UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

Jerry Gilliam, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

William H. Ordiway, Jr., and 

Marveilyn Talisic Ordiway, 

Defendants. 

________________________________/

Case No. 15-cv-11833 

Hon. Judith E. Levy 

Mag. Judge Mona K. Majzoub 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS [11] 

Pro se plaintiff Jerry Gilliam filed a second amended complaint on 

June 26, 2015, alleging “invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of 

emotional distress and out[r]ageous conduct inflicting extreme 

emotional distress,” caused by defendants William H. Ordiway, Jr. and 

Marvielyn Talisic Ordiway (incorrectly spelled Marveilyn in the caption 

and throughout the complaint). (Dkt. 7.) Plaintiff invokes this Court’s 

diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, alleging that he is a 

citizen of Missouri, defendants are residents of Michigan, and damages 

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exceed $75,000. (Id. at 3.) Defendants also appear pro se in this action. 

Defendants filed an answer and motion to dismiss on July 21, 2015, 

(Dkt. 11), which is the subject of this opinion and order.1 For the 

reasons set forth below, the motion is denied. 

I. Background 

Plaintiff alleges generally that from January 2014 through August 

2014, defendants “made numerous communications to plaintiff and 

plaintiff’s family members through telephone and internet services that 

included demands for money, accusations of crimes, [and] threats of 

arrest and imprisonment of plaintiff.” (Dkt. 7 at 3.) Plaintiff claims 

that defendants’ actions caused him “physical symptoms including 

rapid heartbeat, dizziness, unsteadiness, fainting, palpitating 

heartbeat, irregular heartbeat, night sweats, insomnia and 

nightmares.” (Id. at 10.) 

                                                            

1 Defendants cannot file both an answer and motion to dismiss. See generally Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(b) (“A motion asserting a[ failure to state a claim on which relief can be 

granted] must be made before pleading if a responsive pleading is allowed.”). 

Because defendants are acting pro se, the document will be considered a motion to 

dismiss and not as an answer, and defendants will have fourteen days after notice 

of this opinion and order to file an answer to plaintiff’s second amended complaint. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A) (“[S]erving a motion under this rule alters these 

periods as follows: . . . if the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition 

until trial, the responsive pleading must be served within 14 days after notice of the 

court’s action[] . . . .”). 

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According to plaintiff, “defendant Ordiway” (it is unclear to which 

Ordiway plaintiff refers) made the first demand for $100,000 on 

January 5, 2014, “resulting in plaintiff suffering emotional distress.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff claims that defendants attempted to “extort” this money 

from plaintiff “to cover hospital medical bills for [defendants’] adopted 

(sponsored) son, when [p]laintiff was not legally bound in any manner 

to pay such medical bills.” (Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant 

William Ordiway filed suit in Michigan state court “for [p]laintiff 

Gilliam to pay child support—motion and/or medical bill payments for 

$100,000.00 dollars—which the state court denied.” (Id. at 9.) 

According to plaintiff, these alleged demands caused him “numerous 

panic attacks, insomnia and overall extreme emotion distress for 

several months and continued until defendants ceased and desisted on 

or about August 2014.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff also alleges that defendants “committed invasion of 

privacy by communicating with [p]laintiff’s family members concerning 

allegations, unsupported by relevant facts, of crimes committed in the 

Philippine Islands,” specifically “accusing plaintiff of crimes of rape, 

bigamy and tax evasion.” (Id. at 4.) According to plaintiff, defendants 

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committed “egregious misconduct” by attempting “to convince 

[p]laintiff’s family of [p]laintiff’s lack of morals and [to] portray plaintiff 

as a ‘criminal.’” (Id.) 

The alleged misconduct included sending “emails to plaintiff’s 

family members” in an attempt “to damage plaintiff’s reputation and 

character and standing with his family.” (Id. at 5.) Defendants 

allegedly “knew that plaintiff had made great efforts to locate his 

missing [seven]-year[-]old daughter,” and “provided the[] allegations of 

crimes and arrest to plaintiff’s family members with the intention to 

harm plaintiff and harm plaintiff’s ability to get his ex-wife into a court 

of law.” (Id.) Defendants allegedly “knew or reasonably should have 

known [that] to invade plaintiff’s privacy by sharing the bogus 

allegations of crimes and pending felony warrant with plaintiff’s family 

would cause harm to plaintiff and result in . . . emotional distress,” 

especially given that defendants were “fully aware of plaintiff’s mental 

health disorders.” (Id. at 5-6.) 

According to plaintiff, this “dissemination of . . . false allegations 

. . . interfered with plaintiff obtaining custody and visitation rights to 

his [seven]-year[-]old daughter.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff claims that he has 

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“no such criminal past” because there were “no charges pending” and 

another incident “was settled.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff brings eight causes of action, which may be distilled as 

follows. First, plaintiff claims that defendant William Ordiway acted 

“with malicious intent to harm plaintiff” or “with reckless disregard 

towards the probability of causing emotional distress” by emailing 

plaintiff and plaintiff’s family, and that his actions were the “actual and 

proximate cause” of plaintiff’s emotional distress. (Id. at 11-12.) 

Second, he alleges that defendant William Ordiway committed 

intentional infliction of emotional distress by knowingly or 

unreasonably interfering with plaintiff’s custody and visitation order 

and his ability to bring his ex-wife into court. (Id. at 14.) Third, 

defendant William Ordiway allegedly violated a duty of care owed to 

plaintiff “by disseminating allegations of crimes and immoral conduct to 

plaintiff’s family[,] accusing plaintiff of rape, bigamy and tax evasion, 

all of which is false,” which caused plaintiff emotional distress. (Id. at 

15-16.) Plaintiff brings separate causes of action against defendant 

Marvielyn Ordiway with the same general allegations, but for “aiding 

and abetting her husband.” (See id. at 12-16.) 

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In their motion, defendants argue generally that plaintiff “has no 

evidence to support his claims due to the fact there is none.” (See Dkt. 

11 at 3.) Defendants challenge plaintiff to “provide proof” of his 

allegations. (Id. at 5-6.) According to defendants, there “were never 

ANY demands for money,” and “the ONLY email that was sent to 

[p]laintiff with regards to any money was sent on 03/04/2014,” which 

“only explain[ed] what happen[ed] and request[ed] [p]laintiff[’s] contact 

info[rmation].” (Id. at 4.) Rather than attaching the email, defendants 

write that the email provided as follows: 

[Subject:] “Sorry that you[’re] invol[ve]d” . . . . Jerry, Clint 

was attacked by a wild dog and had to be rushed down to 

Saginaw for plastic surgery[. He’]s ok but the problem is 

that the hospital called me and advised me that my 

medica[i]d has been cancelled and [] when they found out he 

is not a US Citizen I had to produce all the visa papers. Now 

they are requ[e]sting that I give them all your info as to 

where you live and contact info. Jerry [I’]m really sorry as 

the bill is over $100,000.00 and they told me that you[’re] 

going to be responsible as you should [have] made sure he 

got his US Citizenship because you w[]ere the spons[o]r. 

Clint will need a few more plastic surger[ies] that will be 

over $100,000.00. Jerry [I’]m sorry that you had to be 

dragged into this. Please email me back your current 

address and phone number. 

(Id.) 

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 According to defendants, “the only family member [] defendants 

contacted was [plaintiff’s] sister,” in an effort to get her to testify on 

defendants’ behalf after plaintiff filed his first complaint against them. 

(Id. at 5.) Defendants believe that plaintiff “is only using this court 

system to harass [d]efendants,” alleging that plaintiff previously 

reported defendants for welfare fraud, contacted a local building 

department for permit violations, and “contacted ICE” and “the Detroit 

Field Office regarding [f]raud” to “try to get [d]efendant Marvielyn and 

son Clint deported.” (Id. at 5-6.) Finally, defendants note that plaintiff 

filed a complaint “against his brother, sisters and ex-wife” in the U.S. 

District Court for the Eastern District of California, in which plaintiff 

made claims based on similar allegations of interference with custodial 

and visitation rights. (Id. at 6.)2 

II. Standard 

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 

the Court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to 

the plaintiff and accept all allegations as true.” Keys v. Humana, Inc.,

684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 

                                                            

2 The California case cited by defendants was closed on June 1, 2015. See Gilliam v. 

Gilliam et al., No. 14-cv-02454 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2015). The court dismissed 

plaintiff’s complaint without leave to amend. See id. 

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complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plausible claim need not contain “detailed 

factual allegations,” but it must contain more than “labels and 

conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ . . . and ‘a 

pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 

lawyers[.]’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)) (internal citation omitted). 

III. Analysis 

Plaintiff claims that defendants committed intentional infliction of 

emotional distress by outrageous conduct, including by violating his 

right to privacy, interfering with his custodial and visitation rights, and 

falsely accusing him of rape, bigamy, and tax evasion. Plaintiff’s claims 

are inartfully pled, but his complaint is subject to “less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” See Haines v. 

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Even still, a pro se complaint 

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“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Court will thus look at the 

alleged facts to determine whether plaintiff has pled plausible claims, 

regardless of whether they are correctly styled. 

a. Plaintiff sufficiently pled a claim of defamation. 

Under Michigan law, the elements of a defamation claim are: (1) a 

false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) an 

unprivileged communication to a third party; (3) fault amounting at 

least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) either 

actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm 

(defamation per se) or the existence of special harm caused by 

publication. Mitan v. Campbell, 706 N.W.2d 420, 421 (Mich. 2005).3 

“[A]n accusation of the commission of a crime is defamatory per se, 

meaning that special harm need not be proved.” Kevorkian v. AMA, 602 

N.W.2d 233, 237 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); see also Burden v. Elias Bros. 

Big Boy Restaurants, 613 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) 

(“[W]here a plaintiff brings an action alleging words imputing lack of 

                                                            

3 There is a one-year limitations period for defamation under Michigan law, which 

is not an issue in this case. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(1), (9). 

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chastity or commission of a crime . . . , the inability to prove damages is 

not fatal to the claim”). Because plaintiff is not a public figure, actual 

malice—that is, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the 

truth—need not be shown. See Kevorkian, 602 N.W.2d at 237-38. 

Rather, the proper standard is negligence. See Mitan, 706 N.W.2d at 

421. 

Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a plausible claim of defamation per 

se. Plaintiff claims that defendants emailed his family members—

publication to third parties—falsely accusing him of rape, bigamy, and 

tax evasion—a false and defamatory statement concerning plaintiff that 

is actionable irrespective of special harm. And plaintiff alleges that 

defendants did so for the purpose of interfering with his custodial and 

visitation rights, in part because defendants knew plaintiff’s ex-wife 

personally, (Dkt. 4), which may amount to at least a negligent disregard 

for the truth. And although not necessary to establish a claim of 

defamation per se, plaintiff alleges that defendants caused him to suffer 

“rapid heartbeat, dizziness, unsteadiness, fainting, palpitating 

heartbeat, irregular heartbeat, night sweats, insomnia and 

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nightmares.” Plaintiff sufficiently pled every element to establish a 

claim of defamation per se, and the claim may go forward. 

b. Plaintiff sufficiently pled intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. 

Under Michigan law, the elements of intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (“IIED”) are: (1) that the defendant engaged in 

extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) that the defendant intended to 

cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress or was reckless with regard 

to whether the plaintiff would suffer such distress; (3) that the 

defendant’s actions actually caused emotional distress; and (4) that the 

emotional distress was severe. Melson v. Botas, 863 N.W.2d 674, 674-75 

(Mich. 2015) (citing Graham v. Ford, 604 N.W.2d 713, 716 (Mich. 

1999)). “Sufficient proof must be adduced of intentional infliction and 

something much more than simply aggravation must be shown to make 

out a case of emotional distress.” Bhama v. Bhama, 425 N.W.2d 733, 

736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). This requires plaintiff to show more than 

“hurt feelings,” but “seeking and receiving medical treatment” is not “a 

condition precedent to satisfying the element of extreme emotional 

distress.” See McCahill v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 446 N.W.2d 579, 

584 (Mich. 1989). 

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The Michigan Court of Appeals has permitted an IIED claim to 

proceed based on allegations of interference with parental rights, noting 

that it was “unpersuaded that the deliberate destruction of a parentchild relationship can never be recognized as outrageous conduct” under 

the first element. See Bhama, 425 N.W.2d at 736.4 Here, plaintiff 

alleges that defendants deliberately defamed him for the purpose of 

interfering with his custodial and visitation rights with his daughter. 

And plaintiff alleges that defendants were aware that he had mental 

health issues, which may establish that they were “reckless with regard 

to whether the plaintiff would suffer such distress.” 

Finally, plaintiff alleges that he suffered “physical symptoms 

including rapid heartbeat, dizziness, unsteadiness, fainting, palpitating 

heartbeat, irregular heartbeat, night sweats, insomnia and 

nightmares,” which is sufficient to establish emotional distress. See, 

                                                            

4 The domestic-relations exception to diversity jurisdiction does not bar the claims 

in this case, as the court in California found in plaintiff’s prior case against his 

family. The “domestic relations exception encompasses only cases involving the 

issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 

504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992). The “domestic-relations exception is narrow, and lower 

federal courts may not broaden its application.” Chevalier v. Estate of Barnhart, 

803 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 2015). “When analyzing the applicability of the 

domestic-relations exception, [the Court] must focus on the remedy that the plaintiff 

seeks: Does the plaintiff seek an issuance or modification or enforcement of a 

divorce, alimony, or child-custody decree?” See id. at 797. It is not clear that the 

answer to that question is “yes” to resolve the IIED claim here, so jurisdiction—at 

least for now—is proper.

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e.g., McMillin v. Fumich, 2002 Mich. App. LEXIS 2104, at *17-18 (Mich. 

Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2002) (physician’s letter indicating physical symptoms 

caused by mental distress and need for anti-depressant sufficient to 

establish a question of fact as to severe emotional distress); Haverbush 

v. Powelson, 551 N.W.2d 206, 209 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (“[E]motional 

distress ‘includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, 

horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, 

disappointment, worry, and nausea.’”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of 

Torts § 46 cmt. j at 77). Plaintiff sufficiently pled every element to 

establish a claim of IIED, and the claim may go forward. 

IV. Conclusion 

Plaintiff sufficiently pled claims of defamation and IIED. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (Dkt. 6), is therefore denied. This case 

will go forward, and plaintiff will be required to prove each element of 

his claims with sufficient, admissible evidence. Defendants will have 

an opportunity to refute these claims and to file appropriate motions. 

Defendants have until Friday, December 11, 2015, to file an answer to 

plaintiff’s second amended complaint. Their answer should address 

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each allegation and may include any affirmative defenses, if 

appropriate. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 24, 2015 s/Judith E. Levy 

Ann Arbor, Michigan JUDITH E. LEVY 

United States District Judge 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s 

ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on November 24, 2015. 

s/Felicia M. Moses 

FELICIA M. MOSES 

Case Manager 

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