The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge 1

for the District of Minnesota.

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 No. 95-3985

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United States of America, *

 *

Appellee, *

 * Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

 * District of Minnesota.

Cheryl Stone, * [UNPUBLISHED]

 *

Appellant. *

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 Submitted: March 12, 1996

 Filed: March 22, 1996

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Before FAGG, BOWMAN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Cheryl Stone challenges the sentence imposed by the district court1

after she pleaded guilty to knowingly making, uttering, and possessing

forged securities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513(a). We

affirm.

Stone's presentence report noted no factors warranting a departure

from the applicable 6-to-12 month Guidelines range. Stone objected,

contending that a downward departure "to straight probation" was

appropriate because (1) the criminal history calculation over-represented

the seriousness of her criminal history or the likelihood that she would

commit further crimes; (2) she had displayed an extraordinary level of

acceptance of responsibility; and (3) she was under the influence of drugs

and
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alcohol when she committed the offense, but was presently alcohol- and

drug-free. At sentencing, Stone added that a co-defendant had received a

downward departure to a 4-month term of incarceration. 

The district court denied Stone's departure request and sentenced her

to three years probation, a condition of which was that she reside in a

community corrections center for six months. For reversal, Stone contends

the district court erred in not departing downward, based on the totality

of the circumstances, including the factors she presented below and her

lack of dangerousness.

We first conclude that we cannot review the district court's

discretionary refusal to depart--on overstated criminal-history and

substantial acceptance-of-responsibility grounds--because the sentencing

transcript demonstrates the district court was aware of its authority to

do so. See United States v. Elkins, 16 F.3d 952, 954 (8th Cir. 1994). In

any event, we note that the district court could not "depart[] below the

lower limit of the guideline range for Criminal History Category I on the

basis of the adequacy of criminal history." U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, p.s.; see

United States v. Franklin, 926 F.2d 734, 737 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 502

U.S. 881 (1991).

We further conclude no error occurred in the district court's failure

to grant Stone a departure based on the fact that her co-defendant had

received a departure. "Disparity between sentences imposed on codefendants

is not a proper basis for departure." United States v. Polanco, 53 F.3d

893, 897 (8th Cir. 1995), pet. for cert. filed, No. 95-5022 (U.S. Jun. 29,

1995). We do not address Stone's contention that her lack of dangerousness

merited a departure, because she did not present this argument below. See

Fritz v. United States, 995 F.2d 136, 137 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,

114 S. Ct. 887 (1994). Finally, we conclude that the
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factors relied upon by Stone--viewed as a whole--did not warrant a downward

departure. Cf. United States v. Whitehorse, 909 F.2d 316, 318-19 (8th Cir.

1990) (noting that discrete circumstances may converge to create situation

warranting departure).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.