GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Attorney General

December 1999 SEIZED DRUGS AND 

FIREARMS

FBI Needs to Improve 

Certain Physical 

Safeguards and 

Strengthen 

Accountability

GAO/AIMD-00-18

Page 1 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Accounting and Information

Management Division

B-282211 Letr

December 16, 1999

The Honorable Janet Reno

The Attorney General

Dear Madam Attorney General:

Since 1990, we have periodically reported on government operations that 

we have identified as “high risk” because of their greater vulnerabilities to 

waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. One of these operations is the 

asset forfeiture program operated by the Department of Justice. As we 

reported in January 1999, although some improvements have been made to 

the program since we first designated it as a high risk program in 1990, 

significant problems remain and continued oversight is necessary to ensure 

that policies and procedures are followed and that adequate safeguards are 

in place.1

Related to asset forfeiture, Justice operations often involve the seizure, 

custody, and disposition of evidence that is used by federal prosecutors. A 

critical support function is controlling evidence to help ensure that federal 

cases are not compromised or weakened by challenges made by the 

defense about the existence, completeness, or handling of evidence, or its 

ties to defendants. Seized property, including items such as drugs and 

firearms, are subject to forfeiture and typically remain in the custody of the 

seizing agency until they are approved for final disposition. 

This report focuses on Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) 

controls over seized drugs and firearms. There is an inherent risk of theft, 

misuse, and loss of drugs and firearms because such evidence typically has 

a market or “street” value. In addition, evidence can remain in the FBI’s 

custody for significant amounts of time due to the FBI’s long-term 

investigations. Another factor increasing this risk is changes in custody of 

the evidence as the FBI often conducts its operations with other law 

enforcement agencies, which can result in evidence being transferred from 

one agency to another. 

1

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice

(GAO/OCG-99-10, January 1999).
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Given this inherent risk, our audit objectives were to determine whether 

the FBI (1) put in place physical safeguards that if operated effectively 

would help control access to and use of drug and firearm evidence and

(2) maintained adequate accountability over such evidence. To accomplish 

these objectives, we interviewed officials from FBI headquarters and four 

selected FBI field offices and reviewed pertinent policies and procedures 

provided by the FBI concerning the safeguarding and handling of drug and 

firearm evidence. Based on discussions with FBI headquarters officials and 

a review of staffing levels for the FBI’s 56 field offices, we selected two of 

the largest field offices−New York, New York and Miami, Florida−and two 

smaller sized offices−Dallas, Texas and San Diego, California−at which to 

perform our work. 

At each of these four selected FBI field offices, we observed the location 

and condition of storage facilities and physical safeguards over drug and 

firearm evidence; randomly sampled and tested recently acquired drug and 

firearm items; performed inventory procedures for judgmentally selected 

drug and firearm items; and observed FBI personnel weigh selected drug 

items and compared the observed weights to the weights recorded on 

evidence labels attached to the items. We also obtained and reviewed the 

results of recent FBI field office internal inspections to determine if issues 

we identified during our fieldwork were indicative of more systemic 

concerns at the FBI.2

 We performed our work in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards from August 1998 through August 

1999. See appendix I for a more detailed discussion of our scope and 

methodology.

We requested written comments on a draft of this report from the Attorney 

General or her designee. The Assistant Director for FBI’s Office of Public 

and Congressional Affairs provided us with written comments, which are 

discussed in the “Agency Comments and Our Evaluation” section and are 

reprinted in appendix II.

2

The FBI provided copies of (1) electronic communications sent to 41 field offices and

(2) documentation that summarizes the inspection results for 3 other field offices that detail 

deficiencies, and associated instructions and recommendations, related to drugs and 

firearms that were identified by Evidence Program Audits conducted during recent internal 

inspections. According to the FBI Chief Inspector, there were no evidence findings resulting 

from the most recent inspections at the other 12 FBI field offices.
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Results in Brief Physical safeguards over drug and firearm evidence, which include 

adequate storage facilities and control procedures, are essential for 

guarding against theft, misuse, and loss of such evidence and securing it for 

federal prosecutors. Each of the four FBI field offices we reviewed 

established physical safeguards in accordance with key FBI policy 

provisions that, if operated effectively, would help control access to and 

use of drug and firearm evidence. However, overcrowding and inadequate 

packaging of drug evidence and improper maintenance of the night 

depository in the drug vault at one of the four FBI field offices we visited 

increased the potential for theft, misuse, and loss of evidence at that 

location. In addition, we found inadequate ventilation in the drug vault at 

one field office that could potentially negatively affect the health and safety 

of evidence control personnel. At the four field offices we reviewed, we 

also identified cases where firearms were not certified as rendered safe in 

accordance with FBI policy. Further, the most recent internal inspections 

for certain field offices identified similar findings involving the improper 

storage of drug evidence, inadequate ventilation in drug vaults, and the lack 

of documentation certifying that firearms were rendered safe, as well as 

weaknesses in physical access controls.

Drug and firearm evidence must also be accounted for completely and 

accurately to help ensure that such evidence is not compromised for 

federal prosecution purposes and is protected against the risk of theft, 

misuse, and loss. However, the FBI’s ability to account for drug and firearm 

evidence was hampered at one or more of the four field offices we 

reviewed by incomplete and missing information on chain of custody 

documents, failure to promptly issue and reconcile reports that are used to 

verify the location of evidence, and/or inadequate documentation for 

certain bulk drug seizures. For example, with regard to inadequate 

documentation for certain bulk drug seizures, we identified two instances 

at one field office that involved a total of about 770 kilograms of cocaine for 

which there was no signed certification by any of the FBI personnel who 

purportedly witnessed the destructions of most of these drugs.3

Notwithstanding these problems, evidence control personnel at the four 

FBI field offices we visited were able to locate each item selected for our 

testing that was in storage at the field offices, and for those items not in 

3

One kilogram is the equivalent of approximately 2.2 pounds. About 453.6 grams is the 

equivalent of 1 pound.
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storage, they provided documentation supporting the current location or 

status of the item.

Also, timely data entry and data verification are key control procedures 

that help ensure that data records are complete and accurate. We identified 

several instances at three of the field offices we reviewed where evidence 

control personnel or agents entered evidence into the FBI’s Automated 

Case Support (ACS) system late without the required explanatory 

memoranda. For example, at one field office, 9 of the 50 selected drug 

items we reviewed were not entered into the ACS system in a timely 

manner and no required memoranda explaining the late data entries were 

provided. In addition, at the four field offices, we found discrepancies 

between information recorded in the ACS system and information on 

written documents associated with the evidence. The FBI’s own internal 

inspection teams reached similar conclusions pertaining to accounting for 

seized drug and firearm evidence in a complete, accurate, and timely 

manner.

While reviewing selected drug items in storage at the four field offices, we 

noted numerous discrepancies between the actual weight of drug items 

observed during our testing and the weight of these items recorded on 

attached evidence labels, which should reflect the current weight of the 

item including packaging. Although many of the weight variances involved 

only several grams, larger discrepancies included a shortage of 269 grams 

of heroin and an overage of 3.9 kilograms of cocaine. The FBI’s ability to 

account for drug evidence was hindered by the lack of policies and 

procedures on how to identify and address significant weight variances. We 

are making several recommendations to address the above issues. 

In commenting on this report, the FBI stated that while the information 

contained in the draft was, for the most part, factually accurate, it did have 

some concerns about the report’s focus and conclusions and 

recommendations. Nevertheless, the FBI stated that it plans or has already 

taken actions relating to four of our key recommendations, namely, our 

recommendations to modify existing policy related to the weighing of drug 

evidence, and our recommendation to review actions taken by the New 

York Field Office to address various internal control deficiencies. While the 

FBI neither concurred with nor took exception to our recommendation to 

modify existing policy to include guidance for updating records in the ACS 

system to reflect identified changes in the weight of drug evidence, it is 

important to note that, at the time of our review, there was no written 

requirement to update the ACS system for any such changes. Consequently, 
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the weight recorded in the ACS system may not represent the most current 

weight recorded on the item’s evidence label, thus reducing the FBI’s 

accountability over such drug evidence.

The FBI disagreed with our recommendation concerning the need to 

reinforce adherence to certain existing FBI policies, stating that 

recordkeeping issues we identified that were also found during its own 

internal inspections do not, in the aggregate or otherwise, suggest 

inadequate accountability over drug evidence given the overlapping 

internal control procedures in place. We disagree with the FBI and, as 

discussed in this report, identified several issues that we consider to be of a 

more severe nature at one or more of the locations we visited and for which 

we did not identify any redundant controls to compensate for the 

deficiencies.

In addition, FBI stated that we used the findings identified during its own 

internal inspections to extrapolate “systemic” inadequacies in the FBI’s 

Evidence Program, regardless of the circumstance or materiality. The FBI 

also emphasized that maintaining appropriate physical safeguards and 

accountability is an ongoing process as new policies and procedures are 

continually implemented and new employees are continuously introduced 

to evidence procedures. However, the FBI’s internal inspections are cited 

throughout our report to supplement our own findings and illustrate that 

they may be indicative of more systemic concerns. As such, and 

considering the continuous influx of new policies, procedures, and 

personnel, the need for reinforcement of adherence to the existing FBI 

policies listed in our recommendation is valid.

Further, the FBI stated that it does not concur with our recommendation to 

review existing policy to determine whether current procedures for 

verifying evidence information entered into the ACS system are adequate, 

or if the policy should be modified to enhance the FBI’s ability to detect and 

prevent data entry errors. Based on the inaccuracies we found in the ACS 

system, combined with similar results identified during several of the FBI’s 

own internal inspections, a review of existing policies and procedures 

concerning verifying information entered into the ACS system is justified.

Background The FBI is the principal investigative arm of the United States Department 

of Justice. Title 28, United States Code, Section 533, which authorizes the 

Attorney General to appoint officials to detect crimes against the United 

States, and other federal statutes, gives the FBI the authority and 
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responsibility to investigate specific crimes. Currently, the FBI has 

investigative jurisdiction over more than 200 categories of federal crimes 

and will conduct an investigation if a possible violation of federal law under 

its jurisdiction has occurred. The FBI presents the information and 

evidence gathered in the course of its investigation to the appropriate U.S. 

Attorney or Department of Justice official who determines whether or not 

prosecution or further action is warranted. Prosecution is the 

responsibility of federal prosecutors employed by the U.S. Attorney’s 

Offices or the Department of Justice.

The FBI is a field-oriented organization in which nine divisions and four 

offices at FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C., provide program direction 

and support services to field offices located in 56 major cities.4

 The field 

office locations were selected based on crime trends, the need for regional 

geographic centralization, and the need to efficiently manage resources.5

Each field office is normally overseen by a special agent in charge (SAC), 

who is assisted by one or more assistant special agents in charge (ASAC), 

squad supervisors who are responsible for investigative work, and 

administrative officers who manage support operations including evidence 

control. 

FBI field offices face significant challenges in controlling evidence where 

drugs and firearms are involved. Drug evidence can range from bulk 

seizures weighing hundreds of kilograms to residue on paraphernalia, such 

as clothing and pipes. Larger quantities of drugs typically have a substantial 

“street” value and, therefore, are inherently prone to theft. Regardless of 

quantity and form, drug evidence may change hands several times from 

seizure to disposition. For example, during a task force operation, local law 

enforcement personnel may give drug evidence to FBI agents, who then 

transfer it to FBI storage. This evidence will often be transferred to off-site 

testing facilities, such as those maintained by the Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA). After analysis, the testing facility will return the 

evidence to the FBI. Also, field office personnel destroy drugs that are no

4

Fifty-five field offices are in the United States and one is in Puerto Rico.

5

FBI field offices conduct their official business both directly from their headquarters 

facilities and through approximately 400 satellite offices, known as resident agencies. 

Resident agencies are located based on similar criteria as that used for field offices.
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longer needed for prosecution.6 Drug disposal involves transporting the 

drugs from FBI storage facilities to off-site destruction areas for 

incineration.

Firearms seized by FBI agents during the course of their investigations can 

vary considerably. While some seizures may involve a single handgun, 

others may result in the confiscation of multiple weapons including 

shotguns, rifles, and automatic pistols. Similar to drugs, firearms involve an 

inherent risk of theft, misuse, and loss because they have market value and 

may change hands several times from seizure to disposition. They may be 

seized during joint operations with other law enforcement agencies, 

transferred to FBI storage, and subsequently sent to the FBI’s Laboratory 

Division in Washington, D.C., or to local law enforcement facilities for 

forensic examinations. In addition, in cases in which the (1) firearms were 

confiscated from individuals who are convicted of felonies and (2) federal 

prosecutors are able to prove that the firearms were used to commit 

crimes, the FBI will typically send the firearms to their Laboratory Division 

to be destroyed. However, unlike illegal drugs, under certain circumstances 

seized firearms must be returned to their owners. For example, if the 

firearm was stolen from a legitimate owner or if it is the property of a 

suspect who is acquitted and will not waive ownership rights, attempts 

must be made to return the firearm to the owner or deliver it to a 

designated representative.7

Policies to help ensure that drugs and firearms are properly safeguarded 

and accounted for while in FBI custody are developed primarily by FBI 

headquarters personnel. Each field office is responsible for implementing 

the policies and supplementing them when the SAC determines that it is 

necessary. Such policies include the establishment and maintenance of 

evidence control rooms for the storage of evidence and chain of custody 

documents, which are used to show who has custody of specific evidence 

from the time it is acquired by the FBI until it is disposed. In addition, FBI 

field offices employ an evidence program manager and evidence control 

technicians who accept evidence from agents and are responsible for 

6

For bulk drug seizures, a certain amount of the drugs is retained and stored as evidence 

pending conclusion of trials and appeals, while most of the drugs may be destroyed in 

accordance with FBI policy.

7

Return of the firearm to the owner, or delivery to a designated representative, can take 

place only if the party receiving the firearm may legally own a firearm and ownership of 

such type of firearm is not prohibited by law.
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helping to ensure that the evidence is properly secured, protected, and 

recorded while it is in the FBI’s custody.8

As an added control over field operations, each field office is supposed to 

receive an internal inspection every 3 years. These inspections are 

coordinated by the FBI’s Inspection Division and include a comprehensive 

review of all field operations, including those pertaining to safeguarding 

and accounting for drug and firearm evidence. Internal inspections are 

performed by teams which include experienced evidence control personnel 

from other field offices who are knowledgeable about policies and 

procedures related to seizure, storage, and disposition of drug and firearm 

evidence. Each inspection typically involves a 100 percent inventory of 

drug evidence. According to the FBI’s Chief Inspector, once an inspection is 

completed, significant findings are communicated to the field office SAC by 

an electronic communication, which contains the details of the findings 

and recommendations to correct noted deficiencies. Field offices are 

required to respond to all findings within 30 days. The response consists of 

the field office’s written plan, or actions taken, to correct the deficiencies 

identified by the inspection team. Inspection team leaders review the field 

office responses for adequacy; however, typically no additional review or 

specific testing is performed by the inspection team until the next 

inspection. 

Certain Physical 

Safeguards Need 

Improvement

Physical safeguards, which include adequate storage facilities and 

procedures, are needed to reduce the risk of theft, misuse, or loss of drug 

and firearm evidence and help ensure that such evidence is not 

compromised for federal prosecution purposes. In addition, physical 

safeguards can promote a safe working environment for FBI personnel. 

The four FBI field offices included in our review have physical safeguards 

in place that, if operated effectively, would help control access to and use 

of drug and firearm evidence. However, we identified storage problems 

involving drug evidence at one field office that increase the potential for 

theft, misuse, and loss of evidence. At another field office, we noted that 

the drug vault did not have adequate ventilation for odor control and the 

health and safety of evidence control personnel. We also identified several 

firearms involving the four field offices we reviewed that had not been 

certified as rendered safe in accordance with FBI policy. In addition, the 

8

According to an FBI official, all FBI employees are drug tested before they are hired and are 

subject to additional random drug testing during employment at the FBI.
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most recent internal inspections for certain field offices identified similar 

findings involving the improper storage of drug evidence, inadequate 

ventilation in the drug vaults, and the lack of documentation certifying that 

firearms were rendered safe, as well as weaknesses in certain physical 

access controls.

Physical Safeguards Evidence control rooms at each of the four FBI field offices we visited met 

key requirements set forth in FBI policy. In accordance with policy, 

evidence was kept in designated evidence control rooms used solely for the 

storage of seized, recovered, or contributed property.9

 Doors to the 

evidence control rooms used to store general evidence, such as firearms, 

were secured with a combination lock, keypad access control device, or 

similar locking system. As required by FBI policy, drug evidence was stored 

in a separate evidence control room, or drug vault, which was also 

equipped with motion detectors and secured with a dual-entry locking 

system. According to evidence control or security personnel at each of the 

four field offices, the doors to the evidence control rooms and drug vaults 

are equipped with security alarms. 

In addition, we observed various security devices, including cameras, 

motion detectors, and door alarms, which according to FBI personnel at 

the field offices, are operational and monitored by field office personnel

24 hours a day. Officials at each of the four field offices also stated that the 

alarms are routinely tested. However, due to the sensitive nature of the 

evidence, we did not perform any comprehensive tests to verify the 

operation of any of the security devices mentioned above because we did 

not want to risk compromising any of the evidence that may be needed for 

prosecution purposes. 

FBI policy also requires restricted access to drug and general evidence 

control rooms to ensure that evidentiary property can withstand defense 

challenges concerning custody of the evidence. As required by the policy, 

we observed at each of the four field offices we visited that two FBI 

employees were needed to access the drug vault. Each field office we 

visited limited the number of personnel who had access to the drug vault 

and the general evidence control rooms, and we observed that the doors to 

9

FBI agents can collect evidence in various ways; for example, it can be seized from a 

suspected criminal, recovered from an abandoned crime scene, or contributed by a 

cooperating law enforcement agency.
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these areas remained locked unless a specific need for entry arose. Further, 

in accordance with FBI policy, each of the four field offices maintained 

access logs for their drug vault and their general evidence control room and 

required every person entering and exiting the secured areas to sign the 

log, including their name, reason for entry, and the date and time of entry 

and exit. 

Twenty-four of the 44 FBI field office internal inspection results we 

reviewed−including those for the Dallas and New York Field Offices−

documented one or more physical safeguard concerns. For example, eight 

of the inspections for field offices not selected for our review found that 

evidence control rooms, either at the field office or an associated resident 

agency, did not have either a bureau-approved intrusion detection system, 

motion detector, or alarm. Seven of the inspections for field offices not 

selected for our review identified evidence control rooms or temporary 

storage areas with inadequate locking systems, such as no keyless entry or 

no dual locking system as required by FBI policy.

In addition, seven inspections, which included the Dallas and New York 

Field Offices, cited instances involving (1) improper access to evidence 

control rooms by FBI personnel, such as an unauthorized employee 

accessing the evidence control room unaccompanied by the evidence 

control technician, or (2) an evidence control technician having sole access 

to the drug and valuable evidence control room. At seven field offices not 

selected for our review, inspection teams also determined access logs were 

either not used or were not being properly completed by persons entering 

the evidence control rooms. For example, some entries did not include the 

reason for access, the date and time of entry, or the signatures of all 

persons accessing the area. Other physical safeguard concerns listed in one 

or more of the inspections included (1) congested conditions in storage 

areas and (2) an inadequate number of vault witnessing officials.

Storage of Drugs and 

Firearms

Overcrowded and cluttered evidence control rooms, and unsealed and 

damaged evidence packaging, increase the risk of theft, misuse, and loss of 

evidence and the risk that critical drug evidence can be compromised and 

subject to challenges by the defense. At the New York Field Office, we 

found that the drug vault was overcrowded and contained numerous items 

that were not stored in an orderly manner, and we observed drug items that 

were inadequately sealed or were kept in damaged packaging. In addition, 

FBI policy states that some drugs, including marijuana and cocaine, are 

highly odoriferous and require more than normal ventilation for odor 
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control and for health and safety reasons. At the Dallas Field Office, we 

noticed a strong odor emanating from the drug vault and were told by 

evidence control personnel that the drug vault did not have exterior 

ventilation as required by FBI policy. Also, at each of the four field offices 

we reviewed, we identified firearms that had not been certified as rendered 

safe in accordance with FBI policy. Firearms that are not rendered safe 

prior to storage can create unsafe conditions for FBI personnel as well as 

for others who may require access to the evidence.

At the New York Field Office, we observed that shelves in the storage area 

were overcrowded and drug evidence was stacked on the floor to an extent 

that made it difficult for evidence control personnel to walk through the 

room and readily retrieve items we selected for review. Further, the 

temporary storage bin for the night depository, which dropped directly into 

the drug vault, included a large pile of drug items that had not been moved 

and stored in an orderly manner on shelves within the vault. In addition, a 

drug evidence bag was leaking and some drug evidence was stored in 

crushed and open boxes. We also observed a bulk seizure comprised of 

approximately 50 kilograms of cocaine that had not been packaged and 

sealed in accordance with FBI policy. Although seized over 11 months prior 

to our visit, the drug evidence was stored in two large seed bags in the 

same state as it had been acquired−50 bricks of cocaine individually 

wrapped with brown tape or duct tape. Following our observation, 

evidence control personnel notified the case agent who scheduled a date to 

enter the vault and seal the evidence. According to the Evidence Program 

Manager, the evidence was sealed on March 11, 1999.

In addition, evidence control personnel stated that the night depository, 

which we observed, contained drug evidence held for periods ranging from 

about 2 weeks to over 2 months. Because FBI agents frequently make drug 

seizures outside normal business operating hours, FBI policy allows field 

offices to maintain night depositories. However, the policy requires the 

contents from the night depositories to be removed at the beginning of 

each workday by an evidence control technician, accompanied by the vault 

witnessing official, and drug evidence is to be properly stored in the drug 

vault. According to the Evidence Program Manager, although the New York 

Field Office has over 1,000 agents, it had only 2 designated vault witnessing 

officials at the time of our review. Because such a limited number of 

personnel had authorization to participate in opening and entering the 

vault, it was difficult to promptly transfer drugs from the night depository 

to a proper storage location within the vault.
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Twenty-seven of the 44 FBI field office internal inspection results we 

reviewed−including those for the New York Field Office−identified drug 

items (or drug and valuable items)10 that had not been properly sealed, 

wrapped, labeled, or stored. For example, two of these inspections, for 

offices not involved in our review, specifically noted instances of damaged 

or open storage boxes that allowed access to drugs. In addition, at one field 

office not selected for our review, the inspection results state that a review 

of 19 drug and valuable items determined a 100 percent noncompliance of 

proper handling and sealing, and the inspection team at this office found 

that drugs and valuables, as well as items of general evidence were 

commingled and improperly stored. Further, the most recent internal 

inspection of the New York Field Office, which was completed on 

January 29, 1999, found that the physical condition and organization of the 

field office’s drug vault were inadequate.

According to the results of the New York Field Office internal inspection, 

the poor condition of the drug vault made it difficult to conduct the 

inventory audit or to locate evidence.11 Similar to our observations, the 

inspection noted specific instances in which either the evidence was 

improperly sealed or evidence boxes appeared to have been broken open 

from the weight of other stacked evidence boxes. In addition, the 

inspection identified a grate, located about 1 foot off the ground that 

reportedly could easily be pried open and allow for direct entry into the 

vault. According to the inspection results, the drug vault should be 

reorganized and, as appropriate, old items destroyed to make room for new 

evidence. The inspection results also stated that the grate should be 

secured to avoid unauthorized entry.

10While some inspection teams report on drug and valuable evidence separately, other 

inspections combine the results of drug and valuable evidence reviews.

11According to the results of the New York Field Office inspection, the inspection auditors 

discontinued efforts to complete a 100 percent physical inventory due to time constraints. 

At the time of discontinuance, 79 of 1,625 drug items could not be physically located or 

otherwise accounted for by evidence control personnel.
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According to the New York Field Office’s Administrative SAC and the 

Evidence Program Manager, responsibility for the maintenance, 

recordkeeping, and storage of drug evidence was transferred to New York’s 

Administrative Division only about 1 month prior to our November 1998 

visit.12 These officials reported that subsequent to the January 1999 

inspection, the drug vault has been relocated and any physical conditions 

or concerns that were issues have been alleviated by the move. In addition, 

according to these officials, numerous drug items have been resealed and 

documented for proper storage according to policy, and evidence control 

technicians in the New York Field Office will not accept any evidence into 

storage that is not properly sealed or documented.

In addition to the drug storage concerns discussed above, FBI policy 

requires that field office drug vaults which are used exclusively for drug 

and/or valuable evidence, have exterior ventilation for both the storage of 

such odoriferous substances and for the health and safety of evidence 

control personnel. At the Dallas Field Office, we were told by evidence 

control personnel that the drug vault did not have exterior ventilation as 

required by FBI policy. Four of the 44 internal inspection results we 

reviewed, which include the New York Field Office, also reported that 

these offices did not have adequate exterior ventilation in their drug vaults, 

and inspection teams instructed these four field offices to take steps to 

ensure such ventilation is established. 

Regarding firearm evidence, FBI policy states that firearms are not to be 

accepted by evidence control personnel for storage until they have been 

examined by a field office firearms instructor and rendered safe. The policy 

requires the firearms instructor to sign and date the certification on the 

lower left-hand corner of a chain of custody document, designating that 

such examination has been performed.13

12According to the January 1999 internal inspection results, control and custody of the Drug 

Evidence Program was transferred from the Drug Branch of the Criminal Division to the 

Evidence Control Unit of the Administrative Division effective October 5, 1998.

13Although specific procedures for rendering a firearm safe are not described in the policies 

we were provided, according to the FBI Evidence Program Manager, the procedures used by 

FBI agents in rendering a weapon safe include inspecting firearms each time they are 

handled to ensure they are safe and unloaded.
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In our sample of 113 firearms acquired by the four selected FBI field 

offices, we found 3 firearms in storage that lacked documentation 

certifying that the weapon had been rendered safe.14 We also identified four 

other firearms that were certified as rendered safe; however, the 

certifications for these firearms were dated between 1 and 39 days after the 

date they had been accepted for storage by evidence control personnel. In 

addition, we found 11 firearms that had been certified as rendered safe, but 

the certifications were not dated as required by policy.

Similarly, 11 of the 44 FBI field office internal inspection results we 

reviewed−including that for the New York Field Office−reported a lack of 

certification that the firearms were rendered safe. For example, inspection 

results for three field offices not selected for our review identified the 

following: At one field office, there was no documentation certifying that 

firearms had been rendered safe for 70 percent of the items tested by the 

inspection team; at a second field office, about 40 percent of the items 

reviewed lacked certifications that firearms had been rendered safe; and at 

a third field office, the inspection team found no certifications for any of 

the reviewed firearms stored in the evidence control room. 

Accountability Over 

Drug and Firearm 

Evidence Needs 

Strengthening

Written policies covering documentation, record maintenance, and 

independent verification requirements are essential for maintaining 

adequate accountability for drug and firearm evidence. Such procedures 

lower the risk of theft, misuse, and loss of evidence, and the risk that 

evidence can be compromised for prosecution purposes while in FBI 

custody. According to FBI policy, the intrinsic value of drug evidence 

requires the establishment of strict, documented accountability. FBI policy 

requires drug and firearm evidence to be tracked from acquisition to 

disposition with documents including chain of custody forms, Charge-Out 

Reports, and disposition memoranda. The policy also requires drug and 

firearm evidence to be entered within established time frames into the 

FBI’s ACS system.

14We also identified two firearms in storage at resident agencies that, according to the case 

agents who had custody of the firearms, had not been certified as rendered safe by a 

firearms instructor. According to the FBI Evidence Program Manager, firearms not 

submitted for storage are not required to be certified as rendered safe by a firearms 

instructor. However, according to this official, FBI agents are knowledgeable in the handling 

of weapons and, after acquiring a firearm, will remove the ammunition thereby rendering 

the weapon safe.
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We identified incomplete or missing documentation for the custody and 

disposition of specific items selected for testing. In addition, certain field 

offices did not generate and reconcile reports−in accordance with FBI 

policy−that identify agents who maintain custody of drug and firearm 

evidence. We also found that FBI personnel did not always document the 

reason for late data entry of drug and firearm evidence into the ACS 

system, and we identified discrepancies between information recorded in 

the ACS system and the information found on written documents 

associated with the evidence. Recent internal inspections for certain field 

offices noted similar deficiencies. Further, we found that the FBI had no 

written policies or procedures to identify and address significant 

discrepancies between the actual weight of drug items at any time prior to 

destruction and the recorded weight of the items on attached evidence 

labels, which should reflect the current weight of the item including 

packaging.

However, at the four field offices we visited, evidence control personnel 

were able to locate each item selected for testing that was in storage during 

our review, and for items not in storage, they provided documentation 

supporting the current location or status of the items. For example, for 

drug items not in storage because they had been transferred to DEA for 

analysis, we were provided a copy of a DEA form showing signatures of 

FBI and DEA personnel confirming the laboratory’s receipt of the evidence.

Chain of Custody 

Documentation

FBI policy requires its personnel to establish and maintain a chain of 

custody (a tracking document) for seized, recovered, and contributed 

drugs and firearms. This written chain of custody must include the 

signatures of the agent who initially seized or collected the drugs or 

firearms, the evidence control technician who placed the evidence in 

storage, and any other FBI personnel who assumed custody of the evidence 

for any purpose until the evidence is disposed of. It must also include the 

reason for the transfer of custody and the time and date of any custody 

change. In addition, it is important for the written chain of custody to 

include either the barcode number or the case number and exhibit number 

for the specific item in order to conclusively relate the document to a 

particular piece of evidence. The proper maintenance of chain of custody 

documents is a key internal control over seized drugs and firearms because 

custody of such evidence can change several times from seizure to 

disposition, and the document must be able to withstand defense 

challenges during judicial proceedings. 
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During our review, we identified various deficiencies in chain of custody 

documentation at the four field offices we visited. Specifically, of the 50 

drug items reviewed at the New York Field Office, evidence control 

personnel were not able to provide a written chain of custody form for one 

drug item tested; and for three other drug items, the written chain of 

custody provided had neither a barcode nor a case number and exhibit 

number to conclusively relate it to a particular piece of evidence. In 

addition, of the total of 159 drug items reviewed at the four field offices, we 

identified six cases for which either the time or date of a custody change, 

or the reason for the change, was omitted from the written chain of 

custody. And for two other drug items, although we observed the evidence 

in the vault, the evidence control technician did not sign the written chain 

of custody when the evidence was accepted for storage. 

Similarly, of the 24 firearm items reviewed at the Dallas Field Office, the 

written chain of custody form for two of the items had neither a barcode 

nor a case number and exhibit number to conclusively relate it to a 

particular piece of evidence. In addition, one of the 36 firearm items 

reviewed in New York did not have a reason for transfer of the evidence 

recorded on the written chain of custody.

Moreover, the chain of custody did not always adequately reflect the 

current status or location of the drug evidence. In the San Diego Field 

Office, we verified that 10 of the 23 drug items we reviewed involved drugs 

that were taken directly to the DEA laboratory for analysis rather than 

initially stored. Although transporting drug evidence for analysis prior to 

storage is an acceptable procedure, FBI policy requires the chain of 

custody to disclose that the evidence has been forwarded to the DEA 

laboratory. However, the chain of custody forms for 9 of these 10 cases did 

not show the item had been forwarded to the DEA laboratory. FBI officials 

at the San Diego Field Office acknowledged that the chain of custody 

should reflect evidence transported to DEA or picked up from DEA, and 

they stated that they would ensure this would be done in the future.

Thirteen of the 44 FBI field office internal inspection results we reviewed, 

which include the New York Field Office, identified deficiencies in the 

chain of custody. For example, the inspection team at the New York Field 

Office cited failure to properly document the chain of custody for 609, or 

over 44 percent, of the 1,377 drug items examined. In addition, other 

inspection results for three offices not involved in our review cited 

deficiencies found on chain of custody forms, including (1) 17 percent of 

drug and valuable items reviewed at one field office did not have 
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signatures, (2) forms for about 5 percent of drug and valuable items 

examined at another field office were incomplete, and (3) at a third field 

office, the final disposition was not recorded for 68 disposed drug and 

valuable items. 

Reconciliation of ChargeOut Reports

FBI policy requires evidence control personnel to generate and reconcile 

Charge-Out Reports that identify agents who have had custody of drug or 

firearm evidence for more than 60 days. According to FBI policy, evidence 

may be charged out to FBI employees who have an official need. For 

example, a case agent may charge-out an item that is needed by the 

Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) for trial. Even though the agent forwards 

the evidence to the AUSA, the chain of custody will continue to reflect that 

the agent has custody of the evidence. The Charge-Out Report procedure 

requires FBI personnel to routinely verify the location of evidence, thus 

ensuring appropriate custody and allowing for periodic review of the need 

to hold evidence or return it to storage. According to FBI policy, the reports 

must be run every week or every 2 weeks depending on the size of the field 

office. They must be distributed to supervisory officials, who in turn, 

forward them to the person who currently has custody of the evidence so 

that person can determine whether the evidence needs to remain in their 

custody or be returned to storage. The results of this reporting process, 

either the return to storage or the recharging-out of the evidence, must be 

recorded in the ACS system by the evidence control technician. 

Based on inquiries of FBI personnel at each of the four field offices 

included in our review, during the 1997-1998 time frame, only the Miami 

Field Office typically generated the reports every 2 weeks as required. 

According to a Miami official, the reports are still run every 2 weeks and 

are routed to the appropriate supervisor and agent. Because Miami is a 

large office, it generally takes approximately 30 days to distribute the 

report and follow up on its return. According to the official, each time the 

report is sent out, a deadline is set for its return to the evidence control 

personnel. 

According to an Intelligence Research Specialist who had been responsible 

for evidence at the New York Field Office, Charge-Out Reports were not 

routinely prepared and distributed because this was an extremely large 

task in New York due to the magnitude of evidence in custody. The official 

stated that it was very difficult and time consuming to reconcile the 

Charge-Out Report because the report was not a priority with many agents 

whose responses are necessary to complete the reconciliation. However, 
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according to the New York Field Office’s Administrative SAC and the 

Evidence Program Manager, since the Administrative Division has taken 

responsibility for drug evidence, evidence control technicians have 

reinstituted the dissemination of the Charge-Out Report in accordance with 

FBI policy.

An official at the Dallas Field Office stated that during the 1997-1998 time 

frame, the Charge-Out Reports were prepared every 60 days. However, 

currently, the reports are run every 2 weeks as required by policy, and it 

takes approximately 2 to 3 weeks to receive the report back from the 

agents and reconcile it. Finally, the evidence control technician at the San 

Diego Field Office stated that, as in the past, Charge-Out Reports are 

currently prepared once a month, and a 2-week deadline is set for 

reconciling the report.

Ten of the 44 FBI field office internal inspection results we reviewed, which 

include the New York Field Office, cited problems related to Charge-Out 

Reports. For example, the inspection team at an office not selected for our 

review identified a failure to send charge-out reminders and to recharge out 

evidence kept at one of the office’s storage facilities. According to the 

inspection team, Charge-Out Reports for this facility had not been run for 

about a year and a half, and items had not been recharged out to the 

appropriate agents, which is necessary to maintain accountability for the 

items in the ACS system. At two other offices not selected for our review, 

inspection teams identified numerous items that had not been 

appropriately recharged out during the inspection period. 

Documentation for Bulk 

Drug Seizures

FBI policy requires that written notification of a bulk drug seizure be sent 

to the U.S. Attorney with a copy directed to the AUSA no later than 5 

workdays after the seizure, and the letter should provide the date after 

which the bulk of the evidence may be destroyed.15 The policy also requires 

FBI personnel to witness and certify the destruction of all drugs. Further, to 

facilitate accountability for drugs from seizure to disposition, the FBI 

requires that all drug evidence be labeled, and that bulk seizures be 

photographed in accordance with FBI policy. According to the policy 

15The letter also informs the U.S. Attorney that a written request for an exception to the 

destruction process must be submitted to the SAC. If no request for an exception to the 

destruction is received, the bulk of the drug evidence may be disposed without further 

contact with the U. S. Attorney.
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related to handling bulk seizures, the drugs must be photographed, and 

each photograph must display the case file number; names of the seizing 

agents; date, time, and place of seizure; the estimated weight of the total 

seizure; and the exhibit number of the seizure. In addition, a yardstick, 

ruler, or other measuring device must be positioned in each photograph to 

provide a true scale to the bulk seizure. These requirements, including 

initially establishing the date after which the bulk of the evidence can be 

destroyed, completing documents that certify the destruction of bulk drug 

evidence, and appropriately labeling and photographing such evidence, are 

valuable tools for promoting timely destruction of bulk evidence, 

safeguarding the evidence against the risk of loss or misuse, and ensuring 

adequate documentation of the type and volume of evidence for use by 

federal prosecutors. 

We noted inadequate documentation for certain bulk drug seizures at two 

of the four selected field offices we visited.16 We identified two bulk 

seizures of cocaine that were made by FBI agents in the New York Field 

Office for which critical documentation related to disposition and 

destruction was missing.17 In one case, FBI records indicated that 

approximately 450 kilograms of cocaine were seized on November 25, 1997. 

In another case, the records indicated that about 320 kilograms of cocaine 

were seized on December 17, 1997. Although FBI policy requires that 

written notification of the seizures be sent to the U.S. Attorney within 5 

workdays of the seizure, documenting the date after which the bulk of the 

evidence may be destroyed, notification letters for these bulk seizures were 

prepared only after we had brought this issue to the attention of FBI 

personnel, which was about a year after the seizures.

In addition, although the FBI obtained written approval from the AUSA to 

destroy these drugs prior to their disposal, there was no documentary 

evidence supporting the destruction of either bulk seizure, which 

according to FBI policy must include the witnessing of the destruction by 

FBI officials. According to written chain of custody documents, most of the 

16Due to data entry procedures for recording evidence in the FBI’s ACS system which 

provided our universe of items for sampling, 19 of the 50 drug items randomly selected for 

our review in New York involved different parts of 4 bulk drug seizures; and 8 of the 46 drug 

items randomly selected for our review in Miami involved different parts of 5 bulk seizures. 

In Dallas, our review included 2 bulk seizures, representing 2 of the 40 drug items reviewed; 

and in San Diego, none of the 23 drug items reviewed involved a bulk drug seizure.

17Seventeen of the 50 drug items randomly selected for our review in New York involved 

different parts of these two bulk drug seizures.
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450 kilograms of cocaine was destroyed on December 19, 1997, and most of 

the 320 kilograms of cocaine was destroyed on April 21, 1998. In response 

to our inquiries regarding the missing documentation, FBI personnel 

prepared documents dated November 24, 1998, which described the 

circumstances of each destruction, including how, when, and where the 

destruction took place; persons witnessing the destruction; and which 

items were destroyed and which were retained as evidence. The 

documents, however, were not signed or initialed by any of the persons 

listed as having witnessed the destruction.

As discussed earlier in this report, we observed a bulk seizure of 

approximately 50 kilograms of cocaine in the New York Field Office that 

had not been packaged or sealed in accordance with FBI policy. This bulk 

seizure also did not have evidence labels containing signatures of the 

sealing and witnessing agents. Similar to the above cases, prior to our visit, 

there was no documentation that the U.S. Attorney had been notified in 

writing about the bulk seizure. Likewise, although FBI policy requires 

written notification of a bulk drug seizure be sent to the U.S. Attorney 

within 5 workdays of the seizure, for the five bulk seizures involving drug 

items selected for our review at the Miami Field Office, this written 

notification was sent to the U.S. Attorney after the time specified by policy 

for three of these seizures (21, 26, and 89 days, respectively), and 

notification letters for the other two seizures were not prepared or were 

not provided.

Further, for each of the four bulk seizures that contained drug items we 

reviewed in the New York Field Office, photographs of the evidence did not 

comply with FBI policy. Specifically, none of the photographs we were 

provided showed the (1) names of the seizing agents, (2) date, time, and 

place of seizure, and (3) estimated weight of the total seizure. Also, none of 

the photographs contained a measuring device to show a true scale of the 

evidence.

Internal inspection results provided by the FBI indicate similar problems 

have been identified at other field offices. For example, the inspection team 

at a field office not selected for our review reported that the documentation 

prepared for two drug destructions provided neither any description of the 

items destroyed, nor the initials of the persons who participated in the 

destruction. An internal inspection for another field office not selected for 

our review found that one exhibit consisting of 30 boxes, that had been 

entered into evidence in 1991, had no “identifying labels” on the boxes. In 

addition, the inspection results for another field office not included in our 
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review revealed that no bulk seizures held in evidence storage at the time 

of the inspection, which included about 250 kilograms of cocaine, had been 

photographed as required by FBI policy.

Data Entry of Drug and 

Firearm Evidence

Timely data entry and data verification are key control procedures that 

help ensure that data records are complete and accurate. FBI policy 

requires agents to submit documentation related to seized drugs and 

firearms to evidence control personnel for entry into the ACS system 

within 10 calendar days of seizure.18 Evidence control personnel have an 

additional 10 calendar days to actually enter the information into the 

system. In some field offices, agent personnel directly enter their own 

evidence into the ACS system. In such instances, FBI policy provides that 

the agent has 10 calendar days from the date the property is acquired to 

enter the information into the ACS system and send appropriate 

documentation to evidence control personnel. According to the policy, 

agents or evidence control personnel must prepare memoranda explaining 

the circumstances surrounding late submissions or entries, respectively, 

and copies of these documents must be maintained in the evidence control 

room.

We identified a total of 13 out of 229 drug or firearm items we reviewed at 

the New York, Dallas, and Miami Field Offices where evidence control 

personnel or agents entered evidence in the ACS system late without the 

required explanatory memoranda. Nine of these items were drug exhibits 

at the New York Field Office, which were left in the night depository for 

more than 10 days without being entered into the ACS system. Four of 

these nine items were not properly entered into the ACS system for over 2 

months subsequent to the date they were acquired. The other four items 

entered late into the ACS system without the required memoranda 

explaining the late data entry involved firearm evidence that was not 

submitted for storage by the agent. For each of these four items, the initial 

data entry into the ACS system occurred over 40 days after the items were 

acquired.

Twelve of the 44 FBI field office internal inspection results we reviewed 

showed similar problems involving delinquent submission of evidence or 

18When an acquiring agent maintains the evidence rather than submitting it for storage, the 

agent may submit a data loading form (draft FD-192) to communicate to the evidence 

control technician the information that is to be entered into the ACS system.
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late data entry and failure to submit the required explanatory memoranda. 

At one field office not selected for our review, the inspection team 

determined that 77 percent of the drug items reviewed were submitted 

and/or processed after 10 days, and the required memoranda documenting 

the delinquent submission and/or processing was not found in the 

respective files. The inspection teams for New York and eight other field 

offices not selected for our review reported late submission of evidence, 

ranging from 6 drug and valuable items submitted late at one field office to 

174 drug items submitted late at another office. Inspection teams for Dallas 

and one other field office not selected for our review reported that 

personnel failed to submit the required memoranda explaining the 

circumstances for late data entry of drug and valuable items into the ACS 

system. According to these inspection results, about 6 percent of the 

evidence examined at the Dallas office, and about 5 percent of the evidence 

examined at the other field office, was entered past the 10-day limit without 

the required memoranda explaining the late entries.

We also noted in performing our work at the four selected field offices that 

the FBI has procedures to verify information regarding evidence as it is 

initially recorded into the ACS system. Specifically, according to FBI policy, 

after entering evidence items into the ACS system, a copy of the automated 

record is submitted to the supervisory special agent, primary relief 

supervisor, ASAC, or SAC for initialing, and is then filed in the investigative 

case file. A Dallas Field Office official reported that, at this point, the case 

agent’s supervisor is checking the printed copy for accuracy. In addition, 

according to the Dallas official, not only are the entries in the ACS system 

verified, but the manual system of storing evidence is also reviewed by 

periodic inventories and audits as well as by internal inspections 

performed by FBI headquarters about every 3 years. Further, according to a 

Miami official, verification of data input is done when evidence is entered 

into storage because the evidence control technician reviews all of the data 

entered into the ACS system and compares it to the physical evidence prior 

to placing the evidence into storage. Any errors noted at that time are 

modified by the evidence control technician. 

Although the FBI has these procedures for verifying data input, we 

identified 15 out of 229 drug or firearm items we reviewed at the Dallas, 

New York, and Miami Field Offices that involved discrepancies between 

information recorded in the ACS system and information on the written 

chain of custody or the evidence label, which is attached to the evidence 

item. These discrepancies involved the acquisition date of the evidence and 

the names of acquiring, sealing, or witnessing agents handling the evidence. 
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Various reasons were provided for these discrepancies, including that 

multiple agents had participated in the seizure and packaging of the 

evidence, and the information entered into the ACS system was an error. In 

addition, we noted one drug item at the San Diego Field Office was 

recorded in the ACS system in 1992 with a weight of 47.3 grams; however, 

the weight on the item’s evidence label was 473 grams. According to the 

evidence control technician, this was a typing error that has been corrected 

in the ACS system. 

Thirteen of the 44 FBI field office internal inspection results we reviewed, 

which include the New York Field Office, also documented instances of 

incorrect information in the ACS system. For example, similar to our 

findings, the inspection results for one field office not selected for our 

review listed multiple deficiencies. The deficiencies identified included

(1) the names of the sealing and witnessing officials listed on the evidence 

label not corresponding to the names listed in the ACS system, and (2) the 

acquired date and name of the acquiring agent listed on the written chain of 

custody form not matching the date and name listed in the ACS system. In 

addition, at another field office not selected for our review, certain 

information on 48 percent of the chain of custody forms for drug and 

valuable items reviewed by the inspection team did not match information 

recorded in the ACS system. Further, the inspection results for two other 

field offices not selected for our review each noted one of the following 

deficiencies related to this area: (1) inaccurate disposition records in the 

ACS system reflecting destruction of evidence that was found in storage 

and (2) no record in the ACS system of final disposition for drugs and 

valuable items no longer in storage. 
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Accounting for Drug 

Quantities

Quantity is a key factor for describing and fully accounting for a drug item. 

Thus, it is important for the FBI’s inventory records to clearly show the 

quantity of each item in storage or custody. In addition, established 

thresholds for weight discrepancies and systematic internal validations of 

drug amounts can help ensure that significant unexplained changes in the 

quantity of a drug item do not go undetected and unaddressed while in FBI 

custody. FBI policy recognizes the importance of documenting the amount 

of drugs seized. It requires that two agents be responsible for ensuring that 

all drug evidence is initially weighed using scales capable of weighing in 

gram increments, or counted, and recorded on evidence labels before the 

evidence is sealed and transmitted to a lab for analysis or placed in 

storage.19 However, we found that the FBI written policies we were 

provided had no procedures to identify and address significant 

discrepancies between the weight of items recorded on attached evidence 

labels, which should reflect the current weight of the item including 

packaging, and the actual weight of the drug item at any time prior to 

destruction.20

19FBI requires drug evidence, except for certain bulk seizures, to be weighed when it is 

initially acquired and submitted as evidence, as well as each time it is removed, opened, and 

repackaged. DEA also weighs drug items sent by FBI for analysis. After DEA completes a 

drug analysis, the drugs are repackaged, sealed, and marked with a DEA gross weight after 

analysis. Both the FBI and the DEA weights are placed on the drug item’s evidence label and 

should include the weight of the drug and packaging.

20DEA has set 2 grams or 0.2 percent (whichever is greater) as a threshold for a significant 

weight variance for drugs in its custody.
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Federal financial accounting standards and related supplemental guidance 

have highlighted the importance of accurately accounting for nonvalued 

seized and forfeited property, including seized drugs. Specifically, the 

Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standard (SFFAS) No. 3, 

Accounting for Inventory and Related Property, issued in October 1993, 

requires the disclosure of all material forfeited property, including those 

items with no financial value. One such disclosure is an analysis of changes 

in seized property, that would include the amount of seized property, 

including drugs, (1) on hand at the beginning of the year, (2) acquired 

during the year, (3) disposed of during the year, and (4) on hand at the end 

of the year.21

Recently issued supplemental guidance for SFFAS No. 3 states that 

amounts for certain drugs, including cocaine and heroin, should be based 

on weight.22 For example, the standard unit of measurement for such illegal 

drugs should be kilograms. In addition, according to the guidance, material 

amounts of other seized drugs should be separately reported by liquid 

weight, dry weight, number of tablets, or other appropriate measures.

21The Joint Financial Management Improvement Program (JFMIP) has recently issued an 

exposure draft, Seized Property and Forfeited Assets Systems Requirements

(JFMIP-SR-99-7, June 1999), that covers systems requirements for seized property and 

forfeited assets. According to the exposure draft, a system component that covers the 

custody of seized and forfeited property must have the capability to provide information to 

allow the independent verification that each item of seized property is in the physical or 

constructive custody of the government and that the recorded quantity is accurate.

22Reporting on Non-Valued Seized and Forfeited Property, Federal Financial Accounting and 

Auditing Technical Release Number 4, July 31, 1999, issued by the Accounting and Auditing 

Policy Committee (AAPC), which is a permanent committee sponsored by the Federal 

Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB).
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Ninety of the 140 drug items we reviewed for weight variances at the four 

selected field offices had differences between weights recorded on 

evidence labels and weights we observed when the items were reweighed 

by evidence control personnel.23 The variances we observed ranged from 

about 1 gram to 269 grams for the 24 items that were lighter when 

reweighed, and ranged from about 1 gram to 3.9 kilograms for the 66 items 

that were heavier. Although many of the variances involved only several 

grams, we identified at least one item in each field office where the 

observed weight was substantially less than the recorded weight.24 For 

example, the weight recorded by DEA on the evidence label for seized 

heroin, which was in the custody of the Miami Field Office, was 541.8 

grams. However, the weight we observed was 273 grams, a shortage of 

close to 50 percent from the DEA-recorded weight. While field office 

personnel attributed this weight discrepancy to weight approximations and 

packaging material, it did not appear that any packaging had been added or 

taken away after DEA sealed the drug item, listed the gross weight after 

analysis on the label, and returned it to the Miami Field Office. 

FBI personnel experienced difficulty in attempting to explain weight 

discrepancies for certain drug items we reviewed. For such items, a single 

obvious cause of the weight variance was not evident, but multiple factors 

that could influence the weight of an item were cited to explain the 

difference. For example, the explanation for an observed shortage of about 

13 grams of one drug item in the Miami Field Office included (1) the agent 

inadvertently recorded the weight in error, (2) scales used by the agent may 

not have been properly calibrated, and (3) the observed weight did not 

include the packaging. While we could not validate or determine the extent 

agent error or scale calibration affected the shortage, all of the items we 

observed being weighed included packaging.

23Fourteen of the 140 drug items we observed being weighed did not have a weight recorded 

on the item’s evidence label. Therefore, we could not determine whether there was a weight 

variance between the observed weight and the recorded weight on the label for these 14 

items.

24For each of these items, the observed shortage was over 50 grams, and these discrepancies 

ranged from about 3 percent to about 50 percent of the recorded weight.
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Regarding packaging material, FBI policy requires drugs, along with the 

original container, to be initially weighed after being placed in a plastic 

evidence pouch. However, evidence control personnel stated that, in many 

instances, this may not have been done. Rather, according to these 

personnel, in such instances, the evidence was initially weighed without 

the evidence pouch.25 Although there were cases where it appeared that the 

weight discrepancy could have been caused by the weight of packaging 

material, there were other cases for which all of the discrepancy could not 

be explained by the weight of such material. In such cases, scale calibration 

and/or dehydration or deterioration of the drug was often cited as a partial 

explanation of the weight variance.

As mentioned earlier, many of the weight variances we identified involved 

only several grams and these differences were often attributed by FBI 

officials to scale calibration. FBI field office officials acknowledged that 

the FBI does not have a policy regarding the calibration of scales, and 

according to these officials, scales used to weigh drug evidence are not 

frequently calibrated.26

25Evidence pouches are of different sizes and weights but typically weigh about 22 grams.

26DEA requires DEA field office management to ensure that scales used to weigh drugs are 

calibrated at least annually.
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In addition, one drug item at the Miami Field Office had an observed weight 

of 3.9 kilograms more than the FBI-recorded weight on the box.27

According to the description of the evidence, this item involved 

approximately 11 kilograms of cocaine; however, the observed weight of 

the box including the evidence was 14.9 kilograms. A Miami FBI official 

told us that agents often record the amount of bulk drugs as the number of 

kilo-sized bricks. By counting bricks rather than weighing the evidence, the 

weight recorded is an estimate, that does not include the weight of 

packaging materials, such as the wrappings on the individual bricks of the 

drug and the box and tape used to seal the evidence.28 When seized drugs 

are controlled based on estimated rather than actual weights, the FBI 

cannot be assured that the entire quantity of drugs has been placed under 

prescribed safeguards. 

At the time of our review, FBI policy provided to us did not define a weight 

variance threshold covering drug items in FBI custody. FBI policy requires 

squad supervisors to prepare a memorandum of explanation when DEA 

reports a variance of 1 percent or more between the initial weight of a drug 

item submitted for testing by FBI personnel and the weight observed by 

DEA upon receipt. However, we noted that once drug evidence was 

packaged and the weight or amount was recorded on the evidence label, 

there was no additional FBI requirement to validate the item’s weight 

subsequent to initial weighing and prior to destruction.

In addition, prior to our review, there was no requirement for the weight of 

a drug item to be recorded in the ACS system. However, as of November 

1998, the ACS system was modified to include a mandatory data entry field 

to capture drug weight. According to the FBI Evidence Program Manager, 

the FBI had been developing this modification for about 9 months prior to 

its implementation. Further, according to other FBI personnel, no official 

policy for recording the weight of drug exhibits in the ACS system has been 

written yet; however, FBI field offices have been informally advised to 

27We did not observe a weight recorded on this drug item’s evidence label.

28FBI policy provides that bulk drug seizures, except those consisting of marijuana, must be 

packaged in boxes or cartons and each box should be marked with the number of packages 

it contains. According to the policy, entire bulk drug seizures, excluding marijuana, will be 

submitted to the DEA laboratory, which will determine the exact weight of the drugs. For 

bulk marijuana seizures, however, only a representative sample is submitted to the DEA 

laboratory for weighing and analysis. The policy states that it is imperative that precise 

weighing procedures are conducted and documented in bulk marijuana seizures because 

enhanced penalties and mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines are weight-based.
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enter the weight in the new drug field while formal policies on this point 

are being completed.

Although the weight of drug items are now to be recorded in the ACS 

system when the item is initially entered as evidence, there are no 

procedures in place to systematically validate the weight of these items 

while they are in FBI custody. For example, there is no requirement to 

validate the weight of a drug item returned from DEA following analysis. 

Further, there is no written requirement to update the ACS system with the 

newly established DEA weight. In addition, drug evidence is not weighed as 

part of typical FBI inventory or internal inspection procedures. 

Consequently, although the weight of the drug item will be recorded in the 

ACS system, it may not represent the most current weight recorded on the 

item’s evidence label, which reduces the FBI’s accountability over such 

drug evidence. 

Conclusion The FBI has established numerous policies and procedures to control and 

safeguard drug and firearm evidence in its custody. However, based on our 

work at the four FBI field offices and results of the FBI’s most recent 

internal inspections of its field offices, specific actions are needed to 

address concerns with certain physical safeguards over drugs and firearms 

and strengthen accountability over such evidence. Such actions will help 

reduce the potential for theft, misuse, or loss of drug and firearm evidence 

and, therefore, the risk of evidence being compromised for federal 

prosecution purposes while in FBI custody. Further, certain actions 

pertaining to providing adequate ventilation for drug vaults and certifying 

that firearms are rendered safe prior to storage will help ensure a safe and 

healthy environment for FBI personnel.

Recommendations We recommend that the Attorney General require that the Director of the 

FBI take the appropriate steps to reinforce FBI field offices’ adherence to 

existing FBI policies regarding 

• handling and storage of drug evidence, including sealing drug items in 

accordance with FBI policy using appropriate labeling procedures and 

storing evidence in an orderly manner to avoid damage to stored items;

• adequate exterior ventilation being afforded to all drug vaults;
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• rendering firearms safe, including having a firearms instructor sign and 

date the certification on the chain of custody prior to evidence control 

personnel accepting the firearm for storage; 

• written chain of custody forms always including a barcode number or 

case number and exhibit number; a signature; and the date, time, and 

reason for custody transfer of evidence from one party to another;

• Charge-Out Reports being prepared and reconciled at intervals required 

by policy; 

• field office personnel, in accordance with requirements set forth in 

policy, preparing and sending written notification of bulk drug seizures 

to the U.S. Attorney within 5 workdays of the seizure, preparing and 

maintaining documentary evidence supporting the destruction of drug 

evidence, and taking adequate photographs of bulk seizures; 

• drug and firearm evidence being entered into the ACS system within 

established time frames or, for evidence entered after the time frame 

allowed by FBI policy, proper documentation explaining that the late 

data entry was completed by evidence control personnel or agents and 

was reviewed by appropriate supervisory officials; and

• field office personnel weighing seized drugs in accordance with FBI 

policy, with the weight to include the original container and any 

packaging material used to seal the evidence.

We also recommend that the Attorney General require that the Director of 

the FBI review actions taken by the New York Field Office to determine if 

such actions will adequately alleviate the overcrowded conditions in the 

drug vault; ensure that all drug items in storage are properly packaged, 

sealed, and labeled; and ensure that the contents of the night depository are 

routinely removed in accordance with FBI policy.

In addition, we recommend that the Attorney General require that the 

Director of the FBI review existing policy to determine whether current 

procedures for verifying evidence information entered into the ACS system 

are adequate, or if the policy should be modified to include additional 

procedures to enhance the FBI’s ability to detect and prevent data entry 

errors.

Further, we recommend that the Attorney General require that the Director 

of the FBI modify existing FBI policy to include

• a requirement to weigh all seized drugs, including bulk seizures, on 

properly calibrated scales;
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• guidance establishing thresholds for defining significant weight 

discrepancies of drug evidence;

• procedures for identifying and addressing such discrepancies; and

• guidance for updating records in the ACS system to reflect identified 

changes in the weight of drug evidence.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, the FBI stated that while the 

information contained in the draft was, for the most part, factually 

accurate, it did have some concerns about the report’s conclusions and 

recommendations. The FBI also had concerns about the report’s focus that 

are discussed in further detail in appendix II. Nevertheless, the FBI stated 

that it plans or has already taken actions relating to four of our key 

recommendations, namely, our recommendations to modify existing policy 

related to the weighing of drug evidence, and our recommendation to 

review actions taken by the New York Field Office to address various 

internal control deficiencies. 

The FBI stated that our recommendations to modify existing policy related 

to the weighing of drug evidence were well-founded and discussed actions 

that will be taken. Specifically, agents will be required to check the 

recorded weight of all drug evidence retrieved from any laboratory to 

identify any significant weight discrepancies from the original weight, and 

that any discrepancies in weights that fall outside a normal expected range 

resulting from testing procedures will be investigated and the results 

documented in an investigative file. The FBI also concurred with our 

recommendation regarding the calibration of scales and stated that it is 

currently revising policy to require that all seized drugs, including bulk 

seizures, be weighed on properly calibrated scales. While the FBI neither 

concurred with or took exception to our recommendation to modify 

existing policy to include guidance for updating records in the ACS system 

to reflect identified changes in the weight of drug evidence, it is important 

to note that, at the time of our review, there was no written requirement to 

update the ACS system for any such changes. Consequently, the weight 

recorded in the ACS system may not represent the most current weight 

recorded on the item’s evidence label, thus reducing the FBI’s 

accountability over such drug evidence.

The FBI stated that it has already taken action regarding our 

recommendation to review steps performed by the New York Field Office 

to address various internal control deficiencies. On September 2, 1999, we 

provided our draft report, including recommendations, to the Department 
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of Justice for comment. According to the comments we received from the 

FBI, the New York Field Office’s Evidence Program was reinspected in 

September 1999, and that inspection found that the New York Field Office 

had appropriately addressed the issues identified in the FBI’s previous 

inspection. However, the FBI also stated that the inspectors issued 

additional instructions to the New York Field Office to further assist the 

office in ensuring full compliance with all evidence policies and 

procedures. We were not provided specifics as to the results of the 

September inspection; however, the FBI noted in its comments that the 

field office had relocated the drug control room to a larger facility, had 

resealed and repackaged every drug item, and addressed issues regarding 

the night depository, all of which were included in our recommendation.

The FBI disagreed with our recommendation concerning the need to 

reinforce adherence to certain existing FBI policies. The FBI stated that 

recordkeeping issues we identified which were also found during its own 

internal inspections do not, in the aggregate or otherwise, suggest 

inadequate accountability over drug evidence given the overlapping 

internal control procedures in place. The FBI also stated that it believes 

that we used the findings identified during its own internal inspections to 

extrapolate “systemic” inadequacies in the FBI’s Evidence Program, 

regardless of the circumstance or materiality. The FBI emphasized that 

maintaining appropriate physical safeguards and ensuring accountability is 

an ongoing process as new policies and procedures are continually 

implemented and new employees are continuously introduced to evidence 

procedures. 

We believe that our recommendation to reinforce FBI field offices’ 

adherence to certain existing FBI policies is valid. As stated in our report, 

FBI policy requires the establishment of strict, documented accountability 

for drug evidence because of the intrinsic value of such evidence. Several 

of the issues discussed in this report, which we consider to be of a more 

severe nature, involved deficiencies in accountability controls for drug 

items at one or more of the locations we visited where we did not identify 

overlapping controls that compensated for the deficiencies. For example, 

during our review, we identified various deficiencies in required chain of 

custody documentation at the four field offices, including the omission of 

either the time or date of a custody change, the reason for the change, or 

the current location or status of the drug evidence. Strict documentation on 

the chain of custody is a key internal control over seized drugs and firearms 

because custody of such evidence can change several times from seizure to 

disposition and the document must be able to withstand defense challenges 
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during judicial proceedings. In another example, we found that only one of 

the four selected field offices had typically generated Charge-Out Reports 

every 2 weeks as required by policy. Charge-Out reporting is an important 

internal control procedure the FBI uses to routinely verify whether agents 

who have custody of specific drug or firearm evidence need to continue to 

hold the evidence or return it to storage. No overlapping control was 

evident to us at any of the four selected field offices that could routinely 

detect and/or prevent drug or firearm evidence from being inappropriately 

maintained outside FBI storage facilities.

Further, as stated in our report, 13 of 44, and 10 of 44 FBI field office 

internal inspection results we reviewed identified deficiencies in the chain 

of custody and problems related to Charge-Out Reports, respectively. 

Consequently, such deficiencies and problems are not isolated concerns 

involving only a few field offices. The above noted findings along with the 

fact that FBI, as stated in its comments to our report, is continuously 

implementing new policies and introducing new employees to evidence 

procedures and that such changes undoubtedly will cause some confusion 

and noncompliance with operating standards, supports the need for 

reinforcement of the existing FBI policies listed in our recommendation. 

The FBI also stated that it does not concur with our recommendation to 

review existing policy to determine whether current procedures for 

verifying evidence information entered into the ACS system are adequate, 

or if the policy should be modified to include additional procedures to 

enhance the FBI’s ability to detect and prevent data entry errors. As noted 

in the report, during our review, we identified 15 out of 229 drug or firearm 

items at three FBI field offices that involved discrepancies between 

information recorded in the ACS system and information on the written 

chain of custody or the evidence label. In addition, 13 of the 44 internal 

inspection results we reviewed also documented instances of incorrect 

information in the ACS system. As such, a review of existing policies and 

procedures concerning verifying information entered into the ACS system 

is justified.

This report contains recommendations to you. The head of a federal agency 

is required by 31 U.S.C. 720 to submit a written statement on actions taken 

on these recommendations. You should submit your statement to the 

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on 

Government Reform within 60 days of the date of this report. You must also 

send a written statement to the House and Senate Committees on 
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Appropriations with the agency’s first request for appropriations made over 

60 days after the date of this report.

We are sending copies of this report to Senator Fred Thompson, Senator 

Joseph Lieberman, Representative Dan Burton, Representative Henry A. 

Waxman, Representative Stephen Horn, and Representative Jim Turner in 

their capacities as Chair or Ranking Minority Member of Senate or House 

Committees and Subcommittees. We are also sending copies of this report 

to Louis J. Freeh, Director of the FBI; Robert L. Ashbaugh, Acting Inspector 

General, Department of Justice; and the Honorable Jacob J. Lew, Director, 

Office of Management and Budget. Copies will be made available to others 

upon request.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 

512-3406. Key contributors to this assignment were Kenneth Rupar, Linda 

Sanders, and Ellen Wolfe.

Sincerely yours, 

Gary T. Engel

Associate Director

Governmentwide Accounting and

 Financial Management Issues
Page 35 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms
Page 36 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApendxiI

To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed officials from FBI 

headquarters and four selected field offices concerning the processes and 

procedures that are used to physically safeguard seized drugs and firearms 

and to account for such evidence completely and promptly. We requested 

all pertinent FBI policies and procedures and were provided and reviewed 

various sections from the FBI’s Manual of Administrative Operations and 

Procedures and Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines related 

to handling drug and firearm evidence. Based on discussions with FBI 

headquarters officials and a review of staffing levels for the 56 field offices, 

we selected two of the largest field offices−New York, New York and 

Miami, Florida−and two smaller sized offices−Dallas, Texas and San Diego, 

California−as locations to perform our work. According to FBI officials, 

due to the location and size of the field offices, each of them typically 

involves a significant volume of drug and firearm seizures. 

At each of the four field offices, we observed the location and condition of 

storage facilities and other physical safeguards including cameras, motion 

detectors, combination locks, and video monitors that the field offices had 

put into place to control access to and use of drug and firearm evidence. 

We also asked FBI personnel about the operation of the physical 

safeguards. However, due to the sensitive nature of the evidence, we did 

not perform any comprehensive tests to verify the operation of specific 

physical safeguards because we did not want to risk compromising any of 

the evidence that may be needed for prosecution purposes. Also, we did 

not perform security assessments of the interior of the drug vaults because 

FBI policy prohibits non-FBI personnel from entering the vaults beyond 

designated thresholds. However, we were able to accomplish our 

objectives because we could see most of the contents of the vaults from 

these thresholds.

In addition, we performed specific tests on selected drug and firearm 

evidence items. To determine whether the four selected FBI field offices 

maintained adequate accountability for recently acquired drug and firearm 

evidence and properly safeguarded the evidence subsequent to seizure, we 

selected a random sample of drug and firearm items that each office 

entered into the FBI’s ACS system between October 1, 1997, and August 31, 

1998. Based on the size of the universe of drug and firearm items entered 

into the ACS system during this period, we statistically sampled the 

following number of cases at each location: New York−50 drug items and

36 firearm items; Miami−46 drug items and 33 firearm items; Dallas−40 drug 

items and 24 firearm items; and San Diego−23 drug items and 20 firearm 

items. For selected items, our tests included determining whether (1) the 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

ACS system accurately recorded the description and location of the item, 

(2) the chain of custody document was complete, and (3) for those items in 

storage at the field office, the item was properly packaged, sealed, and 

labeled. In addition, we judgmentally selected 10 of the drug items at each 

location, observed evidence control personnel weigh each of the 10 items, 

and compared the observed weight to the weight recorded by FBI or DEA 

personnel on each item’s evidence label. For this procedure, we 

judgmentally selected items that involved various types and amounts of 

drugs.

To further test the field offices’ accountability for acquired drug and 

firearm evidence, we obtained for each office a list of drugs and a list of 

firearms in inventory as of or near the date of our visit. We selected 10 

items from each drug and firearm inventory list and for each item verified 

that it was in storage. We also selected 15 items from each of the drug 

vaults and firearm storage areas and traced the items to the appropriate 

inventory lists to verify that the items were recorded in a complete manner. 

For each of these 25 drug items selected at each location, we also observed 

FBI personnel weigh the item and compared the observed weight to the 

weight recorded on the item’s evidence label. Each of the drug and firearm 

items was judgmentally selected based on one or more of the following: the 

length of time in storage, the type of evidence, and the specific location of 

the evidence in the drug vault or evidence control room. We selected items 

that had been in storage for long periods of time because of the inherent 

risk associated with long-term storage. We also selected different types of 

drug and firearm evidence, such as marijuana and cocaine, and handguns 

and rifles, respectively. In addition, we selected drug and firearm items 

from a variety of locations within each drug vault or evidence control 

room.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

To determine if issues we identified at the four selected field offices are 

indicative of more systemic concerns, we requested a copy of the section of 

the most recent FBI Internal Inspection Report for each FBI field office 

that covers procedures and internal controls over seized drugs and 

firearms. FBI provided the results of Evidence Program Audits for 44 FBI 

field offices. We reviewed these documents which detail deficiencies 

identified during those offices’ most recent internal inspections.1

 These

44 inspections were performed between June 1996 and June 1999. Because 

we received the documents near the end of our fieldwork, we did not 

follow-up with each of the field offices to determine the extent actions had 

been taken to correct noted deficiencies.

We performed our work in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards from August 1998 through August 1999.

We requested written comments on a draft of this report from the Attorney 

General or her designee. The Assistant Director for FBI’s Office of Public 

and Congressional Affairs provided us with written comments, which are 

discussed in the “Agency Comments and Our Evaluation” section and are 

reprinted in appendix II.

1

The FBI provided copies of (1) electronic communications sent to 41 field offices, and

(2) documentation that summarizes the inspection results for 3 other field offices which 

detail deficiencies, and associated instructions and recommendations, related to drugs and 

firearms that were identified by Evidence Program Audits conducted during recent internal 

inspections. According to the FBI Chief Inspector, there were no evidence findings resulting 

from the most recent inspections at the other 12 FBI field offices.
Page 39 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

Appendix II

Comments From the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation ApendxiI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in the 

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.
Appendix II

Comments From the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

Page 40 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

See comment 1. 

See comment 4.

See comment 5.

See comment 5.
Appendix II

Comments From the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

Page 41 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

See comment 6.

See comment 7.

See comment 8.
Appendix II

Comments From the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

Page 42 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

See comment 8.

See comment 9.
Appendix II

Comments From the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

Page 43 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

See comment 1.

See comment 10.
Appendix II

Comments From the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

Page 44 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

See comment 1.

See comment 11.

Now on p. 26.
Appendix II

Comments From the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

Page 45 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

See comment 12.

Now on p. 28.

See comment 4.
Appendix II

Comments From the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

Page 46 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

See comment 1.

See comment 1.

See comment 6.

See comment 1.
Appendix II

Comments From the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

Page 47 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

The following are GAO’s comments on the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s letter dated November 22, 1999.

GAO Comments 1. See “Agency Comments and Our Evaluation” section.

2. In our notification letter to the Assistant Attorney General for 

Administration, dated July 31, 1998, informing him of our work, we stated 

that as part of our review of the status of Justice’s Asset Forfeiture 

Program, we were initiating a review of seized drugs and weapons at the 

FBI. We stated in the letter that the focus of the effort would be on controls 

over the seizure, storage, and disposition of drugs and weapons. 

During our initial meetings at FBI headquarters, FBI officials questioned 

the purpose and focus of our review, expressing the concern that the 

control of seized drugs and firearms at the FBI was a function of the 

Evidence Program rather than the Asset Forfeiture Program. At each of 

these meetings, we explained to FBI officials that seized property, 

including items such as drugs and firearms, is subject to forfeiture and we 

therefore would be considering such activity when updating our 

assessment of the Asset Forfeiture Program high-risk area. Recognizing 

this fact and that seized drugs and firearms typically remain in the custody 

of the seizing agency until approved for final disposition, effective controls 

over such evidence are needed to help ensure that such items are not 

compromised. Because the Evidence Program at the FBI is responsible for 

safeguarding and accounting for such evidence, it became the focal point of 

our work instead of the Asset Forfeiture Program. 
Appendix II

Comments From the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

Page 48 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

As stated in our report, Justice operations, including those at the FBI, often 

involve the seizure, custody, and disposition of evidence that (1) may be 

subject to forfeiture and (2) can remain in the seizing agency’s custody for 

significant amounts of time due to long-term investigations. We also state in 

our report that, as we reported in January 1999, although some 

improvements have been made to the Asset Forfeiture Program operated 

by Justice, significant problems remain and continued oversight is 

necessary to ensure that policies and procedures are followed and that 

adequate safeguards are in place.1

 Our High-Risk Series of reports, which is 

updated every 2 years and was most recently issued in January 1999, noted 

that the federal government faces difficult problems managing a reported

$1.8 billion in property seized by Justice and the Department of the 

Treasury as of September 30, 1997.2

 We specifically stated that Justice had 

reported that its asset forfeiture information systems had been inadequate 

for tracking the life cycle of an asset from its seizure through its ultimate 

disposition. We also noted that, in September 1998, the Justice Inspector 

General reported that at most of the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service Border Patrol stations his staff visited, they found problems with 

the management of seized drugs. The High-Risk Series report, however, did 

not include the specific issues concerning FBI seized drugs and firearms 

identified in this report because we had not completed our fieldwork at the 

time the High-Risk Series report was issued.

3. The FBI correctly noted that our review did not include an evaluation of 

the internal review of the Evidence Program routinely conducted by the 

FBI’s Office of Inspections, nor was there any review of the FBI’s follow-up 

procedures to determine whether deficiencies identified during these 

inspections had been fully addressed. The purpose of our review was to 

identify and assess the FBI’s internal controls related to seized drugs and 

firearms. As noted in our report, we used the results of the FBI’s internal 

inspections to supplement our own findings and further illustrate that they 

may be indicative of more systemic concerns. 

In addition, we did not receive the internal inspection results for the 

majority of the 56 FBI field offices until August 1999, which was near the 

end of our fieldwork. Therefore, we did not follow-up with each of the field 

1

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice

(GAO/OCG-99-10, January 1999).

2

High-Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-99-1, January 1999).
Appendix II

Comments From the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

Page 49 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

offices to determine the extent to which actions had been taken to correct 

noted deficiencies. 

4. The FBI stated that it feels our draft report materially overstates 

potential weaknesses in internal controls over drug and firearm evidence, 

and inappropriately concludes that there are risk factors affecting access 

and accountability of drugs and firearms which simply do not exist. We 

disagree. Our report does not address “potential” weaknesses in internal 

controls, but rather reports on internal control deficiencies we found 

during our review. Our conclusions are based on our observations and 

findings as documented throughout this report.

The FBI’s statement that risk factors affecting access and accountability of 

drugs and firearms simply do not exist at the FBI is not consistent with 

other statements in its comments on this report as well as with the results 

and its own characterization of its ongoing internal inspections. 

Specifically, the FBI stated that in 1999, a policy was implemented to 

require self-inspections by the field offices every 18 months, and the 

Evidence Program is one of the areas to receive this additional scrutiny. 

The FBI also states that this new review process was designed as an 

additional detection system whereby field office management could more 

effectively and promptly identify and resolve problems within their own 

areas of responsibility.

In addition, the FBI states that it takes general exception to the overall 

conclusion and tone of the report. We believe that our overall conclusion is 

balanced and adequately supported by our findings that are documented 

throughout the report. Our conclusion acknowledges that the FBI has 

established numerous policies and procedures to control and safeguard 

drug and firearm evidence, and we state that based on our work at the four 

FBI field offices and the results of the FBI’s most recent internal 

inspections of its field offices, specific actions are needed to address 

concerns with certain physical safeguards over drugs and firearms and to 

strengthen accountability over such evidence. The tone of the report is 

neutral and objective, and in fact, we believe that some of the FBI’s 

comments present a more negative picture of the control environment than 

can be found in our report. For example, FBI’s comments state that the 

New York Field Office was found to have material deficiencies in its 

Evidence Program, and that mismanagement and inadequate training 

produced a litany of serious deficiencies. Our report does not characterize 

the deficiencies we identified as serious or material. Instead, our report 

provides the observations we made during our visit to the New York Field 
Appendix II

Comments From the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

Page 50 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

Office, states the reasons for the deficiencies noted and the corrective 

actions taken according to New York Field Office officials, and 

recommends that the FBI review these corrective actions. 

5. We agree that the FBI shows determination to identify and correct 

deficiencies in its own Evidence Program. As stated in the report, the FBI 

has established numerous policies and procedures to control and safeguard 

drug and firearm evidence in its custody, and as an added control over field 

operations, each field office is supposed to receive an internal inspection 

every 3 years. However, field office internal inspections performed on a 

rotating basis every 3 years are not a substitute for ongoing initiatives to 

keep accountability records current and accurate. Instead, inspections 

serve as a barometer of the success of the FBI’s efforts to carry out its 

policies and procedures on an ongoing basis. Therefore, in order to 

strengthen physical safeguards and improve accountability, it is necessary 

to reinforce adherence to the existing policy requirements we included in 

our recommendation.

6. The FBI’s internal inspection findings are cited throughout our report to 

supplement our own findings and illustrate that they may be indicative of 

more systemic concerns. Although we did not identify any similar problems 

at the four FBI field offices we visited, we thought it significant that 24 of 

the 44 internal inspection results we reviewed documented one or more 

physical safeguard concerns, including evidence control rooms with no 

bureau-approved intrusion detection system, motion detector, or alarm; 

inadequate locking systems; and instances of improper access including an 

unauthorized employee accessing the evidence control room or an 

evidence control technician having sole access to the evidence control 

room. However, we did not include in our report any specific 

recommendation to address these internal control deficiencies as identified 

by the FBI’s internal inspections because these circumstances were not 

evident at any of the four FBI field offices we visited. Further, the scope of 

our review was designed primarily to determine whether weaknesses in 

controls existed that increase the risk that evidence could be lost, stolen, or 

misused or compromised for federal prosecution purposes. It was not our 

intent to specifically determine whether the evidence had in fact been lost, 

stolen, or misused or compromised.

7. The FBI states that overlapping controls and procedures have been 

established to ensure adequate safeguards even if one or more of the 

internal controls are lacking. We disagree. Although multiple controls have 

been designed to safeguard the evidence, if one or more controls are not 
Appendix II

Comments From the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

Page 51 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

effectively implemented, the FBI’s ability to safeguard evidence will be 

diminished. As such, the FBI’s own internal inspection process requires all 

identified deficiencies to be corrected. Each of the internal controls play an 

important role in safeguarding evidence from inappropriate access, and we 

did not identify any redundant controls to fully compensate for deficiencies 

we cited in this report.

The FBI further states that in the cases cited from the internal inspection 

findings, there was no indication that (1) evidence had been lost, stolen, or 

misused; (2) any case was jeopardized because of chain of custody issues; 

or (3) any evidence control rooms were without a locking system, 

monitored by at least one surveillance camera, and/or entry was controlled 

by dual access. We believe these statements are not accurate or are 

misleading. First, as stated in our report, inspection auditors at the New 

York Field Office had to discontinue efforts to complete a 100 percent 

physical inventory of drug items due to time constraints, and at the time of 

discontinuance, 79 of 1,625 drug items could not be physically located or 

otherwise accounted for by evidence control personnel. Second, while we 

agree that the internal inspection results we were provided did not mention 

any case that was jeopardized because of chain of custody issues, we were 

also not provided any documentation showing that this was an issue 

considered or evaluated during the internal inspections. And third, 

although no internal inspection findings cited instances of evidence control 

rooms that had no locking system, seven inspections found inadequate 

locking systems for evidence storage areas, including no keyless entry or 

no dual locking system as required by FBI policy. In addition, as stated in 

our report, seven inspections cited instances involving improper access to 

evidence control rooms by FBI personnel, such as an unauthorized 

employee accessing the evidence control room unaccompanied by the 

evidence control technician, or an evidence control technician having sole 

access to the drug and valuable evidence control room.

8. Our report states that at seven field offices not selected for our review, 

inspection teams determined that access logs were either not used or were 

not being properly completed by persons entering the evidence control 

rooms. We did not report this as a programwide concern and, because we 

did not identify this as an internal control deficiency at any of the four field 

offices we visited, did not make a specific recommendation to address this 

issue. 

The FBI states that given the number of access logs that it maintains and 

the sheer number of entries made into the logs, errors will be made. The 
Appendix II

Comments From the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

Page 52 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

comments also note that there is no basis for suggesting that evidence is 

tainted or that other items in the evidence control room are in jeopardy 

merely because information is missing from access logs. They said that the 

FBI compensates for such administrative lapses through overlapping 

controls and procedures that enable responsible officials to maintain 

accountability. We disagree. Complete and accurate information on access 

logs is necessary to track persons entering evidence control areas to ensure 

only those persons approved for access and with valid reason for access 

are allowed to enter the secured areas and handle evidence. Not using or 

properly completing access logs decreases the FBI’s ability to safeguard 

evidence in its custody, and we did not identify any overlapping controls to 

substitute for or diminish the importance of this internal control. 

9. We recognize that the placement of drug items in storage boxes within 

the evidence control room serves as a layer of protection against loss; 

however, improperly sealed, wrapped, labeled, or stored drug items 

diminish the FBI’s ability to protect the evidence against unauthorized 

access. Similar to the two internal inspections that cited instances of 

damaged or open storage boxes which allowed access to drugs, during our 

review at one field office, we observed one drug evidence package that was 

leaking and one bulk drug seizure comprised of approximately 50 

kilograms of cocaine that had not been packaged or sealed in accordance 

with FBI policy. Although the FBI purports that the absence of this 

protection in some instances for a limited period of time hardly suggests 

weaknesses in internal controls, this bulk drug seizure that we observed 

was stored in two large seed bags in the same state in which it had been 

acquired for over 1 year. A strict adherence to existing FBI policies 

regarding sealing, labeling, and storing drug evidence will strengthen the 

FBI’s ability to guard against the risk of loss, theft, or misuse of the 

evidence.

10. Our primary objective in testing the controls over the safeguarding of 

firearms was to determine whether control procedures existed and were 

being followed. The scope of our testing did not include determining if the 

firearms themselves were rendered safe. FBI policy requires firearms to be 

examined and rendered safe by a firearms instructor prior to being 

accepted for storage by evidence control personnel, with the firearms 

instructor signing and dating a certification that this examination was 

performed. During our review at the four FBI field offices, 18 of the

113 firearms selected for our sample did not fully comply with this policy.
Appendix II

Comments From the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

Page 53 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

Areas of noncompliance involved 3 firearms in storage that lacked 

certification that the weapons had been rendered safe; 4 firearms that were 

certified as rendered safe, but the certifications were dated after the date 

the firearms had been accepted for storage; and 11 other firearms that had 

been certified as rendered safe, but the certifications were not dated. These 

examples of noncompliance form the basis for our recommendation that 

the FBI reinforce adherence to existing FBI policies regarding rendering 

firearms safe, including having a firearms instructor sign and date the 

certification on the chain of custody prior to evidence control personnel 

accepting the firearm for storage. The FBI’s comment that the basis for our 

recommendation appears to stem from our findings in two offices related 

to a total of three firearms that lacked required information on associated 

chain of custody documents is incorrect. The particular examples cited in 

the FBI’s comments are found in the report to document various 

deficiencies in chain of custody documentation, not as examples of the 

inadequate documentation certifying the examination and rendering safe of 

firearms.

11. We do not agree that our recorded weight of a drug item at the Miami 

Field Office was incorrect. We did not weigh the drug items ourselves. 

Instead, we observed FBI personnel weigh the evidence and recorded the 

results of their weighing activity. This process included two GAO personnel 

observing an FBI official placing each drug item on a scale, repeating the 

observed weight to the FBI official to obtain agreement, and one GAO 

member recording the weight on a data collection instrument while the 

other GAO member present reviewed the recorded information. 

For one drug item at the Miami Field Office, the DEA recorded weight on 

the evidence package was 541.8 grams, while the weight we observed was 

273 grams. During our visit, we asked the field office officials to explain 

this discrepancy. Their written response included that the weight variance 

was the difference of the weight of the drug item sealed and the weight of 

the item without packaging as recorded by DEA. However, during a 

subsequent meeting involving these officials, we pointed out that the DEA 

recorded weight on the drug item included packaging, so the explanation 

provided was not reasonable. We were then told by an FBI official that the 

weight of 541.8 grams may have been recorded in error by DEA. However, 

other than the statement in the FBI’s comments to the report, we had not 

been provided any additional explanation or documentation pertaining to 

this weight discrepancy, and at no time was there any discussion that we 

may have recorded the weight in error.
Appendix II

Comments From the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation

Page 54 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

12. Another drug item we observed at the Miami Field Office consisted of a 

sealed box that was marked as 11 kilograms and was described in the ACS 

system as 11 kilograms. Our observed weight of this drug item was

14.9 kilograms; however, this weight was not recorded on the box or in the 

description of the item found in the ACS system. As stated in our report, 

according to a Miami FBI official, agents often record the amount of bulk 

drugs as the number of kilo-sized bricks. By counting bricks rather than 

weighing the evidence, the weight recorded is an estimate that also does 

not include the weight of packaging materials, such as the wrappings on 

the individual bricks of the drug and the box and tape used to seal the 

evidence.

The FBI recognizes that referring to the size of a drug item rather than the 

actual weight of the item may be problematic and that the term “package” 

should be used in lieu of “kilogram” unless referring specifically to the 

item’s weight, and we agree. However, we continue to believe that 

recording estimated package sizes rather than actual weights diminishes 

the FBI’s assurance that entire quantities of drugs are placed under 

prescribed safeguards. The FBI’s concurrence with our recommendation to 

modify existing policy to require that all seized drugs, including bulk 

seizures, be weighed on properly calibrated scales will help to alleviate 

potential problems associated with recording the number of packages 

comprising a drug item rather than the actual weight of the evidence 

including packaging. 

(901785) Letr
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