GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Special 

Committee on the Year 2000 Technology 

Problem, U.S. Senate

October 1999 CRITICAL 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

PROTECTION

Comprehensive 

Strategy Can Draw on 

Year 2000 Experiences

GAO/AIMD-00-1

Page 1 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

Contents

Letter 3

Appedixes Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 30

Appendix II: GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing 

Information Security Issues Since February 1996 32

Appendix III: GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing the 

Year 2000 Challenge 36

Appendix IV: Risks to Computer-Supported Operations 48

Appendix V: Examples of Information Security Weaknesses 

Reported by GAO for Federal Agencies During Fiscal Year 

1999 50

Figure Figure 1: Risks to Computer-Based Operations 7

Abbreviations

CIO Chief Information Officer

DOD Department of Defense

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FISCAM Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual

ICC Information Coordination Center

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NCS National Communications Systems

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

NIPC National Infrastructure Protection Center

NSA National Security Agency

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OPM Office of Personnel Management

PDD Presidential Decision Directive
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United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Accounting and Information

Management Division

B-283617 Leter

October 1, 1999

The Honorable Robert F. Bennett

Chairman

Special Committee on the Year 2000

 Technology Problem

United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Since the early 1990s, an explosion in computer interconnectivity, most 

notably growth in use of the Internet, has revolutionized the way our 

government, our nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct 

business. The benefits have been enormous. Vast amounts of information 

are now literally at our fingertips, facilitating research on virtually every 

topic imaginable; financial and other business transactions can be 

executed almost instantaneously, often on a 24-hour-a-day basis; and 

electronic mail, Internet websites, and computer bulletin boards allow us 

to communicate quickly and easily with a virtually unlimited number of 

other individuals and groups. However, in addition to its benefits, this 

widespread interconnectivity poses enormous risks to our computer 

systems and, more importantly, to the critical operations and 

infrastructures they support, such as telecommunications; power 

distribution; national defense, including the military’s warfighting 

capability; law enforcement; government services; and emergency services. 

Recent efforts to address the Year 2000 computing problem have called 

attention to some important aspects of these risks. In particular, the Year 

2000 problem has highlighted computer-based interdependencies and the 

vulnerability of these systems to disruption. It also has underscored the 

need to develop awareness, cooperation, and a disciplined management 

approach to adequately address such problems. In many ways, the Year 

2000 challenge can be viewed as a major test of our nation’s ability to 

protect its computer-supported critical infrastructures; although, 

protecting critical infrastructures from hostile attacks on a continuous 

basis will require addressing a much broader array of issues. 

This report responds to your request that we (1) summarize our recent 

findings on computer security and critical infrastructure protection and

(2) identify preliminary lessons learned from the Year 2000 date conversion 
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experience that can benefit critical infrastructure protection efforts. It is 

based both on reports we issued during 1997 and 1998 and the first 9 

months of 1999 and on recent discussions with key officials involved in the 

Year 2000 conversion efforts and critical infrastructure protection. 

Appendix I contains a more detailed description of our objectives, scope, 

and methodology. Appendix II lists our reports and testimonies that 

address information security, and appendix III lists our reports and 

testimonies that address the Year 2000 challenge.

Results in Brief Our nation’s computer-based critical infrastructures are at increasing risk 

of severe disruption. Interconnectivity increases the risk that problems 

affecting one system will also affect other interconnected systems. Massive 

computer networks provide pathways among systems that, if not properly 

secured, can be used to gain unauthorized access to data and operations 

from remote locations. While the threats or sources of these problems can 

include natural disasters, such as earthquakes, and system-induced 

problems, such as the Year 2000 date conversion problem, government 

officials are increasingly concerned about attacks from individuals and 

groups with malicious intentions, such as terrorists and nations engaging in 

information warfare.

The resultant damage can vary, depending on the threat. Critical system 

operations can be disrupted or otherwise sabotaged, sensitive data can be 

read and copied, and data or processes can be tampered with. A significant 

concern is that terrorists or hostile foreign states could launch computerbased attacks on critical systems, such as those supporting energy 

distribution, telecommunications, and financial services, to severely 

damage or disrupt our national defense or other operations, resulting in 

harm to the public welfare. Understanding these risks to our computerbased critical infrastructures and determining how best to mitigate them 

are major information security challenges.
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The need to strengthen computer security in both government and the 

private sector has been recognized over the past few years by a number of 

entities, and several initial steps have been taken to address the problem. 

Since 1994, we have issued dozens of reports on individual agency 

computer security weaknesses and made scores of related 

recommendations. In September 1996, we reported that poor information 

security was a widespread federal problem.1

 Subsequently, in February 

1997, in a series of reports to the Congress, we designated information 

security as a new governmentwide high-risk area.2

During 1996 and 1997, federal information security was addressed by the 

President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, which had 

been established to investigate our nation’s vulnerability to both “cyber” 

and physical threats. In its October 1997 report, Critical Foundations: 

Protecting America’s Infrastructures, the Commission described the 

potentially devastating implications of poor information security from a 

national perspective. These efforts were supplemented in late 1997 when 

the federal Chief Information Officers (CIO) Council designated 

information security as one of six priority areas and established a Security 

Committee, which has taken steps to promote awareness, improve agency 

access to incident response services, and support agency improvement 

efforts. 

In May 1998, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63 recognized that 

addressing computer-based risks to our nation’s critical infrastructures 

requires a new approach that involves coordination and cooperation across 

federal agencies and among public and private-sector entities and other 

nations. PDD 63 created several new entities for developing and 

implementing a strategy for critical infrastructure protection. In addition, it 

tasked federal agencies with developing critical infrastructure protection 

plans and establishing related links with private industry sectors. Since 

then, a variety of activities have been undertaken, including development 

and review of individual agency’s critical infrastructure protection plans, 

identification and evaluation of information security standards and best 

practices, and efforts to build communication links with the private sector. 

However, the details of an approach for implementing PDD 63 are still 

1

Information Security: Opportunities for Improved OMB Oversight of Agency Practices

(GAO/AIMD-96-110, September 24, 1996).

2

High Risk Series: Information Management and Technology (GAO/HR-97-9, February 1997).
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being developed. In particular, the first version of a key element called for 

in PDD 63—development of a national plan for critical infrastructure 

protection—has not been completed. As a result, it is not clear how the 

activities undertaken to date interrelate and whether they will effectively 

and efficiently support national goals. As of late August, those involved in 

developing the plan expected it to be issued in late October of this year.

As the plan is finalized and discussed, a number of issues will need to be 

resolved, including those regarding the federal government’s role in critical 

infrastructure protection and how best to balance potentially competing 

demands for security versus privacy. Many of these issues are different 

from those associated with the Year 2000 challenge. However, it is 

important that our government take advantage of the experience it has 

gained and is continuing to gain in addressing the Year 2000 challenge as it 

strives to reduce the risk associated with longer-term threats to our critical 

infrastructures. Although it is too early to identify a comprehensive set of 

lessons learned, some factors provide preliminary insights into the 

challenge ahead. In particular, the Year 2000 experience has provided a 

foundation for improvement and has already clearly shown the value of 

• high-level congressional and executive branch leadership,

• understanding risks to computer-supported operations,

• providing adequate technical expertise, 

• providing standard guidance,

• establishing public-private sector relationships,

• facilitating progress and monitoring performance,

• developing an incident identification and coordination capability, and

• implementing fundamental information technology management 

improvements.

Risks to ComputerDependent Operations 

Are Substantial

The risks associated with our nation’s reliance on interconnected computer 

systems are substantial and varied. The Year 2000 challenge has vividly 

illustrated the risks posed by a widespread system-induced computing 

problem. However, numerous other threats will continue to pose risks long 

after the Year 2000 problem has been resolved. Some, similar to the Year 

2000 problem, could cause severe disruption, while others more directly 

threaten the confidentiality or integrity of data. The following diagram 

provides an overview of the various types of risks. A more detailed 

description, based on a list compiled by the National Institute of Standards 

and Technology (NIST), is in appendix IV. 
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Figure 1: Risks to Computer-Based Operations

Threats

Hostile

States

Spies/

Snoops User

Error

Natural 

Disasters Pranksters

Saboteurs

Potential Damage

Sensitive

Data 

Disclosed Consumer 

& Taxpayer

Confidence

Lost

Critical

Operations

Halted

Services &

Benefits 

Interrupted

Assets

Lost

Integrity of 

Data & Reports

Corrupted

Systems Supporting Critical Operations

Terrorists Fraud

Criminals
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While complete summary data are not available because many computer 

security incidents are not reported, the number of incidents is clearly 

growing. For example, the number of reported incidents handled by 

Carnegie-Mellon University’s CERT Coordination Center3

 has increased 

from 1,334 in 1993 to 4,398 during the first two quarters of 1999. Similarly, 

the fourth annual survey conducted by the Computer Security Institute in 

cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) showed an 

increase in computer system intrusions for the third year in a row. In 1999, 

30 percent of 521 respondents from both the private and public sectors 

reported such attacks.4

Many incidents appear to be unrelated and result in relatively limited 

damage. However, a widespread, well-organized attack could severely 

disrupt or damage critical systems that are essential to our national 

defense, economic prosperity, and quality of life. 

In the federal government, these risks are not being adequately addressed. 

Tests and evaluations of federal systems show that these systems are not 

being effectively protected, even though they process, store, and transmit 

enormous amounts of sensitive data and are indispensable to many federal 

agency operations.

Even greater concerns have been raised about the security of private sector 

systems, which control most of our nation’s critical infrastructures, such as 

energy, telecommunications, financial services, transportation, and vital 

human services. Virtually all U.S. residents and businesses rely on these 

infrastructures, including government operations. One cause of concern is 

that although there are numerous reports of individual system intrusions 

and failures, there is little summary information that can be used to more 

accurately estimate the risk. Few reports are publicly available about the 

effectiveness of controls over privately controlled systems, and private 

entities are reluctant to disclose known problems or vulnerabilities that 

3

Originally called the Computer Emergency Response Team, the center was established in 

1988 by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. It is charged with (1) establishing 

a capability to quickly and effectively coordinate communication among experts in order to 

limit the damage associated with, and respond to, incidents and (2) building awareness of 

security issues across the Internet community.

4

Issues and Trends: 1999 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, announced

March 1999. 
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might weaken their competitive positions or diminish customer confidence 

in their services or products. 

In order to determine adequate levels of protection to safeguard our critical 

infrastructures, it will be important to gain a more thorough understanding 

of the related risks. This will be an ongoing effort due to fast-paced changes 

in computer technology and in the tools and techniques available to wouldbe intruders. As these risks are assessed, it will be important to consider 

that the computer security improvements that would guard against 

purposeful, hostile attacks on critical infrastructures could also provide 

other benefits that would allow our nation and others to take further 

advantage of computer technology. In particular, improved security would 

provide businesses and individuals greater confidence in the integrity and 

confidentiality of computerized information. Such confidence would be 

likely to increase people’s willingness to engage in electronic commerce 

and have confidential data, such as financial and medical records, 

maintained and transmitted electronically. 

Risks to Federal Operations Federal operations, such as national defense, tax collection, law 

enforcement, air traffic control, and benefit payments are at risk of 

disruption, as well as fraud and inappropriate disclosures, due to a variety 

of security weaknesses associated with the computers on which such 

operations depend. Organized attacks, such as the “Solar Sunrise” attack 

on Department of Defense (DOD) and other computers in early 1998, and 

widespread computer virus infections, such as the Melissa virus in early 

1999, illustrate our government’s susceptibility to malicious computerbased actions. 

According to the DOD, Solar Sunrise was a series of attacks during 

February 1998 that targeted its servers by exploiting a well-known 

vulnerability in the Solaris operating system. The attacks were widespread 

and systematic and showed a pattern that indicated they might be the 

preparation for a coordinated attack on DOD’s information infrastructure. 

They were of particular concern because they targeted key parts of DOD’s 

networks at a time when it was preparing for possible military operations 

against Iraq. As we testified in April 1999,5

 the Melissa virus affected 

Microsoft word processing software. Although the Melissa virus disrupted 

5

Information Security: The Melissa Computer Virus Demonstrates Urgent Need for Stronger 

Protection Over Systems and Sensitive Data (GAO/T-AIMD-99-146, April 15, 1999).
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operations at thousands of companies and some government agencies, it 

reportedly did not compromise sensitive government data. However, it 

illustrated the speed with which malicious software can spread in today’s 

interconnected computing environment.

Audit reports we and agency inspectors general issued during fiscal year 

1999 show that 22 of the largest federal agencies have significant computer 

security weaknesses—which closely mirrors a finding we reported in 

September 1998.6

 Reports we issued during the past year describe risks to 

operations and assets at the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration and the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, and Treasury. 

Appendix V provides more detailed descriptions of these weaknesses.

These recent reports supplement a body of evidence on federal computer 

security problems at individual agencies that we have compiled since 1996. 

These reports have provided scores of recommendations for improvement. 

In addition, we have issued several summary reports that provide a more 

comprehensive view of the problem and illustrate the need for concerted 

improvement efforts. 

• In September 1996, we reported that since September 1994, serious 

weaknesses had been reported for 10 of the largest 15 federal agencies.7

In that report we concluded that poor information security was a 

widespread federal problem with potentially devastating consequences, 

and we recommended that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

play a more proactive role in overseeing agency practices and managing 

improvements.

• In February 1997 and again in January 1999, our reports to the Congress 

designated information security as a governmentwide high-risk area.8 

6

Information Security: Serious Weaknesses Place Critical Federal Operations and Assets at 

Risk (GAO/AIMD-98-92, September 23, 1998).

7

Information Security: Opportunities for Improved OMB Oversight of Agency Practices

(GAO/AIMD-96-110, September 24, 1996).

8

High Risk Series: Information Management and Technology (GAO/HR-97-9, February 1997) 

and High Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-99-1, January 1999).
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• In our March 1998 and March 1999 reports on the federal government’s 

consolidated financial statements, we reported that widespread and 

serious computer control weaknesses place enormous amounts of 

federal assets at risk of fraud and misuse, financial data at risk of 

unauthorized modification or destruction, sensitive information at risk 

of inappropriate disclosure, and critical operations at risk of disruption.9

• In September 1998, we reported that critical federal operations were at 

risk of disruption, fraud, and inappropriate disclosure due to 

weaknesses in every major federal agency.10

In both our September 1996 and September 1998 reports and in testimony 

before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs in September 1998,11

we concluded that an underlying cause of weak information security at 

federal agencies was that agency officials had not instituted a basic cycle of 

management procedures for ensuring that risks are fully understood and 

that controls implemented to mitigate risks are effective.12 Our subsequent 

audits have continued to support this conclusion. In particular, many 

agencies are not adequately (1) assessing risks, (2) using the results of such 

assessments to select controls, (3) promoting awareness, (4) evaluating 

control effectiveness, and (5) coordinating their security program through 

a central agency focal point. 

Our September 1996 and September 1998 reports also concluded that more 

effective actions were needed at the governmentwide level. In September 

1998, we recognized efforts by OMB, NIST, the federal Chief Information 

Officers (CIO) Council, and the then newly initiated critical infrastructure 

protection efforts called for by PDD 63, but we also stated that a 

comprehensive governmentwide strategy was needed. We noted that the 

new entities and responsibilities prescribed by PDD 63 supplemented 

existing security requirements prescribed in the Paperwork Reduction Act 

of 1980, OMB Circular A-130, Appendix III, the Computer Security Act, the 

9

Financial Audit: 1997 Consolidated Financial Statements of the United States Government

(GAO/AIMD-98-127, March 31, 1998) and Financial Audit: 1998 Financial Statements of the 

United States Government (GAO/AIMD-99-130, March 31, 1999).

10Information Security: Serious Weaknesses Place Critical Federal Operations and Assets at 

Risk (GAO/AIMD-98-92, September 23, 1998).

11Information Security: Strengthened Management Needed to Protect Critical Federal 

Operations and Assets (GAO/T-AIMD-98-312, September 23, 1998).

12See footnotes 6 and 7, respectively.
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Clinger-Cohen Act, and the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act, as 

well as information security initiatives underway at organizations such as 

the CIO Council. We said that many of the existing organizations and those 

created by PDD 63 appeared to have overlapping objectives and that, 

accordingly, it was especially important that a governmentwide strategy be 

developed that clearly defined and coordinated the roles of new and 

existing federal entities in order to avoid inappropriate duplication of effort 

and ensure governmentwide cooperation and support. 

Specifically, we recommended that the Director of OMB and the Assistant 

to the President for National Security Affairs ensure that the various 

existing and newly initiated efforts to improve federal information security 

are coordinated under a comprehensive strategy. We suggested that such a 

strategy 

• ensure that executive agencies are carrying out the responsibilities 

outlined in laws and regulations requiring them to protect the security of 

their information resources;

• clearly delineate the roles of the various federal organizations with 

responsibilities related to information security;

• identify and rank the most significant information security issues facing 

federal agencies;

• promote information security risk awareness among senior agency 

officials whose critical operations rely on automated systems;

• identify and promote proven security tools, techniques, and 

management best practices;

• ensure the adequacy of information technology workforce skills;

• ensure that the security of both financial and nonfinancial systems is 

adequately evaluated on a regular basis;

• include long-term goals and objectives, including time frames, priorities, 

and annual performance goals; and

• provide for periodically evaluating agency performance from a 

governmentwide perspective and acting to address shortfalls.

In November 1998, key officials in OMB, the National Security Council, the 

FBI, the CIO Council, and the Year 2000 Office held a joint meeting and 

assured us that they were coordinating their efforts. Since then, we have 

observed many instances of cooperation and joint efforts. However, a 

strategy for improving federal information security has not yet been clearly 

articulated.
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Broader Risks to Critical 

Infrastructures

While the federal government has traditionally focused on the security of 

its own systems, there has been a growing realization in recent years that 

our national welfare, including government services and national defense, 

depends to a large extent on systems supporting privately controlled 

infrastructures. This concern has been emphasized by the Year 2000 

challenge as many agencies and private-sector organizations have been 

forced to recognize their dependence on computer systems beyond their 

span of control. Over the past few years, such risks and the need to adjust 

the way we view and protect our nation’s information systems have been 

described in a variety of reports and testimonies before the Congress. The 

following chronology provides an overview of this growing concern.

• A 1994 Joint Security Commission report warned that computer 

networks are “a battlefield of the future” and that the risk was not 

limited to military systems. According to the Commission, if an enemy 

attacked our unprotected civilian infrastructure (for example, the public 

telephone system), the economic and other results could be 

disastrous.13 

• In 1996, the Director of Central Intelligence stated that there is evidence 

that “a number of countries are developing the doctrine, strategies, and 

tools to conduct information attacks” and that “international terrorists 

groups clearly have the capability to attack the information 

infrastructure of the United States.” The Director’s greatest concern was 

that hackers, terrorists, or other nations could use information warfare 

techniques as part of a coordinated attack to seriously disrupt electric 

power distribution, air traffic control, or financial sectors.14

• In October 1997, the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 

Protection issued a comprehensive report on our nation’s computerrelated vulnerabilities that described the potentially devastating 

implications of poor information security from a national perspective.15

13Redefining Security, A Report to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central 

Intelligence from the Joint Security Commission, February 28, 1994.

14Statement for the Record by the Director of Central Intelligence to the U.S. Senate 

Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, “Foreign 

Information Warfare Programs and Capabilities,” June 25, 1996.

15Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures, The Report of the President’s 

Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, October 1997.
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• In March 1998, the Chief of the National Infrastructure Protection 

Center (NIPC), Federal Bureau of Investigation, testified that 

“transnational criminals are rapidly becoming aware of and exploiting 

the power of cyber tools” and that recent computer crimes illustrate 

“the growing problem of cyber crime, the international dimension of the 

problem, and the increasing threat to our critical infrastructure.” 

According to the Chief, one example that illustrates the growing 

problem is the 1994 case where foreign crime groups hacked into a 

major financial service company’s cash management system and 

attempted transfers totaling $10 million.16

• In releasing a December 1998 report on “cyberwarfare” and crime 

prepared by a panel of current and former U.S. national security 

officials, former FBI and Central Intelligence Agency Director William 

Webster stated that “it is time for us to recognize that we have a range of 

enemies today, not only military enemies, but criminals and terrorists 

and others who have the same capabilities to do major damage to the 

infrastructure upon which we all depend.”17

• In May 1998, the President, through PDD 63, directed that a national 

plan on infrastructure protection be developed and addressed a range of 

other infrastructure protection issues.

• In June 1998 and in February 1999, the Director for Central Intelligence 

testified that several nations recognize that cyber attacks against 

civilian computer systems represent an option they could use to “level 

the playing field” during an armed crisis against the United States, and 

they are developing information warfare capabilities. He added that 

terrorists and others were beginning to recognize that information 

warfare offers them “low cost, easily hidden tools to support their 

causes.”18

16Statement for the Record, Deputy Assistant Director and Chief, National Infrastructure 

Protection Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Congressional Joint 

Economic Committee, March 24, 1998.

17Cybercrime, Cyberterrorism, and Cyberwarfare: Averting an Electronic Waterloo, The 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 15, 1999.

18Testimony by Director for Central Intelligence before the Senate Committee on 

Governmental Affairs, June 24, 1998, and before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 

February 2, 1999.
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• In March 1999, the National Communications Systems (NCS), an 

interagency committee formed to examine communication networks 

and institute change, reported that adversaries could disrupt, disable, or 

collect sensitive data through coordinated attacks on U.S. computer 

systems and that organized crime groups are targeting such systems to 

commit fraud, acquire and exploit proprietary information, and steal 

funds and securities transmitted through electronic commerce 

systems.”19

These reports and statements have focused attention on the issues 

associated with infrastructure protection, particularly vulnerabilities to 

critical operations and our national defense. They have also prompted the 

start of a national debate regarding the appropriate mix of public and 

private actions and types of mechanisms needed to better define and 

address these risks.

Critical Infrastructure 

Protection Requires a 

New Approach

As the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 

recognized in its October 1997 report, mitigating the shared risks resulting 

from our computer-based interdependencies will require shared, or jointly 

developed, solutions. Just as it is no longer satisfactory for individual 

organizations to address their computer security risks solely on a systemby-system basis, neither can individual organizations fully protect their 

operations without considering risks associated with systems they use or 

depend on that are controlled by others. Such systems can include those of 

business partners, public utilities, and government entities—in essence, 

any system on which an organization relies for essential services, 

information, or business transactions. 

In response to the Commission’s report, the executive branch initiated 

efforts to implement a cooperative public-private approach to protecting 

our critical infrastructures by issuing PDD 63 in May 1998. PDD 63 calls for 

a range of actions intended to improve federal agency security programs, 

establish a partnership between the government and the private sector, and 

improve our nation’s ability to detect and respond to serious attacks. As 

described previously, to accomplish these goals, the directive

(1) established a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure 

19The Electronic Intrusion Threat to National Security and Emergency Preparedness 

(NS/EP) Telecommunications: An Awareness Document, Third Edition, National 

Communications System, March 1999.
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Protection and Counter-Terrorism who is to report to the President through 

the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and (2) created 

new entities within the Department of Commerce and the FBI. In addition, 

it assigned agencies new responsibilities for coordinating with industry 

sectors and developing critical infrastructure protection plans.

A central requirement of PDD 63 is development of a National 

Infrastructure Assurance Plan. As of late August 1999, officials involved in 

developing the plan estimated that it would be issued in late October 1999. 

Such a plan is important because it can provide a roadmap to guide the 

activities of the many federal entities involved in critical infrastructure 

protection. In particular the plan can provide for 

• defining and ranking risks to help ensure that attention and resources 

are focused on reducing the most significant vulnerabilities,

• designating roles and responsibilities,

• developing a plan of action for addressing the most significant risks 

first, and 

• monitoring progress and measuring performance.

Defining and Ranking Risks PDD 63 identified industry sectors and federal agencies that are important 

to critical infrastructure protection. However, a more detailed analysis is 

needed to determine the greatest specific risks, the most critical systems 

and interdependencies, and the improvement efforts that merit the earliest 

and greatest attention. Such an analysis and identification of risk needs to 

be done within individual organizations and agencies as well as across 

industry groups and government agencies in order to identify critical 

interdependencies. Without a prioritized lists of such factors, or a plan for 

developing such information, it will not be possible to determine what 

protective actions are needed and which should be undertaken first. 

Designating Roles and 

Responsibilities

Many agencies have responsibilities related to computer security that 

overlap somewhat with new critical infrastructure protection initiatives. 

For example, under current laws, federal agencies are primarily 

responsible for adequately securing their own operations, OMB is 

responsible for overseeing and coordinating federal agency security, and 

NIST with assistance from the National Security Agency (NSA) is 

responsible for establishing related standards. In addition, since its 

establishment in 1996, the CIO Council has undertaken activities in this 

area. It is important that the roles of these organizations as they relate to 
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critical infrastructure protection be well defined and coordinated with 

those of newer entities established by PDD 63 within the National Security 

Council, the Department of Commerce, and the FBI.

Developing a Plan of Action Once specific risks and interdependencies have been identified and ranked, 

an action plan can be developed to address them. To be most effective, 

such a plan should define specific objectives, estimate needed resources, 

and provide a schedule of activities.

During the 15 months since PDD 63’s issuance, a variety of activities have 

begun. Twenty-one federal agencies, identified as the most important to 

critical infrastructure protection, have submitted critical infrastructure 

protection plans and received at least one round of comments from an 

expert review team managed by the Critical Infrastructure Assurance 

Office, which was established by PDD 63 in the Department of Commerce. 

In addition, the General Services Administration, OMB, the CIO Council, 

NIST, and others have either engaged in cooperative efforts with the 

entities established by PDD 63 or reoriented or supplemented ongoing 

activities to support PDD 63 goals. Examples include the following: 

• The CIO Council’s security committee created a sub-group for providing 

input on critical infrastructure protection efforts.

• The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office is assisting in establishing 

the Information Coordination Center, which will monitor events 

surrounding January 1, 2000. 

• NIST and NSA are leading an effort to identify and evaluate standards 

and best practices for information security.

• The FBI established the National Infrastructure Protection Center, in 

1998, to facilitate and coordinate the federal government’s investigation 

and response to attacks on critical infrastructures.

However, these efforts are not yet being coordinated under a 

comprehensive plan. As a result, there is a risk that these efforts will be 

unfocused, inefficient, and ineffective. For example, the CIO Council 

Security Committee and a recently established working group both have 

efforts underway to identify standards and best practices that could 

improve federal agency efforts. While such efforts are generally laudable, it 

is unclear how the guidance that may result from them will relate to 

guidance issued by NIST and policies issued by OMB, two organizations 

that have statutory responsibilities in these areas.
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Monitoring Progress and 

Measuring Performance

Once a plan of action has been developed and agreed on, it must be 

implemented. Ensuring effective implementation will require monitoring 

and evaluation to determine if milestones are being met and testing to 

determine if measures to protect critical infrastructures are operating as 

intended. 

Evaluations at several levels can be beneficial. A program to periodically 

test and evaluate agency controls would provide agency managers with the 

information they need to determine if controls are operating effectively on 

an ongoing basis and whether adjustments to agency policies and 

procedures are needed. Evaluations by agency inspectors general or 

outside auditors can serve as an independent check on management 

evaluations. However, the emphasis should be on evaluations initiated by 

management, since computer security is a fundamental, ongoing 

management responsibility. Summary evaluations performed by entities 

such as OMB, GAO, or the CIO Council can provide a governmentwide view 

of progress and help identify crosscutting problems. 

Year 2000 Efforts 

Provide Important 

Insights for Critical 

Infrastructure 

Protection

While the challenge of protecting our critical infrastructures is different in 

many ways from addressing the Year 2000 challenge, there are significant 

similarities. Critical infrastructure protection will raise many issues beyond 

those raised in addressing the Year 2000 problem, such as those pertaining 

to the role of government in ensuring protection of privately controlled 

infrastructures and how best to balance security needs with business and 

individual privacy. However, both challenges involve threats to critical 

computer-dependent operations, and both require actions by and 

cooperation among public and private sector entities. 

While it is too early to comprehensively identify lessons learned from the 

Year 2000 conversion efforts, we identified a number of factors from the 

Year 2000 experience that are relevant to longer term critical infrastructure 

protection and provide insights into the challenges ahead. In some areas, 

the Year 2000 problem has laid a foundation for longer term improvements 

in the way we view, manage, and protect computer systems supporting our 

nation’s critical infrastructures. These areas include 

• providing high-level congressional and executive branch leadership,

• understanding risks to computer-supported operations,

• providing adequate technical expertise, 

• providing standard guidance,
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• establishing public-private sector relationships,

• facilitating progress and monitoring performance,

• developing an incident identification and coordination capability, and

• implementing fundamental information technology management 

improvements.

These factors, which are discussed below, should be considered when 

developing a national strategy for critical infrastructure protection.

Providing Congressional 

and Executive Branch 

Leadership

One of the most important factors in prompting attention and action on the 

Year 2000 problem has been proactive leadership at the highest levels of 

government. In February 1998, the President signed an executive order 

establishing the President’s Council on Year 2000 Conversion, chaired by an 

Assistant to the President and consisting of one representative from each 

of the executive departments and from other federal agencies as may be 

determined by the chair. The Council has focused attention on the problem 

and provided a forum for high-level communication among leaders in 

government, the private sector, and the international community. A similar 

entity, the Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group, was established by 

PDD 63. However, as yet, it has not had the same level of visibility as the 

Council on Year 2000 Conversion or as broad a level of agency 

participation.

In addition to executive branch leadership, congressional leadership has 

been important in addressing the Year 2000 challenge and can serve as a 

model for long-term critical infrastructure protection. The Senate formed a 

Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem, which held 

numerous hearings on the readiness of key economic sectors, including 

power, health care, telecommunications, transportation, financial services, 

emergency services, and general business. Similarly, the House called on 

the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and 

Technology of the Committee on Government Reform and the 

Subcommittee on Technology of the Committee on Science to co-chair the 

House’s Year 2000 monitoring. These and other congressional committees 

and subcommittees have played a central role in addressing the Year 2000 

challenge by holding agencies accountable for demonstrating progress and 

by heightening public appreciation of the problem. 

Understanding Risks According to officials involved in Year 2000 conversion efforts, the Year 

2000 challenge has served as a wake-up call to many who were previously 
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unaware of our nation’s extensive dependency on computers. This new 

awareness of the importance of computer systems and of the 

vulnerabilities of these systems can serve as a basis for better 

understanding long-term risks to computer-supported critical 

infrastructures. In addition, Year 2000 efforts have forced agencies to 

identify those systems that are mission-critical.

At the governmentwide level, OMB identified 43 high-impact programs and 

designated a lead agency for each program. Each lead agency was directed 

to identify the partners integral to program delivery and take a lead role in 

convening those partners and ensuring that they had adequate Year 2000 

plans. For those without plans, agencies were to help develop a plan to 

ensure that the related program would operate effectively. 

These are important first steps for critical infrastructure protection 

because they provide organizations, industry groups, and government 

sectors a basis for helping to ensure that their most significant risks are 

addressed first. However, unlike the Year 2000 problem, critical 

infrastructure protection will be an ongoing challenge. Because risks and 

related system priorities change over time, as do the techniques for 

mitigating risks, infrastructure protection will require organizations to 

institutionalize the practices of inventorying and prioritizing their systems 

through periodic risk assessments. Our recent study of information 

security risk assessment practices at leading organizations provides 

guidance that agencies can use to develop a practical risk assessment 

program.20

20Information Security Risk Assessment: Practices of Leading Organizations (Exposure 

Draft) (GAO/AIMD-99-139, August 1999).
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Providing Adequate 

Technical Expertise

In April 1998, we noted that some agencies were reporting problems 

obtaining and retaining personnel with the technical expertise needed to 

accomplish Year 2000 conversions. Accordingly, we recommended that the 

Council for Year 2000 Conversion develop a personnel strategy that would 

include reemploying former federal employees and identifying ways to 

retain key Year 2000 staff. 21 In October 1998, we reported that several 

efforts had been undertaken to address these workforce issues.22 Some of 

these illustrate the types of creative solutions that can be considered to 

solve specific personnel problems. Others serve as a basis for further 

improvements that could benefit critical infrastructure protection, as well 

as other information technology management issues. 

To address information technology workforce shortages that agencies said 

were impeding their ability to make Year 2000 conversions, the Office of 

Personnel Management (OPM) publicized existing tools for retaining staff 

and supplemented these with additional aids. The tools that were 

publicized included 

• providing authority to reemploy federal retirees to work specifically on 

the Year 2000 conversion without the usually required reduction in the 

retiree’s salary or military annuity;

• encouraging agency heads to exercise their authority to make 

exceptions to limitations on premium pay (including overtime, night, 

and holiday pay) for employees performing emergency work to resolve 

computer system problems associated with the Year 2000 that posed a 

direct threat to life and property; 

• allowing agencies, in certain circumstances and with OPM approval, to 

exclude critical Year 2000 positions from voluntary early retirement 

programs; and

• allowing agencies to authorize a retention allowance of up to 10 percent 

of an employee’s rate of basic pay (or up to 25 percent with OPM 

approval) for a group or category of employees such as computer 

programmers and system engineers that meet certain criteria, such as 

being likely to leave federal service in the absence of the allowance. 

21Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Potential for Widespread Disruption Calls for Strong 

Leadership and Partnerships (GAO/AIMD-98-85, April 30, 1998).

22Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Status of Efforts to Deal With Personnel Issues

(GAO/AIMD/GGD-99-14, October 22, 1998).
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In addition, as we reported in October 1998, the Year 2000 Conversion 

Council took several steps to address personnel shortages from a 

nationwide perspective. These included (1) establishing an Internet site to 

link information technology workers with the companies that need them to 

solve the Year 2000 problem and (2) surveying community colleges to 

determine the effect of workforce issues on local communities.

Perhaps most importantly for the long term and prompted in part by 

concerns over technical staff shortages affecting Year 2000 efforts, the CIO 

Council, in March 1998, tasked its Education and Training committee with 

crafting recommendations for actions to help agencies recruit and retain 

information technology personnel. The final report was issued in June 

1999, generally too late to provide substantive support for the Year 2000 

efforts. However, the report provides an extensive description of the 

current status of federal information technology employment, 

improvement efforts currently underway, and detailed proposals for action 

that are associated with 13 major recommendations. In this regard, the 

report provides a useful basis for improving the federal information 

technology workforce as a whole, including that segment needed to 

support critical infrastructure protection efforts.

Providing Standard 

Guidance

Standard guidance that was universally accepted, adopted, and 

implemented has facilitated Year 2000 conversion efforts and related 

oversight. In particular, guidance issued from 1997 through 1999 by GAO, 

OMB, and the CIO Council has 

• provided a level of consistency across government by providing 

standard terms, tools, and techniques based on best practices;

• imposed structure and discipline;

• increased the rigor of testing and assessment efforts;

• promoted consistency in data gathering and reporting; and

• facilitated audit and evaluation efforts by both agency management and 

auditors.
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To help agencies mitigate their Year 2000 risks, we produced a series of 

Year 2000 guides that were adopted by OMB. The first of these, on 

enterprise readiness, provides a systematic, step-by-step approach for 

agency planning and management of its Year 2000 program. 23 The second, 

on business continuity and contingency planning, provides a structured 

approach to helping agencies ensure minimum levels of service through 

proper planning.24 Our third guide sets forth a disciplined approach to Year 

2000 testing.25 Federal agencies and other organizations have used these 

guides extensively to help organize and manage their Year 2000 programs. 

In addition, an interagency working group (which later evolved into the 

CIO Council’s Year 2000 Committee) developed a best practices guide for 

Year 2000 conversion and made it available on the World Wide Web.

Similar guides could be developed for critical infrastructure protection. 

These could be based to a large extent on existing guides pertaining to 

various aspects of computer security. For example, since May 1998, we 

have issued two guides on information security management and risk 

assessment practices that can be applied to critical infrastructure 

protection as well as a broader range of information security risks.

In addition, since May 1997, OMB has provided agencies with instructions 

on reporting on their quarterly Year 2000 progress. These instructions 

covered items such as Year 2000 remediation progress, data exchanges, and 

costs. OMB periodically updated these instructions to request that agencies 

provide additional information on key topics such as verification actions or 

to clarify existing reporting requirements. 

Establishing Public-Private 

Sector Relationships

Like the Year 2000 problem, the challenge of protecting critical 

infrastructures from computer-based attacks extends well beyond federal 

operations. It spans the entire spectrum of our national, as well as the 

global, economy. Many critical infrastructure facilities are owned and 

operated by private companies whose continued secure operations are 

23Year 2000 Computing Crisis: An Assessment Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, issued as an 

exposure draft in February 1997 and in final form in September 1997).

24Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and Contingency Planning (GAO/AIMD10.1.19, issued as an exposure draft in March 1998 and in final form in August 1998).

25Year 2000 Computing Crisis: A Testing Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.21, issued as an exposure 

draft in June 1998 and in final form in November 1998).
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essential to the national welfare−as well as government services. As a 

result, establishing public-private partnerships has been recognized as one 

of the major challenges of critical infrastructure protection.

The Year 2000 challenge has provided a basis on which to build by 

establishing relationships that can serve as the beginning of such 

partnerships. It was essential that Year 2000 issues be adequately addressed 

in arenas beyond the federal government: state and local governments, the 

public infrastructure, and other key economic sectors, such as financial 

services. This is because a single failure in one system could affect many 

others in our nation’s complex array of public and private enterprises that 

have scores of system interdependencies at all levels. 

To address these concerns, we recommended in April 1998 that the 

President’s Council on Year 2000 Conversion use a sector-based approach 

and establish the effective public-private partnerships necessary to address 

this issue.26 The Council subsequently established over 25 sector-based 

working groups and has been initiating outreach activities since it became 

operational in Spring 1998. Similar sectors and agency focal points were 

designated by PDD 63.

In addition, the Chair of the President’s Council has formed a Senior 

Advisors Group composed of representatives from private-sector firms 

across key economic sectors. Members of this group are expected to offer 

perspectives on crosscutting issues, information sharing, and appropriate 

federal responses to potential Year 2000 failures. In July 1999, the President 

directed establishment of a similar advisory group for critical 

infrastructure protection. The National Infrastructure Assurance Council, 

authorized by Executive Order 13130, is to have 30 members from private 

industry who are expected to be designated by late 1999. This new Council 

is to “support a coordinated effort by both government and private sector 

entities to address threats to our Nation’s critical infrastructure.” It will be 

important for it to take advantage of the public-private relationships 

already established.

Our April 1998 report also recommended that the President’s Council on 

Year 2000 Conversion develop a comprehensive picture of the nation’s Year 

2000 readiness that would identify and assess risks to the nation’s key 

26Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Potential for Widespread Disruption Calls for Strong 

Leadership and Partnerships (GAO/AIMD-98-85, April 30, 1998).
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economic sectors−including risks posed by international links. In October 

1998, the Chair directed the Council’s sector working groups to begin 

assessing their sectors. Accordingly, the Council and federal agencies have 

partnered with private-sector organizations, such as the North American 

Electric Reliability Council, to gather information critical to the nation’s 

Year 2000 efforts and to address issues such as contingency planning. To 

date, the Council has issued three national assessments, most recently on 

August 5, 1999. These assessment reports have substantially increased the 

nation’s understanding of the Year 2000 readiness of key industries. A 

similar approach could be used to evaluate longer term risks to our critical 

infrastructures and provide much-needed pathways for information 

sharing.

Facilitating Progress and 

Monitoring Performance

Both the executive branch and the Congress have developed techniques to 

facilitate and monitor performance in addressing Year 2000 conversion 

efforts. During 1997, OMB instituted a quarterly reporting routine to 

facilitate monitoring of agency progress in making their critical systems 

Year 2000 compliant. Between mid-1997 and early 1999, OMB placed each 

of the 24 major agencies into one of three tiers according to OMB’s 

judgment regarding each agency’s progress as described in their quarterly 

reports. As yet, no such routine reporting mechanism exists to monitor 

agency performance in strengthening computer security or critical 

infrastructure protection. However, as discussed previously, the Critical 

Infrastructure Assurance Office is reviewing agency infrastructure 

protection plans. Once these plans are judged acceptable, it will be 

important to monitor their implementation on a regular basis.

In addition, many congressional committees actively monitored progress 

by holding hearings to obtain information on the Year 2000 readiness of 

federal agencies, states, localities, and other important nonfederal entities, 

such as the securities industry. The House Subcommittee on Government 

Management, Information and Technology of the Committee on 

Government Reform developed a “report card” system for periodically 

grading agencies on their progress. 

In addition, to facilitate remediation at federal agencies, the Congress 

passed and the President signed the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency 

Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, which included $3.35 billion in 

contingent emergency funding for Year 2000 conversion activities. In 

commenting on a draft of this report, the Chairman of the President’s 

Council on Year 2000 Conversion said that the availability of this funding 
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was of great assistance to agencies during the last 15 months of their 

conversion efforts and allowed them to fund Year 2000 conversion needs 

discovered late in the process. The Chairman noted that the situation 

regarding information security is somewhat different because those efforts 

will be ongoing rather than tied to a known completion date. Accordingly, 

agencies should be able to plan to include in their budgets sufficient 

funding for information security. An alternative view was expressed by the 

Chairman of the CIO Council Subcommittee on Critical Infrastructure 

Protection who stated that CIOs would have serious problems 

implementing PDD 63 without supplemental funding similar to that 

provided to help resolve the Year 2000 problem.

Developing an Incident 

Identification and 

Coordination Capability

To monitor and report on events associated with the Year 2000 date 

rollover, the President directed establishment of an Information 

Coordination Center (ICC). The ICC is to serve as the federal government’s 

central point for coordinating information provided during the Year 2000 

transition by government emergency operations centers and the private 

sector. The center will be staffed with subject matter experts detailed from 

federal agencies who will be expected to integrate data received into 

national and international status reports. In this and other ways, the ICC 

will be expected to highlight information of interest to individual agencies, 

provide information to the public, and respond to inquiries.

It is currently too early to determine how successful the ICC will be. 

However, those involved in establishing it are discussing issues that are 

also pertinent to critical infrastructure protection, such as the amount and 

type of data the center needs to collect and how this data should be 

summarized and reported. 

Implementing Information 

Technology Management 

Improvements

Addressing the Year 2000 problem has highlighted the importance of good 

information technology management and, to date, demonstrated that the 

government will likely approach future information technology challenges 

better prepared. The Year 2000 problem has resulted in many agencies 

taking charge of their information technology resources in much more 

active ways than they have in the past, from inventorying and prioritizing 

systems to implementing reliable processes and better controls. In 

particular, it has prompted some agencies to establish much-needed 

information technology policies in areas such as system configuration 

management, risk management, and software testing. In addition, Year 2000 

efforts have reinforced an understanding of the importance of consistent 
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and persistent top management attention, which is essential to solving any 

intractable problem. For the Year 2000 problem, this has been illustrated by 

the work, to date, of the President’s Council on Year 2000 Conversion and 

its senior-level chairman. Such attention from senior federal executives will 

be important to help ensure that information security and critical 

infrastructure protection are taken seriously at lower organizational levels 

and that security specialists have the resources they need to implement an 

effective program. 

According to officials at OMB, the Year 2000 problem also gave agency 

CIOs a “crash course” in how to accomplish projects. Many CIOs were 

relatively new in their positions, due to a requirement for agency CIOs in 

the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. Expediting Year 2000 efforts required many 

of them to quickly gain an understanding of their agency’s systems, work 

extensively with agency program managers and Chief Financial Officers, 

and become familiar with budgeting and financial management practices. 

Conclusions The challenges associated with the Year 2000 date conversion problem are 

examples of the broader and longer term challenges that our nation faces in 

protecting our computer-supported critical infrastructures from hostile 

attacks. While differences exist, many of the efforts that have been 

undertaken to manage and remedy the Year 2000 problem can also be 

applied to these longer term challenges. Through PDD 63, the executive 

branch has initiated steps to address critical infrastructure protection and 

encourage private-sector involvement. As these efforts continue, they can 

benefit from many of the experiences gained during the Year 2000 

conversion period. Some of these “lessons” are already apparent. However, 

it is likely that others will emerge as the Year 2000 transition period 

unfolds. Accordingly, we are making no recommendations at this time. 

Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report and solicited informal comments from a 

variety of officials who have been involved in Year 2000 and critical 

infrastructure protection efforts. We received oral and electronic mail 

comments from the Chairman of the Council on Year 2000 Conversion; the 

Co-Chairs of the CIO Council’s Security Committee, one of whom is Chair 

of the Subcommittee on Critical Infrastructure Protection; officials in the 

Critical Information Assurance Office; and numerous federal agency CIOs. 

Overall, these officials agreed with the points made in the report, and some 
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provided supporting illustrations from their own experience. We have 

noted the most significant comments in applicable segments of the report.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we will not distribute it until 5 days from the date of this 

report. At that time, we will send copies to Senator Christopher Dodd,

Vice-Chairman of the Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 

Technology Problem; Senator Fred Thompson, Chairman, and Senator 

Joseph Lieberman, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on 

Governmental Affairs; Representative Steven Horn, Chairman, 

Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology, 

House Committee on Government Reform; and Representative Constance 

Morella, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Technology, House Committee on 

Science. In addition, we are providing copies to John Koskinen, Chairman 

of the President’s Council on Year 2000 Conversion; Richard Clarke, 

National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and CounterTerrorism; the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and 

Budget; John Tritak, Director, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office; 

Michael Vatis, Director, National Infrastructure Protection Center, FBI; 

Deidre Lee and James Flyzik, Chair and Vice-Chair, respectively, of the CIO 

Council; and other interested parties. Copies will be made available to 

others upon request.

If you have any questions on matters discussed in this letter, please contact 

me at (202) 512-2600, or Jack L. Brock, Director, Governmentwide and 

Defense Information Systems, at (202) 512-6240. 

Sincerely yours,

Jeffrey C. Steinhoff

Acting Assistant Comptroller General
Page 29 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection
Page 30 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ApendxIi

The objectives of our work were to (1) summarize our recent findings on 

computer security and critical infrastructure protection and (2) suggest 

improvements that build on lessons learned from the Year 2000 date 

conversion experience.

To summarize our recent findings, we analyzed our reports on computer 

security issued during fiscal year 1999. In addition, we reviewed findings 

pertaining to computer security issues associated with the fiscal year 1998 

financial statement audits of the 24 federal departments and agencies 

covered by the CFO Act. These agencies account for 98 percent of the total 

reported federal net outlays for fiscal year 1998. In analyzing reported 

findings, we categorized them into six basic areas of general control as 

described by the Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual

(FISCAM), which contains guidance for reviewing information system 

controls that affect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of 

computerized data associated with federal agency operations. These six 

areas include entitywide security program management and planning, 

access control, application program change control, segregation of duties, 

operating systems security, and service continuity. We supplemented this 

analysis with information that we obtained by reviewing key reports and 

statements issued since 1994 on critical infrastructure protection. These 

reports and statements are cited in footnotes throughout this report.

To develop suggested improvements that build on lessons learned from the 

Year 2000 conversion experience, we analyzed our reports issued since 

February 1997 on efforts to address the Year 2000 problem and met with 

key officials leading federal efforts related to the Year 2000 problem and 

critical infrastructure protection. These officials included the Director of 

the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, the Chairman of the 

President’s Council on Year 2000 Conversion, officials at the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation’s National Infrastructure Protection Center, and 

policy analysts at the Office of Management and Budget involved in 

overseeing federal Year 2000 conversion efforts and information security.

We provided a draft of this report and solicited informal comments from a 

variety of officials who have been involved in Year 2000 and critical 

infrastructure protection efforts. We received oral and electronic mail 

comments from the Chairman of the Council on Year 2000 Conversion; the 

Co-Chairs of the CIO Council’s Security Committee, one of whom is Chair 

of the Subcommittee on Critical Infrastructure Protection; and officials in 

the Critical Information Assurance Office. We considered these comments 

and noted the most signficant ones in pertinent segments of the report. 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 31 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

We performed the majority of our review during August and September 

1999 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards.
Page 32 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

Appendix II

GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing 

Information Security Issues Since

February 1996 ApendxIi

Federal Reserve Banks: Areas for Improvement in Computer Controls

(GAO/AIMD-99-280, September 15, 1999).

Information Security: NRC’s Computer Intrusion Detection Capabilities

(GAO/AIMD-99-273R, August 27, 1999).

DOD Information Security: Serious Weaknesses Continue To Place Defense 

Operations at Risk (GAO/AIMD-99-107, August 26, 1999).

Battlefield Automation: Opportunities to Improve the Army’s Information 

Protection Effort (GAO/NSIAD-99-166, August 11, 1999). 

Information Security: Answers to Post-hearing Questions

(GAO/AIMD-99-272R, August 9, 1999). 

Bureau of the Public Debt: Areas for Improvement in Computer Controls

(GAO/AIMD-99-242, August 6, 1999).

Information Security Risk Assessment: Practices of Leading Organizations

(Exposure draft) (GAO/AIMD-99-139, August 1999).

USDA Information Security: Weaknesses at National Finance Center 

Increase Risk of Fraud, Misuse, and Improper Disclosure

(GAO/AIMD-99-227, July 30, 1999).

Information Security: Recent Attacks on Federal Web Sites Underscore 

Need for Stronger Information Security Management (GAO/T-AIMD-99-223, 

June 24, 1999).

VA Information Systems: The Austin Automation Center Has Made 

Progress in Improving Information System Controls (GAO/AIMD-99-161, 

June 8, 1999).

Information Security: Many NASA Mission-Critical Systems Face Serious 

Risks (GAO/AIMD-99-47, May 20, 1999).

Department of Energy: Key Factors Underlying Security Problems at DOE 

Facilities (GAO/T-RCED-99-159, April 20, 1999).

Information Security: The Melissa Computer Virus Demonstrates Urgent 

Need for Stronger Protection over Systems and Sensitive Data

(GAO/T-AIMD-99-146, April 15, 1999).
Appendix II

GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing 

Information Security Issues Since February 

1996

Page 33 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

Financial Audit: 1998 Financial Statements of the United States 

Government (GAO/AIMD-99-130, March 31, 1999). 

Securities Fraud: The Internet Poses Challenges to Regulators and 

Investors (GAO/T-GGD-99-34, March 22, 1999). 

IRS Systems Security: Although Significant Improvements Made, Tax 

Processing Operations and Data Still at Serious Risk (GAO/AIMD-99-38, 

December 14, 1998).

Financial Management Service: Areas for Improvement in Computer 

Controls (GAO/AIMD-99-10, October 20, 1998).

Federal Reserve Banks: Areas for Improvement in Computer Controls

(GAO/AIMD-99-6, October 14, 1998).

Bureau of the Public Debt: Areas for Improvement in Computer Controls

(GAO/AIMD-99-2, October 14, 1998).

Financial Management: Improvements Needed in Air Force Vendor 

Payment Systems and Controls (GAO/AIMD-98-274, September 28, 1998).

Information Security: Serious Weaknesses Place Critical Federal 

Operations and Assets at Risk (GAO/AIMD-98-92, September 23, 1998).

Information Security: Strengthened Management Needed to Protect 

Critical Federal Operations and Assets (GAO/T-AIMD-98-312,

September 23, 1998).

VA Information Systems: Computer Control Weaknesses Increase Risk of 

Fraud, Misuse and Improper Disclosure (GAO/AIMD-98-175, September 23, 

1998).

Defense Information Superiority: Progress Made, but Significant 

Challenges Remain (GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257, August 31, 1998).

FAA Systems: Serious Challenges Remain in Resolving Year 2000 and 

Computer Security Problems (GAO/T-AIMD-98-251, August 6, 1998).

DOD’s Information Assurance Efforts (GAO/NSIAD-98-132R, June 11, 

1998).
Appendix II

GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing 

Information Security Issues Since February 

1996

Page 34 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

Information Security: Serious Weaknesses Put State Department and FAA 

Operations at Risk (GAO/T-AIMD-98-170, May 19, 1998).

Computer Security: Pervasive, Serious Weaknesses Jeopardize State 

Department Operations (GAO/AIMD-98-145, May 18, 1998).

Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize Flight 

Safety (GAO/AIMD-98-155, May 18, 1998).

Executive Guide: Information Security Management: Learning From 

Leading Organizations (GAO/AIMD-98-68, May 1998). 

U.S. Government Financial Statements: Results of GAO’s Fiscal Year 1997 

Audit (GAO/T-AIMD-98-128, April 1, 1998). 

Financial Audit: 1997 Consolidated Financial Statements of the United 

States Government (GAO/AIMD-98-127, March 31, 1998).

Financial Audit: Examination of IRS’ Fiscal Year 1996 Custodial Financial 

Statements (GAO/AIMD-98-18, December 24, 1997).

Financial Management: Review of the Military Retirement Trust Fund’s 

Actuarial Model and Related Computer Controls (GAO/AIMD-97-128, 

September 9, 1997).

Financial Audit: Examination of IRS’ Fiscal Year 1996 Administrative 

Financial Statements (GAO/AIMD-97-89, August 29, 1997). 

Small Business Administration: Better Planning and Controls Needed for 

Information Systems (GAO/AIMD-97-94, June 27, 1997).

Social Security Administration: Internet Access to Personal Earnings and 

Benefits Information (GAO/T-AIMD/HEHS-97-123, May 6, 1997).

Budget Process: Comments on S.261−Biennial Budgeting and 

Appropriations Act (GAO/T-AIMD-97-84, April 23, 1997).

IRS Systems Security and Funding: Employee Browsing Not Being 

Addressed Effectively and Budget Requests for New Systems Development 

Not Justified (GAO/T-AIMD-97-82, April 15, 1997).
Appendix II

GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing 

Information Security Issues Since February 

1996

Page 35 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

IRS Systems Security: Tax Processing Operations and Data Still at Risk Due 

to Serious Weaknesses (GAO/T-AIMD-97-76, April 10, 1997).

IRS Systems Security: Tax Processing Operations and Data Still at Risk Due 

to Serious Weaknesses (GAO/AIMD-97-49, April 8, 1997).

High Risk Series: Information Management and Technology (GAO/HR-97-9, 

February 1997).

Information Security: Opportunities for Improved OMB Oversight of 

Agency Practices (GAO/AIMD-96-110, September 24, 1996).

Financial Audit: Examination of IRS’ Fiscal Year 1995 Financial Statements

(GAO/AIMD-96-101, July 11, 1996).

Tax Systems Modernization: Actions Underway But IRS Has Not Yet 

Corrected Management and Technical Weaknesses (GAO/AIMD-96-106, 

June 7, 1996).

Information Security: Computer Hacker Information Available on the 

Internet (GAO/T-AIMD-96-108, June 5, 1996).

Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose 

Increasing Risks (GAO/AIMD-96-84, May 22, 1996).

Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose 

Increasing Risks (GAO/T-AIMD-96-92, May 22, 1996).

Security Weaknesses at IRS’ Cyberfile Data Center (GAO/AIMD-96-85R, 

May 9, 1996).

Tax Systems Modernization: Management and Technical Weaknesses Must 

Be Overcome To Achieve Success (GAO/T-AIMD-96-75, March 26, 1996). 

Financial Audit: Federal Family Education Loan Program’s Financial 

Statements for Fiscal Years 1994 and 1993 (GAO/AIMD-96-22, February 26, 

1996).
Page 36 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

Appendix III

GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing the 

Year 2000 Challenge ApendxIi

Copies of these products are available through GAO’s home page on the 

Internet’s World Wide Web (http://www.gao.gov). Copies may also be 

obtained at GAO’s Document Distribution Center (700 4th St., NW Room 

1100) or by phone (202-512-6000) or fax (202-512-6061).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Status of the District of Columbia’s Efforts 

to Renovate Systems and Develop Contingency and Continuity Plans

(GAO/T-AIMD-99-297, September 24, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: The District of Columbia Cannot Reliably 

Track Y2K Costs (GAO/T-AIMD-99-298, September 24, 1999).

Reported Year 2000 (Y2K) Readiness Status of 25 Large School Districts

(GAO/AIMD-99-296R, September 21, 1999).

IRS’ Year 2000 Efforts: Actions Are Under Way to Help Ensure That 

Contingency Plans Are Complete and Consistent (GAO/GGD-99-176, 

September 14, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: FAA Continues to Make Important Strides, 

But Vulnerabilities Remain (GAO/T-AIMD-99-285, September 9, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: SBA Needs to Strengthen Systems Testing 

to Ensure Readiness (GAO/AIMD-99-265, August 27, 1999).

Nuclear Weapons: Year 2000 Status of the Nation’s Nuclear Weapons 

Stockpile (GAO/RCED-99-272R, August 20, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Readiness Improving Yet Essential 

Actions Remain to Ensure Delivery of Critical Services

(GAO/T-AIMD-99-268, August 17, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Important Progress Made, But Much Work 

Remains to Avoid Disruption of Critical Services (GAO/T-AIMD-99-267, 

August 14, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Important Progress Made, Yet Much Work 

Remains to Ensure Delivery of Critical Services (GAO/T-AIMD-99-266, 

August 13, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Agencies’ Reporting of Mission-Critical 

Classified Systems (GAO/AIMD-99-218, August 5, 1999).
Appendix III

GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing the 

Year 2000 Challenge

Page 37 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

Social Security Administration: Update on Year 2000 and Other Key 

Information Technology Initiatives (GAO/T-AIMD-99-259, July 29, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Status of Medicare Providers Unknown

(GAO/AIMD-99-243, July 28, 1999).

Reported Y2K status of the 21 Largest U.S. Cities (GAO/AIMD-99-246R,

July 15, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Federal Efforts to Ensure Continued 

Delivery of Key State-Administered Benefits (GAO/T-AIMD-99-241, July 15, 

1999).

Emergency and State and Local Law Enforcement Systems: Committee 

Questions Concerning Year 2000 Challenges (GAO/AIMD-99-247R, July 14, 

1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Important Progress Made, Yet Much Work 

Remains to Avoid Disruption of Critical Services (GAO/T-AIMD-99-234, 

July 9, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Readiness Improving Yet Avoiding 

Disruption of Critical Services Will Require Additional Work

(GAO/T-AIMD-99-233, July 8, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Readiness Improving But Much Work 

Remains to Avoid Disruption of Critical Services (GAO/T-AIMD-99-232,

July 7, 1999).

Defense Computers: Management Controls Are Critical To Effective Year 

2000 Testing (GAO/AIMD-99-172, June 30, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Customs is Making Good Progress

(GAO/T-AIMD-99-225, June 29, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Delivery of Key Benefits Hinges on States’ 

Achieving Compliance (GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-99-221, June 23, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Estimated Costs, Planned Uses of 

Emergency Funding, and Future Implications (GAO/T-AIMD-99-214,

June 22, 1999).
Appendix III

GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing the 

Year 2000 Challenge

Page 38 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

GSA’s Effort to Develop Year 2000 Business Continuity and Contingency 

Plans for Telecommunications Systems (GAO/AIMD-99-201R, June 16, 

1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Actions Needed to Ensure Continued Delivery 

of Veterans Benefits and Health Care Services (GAO/AIMD-99-190R,

June 11, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Concerns About Compliance Information 

on Biomedical Equipment (GAO/T-AIMD-99-209, June 10, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Much Biomedical Equipment Status 

Information Available, Yet Concerns Remain (GAO/T-AIMD-99-197, May 25, 

1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: OPM Has Made Progress on Business 

Continuity Planning (GAO/GGD-99-66, May 24, 1999).

VA Y2K Challenges: Responses to Post-Testimony Questions

(GAO/AIMD-99-199R, May 24, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: USDA Needs to Accelerate Time Frames for 

Completing Contingency Planning (GAO/AIMD-99-178, May 21, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Readiness of the Oil and Gas Industries

(GAO/AIMD-99-162, May 19, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Time Issues Affecting the Global 

Positioning System (GAO/T-AIMD-99-187, May 12, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Education Taking Needed Actions But 

Work Remains (GAO/T-AIMD-99-180, May 12, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Labor Has Progressed But Selected 

Systems Remain at Risk (GAO/T-AIMD-99-179, May 12, 1999).

Year 2000: State Insurance Regulators Face Challenges in Determining 

Industry Readiness (GAO/GGD-99-87, April 30, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Status of Emergency and State and Local 

Law Enforcement Systems Is Still Unknown (GAO/T-AIMD-99-163, April 29, 

1999).
Appendix III

GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing the 

Year 2000 Challenge

Page 39 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Costs and Planned Use of Emergency Funds

(GAO/AIMD-99-154, April 28, 1999).

Year 2000: Financial Institution and Regulatory Efforts to Address 

International Risks (GAO/GGD-99-62, April 27, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Readiness of Medicare and the Health Care 

Sector (GAO/T-AIMD-99-160, April 27, 1999).

U.S. Postal Service: Subcommittee Questions Concerning Year 2000 

Challenges Facing the Service (GAO/AIMD-99-150R, April 23, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Status of the Water Industry

(GAO/AIMD-99-151, April 21, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Key Actions Remain to Ensure Delivery of 

Veterans Benefits and Health Services (GAO/T-AIMD-99-152, April 20, 

1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Readiness Improving But Much Work Remains 

To Ensure Delivery of Critical Services (GAO/T-AIMD-99-149, April 19, 

1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Action Needed to Ensure Continued Delivery 

of Veterans Benefits and Health Care Services (GAO/T-AIMD-99-136,

April 15, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Federal Government Making Progress But 

Critical Issues Must Still Be Addressed to Minimize Disruptions

(GAO/T-AIMD-99-144, April 14, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Additional Work Remains to Ensure Delivery 

of Critical Services (GAO/T-AIMD-99-143, April 13, 1999).

Tax Administration: IRS’ Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Request and 1999 Tax 

Filing Season (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-99-140, April 13, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Federal Reserve Has Established Effective 

Year 2000 Management Controls for Internal Systems Conversion

(GAO/AIMD-99-78, April 9, 1999).
Appendix III

GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing the 

Year 2000 Challenge

Page 40 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Readiness of the Electric Power Industry

(GAO/AIMD-99-114, April 6, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Customs Has Established Effective Year 2000 

Program Controls (GAO/AIMD-99-37, March 29, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: FAA Is Making Progress But Important 

Challenges Remain (GAO/T-AIMD/RCED-99-118, March 15, 1999).

Insurance Industry: Regulators Are Less Active in Encouraging and 

Validating Year 2000 Preparedness (GAO/T-GGD-99-56, March 11, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Defense Has Made Progress, But Additional 

Management Controls Are Needed (GAO/T-AIMD-99-101, March 2, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Readiness Status of the Department of Health 

and Human Services (GAO/T-AIMD-99-92, February 26, 1999).

Defense Information Management: Continuing Implementation Challenges 

Highlight the Need for Improvement (GAO/T-AIMD-99-93, February 25, 

1999).

IRS’ Year 2000 Efforts: Status and Remaining Challenges

(GAO/T-GGD-99-35, February 24, 1999).

Department of Commerce: National Weather Service Modernization and 

NOAA Fleet Issues (GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-99-97, February 24, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Medicare and the Delivery of Health Services 

Are at Risk (GAO/T-AIMD-99-89, February 24, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Readiness of State Automated Systems That 

Support Federal Human Services Programs (GAO/T-AIMD-99-91,

February 24, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Customs Is Effectively Managing Its Year 2000 

Program (GAO/T-AIMD-99-85, February 24, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Update on the Readiness of the Social Security 

Administration (GAO/T-AIMD-99-90, February 24, 1999).
Appendix III

GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing the 

Year 2000 Challenge

Page 41 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Challenges Still Facing the U.S. Postal Service

(GAO/T-AIMD-99-86, February 23, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: The District of Columbia Remains Behind 

Schedule (GAO/T-AIMD-99-84, February 19, 1999).

High-Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-99-1, January 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Status of Airports’ Efforts to Deal With Date 

Change Problem (GAO/RCED/AIMD-99-57, January 29, 1999).

Defense Computers: DOD’s Plan for Execution of Simulated Year 2000 

Exercises (GAO/AIMD-99-52R, January 29, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Status of Bureau of Prisons’ Year 2000 Efforts

(GAO/AIMD-99-23, January 27, 1999).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Readiness Improving, But Much Work 

Remains to Avoid Major Disruptions (GAO/T-AIMD-99-50, January 20, 

1999).

Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Readiness Improving, But Critical Risks 

Remain (GAO/T-AIMD-99-49, January 20, 1999).

Status Information: FAA’s Year 2000 Business Continuity and Contingency 

Planning Efforts Are Ongoing (GAO/AIMD-99-40R, December 4, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: A Testing Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.21, 

November 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Readiness of State Automated Systems to 

Support Federal Welfare Programs (GAO/AIMD-99-28, November 6, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Status of Efforts to Deal With Personnel Issues

(GAO/AIMD/GGD-99-14, October 22, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Updated Status of Department of Education’s 

Information Systems (GAO/T-AIMD-99-8, October 8, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: The District of Columbia Faces Tremendous 

Challenges in Ensuring That Vital Services Are Not Disrupted

(GAO/T-AIMD-99-4, October 2, 1998).
Appendix III

GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing the 

Year 2000 Challenge

Page 42 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

Medicare Computer Systems: Year 2000 Challenges Put Benefits and 

Services in Jeopardy (GAO/AIMD-98-284, September 28, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Leadership Needed to Collect and Disseminate 

Critical Biomedical Equipment Information (GAO/T-AIMD-98-310, 

September 24, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Compliance Status of Many Biomedical 

Equipment Items Still Unknown (GAO/AIMD-98-240, September 18, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Significant Risks Remain to Department of 

Education’s Student Financial Aid Systems (GAO/T-AIMD-98-302, 

September 17, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Progress Made at Department of Labor, But 

Key Systems at Risk (GAO/T-AIMD-98-303, September 17, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Federal Depository Institution Regulators Are 

Making Progress, But Challenges Remain (GAO/T-AIMD-98-305, 

September 17, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Federal Reserve Is Acting to Ensure Financial 

Institutions Are Fixing Systems But Challenges Remain

(GAO/AIMD-98-248, September 17, 1998).

Responses to Questions on FAA’s Computer Security and Year 2000 

Program (GAO/AIMD-98-301R, September 14, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Severity of Problem Calls for Strong 

Leadership and Effective Partnerships (GAO/T-AIMD-98-278, September 3, 

1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership and Effective Partnerships 

Needed to Reduce Likelihood of Adverse Impact (GAO/T-AIMD-98-277, 

September 2, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership and Effective Partnerships 

Needed to Mitigate Risks (GAO/T-AIMD-98-276, September 1, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: State Department Needs To Make 

Fundamental Improvements To Its Year 2000 Program (GAO/AIMD-98-162, 

August 28, 1998).
Appendix III

GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing the 

Year 2000 Challenge

Page 43 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

Year 2000 Computing: EFT 99 Is Not Expected to Affect Year 2000 

Remediation Efforts (GAO/AIMD-98-272R, August 28, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Progress Made in Compliance of VA Systems, 

But Concerns Remain (GAO/AIMD-98-237, August 21, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Avoiding Major Disruptions Will Require 

Strong Leadership and Effective Partnerships (GAO/T-AIMD-98-267,

August 19, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership and Partnerships Needed to 

Address Risk of Major Disruptions (GAO/T-AIMD-98-266, August 17, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership and Partnerships Needed to 

Mitigate Risk of Major Disruptions (GAO/T-AIMD-98-262, August 13, 1998).

FAA Systems: Serious Challenges Remain in Resolving Year 2000 and 

Computer Security Problems (GAO/T-AIMD-98-251, August 6, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and Contingency Planning

(GAO/AIMD-10.1.19, August 1998).

Internal Revenue Service: Impact of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act 

on Year 2000 Efforts (GAO/GGD-98-158R, August 4, 1998).

Social Security Administration: Subcommittee Questions Concerning 

Information Technology Challenges Facing the Commissioner

(GAO/AIMD-98-235R, July 10, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Actions Needed on Electronic Data Exchanges

(GAO/AIMD-98-124, July 1, 1998).

Defense Computers: Year 2000 Computer Problems Put Navy Operations At 

Risk (GAO/AIMD-98-150, June 30, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Testing and Other Challenges Confronting 

Federal Agencies (GAO/T-AIMD-98-218, June 22, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Telecommunications Readiness Critical, Yet 

Overall Status Largely Unknown (GAO/T-AIMD-98-212, June 16, 1998).
Appendix III

GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing the 

Year 2000 Challenge

Page 44 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

GAO Views on Year 2000 Testing Metrics (GAO/AIMD-98-217R, June 16, 

1998).

IRS’ Year 2000 Efforts: Business Continuity Planning Needed for Potential 

Year 2000 System Failures (GAO/GGD-98-138, June 15, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Actions Must Be Taken Now to Address Slow 

Pace of Federal Progress (GAO/T-AIMD-98-205, June 10, 1998).

Defense Computers: Army Needs to Greatly Strengthen Its Year 2000 

Program (GAO/AIMD-98-53, May 29, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: USDA Faces Tremendous Challenges in 

Ensuring That Vital Public Services Are Not Disrupted

(GAO/T-AIMD-98-167, May 14, 1998).

Securities Pricing: Actions Needed for Conversion to Decimals

(GAO/T-GGD-98-121, May 8, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Continuing Risks of Disruption to Social 

Security, Medicare, and Treasury Programs (GAO/T-AIMD-98-161, May 7, 

1998).

IRS’ Year 2000 Efforts: Status and Risks (GAO/T-GGD-98-123, May 7, 1998).

Air Traffic Control: FAA Plans to Replace Its Host Computer System 

Because Future Availability Cannot Be Assured (GAO/AIMD-98-138R,

May 1, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Potential for Widespread Disruption Calls for 

Strong Leadership and Partnerships (GAO/AIMD-98-85, April 30, 1998).

Defense Computers: Year 2000 Computer Problems Threaten DOD 

Operations (GAO/AIMD-98-72, April 30, 1998).

Department of the Interior: Year 2000 Computing Crisis Presents Risk of 

Disruption to Key Operations (GAO/T-AIMD-98-149, April 22, 1998).

Tax Administration: IRS’ Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Request and Fiscal Year 

1998 Filing Season (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-98-114, March 31, 1998).
Appendix III

GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing the 

Year 2000 Challenge

Page 45 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership Needed to Avoid Disruption 

of Essential Services (GAO/T-AIMD-98-117, March 24, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Federal Regulatory Efforts to Ensure Financial 

Institution Systems Are Year 2000 Compliant (GAO/T-AIMD-98-116,

March 24, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Office of Thrift Supervision’s Efforts to Ensure 

Thrift Systems Are Year 2000 Compliant (GAO/T-AIMD-98-102, March 18, 

1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership and Effective Public/Private 

Cooperation Needed to Avoid Major Disruptions (GAO/T-AIMD-98-101, 

March 18, 1998).

Post-Hearing Questions on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s 

Year 2000 (Y2K) Preparedness (GAO/AIMD-98-108R, March 18, 1998).

SEC Year 2000 Report: Future Reports Could Provide More Detailed 

Information (GAO/GGD/AIMD-98-51, March 6, 1998).

Year 2000 Readiness: NRC’s Proposed Approach Regarding Nuclear 

Powerplants (GAO/AIMD-98-90R, March 6, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s 

Efforts to Ensure Bank Systems Are Year 2000 Compliant

(GAO/T-AIMD-98-73, February 10, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: FAA Must Act Quickly to Prevent Systems 

Failures (GAO/T-AIMD-98-63, February 4, 1998).

FAA Computer Systems: Limited Progress on Year 2000 Issue Increases 

Risk Dramatically (GAO/AIMD-98-45, January 30, 1998).

Defense Computers: Air Force Needs to Strengthen Year 2000 Oversight

(GAO/AIMD-98-35, January 16, 1998).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Actions Needed to Address Credit Union 

Systems’ Year 2000 Problem (GAO/AIMD-98-48, January 7, 1998).
Appendix III

GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing the 

Year 2000 Challenge

Page 46 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

Veterans Health Administration Facility Systems: Some Progress Made In 

Ensuring Year 2000 Compliance, But Challenges Remain

(GAO/AIMD-98-31R, November 7, 1997).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: National Credit Union Administration’s Efforts 

to Ensure Credit Union Systems Are Year 2000 Compliant

(GAO/T-AIMD-98-20, October 22, 1997).

Social Security Administration: Significant Progress Made in Year 2000 

Effort, But Key Risks Remain (GAO/AIMD-98-6, October 22, 1997).

Defense Computers: Technical Support Is Key to Naval Supply Year 2000 

Success (GAO/AIMD-98-7R, October 21, 1997).

Defense Computers: LSSC Needs to Confront Significant Year 2000 Issues

(GAO/AIMD-97-149, September 26, 1997).

Veterans Affairs Computer Systems: Action Underway Yet Much Work 

Remains To Resolve Year 2000 Crisis (GAO/T-AIMD-97-174, September 25, 

1997).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Success Depends Upon Strong Management 

and Structured Approach (GAO/T-AIMD-97-173, September 25, 1997).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: An Assessment Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, 

September 1997).

Defense Computers: SSG Needs to Sustain Year 2000 Progress

(GAO/AIMD-97-120R, August 19, 1997).

Defense Computers: Improvements to DOD Systems Inventory Needed for 

Year 2000 Effort (GAO/AIMD-97-112, August 13, 1997).

Defense Computers: Issues Confronting DLA in Addressing Year 2000 

Problems (GAO/AIMD-97-106, August 12, 1997).

Defense Computers: DFAS Faces Challenges in Solving the Year 2000 

Problem (GAO/AIMD-97-117, August 11, 1997).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Time is Running Out for Federal Agencies to 

Prepare for the New Millennium (GAO/T-AIMD-97-129, July 10, 1997).
Appendix III

GAO Reports and Testimonies Addressing the 

Year 2000 Challenge

Page 47 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

Veterans Benefits Computer Systems: Uninterrupted Delivery of Benefits 

Depends on Timely Correction of Year-2000 Problems

(GAO/T-AIMD-97-114, June 26, 1997).

Veterans Benefits Computer Systems: Risks of VBA’s Year-2000 Efforts

(GAO/AIMD-97-79, May 30, 1997).

Medicare Transaction System: Success Depends Upon Correcting Critical 

Managerial and Technical Weaknesses (GAO/AIMD-97-78, May 16, 1997).

Medicare Transaction System: Serious Managerial and Technical 

Weaknesses Threaten Modernization (GAO/T-AIMD-97-91, May 16, 1997).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Risk of Serious Disruption to Essential 

Government Functions Calls for Agency Action Now (GAO/T-AIMD-97-52, 

February 27, 1997).

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership Today Needed To Prevent 

Future Disruption of Government Services (GAO/T-AIMD-97-51,

February 24, 1997).

High-Risk Series: Information Management and Technology (GAO/HR-97-9, 

February 1997).
Page 48 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

Appendix IV

Risks to Computer-Supported Operations ApendxiIV

(Based on a list developed by the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology and included in An Introduction to Computer Security: The 

NIST Handbook, Special Publication 800-12, December 1995.)

• Malicious hackers, those who break into computers without 

authorization, are especially troubling because their identity and 

purpose are unknown. In recent years, there has been growing concern 

that hackers, especially those working on behalf of hostile foreign 

governments or terrorists, could cause devastating disruptions and 

damage to computer-dependent operations and infrastructures. 

• Malicious code, such as viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and logic bombs, 

can cause serious damage and disruption and can be costly to 

remediate. This was recently illustrated by the Melissa virus.

• Errors and omissions in data entry are an important threat to data and 

system integrity. These errors are caused not only by data entry clerks 

processing hundreds of transactions per day, but also by all types of 

users who create and edit data. 

• Software programming and development errors can range in severity 

from benign to catastrophic. 

• Installation and maintenance errors can introduce significant security 

vulnerabilities.

• Criminals intent on fraud and theft can exploit computer systems by 

automating traditional methods of fraud and by using new methods. 

Systems that control access to resources, such as inventory systems, are 

particular targets.

• Employee sabotage can cause especially serious problems because the 

employee, or ex-employee, may have detailed knowledge of system 

operations and vulnerabilities. Such sabotage may include destroying 

hardware or facilities, planting logic bombs that destroy software 

programs or data, “crashing” systems, or holding encrypted data 

“hostage.”

• Foreign government espionage efforts, while often thought of as 

targeting classified systems, may also target unclassified systems to gain 

information on topics such as travel plans of senior officials, civil 

defense and emergency preparedness, manufacturing technologies, 

satellite data, personnel and payroll data, and law enforcement, 

investigative, and security files.

• Threats to personal privacy are of concern because computers now 

accumulate vast amounts of electronic information about individuals by 

governments, credit bureaus, and private companies. In several cases, 

federal and state employees have sold personal information to private 

investigators or other “information brokers.”
Appendix IV

Risks to Computer-Supported Operations

Page 49 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

• Industrial espionage can be perpetrated either by companies seeking to 

improve their competitive advantage or by governments seeking to aid 

their domestic industries.
Page 50 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

Appendix V

Examples of Information Security 

Weaknesses Reported by GAO for Federal 

Agencies During Fiscal Year 1999 ApenxdVi

In May 1999, we reported that, as part of our tests of the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) computer-based controls, 

we successfully penetrated several mission-critical systems. Having 

obtained access, we could have disrupted NASA’s ongoing command and 

control operations and stolen, modified, or destroyed system software and 

data.1

In December 1998, we reported that weaknesses in Internal Revenue 

Service’s (IRS) computer security controls continued to place IRS’ 

automated systems and taxpayer data at serious risk to both internal and 

external threats that could result in the denial of computer services or in 

the unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction of taxpayer data.2

In August 1999, we reported that serious weaknesses in DOD information 

security continue to provide both hackers and hundreds of thousands of 

authorized users the opportunity to modify, steal, inappropriately disclose, 

and destroy sensitive DOD data. These weaknesses impair DOD’s ability to 

(1) control physical and electronic access to its systems and data,

(2) ensure that software running on its systems is properly authorized, 

tested, and functioning as intended, (3) limit employees’ ability to perform 

incompatible functions, and (4) resume operations in the event of a 

disaster. As a result, numerous Defense functions, including weapons and 

supercomputer research, logistics, finance, procurement, personnel 

management, military health, and payroll, have already been adversely 

affected by system attacks or fraud.3

1

Information Security: Many NASA Mission-Critical Systems Face Serious Risks

(GAO/AIMD-99-47, May 20, 1999).

2

IRS Systems Security: Although Significant Improvements Made, Tax Processing 

Operations and Data Still at Serious Risk (GAO/AIMD-99-38, December 14, 1998).

3

DOD Information Security: Serious Weaknesses Continue to Place Defense Operations at 

Risk (GAO/AIMD-99-107, August 26, 1999).
Appendix V

Examples of Information Security 

Weaknesses Reported by GAO for Federal 

Agencies During Fiscal Year 1999

Page 51 GAO/AIMD-00-1 Critical Infrastructure Protection

In July 1999, we reported that the Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) 

National Finance Center (NFC) had serious access control weaknesses that 

affected its ability to prevent and/or detect unauthorized changes to payroll 

and other payment data or computer software. NFC develops and operates 

administrative and financial systems, including payroll/personnel, property 

management, and accounting systems for both the USDA and more than 60 

other federal organizations. During fiscal year 1998, NFC processed more 

than $19 billion in payroll payments for more than 450,000 federal 

employees. NFC is also responsible for maintaining records for the world’s 

largest 401(k)-type program, the federal Thrift Savings Program. This 

program, which is growing at about $1 billion per month, covers about

2.3 million employees and totaled more than $60 billion as of September 30, 

1998.4

 The weaknesses we identified increased the risk that users could 

cause improper payments and that sensitive information could be misused, 

improperly disclosed, or destroyed. 

In October 1998, we reported that general computer controls at the 

Department of Treasury’s Financial Management Service and its contractor 

data centers placed the data maintained in its financial systems at 

significant risk of unauthorized modification, disclosure, loss, or 

impairment. As a result, billions of dollars of payments and collections 

were at risk of fraud.5

4

USDA Information Security: Weaknesses at National Finance Center Increase Risk of 

Fraud, Misuse, and Improper Disclosure (GAO/AIMD-99-227, July 30, 1999).

5

Financial Management Service: Areas for Improvement in Computer Controls

(GAO/AIMD-99-10, October 20, 1998).

(511062) Letr
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