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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

 

UNPUBLISHED 

In re KOZLOWSKI, Minors. July 12, 2016 

Nos. 330043, 330044 

Livingston Circuit Court 

 Family Division 

LC No. 14-014681-NA 

 

Before: OWENS, P.J., and BORRELLO and O’BRIEN, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 In this consolidated appeal, respondent mother (Docket No. 330043) and respondent 

father (Docket No. 330044) both appeal the order of the trial court terminating their parental 

rights to their minor children DAK, DEK, and JK, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that 

led to adjudication continue to exist), MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care and 

custody), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood of harm). For the reasons set forth in 

this opinion, we affirm. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 Respondents were married in March of 2008. Both respondents acknowledged that their 

relationship was tumultuous at times and that there were several break ups. Respondent mother 

gave birth to twins JK and RK shortly before the initiation of these proceedings. Respondent 

father was not their biological father but he indicated his desire to raise them as his children. 

The twins were both born prematurely and with respiratory issues. At that time, respondent 

mother smoked about a half a pack of cigarettes a day and respondent father smoked about two 

packs a day. On March 3, 2014, respondents were separated and respondent mother was told 

that she, DEK, JK, and RK had to leave her brother’s place1

 because her brother’s girlfriend did 

not want to be around the children. She testified that she went to stay with her cousin that 

evening because she had no place else to go but that she planned to go to either her mother’s or 

grandmother’s the next day. Respondent mother acknowledged that her cousin’s house was 

filthy; there was pet litter throughout, mildew on dishes and the toilet, and tobacco covering the 

kitchen table. Respondent mother further acknowledged that three to four adults were living and 

smoking in the house. She and the three children slept on the sofa that evening. In the morning, 

 

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 DAK was staying with respondent father’s parents in Florida. 
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RK was found unresponsive and was unable to be resuscitated by paramedics. Respondent 

father, who was staying with a friend in Flint, claimed that if he had known that respondent 

mother and the children were going to stay in that house that evening, he would have found a 

different place for them to stay. 

 Upon RK’s death, DEK and JK were taken into protective custody. DAK was returned 

from Florida and placed in protective custody with his siblings. 

 Respondent father entered a plea on April 4, 2014 and acknowledged that he had ADHD 

and had not been taking his medication. Respondent mother entered a similar plea on May 13, 

2014, also acknowledging that she had ADHD and had not been taking medication. The trial 

court accepted both pleas finding that grounds for adjudication had been met because there was a 

substantial risk of harm to the children due to an unfit home by reason of neglect and depravity. 

Both respondents participated in psychological evaluations in April of 2014 that identified 

mental health concerns as a barrier to reunification. Respondent mother also testified that 

respondent father had a history with alcohol and marijuana, and respondent mother tested 

positive for marijuana early on in the case. Around the time of adjudication, respondents were 

separated and both lacked stable housing, simply sleeping at the homes of friends or family. At 

one point, respondent father went to Caseville and claimed that he performed some work at a 

campground there but provided no documentation. Both respondents relied either on friends or 

on the public bus system to attend parenting times. 

 Respondents’ initial caseworker, Patricia Galea, testified to meeting with both 

respondents and identifying the barriers to reunification as being issues with housing, respondent 

father’s substance abuse, income, parenting skills, and their relationship with each other. Galea 

stated that she gave respondent mother information on housing assistance but she did not follow 

through. Galea indicated that respondents were inconsistent in attending parenting times. Galea 

testified that she referred respondent father for a substance abuse assessment but he did not 

attend. 

 In the fall of 2014, respondent father moved back from Caseville and reunited with 

respondent mother. Around that time Stephanie Langham became respondents’ case worker. 

Langham was able to move parenting times closer to where respondents were living and ensured 

that they were provided with bus passes and gas cards to aid in their attendance at parenting 

times. Langham acknowledged that the foster family cancelled a number of visits due to the 

children’s illnesses. Respondents both testified that these cancellations made it harder for them 

to find transportation to future visits. Nonetheless, Langham testified that respondents had 

consistent visits while she was the case worker. Around this time respondents quit smoking 

cigarettes and began using e-cigarettes. 

 During a hearing on January 27, 2015 the trial court ordered Langham to file a 

termination petition at the request of the lawyer-guardian ad litem. Langham later testified that 

she therefore did so but did not personally believe that termination of parental rights was 

warranted at that point. The termination hearing was set for April of 2015 but was adjourned due 

to respondents having secured housing and maintained semi-stable employment. Specifically, 

respondents had begun sub-leasing a room in a house that was primarily rented by James Clark. 

Langham and another caseworker, Jahada Turner, testified that the house was appropriate for 
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children. Turner indicated that she performed a background check on Clark and that it did not 

reveal any criminal history. Respondents submitted conflicting documentation regarding the 

amount of rent they were to pay each month, at one point submitting receipts stating that rent 

was $200 and at a later point submitting evidence of a purported lease agreement that stated rent 

was $250 a month. Respondents did not produce Clark’s lease with his landlord. 

 Respondent father obtained a sizeable settlement check in April of 2015 based on a 2012 

accident. With this money, he purchased a vehicle and obtained insurance for it. By early 

summer, he testified, he had obtained employment that required him to work long hours six days 

a week and earned over $500 a week. However, the only documentation of his employment 

given to caseworkers was a $250 pay stub, and he acknowledged that this job would only keep 

him employed during the summer months.. He testified that he and respondent mother received 

over $300 a month in food stamp assistance. Respondent mother testified that she was receiving 

$20 a day from an insurance company to take care of respondent-father on account of a second 

accident that he had been involved in. 

 Respondents both testified to general knowledge of their children’s medical conditions, 

such as breathing problems and surgeries. Respondent mother provided more detail but also 

stated that none of her children had “special needs,” contrary to Galea’s testimony that all the 

children had “special needs.” Additionally, respondent mother was not able to provide detailed 

information about her children’s current immunization status or mental health services. 

Respondents both testified that they asked questions of caseworkers, doctors, and the foster 

parents but did not receive responses. Regarding activities, respondents both testified that they 

were not informed of DAK’s participation in baseball and DEK’s participation in gymnastics. 

Langham corroborated respondents’ testimony that the foster parents did not always provide 

information regarding the children’s appointments. However, respondents acknowledged that 

they were present for several surgeries and hospital stays that the children had during the 

pendency of the case. 

 Galea, Langham, and Turner stated that respondent father had either missed drug screens 

or had positive screens. Langham testified that respondent mother had missed some drug screens 

as well. Turner stated that respondent father used work as an excuse but did not provide her with 

work schedule verification. Respondents testified that they had emotional bonds with their 

children that were displayed during parenting times. Respondents testified to being upset when 

they learned from their children that they had been directed to refer to their foster parents as 

mom and dad. 

 A three-day termination hearing was held before a referee in July, August and September, 

2015. At the termination hearing, Turner testified that one of the biggest barriers that remained 

unresolved was respondents’ mental health issues. Turner specifically stated that respondent 

mother had missed a lot of her therapy appointments. Respondent father acknowledged that his 

psychological evaluation recommended counseling; he requested a specific provider that 

petitioner was unable to pay for. Both respondents attended and completed parenting classes. 

However, Turner testified that after July of 2015 respondents stopped engaging with services 

altogether. 
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 Despite testifying that he made over $2,000 a month in his present job and he and 

respondent mother were receiving over $300 a month in food stamps, respondent father testified 

that he had only a little over $500 in savings at the bank even with the couple’s largest monthly 

expense being the $200 or $250 they paid Clark in rent. Respondent father testified that he had 

more money entrusted to family members. 

 Langham did not believe that termination was appropriate because respondents had 

secured housing and because respondent father had secured a job with stable income. Turner 

disagreed. Turner focused on the lack of progress towards respondent’s mental health goals. 

Turner was also concerned about the evidence of stability regarding respondents’ housing 

situation. While acknowledging that there was no evidence suggesting that respondents would 

be unable to reside with Clark long-term, Turner was bothered by the fact that respondents did 

not have a contingency plan and were unable to provide a copy of Clark’s lease with the primary 

landlord. Turner testified that the children were in need of stability and permanency. Turner 

stated that it was unlikely respondent-mother would be able to resolve her mental health issues in 

six months’ time and that the children could not wait that long for stability and permanence. 

 The referee issued a written recommendation on October 13, 2015 terminating 

respondents’ parental rights. The referee first found that grounds for termination existed under 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), stating that the conditions that led to adjudication were the death of RK 

and a longstanding history of neglect due to lack of housing, unstable mental health, and 

substance abuse. The referee found that neither parent had complied with drug testing, and that 

it was problematic that respondents and Langham believed that the only barriers to reunification 

were a job and a house. The referee believed Turner’s testimony that emotional stability and 

substance abuse were also barriers. The referee found that the documentation provided to make 

their housing situation seem stable was inadequate because there were conflicting amounts of 

rent on the various documents. The referee was also troubled by the fact that, despite appearing 

to have sufficient income, mother still needed the department or Wellspring to provide her with a 

bus pass. 

 The referee next found grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), noting 

respondents’ failure to follow through with the counseling recommended by their psychological 

evaluations and that mother’s attendance was dismal and father demanded a certain provider that 

petitioner had no means to fund. The referee also was troubled by mother’s belief that RK died 

of SIDS, describing this as a failure to internalize the changes that she would be required to 

make. 

 The referee also found grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). The referee 

noted that RK died in the care of respondents, noted mother’s decision to stay in the crowded, 

smoke-filled, and filthy home and that father made no effort to know of the condition in which 

his children were living that evening, and noted lack of income and untreated mental health as 

indications that the children would be at risk if returned. 

 Finally, the referee concluded that termination was in the best interests of the children. 

The referee acknowledged that the children and parents had a bond, but found that respondents’ 

problems with substance abuse and mental instability showed that they could not provide a safe 
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and stable home. The referee also focused on the parents’ lack of knowledge regarding the 

children’s needs. 

 The trial court entered an order adopting the referee’s recommendation to terminate 

parental rights and ordered respondents’ parental rights terminated on October 14, 2015. These 

appeals ensued. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 This Court reviews “for clear error both the trial court’s decision that a ground for 

termination of parental rights has been proved by clear and convincing evidence and, where 

appropriate, the court’s decision regarding the child’s best interests.” In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 

209; 661 NW2d 216, reh den 468 Mich 1239 (2003); MCR 3.977; In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 

Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). A decision is clearly erroneous if “the reviewing court 

on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” 

In re JK, 468 Mich at 209-210.

III. ANALYSIS

 On appeal, respondents each argue that the trial court improperly considered their failure 

to participate in mental health and substance abuse services as evidence of neglect when, 

according to respondents, mental health and substance abuse were not issues that led to the initial 

adjudication. Respondent father also argues that petitioner failed to provide adequate services. 

Respondents also each argue that the trial court erred in its determination that statutory grounds 

for termination of parental rights existed. Finally, respondent mother argues that termination of 

her parental rights was not in her children’s best interests. 

A. SERVICES

 Respondents argue that their failure to participate in certain mental health and substance 

abuse services that they believe were not necessary to rectify conditions that led to adjudication 

should not have been used as evidence of neglectful behavior or as evidence that they failed to 

rectify the conditions that led to adjudication. Respondent father also argues that adequate 

services were not provided. However, a review of the record indicates that there was ample 

evidence for the trial court to conclude that respondents’ mental health and substance abuse were 

issues at the initial adjudication and that petitioner offered father adequate services. 

 Both respondents acknowledged having untreated ADHD at their pleas. Both 

acknowledged that their April 2014 psychological evaluations revealed mental health concerns. 

Respondent mother testified that respondent father had past problems with alcohol and 

marijuana, and Galea reported that respondent mother had an early positive test for marijuana. 

While issues with housing, income, tobacco use, and transportation were issues that resulted in 

respondent mother being in the home with the children where RK died, it appears that 

respondents’ mental health and substance abuse issues were underlying causes of some of these 

concerns and even primary concerns themselves. The trial court did not err in determining that 

respondents’ failure to adequately participate in mental health services or drug screens was 
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evidence of a failure to provide proper care and custody and evidence that the conditions that led 

to adjudication had not been remedied. 

 Father also contends that petitioner failed to offer adequate services when it would not 

pay for counseling services for him and that he was required to obtain his own private insurance. 

This argument lacks merit. 

 Prior to termination, petitioner must show that reasonable efforts were made to “rectify 

the conditions that led to its involvement in the case.” In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 25-26; 610 

NW 2d 563 (2000). If a case service plan “fails to take into account the parents’ limitations or 

disabilities and make any reasonable accommodations, then it cannot be found that reasonable 

efforts were made to reunite the family.” Id. at 26. “The reasonableness of the efforts provided 

affects the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the grounds for termination.” In re 

Hicks/Brown, ___ Mich App at ___; ___NW2d___ (2016) (Docket No. 328870) slip op at 6. 

 What father appears to be referring to is that petitioner was unable to pay for his specific 

choice of provider. Father indicated that he had been requesting to see a specific provider, 

“Taylor Psychological.” Langham clarified that petitioner would not pay for the specific 

provider that father wanted for his therapy. The trial court was correct to note that while 

petitioner “has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to secure 

reunification, there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of respondents to participate 

in the services that are offered.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). 

There is sufficient evidence in the record to show that father, despite requesting a specific 

provider for his counseling, failed to participate in the services that were offered. Galea testified 

that father did not go for a substance abuse assessment despite a referral. Langham testified that 

father was not consistent with substance abuse drops. Turner testified that father was not 

consistent with drug screens and that, despite using work as an excuse, did not provide her with a 

work schedule verification. 

 In short, petitioner made reasonable efforts to “rectify the conditions that led to its 

involvement in the case.” In re Terry, 240 Mich App at 25-26. 

B. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

 Respondents argue that the court erred in finding statutory grounds for termination. We 

disagree. 

 The trial court first found termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), which 

provides that termination is appropriate if the conditions that led to the initial adjudication 

continue to exist 182 days after the initial dispositional order and “there is no reasonable 

likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s 

age.” The conditions that the trial court determined led to adjudication that continued to exist 

were housing, income, mental health, and substance abuse. Respondents did make concerted 

efforts to rectify the issues of housing and income. They had maintained a suitable living 

environment for a significant duration at the time of the termination hearing. However, evidence 

about this arrangement’s stability was conflicting. Respondents were subleasing and the primary 

tenant’s lease was never verified. There was conflicting evidence on the amount of money 
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respondents had to pay Clark each month. While there was no evidence definitively suggesting 

that the arrangement was unstable, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the 

trial court mistakenly questioned its stability in light of respondents’ failure to have a 

contingency plan and Galea’s testimony that she had given respondent mother information on 

housing assistance when the case began in early 2014 and mother had not followed through with 

that information. Given this conflicting evidence, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred 

in finding that housing remained an issue at the time of termination and that it was unlikely to be 

rectified within a reasonable amount of time. 

 Regarding income, respondents both testified that respondent father was earning about 

$2,000 a month. However, the evidence concerning father’s income was even more tenuous than 

the evidence regarding housing. Respondents only provided one pay stub to case workers and 

the pay stub did not substantiate father’s purported earnings and father acknowledged that the job 

would only last until the end of summer. Additionally, despite stating that they only had to only 

pay $200 or $250 in rent per month and that they were receiving over $300 a month in food 

stamp assistance while father was making over $500 a week, respondents both reported only 

having $550 in savings. Respondent father testified that various family members were holding 

his money for him but he was vague on specifics. Furthermore, there was a history of father and 

mother separating and mother had not obtained suitable income to provide for the children in the 

event of another separation. On this record, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction 

that the trial court erred in concluding that unstable income remained an issue at the time of 

termination and that there was no reasonable likelihood that it would be corrected within a 

reasonable amount of time. 

 Mental health and substance abuse were also issues that remained at the time of 

termination. Respondent mother had missed appointments, and respondent father had insisted on 

a certain provider that petitioner could not pay for. Both parties were inconsistent throughout the 

case with drug screens, and respondent father did not attend a substance abuse assessment 

despite being referred. The trial court’s conclusion that mental health and substance abuse were 

concerns that caused adjudication and had not been rectified was not clearly erroneous. 

 In short, the trial court did not clearly err in finding grounds for termination under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Because we have found one statutory ground for termination, we need not 

consider the additional grounds cited by the trial court. See In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 461; 

781 NW2d 105 (2009). 

C. BEST INTERESTS

 Finally, respondent mother challenges the trial court’s best interest determination. 

 “If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that 

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of 

parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not 

be made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). The trial court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that 

termination is in the best interests of the children. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 

NW2d 61 (2014). “[R]egard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge 

the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” In re Miller, 433 Mich at 337. The 
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children’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, and the children’s need for 

permanency, stability, and finality are all factors for the court to consider in deciding whether 

termination is in the best interests of the children. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 

41-42. 

 The trial court determined that there was a strong bond between mother and the children 

but concluded that termination was still in the children’s best interests. It found that the lack of 

ability to understand the children’s special medical needs, the inability to sufficiently benefit 

from services, and the children’s need for permanence and stability indicated that termination of 

parental rights would be in the children’s best interests. While there is some indication that 

respondent mother’s lack of information regarding the children’s medical conditions was partly 

attributable to the lack of communication provided by the foster family, the trial court correctly 

noted that respondent mother had been present at a surgery where she could have obtained more 

information. Furthermore, a caseworker testified that there was a history of medical neglect 

when the children were in mother’s care; and, despite one of the children having respiratory 

problems, both father and mother continued to smoke. In contrast, all of the children’s medical 

needs were being addressed in foster care. Moreover, there was evidence that respondent mother 

had not adequately addressed her mental health issues. Additionally, that the children needed 

permanence and stability was supported by Turner’s testimony that the existing problems could 

not be rectified in six months’ time and that the children could not wait that long. In short, the 

trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the 

children’s best interests. In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41-42. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Donald S. Owens 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien