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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO

General, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW

Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army

1135501

U.S. Army Engineer School

(573) 563-8080/DSN 676-8080

COMMANDANT

BG Peter A. (Duke) DeLuca

563-6192

<peter.deluca@us.army.mil>

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT

COL Fabian E. Mendoza, Jr.

563-6192

<fabian.mendoza@us.army.mil>

DEPUTY COMMANDANT

Mr. James R. Rowan

563-8080

<james.rowan@us.army.mil>

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR

CSM Terrence W. Murphy

563-8060

<terrence.murphy@us.army.mil>

REGIMENTAL CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER

CW5 Scott R. Owens

563-4088

<scott.owens@us.army.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–USAR

COL Adam S. Roth 

563-8045

<adam.roth@us.army.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–ARNG

LTC Rodney M. Graham 

563-8046

<rodney.m.graham@us.army.mil>

CHIEF OF STAFF

LTC Jose L. Aguilar

563-7116

<jose.aguilar@us.army.mil>

COMMANDER, 1ST ENGINEER BRIGADE

COL Allan Webster

596-0224, DSN 581-0224

<allan.webster@us.army.mil>

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT

COL Daniel S. Larsen

563-4093

<daniel.larsen@us.army.mil>

DIRECTOR OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRATION

Mr. Robert F. Danner

563-2845

<robert.f.danner@us.army.mil>

COUNTER EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS CENTER

LTC Chris Barron 

563-8142

<chris.barron@us.army.mil>

HUMANITARIAN DEMINING TRAINING CENTER

Mr. Jonathan D. Green

563-6199

<jonathan.d.green@us.army.mil>

ENGINEER DOCTRINE, MSCoE CDID, CODDD

MAJ Sinlan Morrow

563-2717

<sinlan.morrow@us.army.mil>

MANEUVER SUPPORT ORGANIZATION

Mr. Don Wenzel

563-7264

<don.wenzel@us.army.mil>

MANEUVER SUPPORT MATERIEL

LTC Chris A. Parks

563-5055

<chris.parks1@us.army.mil>
E R

DEPARTMENTS

02 Clear the Way

By Brigadier General 

Peter A. (Duke) DeLuca

03 Lead the Way

By Command Sergeant Major

Terrence W. Murphy

04 Show the Way

By Chief Warrant Officer Five

Scott R. Owens

34 Engineer Doctrine Update

57 Past In Review – “Brilliant 

Scenes: Army Engineers in the 

Overland Campaign”

By Mr. Donald J. McConnell and 

Mr. Gustav J. Person

61 Dedication

MANAGING EDITOR

Diane E. Eidson

EDITOR

Rick Brunk

GRAPHIC DESIGNER

Jennifer Morgan

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT

Phyllis E. Grayson

COMMANDANT

Brigadier General Peter A. (Duke) DeLuca

FEATURES

05 The Delta: The Challenge of Leading Extraordinary People to

Do Ordinary Things

By Colonel Adam S. Roth

08 Bridging the Engineer Gap From Tactical to Strategic

By Mr. J. Erik Fleischner, Lieutenant Colonel Frank E. Hopkins III, and 

Lieutenant Colonel Damon G. Montgomery

12 Clearing the Road Ahead: The Future of Engineer Partnership

in Afghanistan

By Captain Joseph J. Caperna, Captain Thomas M. Ryder, and

First Lieutenant Jamal Nasir

17 Success in Partnership

By Captain Mark D. Gillman

21 Team Muhandis: Building Great Iraqi Army Engineers

 By Major Jason L. Buursma and Captain Thomas G. Fitzpatrick

24 Engineer Civil Action in Cambodia

 By First Lieutenant Peter M. Friedewald

28 Engineer Brigade Validates With Mobile Training Team

 By Sergeant Major David G. Crews, Staff Sergeant Donald J. Keeney,

and Staff Sergeant Rory S. Seppanen

31 Engineer Doctrine and Doctrine 2015

By Lieutenant Colonel Sinlan Morrow

36 Bridging the Gap: U.S. Army Engineers Observe South Korean

River-Crossing Operations

 By Major David W. Noble

38 The Eight-Step Training Model

By Major Matthew R. Little

42 Should the General Engineer Battalion Transform, Again?

By Captain Walter K. Bogardus

43 Army Career Tracker Web Site Opens to Engineer Officers

By Lieutenant Colonel Brian Slack

44 Critical Integration: The Brigade Combat Team Engineer

Coordinator and Geospatial Engineering

By Captain Colleen Reiss Vermeulen

Volume 42 PB 5-12-1 Headquarters, Department of the Army January–April 2012

NGINEE

U.S. ARMY

ENGINEER SCHOOL

The Professional Bulletin of Army Engineers

January–April 2012 Engineer 1

Front cover: ENFORCE 2012—

Engineering For the Wars We Fight logo 

by Kristen L. Jenner.

Back cover: U.S Army photos 

48 Complex Obstacle Breach

By First Lieutenant Lance E. Peterson

50 Targeting in an Engineer Brigade

By Major Gary S. Bonham and Major Jakob C.

Bruhl

53 What Do You Mean, “SHAPE Isn’t NATO Headquarters”?

By Lieutenant Colonel Chris Becking

55 The Human Touch: Geospatial Engineering Meets

Local Afghans

By Major Christopher J. Scott
ead the Way

2 Engineer January–April 2012

 

Clear the Way 

Brigadier General Peter A. (Duke) DeLuca

Commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School

(Continued on page 47)

Engineering for the Wars

We Fight

Engineering for the Wars We Fight is 

the theme of this year’s U.S. Army 

Engineer Regimental Conference 

(commonly known as ENFORCE)—a conference that not only includes the celebratory and competitive aspects of our annual 

gathering, but also has a very substantive 

and productive focus on what we are doing in combat, what we need to be doing in 

combat, and what we are doing each day 

to prevent, shape, and win now and in 

the future.

The conference will focus on the expected operational environment during the next few years, not 

take a hypothetical look into the future far beyond our ability to predict anything about the strategic context in which 

we must work and adapt. Nor will this conference rely on 

sterile scenarios amenable to popular and convenient assumptions about the nature of war and the skills, tools, 

and resources needed to fight them. These types of dysfunctional approaches have hampered our ability to think 

clearly at strategic transition points in the past and cannot 

be allowed to recur. And, of course, prevention and shaping 

operations include theater engagement; engineer preparation of theater actions; defense support of civil authorities 

and its foreign equivalent, partner capacity building; and 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineer (USACE) support to our Nation and international foreign aid and security operations. 

USACE and the field Army engineers are one Regiment, 

and we must work very closely to deliver the engineering 

effects that our forces and our Nation need. This year’s conference will have a variety of activities that are designed to 

further this goal. 

While our Engineer Regiment continues to perform doggedly and superbly in support of maneuver forces and commanders around the globe and at home, it is no secret that 

the context in which we operate is changing. The geopolitical situation, the economy, the operational environment, 

and our strategy are going through transitions that guarantee tremendous uncertainty; but these transitions also 

provide an unprecedented opportunity to reshape our Regiment into the precise form and capacity that our Nation 

needs. So now is the time to reshape our Regiment, and we 

will do it together. Most of you are aware of the discussions 

about our Profession of Arms, the discussions and pending 

decisions of Army 2020, the reductions in our budget, the 

termination of one major theater, and the 

impending termination of a second major 

theater within the next 2 years. These and 

other global changes have a significant 

impact on our Army and the engineers 

entrusted with supporting decisive land 

operations to protect our citizens and national interests and to ensure our Nation’s 

continued prosperity for our children and 

grandchildren.

We will gather at Fort Leonard Wood 

17–21 April. The ENFORCE agenda will 

allow us to visualize the operational environment through multiple national and 

cabinet level experts who will discuss the 

hybrid threats, the operational environment, and the Army 2020 and Engineer Regiment plans 

to meet the future operational environment. We will host 

major addresses from a cabinet official, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) senior leaders 

working the Army 2020 concept (which is already reshaping 

our Army), the Chief of Engineers, the Maneuver Support 

Center of Excellence commanding general, senior members 

of our U.S. Army Reserve and U.S. Army National Guard, 

brigade members who have recently returned from combat 

or who are still in combat, and at least two foreign partner chief engineers. These discussions and panels will provide a breadth of information and perspective unmatched 

during any other event. Our USACE team will conduct a 

Commanders’ Conference and the Installation Management 

Command team will conduct a Department of Public Works 

Conference almost concurrently with ENFORCE, overlapping key events of interest.

Our panel discussions will focus on joint/international, 

interagency/intergovernmental, special operations forces, 

and geospatial/geointelligence operations; and the working 

groups will focus on training and training support to our 

Regiment. Senior level members will address the plenary 

sessions, and then working groups will refine draft products 

and plans to be implemented after ENFORCE. 

We will also conduct the usual social and commemorative engagements to encourage professional dialog and 

foster continued camaraderie. Holding events such as the 

solemn Fallen Sapper Memorial Service and the joyful Engineer Regimental Ball is our duty. We honor our fallen, 

who along with their families made the selfless, ultimate 

sacrifice; and we continue the observance of our most

ancient traditions and celebrate them as Soldiers of this
January–April 2012 Engineer 3

Lead the Way 

Command Sergeant Major Terrence W. Murphy

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

As the U.S. Army transitions to the 

Army of 2020, the Engineer Regi-

.ment will continue to provide the 

best training and resources for our leaders 

and Soldiers. While the Army senior leaders grapple with budget issues and work 

to determine what the Army will look like 

in the future, we as a regiment must continue to strive for excellence. The Army of 

2020 represents many changes in the force 

and the way the Army operates. The Brigade Engineer Battalion concept is still on 

the table and is a vital part of the Engineer Regiment strategy to build the right 

force for the engineers and to place the best 

type of formations in the brigade combat 

teams to assist as they become more lethal 

and agile. This strategy is about providing the best assets

under the right mission command node to ensure that they 

are trained and employed in the best manner to benefit not 

only the brigade combat team but the Army as a whole.

We recently launched the officer version of the Army

Career Tracker (see page 43). (The enlisted version has been 

out for some time.) The Web site allows you to sign in to 

track your career path and to select a leader and mentor(s)

who can provide guidance for career planning and direction. As you look at the site, you will find links to Army 

sites and to other engineer sites. Education is a key in the 

military and civilian worlds. There are links to the College 

of the American Soldier at <http://www.tradoc.army.mil

/INCOPD/cas.html>; to structured self-development 

courses at the Army Training Requirements and Resources 

System Web site at <https://atrrs.army.mil/>; and to other sites that assist in career advancement.

The Regimental Command Sergeant Major blog site,

<https://www.milsuite.mil/login/login?goto=https%3A%

2F%2Fwww.milsuite.mil%3A443%2Fbook%2Fgroups

%2Fcsms-orp>, recently featured a conversation about 

NCOs providing articles to professional publications. Our 

NCO Corps is the best in the world, knowledgeable and 

professional. Sharing knowledge and professional opinions

fuels spirited debate and assists others. As NCOs, we are 

part of the Army profession and should be part of the discussion. When we shy away from presenting our professional

opinions, we minimize ourselves among our comrades. 

We are continuing to develop more professional standards and additional skill identifiers (ASIs) for our Soldiers. Recently, the Engineer Regiment instituted the Sapper Leader Course ASI (S4) and combat engineer heavy 

tracked vehicle operator ASI (B6). These 

ASIs recognize professionalism and provide credentials for special disciplines in 

certain areas of the Engineer Regiment. 

Units are now being fielded with the 

assault breacher vehicle (ABV), which 

features mine-clearing line charges and 

proofing and marking capabilities in one 

package mounted on an M-1 Abrams 

tank chassis. The B6 ASI course is the 

certification mechanism for the ABV, the 

M9 armored combat earthmover (ACE), 

and others in that family of armored vehicles. As fielding plans appear on longrange unit calendars, plan ahead by 

sending your operators to Fort Leonard 

Wood, Missouri, for training. The B6 ASI 

course has been underutilized so far, but provides good service to units that have the ABV and similar vehicles. Units 

in the fielding window should take advantage of the course 

and get their operators certified.

Finally, as professional Soldiers in the Engineer Regiment, we have a duty to look for more educational opportunities. We do not have many degreed or credentialed 

enlisted Soldiers in our profession. The NCO Education 

System is our professional military education system, and 

those who are eligible to attend Advanced and Senior Leaders Courses should place a high priority on attending them. 

It is an individual responsibility and should be a priority 

for NCOs to attend once they become promotable sergeants, 

staff sergeants, and sergeants first class. Although it may 

take Soldiers away from home for a short period of time, the 

benefits are huge for the NCOs and for the units that gain 

increased knowledge in their leaders. The pace of deployments has slowed over the years, and we must reduce the 

backlog of course attendance. 

As this year continues, we are moving toward ENFORCE 

2012, which will be held at Fort Leonard Wood from 17 to 

21 April 2012. The culminating event of the week will be the 

Engineer Regimental Ball on the evening of 21 April. The 

week brings the global regimental team together in a major team-building event and is an educational time period 

where engineers discuss serious topics that will affect the 

Engineer Regiment in the future. The Best Sapper Competition will also be held during that week, as the best of the 

best sappers come together to compete in a grueling contest. 

Come out and join us, and be a part of our annual event 

showcasing the best regiment in the U.S. Army.

Essayons!

 
4 Engineer January–April 2012

Greetings everyone. I hope that 

the New Year is finding you 

safe and that you and your 

families are doing well. As I write this, 

Christmas is almost upon us, but by the 

time you read it, ENFORCE will be in 

session. Speaking of ENFORCE, it has 

been getting better and better every 

year and this year promises to continue 

to build on that momentum. For engineer warrant officers, ENFORCE 2012 

will have even more significance since 

our first geospatial engineering technician (military occupational specialty 

125D) Warrant Officer Basic Course 

will graduate shortly afterward. 

As you know, the Army will undergo 

a major transition over the next several years. As I reflect 

on the Army’s history, I can’t help but recognize that we 

have always been in a state of change. The changes are 

sometimes sweeping and sometimes incremental, but they 

are always focused on meeting current and future challenges. What haven’t changed are the men and women

who volunteer to serve as professional Soldiers in the U.S. 

Army. Many serve one or more terms, while others serve 

an entire career with a passion and commitment that 

most people will never totally understand. 

Over the past few months, I’ve had the pleasure of 

visiting with Soldiers, attending ceremonies and graduations, and speaking at receptions for Engineer Basic Officer Leader Courses and Warrant Officer Basic and Advanced Courses. Meeting these Soldiers and leaders, some 

of whom are just starting out and others who are midway 

through their careers, fills me with reassurance that the 

future of the Army is in good hands. Nearly everyone I 

meet is driven by a passion that is best described as written in the U.S. Army Profession of Arms Campaign: “The 

Chief Warrant Officer Five Scott R. Owens

Regimental Chief Warrant Officer 

Show the Way 

American Professional Soldier is a volunteer . . . bonded with comrades in a shared 

identity and culture of sacrifice and service. . . .” Comradeship is what Soldiers 

are forming while training here in their 

basic courses at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. When they come back throughout 

their careers for advanced military training, they will reaffirm those relationships 

while building new ones as they share 

their experiences and knowledge. 

It has been a great honor to get to 

know some of those Soldiers, and it is 

my honor to represent you, my fellow 

engineer warrant officers. Over the next 

year, Chief Warrant Officer Four Jerome 

Bussey (your assignments manager) and 

I will be visiting many of your locations. We will meet with 

you and your Soldiers, discuss emerging warrant officer 

issues, and hear firsthand any concerns you might have. 

I’m looking forward to seeing each and every one of you. 

Until then, I hope that you will stay safe and that I will see 

many of you at ENFORCE. 

For information about how to become an engineer warrant officer, log on to the U.S. Army recruiting Web site at 

<http://www.usarec.army.mil/hq/warrant>. For information about the Army Profession Campaign and about 

engineer warrant officer issues, log on to the following 

Web sites:

■ <http://cape.army.mil/ArmyProfession.html>.

■ <https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/senior

	 -engineer-warrant-officer-group>.

■ <https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/engineer

-branch-junior-warrant-officer-group>.

Essayons et Faissons!

“The American Professional Soldier is a volunteer 

. . . bonded with comrades in a shared identity and 

culture of sacrifice and service. . . .”
January–April 2012 Engineer 5

When we speak of those who are decorated for bravery or heroism, a frequent comment is that they 

were ordinary people doing extraordinary things. 

As the current wars wind down, we have grown a force that 

is—without reservation—the most combat-proven force in 

generations. These were volunteers who came forward and 

served in a time of war. They were frequently placed in 

positions where life or death decisions had to be made immediately; and frequently, the results were stellar. This is 

the force we have today. They are Soldiers who expect to be 

treated as adults, having had that responsibility in theater 

and having gained life experience during deployment. But 

how do you get Soldiers who have been slaying dragons for

a year to now set their sights on smaller targets and do ordinary things—and want to do them?

While serving at the U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort 

Leonard Wood, Missouri, I regularly conduct outbriefings 

with U.S. Army Reserve students as part of their Engineer Basic Officer Course. I start out with a simple question: What is it that you haven’t learned during the course, 

By Colonel Adam S. Roth

The Challenge of Leading

Extraordinary People to Do

Ordinary Things

The Delta:
6 Engineer January–April 2012

but want to? Almost invariably I get the same set of topics 

that includes—

■ Counseling.

■ Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Reports (NCOERs).

■ Officer Evaluation Reports. 

■ Command Supply Discipline Program.

■ Command Maintenance Discipline Program.

Although it is not a doctrinally correct term, the lost art 

of “garrison leadership” is the locus of those topics. Growing up as a lieutenant in Germany, many of these topics occurred with regularity and created stability and predictability for the Soldiers of U.S. Army Europe before the fall of the 

Berlin Wall. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan terminate 

or decrease in scope, white space appears more frequently 

on training schedules. The patch chart, though vitally important for driving operational tempo for the past 10 years, 

will no longer be the sole driver of training. The next generation of leaders may not start their lieutenant years on 

an operational deployment, but rather learn to master the 

art of garrison leadership while having time on their hands 

to focus on ordinary things. This article focuses on training 

that supports that end—the mastery of garrison leadership. 

It is our collective challenge to take these extraordinary

Soldiers and make them want to do the ordinary things that 

comprise garrison leadership tasks.

Counseling

I

cannot overstate the importance of counseling at every 

level. In units where I have served, leaders have often 

been frustrated with individual Soldiers. When I ask the 

leaders if they have counseled the Soldiers or documented 

their performance, the usual answer is that they have never 

had the time. When I dig further down, I usually see that 

they have never really understood how to counsel Soldiers. 

My first exposure to counseling was at the Infantry Officer Basic Course in 1988, where we conducted role-playing 

with real Soldiers. The quality and realism of that training 

were so vivid that when I met the instructor again recently, 

we could recall word for word what was said 23 years ago. 

Whether using a Department of the Army (DA) Form 4856, 

Developmental Counseling Form,

1

 or an informal document 

of your own creation, you need to take the time to establish 

expectations and standards with each subordinate in your 

organization. If you can quantify those expectations and 

standards, so much the better. 

The other step in the process, sometimes overlooked, is to 

truly listen to what subordinates say, get their perspective 

on what was said, and discover what their personal goals 

are. While conducting counseling sessions with students at 

the Engineer School, I am frequently amazed at their reaction to having a senior leader sit down, one on one, to discuss 

their careers, dreams, and issues. Taking the time for these 

sessions has been a personal priority for me, and I hope that 

the result will be a generation of junior leaders who will do 

the same with their subordinates. In order to grow our next 

generation of leaders, this sort of hands-on career management is probably one of our most solemn duties.

NCOERs

As a battalion commander, I often saw substandard 

NCOERs. Sometimes they were simply a cut and 

.paste from the last noncommissioned officer (NCO) 

who was rated. On my last deployment, we took the opportunity to conduct a 2-day workshop on a litany of topics, to 

include NCOERs. Under the direction of the battalion command sergeant major, we trained more than 200 NCOs during the deployment, and the resulting NCOERs improved 

markedly. The key points of completing good NCOERs come 

back to counseling, setting realistic goals with appropriate metrics, and getting feedback. The rater and the rated 

NCO need to ensure that the duty description is meaningful and includes details such as the number of people supervised and the value of equipment for which the NCO is 

signed. The rater and senior rater also need to know the 

correct career progression for the NCO. Do they have DA 

Pamphlet 600-25, U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide,

2

 open in front of them to see 

logical future positions for the NCO and to determine what 

key and developmental positions are available; or are they 

simply writing in “squad leader” or “platoon sergeant” as 

recommendations? Finally, counseling and final NCOERs 

need to be done on a timely basis. If a final NCOER is late, 

the leader has failed the Soldier and the Army. If proper 

NCOER procedures are not part of the culture in your unit 

and you’re not tracking such ordinary things at your level, 

there will be harmful consequences. Only you, the leader, 

can change this situation.

“This is the force we have today. . . . having had that responsibility 

in theater and having gained life experience during deployment. 

But how do you get Soldiers who have been slaying dragons for 

a year to now set their sights on smaller targets and do ordinary 

things—and want to do them?”
January–April 2012 Engineer 7

Officer Evaluation Reports

The bedrock of this process is DA Form 67-9-1, Officer Evaluation Report Support Form.

3

 Though some 

changes to the form are coming, including the return 

of a block check for senior raters other than field grade officers, the concept and importance of this form will remain 

the same. The first instinct for any officer when meeting 

the new boss should be to leave that meeting with a copy of 

the Officer Evaluation Report Support Form. It is not infrequent that a rater, especially in the Reserve Components, 

does not have a copy of the form available. The rated officer should nonetheless prepare a support form for feedback. 

This document serves as a sort of contract between the rated 

officer and the rater and as a blueprint for how the leader 

will measure the performance of the subordinate. Raters 

and senior raters must develop attainable metrics to gauge 

that performance. The metrics should include not just easily quantifiable things, such as the number of Soldiers who 

have undergone urinalysis, but also harder ones, such as the 

development of a training plan that materially contributes 

to the improvement of the unit’s rating on the unit status 

report. Finally, it is crucial that leaders provide their officers—especially the most junior officers—with quality feedback. The impact of corrective or reinforcing counseling is 

the biggest combat multiplier that I have experienced, and 

time is the only cost for this ordinary task.

Command Supply Discipline Program

This is critical to our success as leaders, especially 

as equipment and supplies stop flowing as freely as 

they have for the past 10 years. Leaders will have to 

regularly account for what they have, to show due diligence, 

and to avoid that signature wound inflicted on commanders 

by the current wars—the financial liability investigation of 

property loss. Leaders will need to know what constitutes an 

end item; what the components of that end item are; what 

basic issue items come with it; and what sets, kits, and outfits are involved. Whether a commander decides to perform 

10 percent inventories monthly or 25 percent inventories 

quarterly, the creative leader should see this as a training 

opportunity for subordinates and thereby renew the lost 

skills of garrison leadership. 

Command Maintenance Discipline

Program

Especially important in mechanized or wheeled vehicle units, this program should be bread and butter 

for leaders. Regular Monday morning motor stables

were a staple of existence in U.S. Army Europe. But there 

were other staples too, including mileage restrictions that 

prohibited the use of tracked vehicles for more than 800 

miles—in an entire year. Leaders should be in the motor 

pool with their Soldiers. If they have vehicles assigned to 

them, they should also participate in the normal preventive 

maintenance checks and services process for the vehicle. 

The fact that many of the vehicles we have operated in the 

past 10 years have been maintained by contract workers has 

created a divide between Soldiers and their equipment.

But maintenance is not only about automotive equipment. 

When is the last time your Soldiers pulled good preventive 

maintenance on their weapons; communication equipment 

(to include radio checks with a company or battalion tactical 

operations center); or their chemical, biological, radiological, 

and nuclear protective gear? Leaders need to know how to 

do these tasks, demonstrate their leadership through their 

physical presence in the mud with their Soldiers when they 

pull a drive sprocket on a Bradley fighting vehicle in the 

mud, and use these ordinary things as training vehicles to 

teach the next generation of Soldiers.

It is not my intention to turn back the clock to an Army 

that will never be again. It is, however, imperative to recognize that the muscle memory from some of those skills, 

learned so long ago, have atrophied. Before many of the senior leaders who started during the Operation Desert Shield/

Desert Storm era retire, it is imperative to renew those garrison leadership skills for leaders who weren’t even born in 

a time when there were two Germanys. Our Soldiers, our 

Army, and our Nation deserve nothing less. 

Endnotes:

1

DA Form 4856, Developmental Counseling Form, August 

2010.

2

DA Pamphlet 600-25, U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide, 28 July 2008.

3

DA Form 67-9-1, Officer Evaluation Report Support 

Form, October 2011.

Colonel Roth serves as the Deputy Assistant Commandant 

(Army Reserve) at the U.S. Army Engineer School. Before his 

graduation from the U.S. Army War College, he commanded 

the 844th Engineer Battalion and deployed to Iraq as part of 

Task Force Sky. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command 

and General Staff College and holds a master’s degree in mechanical engineering from Boston University. 
Bridging the Engineer Gap 

From Tactical to Strategic

8 Engineer January–April 2012

Many times, engineers are thrown into an exercise 

regardless of their training. The result is the placement of tactical engineers at an operational level 

for which they don’t have the appropriate skill set. Engineers 

who can bridge this gap are the “Heroes of the Exercise,” providing engineer planning and reachback to consistently stay 

ahead of the commander’s decision cycle.

In 2009, the first joint force engineer command (JFEC) 

was activated in Afghanistan, centralizing engineer efforts 

and assets across the theater to facilitate and coordinate 

engineer operations. In 2011, U.S. forces saw another first 

for the JFEC concept; the integration of this team of engineers from all services in support of U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). With help from the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers (USACE) and the U.S. Army Reserve 416th

Theater Engineer Command, USEUCOM tested the JFEC 

ability to coordinate engineer assets outside the war zone 

during a training exercise. A deployable command post (DCP)

(Figure 1) was established that required modifying the joint 

manning document to incorporate field force engineering 

and service component engineers to become a JFEC.

The exercise simulated major combat operations from 

the reception, staging, onward movement, and integration 

of troops and equipment through the “Phase III–Dominate” 

operations of the joint campaign. To support operations, the 

JFEC—

■ Facilitated informative update sessions and mission

planning synchronization meetings to increase the engineer unity of effort.

By Mr. J. Erik Fleischner, Lieutenant Colonel Frank E. Hopkins III, 

and Lieutenant Colonel Damon G. Montgomery

Figure 1. Deployable command post

Legend:

CMO - civil-military operations

CMS - construction management section

EFD - engineer facility detachment

FEST-M - forward engineer support team–main

GEOS - geospatial detachment 

HQ - headquarters

IO - information operations

NCOIC - noncommissioned officer in charge

OIC - officer in charge

XO - executive officer

Bridging the Engineer Gap 

From Tactical to Strategic

*Modules depict plug-ins not organic 

to the deployable command post.
January–April 2012 Engineer 9

■ Coordinated effects—tactical through strategic—of U.S.

and coalition engineers.

■ Established a request-for-information process for the

transparency of information requirements. 

USACE and the 416th Theater Engineer Command were 

also heavily involved in developing a master scenario events 

list, generating events that would provide the desired engineer support to joint functions (Figure 2).

Effective Demonstration

The exercise was an astounding success. The JFEC 

demonstrated the effectiveness that its structure 

and flexibility provided, based on the joint engineer 

capabilities inherent in the organization. The JFEC was a 

superior fit for joint task force (JTF) engineer operations. 

The team’s efficiency was repeatedly demonstrated by its 

adaptive response to the scenario and its technical analysis of more than 20 situational events. Response times and 

communication up and down the engineer chain were exceptional. All engineer events injected were successfully analyzed, resolved, and communicated between the JFEC, the 

JTF, USEUCOM, and all subordinate commands via daily 

engineering synchronization meetings.

The USACE field force engineering cadre embedded in 

the exercise acted as a forward engineer support team and 

simulated field force engineering support from forward engineer, contingency real estate, and environmental support 

teams. Whenever forward engineer support team members 

were not working on requests for information or products, 

they were anticipating future missions such as conducting 

river crossings, restoring key infrastructure, developing 

infrastructure products, and researching responses. The 

exercise also tested the forward engineer support team’s 

ability to establish and use teleengineering communications 

equipment to communicate with the USACE Reachback 

Operations Center in Vicksburg, Mississippi; conduct reconnaissance; develop a base camp; and test contracting and 

acquisition support.

During the exercise, the JFEC supported both the JTF 

engineer and the combatant command engineer. To do this, 

the staff was divided as illustrated in Figure 3, page 10. 

This allowed the JFEC to provide additional operational 

and tactical engineering capabilities not normally available during an exercise. It gave USEUCOM a powerful liaison connection to the engineers on the ground. Service 

engineers were integrated from the strategic level down to 

the tactical level, with the JFEC facilitating engineer coordination. The JFEC configuration into “effects,” “construction effects,” and “operations” functional teams created a 

significant force multiplier for future engineer operations 

and planning. The effects team focused on assured mobility 

in order to provide combat engineering support to enhance 

protection. The construction effects team focused on base 

and host nation infrastructure to support the JTF commander’s campaign plan. The operations team managed the 

functions of the JFEC. 

In future exercises or operations, the JFEC configuration and duties for the task-organized effects and

operations teams would include the usual functions of 

Figure 2. Engineer support to joint functions
10 Engineer January–April 2012

current operations, future operations, and plans, with the 

addition of reachback assistance for the following:

■ Contract construction.

■ Heavy construction.

■ Theater construction management system.

■ Battle tracking.

■ Targeting.

■ Infrastructure assessments/sewer, water, electricity, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other considerations.

■ Basing and base camp development.

■ Bed-down.

■ Route clearance.

■ Lines of communication such as roads, railways, ports, 

and airfields.

■ Environmental baselines.

■ Real estate.

■ Report generation.

■ Task organization.

■ Power generation.

■ Geospatial.

The JFEC maintained an operational and tactical focus 

on engineer activities in each of the countries inside the 

joint operations area. This allowed USEUCOM engineers 

to maintain strategic focus and synchronize all engineering 

activities throughout the theater. 

Proficient Coordinating Mechanism

The JFEC was a force multiplier, providing a proficient 

coordinating mechanism for exercises and real-world 

operational requirements, bridging the gap between 

the tactical and strategic levels. It provided exceptional engineer planning and reachback that allowed engineers to 

stay ahead of the commander’s decision cycle. While the 

JFEC can do it all, it is not necessarily a catchall solution for 

every JTF. If the JTF headquarters is based around a corps 

or division headquarters, there would probably be sufficient 

engineer staff that a JFEC would not be needed. However, 

if the JTF engineer needs mission command, is based on an 

Army service component command, or is operating a standalone JTF that was built from scratch, the JFEC concept can 

correct an engineer staff shortage.

Depending on the mission and the assigned forces, the 

theater engineer command DCP (with joint augmentation) 

can transition into one of two functional roles. When there 

are theater level engineer forces such as forward engineer 

support teams or prime power, topographic, or theater construction units, the theater engineer command DCP provides mission command for these units and forms the basis 

of the joint force commander’s engineer staff. When mission 

command is not needed, the theater engineer command DCP 

can still be an extension of the geographic combatant command engineer staff or form the base of the engineer staff 

and would be designated as the joint forces engineer directorate (JFED) (Figure 4).

Focus on Joint Operations

Sometimes staff maneuver elements have interpreted 

the command part of “joint force engineer command” 

to mean that the JFEC is a maneuver element; 

thus the recommendation for designation as a directorate 

when applicable. This would allow the geographic combatant command to use the JFED as a combatant command 

engineer asset, pushed forward to focus on the joint operational area while the actual combatant command engineer 

focuses on the entire theater. Far too often, the combatant 

command engineer staff assumes risks while covering down 

on both missions (in the real world and during exercises). 

The JFED would transition 

from a hypothetical concept 

to a real capability by using 

Soldiers from the theater engineer command DCP, which 

is standard practice today. 

They would become the JFED 

once the service component 

engineer linkage was established. In addition to service 

component engineer augmentation to maximize service

competency, the JFED would 

receive designated liaison 

officers from the three contract construction agencies—

USACE, the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, and the Naval FacilFigure 3. Exercise concept ities Engineering Command—

Legend:

JFACC - joint force air component command

JFLCC - joint force land component command

JFMCC - joint force Marine component command

NCO - noncommissioned officer
January–April 2012 Engineer 11

as well as coalition and host nation liaison plug-ins to

facilitate the best use of partner and host nation engineering

and contracting capabilities. The theater engineer command

DCP would still support the Army service component command theater-wide administrative control responsibilities; 

but in this particular case, the theater engineer command 

DCP would assume a joint engineer mission by incorporating service component engineers. 

Under the legacy engineer command structure, the 412th 

and 416th Engineer Commands had habitual relationships 

with the geographic combatant commands and their Army 

service component commands—the 412th Engineer Command with USEUCOM and U.S. Pacific Command and the 

416th Engineer Command with U.S. Central Command and 

U.S. Southern Command. In 2009, the 412th and 416th 

Engineer Commands received permanent orders to reorganize and were redesignated the 412th and 416th Theater 

Engineer Commands. After this transformation, the habitual relationships ended, allowing DCPs from both theater 

engineer commands to support any Army service support 

command or geographic combatant command contingency 

operation. By continuing the established model of having 

a theater engineer command DCP on the joint manning

document as the base for a JFEC or 

JFED, the theater engineer command 

DCPs can deploy small teams to the joint 

task force and the combined forces land 

component command engineer staffs. By 

serving as the theater engineer staff and 

specializing in joint engineer functions, 

the JFED can become a learning organization, maintaining cohesion during geographic combatant command personnel 

turnover.

This JFEC/JFED concept was put 

into practice for USEUCOM. Because 

of coordination between the staffs of 

the 416th Theater Engineer Command 

and the USEUCOM Directorate of Logistics and Security Assistance, the exercise made the JFEC concept a reality 

for geographic combatant command use. 

There is now a methodology to transform the concept into reality. The next 

steps will be to standardize the JFEC 

and JFED naming convention for supported maneuver units and to secure a 

commitment from geographic combatant 

commands to fill engineer joint manning 

document requirements with theater

engineer command DCP JFEC/JFED 

functional capabilities. 

Mr. Fleischner is the USACE liaison 

officer to USEUCOM. His military education includes the U.S. Army Command 

and General Staff College, the Joint 

Engineer Operations Course, Engineer Officer Basic and 

Advanced Courses, and U.S. Army Airborne and Ranger 

Schools. He holds a master’s degree in environmental engineering from the University of Florida, Gainesville.

Lieutenant Colonel Hopkins is the 416th Theater Engineer 

Command deputy chief of staff for plans. He is a graduate 

of Intermediate Level Education Core and Advanced Operations Courses at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

College, the Joint Engineer Operations Course, the Engineer 

Captains Career Course, and Engineer Officer Basic Course. 

He holds a master’s degree in military arts and science from 

the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. 

Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery is the contingency and 

exercise planner for USACE–Europe District. He is a graduate of Advanced Joint Professional Military Education; Intermediate Level Education Core and Advanced Operations 

Courses at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; the Joint Engineer Operations Course; the Engineer 

Officer Advanced Course; the Field Artillery Officer Basic 

Course; the Lance Missile Officer Course; and the Cannon 

Battery Officer Course. He holds a master’s degree in quality assurance engineering from Southern Polytechnic State 

University, Marietta, Georgia.

Figure 4. Theater engineer command deployable command post change to 

JFED

Legend:

DCP - deployable command post

JFED - joint forces engineer directorate

NAVFAC - Naval Facilities Engineering Command

Prime BEEF - Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force

RED HORSE - Rapid Engineers Deployable 

Heavy Operations Repair Squadron Engineers

Seabee - construction battalion (U.S. Navy)

USACE - U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
12 Engineer January–April 2012

Ten years ago, no one believed that the Afghan National Army (ANA) would possess the capability to 

conduct route clearance patrols, build roads, or construct buildings. Today, Soldiers of Task Force Sword have 

the opportunity to work with Afghan engineers who are 

determined to establish security for the Afghan people and 

prepared to meet the challenge of rebuilding their country. 

As the time remaining for U.S. and coalition forces in 

Afghanistan dwindles, more resources are being devoted to 

partnership with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). 

With the drawdown of forces already being felt throughout 

the Combined/Joint Operations Area–Afghanistan and with 

more cutbacks planned, one thing is clear: the International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) will have to do more with 

less. With the future of Afghanistan hanging in the balance, 

a dire need exists for tactically and technically competent 

Afghan engineers to build infrastructure, ensure freedom 

of movement along vital roads for transportation and commerce, and secure the developing government. According 

to the ISAF Partnering Directive, the Afghan government 

must protect the Afghan population and defeat the insurgency that challenges its sovereignty. The ISAF mission is to 

use embedded partnering—a trust-based, habitual, and enduring relationship with the ANSF—as the method to help 

the government accomplish these goals.

Serving as a theater level asset, Task Force Sword is 

charged with synchronizing all combat and construction engineering effects through the Northern Engineer Region of 

Afghanistan. This region includes Regional Command (RC)–

East, –North, and –Capital and spans more than 100,000 

By Captain Joseph J. Caperna, Captain Thomas M. Ryder, and First Lieutenant Jamal Nasir
January–April 2012 Engineer 13

square miles. Task Force Sword is the only U.S. Army engineer brigade in theater and is composed of the following 

units:

■ 18th Engineer Brigade, Schwetzingen, Germany.

■ 54th Engineer Battalion (Task Force Dolch), Bamberg,

Germany.

■ 111th Engineer Battalion (Task Force Roughneck), Texas

Army National Guard.

■ 1249th Engineer Battalion (Task Force Gridley), Oregon

Army National Guard. 

The Southern Engineer Region contains RC–West,

–Southwest, and –South. It is currently controlled by the 

30th Naval Construction Regiment.

Significance of Partnership

“Partnership is an essential aspect of our counterinsurgency strategy. It is also an indispensable element of the 

transition of responsibility to Afghans.” 

—General David Petraeus (Retired)

Former ISAF commander

Before deploying, Task Force Sword leaders recognized the importance of partnering with ANA engineers and placed partnership as a main line of effort 

alongside construction and combat effects. The desired outcome for the engineer partnership line of effort, when U.S. 

forces depart Afghanistan in 2014, is for ANA engineer units 

to be able to provide combat and construction effects independent of ISAF assistance. The end state for partnership 

is for the ANSF to shoulder additional security tasks and 

conduct and sustain coordinated operations with its own 

operational support and sustainment capabilities and with 

less assistance from the coalition. 

Once deployed, Task Force Sword quickly established its 

partnership cell as part of the operations section. Consisting 

of a captain and a staff sergeant on the brigade staff, the 

aims of the partnership cell are to—

■ Increase ANSF capability and capacity.

■ Help the ANSF and its leaders reach a level where they

can shoulder additional security tasks and conduct coordinated operations with less ISAF assistance.

■ Promote ANSF professionalism.

The partnership cell regularly hosts a working group to 

synchronize Task Force Sword partnership efforts with the 

ANA engineers in RC–East, –North, and –Capital to help 

the ANA engineers conduct full spectrum engineer operations independent of ISAF assistance. The working group 

consists of the brigade operations officer, partnership officers from the brigade and each battalion, the brigade public affairs officer, and a representative from the intelligence 

staff. The working group uses input from the intelligence 

section, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

Training Mission–Afghanistan fielding plan of future ANA 

Commander’s Update and Assessment Tool

Independent

Personnel and equipment are more than 75 percent present, 

and the unit can meet basic logistics needs without help from 

coalition forces. The unit is able to—

■ Plan and execute missions.

■ Maintain mission command of subordinate elements.

■ Summon and control the quick-reaction force and medical 

evacuation assets.

■ Call for and integrate joint effects from coalition forces.

■ Exploit intelligence.

Effective With Advisors

Personnel and equipment are no more than 75 percent present. The unit members, leaders, and staff adhere to the ANSF 

code of conduct and are loyal to the Afghan government. The 

unit is able to—

■ Plan, synchronize, direct, and report on operations and 

status.

■ Coordinate and communicate with higher, lower, adjacent, and

combined/joint units.

Effective With Assistance

Personnel and equipment are no more than 65 percent present. The leaders, staff, and most of the unit members usually adhere to the ANSF code of conduct and are loyal to the Afghan 

government. The unit requires routine mentoring to—

■ Plan, synchronize, direct, and report on operations and

status.

■ Coordinate and communicate with higher, lower, adjacent, and

combined/joint units.

■ Maintain effective readiness reports.

Developing

Personnel and equipment are less than 65 percent present. 

Unit leaders and most of the staff usually adhere to the ANSF 

code of conduct and are loyal to the Afghan government. The unit 

requires partner unit presence to—

■ Plan, synchronize, direct, and report on operations and 

status.

■ Coordinate and communicate with higher, lower, adjacent, and 

combined/joint units.

Establishing

Personnel and equipment are less than 50 percent present. 

Unit leaders and staff may not adhere to the ANSF code of conduct or may not be loyal to the Afghan government. The unit is at 

the beginning of organization and is barely able to—

■ Plan, synchronize, direct, and report on operations and status,

even with the presence and assistance of a partner unit.

■ Coordinate and communicate with higher, lower, adjacent,

and combined/joint units.

Not Assessed

Insufficient data is available for complete assessment.
14 Engineer January–April 2012

engineer units, any requests from ANSF or the Afghan government, and current partnerships. The working group also 

examines units that have no partnership in order to close the 

gap. Often, the reason units lack a partnership is because 

ANA engineer units are still in the process of being created. One critical element of ensuring a solid partnership is 

sending U.S. Soldiers to the ANA engineer school in MazarE-Sharif while their future Afghan partnership unit is 

still being formed. This way, relationships and bonds can 

be formed even before an ANA unit graduates and joins

the fight.

 The partnership working group reviews key leader engagements with ANA units, analyzes the map overlay of U.S. 

units that have partnerships, and revises the commander’s 

update and assessment tool as needed. The tool measures 

ANA units based on leadership, training, overall material, 

and shoot-move-communicate skills and then places them 

into one of the categories in the table. The working group 

also analyzes the security objectives for each RC while determining if partnership efforts are having the desired impact on the security objective areas. 

Updated partnership priorities and planned key leader 

engagements with ANA units and installations are produced 

as outputs from the partnership working groups. After each 

group meeting, slides and outputs are disseminated to the 

strategic communications and targeting working groups so 

that the knowledge can be shared throughout the brigade 

staff and incorporated into different working groups. 

ANA engineer units include—

■ Kandaks, or battalions, which are corps level assets 

containing horizontal, vertical, and combat engineers.

■ Coys, or engineer companies, that have sapper and construction assets to provide combat and force protection 

abilities.

■ Route clearance companies (RCCs), which have less manpower than a coy, but include organic route clearance and

explosive ordnance disposal platoons.

■ Garrison support units, which are part of brigade headquarters. Similar to the department of public works on a

U.S. forward operating base, they provide engineer support to facilities and process recurring work requests. 

A U.S. heavy equipment operator (right) uses his translator to mentor an ANA engineer (left) during a partnership 

construction project.
January–April 2012 Engineer 15

Partnership Success

“Our military is working hand in hand with our civilian 

partners to secure the gains we have made by strengthening 

the Afghan government and by advancing economic opportunity. We’re committed to working with and strengthening our 

Afghan partners because we know that only they can ensure 

the security of their country.” 

—General John R. Allen

ISAF commander

Task Force Sword is involved in mentoring several ANA 

engineer units, including route clearance, facility, and combat engineer units. These partnerships range from basic 

classes in driver training to combined action route clearance 

operations. Regardless of the intended mission, the key to 

making these partnerships yield successful results is using 

realistic expectations and developing goals that will enable 

the ANA to conduct independent operations. 

Great achievements have already been made through 

partnership. ANA combat engineers are securing main 

roads needed for commerce in Afghanistan. ANA construction engineers are busy repairing highways, building infrastructure, and making improvements to the quality of life. 

An example of a successful partnership is that of the 2d 

Brigade, 203d Corps ANA Route Clearance Company with 

the U.S. Army 370th Engineer Company in the vicinity of 

Forward Operating Base Sharana. According to the 370th 

Engineer Company commander, the partnership is going 

well, with the ANA unit fully capable of conducting route 

clearance operations. The Afghan engineers have discovered 

improvised explosive devices while conducting joint missions with U.S. units, validating their route clearance skills. 

The colocation of the partnered units, strong ANA leadership, and trust between Afghan and American Soldiers 

are key ingredients for the success of the partnership. The 

Afghan route clearance Soldiers volunteered to accompany 

critical supplies to the 370th Engineer Company, which had 

suffered multiple improvised explosive device strikes during 

an operation and was stuck at another base awaiting repair 

parts. One U.S. partnership officer described the “brotherhood and relationship” that had been forged by shared combat experience.

Partnership Challenges

Unfortunately, not all partnerships are flourishing. 

Leadership—or the lack thereof—plays a pivotal role 

in overall success. However, logistics, equipment, 

and fielding are bigger challenges than training, leadership, 

or competency in the ANA. Currently, some U.S. Army engineer units are not partnered with the ANA because the 

Afghan units have yet to be stood up, properly trained, and 

fielded. Additionally, not all of the newly formed ANA engineer units are colocated with their American counterparts. 

This significantly detracts from the partnership experience 

and hinders the growth of relationships. Likewise, the ANA 

logistics and supply systems have yet to catch up with the 

A Task Force Roughneck engineer supervises Afghan engineer training in Balkh Province.
16 Engineer January–April 2012

influx of new units being created. The slow progress makes 

it tempting to give the ANA a handout, but U.S. and Afghan 

leaders are seeking long-term solutions.

 “Our hope is that the U.S. forces develop and build the 

ANA and Afghan National Police so that we can defend our 

own country. I don’t want the U.S. and coalition forces to 

solve our problems for us. I want the U.S. to solve the bureaucracy and logistics issues so [we] can help ourselves,” 

said an ANA officer. He added that the lack of education 

makes Afghans susceptible to influence from insurgents 

and that the first step in ANA training should be education 

and literacy.

The Way Ahead

Three lines of effort—engineer partnership, construction effects, and combat effects—continue to develop ANA engineers toward independent operations. 

Task Force Sword spent the first 60 days of its deployment 

focusing on key leader engagements with all currently

fielded ANA engineer units, training facilities, and units 

in training. By building relationships from platoon to brigade level, Task Force Sword developed or grew established

partnerships. 

After 90 days in theater, Task Force Sword assessed all 

training facility programs of instruction and the engineer 

units undergoing training. This step validated the timeline 

for partnered operations to ensure that task force goals and 

milestones were feasible. The next step was to conduct commander updates and assessments of all partnered ANA engineer units to determine each unit’s leadership, readiness 

posture, and ability to conduct missions. The next ongoing step will 

be to ensure that all ANA engineer 

units are fielded and partnered 

with a NATO unit. If possible, the 

NATO units will embed with their 

partnered ANA unit. Partnered 

NATO and ANA units are colocated 

when feasible. 

After training and mentorship 

with partnered units, Task Force 

Sword began to conduct combined 

action with the ANA engineers. 

Certain ANA units require more 

time and training before they are 

ready for combined action. Additionally, as new ANA units are 

formed, engagements and training 

must occur before conducting combined action. Currently, Task Force 

Sword is in the process of improving the operational readiness of all 

partnered ANA units so that they 

are capable of combined action. 

Ultimately, the goal is to build the 

ANA through combined action until 

they can conduct independent operations. Before conducting independent operations, ANA engineers will be assessed 

and validated by their U.S. or NATO partners. 

It is impossible to plan a partnership with the ANA in a 

sterilized environment. Afghans depend on personal contact, 

which develops relationships and yields great rewards. Liaison or partnership officers who take the time to know their 

Afghan counterparts set themselves up for success. U.S. Soldiers must look for commonalities with the Afghan people 

and respect the differences between the two cultures. To 

build rapport, U.S. Soldiers must trust their Afghan counterparts. The future of engineering partnership is for the U.S. 

Army and the ANA to work shohna ba shohna, or “shoulder 

to shoulder,” in pursuit of common mission success. 

Captain Caperna is the 18th Engineer Brigade ANSF development officer. He holds a bachelor’s degree in psychology 

from Hofstra University in New York and is a graduate of the 

Engineer Officer Basic Course.

Captain Ryder is the 18th Engineer Brigade public affairs 

officer. He holds a bachelor’s degree in engineering management from the U.S. Military Academy and a master’s degree 

in engineering management from Missouri University of Science and Technology. A graduate of the Engineer Captains 

Career Course, he is an intern engineer in New York.

First Lieutenant Nasir is the commander of the explosive 

ordnance disposal unit attached to the 2d Brigade, 203d 

ANA Route Clearance Company. He has attended the Afghan 

Military School and the Military University in Kabul.

Soldiers from Task Force Gridley and an ANA route clearance company work 

together to clear a route in Paktika Province.
January–April 2012 Engineer 17

For any route clearance company or maneuver unit 

that will partner with a foreign army unit, we offer 

our strategy and lessons learned, build a relationship 

of trust, create consistency, and demand progress toward 

self-sufficiency. This article describes how A Company, 4th 

Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 

101st Airborne Division, built on these pillars to form what 

was called “the most successful partnership in Afghanistan.”

Background

The roads in Paktika Province are 

mostly unpaved, unimproved, 

and laden with improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These devices 

serve as a powerful deterrent to travel 

by military vehicles. This explains the 

need for route clearance packages, specially equipped combat engineer platoons trained to find and neutralize 

these explosive obstacles.

After 5 months of route clearance 

operations in Paktika, our company 

mission changed to one of partnership. 

The primary task was to train the route 

clearance company (RCC) of the 2d Brigade, 203d Corps of the Afghan National Army (ANA). With little more information than an address in Kabul where 

By Captain Mark D. Gillman

U.S. junior leaders conduct gunnery 

with their ANA counterparts. Partnership at the lowest levels contributed 

to the success of the team.
18 Engineer January–April 2012

the ANA unit basic course was underway and the simple 

guidance to “train the ANA,” we began our preparations. 

We first conducted a leader’s reconnaissance that included the commander, first sergeant, squad leaders from 

our two route clearance packages, and an interpreter. We 

visited the soldiers of the RCC two weeks before their graduation, observed their training, met with their commander, 

inspected their equipment, and quizzed the contracted 

trainers on their curriculum. We learned that there is already a decent draft field manual (also available in the Dari 

language) that describes the training methodology, task 

organization, equipment, and primary duties of an RCC. It 

provides the trainers, partners, and ANA leaders a common 

understanding of what to expect. The trainers are excellent, 

have relevant experience with IEDs in Afghanistan, and 

operate a finely articulated, 14-week training schedule. We 

also learned that their equipment included M1151 advanced 

armament carriers, Panama City mine roller systems, and 

dismounted metal detectors. Finally, we learned that there 

were still many issues to address before the new unit would 

be mission-ready. We gathered enough information to determine that we would build a relationship of trust and consistency and promote self-sufficiency from the very start.

Building Trust

Trust underpins partnership. By providing their life 

support, getting to know them as people, and being 

honest and direct about issues, we gained the trust of 

the ANA soldiers and, thus, their loyalty on the battlefield. 

Soldiers moving to a new place worry about where they will 

sleep, what they will eat, and what amenities will be available. When the RCC soldiers moved into their containerized 

quarters at Forward Operating Base Sharana, their fears 

abated. Our entire company greeted them at the gates of 

their new home on the day they arrived. Being colocated 

with their U.S. partners, they had a lifeline when problems 

arose, whether plumbing, electrical, or medical. That first 

day, we declared that we would help them get settled, train 

them as best we could, and fight alongside them as brothers. 

Our assistance made them willing and able to go on missions 

with us from the very first week.

We also took the time to get to know them as people. It 

is not only Afghan soldiers who are skeptical about working with foreign armies; U.S. Soldiers also have questions 

about missions and how much to trust the foreign soldiers. 

It was important to dissolve some of these barriers, so we 

held a barbecue the first week and invited every interpreter we could find. The members of both armies met, talked, 

threw a football around, and let their guard down a bit. We 

also enrolled every RCC soldier into our biometric system. 

This helped them get badges for easy access to our base and 

helped us develop a picture book. The book, organized by 

platoons and vehicle crews, helped Soldiers remember who 

everyone was and endeared us to our Afghan partners when 

we called them by name. We also learned their calendar system and coordinated all missions based on the Afghan solar 

One of the explosive ordnance disposal teams embedded in each ANA route clearance platoon takes part in 

an IED removal exercise.
January–April 2012 Engineer 19

calendar rather than forcing them to adjust to our system. 

(It is currently the year 1390 on that calendar.) Finally, we 

were sensitive to their faith, accommodating their prayer 

times even when on patrol. Their commander later told us 

that the most disparaging lies spread by the insurgents 

about Americans was that we did not allow ANA soldiers 

to practice their religion. When this proved untrue, we won 

over many whose loyalty had been divided.

Knowing their names, respecting their customs, and 

showing support opened the door for honest communication. 

U.S. Soldiers worried about getting shot in the back because 

of numerous similar incidents around the country. The ANA 

soldiers worried that the Americans would abandon them 

in a firefight because of earlier experiences with other U.S. 

partners. They also questioned why we would withhold our 

seemingly limitless assets from them when we knew that 

they had no support—including vehicle maintenance, fuel, 

and other necessities—from their higher headquarters. We 

discussed these and other issues openly and directly to try 

to understand each other. While we could not always resolve 

issues immediately, we reduced the friction by talking about 

them rather than ignoring them. Because we had trust, we 

could look past these issues and continue doing missions together as a team. 

Striving for Consistency

Our second focus was to strive for consistency in task 

organization, attitude, and battle rhythm. We hoped 

to avoid the plight of RCCs deployed elsewhere in 

the country, many of which had been turned to other purposes. Some were dismantled and turned into personal security 

detachments for Afghan generals, some were designated as 

gate guards or warm bodies to fill details at headquarters, 

and others had devolved into single platoons rather than 

companies because so many assigned soldiers were absent 

without leave, tasked out, or on leave. We started with three 

RCC platoons and were determined to keep them all functioning as such. The key was to keep their platoon organization intact, maintaining ANA leadership of ANA soldiers. By 

building habitual relationships between platoons and combining U.S. and ANA platoons into teams, members got to 

know their counterparts. It also clarified who would be going 

on which missions. 

We learned from the civilian trainers in Kabul how important consistency is in Afghan culture. We took our cue 

from the trainers, who kept the same cadre teams with the 

same classes for the duration of the course and made daily 

schedules predictable. When the RCC deployed from Kabul 

to Forward Operating Base Sharana, several of the same 

U.S. Soldiers who had performed the earlier leaders’ reconnaissance escorted the ANA soldiers to their new quarters. 

“Leo,” one of the trainers from Kabul, lived with our unit 

for a few weeks to further ease the transition. His relationship with the ANA gave him the credibility to explain to 

them some things about the U.S. Army. Leo was also able 

to describe some of the key personalities and dynamics of 

the RCC to us and mentor us on cultural dos and don’ts. His 

presence during the formative weeks of our partnership set 

us up for success. 

Establishing a Battle Rhythm

Establishing a good battle rhythm also helped. One 

example was the after action review conducted immediately following every mission. It became an 

opportunity for each side to reflect, ask questions and, 

sometimes, vent after stressful patrols. To improve their 

Combined clearance formations included an interpreter with a headset to relay information. 
20 Engineer January–April 2012

readiness posture, we made it mandatory for the ANA to 

refuel before they parked their vehicles after operations. 

We mandated daily contact with each platoon and brought 

all platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and U.S. and ANA 

company leaders together for weekly dinners. These events 

kept all route clearance teams in Paktika—American and

Afghan—“giving way together.”

Fostering Self-Sufficiency

We were determined to build independence by emphasizing maintenance and trying to use ANA logistics channels first, demanding effort from the 

ANA before we provided anything. Self-sufficiency is purportedly the desired end state of all partnerships theaterwide. Unfortunately, it is frequently ignored in the name of 

expedience. Like the line between help and welfare, there is 

only so much assistance you can provide before dependency 

is created. On the other hand, missions cannot be run with 

empty bellies, empty fuel tanks, and broken vehicles. Support must come from somewhere, and the ANA system was 

not always adequate. Thus, a balance had to be struck.

First, we sought to understand the ANA logistics network. The RCC was task-organized as a “separate company,” reporting directly to their brigade commander. While 

this relationship was effective for command, it was poor for 

support. Having no battalion level assistance put the RCC 

at a severe disadvantage compared to other maneuver units, 

which have staffs and field grade commanders responsible 

for their well-being. We continued to provide material support for items such as fuel until the ANA logistics system 

began to function more effectively. 

For parts and equipment shortages, we insisted that 

the RCC submit paperwork to the Ministry of Defense for 

everything they required. This 

paperwork represented the Afghans doing all they could do to 

help themselves. We also spent a 

lot of time training the Afghans 

on the care of equipment, including vehicle preventive maintenance, weapons maintenance, 

special equipment maintenance, 

and driver training. Providing 

small items such as weapon oil 

made their maintenance more 

productive. A windfall of vehicle parts allowed us to give 

them what they needed while waiting for their Ministry of

Defense requests to be filled. 

Results

When a combined patrol came under attack by an 

IED and small arms fire, our lead gun truck was 

destroyed. Soldiers from the RCC quickly dismounted, returned fire, and maneuvered on the hasty ambush position the enemy occupied. They were quick enough 

to capture two motorcycles and several weapons and magazines. After one of our vehicles took an IED strike during 

another patrol, the RCC Soldiers dismounted with mine detectors to search for secondary IEDs even before their help 

was requested. By the end of our 6 months together, we had 

progressed to the point that any of the RCC platoons could 

effectively partner with any of our platoons on any given 

mission. We conducted more than 100 combined patrols, 

improved our IED find-to-strike ratio from 33 percent without the ANA to 73 percent with them, and observed as they 

conducted more than 20 operations without U.S. assistance. 

The achievements of this U.S.-Afghan route clearance team 

were widely recognized by leaders of both nations, most notably by Lieutenant General Sher Mohammad Karimi, Chief 

of Army Staff in the Military of Afghanistan. During a visit 

to the brigade headquarters, he commended the RCC commander and dubbed us “the most successful partnership

in Afghanistan.”

Captain Gillman is the commander of Alpha Company, 

4th Brigade Special Troops Battalion, 4th Brigade Combat

Team (Currahee), 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).

He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 2004

and holds a master’s degree from Missouri University of 

Science and Technology at Rolla.

Afghan route clearance 

equipment
January–April 2012 Engineer 21

The Road to a New Dawn

Throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation 

New Dawn, U.S. and coalition forces worked to develop an Iraqi Army engineer force capable of supporting and defending the sovereignty of Iraq. These efforts 

built on years of work by officers and noncommissioned officers from all services and coalition partners. Australia, in 

particular, contributed significantly to the training effort 

throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom. For several years, 

the Australians provided an engineer officer to serve as the 

officer in charge of Team Muhandis (Engineer), the Multinational Corps–Iraq engineer section advising Iraqi Army 

engineers. These field grade officers served 6-month tours, 

advising Iraqi Army engineer senior leaders and synchronizing efforts and information with subordinate engineer 

brigades and military transition teams.

In early 2011, the XVIIIth Airborne Corps assumed responsibility as part of U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF-I) to complete 

Operation New Dawn. The USF-I joint engineer staff (J-7) 

worked to enable a trained and equipped Iraqi Army engineer force to support the internal and external defense of the 

country. Team Muhandis led the J-7 efforts in this strategic 

mission by—

■ Conducting key leader engagements with the Joint Headquarters Military Engineering (M10) Directorate and

Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) engineers.

■ Synchronizing engineer training efforts across multiple

Iraqi organizations.

■ Providing oversight of new equipment fielding to build

engineer capability.

Team Muhandis devised a targeted approach to build 

Iraqi Army engineer capability. The team developed the following three focus areas to enable a minimum-essential capability as the end of the mission approached: 

■ Route clearance.

■ Sustainment.

■ Bridging. 

Route Clearance Capability

Team Muhandis coordinated with division engineers, 

division level cells training Iraqi Security Forces 

(ISF), and the 20th Engineer Brigade to synchronize 

partnership efforts and track the progress of route clearance 

capability. The team also worked with the Iraqi Training 

By Major Jason L. Buursma and Captain Thomas G. Fitzpatrick

Team Muhandis:

Building Great Iraqi Army Engineers
22 Engineer January–April 2012

and Advisory Mission and the M10 directorate to speed up 

the fielding of 45 Iraqi light armored vehicles to fill shortages in Iraqi Army route clearance teams. This combined 

training and resourcing effort led to a significant increase 

in qualified route clearance teams across Iraq. With the 

drawdown of forces, U.S. forces had fewer military transition teams and partnering units available to track ISF engineers, making it difficult to track the activities of each Iraqi 

Army field engineer regiment. 

Team Muhandis coordinated with 

the IGFC engineer staff to refine 

weekly and monthly reports to include 

information useful to U.S. forces. This 

let the IGFC see its engineer capabilities more clearly and provided good 

situational awareness for U.S. forces. 

The added detail also led to an increased emphasis on route clearance. 

In some cases, Iraqi engineer units 

refused to conduct missions with their 

U.S. engineer partners. This was often 

resolved by the IGFC simply issuing 

a directive to the Iraqi unit to conduct partnered operations. Team Muhandis also initiated a weekly online 

meeting with division engineers and 

20th Engineer Brigade staff officers to 

discuss issues common to many Iraqi 

Army engineer units. Team Muhandis 

was then equipped to provide feedback 

to the IGFC and the M10 and to influence Iraqi Army command emphasis 

to resolve problems.

Sustainment Challenges

Sustainment continues to 

be a challenge for Iraqi 

Army engineers as their 

logistical and maintenance system suffers from a variety of 

long-standing problems, from the 

unit to the national level. In early 

2011, the Iraqi Army engineer 

depot level repair facility was 

merely a building without power 

or equipment and had only a few 

Soldiers present to manage operations. Team Muhandis influenced 

key Iraqi Army leaders to put 

greater emphasis on developing 

and strengthening national-level 

engineer sustainment units. A 

competent new Iraqi Army commander was placed in command 

of the repair facility, and the operation moved to a building suitable for depot level repairs. Team 

Muhandis also helped the unit correct critical deficiencies, 

including—

■ Mechanic training.

■ Power generation.

■ Shortage of repair parts.

■ Shortage of equipment such as tool kits and vehicles.

Soldiers from the 1st Cavalry Division train soldiers from the 14th Field Engineers 

Regiment to operate the interrogator arms of their light armored vehicles.

Iraqi light armored vehicle maintenance specialists train Iraqi mechanics.
January–April 2012 Engineer 23

The team coordinated equipping solutions through the 

Iraqi Training and Advisory Mission, but also discovered 

that Iraqi Army engineers could help themselves with many 

of their challenges. The M10 directed that two Iraqi Army 

engineer sustainment units be relocated to Contingency 

Operating Site Taji, where other national engineer assets 

were located. In many cases, one unit had excess items that 

were a shortage in another unit. Team Muhandis and the

20th Engineer Brigade facilitated meetings and coordination between different engineer units to cross-level resources. The units benefited, and U.S. advisors could build capacity faster in under-resourced units. 

Military Bridging Training and Equipping

The 20th Engineer Brigade was tasked to build Iraqi 

Army bridge capability. The brigade dedicated a fulltime team, plus trainers from the 74th Multirole

Bridge Company, to help transform the Iraqi Army

Strategic Bridge Company (originally organic to the Headquarters Field Engineer Regiment) into a Headquarters 

Bridge Regiment. This action required extensive assistance 

and coordination with Iraqi Army engineer leaders to resolve manning, equipping, and facility issues. The most 

difficult task was advising and assisting the transfer of 

personnel and equipment to support the transformation. 

Once the major issues were resolved, Soldiers from the U.S. 

bridge company trained the Iraqi unit on the emplacement 

of the assault float bridge, Mabey-Johnson bridge, and medium girder bridge. They also trained operators on bridge

support equipment. 

The equipping effort required extensive coordination between U.S. and Iraqi Army leaders. The USF-I staff clarified procedures as equipment was transferred to the Iraqi 

“Team Muhandis influenced key Iraqi Army leaders to 

put greater emphasis on developing and strengthening national level engineer sustainment units.”

Soldiers from the 74th Multirole Bridge Company teach Iraqi Army soldiers to employ a bridge across 

the Tigris River.

(Continued on page 27)
24 Engineer January–April 2012

I

n spring 2011, Soldiers from the 544th Engineer Company, 52d Engineer Battalion, traveled to Cambodia to 

participate in Operation Angkor Sentinel 2011, a multinational training exercise sponsored by U.S. Army Pacific 

and the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces. The exercise, led 

by the 204th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, Utah Army 

National Guard, included U.S. Navy Seabees and participants from the Mongolian and Indonesian armed forces. The 

exercise included an engineer civil action project, a medical 

civil action project, and a command post exercise. The ultimate goal of the exercise was to increase the capabilities and 

professionalism of the developing nations’ militaries while 

strengthening the bonds between our countries.

The 40-Soldier element from the 544th Engineer Company spearheaded the engineer civil action project. The 

544th is a vertical engineer company composed of Soldiers 

with a variety of skills, including concrete and masonry specialists, carpenters, plumbers, and electricians. Surveyors, 

heavy equipment operators, and welders from throughout 

the 52d Engineer Battalion also joined the team to enhance 

construction capabilities. Soldiers of every military occupational specialty represented helped ensure the success of 

the project.

The engineer civil action portion of the exercise consisted 

of two projects in Kampong Speu Province, southeast of the 

capital city of Phnom Penh. The 544th Engineer Company 

Soldiers constructed a primary school facility and performed 

major renovations on a rural medical clinic. Both projects 

were enhanced by Seabees, who placed and improved wells 

for the facilities and surrounding villages.

School Construction

Construction of the Pothivong Primary School was 

a significant undertaking. In the span of 8 weeks, 

544th Soldiers turned a 6-hectare swath of jungle 

into a walled compound containing a 9- by 27-meter, threeroom schoolhouse, a three-stall latrine building with a 

septic tank and leach field, a well, and a playground. The 

structures were built in the Cambodian style of reinforced 

concrete, column-and-beam framework and finished with locally made clay bricks, interior and exterior cement stucco 

finish, and interlocking concrete roof tiles. The school now 

serves 120 local children who previously could not attend 

school or had to walk or ride a bicycle more than 3 miles to 

the nearest facility.

The American and Cambodian contingents brought their 

individual strengths to the project. Early on, 544th Soldiers 

contributed their skills and expertise in concrete operations, 

placing more than 80 cubic meters of concrete in the footers 

and monolithic foundation. The Americans demonstrated 

By First Lieutenant Peter M. Friedewald

Children greet 544th Engineer Company Soldiers on their 

way to the jobsite.

Photo by Staff Sergeant Whitney Houston
January–April 2012 Engineer 25

their very high standards for timber formwork to the Royal 

Cambodian Armed Forces engineers and instructed them 

on how to mix concrete to achieve maximum strength. The 

Cambodians proved to be highly adept at fabricating rebar 

cages, laying bricks, and applying 

stucco wall coatings and accents. 

Most of the tools used were locally 

purchased and were much more rudimentary than those the U.S. Soldiers were accustomed to using. The 

Cambodians used tools such as simple levers, water levels, and intricate rebar bending jigs made from 

scrap wood and nails with great 

skill and ingenuity. Throughout the 

project, both contingents learned 

from each other and adapted new 

techniques, lending the effort efficiency and momentum.

The most significant challenge of 

the school project came after a major

design flaw was identified in the 

plans, which called for a reinforced concrete roof ridge beam

to span 8 meters over each classroom while supporting the 

weight of the roof system. Based on their construction experience, 544th leaders determined the design to be unsound and

Soldiers guide a section of five trusses as a crane lifts it onto the schoolhouse roof.

Photo by Specialist Derek Schopps

A Cambodian soldier applies

cement stucco to a classroom 

wall.

Photo by Staff Sergeant Whitney Houston
26 Engineer January–April 2012

unsafe. Dissatisfied with the Cambodian head engineer’s 

alternatives, U.S. project leaders developed a new plan to 

build a truss system. The trusses had to be made of steel, 

since available lumber was of poor quality and Americanstyle timber trusses would lack longevity in the Cambodian 

climate. At this point in the project, the diverse skill sets of 

the U.S. team members became mission-essential. Welders 

from the Forward Support Company, 52d Engineer Battalion, welders from the Cambodian contingent, and a handful 

of vertical engineers worked around the clock for 9 days to 

fabricate, join, and place the 31 trusses, roof purlins, and 

fascia. The truss system was a great success; and as a result, 

the school is a very sound, high-quality structure.

Clinic Renovation

For their second project, 544th Soldiers renovated a 

dilapidated rural clinic. The clinic, staffed by a physician and a single nurse, provides rudimentary 

medical care to about 500 villagers. The 

renovation included the replacement of 

more than 2,400 concrete roof tiles, extensive painting, and the installation of 

a gravity-fed plumbing system. Battling 

“project creep” was a challenge during 

this project. The plumbing system was 

in serious disrepair, and the removal 

of the existing roof tiles exposed rotting timber. These challenges provided 

an excellent unexpected opportunity 

for carpenters and plumbers to practice 

their trades.

While it was rewarding to the Soldiers to dramatically improve the clinic 

facility, the project was also beneficial 

because of the community involvement 

A 544th Engineer Company medic 

treats a Cambodian girl in a village 

Photo by Staff Sergeant Whitney Houston

near the jobsite.

American and Cambodian engineers work together to lift rebar into place.

Photo by Staff Sergeant Whitney Houston
January–April 2012 Engineer 27

at the site. One of the unit medics, a licensed practical nurse, 

helped deliver several babies and treated local children for 

burns, infections, and other minor ailments. In one instance, 

he undoubtedly saved the life of a child suffering from tetanus. The experience left a lasting impression on the Soldiers 

who worked on the project.

Lessons Learned

Construction Meetings. Daily construction meetings were extremely important. These meetings 

were initially very frustrating due to the language 

barrier, different construction management styles, and incongruent time and material estimations. Royal Cambodian 

Armed Forces leaders were hesitant to contribute during 

these meetings at first; but as the project progressed, the 

meetings became easier and more productive. Good communication was a necessity. 

Contracting. Before deployment, the 544th Engineer 

Company trained multiple contracting officer representatives. Establishing a good relationship with the contracting officers and going into the project with personnel who 

understood the requirements, methods, and limitations of 

the contracting process allowed the unit to procure materials and equipment in a timely manner. Effective contracting 

allowed the 544th to make the major, unanticipated design 

changes that the project demanded. 

Reachback. Although leaders were able to overcome a 

major roof system design flaw and produce a sound and safe 

structure, a great deal of stress, effort, and risk could have 

been avoided by leveraging the capabilities of U.S. Army 

Corp of Engineers reachback programs. Units should identify reachback programs and communicate with U.S. Army 

Corp of Engineers subject matter experts throughout the 

planning and execution phases of construction. The U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers Reachback Operations Center can 

be reached at <uroc@usace.army.mil> or 1-877-ARMY-ENG. 

Their Web site address is <https://uroc-redi.usace.army

.mil/default.aspx>.

While the Angkor Sentinel 2011 civil action projects provided an excellent, diverse construction training opportunity for the 544th Engineer Company, the best thing about the 

mission was the community involvement. Soldiers traveled 

to and from the jobsite every day through crowds of smiling 

children who were immensely grateful for the hard work put 

into the projects. Missions such as this one, sponsored annually by U.S. Army Pacific, provide a welcome change of pace 

for engineer Soldiers who have thus far spent the deployed 

portions of their careers in combat zones. Angkor Sentinel 

2011 was a wonderful opportunity to help people and support international peace and cooperation.

First Lieutenant Friedewald is a platoon leader in the 

544th Engineer Company and was the project officer in 

charge.

Army under a number of different programs, each requiring 

a unique process. The staff work was complicated but necessary to properly equip the Iraqi Army engineers. 

The 20th Engineer Brigade provided premier training 

to Iraqi Army engineers, who learned quickly but had high 

rates of turnovers and transfers. Iraqi and U.S. leaders were 

concerned about the loss of trained bridging personnel, so 

the 20th Engineer Brigade worked with the Iraqi Army Engineer School to provide bridging instructors and equipment. 

By ensuring that bridge instructors and equipment were 

built into the generating force, they set the conditions for 

long-term training proficiency in the operating force. These 

trainers will be essential to the Iraqi Army as it works to 

expand its bridging capacity from a company to a regiment. 

The Way Ahead

Future advisors at the national level can replicate 

some of our successes by facilitating communication 

across all advise, train, assist, and equip elements 

through conducting informal coordination meetings; receiving issues from the lower echelons; and facilitating solutions 

through the national headquarters. The advisors can help 

Iraqi Army units help themselves by facilitating communication and coordination between units and ensuring that 

additional capabilities are resourced in the operating and 

generating forces. Finally, senior U.S. leader involvement is 

critical to make these efforts succeed. 

Throughout 2011 and Operation New Dawn, Iraqi Army 

engineers demonstrated significant progress, specifically in 

the areas of route clearance operations, engineer sustainment, and logistical support bridge emplacement and repair. 

Going forward, they must continue to support internal security operations while training to defend their country against 

external threats, thus enabling a more stable, sovereign, and 

self-reliant Iraq. The future of Iraq is in their hands. 

Major Buursma served in a variety of positions, including Team Muhandis officer in charge, during Operation 

New Dawn. He also served as an Iraqi Army field engineer 

regiment advisor, 2008–2009. He holds a bachelor’s degree in 

computer science from Wheaton College and a master’s degree 

in engineering management from the University of Missouri–

Rolla (now Missouri University of Science and Technology). 

Captain Fitzpatrick served in a variety of positions, including IGFC engineer liaison officer, during Operation New 

Dawn. He also served as a route clearance platoon leader and 

company executive officer, 2006–2007. He holds a bachelor’s 

degree in biology from East Carolina University and a master’s degree in engineering management from Missouri University of Science and Technology. 

(“Team Muhandis” continued from page 23)
28 Engineer January–April 2012

Today’s nonlinear battlefield is fluid and changes 

rapidly, requiring Soldiers to adapt quickly. Tactics, 

techniques, and procedures (TTP) sometimes change 

faster than stateside training can support; and equipment 

may become obsolete before it is even used. As the U.S. 

Army refines its TTP, adversaries adjust their own TTP to 

counter ours. Mission success depends on understanding and 

using the capabilities of the combined arms set available in 

theater.

When Soldiers of the 1014th Engineer Company, Puerto 

Rico Army National Guard, prepared for deployment, they 

completed their validation exercise at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin. 

However, their training did not fully address engineerspecific mission sets for the route clearance missions they 

would be conducting. Also, they established their area of 

operations in Regional Command North and had no unit 

with which to conduct relief-in-place training—to include 

local TTP—before taking control of the area. Consequently, 

they called upon their future higher headquarters, the 111th 

Engineer Battalion (Task Force Roughneck) and the 18th 

Engineer Brigade (Task Force Sword), to develop a plan to 

fill the gap in training and validate the unit before receiving 

mission sets.

Task Force Sword fielded a mobile training team 

(MTT) to train and validate the newly arrived engineer 

unit. The MTT traveled throughout the North Engineer 

Region (composed of Regional Commands–East, –North, 

and –Capital) to Forward Operating Base Deh Dadi II to 

conduct phased individual and collective training on current 

equipment, threats, and operational knowledge for a route 

clearance company. After conducting a mission analysis, 

Task Force Sword pulled experienced personnel to support 

the MTT mission. 

Task Force Sword staff identified the training needs of a 

route clearance platoon and the 1014th Engineer Company. 

The training plan consisted of two phases: prerequisite 

training and on-site training, both of which could be 

conducted by the MTT. Prerequisite training is normally 

conducted at the mobilization station before mobilizing 

and during the first 2 weeks after arrival in country. All 

remaining training is normally conducted during the reliefin-place process, which the 1014th Engineer Company did 

not have. The prerequisite training included—

■ Explosive ordnance clearance.

■ Ground-penetrating radar.

■ Weapons intelligence team operations.

■ Route reconnaissance and clearance.

■ PumaTM man-portable, unmanned aerial vehicle operations.

Task Force Sword ordered Task Force Roughneck’s sister 

units to provide their best route clearance Soldiers for the 

MTT. All Task Force Sword units provided experts in a 

variety of enabler positions, while assuming short-term risk 

By Sergeant Major David G. Crews, Staff Sergeant Donald J. Keeney, 

and Staff Sergeant Rory S. Seppanen

Engineer Brigade

Validates With

Mobile Training 

Team
January–April 2012 Engineer 29

in their own units by not having their most skilled Soldiers 

available for missions. These Soldiers gave classes on topics 

that included—

■ Troop leading procedures.

■ Recovery of disabled vehicles.

■ Common remotely operated weapon station operations.

The MTT plan used the standard crawl-walk-run training 

cycle. During the crawl phase, Soldiers learned individual 

tasks such as the operation of handheld improvised explosive 

device detection equipment. In the walk phase, they moved 

to collective training that included medical evacuation 

operations and combat TTP. The run phase concluded with 

trainers conducting a right-seat/left-seat ride to validate 

Soldiers for day and night operations. 

To prepare, Task Force Sword sent an advance team to 

ensure that the training areas were prepared and that all 

needed equipment was on site. Each of the route clearance 

platoons had to work closely with maintenance contractors 

to overcome mechanical and communications problems to 

get critical pieces of equipment fully mission-capable for the 

right-seat/left-seat ride. The engineer equipment officer and 

maintenance officers from Task Force Roughneck and Task 

Force Sword ordered the needed parts, which quickly arrived 

to support the mission. The teamwork successfully brought 

equipment up to standard before the company validation.

During setup for the training, the MTT identified other 

issues, such as missing equipment. Task Force Sword 

Soldiers located and reallocated equipment to make the 

1014th Engineer Company combat-ready, and the items were 

shipped to the training area on the same day. As the advance 

team ensured that all the 

necessary equipment was 

available, Task Force Sword 

continued to coordinate with 

external units so that the 

widest range of applicable 

training and experience was 

available.

In order to train for the 

combined arms fight, the 

Task Force Sword liaison 

to Regional Command–

North coordinated with the 

area of operations owner 

to train the integration of 

infantry assets, including 

human intelligence, mortars, 

artillery, and air weapons 

teams. Although these 

combat multipliers are 

taught in many leadership 

schools, applying them to 

combat scenarios needs to be 

taught for the specific area 

of operations and the combat 

multipliers available. During the training, Soldiers learned 

about the combat multipliers and also about aspects they 

would have to integrate into plans. For instance, they learned 

that they would not always be the top priority in the area of 

operations and that some fire support officers won’t order fire 

missions unless a trained observer is on site. One solution 

proposed was to ask for fire support officers during mission 

coordination and integrate them into the route clearance 

platoon. Leaders were surprised to learn that if they asked for 

the support during the mission planning, there was a variety 

of available firepower, even if they were not a top priority. 

Involving combat multipliers during the planning and 

execution phases maximizes the ability of the route clearance 

platoon to operate and sets everyone up for success.

External support from communications experts resulted 

in technical inspections and training on communications 

equipment, instruction from an explosive ordnance disposal 

team taught the weapons intelligence team about site 

exploitation for key leaders, and North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization units assembled improvised explosive device 

training aids for practical exercises, adding realism to the 

training without hazard to the Soldiers as they practiced 

interrogation techniques. Synchronizing the combined arms 

fight is a challenge; but when done correctly, it can bring a 

lot of firepower to the fight. 

To begin the training, the MTT gauged the level of 

training that Soldiers had received on individual tasks, 

including—

■ Counter remote control improvised explosive device 

electronic warfare (CREW) systems.

■ Mine detection operations.

A Soldier from the 515th Engineer Company instructs 1014th Engineer Company Soldiers 

on the proper use of improvised explosive device detection equipment.
30 Engineer January–April 2012

■ Common remotely operated weapon stations.

■ Route clearance optics suite.

■ Casualty evacuation.

■ Helicopter landing zone selection.

■ Medical evacuation.

■ Communications.

■ Actions on contact.

■ Escalation of force.

■ Vehicle recovery operations.

■ Troop leading procedures.

■ Precombat checks.

■ Precombat inspections.

This identified the requirements for the training, allowing 

the MTT to assign subject matter experts for each task.

The crawl, or individual training, phase began with

5 days of round-robin training on the focus areas identified 

earlier. Instructors were flexible and adapted to a variety of 

training areas. This training lasted 6 to 8 hours daily. By the 

end of this phase, all Soldiers in the company were able to 

operate the given equipment.

The walk, or collective training, phase was an additional 

5-day cycle that applied the classroom instruction on the 

battlefield. The first day of the phase for Soldiers in pay 

grade E-5 and below consisted of each route clearance 

platoon walking through a lane of scenarios focused on using 

all available techniques to find various improvised explosive 

devices. This allowed trainers to judge how well Soldiers 

had received the knowledge they had been given the week 

before. The route clearance platoons performed day and 

night operations on the second day, with 4-hour blocks of 

activity and a review conducted after each scenario. The 

reviews increased the benefits by letting Soldiers learn 

from mistakes. Day three of collective training repeated the 

earlier day and night operations, using the previous day’s 

reviews to adjust techniques. 

During the first 2 days of the walk phase for leaders, 

Soldiers in pay grade E-6 and above enhanced their abilities 

to perform tasks such as the following:

■ Call for fire.

■ Request close air support.

■ Conduct weapons intelligence team tasks.

■ Practice leadership skills. 

The separate training became an issue when the platoon 

leaders returned to their units, having missed the route 

clearance training conducted for lower enlisted platoon 

members. One solution would be for leadership training 

to take place when it would not interfere with leader 

involvement in platoon training. If time constraints will not 

allow that, leaders should at least observe route clearance 

platoon operations before returning to leadership roles.

The run, or mission, phase consisted of route clearance 

platoons conducting small missions. This phase began 

what would normally be covered during the relief-in-place/

transfer-of-authority process or during the right-seat/

left-seat ride. Soldiers continued to refine the information 

received during the previous phases and conducted 

unmanned aerial vehicle operations. On the second day 

of the run phase, the route clearance platoons moved into 

the left seat, while their trainers moved into the right seat. 

Throughout this phase, each route clearance platoon had a 

dedicated trainer to oversee operations and advise platoon 

sergeants and platoon leaders as needed. For 6 days, the 

platoons operated on alternating days, giving Soldiers time 

to conduct training and adjust to review comments, conduct 

maintenance, and perform troop leading procedures. Platoon 

leaders independently executed their final mission with 

little or no guidance from the MTT. 

The overall training assessment was high. Soldiers 

got hands-on experience that can only come from combat 

experience. Classroom teaching was collectively applied 

in realistic scenarios that let Soldiers apply tactical and 

technical experience not covered in earlier training. 

The training clarified current Army doctrine and the 

ever-changing enemy TTP. The phrase “we did it this 

way in Iraq” was frequently repeated, revealing an 

obsolete mind-set that hindered training. Although people 

tend to equate Iraq and Afghanistan, the cultures are 

different, the enemies are unique, and the wars are 

executed in drastically different ways. Enemy TTP and 

the technologies involved are different. Soldiers must 

remember that this is an evolving battlefield. During the 

training, the MTT saw the route clearance patrols come 

together, fall apart, and rebuild again into a functioning 

route clearance package. 

Regardless of the role that each person played within 

the mission, as trainee or instructor, the MTT validated 

essential requirements for combat operations. The MTT 

purpose—to train route clearance platoons in every aspect 

of the job, while mitigating risk and better preparing 

Soldiers to conduct their jobs safely and effectively—

was successful.

Sergeant Major Crews is the 18th Engineer Brigade 

operations sergeant major, currently deployed in support of 

Operation Enduring Freedom. He is a graduate of the U.S. 

Army Ranger School and the Sapper Leader Course. 

Staff Sergeant Keeney is deployed to Afghanistan for the 

fourth time in 7 years, serving as the 18th Engineer Brigade 

electronic warfare noncommissioned officer in charge. He is 

working toward a degree in general studies.

Staff Sergeant Seppanen is the 18th Engineer Brigade 

future operations noncommissioned officer in charge, 

currently deployed in support of Operation Enduring 

Freedom. 
January–April 2012 Engineer 31

Doctrine 2015 is a Department of the Army initiative 

to streamline Army doctrinal manuals so there will 

be fewer—but better-written—manuals that will be 

relevant and can be updated to reflect today’s operational 

environment. It creates five separate categories of publications. Four of the categories are doctrinal publications. 

Technical manuals (TMs), found in the fifth category, are 

general subject manuals, departmentally approved by the 

U.S. Army Engineer School commandant. TMs will continue 

to drive doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) 

domain requirements. In October 2011, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations,

1

 was published, 

signifying the official transition to Doctrine 2015.

Army Doctrine Publications

ADPs will contain only fundamental principles and 

are limited to 15 pages in a 6- by 9-inch book format. 

.As of this writing, the U.S. Army Combined Arms 

Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has identified 15 ADPs. 

ADP 1, The Army (replacing Field Manual [FM] 1-0, Human 

Resources Support2

) and ADP 3, Unified Land Operations

(replacing FM 3-0, Operations3

) are the only two publications considered to be Army “capstone” manuals. 

Army Doctrine Reference Publications

Army doctrine reference publications (ADRPs) provide 

detailed explanations of the principles contained in 

.the ADPs. There should be only one ADRP for each 

ADP. These publications are limited to 75 to 100 pages and 

must contain only the details that explain the principles in 

the ADPs.

Field Manuals

FMs will contain tactics and procedures. There will be 

no more than 50 Army FMs. FM 3-34, Engineer Operations,4

 will be engineer-led. FM 3-34 was published 

in August 2011 and will undergo another revision to align it 

with ADP/ADRP principles. All ADPs and ADRPs should 

be published by October 2012. 

Army Techniques Publications

Army techniques publications (ATPs) describe techniques that are nonprescriptive ways or methods.to perform missions, functions, or tasks. The life

expectancy for ATPs is 5 to 10 years. The Engineer Regiment

is responsible for 13 ATPs:

1. Explosive Hazard Operations.

2. Engineer Operations—Brigade Combat Team and

Below.

3. Engineer Operations—Echelons Above Brigade Combat

Team.

4. Survivability.

5. Combined Arms Mobility.

6. Combined Arms Countermobility.

7. General Engineering.

8. Geospatial Engineering.

9. Engineer Reconnaissance.

10. Brigade Special Troops Battalion.

11. Environmental Considerations.

12. Combined Arms Counter Improvised Explosive Device 

Operations.

13. Base Camps.

An important feature of an ATP will be the ability of the 

engineers to provide relevant feedback via the “milWiki” 

Web site at <https://www.milsuite.mil/wiki/Portal: Army

_Doctrine>. All milWiki publications are unauthenticated and should only be used by the field to make recommended changes to them. This is your opportunity to make

a contribution. These comments will be reviewed, vetted,

and approved by the U.S. Army Engineer School. The only

publications that should be referenced during the execution of operations are on the following authenticated

sites: 

■ General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital

Library, <http://www.train.army.mil/>.

■ Army Publishing Directorate, <http://www.apd.army

.mil/>.

Technical Manuals

TMs are general subject publications that contain 

technical information specific to the Engineer Regiment. While they are Department of the Armyapproved, they are not authenticated as doctrine by the

By Lieutenant Colonel Sinlan Morrow

Engineer Doctrine and

 Doctrine 2015

Engineer Doctrine and

 Doctrine 2015
32 Engineer January–April 2012
January–April 2012 Engineer 33

Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. 

There are 32 engineer FMs awaiting conversion to TMs.

Engineer Regimental Doctrine

The Engineer Regimental doctrine library will consist of 14 doctrinal manuals—1 FM and 13 ATPs. 

This is an opportunity to capture the Engineer 

Regiment’s lessons learned over the past decade. Now is

the time to get doctrine right. The U.S. Army Engineer

School is committed to harnessing the operational experiences of the Soldiers passing through our schools. They

will collect the DOTMLPF aspects and historical data as 

part of the Army-wide effort. This will be an exciting time 

for the Engineer Regiment. The commandant of the U.S. 

Army Engineer School and the Chief of Engineers will use 

our current experienced force to help update engineer doctrine and set in place procedures to keep it updated. Recently discussed was how the generating and operating 

forces could partner to update doctrine undergoing revision 

so that engineers can remain trained and prepared without losing fundamental principles, tactics, and procedures. 

One way to accomplish this would be to have engineer units 

sponsor publications that align with their mission-essential task lists. Another way would be to take advantage of 

engineers returning as students from recent deployments 

to participate in doctrinal working groups or doctrinal 

reviews. This will be one of the top Engineer Regimental 

priorities. 

The Engineer Doctrine Update (page 34), which details 

the publication status of all the engineer manuals, has been 

modified to reflect Doctrine 2015. 

Endnotes:

1

ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 10 October 2011.

2

FM 1-0, Human Resources Support, 6 April 2010.

3

FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001.

4

FM 3-34, Engineer Operations, 4 August 2011.

Lieutenant Colonel Morrow is chief of Engineer Doctrine 

at the U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, 

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. She holds a bachelor’s degree 

in civil engineering from California State University at Long 

Beach and a master’s degree in engineering management 

from Missouri University of Science and Technology at Rolla. 

She is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College, the U.S. Army Combined Arms and Services 

Staff School, and the Engineer Captains Career Course.

The 697th Engineer Company (Pipeline) will hold its 17th reunion in Colorado Springs, Colorado, 20–24 June 2012. 

For more information, call Mr. Tom Petty at (515) 981-3066 or e-mail him at <tom697th@gmail.com>.

697th Engineer Company (Pipeline) Reunion
34 Engineer January–April 2012

Publication 

Number

Title Date Description

(and Current Status)

ATP 3-34.22 Feb 09

FM 3-34 Aug 11

ATP 3-34.35 

(FM 5-103)

Survivability Jun 85 This will be a full revision of FM 5-103, Survivability.

Status: To be published 4th quarter, FY 12.

ATP 3-90.8

(*FM 3-90)

(*FM 5-102)

(*FM 90-7)

Combined Arms 

Countermobility

Mar 85 This will be a full revision that includes the consolidation of FM 3-90, 

Tactics; FM 5-102, Countermobility; and FM 90-7, Combined Arms 

Obstacle Integration. This will be a multi-Service manual that discusses 

countermobility and combined arms obstacle integration and their 

relationship to the combined arms defense and warfighting functions with 

regard to wide area security.

Status: To be published 3d quarter, FY 13.

Publications Revisions

Combat Engineering

ATP 3-34.20

(*FM 3-34.210)

Explosive Hazard 

Operations

Mar 07 This will be a multi-Service, full revision of Field Manual (FM) 3-34.210, 

Explosive Hazards Operations.

Status: To be published 3d quarter, FY 13.

Engineer Operations–

Brigade Combat Team and 

Below

Engineer Operations 

This revision is pending Headquarters, Department of the Army, approval of 

the brigade engineer battalion.

Status: To be published 2d quarter, FY 13.

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence 

Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate

Concepts, Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division

Doctrine Branch, Engineer Division

Engineer ngineer Doctrine octrine Update pdate

ATP 3-90.37

(*FM 3-90.119)

(*FMI 3-34.119)

Combined Arms 

Improvised Explosive 

Device Defeat Operations

Sep 07 This will be a multi-Service, full revision of FM 3-90.119, Combined Arms 

Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations, and Field Manual 

Interim 3-34.119, Improvised Explosive Device Defeat.

Status: To be published 2d quarter, FY 14.

ATP 3-34.23

(*ATTP 3-34.23)

Engineer Operations–

Echelons Above Brigade 

Combat Team

Jul 10 This manual will undergo review and update as required.

Status: To be published 3d quarter, FY 13.

ATP 3-90.61 Brigade Special Troops 

Battalion

Dec 06 This manual will undergo review and update as required.

Status: To be published 3d quarter, FY 13. (*FM 3-90.61)

This is the engineer capstone manual and contains the “box top” as our 

doctrinal framework; integrates the three engineer disciplines of combat, 

general, and geospatial engineering; and introduces the four lines of 

engineer support for decisive actions.

Status: Will undergo additional revision to complement Army doctrine 

publications (ADPs) and Army doctrine reference publications (ADRPs)

2d quarter, fiscal year (FY) 13.
January–April 2012 Engineer 35

Publication 

Number

Title Date Description

(and Current Status)

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence 

Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate

Concepts, Organizations, and Doctrine Development Division

Doctrine Branch, Engineer Division

Engineer ngineer Doctrine octrine Update

General Engineering

ATP 3-34.40

(*FM 3-34.400)

General Engineering Dec 08 This manual will undergo review and update as required.

Status: To be published 4th quarter, FY 13.

This manual will undergo review and update as required.

Status: To be published 3d quarter, FY 13.

ATP 3-34.5

(*FM 3-100.4)

Environmental 

Considerations

Feb 10

ATP 3-37.10 Base Camps New

Note: Current engineer publications can be downloaded from the Army Publishing Directorate Web site at <http://www.apd

.army.mil>. Drafts may be obtained during the staffing process by contacting the Engineer Doctrine Branch at commercial (573) 

563-0003, DSN 676-0003, or <leon.cdidcodddengdoc@conus.army.mil>. The development status of these manuals was current 

as of 20 January 2012.

*Publication number of the current publication, which will be superseded by the new number at the top. Multiple publication 

numbers in parentheses indicate consolidation into one manual.

ATP 3-34.81

(*FM 3-34.170)

Engineer Reconnaissance Mar 08 This manual will undergo review and update as required.

Status: To be published 2d quarter, FY 14.

Geospatial Engineering

ATP 3-34.80

(*FM 3-34.230)

Geospatial Engineering Mar 08 This manual will undergo review and update as required.

Status: To be published 1st quarter, FY 14.

This will be a multi-Service manual. It will be targeted for all branches (not an 

engineer manual solely for the use of engineers). It is a compilation of TTP 

found in doctrine, lessons learned, and reference material that provides an 

integrated systematic approach to base camps.

Status: To be published 1st quarter, FY13.

ATP 3-90.4

(*ATTP 3-90.4)

(*FM 3-34.2) 

(*FM 3-90.12)

Combined Arms Mobility

Operations

Aug 11 This was a full revision, to include the renaming and renumbering of FM 

3-34.2, Combined Arms Breaching Operations, and FM 3-90.12, Combined 

Arms Gap Crossing. Changes in the force structure have required adjustment 

of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) associated with breaching 

and clearance operations. It redefines mobility operations and includes six 

primary mobility tasks.

Status: Anticipate a change document to convert manual from Army Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 3-90.4 to ATP 3-90.4 1st quarter, FY 13.

Combat Engineering (continued)
36 Engineer January–April 2012

By Major David W. Noble

As Republic of Korea (ROK) Army helicopters hovered overhead and smoke 

.vehicles concealed the farside of the 

Nam Han River, U.S. Forces Korea engineer 

and infantry Soldiers observed the 7th Corps 

of the Third ROK Army river-crossing exercise 

in Yeoju, South Korea, in November 2011. The 

U.S. contingent, joined by the Combined Forces 

Command engineer, traveled from all over the 

Korean Peninsula to witness the event. Exercise 

Guardian Nation combined an annual division 

level training exercise with elements from the 

7th Corps of the Third ROK Army, including—

■ Armor.

■ Aviation.

■ Chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear.

■ Engineer.

■ Field artillery.

■ Infantry.

■ Signal.

Bridging Rivers in Korea

The terrain in Korea offers many challenges to 

military units attempting to maneuver there. The 

most significant obstacle to maneuver may be the 

many rivers that cross the Korean landscape. In Korea, a 

unit’s ability to rapidly cross a river while under enemy 

observation and fires is crucial to success. The requirement 

Preconstructed concrete platforms aid ROK training while also 

protecting the riverbanks.
January–April 2012 Engineer 37

Bridge erection boats maneuver pontoons while smoke obscures the farside from enemy observation.

to synchronize the efforts of reconnaissance assets and 

maneuver, artillery, signal, and engineer units is daunting. 

Any opportunity to train on river-crossing operations is vital 

to success.

ROK Army engineer leaders linked up with U.S. leaders 

to fly to the ROK Army 7th Corps training exercise command 

center. The U.S. contingent included members from the 

Joint Security Area; engineers from U.S. Forces Korea; and 

representatives from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

Far East District. For that day’s mission, engineer units 

were ordered to emplace a 275-meter float bridge across the 

Nam Han River at Yeoju. Infantry and chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear elements were to be ferried across 

the river first to provide farside security and obscuration. 

Once in place, the engineer mission was to erect a float 

bridge so that infantry and armor elements could continue 

the offensive. Throughout the operation, Cobra helicopters 

would provide close air support. The operation was to be 

complete within a few hours. The U.S. and ROK observation 

element quickly moved from the briefing sessions to the 

training site.

Activating the Plan

When the observation team arrived, the mission 

was already in motion. Cobra helicopters were 

providing nearside security while smoke units 

obscured the engineer approach. Ferrying operations had 

already transported several infantry elements across the 

river to establish security. Engineers shifted into building 

the float bridge, while armor units held position in a nearby 

staging area. Within an hour, units were crossing the 

completed bridge and moving forward against enemy forces.

Supporting the Training Effort

The Korean government installed a series of concretereinforced crossing platforms along the Nam Han 

River as a permanent training fixture to assist the 

ROK Army in conducting river-crossing operations. The 

series of platforms, spread along several kilometers of the 

river, provided engineer and maneuver units with a variety 

of crossing locations to train. The platforms were designed to 

reinforce the riverbanks at the points where heavy vehicles 

drove onto float bridges to cross the water obstacle. The 

concrete platforms were only designed for entry locations 

on the nearside of the river, while compacted trails were 

constructed at farside exit points. As a safety measure, 

metal tethers and heavy ropes were attached to the interior 

bays to reinforce the stability of the bridge against the

river current. 

Strengthening Ties

When the mission was complete, ROK engineers 

had emplaced 41 interior bays across the Nam 

Han River. All ROK units worked cohesively to 

ensure that the mission was a success. The opportunity 

for U.S. leaders to observe ROK training proved 

beneficial for many reasons. The demonstration of U.S. 

interest in ROK training—especially engineer-related 

tasks—strengthened the importance of river-crossing 

operations. Observing their ROK counterparts in a field 

environment strengthened the U.S. leader confidence in 

their allies’ abilities to perform under pressure. Finally, 

the collaboration between U.S. and ROK Army engineers 

strengthened the tactical and operational communication 

between the two militaries.

Major Noble is the plans and operations chief for the U.S. 

Forces Korea engineers. He previously served in South Korea 

with the 2d Engineer Battalion at Camp Castle. He holds 

a communications degree from the University of Tampa 

and a master’s degree in business administration from the 

University of Phoenix.
38 Engineer January–April 2012

The U.S. Army has adapted extremely well to repeated deployments in the last 10 years. All things come 

with tradeoffs though, and one relative weakness 

that has resulted from a decade of frequent deployments 

is the lessened ability of the Army’s junior leaders to prepare for and conduct training. The Army needs to look at 

ways to train leaders to conduct training, and the eight-step 

training model is a proven and effective method to accomplish this.

The Army’s primary role is to fight and win the Nation’s wars. During peacetime, the Army’s role is to train 

for this wartime mission. As the Army draws down in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, training will be increasingly important. 

However, there will also be fewer resources available to conduct training, which means that leaders need to be more

effective—especially at the small-unit level. A simple improvement would be to emphasize the Army’s eight-step 

training model. Developed by U.S. Army Europe in the mid1990s, this technique is a proven method of preparation for 

units and leaders.1, 2

 Unfortunately, many junior leaders 

are unfamiliar with it. It is not a formal part of the Army’s 

doctrine, but it is worth reviewing, using FM 7-0, Training 

Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations, 

as a doctrinal anchor.

Step 1—Plan the training.

Planning the training starts with the unit METL. Leaders assess the unit performance to evaluate its proficiency. 

Units focus their training by developing a METL and establish long-range training plans that describe events and resources required to increase METL proficiency. Units plan 

backwards to prepare for deployments or other significant 

training events. These plans reflect the commander’s intent 

and end state, with more refined training agendas developed 

in cyclic or quarterly training briefings. The most important 

thing a small-unit leader can do in this step is to identify 

critical items that must be trained and to explicitly accept 

risk in other areas where training does not occur. This helps 

leaders focus their time and effort on training the important 

tasks identified by the commander.

The battalion executive officer gave “Captain Smith” a selection of field manuals (FMs) and described in detail the importance of a mission-essential task list (METL). Captain Smith had served as a platoon leader in Iraq and was a very competent 

leader. After digesting the reading material for a week, he said, “I think I understand this whole METL thing. I wish I’d had 

this as a platoon leader to help us get ready for our year in Iraq.”

By Major Matthew R. Little
January–April 2012 Engineer 39

Too often, leaders complete their plan but neglect the 

preparation required to execute quality training. Completing the plan is necessary for good training, but is not sufficient by itself. Planning and preparation are two of the 

training management phases outlined in FM 7-0. The most 

difficult work is preparation, where the detailed integration 

is completed. If you’ve ever attended a substandard training 

event, chances are that the leadership had a plan but didn’t 

prepare for it. FM 7-0 describes preparation in several parts 

(such as training the trainers and rehearsals) that overlap 

with the eight-step training model. Several parts of the 

troop-leading procedures (TLPs) described in FM 5-0, The 

Operations Process (such as conducting reconnaissance, issuing the order, and supervising and refining) also overlap 

with the eight-step training model (see figure). The preparation steps are essential skills that small-unit leaders must 

know and demonstrate.

Step 2—Train and certify leaders.

Training the trainer is a critical step during the preparation phase. This allows commanders to ensure that their 

subordinate leaders are knowledgeable and qualified to 

evaluate the training. It also allows leaders to extend their 

influence by empowering subordinates to achieve clear standards. Failure to complete this step results in Soldiers who 

are not confident in their leadership and leaders who are not 

clear on the training standards.

Step 3—Conduct a reconnaissance. 

Found in the eight-step training model and in TLPs, conducting a reconnaissance is an important task whether conducting training or executing a mission. Leaders not only 

review the location where the training will be conducted, but 

check to ensure that resources are coordinated and prepared 

for execution. 

Step 4—Issue an order for the training. 

Leaders issue orders to establish clear tasks, conditions, 

and standards. This includes a concept of operations that 

describes how training objectives will be met, a concept of 

sustainment that lists the resources required and the individuals tasked to lead different parts of the training, and 

a timeline. Although verbal orders can be issued, written 

orders are more effective. Written orders become a reference 

for all and can be quickly disseminated and reviewed. Verbal orders require leaders to constantly repeat information, 

which becomes less clear with dissemination. Writing down 

the details of a plan avoids this problem.

Step 5—Rehearse. 

Rehearsals are critical steps in the eight-step training 

model and in TLPs. The four types of rehearsals described 

in Appendix I of FM 5-0 are— 

■ Backbrief.

■ Battle drill/standing operating procedure rehearsal.

■ Combined arms rehearsal.

■ Support rehearsal. 

Rehearsal techniques are limited only by leader creativity and available resources, but FM 7-0 describes six common methods: 

■ Network.

■ Map.

■ Sketch map.

■ Terrain model.

■ Reduced force.

■ Full-dress.

Overlap between TLPs and the eight-step training model
40 Engineer January–April 2012

Leaders select the type and technique of rehearsals and 

are most effective when they combine and integrate them 

into their timeline. 

Step 6—Execute. 

Leaders and units learn best by doing, not by being lectured. Classroom environments or online training can be 

effective in limited circumstances, but they are not appropriate for most Soldier training. Commanders should allow 

their units the freedom to make mistakes and learn through 

experience, rather than through a lecture. As units improve, 

leaders can increase training complexity by having Soldiers 

perform tasks under new conditions. The same task can be 

done at night; in a nuclear, biological, or chemical environment; with a different leader in charge; or with any combination of these variables. These differences will reflect the 

changes that units may face downrange. 

Step 7—Conduct an after action review (AAR).

With contractors and other outside trainers conducting more Army training in the last 10 years, junior leaders 

have less experience conducting AARs. I was surprised to be 

approached by a company commander who asked for help 

conducting the AAR that would follow an upcoming training 

event. This reinforced the importance of the eight-step training model. One of the best references available for AARs is

A Leader’s Guide to After Action Reviews. It is available on 

the Army Training Network at <https://atn.army.mil>.

AARs can be formal or informal. Formal AARs are typically held at the company level and above, although they 

might also be conducted for small-unit gunnery or platoon 

situational training exercises. Informal AARs are usually 

conducted at the platoon level and below. Informal AARs 

can be done at any time during any training and have the 

advantage of giving Soldiers and units immediate feedback. 

Soldiers and units can learn from their efforts and quickly 

adapt to future operations.

There’s an art and a science to conducting an AAR. A 

Leader’s Guide to After Action Reviews describes the mechanics, but does not describe the interpersonal skills necessary 

to make an AAR truly effective. I’ve seen many AARs where 

the audience is silent, reluctant to talk, or quick to shut down 

discussion. Like any task, conducting AARs is a skill that can 

be improved with practice. Preparing for this as a part of the 

eight-step training model will lead to improvement. 

Step 8—Retrain. 

The eight-step training model is often reduced to just 

seven steps, with retraining completely ignored. This is a 

significant error, since retraining allows units to demonstrate competency and confidence in themselves and their 

leaders. Dedicating time to retraining allows even the best 

units to sustain their strengths, improve their performance, 

or expand their skills through adding a layer of complexity 

by performing the training at night, with a junior leader in 

charge, or some other variation to challenge the unit.

During a 48-hour squad stakes exercise, Soldiers detain a suspect while an evaluator looks on.
The eight-step training model has significant overlap 

with TLPs, making it especially effective for leaders at the 

company level and below. Leaders can implement the eightstep training model to develop effective training and simultaneously implement TLPs. 

Although the eight-step training model is numbered, 

leaders must realize that it is not meant to describe events 

in sequence. As with TLPs and the military decisionmaking 

process, the eight-step training model is not linear. Leaders 

most effectively implement these approaches incrementally, 

by thinking through all the steps and identifying where and 

how information is related. Leaders frequently revisit these 

steps to ensure integration. For example, leaders need to 

identify the type and technique they will use for their rehearsal. This specific guidance needs to be published in the 

written order, and leaders must be trained and certified to 

ensure that they are adequately prepared for a specific task. 

A leader who follows the eight-step training model in a lockstep manner will miss this integration. 

As the Army transitions from frequent deployments and 

adjusts to a more limited budget, effective training will become increasingly important. Preparing junior leaders to 

train is essential, and the eight-step training model is a 

simple and proven technique that can be applied to a wide 

spectrum of training. Engineers have applied it successfully 

to construction operations, and units have used it to train 

coalition partners in Iraq.3, 4

 It’s time for a new training circular that describes a way to prepare for training events. It 

might be called A Leader’s Guide to the Eight-Step Training Model and would make explicit what Army leaders have 

been doing for years.

Endnotes:

1

Walter L. Sharp, The Eight-Step Training Model (Part 

One of Two), TALON: Operation Joint Forge Task Force 

Eagle, 3 February 2001, p. 4, <http://www.tfeagle.army.mil

/tfetalon/talon_archive/2001/talon%202001-02-03.pdf>,

accessed on 4 January 2012.

2

Walter L. Sharp, The Eight-Step Training Model (Part 

Two of Two), TALON: Operation Joint Forge Task Force Eagle, 17 February 2001, p. 4, <http://www.tfeagle.army.mil

/tfetalon/talon_archive/2001/talon%202001-02-17.pdf>, 

accessed on 12 December 2011. 

3

Matthew Luzzatto, “Cobra Gold ’99,” Engineer, April

2000, <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0FDF/is

_2_30/ai_64732416/>, accessed on 4 January 2012.

4

Julian T. Urquidez and Paul L. Yingling, “2-18 FA: 

Training the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps,” Field Artillery 

Journal, January–February 2004, pp. 34–37.

References:

A Leader’s Guide to After Action Reviews, September 

2011 <https://atn.army.mil>, accessed on 5 January 2012. 

(This replaces Training Circular 25-20, A Leader’s Guide to 

After Action Reviews, 30 September 1993.)

FM 5-0, The Operations Process, 26 March 2010.

FM 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full 

Spectrum Operations, 23 February 2011.

Training Circular 25-30, A Leader’s Guide to Company 

Training Meetings, 29 April 1994.

Major Little is the officer in charge of the 573d Construction Management Team at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, 

Washington. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy 

at West Point, New York, and holds degrees from the University of Colorado and the U.S. Army School of Advanced 

Military Studies.

January–April 2012 Engineer 41

A large-scale terrain model helps 

the 52d Engineer 

Battalion prepare 

to construct a 

C-130 airfield at 

Camp Guernsey, 

Wyoming.
42 Engineer January–April 2012

The recent transformation of engineer construction 

battalions has generated much discussion. The traditional combat heavy engineer battalion, consisting 

of three engineer companies with vertical and horizontal platoons in each company and a consolidated equipment support 

section in the headquarters support company, has been replaced by an engineer battalion that consists of two vertical 

companies and one horizontal company. The platoons were 

given individual unit identification codes in an effort to make 

them more deployable and to allow the formation of a unit 

that supports the needs of the commanders on the ground, 

similar to the way brigade combat teams are assembled.

 Lessons learned over the past year as the construction 

officer for the 368th Engineer Battalion, deployed to Kandahar Province in support of Regional Command–South, have 

highlighted an additional transformation that warrants 

further investigation. Forming engineer companies with 

broader capabilities, as opposed to the specific vertical and 

horizontal skills of current units, could increase engineer effects on the battlefield. 

Engineer officers attend the Engineer Officer Basic 

Course, which is a general course that teaches the fundamentals of the entire engineer branch. Graduates may be assigned to a variety of units—route clearance company, combat engineer company, or vertical engineer company. The 

knowledge obtained at the course does not make graduates 

proficient in any of these duty positions—the real training 

takes place with the skills obtained and refined on the job. 

This framework could also be implemented for the enlisted Soldiers in the typical military occupational specialties (MOSs) that make up the vertical and horizontal companies. As a former heavy equipment operator, I can attest 

to the skills obtained during advanced individual training. 

They touched on the basics of each piece of equipment, but 

proficiency required “stick time.” That stick time doesn’t

occur in the classroom environment—it only happens after 

the Soldier gets to his first unit. The same can be said for all 

general engineering MOSs. 

If the U.S. Army Engineer School restructured and created a general engineer MOS that taught Soldiers the basics of 

vertical and horizontal construction, company commanders 

would have a much more versatile force. The advanced individual training curriculum for general engineers would provide a broad understanding of the fundamentals of vertical 

engineering and the use of horizontal engineer equipment. 

Soldiers wouldn’t graduate as proficient operators or master 

electricians, but they would possess the foundation for further training. The MOS structure would be more standardized, training would be much broader, and Soldiers would 

have a more diverse understanding of typical engineer tasks 

in a general engineer battalion than in the current specialized units. As a result, the “vertical” and “horizontal” unit 

designators would be eliminated and replaced with the designation of “general engineer.” 

Most construction missions conducted by Army engineers 

have vertical and horizontal components. As a result, battalions must task-organize vertical and horizontal assets to 

support these missions. In the general engineer company 

format, each company commander would have three platoons that are capable of taking on any mission with organic 

assets. The format would also increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the platoons. A platoon leader could use the 

same Soldiers for various phases of the project without having to provide one group of Soldiers to complete the earthworks and another group to construct the final structure.

On occasion, there is still the need to mass vertical or 

horizontal assets to complete a task. The change to a general

engineer company format would not adversely affect this 

and could ultimately provide commanders with even more 

capabilities to accomplish the mission. If a project with a 

By Captain Walter K. Bogardus

Should the General Engineer

Battalion Transform, Again?
January–April 2012 Engineer 43

No. 1 priority required a focused effort by the vertical trades, 

a company commander could dedicate the needed resources 

without any external reorganization. However, the next No. 1

priority would likely require the massing of horizontal assets. A more balanced concentration of vertical and horizontal assets at the platoon level would increase the flexibility 

of units to deliver the results being requested. 

The terms initial occupancy condition and minimum 

military requirements are often used to measure the general 

engineering effects Army engineers provide in a tactical environment. In building tactical infrastructure, combat outposts, and forward operating bases, maneuver commanders 

are concerned with how quickly the task is completed. Construction engineers are often embedded with maneuver elements and tasked with building tactical infrastructure that 

will be immediately occupied so that operations can begin 

from that location. These facilities don’t require tile flooring and complex wiring; they mainly consist of berms or perimeter walls, tent decks, a few guard towers, and perhaps 

some gravel to keep the dust down. The minimum skills required to complete this type of project could easily be encompassed in one general engineer MOS. There would still be 

a need for subject matter experts in vertical and horizontal

construction at the unit level. We can’t dispense with that 

strong noncommissioned officer who knows vertical or horizontal construction and can lead Soldiers. As with commissioned officers, areas of concentration could be established 

to give Soldiers a career track to follow and gain additional 

training and skills in a particular area.

Army engineers fit the definition of the “jack of all trades 

and master of none.” They are asked to accomplish a wide 

variety of missions and expected to have a general understanding of all aspects of military construction. Developing junior Soldiers as general engineers could potentially 

increase the combat effectiveness of Army engineers and 

make the general engineer battalion even more diverse and 

capable of taking on whatever challenges arise. 

When he wrote this article, Captain Bogardus was the 

officer in charge of the construction management section of 

the 368th Engineer Battalion at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan. He holds a bachelor’s degree in civil and environmental 

engineering from The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina, 

and is pursuing a master’s degree in civil engineering from 

the University of Connecticut. He is a professional engineer 

in Connecticut.

On 23 January 2012, the Army Career Tracker 

(ACT) Web site officially opened to all engineer 

officers. Officers can log on at <https://actnow

.army.mil/> for a “one stop shop” of engineer-related news, 

information, and career planning resources.

The ACT program, first unveiled to the enlisted force 

last summer, now also provides officers with a personalized look at their training, education, and assignment 

history alongside items that their branch designates 

as important. Officers can then use this information to 

develop their personalized career plan. ACT will offer 

leaders, raters, and mentors new ways of communicating 

with their Soldiers and monitoring their careers. When 

officers log on, they will select their rater and choose any 

number of mentors. Then, raters and mentors will be 

able to view an officer’s education, training, assignment 

history, and future desires during mentoring and counseling sessions. ACT is designed to be accessed with a 

Soldier’s Army Knowledge Online credentials and to 

seamlessly draw information from eight channels that

support personnel, training, and military/civilian education programs.

On the Career Resources tab, ACT defaults to the Engineer Branch homepage where relevant and useful news 

and information are posted. On the Officer tab, it is possible 

to review past assignments, training, and self-development 

activities alongside Engineer Regiment recommendations 

for the officer’s current pay grade and the next two higher 

pay grades. The recommendations follow Chapter 14 of Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management.

1

A useful feature of the Web site is a printable career map. 

Most entries are hyperlinked to additional information to 

help officers make better-informed decisions. All engineer 

officers are encouraged to explore this new Web site and 

provide feedback to the Engineer Personnel Development 

Office at <leon.usaeshqrfi@conus.army.mil>.

Endnote:

1

Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career 

Management, 1 February 2010.

Lieutenant Colonel Slack is chief of the U.S. Army Engineer School Engineer Personnel Development Office.

By Lieutenant Colonel Brian Slack 

Army Career Tracker Web Site

 Opens to Engineer Officers
44 Engineer January–April 2012

I

n recent years, the civilian and military use of geospatial information has become more advanced and significantly more widespread. In the Army force structure, 

organic geospatial engineering assets have been positioned 

at the brigade level. But what are engineer staff officers doing differently to fulfill their role in this changed environment? 

If we step back from our on-the-ground experiences and 

examine how this essential engineering function is coordinated at the tactical level, the technological and organizational transformations have not been accompanied by an 

evolving vision of how engineer staffs integrate geospatial 

support to help accomplish a brigade combat team (BCT) 

commander’s mission. The ability to leverage geospatial 

information and services lags far behind the technology. 

Instead of expanding the accessibility, efficiency, and effectiveness of geospatial support across a BCT staff and subordinate units, Army engineers often use it to accomplish the 

same tasks in the same way, but with a higher “wow” factor.

Importance of the BCT Engineer

The BCT engineer coordinator occupies a critical distribution and integration point for geospatial engineering. Since the BCT is the lowest echelon in the Army 

with organic geospatial assets, the BCT geospatial section 

operations and the integration capabilities of the engineer 

coordinator determine if subordinate forces—from battalion 

staff to patrol leaders—receive timely and relevant geospatial support. Field Manual 3-34.22, Engineer Operations—

Brigade Combat Team and Below, places this responsibility 

on the engineer coordinator, who “must understand the full 

array of engineer capabilities (combat, general, and geospatial engineering) available to the force and synchronize 

them to best meet the needs of the maneuver commander.”1

The Challenge

Staff engineers are responsible for coordinating geospatial support across the BCT, but this function is often 

neglected. The first reason is fairly obvious—a BCT 

engineer coordinator is busy. Engineers on a BCT staff must 

plan and execute a wide range of missions using organic and 

external engineer assets. The pressing necessity of organizing a route clearance mission to support a maneuver operation, synchronizing external bridging assets, or coordinating 

the construction of a combat outpost are “unavoidable” engineer tasks. If the BCT engineer staff fails to plan or execute 

these engineer functions, the commander certainly notices 

and squarely assigns blame to the engineer staffs and units. 

The geospatial function differs in a way that often allows 

engineers to gloss over it or function on “autopilot” with little perceived negative impact. For example, unlike combat 

or general engineering forces, geospatial analysts in a BCT 

are not under the direct control of an engineer commander. 

Instead, geospatial analysts are part of the BCT staff, often task-organized within an intelligence, geospatial intelligence, or protection section. This means that, although the 

BCT engineers may not have direct control of geospatial assets, the responsibility for integrating geospatial engineering throughout the entire operations process still remains. 

It is a responsibility centered on function, rather than command and control of assets—a different, but no less important, type of responsibility. 

The second reason that BCT engineer staffs do not attempt to seize the mantle of responsibility for integrating 

geospatial support across the staff and subordinate units lies 

in self-imposed perceptions of expertise. Engineer officers 

have come to believe that geospatial support is so technical 

that only specialists—those with an academic background 

in geospatial information—can provide good leadership in 

By Captain Colleen Reiss Vermeulen

The Brigade Combat Team Engineer

Coordinator and Geospatial Engineering

Critical Integration:
January–April 2012 Engineer 45

a BCT. It is important to remember that just as the lack 

of a civil engineering degree is not an excuse for an engineer officer to ignore coordinating construction operations, 

the lack of academic or technical expertise in geospatial 

analysis does not excuse a BCT engineer coordinator from 

ensuring the full integration of geospatial support into BCT

operations. 

Small Steps, Big Impact

These challenges are real, but the responsibility to 

oversee all three Army engineer functions—

combat, general, and geospatial—at the BCT 

level is also real, and vitally important for mission 

success in today’s complex operational environment. 

We can start by focusing on high-impact techniques 

for integrating geospatial support that demand small 

commitments of time and do not require technical expertise. The responsibility of the engineer coordinator 

is not to do geospatial analysis—which is provided by 

talented geospatial information technician warrant officers and geospatial engineer enlisted Soldiers—but to 

integrate it into BCT operations. The engineer coordinator can make significant improvements in geospatial 

support at the BCT level by focusing on the following 

questions:

1. Is the entire unit, or just the staff, getting

support? 

Check the geospatial section tracking list of products or requests for information for the past month 

or quarter. If an overwhelming majority of the section outputs are for the intelligence or operations 

and training officer, subordinate units may not be 

receiving robust geospatial support. While the BCT 

intelligence and operations and training sections are 

important and need significant geospatial support, 

subordinate units can benefit greatly from visualizations for rehearsals, route studies, and more. If subordinate units are submitting requests to the BCT geospatial 

team and not receiving timely, relevant products, they may

become frustrated and simply stop making requests. It is 

also possible that subordinate units, especially nonorganic 

ones, may not know the capabilities of the BCT geospatial 

assets or how to request support. Engineers should ensure 

that all BCT staff sections and subordinate units receive the 

support they request, understand the capabilities, and have 

an efficient method for requesting support. 

Engineer Staff Officer Geospatial Support Checklist

 Subordinate units (not just the staff) receive timely geospatial 

support and know how to make requests from the BCT geospatial capabilities.

 Geospatial analysts have the situational awareness to provide proactive analysis to BCT decisionmaking and operational cycles.

 Analytical tools and capabilities are known and used.

 BCT staff and subordinate units can provide basic “self service” functions without using geospatial section assets.

 Staff and subordinate units can reprint the most popular and

frequently requested map products using plotters.

 Geospatial data is routinely sent to higher headquarters.

 Standard operations include integrated geospatial support 

	 without a specific request.

 The geospatial section is certified as “trained” by an external

	 geospatial analyst, warrant officer, or technician with ad-

	 vanced or equivalent skills and experience.

Geospatial analysts can 

offer predictive analysis and 

problem solving when they 

are integrated into the routine information synthesis 

of a battle rhythm.
46 Engineer January–April 2012

2. Is geospatial support reactive or proactive?

Investigate how consistently geospatial support 

is provided in response to a 

specific request in comparison to analyst-generated 

products. When engineer 

staffs fail to integrate geospatial support into BCT 

planning and decisionmaking cycles, geospatial support can become reactive, 

where a geospatial section 

only makes products that 

specific members of the 

staff or subordinate units 

request. While this is beneficial and responsive, it does 

not capture the full role of 

the trained geospatial analysts. Like intelligence analysts, geospatial Soldiers 

must continually assess the environment and changing situation based on a commander’s intent and understanding of 

current operations. Engineer officers can ensure that the 

geospatial section has a routine method, such as battle update assessment or situation report, for building situational 

awareness and communicating relevant geospatial information and analysis to the staff and subordinate units. 

3. Are geospatial assets being used for analysis and 

recommendations or merely helping staffs visualize? 

Products that display operational control graphics, 

boundaries, political regions, routes, cities, and unit locations are needed and loved by all, but these visualization 

products are only one part of how geospatial support can be 

integrated into BCT operations. Analysts can fuse multiple 

sources of data into geographic patterns to provide predictive 

analysis and incorporate the effects of the operational environment to solve problems. In addition to requesting specific 

products, staffs and subordinate units can be coached by engineer officers to bring questions like the following to the 

geospatial section:

■ Based on your data, where is the best location for a patrol

base? 

■ Where are the most likely criminal trafficking routes? 

This exploits geospatial data and analysts to their 

fullest extent in the unit, rather than limiting it to the 

capabilities of those requesting products. Engineer officers are critical for facilitating this shift from viewing 

geospatial assets as “terrain information providers” to

“analysts.” 

4. What self-service geospatial capabilities do staffs 

and subordinate units use on a regular basis? 

Many years ago, hosting a network of files and posting upto-date announcements on an Internet or intranet site was 

the realm of computer programmers. Today, with programs 

such as Microsoft SharepointTM, almost every member of a 

unit staff can create a useful page for storing, editing, and 

exchanging digital information. The ability to use geospatial 

information has also evolved, and staff engineers can integrate geospatial support into operations by empowering other staff and subordinate units to perform self-service geospatial tasks independently. The engineer coordinator can play 

a key role in introducing programs such as GeoPDF® to the 

staff and leveraging the geospatial section to provide readyto-import data in an easily accessible network location. The 

most challenging aspect of putting entry level geospatial applications to work is in finding the data, not in using the 

interface, as most staff members are comfortable exploring 

new software. By providing an entry level program and the 

relevant data to the staff and subordinate units, the BCT 

geospatial section can be more efficient, devoting limited 

resources to analysis and products that only they have the 

capabilities to generate. 

5. Are the same completed geospatial products

requested repeatedly?

If the geospatial section tracking list of completed products contains many separate requests for the same product, then the section productivity for analyzing and developing new specialized products is being greatly reduced. 

In an environment where many staff sections have access 

to plotters, staffs can print additional or updated copies of 

popular products without a request to the geospatial section. Engineer officers can make this possible by ensuring 

that a digital product repository or “library” of products 

for the BCT is created in a shared folder or on a network 

The widespread use of plotters empowers staffs to print map products from easy-toaccess, digital geospatial information.
January–April 2012 Engineer 47

Web site. The geospatial section can update this library 

with preformatted digital copies (such as portable document format [PDF] versions) of completed products, thus 

enabling network users to print copies of the frequently 

requested unit products. 

6. Is the next higher geospatial section getting

updates?

One of the roles of a BCT geospatial section is to provide 

updates to the unit portion of the theater geospatial database 

through higher echelon geospatial forces. When BCTs do not 

feed valuable geospatial data higher, the information that a 

section collects will not serve other units that are conducting 

operations in the area or units that may need the data in the 

future. Engineer staff officers must oversee this integrative 

function by finding out when the next higher headquarters 

geospatial section wants updates, what features it is collecting, and what file structure is used. Most importantly, the 

engineer staff must ensure that the geospatial section does 

not become entirely focused on current operations and fails 

to send the data up to higher headquarters. 

7. Are geospatial products part of standard

operations? 

When geospatial support becomes integrated into the 

routines of a BCT, staffs and subordinate units receive 

support without asking. For example, patrol or convoy prebriefings should always include relevant geospatial information; a leader should not have to make a request. 

Mission debriefings should include questions about

discrepancies between on-the-ground observations and 

geospatial products or maps provided. Similarly, a unit 

intelligence summary should regularly include geospatial 

intelligence. For the BCT engineer coordinator, integrating geospatial support into the battle rhythm and standard 

operations of the BCT pays significant dividends as the 

presence of geospatial information enables those outside 

the engineer section to integrate it into their planning and

operations. 

8. Are we trained? What are we doing to train?

Geospatial analysts require individual and collective 

training and validation exercises, just like the rest of the 

BCT staff. As the integrator of geospatial support, engineer officers must provide the oversight and coordination

assistance necessary to help a unit geospatial section grow 

professionally. The role of staff engineer is not to be the subject matter expert, but to coordinate for external support to 

train and validate a BCT geospatial section in its collective 

tasks and to move the analysts toward an even higher level 

of professional competency. Some sources for accomplishing 

this include— 

■ The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency National 

Geospatial-Intelligence College.

■ The Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Army Foundry

Intelligence Training Program.

■ Local technical colleges.

■ Geospatial warrant officers from other units or echelons. 

Start Somewhere

This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but it is a 

realistic starting point for all staff engineers. Engineer officers have a responsibility for integrating 

geospatial support into their units, even if that does not entail direct control of the geospatial section. Engineer officers 

have that capability, since advanced technical expertise is 

not required to take an active role in planning and integrating geospatial support throughout BCT operations. Small 

steps make a large impact in this critical field, and the time 

for every engineer coordinator to start assessing geospatial 

support in his or her BCT is now. 

Endnote:

1

Field Manual 3-34.22, Engineer Operations—Brigade 

Combat Team and Below, 2 November 2009.

Captain Vermeulen is assigned to the 4th Battalion, 

413th Regiment (Senior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps), 

and serves as an assistant professor of military science at 

the University of Notre Dame, where she is also a graduate 

student. Former assignments include: commander of the 

100th Engineer Company (Geospatial); plans officer for the 

20th Engineer Brigade; and platoon, company, and staff assignments in the 30th and 37th Engineer Battalions at Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina. She holds a bachelor’s degree in government and history from Cornell University.

great Nation. The Best Sapper Competition culminates 

on Saturday morning; and the Army Engineer Association will then host an Awards Luncheon, where we will 

recognize the winners of the Itschner, Grizzly, Van Autreve, Outstanding Warrant Officer, and Outstanding 

Civilian awards. Finally, we will honor our award recipients and will present the Gold deFleury to this year’s 

winners. You can find the latest information on ENFORCE at <https://www.wood.army.mil/enforce_2012>.

We need to see you at ENFORCE, and we need to harness your minds and experiences as we shape our Engineer force for the future of our Nation. We have a packed 

agenda that will allow us to come together and celebrate 

the accomplishments and sacrifices of our units who are 

engaged in combat, and it will allow us to visualize the 

new operational environment as we build our Regiment 

to meet the challenges that come with it—just as we have 

done since 1775. 

Essayons!

(Clear the Way, continued from page 2)
48 Engineer January–April 2012

After 11 days in sweltering heat, the Soldiers of Alpha Company, Special Troops Battalion, 4th Infan-.try Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, 

reached the final training event in a brigade field training 

exercise at Fort Riley, Kansas. They awaited their chance to 

showcase their talents in conducting a dismounted complex 

obstacle breach on a wire-mine-wire obstacle. 

A platoon level complex obstacle breach requires a coordinated effort with multiple actions on the objective occurring simultaneously, which is an exceptionally difficult and 

important part of the combat engineer mission-essential 

task list in an infantry brigade combat team. Unfortunately, 

combat engineers of today do not always get to practice this 

important skill because of the myriad of other tasks they 

must accomplish in the short dwell time they have between 

deployments. The primary reason that typical engineer 

companies lack this type of training is that, in our current 

conflicts, route clearance has become the focus for combat 

engineers. The types of countermine operations now being 

performed do not require the same proficiency in complex or 

combined arms breaches—let alone the emplacement of antitank mines—as the Engineer Regiment had 15 years ago. 

However, the complex obstacle breach is still a vital task that 

needs to be continuously trained to combat engineers, young 

and old. Though not directly applicable to current operations, conditions could change at any time. It is imperative to

prevent the atrophy of skills that allow Army engineers to 

perform their core functions of providing mobility, countermobility, and survivability support to maneuver units. 

Extra dwell time allowed Alpha Company to shift its

focus onto tasks that are trained far less frequently—yet are 

no less important—than those that have been the typical 

focus of engineer-specific training. The ability to integrate 

more recent additions to the engineer mission-essential task 

list with long-standing core engineer tasks will help prepare 

the company to perform full spectrum operations. 

The Soldiers of Alpha Company entered the “train/ready” 

force pool of the Army force generation cycle in February 2011 

with an opportunity to train on individual combat engineer 

tasks; it was a chance to get back to the basics of being full 

spectrum combat engineers. Quarter by quarter, the company increased the level of training from individual and fire 

team levels to squad and section levels. They finished unified 

land operations training at the platoon level by the fourth 

quarter of fiscal year 2011. During this time, sergeants and 

staff sergeants were arming M15 and M21 antitank mines 

for the first time in years and arming a modular pack mine 

system for perhaps the first time in their careers. Equipment 

operators were digging individual and crew-served weapon 

fighting positions for the first time in years—or in their

careers—as well.

By First Lieutenant Lance E. Peterson
January–April 2012 Engineer 49

During Alpha Company’s final training exercise, each 

platoon was required to create a lane through a wire-minewire obstacle using manual techniques in the time limits established in Army doctrine. Failing to complete the breach 

to standard labeled the platoon as deficient, earning them 

a spot back at the line of departure. Some of the company 

platoon sergeants had trained on this task before, but this 

was the first experience of conducting a platoon breach for 

many junior Soldiers. This meant that platoons had an extended execution phase spread over 3 days. The first day of 

the exercise was allocated for platoon leaders to receive the 

operations order and begin troop leading procedures and rehearsals at lower levels. The execution phase consisted of a 

full day of dry runs, a full day of blank runs coupled with demolition explosive simulators, and the final day when each 

platoon conducted a live breach. 

Alpha Company took some risk in its training plan in the 

fourth quarter by focusing solely on mobility tasks because 

there was not room on the training schedule for platoon 

level, high-intensity, conflict-based countermobility tasks. 

The need to begin training on assumed deployment task requirements and equipment outweighed the need to become 

“trained” on all mission-essential tasks. The transition of 

the Engineer Regiment from a deployment-centered organization to a full spectrum operations-centered organization 

will not happen overnight. The transition won’t be complete 

until a deployable engineer unit can complete the full 2-year 

Army force generation cycle without the disruption of a

deployment. Alpha Company was fortunate to have enough 

time to train on full spectrum operations tasks and to

exercise a different style of training management at the 

company level and below. The company had only small 

amounts of required training, which left plenty of room 

on the schedule for tasks that the company leadership felt 

needed training. For the first time in years, junior leaders 

had input to help shape the direction of training and the 

training management system.

The Army has made a lot of changes to its professional 

schooling to create adaptive leaders who do not just survive, 

but thrive in an asymmetric battlefield environment. The 

future will see a decrease in deployments, so we could see 

a decrease in the number of adaptive leaders because of the 

routine and structured nature of training that focuses on the 

mission-essential task list. The key to maintaining adaptive 

leaders in a peacetime Army will depend on commanders 

who provide multifaceted training events that present leaders with unfamiliar situations. This type of training will 

force them to think critically, to be creative, and to exercise 

moral and ethical decisionmaking skills. These skills are—

and will remain—the most important traits required for

junior leaders to be ready for the next conflict as the Army 

transitions out of its decade of war.

First Lieutenant Peterson graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 2009. He is also a graduate of the Airborne, 

Air Assault, and Counter Explosive Hazard Planners Courses.

He was a platoon leader during the exercise described in this 

article and now serves as the executive officer for brigade 

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division.

Combat engineer Soldiers assault through the obstacle enroute to destroy the enemy on the objective.
50 Engineer January-April 2012

While deployed to Mosul, Iraq, during Operation 

Iraqi Freedom, the 130th Engineer Brigade struggled to use targeting methodology. To correspond 

with its major efforts, the brigade had developed four lines 

of effort (LOEs):

■ Reconstruction.

■ Assured mobility.

■ Iraqi Security Force partnership.

■ General engineering.

Then, the brigade attempted to use targeting to—

■ Give the commander situational awareness on the progress of LOEs.

■ Obtain the commander’s guidance.

■ Revise resource priorities.

However, the attempt to use the targeting process did 

not seem to work. Targeting meetings devolved into commander update briefings, the targeting working group became a rehearsal for the targeting meeting, working groups 

conducted by the LOEs had little connection to the targeting 

meetings, and intelligence was not clearly integrated into 

each LOE. Frustrated, brigade leaders reexamined and revised the targeting process. This enabled the brigade to better incorporate the LOE working groups and changed the 

commander update briefings into true targeting meetings. 

This article examines the targeting process and how engineer brigades operating in counterinsurgency or stability 

operating environments can benefit from using it. It is the 

authors’ contention that the targeting process can help engineer brigade staffs and commanders develop frameworks 

to guide and assess progress in achieving campaign objectives and end states. An effective targeting process enables 

LOEs such as assured mobility, general engineering, reconstruction, or security force assistance to conduct effective

working groups that are linked to the targeting process and 

supported by the entire staff to achieve their goals. It gives 

the staff an effective way to show the commander the progress toward objectives and end states and gives the commander the necessary framework to allocate resources and 

establish targeting priorities. 

Since “targeting is the process of selecting targets and 

matching the appropriate response to them, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities,”1

 it should 

apply across the warfighting functions and to all units. The 

targeting methodology used is a time-tested and proven cyclical method for identifying, tracking, and engaging targets, 

followed by an assessment of effectiveness. The U.S. Army 

applies the same targeting methodology to information 

operations that it does to lethal operations. Field Manual 

(FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, states that the methodology 

applies to “all operations, not just attacks against insurgents.”2

 It further states that ways to engage nonlethal targets include “CMO [civil-military operations], IO [information operations], negotiation, political programs, economic 

programs, social program and other noncombat methods.”3

The manual stops short of explaining how to use the targeting methodology in nonlethal operations or by other-thanmaneuver units. 

Targeting can effectively occur only within the context of 

an operational or tactical framework. The framework developed by the 130th Engineer Brigade allowed the commander 

and staff to “continuously assess the current situation and 

the progress of the operation and compare it with the concept of operations, mission, and commander’s intent.”4

 As 

FM 3-24 states, “operational design and execution cannot 

really be separated. They are both part of the same whole.”5

Targeting is the link between the plan design and execution; the targeting process provides flexibility to adjust to 

changing conditions, identify new opportunities to meet 

the commander’s intent, and synchronize efforts across 

the organization.6

 Prompted by several factors—including 

By Major Gary S. Bonham and Major Jakob C. Bruhl
January-April 2012 Engineer 51

coaching by the observers/trainers at the brigade mission 

readiness exercise in April 2009—the brigade staff set forth 

to apply the targeting process in its battle rhythm. 

During the exercise and the first several months of its 

subsequent deployment to Iraq, the staff struggled to

apply the methodology to its operations, which were organized along the four LOEs.

Only one of these LOEs had a traditional use for

targeting—assured mobility identified violent extremist 

networks and improvised explosive device cells to target. 

Although the brigade did not have maneuver forces available to attack these targets, the assured mobility officer in 

charge participated in the U.S. Division–North and supported brigade combat team counter improvised explosive 

device working groups. For the other three LOEs, the use of 

targeting methodology was not intuitive and, in most cases, 

was applied very loosely.

Recognizing the need to make it work effectively, the 

brigade staff began to review the targeting process by developing a targeting synchronization matrix. While this 

would help the brigade track targets, a broader framework 

of objectives linked to the desired end states of each LOE 

was required. The brigade started with the end state and 

four key objectives that had been developed for each LOE. 

Further refining these, the brigade developed intermediate 

objectives for each key objective. As key objectives were revised and intermediate objectives were developed, care was 

taken to ensure that these were worded as objectives rather 

than as tasks. For each intermediate objective, LOE officers 

in charge attempted to identify measures of performance 

(MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs), along with a 

date that the LOE was expected to reach its objective.7

 The 

MOPs and MOEs included “observable, quantifiable, objective data as well as subjective indicators to assess progress 

measured against expectations.”8

The intermediate objectives represented the basis of 

what the brigade would work toward, and the MOPs and 

MOEs provided agreed-upon goals. Targets were linked to 

one or more intermediate objectives and were tracked using 

the targeting synchronization matrix. Once that framework 

was established, the brigade could effectively use the targeting process. Using a standard “red, amber, and green” 

scale, the LOE officers in charge gave the commander a 

visual assessment of each intermediate objective during 

targeting decision briefings. Targets were derived from this 

assessment. 

Targets were identified, planned, and resourced using 

the “decide-detect-deliver-assess” methodology described 

in FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 

the Targeting Process.

9

 The LOE assessment provided the 

tool to identify potential targets. For example, if an intermediate objective was assessed as “red,” the LOE officer 

in charge would be expected at least to have considered 

proposing a target to address that particular objective. 

(This was not a rigid requirement, and a target was not 

required if circumstances dictated otherwise.) However, if 

an intermediate objective was assessed as “green,” there 

was no expectation for a proposed target, although there 

could be a reason to identify one to sustain the current 

assessment.

In most cases, a traditional understanding of the decide

function applied: 

■ Developing priorities for tasking assets.

■ Gathering and processing information.

■ Determining a method to attack (or in most cases for the 

engineer brigade, affect or influence) the target.

■ Assessing the effectiveness of the attack.

The detect function took a bit of a cognitive stretch to 

apply to the engineer brigade operations. Instead of determining which intelligence assets to devote to positively 

identifying the target, this function was combined with the 

deliver function to describe how the desired results should 

be reached. In most cases, the target was already identified. 

Since they were not moving targets in the traditional sense, 

detection did not neatly apply.

Intelligence related to each LOE was incorporated into 

working groups. Some reporting was used to provide cultural 

background, while more reliable intelligence was integrated 

into target development. LOE officers in charge developed 

targets to mitigate a threat or capitalize on an assessed

enemy vulnerability. By doing so, intelligence-driven operations became more obvious and allowed the commander to 

determine if the MOPs and MOEs should be adjusted to satisfy the desired end state. 

The deliver function—“a technical solution,”10—applied; 

but instead of choosing specific attack units and the type 

of ordnance, it described how to execute the plan. In some 

cases, the delivery method resulted in a fragmentary order 

to subordinate units; in other cases, it led to staff action. The

assess function was applied with very little deviation from 

the traditional understanding within targeting. Instead of 

assessing battle damage and munitions effects, targets were 

“Since ‘targeting is the process 

of selecting targets and matching 

the appropriate response to them, 

taking into account operational 

requirements and capabilities,’ it 

should apply across warfighting 

functions and to all units.”
52 Engineer January-April 2012

assessed against the MOPs and MOEs identified during target development. In most cases, these were more subjective 

than quantitative.

Identifying the target, determining how to deliver required actions, and assessing their effectiveness are critical 

steps. In order to turn them into action, they must be approved by the commander. The brigade staff used a series of 

tools to inform the commander and seek decisions. Charts 

linked proposed targets to intermediate objectives and outlined the concept of the operation for the targets.

The final step in linking the targeting process with the 

campaign plan was to reassess the intermediate objectives 

upon the successful completion of a target or after the occurrence of outside events that could have an influence on 

an intermediate objective. From the updated intermediate 

objective assessment, the key objectives could be reassessed. 

Finally, a summary chart aided the brigade commander’s 

understanding of the brigade progress toward the defined 

end state and provided a framework for additional guidance. 

This summary chart was presented every 2 weeks during 

the targeting decision briefing.

The 2-week targeting cycle evolved throughout the deployment. The brigade began with a 1-week cycle. After a 

few months of this battle rhythm, the staff agreed that it 

was too short for the pace of operations. Too much time was 

being spent preparing for meetings at which little change 

was presented. By changing to a 2-week targeting cycle, the 

brigade remained nested in its higher headquarters targeting cycle, provided adequate time for staff and subordinate 

units to effect change, and reduced the meeting preparation burden on the staff, which freed up more time to effect change. The brigade targeting cycle was driven by LOE 

working groups, which met weekly and fed into the bimonthly targeting working group that met the day before the targeting decision briefing to the commander. The targeting 

working group brought the staff together “to synchronize the 

targeting process and obtain approval for and/or changes to 

the targeting products.”11

With the new battle rhythm, the staff had a more interactive and productive targeting working group that was 

no longer just a rehearsal for the upcoming briefing to the 

commander. Instead, the group had time to vet and discuss 

new targets, analyze and debate new assessments of intermediate and key objectives, and adjust following the working group. This translated into a more productive targeting 

decision briefing. Targets were now linked to intermediate 

objectives that were linked to the key objectives that were 

linked to the end state. Assessments of enemy actions and 

environmental factors were fully integrated into each LOE. 

The commander could look at the targets, compare them to 

his targeting priorities and the LOE assessments, and make 

a quick visual determination if they were in agreement. Another benefit of the new battle rhythm and revised targeting 

process was that they allowed the commander to review the 

targeting briefing before the meeting and prepare guidance 

and questions. 

Targeting is not just for maneuver units; the process has 

great value for engineer brigades that are conducting counterinsurgency or stability operations. The effective use of 

the targeting methodology allowed the 130th Engineer Brigade to link targets to desired end states. It also allowed 

the brigade to conduct effective assessments of progress 

toward the desired end states through the intermediate 

and key objectives developed in support of the targeting 

process. The targeting process that the 130th Engineer 

Brigade developed during Operation Iraqi Freedom was an 

important contributing factor to brigade success and can 

serve as an example for other engineer brigades to use in 

the future. 

Endnotes:

1

FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the 

Targeting Process, 8 May 1996, p. 1-1. (Superseded by FM 

3-60, The Targeting Process, 26 November 2010.)

2

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 15 December 2006, para. 

5-100.

3

Ibid, para. 5-103.

4

FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001, para. 5-84.

5

FM 3-24, para. 5-116.

6

FM 6-20-10, p. 1-1.

7

FM 3-0.

8

FM 3-24, para. 5-96.

9

FM 6-20-10. 

10Ibid, p. 1-6.

11FM 3-09.12, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 

Field Artillery Target Acquisition, 21 June 2002, p. 1-6.

Major Bonham is the executive officer for the 84th Engineer Battalion. He holds a bachelor’s degree from the University of Nevada, Reno; a master’s degree from the University 

of Missouri–Rolla (now Missouri University of Science and 

Technology); and a master’s of military art and science from 

the Naval War College. He is a professional engineer in the 

state of Nevada. When this article was written, he was the 

plans officer for the 130th Engineer Brigade.

Major Bruhl is the officer in charge of the 14th Engineer Detachment. He holds a bachelor’s degree from RoseHulman Institute of Technology; master’s degrees from the 

University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign and the University of Missouri–Rolla (now Missouri University of Science 

and Technology); and a master of military art and science 

degree from the U.S. Air Force Air University. He is a professional engineer in the state of Missouri. When this article was 

written, he was the design engineer for the 130th Engineer 

Brigade.
January–April 2012 Engineer 53

I

magine my excitement as I considered my assignment to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 

(SHAPE), in Mons, Belgium. But upon arriving, that 

excitement turned into a growing confusion, culminating 

in the question: What do you mean, “SHAPE isn’t NATO 

headquarters”? Thus began 6 weeks of learning the basics 

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), followed 

by a year of discovering how much more there was to learn. 

While our alliance partners may easily serve multiple NATO 

assignments during their military careers, U.S. Army Soldiers rarely receive even one NATO assignment in a typical 

career. From my own experience, and the similar experience 

of most of my U.S. Army peers working in NATO, I believe 

that our U.S. Army education (formal and informal) about 

NATO is severely lacking. However, as the United States 

moves to a more austere future budget (just as our alliance 

partners are doing), we are likely to conduct more operations with NATO. Thus, to be effective contributors in these 

future operations, we need to obtain a better working knowledge of NATO structures and operations, dispel some misconceptions about NATO, and review some practical tips. 

NATO Overview

I

n April 1949, 12 countries formed NATO by signing the 

North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C., to ensure 

the collective defense of North America and Europe. 

From its inception, NATO has remained a political and military alliance to prevent conflict. With six expansions from 

1952 to 2009, NATO has grown to an alliance of 28 nations, 

headquartered in Brussels, Belgium. At the Lisbon Summit 

in 2010, NATO adopted a new strategic concept with three 

key tasks:

■ Collective defense.

■ Crisis management.

■ Cooperative security. 

Another key item from the Lisbon Summit was the commitment to undertake the largest reorganization of NATO 

command structures to date. When the reorganization is 

complete, currently planned for 2013, NATO will retain the 

headquarters in Brussels, supported by two subordinate 

strategic headquarters: Allied Command Transformation 

and Allied Command Operations. 

Allied Command Transformation

Allied Command Transformation, based in Norfolk, 

Virginia, will continue to ensure the interoperabil-

.ity and continued transformation of NATO; 

its roles are parallel to many roles of the former U.S. 

Joint Forces Command. In addition, Allied Command

Transformation oversees the 16 NATO centers of excellence. With functions similar to the U.S. Army Engineer 

School, the NATO Military Engineering Centre of Excellence is in Ingolstadt, Germany. NATO also maintains 

the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence 

in Trencin, Slovakia, and the Counter Improvised Explosive Devices Centre of Excellence in Madrid, Spain. These

facilities are critical resources for training, standardization, and doctrine development. 

Allied Command Operations

Allied Command Operations, led by SHAPE in Belgium, will continue to serve as the strategic com-.mand responsible for executing NATO operations. 

At the end of the reorganization in 2013, it will oversee two 

subordinate joint force commands, to be located in Naples, 

Italy, and Brunssum, the Netherlands. It is through these 

joint force commands that NATO will oversee its six ongoing operations. Most familiar to Americans are the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and 

the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo. However, NATO also 

conducts three other operations:

■ Operation Ocean Shield, which provides security to the 

seas off the Horn of Africa.

■ Operation Active Endeavor, which deters terrorism

throughout the Mediterranean region.

■ NATO support to the African Union, which provides critical support to stabilize Africa. 

Additionally, NATO successfully completed the following 

significant operations in 2011:

■ NATO Training Mission–Iraq, which helped develop the 

Iraqi Security Forces.

■ Operation Unified Protector, which helped protect the 

civilian population of Libya.

Misconceptions About NATO

Not only must we understand NATO to be better contributors to possible future alliance operations, but 

we must also leave behind several common misconceptions about NATO. 

 The United States pays 50 percent of NATO costs.

This is one of the most common—and most misleading—

sound bites I hear. The U.S. share of NATO expenses is 

currently 22 percent.1

 While the United States contributes 

the largest single share of the NATO budget, the costsharing percentages are based generally on the size of 

By Lieutenant Colonel Chris Becking

What Do You Mean, “SHAPE Isn’t NATO Headquarters”?
54 Engineer January–April 2012

national economies and have been agreed to by all 28 alliance nations. The 50 percent figure often mentioned in the 

media is more correctly related to the comparison of the U.S. 

annual defense budget with the budgets of other alliance 

members. If combined with the defense budgets of all other 

NATO nations, the U.S. annual defense budget would account for more than 50 percent of defense spending by all 

NATO nations. The bottom line is that we aren’t paying 

more than half of NATO costs; we are spending more on our 

own defense than the other 27 NATO countries combined. 

NATO countries/forces/personnel don’t do anything.

This is another favorite complaint of American service members; and again, it is far from the truth. Consider that France 

(a popular target for U.S. criticism) has approximately 

13,000 personnel deployed throughout the world, with half 

of those in Africa alone. Or that Italy has maintained more 

than 2,500 personnel deployed to Lebanon since 2007. These 

are only two examples of numerous ally commitments. 

The efforts of our NATO allies in these conflict areas have 

freed the United States to devote resources elsewhere. On a 

smaller scale, remember that U.S. Army engineers recently 

renewed the development of several critical capabilities—

including mine clearing and the use of mine detection dogs—

by learning from allies who have been employing them in 

conflicts throughout the world almost continually for years. 

While we may always wish that our allies could do more to 

support the United States, we need to fully understand what 

they are already doing to help us. 

NATO forces have too many caveats to be effective.

This misconception is often quoted by the media in reference to the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. For example, of 

the 49 nations contributing troops to ISAF, few have provided their forces with no caveats—even the United States 

provides guidance on the employment of its forces. While 

some caveats are more restrictive than others, they are a 

reflection of national political climates, not of the militaries 

themselves. As Soldiers, we need to respect the capabilities 

of each military and accept the fact that they operate within 

the limitations their governments establish, just as we do in 

the United States.

Americans do all the work on any NATO staff/

exercise/operation. Many Americans make this claim, 

which is simply not true. While most NATO partners will 

readily acknowledge the hard work and contributions of 

Americans, they can just as easily point to instances where 

Americans don’t fully appreciate the contributions of other 

partners. U.S. Soldiers should be proud of their reputation 

for representing their country well and carrying their share 

of the workload. However, they should always acknowledge 

the unique contributions of all NATO partners. 

Tips for Success at NATO

Whether you find yourself assigned to a NATO headquarters or leading your platoon on a joint project 

with a platoon from another NATO country, there 

are a few simple steps to success in any NATO environment.

Leave the bragging at home. Most NATO personnel 

are fully aware of U.S. military capabilities compared to 

their own. You need not remind them of this; NATO is no 

place for boasting about your own country. 

Learn to listen. Many NATO partners have wide experience and would be happy to share with those who will listen. 

Ask questions to solicit their views; and then listen to their 

response, only speaking to ask clarifying questions. 

Understand what consensus means in NATO. Contrary to what occurs in most American military culture, 

many NATO meetings are more about building consensus 

rather than making decisions. All views are considered and 

valued; decisions often are not delivered until a consensus 

is reached. 

Be thankful you speak English. While many of our allies are forced to learn English to operate in NATO, we don’t 

have to overcome this additional hurdle. Appreciate the efforts of our allies to learn and speak English. Be patient and 

supportive as you communicate with each other.

Appreciate the long-term views of NATO nations.

Americans are routinely characterized as being interested 

only in short-term goals. Many of our alliance partners take 

much longer views of issues, big and small. While a bit different from our own, these world views can be particularly 

helpful in developing solutions to difficult problems. 

Go for coffee. This may sound silly, but surprising progress can be made in developing a working relationship by 

simply sitting down to talk. Get to know your alliance partners in a relaxed setting; your working relationship will go 

more smoothly from there. 

Even if you don’t find yourself assigned to a NATO position in the near future, the chances of U.S. Army engineers 

working with NATO allies continue to increase. Keeping in 

mind the basic NATO history and structure, dispelling the 

common misconceptions, and acting on a few practical tips 

will ensure that your NATO interaction won’t leave you feeling as lost and confused as I once was. 

Endnote:

1

NATO Resource Policy and Planning Board, “NATO 

Common-Funded Budgets and Programmes–Cost Share 

Arrangements Valid from 1/1/2010 to 31/12/2011,” <www

.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_01/20101102

_NATO_common_funded_budgets_2010-2011.pdf>, accessed

 on 25 January 2012.

Lieutenant Colonel Becking is an engineer operations officer for NATO at SHAPE, Belgium. He holds a bachelor’s 

degree in mechanical engineering from the University of 

Michigan and a master’s degree in mechanical engineering 

from Auburn University.
January–April 2012 Engineer 55

Alpha Company, 4th Special Troops Battalion, 4th 

Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, was 

.responsible for four districts along Afghanistan’s 

border with Pakistan in southern Nangarhar Province. The 

company inherited the mission of connecting the local population to the government, separating them from antigovernment forces, and improving economic opportunities in the 

4,000-square-kilometer area. The company partnered with 

four district governors, five district police forces, an Afghan 

border patrol company, and two Afghan National Army infantry companies. It was a challenging opportunity for an 

engineer company with two platoons, an attached platoon of 

military police Soldiers, and a pair of howitzers.

After 60 days in theater, it was obvious that there was 

still a large fundamental gap in knowledge of the cultural 

geography in the company area of operations. Geospatial intelligence provided a comprehensive representation of the 

physical terrain, but we did not know local naming conventions to describe small villages inside the district boundaries. The local population used the names of small villages, 

rather than political district boundaries, to describe locations, thereby hampering the effectiveness of local reporting. Also, our contact with local leadership ended with the 

appointed district governor. With tribal leadership such a 

driving force in Afghan society, we knew that communicating with the elders was essential to understanding the disconnected populace. We needed access, and we needed it in 

concert with the district governors.

Solution

Operation Jantacular was developed as a 45-day 

survey program to meet over breakfast with the

elders of each village to produce a geodetic product

representing the human terrain in our area of operations. 

Jantacular is a British term for breakfast, which was appropriate for our intent. The aim was to meet with the leaders 

of one village daily. This would allow us to get the data to 

complete the survey, which would help us understand the 

fundamental challenges and let us spend more of our deployment time tackling them. Entering the data into the geospatial intelligence database would ensure that the information 

lived beyond our deployment. 

Preparation

I

t was decided that three to four village elders would 

be the right size group, large enough to feel comfortable among Americans, but small enough to discourage 

sidebar conversations. Our civil-military Jantacular Team 

was composed of an American civilian law enforcement professional, a district support team (composed of representatives from the U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for 

International Development), the company intelligence team 

leader, platoon leaders (if available), and the company commander. At least one interpreter attended to facilitate the 

mission. It quickly became apparent that choosing the right 

interpreter and maintaining consistency were important for 

success. “James” was our best interpreter, able to anticipate 

issues with less direction from us.

The primary district governor in the Khogyani tribal 

region provided us with initial information, describing the 

names and general location of the 44 villages in our four 

districts. He pointed them out on our tactical operations 

center wall map, which we roughly outlined. He set up 

meetings with village elders, as did his counterparts in the

other districts. Their cooperation was essential and greatly

appreciated. 

By Major Christopher J. Scott
56 Engineer January–April 2012

Large printouts of each village, without any added graphics or layers, formed the centerpiece for our discussions. The 

village elders understood the imagery much better when it 

was oriented on a horizontal surface, rather than hanging 

on the wall. Once, after an especially grueling 2-hour session, all of our work had to be redone when the elders discovered that we had not oriented the mountains on our imagery 

toward the real Tora Bora Mountains and all the features 

had been identified at the wrong end of the map.

We contracted to have a traditional breakfast of flatbread, sweet cream, water, and tea to serve our guests when

visiting elders came to the gate of our forward operating 

base. This flexibility was important since the visitors often 

arrive an hour early or 2 hours late. 

By hosting the meeting at our base (and occasionally providing travel reimbursement), we could conduct Jantacular 

Team meetings whenever the locals were available. Meetings did not affect our patrol schedule or require manpower 

outside of the team. 

Execution

The company intelligence support team and an interpreter escorted the elders from the front gate to 

the meeting room, where we made introductions, 

engaged in small talk, and exchanged cell phone numbers. 

Refreshments were served as we began talking about their 

village. The best meetings began with questions about local history, giving the leaders a chance to brag about their 

village. For mapping, we tried to distinguish the boundaries of the village first; and then we helped the elders find 

their own qalats (walled living compounds), on the map. 

Anyone who has spent hours exploring Google EarthTM 

knows how much fun this can be. Once they found their own 

homes, the elders were usually well oriented to the imagery

and could identify the locations of hospitals, schools, 

mosques, powerful families, and terrain features such as 

hills and streams.

Output

Once an initial map 

survey was complete, the data was 

transcribed into the Tactical 

Ground Reporting System. 

This turned grid coordinates 

into a village name, which 

allowed the operations center to assist in battle tracking and to coordinate with 

the Afghan National Police. 

It also facilitated “tip line” 

operations by translating a

village name into grid coordinates for U.S. patrols. Communication with local nationals improved when we

could use their local village 

names to narrow down the location of a story rather than using vague descriptions such as “2 miles from the old, burnedout Russian tank” as landmarks. Additionally, we created a 

PowerPoint® map of our operating environment, which was 

useful for describing various village metrics in reports to 

higher headquarters.

Once the maps had been transcribed internally, we 

shipped them off to the brigade geospatial intelligence cell 

for data entry. The geospatial intelligence cell then provided 

us with a new tactical operations center map, complete with 

village boundaries, locations of hospitals and mosques, and 

local names of major terrain features. They also provided 

high-resolution imagery of each village, which was compiled 

in binders for patrol leaders to take on missions. This document was very helpful in gathering information from local 

nationals and using the air-to-ground integration of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information during 

cordon-and-search missions.

Conclusion

Operation Jantacular provided information that the 

company used to drive most of its follow-on missions, and the data it produced facilitated a successful battlefield hand-off at the end of the deployment. Without the initial survey, we would have continued business as 

usual and left the follow-on unit with the same knowledge 

gaps that had been passed down for nearly a decade. 

Major Scott was the commander of Alpha Company during its deployment in Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. He 

currently serves in the Pittsburgh District, Lakes and Rivers Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. He is a 

graduate of the Engineer Officer Basic Course, the Engineer 

Captains Career Course, and the Topographic Officer Management Course. He holds a bachelor’s degree in historic 

preservation from the University of Mary Washington in 

Fredericksburg, Virginia. 

An engineer Soldier provides security during a meeting with tribal leaders.
January–April 2012 Engineer 57

The Overland Campaign of the Civil War began on

4 May 1864 and lasted 45 days. Stalemated at almost 

every turn, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant 

continually attempted to sidestep General Robert E. Lee’s 

right flank as the forces moved south until the two armies 

came to rest and entrenched at Cold Harbor, Virginia. Grant 

changed his strategy thereafter by marching across the 

Chickahominy River, crossing the James River unopposed, 

and attempting to seize the Confederate transportation hub 

at Petersburg, Virginia, on the Appomattox River. This article examines the operations of Company A, U.S. Engineer 

Battalion, during the campaign, especially its actions on

14 June 1864 when the battalion assisted the Engineer Brigade of the Army of the Potomac erect a ponton bridge across 

the James River. The second part will examine the demographics of the unit, based on a study of the relevant muster 

rolls and the service and pension records of the officers and 

enlisted men assigned to the company at that time. 

The Overland Campaign

Company A was originally formed as the Company of 

Sappers and Miners at the beginning of the Mexican 

War on 16 May 1846, with an authorized strength of 

150 engineers. It was organized at West Point, New York, 

and ordered to Mexico. The unit rendered distinguished service in that conflict during the campaign to capture Mexico 

City. It engaged in reconnoitering and constructing fortifications and battery positions and served as infantry at the 

battles of Molina Del Rey and Chapultepec.1, 2

In August 1861, the company was expanded into a battalion of four companies and the original unit was restyled 

Company A. Although the official name adopted was the 

Battalion of Sappers, Miners, and Pontoniers, it continued 

to be known as the U.S. Engineer Battalion in most orders 

and correspondence. Battalion strength was authorized at 

600 officers and men. Company B was recruited in Portland, 

Maine, and Company C in Boston, Massachusetts. By 1 July 

1862, however, the battalion only numbered 276 men on the 

rolls. That November, Company D (organized from drafts 

of the other three companies) joined the battalion, but all 

companies remained short of men until the War Department

authorized Regular Army units to recruit from volunteer 

regiments in October 1862.3

In the closing stages of the Overland Campaign, the opposing armies were stalemated east of Richmond around 

Cold Harbor 1–12 June 1864. The regular engineers left 

By Mr. Donald J. McConnell and Mr. Gustav J. Person

Past in Review

Brilliant Scenes:

Army Engineers in the Overland Campaign

This photo of the James River ponton bridge, taken by Timothy O’Sullivan from the north bank, shows trestle work and 

anchoring schooners.

Photo courtesy Library of Congress
58 Engineer January–April 2012

their camp on 12 June and crossed the Chickahominy River 

on a ponton bridge erected by the 50th New York Volunteer 

Engineers. They arrived at Weyanoke Point on the James 

River at about 1400 on 14 June. The regulars started work 

on a 150-foot-long trestlework through the muddy marshes 

and began assembling the ponton bridge with two companies on each bank. Concurrently, the infantry Soldiers from 

three Army corps began ferrying across the river farther upstream. Construction of the bridge began at about 1600 and 

took 7 hours to complete. The bridge stretched 2,170 feet 

and incorporated 101 ponton boats.4, 5, 6, 7

The bridge was in operation until 17 June. All artillery, cavalry, wheeled vehicles, and trains of the Army of 

the Potomac—plus a herd of 3,000 cattle—crossed without 

incident or the loss of a single wagon or piece of artillery. 

It was, as The New York Times reported, “. . . one of the 

most brilliant scenes of the war.”8

 Following its disassembly, 

the components were towed upriver to City Point, Virginia. 

Meanwhile, the assault on Petersburg on 15 June was successful, but an untimely halt in the operation allowed the 

Confederates to seal the breach. Three days later, the Army 

of the Potomac settled down to a siege of the Confederate 

defenses for the next 9 months.9

While the crossing proceeded, the Engineer Battalion 

moved out of the bridgehead on 16 June on an 18-mile march 

that took them closer to the new siege lines. In the following weeks, personnel reconnoitered and surveyed the enemy 

lines, built artillery batteries and fortifications, and conducted various mobility operations.

The Company

When Congress created the battalion in August 

1861, it failed to allow for a command and staff 

element. Consequently, command of the battalion 

usually devolved on the senior officer; in June 1864, this 

was Captain George H. Mendell, who also commanded Company B. Captain Mendell graduated from the U.S Military 

Academy in 1852. After the Overland Campaign, he was

Captain George H. Mendell

Company A Soldiers pose at Petersburg, Virginia, in August 1864.

Photo courtesy Library of Congress

Photo courtesy Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
January–April 2012 Engineer 59

promoted to major and received a brevet promotion to

lieutenant colonel for distinguished service during the recent campaign on 15 August 1864.10

Throughout most of June 1864, only five officers were 

assigned to the battalion; and because these officers were 

often employed on detached engineer duties, the four companies were usually operationally commanded by noncommissioned officers.11, 12, 13, 14

During the latter part of the campaign, First Lieutenant 

William H.H. Benyaurd, commander of Company A since 

10 June, also served as battalion adjutant. First Lieutenant Benyaurd, a native of Pennsylvania, graduated from the 

U.S. Military Academy in 1863. He received a brevet promotion to captain on 1 August 1864 for meritorious service 

during the Overland Campaign. In 1897, he was awarded 

the Medal of Honor for gallantry at the battle of Five Forks, 

Virginia, on 1 April 1865.15

During the war, Company A experienced three large 

strength changes. In July 1862, the company lost 22 men 

on transfer to the other companies in the battalion. In late 

October 1862, the company received a total of 61 Soldiers 

who transferred from various state volunteer regiments. Finally, 30 Soldiers reenlisted en masse at the winter camp at 

Brandy Station, Virginia, in February 1864.16

 By the end of May 1864, Company A was at half strength. 

The aggregate strength was 106 enlisted men and one officer, but only 84 were present for duty. Duty in the field and 

sick men being treated locally further cut the available company strength to just 78.17

The histories of three Soldiers help describe the varied 

backgrounds of Company A Soldiers. The first was Edwin 

Austin, a 22-year-old clerk from New York City. Austin was 

a combat veteran who enlisted in November 1860 and was 

shot through the right lung while crossing the Chickahominy River in June 1862. He was discharged for disability that 

October; but by February 1864, he had recovered sufficiently 

to reenlist in his old unit. Private Austin would survive the 

war, eventually marrying and settling in Washington, D.C.18

Although on detached duty at Portland, Maine, since 

1863, Frederick Gerber, a German immigrant and Mexican War veteran, was carried on the wartime muster rolls 

as the assigned company first sergeant. He served at Portland on recruiting duty after suffering from “Chickahominy

fever” (malaria) and scurvy. In November 1871, Gerber was 

awarded the Medal of Honor for 32 years of gallant and distinguished service. He was the first engineer Soldier to be 

so honored.19

First Lieutenant William H.H. Benyaurd

The Overland Campaign, May–June 1864

Photo courtesy Office of History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Map courtesy of Master Sergeant Paul Jenkins, U.S. Army (Retired)
60 Engineer January–April 2012

The service record of Corporal William Collins does not 

reflect the qualities he demonstrated to earn his promotion, 

but he obviously overcame serious problems. A New York 

native, Collins enlisted in the company in December 1853 

at the age of 22 and reenlisted in December 1858. In March 

1861, Collins went over the hill and was not caught until 3 

years later. Returned to the company on 22 March 1864, he 

was tried by court-martial, sentenced to make good the time 

lost to desertion, and demoted to private. Clearly, Collins 

must have made a choice to live up to his responsibilities.

He was promoted to artificer20 on 1 May and to corporal on 

10 June. Collins would become a sergeant before leaving 

the service in January 1865, although he does not appear to 

have served out the remainder of the time lost to desertion.21

At the beginning of the Civil War, the Regular Army 

was largely filled with immigrants. The Irish, followed by 

the Germans, were the predominant immigrant groups. The 

preenlistment occupations for these Soldiers ran the gamut 

of most trades in the mid-19th century. Farmers headed the 

list, followed by laborers. Most occupations in the company 

were not engineer-specific. There were only six blacksmiths, 

four boatmen (a skill desirable for engineers doing ponton 

boat work), 11 carpenters, and four masons/stone cutters. 

The three shoemakers and one tailor undoubtedly assisted 

in keeping uniforms and leather equipment in serviceable 

condition.22 The company muster rolls for the period, certified by Captain Mendell, noted that the discipline, instruction, military appearance, arms, accoutrements, and 

equipment were all rated as “good.” At least four men of the 

original company group were commissioned during and after the war.23

Desertion posed a constant problem for the Regular Army 

during the 19th century. Company A, however, was notably 

cohesive. Despite the hardships of the campaign, not a single Soldier deserted in May or June 1864. Fortunately, the 

company experienced no combat-related casualties during 

the campaign. This fact, however, should not detract from 

the sterling work and devotion to duty rendered by this outstanding engineer unit.

Endnotes:

1

Clayton R. Newell and Charles R. Shrader, Of Duty Well 

and Faithfully Done: A History of the Regular Army in the 

Civil War, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, Nebraska, 

2011, p. 286.

2

Thomas Turtle, History of the Engineer Battalion, Read 

Before the Essayons Club of the Corps of Engineers, DEC 

21st 1868, Battalion Press, Willets Point, New York, 1868, 

No. VIII, Printed Papers, pp. 1–2.

3

Newell and Shrader, pp. 287–289.

4

Turtle, p. 8.

5

Lieutenant General U.S. Grant, “Dispatches, 14 June 

1864,” The New York Times, 16 June 1864.

6

Gilbert Thompson, The Engineer Battalion in the Civil 

War,” Press of the Engineer School, Washington Barracks, 

D.C., 1910, pp. 68–70.

7

Captain George Mendell’s Report, 5 August 1864, in U.S. 

War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation 

of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 

Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1891, Series 

1, Vol. XL, Part 1, pp. 300–301.

8

Special Correspondent, The New York Times, 17 June 

1864.

9

Thompson, p. 70.

10Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary 

of the United States Army, From Its Organization, September 29, 1789 to March 2, 1903, Government Printing Office, 

Washington, D.C., 1903, p. 702. 

11Newell and Shrader, p. 290.

12U.S. Returns from Regular Army Infantry Regiments, 

1821–1916 (database on line) Provo, Utah: <www.Ancestry

.com> (hereinafter Regimental Returns).

13National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) 

Microfilm Publication M665, Rolls I-244, pp. 297–300.

14Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, 1780s–1917, 

Record Groups (RG) 94 and 391.

The 1864 winter camp of the U.S. Engineer Battalion at Brandy Station, Virginia.

Photo courtesy Library of Congress
January–April 2012 Engineer 61

15Heitman, p. 213.

16Register of Graduates, Association of Graduates, West 

Point, New York, 2000, pp. 4–42.

17Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, 1780s–1917, 

Muster Rolls of the Regular Army Organizations, 1784–

October 31, 1912, NARA.

The U.S. Engineer Battalion stand of 

colors was issued in 1866.

Photo courtesy Burk and McFetridge24

18Regimental Returns.

19Soldier’s Certificate No. 128014, NARA, Civil War 

Pension Index: General Index to Pension Files, 1861–1934,

(database on line) Provo, Utah: <www.Ancestry.com>.

20Eugene V. McAndrews, “Sergeant Major Frederick 

Gerber, Engineer Legend,” The Military Engineer, No. 414, 

July–August 1971, pp. 240–41.

21An artificer was an enlisted Soldier with special technical skills. Artificers earned $4 more than the $13 earned by 

ordinary privates.

22U.S. Army Register of Enlistment, 1798–1914, Provo,

Utah: <www.Ancestry.com>, Register of Enlistment in the 

U.S. Army, 1798–1914, NARA, Microfilm Publication M233, 

Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, 1780s–1917, 

RG 94.

23Ibid.

24Flags of the Army of the United States Carried During the War of Rebellion, 1861–1865, Burk and McFetridge, 

Philadephia, Pennsylvania, 1888.

Mr. McConnell is a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate 

School and the National War College. He now works for the 

Department of Defense. 

Mr. Person is the installation historian at Fort Belvoir, 

Virginia. He has bachelor’s and master’s degrees in history 

from Queens College in New York City.

Dedication

The following members of the Engineer Regiment have been lost in overseas contingency operations since the

last issue of Engineer. We dedicate this issue to them.

Private First Class Adam E. Dobereiner 937th Route Clearance Company, 8th Engineer Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas 

36th Engineer Brigade

Sergeant Brian J. Leonhardt 713th Engineer Company (Sapper), 113th Engineer Battalion, Valparaiso, Indiana

81st Troop Command

Sergeant John A. Lyons 572d Engineer Company, 8th Engineer Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas

36th Engineer Brigade

Specialist Christopher A. Patterson 713th Engineer Company (Sapper), 113th Engineer Battalion, Valparaiso, Indiana

81st Troop Command

Specialist Robert J. Tauteris Jr. 713th Engineer Company (Sapper), 113th Engineer Battalion, Valparaiso, Indiana

81st Troop Command