1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, 

 v. 

JAQUAN LEE DAVIS, 

Defendant. 

4:15-CR-20436-TGB-MJH 

HON. TERRENCE G. BERG 

ORDER DENYING MOTION 

TO VACATE SENTENCE 

(ECF NO. 62) 

Petitioner Jaquan Davis pled guilty to aiding and abetting the 

transportation of an individual for prostitution. Petitioner now moves to 

vacate, correct, or modify his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing 

that his due process rights were violated by (1) prosecutors’ reliance on 

the allegedly false statements of the victim in this case; (2) trial counsel 

coercing Petitioner into accepting a plea; and (3) this Court’s imposition 

of a five-year term of supervised release. However, these claims fall 

outside the one-year statute of limitations that applies to petitions 

brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and this motion must therefore be 

denied. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Petitioner pled guilty to a single-count Information charging him 

with aiding and abetting the transportation of an individual for the 

purpose of prostitution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a) and 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2. Second Super. Inf., ECF No. 46, PageID.394; Plea Agreement, ECF 

Case 4:15-cr-20436-TGB-MJH ECF No. 79, PageID.745 Filed 06/15/22 Page 1 of 6
2 

No. 52, PageID.403-404. Consequently, on March 30, 2017, Petitioner 

was sentenced to serve a 96-month term of imprisonment. Judgment, 

ECF No. 58, PageID.546-47. The Court also imposed a five-year term of 

supervised release. Id. at PageID.548. Four months later, on July 27, the 

Court entered an amended Judgment clarifying that Petitioner’s 96-

month sentence was to be served concurrently to any potential sentence 

for a parole or probation violation based on the same conduct. Am. 

Judgment, ECF No. 61, PageID.558. Petitioner did not appeal. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A prisoner serving a sentence imposed by a federal court may 

challenge that sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 “upon the ground that 

[it] was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States . . . the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or 

. . . the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is 

otherwise subject to collateral attack.” Id. As relief, the prisoner may 

move the court which imposed the sentence to correct, vacate, or set it 

aside. The law is clear that “§ 2255 claims that do not assert a 

constitutional or jurisdictional error are generally cognizable only if they 

involve a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete 

miscarriage of justice.” Snider v. United States, 908 F.3d 183, 189 (6th 

Cir. 2018) (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) 

(internal quotations omitted)). This standard is met only in exceptional 

circumstances; not every alleged error of law can be raised on a § 2255 

Case 4:15-cr-20436-TGB-MJH ECF No. 79, PageID.746 Filed 06/15/22 Page 2 of 6
3 

motion. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); Davis, 417 U.S. 

at 346. 

III. DISCUSSION 

Petitioner raises three arguments: (1) that his due process rights 

and right to privacy were violated by the government’s reliance on the 

false testimony of a witness, though investigators knew the testimony 

was false; (2) that Petitioner’s lawyer rendered ineffective assistance of 

counsel by coercing Petitioner into accepting a plea; and, (3) that the 

Court impermissibly imposed a five-year term of supervised release in 

violation of Petitioners’ Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Claims 

brought under § 2255 are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. 28 

U.S.C. § 2255(f). That period begins to run from one of four dates, 

whichever is latest: (1) the date on which the judgment becomes final; (2) 

the date unconstitutional government-created impediments to filing a 

motion for sentencing relief are removed; (3) the date on which the right 

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactive; or (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim could 

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. Id. 

Generally, a conviction becomes final upon completion of direct 

review. Johnson v. United States, 457 F. App’x 462, 464 (6th Cir. 2012). 

Where, as here, a federal criminal defendant does not appeal his 

conviction, the judgment becomes final when the time during which he 

could have appealed expires, which is 14 days after the entry of judgment, 

Case 4:15-cr-20436-TGB-MJH ECF No. 79, PageID.747 Filed 06/15/22 Page 3 of 6
4 

here April 13, 2017. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1). Petitioner’s one-year 

statute of limitations accordingly would have expired on April 13, 2018, 

one year after the date his judgment of conviction became final.1

Petitioner does not allege the existence of unconstitutional impediments 

to filing his petition. Therefore, Petitioner’s claims will only be timely if 

they rest on newly discovered facts or a new, retroactive right recognized 

by the Supreme Court. 

Petitioner’s claims for ineffective assistance of counsel and due 

process violations do not depend on new facts, nor do they rest on any 

newly recognized right. Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim rests on the allegation that his trial counsel coerced him into 

pleading guilty. Petitioner’s plea was entered in December, 2016. See

Plea Agreement, ECF No. 52; Minute Entry for Dec. 13, 2016 Plea 

Hearing. Petitioner was necessarily aware of his counsel’s allegedly 

1 Because the Amended Judgment in this case was issued to correct a 

clerical error, it did not reset the one-year statute of limitations. See 

Crangle v. Kelly, 838 F.3d 673, 680 (6th Cir. 2016) (where an amended 

judgment “merely corrected a record to accurately reflect the court's 

actions,” it was not a new sentence for statute of limitations purposes); 

In re Stansell, 828 F.3d 412, 420 (6th Cir. 2016) (explaining that where 

an amended judgment is issued simply to correct a clerical error, the 

corrected entry should not be considered a new judgment for § 2255 

purposes). Even if the Amended Judgment did reset the statute of 

limitations, Petitioner’s claims would still be untimely, because the 

limitations period would have ended on August 10, 2018—a year and 

fourteen days after the Amended Judgment issued—but Petitioner did 

not file this petition until March of 2020. 

Case 4:15-cr-20436-TGB-MJH ECF No. 79, PageID.748 Filed 06/15/22 Page 4 of 6
5 

coercive conduct by that date. Petitioner’s claim regarding prosecutorial 

misconduct also does not rest on newly discovered facts. Petitioner claims 

that he was “indicted, arrested, convicted, and sentenced” based on “false 

testimony” because the victim in this matter provided inconsistent 

statements. ECF No. 62, PageID.563. But, as the government points out, 

Petitioner was aware of the inconsistent statements—indeed, they 

formed the basis of a Motion to Suppress litigated in the original 

prosecution. See Mot. to Suppress and for Evidentiary Hearing, ECF No. 

31; Order Denying Mot. To Suppress, ECF No. 43. Petitioner’s claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel and his due process claim stemming from 

the alleged dishonesty of the victim in this case are therefore timebarred. 

Petitioner’s final claim is that the Court impermissibly imposed a 

five-year term of supervised release. To support this claim, Petitioner 

points to United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019). In that case, 

the Supreme Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), which set a mandatory 

minimum penalty for certain supervised release violations based on 

judge-found facts, was unconstitutional. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. at 2378-79. 

However, Haymond is wholly inapplicable to Petitioner’s case because he 

was not sentenced pursuant to § 3583(k) based on a finding by a judge 

that he violated the terms of previously-imposed supervised release by 

committing new sex crimes. Petitioner was not on supervised release at 

all when he was sentenced for the instant offense, and indeed, has yet to 

Case 4:15-cr-20436-TGB-MJH ECF No. 79, PageID.749 Filed 06/15/22 Page 5 of 6
6 

begin serving the five-year term of supervised release that this Court 

imposed. Therefore, Haymond is inapplicable to Petitioner’s situation, 

and his petition falls outside the one-year statute of limitations. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the above-stated reasons, Petitioner Jaquan L. Davis’ motion 

for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is untimely, and therefore must be 

DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 15, 2022 s/Terrence G. Berg 

TERRENCE G. BERG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 4:15-cr-20436-TGB-MJH ECF No. 79, PageID.750 Filed 06/15/22 Page 6 of 6