Filed 10/6/21 In re Saul A. CA2/2

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re SAUL A., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B309200

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP07245)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Stephen Marpet, Juvenile Court Referree. 

Conditionally reversed.

Elizabeth Klippi, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and David Michael Miller, Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * * * * *

Appellant A.M. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s 

orders summarily denying her Welfare and Institutions Code1

section 388 petition requesting family reunification services with 

her child, Saul A. (born 2019), and denying her request for a 

contested section 366.26 hearing. Mother also challenges the 

juvenile court’s findings under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 

1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California 

law. She contends the juvenile court and the Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) 

failed to comply with their statutory duties of inquiry and notice.

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by 

summarily denying mother’s section 388 petition and her request 

for a contested section 366.26 hearing. The Department failed, 

however, to adequately investigate Saul’s father’s claim2

regarding possible Indian ancestry, and the juvenile court failed 

to ensure an appropriate inquiry had been conducted before 

concluding ICWA did not apply to these proceedings. We 

therefore conditionally reverse the juvenile court’s section 366.26 

orders and remand the matter for the limited purpose of directing 

the juvenile court to conduct an inquiry into Saul’s possible 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code.

2 Saul’s father is not a party to this appeal.
3

Indian status, and if warranted, to provide proper notice under 

ICWA.

BACKGROUND

Child welfare history

Mother’s child welfare history included three prior cases in 

which she failed to reunify with her children, resulting in 

termination of her parental rights.

In 2006, mother’s mental and emotional problems resulted 

in dependency jurisdiction over minor D.W. Mother failed to 

reunify with D.W., and her parental rights were terminated in 

2007.

In 2011, mother’s substance abuse and mental and 

emotional problems led to dependency jurisdiction over minor 

M.M. The juvenile court denied mother reunification services 

pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11), and 

terminated her parental rights in 2013.

In 2014, mother’s mental and emotional problems and her 

failure to take prescribed psychotropic medication resulted in 

dependency jurisdiction over minor Xavier M. Mother was 

granted reunification services but failed to reunify with Xavier. 

Her parental rights were terminated in 2015.

Current case

The Department received a referral in 2019 that mother’s 

mental health issues, history of substance abuse, and 

homelessness placed newborn Saul at risk of harm. The referral 

noted that mother was exhibiting mental health problems, 

including rambling and incoherent speech.

Mother told the Department’s responding social worker 

that she was homeless but planned to live with Saul at the Union 
4

Rescue Mission when discharged from the hospital. She said 

Saul’s father was a musician and was currently out of town and 

could not be contacted.

Mother said she had been diagnosed with schizoaffective 

personality disorder, was under the care of a psychiatrist, and 

took prescribed medication. She experienced mental health 

relapses in six-month intervals and was last hospitalized a year 

ago. Mother told the social worker she had completed a dual 

diagnosis program for mental health and substance abuse and 

had last used methamphetamine a year ago. She hoped to find 

another dual diagnosis program.

The Department confirmed that mother had completed a 

dual diagnosis program in September 2019; however, the 

program staff said mother had not been invited to stay because of 

her behavioral issues. The staff said mother was not compliant 

with her medication and engaged in “somewhat violent behavior.” 

She fought with staff and other residents, broke things, and acted 

out in the presence of children. The program staff further 

reported that mother had been homeless for 15 years and that 

Saul’s father was a chronic substance abuser and currently 

incarcerated. 

Mother’s psychiatrist reported that she had last seen 

mother on August 28, 2019. Mother was experiencing auditory 

hallucinations that “tell her negative stuff.” She failed to attend 

two subsequent psychiatric appointments. The psychiatrist 

expressed concerns about mother’s ability to care for newborn 

Saul, as mother’s psychotropic medication had a sedating effect.

In October 2019, the social worker interviewed the paternal 

grandmother, who reported that father had been homeless for 10

years. She expressed concerns about mother’s mental health but 
5

was unaware of any diagnosis. The paternal grandmother was 

also concerned about mother’s continued association with father 

because of his ongoing homelessness and drug use.

In November 2019, the Department executed a removal 

warrant for Saul and filed a petition under section 300, 

subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The petition alleged that mother’s 

mental health issues and both parents’ substance abuse issues 

placed Saul at risk of serious physical harm. 

Mother was present at the November 2019 detention 

hearing when the juvenile court ordered Saul detained from both 

parents. Father appeared in custody at a hearing held on 

November 18, 2019, at which the juvenile court found him to be 

Saul’s alleged father and granted father’s request for a DNA test 

to determine paternity.

Subsequent DNA testing confirmed that father was Saul’s 

biological father. Father was released from custody in March 

2020. His whereabouts thereafter became unknown. 

Father’s ICWA claim

On November 18, 2019, father filed an ICWA-020 parental 

notification of Indian status form. He checked the box on the 

form indicating Saul may be a member of, or eligible for 

membership in, a federally recognized Indian tribe. He identified 

the tribe as Blackfoot. Father also provided the name and 

telephone number of the paternal grandmother and indicated she 

had additional information. 

The juvenile court acknowledged father’s ICWA filing and 

asked father if he knew whether the paternal grandmother was 

registered with any tribe. Father responded, “I don’t. I was just 

told when I was young that.” Father then stated: “Cherokee.” 

The juvenile court found it had no reason to know that Saul was 
6

an Indian child but instructed the Department “to follow up with 

the paternal grandmother . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . And address 

whether she has any additional information. If she does, the 

Department needs to walk it on and we’ll address those issues 

when we come—they need to walk it on to get authorization by 

the court to notice any tribes.” 

Jurisdiction and disposition

Mother told the Department she was diagnosed with 

schizoaffective disorder in 2010 and that she took psychotropic 

medication and participated in mental health services off and on 

since her diagnosis. Mother admitted using marijuana since age 

20 and said she sometimes used methamphetamine in lieu of 

psychotropic medication. Mother said she had been involuntarily 

hospitalized seven times.

The Department reported that mother had completed a 

residential drug treatment program in February 2020 and was 

participating in an outpatient program. Mother’s on-demand 

drug tests in April, May, and June 2020 were all negative.

On March 6, 2020, mother had an in-person with visit with 

Saul, who was placed with a paternal aunt in San Diego. Mother 

was appropriate, and there were no reported concerns. Because 

of COVID-19, mother’s visits were changed to video or telephonic 

visits at the end of March 2020.

The Department learned in May 2020 that mother was not 

under the care of a psychiatrist but was obtaining her prescribed 

psychotropic medication at an urgent care facility. The 

Department encouraged mother to seek regular psychiatric care 

at a mental health clinic.

On May 8, 2020, the dependency investigator received a 

telephone call from mother, who was agitated and upset. Mother 
7

became hostile, “went on a disorganized tangent,” and yelled at 

the investigator, causing the investigator to suspect that mother 

had ceased taking her psychotropic medication.

In June 2020, the paternal aunt reported that mother’s 

telephonic visits had become inconsistent. During the visits, 

mother seemed more interested in talking about father and their 

relationship issues. The paternal aunt stated that father was 

homeless and living in a tent, but that he and mother were often 

together.

Mother was present at the contested jurisdictional hearing 

held in June 2020. Father was absent. The juvenile court 

sustained the section 300 petition as to all counts, finding that 

mother’s history of mental health and substance abuse issues, 

mother’s failure to reunify with Saul’s half-siblings because of 

those issues, and father’s substance abuse placed Saul at risk of 

harm. The court continued the disposition hearing to determine 

whether the parents would receive family reunification services.

In a July 2020 telephone call, mother screamed at the 

Department’s social worker and demanded transportation funds 

for visits with Saul, despite the fact that mother had received 

funds for four visits but had visited Saul only once. The social 

worker arranged to meet with mother at a nearby coffee shop at 

3:00 p.m. Mother arrived at 7:00 a.m., waited a few hours, and 

then said she had to leave because it was raining. 

The paternal aunt informed the social worker in July 2020 

that mother’s telephonic visits with Saul remained inconsistent. 

Mother often cancelled, claiming she was doing laundry, praying, 

or forgot to call.

Mother was present and testified at the July 29, 2020 

dispositional hearing. Father was absent. The juvenile court 
8

ordered Saul removed from parental custody and denied mother 

family reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, 

subdivision (b)(10) and (11). The court accorded mother 

monitored visitation.

Status review reports

In November 2020, the Department reported that Saul 

remained placed with his paternal relatives and was very 

attached to them. The paternal relatives said they wanted to 

adopt Saul.

During an in-person visit with mother on September 13, 

2020, Saul cried and refused to go to mother. The caregivers 

reported that mother did not know how to engage Saul and that 

she was on her phone during the entire visit. The caregivers told 

the social worker they were not comfortable monitoring mother’s 

future visits with Saul. According to the caregivers, mother 

frequently criticized their parenting style and attempted to 

dictate what they could and could not give the child. The 

caregivers further reported that Saul often woke up crying after 

his visits with mother.

During an in-person visit with mother on October 18, 2020, 

Saul would not allow mother to touch him or hold him. Mother 

stated, “you know what he’s telling me, he’s telling me he made 

his decision he wants to stay with his auntie.” Mother was upset 

that Saul refused to interact with her and ended the visit 40 

minutes early.

During an October 21, 2020 virtual visit, Saul cried as soon 

as he saw mother’s face. Mother repeatedly yelled at Saul, 

“[L]ook at me!” “Look at me when I’m talking to you . . . !” 

(Capitalization omitted.) Mother missed 20 telephonic visits with 

Saul between August and October 2020.
9

Section 388 petition

On November 22, 2020, mother filed a section 388 petition 

requesting family reunification services. Mother’s petition stated 

that her changed circumstances included consistent participation 

in mental health services, attending 35 sessions; enrollment in an 

outpatient drug rehabilitation program in August 2020 and eight 

negative drug tests; and consistent, positive visits with Saul. 

Mother’s petition further stated that it was in Saul’s best 

interests “to be raised and cared for by his mother who gave birth 

to him.”

The juvenile court summarily denied mother’s section 388 

petition on November 24, 2020, finding an insufficient change of 

circumstances to warrant an evidentiary hearing. 

Section 366.26 hearing

At a November 24, 2020 hearing, mother’s counsel asked 

the court to set a contested section 366.26 hearing. When asked 

for an offer of proof, counsel stated, “Mother has been actively 

involved in her mental health services. She is—she is, as well, 

visiting the minor. She’s having in person visits now with her 

child and they do appear to be going well. Mother—there has 

been some issues, overall the visits have been consistent. I’m 

asking that this matter be set for contest so mother can testify as 

to the child sibling bond.” 

The juvenile court denied the request for a contested 

hearing, finding “based on the reports, that the visits have been 

virtual and/or monitored and infrequent, at best, and I am 

finding that—I’m denying the request for a hearing as it doesn’t 

rise to the level of the applicable statutes with regard to a 

mother/child bond.” 
10

After finding no exception existed, the juvenile court 

terminated parental rights and designated the paternal aunt and 

her husband as the prospective adoptive parents.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Section 388 petition

Section 388 provides in pertinent part: “(a)(1) Any parent or 

other person having an interest in a child who is a dependent 

child of the juvenile court . . . may, upon grounds of change of 

circumstance or new evidence, petition the court in the same 

action in which the child was found to be a dependent child of the 

juvenile court or in which a guardianship was ordered pursuant 

to Section 360 for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any 

order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of 

the court. The petition . . . shall set forth in concise language any 

change of circumstance or new evidence that is alleged to require 

the change of order or termination of jurisdiction. [¶] . . . [¶] (d) 

If it appears that the best interests of the child ... may be 

promoted by the proposed change of order . . . , the court shall 

order that a hearing be held . . . .”

Although section 388 does not explicitly so provide, courts 

have long held that the right to a hearing is triggered only if the

petition makes a prima facie showing, consisting of facts 

demonstrating a genuine change of circumstances. (In re C.J.W. 

(2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1079.) To require a hearing a 

parent must show changed, not merely changing, circumstances. 

(See In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47, disapproved on 

another ground in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636, 

fn. 5.) In addition, the parent must present new evidence and 
11

facts showing that the requested modification will promote the 

child’s best interests. (C.J.W., supra, at p. 1079.) The petition 

must state facts that, if found to be true, would sustain a 

favorable decision. (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 

250.)

We review the summary denial of a hearing on a section 

388 petition for abuse of discretion. (In re A.S. (2009) 180 

Cal.App.4th 351, 358.) Under that standard, we will not disturb 

the decision of the juvenile court unless it was arbitrary, 

capricious, or patently absurd. (Ibid.)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by summarily 

denying mother’s section 388 petition. Mother’s alleged change of 

circumstance was her enrollment in a drug treatment program 

three months before filing her section 388 petition, and her 

enrollment and participation in mental health services six 

months before the filing of her petition. Mother had a long 

history of mental health and substance abuse issues, resulting in 

chronic homelessness and her failure to reunify with three of 

Saul’s half-siblings. The trial court did not in err concluding that 

mother’s recent enrollment and participation in a drug treatment 

program and mental health services show changing, not changed,

circumstances. “A petition which alleges merely changing 

circumstances and would mean delaying the selection of a 

permanent home for a child to see if a parent, who has repeatedly 

failed to reunify with the child, might be able to reunify at some 

future point, does not promote stability for the child or the child’s 

best interests.” (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.) 

Mother’s assertions that her visits with Saul had been consistent 

and positive is unsupported by any evidence and contradicted by 

the record.
12

Mother also failed to show that the change of order would 

be in Saul’s best interests. Her petition merely states that it is in 

Saul’s best interest to be raised and cared for by mother and that 

he should be given the opportunity to reunify with her. This is 

insufficient. Saul has lived with his paternal aunt for the 

majority of his short life. He is bonded to his caregivers, who 

wish to provide a permanent home for him through adoption. 

Mother’s visits with Saul were inconsistent, and during two inperson visits, Saul refused to allow mother to touch or hold him.

Mother failed to make a prima facie showing of changed 

circumstances or that a change of order would be in Saul’s best 

interests. The juvenile court did not err by summarily denying 

mother’s section 388 petition. 

II. Section 366.26 hearing

“‘The selection and implementation hearing under section 

366.26 takes place after the juvenile court finds that the parents 

are unfit and the child cannot be returned to them.’” (In re 

Grace P. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 605, 611 (Grace P.).) When a 

parent fails to reunify with the child, and the juvenile court finds 

the child likely to be adopted, the burden shifts to the parent to 

show exceptional circumstances exist such that termination of 

parental rights would be detrimental to the child. (Ibid.) One 

such circumstance is when the parent has maintained regular 

visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit 

from the parent-child relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)

A juvenile court may require an offer of proof before 

allowing a contested hearing on the beneficial parental 

relationship exception to termination of parental rights. (In re 

Tamika T. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1122.) “The offer of proof 

must be specific, setting forth the actual evidence to be produced, 
13

not merely the facts or issues to be addressed and argued.” (Id. 

at p. 1124.) “[F]or example, an offer of proof containing the 

assertion of the fact that the parent had a close parent-child bond 

with the minor—without identification of a witness or witnesses 

who would so testify to that fact—would not be sufficient. 

[Citation.] Similarly, a proffer identifying a witness who would 

testify to a close parent-child bond, without including enough 

specifics of the substance of that testimony to establish both that 

the witness has evidence to offer and that he or she is competent 

to so testify, would also not meet the threshold of a valid offer of 

proof.” (In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 973, 1007 (A.G.).)

We review mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s denial 

of her request for contested section 366.26 hearing under the 

abuse of discretion standard. (Grace P., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at

p. 611.) The record discloses no abuse of discretion. Mother’s 

offer of proof failed to meet the applicable legal standards. It 

failed to set forth the actual evidence to be produced and 

identified no witnesses who could attest to a parent-child bond 

between mother and Saul. To the extent mother claims she 

herself was to be that witness, she failed to set forth the specifics 

and substance of her proposed testimony.

Mother’s reliance on Grace P. and A.G. as support for her 

position is misplaced, as the offers of proof presented by the 

parents in those cases, unlike mother’s, were specific and set 

forth the evidence to be produced. In Grace P., the father offered 

to testify that during his regular visits with the children, he 

talked to them about school, redirected their behavioral issues, 

brought food for them, played with them, and told them he loved 

them. The father further stated that his child Grace would 

testify that she enjoyed the visits, that she wanted the visits to 
14

continue, and that she saw father as a parental figure. (Grace P., 

supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 610.)

In A.G., the mother’s offer of proof identified nine potential 

witnesses, including the minor’s siblings and maternal 

grandparents, who would testify regarding the mother’s 

continuous contact with the child, her relationship with him from 

his birth until detention, and the activities they engaged in 

during visits. The mother also offered to produce photographs 

and videotapes as evidence of the closeness of the parent-child 

bond. (A.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 1013.)

Mother’s offer of proof in this case sets forth no evidence, 

identifies no witnesses, and includes no specifics concerning the 

substance of her proposed testimony. The juvenile court did not 

abuse its discretion by finding mother’s offer of proof insufficient 

to warrant a contested section 366.26 hearing.

III. ICWA

A. Statutory framework

Section 224.2, former subdivision (e), in effect at the time 

father filed his ICWA parental notification of Indian status form 

and when the juvenile court made its section 366.26 findings and 

rulings,3 provided in relevant part: “If the court, social worker, or 

probation officer has reason to believe that an Indian child is 

involved in a proceeding, the court, social worker, or probation 

officer shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian 

status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as 

practicable. Further inquiry includes, but is not limited to, all of 

the following: [¶] (1) Interviewing the parents, Indian custodian, 

3 Section 224.2, subdivision (e) was amended in 2020. That

amendment became effective on September 18, 2020. (Stats. 

2020, ch. 104, § 15.)
15

and extended family members to gather the information required 

in paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of Section 224.3.[4] [¶] (2) 

Contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the State 

Department of Social Services for assistance in identifying the 

names and contact information of the tribes in which the child 

may be a member, or eligible for membership in, and contacting 

the tribes and any other person that may reasonably be expected 

to have information regarding the child’s membership status or 

eligibility. [¶] (3) Contacting the tribe or tribes and any other 

person that may reasonably be expected to have information 

regarding the child’s membership, citizenship status, or 

eligibility. Contact with a tribe shall, at a minimum, include 

telephone, facsimile, or electronic mail contact to each tribe’s 

designated agent for receipt of notices under the federal Indian 

Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. Sec. 1901 et seq.). Contact 

with a tribe shall include sharing information identified by the 

tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a membership or 

eligibility determination, as well as information on the current 

status of the child and the case.” (§ 224.2, former subd. (e).)

Appellate courts are divided as to the applicable standard 

for determining when the duty of inquiry arises under section 

4 Section 224.3, subdivision (a)(5) lists the information that 

must be included in notices that must be sent to the minor’s 

parents, Indian custodian, and tribe, when the court or social 

worker knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is 

involved. That information includes the child’s name, date and 

birthplace, the name of the tribe in which the child may be 

eligible for membership, names of the child’s biological parents, 

grandparents, and great-grandparents, a copy of the section 300 

petition, and information regarding the time, date, and location 

of any scheduled hearings. (§ 224.3, subd. (a)(5).)
16

224.2, former subdivision (e). (Compare In re Austin J. (2020) 47 

Cal.App.5th 870 (Austin J.) with In re S.R. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th

303 (S.R.) and In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275 (T.G.).)

B. Austin J.

In Austin J., the mother filed a parental notification of 

Indian status form stating that one of her children “‘may have 

Indian ancestry,’” Cherokee, through a deceased maternal greatgrandmother. The court concluded that the mother’s statement 

that she “‘may have Indian ancestry’” and had been told that the 

maternal grandmother “‘had Cherokee [ancestry],’” together with 

a similar claim by a maternal great-aunt of possible “‘Cherokee 

heritage’” were “insufficient to support a reason to believe” the 

subject minors were Indian children under ICWA. (Austin J., 

supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 888.) The court noted that the 

mother “conspicuously did not check the boxes on her parental 

notification of Indian status forms that would have indicated that 

she or any of the children is or may be a member of, or eligible for 

membership in, an Indian tribe” (id. at p. 889), and held that 

section 224.2 imposed no duty to inquire further into the subject 

minors’ status as possible Indian children (Austin J., at p. 889).

The court in Austin J. reasoned that the “reason to believe” 

standard under section 224.2 requires a logical connection 

between facts and belief to trigger the duty to investigate. 

(Austin J., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 889.) “Information about a 

tribal connection that ‘is too vague, attenuated and speculative’

will not support a ‘reason to believe’” a child is an Indian child. 

(Id. at p. 888.) The court reasoned that ICWA defines “Indian 

child” in terms of tribal membership, not Indian ancestry; hence, 

“Indian ancestry, without more, does not provide a reason to 
17

believe that a child is a member of a tribe or is the biological child 

of a member.” (Id. at pp. 888-889.)

The court in Austin J. further reasoned that legislation 

enacting section 224.2 (Assembly Bill No. 3176 (2017-2018 Reg. 

Sess.)), supported the court’s narrow interpretation of when there 

is “reason to believe” a minor is an Indian child: “Even if we 

assume that the possibility of Indian ancestry may suggest the 

possibility of Indian tribal membership, that bare suggestion is 

insufficient by itself to establish a reason to believe a child is an 

Indian child. In the recent changes to California’s ICWA-related 

law [(Assembly Bill No. 3176)], the Legislature removed the 

language, ‘information suggesting the child is a member of a tribe 

or eligible for membership in a tribe,’ from the list of 

circumstances that provided one with a ‘reason to know’ a child is 

an Indian child. Significantly, it did not add that language to a 

definition of the newly created ‘reason to believe’ standard for 

further inquiry. We will not infer its incorporation into that 

standard.” (Austin J., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 889.)

C. T.G.

The court in T.G. disagreed with the Austin J. court’s 

“narrow reading of the nature and quality of information 

sufficient to trigger the duty of further inquiry.” (T.G., supra, 58 

Cal.App.5th at p. 294.) The court in T.G. acknowledged that 

ICWA defines “‘Indian child’ . . . in terms of tribal membership, 

not ancestry,” but pointed out that “the question of membership 

is determined by the tribes, not the courts or child protective 

agencies.” (Ibid.) The court noted that “the imposition of a duty 

to inquire that is significantly more expansive than the duty to 

provide ICWA notice is premised on the commonsense 

understanding that, over time, Indian families, particularly those 
18

living in major urban centers like Los Angeles, may well have 

lost the ability to convey accurate information regarding their 

tribal status. As a result, the information available at the outset 

of dependency proceedings will often be inadequate to ensure the 

necessary protection of the rights and cultural heritage of Indian

children, Indian families and Indian tribes. [Citation.] General 

information from the family about its ancestry frequently 

provides the only available basis to believe an Indian child may 

be involved. [Citation.] Additional investigation may not develop 

further information establishing the need for ICWA notice, but it 

is essential to the enforcement of the court’s and child protective 

agency’s ‘affirmative and continuing duty to inquire’ to construe 

broadly the duty to make further inquiry.” (T.G., supra, 58 

Cal.App.5th at p. 295, fn. omitted.)

The court in T.G. rejected the Austin J. court’s suggestion 

that Assembly Bill No. 3176 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) “was intended 

to weaken the robust requirements for making further inquiry 

established by then-existing case law.” (T.G., supra, 58 

Cal.App.5th at p. 295.) The court acknowledged that Assembly 

Bill No. 3176 modified the definition of “‘reason to know’” and 

removed from that definition “‘information suggesting the child is 

a member of a tribe or eligible for membership in a tribe.’” (Ibid.) 

Assembly Bill No. 3176 simultaneously expanded, however, the 

statutory language triggering the duty to make further inquiry 

from “‘knows or has reason to know’ to ‘reason to believe an 

Indian child is involved.’” (T.G., at p. 295.) Although the phrase 

“‘“information suggesting”’” was not included in the new “‘reason 

to believe’” standard, the T.G. court noted “it is difficult to 

understand how, as a matter of plain meaning, a parent’s 

statement that she has been told she has Indian ancestry 
19

through a particular tribe or a specific relative ‘suggests’ her 

child is eligible for tribal membership [citations], but does not 

also provide ‘a reason to believe’ the child may be eligible under

the current statute.” (Id. at pp. 295-296.)

The court in T.G. further noted that the 2020 amendment 

to section 224.2, subdivision (e), although not in effect during the 

proceedings at issue, “confirms the Legislature’s view the ‘reason 

to believe’ standard requiring further inquiry concerning a child’s 

possible status as an Indian child should be broadly interpreted.” 

(T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 296.) That amendment, which 

became effective on September 18, 2020, provides in a new 

subdivision (e)(1) to section 224.2: “There is reason to believe a 

child involved in a proceeding is an Indian child whenever the 

court, social worker, or probation officer has information 

suggesting that either the parent of the child or the child is a 

member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian tribe. 

Information suggesting membership or eligibility for membership 

includes, but is not limited to, information that indicates, but 

does not establish, the existence of one or more of the grounds for 

reason to know enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (6), inclusive, of 

subdivision (d).” (Accord, T.G.., at p. 296, citing Assem. Bill

No. 2944 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) and Stats. 2020, ch. 104, § 15.)

D. S.R.

The court in S.R., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th 303 also disagreed 

with “Austin J.’s narrow reading of the kind of information 

sufficient to trigger the duty of further inquiry” and agreed 

instead with the T.G. court’s reasoning that an Indian child’s 

eligibility for membership in a tribe “‘is determined by the tribes, 

not the courts or child protective agencies.’” (S.R., supra, at

p. 316.)
20

The parents in S.R. filed ICWA-020 forms at the time of the 

detention hearing indicating they did not know of any Indian 

ancestry. The children were subsequently placed with the 

maternal grandparents, who attended a permanency planning 

review hearing and completed a “family find” and ICWA inquiry 

form. The grandmother’s form indicated she did not know if she 

had Indian ancestry but checked boxes stating the children had 

other unidentified relatives with Indian ancestry and had family 

members who lived on federal trust land, on a reservation, or on 

a rancheria or an allotment. The grandfather checked boxes on 

the form indicating ancestry with the Yaqui tribe of Arizona, and 

that the children had other relatives with Indian ancestry who 

had lived on federal trust land, on a reservation, on a rancheria, 

or an allotment. The grandfather also identified the children’s 

great-grandmother, Virginia G., who lived with the grandparents, 

as a Yaqui ancestor. (S.R., supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 310.) The 

court in S.R. concluded that this “very specific evidence of Indian 

ancestry . . . does provide reason to believe the children are 

Indian children, even if that evidence does not directly establish 

the children or their parents are members or eligible for 

membership.” (Id. at p. 317.)

The court in S.R. noted that the 2020 amendment to 

section 224.2, subdivision (e) “confirms the ‘reason to believe’ 

standard requiring further inquiry should be broadly interpreted. 

[T]he Legislature amended the statute to specify ‘[t]here is 

reason to believe a child involved in a proceeding is an Indian 

child whenever the court, social worker, or probation officer has 

information suggesting that either the parent of the child or the 

child is a member or may be eligible for membership in an Indian 

tribe.’ [Citation.] Those plain terms suggest a loose fit between 
21

the information that requires further inquiry and the specific 

kinds of information that constitute ‘reason to know’ a child in 

dependency proceedings is an Indian child as defined by statute. 

The next sentence in the statute eliminates all doubt: 

‘Information suggesting membership or eligibility for 

membership includes, but is not limited to, information that 

indicates, but does not establish, the existence of one or more of 

the grounds for reason to know enumerated in paragraphs (1) to 

(6), inclusive, of subdivision (d).’ [Citation.] That new provision 

forecloses the narrow interpretation of what constitutes reason to 

believe advanced by the court in Austin J.” (S.R., supra, 64 

Cal.App.5th at p. 317.)

E. Further inquiry was required in this case

In this case a parent has identified specific tribes as well as 

relatives who may have information about the child’s connection 

to those tribes. We agree with the courts’ analysis in T.G. and 

S.R. and find that the “reason to believe” standard triggering a 

duty of further inquiry under section 224.2 has been met in this 

case. Although the 2020 amendment to section 224.2, subdivision 

(e) discussed in T.G. and S.R. was not operative during the 

proceedings at issue here, that amendment confirms our 

conclusion on the facts present here. The Legislature has made 

clear that there is “reason to believe” a minor is an Indian child 

when there is specific information suggesting eligibility for tribal 

membership. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) That information need only 

indicate that a member of the child’s extended family can inform 

the court that the minor is an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. 

(d)(1), (e)(1).)

The information provided by father in this case was 

sufficient to trigger a duty of further inquiry by the Department. 
22

Father submitted an ICWA form that indicated Saul may be 

eligible for membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe. 

He listed the Blackfoot tribe and later mentioned the Cherokee 

tribe, identified the paternal grandmother as a source of further 

information, and provided her name and telephone number. The 

juvenile court directed the Department to “follow up” with the 

paternal grandmother to determine whether she had any 

additional information. The record does not indicate that the 

Department did so, despite the fact that the Department 

interviewed the paternal grandmother before father filed his 

ICWA-020 form. Under these circumstances, the Department 

was required to further investigate father’s claim regarding 

Saul’s possible Indian status. (§ 224.3, subd. (e).) The matter 

must accordingly be remanded for compliance with the ICWA

inquiry requirements, and if warranted, to provide notice to the 

applicable tribes. (In re J.D. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 118, 124.)

DISPOSITION

The section 366.26 orders of the juvenile court are 

conditionally reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile 

court for full compliance with the inquiry, and if warranted, 

notice requirements of ICWA and related California law.

______________________

CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

______________________________ ______________________

ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J. HOFFSTADT, J.