2020 IL App (1st) 190357-U 

 FOURTH DIVISION

March 31, 2020 

No. 1-19-0357 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent 

by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In re MARRIAGE OF

JESSE VINER, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

and

RENA VINER, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Cook County

No. 07 D 230321 

Honorable 

Debra Walker, 

Judge Presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE REYES delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Lampkin and Burke concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Affirming the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County modifying the former 

wife’s permanent maintenance where she demonstrated a significant change in her 

reasonable needs as required by section 510 of the Illinois Marriage and 

Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/510 (West 2016)). 

¶ 2 Petitioner, Jesse Viner, appeals an order of the circuit court of Cook County modifying 

the maintenance awarded to respondent, Rena Viner, from $10,000 per month to $17,300 per 
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month. On appeal, Jesse maintains that the trial court abused its discretion increasing Rena’s 

maintenance award to $17,300 per month as the evidence established at trial contradicted the 

court’s findings. Specifically, Jesse argues that the trial court: (1) improperly relied solely on 

his increased income to modify Rena’s maintenance award where she failed to demonstrate a 

substantial change in circumstances; (2) improperly found the amount of maintenance originally 

awarded to Rena was inadequate; (3) failed to consider the effect of the Tax Reform Act of 2018 

or to set forth a specific amount for Rena’s taxes; (4) improperly increased the amount of Rena’s 

maintenance based on an unsubstantiated rate of inflation; and (5) failed to consider Rena’s

dating relationship as a source of income for Rena. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the 

judgment of the circuit court. 

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 We begin by observing that while the record in this matter is voluminous, the actual 

issues presented are narrow. Accordingly, we set forth only those facts pertinent to the 

disposition of this appeal. 

¶ 5 After 34 years of marriage, on June 29, 2007, Jesse filed a petition for dissolution of 

marriage. On November 8, 2008, the trial court entered a judgment of dissolution of marriage 

that incorporated the parties’ marital settlement agreement. That agreement awarded Rena 

permanent maintenance, allocated the parties’ marital property, and included specific provisions 

regarding the terms of sale of the former marital residence. 

¶ 6 Pursuant to article II of the marital settlement agreement, Rena was awarded permanent 

maintenance in the initial amount of $11,350 per month commencing November 2008 until such 

time as the marital residence was sold, at which point the amount of Rena’s maintenance would 

decrease to $10,000 per month. The maintenance amounts paid by Jesse were taxable to Rena 
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and deductible by Jesse. Rena’s maintenance award was also subject to the occurrence of 

statutory termination events such as either of the parties’ deaths, Rena’s remarriage, or Rena’s 

cohabitation with another person on a “resident, continuing conjugal basis.” 

¶ 7 The martial estate was distributed as follows: The parties equally divided their retirement 

savings. Rena received 55% of the remaining marital estate comprised of $200,000 from a 

Wachovia account and $450,000 as a buyout of her interest in Jesse’s company, Yellowbrick 

Group (Yellowbrick), a professional services corporation providing mental health services to 

teens and young adults. Jesse received 45% of the marital estate, which included 100% of his 

interest in Yellowbrick.

¶ 8 On May 12, 2016, Rena filed a motion to modify maintenance pursuant to section 510 of 

the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/510 (West 2016)), 

seeking an upward modification of her maintenance based on a substantial change in 

circumstances since the entry of the judgment of dissolution. Specifically, Rena maintained that 

she experienced a significant increase in her living expenses and that Jesse’s income had 

substantially increased since the entry of the judgment of dissolution. 

¶ 9 Subsequently, Jesse filed a petition to terminate maintenance claiming that Rena 

purportedly was engaging in “conjugal cohabitation on a resident, continuing basis with Mr. 

Terry Gold.” 

¶ 10 Over the course of eight days in fall 2018, the trial court conducted an evidentiary 

hearing on Rena’s motion to modify maintenance and Jesse’s petition to terminate maintenance. 

Rena, Jesse, and Terry were the only witnesses. Numerous financial documents, including bank 

statements, tax filings, and financial affidavits from both parties were admitted into evidence in 

support of the testimony presented. 
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¶ 11 Rena testified that she was 67 years old at the time of the evidentiary hearing. She 

received her doctorate in counseling psychology in 1988 but was never professionally licensed as 

a psychologist. Three children (now adults) were born to her marriage with Jesse and she 

worked as a homemaker during the marriage. In 1992 she commenced working at a treatment 

center performing family assessments, but only remained there for 18 months. She then worked 

part-time for Jesse at some point in the 1990s for less than a year. In 2006, Jesse asked her to 

work at Yellowbrick as an executive vice president. In April 2007, she was fired. She has not 

worked a full-time job on a consistent basis since. 

¶ 12 Regarding her standard of living, Rena testified as follows. For 30 years of their 

marriage, Jesse and Rena owned and resided in a 4,500 square foot six-bedroom, three-bathroom 

home in Glencoe, Illinois. She currently rents a two-bedroom apartment in Highland Park, 

Illinois. During each winter break the family would travel for one to two weeks. They went five 

times to Hawaii, and once to Belize, Costa Rica, Argentina, Paris, London, Acapulco, the 

Cayman Islands, and Florida. On spring break, they traveled to Prague, Amsterdam, London, 

and Argentina. They also owned two timeshares where they would travel to go skiing. They 

would take 10-day long summer vacations to various destinations which included two trips to 

Israel. When traveling, the family would stay in hotels like the Fairmont or Four Seasons or they 

would rent a condominium. 

¶ 13 During the marriage, Rena would drive a Lexus or an Audi. Jesse would drive either a 

Mercedes or Lexus. Rena would shop at department stores like Bloomingdale’s or Nordstrom. 

She would wear designer brands like Eileen Fisher, Lafayette, and Armani. Jesse would wear 

Armani suits. Rena testified she currently leases a similar luxury vehicle and shops at the same 

stores as she did when she was married.
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¶ 14 Rena testified that she filed the petition for modification of maintenance because she was 

tapping into her savings too much and she was concerned that she would not have enough 

money. Specifically, Rena testified that she inherited $200,000 from her mother’s estate in April 

2016 and had to use a majority of those funds to cover her living expenses. Rena further testified 

that she had not accounted for certain expenses at the time she signed the martial settlement 

agreement, her taxes increased, and everything became more expensive. 

¶ 15 Rena further testified to her extensive health issues. According to Rena she was regularly 

seen by numerous physicians for her various medical conditions including an internist, a 

dermatologist, an allergist, an otolaryngologist, an immunologist, a cardiologist, a 

gastroenterologist, a rheumatologist, an orthopedic surgeon, a podiatrist, a urologist, an 

oncologist, a pulmonologist, a gynecologist, an oral surgeon, a psychiatrist, and a chiropractor. 

Rena also had knee replacement surgery in October 2018 and she testified that she would be in 

need of physical therapy that was not covered by Medicare. Rena further testified that in the last 

nine months she spent $1400 out of pocket on her medications. According to Rena she pays 

$544 per month for Medicare parts A, B & D as well as a supplemental Blue Cross Blue Shield 

plan. She further testified she does not have dental or optical insurance and had been saving 

funds to pay for some necessary major dental work. 

¶ 16 According to Rena’s financial affidavit of April 2018, she had a savings account with 

$34,640, a Merrill Lynch investment account with a balance of $473,767, and a Schwab 

investment account with a balance of $104,446. Rena testified, however, that those amounts 

have since decreased due to market conditions. In addition, Rena’s financial affidavit indicated 

she had the following retirement benefit accounts: Schwab Roth individual retirement account 

($10,764); Merrill Lynch individual retirement account ($936,995); and a Merrill Lynch 
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inherited individual retirement account ($136,232). 

¶ 17 Rena’s financial affidavit set forth $15,365 in itemized monthly living expenses. During 

the evidentiary hearing Rena testified that since she created the financial affidavit certain 

expenses had increased: rent from $4298 to $4375; cell phone from $127 to $135; storage fees 

from $214 to $219; automobile payment from $469 to $562; and parking from $135 to $145. 

¶ 18 Rena further testified that her taxes would increase in 2018 to approximately $2208 per 

month. Rena supported this testimony with her 2017 tax returns as well as a statement from her 

accountant regarding the impact the Tax Reform Act of 2018 would have on her tax liabilities. 

These documents were admitted into evidence via stipulation between the parties. According to 

the 2017 federal tax returns and the accompanying documents prepared by Rena’s accountant, 

Rena’s federal tax liability would increase from $14,612 in 2017 to $26,500 in 2018. 

¶ 19 Aside from the maintenance she received, Rena testified her monthly income was $2,347, 

including social security, investment income from savings that was reinvested, and mandatory 

distributions from an IRA she inherited from her mother. Rena further testified that she utilized 

credit card points to obtain free flights and hotel stays. 

¶ 20 Terry Gold testified that at the time of the hearing he was 69 years old. He has been 

dating Rena since late 2012 after being set up with her on a blind date. According to Terry, in 

the beginning of their relationship he paid when they would go on dates. However, as their 

dating relationship continued, he and Rena would take turns paying when they went out. 

Regarding vacations, Terry testified that when he and Rena traveled together they would split the 

costs. For example, he would pay for the air fare and she would pay for the hotel. Terry further 

testified that he resided in his own home, he did not keep any belongings at her home, he would 

spend the night at Rena’s approximately once per week, he would see Rena three to six times a 
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week, he did not consistently spend major holidays with Rena, and they did not share any 

financial accounts. 

¶ 21 Jesse, who was 67 at the time of the evidentiary hearing, testified as follows. At the time 

of the divorce, he was making approximately $300,000 per year as the CEO and chief medical 

officer of Yellowbrick. Over the last three years, his income from Yellowbrick averaged $3 

million and he continues to work 60-70 hours per week. Jesse’s financial affidavit indicated he 

had total assets of $14.75 million and a total net worth of $9.35 million. While Jesse testified 

regarding numerous debts (a majority attributable to his ownership of Yellowbrick), he did 

indicate that he had approximately $700,000 in discretionary income each year. Jesse further 

testified that since the judgment of dissolution, he has purchased a $1.6 million home in 

Evanston, Illinois and a $3.8 million condominium in Bal Harbour, Florida. While Jesse testified 

similarly to Rena regarding the vacations the family took and the automobiles they drove, he 

classified their lifestyle as “conservative” in relation to other families in their neighborhood. 

¶ 22 After considering the testimony and evidence presented, the trial court denied Jesse’s 

motion to terminate maintenance finding that Jesse did not meet his burden to establish that Rena 

and Terry were engaged in a de facto marriage. In a subsequent written order, the trial court 

granted Rena’s motion to modify her permanent maintenance. In so deciding, the trial court 

found that Rena testified in a “pleasant, straight-forward, and honest manner” and that she “had a 

good grasp of the voluminous documents and exhibited a good memory.” In regard to Jesse, the 

trial court found he “appeared to be pleasant and quite intelligent” and that “he seemed credible 

at times but did not have the same mastery of the facts as Rena.” The trial court then considered 

the evidence presented and weighed the numerous factors set forth in section 510(a-5) of the Act. 

The trial court found that Jesse remained employed at Yellowbrick, as he was at the time of the 
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divorce; however, his income had dramatically increased since that time. Over the last three 

years, Jesse has had an average adjusted gross income of over $2.8 million annually. Rena, 

however, remained unemployed and dependent upon maintenance and assets to meet her 

reasonable needs. 

¶ 23 Regarding the efforts, if any, made by Rena to become self-supporting, the trial court 

found that the permanent maintenance awarded in November 2008 was appropriate given the 

long duration of the marriage, Rena’s contributions during the marriage, her lack of skills and 

experience, her health considerations, and Jesse’s ability to pay maintenance. The trial court 

further found it was “inappropriate to think that she could have become self-supporting at that 

time, much less now, ten years later, when Rena is 67 years of age and has a myriad of health 

concerns, including arthritis already necessitating one knee replacement, high blood pressure and 

cholesterol, severe reflux disease, a lumbar protruding disc, skin cancer, hematuria, and mental 

health issues.” 

¶ 24 As to any impairment of the present and future earning capacity of either party, the trial 

court found that Rena’s health conditions, age, and lack of work experience have significantly 

impaired her ability to earn income now and in the future. Jesse, however, “has never made as 

much income in his life as he is making now” and there is no evidence that he suffers any 

impairment to his present or future earning capacity. 

¶ 25 In considering the tax consequences of the maintenance payments upon the respective 

economic circumstances of the parties, the trial court found that Rena’s maintenance will remain 

taxable and that evidence was presented that her 2018 quarterly tax payments nearly doubled 

from what they were in 2017. 

¶ 26 Regarding the duration of the maintenance payments previously paid (and remaining to 
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be paid) relative to the length of the marriage, the trial court found that permanent maintenance 

remained appropriate where “[i]t would be inequitable to now penalize [Rena] for the sacrifices 

she made throughout the marriage on behalf of the family.” 

¶ 27 The trial court next considered the property, including retirement benefits awarded to 

each party under the judgment of dissolution of marriage and the present status of the property. 

The trial court found that at the time of the divorce, the parties equally divided their retirement 

savings and Rena received 55% of the rest of the estate (essentially $200,000 in cash – a 

substantial portion of which went to pay her attorney fees – and $450,000 paid over time). Jesse 

received Yellowbrick and its related entities, presumably worth approximately $530,000 at the 

time of the judgment of dissolution. Since that time, Jesse’s net worth has grown to over $7 

million (not including retirement), which does not include a value for Yellowbrick. Jesse’s 

financial affidavit of July 28, 2017, lists total assets of $14.75 million and total net worth of 

$9.35 million. In contrast, even including the inheritance from her mother, Rena’s net worth is 

less than $600,000 (not including retirement funds). The trial court further found that “[a]bsent 

the inheritance she received with approximately $100,000 having already been spent to cover 

living expenses and another $100,000 retained as part of her net worth, she would be much 

worse off.”

¶ 28 The trial court further considered the increase or decrease in each party’s income since 

the prior judgment. The trial court found that Jesse’s income had increased by more than 400% 

since the entry of the judgment, while Rena had been living on the same amount of maintenance 

($11,350 initially and then $10,000 per month in September 2017). The trial court also noted 

Jesse’s financial statement of July 28, 2017, indicated that his total income is $3.73 million with 

total expenditures of $2.887 million, not including his maintenance payments. The trial court 
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concluded that “Jesse has much available net cash each month compared to Rena’s monthly 

shortfall. He testified that he has in excess of $700,000 income over expenses annually.” 

¶ 29 Lastly, the trial court considered the property acquired and currently owned by each party 

after the entry of the judgment of dissolution of marriage. The trial court found that Rena is in 

the same position she was at the time of the divorce and that she has had to use assets including 

part of her inheritance to meet the shortfall between her maintenance and monthly living 

expenses. The trial court observed that “[b]ut for that inheritance from her mother’s estate, Rena 

would be in a worse position.” In contrast, Jesse’s net worth has grown over 1,000% including 

millions of dollars in investments and savings, a $1.6 million home in Evanston, and a $3.8 

million condo in Bal Harbour, Florida. 

¶ 30 The trial court based this conclusion on the financial evidence presented at the 

evidentiary hearing. The trial court calculated that Rena’s monthly income (outside of her 

maintenance) was $2,347, which included social security, investment income, and mandatory 

individual retirement account distributions. The trial court found that Rena’s reasonable monthly 

living expenses total $15,106, which includes her $236 Medicare supplement but excludes her 

income taxes. In reaching this number, the trial court adjusted certain items as they appeared in 

Rena’s financial affidavit: rent to $4,375, cell phone to $135, storage fees to $219, automobile 

payment to $562, parking to $145, dental/orthodontia to $492, optical to $74, medicine to $155, 

and life/long term health insurance to $953. The court further exercised its discretion and 

adjusted moving expenses to $50 (an occasional, not annual, expense); furnishings to $300 (as 

the amount listed was excessive and unreasonable); and clothing to $1000 (as the amount listed 

was excessive and unreasonable). The trial court also observed, “Interestingly, if one examines 

Rena’s claimed living expenses in June 2008 (just prior to the divorce) and subtracts the 
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expenses for [her] daughter *** her expenses were $13,191. If one now accounts for inflation 

over the past 10 years, the sum of $15,106 is logical.” 

¶ 31 In response to Jesse’s argument that Rena’s prior living expenses could not have been so 

high because maintenance was previously set at $11,350 which was automatically adjusted down 

to $10,000 after the sale of the marital residence, the trial court observed that Rena “testified that 

she thought she needed to agree to less maintenance in order to get divorced from Jesse.” The 

court further noted that this amount was agreed to by the parties in the marital settlement 

agreement. However, “[n]ow that this matter has been litigated and evidence adduced, it is clear 

to this Court that Rena agreed to an original maintenance amount that was inadequate. During 

this evidentiary hearing, this Court heard Rena testify on multiple occasions that she has been 

depleting her savings in order to maintain her standard of living.” The court noted that Rena 

testified she was using money from her inheritance to pay bills and that when her mortgage 

payment and taxes increased she had to pay by withdrawing funds from her savings account. 

¶ 32 The trial court also addressed Jesse’s argument that he and Rena had a “modest and 

conservative lifestyle during their marriage” such that Rena does not need that much 

maintenance to maintain her marital standard of living. The trial court disagreed and found this 

argument was belied by the testimony. The trial court pointed out that for the last 20 years of 

their marriage, the parties owned and resided in a very large home in Glencoe consisting of 4500 

square feet with six bedrooms and three bathrooms. In contrast, Rena is now renting a twobedroom apartment with a small den in Highland Park which is half the size of her marital home. 

The court also observed that the parties took numerous international vacations, shopped at 

expensive boutiques, and that Jesse purchased expensive jewelry for Rena. Accordingly, the trial 

court found that Rena was not currently living beyond the lifestyle established during the 
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marriage. To account for her payment of income taxes, the trial court ordered Jesse to pay Rena 

an increased maintenance of $17,300 per month. Thereafter, Jesse filed this appeal.

¶ 33 ANALYSIS

¶ 34 On appeal, Jesse maintains that the trial court abused its discretion increasing Rena’s 

maintenance award to $17,300 per month as the evidence established at trial contradicted the 

court’s findings. Specifically, Jesse argues that the trial court: (1) improperly relied solely on 

his increased income to modify Rena’s maintenance award where she failed to demonstrate a 

substantial change in circumstances; (2) improperly found the amount of maintenance originally 

awarded to Rena was inadequate; (3) failed to consider the effect of the Tax Reform Act of 2018 

or to set forth a specific amount for Rena’s taxes; (4) improperly increased the amount of Rena’s 

maintenance based on an unsubstantiated rate of inflation; and (5) failed to consider Rena and 

Terry’s dating relationship as a source of income for Rena. We will address each contention in 

turn. 

¶ 35 Maintenance may be modified or terminated by a court pursuant to section 510(a-5) of 

the Act (750 ILCS 5/510(a-5) (West 2016)) only upon a showing of a “substantial change in 

circumstances.” A “substantial change in circumstances” as required under section 510(a-5)

means that either the needs of the spouse receiving maintenance or the ability of the other spouse 

to pay that maintenance has changed. Shen v. Shen, 2015 IL App (1st) 130733, ¶ 132. It is well 

settled that the party seeking modification of maintenance has the burden of establishing that a 

substantial change in circumstances has occurred. In re Marriage of Bernay, 2017 IL App (2d) 

160583, ¶ 14; Shen, 2015 IL App (1st) 130733, ¶ 132. “Trial judges cannot gaze into a crystal 

ball and foresee what the future holds for the parties. This explains why permanent maintenance

is always modifiable or terminable should there occur a substantial change in circumstances.” 
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Shen, 2015 IL App (1st) 130733, ¶ 87. 

¶ 36 In determining whether to modify or terminate a maintenance award, a court considers 

the nine factors set forth in section 510(a-5) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/510(a-5) (West 2016)). 

Those factors are:

 “(1) any change in the employment status of either party and whether the change 

has been made in good faith; 

 (2) the efforts, if any, made by the party receiving maintenance to become selfsupporting, and the reasonableness of the efforts where they are appropriate; 

 (3) any impairment of the present and future earning capacity of either party; 

 (4) the tax consequences of the maintenance payments upon the respective 

economic circumstances of the parties;

 (5) the duration of the maintenance payments previously paid (and remaining to 

be paid) relative to the length of the marriage; 

 (6) the property, including retirement benefits, awarded to each party under the

 judgment of dissolution of marriage *** and the present status of the property; 

(7) the increase or decrease in each party's income since the prior judgment or 

order from which a review, modification, or termination is being sought; 

 (8) the property acquired and currently owned by each party after the entry of the 

judgment of dissolution of marriage ***; and 

 (9) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be just and equitable.” Id.

¶ 37 Section 510(a-5) further instructs that the court shall consider the applicable factors in 

section 504(a) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2016)). 750 ILCS 5/510(a-5) (West 2016). 

The section 504(a) factors are:
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 “(1) the income and property of each party, including marital property 

apportioned and non-marital property assigned to the party seeking maintenance as well 

as all financial obligations imposed on the parties as a result of the dissolution of 

marriage;

 (2) the needs of each party; 

 (3) the realistic present and future earning capacity of each party;

 (4) any impairment of the present and future earning capacity of the party seeking 

maintenance due to that party devoting time to domestic duties or having foregone or 

delayed education, training, employment, or career opportunities due to the marriage; 

 (5) any impairment of the realistic present or future earning capacity of the party 

against whom maintenance is sought; 

(6) the time necessary to enable the party seeking maintenance to acquire 

appropriate education, training, and employment, and whether that party is able to 

support himself or herself through appropriate employment or any parental responsibility 

arrangements and its effect on the party seeking employment; 

 (7) the standard of living established during the marriage; 

 (8) the duration of the marriage; 

 (9) the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational 

skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties;

 (10) all sources of public and private income including, without limitation, 

disability and retirement income;

 (11) the tax consequences of the property division upon the respective economic 

circumstances of the parties;
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 (12) contributions and services by the party seeking maintenance to the education, 

training, career or career potential, or license of the other spouse; 

 (13) any valid agreement of the parties; and 

 (14) any other factor that the court expressly finds to be just and equitable.” 750 

ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2016). 

No single factor is determinative in considering the duration and amount of maintenance and the 

trial court is not limited to reviewing the factors outlined in the statute. In re Marriage of Heroy, 

385 Ill. App. 3d 640, 651 (2008). 

¶ 38 A trial court’s decision to modify or terminate a maintenance award will not be disturbed 

on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 650; In re Marriage of Anderson, 409 Ill. 

App. 3d 191, 199 (2011). An abuse of discretion occurs only where the trial court’s ruling is 

arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted 

by the court. In re Marriage of Johnson, 2016 IL App (5th) 140479, ¶ 93. 

¶ 39 In the present case we find that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in 

concluding that both Rena’s reasonable needs and Jesse’s ability to pay had increased since the 

2008 judgment of dissolution of marriage. At the evidentiary hearing on the petition for 

modification, Rena testified that her necessary living expenses had increased substantially since 

the 2008 judgment of dissolution. In support of her claim, Rena presented a financial affidavit 

which consisted of an itemized list of her monthly living expenses totaling $15,365.92. Rena 

also testified that certain of these expenses had increased since the financial affidavit was

created. Namely, these increases involved her rent from $4298 to $4375, parking from $135 to 

$145, onsite storage from $15 to $20, and automobile lease payment from $469.42 to $562. 

Rena further testified regarding an increase in her medical expenses; specifically, that she needed
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increased dental and optical care and that she had spent $1400 on her medications in the last nine 

months. 

¶ 40 Rena’s financial affidavit also detailed certain deductions and expenses that were not 

provided for in her 2008 financial affidavit. These included: federal tax ($2208), state tax 

($542), life/long term care insurance ($1000), and individual retirement account contribution 

($541.66). Accordingly, Rena argued before the trial court that her living expenses totaled 

$16,128.04 and requested the court award her $20,000 to account for the taxes she would need to 

pay on those funds. 

¶ 41 After weighing the statutory factors, the trial court declined to award her the requested 

amount, finding the amount Rena testified she spent on clothing, furnishings, and moving 

expenses to be unreasonable. Thus, the trial court adjusted those monthly amounts to $1000 for 

clothing, $300 for furnishings, and $50 for moving expenses. After considering the additional 

income Rena received from social security, dividends, and mandatory disbursements, as well as 

the effect of inflation, the trial court found Rena’s monthly living expenses to be $15,106. The 

trial court then increased the monthly award to $17,300 to account for Rena’s payment of income 

taxes. Based on the record before us, we agree with the trial court’s assessment of the statutory 

factors and the amount of maintenance awarded. Therefore, we do not find the trial court’s 

award to be an abuse of discretion. 

¶ 42 Jesse, however, maintains that the trial court made various factual findings that were 

against the manifest weight of the evidence and therefore the modification award was an abuse 

of discretion. We address each of his arguments in turn. 

¶ 43 We first address Jesse’s argument that the trial court erred in basing Rena’s maintenance 

increase solely on the fact his income had increased. According to Jesse, his income is only 
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relevant after Rena has demonstrated a substantial change in her circumstances. He maintains 

that because Rena has been able to afford the marital standard of living over the last decade 

without incurring any debt, she is unable to establish a change in circumstances to warrant an 

increase in her support. 

¶ 44 Jesse relies on In re Marriage of S.D., 2012 IL App (1st) 101876, to support his 

argument. We initially observe that S.D. involved a general review of maintenance pursuant to 

the parties’ martial settlement agreement, not a modification of maintenance under section 510 of 

the Act. Id. ¶ 25. As noted by the S.D. court, a general review of maintenance involves a 

different standard, namely that the petitioner is not required to prove a substantial change in 

circumstances in order to justify a change in the maintenance award. Id. Accordingly, S.D. is 

distinguishable from the case at bar in this regard. 

¶ 45 Procedural posture aside, S.D.’s discussion of a spouse’s increase in income is relevant 

here. In S.D., the former wife argued that the former husband should contribute more to her 

maintenance because his income allowed him to do so and still maintain a reasonable standard of 

living for himself. In rendering these arguments, the former wife relied on In re Marriage of 

Reynard, 344 Ill. App. 3d 785 (2003), and In re Marriage of Simmons, 87 Ill. App. 3d 651 

(1980). The reviewing court disagreed that these cases supported the former wife’s argument 

that a party must pay more maintenance merely because he has the ability to do so. S.D., 2012 

IL App (1st) 101876, ¶ 44. The S.D. court observed that instead, the trial court must consider the 

factors outlined in section 504(a) and 510(a-5) of the Act, and “award an increase or decrease in 

maintenance only where ‘the needs of the spouse receiving alimony change or the ability of the 

other spouse to pay alimony changes.’ ” Id. (quoting Shive v. Shive, 57 Ill. App. 3d 754, 760 

(1978)). Applying this standard, the reviewing court acknowledged that the trial court found the 
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former wife’s needs did not increase substantially, but rather decreased given the emancipation 

of the parties’ child and that the former husband’s income had decreased by 24%. Id. 

Accordingly, the reviewing court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

decreasing the former wife’s maintenance to $10,000 per month. Id.

¶ 46 Applying the law set forth in S.D. to the facts of this case, as discussed above, it is 

apparent that Rena has demonstrated a significant change in circumstances as to warrant an 

increase in maintenance. While Jesse is correct that Rena did not acquire any debt since 2008, 

the evidence disclosed that she had to use significant amounts of the cash inheritance from her 

mother in order to pay her bills. Furthermore, although Jesse is correct that the amounts of 

certain bills decreased over time, we observe that these bills were related to the maintenance of 

their large marital home. It is obvious to this court that the amount Rena would need to spend to 

clean her apartment and to pay the utility bills related to that apartment would be significantly 

less than those associated with a six-bedroom single family home. In addition, we are obliged to 

acknowledge that a decade has passed since the marital settlement agreement was entered. Over 

those ten years, Rena has developed significant health challenges which required her to see over 

a dozen different physicians. While she is now on Medicare (which has decreased the amount 

she pays for health insurance), she is still responsible for out of pocket expenses (such as 

physical therapy, medications, and dental work) and in need of other conveniences to maintain 

her standard of living. Moreover, as set forth in more detail below, Rena has also demonstrated a 

substantial change in the amount of taxes she is required to pay. While Jesse is correct that 

“[t]he law does not require a party to pay more maintenance merely because he or she can do so” 

(In re Marriage of Brunke, 2019 IL App (2d) 190201, ¶ 63), it is readily apparent that the trial 

court did not solely increase Rena’s maintenance based on Jesse’s substantial income but due to 
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a substantial change in her reasonable needs. Accordingly, based on the record before us, we 

cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it increased Rena’s maintenance.

¶ 47 Jesse next takes issue with “the trial court’s finding that the original maintenance 

awarded to Rena years previously in a marital settlement agreement was unfair and inadequate 

was a legally impermissible inquiry or conclusion.” Jesse asserts that it was improper for the 

trial court “to go behind the [marital settlement agreement] and accept Rena’s testimony that she 

felt forced to compromise and accept an under payment of maintenance.” Jesse concludes that 

the trial court gave this improper finding great weight when deciding to increase Rena’s 

maintenance. Rena disagrees and maintains that the trial court’s statements in this regard were in 

response to Jesse’s argument that the original maintenance amount was sufficient to satisfy 

Rena’s marital standard of living. 

¶ 48 It is well-established that a proceeding to modify maintenance is not a review of the 

equities of the original judgment of dissolution. Id.; Shive, 57 Ill. App. 3d at 762. “The question 

presented, therefore is not whether that decree was correct when entered but whether [the 

petitioner’s] needs and [the respondent’s] ability to pay have increased since the decree.” Id. 

Accordingly, a trial court is to consider only the facts that occurred since the last maintenance 

hearing and consider a substantial change in circumstances since that date. Anderson, 409 Ill. 

App. 3d at 198-99. 

¶ 49 The trial court stated in its written order that while Rena’s $10,000 monthly maintenance 

was agreed to in the marital settlement agreement, “Rena testified that she thought she needed to 

agree to less maintenance in order to get divorced from Jesse” and “[n]ow that this matter has 

been litigated and evidence adduced, it is clear to this Court that Rena agreed to an original 

maintenance amount that was inadequate.” It is evident to this court that the trial court made this 
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statement in response to Jesse’s argument that “Rena’s prior living expenses could not have been 

that high because maintenance was previously set at $11,350 which was automatically adjusted 

down to $10,000 after sale of the marital residence.” Moreover, the trial court’s 

acknowledgement that Rena “agree[d] to less maintenance in order to get divorced from Jesse” 

was testimony elicited from Rena on cross-examination after Jesse’s counsel asked her about the 

reasons she agreed to the original maintenance amount. As Jesse was the one who encouraged 

the trial court to address these arguments, he cannot now complain of error which he injected 

into the case. See In re Marriage of Eastburg, 2016 IL App (3d) 150710, ¶ 14. Indeed, our 

review of the record reveals that the trial court did not consider the original maintenance amount 

in rendering its ultimate determination, but instead focused on the evidence presented and 

weighed the statutory factors accordingly. 

¶ 50 Jesse further contends that the trial court’s finding that Rena had an increased tax burden 

was against the manifest weight of the evidence where the court did not consider the Tax Reform 

Act of 2018 and failed to indicate a specific tax amount. Rena maintains that Jesse failed to raise 

the argument regarding the Tax Reform Act of 2018 before the trial court and therefore 

maintains we should not consider it. We agree with Rena. Jesse failed to raise this argument 

before the trial court and therefore we find it to be forfeited on appeal. See In re Marriage of 

Schneeweis, 2016 IL App (2d) 140147, ¶ 46 (citing Hytel Group, Inc. v. Butler, 405 Ill. App. 3d 

113, 127 (2010) (“A reviewing court will not consider arguments not presented to the trial 

court.”)). We will, however, consider Jesse’s argument that the trial court awarded an “unknown 

sum” to account for Rena’s taxes. 

¶ 51 We disagree with Jesse’s assessment that the trial court awarded an “unknown sum” for 

Rena’s taxes. The trial court was presented with testimony and evidence that Rena’s estimated 
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2018 federal tax payment would be $26,500 or $2208 per month. When one subtracts the 

amount of Rena’s monthly living expenses ($15,106) from the final maintenance amount 

awarded ($17,300) there is a difference of $2194. It is thus apparent that the $2194 accounts for 

the payment of Rena’s federal taxes. We find no error in the trial court’s failure to delineate the 

amount of maintenance that would go toward Rena’s taxes. 

¶ 52 Jesse further asserts that the trial court erred in “assuming some unsubstantiated rate of 

inflation as definitively increasing Rena’s expenses in some unknown sum.” We disagree with 

Jesse’s argument that the trial court’s consideration of inflation was improper. It is wellestablished that the trial court may take judicial notice of inflation. See In re Marriage of Krupp, 

207 Ill. App. 3d 779, 794 (1990); Shive, 57 Ill. App. 3d at 761. In any event, the trial court did 

not solely increase Rena’s maintenance award based on inflation, but on the evidence of a 

change in her reasonable needs. Indeed, the trial court did not even include inflation as a 

separate calculation when determining the amount of Rena’s maintenance, but instead articulated 

each living expense, determined whether it was reasonable or not, and modified the amount 

accordingly. It is apparent to this court, based on the record before it, that the trial court 

appropriately calculated the amount of maintenance.

¶ 53 Relying on In re Marriage of Rogers, 213 Ill. 2d 129 (2004), and In re Marriage of Brill, 

2017 IL App (2d) 160604, Jesse lastly contends that the trial court failed to consider the funds 

Terry expended while going on dates and vacations with Rena as an additional source of Rena’s 

income. Jesse asserts that Rena has been the beneficiary of Terry’s “largesse” for over seven 

years and that these “frequent periodic gifts” should count as income available for Rena’s 

expenses under the Act. 

¶ 54 In response, Rena argues that Jesse provides no basis to expand the application of Rogers 
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and Brill to a boyfriend’s “largesse.” Rena maintains that these authorities are inapplicable to 

the situation here, namely Rena’s long-term boyfriend paying when they go on dates. 

¶ 55 Gross income, for maintenance purposes, is defined in section 504 of the Act as “all 

income from all sources, within the scope of that phrase in Section 505 of this Act. 750 ILCS 

5/504(b-3) (West 2016). Section 505 of the Act, which addresses child support, defines “net 

income” as “the total of all income from all sources,” with specific deductions not at issue here. 

750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3) (West 2016). In Rogers, our supreme court engaged in statutory 

interpretation of the term “net income” as it appears in section 505 of the Act. Interpreting “net 

income,” the Rogers court observed that the General Assembly had adopted “an expansive 

definition” and that “net income” is “defined broadly to encompass ‘the total of all income from 

all sources,’ minus deductions for state and federal income tax, social security (FICA payments), 

mandatory retirement contributions, union dues, dependent and individual health/hospitalization 

insurance premiums, prior obligations of support or maintenance actually paid pursuant to court 

order, and expenditures for repayment of debts incurred for certain purposes.” Rogers, 

213 Ill. 2d at 136 (quoting 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3) (West 2002)). The Rogers court then turned to 

examine the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “income”: “As the word itself suggests, 

‘income’ is simply ‘something that comes in as an increment or addition ***; a gain or recurrent 

benefit that is usu[ally] measured in money ***: the value of goods and services received by an 

individual in a given period of time.” Id. It has further been defined as “ ‘[t]he money or other 

form of payment that one receives, usu[ally] periodically, from employment, business, 

investments, royalties, gifts and the like.’ ” Id. at 137 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 778 (8th 

ed. 2004). 

¶ 56 The source of the additional income in Rogers, however, is significantly different from 
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the source of Rena’s alleged “income” in this case. Rogers involved a determination of whether 

$46,000 in annual gifts the former husband received from his parents on a frequent and regular 

basis were to be considered as part of his income for the purposes of determining his child 

support obligation. Rogers, 213 Ill. 2d at 137. Notably, the former husband testified that the 

gifts and loans from his family represented a “steady source of dependable annual income” that 

he “has received each year over the course of his adult life.” Id. at 134. The former husband 

further testified that he never had to repay any portion of those sums, nor had he been required to 

pay tax on them. Id. Similarly, Brill involved a determination of whether $15,349 of financial 

assistance the former wife received from her parents justified the reduction of the duration of her 

maintenance award from 270 to 96 months. Brill, 2017 IL App (2d) 160604, ¶ 33. Neither of 

these cases expressly considered the issue raised by Jesse; namely, whether the funds expended 

by a boyfriend when taking a former wife on a date or on a vacation should be imputed as 

income to the former wife. 

¶ 57 Under the facts of this case, we take serious issue with Jesse’s argument that Rena’s 

dating relationship can amount to income for maintenance purposes as it inappropriately implies

that she engages in such a dating relationship to receive an economic benefit. This case, 

however, does not provide us with the proper set of facts on which we can opine regarding 

whether funds expended by a paramour on a former spouse should be considered as “income” 

under the Act for the purpose of modifying maintenance. The evidence presented at trial 

demonstrated that Rena and Terry took turns paying for meals, split costs when going on 

vacation together, and generally did not engage in gift giving aside from an occasional birthday 

present. While Jesse points to a portion of Terry’s testimony wherein he stated, “I generally pay 

when I go out on a date or have gone out on dates,” we find this testimony was not specific to his 
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interaction with Rena. This is evidenced by the fact that, immediately following this response, 

Terry testified that he and Rena “generally take turns” paying for dates. Moreover, Rena 

clarified Terry’s testimony when she testified that “[e]arly on in our dating he paid more” but as 

they became more comfortable with each other she began paying. According to Rena, Terry was 

“in shock” when she suggested she pay. She explained, “I sort of started picking up because, 

you know, you’re talking about somebody who’s 67 years old now. And he’s close to 70. And 

we all grew up where the guy would pay. And it’s a big change for me and for him.” Rena did 

acknowledge, however, that Terry “probably pays a little bit more than I do.” Terry further 

testified that when they went on vacations “[w]e usually split different things. Sometimes she’ll 

pay for the hotel, I’ll pay for airfare. *** I’ll pay for some food. She’ll pay for some food. We 

just kind of split it.” Accordingly, where, as here, a party is involved in a social relationship with 

another person that involves sharing the responsibility of payment for their social outings, it 

cannot be said that any “income” as contemplated by the Act is generated. 

¶ 58 In sum, it is evident from the record that the trial court considered and weighed all of the 

factors set forth in sections 510(a-5) and 504 of the Act and determined that Rena met her burden 

to warrant an increased modification in the permanent maintenance award. Our review of the 

record demonstrates that the trial court’s analysis was reasonably based on the evidence 

presented and it did not abuse its discretion in concluding that her needs had materially changed 

since the initial decree. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

¶ 59 CONCLUSION

¶ 60 For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is 

affirmed.

¶ 61 Affirmed.