UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

ANGELO SADLER, a/k/a 

DARRYL ALAN WESTON, 

 Petitioner, 

v. CASE NO. 15-12437 

 HONORABLE NANCY G. EDMUNDS 

THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Respondent. 

__________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER

GRANTING THE STATE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

AND DISMISSAL OF THE HABEAS CORPUS PETITION (ECF NO. 8), 

DISMISSING THE HABEAS CORPUS PETITION (ECF NO. 1), AND 

 DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

 This matter has come before the Court on petitioner Angelo Sadler’s habeas 

corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and the State’s motion for summary judgment 

and dismissal of the habeas petition. For reasons given below, the Court agrees with 

the State that Petitioner failed to comply with the one-year statute of limitations for 

habeas petitions. Accordingly, the State’s motion will be granted, and the habeas 

petition will be dismissed. 

 I. Background

 Petitioner was charged in Wayne County, Michigan with second-degree murder, 

Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.317, assault with intent to commit murder, Mich. Comp. Laws 

§ 750.83, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony 

firearm), Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b. The charges arose from a shooting in Detroit 

2:15-cv-12437-NGE-MKM Doc # 15 Filed 08/23/16 Pg 1 of 11 Pg ID 572
2 

in July 31, 1994. One victim died from multiple gunshot wounds; the other victim was 

unharmed. 

 On March 10, 1995, Petitioner pleaded guilty, as charged, to second-degree 

murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and felony firearm. The plea and 

sentencing agreement called for a sentence of ten to fifteen years in prison for the 

murder and assault convictions and a consecutive term of two years in prison for the 

felony-firearm conviction. The trial court scheduled the sentencing for April 6, 1995, but 

Petitioner absconded from the jurisdiction and failed to appear for sentencing. 

 In 2006 or 2007, Petitioner was arrested in Florida on a federal narcotics charge. 

He subsequently pleaded guilty to the charge, and on June 8, 2007, United States 

District Judge Kenneth A. Marra of the Southern District of Florida sentenced Petitioner 

to ten years in prison for the crime. 

 During the federal proceedings, officials discovered that there was an 

outstanding warrant for Petitioner’s arrest due to his failure to appear for sentencing in 

Michigan. No immediate action was taken to extradite him to Michigan, and Petitioner 

alleges that he was not brought to Michigan until July of 2009. On October 19, 2009, 

the state trial court sentenced Petitioner, as previously agreed, to concurrent terms of 

ten to fifteen years in prison for the murder and assault convictions and to a consecutive 

term of two years in prison for the felony-firearm conviction. 

 Petitioner appealed as of right on the basis that he was entitled to sentencing 

credit for the two-year period beginning in June of 2007 and ending in July of 2009. He 

claimed that the Wayne County prosecutor knew he was in federal prison during that 

time, but failed to extradite him to Michigan for sentencing on his state conviction. 

2:15-cv-12437-NGE-MKM Doc # 15 Filed 08/23/16 Pg 2 of 11 Pg ID 573
3 

Petitioner argued that the delay in extraditing him violated the Interstate Agreement on 

Detainers (Mich. Comp. Laws § 780.601), the Michigan sentencing credit statute (Mich. 

Comp. Laws § 769.11b), his right to due process, and his right to a speedy trial. The 

Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed with Petitioner and affirmed his sentence. See 

People v. Sadler, No. 294813, 2010 WL 5129744 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2010). On 

April 25, 2011, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal because it was not 

persuaded to review the questions presented to it. See People v. Sadler, 796 N.W.2d 

90 (Mich. 2011) (table). 

 On or about September 16, 2013, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from 

judgment in the state trial court. He argued that his rights to due process and a speedy 

trial were violated by the two-year delay in bringing him to Michigan for sentencing in his 

state case. The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion after concluding that there was no 

merit in his claims and that Petitioner had not shown “good cause” under Michigan 

Court Rule 6.508(D)(3) for failing to raise his claims on appeal and “actual prejudice.” 

See People v. Weston, No. 94-008592-01 (Wayne Cty. Cir. Ct. Dec. 17, 2013). 

 Petitioner appealed the trial court’s decision on grounds that (1) his sentence 

was invalid because the trial court refused to grant credit for time served and (2) 

transcripts were being withheld from him. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave 

to appeal for failure to establish entitlement to relief under Michigan Court Rule 

6.508(D). See People v. Sadler, No. 321389 (Mich. Ct. App. July 2, 2014). On March 

3, 2015, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal for the same reason. See 

People v. Sadler, 859 N.W.2d 688 (Mich. 2015) (table). 

2:15-cv-12437-NGE-MKM Doc # 15 Filed 08/23/16 Pg 3 of 11 Pg ID 574
4 

 Finally, on June 30, 2015, Petitioner signed and dated his habeas corpus 

petition, which the Clerk of the Court filed on July 7, 2015. Petitioner argues that he is 

entitled to credit on his Michigan sentence for the two years that he served in federal 

custody while waiting to be extradited from Florida to Michigan. More specifically, 

Petitioner asserts that (1) the State violated his right to a speedy trial by its delay in 

producing him for sentencing in Michigan and (2) the State violated his right to due 

process through its gross negligence and abuse of power in failing to promptly extradite 

him for sentencing. 

 Respondent maintains in his motion for summary judgment that the Court should 

dismiss the habeas petition on the basis of Petitioner’s failure to comply with the oneyear statute of limitations. Petitioner replies that Respondent should be required to 

address the merits of his claims because he pursued his rights diligently and 

extraordinary circumstances prevented him from timely filing his habeas corpus petition. 

II. Discussion

A. Summary Judgment and the Statute of Limitations 

 The Court must “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). This rule applies to habeas corpus proceedings. 

Harris v. Stegall, 157 F. Supp.2d 743, 746 (E.D. Mich. 2001). The moving party bears 

the responsibility for “identifying those parts of the record that demonstrate the absence 

of any genuine issue of material fact.” Modowan v. Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir. 

2009) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “To defeat a motion 

for summary judgment, the non-moving party must set forth specific facts sufficient to 

2:15-cv-12437-NGE-MKM Doc # 15 Filed 08/23/16 Pg 4 of 11 Pg ID 575
5 

show that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in his favor.” Sanders v. 

Freeman, 221 F.3d 846, 851 (6th Cir. 2000). 

 The basis for Respondent’s motion is the statute of limitations set forth in the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). AEDPA governs this 

case because Petitioner filed his habeas petition in 2015, long after AEDPA was 

enacted. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) (holding that AEDPA 

generally applies to cases filed after the Act became effective); Barker v. Yukins, 199 

F.3d 867, 871 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating “[i]t is now well settled that AEDPA applies to all 

habeas petitions filed on or after its April 24, 1996 effective date”). 

 AEDPA established a one-year period of limitation for a state prisoner to file a 

federal habeas corpus petition. Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 550 (2011) (citing 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)); Holbrook v. Curtin, __ F.3d __, __, No. 14-1247, slip op. at 4 (6th 

Cir. Aug. 15, 2016) (citing § 2244(d)(1)). The limitations period runs from the latest of 

following four dates: 

 (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

 (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State 

action; 

 (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized 

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review; or 

 (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence. 

2:15-cv-12437-NGE-MKM Doc # 15 Filed 08/23/16 Pg 5 of 11 Pg ID 576
6 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). “AEDPA also contains a tolling provision, which 

specifies that ‘the time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction 

or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall 

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.’ ” Holbrook, slip 

op. at 4 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)). 

B. Application

 Petitioner is not relying on a newly recognized constitutional right or on newly 

discovered facts, and he has not shown that the State created an impediment to filing a 

timely habeas petition. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B-D). Consequently, the statute of 

limitations began to run when his judgment “became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

 “Direct review” concludes for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) when the availability of 

direct appeal to the state courts and to the United States Supreme Court has been 

exhausted. Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119 (2009). “Until that time, the 

‘process of direct review’ has not ‘com[e] to an end’ and ‘a presumption of finality and 

legality’ cannot yet have ‘attache[d] to the conviction and sentence.’ ” Id. at 119-20 

(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983)). 

For petitioners who pursue direct review all the way to [the Supreme] 

Court, the judgment becomes final at the “conclusion of direct review”—

when [the Supreme] Court affirms a conviction on the merits or denies a 

petition for certiorari. For all other petitioners, the judgment becomes final 

at the “expiration of the time for seeking such review”—when the time for 

pursuing direct review in [the Supreme] Court, or in state court, expires. 

2:15-cv-12437-NGE-MKM Doc # 15 Filed 08/23/16 Pg 6 of 11 Pg ID 577
7 

Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 653-54 (2012). A petition for the writ of certiorari in 

the United States Supreme Court must be filed within ninety days of the judgment in a 

state court of last resort. Sup. Ct. Rule 13.1. 

 Petitioner did not apply for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court 

on direct review, and the deadline for doing so was July 24, 2011, ninety days after the 

Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on direct review. Thus, Petitioner’s 

convictions became final on July 24, 2011, when the time for pursuing direct review in 

state court expired. Gonzalez, 132 S. Ct. at 653-54. The statute of limitations began to 

run on the following day. Miller v. Collins, 305 F.3d 491, 495 n.4 (6th Cir. 2002). It ran 

without interruption for one year and then expired on July 24, 2012. 

 Petitioner did not file his habeas petition until 2015. Thus, the habeas petition is 

time-barred, absent equitable tolling of the limitations period or a credible showing of 

actual innocence.1

C. Equitable Tolling

 The Supreme Court has “made clear that a [habeas] ‘petitioner’ is ‘entitled to 

equitable tolling’ only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and 

(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” 

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 

 

1

 Although Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment in September of 2013, the 

limitations period had already expired by then. The motion did not revive the limitations 

period, nor restart the limitations clock at zero. Vroman v. Brigano, 346 F.3d 598, 602 

(6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Rashid v. Khulmann, 991 F. Supp. 254, 259 (S.D. N.Y. 1998)). 

The tolling provision of § 2244(d)(2) “can only serve to pause a clock that has not yet 

fully run. Once the limitations period is expired, collateral petitions can no longer serve 

to avoid a statute of limitations.” Rashid, 991 F. Supp. at 259. 

2:15-cv-12437-NGE-MKM Doc # 15 Filed 08/23/16 Pg 7 of 11 Pg ID 578
8 

408, 418 (2005)); see also Hall v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst., 662 F.3d 745, 749-50 

(6th Cir. 2011) (adopting Holland’s test for determining whether a habeas petitioner is 

entitled to equitable tolling). 

 In his reply to Respondent’s motion, Petitioner urges the Court to equitably toll 

the limitations period because he did not receive notice of the Michigan Supreme 

Court’s 2011 order denying leave to appeal on direct review. He claims that, without 

notice of the state supreme court’s order, he was unaware that the statute of limitations 

had begun to run. 

 In a supporting affidavit, Petitioner alleges that he was incarcerated in a federal 

prison in Pennsylvania in 2011 and that in January 2012, he was transferred to a federal 

prison in Minnesota. He asserts that he did not become aware of the Michigan 

Supreme Court’s order on direct appeal until September of 2013 when he spoke with 

someone whom he asked to check on his appeal. 

 A prisoner’s failure to receive a copy of a state court’s decision can be a basis for 

equitable tolling of the limitations period, but the prisoner may not “passively await 

decision.” Miller, 305 F.3d at 496. Instead, the prisoner must act diligently both before 

and after receiving notice of an appellate court’s decision. Id. 

 In Miller, the habeas petitioner filed an application to re-open his appeal. After 

waiting nine months for a decision on his application, he asked the state court of 

appeals to rule on his application. The court of appeals had already ruled on his 

application, but there was evidence to corroborate Miller’s contention that he had not 

received the appellate court’s ruling. Additionally, Miller acted promptly upon learning of 

the appellate court’s ruling. The Sixth Circuit determined that, under the circumstances, 

2:15-cv-12437-NGE-MKM Doc # 15 Filed 08/23/16 Pg 8 of 11 Pg ID 579
9 

waiting nine months before making an inquiry about the status of the appellate case 

was reasonable. The Sixth Circuit ruled that equitable tolling of the statute of limitations 

was appropriate for the time between the appellate court’s decision on Miller’s 

application and the date that Miller received notice of the decision. 

 In Robinson v. Easterling, 424 F. App’x 439 (6th Cir. 2011), the Sixth Circuit 

considered a prisoner’s delay in asking his attorney for updates on the status of his 

appellate case. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that “the realities of incarceration may 

justifiably delay a petitioner’s request for a case status update,” but determined that 

waiting eighteen months between requests for case updates was not reasonable 

diligence and did not warrant equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Id. at 443. 

The Sixth Circuit also has 

declined to allow equitable tolling where a petitioner’s attorney misled him 

into believing that his appeal was still pending before the state court 

because the petitioner failed to diligently monitor the progress of his 

appeal. Winkfield v. Bagley, 66 Fed. Appx. 578, 583–84 (6th Cir.2003). 

Similarly, [the Sixth Circuit] has declined to equitably toll the statute of 

limitations where a petitioner alleged that the state court and his attorney 

failed to inform him that a decision had been rendered affirming his 

conviction. Elliott v. Dewitt, 10 Fed. Appx. 311, 312–13 (6th Cir. 2001). 

Keeling v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst., 673 F.3d 452, 463 (6th Cir. 2012). 

 Petitioner has not stated precisely when he requested updates on his state 

supreme court case. He does say that he learned of the Michigan Supreme Court’s 

ruling in 2013 after he asked someone to check on the status of his case. But that was 

more than two and a half years after he filed his application for leave to appeal in the 

Michigan Supreme Court on January 10, 2011, and he apparently was in transit 

between federal prisons for only a short portion of that time. If he had checked on the 

2:15-cv-12437-NGE-MKM Doc # 15 Filed 08/23/16 Pg 9 of 11 Pg ID 580
10 

status of his state supreme court case after nine months of filing his application for 

leave to appeal, as the petitioner in Miller did, he would have learned that the Michigan 

Supreme Court had ruled on his application and that the federal statute of limitations 

had begun to run. Then he could have filed a timely habeas petition or a motion for 

relief from judgment which would have tolled the limitations period. 

 Petitioner has failed to show that he diligently monitored the status of his state 

supreme court case, and the two-and-a-half-year delay in seeking information about his 

supreme court case exceeded the amount of time that the Sixth Circuit determined was 

excessive and inappropriate for equitable tolling in Robinson, 424 F. App’x at 443. The 

Court therefore declines to equitably toll the limitations period.

 D. Actual Innocence

 Actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which habeas 

petitioners may pass when the impediment to consideration of the merits of their 

constitutional claims is expiration of the statute of limitations. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 

S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013). But Petitioner pleaded guilty, as charged, and he has not 

asserted that he is innocent. “AEDPA’s time limitations apply to the typical case in 

which no allegation of actual innocence is made.” Id. at 1933. Petitioner therefore may 

not pass through the “actual innocence” gateway to have his claims heard on the merits. 

III. Conclusion

 Petitioner filed his habeas petition after the statute of limitations expired, and he 

is not entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period. Therefore, Respondent is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court grants Respondent’s motion for 

2:15-cv-12437-NGE-MKM Doc # 15 Filed 08/23/16 Pg 10 of 11 Pg ID 581
11 

summary judgment and dismissal of the habeas petition (ECF No. 8) and dismisses the 

habeas corpus petition (ECF No. 1) as untimely. 

 Before Petitioner may appeal this Court’s decision, a certificate of appealability 

must issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1). A certificate of 

appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When, as here, a district court 

rejects a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the merits of the 

petitioner’s underlying claims, the petitioner must show “that jurists of reason would find 

it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

 Reasonable jurists could not debate whether the Court’s procedural ruling is 

correct or whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right. 

The Court therefore denies a certificate of appealability. 

 

 s/ Nancy G. Edmunds 

 NANCY G. EDMUNDS 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: August 23, 2016 

 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 I hereby certify that a copy of this order has been served upon counsel and/or parties of record on 

This 23rd day of August, 2016 by regular mail and/or CM/ECF. 

 s/ Carol J Bethel 

 Case Manager 

2:15-cv-12437-NGE-MKM Doc # 15 Filed 08/23/16 Pg 11 of 11 Pg ID 582