UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

KIMBERLY J. GUEST-MARCOTTE, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 15-cv-10738 

v Honorable Thomas L. Ludington 

 Magistrate Judge Patricia T. Morris 

METALDYNE POWERTRAIN 

COMPONENTS, Inc., et al., 

 

Defendants. 

__________________________________________/ 

ORDER OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS, ADOPTING THE REPORT 

AND RECOMMENDATION, GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S PROCEDURAL 

CHALLENGE, AND CONFIRMING STANDARD OF REVIEW AS 

ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 

Plaintiff Kimberly J. Guest-Marcotte initiated this case by filing her two-count complaint 

on February 27, 2015. Complaint, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her 

rights under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) and 

(a)(2) (“ERISA”) in denying her request for short term disability benefits, and her rights under 

Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”) in subsequently terminating 

her employment. After her state law claim was dismissed, Plaintiff filed a procedural challenge 

seeking discovery. ECF No. 27. When the subsequent briefing led to confusion about the 

applicable plan and related documents, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended 

complaint. ECF No. 35. 

 Magistrate Judge Patricia T. Morris issued her report and recommendation on February 

17, 2016. ECF No. 40. The magistrate judge concluded that the appropriate standard of review 

was arbitrary and capricious. She also recommended granting in part and denying in part 

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Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint, and denying Plaintiff’s procedural 

challenge. Plaintiff timely filed objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, 

which will now be overruled for the reasons stated below. ECF No. 41. The magistrate judge’s 

report and recommendation will be adopted. 

I. 

 Plaintiff Kimberly J. Guest-Marcotte is an individual currently residing in Sanford, 

Michigan. Compl. ¶ 1. Defendant Metaldyne Powertrain Components, Inc. (“Metaldyne 

Powertrain”) is a subsidiary of Metaldyne, LLC, with its principal place of business in Delaware. 

Id. ¶¶ 4, 17. In her complaint, Plaintiff Guest-Marcotte alleges that she was an employee of 

Defendant Metaldyne Powertrain and a participant in Defendant Metaldyne Salary Continuation 

Plan. Compl. ¶ 18. Plaintiff alleges that the Metaldyne Salary Continuation Plan is an employee 

welfare benefits plan under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), and therefore governed by ERISA. Compl. ¶ 

19. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Life Insurance Company of North America, under the 

service mark CIGNA Group Insurance (“CIGNA”) is the administrator and fiduciary of the 

Metaldyne Salary Continuation Plan. Id. ¶ 20. 

A. 

After taking a disability leave of absence for a medical condition called Ehlers-Danlos 

syndrome1

 on June 6, 2013, Plaintiff applied for short-term disability benefits under the 

Metaldyne Salary Continuation Plan. Compl. ¶¶ 25-29. In her application Plaintiff attached 

documentation from her primary care physician, Dr. Phillip Kadaj, M.D., and from an Ehlers 

 

1

 Ehlers-Danlos syndrome refers to “any one of a rare group of inherited (autosomal dominant or autosomal 

recessive) disorders of the connective tissue involving abnormal or deficient collagen, the protein that gives the body 

tissues strength.” OXFORD CONCISE MEDICAL DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2015). It is often marked by elastic, yet fragile 

skin that bruises easily and scars poorly, as well as mobile joints prone to dislocation. Id. 

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Danlos syndrome specialist, Dr. Bradley Tinkle, stating that Plaintiff was indefinitely disabled 

from employment. Compl. ¶ 30; Compl. Exs. 10, 11. 

CIGNA denied Plaintiff’s request by a letter dated August 2, 2013. Compl. Ex. 1. In 

denying Plaintiff’s claim, Plaintiff alleges that LICNA/CIGNA used an incorrect definition of 

“disability” under the plan. Specifically, while the plan summary states in relevant part that 

“[y]ou are considered Disabled if, solely because of Injury or Sickness you are: Unable to 

perform the material duties of your Regular Occupation; and Unable to earn 80% or more of 

your Covered Earnings from working in your Regular Occupation.” Compl. Ex. 2 § 6. In 

contrast, the letter denying Plaintiff’s request for benefits states that under her employer’s plan, 

“An employee is Totally Disabled if, because of Injury or Sickness, he or she is unable to 

perform all the substantial and material duties of his or her regular occupation, or solely due to 

Injury or Sickness, is unable to earn more than 80% of his or her Indexed Covered Earnings.” 

Compl. Ex. 1 (emphasis added). 

After the denial, Plaintiff attempted to send supplementary medical documentation to 

support her claim. However, on August 4, 2013, August 20, 2013, and August 23, 2013 

Defendant CIGNA reaffirmed its decision to deny Plaintiff’s claim. See Compl. Exs. 4-6. 

Plaintiff then filed a second stage appeal with additional medical information on September 25, 

2013. CIGNA denied her appeal in a letter dated November 21, 2013. See Compl. Ex. 7. In 

upholding its decision, CIGNA again referenced the “incorrect” definition of disability, and 

explained that “[t]here were no significant clinical findings identified to support a loss of 

function. The medical information on file reviewed does not demonstrate you would be unable 

to perform your job duties as a Senior Risk Analyst.” Id. 

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While the plan administrator, Defendant CIGNA, did not find that Plaintiff was unable to 

perform her job duties, her employer, Defendant Metaldyne Powertrain, reached the opposite 

conclusion. On November 22, 2013, the day after Plaintiff’s appeal was denied, Metaldyne 

Powertrain terminated Plaintiff’s employment. Compl. Ex. 8. Metaldyne Powertrain explained 

that Plaintiff had been on leave since June 6, 2013, that her 12 week allotment of leave under the 

Family and Medical Leave Act had expired on August 28, 2013, and that she had been unable to 

return to work after the expiration of her FMLA leave. Id. Metaldyne Powertrain primarily relied 

on documentation from Doctor Kadaj, which indicated that Plaintiff remained unable to perform 

the essential functions of her position with or without a reasonable accommodation, and that 

Plaintiff was unlikely to recover sufficiently to perform the functions of her position. Id. In light 

of the denial of her appeal for short-term disability benefits, “the unknown nature of your ability 

to perform your job functions in the future, and the unknown timing of your ability to return to 

work, your employment with Metaldyne will end November 22, 2013.” Id. 

On July 30, 2014, Plaintiff timely filed her final internal appeal to CIGNA. Plaintiff 

again submitted medical documentation from both Dr. Kadaj and Dr. Tinkle. Compl. ¶¶ 47-50. 

CIGNA again denied Plaintiff’s appeal on October 22, 2014, using the same definition of 

disability as it had previously. Compl. Ex. 12. The final denial explained that, “[w]hile we 

understand your client has Ehlers-Danlos syndrome, the clinical findings and test results do not 

document her physical impairments. There was no clinical evidence that would demonstrate a 

functional loss and inability to perform her sedentary occupation beginning 6/6/13.” Id. 

B. 

 Plaintiff filed suit on February 27, 2015, claiming that Defendants’ violated her rights 

under ERISA 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2) in denying her request for short term 

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disability benefits. Compl. ¶¶ 54-56. Plaintiff also alleged that Defendant Metaldyne Powertrain 

discriminated against her in violation of Michigan’s PWDCRA, by terminating her employment. 

See Compl. ¶¶ 57-67. The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Patricia T. Morris on April 1, 

2015 for hearing and determination of any pretrial matters. ECF No. 9. 

On April 24, 2015 all Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under the 

PWDCRA. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 11. Defendants alleged that, because Plaintiff admitted 

her disability was related to her ability to perform the duties of her job, Plaintiff could not 

establish a prima facie case under the PWDCRA. Id. Pursuant to that motion, the Court 

dismissed Plaintiff’s PWDCRA claim on August 5, 2015. ECF No. 28. 

i. 

Also on April 5, 2015, Plaintiff filed a statement of procedural challenge. ECF No. 27. In 

her challenge, Plaintiff sought discovery outside the administrative record under Metropolitan 

Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008). Plaintiff alleged that there was a potential CIGNA 

acted with bias and conflict in denying her claim. In support of this allegation, Plaintiff argued 

that CIGNA had ignored substantial medical evidence in support of Plaintiff’s claim, cherry 

picked medical evidence in support of its determination, and used the incorrect definition of 

“disability.” ECF No. 27. Plaintiff therefore sought to discover information related to bias and 

conflict of interest. Id. 

In response, Defendants argued that discovery outside the administrative record “both 

unnecessary and unauthorized” in a majority of cases. ECF No. 34. See also Wilkins v. Baptist

Healthcare Sys., 150 F.3d 609, 618 (6th Cir. 1998). Defendants noted the narrow exception to 

the general rule that discovery is not permitted: where discovery is necessary to resolve a 

procedural challenge that includes an alleged lack of due process afforded by the administrator or 

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alleged bias on the part of the administrator. Id. at 618. Defendants argued that this narrow 

exception did not apply because Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of bias were insufficient to 

obtain discovery without any actual evidence of bias. See Bennetts v. AT & T Umbrella Plan 

Case No. 12- 14640, *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 9, 2013). 

On October 7, 2015 the magistrate judge issued an order requesting supplemental 

briefing as to the correct standard of review. ECF No. 30. In her supplemental brief, Plaintiff 

argued that a de novo standard of review should apply for two reasons: (1) Defendants had used 

a definition of “disability” that differed from the summary plan definition; and (2) Michigan law 

requires de novo review. In contrast, Defendants argued in their supplemental brief that the 

usual arbitrary and capricious standard should apply, since Metaldyne’s short term disability plan 

granted the plan administrator, CIGNA, discretionary authority to interpret the plan terms. ECF 

No. 31. In support of their arguments, Defendants attached as exhibits (1) Metaldyne, LLC’s 

Short Term Disability Income Plan, effective January 1, 2012 (“STDIP”), and (2) a summary 

plan description of Metaldyne, LLC’s STDIP. ECF No. 31 Exs. 1-2. 

In responding to Defendants, Plaintiff took issue with the two Metaldyne STDIP 

documents attached to Defendants’ supplemental brief. ECF No. 34. Plaintiff argued that those 

plan documents had never been provided to her, despite the fact that she had requested “a copy 

of all plan documents related to her Short Term Disability Claim” in January of 2015, and that 

Defendants had only provided her with documents related to the Metaldyne Salary Continuation 

Plan. Id. Plaintiff alleged that Metaldyne Powertrain’s failure to produce the documents related 

to Metaldyne’s STDIP constituted a violation of ERISA § 104(b), which requires plan 

administrators to provide various documents to a requesting participant. 

ii. 

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Thereafter, on November 20, 2015 Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a first 

amended complaint. ECF No. 35. In her motion Plaintiff seeks to elimiate her PWDCRA claim 

(which has already been dismissed by this Court), add five new exhibits, add Defendant 

Metaldyne STDIP to her first Count, and add a claim that Defendants violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 

1132(c)(1) and 1024(b)(4) by failing to provide her with all required plan documents upon her 

request. 

In their response, Defendants argue that the STDIP plan documents were mistakenly 

attached to their supplemental brief. ECF No. 36. They argue that in her January 22, 2015 

requests for documents, Plaintiff addressed the requests only to Defendant Metaldyne Salary 

Continuation Plan and Defendant CIGNA, and that Defendant CIGNA then provided Plaintiff a 

copy of, among other things, the Metaldyne Salary Continuation Plan Summary Plan 

Description. Defendants further argue that Plaintiff herself attached a copy of the Metaldyne 

Salary Continuation Plan to her original complaint and named the Metaldyne Salary 

Continuation Plan as a defendant in this action. Id. Defendants also argue that, because the 

STDIP documents were created by CIGNA not Metaldyne Powertrain, they do not constitute 

summary plan descriptions. Finally, Defendants argue that in any event the Metaldyne Salary 

Continuation Plan supersedes that Metaldyne STDIP documents, making them irrelevant to 

Plaintiff’s claims. 

In their response Defendants conclude that Plaintiff’s proposed claim that Defendants 

violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(c)(1) and 1024(b)(4) by failing to provide her with all required plan 

documents would be futile because she received all relevant plan documents. Defendants also 

conclude that Plaintiff’s claim would be moot because she eventually received the Metaldyne 

STDIP documents through Defendants’ October 22, 2015 supplemental brief. Finally, 

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Defendants conclude that Plaintiff’s proposed claim is futile with respect to any entity other than 

the Plan Administrator under Caffey v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 302 F.3d 576, 584 (6th Cir. 2002), 

and that Metaldyne, LLC – not a party to this action – is the Plan Administrator of Metaldyne 

STDIP. 

After receiving a reply and sur-reply from the parties, the magistrate judge issued her 

report and recommendation. ECF No. 40. The magistrate judge recommended that the standard 

of review should be “arbitrary and capricious”. In so doing, the magistrate judge rejected 

Plaintiff’s argument that the different definition of “disability” required a different standard of 

review. She also rejected Plaintiff’s argument that Michigan law required de novo review, 

finding Michigan Administrative Code Rule 500.2201.-02 inapplicable because the plans at issue 

are self-funded and therefore preempted by ERISA. The magistrate judge concluded that 

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a first amended complaint should be granted in part and denied 

in part, and that Plaintiff’s request for discovery should be denied. Id. Plaintiff timely filed two 

objections to these recommendations. ECF No. 41. Having reviewed both of Plaintiff’s 

objections de novo, the objections will be overruled, and the report and recommendation will be 

adopted. 

II. 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, a party may object to and seek review of 

a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Objections must 

be stated with specificity. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 151 (1985) (citation omitted). If 

objections are made, “[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate 

judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). De novo review 

requires at least a review of the evidence before the Magistrate Judge; the Court may not act 

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solely on the basis of a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation. See Hill v. Duriron Co., 

656 F.2d 1208, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981). After reviewing the evidence, the Court is free to accept, 

reject, or modify the findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. See Lardie v. Birkett, 

221 F. Supp. 2d 806, 807 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 

 Only those objections that are specific are entitled to a de novo review under the statute. 

Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). “The parties have the duty to pinpoint those 

portions of the magistrate’s report that the district court must specially consider.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). A general objection, or one that merely restates the 

arguments previously presented, does not sufficiently identify alleged errors on the part of the 

magistrate judge. See VanDiver v. Martin, 304 F.Supp.2d 934, 937 (E.D.Mich.2004). An 

“objection” that does nothing more than disagree with a magistrate judge’s determination, 

“without explaining the source of the error,” is not considered a valid objection. Howard v. Sec’y 

of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). Without specific objections, 

“[t]he functions of the district court are effectively duplicated as both the magistrate and the 

district court perform identical tasks. This duplication of time and effort wastes judicial resources 

rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrate’s Act.” Id. Plaintiff 

now objects to both of the magistrate judge’s recommendations. 

A.

Plaintiff first objects to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s motion to amend 

should be granted in part and denied in part. In her report the magistrate judge recommended 

granting Plaintiff’s motion to amend to remove her dismissed PWDCRA claim and her proposed 

joinder of Defendant Metaldyne STDIP to her first Claim. ECF No. 40. However, the magistrate 

judge recommended denying Plaintiff’s motion to amend to the extent she sought to add a claim 

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that Defendants violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(c)(1) and 1024(b)(4) by failing to provide her with 

all required plan documents upon her request. In reaching this conclusion, the magistrate judge 

accepted Defendants’ argument that the proposed amendment was futile with regard to any entity 

other than the plan administrator under Caffey, 302 F.3d 576, at 584. The magistrate judge 

concluded that because non-party Metaldyne, LLC was the plan administrator of Metaldyne 

STDIP, the proposed claim would be futile as to all Defendants in this action. 

i. 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, a court should “freely give leave” to amend 

“when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). “[T]he thrust of Rule 15 is to reinforce the 

principle that cases should be tried on their merits rather than the technicalities of pleadings.” 

Moore v. City of Paducah, 790 F.2d 557, 559 (6th Cir. 1986) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). Factors that courts should consider when determining whether to grant leave to amend 

include “[u]ndue delay in filing, lack of notice to the opposing party, bad faith by the moving 

party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the 

opposing party, and futility of amendment....” Hageman v. Signal L.P. Gas, Inc., 486 F.2d 479, 

484 (6th Cir. 1973). “Decisions as to when justice requires amendment are left to the sound 

discretion of the trial judge[.]” Robinson v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co. Inc., 918 F.2d 579, 591 

(6th Cir. 1990). 

The magistrate judge determined that Plaintiff’s proposed claim under 29 U.S.C. 

1132(c)(1) would be futile. “A proposed amendment is futile if the amendment could not 

withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Med. Mut. of Ohio,

601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). A pleading 

fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) if it does not contain allegations that support recovery 

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under any recognizable legal theory. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009). In considering 

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court construes the pleading in the non-movant’s favor and accepts 

the allegations of facts therein as true. See Lambert, 517 F.3d at 439. The pleader need not have 

provided “detailed factual allegations” to survive dismissal, but the “obligation to provide the 

‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In essence, the pleading “must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678, (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 

ii.

 Plaintiff does not raise any specific objections to the magistrate judge’s determination 

that Plaintiff’s proposed claim would be futile as to any entity other than the plan administrator. 

Instead, despite conceding that Metaldyne LLC is the plan administrator, Plaintiff argues 

generally that “the discussion by the Magistrate insufficiently addresses the prejudicial effect” of 

Defendants’ conduct. Plaintiff essentially argues that because she did not pursue her benefits 

claims under Metaldyne’s STDIP, and because that decision was not brought to her attention 

until Defendant inadvertently attached the Metaldyne STDIP documents to its supplemental 

brief, this Court should ignore Sixth Circuit precedent that “only plan administrators are liable 

for statutory penalties under § 1132(c).” Caffey, 302 F.3d at 584. Plaintiff’s objection is not 

persuasive and will be overruled. 2 

B.

 

2

 Plaintiff’s request for permission to amend her complaint to add a claim against the plan administrator, Metaldyne 

LLC will not be addressed. As explained in this Court’s policies and procedures, “under no circumstances may a 

motion be included within the text or footnotes of another motion.” 

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 Plaintiff next objects to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Plaintiff has not stated a 

colorable procedural challenge. The magistrate judge determined that discovery was unavailable 

in this case because the law generally disallows discovery in actions for benefits under ERISA, 

and because Plaintiff’s procedural challenge consisted only of substantive challenges to the 

benefit denial and conclusory allegations of bias. The magistrate judge specifically rejected 

Plaintiff’s claim that a per se conflict of interest existed because “an insurance company that is 

retained to review disability claims has an incentive to find no disability in order to save money 

for the employer and to preserve their own contractual arrangement with the employer.” The 

magistrate judge found this allegation to be conclusory, unsupported by any factual allegations, 

and therefore insufficient to warrant discovery. 

Plaintiff does not make any specific objection to the report and recommendation. Instead, 

Plaintiff merely restates arguments previously presented to and rejected by the magistrate judge, 

and expresses general disagreement with the magistrate judge’s determination. This objection is 

therefore improper and will be overruled. See VanDiver, 304 F.Supp.2d at 937; Howard, 932 

F.2d at 509. 

III. 

 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff Guest-Marcotte’s objections, ECF No. 41, 

are OVERRULED. 

 It is further ORDERED that the report and recommendation, ECF No. 40, is 

ADOPTED. 

 It is further ORDERED that the standard of review is ARBITRARY AND 

CAPRICIOUS. 

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 It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff Guest-Marcotte’s procedural challenge, ECF No. 

27, is DENIED. 

 It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff Guest-Marcotte’s motion for leave to file a first 

amended complaint, ECF No. 35, is GRANTED IN PART AND REJECTED IN PART. 

 It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff Guest-Marcotte is GRANTED LEAVE to add 

Defendant Short Term Disability Income Plan of Metaldyne, LLC, as a Defendant, to attach any 

new exhibits related to the amended Count I, and to remove Count II. 

s/Thomas L. Ludington 

 THOMAS L. LUDINGTON 

 United States District Judge 

Dated: March 15, 2016 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served 

upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first 

class U.S. mail on March 15, 2016. 

 s/Michael A. Sian 

 MICHAEL A. SIAN, Case Manager 

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