnel

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

This report responds to the request of the Chairman and the former Ranking Minority Member

that we review the recruiter incentive systems that the military services use to optimize the

performance of military recruiters and ensure that only fully qualified applicants are enlisted.

We reviewed the services’ recruiting processes to (1) screen, select, and train recruiters;

(2) screen, select, and prepare recruits for basic training; and (3) measure and reward recruiter

performance. Specifically, we identified practices in each service that enhance recruiter

performance and retention of recruits and could be expanded to other services.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the

Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. We will also make copies available to

others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this

report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations and

 Capabilities Issues
Executive Summary

Purpose Through extensive recruiting efforts, the military services send more than

167,000 men and women each year to basic training. However, about

one-third of the enlisted personnel recruited since fiscal year 1987 left the

military before completing their initial service obligations. In response to

concerns of the Chairman and former Ranking Minority Member,

Subcommittee on Personnel, Senate Committee on Armed Services, about

this attrition and the cost of recruiting and training personnel who do not

complete their initial military obligations, GAO reviewed the services’

recruiting processes to (1) screen, select, and train recruiters; (2) screen,

select, and prepare recruits for basic training; and (3) measure and reward

recruiter performance. Specifically, GAO identified practices in each

service that enhance recruiter performance and recruit retention and

could be expanded to other services.

Background Recruiting and retaining well-qualified military personnel is among the

goals included in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) strategic plan, as

required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.1 DOD

has approximately 12,000 recruiters at 5,500 recruiting stations in the

United States and overseas who are responsible for selling potential

recruits on the benefits of military service. The Air Force is the only

service that has an all-volunteer recruiter force. Each of the services has

its own process for selecting, training, and rewarding its recruiters, who

are generally assigned monthly goals of people to enlist to help meet their

services’ annual recruiting missions.

Recruiters prescreen applicants for military service using established

criteria. Those applicants who pass this initial screening are sent to 

1 of 65 military entrance processing stations located throughout the United

States. At these stations, applicants take a battery of tests and receive a

medical examination. Applicants who are selected for service sign an

enlistment contract and enter the delayed entry program, in an unpaid

status, for up to 1 year. Recruits have time while in this program to

prepare mentally and physically for basic training. Recruiters are

responsible for managing the delayed entry program by providing recruits

with information and instruction that will help them to transition from

civilian to military life.

Between fiscal years 1987 and 1996, DOD sent approximately 2.2 million

recruits to basic training. However, over 700,000 of those recruits failed to

1

This act requires all federal agencies to develop strategic plans that define the agency’s mission, set

goals, and link activities and resources to those goals.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Executive Summary

complete their initial service obligations, with about 200,000 failing to

complete even 90 days of service. In addition, recent service data show

that between 13 and 21 percent of recruits in the delayed entry program

dropped out of the military even before leaving for basic training.

Appendix I contains DOD and service information related to the costs of

recruiting and training new servicemembers and our analysis of the

difficulties associated with estimating the costs of attrition.

Results in Brief DOD could enhance the success of its recruiters if the services

strengthened key aspects of their systems for selecting and training

recruiters. Only the Air Force requires personnel experienced in recruiting

to interview candidates for recruiting positions and uses selection tests to

screen interviewees for recruiting duty. While recruiters from each service

receive practical training to improve their ability to recruit and enlist

personnel, Marine Corps and Navy training also emphasize the importance

of retaining recruits once enlisted and require recruiters to focus on

retention as well as recruiting.

The services have taken steps to improve their delayed entry programs,

such as increasing the amount of contact between recruiters and recruits.

Although all the services give recruits in the delayed entry programs

access to their physical fitness facilities and encourage the recruits to

become or stay physically fit, only the Marine Corps conducts regular

physical training for recruits who are waiting to go to basic training.

Although recruits who are physically fit are more likely to complete basic

training, only the Marine Corps requires all recruits to take a physical

fitness test before reporting to basic training.

Achieving monthly goals has been the key measure of recruiter

performance. Only the Marine Corps and the Navy consider retention in

measuring and rewarding recruiter performance. Specifically, they

consider the number of recruits completing basic training when evaluating

the success of recruiters. The Army and the Air Force consider primarily

the number of recruits enlisted or the number reporting to basic training.

DOD’s 1996 survey of service recruiters showed that the number of hours

that recruiters work reached its highest point since 1989. Despite this

effort, less than one-half of the recruiters achieved their goals in 9 or more

months of a 12-month period. The recruiters GAO interviewed were

concerned about the difficulties they face in meeting monthly goals and

the long hours they must devote to their jobs. Establishing quarterly

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Executive Summary

floating goals could ease the burden on recruiters and still provide an

incentive to meet recruitment goals.

Principal Findings

Improved Recruiter

Selection, Screening, and

Training Could Enhance

Recruiter Success

The services designate personnel to screen and select recruiters. In

general, these personnel follow various processes, including conducting

interviews and checking the medical and personnel records of potential

recruiters. Factors that may disqualify a person for recruiting duty include

average or low performance marks; recent alcohol or drug use; and

financial, health, and legal problems. The Air Force has the most extensive

screening program, relying heavily on a team of experienced, senior

recruiters to interview candidates. In contrast, many Army and Marine

recruiting candidates are interviewed by personnel in their current chain

of command who may not have recruiting experience. The Navy is

beginning to change its recruiter selection procedures to more closely

resemble those of the Air Force.

During interviews of prospective candidates for recruiting duty, Air Force

recruiters evaluate the potential of candidates to be successful recruiters,

including the ability to communicate effectively. In fact, the Air Force

recently began using a screening test to assess a candidate’s personality.

The Army, the Marine Corps, and the Navy tend to focus on a candidate’s

past performance in non-recruiting positions. However, the Navy is

planning to test the use of an instrument that is similar to the Air Force

test.

All of the services’ recruiter school curriculums emphasize the importance

of recruiting well-qualified personnel. However, training for Marine Corps

and Navy recruiters also address attrition problems and emphasize the

importance of the recruiters’ role in retaining recruits after basic training.

The Marine Corps also takes advantage of the fact that its recruiter school

is colocated with one of its basic training locations. Future recruiters

interact with drill instructors and recruits at basic training to gain insight

on ways to motivate recruits in the delayed entry program. Navy recruiters

have the same interaction but not until after they have been in the

recruiting field for a period of time.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Executive Summary

Increasing Emphasis on

Physical Fitness Could

Help Reduce Early

Attrition

The delayed entry program provides time for recruits to prepare mentally

and physically for basic training. To strengthen the recruits’ commitment

to serve while in this program, the services have made specific efforts to

provide better information, training, and benefits to the recruits. For

example, all of the services require recruiters to have regular contact with

recruits in the program and give recruits access to their physical fitness

centers. The Army also gives its recruits the opportunity to earn points

toward future promotions by working on correspondence courses.

Recruits who cannot pass physical fitness tests can be discharged from the

services, and service officials acknowledged that poor physical condition

among recruits is often a contributing factor in early attrition. Although all

of the services encourage recruits in the delayed entry program to

maintain or achieve a specific level of physical fitness before leaving for

basic training, only the Marine Corps conducts regular physical training

and fitness tests. Specifically, Marine recruits usually take a physical

fitness test within the first 30 days after entering the program and are

required to take the test within 30 days of beginning basic training. A study

of almost 14,500 Marines who attended basic training in fiscal year 1994

found that recruits who failed the initial physical fitness test had an

attrition rate of 24.1 percent, whereas those who passed had an attrition

rate of 13.4 percent.

Including Attrition as a

Factor in Measuring

Recruiter Success Could

Increase the Focus on

DOD’s Retention Goal

Two of the services include attrition as a factor in measuring and

rewarding recruiter performance. Specifically, the Marine Corps ties

recruiter success and awards to basic training graduation rates, and the

Navy began moving in that direction in fiscal year 1996. However, the

Army and the Air Force, which annually bring in almost 55 percent of

DOD’s recruits, generally reward recruiters based on the number of recruits

who are enlisted or who report to basic training rather than the number

who graduate and become productive servicemembers. According to DOD’s

strategic plan, which is required under the Government Performance and

Results Act of 1993, one of DOD’s goals is not only to recruit well-qualified

personnel but also to retain them.

Monthly Goals May

Restrict Recruiters

Recruiters in all of the services generally work long hours, take very little

leave, and are under almost constant pressure until they achieve their

assigned monthly goals. Successful recruiters are often required to make

up for recruiters who do not perform well. A 1996 DOD survey indicated

that recruiter performance is at an all-time low, even though the number of

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Executive Summary

working hours increased to the highest point since 1989. For example,

only 42 percent of the services’ recruiters met assigned goals for 9 or more

months in the previous 12-month period.

The current system of monthly goals requires each recruiter to typically

recruit two to three people each month. Recruiters who achieve double

their monthly goal are usually assigned the same or higher goals in the

next month and are not given credit toward that month’s goal. Recruiters

who miss their goal in one month are concerned about their performance

rating even if they meet or exceed their annual goals. Recruiters GAO

interviewed believed that monthly goals were restrictive and that the

hours they worked were long. A system of quarterly floating goals could

provide recruiters more flexibility in their working hours and leave plans

and still provide the checks and incentives needed to encourage

productivity.

Recommendations To enhance the performance of recruiters and the retention of recruits,

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the services to

• use experienced field recruiters to interview in person all potential

recruiters and use communication skills as a key recruiter selection

criterion;

• develop or procure personality screening tests that can aid in the selection

of recruiters;

• emphasize the recruiters’ role in reducing attrition in their recruiter

training curriculums and provide opportunities for recruiter trainees to

gain insight into problems encountered in basic training by having (1) drill

instructors meet with students at the recruiter schools and (2) recruiter

students meet with separating recruits and those who are being held back

due to poor physical conditioning;

• conduct physical fitness tests before recruits report to basic training and

encourage the services to incorporate more structured physical fitness

training for recruits into their delayed entry programs;

• link recruiter awards more closely to recruits’ successful completion of

basic training; and

• encourage the use of quarterly floating goals as an alternative to the

services current systems of monthly goals.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Executive Summary

Agency Comments

and GAO’s Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of GAO’s report, DOD concurred with GAO’s

recommendations to develop or procure personality screening tests to aid

in the selection of recruiters, establish better communication between the

recruiting force and basic training drill instructors, conduct physical

fitness tests on recruits before they report to basic training and encourage

the services to incorporate more structured physical fitness training into

their delayed entry programs, and link recruiter awards more closely to

recruits’ successful completion of basic training.

DOD partially concurred with GAO’s recommendation to use experienced

field recruiters to personally interview all potential recruiters. Although

DOD stated that GAO’s recommendation is valid, where possible, it also

stated that this recommendation is not feasible in the Army due to the

large number of men and women who are selected annually for recruiting

duty and to the geographic diversity of their assignments. While it may be

difficult for the Army to use field recruiters to interview 100 percent of its

prospective recruiters, GAO continues to believe that senior, experienced

recruiters have a better understanding than operational commanders

about what is required in recruiting duty and, therefore, encourages the

Army to place a greater emphasis on the use of recruiter selection teams

or explore other alternatives that would produce similar results.

DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation to encourage the

use of quarterly floating goals as an alternative to the services’ current

systems of monthly goals. DOD’s primary concern with this

recommendation is that floating quarterly goals would reduce the services’

ability to make corrections to recruiting difficulties before they become

unmanageable. However, it should be noted that this proposal is for

floating, rather than static, quarterly goals. Floating goals would still

provide recruiting commands with the ability to identify recruiting

shortfalls in the first month that they occur and control the flow of new

recruits into the system on a monthly basis.

DOD’s comments appear in their entirety in appendix III and are discussed

in chapters 2, 3, and 4.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

10

Recruiting and Retention Is a Key DOD Goal 10

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 11

Chapter 2 

Enhanced Recruiter

Selection and Training

Could Improve the

Recruiting Process

14

Services’ Recruiter Selection Standards Do Not Necessarily

Identify the People Most Likely to Succeed

14

Most Recruiter Training Does Not Emphasize Communication

With Basic Training Personnel

18

Conclusions 21

Recommendations 21

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 21

Chapter 3 

Additional Physical

Fitness Preparation

Can Enhance Recruit

Retention

23

Recruiters Consider Standard Criteria in Screening Recruits 23

Improved DEP Participation Can Enhance Recruit Retention

Levels

25

Conclusions 27

Recommendations 27

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28

Chapter 4 

Some Service

Performance

Measures Ignore

Attrition, and Monthly

Goals May Restrict

Recruiters

29

Some Award Systems Are Not Tied to the Right Performance

Measures

29

Most Recruiters Are Not Meeting Monthly Goals 32

Recruiters Are Dissatisfied With Working Hours and Pressures to

Make Goals

33

Recruiters Have Little or No Control Over Their Monthly Goals 35

Conclusions 35

Recommendations 36

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 37

Appendixes Appendix I: Costs of Recruiting, Training, and Attrition 40

Appendix II: Quarterly Floating Goals 44

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense 49

Appendix IV: Major Contributors to This Report 55

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Contents

Tables Table 4.1: Recruiter Productivity Needed to Support 1997 Service

Accession Goals

33

Table I.1: Recruiting and Advertising Investment per Recruit 40

Table II.1: Comparison of Recruiter Goals, Performance, and

Monthly Evaluations Under Two Different Systems

45

Table II.2: Production Numbers Necessary for Excellent

Recruiters to Stay on Track

46

Table II.3: Possible Production Levels of Excellent Recruiters

Under Different Goals

47

Abbreviations

DEP delayed entry program

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

MEPS military entrance processing station

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Chapter 1 

Introduction

To ensure that the Department of Defense (DOD) has an adequate number

of military personnel in place to meet U.S. national security objectives, the

services continuously conduct recruiting efforts. The four services have

nearly 12,000 recruiters at 5,500 recruiting stations throughout the United

States and overseas. Each of the services has its own process for selecting,

training, and rewarding its recruiters. The Air Force is the only service

with a recruiter force comprised entirely of volunteers. Recruiters are

generally assigned monthly goals of the number of people to enlist to help

meet their services’ annual recruiting goals.

Recruiters are responsible for selling the benefits of military service to

various audiences, including possible recruits, their parents, and teachers,

and then prescreening applicants, according to established criteria, to

determine whether the applicants should continue through the enlistment

process. Those who pass the prescreening process are sent to 

1 of 65 military entrance processing stations (MEPS) located throughout the

United States. At a MEPS, applicants take a battery of tests and receive a

medical examination to determine their eligibility for military service.

Applicants who qualify for service sign their first contract, take their first

enlistment oath as members of the Individual Ready Reserve, and enter the

delayed entry program (DEP), in an unpaid status, for up to 1 year while

awaiting assignment to basic training. While in the DEP, recruits have time

to prepare mentally and physically for basic training. Recruiters are

responsible for maintaining contact with recruits in the DEP and providing

them with information and instruction that will help them successfully

move from civilian to military life.

Each service has its own basic training program, and the duration of the

four programs ranges from 6 to 12 weeks. Before leaving for basic training,

recruits return to the MEPS for final processing. At that time, the recruits

undergo another medical examination, sign their second contract, and

take their second enlistment oath as active duty servicemembers. After

basic training, most recruits attend technical training for a few weeks to

more than 1 year before reporting to their first assignment. Most initial

enlistments last 4 years, including the time spent in training.

Recruiting and

Retention Is a Key

DOD Goal

The services recruit more than 167,000 men and women each year.

Between fiscal years 1987 and 1996, DOD sent almost 2.2 million first-time

recruits to basic training, which enabled all four services to meet or

exceed their annual recruiting goals during that time. The Army enlisted

about 38 percent of these recruits, the Navy 31 percent, the Air Force

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Chapter 1 

Introduction

16 percent, and the Marine Corps 15 percent. The Marine Corps replaces

the greatest portion of its enlisted forces each year—typically close to

20 percent. The Air Force has the smallest yearly personnel changes; new

recruits generally constitute less than 10 percent of its total enlisted force.

While the number of new enlistees generally declined between 1987 and

1996 due to the drawdown of forces,1

 the percentage of traditional high

school diploma graduates remained fairly steady at about 94 percent.

About one-third of the personnel recruited since fiscal year 1987, or more

than 700,000 personnel, left military service after reporting to basic

training but before completing their initial service obligations. Over this

same period, approximately 9 percent, or about 200,000 personnel, left

within the first 90 days of service.2

 In addition, recent service data show

that between 13 and 21 percent of recruits in the DEP dropped out of the

military even before they left for basic training. These high attrition rates

mean that recruiters must now enlist two people to fill one service

obligation.

Recruiting and retaining well-qualified military personnel is among the

goals included in DOD’s strategic plan required under the Government

Performance and Results Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-62, Aug. 3, 1993). The act

was designed to create a new results-oriented federal management and

decision-making approach that requires agencies to clearly define their

missions, set goals, and link activities and resources to those goals. The

act required that federal agencies’ strategic plans be developed no later

than September 30, 1997, for at least a 5-year period.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

In response to concerns of the Chairman and former Ranking Minority

Member, Subcommittee on Personnel, Senate Committee on Armed

Services, about the cost of recruiting and training personnel who do not

complete their initial military obligations, we reviewed the services’

recruiting efforts to (1) screen, select, and train recruiters; (2) screen,

select, and prepare recruits for basic training; and (3) measure and reward

recruiter performance. Specifically, we identified practices in each service

that enhance recruiter performance and recruit retention and could be

expanded to other services. We are also providing DOD and service

1

The general downward trend reversed in fiscal year 1996, largely as a result of increased Army

accessions.

2

Our report, Military Attrition: DOD Could Save Millions by Better Screening Enlisted Personnel

(GAO/NSIAD-97-39, Jan. 6, 1997), addressed attrition occurring within the first 6 months of service. We

are currently conducting another assignment that addresses attrition occurring after 6 months but

before the end of an enlistment contract.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Chapter 1 

Introduction

information related to the costs of recruiting and training new

servicemembers and our analysis of the difficulties associated with

estimating the costs of attrition (see app. I).

We limited the scope of our review to the role that recruiters might play in

reducing attrition. We recognize that many other factors can contribute to

attrition, such as medical, security, or other screenings performed by

individuals or agencies outside the recruiting commands. However, we did

not examine the adequacy of these factors. Also, we did not evaluate the

role of basic training policies and personnel in reducing attrition.

To address these objectives, we met with representatives from service

recruiting commands, recruiter teams, and service recruiter schools. We

also reviewed applicable instructions, regulations, policy statements, and

recruiter school curriculums and observed 50 recruiter screening

interviews.

In addition, we discussed selection and training procedures with 35

experienced recruiters at various U.S. locations. We also spoke with the

recruiters about the role they play in screening applicants for enlistment

and preparing them for basic training. Finally, the recruiters provided us

with their perspectives of the services’ recruiter award and incentive

systems. The 35 recruiters did not constitute a representative sample of all

recruiters, but they did provide broad perspectives based on more than

280 years of collective recruiting experience in 21 different states. To

corroborate their statements, we compared the information they provided

us with the results of DOD’s 1996 recruiter survey, which was based on a

representative sample of recruiters.

We also reviewed past accession and attrition studies done by audit

agencies and private firms and collected and analyzed accession and

attrition data from each of the services and the Defense Manpower Data

Center to determine recruiting and retention trends.

Although we did not extensively test the reliability of the Center’s data

base, we did check computations of attrition percentages from accession

and attrition statistics. We also compared Center data with information in

the services’ databases. Because personnel numbers can change daily and

the service data we used was not compiled on the same day as the Center’s

data, we did not attempt to match these numbers. However, our data

analysis revealed the same trends between service-generated data and

Center data, and we did not find any large discrepancies between the

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Chapter 1 

Introduction

databases. Finally, we discussed our data with recruiting command

officials to ensure that no large discrepancies existed.

We performed our work at the following locations:

• Directorate for Accession Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense, Force Management Policy, Washington, D.C.;

• Army Recruiting Command, Fort Knox, Kentucky;

• Army Recruiting and Retention School, Fort Jackson, South Carolina;

• Air Force Recruiting Service, Randolph Air Force Base, San Antonio,

Texas;

• Air Force Technical Training School, Recruiter Training Flight, Lackland

Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas;

• Navy Recruiting Command, Arlington, Virginia;

• Naval Recruiter School, Pensacola, Florida;

• Marine Corps Recruiting Command, Arlington, Virginia; and

• Marine Corps Recruiter School, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego,

California.

We conducted our review between January and December 1997 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Chapter 2 

Enhanced Recruiter Selection and Training

Could Improve the Recruiting Process

The services use a variety of screening methods, such as reviewing annual

performance appraisals and obtaining commanding officer

recommendations, to ensure that personnel who are assigned to recruiting

duty are chosen from among the best noncommissioned officers in their

respective career fields. However, not all of these screening methods

ensure that personnel selected for recruiting duty possess the

communication and interpersonal skills necessary to be successful

recruiters. The Air Force is the only service that critically evaluates

communication skills as part of the recruiter screening process. It is also

the only service that uses a personality assessment test during its recruiter

screening.

Personnel selected for recruiting duty in all of the services receive

practical training in communication skills, sales techniques, and

enlistment and paperwork requirements. This training supports a direct

link between recruiter daily performance and DOD’s strategic goal of

recruiting well-qualified military personnel. However, only the Marine

Corps and the Navy recruiter schools have curriculums that are directly

linked with DOD’s goal of retaining these personnel.

Services’ Recruiter

Selection Standards

Do Not Necessarily

Identify the People

Most Likely to

Succeed

Because recruiters represent the military services in civilian communities,

they must meet high selection standards. These standards ensure that

recruiters are selected from among the best noncommissioned officers in

the military, but they do not necessarily identify those who possess or can

develop the communication and interpersonal skills needed to become

successful recruiters. Only the Air Force’s screening process critically

evaluates servicemembers’ communication skills and uses assessment

tests to predict the likelihood of their success as recruiters.

Communication Skills Are

Not Emphasized in the

Screening Processes of All

Services

Although actual screening standards vary by service, the recruiting

commands generally use interviews and medical and personnel records to

screen and select personnel for recruiting duty. The services generally

draw their recruiters from noncommissioned officers in paygrades E-5

through E-7. During the screening process, the services use different but

measurable criteria to evaluate a prospective recruiter’s education, health,

moral character, emotional and financial stability, personal appearance,

and job performance. Failure to meet any of these standards can disqualify

a person from recruiting duty. The services also have minimum and

maximum pay grade and time-in-service requirements, and those selected

for recruiting duty are generally required to reenlist if they do not have at

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Chapter 2 

Enhanced Recruiter Selection and Training

Could Improve the Recruiting Process

least 3 years remaining on their current enlistment. Finally, personnel with

performance marks below a certain level are not eligible for recruiting

duty. For example, Navy regulations disqualify any servicemember who

has received an overall evaluation below 3.8 or individual marks below 3.6

(on a 4.0 rating scale) during the previous 3 years.

Successful recruiters must be able to effectively communicate with a

variety of people in the civilian community and convince them of the

benefits of military service. These people include not only potential

recruits but also parents, teachers, guidance counselors, coaches, school

administrators, and others who may influence potential recruits. However,

we found that only the Air Force’s screening process has measurable

criteria to evaluate the communication and interpersonal skills of

prospective recruiters. It is important to measure these skills because

noncommissioned officers can excel in many military job specialties

without possessing the ability to effectively interact with the general

civilian population.

The Air Force is the only service to require that recruiting command

officials interview all prospective recruiters. Most Air Force interviews

(about 70 percent) are conducted by a team of experienced recruiters who

travel to U.S. and overseas bases. The team makes general presentations

about recruiting duty and then conducts interviews with individuals who

are interested in becoming recruiters. According to a team member,

interviews generally last between 30 and 45 minutes, and spouses are

required to be present. A prospective recruiter’s ability to communicate

with the team is a key factor in determining whether the person will be

selected. Prospective recruiters who lack communications skills can be

rejected even if they meet all the pay grade, time-in-service, legal,

financial, appearance, and performance requirements. The remaining

interviews (30 percent) are for personnel who were not available or

interested in recruiting at the time of the recruiter team’s visit. These

candidates are interviewed by a high-level recruiting command official in

their geographic area.

The Marine Corps also has a recruiter screening team that travels to bases

to present an overview of recruiting duty and interview people who have

volunteered for recruiting duty or have been identified by the recruiting

command as possible recruiters. However, a prospective recruiter’s ability

to communicate with the screening team is not critically evaluated during

these screening interviews, which typically last 5 to 10 minutes. Spouses

are encouraged, but not required, to attend the interviews. Most Marines

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Chapter 2 

Enhanced Recruiter Selection and Training

Could Improve the Recruiting Process

recruiters are screened by the team, but those who are unable to attend an

interview with the screening team can be selected for recruiting duty

based on a check of their records and an interview with their commanding

officer. Marines who are selected for recruiting duty undergo a second,

more in-depth screening interview when they arrive at the Marine Corps

recruiter school in San Diego.

The Army’s recruiter team interviews a much smaller percentage of the

soldiers who have volunteered or are identified as prospective recruiters

than the Air Force and the Marine Corps recruiter selection teams.

Prospective Army recruiters can be interviewed by high-level officials

within their chain of command who may, but most likely do not, have

recruiting experience. These officials use a general checklist in deciding

whether to recommend a person for recruiting duty. The checklist has

measurable criteria for some items. For example, prospective recruiters

must be a sergeant, a staff sergeant, or a sergeant first class and must have

between 4 and 14 years time in service. They must also be high school

graduates or have 1 year of college and a high school equivalency degree,

and they cannot have been convicted of a crime by a civilian court or

military court-martial. However, the checklist does not have any

measurable standards regarding the prospective recruiters’

communication or interpersonal skills.

Volunteers and other prospective Navy recruiters are interviewed by their

commanding officers to determine whether they meet established

standards. The commanding officers do not evaluate the prospective

recruiters’ ability to communicate effectively in determining whether to

endorse a person for recruiting duty. Navy officials told us that they think

recruiting command personnel are in a better position to evaluate a

person’s chances of being a successful recruiter. Therefore, the Navy is

beginning to change its recruiter selection procedures to more closely

resemble those of the Air Force. These officials said that the Navy hopes

to have a traveling recruiter selection team in place in the near future. In

its response to a draft of this report, DOD stated that the Navy has, in fact,

assembled a recruiting team consisting of four career recruiters who will

be augmented by field recruiters.

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Air Force Uses a

Personality Test to Screen

Prospective Recruiters

In 1996, noting the results of studies of private salespeople,1 the Air Force

began investigating the possibility of using a personality assessment test in

screening potential recruiters. After administering a commercially

developed biographical screening test to 1,171 recruiters, the Air Force

found that recruiters with certain traits were much more likely to succeed

than recruiters who lacked those traits. These traits, in order of

importance, were assertiveness, empathy, self-regard (awareness of

strengths and weaknesses), problem-solving ability, happiness and

optimism, interpersonal relations, emotional self-awareness (ability to

recognize one’s feelings), and reality testing (ability to distinguish between

what you see and what is). The study also found that high performers

worked the least number of hours and reported higher marital satisfaction

and that neither the recruiter’s geographic region nor zone was a factor in

predicting recruiter success. In August 1997, the Air Force purchased the

133-question biographical screening test for less than the cost of putting

one recruiter in the field. In November 1997, the Air Force’s recruiter

screening team began administering this test to prospective recruiters.

All of the services use the armed services vocational aptitude battery of

tests to measure servicemembers’ aptitude for initial job placement, yet

none of the services uses this battery of tests to evaluate a person’s

aptitude for recruiting. In its response to a draft of this report, DOD stated

that the Navy is planning to test the use of an instrument that is similar to

the Air Force test.

Recruiter Screening

Continues During the

Training Process

Personnel selected for recruiting duty report to training sites where their

suitability for recruiting duty continues to be evaluated. To become fully

qualified, all recruiters undergo formal classroom training that lasts

between 5 and 7 weeks and on-the-job training that can last up to 1 year.

The Air Force and the Marine Corps are not only more selective than the

other two services in the recruiters they send to school but also in the

recruiters they allow to graduate from school. The Air Force recruiter

school has an attrition rate of 17 percent, despite having all volunteer

recruiters who have passed the most detailed pretraining screening

process of the four services. Attrition rates at the Marine Corps recruiter

school typically run between 14 and 16 percent. The Navy recruiter school

has an attrition rate of approximately 6 percent, and the Army recruiter

school attrition rate was under 5 percent during fiscal year 1997.

1

Personality tests allow private firms to predict an applicant’s potential to succeed before investing

resources in hiring and training the individual. Although there are significant differences between

military recruiters and civilian salespeople, both professions require people with excellent

communication skills who are capable of effectively interacting with the general public.

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Air Force Recruiters Have

the Highest Success Rates

Air Force recruiters are more than twice as productive as recruiters from

the other services. On average, each Air Force recruiter sends at least 

32 recruits to basic training each year, whereas recruiters for the other

services send between 12 and 16 recruits to basic training annually.

Officials from all the services acknowledged that part of this difference is

due to the fact that the Air Force is “the service of choice,” receiving the

most walk-in applicants and having the lowest turnover rate of the

services. However, the Commanding General of the Air Force Recruiting

Service attributes a large part of this success to the Air Force’s intensive

recruiter screening process. Also, Air Force recruiters are the most

successful in terms of meeting their assigned goals. Despite having the

highest individual recruiting goals, DOD’s 1996 recruiter survey showed that

62 percent of Air Force recruiters reported making their assigned monthly

goals 9 or more times during the previous year, compared with a DOD

average of 42 percent.

Lower turnover rates may also contribute to the success rate of Air Force

recruiters. Air Force recruiters typically serve 4-year tours, whereas

recruiters in the other services normally serve 3-year tours. Various

studies have found that recruiter productivity increases after an initial

learning period in the field, suggesting that the positive effects of

experience can be realized as early as the 4-month point or as late as the

2-year point. Regardless of the length of the learning curve, the Air Force

achieves some efficiency from the increased experience and lower

turnover rates of its recruiters.

Most Recruiter

Training Does Not

Emphasize

Communication With

Basic Training

Personnel

The services’ recruiter schools support a direct link between recruiter

daily performance and DOD’s strategic goal to recruit well-qualified military

personnel. The curriculums consist of instruction, practical exercises, and

examinations in communication and sales techniques as well as enlistment

and paperwork requirements. However, only the Marine Corps recruiter

school spends a significant amount of time teaching recruiters about

preventing attrition, thus supporting DOD’s strategic goal to retain

well-qualified personnel.

Marine Corps Emphasizes

Communication and

Leadership as Ways to

Reduce Attrition

The Marine Corps recruiter school, located at the Marine Corps Recruit

Depot in San Diego, supports DOD’s strategic retention goal by teaching

recruiters that they have an important role in reducing attrition that occurs

before the end of the first enlistment contract. Communication and

leadership are viewed as the keys to reducing attrition. The curriculum

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devotes more than a full week, out of 7, to these issues: 2-1/2 days to

communication and basic training issues and 3-1/2 days to leadership

training. Students at recruiter training discuss attrition issues with basic

training drill instructors, recruits who are separating from basic training,

and recruits who are being held back in basic training because they cannot

meet the physical fitness requirements. Marine Corps officials believe this

interaction with drill instructors helps to open the lines of communication

between drill instructors and recruiters after the recruiters graduate. The

interaction with recruits helps the recruiters to realize that they not only

need to recruit people but that they also need to prepare them for basic

training and maintain contact with them while they are at basic training.

A large portion of the Marine Corps school’s leadership training focuses on

the effect that DEP leadership can have on reducing attrition. One lesson

begins with a classroom demonstration in which all of the students are

initially standing. Then, about 19 percent of the students are told to sit

down to represent DEP discharges. Next, another 12 percent are instructed

to sit down to represent basic training attrition. Finally, another 25 percent

of the class is told to sit down to represent the rest of the first-term

attrition. This lesson vividly illustrates to the students that less than one of

every two recruits actually completes the first full term of obligated

service. Afterward, the instructor explains that recruiters have to make up

every one of the discharges and emphasizes the four goals of the Marine

Corps’ national DEP: to reduce DEP attrition, reduce basic training attrition,

positively impact other first-term attrition, and deliver better motivated

Marines to the Fleet Marine Force. Marine Corps recruiters are taught that

they must sell their enlistees on the features and benefits of DEP,

2

 just as

they sold them initially on the Marine Corps.

All Marine Corps recruiters are required to write to their recruits and the

recruits’ families while the recruits are in basic training. One Marine Corps

recruiter told us that he was required to send three letters to each recruit

in basic training and that none of the letters was allowed to be a form

letter. According to Marine Corps recruiters, drill instructors often call

recruiters to warn them if one of their recruits is having trouble at basic

training. To prevent attrition, the recruiters can then talk to their recruits

on the telephone and remind them of the reasons that they joined the

Marine Corps. The recruiters said basic training attrition would probably

be much higher if they were not given early warnings of trouble and

allowed to resell their recruits on the benefits of serving in the Marine

2

Recruits who participate in DEP activities are better prepared for basic training, as evidenced by their

lower attrition rates. In addition, recruits can get to know other recruits in the DEP, and can even be

promoted if they supply qualified referrals who enlist in the Marine Corps.

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Corps. According to a Marine Corps document, the percentage of recruit

training graduates is indicative of the efforts that have taken place from

contract to accession. It demonstrates quality prospecting and screening,

sound sales practices, and an effective DEP.

Other Service Curriculums

Do Not Include

Interactions With Drill

Instructors and Recruits

Although the Army’s recruiter school is located at Fort Jackson, South

Carolina, which is also the site of one of its basic training programs, the

curriculum does not include any interaction between future recruiters and

recruits or drill instructors at basic training. Likewise, the Air Force’s

recruiter school is colocated with its basic training squadrons at Lackland

Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas. However, the curriculum does not

include discussions between the students and drill instructors or new

recruits, except during a 1-hour tour of the basic training facilities.

Students at the Navy’s recruiter school do not have any interaction with

drill instructors or recruits because the recruiter school is located in

Florida and the basic training site is in Illinois. However, the Navy recently

began a 4-day refresher training course for its recruiters who have been in

the field between 12 and 18 months. The refresher course is held at the

basic training site in Illinois, and recruiters spend about one-half of their

time observing and interacting with recruits and their families, drill

instructors, and other training command personnel at basic training and

graduation events. After all current recruiters have attended this training,

the Navy plans to send new recruiters to the training after they have been

in the field about 6 to 8 months.

The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force do not have separate leadership

modules in their recruiter school curriculums. Although they all include

instruction in DEP management as part of their recruiter curriculums, this

training is less extensive than the Marine Corps’ leadership training,

lasting only 3 to 9 hours. In addition, these services do not emphasize the

relationship between effective DEP management and DOD’s strategic

retention goal.

Army, Navy, and Air Force recruiters we spoke with said that drill

instructors hardly ever call them to give an early warning that a recruit is

having difficulties at basic training. The recruiters said they usually learn

that a recruit is having problems only through the recruit’s family or when

they see the recruit back in town after dropping out of basic training. In

addition, some Air Force recruiters told us that they were prohibited from

writing letters to recruits in basic training due to concerns that some

recruits would receive more mail from their recruiters than others.

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Conclusions By carefully selecting recruiters based on a demonstrated aptitude for

recruiting, as well as excellent performance in another military specialty,

the services should be able to increase the effectiveness of their recruiters.

In addition, by training these recruiters to lead and motivate recruits in the

DEP and requiring the recruiters to keep in touch with their recruits at

basic training, the services could help to increase retention and the

efficiency of their recruiting commands.

Recommendations For the services to meet DOD’s strategic goal of recruiting and retaining

well-qualified military personnel, optimize recruiting command efficiency

by identifying personnel who are likely to succeed as recruiters, and

increase recruits’ chances of graduating from basic training, we

recommend that the Secretary of Defense instruct the services to

• use experienced field recruiters to personally interview all prospective

recruiters and evaluate their potential to effectively communicate with

applicants, parents, teachers, and others in the civilian community;

• jointly explore the feasibility of developing or procuring assessment tests

that can aid in the selection of recruiters; and

• instruct officials at the service recruiting schools to emphasize the

retention portion of DOD’s long-term strategic goal by having drill

instructors meet with students at the schools and having the recruiters in

training meet with separating recruits and those being held back due to

poor physical conditioning. These practices could establish an ongoing

dialogue between recruiters and drill instructors and enhance

understanding of problems that lead to early attrition.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to use experienced field

recruiters to interview all prospective recruiters. In its response, DOD

agreed that the selection and training of the recruiter force is of vital

importance and that our recommendation to use experienced recruiters to

personally interview prospective recruiters is valid, where possible.

However, DOD also stated that this recommendation is not economically

feasible in the Army due to the large number of men and women who are

selected annually for recruiting duty and to the geographic diversity of

their assignments. While it may be difficult for the Army to use field

recruiters to interview 100 percent of its prospective recruiters, we

continue to believe that senior, experienced recruiters have a better

understanding than operational commanders about what is required in

recruiting duty. Therefore, we encourage the Army to place a greater

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emphasis on the use of recruiter selection teams or explore other

alternatives that would produce similar results. In the case of the Marine

Corps, DOD did not present any reasons to suggest that this service could

not implement this recommendation. Instead, DOD referred to the

additional screening that the Marine Corps conducts at its recruiter school

and the Marine Corps’ belief that it does not place any recruiters on the

street who are not properly screened. We discussed this additional

screening and cited the relatively high attrition rate that this school

experiences. However, we also presented some limitations in the Marine

Corps’ current screening process and believe, therefore, that this service

would also benefit from this recommendation. As previously stated in this

report and in DOD’s comments, the Air Force already relies on recruiters,

and the Navy is changing its recruiter selection procedures to more closely

resemble those of the Air Force.

DOD concurred with our recommendation to jointly explore the feasibility

of developing or procuring assessment tests that can aid in the selection of

recruiters. In its response, DOD said that the Office of the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy will work with the

services to evaluate various assessment tests.

DOD also concurred with our recommendation to establish better

communication between the recruiting force and basic training drill

instructors, adding that this recommendation is sound and viable. In its

response, DOD stated that the Army is reviewing the recruiter school

curriculum and will establish a linkage between the recruiter school and

the recruiter liaison at the basic training site at Fort Jackson and that the

Air Force has incorporated an in-depth tour of basic training into its

recruiting school’s curriculum. DOD also cited the Navy’s refresher training

for new recruiters, where recruiters have the opportunity to meet and

interview recruits during the last week of basic training.

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Recruiters use standard criteria in screening applicants for military

service, but physical fitness is not among the criteria. Thus, the services

have no assurance that recruits will be able to pass their physical fitness

tests in basic training. To help prepare recruits for basic training and

reduce early attrition, the services are now encouraging recruits to

maintain or improve their physical fitness while in the DEP. However, only

the Marines Corps conducts regular physical fitness training for its recruits

in the DEP and requires them to take a physical fitness test before reporting

to basic training. The Marine Corps has found that attrition is lower among

those who pass this test.

Recruiters Consider

Standard Criteria in

Screening Recruits

Recruiters are only one part of the enlistment process. They play an

important role in the process by applying criteria established by Congress,

DOD, and the individual services during initial screening interviews to

identify applicants who are preliminarily qualified for enlistment.

However, physical fitness is not among the criteria. Also, recruits may

request a waiver if they do not meet one or more of the established

criteria.

Recruiters Play an

Important Role in the

Enlistment Process

Service personnel in several different organizations play a role in

screening and selecting candidates for military service. The accuracy and

thoroughness of the recruiter in screening for established criteria during

the initial interview are critical to the efficiency of the entire recruit

selection process. Failure to screen for all of the established criteria can

allow unqualified candidates to continue needlessly through the selection

process, wasting time and money on applicants who will likely be

disqualified during further enlistment processing at a MEPS or discharged

from service.

The head of one service’s recruiting command told us that recruiters

should be selective in their initial screenings and that it is appropriate for

them to use their judgment in addition to the established criteria.

However, most recruiters we spoke with said that they do not screen out

individuals who meet the established screening criteria. The recruiters

also explained that they generally did not want to pass judgment on an

applicant’s suitability for service because some prior assessments had

proven to be wrong. In addition, the recruiters were concerned that they

could receive congressional inquiries if individuals who met the eligibility

criteria were not selected for service.

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Standard Criteria Do Not

Include Physical Fitness

Congress and DOD have set minimum standards for two of the primary

screening criteria—possession of a high school diploma and score on the

Armed Forces Qualification Test. DOD guidelines state that a minimum of

90 percent of recruits who have not previously served in the military need

high school diplomas. The guidelines also state that at least 60 percent of

first-time recruits need to score in the top three of six mental categories

on the qualification test. Further, Congress has prohibited the selection of

recruits from the bottom test category and limited the number of recruits

who can score in the next lowest category.

DOD and service enlistment standards establish additional criteria that

potential recruits must meet. These criteria, which can vary by service,

include age, citizenship, weight, number of dependents, health, prior drug

or alcohol abuse, and law violations. Potential recruits also receive a

medical examination to determine a certain level of wellness. However,

actual physical fitness is not included as a criterion, even though service

officials acknowledge that poor physical conditioning among recruits is

often a contributing factor in early attrition. As a result, the services spend

thousands of dollars training recruits without any assurance that they will

be capable of passing their physical fitness tests. Recruits who cannot pass

service physical fitness tests face discharge.

Some Enlistment Criteria

May Be Waived

Most of the applicants who are enlisted meet all of the services’ enlistment

criteria. However, those applicants who do not meet one or more of these

criteria can continue to pursue entrance into the military by requesting a

waiver for each criterion not met. Recruiters are not required to encourage

unqualified prospects to apply for a waiver. Nevertheless, when applicants

wish to pursue a waiver, recruiters do not have the authority to disapprove

this request and must forward the waiver through their chains of

command.

Generally, the farther an applicant is from meeting an established

standard, the higher the waiver approval authority. For example, an Army

applicant convicted of driving under the influence could apply for a waiver

from a recruiting battalion commander. However, a waiver request for two

incidents of driving under the influence would need to be considered by

the Commanding General of the Army Recruiting Command. The burden is

on applicants to prove to the waiver authorities that they have overcome

any disqualifying condition.

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Improved DEP

Participation Can

Enhance Recruit

Retention Levels

To enhance recruit retention levels, the services are improving their DEPs.

The services now encourage recruits to maintain or improve their physical

fitness level so that they will be able to meet the initial physical

conditioning requirements of basic training. However, only the Marine

Corps conducts regular physical fitness training for its recruits and

requires them to take a physical fitness test while in the DEP. The Marine

Corps reports that attrition is lower among recruits who passed the test.

DEPs Are Being Improved One of the purposes of the DEP is to obtain a recruit’s commitment to

serve. The services have recently attempted to strengthen the commitment

of recruits in the DEP by providing them with better information, training,

and benefits. The services believe that individuals with a strong

commitment to serve are less likely to drop out of the DEP or leave military

service before the end of their first enlistment period.

The Navy and the Marine Corps recognize the positive effect the DEP can

have on retention rates and have established a minimum and optimum

time, respectively, that their recruits should spend in the DEP. Overall DOD

attrition statistics for fiscal years 1987 through 1994 showed that recruits

who spent at least 3 months in the DEP had lower attrition rates than those

who spent less time. This correlation was much stronger for the Marine

Corps and the Navy than it was for the Army and the Air Force.

DEP programs vary by service, but all require their recruiters and recruits

to be in regular contact with each other. Army, Navy, and Air Force

recruiters are responsible for contacting their recruits on a regular basis.

The Marine Corps, on the other hand, tries to instill responsibility in its

recruits by requiring them to contact their recruiters each week.

Participation in DEP activities is voluntary, but all of the services strongly

encourage recruits to attend monthly DEP meetings to help them prepare

for basic training. Some services also give recruits basic training material

to study before basic training begins. In addition, Army recruits have the

opportunity to earn points toward future promotions by working on

correspondence courses while in the DEP.

All of the services are also encouraging recruits to maintain or improve

their level of physical fitness while in the DEP. For example, recruits now

have access to their service’s physical fitness centers. However, only the

Marine Corps conducts regular physical training for DEP members and

requires all recruits to take a physical fitness test before leaving for basic

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training. Other services only require recruits in a few selected career fields

to take physical fitness tests before basic training. Army and Air Force

officials have expressed concerns about service liability for injuries that

recruits could sustain during DEP physical training. The Navy addressed

this concern by giving recruits access to medical facilities if they suffer

DEP-related injuries. Marine Corps officials said that there have been minor

injuries during DEP physical training but that none of these injuries have

resulted in a serious claim against the government.

Marine Corps Holds DEP

Recruits to Higher

Standards

The Marine Corps generally holds its DEP recruits to higher standards than

the other services. These recruits are told that they must earn their way to

basic training by preparing mentally, psychologically, and physically. The

Commander of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command stated that failure

to participate in DEP training programs is evidence of a lack of desire and

motivation to become a Marine and could result in discharge.

The Marine Corps implemented changes to its DEP in May 1994, and

physical training is a key component of this program. Recruiters are

encouraged to give recruits an initial physical fitness test within their first

30 days in the DEP, but a test must be given within 30 days of the date that

the recruit is to leave for basic training. Recruiters also encourage recruits

to exceed the test’s minimum requirement before leaving for basic

training.

According to the Commander of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command,

recruits who cannot accomplish the minimum standard in the physical

fitness test experience significantly higher attrition rates and are much

more at risk of injury than those who can pass the test.1

 Marine Corps

attrition statistics also show a strong correlation between performance on

the test and attrition rates. A study of almost 14,500 male Marines who

attended basic training in fiscal year 1994 found that recruits who failed

the initial physical fitness test had an attrition rate of 24.1 percent,

whereas those who passed had an attrition rate of 13.4 percent. In

addition, attrition rates were only about 11 percent for recruits who far

exceeded the minimum test requirements by doing 10 or more pull-ups or

running a 1-1/2 miles in less than 12 minutes.2

1

Minimum passing requirements for males are 2 pull-ups, 35 sit-ups in under 2 minutes, and a 1-1/2-mile

run in 13 minutes and 30 seconds or less.

2

There was no statistically significant difference in attrition rates for those who did 35 to 39 sit-ups and

those recruits who did 50 or more sit-ups.

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Statistics also show that recent Marine Corps efforts to reduce attrition,

including the changes to its DEP in May 1994, are working. Twelve-month

attrition rates across DOD rose from 15 percent in fiscal year 1990 to

19 percent in fiscal year 1995. However, while Army, Navy, and Air Force

attrition rates were increasing by 4 to 6 percent over this time period,

Marine Corps attrition rates declined by 4 percent.

Conclusions Recruiters have many tools at their disposal to help them screen

candidates for military service. However, while education requirements

provide some assurance that recruits will be capable of learning the

academic material that will help them become productive

servicemembers, and physical examinations provide some assurance that

recruits have a minimum level of wellness, the absence of physical fitness

screening requirements prevents the services from having any assurance

that their recruits will be able to pass their physical fitness tests. Since all

servicemembers are required to pass physical fitness tests, the services

may be investing thousands of dollars training an individual who will

eventually face discharge.

The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force may be able to improve their

attrition rates by running stronger DEP programs. The Marine Corps

emphasizes physical fitness training in its DEP program and administers a

physical fitness test to its recruits at least 30 days before they report to

basic training. Recent statistics show a strong correlation between

performance on this test and attrition rates. Recruits who attained higher

scores on the test experienced lower attrition rates than those who either

attained lower scores or failed the test. Although it may be more difficult

for recruiters with large geographic areas to conduct regular physical

training with members of their DEP, most recruiters should not have this

problem. However, even recruiters with large areas should be able to

follow the Marine Corps’ practice of giving all recruits a physical fitness

test before basic training.

Recommendations To maintain recruit quality and increase a recruit’s chances of graduating

from basic training, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense instruct

the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to implement the Marine Corps’

practice of administering a physical fitness test to recruits before they

report to basic training. In addition, we recommend that the Secretary

encourage the services to incorporate more structured physical fitness

training into their DEP program.

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Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our

recommendation regarding administering a physical fitness test to recruits

before they report to basic training and encouraging the services to

incorporate more structured physical fitness training into their DEP

programs (see app. III). DOD stated that, in an attempt to reduce basic

training attrition, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force are now taking

steps similar to the Marine Corps to better prepare recruits in the DEP for

the physical rigors of basic training. Furthermore, DOD stated that the

Office of the Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy will

investigate the legal status of DEP members and the limits of their medical

entitlements while they are in the DEP.

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Some Service Performance Measures Ignore

Attrition, and Monthly Goals May Restrict

Recruiters

All of the services reward recruiter success. However, many existing

awards and incentives are based on output measures that do not reflect

DOD’s long-term retention goal to retain quality personnel. Only the Marine

Corps and the Navy use basic training graduation rates as criteria in

evaluating recruiters for awards, thus linking DOD’s strategic goals to their

recruiters’ daily operations.

According to DOD recruiter satisfaction surveys, recruiter job performance

has been declining since 1991, and is the lowest it has been since recruiter

surveys were first administered in 1989. In 1996, 58 percent of the services’

recruiters said they had missed their monthly goals 3 or more times during

the previous 12 months. Recruiters also said that they are under constant

pressure to make their assigned goals and that their working hours are

increasing.

DOD’s 1996 recruiter survey showed that 54 percent of recruiters were

dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with recruiting, compared with 47 percent

in DOD’s 1994 survey and 35 percent in the 1991 survey. The results of DOD’s

recruiter surveys and our interviews with experienced recruiters show

that current award and incentive systems have not effectively dealt with

recruiters’ two biggest concerns—their monthly goals and working hours.

Some Award Systems

Are Not Tied to the

Right Performance

Measures

Incentive and award systems based on recruit graduation rates from basic

training would provide the services with a required link between DOD’s

long-term strategic goals to recruit and retain well-qualified military

personnel and daily recruiter operations. However, only the Marine Corps

and the Navy use recruits’ basic training graduation rates as key criteria

when evaluating recruiters for awards. The Army and the Air Force

measure recruiter performance primarily by the number of recruits who

enlist or the number who report to basic training rather than the number

who graduate and become productive servicemembers.

Award and incentive systems have differed significantly by service and

within services over time, but they are usually based on point systems that

take into account the quality of recruits enlisted, the positions the recruits

fill, and the recruiter’s success in making his or her goal.1

 At various times,

the services have used individual, team, and combination awards, and they

have based these awards on both absolute and relative performance.

Despite numerous studies on recruiter award and incentive systems, all of

1

The Marine Corps does not have a point system and counts all recruits the same for competition

purposes.

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Recruiters

the services have been unable to settle on an optimal system. Also, the

services have, at times, altered their recruiter incentive systems in

opposite directions: as one service moved from individual to team awards,

another de-emphasized team awards and moved toward greater reliance

on individual awards. Current recruiter awards vary from badges and

plaques to meritorious promotions.

Recruit Attrition Is a Key

Criterion for Marine Corps

Recruiter Awards

The Marine Corps is the only service that has consistently used attrition

data as an important criterion in determining awards for its top

performers. For example, the Commandant of the Marine Corps gives out

two top achievement awards annually, one for the top recruiter and one

for the top noncommissioned officer in charge of a recruiting substation.

The recruiters nominated for these awards must meet numerical and

quality accession goals and have DEP attrition rates below 20 percent and

basic training attrition rates below 13 percent. Between 1993 and 1996,

Marine Corps basic training attrition remained relatively stable between

12.7 and 13.5 percent. Therefore, recruiters nominated for the

Commandant’s awards had to ensure that their recruits’ basic training

attrition rates were at or below average attrition rates. Marine Corps

recruiting awards presented at lower levels also take attrition rates into

account.

Navy Uses a Point System

to Reward Recruiters for

Recruit Success

The Navy has numerous awards for its top recruiters and recruiting

stations but, unlike the Marine Corps, bases these awards on a competitive

point system. Since fiscal year 1996, this point system has undergone

several changes that were designed to give greater weight to recruits who

completed part or all of basic training.

The Navy awards recruiters points when one of their recruits enlists at a

MEPS. The number of points awarded is based on Navy needs and can vary

throughout the year. Recruits with high school diplomas and good

enlistment test scores who enlist into difficult fields, such as nuclear

power, generally earn recruiters high point levels. Conversely, recruits

without diplomas or with low test scores usually yield recruiters fewer

points. Recruiters can also earn points when their recruits help the Navy

to meet its racial, ethnic, or gender goals. In fiscal year 1998, Navy

recruiters will be awarded an additional set of points, worth four times the

original point value, when a recruit leaves for basic training, thus giving

recruiters a strong incentive to monitor and mentor their recruits in the

DEP. When recruits graduate from basic training, the Navy will award their

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recruiters with additional points worth 5 times the recruit’s original point

value, for a total of 10 times the original point value. The additional points

give recruiters a strong incentive to ensure that recruits are motivated and

prepared to succeed at basic training. To be competitive, a recruiter who

can sell applicants on enlisting but cannot motivate them to go to basic

training would have to enlist 10 applicants just to keep pace with the

recruiter who enlists and motivates 1 recruit who graduates from basic

training.

Army and Air Force

Recruiter Awards Are Not

Based on Recruit

Retention

Army and Air Force awards are generally based on the number and quality

of initial contracts and accessions in relation to assigned recruiting goals.

These services do not reward recruiters based on the number of recruits

who graduate and go on to become productive soldiers or airmen. The

Army and the Air Force, which bring in almost 55 percent of DOD’s new

recruits, see clear lines of separation between the recruiting and training

processes, and believe it is inappropriate to hold recruiters accountable

for recruits who fail to complete basic training.

Although the Army and the Air Force do not use basic training graduation

rates as key criteria when selecting award recipients, they can exclude

recruiters from awards if their attrition statistics are extremely high. For

example, Air Force senior and master recruiter badges are earned

primarily on the basis of production, but recruiters are not eligible for the

badges if the basic training attrition rate for their recruits is above

15 percent. Between fiscal year 1993 and 1996, overall Air Force basic

training attrition rates varied between 8.7 and 11.1 percent. Therefore, a

recruiter’s the basic training attrition rate had to be 35 to 72 percent above

the Air Force average before he or she was prevented from earning a

senior or master recruiter badge.

Recruiters Have to Make

Up for Early Attrition

In effect, all of the services hold their recruiters indirectly accountable for

early attrition through higher goals, even if their awards systems do not

reflect this. The number of recruits that is needed in a given year is

determined based on projected end strengths, historical loss rates, and the

mix of contract lengths for current servicemembers. In setting goals for

their recruiters, the services recognize two different types of attrition. The

first is DEP attrition, which occurs between the time an applicant first signs

an enlistment contract at a MEPS and the date the recruit leaves for basic

training. The second is active duty attrition, which occurs any time after a

servicemember reports to basic training.

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Recruits in the DEP are allowed to quit for any reason. Enlistment contracts

are simply canceled for those who quit, with no permanent adverse effect

on the recruits. However, with the exception of the Navy,2

 recruiters are

held individually responsible for DEP attrition, and their current month’s

goal is raised each time one of their recruits drops out of the DEP.

Recruiters are not held individually responsible for active duty attrition.

However, the services use active duty attrition rates, which have remained

fairly steady at about one-third of accessions, to compute annual goals for

the service recruiting commands. Application of this attrition rate causes

recruiting command goals to be much higher than they would be if

attrition did not exist or was much lower.

Since recruiting command headquarters personnel do not actually recruit,

increased recruiting goals are passed down through the chain of command

and eventually result in increased goals for individual recruiters in the

field. Therefore, although some services claim that recruiters cannot affect

attrition and should not be held accountable for it, all of the services are,

in fact, currently holding their recruiters accountable for attrition.

Most Recruiters Are

Not Meeting Monthly

Goals

Recruiter performance is primarily measured against and driven by

monthly contracting and accession goals. Additional performance

measures have changed over the years, but monthly contracting and

accession numbers have remained largely unchanged as the primary

performance measures. Recruiters said that they are under pressure to

make their goal beginning on the first day of every month, and the

pressure often does not let up when they make their monthly goal.

Recruiters told us that, once they make their own monthly goal, they are

often pressured to recruit one more person to cover for other recruiters

who do not make their goal. Table 4.1 shows the number of recruits the

average production recruiter needed to recruit for the services to achieve

their 1997 accession goals.3

2

Navy goals are formally assigned only to the station level and not to individual recruiters. In addition,

the Navy recently changed its procedures to combat last minute DEP attrition. Now, the monthly

station goal is raised only if a recruit drops out of the DEP within 5 weeks of the date he or she was

scheduled to leave for basic training.

3

Production recruiters are those recruiters who are expected to actually bring people into the services

each month. Other recruiters are sometimes assigned supervisory and administrative responsibilities,

such as conducting field training, and they are not given a monthly recruiting goal.

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Table 4.1: Recruiter Productivity

Needed to Support 1997 Service

Accession Goals

Service

Accession

goals

Average number of

production recruiters

Number of recruits

needed yearly per

production recruiter

Army 89,700 5,525 16.2

Navy 53,628 3,850 13.9

Marine Corps 35,300 2,650 13.3

Air Force 30,200 1,055 28.6

Source: DOD and service testimony before the Subcommittee on Personnel, Senate Armed

Services Committee, March 1997.

Recruiter monthly goals vary from one to four or more recruits. However,

since all of the services need their production recruiters to achieve more

than one accession per month to make their service’s accession goal, most

recruiters are assigned a minimum goal of two recruits per month. Many

Air Force recruiters have goals of three accessions per month because of

that service’s higher requirements per recruiter.

Recruiter responses in DOD’s 1996 recruiter satisfaction survey showed

that recruiter job performance was at an all-time low. Despite the

successes of the service recruiting commands, only 42 percent of the

recruiters who responded to DOD’s survey said that they had made their

goal 9 or more months out of the previous 12. This figure represented a

decrease of 8 percent from DOD’s 1994 survey and the lowest level since

DOD began its recruiter surveys in 1989. In addition, 28 percent of the

respondents said that their monthly goals were unachievable.

Recruiters Are

Dissatisfied With

Working Hours and

Pressures to Make

Goals

At the same time that recruiters’ job performance has been dropping, their

working hours have been increasing. In DOD’s 1996 recruiter survey,

63 percent of recruiters said they worked 60 or more hours per week.

These results show that the percentage of recruiters working long hours is

at the highest level since recruiter surveys were first taken in 1989. In

addition, only 23 percent of the services’ recruiters said they would remain

in recruiting if given the chance to be reassigned to another job.

During our review, we spoke to 35 recruiters who had a total of over 

280 years of recruiting experience. Many of these recruiters corroborated

the results of the 1996 recruiter survey. They said that working hours in

many places are getting worse and that recruiters everywhere experience

tremendous pressures to meet their monthly goal. Recruiters who do not

make their goal are often put on extended working hours until the goal is

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achieved, and successful recruiters who exceed their goal are often

required to work longer hours to make up for those who do not make their

goal.

Time Off Is an Important

Motivator

All of the 35 experienced recruiters we spoke with said that time off is an

important incentive for motivating recruiters. In fact, most of the

recruiters said it is the biggest incentive a production recruiter ever

receives. This sentiment was repeated even among those recruiters who

had been meritoriously promoted as a reward for their recruiting

excellence.

Senior enlisted officials in the Marine Corps told us that the commanding

officer of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command had given recruiters 

4 days off after the Command made its 24th consecutive monthly goal.

However, according to these officials, many supervisors did not give their

recruiters the time off and never even informed them that they were

supposed to get the time off.

Recruiters Have Problems

Taking Leave

Command-level officials in all of the services encourage recruiters to take

leave. However, the same encouragement does not always flow down the

chain of command to production recruiters. In the Air Force, recruiters

who take 2 weeks of leave in 1 month will not be assigned a goal for that

month. Army recruiters are encouraged to take 1 week of leave per

quarter. According to senior Marine Corps Recruiting Command officials,

the commanding officer of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command

personally monitors recruiter leave balances to ensure that recruiters are

not denied the opportunity to take leave. Despite all these efforts,

68 percent of the recruiters who responded to DOD’s 1996 survey said the

demands of the job had prevented them from taking leave during the

previous 12 months. This figure represented almost a 50-percent increase

from the level in the 1994 survey and the highest level since the first DOD

recruiter survey in 1989.

We spoke with several recruiters who were called in off leave or who

came to work during their leave. With regard to the problem of taking

leave, some recruiters suggested that the services should close all

recruiting and MEPS stations during the week between Christmas and New

Year’s Day and require recruiters to take leave during that typically

unproductive time period. The recruiters said this action is the only way to

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guarantee that production recruiters will actually get time off to use their

leave.

Recruiters Have Little

or No Control Over

Their Monthly Goals

Under the current monthly goal system, recruiters cannot work ahead and

sign extra recruits in one month so they can ease up and take some leave

the next month. Recruiters who make double their monthly goal are

usually assigned the same or higher goals for the next month. In addition,

recruiters who have a bad month face concerns about how they will be

rated after missing one or more monthly goals, even when they meet or

exceed their annual goals.

A senior official at the Air Force Recruiting Service suggested that

quarterly floating goals could overcome recruiter concerns about monthly

goals and still provide the services with a steady flow of recruits to fill

training slots. Under a quarterly floating goal system, recruiters would still

be assigned monthly goals, and their performance would still be evaluated

on a monthly basis. However, each month the current month’s goal would

be added to the goals of the previous 2 months and compared to the

recruiter’s performance during that 3-month period, rather than comparing

the current month’s performance to the current month’s goal.

Recruiters who make their goals every month under the current system

would be unaffected by changing to quarterly floating goals. They would

still be considered successful. Recruiters who never make their monthly

goals would also be unaffected by a change to quarterly floating goals.

However, quarterly floating goals could benefit recruiters who make their

annual goals but underproduce in some months and overproduce in

others. Appendix II contains additional information about quarterly

floating goals, including examples of how these goals could help individual

recruiters without jeopardizing the services’ ability to make their

command goals.

Conclusions Recruiters can be motivated to support DOD’s long-term strategic goals, but

they must view their award systems as fair and reasonable and closely

linked to those strategic goals. The Marine Corps and the Navy have tied

many of their awards and incentives to basic training graduation rates,

establishing a link between recruiter performance and DOD’s strategic

retention goal. Marine Corps and Navy recruiters thus understand that

they bear some of the responsibility for basic training attrition. The Army

and the Air Force award systems place very little weight on recruit

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performance at basic training and base awards primarily on the number of

recruits a recruiter enlists or sends to basic training. Under Army and Air

Force award systems that do not tie awards to retention, recruiters may

mistakenly believe that they have no responsibility for basic training

attrition. However, because these services need to replace the people who

drop out of basic training, recruiters are given monthly goals that are

higher than they would be if attrition did not occur. Thus, recruiters are

responsible for making up for basic training attrition.

The results of DOD’s most recent recruiter survey demonstrate a fairly high

level of dissatisfaction among recruiters over the current system of

monthly goals and the long hours that they must work to achieve the

goals. This dissatisfaction may create morale problems that adversely

affect productivity. These conditions might also discourage others from

volunteering for recruiting duty. Changing the monthly goal system to a

floating quarterly goal system could relieve some pressure from recruiters

and enhance their working conditions without sacrificing overall

recruiting goals. Better morale and working conditions could encourage

additional candidates to volunteer for recruiting duty.

Recommendations In our January 1997 report on military attrition, we recommended that the

services link recruiting quotas more closely to recruits’ successful

completion of basic training. We also suggested consideration of a

quarterly floating goal system. In a March 1997 memorandum directing the

services to act on our report, DOD deferred taking a position on those

issues pending recommendations from this follow-up review. This report

expands upon our earlier work and provides a detailed example of how a

floating goal system might operate.

To enhance recruiter success and help recruiters focus on DOD’s strategic

retention goal, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense instruct the

services to link recruiter awards more closely to recruits’ successful

completion of basic training.

To enhance recruiters’ working conditions and the services’ ability to

attract qualified candidates for recruiting duty, we also recommend that

the Secretary of Defense encourage the use of quarterly floating goals as

an alternative to the services’ current systems of monthly goals.

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Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the services link recruiter

awards more closely to recruits’ successful completion of basic training,

stating that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management

Policy will ensure that all the services incorporate recruit success in basic

training into their recruiter incentive systems.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of

Defense encourage the use of quarterly floating goals as an alternative to

the services’ current systems of monthly goals. DOD’s primary concern with

this recommendation is that floating quarterly goals would reduce the

services’ ability to make corrections to recruiting difficulties before they

become unmanageable.

DOD also stated that the Air Force had tried floating goals, and that its

experience indicated that such a system leads to a lessened sense of

urgency early in the goaling cycle and more pressure later in the cycle. In a

follow-on discussion with a senior official at the Air Force Recruiting

Service, we learned that the Air Force did experiment with a quarterly

system in its northeast region from October to December 1991. However,

the Air Force canceled this experiment in January 1992 when it discovered

that many recruiters had fallen behind in their goals for that 3-month

period.

We do not believe that the Air Force’s experience truly measured the

potential merits of a quarterly floating goal system since the Air Force

canceled this program after only 3 months. While we agree that recruiting

commands must maintain the ability to control the flow of new recruits

into the system on a monthly basis, it should be noted that this proposal is

for floating, rather than static, quarterly goals. As a result, recruiting

shortfalls would still be identified in the first month that they occur and

not disrupt the flow of recruits to training. Accordingly, we believe that a

longer test period than 3 months would be needed to fully test this

concept.

Moreover, DOD recruiter surveys show that recruiter performance is at an

all-time low and that the percentage of recruiters working long hours is

the highest it has ever been since the surveys were first taken in 1989. We

believe this matter warrants serious attention and that these problems will

continue if changes are not made. The quarterly floating goal proposal

would provide recruiters with some flexibility and enhanced quality of life

and still provide recruiting commands with the ability to control the flow

of new recruits into the system on a monthly basis. Better working

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conditions and recruiter morale could ultimately encourage additional

candidates to volunteer for recruiting duty, thereby easing the current

burden on recruiting commands to screen and select new recruiters.

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Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Appendix I 

Costs of Recruiting, Training, and Attrition

Costs of Recruiting

and Training

The military services’ investment in their enlisted personnel is made up of

both fixed and variable costs. The fixed costs can be thought of as

overhead or infrastructure costs that are not easily or quickly changed and

cannot be directly associated with a single enlistee. Examples of this type

of cost are the total number of recruiters or drill instructors or the money

spent by a service on a television advertisement campaign for recruiting.

The variable costs are directly connected to each recruit, such as costs for

issuance of clothing and pay and allowances for each enlistee.

Table I.1 shows the services’ 1996 and 1997 recruiting and advertising

investment for each recruit who reported to basic training.

Table I.1: Recruiting and Advertising

Investment per Recruit Recruiting and

advertising in fiscal

year 1996

Recruiting and

advertising in fiscal

year 1997

Advertising in fiscal

year 1997

Army $8,310 $7,354 $775

Navy 6,636 6,297 687

Marine Corps 5,165 4,923 559

Air Force 3,740 3,934 349

DOD 7,187 6,704 673

Source: President’s budget for fiscal years 1998-99.

The figures above include the costs of advertising, leasing recruiting

facilities, joint advertising and market research, recruiter cars, supplies,

and recruiter and support personnel salaries. The figures also include

recruit bonuses and college fund expenses. The figures do not include the

cost of transporting recruits to and from basic training or the cost of

housing, feeding, clothing, and paying the recruits while they are at basic

training. Based on Navy figures, we placed those costs at approximately

$5,000 in our report last year.1

 Collectively, the service figures are

consistent with the Department of Defense’s (DOD) figures, which indicate

that it costs between $8,900 and $12,400 to recruit and train an applicant

through basic training.

1

Military Attrition: DOD Could Save Millions by Better Screening Enlisted Personnel

(GAO/NSIAD-97-39, Jan. 6, 1997).

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Appendix I 

Costs of Recruiting, Training, and Attrition

Difficulties Associated

With Estimating

Attrition Costs

Although the cost of keeping personnel who cannot adjust to military life

or meet established standards could be very high, DOD officials have

acknowledged that a certain percentage of attrition is probably avoidable.

Over the past 2 decades, numerous attrition studies have been conducted

by DOD and other government and private organizations. However, none of

the studies has been able to accurately define an acceptable or desirable

level of attrition. In addition, none has determined when the costs of

recruiting and training are recouped. We recognize the limitations of

available cost information concerning attrition. Therefore, we have used

average cost data from the services and DOD only to identify the general

magnitude of the military attrition problem rather than a precise cost

savings figure.

The costs of attrition increase each day recruits remain in a training or

temporary status. Once recruits report to their permanent duty stations

and begin performing the jobs that they were recruited to perform, the

services begin to receive benefits on their investment in recruiting and

training. Attrition costs can decline at varying rates both among different

career fields and within career fields. The rate of decline depends on the

amount of on-the-job training required for an individual to become

proficient at the job.

Approximately one-half of all attrition occurs between the time recruits

are first sworn into a service at a military entrance processing station and

the time they complete basic training. Calculating the cost savings that

would result if the services reduced this attrition is complicated.

Nevertheless, there are two different ways of reducing the cost of this

early attrition. One way is to take actions to lower attrition rates, without

compromising retention standards. A second way is to accept current

attrition rates, but cause attrition to occur as early in the recruiting or

training process as possible. Delayed Entry Program (DEP) attrition is less

expensive than basic training attrition, which is generally less expensive

than attrition that occurs during advanced training. The Army Recruiting

Command calculated that, in fiscal year 1996, each loss from its DEP cost

approximately $1,800. However, losses from basic training would be even

greater because the costs of feeding, clothing, transporting, and housing

the recruits would have to be added to the DEP loss cost. Attrition

occurring during advanced training is costlier still, due to the additional

military pay and infrastucture costs associated with such training.

The cost savings that could be expected by reducing attrition are difficult

to measure for four reasons. First, lower attrition rates could lead to a

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Costs of Recruiting, Training, and Attrition

decline in recruiting and training support costs. Recruiting support costs

include items such as recruiter, administrative, and management support

salaries; facility leases; advertising costs; and recruiter car expenses.

Training support costs include drill instructor, administrative, and

management support salaries and the cost of maintaining recruit housing,

classrooms, and other facilities. These cost reductions, however, would

not necessarily be proportional to the decrease in attrition. For example, if

attrition were reduced by 10 percent, it is likely that infrastructure costs

would be reduced by less than 10 percent. One reason that infrastructure

costs are not likely to decrease in the same proportion as attrition is that

the services may need to ensure that their recruiting and training

organizations maintain excess capacity in the event of future increases in

accessions. The services now determine staffing and funding for recruiting

commands based on the services’ accessions missions, which could be

lower if attrition were to decrease.

Second, the near-term savings in variable costs per recruit can vary

significantly depending on which recruits are separated. Some of these

differences are readily apparent. For example, the transportation costs for

sending an Air Force recruit from Alaska to and from basic training at

Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio are obviously much higher than

the transportation costs of sending a recruit who lives in San Antonio to

basic training. Other cost differences may not be as obvious. Only a limited

number of recruits, for example, receive enlistment bonuses or service

college funds, and the attrition of those recruits costs the services more

than the attrition of recruits who do not receive these benefits. Pay rates

of recruits can also be different. Recruits who have completed some

college and recruits who supply their recruiters with referrals who enlist

can enter basic training in pay grades E-2 or E-3 rather than in pay grade

E-1. The difference in pay between E-1 and E-3 is about $200 per month. In

addition, uniforms for female servicemembers can cost more than those

for male servicemembers, and uniform costs can vary within gender

categories depending on a recruit’s size.

Third, any additional costs that might be incurred by the services to better

prepare recruiters and recruits would have to be subtracted from any

calcuations of marginal savings. Such added mechanisms could include

adjustments to recruiter screening processes, recruiter training, and DEP

management.

Fourth, recent recruiting practices in the Navy and the Army could

increase the costs of attrition. For example, the Navy is now requiring all

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Costs of Recruiting, Training, and Attrition

applicants without a high school diploma to score high enough on the

enlistment screening test to qualify for advanced training in order to enlist.

In the past, the Navy enlisted many of these nondiploma applicants in

general seaman, airman, or fireman career fields that did not require any

advanced training. According to the Navy’s compensatory screening

model, high-quality applicants without diplomas should behave similarly to

those with high school diplomas. However, Navy recruits without

diplomas are continuing to experience attrition rates that are much higher

than recruits with diplomas. If attrition rates for nondiploma recruits

continue to be much higher than those of recruits with diplomas, the Navy

will actually be increasing the cost of its attrition by requiring nondiploma

recruits to qualify for advanced training.

The Army is loosening its criteria for its “quick ship” bonuses.2

 Previously,

the Army had only been paying these bonuses to recruits who scored in

the top three enlistment test categories. However, it recently began

offering these bonuses to recruits in a lower test category as well. Recruits

from this lower category have higher attrition rates than recruits from the

top categories. Therefore, if attrition statistics remain unchanged, a higher

percentage of the recruits who drop out will have been paid bonuses, thus

driving up the cost of Army attrition.

2

Quick ship bonuses are paid to recruits who leave for basic training within 30 days of their initial

enlistment.

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Appendix II 

Quarterly Floating Goals

Under the current goal system, recruiters are continually evaluated on a

month to month basis, and recruiters and recruiting command officials

told us that recruiters commonly hear the same question and comment

about their performance in relation to their monthly goals. The question is

what has the recruiter done lately. The implication of this question is that

making or exceeding last month’s goal no longer counts if the recruiter has

not made this month’s goal. The comment is that the recruiter is either a

“hero” or a “zero.” Recruiters who make their goals in a given month are

considered heros. Recruiters who miss their goals (even if they enlist three

people for a goal of four) are considered zeros.

If the services adopted quarterly floating goal systems, recruiters would

still be assigned monthly goals, and their performance would still be

evaluated on a monthly basis. However, each month the current month’s

goal would be added to the goals of the previous 2 months and compared

to the recruiter’s performance during that 3-month period. Recruiters who

make their monthly goals every single month under the current system

would be unaffected if the services changed to quarterly floating goals.

They would still be considered heros. Recruiters who never make their

monthly goals would also be unaffected if the services changed to

quarterly floating goals. They would still be considered zeros. Quarterly

floating goals are most likely to benefit recruiters who make their annual

goals but underproduce in some months and overproduce in other months.

Table II.1 shows an example of how quarterly floating goals could work

and how they could benefit some recruiters. For example, recruiters who

make their annual goal could be considered zeros in some months under

the monthly goal system, but they would be considered heros under the

quarterly foating goal system.

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Quarterly Floating Goals

Table II.1: Comparison of Recruiter Goals, Performance, and Monthly Evaluations Under Two Different Systems

Monthly goal system Quarterly floating goal system

Month

Monthly

goal

Monthly

enlistments

Recruiter’s

evaluation

Floating

quarterly goala

Quarterly

enlistmentsb

Recruiter’s

evaluation

January 2 3 Hero 2 3 Hero

February 2 1 Zero 4 4 Hero

March 2 2 Hero 6 6 Hero

April 2 3 Hero 6 6 Hero

May 2 1 Zero 6 6 Hero

June 3 4 Hero 7 8 Hero

July 3 4 Hero 8 9 Hero

August 3 2 Zero 9 10 Hero

September 2 3 Hero 8 9 Hero

October 2 2 Hero 7 7 Hero

November 2 1 Zero 6 6 Hero

December 2 3 Hero 6 6 Hero

Total 27 29 Met goal in

8 of 12

months

27 29 Met floating

goal every

month

aThe goal for January is only January’s goal; the goal for February is figured by adding January

and February goals; thereafter, the floating quarterly goal is figured by adding the last 3 monthly

goals.

bEnlistments for January include only those made in January; enlistments for February include

those made in January and February; thereafter, quarterly enlistments are figured by adding

enlistments for the last 3 months on a rolling basis.

A quarterly floating goal system could be phased in over a 3-month period.

For example, in January, recruiters could be evaluated on the basis of

performance in 1 month (January). In February, they could be evaluated

on the basis of performance in 2 months (January and February). In March

they could be evaluated on the basis of performance in 3 months (January,

February, and March). Once quarterly floating goals were fully

implemented in March, recruiters would be evaluated each month on their

performance over the last 3 months compared with their goals. According

to our example in table II.1, in October, a recruiter’s performance in

August, September and October would be measured against the goals for

those 3 months, or seven enlistments. In November, a recruiter’s

performance in September, October, and November would be measured

against the goals for those particular 3 months, or six enlistments. This

pattern would continue in each successive month. When a new year

begins, monthly totals would carry over from the previous year.

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Quarterly Floating Goals

Table II.1 also demonstrates how a quarterly floating system could help

the recruiter who falls short of making his or her goal in any given month.

In May, for example, the recruiter would only have to enlist one person to

stay on track, even though May’s monthly goal is two people. The recruiter

would only need one person in May because he or she made the goal of

two in March and surpassed the goal by one in April. As a result, the

recruiter might be inclined to schedule some leave in May. However, in

September the recruiter would need to enlist three people, even though

the goal for that month is two enlistees. This is due to the fact that the

recruiter missed August’s goal by one.

In discussing quarterly floating goals, officials from one of the service

recruiting commands expressed concerns that quarterly floating goals

could cause their best recruiters’ production levels to drop. Although

drops could occur, we do not believe these drops would be significant.

Any drops that might occur could be offset by the benefits of the quarterly

floating goal system. For example, these goals could encourage additional

high-caliber recruiters to volunteer for permanent recruiting duty, thus

strengthening the services’ recruiting commands. Table II.2 demonstrates

how checks are built into the quarterly floating goals and shows why

quarterly floating goals will not cause production to drop significantly for

the services’ best recruiters.

Table II.2: Production Numbers Necessary for Excellent Recruiters to Stay on Track

Month

Monthly

goal

Actual monthly

enlistments

Quarterly

enlistments

Quarterly

floating goal

Number of recruits

needed to stay on

track

Recruiter’s

evaluation under

quarterly floating

goals

January 3 9 9 3 3 Hero

February 3 0 9 6 0 Hero

March 3 2 11 9 0 Hero

April 3 6 8 9 7 Zero

Note: See notes in table II.1 for an explanation of quarterly enlistments and quarterly floating

goals.

In this extreme example, the recruiter makes his or her entire quarterly

goal (January through March) in January. The recruiter then takes off the

entire month of February, and part of March. The recruiter is unlikely to

take off all of March because doing so would increase April’s goal to nine

enlistments. In April, the recruiter enlists six people, more than two times

April’s goal, but still faces possible counseling, training, and increased

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Quarterly Floating Goals

supervision for not making his or her quarterly floating goal. The recruiter

is then likely to get back on track and overproduce on a monthly basis,

which he or she is capable of doing based on January’s performance.

Although this scenario is possible, we believe the example shown in table

II.3 more accurately depicts the types of differences that are likely to

occur for excellent recruiters under quarterly floating goals.

Table II.3 shows how recruiters who operate under a monthly goal system

are more limited in using their leave than recruiters who operate under a

quarterly floating goal system. Under the quarterly floating goal system,

the recruiter who is able to work longer and harder in May and June is

then able to take off the entire month of July. The recruiter is also able to

work less in December and April by working additional hours during the

preceding months.

Table II.3: Possible Production Levels

of Excellent Recruiters Under Different

Goals

Month Monthly goal

Monthly

enlistments

Floating

quarterly

goal

Quarterly

enlistments

Recruiter’s

evaluation

January 3 3 3 3 3 for 3

February 3 4 6 4 7 for 6

March 3 4 9 4 11 for 9

April 3 3 9 2 10 for 9

May 3 3 9 4 10 for 9

June 3 5 9 6 12 for 9

July 3 4 9 0 10 for 9

August 3 3 9 5 11 for 9

September 3 4 9 4 9 for 9

October 3 3 9 3 12 for 9

November 3 4 9 5 12 for 9

December 3 3 9 2 10 for 9

Annual total 36 43 36 42 42 for 36

Note: See notes in table II.1 for an explanation of quarterly enlistments and quarterly floating

goals.

During our field work, we interviewed production recruiters who said that

they would not consider becoming career recruiters because their

supervisors were constantly dictating their working hours and daily

activities. These recruiters believed that they were not being given the

respect that they had earned as noncommissioned officers who were

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Appendix II 

Quarterly Floating Goals

productive recruiters. One of these recruiters was the top producer for his

region. Compared to monthly goals, quarterly floating goals would allow

individual recruiters more flexibility in the performance of their duties.

Allowing recruiters the same type of flexibility and decision-making

authority as other noncommissioned officers in the services may

encourage more of the services’ outstanding recruiters to become career

recruiters.

The service recruiting commands were also concerned about the effect

that quarterly floating goals could have on their training pipelines.

However, because recruiters would still be evaluated monthly,

fluctuations in the numbers of recruits entering the services each month

are not likely to be significantly different than fluctuations under the

current system of monthly goals. Tables II.2 and II.3 illustrate that

recruiters cannot underproduce 2 months in a row and still be successful.

Under a quarterly floating goal system, the monthly production levels of

individual recruiters are likely to vary more than they do under monthly

goals. However, all recruiters are not likely to overproduce and

underproduce during the same months. Therefore, the overproduction of

some recruiters in a given month is likely to be offset by the

underproduction of other recruiters in that same month. Training pipelines

are not currently level throughout the year. For example, the Marine Corps

has established accession goals of 32 percent for October through January,

22 percent for February through May, and 46 percent for June through

September.

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 21.

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 27.

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 36.

Non on p. 36.

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Carol R. Schuster

William E. Beusse

David E. Moser

Michael J. Ferren

Karen S. Blum

(703189) Page 55 GAO/NSIAD-98-58 Military Recruiting
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