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62–189 PDF 2010

S. HRG. 111–708 

PRINCIPLES OF U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN ASIA 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN 

AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JANUARY 21, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

DAVID MCKean, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

JIM WEBB, Virginia Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Campbell, Hon. Kurt M., Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian 

and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC ............................. 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senators: 

Richard G. Lugar ....................................................................................... 43 

Barbara Boxer ........................................................................................... 48 

James M. Inhofe ........................................................................................ 51 

Herman, Robert, Director of Programs, Freedom House, Washington, DC ........ 23 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 26 

Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from Oklahoma, prepared statement ...... 5 

Sutter, Robert, Visiting Professor of Asian Studies, Georgetown University, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 30 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 33 

Webb, Hon. Jim, U.S. Senator from Virginia, opening statement ....................... 1 

(III)

(1) 

PRINCIPLES OF U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN ASIA 

THURSDAY, JANUARY 21, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jim Webb, (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senator Webb. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM WEBB, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Senator WEBB. Good morning. The hearing will come to order. 

There’s an old saying in the Marine Corps, that a lot of times 

when you are up to your neck in alligators, you tend to forget that 

you came to drain the swamp. This is something of a parallel, in 

terms of our foreign policy, and in places like Asia, particularly. 

Today the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee will 

begin examining a long overlooked area of our foreign policy rooted 

in the often contradictory standards we’ve used in the past and, to 

some extent, still use today, in defining the underlining parameters 

of our relationships with different countries and different governmental systems. Nowhere are these contradictions more glaring 

than in Asia, and nowhere is it more important that we clarify the 

basic tenets that shape our engagements. 

As such, I believe, that the time has come to undertake a comparative assessment of how our policies toward Asian governments 

effect our relationships, not only in the region, but also in the rest 

of the world. 

Our bilateral relations with different countries have evolved incrementally over many decades, and in some cases over more than 

two centuries. They’ve been driven by the consequences of war, by 

the emergence of new government structures in other countries, 

and by geopolitical necessity. Collectively, their origin, founding 

principles, and the resulting governments have varied. Ours do not. 

The fundamental political principles underlying the founding and 

growth of our country have remained constant. It’s important, for 

our credibility and for international stability, that our foreign policy also be seen as consistent, predictable, and firm. 

History shows that consistency breeds predictability so that our 

friends can stand with us, our potential adversaries can measure 

the potential for disagreement, and those who aspire to better relations with us will have a clear idea of the road to follow. InconsistVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 Dec 06, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
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ency breeds not only disrespect for our standards and disbelief in 

our motives, but also detracts from the long-term effectiveness of 

our foreign policy goals. 

Asia is a composite of political and economic systems, demographic and geographic disparities, and historic rivalries. Many nations in this region are far older than the United States, ancient 

in their traditions, and driven by cultural forces that date back 

thousands of years. At the same time, the governmental structures 

in some of these countries have been affected by the impact of colonialism. Others have been born out of the conflicts of the last century. Many of these same countries are still disputing the final 

demarcation of their own boundaries. Perceptions of active security 

threats remain alive. Relations with the United States have been 

shaped by all of these factors, and it is natural, to a certain point, 

that we would have a different set of relations and differing benchmarks with nations that have undergone such varying evolutions. 

It also should be pointed out that the economic reforms since 

World War II, and especially over the last 30 years, have caused 

Asia to become more cohesive, economically, and, to greater and 

lesser degrees, interdependent. Cooperation, as a whole, has 

strengthened, evidenced most recently by such regional efforts such 

as the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement that went into effect 

this month. Millions of Asians have taken advantage of new economic opportunities during these past decades and have risen out 

of poverty. 

This period had also seen the growing recognition of the importance of Asia to our own national interests. Six of our top fifteen 

trade partners are located in East Asia. Eight of the top twenty 

holders of U.S. Treasury securities are located in Asia, with China, 

Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan among the top 10. The United 

States maintains several security alliances in Asia that are the key 

to preserving regional stability and balance, and other partnerships 

in that region to counter emerging global threats of nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and narcotics trade. 

Given all of this change and political evolution, it is absolutely 

vital that the United States communicate a sense of purpose and 

consistency in its dealings with every nation. 

There’s no country in the world to which we are more vulnerable, 

strategically and economically, than China. The risks we face are 

illustrated by China’s recent cyber attacks against government and 

business organizations, such as Google; by its military interceptor 

tests on January 11; by its expanding military activities in the 

South China Sea; and by the growth of its foreign reserves to $2.4 

trillion at the end of 2009, despite the global recession. Moreover, 

it serves well to remember that the Chinese Government does not 

allow national elections; opposition parties are illegal; political dissidents and their lawyers are regularly imprisoned; and Internet 

censorship is routine. 

And yet, our burgeoning relations with China have not been 

preconditioned on the nature of its internal political system, nor its 

actions beyond its borders. This is not an allegation, it is a statement—a recital of facts. 

There are other notable instances that seem to contradict or to 

call into question our efforts at maintaining consistency in our relaVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 Dec 06, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
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tions with other Asian nations. While sharing a strong trade relationship and a burgeoning political relationship with Vietnam, 

despite its failure to abide by its agreement in the 1973 Paris 

Peace Accords to hold national elections, we have asserted in the 

past, that free elections in Cambodia were necessary to end the 10- 

year Vietnamese occupation of that country. Thailand has, on occasion, been penalized by our Government for its struggles with elective politics. And while, most recently, Burma’s military junta has 

confirmed its intent to hold an election this year and to allow opposition parties to form, we have been slow to engage the government. Many are opposed to any support for this effort, because it 

does not represent full democracy. 

As these examples illustrate, it is important to reiterate that inconsistencies inherent in our policies toward different governments 

tend to create confusion, cynicism, and allegations of situational 

ethics. There may be valid reasons for these disparities, and I look 

forward to hearing discussion of these issues in today’s testimonies. 

But, as a retired Indian diplomat recently commented in the Asia 

Times, ‘‘Central Asian countries see Western discourse on democracy and human rights as doublespeak from countries that pander 

to authoritarian regimes without scruples when it suits their business interests. Furthermore, the sanctions and other restrictions 

that the United States places on smaller countries, for internal 

political acts that are not demonstrably different than those of the 

Chinese Government itself frequently leads those countries to succumbing to greater influence from China itself.’’ 

For example, after an attempted coup in 1997, directed at Cambodia’s elected Prime Minister Hun Sen, our Government slapped 

a ban on direct assistance to that government for the harsh measures that it applied to defeat the rebels. This may have been justified, but the Chinese immediately backed Hun Sen’s government, 

tossed in $3 million in military aid, and, since then, China has 

overtaken all countries in donor aid to Cambodia, including having 

donated $256 million last year. This observation is especially relevant as Congress and the administration consider an appropriate 

diplomatic response to the recent deportation of 18 Uyghurs from 

Cambodia to China. This was done at China’s assistance, and was 

also sweetened by the Chinese Government’s giving $1.2 billion in 

additional aid to Cambodia. Most people conclude that Cambodia 

had no choice in this matter, because the Chinese presence in that 

country, at all levels, is so pervasive. 

The State Department’s reaction, thus far, has been to condemn 

Cambodia for its deportation of political refugees, without publicly 

confronting the Chinese for having levied that demand on 

Cambodia. 

Nowhere is this more obvious than in Burma, where Chinese influence has grown steadily, at a time when the United States has 

cut off virtually all economic and diplomatic relations. Since the 

tightest restrictions were placed on Burma, Chinese arms sales and 

other military aid has exceeded $3 billion. Other public and private 

Chinese aid has been in the form of billions in interest-free loans, 

grants, concessional loans, and debt relief. There also have been 

numerous low-interest loans, tens of millions of dollars of which 

have gone to stabilize Burma’s currency. And as only one example 

4 

of China’s enormous investment reach, within the next decade 

China is on track to exclusively transfer to its waiting refineries 

both incoming oil and locally tapped natural gas via a 2,380-kilometer pipeline across Burma. 

These examples, and more, illustrate that American sanctions 

and other policy restrictions have not only increased Chinese political and economic influence in Southeast Asia, they have, ironically, served as a double reward for China, because all the while 

American interaction in East Asia has been declining. 

So, the ultimate question becomes, What standards should the 

United States apply in its relations with countries that do not 

share its belief in free and open political systems? And a second 

question follows. If we are to communicate and uphold these standards, under what conditions should they not apply to certain countries? These are not idle intellectual questions, they go to the heart 

of how America sees itself and also how America is viewed around 

the world. 

In order to address these issues, today we are pleased to have 

with us Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell. Prior to his confirmation in June 2009, Assistant Secretary Campbell was the CEO and 

cofounder of the Center for a New American Security, and concurrently served as director of the Aspen Strategy Group. He has 

served in several capacities in government, including as Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and the Pacific, a director 

on the National Security Council staff, Deputy Special Counselor to 

the President for NAFTA in the White House, and as a White 

House fellow. 

Following Secretary Campbell’s testimony, we will begin our second panel with Dr. Robert Sutter, of Georgetown University, and 

Dr. Robert Herman of Freedom House. 

Dr. Sutter is visiting professor of Asian studies at the School of 

Foreign Service at Georgetown. Prior to this position, he specialized 

in Asian and Pacific affairs and U.S. foreign policy and an American Government career spanning 33 years. He’s published 17 

books, numerous articles, and several hundred government reports 

dealing with contemporary East Asian and Pacific countries and 

their relations with the United States, including his most recent 

book ‘‘The United States in Asia.’’ 

Dr. Robert Herman is presently director of programs for Freedom 

House. He has traveled extensively throughout Asia over the past 

20 years as both an NGO representative and also as a U.S. Government official. He has more than 25 years of experience in democracy promotion and human rights. And his work in Asia has taken 

him to India, Nepal, Bangladesh, China, Japan, South Korea, Sri 

Lanka, and Thailand. 

And, gentleman, all three of you, we appreciate your coming 

today, and we look forward to these discussions. 

And at this time, I would like to introduce into the record a 

statement of Senator Inhofe, the ranking Republican on this committee, who is, at this moment, at an Armed Services Committee 

hearing, may come later, but we would like to introduce his statement at this point. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:] 

5 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA

Thank you Chairman Webb, for holding this timely hearing to examine U.S. engagement in Asia. I welcome the opportunity to hear from the witnesses today—and 

especially from Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell—about our policies toward various Asian governments, and what standards the United States should apply in its 

relations with countries that share our beliefs in free and open political systems, 

and with those that do not. 

According to the just released 2010 Index of Economic Freedom published by The 

Heritage Foundation, Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand hold the 

top four positions as possessing the greatest ‘‘economic openness, regulatory efficiency, rule of law, and competitiveness’’ out of the 179 countries ranked. Japan and 

Taiwan rank 19 and 27th respectively. While South Korea (27), India (124), Thailand (66), Sri Lanka (120), Malaysia (59) Indonesia (114) and the Philippines (109) 

reflect a wide swing in rankings, the nondemocratic, totalitarian regimes of China 

(140), Vietnam (144), Laos (138), Burma (175) and North Korea (179) hold the lowest rankings in the region. 

Though not a precise indicator of democratic governance in East Asia—such a 

ranking would have to include factors like poverty levels, public health spending, 

literacy, transparency of electoral systems and respect for human rights—it gives 

a snapshot of how many of this region’s nations have progressed, and unfortunately 

how many have regressed. 

It is a mixed result, and as such U.S. foreign policy must be sophisticated and 

nimble enough to utilize multiple approaches to further U.S. national security interests in East Asia. Realpolitic, unipolarity, pragmatism; whatever diplomatic strategy 

is implemented, it must also adhere to our core American values. That includes the 

pursuit of capitalism and free enterprise, but also respect for individual freedoms 

and basic human rights ensured through democratic institutions. 

I will be particularly interested in hearing the witnesses’ comments regarding the 

U.S. relationship with China. Although the United States carries on a robust trading relationship with China, it is the Chinese Communist government which holds 

the largest share of U.S. debt, possesses foreign exchange reserves in excess of $2 

trillion and maintains a major trade imbalance with the United States. This Communist regime also continues to rely on repression and brutality to maintain its 

rule, continues to suppress political rights, such as free speech, press, and assembly—the censorship of Google is only the latest example—and violates basic human 

rights. This includes the Chinese crackdown on Tibetans and religious groups such 

as the growing Christian population and the Falun Gong. And women still face 

forced abortion and sterilization as part of China’s enforcement of its one-child policy. 

I applaud President Obama when he spoke of respecting ‘‘fundamental human 

rights’’ on his recent trip to China, but I am still waiting to see if any actions have 

been taken by either the Communists or the Obama administration to address this 

crucial issue. Could it be that U.S. foreign policy directed at China is weighted too 

much in favor of capitalism and free enterprise and not enough in support of respect 

for individual freedoms and basic human rights? 

I would very much like a response to this question from each of the witnesses. 

Mr. Chairman, I again thank you for holding this hearing and commend you for 

creating a welcoming forum where open, frank, and I am sure productive discussion 

will occur. 

Senator WEBB. And, Secretary Campbell, we greatly appreciate 

your taking the time to be with us today, and the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KURT M. CAMPBELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC 

AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman and staff, thank you very much for 

the opportunity to appear before you today. And thank you very 

much for your continuing leadership on Asian issues. 

I’m very grateful for the chance to lay out, at a strategic level, 

at the outset, the goals and ambitions of the Obama administration, when it comes to Asia. 

I’d would like to suggest that I put my testimony into the record 

and then proceed with some specific comments—— 

6 

Senator WEBB. Without objection, your full statement will be entered into the record at this time. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you. And then we can get down to some 

specifics, if we could, Senator Webb. 

First of all, just at a very strategic level, Senator Webb, I would 

suggest to you one area that we are in profound agreement is the 

issue about American engagement in the region. I think if you ask 

many Americans today what is the central focus, regionally, of 

American foreign policy, they all would say it is South Asia. Now, 

there are obvious reasons. We have huge stakes in the ongoing 

challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen and elsewhere, but I 

would imagine, that in 20 or 25 years, when we look back on this 

period, I think it will be very clear that the central arena of historical and strategic challenges and opportunities for the United 

States is actually in the Pacific and that one of the things that 

President Obama and Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, I think, 

recognized, at the outset of a new administration, is that the 

United States needed to step up its game in Asia. 

Now, occasionally there have been suggestions that this has been 

a discontinuity with previous administrations, in terms of the overall focus. I do not think that’s the case. I think there is a strong 

bipartisan commitment to Asia, with specific steps and values that 

have animated our overall engagement for decades. I think the biggest change in the Obama administration has been an attempt to 

step up the intensity, to step up the level and the frequency of engagements. And one of the things that we’ve seen over the course 

of the last several months are high-level visits, not only of the Secretary’s four trips to Asia during her first year, although the fourth 

was slightly aborted because of the ongoing challenges in Haiti; a 

Presidential trip to our treaty allies in China during his first year, 

and plans for subsequent travel; and then a number of initiatives, 

many frankly, influenced by your own encouragement; an attempt 

to put in place a more pragmatic approach, in terms of diplomacy 

toward Burma; the Secretary signing the Treaty of Amity and 

Cooperation; an intention on the part of the United States to play 

a more active role in the multilateral institutions of Asia; a recognition that in the 1990s, most of that architecture was transpacific, suggesting a strong role for the United States and more 

recently, I think, that some of the movements and dynamics 

were more Pan-Asian; and the very clear intention, made specific 

when the Secretary was in Hawaii last week, that the United 

States wants a more active role in the multilateral frameworks 

that are emerging in Asia; a very substantial attempt at comprehensive partnership with Indonesia; and the first-ever U.S.- 

ASEAN summit. 

I think, in addition, the administration’s putting together—some 

would say that it’s taken a while—but has put together an economic and trade strategy associated with both the Trans Pacific 

Partnership and Korea Free Trade Agreement. We can talk about 

those dimensions in our give-and-take. And, I think, also an attempt to put forward a comprehensive strategy for dealing with 

and engaging China, one of the most complicated, challenging bilateral relationships that the United States is involved in. It has 

many different facets, as you have already underscored, Senator. 

7 

And so, I think there has been a recognition that the United 

States needed to step up its game. And I think we have attempted 

to do so in the Asia-Pacific region, overall. And I think there is a 

sense, in Southeast Asia, with our allies and with China, that the 

United States is, in fact, in the midst of that as we go. 

I think you have also underscored, Senator, and we recognize, 

that Asia is a tremendously diverse region. There are varying 

degrees of political, economic, and strategic developments. Issues 

associated with democratization, human rights are a mixed bag, 

frankly. And, in fact, in many countries, some of which you have 

indicated, we have seen some backtracking. And some of that backtracking is worrisome. 

Toward that overall picture, I think the United States under not 

just this administration, but previous administrations, had attempted to put together a coherent overarching regional strategy 

that recognizes the diverse ingredients that make up this dynamic 

region and to recognize that the overall strategy requires a diverse 

toolbox. 

And, if I might just say, as we speak now, Senator, Secretary 

Clinton is giving a speech on Internet freedom, which is actually, 

in many respects, designed to deal with this new tool and the role 

that it has played in developing openness in a variety of countries 

globally, not just in the Asia-Pacific region. And, of course, the 

issue of Google in China will figure prominently in her overall 

remarks. 

I think we recognize that it is essential, and there is an expectation and historical record, that human rights and democracy promotion is, and should be, a component of every one of our bilateral 

relationships in Asia. Some of them are different, they are varying 

in scope and intensity, but we believe that it is critical. And you 

have seen, more recently, specific indications of that. Bob King, the 

recently confirmed representative for North Korean human rights 

issues, has made an important trip around the region, and he is 

actively involved in our diplomacy toward North Korea. I think 

there is a recognition in this administration that we cannot separate any diplomatic initiative in North Korea from very concerning 

human rights situation in North Korea. 

We are also involved in a dialogue to establish a new kind of 

human rights dialogue between the United States and China, to 

deal with a number of the issues that you have laid out, and others. And I think there are concerns that the United States continues to promulgate in our bilateral settings. 

We also are in the midst, as you well understand, Senator, of the 

first phases of a strategy to begin direct discussions with the 

authorities in Burma. It is too early to give a report card on that 

effort, but we recognize that this is a critical period, 2010, with the 

intention of the government to hold elections at some point later 

this year. 

There is also a desire, when it comes to global or regional issues 

of democratization and human rights, to raise these matters, not 

just in a bilateral setting, but to raise them in regional fora. So, 

for instance, at the ASEAN regional forum last year in Thailand 

Secretary Clinton raised issues of concern particularly in Burma, 

but not just in Burma, in a regional context. And, to our satisfacVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 Dec 06, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
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tion, we have seen a number of other countries, like Indonesia, the 

Philippines, increasingly talk about values and shared interests in 

a way that we think is very reinforcing. And, of course, those general tenets and beliefs are the foundation of our strong and deep 

partnerships with countries like Japan, South Korea, Australia, the 

Philippines, Thailand, and others. 

Just as we go to questions now, Senator, I would say that I think 

the United States can take some general satisfaction about the historical trends. If you look at what has transpired since 1975 in 

Asia, largely due to a very strong American presence providing a 

security guarantee, and the ability for countries to overcome historical animosities, regional rivalries, anxieties about military competition, this strong American presence and the consistent message 

about the importance of the dignity of individuals, has led to, 

really, historically unprecedented results in the Asian-Pacific region. Large numbers of countries have trended democratic. Millions 

of people have been lifted out of poverty. A number of indicators 

suggest that the forward wheel of progress has been more significant in Asia than perhaps any other place on the planet. And the 

United States can take some satisfaction that we played an important role in this historical trend. 

There is much yet to be done. I think, Senator Inhofe’s very important statement underscores that, by many indicators, we have 

seen backtracking in several states. There are a number of countries that still have very disappointing human rights records and 

treatments of religious and ethnic minorities. 

It is incumbent on the United States, not only to step up its 

game in the Asian-Pacific region, in terms of the level and intent 

of our diplomacy, but also as you prod us to do—to try to be consistent across economic variables, strategic variables, and the like. 

And that is what we are attempting to do as we go forward. 

And again, I thank you for the opportunity for this dialogue 

today, Senator, and for making sure that Asian issues are not 

neglected amidst the already, you know, full agenda including 

health care and developments in Afghanistan and the like. So, 

thank you for that. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Campbell follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KURT M. CAMPBELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

STATE, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and members of the subcommittee, thank you very 

much for inviting me here today to testify about the vital importance of Asian-Pacific countries to the United States and the key aspects of our engagement strategy 

with the region. 

There should be no doubt that the United States itself is a Pacific nation, and 

in every regard—geopolitically, militarily, diplomatically, and economically—Asia 

and the Pacific are indispensable to addressing the challenges and seizing the opportunities of the 21st century. Senator Webb, as you have eloquently noted, ‘‘The 

United States is a Pacific nation in terms of our history, our culture, our economy, 

and our national security.’’ As the Asia-Pacific century emerges, defining the new 

international environment, the United States must enhance and deepen its strategic 

engagement and leadership role in the region. 

Our economic relationships demonstrate the mutual importance of the interactions between the countries of the Asia-Pacific and the United States. The region 

is home to almost one-third of the Earth’s population. The Asia-Pacific accounts for 

almost one-third of global GDP and is a key driver for technological innovation. 

9 

American and Asian economies are growing increasingly interdependent while 

assisting the global economic recovery. 

Despite significant economic growth and vitality, the Asia-Pacific region is home 

to many of the most pressing security challenges of the modern era. What is most 

often absent in our discussion about the ‘‘Asian miracle’’ are the challenges posed 

by uneven growth, poverty, and weak and ineffective governments. Hundreds of millions have yet to benefit from the fruits of the Asian miracle, and income inequality 

continues to strain the capacity of governments to respond. Perhaps the most significant unintended consequence of the Asian miracle has been the acceleration of 

greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Asia’s densely populated littoral nations will 

likely suffer as climatic variations target the region. Compounding these challenges 

is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, extremist groups in Southeast 

Asia, unresolved territorial disputes, and growing competition over energy and natural resources. 

The severity and transnational nature of these challenges demand collective action and American leadership. They also suggest a need for America to enhance, 

deepen, and sustain our engagement to seize opportunities and minimize risk. 

Renewed Engagement Generates Results.—Let me now take this opportunity to 

briefly list the steps we have undertaken over the past year to step up and broaden 

U.S. engagement in the region. First, we have newly reengaged in the region 

through visits of our senior leadership and attendance at high-level meetings. Our 

attendance has produced concrete results that further U.S. strategic interests. In 

November, President Obama spent 10 days visiting Japan, Singapore, China, and 

South Korea, strengthening U.S. leadership and economic competitiveness in the region, renewing old alliances, and forging new partnerships. Under the leadership 

and guidance of President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and Secretary Geithner, we 

hosted the first U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in July 2009, and we 

will have follow-on discussions in 2010. The dialogue set a positive tone for the 

United States-China relationship, while underscoring challenges and opportunities 

to enhance that relationship. We continue to build the United States-Indonesia 

Comprehensive Partnership, which would provide a framework to broaden and 

deepen the bilateral relationship. Secretary Clinton has visited the region four 

times. Her first overseas trip as Secretary last February and her subsequent trips 

in July, November, and earlier this month bolstered bilateral relationships and enhanced U.S. ties to multilateral organizations. 

The renewal of high-level engagement is producing tangible results. President 

Obama’s November trip included participation in the 17th Annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ meeting in Singapore, important for U.S. trade 

since APEC members account for 53 percent of global GDP, purchase 58 percent of 

U.S. goods exports, and represent a market of 2.7 billion consumers. APEC leaders 

endorsed the Pittsburgh G20 principles and agreed to implement the policies of the 

G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth, further expanding 

the global commitment to achieve more balanced growth that is less prone to destabilizing booms and busts. They also put forward a strong statement of support for 

concluding the Doha Round in 2010 and agreed to reject all forms of protectionism. 

In addition, Leaders agreed on core principles to promote cross-border services trade 

that will provide a strong basis for our efforts to facilitate and promote trade in 

services in the Asia-Pacific region. Leaders also pledged to make growth more inclusive through APEC initiatives that will support development of small and medium 

enterprises, facilitate worker retraining, and enhance economic opportunity for 

women. Finally, Leaders took steps to ensure environmentally sustainable growth 

in the region by agreeing on an ambitious plan to address barriers to trade and investment in environmental goods and services. 

President Obama also attended the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN) Leaders Meeting, the first ever with all 10 ASEAN members represented, 

providing a clear demonstration of renewed U.S. engagement with Southeast Asia. 

Secretary Clinton’s July trip included meetings with regional Foreign Ministers at 

the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Thailand and the signing of the Treaty of 

Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with ASEAN nations. Her November visits to the 

Philippines, Singapore, and China included attendance at APEC Ministerial Meetings and meetings with allies and regional partners that further solidified relationships and deepened U.S. multilateral engagement. 

Let me turn to another area of renewed engagement: Burma. Mr. Chairman, your 

leadership on this issue has been instrumental in changing our policy and initiating 

steps to engage the Burmese junta. As you are well aware, the administration’s formal review of U.S. policy toward Burma reaffirmed our fundamental goals: a democratic Burma at peace with its neighbors and that respects the rights of its people. 

A policy of pragmatic engagement with the Burmese authorities holds the best hope 

10 

for advancing our goals. Under this approach, U.S. sanctions will remain in place 

until Burmese authorities demonstrate that they are prepared to make meaningful 

progress on U.S. core concerns. The leaders of Burma’s democratic opposition have 

confirmed to us their support for this approach. The policy review also confirmed 

that we need additional tools to augment those that we have been using in pursuit 

of our objectives. A central element of this approach is a direct, senior-level dialogue 

with representatives of the Burmese leadership. Since I testified before you on the 

subject late last September, I visited Burma November 3 and 4 for meetings with 

Burmese officials, including Prime Minister Thein Sein, leaders of the democracy 

movement, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and representatives of the largest ethnic 

minorities. In my meetings, I stressed the importance of all stakeholders engaging 

in a dialogue on reform and emphasized that the release of political prisoners is essential if the elections planned for 2010 are to have any credibility. 

Finally, I want to underscore the Obama administration’s commitment to stepping 

up our engagement with Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Island nations. 

Secretary of State Clinton was en route to Papua New Guinea, New Zealand and 

Australia last week, but the pressing need to help organize U.S. assistance to Haiti 

led her to postpone that visit. Her trip builds on her meeting with Pacific Island 

leaders in September 2009 in New York, with all parties committing to work together to address climate change and other transnational issues. The U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Susan Rice, has met regularly with her Pacific Island counterparts to share views and build cooperation on 

key issues before the United Nations. Within weeks of assuming my current responsibilities, I traveled to Cairns, Australia, to represent the United States at the 

Pacific Island Forum’s Post Forum Dialogue of key partner countries and institutions. Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd chaired the proceedings, which focused 

on improving the coordination and effectiveness of development assistance efforts in 

the region. 

U.S. Principles for Engagement in the Asia-Pacific Region.—The Asia-Pacific region is of vital and permanent importance to the United States and it is clear that 

countries in the region want the United States to maintain a strong and active presence. We need to ensure that the United States is a resident power and not just 

a visitor, because what happens in the region has a direct effect on our security and 

economic well-being. Over the course of the next few decades climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and widespread poverty will pose the 

most significant challenges to the United States and the rest of the region. These 

challenges are and will continue to be most acute in East Asia. This situation not 

only suggests a need for the United States to play a leading role in addressing these 

challenges, but it also indicates a need to strengthen and broaden alliances, build 

new partnerships, and enhance capacity of multilateral organizations in the region. 

Fundamental to this approach will be continued encouragement of China’s peaceful 

rise and integration into the international system. A forward-looking strategy that 

builds on these relationships and U.S. strengths as a democracy and a Pacific power 

is essential to manage both regional and increasingly global challenges. 

With the positive outcomes of renewed engagement as a backdrop, I would like 

to discuss a series of principles that will guide our efforts moving forward. Intrinsic 

to our engagement strategy is an unwavering commitment to American values that 

have undergirded our foreign policy since the inception of our Republic. In many 

ways, it is precisely because of the emergence of a more complex and multipolar 

world that values can and should serve as a tool of American statecraft. Five principles guide the Obama administration’s engagement in East Asia and the Pacific. 

In her January 12 speech in Honolulu, Secretary Clinton detailed the five principles 

for how we view the Asia-Pacific architecture and U.S. involvement evolving. These 

include the foundation of the U.S. alliance system and bilateral partnerships, building a common regional economic and security agenda, the importance of resultoriented cooperation, the need to enhance the flexibility and creativity of our multilateral cooperation, and the principle that the Asia-Pacific’s defining institutions 

will include all the key stakeholders such as the United States. 

For the last half century, the United States and its allies in the region—Japan, 

the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand—have maintained 

security and stability in East Asia and the Pacific. Our alliances remain the bedrock 

of our engagement in the region, and the Obama administration is committed to 

strengthening those alliances to address both continuing and emerging challenges. 

The United States, therefore, must maintain a forward-deployed military presence 

in the region that both reassures friends and reminds others that the United States 

will remain the ultimate guarantor of regional peace and stability. There should be 

no mistake: the United States is firm in its resolve to uphold its treaty commitments regarding the defense of its allies. 

11 

Our alliance with Japan is a cornerstone of our strategic engagement in Asia. The 

May 2006 agreement on defense transformation and realignment will enhance deterrence while creating a more sustainable military presence in the region. The 

Guam International Agreement, signed by Secretary Clinton during her February 

2009 trip, carries this transformation to the next stage. As part of our ongoing 

efforts to assist the Government of Japan with its review of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) Agreement, a high-level working group met in Tokyo in November and December, and the Government of Japan is continuing its review. In addition to our focus on these issues, we are working to create a more durable and 

forward-looking vision for the alliance that seizes upon Japan’s global leadership 

role on climate change and humanitarian and development assistance programs, to 

name a few. As we approach the 50th anniversary of the alliance, we will work 

closely with our friends in Japan to think creatively and strategically about the 

alliance. 

We are also working vigorously with our other critical ally in Northeast Asia, the 

Republic of Korea, to modernize our defense alliance and to achieve a partnership 

that is truly global and comprehensive in nature. Building off the Joint Vision 

Statement between Presidents Obama and Lee Myung-bak, we are committed to 

creating a more dynamic relationship that builds on our shared values and strategic 

interests. We look forward to the Republic of Korea’s growing international leadership role as it hosts the 2010 G20 Leaders Meeting. 

Japan and the Republic of Korea have been key partners in our joint efforts to 

maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia and, in particular, to denuclearize 

North Korea through the Six-Party process. The process suffered serious setbacks 

in 2009 with North Korea carrying out a series of provocations including its April 

5 missile test and its May 25 announcement of a second nuclear test. As President 

Obama said, North Korea’s actions blatantly defied U.N. Security Council resolutions and constitute a direct and reckless challenge to the international community, 

increasing tension and undermining stability in Northeast Asia. However, the international community’s unified response to North Korea’s provocations is another example of the fruits of U.S. engagement. The U.N. Security Council, led by our FiveParty partners, unanimously condemned the DPRK’s provocative actions and passed 

UNSCR 1874, introducing tough sanctions against North Korea’s weapons and proliferation finance networks. When North Korea began to show renewed interest in 

dialogue later in the year, the United States sent U.S. Special Representative for 

North Korea Policy Ambassador Stephen Bosworth to Pyongyang on December 8 for 

discussions with North Korean officials about the nuclear issue. In these discussions, the DPRK reaffirmed the importance of the Six-Party Talks and the September 2005 Joint Statement on the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean 

Peninsula in a peaceful manner. We did not, however, reach agreement on when 

and how North Korea will return to Six-Party Talks, a matter that we will continue 

to discuss with Asian partners early in 2010. 

Our deep and sustained engagement with China continues to yield progress on 

important international issues, such as the global economic recovery, climate change 

policy, and efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. However, we obviously do 

not see eye to eye with China on every issue, as evidenced by our discussions on 

human rights and concerns over China’s opaque military modernization and exclusionary industrial policies. We will continue to address these issues through continuous and frank dialogue, seeking out Chinese cooperation on areas of mutual concern while directly addressing differences. A recent example of this approach is our 

engagement regarding Google’s troubling allegations regarding intrusions and the 

routine accessing of human rights activists’ e-mail accounts by third parties. U.S. 

officials have emphasized the importance of China’s addressing the concerns raised 

by Google as well as the importance of Internet freedom as a central human rights 

issue. 

We need to recognize Asia’s importance to the global economy. Close United 

States-Asian economic cooperation is vital to the well-being of the United States and 

international economic order. However, as President Obama noted in his recent trip 

to Asia, ‘‘We simply cannot return to the same cycles of boom and bust that led us 

into a global recession.’’ The United States and Asia need to emphasize balanced 

growth and trade. 

It is worth highlighting that four Asian economies (China, Japan, the Republic of 

Korea, and Taiwan) are now among our top 12 trading partners. Today, the 21 

APEC economies purchase almost 60 percent of U.S. goods. Taken as a group, 

ASEAN is also a large and critical trading partner. The strong Asian participation 

in APEC, the WTO, and the G20 reflects the increasing importance of Asian economies and their centrality to strengthening the multilateral trading system and 

maintaining our economic recovery. 

12 

Continued integration of the economies of this region will create new business opportunities, benefiting workers, consumers, and businesses and creating jobs back 

here in the United States. Despite strong export growth to the Asia-Pacific, the 

United States share of the total trade in the region has declined by 3 percent in 

the past 5 years. To reverse this trend, we will continue to work with the Congress, 

stakeholders, and the Republic of Korea to work through the outstanding issues of 

concern so we can move forward on our bilateral free trade agreement. We will also 

enter into negotiations of a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, as President 

Obama announced to APEC leaders in November. As the administration stated 

when it announced its intention to launch these negotiations, we intend to work in 

partnership with the U.S. Congress and stakeholders to shape a high-standard, 

broad-based regional agreement that will serve as a potential platform for economic 

integration across the region. This is an exciting opportunity for the United States 

to engage with some of the fastest growing economies in the world as well as to update our approaches to traditional trade issues, address new issues, and incorporate 

new elements that respond to 21st century challenges. 

The U.S. commitment to democracy and the protection of human rights is an intrinsic and indispensable aspect of our character as a nation and our engagement 

in the Asia-Pacific region. Let me be clear, the promotion of democracy and human 

rights is an essential element of American foreign policy. It is part of who we are 

as a people. We believe human rights are not only core American values, but universal values. These values are a force multiplier in a region where democratic 

norms are on the ascent. We believe that citizens around the world should enjoy 

these rights, irrespective of their nationality, ethnicity, religion, or race. The United 

States will continue to speak for those on the margins of society, encouraging countries in the region to respect the internationally recognized human rights of their 

people while undertaking policies to further liberalize and open their states. As 

President Obama said in his speech on the way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan, ‘‘We must promote our values by living them at home—which is why I have 

prohibited torture and will close the prison at Guantanamo Bay.’’ President Obama 

has eloquently stated that our willingness to speak out on human rights and other 

democratic values is the source of our moral authority and courage. 

In order to ensure that human rights and the development of the rule of law and 

civil society remain strong pillars of our engagement, we will continue to adopt new 

and creative approaches that seize the opportunities of a dynamic information age. 

The freedom to speak your mind and choose your leaders, the ability to access information and worship how you please are the basis of stability. We need to let our 

partners in the region know that we will always stand on the side of those who pursue those rights. 

Democratic governance is rapidly evolving within Asia; advancing human rights, 

freedom, and democracy is critical to alleviating poverty and conditions that catalyze extremism. Sustained economic growth requires governments that are transparent, noncorrupt, and responsive to the needs of their people. Our strategy is to 

maintain pressure on local decisionmakers to improve governments’ human rights 

records while cooperating closely with international and nongovernmental organizations involved in monitoring and reporting on human rights. 

As the Asia-Pacific region evolves, so should our own approach to multilateral economic and security cooperation. The President stated in Tokyo that we aim to participate fully in regional organizations, as appropriate, including engaging with the 

East Asian summit. Secretary Clinton spoke in Honolulu of the need to enhance the 

flexibility and creativity of our multilateral cooperation. We plan to consult with 

allies and partners in the region and with Congress on how the United States, 

working with our Asian counterparts, can join and shape the region’s evolving multilateral bodies. Strong, multilateral links to Asia can help ensure that the United 

States remains a critical part of this dynamic region. 

Multilateral engagement can be an effective way to address our efforts to deal 

with transnational security challenges such as climate change, pandemics, or environmental degradation. For example, steps taken by APEC and ASEAN to improve 

cooperation among regional emergency management agencies is an important step 

in light of the spate of recent natural disasters that have battered the region. Multilateral efforts are also proving effective in addressing new transnational threats 

such as terrorism, piracy that threatens our sea-lanes, and traffickers who exploit 

women, children, laborers, and migrants. 

In 2011, the United States will host APEC for the first time in 18 years, providing 

us with unique opportunities to demonstrate our commitment to and engagement 

in the region, shape the organization’s agenda in ways that reflect our values, and 

will help U.S. businesses and workers to compete on a more level economic playing 

field in this dynamic region. Through APEC, we will continue to advance regional 

13 

economic integration, reduce barriers to trade and investment in the region, and 

help rebalance the Asia-Pacific economies. Working with ASEAN, the United States 

will seek to streamline and strengthen the ASEAN Regional Forum’s (ARF) institutional processes and create a more action-oriented agenda, especially with respect 

to transnational and nontraditional security challenges. 

CONCLUSION

The United States faces a number of critical challenges in the coming years in 

its engagement with Asia. These include rising and failing states, proliferation of 

weapons of mass destruction, critical global issues like climate change, violent extremism in some parts of Southeast Asia, poverty and income disparity. The essential 

ingredient in meeting these challenges is United States leadership. We need to play 

an active role in helping the countries of the region to enhance their capacity to succeed. The region is vital to U.S. interests not only in the Asia-Pacific context, but 

also globally. We are a vital contributor to the region’s security and economic success. The Asia-Pacific region, in turn, has a profound impact on our lives through 

trade, our alliances, and partnerships. As the region continues to grow and as new 

groupings and structures take shape, the United States will be a player, not a distant spectator. Under President Obama and Secretary Clinton’s leadership, we are 

ready to face these challenges. We look forward to working with Congress and this 

committee to seek opportunities to influence positively the future direction of the 

region. 

Thank you for extending this opportunity to me to testify today on this pressing 

and vitally important issue. I am happy to respond to any questions you may have. 

Senator WEBB. I thank you for your comments, and also for your 

written statement, which, as I said, is a part of the record. 

And let me begin by saying how much I appreciate the efforts in 

this administration, from Secretary Clinton’s initial decision to 

make her first visit to Asia and to, as you put it, to put East Asia 

back on the map, in terms of the focus of the American people. As 

you and I have discussed on a number of occasions, we have spent 

so much emotional energy and blood and treasure with the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan, over the past 7 or 8 years, that 

when Americans look at Asia, they tend to think, principally, of 

China, and, on a good day, maybe China and Japan. But, it is 

really important for people in this country to understand the larger 

dynamic at play, in terms of our national interests, in the countries 

of ASEAN, which number at probably 650 million people, added up, 

and the growing future that we should be having in trade, commerce, as well as security issues. 

So, I want to make sure that, at the outset of this discussion that 

we’re having today, that I reemphasize how vital this region is, and 

how positive, I think, in general, our relations are. We have some 

very serious questions of immediate concern. We’ll talk a bit about 

those. And then we have the question that doesn’t really get raised 

that often, which is the principal reason that I decided to hold this 

hearing. And that is the importance, from a United States perspective, of ensuring that the countries in this region know that we 

have consistency, in terms of how we approach these issues of, as 

you put in your testimony, the promotion of democracy and the respect for human rights. 

And let’s just make sure we know where we are on these issues, 

in terms of country by country. 

First, there is a difference in our discussion that is not clarified 

enough, in my view, and that is between human rights issues and 

evolution-of-democracy issues. They’re two separate issues. We 

tend to lump them together in our discussions. But, if we are—I’m 

going to read from your statement, ‘‘Intrinsic to our engagement 

14 

policy is an unwavering commitment to American values that have 

undergirded our foreign policy since the inception of our Republic. 

The promotion of democracy and human rights is an essential 

element of American foreign policy.’’ This is from your written 

statement. 

I’d assume you would agree that there is a difference between 

issues of human rights and the evolution of democracy, when it 

comes to systems. They are compatible goals, but they are two separate approaches. Would you agree? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I would, Senator. And I would even go further 

than that. I think there are many elements of a comprehensive 

strategy associated along the lines that you have laid out. It is not 

just human rights, it is not just democracy promotion, it is the role 

of the rule of law, the role of civic society. And so, there are many 

measurements and, in fact, many tools that one looks for as part 

of a comprehensive engagement with states that are struggling 

along this path to development. 

Senator WEBB. Could you review for us the extent to which we 

have been promoting democracy in a country like China? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Would you like me to describe this primarily in 

this administration or—— 

Senator WEBB. Well, in terms of government policy rather than 

aspirations. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes. I would say, first of all, in my experience, 

in every single high-level meeting that I have been a part of, either 

with the President or the Secretary or my own interactions, the 

subject of human rights has come up in every single meeting. Many 

times those interactions can be extensive and quite tense. They 

range not only—from treatment of groups within China to specific 

individual cases. 

In addition, I think that there has been an attempt to understand the historical trends that are at work in China, and to appreciate, for instance, the role of the Internet and how the Internet is 

playing. There are more Internet users in China than there are 

outside of China, a huge growing number of bloggers, recognition 

that, although there is substantial censorship inside the country, 

many Chinese users believe that this capability, this technology, 

has provided them the ability to raise concerns about corruption, 

about health care, and the like. 

When President Obama visited China in November, he held the 

first-ever cyber townhall in which tens of millions, probably close 

to 100 million, Chinese interlocutors and citizens had the chance 

to review his comments and see his views online. 

I think the matter that you have raised about, for instance, the 

Uyghurs in Cambodia, was raised, not just with the Cambodians. 

And I do fundamentally agree that the pressure brought on Cambodia was substantial, but we have also raised it with Chinese 

interlocutors. 

So, I do believe that this is an issue that is part of our strategic 

dialogue with China. Chinese interlocutors expect it. It would be an 

enormous mistake for any administration to neglect this critical 

dimension of our foreign policy. I think it is also the view of particularly President Obama and Secretary Clinton that not only is 

it important to talk about these values, but to live them. So, when 

15 

the President talks about specific issues, he believes it is extraordinarily important to be consistent on Guantanamo and torture 

and the like. And so, he has been very clear with interlocutors, 

both domestically and internationally, that he believes that the 

United States itself has to stand by a higher standard. 

So, I would just say, Senator, that the administration believes 

that these issues are of central importance. They are not standalone issues, they have to be taken in consideration with a broad 

range of issues, such as China’s role in the fledgling financial revival; the strategic issues arising from Chinese military capabilities; a very dynamic Chinese strategy to play a larger role, not just 

in Southeast Asia, but in Asia as a whole. And so, it is very clear 

that, to have a successful strategy toward China—and that is an 

enormous challenge—this has to be part of that overall strategy. 

But, it can’t be a stand-alone issue, either. 

Senator WEBB. All right. Let me give you my reaction to—— 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. To that statement, and ask you another follow-on question. 

Those are all valid points. They basically go to human rights 

issues rather than democratic-systems issues, which sort of is illustrative of the concern that I was just mentioning. And this doesn’t 

just to go into the China situation. It’s to talk about, fundamentally, whether we have a consistent policy that people in all countries in Asia can understand. 

You mention Internet access, and I agree with you that it’s a 

great tool, in terms of getting information in and elevating of public 

consciousness. You can see it also in Vietnam; I think there are 

now 40 million Internet users in Vietnam, which, per capita, probably is even higher than China. 

At the same time, we know of the situation, last week, where 

Google announced that it had been the target of cyber attacks. 

They’ve confirmed that it came from within China. They’ve also 

made statements that this is a general pattern, not simply designed toward Google and not necessarily designed toward business 

interests. And, at the same time, there was an article in the Washington Times yesterday indicating that the administration had 

downgraded the level of concern about Chinese activities. Rather 

curious timing, in terms of administration policy. 

With respect to—staying on the human rights question for a 

minute—with respect to human rights situations inside China, 

these are the numbers that I received from my staff, from the State 

Department’s report on human rights. Vietnam has an estimated 

35 political detainees, perhaps as high as 400, according to Human 

Rights Watch. Burma has 2,100, and that includes political prisoners, merchants, violators of state security laws, and those convicted of religious disturbances. China has, ‘‘tens of thousands’’ of 

political prisoners remaining incarcerated. And the number of 

Tibetans detained, in the months following the 2007 protests, is 

estimated at more than 6,500. 

So, before we get even to the question of democratic systems or 

how we articulate our desire to see democratic systems in these 

very different countries, as I pointed out in my opening statement, 

we do have serious concerns on human rights issues. And I know 

16 

that the State Department and others are watching them. But, 

they are serious, and they do go to the standards that we apply, 

no matter what governmental system happens to be in place. 

The second question is more a question, I think, of pragmatics, 

but it’s not unimportant, in terms of how people in the region, and 

in the world, view the credibility of what the United States says 

when it talks to one country or another about governmental 

systems. 

To my knowledge, we have never suggested to the Chinese Government that they hold free elections or have minority political 

parties or any of those sorts of things. Nor have we, in Vietnam, 

at least since the Paris Peace Talks of many, many years ago, as 

I mentioned. And the Hanoi government signed on to internationally supervised free elections, 1973. That’s not been a part of the 

formula, when realistically and pragmatically, we shouldn’t—I’m 

not saying, today, we should stand up and say that, but if you’re 

in another country where the United States is taking a different 

line, you look for consistency. And I think that’s what the comment 

was all about from the former Indian minister that I mentioned in 

my opening statement. 

And you see countries like Thailand, which are very evolved in 

terms of individual freedoms and free press. Even after the coup, 

the local elections took place. And you see a lot of pressure from 

the United States, cutting off different types of government-togovernment relations. 

And then we see the situation in Burma. And I want to be very 

clear, I’m not trying, in any way, to defend the actions of the military junta. We’re trying to figure out a way to open up dialogue. 

But, when you see these sorts of inconsistencies, if you are someone sitting in Southeast Asia right now, how would you explain 

what the overall objectives are of the United States, in terms of 

governmental systems? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. It is a powerful question, Senator, and I will try 

to answer it with a couple of specifics. And I think your overall 

point—that one of the most important dimensions of American policy, in its implementation, is to make sure that you are both realistic and pragmatic. And so, when I talk about the number of factors that come into play, in terms of the formulation and execution 

of policy, let’s take a few specifics. 

You talk about Vietnam, a country that you have forgotten more 

about than I will ever know. So, I recognize I am treading into an 

area of a profound expertise. But, if you look, historically, in the 

period before diplomatic recognition, we laid out some very clear 

things that we wanted the government to do, both in terms of closing of reeducation camps, some specific issues associated with its 

neighbors, and some steps associated with the economy. 

I would say, over the course of the last several years, we have 

seen some enormous progress in a number of areas in Vietnam. 

Extraordinarily dynamic economic performance, perhaps rivaling 

and exceeding capabilities and progress in other places in Southeast Asia and in parts of China. Very important, very impressive. 

The growth of certain kinds of civil society and certain religious 

freedoms recently has been extremely important. 

17 

And an important dimension, Senator, that we have not discussed is, What is the attitude of the government toward the 

United States? The truth is, unlike some countries, at best, Burma 

is ambivalent about the United States. I know of few countries who 

are more actively interested in a better relationship with the 

United States than Vietnam, something that you know very well. 

So, in the plus ledger, there are some very important positive developments that the United States needs to recognize as we look 

at a larger strategic framework, that you know, again, better than 

I do, in Asia. But, at the same time, frankly, in the recent period, 

we have been worried and concerned by some developments that 

we have seen domestically in Vietnam. 

What we try to do in that dialogue is, again, recognizing that no 

cookie-cutter-like approach works, we have to sculpt each strategy 

toward each bilateral relationship and make very clear to our 

Vietnamese interlocutors that we, too, want a better relationship; 

we, too, want to work more closely together. Some of the domestic 

problems, not just human rights, but the lack of progress in certain 

areas, societally, that you underscore, make it difficult for the 

United States. But, over the course of the last 15 or 20 years, 

through suggestions from the United States, we have seen enormous progress on a variety of fronts in Vietnam. 

Burma is a very different case, Senator, and, I think, one that 

you know well. Burma has had elections. Those elections have been 

overthrown. 

I think, one of the things that we could argue about, and could 

debate—I think, in the past, perhaps the leadership of Vietnam 

was not as interested in the welfare of the people. Through a variety of interactions, including those of yourself and others in the 

United States, although we still have a repressive Communist regime, there is clearly a greater interest in the welfare, economically, of its people than 15 or 20 years ago. 

I am not sure we have yet seen that corner turned in Burma. I 

think there are some very substantial concerns about how its leadership views the people; the quality of life of the people; issues 

associated with ethnic minorities; treatment of legitimate politically elected groups; and, on top of that, attitudes toward the 

United States and concerns about proliferation. 

And so, what we try to do, Senator, when we look at each country, is look at the full range of issues that we are confronting. But, 

at the same time, what we are trying to do, under your encouragement, is to be more pragmatic and to improve our standing, across 

the board, and to recognize that we must engage with the world, 

as we find it, not always as we wish it to be, and we seek improvements in each situation according to what is possible, what is pragmatic, and what is achievable. 

Senator WEBB. Well, let me first say that, if you looked at Vietnam in 1991, when I first started going back there, you wouldn’t 

see much difference from the attitude in Burma today. Among governing people, they were very isolated; they were a part of the 

Soviet sphere; they were, you know, getting billions a year from the 

Soviets; they were suspicious of the outside world. 

We didn’t have trade relations, because of the trade embargo 

that followed the Communist takeover, which I supported, by the 

18 

way, as you know, for many years. I changed my mind in the 

mid-1990s and early 1990s, once the Japanese lifted their trade 

embargo. 

But, certain of the conditions that you mentioned really are a 

product of isolation. And when you have small opportunities, the 

smartest thing to do is to take them, and to see if you can build 

something on them, which is actually what happened in Vietnam. 

And Vietnam is not perfect. It’s far from perfect. It doesn’t allow 

an opposition party. And I don’t want this whole testimony to get 

into a discussion between Vietnam and Burma, because—— 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. There’s many, many other issues for 

us to discuss. 

But, the best way for the United States to be understood inside 

these isolated countries is to do what we can, according to the precepts which we believe as a nation, to open up those societies and 

let them see the outside world. 

And a concern that I have is, if you on the other side of this is 

that if we, as a nation, tolerate certain activities by closed systems 

that have a great deal of power, as with some of the recent activities from China, then these emerging governments will see that 

there is no accountability for negative behavior and, as a result, 

will continue in the other direction. 

For instance, we just saw, very recently, in the last couple of 

weeks, in China and then in Vietnam, the decision to imprison certain dissidents who were, essentially, speaking their minds, as 

much as anything else. What would your thoughts be about that 

sort of behavior? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Senator. I agree, we—just back on 

one point, I agree with your statement about Vietnam in 1991. But, 

what we saw throughout the 1990s were occasionally dramatic, but 

most often incremental, steps by the leadership in Vietnam, a 

direct communication with the United States about a desire to 

have a better relationship. And over a period of 10 years, that relationship was fundamentally transformed, largely due to the encouragement of people like you and Senator McCain and others, who 

shed blood and committed themselves to a profound engagement 

with that country. 

We are attempting to take that first step with Burma—again, 

with the encouragement of people like you. But, I do want to underscore that one cannot dance on a dance floor alone. We have 

been very clear about the things that we are prepared to do. We 

have communicated them at a high level. And, Senator, I must say, 

you know this, we’ve done some of those things already. We are 

looking for some clear signals from the junta about their intentions 

on the way forward. 

And so, I fundamentally, violently agree with your logic here. 

And we acknowledge that we are at the very beginning of this process, but this will not be a one-way affair. We will need to see reciprocal steps, even if those steps are small ones. And we think it is 

important. So, I completely agree with you, more generally. 

On the issue of—— 

Senator WEBB. Let me just—— 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Please. 

19 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. If I may, having visited Burma last 

August and having met with all their top leadership, and then had 

subsequent meetings in the United Nations here, I was a part of 

that journey in the 1990s with Vietnam. And people are right, 

Burma is not Vietnam. Vietnam is not Burma. 

At the same time, the process, as you correctly say, is a gradual 

process over time. But, it was not simply the Government of Vietnam deciding that they wanted better relations in the early 1990s. 

They had faced a situation, with the demise of the Soviet Union, 

where they were not receiving the same support, financially and 

otherwise, from the Soviet Union. But, there was a lot of resistance, inside the Government of Vietnam, to moving forward. And 

it was very important for people, at a lot of different levels, to bring 

the mid-level people from the Vietnamese Government out—the 

future leaders—to allow them to see, with their own eyes, the way 

that the rest of the world was working, and to do a lot of other 

things. 

So, I didn’t see a complete resistance in the Burmese Government. And this is not the appropriate place for the discussion, and 

I would say that looking at the situation, I have seen some positive 

movement, in terms of how they are dealing with Aung San Suu 

Kyi and her political party, and having met with a number of 

groups here, too, as well. So, I didn’t want to—— 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. To let that go without some sort of 

a reaction to it, that it’s, by no means, a slam dunk, but I don’t 

think you’re out there on a dance floor all by yourself—— 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Either. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I did not mean to indicate that I was. What I was 

trying to indicate to you was that when the United States articulates a strategy, a desire to engage, whether it’s in North Korea or 

it is in Burma, there is an understanding that we will be pragmatic, we will demonstrate where we can be flexible, but we expect 

results. And I would be the first to say that I think we see at least 

some signs that we are looking forward to follow up on. But, it is 

also the case, Senator, if we are both honest, it is still too early to 

tell, and much more needs to be done. 

On your earlier point about a variety of developments in Southeast Asia, and also in China, in terms of treatment of both dissidents and minority groups, I think it is incumbent on the United 

States to raise those issues at the highest levels. 

I think, occasionally, and again, I am relatively new to the State 

Department, to be perfectly honest, we have dialogues internally 

with senior-level people, and we sometimes discuss and debate 

about what is the most appropriate way to manage and handle situations. Is it better to be outspoken and public? Is it better, in certain circumstances, to use the quiet channels of diplomacy? And, 

truth be told, probably the most successful strategies involve elements of both. And that is what we have tried to do, across the 

board. 

And so, there have been times where we think it’s important to 

speak out loudly and clearly, in circumstances in China and other 

parts of Southeast Asia, and there have been other circumstances 

20 

where we think it perhaps is more prudent, and we have a better 

chance at getting the short-term achievements that we’re looking 

for, by managing things quietly and carefully behind the scenes. 

I mean, that is the essence of diplomacy. It also leads, often, to 

substantial second-guessing, which I understand. But, I think what 

is important to underscore is that I would say that I spend a substantial part of every day thinking about both individual cases and 

also questions of state policy when it comes to these critical 

matters. 

Senator WEBB. And you mentioned something in your oral remarks that I think it’s worthwhile to follow up on, and I’d like to 

hear your specific thoughts on it. And that is that, as we both 

know, as all of us in this room know, Asia is really moving toward 

multilateral relationships. And it’s positive. ASEAN is one of the 

great things that’s happened in East Asia in the post-World War 

II period. 

If we are desirous of promoting certain types of governmental 

behavior, it would seem to me that the best way to do so, along 

with our economic and cultural interests, are to reaffirm our relationship with countries like Japan, and to build partnerships that 

demonstrate the validity of the way that these systems work. What 

are your thoughts on that? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you. I really appreciate the question. Let 

me try to answer it in two parts, and I will do the last part first. 

I think there is a recognition now—and again, this is not new, 

it is something that you see consistently, over several administrations—but we have a much greater chance at success at major initiatives if we bring our like-minded partners along. 

So, for instance—you know, yes, there is a lot of debate about a 

particular base in Japan. Well, we do not need to get into that— 

but, the truth is, if you look at what Japan has done over the 

course, Senator, of the last several months in a variety of areas, 

it is really almost unprecedented. And they have gotten remarkably little credit for it. 

Who, today, is the largest provider of aid in Afghanistan? It is 

Japan, a $5 billion commitment, the largest by far. They pay the 

salaries of most of the policeman and other critical parts of civic 

society in Afghanistan. 

Which country stepped up with the United States at Copenhagen 

to say, ‘‘Look, yes, we can talk about limits, we can talk about 

quotas, but let us talk specifically about the urgent programs that 

will be necessary to deal with the poor that will bear the burden 

of climate change’’? Japan. 

Which country has been helpful, in terms of piracy prevention in 

the Gulf of Aden? Japan. 

Which country, immediately after the Secretary’s announcement 

of the Mekong Initiative, stepped up with resources to try to help 

support this overall effort? Japan. 

We are trying to work with Japan and a new Korea Government 

that has adopted an outward profile, a sort of global Korea, much 

more interested in the promotion of shared values and expectations. We are trying to work with other like-minded states in the 

Pacific as we step up our game, something that you’ve talked 

about. We are proud, we have opened up USAID offices. We are 

21 

working more closely with our partner nations on development 

objectives in the Pacific. 

These programs extend, not just to Japan and Korea and Australia, but, increasingly, to India, a country that is now demonstrating a greater desire to play a role in the Asia-Pacific region. 

So, no element of American policy could be more important, in 

my view, than the sort of value-added multiplicity associated with 

not working alone, but working with other like-minded states. 

And, Senator, I have gone on so long, this shows you how out of 

step I am, I have forgotten your first question. So, I apologize. 

I—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator WEBB. You answered it. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. OK. Did I? I think I answered the second question. 

Senator WEBB. Well, I think—well, you know, I totally agree 

with you. We tend to forget, in this country, the amazing story of 

Japan since the end of World War II—— 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. In terms of its form of government 

and the economic energy and the vitality of its culture and the contributions the Japanese have made alongside us in many, many 

areas. So, I would very much appreciate your observations. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I just remembered the point that you made about 

multilateralism and about institutions in Asia. I think there is a 

general perception that, you know, if you look—if there is this 

tendency to want to compare Europe and Asia. And although 

Asians are very polite, one of the things they hate is when people 

come and explain how their institutions are inferior to European 

institutions, or different. 

The biggest and most pleasant surprise I have had there have 

been many, but one of them since coming to office has been to see 

the dramatic progress that an organization like the ASEAN 

Regional Forum has made in just a short period of time. It is much 

more serious, much more focused on the critical issues that define 

the region; and the United States wants to be part of that. 

When we talk, Senator, about the great achievement, institutionally of ASEAN, it seems to me that what you are describing, this 

inconsistency, this difficulty in coherence, is occasionally not simply 

exhibited or demonstrated by the U.S. Government. You see it, actually, is in the region, as a whole. And so, there is this desire, in 

ASEAN, to act in a unified, collective, coherent way, but one of the 

challenges that ASEAN has faced in recent years is the dramatic 

differences between their government structures and their outlooks. 

And so, we see, increasingly, gaps developing between emerging 

dynamic democratic states like Indonesia and countries like Burma 

that are still struggling at a much different level of development. 

And so, for us, we think one of the reasons why it is important 

to promote these shared values and goals is that, ultimately, for 

ASEAN to be effective, to be the dominant institution of Asia and 

when you talk about ASEAN, Senator, it is not just some modest 

success. ASEAN is economic performance, in terms of overall trade, 

22 

exceeds economic interaction with Europe. And I do not think that 

is appreciated or well known by most Americans. 

But, for the organization to be successful, it has to have a greater 

leveling effect. And the only way that happens, I think, over time, 

is if there is a shared aspects and aspirations associated with government attitudes and the like. 

Senator WEBB. I would agree. At the same time, one of the precepts in ASEAN is that, if you are a member, then you are treated 

equally inside ASEAN, as a member. It creates something of a difficulty for the efforts that we have been looking at here, in terms 

of putting together a Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN, which 

is something that I believe would be beneficial to the country, if we 

were able to do it. And I say that because of the situation with the 

sanctions in Burma at the moment. 

But, as we move forward in the region, again, we’ve got this twoheaded difficulty here, the two parts that seem to collide on all 

issues of policy; and that is, on the one hand, we must be pragmatic as a nation, and, on the other hand, we cannot retreat from 

the values that we espouse. And that goes to systems of government. 

And there’s an old saying in Asia, many years ago, I remember, 

from when people were discussing some incidents in China during 

World War II, ‘‘Did you kill the chicken to scare the monkey?’’ You 

know, you take a small incident, and it has larger reverberations. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Yes. 

Senator WEBB. And if we are not consistent in how we deal with 

these incidents, such as locking up dissidents and these sorts of 

things, in a country like China, then the rest of the region does not 

believe we’re serious about what our policies really are. Would you 

not agree? 

Mr. CAMPBELL. I agree with that, Senator. 

Senator WEBB. Well, I appreciate, very much, your coming today. 

This is, I think, a fresh opportunity to try to bring some consistency into our policies. And, again, I thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Senator. 

[Pause.] 

Senator WEBB. We will now begin our second panel. 

We would like to welcome Dr. Robert Sutter of Georgetown, and 

Dr. Robert Herman of Freedom House. I—— 

Dr. HERMAN. Thank you. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Related their extended biographical 

information at the beginning of this hearing. And, once Secretary 

Campbell departs—— 

Dr. HERMAN. He is here. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. With his entourage, we will—— 

[Laughter.] 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Begin. 

Dr. Sutter—— 

Dr. HERMAN. He is here. He stepped out—maybe he got swept 

away with the entourage. [Laughter.] 

Senator WEBB. Well, Dr. Herman, welcome. And when Dr. Sutter, shows up we will give him, also, the opportunity to testify. 

Thank you very much for being with us today. 

23 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT HERMAN, DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS, 

FREEDOM HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Dr. HERMAN. My pleasure. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me begin by thanking you for convening this important and 

timely hearing on Principles of U.S. Engagement in Asia. I’m honored to appear before the subcommittee as a representative of Freedom House, an independent nongovernmental organization committed to the expansion of freedom around the world. 

We carry out that mission through a variety of—or, through a 

combination of research and analysis, advocacy, domestically and 

internationally, and programs, some that are funded by the U.S. 

Government that provide direct support to democracy and human 

rights activists, particularly in repressive political environments. 

It is our considered view that U.S. policy must accord high priority to the advancement of democracy and human rights around 

the world. Indeed, over several decades successive administrations, 

Democratic and Republican, have understood that helping to build 

a world in which governments respect the fundamental rights of 

their people, and those in power derive their authority and legitimacy from the consent of the governed, advances U.S. vital 

interests. 

As importantly, the United States and like-minded allies have 

sought to protect and strengthen universal human rights as an end 

in itself. History has demonstrated that nurturing democracy and 

human rights, and the values that underpin them, is both the right 

and the smart thing to do. 

Recent statements by President Obama and Secretary of State 

Clinton, reaffirming the centrality of democracy, human rights, and 

the rule of law in the formulating of U.S. foreign policy, are especially welcome in light of the siege against activists launched by 

authoritarian regimes in every region of the world. 

Asia, as we heard this morning, is a region of seminal importance to the United States. American policymakers confront an 

exceptionally diverse landscape, in terms of history, language, culture, and levels of economic and political development. The principles that shape our engagement with those countries of the 

region should reflect our core values, which include support for 

democratic governance, rule of law, and fundamental freedoms. 

But, the precise nature of our engagement will, and should, vary 

from country to country, due to a different constellation of local 

conditions, challenges, and opportunities largely shaped by the 

character of the political system. Our relationship with China or 

North Korea will qualitatively—will be qualitatively different than 

our relationship with Japan, Australia, or Indonesia. But, by the 

same token, strategies to support human rights in Cambodia will 

differ appreciably from strategies pursuing the same goal in other 

equally inhospitable settings—for example, Vietnam. 

Rather than an inconsistent application of essential principles, 

what might be termed ‘‘pragmatic idealism’’ blends normative commitment and the crafting of circumstances, tailored policies that 

work. 

In Asia, United States engagement necessarily involves sustaining and deepening ties with allies, and should include cooperating 

24 

with these established and nascent democratic states, both bilaterally and in international fora, to bolster fundamental rights. 

At the same time, the United States must pursue constructive relations, as you made clear, with authoritarian states, where shared 

interests will be less robust. In these cases, engagements should 

not be confined to relations with the governments, it should also 

entail reaching out to the respective citizenries of these countries 

directly and through U.S. NGOs. In most, though not all, instances, 

this elevates the stature and boosts the legitimacy of democracy 

and human rights activists in their own societies. 

Any effort to design and implement effective policies should be 

grounded in an accurate assessment of political conditions in the 

given country. For almost 40 years, Freedom House has applied a 

rigorous methodology to analyze the state of political rights and 

civil liberties in every country in the world. Our annual survey, 

‘‘Freedom in the World’’—and we have a map here that is the result of that analysis—we found that in 2009, what we have termed 

a ‘‘global political recession’’ has deepened, as twice as many countries registered declines as advances. This sober state of affairs reflects a systematic, coordinated, global effort to counter the push 

for greater political freedom. 

Repressive regimes, and even some marginally democratic ones, 

attempted to shrink the space for independent political activity; restricted the flow of ideas and information, including on the Internet; misused the law to silence domestic critics; and prevented civic 

activists from receiving assistance from the international community. 

According to Freedom House’s tripartite categorization, 89 countries, or 46 percent of the total, are rated ‘‘free,’’ about a quarter 

are ‘‘not free,’’ and 30 percent are deemed ‘‘partly free.’’ Over 2.3 

billion people, or one-third of the world’s population, live in ‘‘not 

free’’ countries. Over half of them in China. 

The performance profile of the Asia-Pacific region, as it is delimited geographically by this subcommittee, is quite similar to the 

global picture, but the authoritarian shadow cast by China is much 

more pronounced. Almost 70 percent of the region’s people live in 

‘‘not free’’ countries. 

In 2009, modest gains were registered in Indonesia, Taiwan, 

Mongolia, while in Japan—while Japan saw an election that 

brought to power the opposition democratic party. However, these 

advances were eclipsed by declines in both authoritarian and nominally democratic societies, from Cambodia and North Korea and 

Vietnam to the Philippines. 

The established consolidated democracies, such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan, and many of the small 

island nations, continued to perform at high levels. In addition to 

security and economic ties, several allies and partners in promote— 

several of these allies are partners in promoting democracy and 

human rights in the region and beyond. 

The middle category, of ‘‘partly free’’ countries, has two tiers. The 

first consists of democracies, such as Indonesia and Mongolia, that 

have made important strides even as they continue to grapple with 

challenges to buttress their democratic institutions. 

25 

The second tier finds struggling former or would-be democracies, 

such as the Philippines, Thailand, East Timor, and Malaysia, countries that have some of the components of a democratic polity, but 

where weak rule of law, widespread corruption, concentration of 

political power, and restrictions on civil liberties retard progress. 

These countries are prime candidates for various types of support 

designed to enhance the prospects for democratic consolidation. 

The Asia-Pacific region is also home to several of the world’s 

most repressive societies. China, Burma, North Korea, Laos, and 

Vietnam rank among the worst performers with respect to political 

rights and civil liberties. Cambodia is only marginally better. These 

countries systematically violate human rights, permit very little, if 

any, space for independent political activity, suppress any hint of 

independent media, and lack even those rudimentary mechanisms 

for holding those in power to account. 

Those seen as a threat to the regime are dealt with harshly— 

again, as was raised this morning—imprisonment and torture are 

common. While some of these countries have made impressive economic gains that have lifted millions of people out of poverty—no 

small achievement—the possibility for citizens to exercise freedom 

of expression, freedom of association and assembly, and other fundamental rights, is severely circumscribed. 

As the United States engages with authoritarian governments, 

the agenda with China being particularly broad, political liberalization and human rights must be an important part of the dialogue. 

These governments have come to expect it, and will not shun relations because America’s leadership, its diplomats, and Members of 

Congress insist on discussing human rights. Moreover, this is who 

we are as a nation and as a people. 

And while devising strategies incorporating a mix of carrots and 

sticks to influence government behavior, the United States and its 

allies should continue to expand efforts to support front-line activists who are running tremendous risks in advocating for political 

reform and adherence to human rights norms. This support is often 

the lifeline they need to carry—to continue on with their work. 

The state of democracy and human rights in the Asia-Pacific is 

far from grim. As I was reminded again on my recent trip to Indonesia and Malaysia, and by virtue of the ongoing work that Freedom House does with activists across the region, brave and resilient men and women are making their voices heard and organizing 

to pressure those in power to respect rights and embrace democratic reform. 

ASEAN, which we discussed a lot this morning, the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, ICHR, marks the first time 

the organization has established a mechanism to support human 

rights. It is the product of a decade-long campaign by civil society 

groups, parliamentarians, and sympathetic government officials 

from member states. Whether it becomes an effective instrument 

for influencing the actual behavior of governments remains to be 

seen, but it does provide a venue and a means for civil society to 

engage decisionmakers. 

Paradoxically, even the repression experienced by so many people in the Asia-Pacific region is cause for hope. Governments are 

cracking down, precisely because citizens, civil society activists, 

26 

journalists, bloggers, political party and labor activists, are overcoming daunting obstacles to exercise their fundamental rights and 

press those in power to move these countries in the direction of 

democracy and the rule of law. 

Mr. Chairman, the U.S. Government and the broader policy—foreign policy community should leave no doubt we stand in solidarity 

with them while simultaneously pursuing our mutually beneficial 

relations with those governments. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Herman follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT HERMAN, DIRECTOR OF PROGRAMS, FREEDOM

HOUSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Chairman Webb and members of the subcommittee, thank you for calling this important hearing today and for inviting Freedom House to testify. Since President 

Franklin Roosevelt’s famous ‘‘Four Freedoms’’ speech on the eve of American entry 

into the Second World War, the United States has consistently espoused certain 

principles in its engagement with countries around the world. The United States is 

not only a signatory of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the UDHR is 

itself a reflection of the vision set out by Roosevelt’s ‘‘Four Freedoms’’ speech; indeed, American diplomatic efforts, in the person of Eleanor Roosevelt, were instrumental in the U.N. General Assembly adoption of that historic document more than 

60 years ago. Since that time, America has supported the rule of law, freedom of 

thought, representative government, and respect for individual rights as a key part 

of our foreign policy agenda. 

The United States has not always applied these principles uniformly. Frequently, 

democracy and human rights priorities are overtaken by pursuit of economic or security interests. Different challenges and opportunities naturally require different 

strategies. The United States engagement in the East Asia-Pacific region must be 

nuanced, adaptive, and commonsensical, while maintaining our commitment to core 

values. We at Freedom House believe that diplomatic engagement should be shaped 

by the realities on the ground, and that a policy that is effective in one country or 

region may need to be altered to be effective in another. At the same time, we believe that supporting human rights and promoting democratic institutions must be 

a vital part of the American agenda in every country. 

Any evaluation of the effectiveness of U.S. policy needs to be grounded in an accurate assessment of the state of human rights and freedom within a country. That 

assessment needs to look at the treatment of individuals, and the laws and practices 

that undergird fundamental human rights, but also include an analysis of how the 

political system and regime actually operate. Freedom House has been producing reports analyzing the state of political rights and civil liberties in every country 

around the world for close to 40 years. 

THE WORLD AS IT IS: POLITICAL TRENDS OF 2009

On January 12, Freedom House released the findings of ‘‘Freedom in the World 

2010,’’ the latest edition of its annual assessment of political rights and civil liberties covering every country and territory in the world. We found that 2009 is the 

fourth consecutive year in which setbacks have outnumbered gains, the longest such 

pattern of overall decline in the nearly four-decade history of ‘‘Freedom in the 

World.’’ 

In 2009, declines for freedom were registered in 40 countries, representing 20 percent of polities and occurring in most regions in the world. In 22 of those countries 

declines were significant enough to merit numerical Rating declines in political 

rights or civil liberties. Six countries moved downward in their overall Status designation from either Free to Partly Free or from Partly Free to Not Free. This year 

also saw a decline in the number of electoral democracies—from 119 to 116—now 

back down to the lowest figure since 1995. 

Forty-seven countries were found to be Not Free in 2009, representing 24 percent 

of the total number of countries. The number of people living under Not Free conditions stood at 2,333,869,000, or 34 percent of the world population, though it is important to note that more than half of this number lives in just one country: China. 

The number of Not Free countries increased by five from 2008. 

By absolute historical standards the overall global state of freedom in the world 

has actually improved over the past two decades. Many more countries are in the 

27 

Free category and are designated as electoral democracies in 2009 than in 1989, and 

the majority of countries that registered democratic breakthroughs in the past generation continue to perform well, even under stress such as the present global economic crisis. 

However, over the past 4 years, the dominant pattern has been that of growing 

restrictions on fundamental freedoms of expression and association, and the failure 

to secure the primacy of the rule of law and to reduce corruption, stalling or reversing democratic progress in a number of countries. Unfortunately, these patterns 

have taken hold in, and sometimes been set by, countries in the East Asia-Pacific 

region and in 2009 we saw five particularly troubling trends: 

• Government efforts to restrict freedom of expression and press freedom were expanded to include restrictions on and control of the use of new media as a tool 

to facilitate citizen activism or social networking considered to be a threat to 

incumbent regimes. This effort was exemplified by China, which remained at 

the forefront of efforts to develop and deploy new forms of Internet control. Additionally, China’s tactics to curtail new media have significantly influenced 

other authoritarian states with Vietnam, Burma, and Malaysia adopting measures in 2009 to monitor and crackdown on Internet users. • We saw regimes undertake repressive campaigns against ethnic and religious 

minorities in 2009. Additionally, the plight of many refugees in the region has 

worsened due to troubling developments where governments forcibly returned 

countries to regimes where they face persecution, prison, and torture. • The overall trend in 2009 was one of decreasing respect for the rule of law, including in countries deemed Partly Free such as the Philippines. • Our 2009 assessment illuminates a disturbing pattern of growing restrictions 

on freedom of association by regimes worldwide, a response to the demands of 

citizens for accountable governing institutions that respect human rights. 

The global trends away from freedom are also evident in declines in a number 

of countries in the Asia-Pacific region, although there was less movement there this 

year than in other parts of the world. 

EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC TRENDS

As the world’s most populous region, Asia is home to both some of the globe’s largest democracies and to its most populous authoritarian regimes, presenting distinct 

challenges for democratic development and for the United States. 

The East Asia and Pacific region experienced some modest gains in 2009. Indonesia held competitive and fair general elections in 2009 and polls in Mongolia contributed to improvement in the realization of political rights. Japan experienced a 

significant transfer of authority when the Democratic Party of Japan took control 

after 50 years of nearly continuous rule by the Liberal Democratic Party. Additionally, some of the world’s most stable democracies can be found in important regional 

partners such as South Korea, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Australia. Unfortunately, 

these positive developments occurred against a backdrop of declines in a number of 

countries in the region, and continued repression and persecution by some of the 

world’s worst human rights violators. 

East Asia is home to four of the world’s most repressive regimes. Burma and 

North Korea have consistently received Freedom House’s lowest possible ranking on 

political rights and civil liberties, that of a 7,7. Faring only slightly better are Laos 

and China which each received a 7 for political rights and a 6 for civil liberties in 

2009. In North Korea, already the world’s most repressive country, conditions deteriorated further during the year. 

There were negative political developments in many countries in the region in 

2009. In the Philippines, the massacre of civilians in connection with a local candidate’s attempt to register his candidacy, and the government’s subsequent declaration of martial law in the area, were indicative of heightened political violence in 

the runup to 2010 elections. In Burma, the military junta continues to cling to the 

promise of elections in 2010 despite the absence of a date and the continued incarceration of much of the opposition party leadership, including the obsessive harassment of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. 

Among civil liberties, particular pressure was placed on the rule of law and respect for freedom of expression, with reversals noted in both authoritarian and 

democratic societies. In Cambodia, the government recriminalized defamation and 

then used the new legislation to intimidate independent journalists. In Vietnam, a 

prominent independent think tank was shut down and prodemocracy civic activists 

were imprisoned. Even in a promising democracy like Indonesia there remain concerns; in 2009 top law enforcement officials were implicated in efforts to undermine 

anticorruption bodies. And in China, Communist Party leaders sought to tighten 

28 

control over judges, while embarking on a sweeping crackdown against leading 

human rights lawyers and nonprofits offering legal services. 

Indeed, as China’s leaders showed greater confidence on the world stage, their actions at home demonstrated continued insecurity and intolerance with respect to 

citizens’ demands for legal rights and accountable governance. The authorities’ paranoid handling of a series of politically sensitive anniversaries—such as the 60-year 

mark of the Communist Party’s time in power—included lockdowns on major cities, 

new restrictions on the Internet, the creation of special extralegal taskforces, and 

harsh punishments meted out to democracy activists, petitioners, Tibetans, Falun 

Gong adherents, and human rights defenders. Separately, longstanding government 

policies of altering demography and repressing religious freedom in the Xinjiang region came to a head in 2009, when an eruption of ethnic violence was followed by 

forced ‘‘disappearances’’ of Uighur Muslims, a series of executions, and tightened 

Internet censorship. 

Often at great personal risk, many of China’s bloggers, journalists, legal professionals, workers, and religious believers nevertheless pushed the limits of permissible activity in increasingly sophisticated ways. They managed to expose cases of 

official corruption, circulate underground political publications, and play a role in 

forcing the government’s partial retraction of a policy to install monitoring and censorship software on personal computers. Growing labor unrest and better organized 

strikes reflected workers’ ability to bypass the party-controlled union, sometimes resulting in concessions by employers. 

Taiwan in 2009 registered progress and decline. Despite promising improvements 

in anticorruption enforcement, there were some troubling developments including 

new legislation that restricts the political expression of academics and an influx of 

Chinese investment that may stifle freedom of expression. 

PRINCIPLES FOR U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

In order to successfully engage countries in the Asia-Pacific region while maintaining our commitment to human rights and democracy, U.S. foreign policy should 

be guided by the following principles: 

Be Present and Active 

The relationship with the Asia-Pacific region is one of the United States most important; it is imperative that the United States continue to play an active role in 

the region. The Obama administration has already clearly articulated this as a core 

element of its current foreign policy agenda, most recently with Secretary of State 

Clinton’s January 12 speech on United States-Asia relations at the East-West Center, in which she said, ‘‘America’s future is linked to the future of the Asia-Pacific 

region; and the future of this region depends on America.’’ The prominence of Asia 

in U.S. foreign policy is evidenced by high-profile trips to the region by the President and Secretary of State during the administration’s first year. 

Develop Both Bilateral and Multilateral Relationships 

Our regional relationships are just as important as our bilateral ones. President 

Obama’s participation in the APEC summit last year and his attendance of the firstever United States-ASEAN summit in November show renewed U.S. commitment 

to involvement in regional issues. Multilateral institutions in the region have been, 

and will continue to be, a vitally important tool for engaging those countries with 

which the United States may not have such close relationships. We should intensify 

our participation in Pacific institutions. 

Regional mechanisms can be a vehicle for promoting the values the United States 

seeks to prioritize, such as human rights and robust democratic institutions and 

processes. For example, the United States should strongly support the newly created 

ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). This is after 

all, the product of several years’ effort by civic leaders and diplomats from a number 

of countries, including Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. However, it is important to note, as Secretary Clinton did when discussing AICHR in her speech on 

Asia-Pacific policy earlier this month that, ‘‘our institutions must be effective and 

focused on delivering results.’’ Freedom House hopes that with the United States 

cooperation, ASEAN can use AICHR to promote fundamental freedoms as universal 

pan-Asian principles. 

Support Friends and Allies 

The United States ties to the countries of the Asia-Pacific region are complex; we 

have strong economic partnerships with many countries in the region, as well as 

longstanding alliances with countries including Japan, South Korea, Australia, 

Thailand, and the Philippines. Our friends and partners in the region live in the 

29 

shadow of the wealth and influence of China as well as the constant threat of a nuclear North Korea. Through diplomacy and policymaking we must reinforce our commitments to our allies and be a strong and consistent counterpoint to the increasing 

economic and political influence of China. 

Engage all Governments While Promoting American Values 

In order to be an effective influence in the region the United States must make 

attempts to engage every government and their people. The idea that certain governments’ policies preclude all diplomatic, economic, or other engagement with the 

United States is at odds with our goals of being a primary actor in the region. We 

at Freedom House believe that while policies must be tailored to the specific situation in each country, some level of engagement is necessary and should be pursued 

with every government. A willingness to dialogue with a repressive regime does not 

imply approval for its policies, but it matters what is said in these dialogues, in private as well as in public. 

Foster Relationships With Civil Society 

Equally important, the United States should engage with and support elements 

of civil society across the region, especially in those countries where activists face 

intense repression. By engaging civil society the United States can also gain greater 

insight into the dynamics driving possible change in the country. In some cases U.S. 

support may be financial, but many times it involves providing training or access 

to new media. Other times it’s as simple as making a public statement to let the 

world, and target governments, know that those who are struggling for human 

rights and democratic reform do not stand alone. The United States can make unequivocally clear that we support those who advocate and work for peaceful democratic change. 

Regimes opposed to promoting political freedom and human rights in the region 

often cite a difference in ‘‘Asian values’’ to justify the subordination of human rights 

and democracy to economic and strategic factors. While poverty rates are down 

throughout the region and many countries are succeeding economically, democratic 

gains have not necessarily followed, and indeed have stagnated in some once-promising countries. However, Asia is home to a number of strong, vibrant democracies, 

and across the region, millions of people engage daily in an effort to expand freedom 

and justice in their societies, sometimes at great personal risk. The existence and 

actions of these successful democracies and democratic activists belie the ‘‘Asian values’’ argument, and it is encouraging to see regional agreements and mechanisms 

such as AICHR, along with and increasingly vocal and technologically savvy activist 

community, to demonstrate that Asian values can, and do, include democracy and 

human rights. 

PRAGMATIC IDEALISM

Any discussion of U.S. efforts to help support democratic political reform in Asia 

or elsewhere should be imbued with an appropriate degree of modesty and humility. 

The fate of freedom and democracy in other countries, has always primarily been 

determined by those within these societies. The ability of the U.S. Government— 

or U.S. NGOs—to influence the course of events abroad is limited. We are usually 

the supporting actors in dramas that are being played out by others. How well we 

play our roles, of course, occasionally matters a lot, and often depends on how well 

we are listening and responding to the voices of democrats and human rights advocates in those countries. 

That being said, Freedom House was founded on the premise that the U.S. Government—and increasingly, other democratic governments—can make a difference. 

Finding the right way forward and the appropriate balance in our relations with 

other countries has been a challenge for successive U.S. administrations, especially 

over the last 20 years. But in dealing with these countries on security, trade, environmental, or other important interests, Freedom House believes that the United 

States should never retreat from its role as a defender and protector of human 

rights, whose political, diplomatic, moral, and material support struggling democratic activists around the globe have looked to for decades. 

CONCLUSION: HOW CAN THE U.S. AND CONGRESS BETTER PROMOTE DEMOCRACY AND

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REGION

In addition to holding the purse strings and overseeing the executive branch, 

Members of Congress and their staffs should also play an active role in supporting 

human rights and civic activists abroad. Hearings like this are important. Frequent 

travel to these countries and meeting with courageous civil society, human rights, 

and political party activists struggling to realize fundamental political rights and 

30 

civil liberties is a critical signal of the support of the American people for their 

struggle. 

In its relations with other countries, the United States must at times have the 

courage of inconsistency. We will never be able to adopt uniform approaches to 

human rights with regard to every country around the world, nor should we. Each 

country requires a specific tailored strategy based on a detailed assessment of the 

realities and dynamics within a particular society, and the leverage that the U.S. 

Government can use to bring about change. However, in our dealings with foreign 

governments and their citizens, we should never allow our core values of human 

rights and democracy to fall off the table. Human rights activists have come to rely 

on our commitment to their cause, though they may not be able to always say so 

publicly. Instead of ignoring this commitment because it may be too difficult, we 

should redouble our efforts and consider new and innovative ways to help those who 

need it most. I again thank the subcommittee for asking me to testify at this hearing and look forward to your questions. 

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—An addendum submitted with Dr. Herman’s 

prepared statement was to voluminous to print in this hearing. It 

will be maintained in the subcommittee’s permanent record.] 

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Dr. Herman. 

Dr. Sutter, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT SUTTER, VISITING PROFESSOR OF 

ASIAN STUDIES, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Dr. SUTTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It’s a pleasure 

for me to be here and talk with you about this important topic. 

It is an ongoing challenge of U.S. policymakers to find an appropriate balance in promoting American values abroad, on the one 

hand, while sustaining important security, economic, and other interests and relations with Asian governments that do not share our 

values, on the other hand. 

My argument is that the United States is in a strong position to 

promote its values in Asia, and has various ways to do so that will 

not seriously disrupt other U.S. interests, even with governments 

that do not share American values. 

Coercion and pressure may be needed to promote U.S. values in 

the face of egregious violations of U.S.-supported norms, but the 

United States seems better advised to use its strong position as the 

responsible leader in the region to advance the values Americans 

hold dear in less confrontational ways. 

I see four major strengths of the United States in Asia that often 

don’t get enough attention, it seems to me. 

No. 1, security. In most of Asia, governments are strong, viable, 

and make decisions that determine direction in foreign affairs. Popular elite media and other opinion may influence government officials and policy toward the United States and other countries, but, 

in the end, the officials make decisions on the basis of their own 

calculus. In general, the officials see their governments’ legitimacy 

and success resting on nation-building and economic development, 

which require a stable and secure international environment. 

Unfortunately, Asia is not particularly stable, and most governments, privately, are wary of, and tend not to trust, each other. As 

a result, they look to the United States to provide the security they 

need to pursue goals of development and nation-building in an 

appropriate environment. They recognize that the U.S. security role 

is very expensive and involves great risk, including large-scale casVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 Dec 06, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
31 

ualties, if necessary, for the sake of preserving Asian security. They 

also recognize that neither rising China, nor any other Asian power 

or coalition of powers, is able or willing to undertake even a fraction of these risks, costs, and responsibilities. 

Second strength, economic. The nation-building priority of most 

Asian governments depends, importantly, on export-oriented 

growth. Chinese and Asian trade heavily is dependent on exports 

to developed countries, notably the United States. And we all know 

about the United States recent trade deficits with China and with 

Asian traders. Asian government officials recognize that China, 

which runs a large overall trade surplus, and other trading partners in Asia are unwilling and unable to bear even a fraction of the 

cost of such large trade deficits that are very important for the 

Asian government’s agenda. 

Third feature has to do with government engagement and Asian 

contingency planning. The Obama administration inherited a U.S. 

position in Asia, buttressed by generally effective Bush administration interaction with Asia’s powers. The Obama government has 

moved to build on these strengths, notably with a series of initiatives designed to remove obstacles to closer U.S. cooperation with 

ASEAN and Asian regional organization. Its emphasis on consultation and inclusion of international stakeholders before coming to 

policy decisions on issues of importance to Asia also has been 

broadly welcomed and stands in contrast with the previously perceived unilateralism of the U.S. Government. 

Meanwhile, in recent years the U.S. Pacific Command and other 

U.S. security apparatus have been at the edge of wide-ranging and 

growing U.S. efforts to build and strengthen webs of military relationships throughout the region. Part of the reason for the success 

of these efforts has to do with active contingency planning by many 

Asian governments. As power relations change in Asia—notably on 

account of China’s rise—Asian governments generally seek to work 

positively and pragmatically with rising China, on the one hand, 

but, on the other hand, they seek the reassurance of close security, 

intelligence, and other ties with the United States, in case rising 

China shifts from its current generally benign approach to one of 

greater assertiveness or dominance. 

And a fourth feature, which gets very little attention, it seems 

to me, has to do with nongovernment U.S. engagement and immigration. And here, my friend Dr. Herman is an excellent example 

of nongovernment U.S. engagement with Asia. For much of its history, the United States exerted influence in Asia much more 

through business, religious, education, and other interchange than 

through channels dependent on government leadership and support. Active American nongovernment interaction with Asia continues today, putting the United States in a unique position, where 

American nongovernment sector has such a strong and usually 

positive impact on the influence of the United States exerts in the 

region. 

Meanwhile, over 40 years of generally colorblind U.S. immigration policy since the ending of discriminatory U.S. restrictions on 

Asian immigration in 1965 has resulted in an influx of millions of 

Asian migrants who call America home and who interact with their 

countries of origin in ways that undergird and reflect well on the 

32 

U.S. position in Asia. No other country, with the exception of 

Canada, has such an active and powerfully positive channel to influence Asia. 

So, what does this mean for American values in Asia? These four 

sets of determinants of U.S. strengths show the United States is 

deeply integrated in Asia at the government and the nongovernmental level. U.S. security commitments and trade practices meet 

the fundamental security and economic needs of Asian government 

leaders, and those leaders know it. The leaders also know that neither rising China nor any other power or coalition or powers is able 

or willing to meet even a small fraction of these needs. 

Meanwhile, Asian contingency planning seems to work to the 

advantage of the United States, while rising China has no easy 

way to overcome pervasive Asian wariness of China’s longer term 

intentions. 

So, what should the United States do in using this influence in 

order to deal with values that it holds dear? There are obvious 

choices in this regard. One is the option of the United States trying 

to soft pedal its concerns with values in the interest of pragmatic 

interaction with countries such as China. This has been the case 

in the past, and it hasn’t worked out very well in U.S. history. 

At the other end of the spectrum are policy options that are 

assertive and unilateral in dealing with salient human rights and 

democracy questions in Asia. As shown above, U.S. values are not 

among the most salient aspects of U.S. strength among the generally pragmatic decisionmaking officials in Asia who are focused 

on nation-building and national legitimacy. American values and 

support of transparent decisionmaking, open markets, and good 

governance do indirectly or directly reinforce the salient U.S. 

strengths. However, a strong U.S. insistence on its values in various policy areas that are value-laden probably would result in serious and disruptive changes in the prevailing Asian order. 

Between these extremes, there is much the United States can do 

to promote American values in Asia. U.S. care and attentiveness in 

dealing with security and economic responsibilities in the region 

highlight the positive example of the United States for Asian elites 

and popular opinion. A good American stewardship protecting the 

common goods important to all redounds to the benefit of U.S. officials pursuing their approach to American values, and also redounds to the benefit of nongovernment Americans pursuing these 

kinds of interests, as well. 

And so, the Obama government has moved to improve U.S. stewardship in Asia with its consultative-engagement approach, and, in 

this context, it’s been quite effective in raising the salience and improving the image of the United States in the region. 

And so, how should the United States promote American values 

like human rights while dealing in a consultative way with Asian 

governments’ leaders? This seemed on display when President 

Obama spoke about this at the China/United States dialogue last 

year. He basically said—I quote this in my prepared statement— 

he basically said, ‘‘This is who we are. We will pursue our values 

because this is what Americans are.’’ 

And so, I would conclude by saying, remembering and being who 

we are, as American officials and nongovernmental U.S. representVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 Dec 06, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
33 

atives supporting human rights and other American value in interaction with Chinese or other Asian government officials opposed to 

or challenged by these values, should continue strongly. By and 

large, these governments want to improve relations with the 

United States, the Asian regional leader on whom they depend. 

They know who we are and obviously should not, and do not, expect us to change in order to favor their political interests. 

In general, I believe they will live with, and hopefully gradually 

adjust to, a regional and world order heavily influenced by the 

United States through example, responsible stewardship of common goods, and persistent but respectful advocacy. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Sutter follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT SUTTER, VISITING PROFESSOR OF ASIAN STUDIES, SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Chairman Webb, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 

testify on this important topic. 

It is an ongoing challenge of U.S. policymakers to find an appropriate balance in 

promoting American values abroad on the one hand, while sustaining important security, economic, and other interests in relations with Asian governments that do 

not share our values on the other. 

My argument is that the United States is in a strong position to promote its values in Asia and has various ways to do so that will not seriously disrupt other U.S. 

interests, even with governments that do not share American values. Coercion and 

pressure may be needed to promote U.S. values in the face of egregious violations 

of U.S.-supported norms, but the United States seems better advised to use its 

strong position as the responsible leader in the region to advance the values Americans hold dear in less confrontational ways. 

U.S. STRENGTHS IN ASIA

It often has been fashionable for media commentators, specialists, and others to 

discern evidence of American decline in Asia. Today’s projections of U.S. leadership 

being overshadowed by rising China recall the common view after the fall of Saigon 

that the Soviet Union was expanding to regional leadership while the United States 

declined; and the common view in the 1980s that Japan’s economic ‘‘juggernaut’’ 

was marginalizing America’s leading role. The projections of U.S. decline often have 

a common pattern: They emphasize the strengths of the rising power and emphasize 

U.S. weaknesses. They tend to soft-pedal or ignore the weaknesses of the rising 

power and the strengths of the United States. 

More balanced treatment shows the United States in a strong leadership position 

in Asia based on four sets of factors. 

Security 

In most of Asia, governments are strong, viable, and make the decisions that determine direction in foreign affairs. Popular, elite, media and other opinion may influence government officials in policy toward the United States and other countries, 

but in the end the officials make decisions on the basis of their own calculus. In 

general, the officials see their governments’ legitimacy and success resting on nation-building and economic development, which require a stable and secure international environment. Unfortunately, Asia is not particularly stable and most governments privately are wary of and tend not to trust each other. As a result, they 

look to the United States to provide the security they need to pursue goals of development and nation-building in an appropriate environment. They recognize that the 

U.S. security role is very expensive and involves great risk, including large scale 

casualties if necessary, for the sake of preserving Asian security. They also recognize that neither rising China nor any other Asian power or coalition of powers is 

able or willing to undertake even a fraction of these risks, costs, and responsibilities. 

Economic 

The nation-building priority of most Asian governments depends importantly on 

export oriented growth. Chinese officials recognize this, and officials in other Asian 

countries recognize the rising importance of China in their trade; but they all also 

recognize that half of China’s trade is done by foreign invested enterprises in China, 

34 

and half of the trade is processing trade—both features that make Chinese and 

Asian trade heavily dependent on exports to developed countries, notably the United 

States. In recent years, the United States has run a massive trade deficit with 

China, and a total trade deficit with Asia valued at over $350 billion at a time of 

an overall U.S. trade deficit of over $700 billion. Asian government officials recognize that China, which runs a large overall trade surplus, and other trading partners of Asia are unwilling and unable to bear even a fraction of the cost of such 

large trade deficits, that are very important for Asia governments. 

Obviously, the 2008–09 global economic crisis is having an enormous impact of 

trade and investment. Some Asian officials are talking about relying more on domestic consumption but tangible progress seems slow as they appear to be focusing 

on an eventual revival of world trade that would restore as much as possible previous levels of export-oriented growth involving continued heavy reliance on the U.S. 

market. How cooperative China actually will be in working with the United States 

to deal with the various implications of the economic crisis also remains an open 

question, though the evidence on balance appears to show great care on the part 

of the Chinese administration to avoid pushing controversial policies that would further undermine international confidence in the existing economic system and thwart 

meaningful efforts at economic recovery. The Chinese leadership appears to give priority to stability in its continued adherence to international economic patterns that 

feature the leading role of the U.S. dollar, strong direct and indirect U.S. influence 

on foreign investors in China, and the United States as a market of top priority for 

Chinese products. 

Government Engagement and Asian Contingency Planning 

The Obama administration inherited a U.S. position in Asia buttressed by generally effective Bush administration interaction with Asia’s powers. It is very rare 

for the United States to enjoy good relations with Japan and China at the same 

time, but the Bush administration carefully managed relations with both powers 

effectively. It is unprecedented for the United States to be the leading foreign power 

in South Asia and to sustain good relations with both India and Pakistan, but that 

has been the case since relatively early in the Bush administration. And it is unprecedented for the United States to have good relations with Beijing and Taipei 

at the same time, but that situation emerged during the Bush years and strengthened with the election of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou in March 2008. 

The Obama government has moved to build on these strengths, notably with a 

series of initiatives designed to remove obstacles to closer U.S. cooperation with 

ASEAN and Asian regional organizations. Its emphasis on consultation and inclusion of international stakeholders before coming to policy decisions on issues of importance to Asia also has been broadly welcomed and stands in contrast with the 

previously perceived unilateralism of the U.S. Government. 

Meanwhile, in recent years, the U.S. Pacific Command and other U.S. military 

commands and organizations have been at the edge of wide-ranging and growing 

U.S. efforts to build and strengthen webs of military relationships throughout the 

region. In an overall Asian environment where the United States remains on good 

terms with major powers and most other governments, building military ties 

through education programs, onsite training, exercises, and other means enhances 

U.S. influence in generally quiet but effective ways. Part of the reason for the success of these efforts has to do with active contingency planning by many Asian governments. As power relations change in the region, notably on account of China’s 

rise, Asian governments generally seek to work positively and pragmatically with 

rising China on the one hand; but on the other hand they seek the reassurance of 

close security, intelligence, and other ties with the United States in case rising 

China shifts from its current generally benign approach to one of greater assertiveness or dominance. 

Nongovernment Engagement and Immigration 

For much of its history, the United States exerted influence in Asia much more 

through business, religious, educational, and other interchange than through channels dependent on government leadership and support. Active American nongovernment interaction with Asia continues today, putting the United States in a unique 

position where the American nongovernment sector has such a strong and usually 

positive impact on the influence the United States exerts in the region. Meanwhile, 

over 40 years of generally color-blind U.S. immigration policy since the ending of 

discriminatory U.S. restrictions on Asian immigration in 1965 has resulted in the 

influx of millions of Asian migrants who call America home and who interact with 

their countries of origin in ways that under gird and reflect well on the U.S. position 

35 

in Asia. No other country, with the exception of Canada, has such an active and 

powerfully positive channel of influence in Asia. 

IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR PROMOTING AMERICAN VALUES

These four sets of determinants of U.S. strengths show that the United States is 

deeply integrated in Asia at the government and nongovernment level. U.S. security 

commitments and trade practices meet fundamental security and economic needs of 

Asian government leaders and those leaders know it. The leaders also know that 

neither rising China nor any other power or coalition of powers is able or willing 

to meet even a small fraction of those needs. Meanwhile, Asian contingency 

planning seems to work to the advantage of the United States, while rising China 

has no easy way to overcome pervasive Asian wariness of Chinese longer term 

intentions. 

Though a lot is written about the so-called Beijing consensus and the 

attractiveness of the Chinese ‘‘model’’ to Asian and other governments, the fact remains that the Chinese leadership continues to emphasize a narrow scope of national interests and assures that its policies and practices serve those interests. 

Thus, China tends to avoid the types of risks, costs, and commitments in security 

and economic areas that undergird the U.S. leadership position in Asia. By and 

large, Asian government officials understand this reality. China continues to run a 

substantial trade surplus and to accumulate large foreign exchange reserves supported by currency policies widely seen to disadvantage trading competitors in Asia 

and elsewhere. Despite its economic progress, China annually receives billions of 

dollars of foreign assistance loans and lesser grants from international organizations 

like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and from foreign government 

and nongovernment donors that presumably would otherwise be available for other 

deserving clients in Asia and the world. It carefully adheres to U.N. budget formulas that keep Chinese dues and other payments remarkably low for a country 

with Chinese international prominence and development. It tends to assure that 

China’s contributions to the broader good of the international order (e.g., extensive 

use of Chinese personnel in U.N. peacekeeping operations) are paid for by others. 

At bottom, the ‘‘win-win’’ principle that undergirds recent Chinese foreign policy 

means that Chinese officials make sure that Chinese policies and practices provide 

a ‘‘win’’ for generally narrowly defined national interests of China. They eschew the 

kinds of risky and costly commitments for the broader regional and global common 

good that Asian leaders have come to look to U.S. leadership to provide. 

Policy Options 

In sum, the main question for U.S. policymakers is how to use the leverage and 

influence that comes from U.S. leadership in Asia in order to promote American values without major negative side effects. 

At one end of available options is an overly cautious approach by the U.S. Government seeking to avoid raising issues of values in a pragmatic effort to build better 

ties with Asian governments that oppose American values. U.S. policy toward China 

often has seen U.S. policymakers strongly identified with human rights promotion 

(e.g., Jimmy Carter, George W. Bush) appear to pull their punches in seeking better 

relations with Chinese leaders. This policy approach has proven unsustainable over 

the long term in an American political context, even though it may provide some 

expedient benefit for the U.S. Government in dealing with China over the short 

term. 

At the other end of the spectrum of policy options is an assertive and unilateral 

U.S. posture on salient issues of human rights questions and other value-laden subjects. As shown above, U.S. values are not among the most salient aspects of U.S. 

strength among the generally pragmatic decisionmaking of officials in Asia focused 

on nation-building and national legitimacy. American values in support of transparent decisionmaking, open markets and good governance do indirectly or directly 

reinforce the salient U.S. strengths. However, the strong U.S. insistence on its values in this policy option would probably result in serious and disruptive changes in 

the prevailing Asian order; Asian governments challenged by the U.S. insistence on 

its values, even Asian states that relied on the security and economic support provided by the United States, would feel compelled to seek their interests in a more 

uncertain environment of less reliance on and more distance from or even opposition 

to the United States. 

Between these extremes, there is much the United States can do to promote 

American values in Asia. U.S. care and attentiveness in dealing with security and 

economic responsibilities in the region highlight the positive example of the United 

States for Asian elites and popular opinion. Good American stewardship protecting 

the common goods important to all redounds to the benefit of U.S. officials pursuing 

36 

policies promoting American values; it also benefits the wide array on nongovernment American organizations and entities that interact with counterparts throughout the region, frequently explicitly and more often implicitly, promoting American 

values. As Asian officials, elites and public opinion see their success in nation-building tied to the effective and responsible policies and practices of the United States, 

they likely will be inclined to emulate American policies and practices at the root 

of U.S. leadership and strength. These include those values supported by the United 

States. 

Improving on U.S. stewardship in Asia, the Obama government has adjusted U.S. 

policy in order to build on the strengths inherited from the Bush administration 

while correcting some weaknesses. The new U.S. Government stresses consultative 

engagement and greater attention to the interests and concerns of Asian leaders. 

U.S. leaders should continue to use U.S. power and leadership in close consultations 

with Asian governments in order to establish behaviors and institutions in line with 

longstanding U.S. interests and values. Listening to and accommodating whenever 

possible the concerns of Asian governments helps to insure that decisions reached 

have ample support in the region. The Obama government has gone far to change 

the U.S. image in Asia from a self absorbed unilateralist to a thoughtful consensus 

builder. 

How the United States should seek to promote American values like human rights 

while dealing in a consultative way with Asian government leaders seemed on display when President Obama spoke to the annual Sino-American leadership dialogue 

meeting in Washington in July 2009. He advised his Chinese colleagues that the 

American Government did not seek to force China to conform to its view of human 

rights but it would nonetheless continue to press China and others to conform to 

the values of human rights that are so important to the United States. He said: 

Support for human rights and human dignity is ingrained in America. 

Our nation is made up of immigrants from every part of the world. We have 

protected our unity and struggled to perfect our union by extending basic 

rights to all our people. And those rights include the freedom to speak your 

mind, to worship your God, and to choose your leaders. They are not things 

that we seek to impose—this is who we are. It guides our openness to one 

another and the world. 

Remembering and being ‘‘who we are’’ as American officials and nongovernment 

U.S. representatives supporting human rights and other American values in interactions with Chinese or other Asian government officials opposed to or challenged 

by those values should continue strongly in my judgment. By and large, these 

governments want to improve relations with the United States, the Asian regional 

leader on whom they depend. They know who we are and obviously should not and 

do not expect us to change in order to favor their political interests. In general, I 

believe they will live with and hopefully gradually adjust to a regional and world 

order heavily influenced by the United States through example, responsible stewardship of common goods, and persistent but respectful advocacy. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you very much, Dr. Sutter. 

I appreciate the viewpoints expressed by both of you in your testimony, and also thank you, again, for your willingness to come 

here today and to be a part of this hearing. 

Let me, first, ask for both of your—I’m going to start with Dr. 

Herman’s viewpoint on where we are strongest and where we are 

weakest, in East Asia and Southeast Asia, in terms of nongovernmental involvement. And I know, from my own personal experience, how important that is, in terms of communicating to the average citizen on the street, what exists outside of their own society, 

and, in others, just simply helping to create further understanding, 

even among different governments, about the real intentions of the 

United States and with respect to how we view our own culture 

and what it is that we stand for. 

Where are we good and where are we not good, Dr. Herman? 

Dr. HERMAN. Well, I think as—it won’t come as a surprise to say 

that I think it’s a bit of a mixed record. U.S. NGOs, like Freedom 

House and others, have had, I think, a longstanding relationship, 

and building partnerships in that part of the world, trying to 

37 

strengthen regional networks of activists in that part of the 

world—I think one of the tools in the—or one of the—in the toolbox 

of authoritarian states—is to try to isolate their citizens, especially 

their activists, both from one another in the country, but also in 

terms of transnational linkages, regionally and more globally. And 

I think what a lot of civil society groups from the outside, United 

States and others, have tried to do is provide a way of reaching out 

to them, also sometimes giving them a forum in order to come together, discuss common strategies, common experiences. So, I think 

that’s one of the most valuable contributions that have been made 

by the U.S. NGOs. 

It varies, in terms of where we can do this. The more repressive 

the society, the harder it is to do that. In places like China, where 

you have more people traveling, perhaps, than you do in others, 

there are these networks that are established. In places like Laos 

or Cambodia, I think it’s much harder. 

But, what’s—again, what’s encouraging to me is that, in all of 

the societies, even the most repressive ones, perhaps with the exception of North Korea, there is emerging a civil society overcoming 

the constraints that they face in order to, again, organize themselves politically, domestically, sometimes through the Internet— 

that seems to be one of the most promising mechanisms for doing 

that—but, increasingly, looking even beyond their countries. 

I think, also, one of the important developments here is the role 

of Indonesia and other emerging democracies. To be discussing, not 

only with their fellow governments about the roles that NGOs— 

that they have nothing to fear; in fact, NGOs can be a partner in 

the development process. Of course, the reality is, in many of these 

societies, they are seen as a threat, in part because they are viewed 

as trying to dislodge, from their privileged position of power, those 

who hold power. 

And so, I think what the U.S. Government can do, as we said before, both engaging those governments, but also providing support 

that’s needed to do two things. One, engage also with the citizenries of those countries directly. We do that through a whole variety 

of ways. But, also take advantage of something that Dr. Sutter had 

said—the great strength of the United States is, in part, its own 

civil society. And that has enormous benefits. We can do—both 

NGOs and U.S. Government can do, I think, a much better job, 

across the board, in trying to elevate the status, the standing, and 

the legitimacy of civil society in those countries. 

Oftentimes, these governments will go to great lengths to tarnish 

their reputation, to call into question their patriotism, and the rest. 

I think there’s a lot that we can do, by bringing them together in 

regional fora, and others, to talk about strategies to combat that 

tactic on the part of governments. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

Dr. SUTTER. If I could, I’d like to—— 

Senator WEBB. Yes. 

Dr. SUTTER [continuing]. Broaden the scope, when you say ‘‘nongovernment involvement,’’ because I really think it’s so broad. And 

this is what I really would hope we’d consider in this kind of 

issue—and the impact of the United States. 

38 

Business. Business is nongovernment. And in China, it isn’t always nongovernment, as you know. 

And you talk about—you mention China and this ASEAN Free 

Trade Agreement, and so China does more trade with ASEAN than 

the United States now. But, China’s trade with ASEAN is 11 percent of ASEAN’s trade. It’s 11 percent. It’s not enormous. 

And so, China runs a $20 billion trade surplus with ASEAN, 

whereas the United States runs a $20 billion trade deficit with 

ASEAN. And the ASEANs appreciate the deficit more than they 

appreciate the surplus. 

And China’s investment in ASEAN—this is according to ASEAN 

Web site figures—China’s investment in ASEAN is 2 percent 

whereas U.S. investment is much larger. 

And so, business has a big impact in all areas. This is just one 

example. 

And then, education. I come from Georgetown University. We do 

all sorts of things with the countries of Asia. And we—and all the 

universities I’m familiar with—do all sorts of things with the countries in Asia. This has been going on for years—for decades. 

Foundations. And then, religious institutions, the Catholic 

Church. Georgetown is a Jesuit Catholic university—these various 

religious groups foundations and others do all sorts of interaction 

throughout the region—as well as immigrants, individual immigrants and what they do. 

And so, when we add all this up, you don’t have to be an advocate, you don’t have to be part of an organization pushing for certain things; this is where example comes into play. This is where 

the impact of the United States is felt everywhere you look. And 

I didn’t even get into the media. 

And so the point I would urge everyone to think about is that 

this nongovernmental impact of the United States is enormous in 

Asia. And it has been enormous for a long, long time. This is not 

new. And it’s generally positive, and generally, I think, it moves 

Asia in this kind of—in the direction that you—that we all would 

like to see. 

Senator WEBB. Right. Actually, I appreciate that. That was the 

intended nature of my question. Not simply to focus on NGOs. 

Even going back to the discussion I had with Secretary Campbell 

about Vietnam in the 1990s, when it was beginning to open up. 

There were a lot of private initiatives, just people who affiliated 

with veterans organizations, incipient business attempts, these 

sorts of things. Bringing people out—— 

Dr. SUTTER. People like John McAuliff. 

Senator WEBB. A lot of different people. I did a lot of it myself. 

So, I fully agree with you. 

But, with respect to the China-ASEAN trade agreement, I think 

we need to be clear here, it was just signed, as of this month. And 

the numbers that exist right now don’t necessarily represent what 

this is going to look like if we do not engage in a similar way, in 

my view. 

They are looking at dropping their tariff rates down to, basically, 

zero in the fairly near future. And we are now attempting to put 

together something, but we have yet to do so. 

39 

And also, that ties in to the security situation in the region, 

which you mentioned and which is, you know, true, in the way that 

you mentioned it, but also is occurring in the face of expanded Chinese military operations, including, just recently, the announcement that China and the Thais are going to do a fairly large cooperative military operation. 

So, I’m saying this, as a way of attempting to communicate, here, 

how vital it is that the United States remain involved, on a security level, but also in a business, economic level, and cultural 

level—I’ve said this many, many times—in the region. We are a 

very important balancing point in the region. And we tend, I think, 

too often, simply to think of that in national security terms, up 

here. But, it’s an across-the-board concern that we have. 

And I see that you wanted to say something, Dr. Sutter, so you’re 

certainly welcome to. 

Dr. SUTTER. Oh, I just—on the China ASEAN—the China—the 

initial agreement was signed in—the intent was 2002. It’s been undergoing development. It’s now reached the point where it’s ready 

to be implemented, but parts of it have been implemented over the 

course of 2002 to 2010. 

And this is a very common pattern in ASEAN trade. No country 

has more than 12 percent of trade with ASEAN. It’s a very diversified trade, so it’s—that’s just a minor point, sir. But it—— 

Senator WEBB. But in terms of actual tariff arrangements and 

these sort of things the agreement went into effect this month. 

Dr. SUTTER. It probably will have some effect. I’m not sure how 

much, I wouldn’t—I guess, my point is that often, China’s depicted 

as this controlling power in Asia. And my sense is—and I’ve tried 

to examine this very carefully—the United States is the leading 

power of Asia. And China knows this. And until China really undertakes risks, costs, and commitments that it wouldn’t ordinarily 

do, China’s really not going to be seen as a leader of Asia. And it 

doesn’t do risks, costs, and commitment that it wouldn’t ordinarily 

do, because it’s too risky and too costly, and they don’t do this. And 

the United States does. 

Senator WEBB. Well, first of all, my viewpoint, and the viewpoint 

of a lot of people with whom I agree, is not that China is the controlling power in Asia. It is an expansionist nation, by virtue of its 

growing economic power, the accumulation of its reserves, and 

where it is investing. Actually, the other side of that equation is 

where my concern is, and that, it is vital for the United States to 

remain actively involved in the region. Our trade numbers have not 

looked good over the last couple of years in the region, particularly 

last year, part of that being, obviously, the recession. And so, this 

is more an attempt to speak affirmatively about how vital this region is to the United States than to speak negatively about the fact 

that China is becoming more active. 

Dr. SUTTER. I fully agree, sir. And I applaud your efforts in doing 

this. I very much do. I think that this is what should be our focus, 

is the United States—what are our interests and how do we expand them? Because we have tremendous interest in the region. 

Senator WEBB. And there is a question that derives from that, 

though, and it’s one of the purposes of the hearing, and I would appreciate getting both of your thoughts on it. And that is, To what 

40 

extend does the United States become vulnerable through an increasing dependence on a governmental structure that’s not like 

our own? And I think it’s a worthwhile question. I’d like to hear 

your thoughts. 

Dr. SUTTER. Are you referring to China, sir, or the—— 

Senator WEBB. The interdependence we have with the Chinese 

Government. 

Dr. SUTTER. Yes. Yes, it’s—in my view, it’s a very—it’s a constraining factor on both sides. This interdependence is something 

that—in a way, we tried—this is part of our plan. I mean, we 

wanted to engage China. And by engagement, we brought them 

into these various webs of relationships, economic relationships. 

And that made us more interdependent with China. 

And China has worked assiduously to make the United States 

economically interdependent with it. And this constrains our ability 

to do things that we would like to do in areas of differences with 

China, in a hard way, because we’re interdependent. It makes it 

very difficult to do that. And they have the same constraint. 

And so, even though our interests and values drive us against 

each other, neither side is really going to take tough action to do 

this, because they have the interdependence. It’s—both sides, in a 

way, followed a Gulliver strategy. They tried to web down the other 

side so that they wouldn’t do negative things. We certainly tried 

that, and did it, and it worked. China is much more cooperative 

than it was 25 or 30 years ago. And so—and, at the same time, 

they did it to us. 

And so, we’re in that sort of situation where it’s harder, in areas 

of differences like human rights and values, for us to really put 

that as a top priority and push hard on that issue, because it 

affects these other interdependencies that we have. 

And so, yes, we have, I think, a realistic view of the situation. 

Senator WEBB. Dr. Herman. 

Dr. HERMAN. You know, whether it constrains behavior, I’ll defer 

to Professor Sutter, but I think the logic behind interdependence, 

not just economically, but also that it was going to create an open 

space, as you said before, to make these closed societies more open; 

more open in terms of what citizens could do; more open in terms 

of the ability for people to engage with the outside world, not just 

through commerce and business, but also through the flow of ideas 

and information. We’ve seen a little bit of that with the Internet. 

But, I think, for those who thought that opening them up—opening up China or Vietnam or other countries to commerce was going 

to lead us on a path that inexorably would lead to democracy, I 

think we’ve seen that that’s not necessarily the case. Which goes 

back, I think, to the earlier point that democracy, human rights 

have to be part of the dialogue, on an ongoing, consistent basis. I 

think, it’s what you said before, people are looking to us for that 

consistency. How we apply that may vary from country to country—as we’ve said before, the constellation of opportunities and 

challenges is going to vary—but, I think we should be very clear, 

in terms of that we lead with those values that—and we are determined, I think, to, again, engage the citizenries in the society, to 

help give them a voice. 

41 

I mean, ultimately, this is—the fate of these societies and their 

political evolution rests not with us, the United States Government 

or NGOs, it rests with the citizens. We’re in a supporting role, at 

best. But, to the extent that we can help create more space for 

them, for the bloggers, for activists, for others to begin to raise 

these issues with their own governments, that’s the key. 

The other—one other thing I wanted to mention is that—in my 

testimony I had talked about a siege, really, that’s happening 

against activists. The leading authoritarian states in the world, 

which includes China and countries like Russia and others, many 

of them petro-authoritarian states, they’re not just putting the 

clamps on their own populations, they are engaging more and more 

in efforts to weaken regional and global institutions that have 

democracy and human rights as part of their mandates, so whether 

that’s the OSCE or the OAS, in terms of Venezuela—but, we also 

see that, a little bit, in terms of Asia, where the infrastructure for 

democracy and human rights has been much behind what we’ve 

seen in other regions of the world. 

In this last trip, I was very taken by the fact that the democracy 

and human rights activists that I talked with—this new mechanism that’s been created at ASEAN, they’re intent on using it. 

They were also very, very interested to see what the experiences 

is of other democracy and human rights activists in other regions, 

and how they can access this mechanism, again, in order to be able 

to bring more pressure to bear on these authoritarian governments. 

Moreover, these linkages that are created, I think, it’s important 

to remember, not only are they sometimes a lifeline to these 

human rights activists, they also are transmission belts for ideas, 

for values. It’s part of what you said earlier, before, How do we try 

to open up these societies? And I think there is a whole panoply 

of ways that we do that. And, as you said, NGOs, business community, that’s all part of the equation. 

Senator WEBB. Well, that actually leads to, maybe, a question 

that could be the final summation of our hearing here. We have 

clearly articulated, from a governmental perspective, different 

standards, in terms of electoral process, openness of the media, 

freedom of movement, et cetera—China, Japan, Vietnam, Thailand, 

Burma. How would you both say that is interpreted among people 

who are in the region, looking at the consistency, or lack thereof, 

of American policy? 

Dr. SUTTER. I’m not sure we have articulated a different standard, sir. Maybe, in practice, it’s carried out in different ways. And 

I think Mr. Campbell made it clear why the priorities will be different in different situations. 

If you look at the State Department Report on Human Rights, 

I think it’s pretty consistent. I’ve been reading it for a long, long 

time, and it’s very consistent, it seems to me, in the issues they 

look at, and that’s the U.S. Government position—— 

Senator WEBB. Well, if I may, right there—— 

Dr. SUTTER. Yes, sir. 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. Because, you know, as I said to Secretary Campbell, we tend to focus on human rights, which are separate from governmental systems, in terms of analysis. But, if 

you’re looking at the approach that we have taken, in terms of acVerDate Nov 24 2008 13:25 Dec 06, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\2010 ISSUE HEARINGS TO PREPARE FOR PRINTING\ISSUE HEARIN
42 

tually how governments operated, we have taken different positions on these different positions on these different countries. And 

some of them—for instance, as I mentioned earlier, the Thais, who 

I think have worked very hard over a long period of time to open 

up their society, they’ve got great free press—even after the military coup, the local elections went forward. We take one standard 

on electoral process in a place like Thailand, and then we’ll say— 

or we will not say, to Vietnam or China, that they should even 

have elections. I’m not saying today that we should say that. And 

then when the junta, in Burma, says they are going to have elections, it’s a flawed process, we know it’s a flawed process, but it’s 

allowing an opposition party. There are no opposition parties in 

Vietnam, and there are no opposition parties in China. So, if you’re 

sitting on the ground in Asia, you’re seeing that there are a variety 

of different policies, in terms of their articulation from the government. And how do people digest that? 

Dr. SUTTER. I’ve done a lot of interviewing in Asia. This issue 

has come up from time to time. That’s the basis of what I’m going 

to say. And I think they see it as, basically, a factor of interest, 

that you have certain interests in China, so therefore, you don’t 

push very hard with China in a public demeanor. You have a dialogue, which is secret. Nobody knows what’s going on in the dialogue. And that’s how you handle human rights with China. 

Whereas, the examples you gave of smaller countries being given 

more pressure in a public way—and so, it’s a matter of interest. It’s 

interpreted that the United States has big interests with China, 

and therefore, it doesn’t do these kinds of things. And I think that’s 

not an unfair judgment, it seems to me. I think that is what happens. And we can try to explain it in various ways, but I think that 

is why the differentiation. I think, because if we pushed hard on 

China, it would be, probably, counterproductive given the circumstances. 

So, you have to look at the circumstances. And it really makes 

it hard to have this consistent approach, because that puts human 

rights—look at the way we have dealt with China over the past 20 

years. The Congress, 20 years ago, was focused on China in such 

a negative way; it’s very different now, very different. We learned. 

I mean, I assume we learned. And so, if there’s not even consistency with China, I think this is subject to circumstances and different interests and how they play. And therefore, you have to pursue these different things. It’s not because you don’t want to—— 

Senator WEBB. Well—— 

Dr. SUTTER [continuing]. It’s because you have these other—— 

Senator WEBB [continuing]. This is the division, in terms of the 

debate. 

Dr. SUTTER. Yes. 

Senator WEBB. You know, some people would say we have to adjust to different conditions, other people would say we don’t have 

consistent standards. And there are realities in play. But, this is 

the perception we’re trying to examine in this hearing. 

And, Dr. Herman. 

Dr. HERMAN. Yes, I just wanted to say—from the standpoint, I 

think, of the activists that we deal with, I’ve noticed an increased 

sophistication on the part of these activists, which is to say that 

43 

they recognize that the United States has a multiplicity of interests. They also look to the United States for leadership in Asia, especially in terms of democracy and human rights, speaking out, 

also, hopefully, comporting ourselves in ways that are consistent 

with our values and our ideals. I think they’re very sensitive when 

there is a gap between the two. 

But, I think they recognize that, how the United States is going 

to pursue support for democracy and human rights is going to vary 

from country to country. Indeed, many of the activists from these 

more closed societies, they want the U.S. Government to engage 

with their government. They don’t want strategies of isolation, for 

all the reasons you said before. But, at the same time, they want 

to have confidence that the United States is going to continue to 

make sure that democracy and human rights is central to that engagement. I think that’s where they worry. And, that’s why I think 

public diplomacy is important. When the United States, whether 

it’s Members of Congress, whether it’s leadership, when they meet 

with activists in these societies, and do so in a public way, which 

sometimes runs risks because you can have the meeting, everybody 

goes home, and we know what happened to the activists. So, we 

have to be careful. We have to apply the ‘‘do no harm’’ principle. 

But, I can tell you, it makes a huge difference, in terms of the stature, the legitimacy of them, being elevated in the eyes of the citizenry in those countries. 

And I think that’s part of this broader diplomatic strategy of not 

just engagement with the governments, but also with the civil societies. And it sends a very important message, also, to those governments to say, ‘‘These are also our partners, as we try to move these 

countries forward in a variety of ways.’’ 

Senator WEBB. Well, I thank you both very much for your testimony today, and for sharing your views. 

I think this has been a very good opportunity for us to exercise 

some oversight, here in the Congress, on the evolution of policy, 

and also, hopefully, to give all of us some things to think about, in 

terms of how the United States is perceived in this very vital part 

of the world. 

Thank you, again. 

This hearing is closed. 

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY KURT CAMPBELL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR

Question. As part of your confirmation hearing, you committed to working toward 

the return of the hundreds of American children who have been abducted by their 

Japanese parents. Please provide for the committee a comprehensive report on the 

meetings and activities related to this that you, Ambassador Roos, and other officials of the State Department have conducted since your confirmation. Did Secretary 

Clinton raise the issue with Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada during their 

meeting in Hawaii earlier this month, what commitments did she receive, and how 

will the Department follow up on those commitments? 

Answer. Secretary Clinton remains very committed to pressing Japan and other 

countries on the issue of international parental child abduction. She raised this 

issue during her first meeting with Foreign Minister Okada on November 11, and 

will continue to raise the issue in the future as opportunities arise. The Secretary 

44 

did not discuss this issue during her January 12 meeting with FM Okada to discuss 

the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance in Hawaii, but has ensured Department officials 

at all level engage with the Government of Japan frequently in order to keep the 

issue in the forefront of our bilateral relationship with Japan. 

The following is a list of the meetings and activities of Department of State officials have conducted regarding international parental child abduction since my confirmation: 

• June 30, 2009: Consul General (CG) Ray Baca met with Left Behind Parents 

(LBP) in Nagoya to discuss his situation. 

• July 16, 2009: American Citizen Services (ACS) Chief Bill Christopher met with 

representatives of newly established SOS-Japan, an organization for LBPs, regarding Embassy’s assistance to LBPs. 

• July 17, 2009: A/S Kurt Campbell raised International Parental Child Abduction (IPCA) in a private meeting with Vice Foreign Minister (FM) Yabunaka. 

• July 23, 2009: Charge ́ d’affaires (CDA) James Zumwalt participated in a demarche of Ministry of Justice (MOJ) with Deputy Heads of Mission from the 

British, Canadian, and French Embassies. Japanese MOJ Civil Affairs Bureau 

Director General (DG) Mr. Masaru Hara received the demarche. 

• July 30, 2009: CDA James Zumwalt discussed the Hague Convention on Child 

Abduction and the demarche by the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, 

and France at MOJ with North American Affairs DG Umemoto. 

• July 30, 2009: CDA James Zumwalt discussed child abduction with MOJ International Legal Affairs DG Koji Tsuruoka. 

• August 28, 2009: Ambassador Roos raised child abduction with Vice FM 

Yabunaka. 

• September 3, 2009: Tokyo CG Raymond Baca, Osaka Consular Chief Dave 

Hillon chaired a Consular Conference Panel Discussion on IPCA. Consular officers from Tokyo, Osaka, Naha, Fukuoka, Sapporo, and Seoul; Tokyo DHS/CBP 

and ICE Officers; DHS USCIS Officer from Seoul; and military legal assistance 

office representatives attended. 

• September 9, 2009: CG Osaka issued passports to two children, with only the 

consent of the Amcit father as per instructions from the Department of State 

(DOS), Consular Affairs Bureau. Children were taken from their home in the 

United States in March 2008 by the Japanese mother, to whom the father is 

still married. Passports were issued with the father’s signature only under Special Family Circumstances. Father and children returned to United States. 

• September 10, 2009: ACS Chief Bill Christopher and ACS Deputy Chief Joe 

Koen met with Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) officials to discuss an IPCA 

related case. MOFA attendees were Oyama Hiromoto and Yukiko Haromoto— 

Deputy Directors First North America Division, North American Affairs Bureau. 

• September 11, 2009: CG Ray Baca met with American parents in Japan who 

are experiencing difficulties visiting their children in Japan. CG updated them 

on meetings Ambassador and DOS officials held with Government of Japan 

(GOJ) officials. 

• September 11, 2009: Consular Affairs/Overseas Citizen Services/Children’s 

Issues (CA/OCS/CI) Director Michael Regan, CA/OCS/CI Ann McGahuey, Japan 

Desk Political Officer Todd Campbell held negotiations related to the formation 

of a working group to address the Hague Convention and resolution of current 

IPCA cases. The Embassy of Japan was represented by Legal Attache ́ Yoshihiro 

Ohara, Consul Kiyoshi Itoi, 2nd Secretary Zenichiro Uemura, 3rd Secretary 

Makiko Asami. 

• September 21, 2009: Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William 

Burns raised IPCA with Vice FM Mr. Mitoji Yabunaka. 

• September 28, 2009: Fukuoka Principal Officer Margot Carrington reports that 

an American citizen (Amcit) has been detained by the police. PLEASE NOTE 

THIS CASE REOCCURS THROUGHOUT THE TIMELINE UP THROUGH 

OCTOBER 29, 2009; RELATED ENTRIES DENOTED WITH ASTERISK*. 

• September 29, 2009: *Fukuoka Consular Officer Jay Avecilla visits Amcit arrested for allegedly kidnapping minors. 

• September 30, 2009: *Political Minister Counselor spoke with Mr. Kazuyoshi 

Umemoto, DG First North American Affairs Bureau, to express Embassy’s concern about the arrest of Amcit for allegedly kidnapping his children outside 

Fukuoka. 

• September 30, 2009: *Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) James Zumwalt called 

Mr. Kazuyoshi Umemoto, DG First North American Affairs Bureau, to express 

concern about the Amcit arrest case and the hope they could be released soon. 

45 

• September 30, 2009: *In response to DCM James Zumwalt and Political Minister’s separate telephone conversations with MOFA officials (see Sept 30), 

MOFA official called ACS Chief Bill Christopher and reports the ‘‘facts of the 

arrest.’’ 

• October 1, 2009: ACS Chief Bill Christopher met with MOFA officials to discuss 

several IPCA cases. 

• October 1, 2009: DCM James Zumwalt called MOFA Deputy FM, Koro Bessho, 

regarding an IPCA case, IPCA issues, and the Hague Convention. 

• October 6, 2009: CA/OCS/CI Director Michael Regan, CA/OCS/CI Ann 

McGahuey, Abduction Division Chief Marco Tedesco, and Japan Desk Political 

Officer Todd Campbell negotiated formation of working group to address the 

Hague Convention and resolution of current IPCA cases. The Japanese Embassy was represented by Legal Attache ́ Yoshihiro Ohara, Consul Kiyoshi Itoi, 

2nd Secretary Zenichiro Uemura, 3rd Secretary Makiko Asami. 

• October 7, 2009: *Embassy Tokyo consular officer visits LBP arrested for allegedly kidnapping minors. This is the third jail visit since the September 28 incident. LBP says he wants the consular officer to try to visit his children. Consular staff calls Taking Parent (TP) but she refuses consular visit. 

• October 7, 2009: ACS Chief Bill Christopher hosts meeting for consular officers 

from United States, Canada, France, Italy, and United Kingdom meet regarding 

upcoming demarche. Australia agrees to participate. 

• October 9, 2009: CG Ray Baca and ACS Chief Bill Christopher met with LBP 

who traveled to Japan to try to visit his daughter. 

• October 9, 2009: *Fukuoka consular officer visits a LBP arrested for allegedly 

kidnapping minors. This is the fourth jail visit since the September 28 incident. 

• October 9, 2009: *Diplomatic Note sent to MOFA requesting assistance arranging a welfare and whereabouts (w/w) visit with LBP’s children. LBP’s ex-wife 

turned down request during phone call with Fukuoka staff on Oct 7. 

• October 12, 2009: A/S Campbell raised the Hague Convention during a lunch 

with Ministry of Defense (MOD) and MOFA counterparts. He advocated for 

Japan to accede to the convention. Mr. Mitoji Yabunaka, Deputy FM, and 

Kazuyoshi Umemoto, DG First North American Affairs Bureau, were the ranking Japanese officials present. 

• October 14, 2009: Embassy Tokyo Political section’s Deputy Chief, Marc Knapper, met with Diet Member Edano to discuss the parental abduction issue. 

• October 15, 2009: *CG Ray Baca, ACS Chief Bill Christopher met with MOFA 

Director to follow up on Embassy’s note verbale requesting assistance arranging 

a consular visit with LBP’s children. MOFA stated they would contact the exwife. During the meeting MOFA said LBP would be released that same day. 

• October 15, 2009: *Fukuoka Consular Officer Jay Avecilla confirms that the 

LBP was released from jail. 

• October 16, 2009: During a meeting with Diet member Yorihisa Matsuno (Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary) Embassy Tokyo’s Deputy Political Counselor noted 

that Ambassador Roos is actively pursuing the parental abduction issue. 

• October 16, 2009: Ambassador Roos, accompanied by six ambassadors and one 

deputy head of mission from other embassies in Japan, demarched new Minister of Justice, Keiko Chiba, on IPCA. 

• October 19, 2009: CG Ray Baca, ACS Chief Bill Christopher, and Deputy ACS 

Chief Joe Koen met with Tokyo based Left Behind Parents. 

• October 19, 2009: Ambassador Roos during a courtesy call on October 19 raised 

IPCA with Minister Mizuho Fukushima (State Minister for Consumer Affairs, 

Food Safety, Declining Birthrate, and Gender Equality). 

• October 20, 2009: Ambassador Roos urged Diet leadership to make progress on 

IPCA. Diet Upper House President Eda, Upper House Vice President Akiko 

Santo and Upper House International Affairs Bureau Head Ikuo Idaka attended 

the meeting. 

• October 22, 2009: Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Joseph Donovan raised 

IPCA with Mr. Koji Tomita, Deputy DG, North American Affairs Bureau. 

• October 28, 2009: CA/OCS/CI Director Michael Regan, CA/OCS/CI Ann 

McGahuey, Abductions Unit Chief Marco Tedesco, and Japan Desk Political 

Officer Todd Campbell continued negotiations related to the formation of working group to address the Hague Convention and resolution of current IPCA 

cases. Legal Attache ́ Yoshihiro Ohara, Consul Kiyoshi Itoi, 2nd Secretary 

Zenichiro Uemura, 3rd Secretary Makiko Asami represented the Japanese 

Embassy. 

• October 29, 2009: DCM James Zumwalt and Embassy officials briefed new DPJ 

Diet members on USG policies. Consular briefing including IPCA. 

46 

• October 29, 2009: *MOFA called ACS Chief to inform Consulate Fukuoka that 

a LBP’s ex-wife (the Taking Parent) told MOFA she would accept a consular 

visit. MOFA contacted TP in response to note verbale sent by Embassy after 

TP denied Fukuoka’s previous request for consular visit. 

• October 30, 2009: Briefing given to new DPJ Diet members about USG policies, 

including IPCA, by DCM James Zumwalt and representatives from Embassy 

sections. 

• November 5, 2009: A/S Campbell and Ambassador Roos urged Japan to take the 

initiative, and told MOFA officials that Japan must develop a roadmap to accede to the Hague, find a way to resolve existing abduction cases, and develop 

a framework for visitation in Japan which is enforceable. A/S Campbell offered 

to have CA/OCS/CI trainers come to Japan to provide training to MOFA 

officers. 

• November 10, 2009: Deputy Chief, ACS Koen participated in meeting to plan 

multilateral demarches on GOJ by represented embassies and to plan a spring 

2010 symposium on IPCA and Hague Convention. Consular officials from the 

Embassies of Canada, Australia, Italy, France, and Spain were present. 

• November 11, 2009: Secretary Clinton raised IPCA in Japan with FM Okada 

on the sidelines of the 2009 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum 

in Singapore. 

• November 13, 2009: A/S Campbell, CG Baca, Deputy CG Wakahiro, Deputy 

ACS Chief Koen meet to discuss GOJ amenability to Hague accession; strategy 

for engaging the GOJ; and near-term prospects for improving conditions for 

LBPs. 

• November 17, 2009: Deputy ACS Chief Koen meets with new Diet member who 

has shown interest in IPCA issues. Discussion of future Diet roundtables on the 

issue, March 2010 IPCA symposium. 

• December 8, 2009: ACS Chief Christopher meets with MOFA Officials to discuss 

purpose of newly established Division for Issues Related to Child Custody 

(DIRCC). DIRCC is coordinating body of Policy Bureau, Legal Affairs Bureau, 

Consular Bureau, and North American and Europe regional bureaus. Its nine 

members are from these bureaus. 

• December 9, 2009: Embassy Officials Meeting to plan multilateral demarches 

on Japanese Foreign Minister and Prime Minister by represented embassies 

and to plan a spring 2010 symposium on IPCA and Hague Convention. 

• December 11, 2009: Ambassador Roos meets with the Japan Federation of Bar 

Associations (JFBA). Ambassador urged JFBA to press the GOJ to accede to the 

Hague Convention. Ambassador offered Embassy assistance to answer JFBA 

questions or concerns. 

• December 15, 2009: CG Ray Baca, ACS Chief Bill Christopher meet with 

MOFA’s Director of new Division for Issues Related to Child Custody. 

• December 15, 2009: CA/OCS/CI Director Michael Regan, CA/OCS/CI Ann 

McGahuey, Japan Desk Political Officer Todd Campbell continue negotiations 

related to the formation of working group to address the Hague Convention and 

resolution of current IPCA cases. Legal Attache ́ Yoshihiro Ohara, Consul 

Kiyoshi Itoi, 2nd Secretary Zenichiro Uemura represent the Japanese Embassy. 

• December 17, 2009: Ambassador Roos raised IPCA during meeting with former 

Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda. 

• December 22, 2009: Ambassador Roos raised IPCA during dinner he hosted for 

FM Okada. 

• January 6, 2010: Ambassador Roos, CG Ray Baca, ACS Chief, Bill Christopher, 

and Deputy ACS Chief Joe Koen met with LBPs in Japan. Ambassador updated 

the parents on Embassy and Department actions. He welcomed their ideas for 

how the Embassy can assist them and said that they could also provide input 

during future meetings with CG. 

• January 7, 2010: CA/OCS/CI Director Michael Regan, Citizen Services Specialist (Japan) Anthony Alexander, and EAP Japan Desk Political Officer Todd 

Campbell finalized negotiations related to the formation of working group to address the Hague Convention and resolution of current IPCA cases. Legal 

Attache ́ Yoshihiro Ohara, Consul Kiyoshi Itoi, and 2nd Secretary Zenichiro 

Uemura represented the Embassy of Japan. 

• January 11, 2010: During briefing about United States-Japan relations, Senator 

Patty Murray and DCM James Zumwalt discussed Embassy efforts regarding 

IPCA in Japan. 

• January 14, 2010: During briefing about United States-Japan relations for Senator Inouye, CDA James Zumwalt, and CG Ray Baca updated the Senator on 

Embassy efforts regarding IPCA in Japan. 

47 

• January 20–21, 2010: IPCA Training Seminar in Naha led by officers from CA/ 

OCS/CI and CA/PRI. U.S. Embassies Tokyo, Manila, and Seoul; consulates in 

Naha, Osaka, Fukuoka, Nagoya, Sapporo, Hong Kong, and Shanghai, and AIT 

Taipei attended. Officials from U.S. military bases in Japan and Korea also participated. • Week of January 21, 2010: Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs 

William Burns raised child abduction issues with Deputy Foreign Minister for 

Political Affairs Kenichiro Sasae. • January 22, 2010: CG Ray Baca, ACS Chief Bill Christopher, Deputy ACS Chief 

Joe Koen, CA/OCS/CI Ann McGahuey, CA/OCS/CI Tony Alexander, CA/OCS/ 

PRI Corrin Ferber meet with Japan based LBPs. • January 22, 2010: CG Ray Baca, ACS Chief Bill Christopher, CA/OCS/CI Ann 

McGahuey, CA/OCS/CI Tony Alexander, and CA/OCS/PRI Corrin Ferber attend 

meeting regarding setting up working group to discuss individual cases. Mr. 

Koji Tomita, Deputy DG, North American Affairs Bureau; Mr. Tomoyuki 

Yoshida, Director, First North America Division; Mr. Masataka Okano, Director, International Legal Affairs Division; Mr. Hisanori Yaegashi, Director, Consular Policy Division and other Japanese officials participated in the meeting. • January 22, 2010: ACS Chief Bill Christopher, CA/OCS/CI Ann McGahuey, CA/ 

OCS/CI Tony Alexander, CA/OCS/PRI Corrin Ferber, and consular officer 

Megan Phaneuf met with Ministry of Justice officials to discuss legal issues related to IPCA. MOJ Officials Mr. Tomoyuki Tobisawa, counselor, Civil Affairs 

Bureau; Mr. Fuminori Sano, Attorney, Civil Affairs Bureau participated in the 

meeting 

• January 22, 2010: ACS Chief Bill Christopher, CA/OCS/CI Ann McGahuey, CA/ 

OCS/CI Tony Alexander, CA/OCS/PRI Corrin Ferber, and consular officer 

Megan Phaneuf discussed Japanese passport issuance requirements as a means 

to prevent IPCA (e.g., how an American parent can request that a Japanese 

consulate in United States not issue passport to his/her child). MOFA Officials 

Mr. Masaru Hattori, Deputy Director, Passport Division; and Mr. Takuma 

Inoue, Official, Passport Division, participated. 

• January 22, 2010: Press statement release following the meeting of the working 

group that was established to address issues related to cross-border child custody issues. The statement communicated U.S. Government hopes that the 

working group will provide a means to improve American parents’ access to and 

visitation with their children; facilitate visits with children by U.S. consular officers; and explore ways to resolve current child abduction cases. 

• January 25, 2010: Deputy CG Wakahiro, Deputy ACS Chief Koen; CA/OCS/CI 

Ann McGahuey, CA/OCS/CI Tony Alexander, CA/OCS/PRI Corrin Ferber meet 

with Japanese family law attorney Mikiko Otani, who has written numerous 

newspaper articles supporting Japan’s accession to the Hague Convention on 

IPCA. 

• January 25, 2010: Deputy CG Wakahiro, Deputy ACS Chief Koen; CA/OCS/CI 

Ann McGahuey, CA/OCS/CI Tony Alexander, CA/OCS/PRI Corrin Ferber discuss Japan’s family law system as it relates to divorce, custody, and parental 

child abduction with Kyoto University Law Professor. 

• January 29, 2010: A/S Campbell, A/S for Consular Affairs Janice Jacobs, Deputy 

Assistant Secretary Michele Bond, CA/CI Director Mike Regan, CA/CI Anthony 

Alexander, Japan Desk Deputy Director Simon Schuchat, and Japan Desk Political Officer Todd Campbell meet with 23 LBPs. 

• January 30, 2010: Ambassador Roos, accompanied by six Ambassadors and one 

deputy head of mission from other embassies in Japan, demarche Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada on IPCA. They urged Japan to accede to the Hague Convention and take measures to improve access for parents separated from their 

children. 

• February 2, 2010: A/S Campbell raised International Parental Child Abduction 

with Vice FM Yabunaka, met with Japan-based Left Behind Parents, and held 

a press conference during which he publicly urged the GOJ to accede to the 

Hague and take steps to resolve current cases. 

Question. Finally, the FY 2009 State Department Report on International Child 

Abduction states that there were 15 new cases involving 57 children for Japan. 

Please provide the committee with the total number of abducted U.S. children in 

Japan that the Department has on file, broken down by year as well. 

Answer. Since 1994, we have opened 202 cases involving 277 children abducted 

to or wrongfully retained in Japan. At the end of FY 2009, 75 cases involving 103 

U.S. children were still open. Our statistics reflect only children whose left-behind 

parents report their case to the Department of State’s Office of Children’s Issues; 

48 

therefore, we cannot accurately estimate the actual number of abducted American 

children in Japan. 

A case remains open until the left-behind parent (LBP) reports a satisfactory resolution, we lose contact with the LBP and cannot locate him/her despite significant 

effort over a period of 1 year, or the child attains age 18, at which point the case 

is ‘‘closed’’ in Children’s Issues, but transferred to our American Citizens Services 

(ACS) and Crisis Management office, which is colocated with Children’s Issues and 

part of the same Directorate, Overseas Citizens Services. The Office of Children’s 

Issues may continue to assist as requested. 

Of the 202 cases in Japan opened since 1994, 127 cases involving 174 children 

have been closed: 19 because the children were voluntarily returned to the United 

States, 79 because of lack of response from or loss of contact with the LBP, 9 because they were transferred to ACS when the children attained age 18, and 20 for 

other reasons. Of the cases closed for other reasons, six cases withdrawn by the 

LBP, one was resolved because the taking parent had sole custody in the United 

States, two because the LBP lives in Japan, five because the child was not in Japan, 

one because the child only lived in Japan and a Japanese court order applied, one 

because the LBP accepted the Japanese court order granting custody to the taking 

parent, three because the child’s U.S. citizenship was not confirmed, and one because the taking parent was granted sole custody in both the United States and 

Japan. 

Please note that the question appears to state incorrect numbers. The State 

Department’s FY 2009 Report on International Child Abduction reported that in FY 

2008, there were 37 new cases opened, involving 57 U.S. children who were 

abducted from the United States to Japan or wrongfully retained there. 

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY KURT CAMPBELL TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY

SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

Question. Hundreds of leftist politicians and political activists, journalists, and 

clergy members have been killed or abducted since President Arroyo came to power 

in 2001. With only 11 people convicted for 6 of these killings, how is the administration working to pressure the Philippine Government to properly investigate such 

killings and prosecute perpetrators? 

Answer. The United States takes allegations of extrajudicial killings (EJKs) and 

forced disappearances very seriously. Our Embassy in Manila, as well as senior officials in Washington, consistently raise these issues with Philippine Government 

interlocutors, urging greater progress toward investigating disappearances, eliminating the killings, and increasing prosecutions and convictions for their perpetrators. Secretary Clinton expressed our concern over EJKs when she met with the 

Philippine Foreign Secretary in Manila on November 12, 2009. The Philippine Government appears well aware that EJKs threaten its international standing and that 

concern about such killings has contributed to pressure to end preferential treatment the Philippines receives under the U.S. Generalized System of Preference. 

Our message is reinforced at the working level and through targeted assistance 

programs sponsored by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the State 

Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL), and the 

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), aimed at 

building Philippine capacity to conduct proper investigations and effectively prosecute cases. This assistance includes: training on the investigation and prosecution 

of EJKs, forced disappearances, and torture; workshops providing human rights 

training for judges, public attorneys, police and military personnel, and other government officials; and training and materials to enhance the capacity of journalists 

to produce high-quality, accurate reports on human rights investigations and cases, 

thereby promoting greater public awareness. 

The Philippine Government has taken numerous and significant measures to address the problem of EJKs. The Philippine Government in 2006 established a police 

task force (Task Force Usig) specifically charged with investigating extra-judicial 

killings of journalists and political and labor activists. In 2009, the government expanded this task force’s authority to include investigations into killings of foreign 

nationals, established and strengthened regional branches, and funded a program 

to provide rewards for information leading to the resolution of EJK cases. 

The number of killings has decreased after peaking in 2006. However, even one 

EJK is one too many, and we will continue to highlight at every opportunity our 

concerns about human rights and extrajudicial killings and our efforts to help the 

Philippines improve its judicial capacity and prosecutorial effectiveness. 

49 

Question. It is my understanding that to date, no member of the military who was 

accused of carrying out an extrajudicial killing while on active duty has been 

brought to justice. How is the administration working to pressure the Philippine 

Government to investigate members of the military for these crimes, ensure that all 

military investigations are transparent, and hold senior military officials accountable under ‘‘command responsibility?’’ 

Answer. The United States regards allegations of Philippine military involvement 

in human rights abuses and EJKs as a very serious matter, and will continue to 

press the Philippine Government for greater progress in holding the perpetrators of 

such crimes to account and promoting a climate of accountability. 

Officials of Task Force Usig, which is responsible for EJK investigations, have told 

U.S. Embassy officials that nine EJK cases involving military and paramilitary elements as suspects have been filed before the courts since 2001, and six cases involving police personnel have been filed for prosecution (not including ongoing efforts 

against police officials involved in the November 2009 Maguindanao massacre). In 

2008, Armed Forces of the Philippines Corporal Rodrigo Billones was sentenced to 

a minimum of 54 years in prison for the 2000 disappearance of six suspected leftists 

in Agusan del Sur province. 

In addition to the law enforcement and judicial assistance programs cited above, 

our ongoing military assistance programs are designed to enhance professionalism, 

strengthen the concept of command responsibility, and encourage respect for human 

rights. U.S. military personnel provide human rights training, embedded in military 

training exercises, to thousands of Philippine soldiers each year. We continue to 

highlight at every opportunity our concerns about human rights abuses and 

extrajudicial killings, including allegations of Philippine military involvement of 

these crimes, and seek to identify additional ways the U.S. Government can provide 

assistance. 

Question. What is the government doing to push the Philippine central government to ensure that investigations into the November 23, 2009, Maguindanao massacre—in which at least 57 people were killed, allegedly by paramilitary forces acting at the direction of local government officials—are pursued up to the most senior 

levels? 

Answer. In the immediate aftermath of the massacre, the U.S. Ambassador to the 

Philippines spoke with leading members of the Philippine Cabinet and urged a thorough, rapid, and transparent investigation. 

The Philippine Government moved quickly to take into custody leading suspects. 

Virtually all police officials in the province were transferred, to preclude interference in the investigation. Legal proceedings are now underway against the suspected leader of the massacre, while authorities have charged more than a halfdozen police officials with multiple murders in the massacre. We will continue to 

monitor the situation closely, and underscore to the Philippine Government the need 

for a speedy, fair, and transparent trial of those responsible, as well as ongoing 

efforts to prevent further violence. 

Question. What steps will the administration take to urge the Burmese junta to 

release the 2,100 political prisoners ahead of elections, including U.S. citizen Nyi 

Nyi Aung? 

Answer. Securing the release of all political prisoners in Burma remains one of 

the administration’s fundamental goals in Burma. We remain deeply concerned by 

the growing number of political prisoners held by the regime, including much of the 

opposition leadership. We have underscored to Burmese authorities the importance 

of making meaningful progress on this issue in order to allow for the possibility that 

national elections, planned for this year, are conducted in an inclusive and therefore 

credible fashion. We will continue to raise the issue of all of Burma’s political prisoners in our engagement with Burmese authorities, and continue to urge other governments with influence to do the same. 

Question. If bilateral talks fail, what further steps will the administration take 

to pressure the Burmese regime, such as imposing additional targeted financial 

sanctions? 

Answer. Our dialogue with the Burmese leadership is at a very early stage. We 

will examine conditions in Burma and evaluate the progress on our core concerns 

as this process moves forward. In addition, we continually evaluate the various tools 

we have available to advance our goals in Burma, including sanctions. We reserve 

the option of tightening sanctions on the regime and its supporters in the future 

as appropriate. 

50 

Question. When will the administration appoint a Burma Special Representative 

and Policy Coordinator as stipulated in the Lantos JADE Act of 2008? 

Answer. The administration places a high priority on the appointment of a Special 

Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma, as required by the JADE Act, and 

intends to appoint an individual soon. 

Question. When will the administration issue a report on military and intelligence 

aid to Burma, including on the provision of weapons of mass destruction and related 

materials to Burma, as stipulated in the Lantos JADE Act of 2008? 

Answer. The report is in the final stages of the clearance process. We expect to 

deliver it to Congress shortly. 

Question. On November 5, 2009, I sent a letter to President Obama along with 

Senator Corker and 20 of our Senate colleagues asking him to raise the issue of 

international parental child abduction with Japanese Prime Minister Yukio 

Hatoyama during his November visit there. I understand that the Department of 

State is preparing a response, which I have yet to receive. When will I receive a 

response? 

Answer. The response was sent on March 4, 2010, by the Bureau of Legislative 

Affairs to Senator Boxer’s office. Ariana Reks, legislative aide to Senator Boxer, has 

confirmed the response was received. 

Question. What have you learned about the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s new 

division to address international parental child abductions? What has the new 

division accomplished to date? Have you met with Japanese officials within this new 

division? 

Answer. In December 2009, the Japanese Foreign Ministry established the Division for Issues Related to Child Custody (DIRCC) to study accession to the Hague 

Convention and to coordinate issues within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). 

The DIRCC comprises nine members from the Legal Affairs Bureau, Consular 

Bureau, and North American and European regional bureaus. 

On November 15, 2009, Embassy Tokyo Consul General Ray Baca and American 

Citizen Services Chief William Christopher met with MOFA’s Director of DIRCC to 

discuss the division’s future functions. They were informed that the division would 

study Japan’s accession to the Hague Convention, and how to address issues related 

to cross-border child custody issues. On January 22, Embassy and Bureau of Consular Affairs officials held the first formal meeting with DIRCC officials in Tokyo. 

We expect the working group will provide a means to improve parents’ access to and 

visitation with their children; facilitate visits with children by U.S. consular officers; 

and explore ways to resolve current child abductions cases as well as encourage 

Japan to accede to the Hague. 

Question. What progress have you made in your discussions with the Japanese 

on Japan’s accession to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 

Child Abduction? What progress have you made in conveying U.S. concern to the 

Japanese regarding the current cases of abducted American children? Have you 

been successful in engaging the Japanese Ministry of Justice on this issue? 

Answer. The Embassy, the Bureau of Consular Affairs, and the Bureau of East 

Asian and Pacific Affairs continue to raise this issue during meetings with Japanese 

officials at all levels. Japanese officials have consistently stated that: 

• MOFA and MOJ are studying the Hague Convention. 

• Japanese family law is not consistent with the Hague Convention. 

• The Diet would have to pass the required legislation to change domestic law. 

On October 16, 2009, Ambassador Roos and the Ambassadors of Canada, France, 

Italy, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the deputy head of mission of 

Australia, demarched the new Minister of Justice (MOJ) about International Child 

Abduction. They urged Japan to accede to the Hague Convention and take measures 

to improve access for parents separated from their children. A joint press statement 

was issued by the eight embassies following the meeting. There was good media coverage of the meeting and the statement in Japan. 

On January 22, 2010, American Citizen Services Chief William Christopher and 

staff from the Office of Children’s Issues met with MOJ officials to discuss Japan’s 

legal statutes as they relate to International Parental Child Abduction (IPCA), in 

particular the legal definition of domestic violence, how courts determine custody in 

divorce cases and mechanisms used to enforce court orders. 

On January 30, 2010, Ambassador Roos, accompanied by the same six ambassadors and one deputy head of mission from other embassies in Japan, demarched 

Minister of Foreign Affairs Katsuya Okada about IPCA. The Ambassadors urged 

51 

Japan to accede to the Hague Convention and to take measures to improve access 

for parents separated from their children. Minister Okada expressed appreciation 

for the meeting and stated that the new government must decide how to deal with 

IPCA. There was good media coverage of the meeting and the statement in both 

Japan and overseas. 

Assistant Secretaries Kurt M. Campbell and Janice L. Jacobs continue meetings 

with Left Behind Parents at regular 2- to 3-month intervals. On February 2, 2010, 

EAP Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell met with Left Behind Parents in Japan. 

At the end of the meeting, he held a press conference where he spoke about International Parental Child Abduction. We plan to hold our next meeting with Left 

Behind Parents in early April. 

Question. What benchmarks would you like to see the Japanese achieve on this 

issue, and in what timeframe? 

Answer. At the earliest opportunity: 

• We urge the Government of Japan to establish avenues for resolving cases of 

wrongful removal and retention of children from the United States to Japan. 

• To prevent child abduction by Japanese parents, we urge Japan to require that 

both parents sign the child’s passport application, or otherwise consent in writing to the issuance of a Japanese passport to a child. 

• We call for Japan’s accession to the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. 

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE KURT CAMPBELL TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Question. For over 60 years, the United States and Taiwan have maintained a 

close partnership as Taiwan remains one of our strongest allies in the Asia Pacific 

region. The United States has a longstanding commitment, as laid out in the 

Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), to aid our friends in their capabilities to defend themselves against aggressive neighbors. Additionally, it is vital that a peaceful environment exists in the Strait of Taiwan, and the ability of Taiwan to maintain its 

defense rests heavily upon its ability to acquire defense articles. 

In October 2008, I was pleased that former President George W. Bush approved 

the sale of 6.5 billion dollars’ worth of weapons to Taiwan. For the past 3 years, 

Taiwan has submitted several requests to the United States for the sale of F–16 

C/D Block 50/52 fighters, diesel-electric submarines, Blackhawk utility helicopters, 

and the PAC–III antimissile defense system. However, none of these requests have 

been accepted and are all currently pending. 

• Is the Obama administration committed to fulfilling the U.S.’s pledge to Taiwan 

under the TRA by continuing to provide Taiwan with defense articles? 

• Does the administration have a plan to approve Taiwan’s pending defense 

requests? 

• Do you support selling these pending items to Taiwan? 

Answer. The Obama administration’s commitment to fulfilling the terms of the 

Taiwan Relations Act is unwavering. 

The administration intends to continue to make available defense articles and 

services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. 

On January 29, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the administration formally notified Congress of its intent to sell to Taiwan UH–60 Black Hawk 

utility helicopters; Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC–3) firing units, training 

unit, and missiles; Multifunctional Information Distribution Systems (MIDS) to support Taiwan’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) communications system; Osprey-class mine 

hunting ships; and Harpoon telemetry missiles. 

F–16 C/D aircraft and a diesel submarine design were not notified at this time. 

The administration has not denied any of Taiwan’s requests, and it continues to 

evaluate Taiwan’s defense needs. 

TAIWAN AND ICAO MEMBERSHIP

Question. In May 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General 

invited Taiwan’s Health Minister to lead a delegation to attend the 62nd World 

Health Assembly as an observer. This decision has opened the door for more involvement for Taiwan in other UN agencies, programs, and conventions as well. 

Recently, Taiwan has expressed its desire to participate in the International Civil 

Aviation Organization (ICAO). Taiwan is a key air transport hub in the Asia Pacific 

52 

region serving more than 1 million flights and over 40 million passengers each year. 

Taiwan’s lack of participation in the ICAO results in its incapability to access information regarding important aviation issues, creates a gap in the global aviation network, and prevents it to receive ICAO technical assistance. 

• Do you support Taiwan’s observer status in the ICAO? 

• Could you describe what steps, if any, the Obama administration is taking to 

assist Taiwan in its effort to gain meaningful participation in ICAO? 

Answer. The United States supports Taiwan’s membership in international organizations where statehood is not a prerequisite and supports meaningful participation by Taiwan in organizations where statehood is required. Taiwan’s ability to 

gain official status in ICAO or other United Nations organizations is affected by the 

fact that Taiwan is not a Member State of the United Nations and does not have 

observer status at the United Nations General Assembly. 

It is U.S. policy to support Taiwan’s involvement in international organizations, 

processes, agreements, and gatherings wherever possible. Our overall goal is to ensure that Taiwan has access to information on international standards, restrictions, 

quotas, etc., so that it can comply with international regulations and guidelines and 

benefit from international assistance and advice. 

We are aware that Taiwan wishes to expand its meaningful participation in 

ICAO. Given the volume of flights through Taiwan’s airspace, there are important 

practical reasons to support the island’s inclusion, in some form, in the work of 

ICAO entities. The United States supports this objective. 

Rule 5 of the Standing Rules of Procedure for the ICAO Assembly declares that 

‘‘Non-Contracting States and international organizations duly invited by the Council, or by the Assembly itself, to attend a session of the Assembly may be represented by observers.’’ Comprised of 36 Member States (including the United 

States), the Council is ICAO’s governing body that runs the Organization between 

sessions of the triennial Assembly. The practical question is whether Taiwan can 

obtain an invitation from the Council or Assembly. The ICAO Council and Assembly 

both operate by consensus on a matter such as this and, to date, there is no agreement among ICAO Member States on inviting Taiwan to participate as an observer. 

Taiwan receives information on ICAO safety, security, and environmental standards and other matters by way of the membership of its airline, China Airlines, in 

the International Air Transport Association (IATA), which is an active observer in 

ICAO meetings on behalf of its hundreds of member airlines. 

The U.S. Mission to ICAO in Montreal has, and will continue to respond to inquiries for information from Taiwan representatives in Canada about the Organization, 

to the extent that they seek a better understanding of the structure and rules of 

procedures of ICAO, including those of the Assembly and the Council. 

Æ