United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman and the Ranking

Minority Member, Subcommittee on

Science, Technology and Space,

Committee on Commerce, Science and

Transportation, U.S. Senate

March 1998 AEROSPACE

TESTING

Promise of Closer

NASA/DOD

Cooperation Remains

Largely Unfulfilled

GAO/NSIAD-98-52

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-276817 

March 11, 1998

The Honorable William H. Frist

Chairman

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller, IV

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation

United States Senate

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the

Department of Defense (DOD) operate several types of aerospace test

facilities, including wind tunnels and rocket engine test stands. Since the

end of the Cold War, Congress has been appropriating less money for

aerospace programs. In response to declining budgets and reductions in

personnel, NASA and DOD agreed in 1995 to perform essential aerospace

testing on a more cooperative basis.1

 The agencies recommended, in

April 1996, that they establish joint working groups, or alliances, to assess

and make recommendations on investments and other issues.

As requested, we are providing you with the results of our review of NASA’s

and DOD’s cooperation since May 1996 to develop a national perspective on

aerospace test facilities.2

 Specifically, to assess the progress of

cooperative efforts we determined (1) the extent to which NASA/DOD

working groups (“alliances”) on major test facilities have been operating

on a regular basis, (2) NASA’s and DOD’s actions in response to a future need

to test an engine for new Air Force rockets, (3) whether NASA and DOD

prepared a congressionally required joint plan on rocket propulsion test

facilities, and (4) whether NASA and DOD are implementing a DOD

assessment team’s recommendation in March 1997 to jointly manage with

NASA certain aeronautical test facilities.

This report includes a matter for congressional consideration.

1

A framework within which changes to the federal research, development, test, and evaluation

infrastructure can be accomplished was discussed in Best Practices: Elements Critical to Successfully

Reducing Unneeded RDT&E Infrastructure (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-98-23, Jan. 8, 1998).

2

NASA/DOD cooperation on test facilities was previously discussed in NASA Infrastructure: Challenges

to Achieving Reductions and Efficiencies (GAO/NSIAD-96-187, Sept. 9, 1996) and

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-238, Sept. 11, 1996).

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
B-276817 

Background In June 1995, NASA and DOD agreed to identify cooperative actions that

could lead to significant reductions in investments and cost of operations.3

The agencies identified seven areas of mutual interest, one of which was

major aerospace test facilities—specifically, wind tunnels, aeropropulsion

test cells, rocket engine test stands, space environmental simulation

chambers, arc-heaters, and hypervelocity gas guns and ballistic ranges.4

The cooperation initiative was done under the auspices of the joint

NASA/DOD Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB).5

Figure 1 shows the location of these test facilities.

3

Final Report on the 1995-1996 DOD/NASA Cooperation Initiative (AACB, May 1996).

4

See appendix I for information about these types of test facilities.

5

The AACB is chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology and NASA’s

Deputy Administrator. The purpose of the AACB is to facilitate coordination of aeronautics and space

activities of mutual interest.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
B-276817 

Figure 1: Location of Major NASA and DOD Test Facilities

DOD

Wind Tunnels

 Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC)

 Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division (NSECCD)

 Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright Patterson (AFRL)

 AEDC, White Oak, MD

Hypervelocity Impact

 AEDC

Air-Breathing Propulsion Test Facilities

 AEDC

 Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, China Lake (NAWCAD)

 RTTC

Rocket Propulsion Test Facilities

 AEDC

 Air Force Research Laboratory, Edwards (AFRL)

 NAWCAD

 RTTC

Space Environmental Simulation Facilities

 AEDC

 AFRL

 Naval Research Laboratory (NRL)

Arc Heated Facilities

 AEDC

1

1

2

3

7

4

5

1

4

Space Environmental Simulation Facilities

 LeRC

 MSFC

 Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)

 7 Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)

 JSFC

Arc Heated Facilities

 ARC

 LaRC

 JSFC 

5

7

8

1

3

6

4

4

5

3

8

1

3

1

NASA 

Wind Tunnels

 Ames Research Center (ARC)

 Langley Research Center (LaRC)

 Lewis Research Center (LeRC)

Hypervelocity Impact

 ARC

 Johnson Space Flight Center (JSFC)

 Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)

 White Sands Test Facility (WSTF)

Air-Breathing Propulsion Test Facilities

 LaRC

 LeRC

Rocket Propulsion Test Facilities

 LeRC

 MSFC

 Stennis Space Center (SSC)

 WSTF

 

2

1

1

6 

2

3

9

9

2

5

7 6

2

2

1

3

5

3

5

4

6

3

1

1

3

6

1

5

9

9

7

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
B-276817 

The number of active major test facilities declined from 260 in 1993 to 186

in 1996. The AACB’s major test facilities study team concluded that, in most

areas, the present number of major test facilities “very nearly represents

the minimum required to conduct the aeronautical- and space-related

research and development programs identified for this country.”6

 The

study team further stated that (1) closing facilities without eliminating

programs does not generate big savings, (2) NASA and DOD are not on a

common track to developing comparable facility-cost accounting, (3) there

is inadequate coordination of investments, upgrades, and operations

between NASA and DOD, and (4) NASA and DOD’s rocket propulsion test

facilities have excess capacity for current and future workload. To address

these issues, the team recommended in April 1996 that NASA and DOD form

six cooperative alliances7

 to

• coordinate investment to avoid unnecessary duplication,

• coordinate test schedules to spread the workload across facilities, and

• develop standardized and common business processes.

Notwithstanding a history of NASA/DOD cooperation on aerospace test

facility-related issues prior to 1996,8

 these goals collectively represent an

effort to develop a broader national perspective on such issues. In

September 1996, Congress added to this effort by requiring NASA and DOD to

prepare a joint plan on rocket propulsion test facilities.

Results in Brief The promise of closer NASA/DOD cooperation and the development of a

national perspective on aerospace test facilities remains largely unfulfilled

because NASA and DOD (1) have not yet convened most test facility

alliances, (2) compete with each other to test engines for new rockets, and

(3) did not prepare a congressionally required joint plan on rocket

propulsion test facilities. Although NASA and DOD have agreed to go beyond

cooperative alliances in aeronautics and jointly manage their aeronautical

test facilities, they have not yet reached agreement on key aspects of a

management organization.

6

The study team documented a 30-percent reduction in active aeronautical facilities since 1993, with an

annual saving of $14.2 million.

7

In the summer of 1995, NASA officials met several times to discuss cooperation on rocket propulsion

testing on a national basis, and the major test facilities study team’s proposal to form alliances drew on

the discussions of this group.

8

For example, DOD relies on NASA to meet all of its subsonic wind tunnel testing requirements. Also,

research and test centers such as NASA’s Lewis Research Center, Ohio, and DOD’s Arnold Engineering

Development Center, Tenn., cooperate in several areas, including testing the effects of icing on aircraft

wings and engines.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
B-276817 

NASA and DOD took 20 months (May 1996 through Dec. 1997) to negotiate

and sign agreements formally establishing the six test facility-related

cooperative alliances.9

 During that time, only the space environmental

simulation alliance met regularly and conducted business. The already

established rocket propulsion alliance met only once during this period

despite a desire by some members to meet regularly. NASA and DOD officials

did not regularly convene the other four alliances in the absence of

approved charters.10

Despite the formation of the rocket propulsion alliance, NASA and DOD

compete against each other to test engines for new rocket programs. A

principal arena of competition is the next phase of the Air Force’s Evolved

Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program.11 In particular, the Air Force

has spent millions of dollars to upgrade a test stand on the assumption

that it, not NASA, would test EELV engines.

DOD did not prepare a legislatively mandated joint plan with NASA to

coordinate rocket propulsion test facilities.12 In a letter to congressional

committee chairs and other members, DOD said that the bases of such a

plan are (1) on-going activities such as Vision 21,13 (2) the May 1997

Quadrennial Defense Review of defense strategy,14 and (3) activities of the

rocket propulsion alliance. However, these efforts are unlikely to form the

basis of a joint plan because NASA is not participating in either Vision 21 or

the Defense Review. Further, DOD prepared, but did not submit, a

legislative package for Vision 21, and instead opted to include

9

The charters were signed by DOD on December 24, 1997, and by NASA on January 9, 1998. See

appendix II for the charter of the National Rocket Propulsion Test Alliance.

10Between November 1996 and October 1997, NASA and DOD officials participated in workshops and

meetings on wind tunnel test technology and joint management of aeronautics test facilities. Agency

officials consider these meetings to be functionally equivalent to alliance meetings. The Airbreathing

Propulsion Test Facilities alliance held its first meeting on October 23, 1997. Also, NASA and Air Force

officials held four discussions on rocket propulsion test-related issues during the

May 1996-November 1997 period.

11Additional information on the EELV program can be found in Access to Space: Issues Associated

With DOD’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-130, June 24, 1997).

12Section 211(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (P.L. 104-201, Sept. 23,

1996).

13Vision 21 responds to sections 277 and 265 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 

(P.L. 104-106, Feb. 10, 1996). Section 277 requires a 5-year plan to consolidate and restructure DOD’s

laboratories and test and evaluation centers by 2005. Section 265 requires DOD to conduct a

comprehensive review of U.S. aeronautical research and test facilities.

14The review of the defense program (potential threats, strategy, force structure, readiness posture,

military modernization programs, and defense infrastructure) was required by the Military Force

Structure Review Act of 1996 (title IX, subtitle B of P.L. 104-201, Sept. 23, 1996).

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
B-276817 

consolidation of its laboratories and test and evaluation centers in future

“Base Realignment and Closure” (BRAC) rounds. But Congress, so far, has

not accepted the need for such rounds. As a consequence, Vision 21’s

future is unclear until Congress either changes its position on BRAC or new

guidelines for Vision 21 are developed.

In October 1997, NASA and Air Force officials took a step toward creating a

national perspective on test facilities in the aeronautics area. Specifically,

they reached an understanding on the scope and approach for joint

strategic management of their aeronautical test facilities, including a new

management organization. However, they have not yet resolved basic

issues, such as the organization’s structure and authority. Ultimately, if

joint strategic management of aeronautics test facilities is successfully

established, its adaption to other types of test facilities could be

considered.

Most NASA/DOD

Alliances Would Not

Meet Without

Approved Charters

The institutional centerpiece of future NASA/DOD cooperation on aerospace

test facilities is six alliances approved by the AACB in April 1996. Twenty

months later, NASA and DOD signed agreements formally establishing these

alliances. However, with one exception, the new alliances did not meet

regularly during that time, and the rocket propulsion alliance—which

predates the cooperation initiative—met only once. The one exception

was the space environmental simulation alliance, which met four times

and evaluated a proposed new investment at Kennedy Space Center. The

rationale given by most alliances for not meeting was the lack of an

approved charter.

Only One Alliance Met

Regularly

Despite not having official charters, the space environmental simulation

alliance met four times and the rocket propulsion test alliance met once

between May 1996 and October 1997. The other alliances could have

conducted business without formal charters, but did not. At its inaugural

meeting in November 1996, the space environmental simulation alliance

noted the absence of a charter, but agreed to conduct business deemed to

be in the “best national interest.” The alliance also met in February, May,

and August 1997.

Similarly, the rocket propulsion test alliance met in October 1996 and

members noted other alliances “do not appear to be meeting,” but agreed

the rocket propulsion alliance “cannot wait.” As of November 30, 1997, this

alliance has not met again. A NASA official told us the alliance did not meet

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
B-276817 

because there was little business to discuss until NASA implemented its

plan, as discussed below, to consolidate NASA’s management of rocket

propulsion testing. In addition, NASA and DOD officials disagreed over who

in their respective agencies should sign the alliance’s charter.

Alliance Helped Eliminate

Proposal to Build Vacuum

Chamber

An example of how the promise of closer cooperation on test

facility-related issues can be met by alliances was provided by the space

environmental simulation alliance in March 1997. In early 1997, officials at

NASA’s Kennedy Space Center proposed to build a vacuum chamber to

(1) test for leaks in the pressurized parts of the International Space Station

prior to their launch and assembly in space and (2) support an

environmental test capability at Kennedy. In February 1997, NASA

headquarters officials asked the space environmental simulation alliance

to evaluate the proposal. In March 1997, the alliance’s evaluation team

concluded that there was “no compelling reason” to construct such a

facility to support space station requirements. With regard to Kennedy’s

proposed test capability, the team recommended a “rigorous” thermal

vacuum chamber requirements and cost-benefits analysis that, in part,

would include determination of the national thermal vacuum chamber

capabilities.

On June 25, 1997, the Kennedy Space Center introduced another approach

to justify acquiring a vacuum chamber. This time, Kennedy officials

solicited comments from industry, for planning purposes only, on the

design, construction, and procurement methodology for a thermal vacuum

chamber to simulate environments on other planets. Kennedy officials

estimated the chamber would cost from $35 million to $60 million. NASA’s

Office of the Inspector General is currently doing a review to determine

whether (1) the alliance’s recommended cost-benefit analysis was

performed, (2) the vacuum chamber is needed to support present and

future NASA missions and programs, and (3) funding will be available for

the project’s construction, installation, and operation. The Inspector

General has not set a completion date for this review.

NASA and DOD

Compete to Test

Rocket Engines

Despite the formation of the rocket propulsion alliance, NASA’s and DOD’s

relationship over this type of testing has been recently marked by

competition. Partly to improve its competitive position, NASA has

consolidated rocket propulsion test management in one center, but is

struggling to define the center’s authority for this role. Testing engines in

the next phase of the EELV program was the focus of NASA and Air Force

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
B-276817 

competition. In July 1997, an EELV engine contractor provisionally selected

NASA’s Stennis Space Center to test engines in the next phase of the

program. Consequently, the future role of the Air Force’s test center for

this program is uncertain.

NASA Consolidates

Management of Rocket

Propulsion Test Facilities

NASA tests rocket engines in four locations: Stennis Space Center,

Mississippi; Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama; White Sands Test

Facility, New Mexico; and Lewis Research Center’s Plum Brook Station,

Ohio. According to Stennis officials, these four test locations have

“resulted in facility duplication and higher overall infrastructure-related costs. Substantial

investments have been made in facilities based on local insight and local funding provided

by programs, institutions, and non-NASA customers rather than on an Agency-wide

perspective.”

In May 1996, NASA’s Associate Administrator for Space Flight unilaterally

designated Stennis Space Center the center of excellence “not only for

NASA, but DOD, other government agencies, academia and industry.” He

noted, the “unique capabilities currently in place” at Stennis “permit us to

centralize the major propulsion test facilities of NASA, DOD, and industry.”

NASA’s rocket propulsion testing is managed by the Rocket Propulsion Test

Management Board.15 It determines the location of each test, reviews

investment recommendations, and establishes annual budget

requirements.16 For example, in November 1996, the Board accepted a

recommendation to relocate a 5,000 gallon high pressure liquid hydrogen

tank from a component test stand at Marshall to the one at Stennis, as part

of NASA’s plan to complete this facility and consolidate test capabilities at

Stennis.17 The Board has also decided to move four other liquid oxygen

tanks from Marshall.

NASA Rejects Internal Plan

to Reduce Rocket

Propulsion Test Facilities

Although NASA has consolidated management of rocket propulsion testing

at Stennis, it has struggled to define Stennis’ authority to make investment

decisions. For example, the early goals of consolidation went beyond

15Board members are from Stennis, Marshall, White Sands, and Lewis. The Board’s chair is from

Stennis.

16According to a Stennis official, Stennis has authority, in principle, to establish the rocket propulsion

test budget on a NASA-wide basis, but details of how it will do so are incomplete.

17NASA requested $45.5 million to complete this partially constructed facility. The funds were

appropriated by the Omnibus Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (P.L. 104-134, Apr. 26, 1996). The

facility was started in 1989 in support of the Advanced Launch System program and stopped when the

program was canceled in 1992.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
B-276817 

relocation to include mothballing and abandoning test assets as necessary

to reduce or eliminate unnecessary duplication and lower costs. In

January 1997, Stennis officials proposed a plan that would have greatly

reduced testing at Marshall and Plum Brook; some stands would have

been abandoned and others would have had their capabilities reduced and

transferred to Stennis and White Sands. The draft plan was based on

known requirements for NASA’s test services. But, by June 1997, NASA’s

management decided to abandon Stennis’ plan rather than the test stands

at other centers. Nearly all of the test stands and facilities that would have

been deactivated by the January plan will remain open. According to

Stennis officials, the June plan is based on possible future customers,

which are estimated to be more plentiful than funded customers.18

Air Force Tries to Improve

Competitive Position

The Air Force tests rocket engines at Phillips Laboratory, Edwards Air

Force Base, California; and Arnold Engineering Development Center,

Tennessee.19 In April 1997, the Air Force established the Air Force

Research Laboratory consisting of Phillips Laboratory, three other

laboratories, and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research.20 However,

Arnold, as a test center, is not part of the consolidation.

Phillips Laboratory’s Test Stand 1A was built in the late 1950s and has

recently been altered to give it a liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen capability.

Phillip’s Test Stand 2A also has been changed for a high-pressure liquid

oxygen/liquid hydrogen capability for testing engine components. So far,

changes to these stands have cost about $49 million.21 Test stand 1A’s

changes are for EELV engine testing and 2A for the government—and

industry—sponsored Integrated High Payoff Rocket Propulsion

Technology program to boost engine performance over the next 15 years.22

18An unfunded but possible future customer is a liquid fuel engine for the Space Shuttle’s reusable

boosters. The current boosters use solid fuel. Congress has not approved new types of boosters for the

Shuttle.

19Phillips Laboratory’s headquarters is Kirtland Air Force Base, N.Mex. The Navy and Army test rocket

engines at the Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake, Calif.; and Redstone Technical Test Center,

Redstone Arsenal, Ala., respectively.

20This reorganization is being conducted in phases between March 1997 and 2001. Besides Phillips

Laboratory, the other laboratories affected by the consolidation are Armstrong, Rome, and Wright.

21The cost to change Test Stand 1A has been about $14 million and Test Stand 2A about $35 million.

22NASA and DOD have participated in this program since 1993 to develop new propulsion technologies

in three phases with goals set for 2000, 2005, and 2010. For example, at the end of phase I in 2000, new

propulsion technologies are to cut existing expendable launch vehicle costs by 38 percent and increase

payloads by an average of 40 percent.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
B-276817 

Air Force May Have Lost

Competition to Test New

Engine

The federal government currently uses a fleet of expendable launch

vehicles—Delta, Atlas, and Titan—to transport national security and civil

satellites into space. According to DOD, these vehicles currently operate at

or near their maximum performance capability. In 1994, Congress directed

DOD to develop a space launch modernization plan that led to the initiation

of the EELV program. On December 20, 1996, the Air Force selected

McDonnell Douglas’ Delta IV and a Lockheed Martin proposal for the

“preliminary engineering and manufacturing development” phase of the

competition to build the Air Force’s EELVs consisting of small, medium,

and heavy launchers. Lockheed Martin’s EELV will use the

Russian-designed RD-180 engine to be built by Pratt and Whitney.

Rocketdyne Division of Boeing North American is building the Delta IV’s

first-stage RS-68 engine.23 In November 1996, Rocketdyne selected Phillips

to test its engines in the second, or pre-engineering and manufacturing

development, phase of the program. Originally, a single contractor for the

third, or engineering and manufacturing development, phase of the EELV

program was to have been selected in June 1998.24 The anticipated

contract value for the third phase was $1.6 billion over approximately 

6 years. However, on November 6, 1997, the Air Force announced a change

in acquisition strategy to fund both Boeing’s and Lockheed Martin’s EELVs

in the third phase of the program.

Testing EELV engines in the next phase of the program is important to

Stennis and Phillips. According to a Stennis official, Stennis has two test

stands available for EELV engine testing in 1998, but without EELV engine

testing, there are no identifiable customers starting in 1999 for these and

another of its large test stands.25 And, as noted previously, the Air Force

refurbished Phillip’s Test Stand 1A for EELV engine testing. This test stand

has no other funded customers.

Despite the Air Force’s efforts, it may have lost its EELV engine customer to

NASA. On July 19, 1997, Boeing stated that it had selected Stennis to

conduct development, certification, and production acceptance testing of

the RS-68 engine. Boeing has not yet fully defined its test requirements,

and its intention to test at Stennis is conditional pending a satisfactory

resolution of such issues as the amount of Stennis’ user fees. Boeing may

23The Boeing Company and McDonnell Douglas Corporation began operations as a single company on

August 4, 1997.

24EELV acquisition is in three phases—low-cost concept validation (Aug. 1995-Dec. 1996),

pre-engineering and manufacturing development (Dec. 1996-June 1998), and engineering, and

manufacturing development (June 1998-2004).

25Testing the engines for Lockheed’s Reusable Launch Vehicle is scheduled to start in 2004.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
B-276817 

also test this engine on Phillip’s Test Stand 1A, but it has not made a

formal commitment to do so.

Rocket Propulsion Alliance

Not Yet Playing an Active

Role

The rocket propulsion alliance last met in October 1996 but did not

discuss such major current issues as (1) consolidation of propulsion

testing at NASA or elsewhere, (2) competition between NASA and the Air

Force to test engines, and (3) investment decisions.

According to NASA officials, the alliance is likely to be reactive and unlikely

to initiate a consolidation-related evaluation on its own. At the October

meeting, NASA described the reasons for making Stennis NASA’s center of

excellence for rocket propulsion testing and noted its consolidation plan

would be completed by early 1997.

At the time of the alliance meeting in October, NASA and the Air Force were

competing to test EELV engines in the current phase of the program.

Upgrades to Phillips’ test stands for EELV testing were noted at the

meeting, but this investment was not critically discussed. Also not

discussed was the role the alliance might play in evaluating future

investment decisions or NASA’s effort to complete the component test

facility at Stennis after the Air Force had started to refurbish its own

component test stand at Phillips. According to a DOD official associated

with the alliance, a test of its effectiveness is the ability of alliance

members to review a proposed investment in test facilities.

Required Joint Rocket

Propulsion Test

Facilities Plan Was

Not Submitted

In September 1996, Congress enacted legislation requiring NASA and DOD to

submit within 90 days a

“joint plan for coordinating and eliminating unnecessary duplication in the operations and

planned improvements of rocket engine and rocket engine component test facilities

managed by the [Air Force and NASA]. The plan shall provide, to the extent practical, for the

development of commonly funded and commonly operated facilities.”26

In a January 1997 response to congressional committees, DOD

acknowledged that although NASA and the Air Force “do not yet have a

formal plan,” a range of efforts was underway that would “form the basis

for such a plan.” The efforts cited were Vision 21, the Quadrennial Defense

Review, and the rocket propulsion alliance.

26Public Law 104-201, section 211(c).

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
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The first two efforts cited are unlikely to form the basis of a joint plan

because NASA is not a formal part of the Vision 21 review, and DOD does not

intend that its 5-year plan to consolidate and restructure its laboratories

and test and evaluation centers be a joint plan with other federal agencies.

NASA also was not a formal part of the Quadrennial Defense Review of

defense strategy. Nevertheless, NASA concurred with DOD’s response. DOD

did not state in its letter whether it would prepare a joint plan for

submission to Congress in the future.

The rocket propulsion test alliance’s possible role in joint planning is

problematical at this time in as much as the alliance has not met since

October 1996 and the requirement for a joint plan was not formally

discussed at the meeting.

There is an additional reason why Vision 21 cannot serve as the basis of

the joint plan. DOD prepared, but did not submit, a legislative package for

Vision 21; instead, it opted to include consolidation of its laboratories and

test and evaluation centers in future BRAC rounds. But Congress, so far, has

not accepted the need for such rounds. As a consequence, Vision 21’s

future is unclear until Congress either changes its position on BRAC or new

guidelines for Vision 21 are developed.

NASA and DOD Move

Toward Joint Strategic

Management of

Aeronautical Test

Facilities

NASA and DOD took a step toward creating a national perspective on testing

in the area of aeronautics by agreeing in May 1997 to consider joint

strategic management of their test facilities. And in October 1997, NASA and

Air Force officials reached a verbal understanding on the scope and

approach for joint strategic management, but have yet to agree on key

aspects of a management organization. Ultimately, if joint strategic

management of aeronautics testing is successfully established, its adaption

to other types of test facilities could be considered.

NASA and DOD Officials’

Concepts of Joint

Management Differ

The October understanding was preceded by an agreement on May 5, 1997,

between senior NASA and DOD officials to discuss issues associated with

joint strategic management. In so doing, they rejected the two aeronautical

alliances (wind tunnels and aeropropulsion) as the way to address a

variety of management and investment issues.

This agreement, in turn, followed a DOD assessment team’s report, which

noted in March 1997:

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
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“Each agency and Service manages its wind tunnel facilities independently. There is no

structured oversight of the various facilities in the nation . . . . As a result, there is no

focused approach to what the national needs are for the various facilities.”27

The DOD assessment team was skeptical that the two aeronautical alliances

could effectively overcome this tradition of independence and

recommended, in part, that DOD (1) establish a new office with NASA to

manage the investment and test-technology-related funds for the nation’s

core government wind tunnel facilities and (2) immediately initiate with

NASA and industry a long-term program to build a new transonic wind

tunnel.28

The DOD assessment team proposed a new organization—National

Aeronautical Facility Base—with members from the three military

departments and NASA.

29 The members would reside within their parent

agencies, and, in ad hoc fashion, comprise the new organization. The

organization would not have authority over operations and maintenance

funds, which would remain under the separate authorities of DOD and NASA.

But the management organization would “make investments based on a

national perspective without regard to whether the wind tunnel facility is

DOD- or NASA-owned.”

NASA’s aeronautical officials also were doubtful about the adequacy of the

cooperative alliances, and in November 1996, before the AACB’s

aeronautics panel, recommended formation of an independent

organization to strategically manage selected NASA and DOD wind tunnels

and aeropropulsion test cells.30 However, in NASA’s proposal, the new

organization would receive funding from participating agencies and

possibly industry, and its staff would be full-time members of the

organization.

27DOD Aeronautical Test Facilities Assessment (Mar. 1997), p. 60.

28This recommendation revives a recommendation of the April 1994 report of the “National Facilities

Study” team, which recommended that two major new wind tunnels be developed with the primary

objective of strengthening U.S. industry’s capability to compete effectively in the international market

for commercial jet transports. In 1996, NASA terminated this program due to budget constraints. See

David P. Radzanowski, Wind Tunnels: Proposal for a New National Wind Tunnel Complex

(Congressional Research Service, Jan. 4, 1995).

29The model for this organization is DOD’s Major Range and Test Facility Base, which is comprised of

21 test installations, facilities, and ranges, including, for example, Arnold Engineering Development

Center.

30Aside from Aeronautics, the AACB’s other panels are Launch Systems Development, Spacecraft

Technology, and Space Communications and Operations.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
B-276817 

In proposing their different versions of joint management, NASA and DOD

officials noted that in 1994 seven European aeronautical research

establishments had combined to form a joint management organization

called the Association of European Research Establishments in

Aeronautics, which now manages five wind tunnels in four countries. NASA

and DOD officials believe relatively new European wind tunnels and the

association of research establishments have combined to make Europe’s

facilities especially competitive in attracting new test-related business.31

In October 1997, NASA and Air Force officials reached a verbal

understanding on a scope and approach for a joint strategic management

organization. The understanding proposes that NASA and DOD will continue

to own, operate, and fund their own test facilities. The purpose of the new

management organization will be to provide strategic management in four

areas: (1) planning (includes making foreign competitive assessments and

developing an associated strategy), (2) test technology (includes advocacy

for resources), (3) operations policy (includes reviewing, coordinating,

and recommending facilities’ test schedules), and (4) business

management (includes, as discussed below, cost accounting and charging

policy). The new organization will be under the review authority of the

AACB.

However, basic questions remain about strategic joint management,

including the new organization’s structure and authority to make binding

decisions and recommendations. NASA and DOD officials have not agreed on

a charter for the new management organization.

Cost Issues Remain

Unresolved

The major facilities study team recognized that consolidation of test

facilities depended on the development of “consistent/comparable” cost

models because currently NASA and DOD differ on the issues of how much

and whom to charge for testing. Generally, NASA does not charge for use of

its aeronautical test facilities, while DOD does.

The major facilities study team developed some information on cost

models. The team noted that although NASA’s and DOD’s “direct” and

“indirect” costs were comparable at summary levels, differences over what

31European Aeronautics: Strong Government Presence in Industry Structure and Research and

Development Support (GAO/NSIAD-94-71, Mar. 23, 1994).

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
B-276817 

to charge users of test services remained.32 In 1993, Congress gave DOD

increased flexibility to adjust charges for indirect costs for commercial

users of its Major Range and Test Facility Base.33 NASA does not charge

customers of its aeronautical facilities unless they receive “special

benefits” over and beyond those which accrue to the public at large. For

example, NASA charges commercial customers to use its wind tunnels if

their tests are not officially supported by a government contract or letter

of intent, or, if so supported, they are beyond the scope of testing

requested by the government. On the other hand, DOD’s Major Range and

Test Facility Base charges other federal agencies and commercial

customers 100 percent of direct costs and a portion of indirect costs.

Conclusions By agreeing to the recommendation to establish cooperative alliances, the

AACB accepted the proposition that institutionalizing cooperative behavior

in this way would add value to the already established cooperative

relationship between NASA and DOD. Progress towards validating this

proposition has been slow and sporadic. The alliances appear to offer the

opportunity for an ongoing evaluation of test-related issues and

cost-saving efficiencies of mutual interest to NASA and DOD, and thereby,

create the basis for the testing community itself to construct a national

perspective on these issues. While this perspective may be emerging in

some cases, it is essentially absent in others. By not convening most

alliances, the development of a national perspective from the bottom up

remains largely untested. While the effect of such a delay is unclear, it may

indicate that some NASA and DOD test officials do not see the alliances as

having practical value, and that, with few exceptions, they would not

object to continuing the pre-alliance status quo.

In 1996, Congress began to push for a national perspective with the

requirement for joint planning, common funding, and common operations

of NASA and DOD’s rocket propulsion test facilities. NASA’s and DOD’s formal

reply to this requirement was not responsive. Consequently, it may be

appropriate to reaffirm and extend the search for a national perspective on

test facility issues begun in the 1996 legislation.

32Direct costs are those that can be linked to specific activities in using a facility itself. Indirect costs

are those common to various programs using a facility, plus an allocated share of the general and

administrative costs of doing business at a research center or base.

33Section 846 of the Fiscal Year 1994 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 103-160, Nov. 30, 1993).

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
B-276817 

Matter for

Congressional

Consideration

Congressional intent, as reflected in the statutory requirement for joint

planning of rocket propulsion test facilities, is not being fully met by NASA

and DOD. Congress may wish to consider reaffirming its intention in this

regard and extend its joint planning requirement to other types of

aerospace test facilities, including a requirement that NASA and DOD assess

the possible extension of joint management of aeronautical facilities to

other types of test facilities, especially rocket propulsion.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred that NASA and

DOD need to coordinate more on infrastructure planning, but partially

concurred that progress in institutionalizing cooperation was slow and

sporadic. While DOD agreed that progress was slow in some areas, it

believed we should give more credit to the progress that has been made.

DOD noted that, without formal alliance charters, increases have occurred

in interagency communications, interagency meetings on coordination of

test technology, joint management alternatives and data bases, and the

agencies’ understanding of each other’s policies and capabilities. DOD also

partially concurred with our suggestion that Congress may wish to

consider reaffirming its intention for joint planning of rocket propulsion

test facilities and assess the possible extension of joint planning to other

types of aerospace test facilities. DOD emphasized that it fully intends to

meet congressional requirements and said that further legislation is either

not needed or premature. DOD’s comments and our evaluation of them are

included in appendix III.

While an objective of our report is to determine the extent to which

cooperative alliances have been operating on a regular basis, we

recognized cooperative activities that preceded the signing of the

alliances’ charters in January 1998. For example, we noted cooperation on

(1) testing in subsonic wind tunnels, (2) testing the effects of icing on

aircraft, (3) developing wind tunnel test technology plans, (4) discussing

rocket engine test issues, and (5) boosting rocket engine performance over

the next 15 years. In particular, one activity cited by DOD—joint

management alternatives—is discussed in some detail.

In responding to our conclusion and matter for congressional

consideration, DOD did not state when it intends to comply with the

statutory requirement. Therefore, because DOD and NASA have not been

responsive to the congressional requirement, we believe that a

reaffirmation of congressional intent, which would not necessarily require

additional legislation, might be appropriate. We did not suggest that

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
B-276817 

Congress extend joint management to other types of aerospace test

facilities, only that Congress consider requiring an assessment of that

possibility. We believe our matter for congressional consideration remains

valid.

In its written comments, NASA said the report could be strengthened by

including updated information and identifying past cooperative activities

made by the alliances. As discussed previously, we believe our report

identified past cooperative activities. We updated the report where

appropriate. NASA’s comments are reprinted in appendix IV.

NASA and DOD also provided technical comments which we have

incorporated where appropriate.

Scope and

Methodology

To accomplish our objectives, we obtained documents from and

interviewed officials at NASA headquarters in Washington, D.C.; NASA’s

Langley Research Center, Virginia; Goddard Space Flight Center,

Maryland; and John C. Stennis Space Center, Mississippi. We also held

discussions with and obtained documents from officials in the Office of

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, the Air

Force’s Test and Evaluation Directorate, Washington, D.C.; the Air Force’s

Phillips Laboratory Propulsion Directorate, Edwards Air Force Base,

California (now part of the Air Force Laboratory, Wright Patterson Air

Force Base, Ohio); the Air Force’s EELV program office, Los Angeles Air

Force Base, California; and the Air Force Materiel Command’s Arnold

Engineering Development Center, Arnold Air Force Base, Tennessee.

To evaluate NASA and DOD’s formal cooperation, we interviewed cognizant

officials about the chartering and perceived value of the test facility

alliances and reviewed the minutes of all formal alliance and AACB panel

meetings held between May 1996 and August 1997.

With regard to competition to test EELV rocket engines, we interviewed

cognizant officials and reviewed documents at Stennis Space Center and

the Propulsion Directorate of Phillips Laboratory on the perceived

advantages and disadvantages of each test facility in relation to EELV

testing. We also discussed EELV testing with officials at the Air Force’s EELV

program office and with officials of one of the EELV engine contractors.

To evaluate NASA and DOD’s response to a congressional requirement to

prepare a joint plan on rocket propulsion test facilities, we interviewed

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
B-276817 

officials about DOD’s response and analyzed documents obtained at the

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.

To review proposals for joint management of wind tunnels, we

interviewed cognizant officials about the perceived need for a new

management arrangement and reviewed joint-management proposals at

the Langley and Arnold centers.

We performed our work between November 1996 and December 1997 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the NASA Administrator; the

Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.

We will also make copies available to others upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions, I can be reached at (202) 512-4841.

Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Allen Li

Associate Director,

Defense Acquisition Issues

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Major Test Facilities

22

Appendix II 

Charter of National

Rocket Propulsion

Test Alliance

30

Appendix III 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

37

Appendix IV 

Comments From the

National Aeronautics

and Space

Administration

44

Appendix V 

Major Contributors to

This Report

46

Figures Figure 1: Location of Major NASA and DOD Test Facilities 3

Figure I.1: Wind Tunnel 22

Figure I.2: Aeropropulsion Test Cell 23

Figure I.3: Rocket Engine Test Stand 25

Figure I.4: Space Environmental Simulation Chamber 27

Figure I.5: Arc-Heated Facility 28

Figure I.6: Hypervelocity Gas Gun 29

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Contents

Abbreviations

AACB Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board

BRAC Base Realignment and Closure

DOD Department of Defense

EELV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix I 

Major Test Facilities

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the

Department of Defense (DOD) formed cooperative alliances for the

following types of test facilities:

Wind tunnels are used to test aerodynamic forces (lift, drag, and side

force) acting on scale models of air and spacecraft in a controlled

airstream at different airspeeds. The challenge to testing in a wind tunnel

is the applicability of results obtained with a scale model to full-sized air

and spacecraft. Figure I.1 depicts a NASA wind tunnel that consisted of

three test sections fed by one power source consisting of 4 coupled

electric motors capable of 180,000 horsepower when operating on a

continuous basis.

Figure I.1: Wind Tunnel

Source: NASA.

Aeropropulsion test cells are used to test air-breathing engines under

simulated flight conditions. (See fig. I.2.)

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix I 

Major Test Facilities

Figure I.2: Aeropropulsion Test Cell

Engine

Inlet

Plenum

Cell

Test Cell

Exhaust

Duct

Ejector

Plenum

Source: Arnold Research Center.

Rocket engine test stands are used to test chemical, solar, electric, and

other types of rocket engines, and engine components such as fuel pumps

and injector systems. Some test stands can simulate high altitudes. The

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix I 

Major Test Facilities

test stand in figure I.3 is 160 feet high and can test engines capable of

producing 1.5 million pounds of thrust.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix I 

Major Test Facilities

Figure I.3: Rocket Engine Test Stand

Liquid hydrogen

run tanka

Crane

Hydrogen

vent line

Flame deflector

Liquid oxygen

run tanka

aRun tanks directly supply engine with fuel and oxydizer from near-by storage tanks.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Source: NASA.

Space environmental simulation chambers are used to test spacecraft,

instruments and components in ground handling, launch, and powered and

orbital flight environments. Test facilities include acoustic and thermal

vacuum chambers. Some simulation chambers are capable of creating a

vacuum of less than one billionth of atmospheric pressure. (See fig. I.4.)

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix I 

Major Test Facilities

Figure I.4: Space Environmental Simulation Chamber

Liquid nitrogen cold wall

Heat lamps

Test article

Structural load

actuators

Structural test

fixture

Liquid hydrogen catch basin

Source: NASA.

Arc-heated facilities are used for two fundamental purposes: aerothermal

testing of materials and structures to simulate the aerodynamic heating

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix I 

Major Test Facilities

environment of hypersonic flight, and aeropropulsion testing of engines

that operate at high velocities and temperatures. NASA tests heating of

Earth and planetary entry vehicles, and DOD tests heating of ballistic and

other types of missiles. The arc heated facility illustrated in figure I.5 is

capable of heating gas to more than 10,000 degrees Fahrenheit and

directing it under pressure at an object or material to be tested.

Figure I.5: Arc-Heated Facility

Chamber Water

Air

Electrical

Power (+)

Electrical

Power (-) Front

Electrode

Transition

Section

Heat Transfer And

Pressure Gauges

Test

Section

Diffuser

Continuous

Steam Jet Ejector

Vacuum System

Supersonic

Nozzle

Source: NASA.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix I 

Major Test Facilities

Hypervelocity gas guns are used for impact testing. NASA tests

meteoroid/orbital debris-sized particles impacting on space structures

such as the international space station. DOD tests ballistic missile intercept

systems. In figure I.6, a powder charge drives the piston into trapped

hydrogen, compressing it. The petal valve ruptures, forcing the projectile

and sabot down the launch tube. The sabot is machined plastic that

protects the launch tube from the projectile.

Figure I.6: Hypervelocity Gas Gun

Pump tube Hydrogen gas

Piston

High pressure coupling

Sabot

Projectile

Petal valve

Launch tube

Source: NASA.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix II 

Charter of National Rocket Propulsion Test

Alliance

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix II 

Charter of National Rocket Propulsion Test

Alliance

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix II 

Charter of National Rocket Propulsion Test

Alliance

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix II 

Charter of National Rocket Propulsion Test

Alliance

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix II 

Charter of National Rocket Propulsion Test

Alliance

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix II 

Charter of National Rocket Propulsion Test

Alliance

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix II 

Charter of National Rocket Propulsion Test

Alliance

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 2.

See comment 1.

See comment 3.

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 4.

See comment 1.

See comment 1.

See comment 4.

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 5.

See comment 1.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on DOD’s letter dated December 23,

1997.

GAO Comments 1. Refer to the “agency comments and our evaluation” section of the

report.

2. We do not indicate that the alliances were not pursuing the intentions of

their charters.

3. We did not review the basis of the Air Force’s decision to upgrade some

of Phillips Laboratory’s test stands, nor did we evaluate the EELV program.

The point of our discussion of EELV engine testing was to establish that the

NASA/DOD relationship on rocket engine testing is defined by both

competitive and cooperative behavior. We used EELV engine testing to

illustrate the competitive aspect of this relationship. The congressional

requirement for joint planning of rocket propulsion test facilities

establishes the context of our discussion because joint planning is one

possible way to manage the NASA/DOD relationship in this area. With

respect to DOD’s comment on the rocket propulsion alliance, we did not

state that the alliance should have reviewed the decision to upgrade

Phillip’s test stands. Our point is that, in the opinion of some alliance

members, a test of the alliance’s future relevance is its determination and

ability to evaluate investment issues of the type that had been made at

Phillips and Stennis Space Center.

4. Determining test capacity of rocket engines was not an objective of our

report. We note that when DOD states that “Both NASA and Air Force

officials have challenged the assumption that there is excess rocket test

capacity with the two agencies,” it is, in fact, disagreeing with the

conclusion of its own May 1996 report on NASA/DOD cooperative initiatives.

DOD’s response does not provide specific information as to why NASA’s and

DOD’s perception changed from May 1996 to October 1996 when DOD says

the rocket propulsion alliance determined that there was no excess test

capacity in the alliance for the next 2 years. Subsequent to DOD’s response,

we analyzed the minutes of the October 1996 meeting of the rocket

propulsion alliance and concluded that these minutes do not clearly reflect

that a discussion on test capacity took place or that a determination about

capacity was made.

5. We share DOD’s concern about the premature expansion of joint

strategic management to other types of test facilities. As we stated in the

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

report, ultimately, if joint strategic management of aeronautics test

facilities is successfully established, its adaption to other types of test

facilities could be considered.

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix IV 

Comments From the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix IV 

Comments From the National Aeronautics

and Space Administration

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
Appendix V 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Frank Degnan

Tom Mills

Dan Hoagland

Denver Field Office Maria Durant

Mark McClarie

Los Angeles Field

Office

Ambrose McGraw

Jeff Webster

(707250) Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-98-52 NASA/DOD Cooperation
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