Report to Congressional Requesters

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

April 2001 ARMY TRAINING

Improvements Are

Needed in 5-Ton

Truck Driver Training

and Supervision

GAO-01-436
Page i GAO-01-436 Army Training

Letter 1

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 21

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 23

Tables

Table 1: Percentage of Students in Formal, Informal, and Reserve

Programs Satisfied With Training 10

Figures

Figure 1: Three M939 series Trucks 3

Figure 2: Number of Authorized, Assigned, and On-hand

 Instructors at Fort Leonard Wood, January-September

 2000 6

Figure 3: On-hand Instructors as a Percentage of Assigned

 Instructors at Three Schools, January-September 2000 8

Figure 4: Comparison of Two Formal Army Schools, Fiscal

 Year 2000 9

Figure 5: Percentage of Interviewees Aware of M939 Speed Limit

 Restriction 13

Figure 6: Some Recurring Conditions Cited in M939 Accident

 Reports, 1988-99 17

Contents
Page 1 GAO-01-436 Army Training

April 11, 2001

The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman

United States Senate

The Honorable Rosa L. Delauro

House of Representatives

In April 1997, a 5-ton M939 Army truck was involved in a fatal accident in

which two reservists died. The Army has over 30,000 of these trucks,

which are used extensively to carry personnel and pull equipment. You

asked us to report on the M939’s accident history and to assess the

training and supervision received by its drivers. We broke your request

into two issues. The first dealing with the accident history and any

inherent mechanical/design defects in the truck itself. The second dealing

with issues involving the safe handling of the truck–the training and

supervision of the truck’s drivers. In April 1999, we reported on the M939’s

accident history and mechanical soundness.1

 For this second report, we

(1) evaluated the capacity of the Army’s 5-ton truck driver training

programs to fully train drivers, (2) determined whether oversight

procedures and processes for these drivers are being followed, and

(3) determined whether and how the Army uses accident data to improve

training, supervision, and safety.

The 5-ton truck driver training programs we reviewed do not graduate

drivers that are fully trained in all aspects of the instruction program and

for some tasks they may be required to perform. The main reasons for

these shortcomings are instructor shortages, limited environmental

conditions (lack of snow, ice, steep or rocky terrain, etc.) at the training

sites, and certain mission-related driving skills not being taught. There is

also an imbalance between the two formal truck driver training schools:

the larger one is understaffed to teach the number of students there, while

 1 Military Safety: Army M939 5-Ton Truck Accident History and Planned Modifications

(GAO/NSIAD-99-82, Apr. 9, 1999).

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548

Results in Brief
Page 2 GAO-01-436 Army Training

the other one has smaller classes, conducts fewer classes per year, and

maintains a lower student-teacher ratio. In addition, some communication

problems hinder the flow of information to instructors, students,

supervisors, and licensed drivers.

Some supervisory procedures and processes designed to ensure that 5-ton

trucks are operated safely are not being performed or documented as

required. In particular, required annual “check rides” and “sustainment

training” are either not properly performed or recorded. We reviewed over

450 driver records and found that more than three-quarters of them did not

contain a required entry indicating that the driver had received an annual

check ride and/or sustainment training as stipulated in Army regulations.

The Army Safety Center maintains an accident database that has already

proven useful in developing some policies aimed at improving the safe

operation of M939 trucks. We analyzed M939 accident data from 1988

through 1999 and found trends that we believe could be used to improve

driving safety and to better focus training on problem areas. But the

database is not being periodically analyzed for these purposes, and

opportunities are thus being missed. Also, some accident reports have

missing information, thus limiting the usefulness of the database for some

analytical processes using these fields.

We are making recommendations aimed at improving the quality of truck

driver training, increasing compliance with Army regulations, and

increasing the safety of M939 truck driver operations. The Department of

Defense concurred with all our recommendations.
Page 3 GAO-01-436 Army Training

The Army has around 97,000 “medium tactical wheeled vehicles” (about

57,000 5-ton trucks and 41,000 2-1/2-ton trucks) in its fleet. The M939

accounts for more than half its 5-ton trucks. The truck is used to carry

personnel or pull equipment under all weather and road conditions,

including rain, snow, ice, unpaved roads, sand, and mud (see fig. 1).

Figure 1: Three M939 Series Trucks

Source: Shane G. Deemer.

Background
Page 4 GAO-01-436 Army Training

The active Army uses formal and informal programs to train 5-ton truck

drivers.2

 The formal program is aimed at military personnel whose official

primary occupation will be “88M Motor Transport Operator”—or truck

driver. The program lasts 6 weeks and is taught in schools at Fort Leonard

Wood, Missouri, and Fort Bliss, Texas. Fort Leonard Wood trains about

90 percent of all 88M students. Fort Bliss for the most part trains the

“overflow” of students that Fort Leonard Wood cannot accommodate. The

formal instruction program calls for about 1 week in the classroom and

5 weeks of hands-on training. Students who complete the program do not

immediately receive a license to drive a 5-ton truck; they are licensed at

their next duty station after undergoing additional training and testing

there. The Army Transportation Center and School at Fort Eustis, Virginia,

is responsible for the content of the instruction program used by the

formal training schools. It aligns under the Army Training and Doctrine

Command at Ft. Monroe, Virginia.

According to Army officials, informal programs are taught at installations

or units that need occasional3

 truck drivers but are not authorized any or

enough 88M drivers to handle their needs. Occasional drivers do not drive

trucks as their primary occupation; they do so on a part-time or as-needed

basis. Informal programs are usually 40 to 120 hours long and combine

classroom and driving time. Graduates are not automatically licensed and

must usually meet additional driving and testing requirements by their

units. Occasional drivers receive the same license as 88M drivers and,

accordingly, may be required to perform the same driving maneuvers.

The Army Reserve trains both Reserve and National Guard 88M drivers

using a two-part program that contains the same instructional material as

the formal program. The first part (81 hours) is conducted at the soldier’s

home station during weekend drills. The second part (120 hours) is usually

conducted at a Reserve training center during a 2-week active duty

session. Like active Army truck drivers, program graduates must undergo

additional training and testing by their units before being licensed.

 2

 We define formal programs as resident training programs taught in a school-house setting;

and informal programs as those conducted by individual Army units at many different

installations.

3

 We define an occasional driver as a driver licensed to operate a 5-ton truck but not

possessing the military occupation specialty designator or 88M – Motor Transport

Operator.
Page 5 GAO-01-436 Army Training

Graduates of the Army’s truck driver training programs are not skilled

enough to safely handle 5-ton trucks in some situations for which they

should have received training. This is because of instructor shortages and

limited training conditions. Graduates are either partially trained or

untrained in some skills found in the instruction program. In addition, the

schools do not teach driving skills that are essential to performing the

5-ton truck’s primary mission.

One of the Army’s two formal truck driver training schools, the school at

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, operates with sizable instructor shortages.

Because of this Fort Leonard Wood operates at a higher student-instructor

ratio than called for in the instruction program. In fiscal year 2000, the

Fort Leonard Wood facility trained nearly 90 percent of the Army’s 88M

drivers in spite of these shortages. Instructors at the informal and Reserve

programs also said that their programs suffer from instructor shortages.

During the first 9 months of 2000, Fort Leonard Wood operated with an

average of 53 percent of its authorized instructors on-hand to teach the

program. The main reasons were 1) fewer personnel were assigned to

teach than were authorized and 2) even fewer were available (on-hand)

than were assigned due to other commitments (such as bus driving,

funeral and parade duty, leave, etc.). Authorized refers to the number of

instructors the Army determines are needed to teach a program; assigned

refers to the number of instructors the Army allocates to teach a program;

and on-hand refers to the number of instructors that are present and

teaching a program. Figure 2 shows the number of instructors authorized,

assigned, and on-hand at Fort Leonard Wood in the first 9 months of 2000,

when on average about 45 of 84 authorized instructors were available.

Some Essential

Driving Skills Are Not

Taught

Instructor Shortages
Page 6 GAO-01-436 Army Training

Figure 2: Number of Authorized, Assigned, and On-hand Instructors at Fort Leonard

Wood, January-September 2000.

Source: Our analysis of Army data.

Assuming that (1) the Army continues assigning instructors at about

85 percent of authorized levels and that (2) the number of instructors

on-hand remains constant at about 53 percent of those assigned, the Army

would have to increase its present authorized level of instructors from

84 to158, an increase of 88 percent, in order to have a full complement

on-hand.

The formal instruction program calls for a 6-to-1 student-instructor ratio—

and Fort Leonard Wood is structured to operate at this ratio when staffed

at 100 percent of its authorized level. In the first 9 months of 2000, our

review showed that Fort Leonard Wood operated overall at a higher ratio

of about 9 to 1. Nonetheless, training officials stated that the school has

been conducting the behind-the-wheel (hands-on) training portion of the

program at the 6-to-1 ratio the instruction program calls for. This means

one instructor overseeing 3 trucks with two students per truck. However,

Army regulations stipulate a 1-to-1 truck-instructor ratio when a student

driver is behind the wheel. In December 1998, Fort Leonard Wood

requested a waiver to allow the 6-to-1 ratio when students were driving
Page 7 GAO-01-436 Army Training

trucks. While the request has yet to be officially approved, school officials

claim that if required to maintain the 1-to-1 ratio, each student might drive

as little as 30 miles during the entire course, instead of the present target

of about 100 miles per student on average.

Effects of Instructor Shortages

Instructor shortages affect the quantity and quality of training. Students do

not get sufficient hands-on driving experience and are not trained in all the

skills required by the instruction program.

Program officials at Fort Leonard Wood said that at times, instructors

could fully teach only about three-quarters of the instruction program’s

required tasks. For example, in the second half of fiscal year 1999 two

training modules—driving off-road and basic vehicle control—were often

carried out only in part or demonstrated but not practiced. These two

modules account for almost 93 percent of the 85.5 hours students are

supposed to spend driving trucks. Because of instructor shortages during

these two quarters, the average number of miles driven by each student at

Fort Leonard Wood dropped from nearly 100 to less than 50. In addition,

hands-on training is presently limited to mostly driving in controlled

settings only. Students drive in convoys on unpaved but graded and

regularly maintained training routes at no more than 25 mph – receiving

almost no training in how to drive on public highways or in suburban

settings. One group of trainers stated that with more instructors, they

could take students on some realistic training rather than the “follow-theleader” driving students now receive.

Students are also not being taught all the tasks that 5-ton-truck drivers are

expected to perform. Training officials at the two formal programs stated

they thought drivers should be trained in hauling loads or pulling

equipment—the primary mission of 5-ton trucks. While the instruction

program calls for 20 percent of all vehicles to operate with a load in the

cargo area, this is not being done, according to training officials, because

of logistical problems that make it difficult to train this skill. Pulling

equipment is not taught because it is not specified in the instruction

program. Therefore, students must learn these essential skills after

graduation and rotation to their next duty stations.

Neither the Marine Corps, which co-trains its 5-ton truck drivers with the

Army at Fort Leonard Wood, nor the smaller Fort Bliss school, which

mostly trains the overflow from Fort Leonard Wood, experience as severe

Comparison of On-hand

Instructors
Page 8 GAO-01-436 Army Training

instructor shortages as Fort Leonard Wood. Thus, neither encounters

problems teaching the instruction program in its entirety. According to

Marine Corps training officials, its detachment is authorized 76 instructors,

and in the first 9 months of 2000, averaged having 70 instructors assigned

and 65 on-hand (93 percent). During that same period of time, Fort Bliss

training officials stated its school was authorized 17 instructors but

actually had 18 assigned and on-hand (106 percent).

During the first 9 months of 2000, the Marine Corps program averaged a

higher percentage of its assigned instructors on-hand than the Fort

Leonard Wood Army program – 93 percent versus 63 percent (see fig. 3).

This, according to Marine Corps training officials, was mostly because

their instructors did not have other commitments or assignments as did

Army instructors. Also, the average class size for the Marine Corps was

much smaller than that for the Army (44 versus 70 students), and they had

more instructors available to teach (65 on average versus the Army’s 45).

Because of the smaller class size and larger number of on-hand

instructors, the Marine Corps can staff each truck at the 1-to-1 instructorto-truck ratio regulations call for. This, according to them, allows students

to gain driving skills in uncontrolled settings such as driving off-post, on

public highways, and in various urban settings.

On the other hand, the Fort Bliss school actually had a surplus of

instructors: it had 106 percent of its assigned instructors on-hand

(see fig. 3). According to program officials, their instructors also did not

have other commitments and assignments as did Fort Leonard Wood Army

instructors.

Figure 3: On-hand Instructors as a Percentage of Assigned Instructors at Three

Schools, January-September 2000

Source: our analysis of Army data.
Page 9 GAO-01-436 Army Training

During fiscal year 2000, Fort Bliss also graduated fewer students, utilized

less of its overall available classroom capacity, averaged smaller class

sizes, and conducted about one-third the classes that Fort Leonard Wood

conducted (see fig. 4).

Figure 4: Comparison of Two Formal Army Schools, Fiscal Year 2000

Source: Our analysis of Army data.

Student Opinions Show Varied Satisfaction With Training Received

We surveyed 139 students at the two formal school programs, 72 students

at 10 informal programs, and 98 students at 1 Army Reserve training

program. We asked them to rate their satisfaction with the type of training

there were receiving in various driving techniques and conditions. As table

1 shows, students at Fort Bliss felt better about the training they received

in many driving skills than their counterparts at Fort Leonard Wood.

Students in the Reserve program were the most satisfied overall with the

training they received, while students in the informal programs were

generally the least satisfied.

Imbalances Between the

Two Formal Army Schools
Page 10 GAO-01-436 Army Training

Table 1: Percentage of Students in Formal, Informal, and Reserve Programs

Satisfied With Training

Fort Bliss

Fort Leonard

Wood Informal Reserve

Backing empty truck 92 55 69 87

Overall wheel time 100 64 55 80

Small inclines/slopes–empty

truck

38 66 15 50

Wheel time in different

weather/surfaces–empty truck

08 07 09 57

Load in cargo area/pulling

equipmenta

N/A N/A 02 04

Driving at night 00 23 09 32

a

N/A (not applicable). The formal schools do not teach driving with a load, and the instruction program

does not call for training while pulling equipment.

Source: Our analysis of survey responses.

According to the instruction program, the majority of driving training time

(about 65 hours) should be dedicated to driving on and off roads through

woods, streams, brush, sand, mud, snow, ice, rocky terrain, ditches,

gullies, and ravines. However, we found that neither of the two formal

schools provides all these conditions in its training routes.

Students at Fort Bliss are well trained to drive in sand because the

school’s training routes have sand. But the school seldom sees snow or ice

because these conditions seldom occur there. And the school’s training

routes we observed were for the most part flat and unchallenging. One

route we drove offered few or no opportunities to drive through woods

and brush, over rocky terrain, or through gullies and ravines. The problem,

according to school officials, is that the land the training routes are on is

too flat and lacking in undergrowth. Training officials also told us that

money constraints and the fact that Fort Bliss’ mission is to handle the

overflow of students from Fort Leonard Wood impede the development of

more challenging driving routes.

Training routes at Fort Leonard Wood also offered limited obstacles or

challenges. We drove what school officials said was the most difficult

training route and found that it did go through some woods and rocky

terrain and over some hills and inclines. However, it contained no sand

and engineering units maintained the surface the trucks drove on by

routinely smoothing out bumps, ruts, and other obstacles.

Environmental Limitations

at Formal Training Schools
Page 11 GAO-01-436 Army Training

Simulators Can Be Useful Training Tools

When adverse weather, dangerous road conditions, or other problems

arise, the formal schools hesitate to allow students to drive because of

safety concerns. However, the Army has determined that simulators can

be used to teach some driving skills that cannot be taught in high risk

driving conditions because of the dangers involved.

Because of safety concerns, the Fort Leonard Wood command has issued

an oral directive prohibiting students from driving off the installation. As a

result, students do not learn to drive trucks in traffic at highway speeds or

in urban settings. Furthermore, the training command frequently cancels

hands-on driver training in the presence of ice, snow, or fog because it

believes the risk of student drivers having a serious accident outweighs

the benefits of the driving experience.

Not training under adverse weather and road conditions limits the ability

of drivers to handle a truck safely in these situations when they rotate to

their new duty stations and begin to drive. In May 2000 the Analysis Center

at the Army Training and Doctrine Command completed a study that

concluded, among other things, that students graduating from the formal

schools were only about 15-percent proficient4

 in skills needed to drive in

fog, ice, or snow and 27-percent proficient in skills needed to drive on

sand.

The study concluded that simulators could overcome these and other

shortcomings in driver training. It reviewed 31 critical driving tasks taught

at the formal schools and concluded that simulators could help students

obtain higher proficiency levels in as many as 22 of them. The study also

concluded that simulators might help reduce the potential for accidents

both during training and—most importantly—during the first year after

training by increasing driving proficiency in fog, snow, or ice.

 4

 The study defined proficiency as how well a school graduate performed a specific driving

task when compared to a driver with 1 year of post-training experience, as assessed by

qualified instructors.
Page 12 GAO-01-436 Army Training

Formal training program personnel agreed, stating that they cannot teach

students to drive under some of the more common hazardous conditions5

because it is too dangerous. Other Army officials also said that simulators,

especially more advanced ones, can recreate such situations and give

students a sense of driving under these conditions without putting lives at

risk. Training personnel at both formal schools, Army Transportation

School officials, as well as the simulator study itself strongly cautioned,

however, that simulators should not replace actual behind-the-wheel

driving time.

The private sector uses simulators in its truck driving schools and

considers them very useful. Officials at two commercial driving schools

stated that their simulators help students learn to drive under various

high-risk driving and weather conditions, including braking with a load on

steep inclines or on wet and icy surfaces.

Some safety rules relating to M939 trucks are not being communicated

effectively. Moreover, many informal training programs seem to be

unaware of available assistance from the Army Transportation School.

Better communication is key to improving the flow of this type of

information.

The M939 series trucks are not supposed to be driven over 40 mph, even

under ideal conditions. However, we found that some licensed drivers,

students, instructors, and supervisors alike were either unaware of the

speed limit, had forgotten about it, or did not know this restriction is still

in effect for M939s without anti-lock brake systems6

. Two-thirds of

licensed drivers we interviewed, as well as about one-third of student

drivers in formal training programs and over two-thirds of student drivers

in informal training programs, did not know or could not recall the 40-mph

limit. And none in a group we interviewed from a recently graduated

formal program class were able to tell us the correct maximum speed

 5

 In 1995 the Army Deputy Director of Safety concluded that M939 trucks were involved in

a disproportionately high number of accidents in which a panic stop on a wet surface with

a partially loaded truck going over 40 mph were among the factors that contributed to the

accident.

6

 For all M939s having been outfitted with anti-lock brake kits, the speed limit restriction of

40 mph is no longer in effect. However, we did not observe an M939 equipped with such

during our on-site visits.

Some Information Not

Reaching Its Target
Page 13 GAO-01-436 Army Training

limit. Although nearly all the 65 formal and Reserve program instructors

we interviewed could state the correct speed limit, only about two-thirds

of informal program instructors and driver supervisors could do so. By

contrast, all of the nearly 100 students we interviewed at the Army Reserve

training program knew of the speed limit, and for a simple reason: all the

M939 trucks used for training had a dashboard sticker to remind the driver

of the speed limit. (See fig. 5.)

Figure 5: Percentage of Interviewees Aware of M939 Speed Limit Restriction

Source: Our analysis of interview responses.

There also appears to be a communication problem between informal

program instructors and the Army Transportation School. Although the

instructors believe their training programs are good ones, they also stated

they do not have enough time to focus on improving and upgrading these

programs and would like more input from “knowledgeable personnel,”

such as those at the Fort Eustis Transportation School who developed the

formal training program. Some said they could have avoided difficulties

they encountered in developing a high-quality informal program if such

expertise had been available. Many suggested that standardized, Armywide training packages tailored for each type of vehicle would be an

efficient and economical way of training informal drivers.

However, none of the instructors we interviewed knew that the

Transportation School has a program available designed specifically for

informal training of M939 drivers. In November 1999, the Transportation

School distributed a CD-ROM driver training program7

, which includes

 7

 Army Model Drivers Training Program M939, 5-ton Tactical Cargo Truck.
Page 14 GAO-01-436 Army Training

lessons on driving and performing operator maintenance on the M939 to

Army standards. Transportation School officials stated that the program

was sent to around 1,800 different Army locations (according to the

number and location of M939 trucks) and is also available through the

Army’s web site.

While facing similar instructor shortages and limited driving conditions,

the informal and Reserve training programs we reviewed must also try to

train drivers in a shorter time than the formal programs. The reserves also

have problems with their equipment.

The 10 informal programs we reviewed ranged between 40 and 120 hours

(compared to 6 weeks for the formal program). As a result, instructors

focus mostly on teaching the basics (driving on surfaced roads, backing up

on flat surfaces, and performing some required maintenance and service).

Instructors teach more difficult skills only if time and circumstances

allow. Several instructors questioned how their 40 to 80 hour programs

could possibly teach as much as was taught in the 6-week formal course.

The reserves have problems not only with instructor shortages, but also

with training equipment. Reserve officials said their 5-ton truck driver

training programs are generally understaffed because of a lack of available

senior noncommissioned officers to teach. Also, because programs are

usually not authorized a fleet of trucks exclusively for training, units must

borrow trucks from the installation where training is taking place or from

other nearby Army installations. The training unit is responsible for

picking up and returning the trucks or for paying to have the trucks

delivered and returned. They also pay an established usage fee to the units

that lend the trucks. This is costly, especially if a borrowed vehicle needs

repair work before it can pass the required safety inspection so that it can

be used for training. Reserve training officials told us that this happens

frequently and adversely impacts training.

Additional Challenges

Facing Informal and

Reserve Training Programs
Page 15 GAO-01-436 Army Training

Army regulations8 require that truck drivers undergo a so-called “check

ride” and “sustainment training9

” once a year (once every 2 years for the

Army Reserve and National Guard). Performing these procedures-which

are aimed at identifying and correcting poor driving habits, maintaining

high driving proficiency levels, and ensuring safe driving-is the

responsibility of the driver’s assigned unit. Both procedures must also be

documented in personnel driving records. However, we found that they

are either not being performed or are not being recorded as required.

We reviewed over 450 driving records and found that over 80 percent did

not contain an entry indicating a check ride had been performed every

year and for each type of vehicle in which the driver was licensed to drive.

Eighty-five percent of records also did not have an entry documenting that

sustainment training had been given annually as required. Seventy percent

of the drivers we interviewed (both 88M drivers and occasional drivers)

stated they either did not know what a check ride was or had not been

given one annually. Three-quarters of the drivers we interviewed also said

they had not attended an annual sustainment training course.

Supervisors10 are responsible for administering check rides to assess a

driver’s capabilities and overall driving habits. According to Army officials,

unit commanders and supervisors must also develop and implement

annual sustainment training programs, in part, on the basis of the results

of check rides. A number of supervisors told us that they do not always

conduct formal check rides because of personnel shortages and high

operating tempo; rather, they try to assess drivers’ skills and give

correctional guidance—a sort of “informal” check ride—whenever they

ride with a driver. None of them knew about the Transportation School’s

informal driver training program, which includes guidelines for

sustainment training.

 8

 ArmyRegulation 600-55, Army Driver and Operator Standardization Program (Selection,

Training, Testing, and Licensing).

9

 Instruction and practice to ensure that mastery of specific skills are maintained.

10 Supervisors are those in the driver’s immediate chain-of-command who oversee and

direct the driver’s day-to-day activities.

Some Supervisory

Procedures Are Not

Being Performed or

Documented
Page 16 GAO-01-436 Army Training

The Army Safety Center maintains a ground accident database11 that has

been used in the past to identify accident anomalies that in turn led to

safety improvements involving the operation of M939 series 5-ton trucks.

The database, however, is not complete because not all data fields in

accident investigation reports are always filled in. The database is also not

being analyzed on a regular basis to identify trends or recurring problems.

One of the purposes of the ground database is to provide demographic

information that can be used for statistical comparisons. The Army Safety

Center did so in 1998 when it compared accident rates of different Army

trucks12 and found that the M939 series trucks had a much higher serious

accident rate than other similar trucks. In other, earlier studies, the Center

reviewed M939 accident data and found a series of recurring accident

conditions. On the basis of these studies, the Army Tank-automotive and

Armaments Command in December 1992 issued the first of several

Army-wide messages13 warning of these problems and imposing the

40-mph speed limit on the M939. Also on the basis of these studies, the

Command conducted additional studies on the M939, which in turn led to

an estimated $122.4 million in recommended design modifications.14

We analyzed nearly 400 M939 accident reports dating from 1988 through

1999 contained in the Safety Center’s database and found that four of the

36 data fields of information we requested for our analysis were often not

filled in. Safety Center personnel acknowledged that the missing data

could weaken any conclusions reached using these fields. Two fields –

Was the Driver Licensed at the Time of the Accident and What was the

Driver’s Total Accumulated Army Motor Vehicle Mileage – contained no

information 45 and 50 percent of the time respectively, and because of

this, could not be included in the analyses we performed. Two other Fields

–What Was the Mistake Made and Why Was the Mistake Made-were also

often left blank.

 11 Army regulations require that an accident investigation report be filled out for all class A

through C occupational injury accidents and all class A through D property damage

accidents. The classes denote the severity of the accident, with “A” as the most serious or

costly.

12 The M34/35 trucks, the M939 trucks, and the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicle trucks.

13 The Army uses Ground Precautionary Messages and Safety of Use Messages to

disseminate service-wide safety information.

14 See Military Safety: Army M939 5-Ton Truck Accident History and Planned

Modifications (GAO/NSIAD-99-82, Apr. 9, 1999).

Accident Database

Not Used Effectively
Page 17 GAO-01-436 Army Training

Our analysis also revealed patterns that, if studied further, might be useful

in improving training programs. For example, many of the reported

accidents occurred on wet or slippery surfaces or when the truck was

hauling cargo or pulling equipment. Furthermore, three-quarters of

accidents involved occasional drivers (those trained at informal schools).

Some patterns we identified are illustrated in figure 6.

Figure 6: Some Recurring Conditions Cited in M939 Accident Reports, 1988-99

Source: Our analysis of Army Safety Center ground accident database.

Instructor shortages are affecting the quality and quantity of truck driver

training, especially at Fort Leonard Wood. The end result is that student

drivers are not fully trained in all aspects of the instruction program when

they graduate. This places an additional burden on the drivers’ assigned

units, which must further train these drivers, and on supervisors, who

must be more vigilant in identifying drivers’ shortcomings. If formal

schools had enough instructors on-hand, they would presumably be able

to teach the entire instruction program.

The student imbalance between the schools at Fort Leonard Wood, which

is understaffed, and Fort Bliss, which has smaller class sizes and a lower

student-instructor ratio, creates an ineffective use of resources. This

imbalance places an unnecessarily heavy burden on Fort Leonard Wood. If

the annual student load were more equally distributed between the two

schools, student graduates from Fort Leonard Wood might receive more

complete training.

Conclusions
Page 18 GAO-01-436 Army Training

The formal schools are not adhering to the instruction program, which

calls for some training with trucks carrying cargo. Further, no training is

provided in how to pull equipment. With a high percentage of M939

accidents taking place under these two conditions, the formal schools

should provide some training in these areas.

Similarly, students are not being trained to drive under different weather

and surface conditions. While it is understandable why formal schools

hesitate to take the risk of having students drive under hazardous or highrisk conditions, it is also necessary that students receive such training. An

army study concluded that simulators can provide an effective means of

safely training drivers in high-risk weather and different road-surface

situations.

Because annual check rides and sustainment training are not always being

performed, unsafe driving habits may go undetected. Further, if corrective

oversight or training is not recorded, unit commanders and supervisors

cannot know which drivers need attention. Although performing and

recording check rides and sustainment training may be time-consuming,

these procedures can save lives.

Some important safety information, such as M939 speed limit restrictions,

is not always being passed on to or remembered by drivers, supervisors,

and trainers. Using inexpensive devices, such as dashboard stickers, is a

simple way to remind these personnel of the speed restrictions.

The Safety Center’s accident database could be used to identify trends that

may show the need for greater training emphasis in certain driving

maneuvers. A periodic analysis of the database could assist school

officials, instructors, and supervisors in adjusting instruction programs or

mentoring drivers. However, such analysis would prove more useful if all

fields of information contained in the database were complete.

We recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the Commander of

the Training and Doctrine Command to

• review and modify, as needed, instructor levels for the formal training

programs to ensure that the programs are adequately staffed to teach the

anticipated class size;

• balance the student load between the two schools by bringing the Fort

Bliss school up to fuller capacity and/or increasing the number of classes

Recommendations
Page 19 GAO-01-436 Army Training

annually taught there, thereby reducing the student load and associated

problems created by such at Fort Leonard Wood;

• enforce the instruction program used by the two formal schools to ensure

that students receive hands-on training in driving trucks loaded with cargo

and also modify the program to include driving when pulling equipment—

two essential skills in performing the primary mission of the 5-ton tactical

fleet; and

• consider using simulators at the two formal schools to safely teach known

training shortfalls such as driving under hazardous conditions, with the

understanding that simulators not be used to replace hands-on driving

conducted under less risky conditions.

We also recommend that the Secretary of the Army issue instructions to all

applicable major army commands to

• require adherence to Army regulations on check rides and sustainment

training of licensed truck drivers and

• require that warning stickers indicating speed restrictions be prominently

displayed in the cabs of all M939 trucks not equipped with anti-skid brake

systems.

We further recommend that the Secretary of the Army direct the

Commander of the Army Safety Center to

• ensure that all information fields in accident reports are properly filled in

and

• periodically review accident data for the presence of trends or anomalies

for the purposes of informing trainers and supervisors of any information

that may help them perform their duties or help improve safety.

In oral comments on a draft of this report, Department of Defense officials

concurred with all our recommendations.

We are providing copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H.

Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Joseph W. Westphal, Ph.D.,

Acting Secretary of the Army; and interested congressional committees.

Copies will also be made available to other interested parties upon

request.

Agency Comments

and Our Review
Page 20 GAO-01-436 Army Training

If you or your staff have questions concerning the report, please call me at

(202) 512-5559. Our scope and methodology is explained in appendix I.

GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments to this report are listed in

appendix II.

Derek B. Stewart

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Page 21 GAO-01-436 Army Training

Our objectives were to (1) evaluate the capacity of the Army’s 5-ton truck

driver training programs to fully train drivers, (2) determine whether

oversight procedures and processes for these drivers are being followed,

and (3) determine whether and how the Army uses accident data to

improve training, supervision, and safety.

To evaluate the capacity of the Army’s 5-ton truck driver training programs

to fully train drivers, we reviewed applicable training programs in terms of

compliance and completeness at both of the Army’s formal schools (Fort

Leonard Wood and Fort Bliss) and 10 different informal training facilities

located at 4 installations. We also reviewed the training provided at one of

eight Army Reserve training centers. Reserve training centers all use the

same Program of Instruction. We reviewed these programs for compliance

with existing regulations and standard operating procedures established

by the various training components. To assess the completeness of

training, we made observations and collected documentation relating to

the actual training being conducted and compared that documentation to

the training specified in each training schools/program’s instruction

program and also in relation to the primary mission of the 5-ton truck

fleet. We also discussed these issues with officials responsible for

designing the training programs, training command personnel, driving

instructors, and student drivers to gain their perspectives. Lastly we

compared the formal Marine Corps 5-ton training program and two

commercial sector training programs to the Army’s formal program to

identify any training techniques and/or devices that might benefit 5-ton

training curriculums.

To determine whether oversight procedures and processes for these

drivers are being followed, we documented the duties of supervisors of

medium tactical vehicles as found in Department of Defense and Army

guidance, instructions, procedures, and regulations. Through observations

and discussions with nearly 80 driver supervisors and nearly 200 truck

drivers stationed at 12 different Army and National Guard units, we then

assessed the degree to which they accomplished these responsibilities or

followed required documentary procedures. In addition, at the units

visited we collected over 450 historical driving records for truck operators

and reviewed them for required annual supervisory annotations relating to

check ride and sustainment training specified in Army regulations.

To ensure we collected information representative of the universe of

existing 5-ton truck informal training programs and the administering of

driver supervision responsibilities, we selected—for review and

observation purposes—four installations aligned under the U.S. Army

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and

Methodology

Page 22 GAO-01-436 Army Training

Forces Command. This major command, according to the Army Materiel

Command’s Logistic Support Activity, controls 94 percent of the active

army’s M939 series 5-ton trucks in the continental United States. Because

Army automated record-keeping systems cannot provide 5-ton truck

densities or locations below the major command level, we engaged the

services of Army Internal Review personnel to assist us. Within the four

installations, we requested that Internal Review personnel set up meetings

with subordinate commands conducting the majority of 5-ton truck driver

training and with commands maintaining the largest concentrations of 5-

ton trucks and/or drivers.

In discussing accident data with Army Safety Center personnel, we learned

of Army notifications currently in effect and relevant to the safe handling

of 5-ton trucks that resulted from past analyses performed on the Center’s

ground accident database. We reviewed these notifications, including

existing Army regulations and procedures pertaining to how this

information is to be disseminated Army-wide. We then queried 5-ton truck

driver-trainers, student drivers, supervisors, and licensed drivers to gain

an understanding of how knowledgeable they were of restrictions imposed

by these notifications.

To determine whether and how the Army uses accident data to improve

training, supervision, and safety, we interviewed safety center personnel

and obtained and reviewed past studies and analyses conducted by the

Center. In addition to identifying data that could be useful in improving

training or supervision, we analyzed 12 years of demographic accident

information pertaining to M939 series 5-ton tactical cargo trucks. Our

analysis of this information, compiled for us by Army Safety Center

personnel, included Class A, B, and C accidents occurring from January

1988 through December 1999 and for which some degree of fault was

attributable to an M939 driver. This truck series accounts for about onehalf of the Army’s 5-ton fleet and is the series specifically mentioned in the

request letter. We focused on identifying the presence of any demographic

anomalies or commonality factors that, when compiled statistically, might

prove beneficial to trainers, supervisors, or the safer operation of M939

series trucks. We also discussed the results of our accident analysis with

Army Safety Center officials, trainers, and supervisors to obtain their input

and/or concurrence.

We performed our work from May 1999 through July 2000 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff

Acknowledgments

Page 23 GAO-01-436 Army Training

Reginald L. Furr, Jr. (202) 512-5426

In addition to those named above, Aisha A.Mahmood, Stefano Petrucci,

William R. Simerl, Lorelei St. James, and Gerald L. Winterlin made key

contributions to this report.

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Acknowledgments

(702001)

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