UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

Miguel Mendez, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

FedEx Express and AETNA, 

Defendants. 

________________________________/

Case No. 15-cv-12301 

Judith E. Levy 

United States District Judge 

Mag. Judge Anthony P. Patti 

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN 

PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR BACK BENEFITS, 

INTEREST, COSTS, AND ATTORNEY FEES [29] 

 The Court previously granted plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment, finding that defendants Federal Express Corporation and 

Aetna Life Insurance Company denied his claim for long-term disability 

benefits in violation of The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 

1974. (Dkt. 28.) At issue here is plaintiff’s motion for back benefits, 

interest, costs, and attorney fees, pursuant to the Court’s order. (Dkt. 

29.) For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s motion is granted in 

part and denied in part. 

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 Defendants do not oppose plaintiff’s request for back benefits in 

the amount of $12,479.38, nor do they oppose his request for 

reinstatement of his long-term disability benefits. (Dkt. 29 at 4.) Thus, 

the Court awards plaintiff $12,479.38 in back benefits and orders 

defendants to reinstate plaintiff’s long-term disability benefits. 

 Defendants also do not oppose plaintiff’s request for pre-judgment 

interest in the amount of $40.35, as calculated by plaintiff based on the 

52-week Treasury 1 year constant maturity yield rate for each month, 

compounded annually. (See Dkt. 29 at 4-5; Dkt. 29-3.) Thus, the Court 

awards plaintiff pre-judgment interest in the amount of $40.35. 

 Plaintiff also requests $699.60 in total costs (Dkt. 29 at 2; Dkt. 29-

4), but defendants argue that plaintiff is entitled to taxable costs of only 

$400 for his e-filing fee, and not $114 for West Law research, $171.70 in 

copying costs, and $13.90 in postage. (Dkt. 33 at 2-3.) According to 

defendants, “routine copy expenses; those made for service; filing or for 

the convenience of counsel are not taxable within the discretion of the 

taxation clerk,” and “computerized legal research charges and postage 

fees are not taxable.” (Id.) 

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 The Court has broad discretion to award costs to prevailing 

parties in ERISA actions. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (providing that the 

Court “in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs 

of action to either party”). And even nontaxable costs may be 

considered part of an attorney fee award under the statute, “as long as 

those costs are reasonable . . . [and] normally charged to a fee-paying 

client in the course of providing legal services.” See Potter v. Blue Cross 

Blue Shield of Mich., 10 F. Supp. 3d 737, 771 (E.D. Mich. 2014) 

(collecting cases). 

 Costs for legal research have been permitted as part of a 

reasonable attorney fee award. Id. (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 353 F. 

Supp. 2d 929, 945 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (awarding but reducing total 

research cost as “exorbitant”); Ousley v. GM Ret. Program, 496 F. Supp. 

2d 845, 852 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (awarding legal research costs)). So too 

have copying and postage costs. Id. (collecting cases). Here, plaintiff 

seeks modest nontaxable costs of only $114 for research, $171.70 for 

copying, and $13.90 for postage. And those are the costs that are 

regularly charged to fee-paying clients in the normal course. See id. 

Thus, the Court awards plaintiff the total request of $699.60 in costs, 

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$400 of which are taxable and $299.60 of which are part of the attorney 

fee award. 

 Finally, plaintiff seeks $58,185 in attorney fees, for 129.3 hours of 

work at a rate of $450 per hour. (See Dkt. 29-5 at 7.) Defendants do not 

dispute that plaintiff’s counsel is entitled to an award. Rather, 

defendants argue that the requested amount is excessive for a number 

of reasons. According to defendants, the $450-per-hour rate is 

excessively high (they argue that plaintiff’s rate should only be $250 per 

hour); a number of plaintiff’s billing entries are excessive, unsupported, 

or vague; and there should otherwise be an across-the-board reduction 

of 25% because of voluminous block billing with vague descriptions. 

(Dkt. 33 at 3-9.) 

 “The primary concern in an attorney fee case is that the fee 

awarded be reasonable, that is, one that is adequately compensatory to 

attract competent counsel yet which avoids producing a windfall for 

lawyers.” Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting 

Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 471 (6th Cir. 1999)). The “lodestar” 

method—multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the proven number of 

hours reasonably expended on the case by counsel—is the “proper 

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method for determining the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees.” 

Bldg. Serv. Local 47 Cleaning Contractors Pension Plan v. Grandview 

Raceway, 46 F.3d 1392, 1401 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Pa. v. Del. Valley 

Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 563 (1986)). First, the 

lodestar must be calculated for each attorney involved. See Del. Valley 

Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. at 563. Second, the Court may, 

“within limits, adjust the ‘lodestar’ to reflect relevant considerations 

peculiar to the subject litigation.” See Adcock-Ladd v. Sec’y of Treasury, 

227 F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Reed, 179 F.3d at 471-72). 

 A reasonable hourly rate is generally calculated according to the 

“prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” See Blum v. 

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). The “relevant community” here is 

the Eastern District of Michigan. See Adcock-Ladd, 227 F.3d at 350 

(relevant community is the legal community within the court’s 

territorial jurisdiction). And the “‘prevailing market rate’ is that rate 

which lawyers of comparable skill and experience can expect to 

command” in the relevant community. See id. “The appropriate rate 

. . . is not necessarily the exact value sought by a particular firm, but is 

rather the market rate in the venue sufficient to encourage competent 

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representation.” Gonter v. Hunt Valve Co., 510 F.3d 610, 618 (6th Cir. 

2007). 

 Plaintiff argues that Craig Nemier and Michelle Mathieu, 

plaintiff’s counsel, are entitled to $450-per-hour because they are “AV 

rat[ed]” attorneys with 40 and 34 years’ experience, respectively, and 

should be awarded rates in the 95th percentile of attorneys with more 

than 35 years’ experience, with an office location in south Oakland 

County, and with a practice of civil litigation. (See Dkt. 29 at 11-12.) 

 According to the most recent survey from the State Bar of 

Michigan, attorneys with over 35 years’ experience charged rates of 

$350 at the 75th percentile and $525 at the 95th. See State Bar of 

Michigan, Economics of Law Practice 6 (2014), http://www.michbar.org/ 

file/pmrc/articles/0000151.pdf. Attorneys who practice in Oakland 

County south of M-59 charged hourly rates of $325 at the 75th 

percentile and $495 at the 95th. See id. at 7. Attorneys in a firm the 

size of 7 to 10 attorneys, the approximate size of plaintiff’s counsels’ 

firm, charged hourly rates of $325 at the 75th percentile and $455 at 

the 95th. See id. And attorneys who practice plaintiffs’-side 

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employment law charged hourly rates of $330 at the 75th percentile and 

$450 at the 95th. 

 Mr. Nemier and Ms. Mathieu are experienced and well-qualified 

attorneys. The most relevant rate here is that of attorneys in the 75th 

percentile of the categories set forth above, because plaintiff’s counsel 

bill for legal work that could not likely command the requested $450-

per-hour from fee-paying clients. For example, plaintiff’s counsel bill 

for work such as “prepare proposed [stipulated] order,” “legal research 

case citations of [summary judgment] brief,” and “legal research re 

recoverable atty fees in ERISA” (see Dkt. 29-5), which is often the type 

of work that is assigned to associates or legal assistants and charged at 

much lower rates. The Court will thus award a rate of $375-per-hour 

for the work performed by both counsel. That rate is around or above 

the 75th percentile for attorneys who have similar experience, practice 

in this field, and practice in south Oakland County in a firm the size of 

plaintiff’s counsels’ firm. 

 As to the number of hours, plaintiff seeks fees for 129.3 hours of 

work performed by his counsel. The time billed for administrative or 

otherwise non-compensable tasks is discounted. This Court will not 

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award attorney fees for administrative or non-legal tasks. See, e.g., 

Potter, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 750 (reducing fees for “clerical tasks” such as 

“file organization,” “proofread[ing] correspondence and filing,” 

“[r]etriev[ing] documents from Wayne Library,” and “[c]ontinu[ing] and 

complet[ing] file organization”); Caudill v. Sears Transition Pay Plan, 

No. 06-cv-12866, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45294, at *44-45 (E.D. Mich. 

Apr. 26, 2011) (reducing hours for entries such as “organized file,” “resorting questionnaires,” “filing,” “binders,” and “organize meeting”); 

Gratz v. Bollinger, 353 F. Supp. 2d 929, 941 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (no fees 

for “media and public relations efforts”). Plaintiff’s counsels’ hours are 

thus reduced by 6.7 hours for a total of 122.6 hours.1

 Finally, the Court further reduces the award because it finds that 

the fees requested for hours spent in preparation for recovery of 

 

1 The Court discounts the following hours billed: 0.3 for “preparation of summons 

for Fed Ex”; 0.3 for “preparation of summons for Aetna”; 1.0 for “creation of federal 

e-file for filing federal complaint”; 0.1 for “review of confirmation of receipt of filing 

fee of $400”; 0.2 for “review of notice from Court of magistrate option”; 0.3 for 

“review of appearance of defense attorney for defendants”; 0.5 for “review of 

defendants appearance and note in file attys and addresses”; 0.3 for “review of 

FedEx financial disclosure”; 0.2 of the 0.3 for “review of notice to appear for case 

management status conf 9/25/15 and joint discovery plan due 4 days prior to conf 

9/21/15”; 0.1 of the 0.2 for “email to atty to try and reschedule scheduling conf”; 0.1 

of the 0.2 for review of scheduling order for discovery”; 2.9 of the 4.9 for “locate some 

of the exhibits in the administrative record with page numbers”; 0.2 for 

“electronically file brief”; and 0.2 for “e-filing motion and exhibits.” (Dkt. 29-5 at 2-

7.)

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attorney fees and costs was excessive. Of the 129.3 hours in total 

sought by plaintiff’s counsel, 16.2 hours were spent on preparation of 

the attorney fee petition alone.2 Put differently, about 12.5% of the 

total hours spent on this case were expended on preparation of the 

attorney fee request. 

 There is no bright-line rule capping the number of hours that can 

be spent on “fees for fee awards.” See Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. 

Husted, 831 F.3d 686, 725 (6th Cir. 2016) (abrogating Coulter v. 

Tennessee, 805 F.2d 146, 151 (6th Cir. 1986)). Rather, the Court must 

determine the number of “reasonable attorneys’ fees for the hours 

expended . . . in seeking the[] fee award.” Id. The Court finds that a 

reducing the 16.2 hour fees for fee request by 25% is reasonable, in part 

because many of these entries are duplicative, and thus reduces the 

 

2 Plaintiff requests 3.7 for “legal research re recoverable atty fees in ERISA – proofs 

required, reasonable rates, lodestar factors”; 0.6 for “receipt/review of ED Mich bill 

of costs handbook and review local rules on requirements for motions for costs and 

atty fees”; 0.3 for “review of bill of costs form”; 0.6 for “gathering data re taxable 

costs incurred”; 1.8 for “preparation of portion of brief for 4 part test for attorney 

fees”; 0.8 for “legal research economics of law re atty fees rate and court rule re time 

calculation and power of court on extension”; 2.5 for “preparation of more 

arguments for brief for costs and fees”; 0.3 for “preparation of bill of costs”; 1.0 for 

“revision of/adjustments to motion for benefits, costs and attorney fees”; 1.8 for 

“revision of brief with more case law in support of 5 factors”; 1.9 for “revision of 

/additions to motion/brief re interest and supporting authority on costs interest and 

attorney fees”; 0.4 for “preparation of affidavit of CLN re costs/fees”; and 0.5 for 

“finalize motion and brief re costs, interest and fees.” (Dkt. 29-5 at 6-7.) 

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hours by an additional 4.05 hours, for a total of 118.55 hours. At the 

awarded rate of $375-per-hour, plaintiff is awarded a total of $44,456.25 

in attorney fees. 

 Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for back benefits, interest, costs, 

and attorney fees (Dkt. 29) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN 

PART. Plaintiff is awarded $12,479.38 in back benefits, $40.35 in prejudgment interest, $400 in taxable costs, $299.60 in nontaxable costs as 

part of the attorney fee award, and $44,456.25 in attorney fees. 

Moreover, defendants shall reinstate plaintiff’s long-term disability 

benefits. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 17, 2017 s/Judith E. Levy 

Ann Arbor, Michigan JUDITH E. LEVY 

United States District Judge 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s 

ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on January 17, 2017. 

s/Felicia M. Moses 

FELICIA M. MOSES 

Case Manager 

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