J-A16035-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN RE: ESTATE OF SOPHIA M. 

KRASINSKI A/K/A SOPHIA KRASINSKI 

A/K/A SOPHIA KRASINSKY LATE OF 

MORRISDALE (COOPER TOWNSHIP), 

CLEARFIELD COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

DECEASED NOVEMBER 4, 2006, 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

APPEAL OF: ESTATE OF SOPHIA M. 

KRASINSKI AND ITS EXECUTOR, 

EDWARD KRASINSKI 

 No. 1265 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order July 16, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): 1707-0003 

IN RE: ESTATE OF SOPHIA M. 

KRASINSKI, A/K/A SOPHIA KRASINSKI 

A/K/A SOFIA KRASINSKY, LATE OF 

MORRISDALE, (COOPER TOWNSHIP) 

CLEARFIELD COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

DECEASED ON 11/04/06, 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

APPEAL OF: PATRICIA KRASINSKIDUNZIK 

 No. 1289 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order July 16, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): 1707-0003 
J-A16035-16 

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BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: 

FILED: October 5, 2016 

 I concur in the Majority’s disposition of the Estate’s appeal. However, 

because Pennsylvania case law instructs that the April 30, 2013 order 

confirming the private sale of Sophia’s real estate was interlocutory, I 

respectfully dissent from the Majority’s conclusion that Patricia’s issues 

regarding the private sale are waived. I also disagree that Patricia is 

responsible for the tax implications of the private sale. 

 Initially, I note that Sophia did not specifically devise her real estate to 

her children. Instead, she provided that the residue of the estate was to be 

divided equally among her four children. Last Will and Testament, 8/18/99, 

at Item II. Also, Sophia did not authorize her executor to sell her real 

property. 

 This Court has held, “In a decedent’s estate, the confirmation of the 

final account of the personal representative represents the final order, 

subject to exceptions being filed and disposed of by the court.” In re 

Estate of Habazin, 679 A.2d 1293, 1295 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citation 

omitted); In re Estate of Quinn, 804 A.2d 541, 543 (Pa. Super. 2002) 

(“[T]he confirmation of the final account of the personal representative 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 
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represents the final order.”). Here, the April 30, 2013 order, confirming the 

private sale of real property of the decedent’s estate, is facially interlocutory 

because it does not generate an appeal from the confirmation of the 

executor’s final account. 

Moreover, and contrary to the Majority’s position, the April 30, 2013 

order was not appealable under subsection (a)(6)—or any subsection—of 

amended Pa.R.A.P. 342.1 “Legal title to all real estate of a decedent shall 

pass at his death to his heirs or devisees, subject, however, to all the 

powers granted to the personal representative by this code and lawfully by 

the will and to all orders of the court.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 301 (emphasis 

supplied). Here, until legal title passed to the heirs pursuant to the April 30, 

2013 order, the estate owned the properties; therefore, subsection (a)(6) 

does not apply. Accord In re Estate of Ash, 73 A.3d 1287, 1290 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (holding that an order directing the sale of real estate not 

specifically devised did not determine an interest in property because “the 

estate obviously own[ed]” the property in question). The purpose of the 

April 30, 2013 order was not to resolve some dispute about who had or has 

an interest in the properties; the estate owned the properties. Instead, the 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Under Stricker, infra, the question of appealability was vested strictly in 

the orphans’ court’s discretion. In re Estate of Cherry, 111 A.3d 1204, 

1209 (Pa. Super. 2015). Following Stricker, Pa.R.A.P. 342 was amended, 

effective February 12, 2012, to list a number of orphans’ court orders 

appealable as of right. Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(1-8). 
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April 30, 2013 order was about the propriety of the executor’s plan to sell 

the properties through a private sale, the goal being to distribute the estate 

assets in accordance with the will, i.e., to Sophia’s children. In other words, 

the purpose of the order was to achieve the distribution of the estate, not to 

determine an interest in real property. 

Nor was the April 30, 2013 order appealable as a collateral order under 

Pa.R.A.P. 313. See In re Estate of Stricker, 977 A.2d 1115, 1118 (Pa. 

2009) (holding that an orphans’ court order directing the sale of real estate 

in the process of the administration of an estate is not immediately 

appealable under Rule 313 as a collateral order); Ash, 73 A.3d at 1289 

(concluding that an order authorizing the sale of real property of the 

decedent’s estate was not a collateral order under Rule 313). Here, the real 

estate at issue is central to the estate. “Consequently, its eventual 

disposition will serve directly the final account and distribution of the estate. 

Accordingly, it is central to the main cause of action and it does not qualify 

as a collateral order subject to immediate appeal.” In re Estate of Cherry, 

111 A.3d 1204, 1211 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Based on the foregoing, I disagree with the Majority’s conclusions that 

the April 30, 2013 order was final, that Patricia should have filed an appeal 

from the April 30, 2013 order and that, because she did not appeal that 

order, her issues regarding the private sale are waived. Therefore, I would 

address those issues on the merits. 
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I also disagree with the Majority’s conclusion that Patricia was 

responsible for the tax implications of the private sale. The decedent 

expressly directed, “[A]ll taxes that may be assessed in consequence of my 

death, of whatever nature and by whatever jurisdiction imposed, shall be 

paid from my residuary estate as a part of the expense of the administration 

of my estate.” Last Will and Testament, 8/18/99, at Item III. Therefore, 

the Estate was responsible for the tax implications of the private sale.