UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

Haskell G. Greer, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

City of Highland Park, et al., 

Defendants. 

________________________________/

Case No. 15cv12444 

Judith E. Levy 

United States District Judge 

Mag. Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 

DEFENDANTS’ 12(C) MOTION [17] AND GRANTING 

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND 

AMENDED COMPLAINT [22] 

On July 1, 2016, oral argument was heard on defendants’ motion 

under Rule 12(c) to grant summary disposition on all claims in this 

lawsuit. (Dkt. 17.) For reasons stated on the record, defendants’ 

motion was granted in part and denied in part without prejudice to 

plaintiffs’ having leave to move to file a second amended complaint. 

Now before the Court is plaintiffs’ motion to file a second amended 

complaint (Dkt. 22) and defendants’ opposition. (Dkt. 24.) For the 

reasons provided below, plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED. 

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I. Background 

Plaintiffs are Haskell and Kim Greer, their two adult daughters 

Ashley and Catera Greer, their 7-year-old daughter Kailaa Greer, and 

their adult nephew Alexander Lawrence. Their lawsuit arises from an 

incident that occurred in the early morning hours of October 30, 2014, 

when defendants, the Chief and officers of the Highland Park Police 

Department, allegedly entered, searched, and seized property from 

plaintiffs’ home in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. They 

also allege that plaintiff Lawrence was falsely arrested during the 

search. The proposed amended complaint alleges violations of the 

Fourth Amendment by the individual defendants, municipal liability for 

the same Fourth Amendment violations through Chief Coney’s alleged 

authorization of the unlawful search and the city’s inadequate training 

of its officers, and a state-law claim of false imprisonment against the 

as-yet-unnamed officer or officers who handcuffed Lawrence. (Dkt. 22-2 

at 11-16.) 

Plaintiffs assert that defendants were in “SWAT” gear or 

otherwise masked and plain-clothed when they entered the Greer 

family home, making identification of individual officers and what 

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specific actions each defendant may have taken during the search 

difficult to plead with specificity. (Dkt. 22 at 2-3, 13.) Discovery, 

including depositions of the officers involved, was ongoing at the time 

plaintiffs filed their current motion for leave to amend; therefore, 

plaintiffs suggest that they will be able to provide more specificity 

regarding individual officers’ actions when discovery is complete. (Id. at 

13.) 

II. Analysis 

Leave to amend a complaint is to be granted “freely . . . when 

justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The animating principle of 

Rule 15 is that cases “should be tried on their merits rather than the 

technicalities of pleadings.” Moore v. City of Paducah, 790 F.2d 557, 

559 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Tefft v. Seward, 689 F.2d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 

1982)). 

A motion to amend will be denied if it “is brought in bad faith, for 

dilatory purposes, results in undue delay or prejudice to the opposing 

party, or would be futile.” Crawford v. Roane, 53 F.3d 750, 753 (6th Cir. 

1995). Prejudice to the opposing party is an essential consideration in 

evaluating a motion for leave to amend. Id. at 562 (stating that “delay 

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alone is not a sufficient reason for denying leave,” but rather prejudice 

from that delay must be shown) (citing Mercantile Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n 

v. Inland Marine Products Corp., 542 F.2d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 1976); 

Beeck v. Aquaslide ‘N’ Dive Corp., 562 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1977); Buder v. 

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 690, 694 (8th Cir. 

1981)). Prejudice typically arises when a defendant has already 

expended time, effort, and expense to litigate a set of claims and 

prevailed in that effort. Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 489 

F.2d 968, 971 (6th Cir. 1973). A proposed amendment to a complaint is 

futile and must be denied if the amendment could not survive a Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Rose v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. 

Co., 203 F.3d 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2000). 

Here, there is no bad faith, dilatory purpose, or prejudice to 

defendants in plaintiffs’ motion. It is reasonable in circumstances such 

as this that plaintiffs will be able to discover readily the names of each 

officer who was on site during the search of their home, but not be able 

to discern which officer was responsible for which specific action until 

depositions have been taken and a precise account of each individual’s 

activity can be developed. Neither have defendants asserted that they 

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would be prejudiced through an amendment at this stage of the 

litigation. 

Defendants instead argue that this motion should be denied as 

futile, because plaintiffs’ proposed amendments do not satisfy the 

pleading standards for any of their claims. (Dkt. 24.) They first claim 

that the failure to attribute the alleged misconduct to specific 

defendants does not set forth plausibly pleaded facts. (Id. at 8-9.) 

Second, they argue that plaintiffs’ allegations do not establish the 

requisite elements for municipal liability. (Id. at 9). Finally, they state 

that the false-imprisonment claim cannot be brought against a 

municipality or the Chief of Police. (Id.) 

Defendants’ oppositions are unavailing. First, plaintiffs’ 

allegations regarding the conduct of the individual officers are 

sufficiently pleaded, given that they are alleged to have performed the 

search of the home in SWAT gear and clothing that hid their identifying 

features. The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) does not a plaintiff 

to already know all the facts relevant to his claim in order to file his 

complaint. Surely, when the defendants allegedly shielded their 

identity and the only way to discern who was responsible for which 

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conduct is to depose the officers, plaintiffs cannot be penalized for not 

knowing prior to the depositions who among the group of defendants did 

what. 

Second, plaintiffs’ proposed amended complaint adequately pleads 

the claim of municipal liability under Monell. Monell v. Dep’t of Social 

Svcs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Their amended complaint alleges that the 

Chief of Police personally participated in the alleged raid of the Greer 

home, and that in doing so he ordered or ratified an unlawful search. 

(Dkt. 22-2 at 13-14.) If true, this would factor heavily in the jury’s 

consideration of municipal liability. They also allege that the City of 

Highland Park provides only training at the police academy for cadets 

on obtaining and serving search warrants, despite its awareness that 

its officers consistently execute search warrants in ways that are 

constitutionally infirm. (Id. at 14.) These facts are sufficient to satisfy 

the Monell elements for municipal liability. See, e.g., Burgess v. 

Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013). 

Finally, while some of the defendants—notably the Chief of 

Police—may have a governmental immunity defense to plaintiffs’ claim 

that Lawrence was subjected to false imprisonment, it would not be 

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prudent to deny leave to amend this portion of the complaint at this 

time. It is proper to deny leave to amend where the amendment would 

be futile because the amended complaint could not overcome an 

affirmative defense such as immunity. See, e.g., Budsgunshop.com. 

LLC v. Sec. Safe Outlet, Inc., No. 5:10-cv-00390-KSF, 2012 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 72575, at *27-28 (E.D. Ky. May 23, 2012) (citing inter alia

Riverview Health Inst. LLC, 601 F.3d 505, 523 (6th Cir. 2010)). 

Defendants argue that Police Chief Coney and the City of Highland 

Park are immune from liability for the tort of false imprisonment. (Dkt. 

24 at 9 (citing MCL § 691.1407(5)).) This may very well be the case, but 

plaintiffs have only asserted this claim against an individual officer or 

officers who handcuffed Lawrence (Dkt. 22-2 at 15), and as noted above, 

at this time they have not yet discovered through depositions which 

officers were responsible for this conduct. 

III. Conclusion 

For the reasons provided above, plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a 

 

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second amended complaint is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 10, 2016 s/Judith E. Levy 

Ann Arbor, Michigan JUDITH E. LEVY 

United States District Judge 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s 

ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on August 10, 2016. 

s/Kelly Winslow for 

FELICIA M. MOSES 

Case Manager 

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