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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

COLETTE KNIGHT, 

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-CV-14513 

vs. DISTRICT JUDGE MATTHEW F. LEITMAN 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE MONA K. MAJZOUB 

COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant. 

___________________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff Colette Knight seeks judicial review of Defendant the Commissioner of Society 

Security’s determination that she is not entitled to Social Security benefits for her physical 

impairments under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Docket no. 1.) Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment (docket no. 10) and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket 

no. 13). Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant’s Motion. (Docket no. 14.) The motions have 

been referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(B). (Docket no. 2.) The Court has reviewed the pleadings, dispenses with a hearing 

pursuant to E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2), and issues this Report and Recommendation. 

I. Recommendation 

The undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [10] be 

GRANTED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [13] be DENIED. This matter 

should be remanded for further discussion of Plaintiff’s credibility and further analysis of her 

medical record and complaints as discussed herein. 

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II. Procedural History 

Plaintiff filed an application for Supplement Security Income with a protective filing date 

of April 11, 2012, alleging that she had been disabled since January 1, 2007, due to uterine 

fibroids, hearing loss, hypertension, asthma, degenerative join disease in her knees, and chronic 

back pain. (See TR 16, 115-27.) The Social Security Administration denied benefits. (See TR 

16.) Plaintiff then requested a de novo hearing, which was held on July 31, 2013, before 

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) John Dodson, who subsequently found that Plaintiff was not 

entitled to benefits because she was capable of performing a significant number of jobs in the 

national economy. (TR 14-21.) The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision, 

and Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review. The parties then filed their instant 

Motions. 

III. Plaintiff’s Testimony, Medical Evidence, and Vocational Expert Testimony

Plaintiff (docket no. 10 at 5-9) and the ALJ (TR 17-20) each set out a detailed factual 

recitation with regard to Plaintiff’s medical record, the vocational expert’s testimony, and 

Plaintiff’s hearing testimony. Defendant adopts the ALJ’s recitation of facts. (Docket no. 13 at 

4.) As discussed herein, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s findings, arguing that he mischaracterizes 

evidence and misinterprets her medical records. Having reviewed Plaintiff’s medical record, the 

undersigned finds that there are no material inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s recitation of facts 

and the record itself. Therefore, the undersigned will incorporate Plaintiff’s statement of facts by 

reference. Additionally, the undersigned has conducted an independent review of Plaintiff’s 

medical record and the hearing transcript and will include comments and citations as necessary 

throughout this Report and Recommendation. 

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IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Determination

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 11, 

2012, her application date, and that she suffered from severe uterine fibroids, bilateral 

sensorineural loss, hypertension, asthma, and degenerative joint disease of both knees. (TR 16.) 

The ALJ then found that her impairments did not meet or equal those listed in the Listing of 

Impairments. (TR 16-17.) The ALJ found, however, that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the 

extent of her symptoms were not wholly credible and that Plaintiff had the residual functional 

capacity to perform light work with the following additional exceptions: 

[Claimant must] avoid concentrated exposure to loud noise; avoid hazards such as 

unprotected heights or moving machinery; [have] no concentrated exposure to 

humidity or extreme temperatures; [have] no concentrated exposure to pulmonary 

irritants, such as dust, odors, gases, fumes, or poor ventilation; and [perform] no 

work requiring production like-standards (sic). 

(TR 17-20.) The ALJ then determined, in reliance on the VE’s testimony, that Plaintiff was 

capable of performing a significant number of jobs in the national economy. (TR 20-21.) 

Therefore, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act from April 

11, 2012, through the date of her decision. (TR 21.) 

V. Law and Analysis 

A. Standard of Review

 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s 

final decisions. Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decisions is limited to determining 

whether his findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether he employed the proper 

legal standards. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Walters v. Comm’r, 127 

F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a 

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preponderance; it is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.’” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Walters, 127 F.3d at 528. It is not the function of this Court to try 

cases de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility. See Brainard 

v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989); Garner v. Heckler, 745 

F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). 

 In determining the existence of substantial evidence, the court must examine the 

administrative record as a whole. See Kirk v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 

536 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). If the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, even if the reviewing court would decide 

the matter differently, Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), and even if 

substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. See Her v. Comm’r, 203 F.3d 388, 

389-90 (6th Cir. 1999); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (noting that 

the substantial evidence standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which the 

decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts”). 

B. Framework for Social Security Determinations

 Plaintiff’s Social Security disability determination was made in accordance with a 

five-step sequential analysis. In the first four steps, Plaintiff was required to show that: 

(1) Plaintiff was not presently engaged in substantial gainful employment; and 

(2) Plaintiff suffered from a severe impairment; and 

(3) the impairment met or was medically equal to a “listed impairment;” or 

(4) Plaintiff did not have the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform 

relevant past work. 

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See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). If Plaintiff’s impairments prevented Plaintiff from doing past 

work, the Commissioner, at step five, would consider Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and past 

work experience to determine if Plaintiff could perform other work. If not, Plaintiff would be 

deemed disabled. See id. at § 404.1520(g). The Commissioner has the burden of proof only on 

“the fifth step, proving that there is work available in the economy that the claimant can perform.” 

Her, 203 F.3d at 391. To meet this burden, the Commissioner must make a finding “supported by 

substantial evidence that [the claimant] has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs.” 

Varley v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 1987). This 

“substantial evidence” may be in the form of vocational expert testimony in response to a 

hypothetical question, “but only ‘if the question accurately portrays [the claimant’s] individual 

physical and mental impairments.’” Id. (citations omitted). 

C. Analysis

 The Social Security Act authorizes “two types of remand: (1) a post judgment remand in 

conjunction with a decision affirming, modifying, or reversing a decision of the [Commissioner] (a 

sentence-four remand); and (2) a pre-judgment remand for consideration of new and material 

evidence that for good cause was not previously presented to the [Commissioner] (a sentence-six 

remand).” Faucher v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Under a sentence-four remand, the Court has the authority to “enter upon the 

pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, denying, or reversing the decision of 

the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the cause for a hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Where there is insufficient support for the ALJ’s findings, “the appropriate remedy is reversal and 

a sentence-four remand for further consideration.” Morgan v. Astrue, 10-207, 2011 WL 

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2292305, at *8 (E.D.Ky. June 8, 2011) (citing Faucher, 17 F.3d at 174). Plaintiff asserts that this 

matter should be reversed or remanded because the ALJ failed to properly consider Plaintiff’s knee 

issues, hearing loss, or angina when determining her RFC. As part of her argument, Plaintiff 

contends that the ALJ failed to perform a proper credibility analysis, misinterpreted evidence, and 

improperly applied Plaintiff’s medical records. (Docket no. 10.) 

1. The ALJ’s Credibility Determination 

As a continuing theme throughout her brief, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to 

properly credit her allegations of limitations related to her physical impairments, with a specific 

focus on her knee pain, hearing loss, and angina-related chest pain. As discussed further, infra, 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when he failed to account for any limitations related to these 

impairments after finding them to be severe at Step 2. Additionally, though, Plaintiff argues that 

to the extent the ALJ found that her allegations lacked credibility, he improperly relied only on a 

lack of objective evidence in making this determination. (See docket no. 10.) 

“An ALJ’s findings based on the credibility of the applicant are to be accorded great weight 

and deference, particularly since an ALJ is charged with the duty of observing a witness’s 

demeanor and credibility.” Walters v. Commissioner, 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). But 

credibility assessments are not insulated from judicial review. Despite the deference that is due, 

such a determination must nevertheless be supported by substantial evidence. Id. An ALJ’s 

credibility determination must contain “specific reasons . . . supported by the evidence in the case 

record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent 

reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the reasons for that 

weight.” SSR 96–7p. “It is not enough to make a conclusory statement that ‘the individual’s 

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allegations have been considered’ or that ‘the allegations are (or are not) credible.’” Id. “The 

adjudicator may find all, only some, or none of an individual’s allegations to be credible” and may 

also find the statements credible to a certain degree. See id.

Further, to the extent that the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements are not substantiated by 

the objective medical evidence in the record, the Regulations explicitly provide that “we will not 

reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about 

the effect your symptoms have on your ability to work . . . solely because the available objective 

medical evidence does not substantiate your statements.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(2). The ALJ 

must consider: (1) the claimant’s daily activities, (2) the location, duration, frequency, and 

intensity of claimant’s pain, (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, 

effectiveness, and side effects of any medication taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms, (5) 

treatment, other than medication, for pain relief, (6) any measures used to relieve the pain, and (7) 

functional limitations and restrictions due to the pain. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3); see also 

Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1039-40 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying these factors). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ impermissibly relied on only the lack objective medical 

evidence when discrediting her testimony. Moreover, Plaintiff contends, the ALJ ignored her 

complaints of pain following injections in her knees; he failed to acknowledge that although her 

hearing would have improved with hearing aids, she only had one hearing aid because she could 

not afford to purchase them; and he failed to consider that although her chest pain was reduced 

with nitroglycerine, she had to rest for 20 minutes after taking her pills before they would take 

effect. (Docket no. 10 at 13, 15, 17.) Defendant argues that the ALJ did not err because a lack of 

objective evidence is a proper consideration; he also considered the effect of Plaintiff’s medication 

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on her impairments, as required; that Plaintiff’s single hearing aid was sufficient based on the 

record evidence; and that Plaintiff provided no evidence to suggest that she needed to take 

20-minute breaks related to her taking nitroglycerine. (Docket no. 13 at 10-11, 12-13, 14-15.) 

In his opinion, the ALJ states, “The objective medical evidence does not fully corroborate 

the claimant’s testimony regarding the extent of her limitations.” (TR 18.) And although he 

mentions that her testimony is not credible “for the reasons explained in this decision,” he does not 

set forth those reasons. (See TR 17-20.) Defendant correctly points out that the ALJ referred to 

exhibits wherein Plaintiff complained of knee pain following her injection, that Plaintiff appears to 

have the ability to understand conversational speech with one hearing aid, and that Plaintiff did not 

provide any evidence aside from her own testimony that she had to take a 20-minute break after 

taking nitroglycerine. But it is the ALJ’s rationale that is on review, not Defendant’s; thus, 

Defendant’s post-hoc rationalization is inapposite. See Christephore v. Commissioner of Social 

Sec., No. 11-13547, 2012 WL 2274328, *6 (E.D. Mich. June 18, 2012) (Roberts, J.) (“[I]t is not the 

Court’s job to conduct a de novo review of the evidence or to rubber stamp the ALJ’s decision. The 

Court must ensure both that the ALJ applied the correct legal standard and that his decision is 

supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, it is the ALJ’s rationale that is under review, not 

defense counsel’s.”). Even if the ALJ’s decision is ultimately supported by substantial evidence, 

his decision is not sufficiently specific to make clear the reasons he discounted Plaintiff’s 

testimony. And without that rationale, the Court cannot determine if the ALJ properly considered 

all of the evidence before him. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion should be granted, and this matter 

should be remanded for a property discussion of Plaintiff’s credibility. 

2. Plaintiff’s Knee Pain, Hearing Loss, and Angina 

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In the context of the ALJ’s credibility determination, Plaintiff primarily argues that the 

ALJ also failed to properly consider the evidence with regard to her knee pain, hearing loss, and 

angina-related chest pain. (Docket no. 10.) Plaintiff notes that the ALJ found that all three 

impairments were severe—meaning that they “significantly limit[ her] ability to perform basic 

work activities, 20 CFR §§ 416.920, 416.921—but failed to then account for any limitations 

related to these severe impairments. 

With regard to her knee pain, Plaintiff notes her continuing complaints of bilateral knee 

pain to her treating physician, Dr. Ellison, including complaints of pain after she received a 

Kenalog injection. (Docket no. 10 at 12-13.) Plaintiff argues that instead of considering the 

evidence, the ALJ relied on the opinion of a state agency consultant, but that consultant did not 

have any of the records from Dr. Ellison. (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff claims that because a limitation to 

“light work” requires “a good deal of walking or standing,” a consideration of Plaintiff’s knee pain 

was critical. (Id. at 11 (quoting SSR 83-10).) Moreover, Plaintiff alleges, while the ALJ 

continually noted that her examinations were “normal,” such was not the case. (See docket no. 14 

at 5-6.) 

With regard to her hearing loss, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ summarily dismissed her 

allegations of hearing problems by improperly determining that he hearing loss was corrected with 

the use of hearing aids. Plaintiff impliedly acknowledges that her hearing may be improved 

through the use of two properly fitted and properly calibrated hearing aids, but she notes that the 

only hearing aid she was able to procure was through the help of the Lion’s club, which she 

testified “did not work too well.” (Docket no. 10 at 7-8, 14-15.) Plaintiff argues, however, that 

the main problem was the ALJ’s failure to even acknowledge that she only had one hearing aid and 

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his continued reference to hearing “aids” throughout his decision and his finding that they 

significantly improve her hearing. (Id. at 14-16 (citing TR 17-20).) Plaintiff also notes that in 

reaching this determination, the ALJ relied on records from her treating physician, but “there is no 

indication that the treating physician ever saw plaintiff after she got even that solitary hearing aid.” 

(Id. at 15.) 

Finally, with regard to her angina, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ entirely ignored her cardiac 

symptoms by incorrectly finding that all of her examinations were “normal” or “negative.” 

Plaintiff contends that her examinations were not normal, as evidenced by a mildly ischemic target 

heart rate, a decrease in exercise functional capacity, and her prescription for nitroglycerine 

tablets. (Id. at 16-17.) 

It is axiomatic that an ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence in the record. 

Kornecky v. Comm’r, 167 Fed. Appx. 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). And as 

Defendant notes, a finding that an impairment is severe does not necessarily result in a finding of 

related functional limitations. (Docket no. 13 at 6 (citing Courtney v. Colvin, No. 13-72, 2014 

WL 320234, at *4 (D. Me. Jan. 29, 2014)).) Nevertheless, the undersigned agrees with Plaintiff. 

The evidence and considerations raised by Plaintiff more than trigger a reference to the ALJ’s zone 

of choice. Although Defendant’s arguments with regard to why Plaitniff’s RFC is supported by 

substantial evidence are sound, the ALJ’s failure to discuss Plaintiff’s Kenalog injections or her 

subsequent pain; his failure to discuss the status of her hearing loss without two hearing aids or her 

continued complaints related thereto; and his misstatements with regard to her cardiovascular 

examinations, coupled with a lack of any mention of her nitroglycerine or its related effects, call 

into question whether the ALJ even considered this information. Therefore, this matter should be 

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remanded for further discussion and determination. 

VI. Conclusion 

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [10] should be 

GRANTED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [13] should be DENIED. This 

matter should be remanded for further discussion of Plaintiff’s credibility and further analysis of 

her medical record and complaints as discussed herein. 

REVIEW OF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Either party to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but must act within fourteen (14) days of service of a copy hereof as provided 

for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2). Failure to file specific objections 

constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard 

v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 

F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections which raise some issues but fail to raise others with 

specificity will not preserve all objections that a party might have to this Report and 

Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 

1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). 

Pursuant to Rule 72.1(d)(2) of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Michigan, a copy of any objection must be served upon this Magistrate Judge. 

Within fourteen (14) days of service of any objecting party’s timely filed objections, the 

opposing party may file a response. The response shall be not more than five (5) pages in length 

unless by motion and order such page limit is extended by the Court. The response shall address 

specifically, and in the same order raised, each issue contained within the objections. 

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Dated: September 3, 2015 s/ Mona K. Majzoub 

 MONA K. MAJZOUB 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a copy of this Report and Recommendation was served on counsel of 

record on this date. 

Dated: September 3, 2015 s/ Lisa C. Bartlett 

Case Manager 

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