UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

DEXTER ANDERSON, 

 Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 15-11703 

 Honorable Gershwin A. Drain 

 Magistrate Judge David R. Grand 

v. 

 

B. TRUE, ARDETTA MOODY, 

MATTHEW BURNETT, and 

ANDRE McCLATCHEY, 

 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, OR IN THE 

ALTERNATIVE, MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS’ ANSWER [23] 

A. REPORT 

1. Factual Background 

On May 11, 2015, pro se plaintiff Dexter Anderson (“Anderson”) filed his 

complaint in this case, pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 

Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), against Defendants True, Moody, Burnett, and 

McClatchey (collectively “Defendants”). (Doc. #1). Essentially, Anderson alleges that 

Defendants violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for filing an 

administrative grievance while incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution 

(“FCI”) in Milan, Michigan. (Id.). On May 18, 2015, this case was referred to the 

undersigned for all pretrial purposes. (Doc. #6). 

In his complaint, Anderson alleges that, on or about June 5, 2013, he requested 

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that Defendant Ardetta Moody, Unit Manager, verify his Inmate Trust Fund account 

balance for purposes of gaining in forma pauperis status in a separate piece of litigation. 

(Doc. #7 at ¶14). According to Anderson, Moody refused to sign, so he sought the 

assistance of Associate Warden True and a prison secretary. (Id. at ¶¶15-16). Anderson 

claims that on June 7, 2013, Moody summoned him to her office “to chastise and berate” 

him, and was “very disrespectful and hostile,” threatening to send him to the Special 

Housing Unit for going to others for help with the Trust Fund account verification. (Id. at 

¶17). As a result of these alleged “verbal threats” from Moody, Anderson complained 

about Moody’s conduct through the prison grievance system. (Id. at ¶10). Anderson 

alleges that in retaliation for filing this administrative grievance, Moody conspired with 

Defendant Matthew Burnett to transfer him from FCI Milan to FCI Danbury, which he 

considers to be a less desirable placement. (Id. at ¶¶7-8, 24-25).

On November 3, 2015, Defendants timely filed an answer to Anderson’s 

complaint, denying Anderson’s allegations regarding an alleged violation of his First 

Amendment rights at FCI Milan. (Doc. #21). Specifically, Defendants denied that 

Anderson was summoned to Moody’s office to be chastised for seeking help with the 

verification form, that Moody was disrespectful or hostile, and that she threatened to send 

Anderson to the Special Housing Unit. (Id. at ¶17). Defendants further denied that they 

attempted to retaliate against him in any way, including by transferring him to FCI 

Danbury. (Id. at ¶¶23-24, 30, 45, 49, 51). 

On November 27, 2015, in the midst of ongoing discovery, Anderson filed the 

instant Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, to Strike Defendants’ 

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Answer. (Doc. #23). In his motion, Anderson asserts that his “well-pleaded allegations 

must be taken as true” and, therefore, he is “entitled to judgment based on the merits.” 

(Id. at 4). In the alternative, Anderson asks the Court to strike “most” of Defendants’ 

answers, since they “do not flat-out deny or admit the allegations” in his complaint, nor 

do they “address the substance of [his] allegations,” in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. (Id.

at 5). Defendants filed a response in opposition to Anderson’s motion (Doc. #24), and 

Anderson filed a reply (Doc. #26). The matter is now ripe for ruling. 

2. Analysis 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be 

granted where “no material issue of fact exists and the party making the motion is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law.” JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 

582 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation and citation omitted). As the Sixth Circuit noted, 

“For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material 

allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion 

may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.” Id.

(internal quotation and citation omitted) (emphasis added). 

In this case, as set forth above, Defendants’ answer unequivocally denies 

Anderson’s allegations regarding alleged violations of his First Amendment rights. (Doc. 

#21). Specifically, Defendants deny that Anderson was summoned to Moody’s office, 

that he was chastised for seeking help with the verification form, that Moody was 

disrespectful or hostile to him, and that she threatened to send him to the Special Housing 

Unit. (Id. at ¶17). Defendants further deny that, after Anderson filed his grievance 

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against Moody, they retaliated against him in any way, including by transferring him to 

FCI Danbury. (Id. at ¶¶23-24, 30, 45, 49, 51). Anderson asserts that, “Simply denying 

[his] allegations that the defendants violated his First Amendment rights is not enough to 

overcome a ruling in favor of the plaintiff.” (Doc. #26 at 5). But this is incorrect: on a 

motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Anderson, the Court must accept the 

statements of Defendants – the non-moving parties – as true. See Coyer v. HSBC 

Mortgage Servs., Inc., 701 F.3d 1104, 1107-08 (6th Cir. 2012); JP Morgan Chase Bank, 

510 F.3d at 582. Thus, where genuine issues of material fact remain as to Anderson’s 

entire retaliation claim, his motion for judgment on the pleadings should be denied. 

In the alternative, Anderson asks the Court to strike “most” of Defendants’ 

answer, as well as all three of their affirmative defenses. (Doc. #23 at 5-12). Pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), the Court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any 

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Motions to strike affirmative 

defenses are “generally disfavored”; indeed, it is “well established that the action of 

striking a pleading should be sparingly used by the courts.” Howard v. Gardon, 2011 

WL 4708790, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2011) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

Here, Anderson argues that most of Defendants’ answers are insufficient because they do 

not fairly “address the substance” of his allegations, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(b)(2). (Doc. #23 at 5). Reviewing Defendants’ answer, however, it is clear that 

Anderson’s argument is without merit. In some instances, Defendants outright deny 

Anderson’s allegations, consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(B). (E.g., Doc. #21 at 

¶¶3-5, 23-24, 45-48). In other instances, Defendants state that they lack information 

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sufficient to form a belief about the matter asserted, which has the effect of a denial, 

consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(5). (E.g., Doc. #21 at ¶¶14-16, 18, 20, 38). And, in 

still other instances, Defendants admit that parts of a paragraph are true, while denying 

the rest, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(4). (E.g., Doc. #21 at ¶¶2, 13, 31, 49-50). 

For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Defendants’ answer is sufficiently clear and 

fairly responds to the substance of each of Anderson’s allegations.1

Finally, Anderson moves to strike Defendants’ qualified immunity and exhaustion 

affirmative defenses, apparently because, in Anderson’s opinion, Defendants have not 

definitively established either defense. (Doc. #23 at 6-10). But, Defendants’ assertion of 

these defenses in their answer is proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), which states that 

“[e]very defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive 

pleading if one is required.” At this point, then, when discovery is ongoing, Defendants 

need not fully establish the validity of their affirmative defenses, and there is no basis to 

strike these from Defendants’ answer. Similarly, Anderson asks the Court to strike 

Defendants’ affirmative defenses that he has failed to state a claim against Defendant 

McClatchey. (Doc. #23 at 10-12). The Federal Rules provide that the defense of 

“[f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” may be raised in an answer to 

a complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a), 12(h)(2)(A). Again, Defendants need not fully 

1

 In his motion, Anderson takes issue with Defendants’ answer to the extent it asserts that an 

allegation “speaks for itself” and to the extent it states that an allegation “contains legal 

conclusions to which no response is required.” (Doc. #23 at 6 (referencing paragraphs 1, 9, 11, 

21, 27, and 32 of Defendants’ answer)). Having reviewed the substance of Anderson’s 

allegations in these paragraphs, as well as Defendants’ answers, the Court is not persuaded that 

Defendants’ answers are inadequate. Regardless, however, Defendants have – in response to 

Anderson’s motion – provided amended answers to each of the paragraphs at issue (Doc. #24 at 

7-8), which the Court finds sufficient.

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prove this affirmative defense at this stage of the proceedings, and it should not be 

stricken.

B. RECOMMENDATION 

For the reasons stated above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Anderson’s Motion 

for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, to Strike Defendants’ Answer (Doc.

#23) be DENIED.

Dated: February 26, 2016 s/David R. Grand 

Ann Arbor, Michigan DAVID R. GRAND 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS 

Within 14 days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation 

and Order, any party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed 

findings and recommendations and the order set forth above. See 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(1). Failure to timely file objections 

constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 

(1985); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005). Only specific 

objections to this Report and Recommendation will be preserved for the Court’s appellate 

review; raising some objections but not others will not preserve all objections a party may 

have. See Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 

1987); see also Frontier Ins. Co. v. Blaty, 454 F.3d 590, 596-97 (6th Cir. 2006). Copies 

of any objections must be served upon the Magistrate Judge. See E.D. Mich. LR 

72.1(d)(2). 

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A party may respond to another party’s objections within 14 days after being 

served with a copy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). Any such 

response should be concise, and should address specifically, and in the same order raised, 

each issue presented in the objections. 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of 

record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective 

email or First Class U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on 

February 26, 2016. 

 s/Eddrey O. Butts 

 EDDREY O. BUTTS 

 Case Manager

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