GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

October 1999 DEFENSE 

INVENTORY

Management of Repair 

Parts Common to 

More Than One 

Military Service Can 

Be Improved

GAO/NSIAD-00-21

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-21 Defense Inventory

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 18

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense 20

Related GAO Products 22

Tables Table 1: Repairable Parts Used by More Than One Service 6

Figures Figure 1: Primary Manager Assignments for Identical Parts 7

Figure 2: User Assignments for Identical Parts 9

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

DOD-IG Department of Defense Inspector General
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Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-00-21 Defense Inventory

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-280313 Letr

October 20, 1999

The Honorable Tom Harkin

The Honorable Richard Durbin

United States Senate

The Honorable Peter DeFazio

The Honorable Carolyn B. Maloney

House of Representatives

This report is one in a series of reports on the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) management of secondary inventory−spare and repair parts, 

clothing, medical supplies, and other items that support DOD’s operating 

forces on land, at sea, and in the air.1

 We have identified the management of 

defense inventory as a high-risk area.2 Past reports have identified 

management weaknesses that make some portion of DOD’s inventory 

vulnerable to waste and inefficiency. As requested, we reviewed DOD’s 

management of identical repairable parts used by more than one DOD 

component (hereafter referred to as identical parts).3

 Over 57,000 identical 

parts, with an estimated value of $4 billion, are used and typically managed 

by more than one service. They include such supply items as hydraulic 

pumps, computer circuit card assemblies, wing sections, and landing gear. 

This report discusses (1) DOD’s progress in correcting problems in the 

management of identical parts and (2) opportunities to improve 

1

See Related GAO Products at the end of this report.

2

In 1990, we began a special effort to review and report on the federal program areas that we 

identified as high risk because of vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and 

mismanagement. This effort, which was supported by the Senate Committee on 

Government Affairs and the House Committee on Government Reform, brought a much 

needed focus on problems that were costing the government billions of dollars. We 

identified inventory management as high risk in our 1992, 1995, 1997, and 1999 high-risk 

reports because of the high levels of inventory in excess of current needs and the lack of 

adequate systems for determining inventory requirements.

3

DOD refers to these parts as multiservice repair items. Each identical item has a unique 

national stock number. National stock number refers to a 13-digit stock number that DOD 

and other agencies use to identify and manage items of supply. It consists of a four-digit 

federal supply class that designates the general commodity grouping of the item and a 

nine-digit item identification number that differentiates one supply item from another.
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management of these parts. The scope and methodology of our work can 

be found in appendix I.

Results in Brief DOD initiatives dating to the early 1970s to improve the management of 

identical parts have been largely ineffective. Many identical parts continue 

to be managed by more than one service, even though opportunities for 

savings and management efficiencies exist by using a single manager when 

there are multiple users of the same part. While we cannot precisely 

quantify the savings from improving management of identical parts, our 

current work and past DOD studies showed that they would be 

considerable. For example, our analysis of 7,683 identical parts, with assets 

on hand valued at $474 million, showed that they should have been 

managed by one DOD component. This condition is similar to what existed 

in 1995 when the DOD Inspector General reported that the primary 

inventory manager did not have information on over $400 million in assets 

held by the other services and that over $140 million of these assets could 

have been used to fill the needs of the primary manager.

Due to planning and management weaknesses, the DOD initiatives have not 

been successful in moving to an approach that would result in a single 

manager performing all inventory management functions. These 

weaknesses include not developing an implementation plan that contains 

performance objectives, milestones, and outcome measures linked to 

DOD’s Logistics Strategic Plan, and not establishing oversight 

accountability for implementing the single manager approach Departmentwide. These weaknesses are similar to long-standing problems noted in our 

high risk reporting on DOD’s inventory management that have hindered 

other major inventory management improvement initiatives.

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense establish DOD-wide 

goals to improve the management of identical parts and develop an 

implementation plan with short- and long-term actions to guide 

accomplishment of these goals. Further, clear accountability for overseeing 

the execution of the implementation plan should be established.

Background DOD has had inventory management problems for decades. In 1990, we 

identified DOD’s management of secondary inventories as a high-risk area 

because levels of inventory were too high and management systems and 

procedures were ineffective. While some improvements have been made, 
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particularly in the management of medical, food, and clothing items, these 

general conditions still exist. Program implementation problems have 

resulted largely from long-standing issues that have hindered other major 

management initiatives. These issues include cultural resistance to change; 

service parochialism; and lack of outcome-oriented goals, performance 

measures, and management accountability.

Inventory management problems have been identified in many areas. One 

problem relates to missed opportunities to standardize parts that have 

different stock numbers but actually are very similar. This report focuses 

on identical parts that have one stock number but have more than one 

manager. Managing parts includes functions such as determining what is 

needed; buying needed parts; and storing, maintaining, distributing, and 

disposing of these parts once they are received. DOD policy is to have a 

single manager to handle these functions for each item. Although DOD’s 

goal is to have a single manager for identical parts used by more than one 

service, this goal has not been achieved. DOD has divided these 

management functions between what it refers to as a primary inventory 

control activity and a secondary inventory control activity (hereafter 

referred to as primary manager and secondary manager). The primary 

manager is responsible for most of the inventory management functions; 

however, the secondary manager retains some functions such as 

developing supply support requirements.

The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics) is responsible for 

providing policy and guidance on inventory management in DOD. The DOD 

components are responsible for the day-to-day inventory management 

operations. In December 1994, the Deputy Under Secretary established a 

Nonconsumable Integrated Materiel Management Committee to improve 

the management of repair parts. Repairable parts are generally expensive 

and can be fixed and used again. The Deputy Under Secretary chairs a 

senior steering group, comprised of senior logistics personnel from DOD 

and its components, that is responsible for overseeing the work of the 

committee.

DOD’s inventory of secondary items contained a reported 524,396 

repairable parts as of February 1999. Almost 90 percent of the repairable 

parts are used by only one service, and management functions are handled 

by that service. The other 57,429 repairable parts are used and, to varying 

degrees, managed by more than one service. The number of identical parts 

used by more than one service has not changed significantly since October 
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1995, remaining steady at about 11 percent of total repairables, as shown in 

table 1.

Table 1: Repairable Parts Used by More Than One Service

Figure 1 shows the primary manager assignments for identical parts used 

by more than one service as of February 1999. The number of primary 

managers does not represent inventory management personnel because 

individual inventory managers have more than one part assigned to them. 

DOD records indicate that these identical parts are valued at a latest 

acquisition cost of almost $4 billion.

Date Total repairables

More than one

service Percent

October 1995 552,772 60,315 10.9

October 1996 550,645 63,819 11.6

November 1997 537,319 59,131 11.0

June 1998 530,550 58,879 11.1

October 1998 528,255 58,202 11.0

February 1999 524,396 57,429 11.0
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Figure 1: Primary Manager Assignments for Identical Parts

Note: Organizations in the “Other” category include the Defense Logistics Agency and 

civilian agencies such as the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Weather 

Service.

Improvement 

Initiatives Have Not 

Been Successful

DOD initiatives to improve the management of identical parts have been 

largely ineffective. Many identical parts continue to be managed by more 

than one service, even though opportunities for savings and management 

efficiencies exist by using a single manager when there are multiple users 

of the same part. While we cannot precisely quantify the savings from 

improving management of identical parts, our current work and past DOD 

studies showed that they would be considerable.

Management Initiatives 

Have Yielded Minimal 

Progress 

Although DOD has had initiatives dating to the early 1970s to improve 

management of identical parts, they have not accomplished the results 

DOD wants, leaving some portion of this inventory vulnerable to waste and 

inefficiency. DOD initiatives to improve the management of identical parts 

involves a two-phased process. Under the phase one process, the primary 

manager handles cataloging, procurement, disposal, and where 

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000 Number of parts

Air Force Army Navy Marines Other
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appropriate, maintenance, while a secondary manager develops supply 

support requirements for its users and sends them to the primary manager. 

The secondary manager also maintains stocks and issues them to its users. 

Under the phase two process, the primary manager performs most of the 

inventory management functions required of a single inventory manager. In 

addition to carrying out all of the functions described for a primary 

manager in phase one, the primary manager stocks, stores, and issues 

repair parts and establishes, budgets, and funds stock requirements for all 

secondary users. The secondary manager still determines some 

requirements and submits them to the primary manager for consolidation 

with the requirements of other users.

Even though DOD’s goal is to have a single manager for each identical part, 

its two-phased initiatives are interim steps toward achieving this goal. 

Notwithstanding these initiatives, many identical parts are still in phase 

one and none are managed under the single manager approach. In fact, 

under the two-phase process the number of phase two secondary manager 

assignments stayed at about 51 percent from October 1996 to February 

1999, as indicated in figure 2. The number of secondary managers shown in 

the figure does not represent inventory manager personnel because 

individual inventory managers have more than one part assigned to them. 

Also, although each identical part has one primary manager, it may have 

more than one secondary manager. For this reason, of the 57,429 identical 

parts in February 1999, there were 11,322 parts with three or more users.
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Figure 2: User Assignments for Identical Parts

Potential Savings Can Be 

Obtained Through Improved 

Management

If DOD moves more identical parts from phase one into phase two, and 

ultimately to a single manager approach, the resulting improved 

management can provide potential savings. Although we cannot precisely 

quantify the overall savings, past DOD Inspector General (DOD-IG) reports 

and our current work show that waste and inefficiencies continue.

We analyzed June 1998 Defense Logistics Information Service cataloging 

data on identical parts in phase two and found that the secondary managers 

had parts on hand that should have been in the hands of the primary 

manager as prescribed by DOD regulations. These assets were valued at 

nearly $474 million for 7,683 parts. For over 1,000 of these parts, the 

primary manager had no assets to meet current needs while the secondary 

managers had assets on hand valued at nearly $47 million. DOD also 

identified a number of secondary managers holding assets that should have 

been held by the primary managers, according to the February 1999 

0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

70000

80000 Number

October 

1995

October 

1996

November

1997

June

1998

October 

1998

February

1999

Phase II 

Phase I 

48.9% 51.7% 51.4% 51.2% 51.2% 51.3%
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minutes of the DOD Nonconsumable Integrated Materiel Management 

Committee.

We reviewed a judgmental sample of 38 identical parts, each of which was 

used by the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. Of these parts, 13 were in 

phase one and 25 were in phase two. We found that secondary managers 

for 22 of the 25 parts had assets on hand that they should not have because, 

according to the applicable DOD regulation, the primary manager stocks, 

stores, and issues the parts. For example, two secondary managers had 

107 radio receivers on hand, valued at $783,000, even though the primary 

manager had 598 receivers on hand, valued at $4.1 million. In another case, 

a secondary manager had 12 radar receiver-generators on hand, valued at 

$3.2 million, while the primary manager had 43 on hand, valued at 

$9.4 million. Parts in the hands of secondary managers create the potential 

for unnecessary procurements because primary managers may not be 

aware of these assets. Several item managers, in their role as a primary 

manager, told us that they did not have information on the amount of 

inventory held by the secondary managers.

The DOD-IG issued four reports over the 13-year period ending 1995 that 

discussed problems and issues in the area of identical parts.4

 The reports 

contained recommendations for improvement, and DOD promised 

corrective actions. However, our current work shows that problems still 

exist. Findings from the DOD-IG audits ranged from basic operational 

issues among the services to the primary manager unnecessarily procuring 

assets when the secondary manager had assets on hand. The 1995 report 

noted that the primary managers did not have information on over 

$400 million in assets held by the secondary managers. Over $140 million of 

these assets could have been used to fill the inventory needs of the primary 

manager. In addition, the report discussed unnecessary procurements, 

required inventory being disposed of, and excess inventory not being 

disposed. Similar points were made in a 1992 DOD-IG report.

4

Management of Common Use Repairable Items in the Department of Defense (DOD-IG 

Report No. 95-303, Sept. 1, 1995).

Management of Repairable Items Used by More Than One Service (DOD-IG Report No. 

92-071, Apr. 7, 1992).

Procurement of Repairable Items Used by More Than One Service (DOD-IG Report No. 

86-067, Feb. 18, 1986).

Management of Nonconsumable Items Used by More Than One Service (DOD-IG Report 

No. 83-053, Dec. 17, 1982).
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A recent DOD-IG audit report, issued in May 1999, dealt with the disposal of 

identical parts.5

 A main finding of that review was that secondary managers 

were disposing of assets without notifying the primary manager. As a 

result, the primary manager was purchasing parts at the same time the 

disposal actions were occurring. The report stated that procurements 

could have been avoided if procedures were followed and secondary 

managers notified primary managers of their asset disposal plans. 

Moreover, savings could result if DOD eliminated the multiple levels of 

management under the primary/secondary manager process and moved to 

a single manager for identical parts. According to the minutes of a 

September 1998 meeting, the DOD Nonconsumable Integrated Materiel 

Management Committee discussed moving toward a global, or single, 

manager concept for identical parts, where the role of the secondary 

manager is eliminated. In a July 1998 briefing, the Air Force, in particular, 

questioned the need for secondary managers and advocated single 

managers for identical parts. Eliminating secondary managers would make 

management of repairables similar to the Defense Logistics Agency’s single 

management of consumables (supply items that are used and discarded 

when their useful life is completed). The Defense Logistics Agency is the 

single manager for most of the 4.3 million consumables in the DOD supply 

system.

Opportunities for 

Improvement Exist by 

Addressing Planning 

and Management 

Weaknesses

While DOD in the past has established goals to improve the management of 

identical parts, DOD initiatives have not been successful in moving to a 

single manager approach. The lack of progress in reaching the program 

goals stems largely from a lack of sustained and clearly formulated 

commitment to the program. Key management actions needed to guide 

program implementation were absent. These include a lack of 

implementation plans containing performance objectives, milestones, and 

outcome measures linked to a DOD-wide Logistics Strategic Plan, and not 

establishing oversight accountability for the improvement efforts. These 

weaknesses are similar to long-standing issues noted in our high risk 

reporting on DOD’s inventory management that have hindered other major 

management initiatives.

5

Interservice Availability of Multiservice Used Items (DOD-IG Report No. 99-159, May 14, 

1999).
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DOD periodically issues Logistics Strategic Plans to provide a DOD-wide 

guide to the operation of the logistics process. Its efforts to improve the 

management of identical parts were emphasized in the fiscal year 1995 

DOD Logistics Strategic Plan, which set a goal to move identical parts from 

phase one to phase two by October 1996. This second phase would have a 

primary manager assigned to perform almost all of the inventory 

management functions for all DOD components. A similar goal to fully 

implement the second phase by October 1997 was included in the Logistics 

Strategic Plan for fiscal years 1996/97. Moreover, another aspect of this goal 

was to implement a single (or “global”) manager concept for identical 

parts, thus eliminating the primary/secondary manager process.

However, implementation plans with performance objectives, milestones, 

time frames, and outcome measures−such as improved efficiency, reduced 

costs, and better service to the customer−were not developed and none of 

these goals were achieved. Also, comprehensive cost data associated with 

the management of identical parts by more than one service was not 

developed. The 1996/97 DOD Logistics Strategic Plan contained a strategy 

to perform a study to determine the costs of duplication due to 

primary/secondary manager assignments, but the study was not done. 

Goals were not included in the most recent plan−the fiscal year 1998 

Logistics Strategic Plan.

The DOD Nonconsumable Integrated Materiel Management Committee 

formed in December 1994 to renew the efforts begun 20 years earlier to 

improve management of identical parts has provided limited management 

oversight. The activities of the committee, which consists of mid-level 

managers from the DOD components, have been sporadic. The committee 

met frequently in 1995 but less frequently thereafter. While the committee 

reports to a senior logistics steering group chaired by the Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense (Logistics), the activities of the committee have not 

been on the agenda of this oversight steering group.

Several issues that cut across service lines evidence the lack of top level 

management attention that has been provided in this area. More 

specifically, these issues point out the need for an implementation plan that 

contains short- and long-term actions to address the underlying obstacles 

to more efficient management of identical parts. Identifying assets held by 

secondary managers is one major example. Further, the services find it 

difficult to track their assets in the hands of another service for repair and 

experience difficulties in receiving credit for assets turned in for repair in 

exchange for functioning assets. The DOD Nonconsumable Integrated 
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Materiel Management Committee has been dealing with these issues for 

many years but has not yet resolved them. In some cases, incompatible 

data systems contribute to the problems. However, the lack of 

implementation plans monitored by an active oversight body results in no 

accountability for progress toward the long-standing DOD goal of 

improving the management of identical parts.

Conclusions Although DOD in the past has established goals to improve the 

management of identical parts, DOD initiatives were not successful in 

moving to a single manager approach. The lack of progress in reaching the 

program goals stems largely from a lack of sustained and clearly 

formulated commitment to the program. Key management actions needed 

to guide program implementation were absent. These include a lack of 

implementation plans containing performance objectives, milestones, and 

outcome measures linked to a DOD-wide Logistics Strategic Plan, and not 

establishing oversight accountability for the improvement efforts. As a 

consequence, segments of DOD’s inventory management system remain 

vulnerable to inefficiency and waste.

Recommendations In order to address the systemic management weaknesses that have 

hindered DOD’s progress toward achieving a single manager for identical 

parts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following 

actions.

• Establish goals to support the next DOD Logistics Strategic Plan 

designed to improve management of identical parts by moving to a 

single manager approach.

• Develop an implementation plan that addresses short- and long-term 

actions to improve the management of identical parts. Short-term 

actions should include improvements in communications and reporting 

and long-term actions should include the elimination of primary and 

secondary managers so that a single manager will manage identical 

parts. The implementation plan should contain performance objectives, 

milestones, timetables, and outcome measures that support the 

Logistics Strategic Plan. The plan should provide outcome measures, 

such as improved efficiency, reduced costs, and better service to the 

customer.
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• Establish clear accountability for Department-wide oversight and 

component execution of the implementation plan and achievement of 

desired results.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially agreed with the 

report and our recommendations. (See app. II for DOD’s complete 

comments.) The Department agreed that continuous improvements are 

needed in the management of repair parts, especially identical parts with 

more than one user. The Department stated, however, that a single manager 

approach by item is not feasible until a more modernized information 

system is developed. We agree that implementation of a Department-wide 

modernized information system would facilitate the effectiveness of the 

single manager approach to managing identical parts. However, 

modernizing information systems will require a lengthy period of time. 

Consequently, we have modified our report recommendations to reflect 

both short- and long-term solutions for improving the management of 

identical parts.

With regard to our recommendation that a goal be established to improve 

management of identical parts to support the next Logistics Strategic Plan, 

DOD stated that one of the goals of the Nonconsumable Integrated Materiel 

Management Committee has been to improve the management of identical 

parts by moving to a single manager approach where feasible. The 

Department stated, however, that this approach is rarely the best because 

costly changes to existing information systems are required. According to 

DOD, while improvements have been made in data sharing between 

primary and secondary managers, there will continue to be a small number 

of items with multiple managers until information systems can be 

modernized.

While we agree that the single manager approach would be facilitated by 

improved information systems, improved systems are not necessary to 

taking action now to provide opportunities for savings and management 

efficiencies. For example, improvements can be made by (1) improving 

communications using telephonic or fax capability before initiating 

procurement, repair, or disposal actions; (2) having secondary managers 

provide periodic manual reports to primary managers on their on-hand 

inventories; and (3) making cost-effective interim changes to existing 

information systems, such as improving compatibility between existing 

systems. As a result, we have not made any specific changes to the 

recommendation on the basis of DOD’s comments. Our recommendation is 
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directed toward establishing a goal to support the next Logistics Strategic 

Plan and is consistent with the Department’s past actions in setting goals 

for identical parts management in the 1995 and 1996/1997 Logistics 

Strategic Plans. This goal could be the basis for guiding an implementation 

plan designed to make short- and long-term improvements to the 

management of identical parts.

In commenting on our recommendation to develop an implementation plan 

for managing identical parts by a single manager, DOD agreed that 

implementation plans that include outcome measures such as improved 

efficiency, reduced costs, and better services to the customer are factors of 

success. However, the Department reiterated that the single manager 

approach is rarely feasible because costly changes to existing systems are 

required and stated that an implementation plan to move all items to this 

concept would be inappropriate at this time. It also stated that 

improvements in data sharing have been made but further improvements 

require Department-wide modernized information systems. As previously 

stated, we believe there are opportunities to take interim measures at this 

time as well as work toward long-term solutions. We have, therefore, 

modified our recommendation to recognize the need for an implementation 

plan that includes performance objectives, milestones, timetables, and 

outcome measures covering short- and long-term measures.

With regard to our recommendation to establish clear accountability for 

oversight and execution of the implementation plan, the Department stated 

that this will be done as implementation plans are developed for systems or 

items moving to a new management concept. However, DOD did not 

explain the new management concept and again cited the need to first 

modernize its information system before a single manager approach could 

be implemented. In addition, the Department’s comments did not address 

the accountability and oversight problems that exist under the current 

management structure. Accordingly, we continue to believe that 

establishing clear accountability and oversight now is critical to 

implementing short- and long-term solutions to the problems we identified. 

Therefore, we have not modified our recommendation.

As arranged with your offices, we plan no further distribution of this report 

until 7 days from its issue date unless you publicly announce the report’s 

contents earlier. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the 

appropriate congressional committees; the Honorable William S. Cohen, 

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; 
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the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Secretary of the Air Force; the Honorable 

Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; General James L. Jones, 

Commandant of the Marine Corps; Lieutenant General Henry T. Glisson, 

Director, Defense Logistics Agency; and the Honorable Jacob J. Lew, 

Director, Office of Management and Budget.

Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff have any questions 

concerning this report. Key contributors to this report are Charles Patton, 

James Murphy, Gerald Thompson, and George Surosky.

David R. Warren, Director

Defense Management Issues
Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-00-21 Defense Inventory
Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-00-21 Defense Inventory

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To obtain an overall perspective on the magnitude of the parts managed by 

more than one service, we analyzed reports prepared by the Defense 

Logistics Information Service, Battle Creek, Michigan, and information in 

Segment B of the Federal Logistics Information System as of June 1998. We 

also obtained from the services their Master Data Records/Files as of 

February and March 1999 and calculated an inventory value for those parts 

managed by more than one service.

To evaluate the Department of Defense’s (DOD) progress in correcting 

problems in the management of identical parts and identify opportunities 

to improve management of these parts, we reviewed pertinent documents 

and interviewed DOD officials. We contacted officials located at Army 

Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Naval Supply Systems Command, 

Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania; and Air Force Materiel Command, 

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. We interviewed the chairperson of 

the Nonconsumable Integrated Materiel Management Committee in the 

Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics), Washington, 

D.C. These offices provided us with documents and information on the 

efforts to eliminate dual management of parts by more than one service. We 

also reviewed the reports issued on this subject by the DOD Inspector 

General.

We analyzed the September 30, 1997, inventory stratification reports for the 

Army, the Navy, and the Air Force for overall data regarding parts used by 

more than one service. We used this data to identify identical parts being 

used by more than one service and developed four matches between the 

services−Army and Navy; Army and Air Force; Air Force and Navy; and 

Army, Navy, and Air Force.

We selected a judgmental sample of 38 parts from the data match among 

the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. We selected those parts that had the 

highest inventory on-hand, highest unit price, highest inventory on order, 

and highest requirements at representative inventory control points in each 

service. Using information from the Federal Logistics Information System, 

we identified for these parts their primary and secondary inventory control 

points.

We held discussions and collected information from item managers and 

analyzed inventory records during visits to the Army’s CommunicationsElectronics Command, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; the Air Force’s Warner 

Robbins Air Logistics Center, Georgia; and the Naval Inventory Control 

Point, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In addition, we collected and analyzed 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-00-21 Defense Inventory

records from the Naval Inventory Control Point, Mechanicsburg, 

Pennsylvania. We also met with other inventory control officials, as 

needed, to discuss various subjects and concepts related to the overall 

management of parts used by more than one service. In collecting data on 

individual sample items, we used the same data the services use for 

inventory management, reporting, and budgeting purposes. We did not 

validate the data from the various systems cited above.

This review concentrated on identical parts with the same stock number. 

There are other parts in the DOD supply system that are very similar, or 

even identical, but have different stock numbers. Because the stock 

numbers are different, identification of these parts would take a major 

effort. As a result, we did not include these parts in the current review. 

However, prior DOD studies have identified opportunities to standardize 

them.

We performed our review between May 1998 and July 1999 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-00-21 Defense Inventory

Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-00-21 Defense Inventory
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-00-21 Defense Inventory

Related GAO Products

Defense Inventory: Status of Inventory and Purchases and Their 

Relationship to Current Needs (GAO/NSIAD-99-60, Apr. 16, 1999).

Defense Inventory: DOD Could Improve Total Asset Visibility Initiative 

With Results Act Framework (GAO/NSIAD-99-40, Apr. 12, 1999).

Defense Inventory: Navy’s Procedures for Controlling In-Transit Items 

Are Not Being Followed (GAO/NSIAD-99-61, Mar. 31, 1999).

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Defense (GAO/OCG-99-4, Jan. 1999).

High Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-99-1, Jan. 1999).

Inventory Management: More Information Needed to Assess DLA’s Best 

Practices Initiatives (GAO/NSIAD-98-218, Sept. 2, 1998).

Navy Inventory Management: Improvements Needed to Prevent Excess 

Purchases (GAO/NSIAD-98-86, Apr. 30, 1998).

Inventory Management: DOD Can Build on Progress by Using Best 

Practices for Reparable Parts (GAO/NSIAD-98-97, Feb. 27, 1998).

Defense Inventory Management: Expanding Use of Best Practices for 

Hardware Items Can Reduce Logistics Costs (GAO/NSIAD-98-47, Jan. 20, 

1998).

Defense Inventory: Inadequate Controls Over Air Force Suspended Stocks 

(GAO/NSIAD-98-29, Dec. 22, 1997).

Defense Logistics: Much of the Inventory Exceeds Current Needs

(GAO/NSIAD-97-71, Feb. 28, 1997).

Defense Inventory: Spare and Repair Parts Inventory Costs Can Be 

Reduced (GAO/NSIAD-97-47, Jan. 17, 1997).

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