UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

Jimmy Lee Scott filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his state court convictions for 

assault with intent to commit murder, unlawful imprisonment, and possession of a firearm during 

the commission of a felony. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. His petition raises three claims for relief. None 

persuade. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the petition and denies a certificate of 

appealability.

I.

On the night of August 20, 2010, Kendra Bryant, Scott’s girlfriend, visited Scott at his 

home. (R. 4, PageID.147.) The two got into an argument and Scott slapped and choked her. (R. 4, 

PageID.148.) Scott then retrieved a gun and shot Bryant five times. (Id.) He did not allow her to 

leave the house, but Bryant eventually escaped and survived her injuries. (See R. 4, PageID.147–

148.) 

 1 Scott has been transferred to the Kinross Correctional Facility. So the warden of this

facility is the proper respondent. See Edwards v. Johns, 450 F. Supp. 2d 755, 757 (E.D. Mich. 

2006); Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Therefore, the Court substitutes Warden Duncan MacLaren 

in the caption.

JIMMY LEE SCOTT,

Petitioner,

v.

DUNCAN MACLAREN,

1

Respondent.

Case No. 15-11294

Honorable Laurie J. Michelson

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

AND DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
2

In late 2010, the state court ordered that Scott be evaluated for criminal responsibility and 

competency. (R. 1-7, PageID.94–99.) Dr. Koltuniak, the evaluating psychologist, could not 

perform the evaluation for criminal responsibility “[d]ue to Mr. Scott’s lack of cooperation.” (R. 

1-7, PageID.94.) As for Scott’s competency to stand trial, Dr. Koltuniak opined that Scott was 

intentionally attempting to appear emotionally impaired and confused. (R. 1-7, PageID.96.) A 

malingering test was administered, and the results indicated that Scott was deliberately answering 

questions regarding his memory incorrectly. (R. 1-7, PageID.97.) The report also indicated that 

Scott was either fabricating or exaggerating past auditory and visual hallucinations. (R. 1-7, 

PageID.96.) Thus, while Dr. Koltuniak could not complete a conventional examination of Scott’s 

competency, he did opine that the presumption of competency, “could be safely made in the current 

case.” (R. 1-7, PageID.99.) 

At the pretrial hearing, Scott’s attorney, Cena White, informed the state trial court that 

Scott would plead no contest to the charges. (R. 5-3, PageID.274.) White indicated that there had 

been a Cobbs2 sentencing evaluation done and Scott wanted to avail himself of it. (Id.) The 

evaluation called for a minimum sentence not to exceed ten years plus two years consecutive for 

the felony firearm. (Id.)

Scott pled no contest. (R. 5-3, PageID.275–277.)

At the sentencing hearing, White requested that the court sentence Scott in accordance with 

the Cobbs evaluation. (R. 5-4, PageID.282.) The court heard from Bryant, who indicated that she 

 2 See People v. Cobbs, 505 N.W.2d 208, 212 (Mich. 1993) (creating procedure whereby a 

sentencing evaluation is made in conjunction with a plea agreement which allows the defendant to 

withdraw the plea in the event the trial court will not sentence the defendant in accordance with 

the evaluation).
3

thought Scott should be given the maximum possible sentence. (R. 5-4, PageID.282–283.) The 

court, having believed that Bryant was in agreement with the deal, called for a sidebar conference 

and recess. (Id.) 

After the sidebar and recess, the court indicated that it would not accept the sentencing 

evaluation and asked the parties how they wanted to proceed. (R. 5-4, PageID.283.) White

indicated that the guideline range was for a minimum term of between 135 to 225 months, and it 

was her understanding after the sidebar that the court would sentence Scott to the minimum 135 

month term if they went ahead with the plea. (R. 5-4, PageID.284.) She further stated that “Mr. 

Scott has indicated that he wishes to proceed with the 135 months, that being the minimum.” (Id.)

The court indicated that this was correct, and that it would sentence Scott to a minimum term of 

135 months, plus two years for the firearm offense. (Id.) The prosecutor voiced strenuous 

opposition and requested an upward departure from the guideline range. (R. 5-4, PageID.284–

285.)

After another recess, the court stated that it would “reluctantly” sentence Scott to the 

second negotiated agreement. (R. 5-4, PageID.286.) The court explained, “It is in fact a heinous, 

reprehensible crime, but the Court would note for the record that the defendant has taken 

responsibility for his actions, has spared the victim the trauma of trial and reliving this very 

traumatic and tragic event, and based on those facts the Court is going to follow the Cobbs

agreement.” (Id.)

Scott subsequently filed a motion for resentencing and to withdraw the plea. Scott 

maintained that the court should have given him an opportunity to withdraw his plea once it 

decided not to comply with the first Cobbs agreement. He further sought a Ginther hearing on his 
4

trial counsel’s failure to investigate his mental health and pursue any defenses based on his mental 

health. 

The court denied both the motion to withdraw the plea and the request for a Ginther 

hearing. (R. 5-5, PageID.294–295.) But the court accepted Scott’s challenge to the scoring of the 

sentencing guidelines, and ordered resentencing. (R. 5-5, PageID.295–296.)

Scott filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied. (R. 1-3.)

Scott was resentenced on June 26, 2012. (R. 5-6.) After addressing the new guideline range, 

Scott was once again sentenced to 11 years and 3 months to 50 years on the assault with intent to 

murder charge, 10 to 15 years on the unlawful imprisonment charge, and a consecutive two years 

on the firearm charge. (R. 5-6, PageID.304.) 

Scott filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals. He raised

four claims, including that the trial court erred in denying him a Ginther hearing and that the trial 

court violated People v. Cobbs by failing to inform him that he could withdraw his no-contest plea 

after the court decided to not follow the first Cobbs agreement.

The Michigan Court of Appeals denied Scott’s application for leave to appeal “for lack of 

merit in the grounds presented.” People v. Scott, No. 314075 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013). 

Scott then filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, raising

the same claims as he raised in the court of appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied the

application because it was “not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed.” 

People v. Scott, 839 N.W.2d 211 (Mich. 2013).

Scott now asks this federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. He raises three grounds in his 

petition. He argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to investigate 

his mental health and competency prior to pleading and for failing to present defenses based on 
5

his mental health. He also argues that his plea was not knowing and voluntary as the trial court 

failed to inform him that he could withdraw his plea after rejecting the first Cobbs agreement.

For the following reasons, Scott’s petition will be denied.

II.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) (and 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in 

particular) “confirm[s] that state courts are the principal forum for asserting constitutional 

challenges to state convictions.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011); see also Cullen 

v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 182 (2011). If a claim was “adjudicated on the merits in State court 

proceedings,” this Court cannot grant habeas corpus relief on the basis of that claim “unless the 

adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision” (1) “that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 

of the United States” or (2) “that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). But if the state 

courts did not adjudicate a claim “on the merits,” this “‘AEDPA deference’ does not apply and 

[this Court] will review the claim de novo.” Bies v. Sheldon, 775 F.3d 386, 395 (6th Cir. 2014).

III.

A.

Scott first asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his mental 

health and present an insanity defense. 

The first task for the Court is to determine whether the state court adjudicated this claim 

on the merits. Scott argues that the trial court never addressed his failure-to-investigate claim and 

therefore the Court must review the claim de novo. (R. 1, PageID.40.) The Court disagrees. 
6

Although it is unclear at best whether the trial court adjudicated this claim, that does not 

mean that the Court reviews the claim de novo. While the Michigan Supreme Court order was not 

an adjudication on the merits, Hynes v. Birkett, 526 F. App’x 515, 519 (6th Cir. 2013), the 

Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision was, Werth v. Bell, 692 F.3d 486, 491–94 (6th Cir. 2012).

Scott presented his federal failure-to-investigate claim to the Michigan Court of Appeals. (R. 5-7, 

PageID.326–329.) And “[w]hen a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state 

court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits 

in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Harrington v.

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). Scott has not provided any basis to doubt that the Court of Appeals

adjudicated that claim on the merits. So Scott must show that “there was no reasonable basis for 

the state court to deny relief.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98. He has not done so.

Success on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim requires Scott to point to evidence 

of his trial counsel’s deficient performance and then explain how that deficient performance 

prejudiced his legal defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The 

prejudice element requires Scott to show that there is a “reasonable probability,” id. at 694, that, 

but for White’s errors, he would have gone to trial instead of pleading to the charges. Post v. 

Bradshaw, 621 F.3d 406, 430–31 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58–59 

(1985)).

Under Strickland, “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts 

relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less 

than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional 

judgments support the limitations on investigation.” 466 U.S. at 690–91. “In other words, counsel 

has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 
7

investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate 

must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure 

of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Id. “In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney’s 

investigation . . . a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence already known to 

counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate 

further.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527 (2003).

Here, there is a reasonable basis for the state court to have found that White did not fail to

reasonably investigate Scott’s mental health. None of the records that Scott produced demonstrate 

that his counsel was unreasonable in not further investigating his mental health for a possible 

insanity defense. Dr. Koltuniak wrote to the court that he was unable to perform an evaluation of 

Scott’s criminal responsibility “[d]ue to Mr. Scott’s lack of cooperation.” (R. 1-7, PageID.94.) He

further opined during Scott’s competency evaluation that Scott was intentionally attempting to 

appear emotionally impaired and confused, was deliberately answering questions regarding his 

memory incorrectly, and was fabricating or exaggerating past auditory and visual hallucinations. 

(R. 1-7, PageID.96–97.) To be sure, the records from Harbor Oaks Hospital, where he was 

admitted for psychiatric treatment after being released from the Macomb County Jail (R. 1-8, 

PageID.117), and the report from his evaluation at the Michigan Department of Corrections (R. 1-

9, PageID.124), do suggest that he is mentally ill, with evidence of psychosis and schizophrenia.3

But faced with Dr. Koltuniak’s findings of malingering and Scott’s refusal to participate in the 

evaluation into this criminal responsibility, the Court cannot find that there was no reasonable 

 3 At some point in time, after being evaluated by MDOC, Scott was released on bond. (R. 

5-3, PageID.279.) He voluntarily checked himself into Harbor Oaks because he believed he was 

suicidal. (R. 1-8, PageID.112.)
8

basis for the state court to find that White reasonably decided not to investigate Scott’s legal 

culpability further. 

Scott also claims that White further erred in not pursuing an insanity defense.

The trial court rejected this claim on the merits when it denied Scott’s motion to withdraw 

his plea and the motion for reconsideration.

4 Because the Michigan Court of Appeals did not 

provide a reasoned decision, the Court will “look through” that decision to the reasoned decision

of the trial court. See Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1193–94 (2018). 

The trial court found that White did not perform deficiently in not pursuing an insanity 

defense. The court highlighted that Scott had been evaluated and found competent. (R. 5-5, 

PageID.295.) As for the medical records that Scott asserted White improperly dismissed, the state

trial court found that those records had a “minimal, if not irrelevant” “contribution to either any 

defense strategy or sentencing”; it added that it “[couldn’t] imagine any defense that would, that 

those records could support under those facts.” (Id.)

The Court cannot find that this decision involved an unreasonable determination of the 

facts or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Scott 

relies on the report generated by Dr. Feurino from the Michigan Department of Corrections to 

show that he had a viable insanity defense. (R. 1-9, PageID.122–125.) However, Dr. Feurino did 

not opine that Scott was legally insane when he attacked the victim. Rather, Dr. Feurino opined 

that Scott suffers from severe mental illness. (See id.) But in order to prevail on a defense of legal 

insanity, a defendant must prove that he “lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the nature 

 4 Although the court cites no federal law, in situations where, as here, state and federal law 

line up, see People v. Pickens, 521 N.W.2d 797 (Mich. 1997), a state court’s discussion of state 

law is “sufficient to cover a claim based on the related federal right,” even if federal law is never 

mentioned, see Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 298–99 (2013). 
9

and quality of the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the 

requirements of the law.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 768.21a(1). Dr. Feurino’s report does not opine on 

this issue. Also, the record demonstrates that trial counsel chose to pursue a strategy of contrition 

and mitigation in order to minimize Scott’s sentence. And the state court noted Scott’s acceptance 

of responsibility and contrition as factors that led it to reluctantly accept the sentencing 

recommendation. On the doubly deferential standard of review, see Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101,

it was not unreasonable for the state court to find White’s decisions reasonable. 

Moreover, even if Scott established that counsel was deficient for not further exploring an 

insanity defense, he presented no evidence of prejudice.5 Again, without evidence suggesting that 

he met the legal definition of insanity at the time of the crime, Scott cannot show that he would 

have not pled and instead opted for trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.

Lastly, Scott appears to be contesting White’s alleged failure to present mitigating evidence 

at his sentencing hearing. (R. 1, PageID.37–38.) This claim was raised and adjudicated by the state 

courts. (R. 5-5, PageID.294–295; R. 5-7, PageID.329–331; R. 5-8, PageID.503–504.) Although 

the Warden did not address this claim in its answer, the Court finds it meritless. 

“Counsel’s . . . failure to raise a viable argument that would reduce his client’s sentence 

may constitute deficient performance.” McPhearson v. United States, 675 F.3d 553, 559 (6th Cir. 

2012) (citations omitted). But “an omission by counsel at sentencing will not be deficient unless 

his failure to raise the argument was objectively unreasonable.” Id. “An error by counsel at 

 5 In passing, Scott also raises that White failed to investigate the possibility of Scott 

pleading “guilty but mentally ill,” pursuant to Michigan Court Rule 6.303, or that a jury could have 

made this finding at trial, Mich. Comp. Laws § 768.36. (R. 1, PageID.36.) As someone found 

“guilty but mentally ill” “must be sentenced in the same manner as any other defendant committing 

the same offense and subject to psychiatric evaluation and treatment,” People v. Carpenter, 627 

N.W. 2d 276, 283 (Mich. 2001), counsel’s failure to pursue this strategy did not prejudice Scott. 

See People v. Lloyd, 590 N.W.2d 738, 745 (Mich. 1999).
10

sentencing that amounts to any extra jail time is prejudicial under the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at

563 (citing Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 202–04 (2001)).

The Court again looks to the trial court opinion. The trial court found that the medical 

records had “minimal” value to sentencing, or were wholly “irrelevant.” (R. 5-5, PageID.295.) It 

further found that White “performed at a very high level in negotiating the original Cobb’s that 

she did where the Court agreed to depart two years below the bottom of the guidelines, and 

continue to procure what the court believes to be [an] excellent deal for this defendant under the 

circumstances in convincing the Court to sentence at the bottom of the guidelines.” (Id.)

The Court cannot find that the trial court’s decision was an unreasonable application of 

Supreme Court precedent. Indeed, the Court doubts that White failed to present evidence regarding 

Scott’s mental health for the trial court’s consideration. In the prosecution’s response to the state 

appellate briefing, it asserted that White wrote a memorandum asking the court to sentence Scott 

according to the first Cobbs agreement, and that memo “extensively states and informs the Court 

of [Scott’s] mental health history in support of a departure below the guidelines.” (R. 5-8, 

PageID.609.) Scott offers nothing contradicting the prosecution’s assertion about what the trial 

court knew.

Further, Scott cannot show prejudice. First, the trial court itself found that the documents 

Scott wanted presented were of “minimal” value, if not totally “irrelevant,” so Scott cannot show 

that this omission was an “error” that amounted to any extra jail time. Further, Scott’s appellate 

counsel was able to fully present Scott’s mental health history to the court at his re-sentencing 

hearing. (R. 5-6, PageID.300–03.) Despite having this information, the court did not change its 

sentence. (R. 5-6, PageID.304.)

Scott’s first claim fails.
11

B.

Scott’s second claim asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge his 

competence to plead no contest. This claim appears to challenge both White’s failure to investigate 

his competency to plead and her failure to challenge his competency to plead. (R. 1, PageID.41.)

The State argues that this claim is unexhausted, as Scott failed to raise these issues in his 

appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court. (R. 4, PageID.168–169.) 

Scott disagrees. (R. 1, PageID.42.) 

Unfortunately, while Scott’s appeal brief to the Michigan Court of Appeals discusses his 

counsel’s failure to investigate his mental health issues, it does not clearly delineate the claims 

being raised. So it is unclear whether this claim was exhausted. (See R. 5-7, PageID.307–348.)

Because of the uncertainty, the Court will assume that the claim was not exhausted. And 

while Scott has not yet filed a motion for relief from judgment under Michigan Court Rules § 

6.502, if he were to do so, his claim would likely be procedurally defaulted by the state court 

because it could have been raised on direct appeal. See Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)(3). Even with these 

procedural deficiencies, the Court will decide this claim on the merits as it is clearly deficient. See 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Hickey v. Hoffner, 701 F. App’x 422, 426 (6th Cir. 2017); Farley v. Lafler, 

193 F. App’x 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2006).

Starting first with the investigation, as referenced before, “counsel has a duty to make 

reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations 

unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91. Here, White had the following information about 

Scott’s mental health: a recent evaluation by Harbor Oaks Hospital indicating that that Scott was 

mentally ill, likely with major depression with psychotic features (R. 1-8); a report from the courtordered psychologist stating that he was unable to complete a “conventional examination of Mr. 
12

Scott’s competency” due to his malingering but that the presumption of competence “could be 

safely made” (R.1-7); and a report from MDOC that Scott either had schizophrenia or major 

depression with psychotic features (R. 1-9). 

The standard for competency “is whether the defendant has ‘sufficient present ability to 

consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and has “a rational as 

well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 

396, (1993) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)). This standard is the same for 

pleading and standing trial. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 397.

Given this standard, the Court cannot find that White did not make a reasonable decision 

not to further investigate Scott’s competency given what she knew. Indeed, while there was 

evidence that Scott was suffering from a mental illness, the psychologist who was tasked 

specifically with determining Scott’s competency to stand trial opined that the presumption of 

competence could be “safely made,” and additionally found evidence that Scott was malingering 

to feign incompetence. (See R. 1-7.) Further, information in the medical records indicate that Scott 

understood the proceedings against him: he told staff at Harbor Oaks that he had been recently 

released from jail and was facing charges of assault with attempt to murder (R. 1-8, PageID.112); 

and he expressed remorse about the offense to Dr. Feurino at MDOC (R. 1-9, PageID.123). Further

still, Scott states that he provided his records from Harbor Oaks Hospital in hopes that White would 

mount an insanity defense on his behalf—an act that strongly suggests he “had a present ability to 

consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” of the proceedings 

against him. Given that, the Court cannot find that White unreasonably decided that she did not 

need to investigate this issue further. For the same reasons, the Court cannot find that White 

performed deficiency for failing to object to his competency prior to the plea. 
13

Nor can Scott show prejudice. Mental illness does not equate to mental incompetence. In 

evaluating Scott’s Cobb’s argument, the trial court specifically found that Scott “seemed to clearly 

understand the nature and extent of the proceeding” (including that he was waiving certain rights

and the maximum penalties). (R. 5-5, PageID.294.) And on the motion for reconsideration, the 

trial court further “found no evidence that [Scott] was incapable of understanding the proceedings, 

of comprehending his own condition in reference to his proceedings, or of assisting in his defense 

in a rational and reasonable manner.” (R. 5-7, PageID.363.) The trial court continued, “[Scott’s] 

mental capacity was not questioned, particularly since he calmly and rationally addressed and 

apologized to the victim, and otherwise conducted himself cogently and sensibly, giving this Court 

no reason to order another forensic examination, or even question his competence.” (Id.)

Thus, even if White had raised the issue of his competency to the trial court, there is not a 

reasonable probability that the trial court would have found Scott incompetent to plead. 

Scott’s second claim fails.

C.

Scott’s final claim asserts that the trial court failed to inform Scott of his ability to withdraw 

his plea after the minimum sentence evaluation was increased at the sentencing hearing. 

Because he was not informed of his right to withdraw his plea, Scott argues that his plea was not 

knowing and voluntary.

Like Scott’s first claim, the Court will look at the trial court’s reasoning in denying the

Cobbs claim. See Wilson, 138 S.Ct. at 1193–94. 

When this claim was raised in Scott’s motion to withdraw his plea, the trial court rejected 

it as follows:

The Court believes that it was very clear to the Defendant that he could withdraw 

his plea. In effect he did, although it was not part of the record. The Court believes 
14

that it certainly complied with the spirit of People v Cobb, if not the explicit letter. 

Hindsight being 20/20, it would have, it would have been desirable to articulate on 

the record that the Defendant did have the opportunity to withdraw his plea. But 

the court did do that at side bar. Counsel was clearly aware of that. The Defendant 

was clearly aware of that, and the Defendant clearly exercised his option to 

negotiate a second Cobb’s agreement with full knowledge that he had the ability to 

withdraw his plea, if he did not.

(R. 5-5, PageID.293–94.)

A plea is knowing and voluntary only if a defendant has “sufficient awareness of the 

relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 

(1970). The purpose of the knowing-and-voluntary inquiry is to determine whether the defendant 

“actually does understand the significance of a particular decision.” King v. Berghuis, 744 F.3d 

961, 970 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n. 12). “The case law indicates that the 

inquiry as to whether a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary is a ‘subjective, highly individualized 

test.’” King, 744 F.3d at 970.

Here, the only reason Scott says his plea was not knowing and voluntary is that the trial 

court failed to instruct him that he had the right to withdraw his plea. But the state trial court found

that Scott knew that he had the right to withdraw his plea and that Scott’s counsel was also 

informed of that right at sidebar. And Scott does not argue that this “was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Indeed, his arguments focus on the trial court’s failure to strictly comply with 

Cobbsrather than Scott’s subjective knowledge of his right to withdraw his plea. (R. 1, PageID.43–

50.) As the “knowing and voluntary” inquiry is a subjective, individualized inquiry as to what 

Scott actually knew and understood, and the trial court made an unrebutted finding that Scott

subjectively knew he had the right to withdraw his plea, this Court cannot find that his plea was 

not knowing and voluntary.
15

Lastly, Scott argues that the trial court failed to raise the issue of Scott’s mental competence 

to plead, rendering his plea not knowing and voluntary. (R. 1, PageID.48–49.) Like his competency 

claim in the preceding section, it is unclear at best whether this claim was raised in the state courts. 

(See R. 5-7, PageID.307–348.) But, again, because it lacks merit, the Court will address the claim. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Hickey, 701 F. App’x at 426; Farley, 193 F. App’x at 549.

What, precisely, Scott is alleging in this claim is unclear. But looking at the statutes and 

case law cited in the brief, the Court gleans that Scott is challenging the trial court’s failure to raise 

the issue of Scott’s competency to plead. (See R. 1, PageID.48–29.)

A trial court must hold a competency hearing prior to entry of a plea where evidence raises 

a “bona fide doubt as to a defendant’s competence.” Warren v. Lewis, 365 F.3d 529, 533 (6th Cir. 

2004) (quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 173 (1975)). Here, Scott argues that the medical 

records indicating that he is mentally ill should have raised a bona fide doubt. (R. 1, PageID.49.) 

But, as discussed earlier, mental illness does not equate to incompetence to plead, and Scott fails 

to connect any findings in those records with an inability to consult with his attorney or understand 

the proceedings against him. Further, a doctor specifically tasked with determining Scott’s 

competency opined that Scott was malingering and that it was safe to presume his competence. (R. 

1-7, PageID.99.) And Scott points to no evidence of his behavior in court that would have given 

the trial court a bona fide doubt of his ability to consult with his attorney or his understanding of 

the proceedings against him. This claim fails.

As none of Scott’s claims merit relief, the petition will be denied.

IV.

For the reasons stated above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. And a 

certificate of appealability is DENIED because Scott has not shown that reasonable jurists would 
16

debate whether the petition should have been resolved in a different manner. Slack v. McDaniel, 

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

SO ORDERED.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing document was served on the attorneys

and/or parties of record by electronic means or U.S. Mail on September 24, 2018.

s/Julie Owens

Case Manager