## IN THE COUR T OF CRIMINA L APPEALS OF TEX AS
N o. P D - 1713- 08

THE S TA TE OF TE X AS

v . W E N D Y R . D U N B A R , A ppel l ee ON APP ELLEE ’ S PET I TI ON FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW I N CA USE NO . 0 9 - 0 8 - 0 0 1 0 4 - CR FRO M THE NI NTH CO URT O F AP PEALS M ON TGO M ERY CO UNTY

H O L C O MB , J., delivered the opinion of the un animous Court.
Th e c ourt of a pp e a ls h e ld that the State wa s no t ba rr e d fr om c omp la ini ng fo r t he fi rs t ti me on appea l that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to place appellee Wendy R. Dunbar on shoc k
c omm un ity su pe rv isi on . We a ff

ir m. On Aug ust 7, 1996, a Montgome ry County g rand j u ry returne d an indictment cha rg ing Dunbar with the felony offe nse of indece ncy with a child. See Tex. P en. Code § 21.11. On June 6, 1997, Dunbar

pled nolo contende re to the c harg e. On that same date, the trial c ourt defe rre d
a dju dic a tio n o f Dunb ar’ s g uil t and pla c e d h e r o n c omm

un ity su pe rv isi on fo r a pe ri od of te n y e a rs .DUNB AR -- 2

I n her br ief to the c ourt of appe als, Dunbar argued that she ha d “ag ree d to the four y ear 1 assessment of punishment without argument in exchang e for assura nces f rom the trial cour

t throug h her attorney

of re cord that she would have an opportunity for shoc k probation.” N othing in the rec ord substantiates this claim, howeve r. I f Dunba r in fac t entere d her ple as of “ true” based upon a

misunderstanding or misrepre sentation, then she may wish to seek re lief throug h a post-conviction application for a wr it of habea s corpus. We express no opinion on the merits of su c h a po ssi ble c la im. I n its brief to this Court, the St ate points out that the ca se re cord c ontains “no cour t 2 repor ter’s r ecor d of either

the hea ring on the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt or any hear ing that may have oc curr ed on [Dunbar’ s] m otion for shock probation.” Thus, the re cord doe s not refle ct whether the State ac quiesce d in or objecte d to the trial court’ s place ment of Dunba r on shock community

supervision. On April 18, 2007, the State filed a motion to adjudicate Dunbar ’s g uilt. I n its motion, the State alleg ed that Dunba

r had violate d sever al terms of he r co m m u n i t y supervision. On May

17, 2007, the t rial court held a hear ing on the State’s motion. At that hear ing, D unbar ple d “true ” to five of the a lleg ations in the State’s motion. On September 5, 2007, the trial cour t adjudicated D unbar g uil ty of ind e c e nc y

wi th a c hil d a nd a sse sse d h e r p un ish me nt at im pr iso nme nt f

or fo ur y e a rs . Dunb ar d id n ot a

pp e a l or fi le a mot ion fo r n e w tri a l. 1 On Decem ber 6, 2007, D unbar f iled a motion for shock c ommunity supervision. On F e br ua ry 14 , 2 00 8, the tr ia l c ourt

g rante d D un

ba r’ s mo tio n a

nd pla c e d h e r o n s ho c k c omm un ity
su pe rv isi on fo r a pe ri od of on e y e ar. On

Ma rc h 3 , 2 00 8, the State fi le d a no tic e of a pp e a l. On direc t appea l, the State complained that Dunba r wa s statutorily

inel igible f

or shock community

supervision and, ther efor e, the tria l court had lacked jurisdiction to place her on shoc k
c omm un ity su pe rv isi on . D un

ba r r e sp on de d, in r e le va

nt p art , th a t th e State ha d “f a ile d to ob

je c t” in the t rial court to the t rial court’s place ment of her on shock community supervision and, ther efor e, 2DUNB AR -- 3

Rul e 33 .1 (a )( 1) (A ) p ro vid e s: 3

“ As a pr e re qu isi te to p re se nti nga c omp la int

fo r a pp e llate re vie w, the re c or d mu st show that the complaint wa s made to the trial c ourt by a timely reque st, objection, or motion that stated the g rounds for the ruling that the complaining party soug ht from the tria l court with sufficie nt specificity to make the tria l court aw are of the complaint, unless the spec ific g rounds wer e appa rent fr om the context.” Dunbar ’s sec ond g round for revie w re ads: “Did the c ourt of appe als err in holding that 4 the State did not waive [its] rig ht to appeal by not objecting to the trial court plac ing [Dunbar ] on p r o b a t i o na tt h e t i m e t h e c o u rto r d e r e d t h e s h o c k

p r o b a t i o n ?” Dunbar ’s re fer ence to a “3goffe nse” is a r efe renc e to those off enses, spe cified in Te x as 5 Code of Criminal Procedur e ar ticle 42.12, § 3g (a) (1), whic h rende r a de fenda nt ineligible f

or regular c ommunity

supervision or shock c ommunity supervision. See discussion, inf ra . the State had “ waiv[ed] preservation of err or” unde r Texas Rule of Appe llate Proce dure 33.1. 3 T h e c o u r t o f a p peals a cce pted the State’s substantive a rg ument, reje cted Dunba

r’s proc edura l argument, vaca

ted the trial court’s orde r plac ing he r on shock c ommunity supervision, and

“ re mand [ed ] the c a se to t he tr ia l c ourt

wi th i ns tr

uc tio ns to carry ou t the se nte nc e pr e vio us ly imposed.” State v. Dunbar , 269 S.W. 3d 69 3, 69 6 ( Te x.Ap p. –B e a umo nt 2 00 8) . With r e sp e c t to Dunbar ’s proc edura l argument, the cour t of appeal s held that “the issue r aised by the State is not subject to proce dural de fault.” Ib id
. Dunbar later f iled a petition for discretionary revie w t hat asserted t wo grounds for revie w, the sec ond of which w e g rante d. See Tex. R. App. P roc. 66.3(d). I n her brief, Dunbar arg ues that 4 the c ourt of a pp e a ls e rr e d in

re je c tin g he r pr oc e dura l argume nt be c a us e , un de r R

ule 33 .1 , “ the State should be requir ed to object at the trial court level t o p re s erve the issue of improper ly g ranting [shock] probation on a 3goffe nse i n order to appea l that improper grant to the Court of Appe als.” 5 I n its reply

brief, the State argues that “[a] trial court lac ks jurisdiction to sus pend a pr ison sentence months after a

defe ndant has be g un serving it, unless the shoc k probation statute is applica ble,” a ndDUNB AR -- 4

in this case, ac cordingto t h e State, the shock probation statute was not applicable beca use of the nature of Dunba

r’s off ense. Rule 33.1 provides that as a prer equisite to prese nting a complaint for a ppellate r eview, the
re c o r d m u s t s h o w t h a t t h e c o mp l a i n t w a s m a d e t o t h e t r i a l c o u rt b y a s p e c i f i c an d t i m e ly

re qu e st, objection, or motion. Se e Gi llen wat e rs v . S tat e , 205 S.W .3d 534, 537 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) (d isc us sin g R

u l e 3 3
. 1 )
. B u t R

u l e 3 3
. 1 d o e s n o t a

p p l y t o r i g h t s w h i c h ar e w a i v a b l e o n l y or

to
a bs olute sy ste mic re qu ir e me nts , th e vio la tio n o f w hic h ma y sti ll b e ra ise d f

or the fi rs t ti me on

a pp e a l. Ma rin v . S

tat e , 851 S.W .2d 275, 280 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). Trial cour t jurisdiction over a c ase is an a bsolute s y s t em i c require ment. Id . at 27 9. Thus , Rul e 33 .1 did

no t pr oh ibi t th e State in t his c a se fr om r a isi nga jur isd ic tio na l com pla int fo r t

he fi rs t tim e on a pp e a l. B ut w a s th e State ’s c omp la int he re tr uly jur isd ic tio na l? The ter m “jurisdiction” re fers t o the power of a c ourt to hear

a contr oversy

and make decisions that ar e leg all y b i n d i n g on the par ties involved. De ar

s v . S tat e , 154 S.W .3d 610, 612 ( T e x. Cr im
. A p p . 2 0 0 5 ) ; 21 C.J.S
. Co urts § 9 (2006). I f there is no jurisdiction, t he cour t has no power to act. Garcia v. D ial , 596 S.W .2d 524, 528 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980). A trial cour

t’s jurisdiction over a c riminal case consists of “the powe r of the court over the ‘s ub je c t matte r’ of the c a se , co nv e y e d by statut e or c on sti tut ion a l pro vis ion , c ou ple d w ith‘p e rs on a l’ jurisdiction over the acc used, which is invoked in felony prosec utions by

the filing of [an] i ndictment or information if indictment is waived.” Fa irf ie ld v . S tat e , 610 S.W .2d 771, 779 (Tex.Crim.App. 19 81 ). I f n o c omm

un ity su pe rv isi on is i mpo se d, no mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l or

in a rr e st o f j ud g me nt i s filed, and no a

ppeal is take n, then the trial court’s persona l jur isdiction ove r the ac cused te rminates thirty day s after

sentenc ing. Se e Col lin s v . S tat e , 240 S.W .3d 925, 927 (Tex
. C ri m . Ap p . 2007);DUNB AR -- 5

Mc Clin ton v . S

tat e , 1 2 1 S. W. 3 d 7 6 8 , 7 6 9 n . 1 ( T e x. Cr im
. A p p . 2 0 0 3 ) ( Co c h r an , J. , c o n c u r r in g ) ; T e x. R. Ap p . Proc. 21.4 & 22.3. Consequently , bey ond that thirty -day period, “ a sourc e of jurisdiction must be found to authorize the trial cour t’s order s.” State v. Patrick, 86 S.W .3d 592, 595 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (plurality op.). I n the instant case , the trial cour t acquire d persona l jurisdiction over Dunbar when the indictment ag ainst her wa s filed on Aug ust 7, 1996. The trial cour t lost personal jurisdiction over Dunbar thirty day s afte r t he trial court sentenced her on September 5, 2007. Was there a source of jurisdiction to authoriz e the tria l co u rt ’s Fe bruar y 14, 2008, order

placingDunbar

on shock community

supervision? Dunb ar w a s c on vic te d o f i nd e c e nc y wi th a c hil d und e r T e xas P e na l Co de § 2 1. 11 . A rt ic le 42.12, § 3g , of the Te x as Code of Criminal Proce dure pr ovides that a pe rson convicte d of indec ency with a child is ineligible f or “r eg ular” community

supervision. And Article 42.12, § 6(a) (1), provides that a pe rson who is inelig ible for r eg ular c ommunity supervision is also ineligible f or shock community

super v is io n. Ex pa rteAu sti n , 7 46 S.W. 2d 22 6, 22 9 ( Te x.Cr im. Ap p. 19 88 ); G. Di x & R. Dawson, 43A Te

x as Prac tic e Se rie

s: Cri mi na l Prac tic e an d P ro c e du re §§ 39.43 & 39.63 ( 2nd ed. 2001). Thus, the trial cour t in this case did not re-a cquire persona l jurisdiction over Dunbar by virtue of the shoc k community supervision statute, and we know of no other possib l e s o u rce of jurisdiction. I n view of the fore g oing, w e co n cl ude that the tria l court, at the time it place d Dunbar on sh oc k c omm

un ity su pe rv isi on , la c ke d the jur isd ic tio n to do so . T he re fo re , th e State ’s c omp la int in the cour t of appe als was truly

jurisdictional and could prope rly be ra is ed fo r the first time in that court.DUNB AR -- 6

We o ve rr ule Dunb ar’ s g ro un d f

or re vie w a nd a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he c ourt of a pp e a ls.

DEL I VERED: NOVEMB ER 18, 2009 PUB L I SH