Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Management Oversight and Additional 
 

Automated Capabilities Needed to Improve 
 

Intelligence Information Sharing 
 

(Redacted)
 


OIG-11-87 June 2011 
Office ofInspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

Homeland 

Security 

June 3, 2011 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the department's capability to 

share intelligence and threat information among its components. It is based on direct 

observations and analyses of applicable documents. We obtained additional supporting 

documentation through interviews with personnel from selected components. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our 

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We 

trust this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We 

express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Acting Inspector General 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Executive Summary .............................................................................................................1 
 

Background..........................................................................................................................2
 


Results of Audit ...................................................................................................................4 
 

Actions Taken to Share Intelligence Information ..........................................................4 
 

Management Oversight is Needed to Improve the Effectiveness of the 

 Intelligence Information Sharing Process ....................................................................6 
 

Recommendations........................................................................................................10
 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ................................................................10 


 Capabilities are Needed to Enhance the Consolidation 

and Dissemination of Intelligence Information ........................................................12 
 

Recommendations........................................................................................................16
 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ................................................................16 
 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope and Methodology........................................................19 
 

Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report .......................................20 
 

Appendix C: Major Contributors to this Report........................................................24 
 

Appendix D: Report Distribution ..............................................................................25 
 

Abbreviations 

ATS Automated Targeting System 

CBP Customs and Border Protection 

CIO Chief Information Officer 

CISO Chief Information Security Officer 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

HSDN Homeland Secure Data Network 

HSIN Homeland Security Information Network 

I&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

IT information technology 

JWICS Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications 

System 

NPPD National Protection and Programs Directorate 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

TRACE TSA Remote Access to Classified Enclave 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

USCIS United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
 

 

USCG United States Coast Guard 
 

USSS United States Secret Service
 

OIG
 


Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

We audited the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 

intelligence information sharing capabilities to assess the 

processes, information technology (IT) systems, and other 

mechanisms used by the department and its components to share 

intelligence and threat information. Our objective was to 

determine whether DHS has established effective department-wide 

processes and information systems to share intelligence and threat 

information. 

DHS has taken actions to create an environment and infrastructures 

necessary to promote intelligence information sharing. 

Specifically, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) is 

responsible for leading and managing the DHS Intelligence 

Enterprise and establishing a unified, coordinated, and integrated 

intelligence program for the department. Additionally, I&A 

established various councils, boards, and a task force to serve as 

forums for the components’ leadership and offices to collaborate 

on information sharing initiatives and to address information 

sharing issues. Further, components are developing intelligence 

information sharing systems to increase communication with their 

field offices and other DHS components. 

I&A can further improve the department’s intelligence information 

sharing capabilities to ensure that components have the relevant 

data, policies, and information systems to perform their missions. 

I&A needs to provide additional management oversight to improve 

the effectiveness of the intelligence information sharing process. 

Specifically, I&A needs to finalize its policies and procedures to 

clarify and promote intelligence information sharing across the 

department. Additionally, I&A needs to improve 

intelligence information sharing system capabilities to ensure that 

threat and vulnerability information is readily available to allow a 

timely response. 

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Background 

Effective intelligence information sharing is vital to enable DHS to 

carry out its mission of combating terrorist threats and attacks. 

The ability to gather, analyze, disseminate, and utilize intelligence 

information is paramount to our national security. It is imperative 

that DHS provides maximum access to and dissemination of 

intelligence information among its components, while balancing 

the obligation of protecting intelligence sources and methods to 

meet its overall mission. 

In February 2007, the Secretary issued the OneDHS memorandum 

to establish the policy on internal information sharing and 

exchange. Additionally, the Under Secretary of Intelligence and 

Analysis has been designated as the Chief Intelligence Officer for 

the department. The Under Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis 

is responsible for leading and managing the DHS Intelligence 

Enterprise and establishing a unified, coordinated, and integrated 

intelligence program for the department. To better meet its 

intelligence information sharing responsibilities, I&A established 

overarching priorities for its intelligence enterprise: 

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Improve the quality of intelligence analysis across the 

department. 

Integrate DHS intelligence across several components. 

Ensure effective service to all homeland security stakeholders, 

including all of DHS and the Intelligence Community.1 

I&A initiated several actions to integrate the department’s 

intelligence enterprise. For example, in 2006, I&A developed the 

DHS Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan, which provides the 

goals to guide the department in integrating, synchronizing, and 

advocating for the DHS intelligence mission. The plan was 

updated in 2008 to further outline DHS’ commitment to an 

integrated common intelligence mission and to strengthen 

analytical and dissemination capabilities throughout the 

department. 

1

 The Intelligence Community is a federation of executive branch agencies and organizations that work 

separately and together to conduct intelligence activities necessary to protect the national security of the 

United States. 

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Additionally, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA), United States Coast Guard (USCG), and 

United States Secret Service (USSS) have established specific 

offices to carry out their intelligence gathering and assessment 

responsibilities. These components serve as the lead on 

intelligence and analyses related to their specific mission of 

providing timely and accurate information on threats to 

transportation, immigration, or border security. The intelligence 

information is provided to the department’s leadership and other 

components, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA), National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), 

and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 

to ensure that they are notified of and are prepared for potential 

terrorist threats. 

Further, DHS has deployed enterprise-wide information systems, 

such as the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and 

Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN), and has access to the 

Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) to 

serve as the technical means of sharing intelligence and threat data 

among components. These systems provide the network and 

information technology infrastructure that allows DHS personnel 

to exchange and share all types of intelligence information with 

stakeholders. 

DHS uses JWICS, a Department of Defense system, to transmit 

information classified as “Top Secret/ Sensitive Compartmented 

Information.” JWICS provides intelligence personnel with access 

to other Intelligence Community highly secured intelligence 

systems, intranets, and databases to conduct research and obtain 

intelligence updates. HSDN is a wide area network, classified as 

“Secret,” for DHS and its components with specific and controlled 

interconnections to the Intelligence Community and federal law 

enforcement resources, such as Secret Internet Protocol Router 

Network.2

 With HSDN, DHS has the ability to collect, 

disseminate, and exchange both tactical and strategic intelligence 

information throughout DHS and its partners. 

2

 The Secret Internet Protocol Router Network is a system of interconnected computer networks used by 

the Departments of Defense and State to transmit information classified as “Secret” in a secure 

environment. 

Management Oversight and Additional Automated Capabilities Needed to Improve Intelligence Information 
 

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DHS developed HSIN, a web-based platform for sharing and 

collaborating sensitive but unclassified information among federal 

agencies, state, local, tribal, private sector, and international 

partners. HSIN was created to interface with existing 

information sharing networks to support the diverse communities 

of interest engaged in preventing, protecting from, responding to, 

and recovering from all threats, hazards, and incidents under the 

jurisdiction of DHS. Currently, HSIN has more than main 

communities of interest portals. 

Results of Audit 

Actions Taken To Share Intelligence Information 

DHS has taken actions to create an environment and infrastructures 

necessary to promote intelligence information sharing in support of its 

mission. For example, DHS has established forums that make up the 

governance structure to share intelligence information. Some of the 

actions designed to foster and improve intelligence information sharing 

among the components include: 

�	 

�	 

�	 

Established the Information Sharing Governance Board, Homeland 

Security Intelligence Council, and Information Sharing 

Coordination Councils to serve as forums for executives, key 

intelligence officials, and program managers to coordinate the 

exchange of intelligence information within the department and 

make sound operational decisions. 

Established the DHS Threat Task Force to coordinate a 

comprehensive DHS response to potential homeland security 

incidents. It adds value by integrating component data early in the 

analytical process and enhances intelligence reporting and 

information sharing across the components. 

Collaborated with the Intelligence Community and DHS 

components on emergent threats and improved situational 

awareness through the use of secure video teleconferences. 

Additionally, components are developing their intelligence information 

sharing systems to increase communication among their field offices, 

offsite personnel, and other DHS components, as well as their external 

partners. Components with similar intelligence and law enforcement 

Management Oversight and Additional Automated Capabilities Needed to Improve Intelligence Information 
 

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missions exchange relevant information that is captured in their 

component-specific information systems. Some component-specific 

initiatives include: 

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USCG has established an agreement to use the information 

captured in CBP’s Automated Targeting System (ATS) to 

perform its intelligence mission.3

 Both components have 

extended the functionality of ATS to include USCG data that 

both components can use to facilitate a better environment to 

exchange information. 

CBP is developing and testing its Analytical Framework for 

Intelligence system to increase its data consolidation and 

analyses and enhance collaboration and information sharing 

between analysts. It also facilitates and consolidates access to 

existing CBP data sources. 

I&A is developing the 

to provide 

. 

TSA is adding a new capability to its TSA Remote Access to 

Classified Enclaves (TRACE) system 

. 

USCIS is developing and testing its Citizenship and 

Immigration Data Repository, which allows intelligence 

analysts to conduct person-centric data analyses using USCIS 

datasets and classified data sources. The systems also facilitate 

requests for information received from other agencies. 

While actions have been taken to facilitate the exchange of intelligence 

information within the department, I&A still faces numerous challenges in 

carrying out its mission as the leader of the Homeland Security 

Intelligence Community and a provider of high-quality analysis. I&A 

3 CBP uses ATS to improve the collection, use, analysis, and dissemination of information to target, 

identify, and prevent potential terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States and identify 

other violations and violators of United State laws. ATS enables CBP officers to focus their efforts on 

travelers and cargo shipments that most warrant further attention. 

Management Oversight and Additional Automated Capabilities Needed to Improve Intelligence Information 
 

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must continue to improve in performing its intelligence functions: 

collecting, analyzing, sharing, and managing intelligence data. 

Additionally, I&A must encourage components to share their systems and 

capabilities so that the department can keep abreast of new developments 

and respond to terrorist attacks. 

Management Oversight is Needed to Improve the Effectiveness of 

the Intelligence Information Sharing Process 

I&A is hindered in its ability to provide an effective intelligence and 

information sharing program for the department. Specifically, I&A needs 

to strengthen its oversight and better leverage component intelligence 

activities and initiatives to establish a unified department intelligence 

mission. Additionally, I&A has not finalized various policies and 

procedures to clarify and promote intelligence information sharing across 

the department. Without a unified intelligence mission and policies, DHS 

will continue to maintain a fragmented and less than optimal intelligence 

enterprise. 

DHS’ Intelligence Activities are Not Integrated 

DHS intelligence activities are fragmented, hindering I&A’s ability 

to promote effective intelligence information sharing across the 

department. This is occurring, in part, because I&A has not 

provided sufficient oversight of component intelligence 

organizations in order to leverage their respective activities. 

Specifically, I&A has not implemented intelligence activities and 

initiatives on an enterprise level. As a result, components are 

constantly developing systems for their specific mission and 

intelligence needs. Without I&A’s oversight, components will 

continue to operate independently in their intelligence activities 

and initiatives and will not be able to provide the department with 

a more efficient and effective intelligence function. 

Although components look to I&A for guidance and coordination 

of intelligence activities and information, some components 

expressed concern that I&A is not performing its intelligence 

analysis more efficiently to ensure that their initiatives are 

implemented in a timely manner. Additionally, components view 

I&A as the focal point for disseminating homeland security 

intelligence for the department. Since I&A has direct access to the 

Intelligence Community, it has access to intelligence information 

Management Oversight and Additional Automated Capabilities Needed to Improve Intelligence Information 
 

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that other components do not have. Components’ intelligence 

analysts believe that they could use the additional intelligence 

information from I&A to improve their analyses to make informed 

decisions concerning potential terrorist threats. 

Further, component intelligence officials told us they prefer to 

have I&A’s guidance when developing their intelligence activities 

initiatives. For example, I&A can assist them during various 

phases of the initiatives, on legal, privacy, and civil liberties issues. 

Further, I&A can assist in determining whether additional rules or 

data sets can be incorporated to expand the purpose and 

functionalities of existing or newly developed systems. 

According to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, 

DHS is the focal point for preventing and responding to terrorist 

attacks and other emergencies. Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive – 5 requires DHS to coordinate federal operations to 

prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks and other 

emergencies. Further, the National Response Framework 

emphasizes that DHS is the primary national hub for situational 

awareness and operations coordination across the federal 

government for incident management, in providing the Secretary 

with intelligence and information necessary to make critical 

national level decisions. 

By increasing its oversight functions, I&A will be in a stronger 

position to leverage component-specific intelligence activities and 

initiatives to ensure that the benefits can be shared on an enterprise 

level to achieve potential cost savings. Also, component 

intelligence analysts will have additional information available 

from I&A to better perform their duties. Further, I&A can make 

certain, to the extent possible, that new and existing information 

systems are compatible with one another. Therefore, by fostering 

an integrated homeland security approach to intelligence and 

strengthening assistance to maximize intelligence collaboration, 

I&A can advance partnerships among the components. 

Overarching and Specific Operational Intelligence Information 

Sharing Policies and Procedures Are Needed 

DHS does not have overarching and operational policies and 

procedures that specifically address intelligence information 

sharing. For example, the DHS Information Sharing Strategy and 

the DHS Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan do not provide 

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detailed guidance to components on how to share intelligence 

information. Although both documents emphasize the need to 

foster communication between law enforcement agencies and the 

Intelligence Community, they do not contain a comprehensive 

method to share intelligence information that the components can 

implement. Although DHS stresses the need to establish a 

uniform, single information sharing environment, components’ 

intelligence officials informed us that they are still unclear as to 

what they can share with other components, as current strategies 

are too broad. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, requires DHS to 

disseminate, as appropriate, information analyzed within the 

department and other agencies to assist in the deterrence, 

prevention, preemption of, or response to terrorist attacks. 

Additionally, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 

Act of 2004, as amended, requires the Information Sharing 

Environment, in which DHS participates, to facilitate the 

availability of terrorism information in a form and manner that 

facilitates its use in analysis, investigations, and operations. 

I&A acknowledges the need to develop policies and procedures for 

intelligence information sharing. Currently, I&A is revising DHS 

Management Directive 8110, Intelligence Integration and 

Management, to delineate the policies and related responsibilities 

needed to develop and strengthen an integrated and collaborative 

DHS Intelligence Enterprise. Also, I&A is developing the 

Homeland Security Intelligence Priorities Framework to establish a 

department-wide method for identifying and prioritizing 

intelligence that supports the department’s operations. The 

framework would enable department leadership to align DHS’ 

intelligence activities with I&A’s priorities to identify shortages, 

redundancies, and opportunities for collaboration. 

Further, I&A needs to leverage knowledge obtained from 

information sharing assessments to develop specific operational 

policies and procedures. For example, I&A performed an 

information sharing assessment of the Southwest Border to better 

understand the needs and limitations of border operations.4

 The 

premise of this assessment was to develop the strategic vision and 

4 Department of Homeland Security Intelligence and Analysis: Southwest Border Information Sharing 

Assessment, January 2010. 

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policies to characterize individual processes, activities, and 

interactions of the organization. 

. Until these assessments are 

completed, I&A cannot 

. 

See Figure 1 for the full listing of DHS mission areas. 

Mission 1: Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security 

Goal 1.1: Prevent Terrorist Attacks 

Goal 1.2: Prevent the Unauthorized Acquisition or Use of 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Materials and 

Capabilities 

Goal 1.3: Manage Risks to Critical Infrastructure, Key 

Leadership, and Events 

Mission 2: Securing and Managing Our Borders 

Goal 2.1: Effectively Control U.S. Air, Land, and Sea Borders 

Goal 2.2: Safeguard Lawful Trade and Travel 

Goal 2.3: Disrupt and Dismantle Transnational Criminal 

Organizations 

Mission 3: Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration 

Laws 

Goal 3.1: Strengthen and Effectively Administer the 

Immigration System 

Goal 3.2: Prevent Unlawful Immigration 

Mission 4: Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace 

Goal 4.1: Create a Safe, Secure, and Resilient Cyber 

Environment 

Goal 4.2: Promote Cybersecurity Knowledge and Innovation 

Mission 5: Ensuring Resilience to Disasters 

Goal 5.1: Mitigate Hazards 

Goal 5.2: Enhance Preparedness 

Goal 5.3: Ensure Effective Emergency Response 

Goal 5.4: Rapidly Recover 

Figure 1: DHS Homeland Security Missions 

Management Oversight and Additional Automated Capabilities Needed to Improve Intelligence Information 

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Although these efforts attempt to address intelligence information 

sharing needs, they are limited to a specific level or mission area. 

For example, while Management Directive 8110 describes broad 

responsibilities at the managerial level, it does not allocate 

intelligence information sharing responsibilities at the operational 

level. Without 

to potential 

threats to the homeland. By issuing detailed intelligence 

information sharing policies and procedures, I&A can establish a 

common standard to ensure that relevant and time-sensitive 

information is available to components. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Under Secretary for Intelligence and 

Analysis: 

Recommendation #1: Develop and implement an 

of intelligence information across 

the department. The policy should (1) delineate I&A’s roles and 

responsibilities as the leader of DHS’ intelligence enterprise, and 

(2) require components to develop 

intelligence 

information throughout the department. 

Recommendation #2: Coordinate with component Chief 

Information Officers on intelligence system initiatives to achieve 

 of systems. 

Recommendation #3: Perform intelligence information sharing 

assessments in the other mission areas to identify areas of 

improvement and develop operational policies and procedures to 

address deficiencies. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

I&A concurred with recommendation 1. I&A has been engaged in 

the approval process for Management Directive 213, an updated 

version of Intelligence Integration and Management (formerly 

Management Directive 8110). Once approved by the department, 

Management Oversight and Additional Automated Capabilities Needed to Improve Intelligence Information 
 

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Management Directive 213 should provide DHS and its 

components with a reliable basis for understanding the roles of 

I&A and the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer, as well as enabling 

the Chief Intelligence Officer to manage components’ efforts to 

identify relevant data and develop robust mechanisms for sharing 

intelligence information. 

We agree that the steps I&A has taken, and plans to take, begin to 

satisfy this recommendation. This recommendation will remain 

open until I&A provides documentation to support that all planned 

corrective actions are completed. 

I&A concurred with recommendation 2. I&A actively engages in 

efforts to intelligence systems through 

the National Security Systems Board and the Chief Information 

Officers Council. The completion of these efforts will help to 

drive the maturation of the Intelligence Enterprise and to 

encourage the unimpeded flow of intelligence information 

throughout the department. 

We agree that the steps I&A has taken, and plans to take, begin to 

satisfy this recommendation. This recommendation will remain 

open until I&A provides documentation to support specific efforts 

taken to intelligence systems throughout 

the department. 

I&A concurred with recommendation 3. The Information Sharing 

and Intelligence Enterprise Management Division within I&A has 

initiated a project to develop information sharing diagrams for 

selected flows within the major information sharing mission areas. 

These flow diagrams, when completed, will identify areas of 

needed improvement and will enable the Chief Intelligence Officer 

and components to develop functional standards and information 

exchange protocols to all for increased automated sharing. 

We agree that the steps I&A has taken, and plans to take, begin to 

satisfy this recommendation. This recommendation will remain 

open until I&A provides documentation to support that all planned 

corrective actions are completed. 

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 Capabilities are Needed to Enhance 

the Consolidation and Dissemination of Intelligence Information 

DHS does not have 

 Additionally, DHS needs to improve the functionality and 

interoperability of its existing intelligence systems at components to 

promote better collaboration within the department. Also, DHS needs to 

develop a 

component intelligence analysts will 

continue to face hurdles when researching and sharing intelligence 

information. 

Components’ Abilities 

to Share 

The department has 

 to all the intelligence analysts. 

Further, DHS does 

of 

intelligence information. 

I&A encourages the components to use HSDN to share 

intelligence analysis and information. Some components’ 

intelligence officials stated that they

 and that HSDN and HSIN system 

constraints limit their effectiveness. For example, CBP, ICE, and 

USSS personnel informed us that many of their 

. Also, 

HSDN is . 

According to a CBP official, a field agent may 

 Some CBP 

agents have to 

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 ICE personnel informed us 

that

 to exchange intelligence information. 

Component officials and intelligence analysts identified a number 

of constraints that limit HSDN’s effectiveness: 

Similar to HSDN, HSIN has a number of constraints that limit its 

effectiveness. 

However, component personnel noted a number of concerns 

regarding HSIN: 

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The Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended, requires DHS to 

establish appropriate systems, mechanisms, and procedures to 

share threat and vulnerabilities information that is relevant to 

national critical infrastructure and key resources with other federal 

agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector in a 

timely manner. Additionally, the Under Secretary of Intelligence 

and Analysis is required to establish and utilize, in conjunction 

with the department’s Chief Information Officer, a secure 

communications and information technology infrastructure. The 

infrastructure should include other advanced analytical tools to 

access, receive, and analyze data and information and to 

disseminate information acquired and analyzed by the department. 

Further, the National Response Framework requires that 

coordinating mechanisms be provided for expedited and proactive 

federal support to ensure that critical life-saving assistance and 

incident containment capabilities are in place for a quick and 

efficient response to catastrophic incidents.5 

Additionally, intelligence analysts do not 

These concerns will 

continue to hinder analysts’ abilities to perform their duties and 

impact the quality, efficiency, and effectiveness of intelligence 

information sharing. 

is Needed to Perform Searches of 

Intelligence Information on 

DHS does not have an of 

intelligence information Specifically, 

component intelligence analysts have to 

for law enforcement and intelligence 

information. 

 

5

 The National Response Framework highlights improvements to the previous National Response Plan. 

The Framework superseded the Plan, which focused largely on federal roles and responsibilities. 

search query. 

Management Oversight and Additional Automated Capabilities Needed to Improve Intelligence Information 
 

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6 
 For 

example, the ICE Law Enforcement Information Sharing service 

will be the first 

DHS is looking for 

ways to accelerate the implementation at or shortly after the initial 

operating capability that is scheduled for September 2011. 

With 

 analyze and warn of potential terrorist 

threats more effectively. 

A Can Share Intelligence Products More 

Effectively 

DHS needs to improve its intelligence information sharing and 

collaboration efforts among the components to ensure that threats 

and incidents are mitigated timely. Specifically, DHS needs to 

provide an 

can be shared. 

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I&A is aware of some of the components’ concerns regarding

 In response, I&A 

has developed several proposed enhancements on its 

 including implementing 

.

7

 For example, I&A plans to have 

in the near future. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Under Secretary of Intelligence and 

Analysis collaborate with the DHS CIO, to: 

Recommendation #4: Develop a 

products. 

Recommendation #5: Acquire technology to 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

I&A concurred with recommendation 4. I&A has partnered with 

CBP to bring the collaborative capabilities 

This effort seeks to expand DHS’ ability to connect 

people and to facilitate information sharing. 

Management Oversight and Additional Automated Capabilities Needed to Improve Intelligence Information 
 

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7 
We agree that the steps that I&A has taken, and plans to take, 

begin to satisfy this recommendation. This recommendation will 

remain open until I&A provides documentation to support that all 

planned corrective actions are completed. 

I&A concurred with recommendation 5. 

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We agree that the steps that I&A has taken, and plans to take, 

begin to satisfy this recommendation. This recommendation will 

remain open until I&A provides documentation to support that all 

planned corrective actions are completed. 

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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

The objective of our audit was to determine whether DHS has 
 

established a department-wide capability to effectively share 
 

intelligence and threat information. Specifically, we determined 
 

whether DHS has established a standardized process to share 
 

intelligence and threat information. 
 

Our review focused on DHS’ intelligence sharing activities based 
 

on the requirements outlined in The Homeland Security Act (2002), 
 

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004), 
 

Executive Orders 12333 (1981) and 13356 (2004), the DHS
 

Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan (2008), the DHS
 

Information Sharing Strategy (2008), and the National Strategy for 
 

Information Sharing (2007). We interviewed selected DHS 
 

management and intelligence officials, as well as officials from the 
 

National Operations Center. Further, we interviewed personnel 
 

from CBP, FEMA, ICE, I&A, NPPD, TSA, USCG, USCIS, and 
 

USSS regarding DHS’ communication methods, systems 
 

inventory, technologies, tools, and arrangements that the 
 

components use to collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence 
 

information. We did not evaluate the effectiveness of security 
 

controls implemented for the intelligence systems. Additionally, 
 

we did not evaluate fusion centers, state and local entities, and 
 

their associated intelligence systems. 
 

We conducted this performance audit between August 2010 and 
 

February 2011 pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 
 

amended, and according to generally accepted government 
 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 
 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 
 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based 
 

upon our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 
 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based 
 

upon our audit objectives. Major OIG contributors to the audit are 
 

identified in Appendix C. 
 

The principal OIG point of contact for the audit is 
 

Frank W. Deffer, Assistant Inspector General, IT Audits,
 

at (202) 254-4100.
 

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Homeland

Security

Frank W. DeITer

Assistant [nspa:lor Ckncral, IT Audits

DHS Office ofinspa:lOr General

1120 Vermont A'"enuc Northwest

Washington, DC 20005

Dear Mr. Dcffer:

RE: Drllft RepoI1 OIG·l0.028·fTA-DHS, MQ~f'''1Ovusighl andAddUi()lUl1 Ifulomattr/

C(Jp(lbilitia Need«l1O ''''prove [1IIf'iJigtnu l'1fornwlion SJuuiIlg

The Department of Homeland Security appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on

the draft rtpOr1 rcferenc:ro abo'"Co The: Ocparuncnt. putirolarly the Office of Intelligence and

Analysis. COOCUB with the recornmmdal:ions in !he report..

We: acknowledge lhc collaboration thai your $Uffhas undcnakcn with our program tnanaiC'"

and liai$Ofl$lO .:ljUSl the language oflhcse rec:ommendlllions. We: also appreciate !he effort that

your staffhas made: to ensure !he proper assignment and direction oflhe report"s

m:ommeodations. as it will do rnl,l(:h to assist us with their implementation.

While much progress has hem made to improve inlclligcm:e information sharing throughout the

Department. including efforts at the National Security Systems Board and the Chief Information

Officcn Council, we agree thai much work remains to be done. A number of docwm,'ntJ an: in

the process oflkpartmenllll clearance thaI. when fina.!. will provide greater clarity and efficiency

in the sharing ofintclligcnce infonnation. We will al50 work closely with your stafflo cttsure

thalthis report's recommendalions are suilably addressed and executed.

Again, we appreciate this opportunity to review lllld oommenl on the draft report. In addilion to

this response, lechnical oomments and a SCIIsitivity review were provided under separale oovcr.

Sincerely,

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Homeland

Security

1J ApOI2011

Frank W. Dcffer

AssWanI Inspector General, IT Audits

OilS Office of InspectofGeneral

1120 Vnmont A,'mUle Northwest

Washington. D.C. 20005

Dear Mr. DefTer:

RE: Draft Rq:JOI1 OIG·IO·028-ITA·DHS. Managt_nJ tftwsight andAdd/liona! Aldomattd

CQpabilif;U Nuded 10 Jll'lpro'", IlIltlligtllU Jriformofion Shoring

1k Ikpanmcnt of Homeland Security (DcpartmmtlDHS). panicularly!he Office oflnlclligcncc

and Analy$is (I&A). appreciates the opponunilY 10 review the draft report referenced abo,'c and

(0 provide co~i\'e actions that are germane to the report rtOOmrllcndalions as listed below.

We recommend thallhe Undn Setrel:lry for Intelligence and AllllfSis:

R«ommcodatioo: Develop and implement an of

intelligence infolTlllltion across the ~nt. The policy should (I) deJirICate I&A's roles and

rcSponsi';biiilii;'~;~,U~","~oodiiii'~'iO~f~D.H~S ..'~I"~",~,;~g~'OC~'~Eii"ii"ii"'iiiirii~i'i"""ii.(2ii).""i"ii;ii.iiooiimii""iiOCiinl.S dcveIOP.~ to

intelligence information throughout the Depanment.

RcspGnn: Coocur. The Office of Intelligence & AlUllysis has been engaged in the approval

process for MD 213. an updated version ofImel/igl!nce Imegrlll;on uml Munageml!m (MD

8lI0). Once approved by the Department. MD 213 should provide DHS and it~ components

with a reliable basis for understanding the roles of I&A and the DHS Chieflntclligence Officer

(CINT) and enable the CINT to manage components' efforls to identify relevant data and

develop robust mechanisms for sharing intelligence infonnation.

Recommendation: Coordinate with component Chieflnfonnation Officers on illlelligenee

~ystem initiatives to achieve ofsystems.

RcsJlonse: Concur. A5 mentioned in the IellCT from the Under Secretary. I&A ac:th'c!Y engages

in efforts to intelligence ~ystems through the National Security Systems

Board and the Chief1nfonnalion Officers Council. The completion ofthese efforts will help to

drive the maturation ofthe Imelligence Enterprise and to encourage the unimpeded flow of

intelligence information throughout the Depanment

R«ommendalion: Perform imelligcnce infonnatioOn sharina assessments in the othel' mission

areas to identify areas of improvement and develop opmltionaJ policies and procedures 10

address delicieocies.

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

Management Oversight and Additional Automated Capabilities Needed to Improve Intelligence Information 
 

Sharing
 


Page 21 

-2-

Response: Concur. The Information Sharing and Intelligence Enterprise Management Division

(ISIEM) within I&A has initiated a project to develop infomllliiorl sharing flow diagrams for

selected flows within the major information sharing mission areas. These flow diagrams, when

completed. will identify areas of needed improvement and will enable the CINT and components

to develop functional standards and information exchange protocols to all for increased

automated sharing.

WI! recommend Ihllt the Under SecretaI')' (or Intelligence and Analysis coll;lborale with the

DHSCIO to:

j

Riittii"iimiimii'ii'ii'ii·ii'iii'ii"ii'."'.velopa!l products.••••••••••••••••••••

Response: Concur. I&A has partnered with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to

bring the collaborative capabilities

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

Management Oversight and Additional Automated Capabilities Needed to Improve Intelligence Information 
 

Sharing
 


Page 22 

- 3-

Again, we appreciate this opportunity to review and comment on the draft report and to provide

corrective actions to the recommendations. Unfortunately, due to the extensive effort and

collaboration required for the above mentioned corrective action plans, we are unable to provide

precise completion dates for them, although we can assert that timelincs for each will likely

exceed 90 days. In addition 10 this response, technical comments and a sensitivity review have

been provided under separate cover.

Todd M. Rosenblum

Senior Component Accountable Official

Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

Management Oversight and Additional Automated Capabilities Needed to Improve Intelligence Information 
 

Sharing
 


Page 23 

Appendix C 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Information Security Audit Division 

Chiu-Tong Tsang, Director 

Tarsha Cary, Audit Manager 

Shannon Frenyea, Senior Program Analyst 

Thomas Rohrback, IT Specialist 

David Bunning, IT Specialist 

Anthony Nicholson, Referencer 

Management Oversight and Additional Automated Capabilities Needed to Improve Intelligence Information 
 

Sharing
 


Page 24 

Appendix D 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Under Secretary, Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) 

Chief Information Officer (CIO) 

Deputy CIO 

Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) 

Director, Compliance and Oversight Program 

Director, Knowledge Management Division, I&A 

Director, Information Sharing and Intelligence Enterprise 

Management Division 

Audit Liaison, I&A 

Audit Liaison, DHS/CISO 

Audit Liaison, DHS/CIO 

Audit Liaison, CBP 

Audit Liaison, FEMA 

Audit Liaison, ICE 

Audit Liaison, NPPD 

Audit Liaison, Operations 

Audit Liaison, TSA 

Audit Liaison, USCG 

Audit Liaison, USCIS 

Audit Liaison, USSS 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

Management Oversight and Additional Automated Capabilities Needed to Improve Intelligence Information 
 

Sharing
 


Page 25
 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4100, 

fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal 

misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 

245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.