TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

F-22 Development and

Testing Delays

Indicate Need for

Limit on Low-Rate

Production

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committee

March 2001

P U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1991-523-762

GAO-01-310 Printed copies of this document will be available shortly.

GAO Form 171 Rev. (3/99)
GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft Page 1

CONTENTS

LETTER 2

APPENDIXES

Appendix I: Air Force Assessment of Development and Test Criteria

Required to Proceed to Low-Rate Initial Production 27

Appendix II: Comparison of Schedules for First Flight

Dates of Test Aircraft 28

Appendix III: Estimates of Performance for Key Parameters 29

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense 31

Appendix V: GAO Staff Acknowledgements 33

RELATED GAO PRODUCTS 34

TABLES

Table 1: Planned Versus Actual Assembly Hours

for Recently Completed Aircraft 9

Table 2: Delays in Planned Completion of Static and

Fatigue Structural Integrity Tests 13

Table 3: Additional Testing Required to Fully

Demonstrate F-22 Capabilities 18

Table 4: Remaining F-22 Development Funding 20

Table 5: F-22 Post-Development Funding Planned

for Fiscal Years 2004 to 2007 21

FIGURES

Figure 1: Comparison of Actual and Planned Flight-Test Hours,

and Flight-Test Hours Planned at Completion 8

Figure 2: Flight-Test Aircraft Delays from First Flight Dates

to Start of Flight-Testing at the Flight Test Center 10

Figure 3: Comparison of Actual, Planned and Needed Airframe

Flight-Test Point Accomplishment Rates 11

Figure 4: Planned Versus Actual Avionics Flight-Test

Hour Accomplishment for 2000 12

Figure 5: Comparison of Actual and Projected Cost Growth Above Budget,

January Through December 2000 15

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense
Page 2 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548

March 15, 2001

Congressional Committees

As you know, the Air Force is developing the F-22 aircraft—which is designed with

advanced features to allow it to be less detectable to adversaries, capable of high speeds for

long ranges, and able to provide the pilot with substantially improved awareness of the

surrounding situation through the use of integrated aviation electronics (avionics). These

features are expected to permit the F-22 to penetrate adversary airspace, operate with limited

interference, and destroy targets in the air as well as on the ground. In view of past increases

in cost estimates to complete development, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 19981 limited the cost of F-22 development to $20.443 billion, as adjusted under the

act’s provisions. The act requires us to annually assess whether the Air Force’s engineering

and manufacturing development program for the F-22 aircraft is meeting key goals. The act

also requires us to assess whether we had access to sufficient information to make informed

judgments on matters covered by our report.

The Air Force began F-22 engineering and manufacturing development in1991, and it

planned in December 2000 to complete ground and flight-testing in August 2002, to be

followed by a year of operational tests and evaluation to demonstrate the aircraft’s

operational suitability and effectiveness. Completion of operational tests and evaluation will

mark the end of F-22 development. Concurrent with these development activities, the Air

Force plans to initiate low-rate production of F-22s, beginning with 10 aircraft in fiscal year

2001. This increases to 16 aircraft in fiscal year 2002.

In March 2000,2 we reported that the Air Force had made progress in achieving its schedule

goals and demonstrating expected F-22 performance. However, some tests and scheduled

activities were delayed because of continuing problems delivering flight-test aircraft on time.

We also reported that, according to the Air Force, if these problems persisted, as much as 37

to 50 percent of the total planned flight-test program would not be completed as scheduled.

Additionally, we reported that the Air Force had identified potential cost growth but had

planned to mitigate this growth through offsetting cost reductions.

This report discusses (1) the extent to which the development program is meeting its

schedule, cost, and performance goals, including whether the program is likely to be

completed within the congressional cost limitation; (2) the status of F-22 modifications; (3)

the development plan for fiscal year 2002; and (4) the Air Force’s plan to increase the annual

 

1 P.L.105-85, Nov. 18, 1997.

2 F-22 Aircraft: Development Cost Goal Achievable If Major Problems Are Avoided (GAO/NSIAD-00-68,

March 14, 2000).
Page 3 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

rate of initial production of F-22 aircraft before the development program is completed. This

report was initially prepared based on the status and progress of the F-22 program through

December 2000 and a draft was provided to DOD for comments in January 2001. The

report, for the most part, identifies DOD’s progress in meeting goals through December

2000, but also includes information about activities and events that occurred in January

through early March 2001.

RESULTS IN BRIEF

The F-22 program did not meet its schedule goals for 2000, the cost to complete development

as now planned may exceed the congressionally established limitation, and the program is

not far enough along in flight-testing to confirm Department of Defense (DOD) estimates of

weapon system performance. First, while progress was made toward achieving test

requirements to evaluate the aircraft’s capabilities, problems and delays were encountered

with the assembly and delivery of flight-test aircraft. Test aircraft that were delivered were

not ready for flight-testing and the operations of the flight-test program were not as efficient

as planned. These delays prevented the Air Force from completing the flight-test hours

planned for 2000, and, when coupled with delays from prior years, make it unlikely that the

flight-test program, as now structured, can be completed by August 2002, as scheduled. It is

also unlikely that operational test and evaluation can be completed by August 2003. Second,

it appears unlikely that the development program can be completed as scheduled within the

current $20.443 billion congressional cost limitation. Furthermore, contractor cost growth

and potential extension of the flight-test program could generate additional costs that are not

considered in current cost estimates. On January 19, 2001, the Director, Operational Test

and Evaluation advised the Secretary of the Air Force and the Congress that the Air Force

had provided a plan to extend development tests by 4- to 6-months and that he had

determined the 1.5 percent increase in the cost limitation was necessary to ensure adequate

testing3. Consequently, the Air Force plans to increase the cost limitation by 1.5 percent in

the spring of 2001. However, the Director also stated that the delay in completing required

testing might be longer than projected by the Air Force. While an internal Air Force cost

study recognized that the estimated cost to complete development may increase by $126

million to $297 million, the Air Force had not sought an increase in the congressional

limitation through March 6, 2001. Air Force officials maintain they are currently prioritizing

work to allow for completion within the cost limitation but recognize that some development

activities could be delayed. Accordingly, some test activities could also be delayed or

dropped. Third, the Air Force continues to project that by the time the development program

ends, the F-22 will meet or exceed its performance goals. However, testing to demonstrate

performance is not far enough along to enable the Air Force to confirm its projections. One

performance goal that may be difficult to meet is the average flight hours that can be

achieved for an F-22 without requiring maintenance. With regard to the status of

modifications or repairs, the Air Force solved problems identified earlier with a casting used

to attach the wing to the aircraft body, and with unexpected stress in the aft (rear) fuselage of

the aircraft. Manufacturing processes were changed and previously delivered aircraft were

modified. Air Force officials said that they are continuing to address other problems.

 

3 The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2001 provided for an increase to the cost limitation by

up to 1.5 percent if the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation determined the increase was necessary to

ensure adequate testing.
Page 4 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

The F-22 development plan includes $860.4 million in fiscal year 2002 funding, mainly for

completing the remainder of the development flight-test program, finishing airframe

structural testing and analysis, and beginning operational tests. The plan is consistent with

completion of the development program at a cost that meets the congressional limitation.

However, the plan does not address the need to extend the test program to accommodate

delays in accomplishing tests that both the Air Force and Director, Operational Test and

Evaluation have recognized, or the possibility of increasing the congressional cost limitation

to allow for the costs associated with these delays.

The fiscal year 2001 Defense Appropriations Act provided funds for low-rate initial

production of 10 F-22 aircraft and for advance procurement for 16 F-22s planned for

procurement in fiscal year 2002. DOD plans to procure 24 aircraft in fiscal year 2003 and

begin full-rate production of 36 aircraft a year in fiscal year 2004. In several reports over the

last 6 years, we have concluded that DOD should minimize commitments to F-22 production

until completion of operational test and evaluation. Flight-testing progress through December

2000, and an independent assessment by the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation,

reinforce our prior conclusion. Limiting low-rate initial production to no more than 10

aircraft a year—the quantity approved in fiscal year 2001 appropriations and authorization

acts—until completion of initial operational test and evaluation would minimize risks.

As discussed in the scope and methodology section of this report, the Air Force and

contractors provided us access to sufficient information to make informed judgements on the

matters covered by this report.

This report includes a recommendation that the Air Force provide the Congress with

information and analysis in the form of a plan to complete testing. Furthermore, in view of

the amount of testing that has yet to be completed, this report also includes a

recommendation that initial production be limited until completion of operational testing. In

regard to the first recommendation, DOD agreed there are concerns regarding completion of

development testing within the period remaining for engineering and manufacturing

development and that adjustments are needed in the F-22 program to ensure adequate

development testing is completed prior to entry into operational test and evaluation. In

regard to the second recommendation, DOD officials said they did not concur with the

recommendation and stated it was premature to comment on any change in the rate of lowrate initial production, pending further progress in a defense program review directed by the

President.

BACKGROUND

The F-22 is an air superiority4 aircraft with advanced features to make it less detectable to

adversaries (stealth characteristics) and capable of high speeds for long ranges. It has

integrated aviation electronics (avionics) to greatly improve pilots’ awareness of the situation

surrounding them. The objectives of the F-22 development program are to (1) design,

fabricate, test, and deliver 9 F-22 flight-test aircraft, 2 nonflying structural test aircraft, 8

production representative test aircraft, and 37 flight-qualified engines; (2) design, fabricate,

 

4 Air superiority is the degree of air dominance that allows the conduct of operations by land, sea, and air forces

without prohibitive interference by the enemy.
Page 5 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

integrate, and test the avionics suite; and (3) design, develop, and test the support and

training systems. The F-22 is being developed under contracts with Lockheed Martin

Corporation (for the aircraft) and Pratt & Whitney Corporation (for the engine).

Following a history of increasing cost estimates to complete development of the F-22, the

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 5 established a cost limitation of

$18.688 billion for F-22 development and a limitation of $43.400 billion for production. The

act instructed the Secretary of the Air Force to adjust the cost limitation for the amounts of

increases or decreases in costs attributable to economic inflation after September 30, 1997,

and for compliance with changes in federal, state, and local laws enacted after September 30,

1997. Congressional direction in fiscal year 2000 legislation shifted six production

representative test aircraft to the development program and also caused the cost limitation to

be adjusted. Since implementation, the cost limitation has been adjusted to its current

amount of $20.443 billion.

For fiscal year 2000, the Air Force requested $1.6 billion for initial production of six F-22

aircraft. However, both authorization and appropriations acts for fiscal year 2000 established

further congressional direction for the program. The authorization act 6 required that before

the Secretary of the Air Force executes a contract for low-rate initial production of the F-22,

the Secretary of Defense has to certify:

(1) that the test plan in the engineering and manufacturing development phase of the program

is adequate for determining the operational effectiveness and suitability of the F-22

aircraft and

(2) that the engineering and manufacturing development phase, and the production phase for

the F-22 program can each be executed within the congressionally-mandated cost

limitations 7.

If the Secretary of Defense is unable to make either of these certifications then he is required

to submit to the congressional defense committees a report that includes:

(1) the reasons that either of the certifications cannot be made,

(2) a revised acquisition plan approved by the Secretary of Defense if the Secretary desires to

proceed with F-22 low-rate initial production, and

(3) a revised cost estimate for the remainder of the engineering and manufacturing

development phase and for the production phase of the program if the Secretary desires to

proceed with low-rate initial production.

 

5

 P.L.105-85, Nov. 18, 1997.

6 P.L.106-65, Oct. 5, 1999.

7

 The limitation on production cost does not specify a quantity of F-22 aircraft.
Page 6 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

The appropriations act 8 for fiscal year 2000 did not approve initial production but approved

acquisition of additional flight-test aircraft with research, development, test, and evaluation

funding. The act restricted award of a fully funded contract for low-rate initial production

until (1) the first flight of an F-22 aircraft incorporating an avionics system designated block

3.0, which brings the software into an integrated system, (2) the Secretary of Defense

certifies to the congressional defense committees that all criteria for the award of low-rate

initial production have been met (including first flight of the block 3.0 system), and (3) the

Director, Operational Test and Evaluation reports to the congressional defense committees on

the adequacy of testing to measure and predict the performance of avionics systems, stealth

characteristics, and weapon delivery systems. Through March 6, 2001, the Secretary of

Defense had not completed the required certifications and the Director, Operational Test and

Evaluation had not submitted the required report.

The fiscal year 2001 authorization act9 amended prior cost limitation provisions, permitting

the Secretary of the Air Force to increase, by up to 1.5 percent, the limitation on the cost of

engineering and manufacturing development, if the Director, Operational Test and

Evaluation, after consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,

Technology, and Logistics determines that the increase is necessary to ensure adequate

testing. For fiscal year 2001, the Congress appropriated $2.1 billion for initial production of

10 aircraft. The fiscal year 2001 appropriations act10 confirmed the prerequisites of the fiscal

year 2000 appropriations act. Before awarding a fully funded contract to begin low-rate

production of 10 F-22 aircraft in fiscal year 2001, prerequisites included in the appropriations

and authorization acts for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 must be fulfilled.

In December 2000, the Congress passed, and the President signed, legislation11 that provided

the Air Force authority to obligate up to $353 million of the fiscal year 2001 production

appropriations if a full contract award for low-rate production is delayed beyond December

31, 2000, because of the program’s inability to satisfy the prerequisites established by the

Congress. The Air Force, as permitted by legislation, obligated the majority of these funds in

February 2001 for F-22 contractors to proceed with advance procurement but without

awarding a fully funded contract for low-rate initial production. On March 6, 2001, the

Secretary of Defense requested the four defense committees to approve reprogramming of

$674.5 million of fiscal year 2001 procurement funds to the advance procurement line to

extend, through fiscal year 2001, the authority that had been provided in December 2000. At

the same time, the Secretary indicated that the decision to award a contract to initiate lowrate production for 10 aircraft was deferred pending completion of a defense program review

directed by the President.

EXTENT TO WHICH THE F-22 DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IS MEETING SHEDULE

GOALS

Through 2000, the Air Force had completed about 22 percent of its planned flight-testing

hours for the F-22, and said it had fulfilled 9 of 11 DOD and congressional development and

 

8

 P.L.106-79, Oct. 25, 1999.

9 Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, P.L. 106-398, Oct. 30, 2000.

10 P.L. 106-259, Aug. 9, 2000.

11P.L. 106-554, Dec.21, 2000.
Page 7 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

test criteria for awarding a low-rate production contract. The Air Force stated that all 11

criteria had been met by February 5, 200112. However, the development program was behind

in meeting key schedule goals. The Air Force acknowledges that the flight-test program is

facing a potential 4-to 6-month extension because tests have been delayed and not enough

time remains to complete all of the planned testing before the planned completion in August

2002. Furthermore, the program is running behind schedule in completing nonflying tests

that assess the structural integrity of the F-22 airframe.

Progress Made in 2000

During 2000, four test aircraft were assembled and first flight was achieved on two of these

aircraft. The Air Force continued flight-testing with these aircraft and completed 325 flighttest hours during the year. The Air Force also began avionics flight-testing and the second

phase of testing on the nonflying structural aircraft. Through December 2000, the Air Force

said it fulfilled 9 of 11 criteria set by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,

Technology, and Logistics, and the Congress for awarding a fully funded contract for the first

lot of 10 production aircraft. The Air Force stated that all 11 criteria had been met by

February 5, 2001. The criteria included completing the first flight of specific test aircraft,

initiating certain types of tests such as high angle-of-attack testing, and completing other

specific tests. (See Appendix I for a listing of the criteria).

Air Force Did Not Meet Schedule Goals for Flight-Tests

The Air Force did not meet its schedule goals in 2000 for flight-testing the F-22. The reasons

included

? problems and delays with the assembly and delivery of flight-test aircraft,

? delivery of flight-test aircraft that were not ready for testing, and

? lower than planned efficiency in the flight-test program.

Figure 1 compares flight-test hours accomplished and the number of hours planned for 2000

in late 1998 and in late 1999. We calculated, based on planned introduction of new test

aircraft into the flight-test program, that the Air Force, in late 1998, was planning13 to

accomplish about 1,900 flight-test hours by the end of 2000. At the end of 1999, the Air

Force planned to accomplish about 1,400 hours. However, actual hours through December

2000 totaled about 831--well short of planned hours. About 78 percent of the total planned

flight-test program hours remain to be completed to reach the goal of completing 3,757 hours

by August 2002.

 

12 Our review of the F-22 program did not include a validation of the Air Force’s statement that the criteria had

been met.

13 Air Force officials advised us however, that they had no documented plan indicating they intended to

accomplish this amount of flight-test hours by the end of 2000.
Page 8 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

Figure 1: Comparison of Actual and Planned Flight-Test Hours

Cumulative Flight-Test Hours

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

End of Calendar Year

Planned in 1998 Planned in 1999

Actual accomplishment

Planned in 1998 through 2000

Planned in 1999 through 2000

Actual Accomplishment

through 2000

Planned at flight-test

completion (Aug. 2002)

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.

Late Introduction of Flight-Test Aircraft

Flight-test aircraft are assembled at Lockheed Martin’s facility in Marietta, Georgia. After

final assembly, the Air Force accepts the aircraft. Lockheed Martin flies the aircraft, corrects

problems, and ultimately flies the aircraft to the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards Air

Force Base, California. At the Flight Test Center, other corrections or changes may be made

before the aircraft is used to carry out flight-testing plans aimed at demonstrating the F-22’s

capabilities.

In early 2000, the Air Force anticipated that six aircraft would be available for flight- testing

at the Flight Test Center by December 2000. However, only two flight-test aircraft actually

were available. Contractor and Air Force officials told us that the test aircraft took longer to

manufacture and assemble than planned because of design changes and modifications to the

aircraft, parts shortages, and the need to complete certain assembly tasks out of sequence.

Table 1 shows the number of hours required to assemble the four aircraft that were

completed during 2000, compared to the number of hours planned and the difference.
Page 9 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

Table 1: Planned Versus Actual Assembly Hours for Recently Completed Aircraft

Aircraft

Planned

assembly hours

Actual assembly

hours Difference

4003 269,360 272,799 +3,439

4004 230,588 265,731 +35,143

4005 207,345 229,387 +22,042

4006 205,821 220,889 +15,068

Source: Air Force.

Appendix II details the planned dates for introduction of new test aircraft into the flight- test

program and shows that the introduction of some aircraft has been substantially delayed from

the prior plans—as much as 15 months in one case.

Some aircraft experienced additional delays at the contractor facility and the Flight Test

Center after assembly was completed. For example, final assembly of aircraft 4004 was

completed on January 26, 2000, and the aircraft was scheduled to make its first flight on May

3, 2000. However, a series of hardware and software-related problems caused that flight to

be delayed until November 15, 2000.

In March 2000, we reported that these delays in meeting first flight dates meant the program

had lost over 600 hours of flight-testing that would have been available had these aircraft

been delivered on time. Because of continued late deliveries, the total hours lost through

December 2000 was 1,062 hours.

Test Aircraft Introduced into Flight Test Program Not Ready for Testing

Even after delivery and being flown for the first time, test aircraft were not ready to

accomplish flight tests because they required more modifications and repairs, which caused

additional delays. Delays ranged from 73 to 252 days for aircraft 4001, 4002, and 4003 (see

fig. 2).
Page 10 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

Figure 2: Flight Test Aircraft Delays from First Flight Dates to Start of Flight-Testing at the Flight

Test Center

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

4001 4002 4003

Days Delayed

Aircraft

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.

The delays these aircraft experienced can be attributed to planned, but yet unfinished, work.

Over 2,500 labor hours of planned but unfinished work had to be completed on aircraft 4003

prior to beginning flight tests at the Flight Test Center. Aircraft 4003’s entry into the flighttest program was also delayed by several modifications and repairs, such as those addressing

problems with large titanium castings that attach the wing to the aircraft’s body, structural

inadequacies in the aft (rear) fuselage, and bonding of composite materials in the horizontal

tail section. These problems as well as cracking problems with the clear section14 of the

aircraft canopy interrupted the flight-test program. If similar delays occur after the first flight

dates of the remaining test aircraft, it will be even more difficult for the Air Force to

complete the flight-test program as planned.

Flight-Test Program Not As Efficient As Planned

Even after test aircraft began to complete flight-test hours, the flight-testing hours and the

overall flight-test program were not as efficient as planned. A gauge of the efficiency of

flight-tests is the average number of test points (specific test objectives) achieved in each

flight-test hour. Through December 2000, the Air Force planned to accomplish an average of

about 10.4 test points per flight-test hour. However, it achieved about 30 percent less, or an

average of 6.9 test points per flight-test hour. To complete the airframe portion of the flighttest program15 as planned, according to our calculations the Air Force would have to almost

 

14 The Air Force refers to this clear section as the transparency.

15 The airframe portion of the flight-test program is the first portion and consists of about 20,000 test points and

1,800 flight-test hours. The second portion is avionics flight-testing and consists of about 1,970 flight-test

hours.
Page 11 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

double its accomplishment rate, to an average of about 13.4 test points per flight-test hour.

Figure 3 shows actual, planned, and needed flight- test point accomplishment rates.

Figure 3: Comparison of Actual, Planned, and Needed Airframe Flight-Test Point

Accomplishment Rates

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data

Progress Is Less Than Planned in Avionics Flight-Testing

An integrated avionics system is a major feature of the F-22, permitting the pilot to have

substantially better control of information regarding the surrounding situation. Tests of

individual components and the integrated package are done on the ground in specially

designed facilities, followed by tests in a Boeing 757 flying test bed. Ultimately, the fully

integrated package (known as block 3.0) is to be installed in an F-22 test aircraft and flown

to determine if it meets requirements and if it functions properly. The avionics tests in F-22

flight-test aircraft are scheduled to take about 1,900 flight-test hours, about two-thirds of the

total remaining flight-test hours.

Avionics is being developed in blocks (segments), with completion of each block being

dependent on completion of prior blocks. During 2000, several early blocks completed

ground testing and were ready to be installed on flight-test aircraft. However, because of the

delayed delivery of test aircraft designated for avionics flight-testing, delays occurred in

flight-testing avionics. As a result, only 2 of 300 avionics flight-test hours planned were

flown through December 2000 (see fig. 4). Only one hour of avionics flight-testing was

flown with block 3 avionics through January 5, 2001. In addition, in attempting to meet its

schedule of flight-testing avionics block 3 in an F-22 before the end of 2000, the Air Force

deferred into mid-2001 and later some block 3 functions and capabilities, such as software

that will allow F-22s to transfer necessary mission data between aircraft.
Page 12 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

Figure 4: Planned Versus Actual Avionics Flight-Test Hour Accomplishment for 2000

745

300

2

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

Planned in 1997 for 2000 Planned at end of 1999

for 2000

Actual 2000

Avionics Flight-test Hours

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.

A total of 1,970 avionics flight-test hours are scheduled to be flown by the end of

development flight-testing planned for August 2002. An independent assessment sanctioned

by the Air Force recently estimated that a minimum of 7-12 additional months after the

planned completion of flight-testing will be required to complete avionics testing.

The Air Force was able to accomplish airborne avionics testing on the flying test bed,

providing information to testers and helping correct many problems with the hardware and

software. However, while avionics testing on a flying test bed is productive testing, it is not

the equivalent of avionics testing in an actual F-22 test aircraft for two main reasons. First,

because the flying test bed is a large Boeing 757 passenger aircraft and not a more agile F22, avionics performance cannot be tested in a dynamic flight environment where the

aircraft is maneuvering at speeds and angles more characteristic of a smaller fighter aircraft.

A DOD testing official advised us that avionics performance can change when operated

under the more demanding conditions of a fighter aircraft. Second, the flying test bed does

not contain the full complement of avionics sensors that are planned to be on an F-22, and in

some cases, the position of sensors on the test bed are not representative of how they are to

be positioned on an F-22.
Page 13 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

Flight-Testing Delays Increase F-22 Risks

The Air Force, in monthly assessments of the program from July through December 2000,

determined that completing F-22 development on schedule was the program’s highest risk

and that cost was also a concern. Also, a review of the flight-test program in late 2000

concluded that extending the test program schedule 4- to 6-months may be needed to

complete tests. Extending the test program schedule will likely increase costs. Further,

DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation indicated the development test program

will likely need to be extended a year or more. Based on this possibility, the Director has

indicated that operational testing that is to follow development testing cannot be started as

scheduled without clearly unacceptable risks and may need to be delayed almost a year. The

Director also indicated there was some justification to delay low-rate production in view of

these delays.

Completion of Testing of Nonflying Ground

Test Aircraft Continues to be Delayed

The F-22 test plan requires two major tests (static and fatigue) of the structural integrity of

the F-22’s airframe. These tests are important to reduce the risk of structural problems

emerging during production or during aircraft operations. Fatigue testing, which measures

the aircraft’s durability over its expected life, was initiated on December 21, 2000. Static

testing is undertaken to ensure the aircraft will withstand stresses expected to be encountered

throughout the aircraft’s flight regime. The aircraft structure is tested to determine if it can

withstand stresses up to 150 percent of its design limits.

After progressing through all but one test, static testing was interrupted in November 2000,

about 6 percent short of the testing goal, because the test hardware, not the aircraft, failed.

Testing resumed and was essentially completed in December 2000. Because of a delayed

start, the expected completion for fatigue testing is now almost 2 years later than planned in

1997. The previous and currently planned completion dates for these tests are shown in

table 2.

Table 2: Delays in Planned Completion of Static and Fatigue Structural Integrity Tests

Planned completion date

Test 1997 plan Mar. 1999 plan Dec. 1999 plan Dec. 2000 plan Total

delay

(months)

Static Oct. 1999 Feb. 2000 Nov. 2000 Dec. 2000a14

Fatigue Dec. 1999 Sept. 2000 Feb. 2001 Nov. 2001 23

a

 Completed Dec. 21, 2000

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data.

Air Force officials, in commenting on a draft of this report, stated that, even though the F-22

fatigue testing was delayed compared to the plan, they expect to complete the first of four

test series 11 months after beginning low-rate initial production. They said that was similar

to schedules of fatigue testing completion in the F-16 and F/A-18E/F programs. However,
Page 14 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

delays in the completion of fatigue testing affects when any structural changes required can

be recognized. Late recognition of any structural problems affects when solutions can be

incorporated into F-22 production. DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation has

expressed concern over the delays in completion of fatigue testing and the incorporation of

any necessary solutions into production.

EXTENT TO WHICH THE F-22 PROGRAM IS MEETING COST GOALS

It appears unlikely that the F-22 development program can be completed as scheduled, and

also include delivery of development and production representative test aircraft, as well as all

the testing now planned, within the $20.443 billion cost limitation. Contractor costs have

continued to increase above budgets and measures identified to offset those increases had not

all been initiated through December 2000. If contractor costs continue to increase above

budgets, measures to offset cost increases are not all initiated and achieved, and the Air Force

extends the flight-test program, cost is likely to increase above the congressional cost

limitation. A recent internal Air Force review concluded that development cost will likely be

about $126 million to $297 million above such a limitation. If the Secretary of the Air Force

increases the cost limitation by 1.5 percent, or about $307 million, to ensure adequate

testing—as permitted subsequent to a determination by the Director, Operational Test and

Evaluation—the Air Force’s estimate would be within the limitation. Notwithstanding such

an increase, the Director has also stated that the test program may need to be extended further

than planned by the Air Force. Such an extension is likely to increase development program

costs further.

Development Cost Growth Is Not Fully

Offset by Cost Reductions

The Air Force has anticipated growth in development costs for the F-22 every year since the

Congress established a cost limitation, and it has identified a number of offsets to mitigate

this growth, including reducing testing infrastructures. In March 1999, we reported that the

potential cost growth through the end of development was estimated at $667 million above a

cost baseline established in 1998; in March 2000, it was estimated to be $757 million. As of

December 2000, the Air Force and its contractors estimated development cost could grow by

$883 million by program completion and had identified about $874 million in cost reduction

efforts to offset this growth. Actions had not yet been initiated to achieve about half of the

cost reduction efforts. Cost growth that is not offset by cost reductions threatens the ability

to execute the development program, as planned, within the congressional cost limitation.

Air Force and Lockheed officials attribute recent cost growth to (1) manufacturing and

design problems that have caused some tasks for production labor to be rescheduled and

accomplished at different times in the assembly sequence than planned, (2) the need to

incorporate more engineering changes than planned, (3) underestimated amounts of labor

required to complete scheduled tasks, and (4) difficulties with development and integration

of avionics. Pratt & Whitney also identified cost growth as the result of technical problems

with an engine nozzle and higher than expected overhead rates.
Page 15 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

Comparison of Lockheed’s Projected Costs and

Actual Costs for 2000

Lockheed’s cost performance in 2000, coupled with the experience in prior years, brings into

question the contractor’s ability to control costs enough to complete the development

program, as planned, within the cost limitation. Figure 5 shows that Lockheed’s actual costs

in 2000 exceeded its available budget by more than projected. At the beginning of 2000,

cumulative actual costs exceeded Lockheed’s budget by $265 million. Lockheed projected

that costs would continue to increase above its budget and that at the end of 2000, cumulative

costs would exceed the cumulative budget by $359 million. Although Lockheed did better

than projected for much of the year, its performance in November and December caused the

contractor to exceed its projection at year-end. Actual costs through 2000 exceeded the

budget by $373 million or $14 million more than projected.

Figure 5: Comparison of Actual and Projected Cost Growth Above Budget, January Through

December 2000 (Cumulative)

(Dollars in millions)

200

225

250

275

300

325

350

375

400

Projected 275 289 302 313 323 330 335 340 345 351 356 359

Actual 275 276 283 290 299 305 314 327 329 345 365 373

January February March April May June July August September October November December

Source: GAO analysis of contractor data.

Air Force Review Recognizes That Costs Are

Likely to Exceed Cost Limitation But

Increase Has Not Been Requested

A recent review of the estimated cost of F-22 development completed by the Air Force Cost

Analysis Improvement Group16 concluded that the cost to complete development is likely to

be about $126 million to $297 million above the current congressional cost limitation of

$20.443 billion.

DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation agrees that an increase is necessary. The

Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2001 provides for an increase to the cost limitation

by up to 1.5 percent, or about $307 million, if the Director determines the increase is

necessary to ensure adequate testing. On January 19, 2001, the Director advised the

 

16 An Air Force group whose function it is to provide cost estimates of major weapon system acquisition

programs at milestone reviews.
Page 16 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

Secretary of the Air Force and the Congress that he had determined the increase in the cost

limitation was necessary to ensure adequate testing.

If the Secretary of the Air Force increases the cost limitation by 1.5 percent, or about $307

million, to ensure adequate testing, the Air Force’s estimate would be within the limitation.

While the Air Force expects to increase the cost limitation by that amount, it has yet to

request such an increase. Through March 6, 2001, the Secretary of Defense had not

completed the required certifications and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation had

not submitted the required report.

Cost Estimates Do Not Account for

Flight-Test Program Extension

Cost estimates do not consider the potential cost growth associated with a schedule extension

of the flight-test program. An Air Force review of the program schedule, done in December

2000, concluded that the flight-test program may need to be extended by 4- to 6-months to

complete the tests. DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation has indicated the

development test program may need to be extended a year or more. Extending the flight-test

program will likely increase costs, and the Air Force and contractor will need to either

identify offsetting cost reductions to stay within the cost limitation, such as reducing the

scope of the flight-test program, or obtain an increase in the cost limitation.

Air Force officials maintain they are currently prioritizing work within the F-22 development

program to allow for completion within the cost limitation. They maintain this prioritization

is being done to ensure testing activities related to major F-22 requirements are conducted,

but also to potentially delay testing activities related to less significant F-22 requirements. In

contrast, DOD’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation concluded the development test

program may need to be extended a year or more to complete required development testing

prior to the start of operational testing. We agree with the Director’s assessment and are

concerned about delaying required test activities. Completion of required testing is likely to

increase development program costs further. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD

stated that, in prioritizing the work, some development efforts currently included in the

engineering and manufacturing development phase (and cost estimate) of the program would

be expected to be shifted to the Operations and Maintenance account in subsequent years.

EXTENT TO WHICH F-22 DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IS MEETING

PERFORMANCE GOALS

In December 2000, the Air Force estimated that by the time the development program ends,

the program will have met, and in some instances exceeded, the major F-22 performance

goals. However, flight-test progress is slower than expected, delaying the confirmation that

the F-22 will indeed deliver the required performance. Although the Air Force assessment is

that they satisfied the criteria for awarding a contract to begin low-rate initial production,

many of the criteria required initiation of certain tests, not completion or successful

demonstrations. Accordingly, most testing, particularly of the low observable features,

avionics, and structural durability, has yet to be completed.
Page 17 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

Confirmation of Performance Estimates Requires Additional Demonstration

The Air Force’s performance estimates to date are based on limited flight-test data,

computer models, ground tests, and analyses. Most ground and flight-tests will have to be

completed before the estimates are confirmed. F-22 performance goals are described in 10

Key Performance Parameters, about which the Air Force reports regularly to the Office of

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Through

December 2000, the Air Force reported that ground and flight-test experience, engineering

analyses, and computer models indicate F-22 performance will meet or exceed all required

parameters.

Appendix III shows the goal for each parameter; the estimated performance the Air Force

believes is consistent with models, ground tests, analyses, and flight-test for each parameter

as of December 2000; and the Air Force’s latest estimates of the performance expected to be

achieved for each parameter by the end of the development program.

Even though F-22 development began in 1991 and flight-testing began in 1997, a significant

amount of testing remains prior to the planned completion of flight-testing in 2002 and the

planned completion of development in 2003. The Air Force through 2000 said they had

satisfied 9 of 11 criteria for awarding a contract for low-rate production, however, several of

the criteria required the initiation of certain tests, not successful completion of a significant

amount of testing. Accordingly, substantial testing must yet be accomplished before the

capabilities of the F-22 will have been fully demonstrated. For example, avionics flighttesting completed through 2000 represents only 2 hours of a planned 1,970-hour avionics

flight-test program.

Table 3 shows several areas of testing that were initiated to comply with the criteria for

awarding a contract to begin low-rate initial production. The table also shows the extent of

planned testing remaining in these testing areas that were initiated, and in several cases,

shows that even at this point in the development program there are still years of planned

testing remaining.
Page 18 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

Table 3: Additional Testing Required to Fully Demonstrate F-22 Capabilities

Criteria for awarding a

contract for low-rate

initial production

Estimated

completion

date at start

of 2000

Actual

completion

Additional testing required to

fully demonstrate capability

Initiate high angle-ofattack testing with

weapon bay doors open.

July 2000 Aug. 2000 Over 90 percent, or about 40

flights to be completed by mid2002.

Initiate fatigue life

testing with goal of

completing 40 percent of

first fatigue life.

Aug. 2000 Dec. 2000 Four lifetimes to be completed

in approximately 3 years.

Initiate separation

testing of AIM-9 and

AIM-120 missiles.

Nov. 2000 Oct. 2000 32 AIM-9 and 30 AIM-120

separation tests extending into

2002.

Initiate radar crosssection flight-testing.Aug. 2000 Jan. 2001 143 hours of flight-testing

remain with scheduled

completion in at the end of

development testing.

Complete avionics block

3.0 first flight, initiating

testing of unique

functionality.

Nov. 2000 Jan. 2001 Block 3 scheduled to be tested

through Spring 2001, plus a

total of 1,970 avionics flight

hours remaining.

Source: GAO analysis of Air Force data

Performance May Be Affected by Additional Factors

The F-22’s performance may be affected by continuing increases in aircraft weight, and

frequency of required maintenance that is still far from its objective. Even though F-22

aircraft weight is not characterized by the Air Force as a key parameter, aircraft weight

impacts several of the key parameters, including supercruise, maneuverability, acceleration,

and combat radius. And, even though the Air Force continues to estimate that by the end of

the development program the F-22 will meet or exceed its supercruise, maneuverability,

acceleration, and combat radius key parameters, the aircraft weight continues to increase as

it has since 1995. During 2000, the estimated weight increased because of additional

requirements and modifications required to add strength to the airframe. The Air Force

maintains that even with this latest weight increase, there is a margin of 1,050 pounds until
Page 19 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

the aircraft’s weight begins to have an impact on the F-22’s ability to meet its key

performance parameters.

In addition, the Air Force estimates that by the end of development, the F-22 will be able to

complete 2 flying hours between maintenance actions; and when the F-22 reaches maturity17

in 2008, F-22s will be able to complete 3 flying hours between maintenance actions (key

parameter number 7, listed in app. III). However, currently the flight-test aircraft are

completing 0.6 flying hours between maintenance actions. This means that aircraft are now

requiring significantly more maintenance than is expected when the system reaches

maturity.

Further, when all factors are considered, more frequent maintenance is being required. When

maintenance tasks related to low observable features are included in maintenance statistics,

the statistics show that more frequent maintenance is being required. Maintenance of low

observable features has historically been more difficult and time-consuming than expected.

On the F-22, extensive maintenance has been associated with compounds that are used to fill

gaps or seams on the aircraft’s surface to help maintain the aircraft’s low observable or

stealthy nature.18 In 1999, program officials determined that the compound planned for use

on the F-22 was not meeting expectations; under certain conditions, it would swell or crack

after application. Since then, a new compound has been formulated and it is being tested

and qualified for use.

STATUS OF AIRCRAFT MODIFICATIONS

Air Force officials said they have largely solved problems identified over the last several

years with a section that attaches the wing to the aircraft’s body and the aft (rear) fuselage of

the aircraft. However, the Air Force is continuing to address problems with the bonding of

the horizontal tail section and cracking of the clear section of the aircraft canopy.

Program officials, in late 1998, identified problems with the development and manufacture of

large titanium castings that attach the wing to the aircraft’s body. These problems caused

significant delays in completing test aircraft and making them available to the flight-test

program. To resolve these problems, they changed the casting process and increased the

frequency of wing inspections on test aircraft. The Air Force estimated the costs of

engineering changes, additional castings, and labor at about $25 million for the F-22

development program.

In April 1999, program officials identified structural inadequacies in the aft (rear) fuselage,

or rear of the airframe. An airframe structural strength analysis that was done as part of the

airframe static test indicated insufficient strength in a panel in the rear of the airframe. The

test aircraft that had been delivered, and those that had been built with the problem parts had

to be repaired and modified to provide additional structuralstrength. Engineering changes,

subcontractor rework, and additional labor costs resulted in $16 million in unanticipated

costs to the development program.

 

17 Defined as 100,000 flying hours.

18 Because the presence of any seams around maintenance access panels can potentially allow the aircraft to be

more easily detected by enemy radar, a compound is applied to these seams to eliminate them and make the

aircraft’s surface smooth.
Page 20 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

Contractor officials also identified a problem with the bonding of the composite materials

that make up the F-22’s horizontal tail section. While contractor officials noted that they

have addressed some of the root causes of this problem, one part of the horizontal tail

continues to show cracking. To gain more of an understanding of this problem and possible

solutions to producing horizontal tails, the contractor assembled a team of industry experts in

June 2000. This team of experts provided the contractor with recommendations, half of

which were implemented. The contractor expects to continue work to resolve this problem.

In March 2000, Lockheed personnel discovered cracks emanating from the mounting holes in

the clear section of the canopy on aircraft 4001. These cracks triggered an investigation of all

these clear sections on the flight-test aircraft, in assembly, and in fabrication. Program

officials grounded the flight-test aircraft for several weeks and limited the flight-test

conditions after they restarted flight tests to ensure safety of flight. The contractor and the

supplier identified a total of 109 potential causes for the cracks and they are developing plans

to address each cause. Eighty-five of the potential causes have been investigated and several

changes have been implemented to prevent cracks from developing. Two leading causes

were susceptibility to harmful solvents and excess stress placed on the clear section during

assembly into its frame. To eliminate the two leading causes of the cracks, contractor

officials have modified the way these clear sections are manufactured and assembled.

Additional changes are still being evaluated.

F-22 DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002

By the end of fiscal year 2001, the Air Force expects that nine F-22 test aircraft will have

been delivered and will have begun flight-tests. For fiscal year 2002, the plan is to complete

(1) the remainder of the development flight-test program, scheduled to end in August 2002,

and (2) the airframe structural testing and analysis.

The planned F-22 funding for fiscal year 2002 and the remainder of the development

program is shown in table 4. The funding plans for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 are consistent

with completion of the development program at a total cost that equates to the congressional

cost limitation. However, the plans do not address the need to extend the test program 4-to

6-months to accommodate the delay the Air Force has recognized or the possibility of

increasing the congressional cost limitation to allow for the costs associated with this delay.

Table 4: Remaining F-22 Development Funding

(Dollars in millions)

Cost category Fiscal year

2002

Fiscal year

2003

Total to complete

development

Air vehicle $415.9 $131.2 $547.1

Avionics 116.4 54.3 170.7

Production representative

test vehicles

124.3 $0.0 124.3

Engine 33.6 16.1 49.7

Other government cost 170.2 116.8 287.0

Total $860.4 $318.4 $1,178.8

Source: Air Force.
Page 21 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

While the F-22 development program and associated funding are scheduled to end in fiscal

year 2003, the Air Force budget plans include $580.7 million for post-development activities

in fiscal years 2002 through 2007 (see table 5). The Air Force classified this funding as postdevelopment funding for various activities.19 Air Force officials told us they consider this

post-development funding separate from and outside the scope of the F-22 development

program, which is subject to the congressional cost limitation of $20.443 billion.

Table 5: F-22 Post-Development Funding Planned for Fiscal Years 2002 through 2007

(Dollars in millions)

Funding Fiscal

year

2002

Fiscal

year

2003

Fiscal

year

2004

Fiscal

year

2005

Fiscal

year

2006

Fiscal

year

2007

Total

Postdevelopment$16.0 $51.0 $136.1 $100.0 $121.2 $156.4 $580.7

Source: Air Force.

PLAN TO INCREASE LOW-RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION BEFORE DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAM IS COMPLETED

The Fiscal Year 2001 Defense Appropriations Act provided funds for low-rate initial

production of 10 F-22 aircraft but prohibited award of a fully funded contract until DOD

meets prerequisites specified in the act. The act also provided funds for advance

procurement for 16 F-22s planned for procurement in fiscal year 2002. The Air Force plans

to procure 24 aircraft in fiscal year 2003, and begin full-rate production of 36 aircraft per

year beginning in fiscal year 2004.

In several reports over the last 6 years, and as recently as March 2000, we concluded that

DOD should minimize commitments to F-22 production to six to eight aircraft a year until

completion of initial operational test and evaluation, now planned for the second quarter of

fiscal year 2003. Current flight-testing progress and an independent assessment by the

Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, reinforce our prior conclusion. Buying production

articles before they can be adequately tested can result in buying systems that require

significant, and sometimes costly, modifications to achieve satisfactory performance;

accepting less capable systems than planned; and deploying substandard systems to combat

forces. Also, deferring a substantial increase in production rates until completion of initial

operational test and evaluation will reduce the amount of needed production funding

committed, which may be an attractive option to maintain the aircraft procurement budget

and overall defense budget within congressional targets. Conversely, Air Force officials

have stated that lower production rates could increase average procurement cost over the life

of the program.

As indicated earlier, the F-22 program has experienced cost growth due to manufacturing and

design problems, the need to incorporate more than the planned numbers of engineering

changes, underestimated amounts of labor required to complete scheduled tasks, and

difficulties with development and integration of avionics. Adding the significant amount of

 

19 These activities include blocks 4 and 5 of avionics, partial funding for a ground collision avoidance system,

flight-testing infrastructure at Edwards Air Force Base, laboratory support, and a classified project.
Page 22 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

testing that is yet to be completed, we believe it prudent to mitigate risks by limiting low-rate

initial production to no more than 10 aircraft a year—the quantity approved in fiscal year

2001 appropriations and authorization acts—until initial operational test and evaluation is

completed.

CONCLUSIONS

The Air Force has made progress in developing the F-22, particularly with respect to

fulfilling the criteria for awarding a fully funded contract for low-rate initial production.

Nevertheless, it is significantly behind in flight-testing, due to continuing assembly and

manufacturing delays, and it is behind schedule in completing nonflying tests that assess the

structural integrity of the aircraft. These delays increase the risk that the Air Force will likely

have to extend the test program past the planned completion date or proceed to the next

stages of the program without completing all flight-tests. Moreover, the scheduling delays

increase the likelihood that costs will not fall within the congressional limitation, especially if

all planned offsets are not implemented and if additional time called for by DOD’s Director,

Operational Test and Evaluation is agreed to.

The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation has also indicated that based on the current

status of the test program, operational testing, with the objective of determining the

operational effectiveness and suitability of the F-22, cannot be started as scheduled without

clearly unacceptable risks and will probably be delayed almost a year. We agree with his

assessment. With this likely delay in starting operational testing, the Director also concluded

there was no reason to authorize low-rate production in January 2001 and some justification

to delay it. Cost growth in the development program due to manufacturing and design

problems and underestimated amounts of labor required to complete scheduled tasks points

to a lack of stability in both design and fabrication. We believe limiting low-rate initial

production to no more than the 10 aircraft per year included in appropriations and

authorization acts for fiscal year 2001 is a prudent way to mitigate risks until initial

operational test and evaluation is completed.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE ACTION

Because the Air Force is unlikely to complete F-22 development within the current cost

limitation, we recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force, as a supplement to the fiscal

year 2002 budget request, provide (1) information showing planned testing not yet

completed; (2) information on any additional funding that would be necessary, above the cost

limitation amount, to complete the testing as planned; and (3) any actual and proposed

changes to the test plans, such as a deletion or postponement of test activities, and the

justification for these changes.

To reduce risks and preclude manufacture and delivery of F-22 aircraft that have not been

fully tested, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense limit low-rate initial production to

no more than 10 aircraft a year until initial operational test and evaluation is completed.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. In regard to the first

recommendation, DOD agreed there are concerns regarding completion of development
Page 23 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

testing within the period remaining for engineering and manufacturing development. DOD

also agreed that adjustments are needed in the F-22 program to ensure adequate development

testing is completed prior to entry into operational test and evaluation. Also, in its

comments, DOD stated that on January 19, 2001, the Director, Operational Test and

Evaluation made a determination provided for in the authorization act for fiscal year 2001,

that permits the Secretary of the Air Force to increase the cost limitation for F-22

development by 1.5 percent or about $307 million.

Although we agree that a 1.5 increase in the cost limitation is warranted based on the

progress of the program, DOD has not yet certified to the Congress that F-22 development

can be completed within the cost limitation, even considering the 1.5 percent increase. The

Director, Operational Test and Evaluation concluded that a 1.5 percent increase may be

sufficient to support an Air Force plan that would defer completion of development testing

by 4- to 6-months. However, the Director stated that a longer delay may be needed to

complete required testing. Additional comments DOD provided indicated that the Air Force

proposed additional actions that entail shifting some remaining development efforts to the

Operations and Maintenance account to allow the F-22 engineering and manufacturing

development program to be completed within the cost limitation. Considering the

uncertainty about the Air Force’s ability to complete the development program within the

limitation as adjusted, and within the schedule as currently planned, and the proposal to shift

funding for some efforts to the Operations and Maintenance account, we believe our

recommendation continues to be valid. We continue to believe DOD should, in a supplement

to its fiscal year 2002 budget request, or as part of any revised acquisition plan submitted to

congressional defense committees, identify the testing that has yet to be completed, the

funding necessary, and the changes that are planned to the test program.

In regard to the second recommendation, DOD officials said they did not concur with the

recommendation and stated it was premature to comment on any change in the rate of lowrate initial production, pending further progress in a defense program review directed by the

President. We believe DOD’s comment obfuscates the issue at hand. We recognize that the

President has directed that the defense program be reviewed and that the timing, cost, and

quantity of F-22 production are likely to be important considerations. However, the slow

progress of the F-22 program during 2000, particularly the flight-test program, does not

justify accelerating production in fiscal year 2002. We believe the Air Force should not

continue with its plans to increase the rate of production beyond 10 aircraft a year until

operational test and evaluation is complete and the operational suitability and effectiveness of

the F-22 has been successfully demonstrated.

DOD’s comments are reproduced in appendix IV. DOD also provided updated information

and suggested additional technical changes, which we incorporated in the report where

appropriate.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

To determine whether the program is expected to meet schedule goals, we reviewed program

and avionics schedules and discussed potential changes to these schedules with F-22 program

officials. We also compared current schedules with those developed in 1997 as a result of a

study by a cost estimating team. We tracked progress in the flight- test program, evaluated

schedule variances in the contractors’ performance management system, and compared
Page 24 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

planned milestone accomplishment dates with actual dates. We also tracked technical

problems in manufacturing and assembling the development aircraft.

To determine whether the program is likely to meet the cost limitation, we examined (1) the

extent to which the development program cost goals are being met, (2) the Air Force’s plans

to fund the program for fiscal year 2001, and (3) the consistencies between the program

funding plan and the cost limitation. We compared the estimated cost at completion of the

prime contracts with planned amounts, evaluated cost variances identified in the contractors’

cost reporting systems, and reviewed the status of initiatives designed to avoid cost growth.

We reviewed DOD validations of Lockheed’s earned value management system and tested a

small sample of expenditures to determine if they had been properly recorded.

To determine whether the development program is likely to meet performance goals, we

analyzed information on the performance of key performance parameters and those subparameters that are measured. We compared performance goals established by the Under

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics with the Air Force’s current

estimates of performance in December 2000 and at completion of development.

To identify the status of F-22 modifications, we collected updated information on the status

of existing aircraft structural problems that have required aircraft modifications. We also

collected and analyzed information on problems identified in 2000 that will require some

aircraft modifications to resolve.

To identify the program’s plan for fiscal year 2002, we collected information on what

development activities are expected to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2001 and the

planned development activities and planned funding for fiscal year 2002.

To assess the Air Force’s plan for increasing the annual initial rate of production, we

determined the amount of overlap between the development program and the production

plans, particularly in reference to the completion of initial operational test and evaluation.

In making these determinations, assessments, and identifications, we required access to

current information about schedule achievements and revisions, costs being incurred, test

results and performance estimates, aircraft modifications, and the program’s plans for

continued development and initial production. The Air Force and the contractors gave us

access to sufficient information to make informed judgments on the matters covered in this

report.

In performing our work, we obtained information or interviewed officials from the Office of

the Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C.; the F-22 System Program Office, WrightPatterson Air Force Base, Ohio; the Defense Contract Management Agency, Marietta,

Georgia; Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems, Marietta, Georgia; Lockheed Martin

Tactical Aircraft Systems, Fort Worth, Texas; and Boeing Military Aircraft, Seattle,

Washington. We performed our work from April 2000 through February 2001 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 25 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of

Defense; the Honorable Lawrence Delaney, Acting Secretary of the Air Force; and the

Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will

also be made available to others on request. Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or Robert

D. Murphy at (937) 258-7904 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report.

Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Allen Li

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Page 26 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John W. Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Ted Stevens

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Bob Stump

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jerry Lewis

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Page 27 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

Appendix I

AIR FORCE ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT AND TEST CRITERIA REQUIRED

TO PROCEED TO LOW-RATE INITIAL PRODUCTION

Criteria Completion status

1. Initiate high angle-of-attack testing with weapon bay

doors open

Completed

2. Complete critical design review for avionics block 3.1 Completed

3. Complete test aircraft 4008 fuselage, wing, and

empennage (tail section) mate

Completed

4. Initiate fatigue life testing with the goal of completing

40 percent of first fatigue life

Completeda

5. Complete air vehicle final production readiness review Completed

6. Complete first portion of engine qualification test Completed

7. Initiate separation of air intercept missile-9 and air

intercept missile-120

Completed

8. Complete aircraft first flights

 Aircraft 4003 Completed

 Aircraft 4004 Completed

 Aircraft 4005 Completed

 Aircraft 4006 Completedb

9. Initiate radar cross section flight-testing Completedc

10. Complete static structural testing Completed

11. Complete avionics block 3.0 first flight, initiating

testing of unique functionality

Completed

a

Testing initiated on Dec. 21, 2000. Completion of 40 percent of the first fatigue life is scheduled for

Mar. 2001.

bCompleted on Feb. 5, 2001.

c Completed on Jan. 31, 2001.
Page 28 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

Appendix II

COMPARISON OF SCHEDULES FOR FIRST FLIGHT DATES OF TEST AIRCRAFT

Test

aircraft

First flight

dates as

planned in

1997

First flight

dates as

planned in

Mar. 1999

First flight

dates as

planned in

June 1999

First flight

dates as

planned in

Dec. 2000

Total delay

of first

flight dates

(months) as

of Dec.

2000

4001 May 1997 Sept. 1997aSept. 1997aSept. 1997a3.37

4002 July 1998 June 1998aJune 1998aJune 1998a-0.33

4003 June 1999 Nov. 1999 Feb. 2000 Mar. 2000a8.80

4004 Aug. 1999 Feb. 2000 May 2000 Nov. 2000a15.20

4005 Jan. 2000 Mar. 2000 June 2000 Dec. 2000b 11.43

4006 May 2000 May 2000 Aug. 2000 Dec. 2000b 7.50

4007 Sept. 2000 Sept. 2000 Oct. 2000 Aug. 2001 10.40

4008 Feb. 2001 Feb. 2001 Feb. 2001 Oct. 2001 8.70

4009 June 2001 June 2001 June 2001 Sept. 2001 3.90

Total delay (months) 68.97

a Actual first flight date.

b

First flight did not occur in December 2000.
Page 29 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

Appendix III

ESTIMATES OF PERFORMANCE FOR KEY PARAMETERS

Key performance

parameter

Goal (acquisition

program baseline)

Air Force assessment

of estimated

performance through

Dec. 2000

Estimated

performance at

completion of

development

1. Supercruise 100 percent 114 percent 115 percent

2. Acceleration

(< 100 percent is

favorablea)

100 percent 89 percent 87 percent

3. Maneuverability 100 percent 102 percent 102 percent

4. Airlift support

(C-141

equivalents)

8 7.4 7.4

5. Sortie

generation rate

100 percent 100 percent 100 percent

6. Radar cross

section (front

sector only)

100 percent Favorable (data

classified)

Favorable (data

classified)

7. Average flight

hours between

maintenance

3.0 0.6 2.0 (at end of

development)

3.0 (by system

maturity in year

2008)

8. Payload

(missiles)

Four medium-range,

two short-range

Six medium-range, two

short range

Six mediumrange, two shortrange

9. Combat radius 100 percent 113 percent 115 percent

10. Radar

detection range

100 percent 117 percent 117 percent
Page 30 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

a

The acceleration parameter is a measure of the time it takes the aircraft to increase speed to a

certain level. If the aircraft is able to increase speed to a certain level in less time than expected, this

is considered favorable. Therefore, a measure of less than 100 percent is favorable.
Page 31 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

Appendix IV

COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Page 32 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

Appendix IV
Page 33 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

Appendix V

GAO STAFF ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Mark Abraham, Marvin E. Bonner, Christopher T. Brannon, Arthur Cobb, Don M.

Springman, and John Van Schaik made key contributions to this report.
Page 34 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

RELATED GAO PRODUCTS

Defense Acquisitions: Recent F-22 Production Cost Estimates Exceeded Congressional

Limitation (GAO/NSIAD-00-178, Aug.15, 2000).

Defense Acquisitions: Use of Cost Reduction Plans in Estimating F-22 Total Production

Costs (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-200, June 15, 2000).

Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal Year 2001

(GAO/OCG-00-8, Mar. 31, 2000).

F-22 Aircraft: Development Cost Goal Achievable If Major Problems Are Avoided

(GAO/NSIAD-00-68, Mar. 14, 2000).

Defense Acquisitions: Progress in Meeting F-22 Cost and Schedule Goals (GAO/T-NSIAD00-58, Dec. 7, 1999).

Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: DOD’s Procurement and RDT&E Programs (GAO/NSIAD-99-

233R, Sept. 23, 1999).

Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal Year 2000

(GAO/OCG-99-26, Apr. 16, 1999).

Defense Acquisitions: Progress of the F-22 and F/A-18E/F Engineering and Manufacturing

Development Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113, Mar. 17, 1999).

F-22 Aircraft: Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing Development Goals

(GAO/NSIAD-99-55, Mar. 15, 1999).

F-22 Aircraft: Progress of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development Program

(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-137, Mar. 25, 1998).

F-22 Aircraft: Progress in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing Development Goals

(GAO/NSIAD-98-67, Mar. 10, 1998).

Tactical Aircraft: Restructuring of the Air Force F-22 Fighter Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-

156, June 4, 1997).

Defense Aircraft Investments: Major Program Commitments Based on Optimistic Budget

Projections (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-103, Mar. 5, 1997).

F-22 Restructuring (GAO/NSIAD-97-100R, Feb. 28, 1997).

Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22 Aircraft Should Be

Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-95-59, Apr. 19, 1995).
Page 35 GAO-01-310 Tactical Aircraft

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-176, May 5, 1994).

Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned

(GAO/NSIAD-94-118, Mar. 25, 1994).

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