UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

 

RALPH BOOZER, 

 Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-cv-12129 

 v. 

COMMISSIONER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE MONA K. MAJZOUB

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 

 Defendant. 

________________________/ 

 

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [14] AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT [15] 

Plaintiff Ralph Boozer seeks judicial review of Defendant Commissioner of Social 

Security’s determination that he is not entitled to social security benefits for his physical and 

mental impairments under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Docket no. 1.) Before the Court are Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 14) and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(docket no. 15). Plaintiff also filed a response to Defendant’s Motion. (Docket no. 21.) With 

consent of the parties, this case has been referred to the undersigned for final judgment in 

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. (Docket no. 18.) 

The Court has reviewed the pleadings, dispenses with a hearing pursuant to Eastern District of 

Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2), and is now ready to rule. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 Plaintiff protectively filed an application for disability insurance benefits on August 24, 

2012, alleging disability beginning January 16, 2011 due to cervical herniated discs, bulging 

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discs in lower back, depression, and anxiety and panic attacks. (TR 194.) The Social Security 

Administration denied Plaintiff’s claims on December 13, 2012, and Plaintiff requested a de 

novo hearing. (TR 17, 21.) On November 14, 2013, Plaintiff appeared with a representative and 

testified at the hearing before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Scott M. Staller. (TR 36-74.) 

Plaintiff agreed to amend his alleged onset date to November 16, 2011, the date on which he was 

below the SGA threshold, at the hearing; however, the amended on-set date is not reflected in the 

ALJ’s decision. (TR 21, 38-39.) In the February 19, 2014 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

was not entitled to benefits because he was capable of performing a significant number of jobs in 

the national economy. (TR 21-31.) The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s decision 

(TR 1-6), and Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review. The parties then filed cross 

motions for summary judgment, which are currently before the Court.

II. HEARING TESTIMONY AND MEDICAL EVIDENCE

In his brief, Plaintiff sets forth the procedural history of this matter as well as a summary 

of the medical record and his hearing testimony. (Docket no. 14 at 3-11.) The ALJ set out a 

detailed, factual recitation of Plaintiff’s hearing testimony, Plaintiff’s medical record, and the 

vocational expert’s (VE’s) testimony in his decision. (TR 24-31.) Defendant adopts the ALJ’s 

recitation of the medical facts. (Docket no. 15 at 2.) There are no material inconsistencies 

between Plaintiff’s and the ALJ’s accounts of the record, with the exception of the ALJ’s 

omission of any discussion of Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. William Pettit. Accordingly, 

the undersigned will incorporate these factual recitations by reference but has conducted an 

independent review of Plaintiff’s medical record and the hearing transcript and will also include 

comments and citations as necessary throughout this Opinion and Order. 

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III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S DETERMINATION

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the 

original alleged onset date of January 16, 2011,1 and that Plaintiff suffered from the following 

severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, degenerative disc disease of 

the cervical spine, a depressive disorder, an anxiety disorder and a pain disorder. (TR 23.) The 

ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s ailments of bicepital tendonitis and elbow contracture were nonsevere impairments. (TR 23.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s severe impairments did not 

meet or medically equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1. (TR 24-25.) The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the following residual 

functional capacity (RFC): 

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as 

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except he can frequently climb 

ramps or stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant can 

frequently balance and occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. He must 

avoid concentrated exposure to dangerous moving machinery, unprotected 

heights, excessive vibrations, and extreme cold. He would be able to understand, 

remember, and carry out simple instructions, and he could make judgments on 

simple work related decisions. The claimant should have no contact with the 

public, and he could have only occasional contact with co-workers and 

supervisors. He should have a low stress job defined as having only occasional 

decision making and only occasional changes in the work setting. The claimant 

would be able to maintain attention and concentration for 2 hour segments over an 

8 hour period, and he could complete a normal work week without interruptions 

from psychologically or physically based symptoms. 

(TR 25.) Subsequently, in reliance on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was 

capable of performing a significant number of jobs in the national economy. (TR 30-31.) 

Therefore, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act at any 

time from January 16, 2011, through the date of the decision. (TR 31.) 

IV. LAW AND ANALYSIS

 

1

 The decision reflects the originally asserted on-set date despite Plaintiff’s attempt to amend it to November 16, 

2011, the first date he acknowledged that his activity fell below the SGA threshold. 

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A. Standard of Review

 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s 

final decisions. Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decisions is limited to determining 

whether his findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether he employed the proper 

legal standards. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Walters v. Comm’r, 127 

F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a 

preponderance; it is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.’” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Walters, 127 F.3d at 528. It is not the function of this Court to try 

cases de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility. See Brainard 

v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989); Garner v. Heckler, 745 

F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). 

 In determining the existence of substantial evidence, the court must examine the 

administrative record as a whole. See Kirk v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 

536 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). If the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, even if the reviewing court would decide 

the matter differently, Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), and even if 

substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. See Her v. Comm’r, 203 F.3d 388, 

389-90 (6th Cir. 1999); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (noting 

that the substantial evidence standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which 

the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts”). 

B. Framework for Social Security Determinations

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 Plaintiff’s Social Security disability determination was made in accordance with a fivestep sequential analysis. In the first four steps, Plaintiff was required to show that: 

(1) Plaintiff was not presently engaged in substantial gainful employment; and 

(2) Plaintiff suffered from a severe impairment; and 

(3) the impairment met or was medically equal to a “listed impairment;” or 

(4) Plaintiff did not have the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform relevant 

past work. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). If Plaintiff’s impairments prevented Plaintiff from doing past 

work, the Commissioner, at step five, would consider Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and past 

work experience to determine if Plaintiff could perform other work. If not, Plaintiff would be 

deemed disabled. See id. at § 404.1520(g). The Commissioner has the burden of proof only on 

“the fifth step, proving that there is work available in the economy that the claimant can 

perform.” Her, 203 F.3d at 391. To meet this burden, the Commissioner must make a finding 

“supported by substantial evidence that [the claimant] has the vocational qualifications to 

perform specific jobs.” Varley v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 

1987). This “substantial evidence” may be in the form of vocational expert testimony in 

response to a hypothetical question, “but only ‘if the question accurately portrays [the 

claimant’s] individual physical and mental impairments.’” Id. (citations omitted). 

C. Analysis

 The Social Security Act authorizes “two types of remand: (1) a post judgment remand in 

conjunction with a decision affirming, modifying, or reversing a decision of the [Commissioner] 

(a sentence-four remand); and (2) a pre-judgment remand for consideration of new and material 

evidence that for good cause was not previously presented to the [Commissioner] (a sentence-six 

remand).” Faucher v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1994) 

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(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Under a sentence-four remand, the Court has the authority to “enter 

upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, denying, or reversing the 

decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the cause for a hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Where there is insufficient support for the ALJ’s findings, “the appropriate remedy is 

reversal and a sentence-four remand for further consideration.” Morgan v. Astrue, 10-207, 2011 

WL 2292305, at *8 (E.D.Ky. June 8, 2011) (citing Faucher, 17 F.3d at 174). 

 Plaintiff asserts that this matter should be remanded under sentence four because (1) the 

ALJ committed reversible error by failing to note the weight assigned to, or even mention, the 

opinions of Dr. Pettit, Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist; (2) the ALJ erred by according little 

weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Siddiqui; and (3) the RFC issued by 

the ALJ is inconsistent with the objective medical evidence. (Docket no. 14 at 12-18.) 

1. Dr. Pettit 

 First, the Court will address Plaintiff’s claims of error with regard to the ALJ’s 

assessment, or lack thereof, of Dr. Pettit’s opinion. Dr. Pettit is a psychiatrist at Herrick Medical 

Center, who treated Plaintiff from January to August 2012. (TR 518-543.) As Plaintiff asserts 

and Defendant concedes in their respective briefs, the ALJ does not mention Dr. Pettit’s 

treatment, records or opinions in his decision. (TR 21-31, Docket no. 14 at 12, Docket no. 15 at 

3.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s failure to address Dr. Pettit’s treatment and opinions of 

Plaintiff alone justifies a remand in this case. (Docket no. 14 at 12-13.) 

It is well settled that the opinions of treating physicians are generally accorded substantial 

deference. The opinion of a treating physician should be given controlling weight if it is “wellsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques,” and “not 

inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. 

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Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). The Commissioner is 

required to provide “good reasons” for discounting the weight given to a treating-source opinion. 

These reasons must be supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently 

specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating 

source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight. Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 

F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013). A failure to analyze a treating source opinion under the twoprong controlling weight test amounts to the failure to provide good reason for giving that 

opinion less than controlling weight. See id. at 376-77. 

This requirement is not simply a formality; it is to safeguard the claimant's procedural 

rights. It is intended “to let claimants understand the disposition of their cases, particularly in 

situations where a claimant knows that his physician has deemed him disabled and therefore 

might be especially bewildered when told by an administrative bureaucracy that [ ] he is not. 

Significantly, the requirement safeguards a reviewing court's time, as it “permits meaningful” 

and efficient “review of the ALJ’s application of the [treating physician] rule.” Cole v. Astrue, 

661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). “This circuit ‘has made clear that [it] 

do[es] not hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has not provided good reasons for the 

weight given to a treating physician's opinion.’” Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 380 (quoting Cole, 661 

F. 3d at 939). The district court should not hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has failed 

to identify the weight assigned to a treating physician’s opinion and provide good reasons for 

that weight. See Cole, 661 F.3d at 939 (“This Court has made clear that ‘[w]e do not hesitate to 

remand when the Commissioner has not provided ‘good reasons’ for the weight given to a 

treating physician's opinion and we will continue remanding when we encounter opinions from 

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ALJ's that do not comprehensively set forth the reasons for the weight assigned to a treating 

physician's opinion.”) (citing Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 267 (6th Cir. 2009)). 

 It is quite clear from the decision in the case at bar that the ALJ did not provide the 

mandated “good reasons” for the weight assigned to Dr. Pettit’s opinion because the ALJ did not 

assign any weight to Dr. Pettit’s opinion. In fact, the ALJ makes no mention Dr. Pettit, his 

treatment of Plaintiff or his opinions relating to Plaintiff’s mental impairments. (TR 21-31.) 

Defendant argues the ALJ’s omission amounts to harmless error because the only opinion 

expressed by Dr. Pettit was that Plaintiff was totally disabled from all employment, which is not 

a medical opinion but rather a statement on an issue reserved to the Commissioner. As such, 

Defendant maintains that Dr. Pettit’s opinion would not be entitled to controlling, or any weight 

at all. Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2007). (Docket no. 15 at 4.) Nevertheless, 

medical opinions, defined as statements reflecting the physician’s judgments on the nature and 

severity of a claimant’s impairments and how they impact his functionality, see 20 C.F.R. 

§404.1527(a)(2), appear throughout Dr. Pettit’s treatment record. (TR 518-543.) For example, 

in February 2012, Dr. Pettit noted that Plaintiff appeared disheveled, was “quite distraught” and 

displayed “marked agitation.” His mood was anxious, depressed and frightened and his thought 

process was tangential and circumstantial. He expressed transient suicidal and homicidal 

ideation, as well as hopelessness, helplessness and ideas of persecution. Finally, Dr. Pettit notes 

that Plaintiff was overwhelmed and had slept less than six hours in the eight days preceding his 

appointment. (TR 525-526.) Another note relates that despite medication for general anxiety, 

Plaintiff experienced four panic attacks in three weeks. (TR 528.) Because Dr. Pettit’s treatment 

notes reflect his judgment on the nature and severity of Plaintiff’s condition and how his 

condition impacts his ability to function, they should have been assessed as the treating 

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physician’s opinion. The absence of any discussion of Dr. Pettit’s treatment of Plaintiff is a clear 

failure to provide good reasons for discounting the opinion’s weight, thereby compelling a 

remand. See Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376. 

2. Dr. Siddiqui 

Plaintiff further asserts that the ALJ erred in assigning little weight to the opinion of 

Plaintiff’s long-time primary care physician, Dr. Siddiqui. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s 

rationale for discounting Dr. Siddiqui’s opinion, specifically that it was inconsistent with the 

opinions of other treaters, the lack of radiculopathy symptoms and “findings of normal gait and 

lower extremity functions,” does not amount to the “good reasons” necessary to justify 

discounting a treater’s opinion. (Docket no. 14 at 17.) 

Even if an ALJ determines that plaintiff’s treating physician’s opinions should not be 

given controlling weight despite the medical evidence in support, “the ALJ must still determine 

how much weight is appropriate by considering a number of factors, including the length of the 

treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record 

as a whole, and any specialization of the treating physician.” Allen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2013 

WL 5676254, at *13 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 2013) (citing Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 

F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009)). Moreover, as discussed above, the Commissioner is required to 

provide “good reasons” for discounting the weight given to a treating-source opinion. These 

reasons must be supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to 

make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s 

medical opinion and the reasons for that weight. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376. 

The ALJ in the instant matter did not provide good reasons for discounting Dr. Siddiqui’s 

opinion, as they were not sufficiently specific to explain the reasoning behind the decision. See 

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Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 245-46 (6th Cir. 2007). First, the ALJ justified the 

assignment of little weight to Dr. Siddiqui’s opinion based on its inconsistency with “the 

generally mild limitations in range of motion that were noted by the treating providers...” (TR 

28.) The ALJ does not identify which of the “treating providers” reached this conclusion. To 

the contrary, the ALJ notes elsewhere in the decision that Dr. Lazzara, Dr. Jacobs, and Dr. 

Buckingham, all consulting examiners, found Plaintiff had cervical range of motion reduced by 

as much as 25%. (TR 26.) 

The ALJ next relied upon a “lack of consistent radicular symptoms,” again without any 

specific corroboration from the record. Again, elsewhere in the decision, the ALJ noted that 

EMG testing in both 2011 and 2013 demonstrated acute on [sic] chronic radiculopathy involving 

the upper extremities. Mild motor peripheral neuropathy was noted in one EMG report and Dr. 

Clague, an evaluating neurologist, found that Plaintiff had weakness in both hands, as wells as 

decreased sensation along the right side of the neck into the right shoulder and down to the right 

elbow. (TR 26.) 

Finally, the ALJ points to repeated findings of a normal gait and normal lower extremity 

functioning (without any direct citation to the record) as justification for discounting Dr. 

Siddiqui’s opinions. (TR 26.) The ALJ does not, however, explain how these findings are 

inconsistent with Dr. Siddiqui’s opinions regarding Plaintiff’s manipulative limitations. The 

undersigned is not convinced that the ALJ’s expressed reasons for discounting Dr. Siddiqui’s 

opinions are supported by the evidence in the case record. In any event, the articulated reasons 

are not sufficiently specific to demonstrate to a subsequent reviewer the justification for 

discounting the opinions. 

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 Defendant argues that the ALJ did provide adequate reasons for rejecting Dr. Siddiqui’s 

opinions on Plaintiff’s manipulative limitations and submits analysis and citations to the record 

in support of the ALJ’s conclusions. (Docket no. 15 at 12-16.) But Defendant’s post-hoc 

rationalization of the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Siddiqui’s opinion does not cure the ALJ’s failure 

to provide good reasons. See Christephore., 2012 WL 2274328, at *6(“[I]t is not the Court’s job 

to conduct a de novo review of the evidence or to rubber stamp the ALJ’s decision. The Court 

must ensure both that the ALJ applied the correct legal standard and that his decision is 

supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, it is the ALJ’s rationale that is under review, not 

defense counsel’s.”). Accordingly, a proper assessment of Dr. Siddiqui’s opinion provides 

additional grounds for remand. 

Because Plaintiff’s RFC assessment will potentially change upon remand after proper 

consideration of Dr. Pettit and Dr. Siddiqui’s opinions under the treating physician rule, the 

Court need not address Plaintiff’s other claim of error in this Order. 

 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [14] is 

GRANTED IN PART, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [15] is DENIED. On 

remand, the ALJ will address and consider the treatment notes and opinions of Drs. Pettit and 

Siddiqui in accordance with the treating physician rule. 

Dated: September 28, 2016 s/ Mona K. Majzoub__ 

 MONA K. MAJZOUB 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

 

 

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PROOF OF SERVICE

 I hereby certify that a copy of this Order was served upon counsel of record on this date. 

 

Dated: September 28, 2016 s/ Lisa C. Bartlett 

 Case Manager

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