If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

T.J. THEISEN and THE THEISEN GROUP, LLC,

Plaintiffs/CounterdefendantsAppellants/Cross-Appellees,

UNPUBLISHED

August 12, 2021

v No. 352952

Oakland Circuit Court

INVENTIVE CONSULTING, LLC, LC No. 2018-165067-CB

Defendant/CounterplaintiffAppellee/Cross-Appellant,

and

MOHAMAD ZEIDAN and SLOBDAN 

PAVLOVIC,

Defendants-Appellees/CrossAppellants.

T.J. THEISEN and THE THEISEN GROUP, LLC,

Plaintiffs/CounterdefendantsAppellees,

v No. 353990

Oakland Circuit Court

INVENTIVE CONSULTING, LLC, LC No. 2018-165067-CB

Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellant,

and

MOHAMAD ZEIDAN and SLOBDAN 

PAVLOVIC,
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Defendants-Appellants.

Before: LETICA, P.J., and SERVITTO and M. J. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In Docket No. 352952, plaintiffs/counterdefendants, T.J. Theisen (Theisen) and The 

Theisen Group, LLC (TTG) (referred to collectively as plaintiffs), appeal as of right a February 

13, 2020 judgment of no cause of action on plaintiffs’ remaining claims and on the remaining 

counterclaims of defendant/counterplaintiff, Inventive Consulting, LLC (IC), following a jury trial 

in this case alleging breach of contract and related claims and counterclaims pertaining to an 

invention in the automotive industry. IC and defendants Mohamad Zeidan (Zeidan) and Slobdan 

Pavlovic (Pavlovic) (all three collectively referred to as “defendants”) have filed a cross-appeal in 

Docket No. 352952 from the February 13, 2020 judgment. In Docket No. 353990, defendants 

appeal as of right a March 24, 2020 order denying IC’s postjudgment motion for attorney fees and 

costs. The appeals were consolidated. Theisen v Inventive Consulting, LLC, unpublished order of 

the Court of Appeals, entered July 8, 2020 (Docket Nos. 352952 and 353990). In Docket No. 

352952, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. In Docket No. 

353990, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

This case arises out of a dispute concerning an invention in the automotive industry. 

Theisen is the sole member of TTG. Pavlovic and Zeidan are members of IC and are actively 

involved in managing and operating IC. According to plaintiffs, in February 2016, the parties 

began negotiations regarding a joint business venture in which plaintiffs would help develop 

certain intellectual property (IP) created by defendants. According to their complaint, plaintiffs 

have “extensive experience in sales, marketing, development, business planning and successful 

implementation of new products in the automotive parts industry worldwide.” Before being 

introduced to plaintiffs, defendants had “a business development/fundraising agreement with nonparty company Global Eagle. Defendants were not satisfied with the lack of progress by Global 

Eagle.”

According to plaintiffs, on or about May 26, 2016, the parties reached an oral agreement 

whereby plaintiffs would purchase the IP from defendants for $1 million; as part of this 

arrangement, Pavlovic and Zeidan would each receive 10% of equity in TTG and thus would each 

receive 10% of the future net profits of the venture. Theisen then began developing a three-year 

business plan with an executive summary and related business development documents; he also 

began reaching out to possible investors to raise the funds needed to fulfill the agreement.

At a July 18, 2016 meeting of the parties, Theisen presented his full PowerPoint 

presentation, which the parties refer to as a “deck,” setting forth his business plans, executive 

summaries, cost analysis, and other items to be used in developing and marketing the IP. Each 

page of the deck contained language stating, “HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL PROPERTY OF THE 

THEISEN GROUP.” According to plaintiffs, the deck included Theisen’s ideas and work product 

that reflected “his years of extensive, high level experience in the development of products for this 

industry and the ramp up for production of those products.” After defendants reviewed the deck, 

they allegedly demanded alterations of the May 26, 2016 agreement. On September 12, 2016, 
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defendants sent plaintiffs a new written proposal. On October 3, 2016, Zeidan informed Theisen 

that the patent application had been filed and that a serial number had been issued. At an October 

13, 2016 meeting of the parties, defendants indicated that other investors were interested in the 

project.

On October 26, 2016, plaintiffs provided to IC a letter of intent (LOI) regarding the terms 

of a proposed agreement. IC rejected the LOI and indicated that, if plaintiffs did not provide $1 

million by the end of November 2016, then plaintiffs would be excluded from the project. On 

November 15, 2016, IC informed plaintiffs that the $1 million payment could be made by the end 

of December 2016, but that plaintiffs must memorialize their financial commitment by the end of 

November 2016. On December 2, 2016, plaintiffs provided a second LOI to IC, confirming 

plaintiffs’ financial commitment and accepting IC’s September 12, 2016 offer. IC rejected the 

second LOI and demanded a fully executed contract. On December 5, 2016, plaintiffs submitted 

to defendants a proposed written contract called a technology purchase agreement (TPA). On 

December 9, 2016, IC instructed plaintiffs to delay payment until January 2017.

According to plaintiffs, by January 2017, the possible investors that plaintiffs had recruited 

grew wary and frustrated because of defendants’ continued delays and unwillingness to sign or 

accept written documentation of an agreement; the possible investors thus were unwilling to fund 

a payment to defendants in January 2017. On February 18, 2017, Theisen received a letter from 

attorney Thomas Heed on behalf of IC stating that the project was no longer open to plaintiffs and 

that plaintiffs no longer had authority to raise funds for the project.

Plaintiffs commenced this action against defendants, alleging claims of breach of contract, 

promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, fraud, misappropriation of trade secrets, and breach of 

fiduciary duty in a joint venture. IC filed a countercomplaint alleging fraud, breach of contract, 

tortious interference with business relationships, statutory conversion, defamation, and civil 

conspiracy. Most of the claims and counterclaims were dismissed by summary disposition or 

directed verdict. At the conclusion of trial, the jury rejected the remaining claims and 

counterclaim. The trial court entered a judgment in accordance with the jury verdict. IC filed a 

postjudgment motion for costs and attorney fees, which the trial court denied. These appeals and 

the cross-appeal ensued.

I. PLAINTIFFS’ ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL IN DOCKET NO. 352952

A. TRADE SECRET

Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to defendants 

under MCR 2.116(C)(8) on plaintiffs’ trade-secret claim because the complaint set forth factual 

allegations that would satisfy the definition of a trade secret under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 

(UTSA), MCL 445.1901 et seq. We agree.

This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for summary 

disposition. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019).

A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim 

based on the factual allegations in the complaint. When considering such a motion, 

a trial court must accept all factual allegations as true, deciding the motion on the 
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pleadings alone. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may only be granted when a 

claim is so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify 

recovery. [Id. at 159-160 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

Under Michigan’s UTSA, misappropriation of a trade secret “includes the disclosure or 

use of a trade secret without consent.” CMI Int’l, Inc v Intermet Int’l Corp, 251 Mich App 125, 

132; 649 NW2d 808 (2002), citing MCL 445.1902(b)(ii). MCL 445.1902(d) provides:

(d) “Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, 

compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that is both of the 

following:

(i) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 

generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other 

persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.

(ii) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 

maintain its secrecy.

The existence of a trade secret is an element of a claim for misappropriation of a trade secret under 

Michigan law. See Nedschroef Detroit Corp v Bemas Enterprises, LLC, 106 F Supp 3d 874, 884 

(ED Mich, 2015), aff’d 646 F Appx 418 (CA 6, 2016) (quotation marks and citations omitted).1 

“It is the plaintiff’s burden of pleading and proving the specific nature of the trade secrets.” Apex 

Tool Group, LLC v Wessels, 119 F Supp 3d 599, 608 (ED Mich, 2015) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

The “extent of measures taken to guard secrecy of information” is among the factors used 

to determine whether a trade secret exists. Dura Global Technologies, Inc v Magna Donnelly 

Corp, 662 F Supp 2d 855, 859 (ED Mich, 2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The 

UTSA requires reasonable efforts under the circumstances to maintain secrecy; perfection is not 

required. Giasson Aerospace Science, Inc v RCO Engineering, Inc, 680 F Supp 2d 830, 840 (ED 

Mich, 2010).

Whether the measures taken by a trade secret owner are sufficient to satisfy the 

[UTSA’s] reasonableness standard ordinarily is a question of fact for the jury. . . . 

[O]nly in an extreme case can what is a reasonable precaution be determined as a 

matter of law, because the answer depends on a balancing of costs and benefits that 

will vary from case to case. [Id. (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).]

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that Theisen “is the sole member of” TTG, which is a limited 

liability company. “Theisen has extensive experience in sales, marketing, development, business 

planning and successful implementation of new products in the automotive parts industry 

 

1 Although decisions of lower federal courts are not binding on this Court, we may “find their 

analyses and conclusions persuasive.” Abela v General Motors Corp, 469 Mich 603, 607; 677 

NW2d 325 (2004).
-5-

worldwide.” According to the complaint, Theisen prepared “an executive summary and three[-

]year business plan” in regard to defendants’ IP. Theisen met with defendants and gave them “his 

full PowerPoint deck with business plans, executive summaries, cost analysis, and other items to 

be used in the development and marketing of the IP.” The complaint further alleged,

This PowerPoint deck is marked “HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL 

PROPERTY OF THE THEISEN GROUP,” on each page of the document; the 

presentation included a detailed summary of the product, its market, design 

advantages, Theisen’s ideas and innovations, Theisen’s detailed revenue 

projections, detailed projected timelines and startup expenses, competitor and 

customer analysis, and otherwise included the work product Mr. Theisen had 

developed using his years of extensive, high level experience in the development 

of products for this industry and the ramp up for production of those products.

The complaint asserted that “[p]laintiffs’ business plan, product development plan, business 

strategies, market analysis information, sales and marketing plans, and marketing work objectives, 

as more fully described above, constitute trade secrets as defined under the [UTSA].” These trade 

secrets afforded plaintiffs a competitive advantage and were “known only by [p]laintiffs and 

limited representatives on a need to know basis.” The complaint alleged that “[p]laintiffs took 

measures reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances to guard the secrecy of these trade 

secrets.”

The trial court ruled that, “[b]ecause the complaint contains no specific allegations 

indicating that any efforts were made to protect the secrecy of the information at issue, [d]efendants 

are entitled to summary disposition of the trade[-]secret claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8).” We 

disagree with the trial court’s ruling. The complaint contains factual allegations sufficient to 

support a conclusion that plaintiffs undertook efforts reasonable under the circumstances to 

maintain the secrecy of the information. The complaint alleged that each page of the deck was 

marked, “HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL PROPERTY OF THE THEISEN GROUP.” Also, the 

complaint asserted that the information was “known only by [p]laintiffs and limited representatives 

on a need to know basis.” Defendants emphasize plaintiffs’ failure to obtain a nondisclosure 

agreement for the information contained in the deck. But the failure to obtain a nondisclosure 

agreement does not as a matter of law preclude a determination that reasonable efforts were made 

to protect the secrecy of the information. See Giasson Aerospace, 680 F Supp 2d at 839-840 

(stating that a jury could find that the plaintiffs made reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy even 

in the absence of a nondisclosure agreement).

Given the allegations that plaintiffs shared the information with only limited persons and 

marked each page of the deck as highly confidential, the complaint adequately alleged reasonable 

efforts under the circumstances to maintain the secrecy of the information. This is particularly 

true in light of the relatively small size of TTG’s operation, as reflected in the allegation that TTG 

was a limited liability company of which Theisen was the sole member. See id. at 840 (“The fact 

that [the] [p]laintiffs are a relatively small operation also supports their argument that they took 

reasonable precautions. The precautions that are reasonable for a large commercial organization 

may be unreasonable for a smaller operation depending on the required cost benefit analysis.”). 
-6-

Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to defendants on plaintiffs’

claim for misappropriation of trade secrets.2

Defendants assert as an alternative ground for affirmance an argument that the trial court 

did not reach, i.e., that plaintiffs had to attach to their complaint all documents cited in the 

complaint, and that plaintiffs failed to attach the deck and the nondisclosure, noncircumvention 

agreement (NDNCA) signed by the parties on February 24, 2016, to protect the confidentiality of 

the IP, both of which were cited in the complaint. Defendants’ argument fails. MCR 2.113(C)(1) 

provides:

(1) If a claim or defense is based on a written instrument, a copy of the 

instrument or its pertinent parts must be attached to the pleading and labeled 

according to standards established by the State Court Administrative Office unless 

the instrument is

(a) a matter of public record in the county in which the action is commenced 

and its location in the record is stated in the pleading;

(b) in the possession of the adverse party and the pleading so states;

(c) inaccessible to the pleader and the pleading so states, giving the reason; 

or

(d) of a nature that attaching the instrument would be unnecessary or 

impractical and the pleading so states, giving the reason.

Contrary to defendants’ assertion, MCR 2.113(C)(1) does not require attaching every document 

cited in a complaint; it requires attaching a written instrument if a claim or defense is based on that 

written instrument, with certain exceptions. Examples of a written instrument include a contract 

or a deed. See Yaldo v North Pointe Ins Co, 217 Mich App 617, 621; 552 NW2d 657 (1996), aff’d 

457 Mich 341 (1998). Defendants fail to develop a coherent argument for how or why the NDNCA 

and the deck qualify as written instruments on which plaintiffs’ claim was based, and that were 

thus required to be attached to the complaint. “A party may not simply announce a position and 

leave it to this Court to make the party’s arguments and search for authority to support the party’s 

position. Failure to adequately brief an issue constitutes abandonment.” Seifeddine v Jaber, 327 

Mich App 514, 519-520; 934 NW2d 64 (2019) (citation omitted). Nor do defendants offer 

meaningful argument rebutting the applicability of exceptions to the attachment requirement, 

particularly given that the deck allegedly contained confidential information that was presented to 

defendants. Defendants’ appellate presentation with respect to the attachment requirement is 

deficient and fails to provide an alternative ground for affirmance.

 

2 We emphasize that the only element or requirement of a trade-secret claim that is before this 

Court is whether plaintiffs made reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of the information. The 

trial court did not address, and the parties on appeal have not briefed, any of the other elements.
-7-

Given our conclusion that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to 

defendants on the trade-secret claim, we need not reach plaintiffs’ argument that they should have 

been allowed to amend the complaint with respect to the trade-secret claim and that the trial court 

erred in striking the portion of the first amended complaint that added back the trade-secret claim.

B. BREACH OF CONTRACT

Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to IC under 

MCR 2.116(C)(10) on plaintiffs’ claim in Count 1 for breach of the alleged May 26, 2016 oral 

contract.3 We disagree.

A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) . . . tests the factual sufficiency of a 

claim. When considering such a motion, a trial court must consider all evidence 

submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 

motion. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no 

genuine issue of material fact. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the 

record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. [Id. at 160 

(quotation marks and citations omitted).]

“The existence and interpretation of a contract are questions of law reviewed de novo.” Kloian v 

Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 273 Mich App 449, 452; 733 NW2d 766 (2006).

The elements of a claim for breach of contract are “(1) that there was a contract, (2) that 

the other party breached the contract, and (3) that the party asserting breach of contract suffered 

damages as a result of the breach.” Doe v Henry Ford Health Sys, 308 Mich App 592, 601; 865 

NW2d 915 (2014). “Before a contract can be completed, there must be an offer and acceptance. 

Unless an acceptance is unambiguous and in strict conformance with the offer, no contract is 

formed.” Kloian, 273 Mich App at 452 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Further, a 

contract requires mutual assent or a meeting of the minds on all the essential terms.” Id. at 453.

Plaintiffs failed to present evidence demonstrating mutual assent or a meeting of the minds 

on all the essential terms of the alleged May 26, 2016 oral agreement. Plaintiffs claim that the 

parties orally agreed on that date that defendants would sell the IP to plaintiffs for $1 million paid 

in three installments and that Zeidan and Pavlovic would each receive 10% shares of TTG. But 

the record does not reflect the parties agreed on certain contingencies of the alleged contract. In 

their first amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the parties agreed on May 26, 2016, that their 

oral contract was contingent on IC’s termination of its relationship with Global Eagle and that, 

after such termination occurred, the parties would draft a definitive written contract. But Theisen’s 

deposition testimony differed from this allegation in his complaint. Theisen testified to the effect 

that, although defendants may have viewed the contract as contingent on IC’s termination of its 

 

3 We note that some of defendants’ argument on this issue is focused on plaintiffs’ claim in Count 

3 for breach of the alleged September 12, 2016 contract and on the alternative claims of promissory 

estoppel in Counts 2 and 4. But plaintiffs have clarified in their reply brief that their argument for 

this issue is confined to the claim in Count 1 for breach of the alleged May 26, 2016 oral contract. 

This Court therefore need not address the claims in Counts 2 through 4.
-8-

relationship with Global Eagle, Theisen did not believe the contract was contingent on such 

termination. Theisen testified that “maybe” defendants “thought” the contract was contingent on 

the termination of IC’s relationship with Global Eagle. But Theisen further testified that he 

“[a]bsolutely” believed that the parties had a contract, regardless of whether IC terminated its 

relationship with Global Eagle.

Moreover, Theisen testified that he believed performance under the contract was not 

required unless and until plaintiffs’ patent attorney, John Artz, Sr., confirmed the patentability of 

the IP. In particular, when asked if there were any events that had to occur before performance 

under the alleged contract was required, Theisen testified:

John Artz, a very well-respected global patent attorney, needed to 

understand this, make sure there was no patent infringement on this before any 

monies were to be—or even for the funding to be to the next level, he needed to 

make sure there was no infringements, nobody’s filed anything that—so no 

infringement on the patent and that it was a viable product or patent.

Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that defendants agreed that performance under the contract 

was contingent on Artz’s confirmation of the patentability of the IP. Indeed, in a July 23, 2016 email to defendants, Theisen criticized them for not meeting with Artz, whose endorsement Theisen 

viewed as essential to the project. In particular, Theisen’s e-mail stated, in relevant part: “Not 

meeting with John Artz[,] Sr[.,] at Dickinson Wright was a grave setback. His endorsement of the 

IP was crucial to the funding based on my business plan.” By his own words, Theisen viewed 

Artz’s role as crucial, but there is no evidence that defendants agreed to Artz’s role; Theisen’s email strongly indicates a lack of agreement.

In short, the evidence does not establish a meeting of the minds on all essential terms of 

the alleged May 26, 2016 oral contract. Theisen’s deposition testimony indicates that defendants 

may have viewed the contract as contingent on the termination of IC’s relationship with Global 

Eagle, but that Theisen did not share that view (despite the contrary allegation in plaintiffs’ first 

amended complaint). And Theisen testified that he viewed performance under the contract as 

contingent on Artz’s confirmation of the patentability of the IP, but there is no evidence that 

defendants agreed to this. Accordingly, because plaintiffs have failed to present evidence 

establishing a meeting of the minds on all essential terms, the trial court properly granted summary 

disposition to IC on the claim in Count 1 for breach of the alleged May 26, 2016 oral contract.4

 

4 Plaintiffs argued below that the July 23, 2016 chain of e-mails between the parties documented 

their May 26, 2016 agreement. But that e-mail chain shows that the parties were continuing to 

negotiate about the terms; it does not establish that the parties had reached a meeting of the minds

on May 26, 2016, on all essential terms.
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C. FRAUD

Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to Zeidan 

and Pavlovic under MCR 2.116(C)(8) with respect to plaintiffs’ fraud claim. Plaintiffs also argue 

that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict to IC on plaintiffs’ fraud claim. We disagree.

1. SUMMARY DISPOSITION

On February 25, 2019, the trial court issued an order denying Zeidan and Pavlovic’s initial 

motion for summary disposition with respect to plaintiffs’ claims against them. The trial court 

stated that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted against Zeidan and 

Pavlovic in the absence of any specific allegations against them in their individual capacities, 

separate and distinct from the allegations against IC. But in lieu of granting Zeidan and Pavlovic’s 

motion for summary disposition, the trial court granted plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their 

complaint to remedy the deficiencies identified by the trial court or to dismiss the claims against 

Zeidan and Pavlovic in their individual capacities. On March 4, 2019, plaintiffs filed their first 

amended complaint alleging that Zeidan and Pavlovic were named as defendants in their individual 

capacities because, in relevant part, they were liable for fraud, which they allegedly committed 

while acting on behalf of IC. Zeidan and Pavlovic again moved for summary disposition, which 

the trial court granted because plaintiffs’ first amended complaint failed to set forth any claim 

against Zeidan and Pavlovic in their individual capacities. The trial court reasoned that plaintiffs’

first amended complaint added eight new paragraphs, none of which set forth a claim on which 

relief could be granted against Zeidan and Pavlovic.

In their appellate argument on this issue, plaintiffs fail to set forth the elements of fraud or 

to explain how any factual allegations in the first amended complaint satisfy those elements for 

the purpose of a fraud claim against Zeidan and Pavlovic.5 “A party may not simply announce a 

position and leave it to this Court to make the party’s arguments and search for authority to support 

the party’s position. Failure to adequately brief an issue constitutes abandonment.” Seifeddine, 

327 Mich App at 519-520 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs argue only that Zeidan and Pavlovic may 

be held liable for IC’s fraud because they are the only members of IC and were intimately involved 

in every detail of the transactions. Plaintiffs suggest that, because the fraud claim against IC was 

allowed to go to trial, the fraud claim against Zeidan and Pavlovic should also have gone to trial. 

But as discussed next, the trial court properly granted a directed verdict to IC on plaintiffs’ fraud 

claim. Plaintiffs identify no basis to conclude that the fraud claim against Zeidan and Pavlovic 

 

5

In their next argument, plaintiffs challenge the grant of a directed verdict to IC on the fraud claim 

and, in that context, discuss the elements of fraud and plaintiffs’ belief that the evidence at trial 

satisfied those elements. But the present issue involves a grant of summary disposition to Zeidan 

and Pavlovic under MCR 2.116(C)(8). A motion for summary disposition under that subrule is 

decided solely on the pleadings. El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 159-160. Plaintiffs’ argument about 

whether the evidence at trial satisfied the elements of fraud is not pertinent to the present issue 

involving whether the factual allegations in the first amended complaint satisfied those elements 

for the purpose of Zeidan and Pavlovic’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8).
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could have survived after the grant of a directed verdict to IC on that claim. Plaintiffs’ argument 

on this issue thus fails to establish the existence of an error requiring reversal.

2. DIRECTED VERDICT

A trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict is reviewed de novo. Aroma 

Wines & Equip, Inc v Columbian Distrib Servs, Inc, 497 Mich 337, 345; 871 NW2d 136 (2015). 

“A party is entitled to a directed verdict if the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party, fails to establish a claim as a matter of law.” Id. “If reasonable persons, 

after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, could honestly 

reach different conclusions about whether the nonmoving party established his or her claim, then 

the question is for the jury.” Nahshal v Fremont Ins Co, 324 Mich App 696, 719; 922 NW2d 662 

(2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

The elements of a fraud claim are:

(1) That defendant made a material representation; (2) that it was false; (3) that 

when he made it he knew that it was false, or made it recklessly, without any 

knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; (4) that he made it with the 

intention that it should be acted upon by plaintiff; (5) that plaintiff acted in reliance 

upon it; and (6) that he thereby suffered injury. Each of these facts must be proved 

with a reasonable degree of certainty, and all of them must be found to exist; the 

absence of any one of them is fatal to a recovery. [Titan Ins Co v Hyten, 491 Mich 

547, 555; 817 NW2d 562 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted).]

In general, “an action for fraud must be predicated upon a false statement relating to a past 

or existing fact; promises regarding the future are contractual and will not support a claim of 

fraud.” Cummins v Robinson Twp, 283 Mich App 677, 696; 770 NW2d 421 (2009). An exception 

to this general rule exists for a fraudulent misrepresentation that is “based upon a promise made in 

bad faith without intention of performance.” Hi-Way Motor Co v Int’l Harvester Co, 398 Mich 

330, 337-338; 247 NW2d 813 (1976). To come within this exception, the evidence of fraudulent 

intent “must relate to conduct of the actor at the very time of making the representations, or almost 

immediately thereafter.” Id. at 338-339 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, under 

the bad-faith exception, a plaintiff must demonstrate that, at the time of making the promise, the 

defendant did not intend to fulfill it. Derderian v Genesys Health Care Sys, 263 Mich App 364, 

379; 689 NW2d 145 (2004).

Plaintiffs argue that they presented sufficient evidence at trial to fall within the bad-faith 

exception. We disagree. Plaintiffs assert that defendants promised to engage TTG to purchase 

and market the IP as a way to induce TTG to provide valuable marketing information, including 

the deck and knowledge about patentability, and that defendants later used this information to 

market the IP to York Innovative Group, LLC (York), and Royal Precision Products, LLC (Royal 

Precision), eventually selling the IP to Royal Precision. But plaintiffs presented no evidence that 

defendants acted in bad faith, i.e., that they made promises with the contemporaneous intention of 

not fulfilling those promises. Even if the evidence at trial indicated that defendants made promises 

and then later failed to fulfill those promises, this alone does not establish that defendants acted in 

bad faith at the time of making the promises; otherwise, essentially every claim for breach of 
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contract would amount to a fraud claim. Plaintiffs assert that “[t]here was no evidence at trial that 

[d]efendants intended to honor their commitment to TTG.” But this assertion inverts the burden 

of proof. Plaintiffs had the burden of proving their fraud claim. Hi-Way, 398 Mich at 336. 

Accordingly, the trial court properly granted a directed verdict to IC on plaintiffs’ fraud claim.

D. EXPERT TESTIMONY

Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting at trial the 

testimony of a defense expert, Dr. Stewart Thornhill, and by limiting the cross-examination of Dr. 

Thornhill. We disagree.

“A trial court’s decision regarding the admissibility of expert testimony is reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion, as are all the trial court’s evidentiary decisions. A trial court abuses its 

discretion if its decision results in an outcome outside the range of principled outcomes.” Varran 

v Granneman (On Remand), 312 Mich App 591, 621; 880 NW2d 242 (2015) (citations omitted).

MRE 702 provides:

If the court determines that scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 

fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise if 

(1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product 

of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles 

and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

Before admitting expert testimony, a trial court must determine that it is relevant and reliable. 

Varran, 312 Mich App at 622. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence 

of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 

than it would be without the evidence.” MRE 401.

Dr. Thornhill testified that he is an investor and a business professor at the University of 

Michigan. Dr. Thornhill reviews presentations seeking investors on a weekly, sometimes daily, 

basis. The trial court recognized Dr. Thornhill as an expert in reviewing presentations seeking

investors. Dr. Thornhill testified regarding the quality or value of the deck prepared by Theisen 

regarding defendants’ IP:

[I]t was not a [d]eck that I would take forward to investors if it were mine. There 

was not enough information on customers, financials, return on investment, 

competitor response, or any other technical details that would inspire me to ask for 

a meeting beyond the initial slide [d]eck. Most investors will see a business plan 

or [d]eck, they’ll read the executive summary before proceeding and deciding 

whether they wanted to go into more detail. If this amount of information were 

presented in an executive summary I certainly wouldn’t have . . . found it credible.

Plaintiffs assert that a business professor “could not conceivably have expertise about the 

value of a unique ‘deck’ in this specific transaction between two small business entrepreneurs, nor 

was any such expertise required or helpful.” We disagree with plaintiffs’ argument. Plaintiffs’
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claims centered on a contention that the deck conferred valuable information to defendants, who 

then used that information for their own benefit. The value or quality of the deck was thus a 

relevant issue. Plaintiffs provide no basis to question the trial court’s determination that Dr. 

Thornhill, as an investor and a business professor who regularly reviewed presentations seeking 

investors, was qualified as an expert in that area. Plaintiffs have not made a convincing challenge 

to the relevance or reliability of Dr. Thornhill’s expert testimony.

Plaintiffs further argue that the trial court improperly limited the scope and duration of their 

counsel’s cross-examination of Dr. Thornhill. We disagree. “The scope and duration of crossexamination is in the trial court’s sound discretion; we will not reverse absent a clear showing of 

abuse.” Wischmeyer v Schanz, 449 Mich 469, 474-475; 536 NW2d 760 (1995).

While cross-examining Dr. Thornhill, plaintiffs’ counsel sought to have Dr. Thornhill 

review a deck that Zeidan had prepared regarding the IP before Theisen prepared his deck. IC’s 

counsel objected and stated, “[Dr. Thornhill] has not reviewed any other documents and asking 

him to do so on the stand without having reviewed the documents first is both not in keeping with 

Michigan’s rules for expert witnesses and it’s not really fair to the witness.” The trial court stated 

that, if Dr. Thornhill had not previously seen the prior deck, then he was not able to evaluate it. 

The trial court further stated:

The point of the matter is that you can’t just give him something stone cold and 

expect him . . . to be able to speak to it. The whole purpose was that this was what 

he did. The jury can determine how much to believe what he said, whether to 

believe anything he said, whether they even care what he said. So, if you, you 

know, for you to give him now another [d]eck to have him compare, that’s—I’m 

not going to allow that, let’s move on.

When plaintiffs’ counsel asked more questions that referred to the prior deck, IC’s counsel 

objected, and the trial court ruled, “As I said, I’m not going to allow him to testify to something 

that he’s never seen, that he’s never evaluated, that he’s—that’s not what he’s hired to do. So, if 

you want to question him as to his methodology of how he arrived at what he did, that’s fine, 

that’s—that’s acceptable.”

After the jury was excused from the courtroom, plaintiffs’ counsel made an offer of proof 

regarding the deck prepared by Zeidan. Plaintiffs’ counsel wanted to show that deck to Dr. 

Thornhill in order to ask him whether Theisen’s deck was an improvement over Zeidan’s deck. 

IC’s counsel responded that plaintiffs’ counsel could have obtained his own expert and could have 

shown Zeidan’s deck to Dr. Thornhill before trial; it was unreasonable to ask Dr. Thornhill to 

review a document he had never seen before while he was on the witness stand at trial. The trial 

court stated: “Thank you, counselors, you’ve made your record. There’s nothing that prevents you 

from making argument to the jury that he didn’t have the benefit of looking at that other [d]eck, 

and leave it at that.”

On appeal, plaintiffs renew their argument that their counsel should have been allowed to 

cross-examine Dr. Thornhill about Zeidan’s deck in order to show that Dr. Thornhill’s opinion 

was flawed and weak because he did not know the full context of what occurred. But plaintiffs 

fail to rebut the trial court’s reasoning, i.e., that it was unfair to hand Dr. Thornhill a document he 
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had never previously seen and ask him to review and evaluate it while on the witness stand at trial. 

Plaintiffs offer no explanation for why they could not have deposed Dr. Thornhill and asked him 

to review Zeidan’s deck before trial. Indeed, when denying plaintiffs’ pretrial motion in limine, 

the trial court noted that plaintiffs had ample time to depose Dr. Thornhill before trial; but plaintiffs 

chose not to do so. Further, as the trial court noted at trial, plaintiffs were free to cross-examine 

Dr. Thornhill at trial about the methodology by which he arrived at his opinions, and plaintiffs 

were also free to argue to the jury that Dr. Thornhill lacked the benefit of having reviewed the 

prior deck when formulating his opinions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion on this matter.

Nor have plaintiffs established that the trial court imposed an improper limitation on the 

duration of the cross-examination of Dr. Thornhill. MRE 611(a) provides,

The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of 

interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation 

and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless 

consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue 

embarrassment.

A trial court has discretion to limit the time for examining witnesses. Barksdale v Bert’s 

Marketplace, 289 Mich App 652, 655-656; 797 NW2d 700 (2010). But the trial court may not 

impose an “utterly arbitrary time limit” that is “unrelated to the nature and complexity of the case 

or the length of time consumed by other witnesses.” Id. at 657 (quotation marks, brackets, and 

citation omitted).

During the cross-examination of Dr. Thornhill, the trial court noted that the Sheriff’s Office 

required the courthouse building to be empty by 5:00 p.m. Plaintiffs’ counsel continued the crossexamination. Later during the cross-examination, IC’s counsel objected to some of the 

questioning, and the following exchange then occurred:

[Plaintiffs’ counsel]: I just really have two more questions.

The Court: Hurry up and ask them because I just got a message that we have 

to—

[Plaintiffs’ counsel]: I’m sorry.

The Court: —vacate the building, so let’s move it.

[Plaintiffs’ counsel]: Okay. Okay.

Plaintiff’s counsel then asked one more question, Dr. Thornhill answered the question, and 

plaintiff’s counsel stated, “Okay, I don’t have anything else.”

After the jury was excused from the courtroom, plaintiffs’ counsel objected to the 

purported limitations on his ability to cross-examine Dr. Thornhill, including that there was not 

enough time to cross-examine Dr. Thornhill. Plaintiffs’ counsel did not explain what additional 

questions he wanted to ask Dr. Thornhill (other than about Zeidan’s deck, but as explained earlier, 

such questioning was precluded on other grounds unrelated to time constraints).
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On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court imposed an improper time limitation. But 

plaintiffs fail to identify what questioning was needed, yet precluded, by the time limitation. When 

plaintiffs’ counsel said during cross-examination that he had only two more questions, the trial 

court allowed plaintiffs’ counsel to proceed. Plaintiffs’ counsel then asked only one more 

question, and after Dr. Thornhill answered it, plaintiffs’ counsel said he had no further questions. 

Plaintiffs have not shown that the trial court imposed an “utterly arbitrary time limit” that was 

“unrelated to the nature and complexity of the case or the length of time consumed by other 

witnesses.” Barksdale, 289 Mich App at 657 (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).

E. DISCOVERY

Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred in denying certain motions filed by plaintiffs 

to compel discovery. We conclude that this issue is moot.

This Court reviews de novo whether an issue is moot. Garrett v Washington, 314 Mich 

App 436, 449; 886 NW2d 762 (2016). This Court generally does not decide moot issues. B P 7 v 

Bureau of State Lottery, 231 Mich App 356, 359; 586 NW2d 117 (1998). “An issue is deemed 

moot when an event occurs that renders it impossible for a reviewing court to grant relief.” Id. “A 

matter is moot if this Court’s ruling cannot for any reason have a practical legal effect on the 

existing controversy.” Garrett, 314 Mich App at 449 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to compel defendants to 

provide further discovery regarding the consideration that Royal Precision was to pay to IC, 

specifically the contingent payments to be made by Royal Precision to IC in the future. Below 

plaintiffs argued that the requested discovery was pertinent to the element of damages for their 

breach-of-contract claims. But the trial court ultimately granted summary disposition to 

defendants on plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claims on grounds that were unrelated to damages. As 

explained earlier, we are not disturbing the grant of summary disposition to defendants on the 

breach-of-contract claims. Plaintiffs have not argued that the requested discovery was pertinent 

to the element of damages for any of their other claims.6 Accordingly, any ruling by this Court 

regarding the discovery dispute at issue would have no practical legal effect on the case. This 

issue is therefore moot.

F. IC’S COUNTERCLAIM

Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred in denying their motions for summary 

disposition and directed verdict with respect to IC’s counterclaim for breach of the confidentiality 

provision of the NDNCA. This issue is moot.

 

6 Plaintiffs were unsuccessful on all of their claims below, either at the summary disposition stage 

or at trial, on grounds unrelated to damages. As explained earlier, we are reversing the grant of 

summary disposition to defendants on the claim for misappropriation of trade secrets and 

remanding for further proceedings, but that does not alter our determination that the present issue 

is moot. Plaintiffs have made no argument below or on appeal that the discovery at issue is 

pertinent to the element of damages for the trade-secret claim.
-15-

The jury rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiffs on IC’s counterclaim for breach of the 

confidentiality provision of the NDNCA; the trial court then entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs 

on that counterclaim in accordance with the jury verdict. Therefore, any ruling by this Court 

regarding whether plaintiffs were entitled to summary disposition or a directed verdict on that 

counterclaim would have no practical legal effect on the case, and this issue is moot. See Kingsford 

Chemical Co v Kingsford, 347 Mich 91, 110; 78 NW2d 587 (1956) (determining that the 

defendant’s motion for a directed verdict became moot once the jury rendered a verdict in favor of 

the defendant).

Plaintiffs assert that allowing the counterclaim to go to the jury affected deliberations by 

allowing the jury to “balance out” plaintiffs’ remaining claims and IC’s remaining counterclaim. 

Plaintiffs do not fully explain what they mean by this. It appears plaintiffs are suggesting that the 

jury’s verdict regarding plaintiffs’ claims was somehow affected by the fact that IC’s counterclaim 

was submitted to the jury. Plaintiffs’ contention is entirely unsupported. The trial court instructed 

the jury to follow the court’s instructions on the law, to determine the facts from the evidence 

presented in court, and to decide the case by applying the law to the facts. The court further 

instructed the jury on the elements of each of plaintiffs’ remaining claims and IC’s remaining 

counterclaim. Jurors are presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions. Zaremba Equip, Inc v 

Harco Nat’l Ins Co, 302 Mich App 7, 25; 837 NW2d 686 (2013). No basis exists to doubt that the 

jury followed the trial court’s instructions by deciding each of the remaining claims and 

counterclaim on the basis of the applicable law and the evidence. Plaintiffs’ suggestion otherwise 

is meritless. Because the jury rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiffs on the counterclaim for 

breach of the confidentiality provision of the NDNCA, the present issue is moot.

G. GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

Plaintiffs next argue that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence because 

the jury ignored undisputed evidence that the parties agreed that plaintiffs were entitled to 50% of 

the proceeds of IC’s sale of the IP to a third party. In civil cases, when a party fails to file a motion 

for a new trial preserving the argument that the jury verdict was against the great weight of the 

evidence, the issue is waived, and there is no appellate review of the issue. Rickwalt v Richfield 

Lakes Corp, 246 Mich App 450, 464; 633 NW2d 418 (2001). Plaintiffs did not file a motion for 

a new trial preserving this issue. Therefore, the issue is waived, and there is no appellate review.7

 

7 Even if we were to consider this issue, plaintiffs have not established that the jury verdict was 

against the great weight of the evidence. Although Theisen testified that he thought he was entitled 

to 50% of the money defendants received for selling the IP to Royal Precision, Zeidan testified 

that the parties never agreed to enter into a joint venture. It was for the jury to assess the credibility 

of the witnesses. Kelly v Builders Square, Inc, 465 Mich 29, 39-40; 632 NW2d 012 (2001). The 

evidence did not preponderate so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of 

justice to allow the verdict to stand.
-16-

H. VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF THEISEN

Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Theisen’s request 

for voluntary dismissal of his claims. We disagree.

A trial court’s decision whether to grant a motion for voluntary dismissal is reviewed for 

an abuse of discretion. Mleczko v Stan’s Trucking, Inc, 193 Mich App 154, 155; 484 NW2d 5 

(1992). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome falling outside 

the range of principled outcomes.” Nowacki v Dep’t of Corrections, 319 Mich App 144, 148; 900 

NW2d 154 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

MCR 2.504(A)(2) states, in relevant part, “[A]n action may not be dismissed at the 

plaintiff’s request except by order of the court on terms and conditions the court deems proper.” 

In exercising its discretion regarding whether to grant a motion for voluntary dismissal, a trial 

court “is to weigh the competing interests of the parties along with any resultant inconvenience to 

the court from further delays.” African Methodist Episcopal Church v Shoulders, 38 Mich App 

210, 212; 196 NW2d 16 (1972). Such a motion is typically granted unless the defendant will be 

prejudiced. Id. The purpose of the court rule “is to protect defendant[s] from the abusive practice 

of dismissal after much time and effort has been put into a lawsuit[.]” Id. (discussing a prior 

version of MCR 2.504(A)(2)). A plaintiff may not request voluntary dismissal as a way to avoid 

losing a lawsuit on the merits. See McLean v McElhaney, 269 Mich App 196, 202-203; 711 NW2d 

775 (2005), rev’d on other grounds 480 Mich 978 (2007); Rosselott v Muskegon Co, 123 Mich 

App 361, 375-376; 333 NW2d 282 (1983). Summary disposition constitutes an adjudication on 

the merits. McLean, 269 Mich App at 202.

In denying plaintiffs’ motion “[a]t this time,” the trial court explained, “[t]here is a pending 

summary disposition motion that pertains specifically to [Theisen] and therefore, unless and until 

the court decides that motion I am not going to dismiss him.” The court was correct that summary 

disposition motions were pending when Theisen sought voluntary dismissal. Defendants were 

arguing that plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous. TTG lacked any assets or income. The parties had 

by that point invested significant time and resources in this heavily litigated case. Thus, the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Theisen’s request for voluntary dismissal.

II. DEFENDANTS’ ARGUMENTS ON CROSS-APPEAL IN DOCKET NO. 352952

A. MOOT ISSUES

Defendants argue on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs’ claims 

were not barred by 35 USC 261. This issue is moot. Defendants argued below that 35 USC 261 

barred plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment. The 

trial court rejected defendants’ argument, and defendants now challenge that ruling. But 

defendants ultimately prevailed on all of those claims; the claims for breach of contract and 

promissory estoppel were dismissed before trial, and the jury found in favor of defendants on the 

unjust-enrichment claim. Plaintiffs have not established on appeal that they are entitled to 

reinstatement of any of those claims. Hence, any ruling by this Court regarding whether those 
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claims were barred by 35 USC 261 would have no practical legal effect. Garrett, 314 Mich App 

at 449. This issue is thus moot.8

Defendants next argue on cross-appeal that they were entitled to summary disposition on 

plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel because plaintiffs lacked the 

financial capacity to fund the alleged deals. This issue is moot. The trial court granted defendants’

motion for summary disposition on plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract and promissory 

estoppel, albeit on grounds other than plaintiffs’ lack of financial capacity, and we are not 

disturbing that ruling. Any ruling by this Court regarding whether summary disposition would 

have been warranted on the alternative basis of plaintiffs’ lack of financial capacity would have 

no practical legal effect. Id. Therefore, this issue is moot.

B. PLAINTIFFS’ FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS

Defendants next argue on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in failing to find that 

plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous when ruling on defendants’ September 20, 2019 motion for 

summary disposition. We disagree.

A trial court’s findings with regard to whether a claim or defense was 

frivolous, and whether sanctions may be imposed, will not be disturbed unless it is 

clearly erroneous. A decision is clearly erroneous where, although there is evidence 

to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been made. [Meisner Law Group, PC v Weston Downs Condo Ass’n, 

321 Mich App 702, 730; 909 NW2d 890 (2017) (quotation marks and citations 

omitted).]

In support of their argument, defendants cite MCR 1.109(E)(7) and MCL 600.2951(3)(a). 

MCR 1.109(E)(7) provides, in relevant part, “In addition to sanctions under this rule, a party 

pleading a frivolous claim or defense is subject to costs as provided in MCR 2.625(A)(2).” MCR 

2.625(A)(2) states, “In an action filed on or after October 1, 1986, if the court finds on motion of 

a party that an action or defense was frivolous, costs shall be awarded as provided by MCL 

600.2591.” MCL 600.2591(1) provides,

Upon motion of any party, if a court finds that a civil action or defense to a 

civil action was frivolous, the court that conducts the civil action shall award to the 

prevailing party the costs and fees incurred by that party in connection with the 

civil action by assessing the costs and fees against the nonprevailing party and their 

attorney.

MCL 600.2951(3)(a) defines “frivolous” to include, as relevant here, either of the following: “The 

party had no reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying that party’s legal position were 

in fact true,” MCL 600.2951(3)(a)(ii), or, “The party’s legal position was devoid of arguable legal 

 

8 Although we are reversing the grant of summary disposition to defendants on plaintiffs’ claim 

for misappropriation of trade secrets and remanding for further proceedings on that claim, 

defendants have never argued that 35 USC 261 bars that claim.
-18-

merit,” MCL 600.2951(3)(a)(iii). The term “prevailing party” is defined as “a party who wins on 

the entire record.” MCL 600.2951(3)(b).

Defendants note that they requested a finding of frivolousness in their September 20, 2019 

motion for summary disposition but that the trial court did not address the issue of frivolousness 

when deciding the summary disposition motion. Defendants thus assert that the trial court failed 

to make a requested finding of frivolousness. But defendants cite no authority requiring the trial 

court to make a finding regarding frivolousness at the summary disposition stage when there are 

still claims and counterclaims pending for trial. When the court granted defendants’ September 

20, 2019 motion for summary disposition regarding four of plaintiffs’ claims, plaintiffs still had 

other claims pending that were not subject to that motion, and IC still had counterclaims pending. 

The remaining claims and counterclaims were the subject of a jury trial that was held after the trial 

court’s ruling on the summary disposition motion. Defendants were free to seek a finding of 

frivolousness and an award of sanctions after the entry of judgment following the trial, and they in 

fact did file such a motion, which the trial court denied and which is the subject of the consolidated 

appeal in Docket No. 353990.9 Defendants have not established that the trial court erred in 

declining to make a finding regarding frivolousness at the summary disposition stage.

III. DEFENDANTS’ ARGUMENT ON APPEAL IN DOCKET NO. 353990

Defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying IC’s March 12, 2020 postjudgment 

motion for attorney fees and costs. Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous and 

that IC was thus entitled to sanctions under MCL 600.2951(1), MCR 2.625, and MCR 1.109(E). 

Defendants further argue that IC was entitled to case evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O). 

This issue is moot. As explained earlier, we are reversing the grant of summary disposition to 

defendants on plaintiffs’ trade-secret claim and remanding for further proceedings on that claim. 

Defendants’ challenge to the denial of IC’s March 12, 2020 postjudgment motion is moot because 

the case is no longer in a postjudgment posture. The parties will be free to pursue any appropriate 

postjudgment motions following the entry of a judgment on remand. Because this issue is the sole 

issue raised on appeal in Docket No. 353990, the appeal in Docket No. 353990 is dismissed as 

moot. See B P 7, 231 Mich App at 360 (dismissing the appeal as moot).

In Docket No. 352952, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. In Docket No. 353990, 

we dismiss the appeal as moot.

/s/ Anica Letica

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

 

9 Moreover, as explained later, because we are reversing the grant of summary disposition to 

defendants on plaintiffs’ trade-secret claim and remanding the case for further proceedings on that 

claim, the case is no longer in a postjudgment posture, and any postjudgment motions for sanctions 

will have to be brought or renewed after a final judgment is entered on remand.