Report to the Chairman and Ranking

Member, Subcommittee on Readiness

and Management Support, Committee

on Armed Services, U.S. Senate

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

April 2001 BEST PRACTICES

DOD Teaming

Practices Not

Achieving Potential

Results

GAO-01-510
Page i GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Letter 1

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 Introduction 8

The Rise of IPTs in Product Development 9

Adoption of the IPT Concept in DOD 12

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 14

Chapter 2 IPTS Help Programs Achieve Better Outcomes 19

IPTs Can Improve the Decision-Making Process 19

Less Effective Teams Had a More Sequential Decision-Making

Process 21

Improved Product Outcomes Attributed to IPTs 25

Chapter 3 Authority and Knowledge Are Key to IPT

 Effectiveness 28

The Best IPTs Had the Knowledge, Authority, and Other Elements

to Be Effective 28

Most DOD Teams Did Not Possess the Key Ingredients of IPTs 35

Chapter 4 Differences in DOD and Commercial Teaming

 Approach Reflect Different Environments 39

Commercial Firms Provided a Different, Supportive Environment

for IPTs 39

DOD Environment Not As Conducive to IPTs 44

Amphibious Vehicle Program Found Ways to Provide a More

Supportive IPT Environment 49

Previous GAO Recommendations and DOD Actions Are Aimed at

Making the Weapon System Environment More Conducive to

Best Practices 51

Chapter 5 Conclusions and Recommendations 53

Conclusions 53

Recommendations for Executive Action 54

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 55

Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense 56

Contents
Page ii GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Appendix II GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 59

Related GAO Products 60

Tables

Table 1: Effective IPTs Also Had Successful Product Development

Outcomes 25

Figures

Figure 1: Functional Approach to Product Development 10

Figure 2: IPT Approach to Product Development 11

Figure 3: Players in Commercial Product Development 13

Figure 4: Players in DOD’s Product Development Programs 13

Figure 5: Decision-Making Process Employed by 3M’s Pluto Team 20

Figure 6: Decision Process Followed by the Advanced Amphibious

Assault Vehicle Firepower IPT 21

Figure 7: Sequential Decision-Making Process for Adding Vehicles

to Accommodate More Weapon System Weight 22

Figure 8: How Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Gun

Calibration Decision Would Have Been Made Without

IPTs 24

Figure 9: Organization of 3M’s Pluto IPT 29

Figure 10: Hewlett-Packard Printer 31

Figure 11: The Marine Corps Advanced Amphibious Assault

Vehicle 33

Figure 12: DaimlerChrysler’s Town and Country Minivan 40

Figure 13: 3M Dental Products 42

Figure 14: Percentage of DOD IPT Members That Perceived Key

Product Elements As Outside the Team’s Control 46
Page 1 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

April 10, 2001

The Honorable James Inhofe

Chairman

The Honorable Daniel Akaka

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

As you requested, this report examines how best practices can help the

Department of Defense maximize the benefits of integrated product teams

in its development of weapon systems. It examines the factors that are

critical to making integrated product teams effective, including the

environment in which such teams operate. We make recommendations to

the Secretary of Defense on how to better support the use of integrated

product teams on weapon system programs.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld,

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Joseph W. Westphal, Acting Secretary

of the Army; the Honorable Robert B. Pirie, Jr., Acting Secretary of the

Navy; the Honorable Lawrence Delaney, Acting Secretary of the Air Force;

the Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Director, Office of Management and

Budget; and to interested congressional committees. We will also make

copies available to others upon request.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please call me at (202) 512-

4841. Other key contacts are listed in appendix II.

Katherine V. Schinasi

Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Executive Summary

Page 2 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Although the Department of Defense (DOD) has boosted its annual

weapon system investment from about $80 billion 4 years ago to about

$100 billion for fiscal year 2001, its buying power will be weakened if

weapons continue to cost more and take longer to develop than planned.

DOD wants to improve program outcomes by reducing weapon system

development cost and time, while still producing weapons that meet user

needs. It has a long way to go; long-standing practices that impede delivery

of new weapons within estimates have proven resistant to reform. GAO

issued a series of reports on the success leading commercial firms have

had in significantly reducing the time and money it takes to develop new

and more sophisticated products—the kinds of results that DOD seeks.

Leading commercial firms find that integrated product teams—teams that

are responsible for all the activities of development, from design to

manufacturing—are key to achievement of such results. The practices of

leading commercial firms can help DOD maximize the benefits of

integrated product teams in its development of weapon systems.

In response to a request from the Chairman and the Ranking Member,

Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Senate Committee

on Armed Services, GAO examined (1) whether and how integrated

product teams affect decision-making and product outcomes, (2) what

factors are key to creating effective integrated product teams, and (3) how

the environment in which products are managed affects the prospects for

effective integrated product teams.

Integrated product teams bring together the different professions or areas

of expertise needed to design and manufacture a new product, such as

engineering, manufacturing, purchasing, and finance. The essence of the

integrated product team approach is to concentrate this expertise in a

single organization together with the authority to design, develop, test,

manufacture, and deliver a product. The hallmark of these teams is their

ability to efficiently make decisions that cross lines of expertise. In

contrast, when the people with the necessary expertise reside in separate

organizations, they tend to work on new products sequentially. For

example, a product might be handed off from a concept group to a design

group, a cost group, a test group, and a manufacturing group before being

delivered to the customer. Often, factors such as how to manufacture or

repair the product are assessed after it has been designed and tested,

forcing redesign and rework from the preceding groups.

Commercial firms came to see this approach as taking too long and being

too costly and in the 1980s, began using integrated product teams as a way

Executive Summary

Purpose

Background
Executive Summary

Page 3 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

to get better results faster. In 1995, DOD adopted integrated product teams

in an attempt to improve its weapon system acquisitions. DOD’s intention

was to use the teams in the same manner as commercial firms—to

integrate different functional disciplines into a team responsible for all

aspects of a new weapon.

To gain insights on how DOD’s implementation of integrated product

teams compares with the practices of leading commercial firms, GAO

conducted eight case studies: three from leading commercial firms; four

from DOD programs experiencing cost, schedule, and performance

problems; and one from a DOD program that has been meeting its

objectives. Within these case studies, GAO examined 18 teams in detail,

including over 100 interviews with team members and leaders.

Integrated product teams work. Effective integrated product teams can

make significant product development decisions quickly and without

relying heavily on consultations with organizations outside the team.

These teams have developed and delivered superior products within

predicted time frames and budgets—often cutting calendar time in half

compared with earlier products developed without such teams. Officials

from the more successful programs GAO reviewed—three commercial and

one from DOD—all cited integrated product teams as a main factor in

achieving such results. In the four DOD programs that were not meeting

cost and schedule objectives, GAO found that the teams did not operate as

effectively. Their decision-making processes were sequential and involved

numerous outside consultations for information and approval.

Two elements are essential to determining whether a team is in fact an

integrated product team: the knowledge and authority needed to recognize

problems and make cross-cutting decisions expeditiously. Knowledge is

sufficient when the team has the right mix of expertise to master the

different facets of product development. Authority is present when the

team is responsible for making both day-to-day decisions and delivering

the product. In the programs experiencing problems, the teams either did

not have the authority or the right mix of expertise to be considered

integrated product teams. If a team lacks expertise, it will miss

opportunities to recognize potential problems early; without authority, it

can do little about them. Although these teams were called integrated

product teams, by and large they were not.

Leading commercial firms took steps to create an environment more

conducive to the integrated product team approach. They committed to

Results in Brief
Executive Summary

Page 4 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

making the approach integral to the product development process and

backed up that commitment through actions to ensure that

implementation was not left to chance. Importantly, the pressures of

competing in the commercial market meshed well with the decisionmaking advantages of integrated product teams. While DOD endorses the

integrated product team approach, it has not taken steps to ensure that the

approach is implemented at the program execution level. In essence, the

approach has been left to germinate in an unchanged environment that is

not necessarily conducive to integrated product teams. For example, the

pressures to launch and fund new programs create incentives that pose

obstacles for integrated product teams. Implementation is thus more

dependent on the ingenuity of individuals working on the programs.

GAO makes recommendations on how DOD can better support the

implementation of integrated product teams on weapon system programs.

Integrated product teams improved both the speed and quality of the

decision-making process. These teams made decisions involving

significant trade-offs without relying unduly on other organizations for

information or approval. For example, a 3M team developing a new dental

material decided, based on its own analyses, to trade off some

sophistication in the material to get it to market sooner. Officials from the

Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Program report that their teams

reduced the time needed to make a system design decision from 6 months

to about a week. The teams at the four remaining DOD programs had a

less efficient decision-making approach. When these teams faced a

significant issue beyond their knowledge and authority, they went through

a lengthy, sequential process to obtain information and approval. On one

program, for example, a trade-off between reducing performance

requirements or increasing weight took a team 6 months and numerous

consultations with other teams, the contractor, program managers, and

service officials.

GAO observed a consistency between the effectiveness of teams and

product outcomes on the eight cases studied: programs that were meeting

product development objectives had more effective teams than the

programs that were having problems. In addition to meeting objectives,

the successful programs were often surpassing the performance of their

predecessors in both time to market and performance. For example,

Principal Findings

Integrated Product Teams

Help Programs Achieve

Better Outcomes
Executive Summary

Page 5 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Hewlett-Packard officials stated that an integrated product team cut cycle

time and increased productivity six-fold. The four programs with less

effective teams were experiencing problems including cost growth,

schedule delays, and/or performance difficulties. While not unusual for

weapon system programs, these are the kinds of problems DOD hoped

integrated product teams could help solve.

Integrated product teams in leading commercial firms and the Advanced

Amphibious Assault Vehicle program had the right mix of expertise to

develop new products. Their teams were responsible for developing and

delivering the product and making day-to-day decisions on cost, design,

performance, quality, test, and manufacturing issues. The combination of

product responsibility and expertise put the teams in a position to have

enough information to tackle crucial issues—like trade-offs—without

having to rely heavily on outside organizations. The 3M team’s decision on

the dental material is an excellent example.

Other factors significantly enhanced team effectiveness. Collocating key

members facilitated communication, built trust, and contributed to unity

of purpose—all key elements of effective decision-making. For example, at

the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Program, because

representatives from the contractor and the DOD program office are

located in the same building, there is little or no delay in getting answers

or sharing information to make decisions. In instances where physical

collocation is not possible, leading firms link team members through

electronic means—such as by shared databases and software. On the more

effective teams, team leaders selected members, rather than having

members assigned by another organization. This allowed team members to

demonstrate commitment and alignment with the team’s goals.

GAO examined 12 teams in detail from the DOD programs experiencing

development problems. Seven of these teams did not have responsibility

for day-to-day decisions on the range of product development issues, nor

did they bear responsibility for delivering the product. Rather, they were

limited to a segment of the product development process, such as

monitoring system performance requirements, testing the system, or

providing logistics during fielding. The remaining five teams that could

claim product responsibility were missing representatives from key areas

of expertise, such as cost and testing, or from key organizations, like the

contractor. Regardless of whether product responsibility or expertise was

lacking, the effect on a team was the same—it was not capable of

identifying problems and resolving them expeditiously through a

Expertise and Authority

Are Key to Effective

Integrated Product Teams
Executive Summary

Page 6 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

collaborative decision-making process. Moreover, the teams did not enjoy

collocation and control over membership.

Corporate leaders from DaimlerChrysler, 3M, and Hewlett-Packard

demonstrated their commitment to integrated product teams by

reorganizing to better align their structure with the teams and making

targeted investments in physical assets, training, and other forms of help.

These changes helped ensure success at the working level. The firms

delegated considerable power to the teams and held the teams

accountable for delivering on set goals. They made it possible for the

typical program manager to succeed in managing with integrated product

teams. DOD did not go much beyond policy statements to create a

supportive environment for integrated product teams. On the weapon

programs experiencing problems, implementation often meant changing

team labels rather than altering lines of authority or team dynamics. Little

training was provided and then only at the initiative of the program.

Program teams were not often involved in setting key product goals, and

program officials observed that unrealistic goals were set before the teams

were formed. Regardless of their efforts, the teams could not make up for

the unachievable goals.

Differences in how commercial firms and DOD managers measure success

and in the pressures they face in starting programs significantly affect the

environment for integrated product teams. Commercial products’ success

is measured in terms of the customer’s acceptance of the final product and

cycle times short enough to beat the competition. These conditions create

incentives for gaining knowledge early, forming realistic goals and

estimates, and holding teams accountable for delivering the product—all

of which favor an integrated product team approach. In DOD, the

pressures to successfully launch new programs and protect their funding,

coupled with long cycle times, create incentives to be overly optimistic in

setting program goals and to focus on process concerns like obtaining

incremental funding. DOD’s necessary reliance on defense contractors

introduces another complication for integrated product teams because the

two organizations are responsible for the product, but they do not

necessarily share the same incentives.

The Marine Corps Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle program has

many of the teaming characteristics of leading commercial firms. This

accomplishment was made possible by the unique environment—or

culture—that the program’s initial manager created to center around the

Differences in DOD and

Commercial Teaming

Approach Reflect Different

Environments
Executive Summary

Page 7 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

integrated product team approach. Unlike the other DOD cases, the teams

were not made to fit among standing organizations and procedures.

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense designate as integrated

product teams only those teams that will have the day-to-day responsibility

for developing and delivering a product, such as a weapon system, and the

cross section of expertise to do so. GAO recommends the Secretary of

Defense use the practices and characteristics described in this report to

develop and communicate standards for what constitutes an integrated

product team. GAO also recommends that the Secretary of Defense put

weapon system program offices in a better position to create and sustain

effective integrated product teams, such as by giving them responsibility

for a deliverable product, authority to make decisions on that product, and

representation from the critical areas of expertise. Finally, GAO

recommends that the Secretary of Defense help program managers and

team leaders become catalysts for implementing the integrated product

team approach by (1) devoting professional education to make these

individuals capable of creating the culture necessary to foster integrated

product teams and (2) drawing lessons from programs like the Advanced

Amphibious Assault Vehicle for bridging the barriers between program

offices and contractors.

DOD agreed with the report and most of its recommendations. DOD

partially concurred with the recommendation that only those teams with

day-to-day responsibility for a product and the necessary cross section of

expertise be designated as integrated product teams. It noted that while

such teams are unique and require certain conditions and investments, the

designation “integrated product team” has spread throughout the

workforce and has benefited other teams as well. DOD does not want to

lose those benefits by limiting the designation. DOD’s position reflects the

practical reality that the designation of integrated product teams is now

difficult to restrict. Given the Department’s recognition that program

office integrated product teams require certain conditions and investments

to succeed that other integrated product teams may not need, GAO

believes that if the Department takes the actions contained in GAO’s other

recommendations, the objective of the recommendation will be achieved.

DOD’s comments appear in full in appendix I.

Recommendations for

Executive Action

Agency Comments
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 8 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Reflecting its urgency to acquire new weapon systems to replace those

seen as outdated and too costly to operate, the Department of Defense

(DOD) has boosted its annual weapon system investment from about $80

billion 4 years ago to about $100 billion for fiscal year 2001. Over the next

5 years, DOD plans to spend over $500 billion developing and acquiring

weapon systems. DOD would like to get the most out of this investment

and has set goals to develop new weapons in half the traditional time and

within budget. Historically, DOD has not received predictable returns on

weapon system investments. Although they provide superior capability,

they have cost significantly more and taken much longer to complete than

originally estimated. When one program needs more money than planned,

unplanned trade-offs—such as delaying or canceling other programs—may

be necessary. As a result of such recurrent problems, about 5 years ago we

began a body of work to examine weapon system acquisition issues from a

different, more cross-cutting perspective—one that draws lessons learned

from the best commercial product development efforts to see if they can

be applied to weapon system development. Leading commercial firms

have developed increasingly sophisticated products in significantly less

time and at lower costs—the kinds of results that DOD wants.

Our previous work has shown that leading commercial firms expect their

program managers to deliver high-quality products on time and within

budget.1

 Accordingly, the firms have created an environment and adopted

practices that put their program managers in a good position to succeed in

meeting these expectations. We have also reported on the importance of

having knowledge about a product’s technology, design, and producibility

at key junctures in the product development process. A key vehicle

leading commercial firms employ to attain such knowledge is the

integrated product team (IPT). Although organizations may employ

various types of teams to develop new products, an IPT is a particular type

of team vested with (1) the knowledge from the different areas of

expertise needed to design, develop, and manufacture a new product and

(2) the authority to use that knowledge in making decisions about the

product. According to leading commercial firms, IPTs have proven

essential to improving product development outcomes. IPTs have enabled

firms like DaimlerChrysler to significantly reduce the time it takes to

develop a new product—by as much as 50 percent—while at the same

time yielding a product more sophisticated and possessing higher quality

 1 Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve Weapon

System Outcomes (GAO/NSIAD-99-162, July 30, 1999).

Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 9 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

than its predecessors. This report identifies best practices for creating

effective IPTs, such as those from leading commercial firms, which can

help DOD develop and produce better weapon systems significantly faster

and at less cost.

Product development, whether for commercial or defense application, is a

complex undertaking. The process begins with a concept or idea for

meeting a customer’s need, the idea is converted to detailed design

drawings, and the design is translated into articles or prototypes that can

be tested. During the product’s development, the processes for

manufacturing the product must be also be identified and tested. The

development process is characterized by a tension between competing

demands on the product. These demands include the desire for the highest

performance and the most features, the lowest cost and shortest time to

market, and the ease with which the product can be produced in both

quantity and quality. Trade-offs between these demands must be made to

provide the customer a desirable product quickly and at a reasonable

price. If performance features are allowed to dominate, the product may

become too expensive. If costs are cut too much, then the product’s

quality may suffer. A product design that ignores the limits of

manufacturing processes may never make it into the hands of the

customer.

Taking a product from idea to delivery requires expertise from a number

of different professions or functions, which can vary depending on the

type of product. To illustrate, designing a product’s features may require

the collaboration of people with expertise in areas such as mechanical,

electrical, materials, and software engineering. People with a financial

management background are needed to accurately estimate the cost of the

product and to keep track of the budget. People expert in test and

evaluation are needed to objectively assess the performance of product

prototypes. Production engineers make sure the design lends itself to

proven manufacturing processes, even developing new processes when

necessary. Quality assurance experts ensure that defects are kept out of

the product design and manufacturing processes. Yet another group of

people are responsible for understanding and representing the customer’s

needs, often part of the marketing function in commercial industry.

In commercial industry, how the knowledge of these experts and the

authority for making decisions are brought to bear on the product

development process have evolved considerably. Years ago, as companies

grew and additional products were developed, many tended to organize

The Rise of IPTs in

Product Development
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 10 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

work around departments and divisions that represented areas of

expertise, referred to as a functional approach to product development.

This approach, with some illustrative functions, is shown in figure 1

below.

Figure 1: Functional Approach to Product Development

Source: GAO.

In this approach, knowledge was segregated or distributed by function, as

was authority. Each organization managed and made decisions on its piece

of a number of different products. Development of a product occurred

sequentially, with people from each function doing their work on the

product and then handing it over to the people from the next function.

While each function attained a high level of expertise, the knowledge

needed to recognize a potential problem often resided in a function that

came later in the product development process. Thus, proposed solutions

had to be reworked in the preceding functions. For example, if the

manufacturing group for an automobile found that the engine

compartment was not large enough to hold the engine, the automobile

would be turned back to the design engineers. The engineers would have

to redesign the engine compartment, the financial staff would have to

reassess the costs and the test and evaluation people might have to

reevaluate the vehicle’s crash protection performance. After this

additional time and effort—rework—the automobile could once again

proceed to manufacturing.

Rework Rework Rework

Move

product

Move

product

Move

product

Engineering

Product A

Product B

Product C

Product D

Engineering

Product A

Product B

Product C

Product D

Finance

Product A

Product B

Product C

Product D

Finance

Product A

Product B

Product C

Product D

Test and 

Evaluation

Product A

Product B

Product C

Product D

Test and 

Evaluation

Product A

Product B

Product C

Product D

Manufacturing

Product A

Product B

Product C

Product D

Manufacturing

Product A

Product B

Product C

Product D

Deliver A

Deliver B

Deliver C

Deliver D

Rework Rework Rework

Move

product

Move

product

Move

product

Engineering

Product A

Product B

Product C

Product D

Engineering

Product A

Product B

Product C

Product D

Finance

Product A

Product B

Product C

Product D

Finance

Product A

Product B

Product C

Product D

Test and 

Evaluation

Product A

Product B

Product C

Product D

Test and 

Evaluation

Product A

Product B

Product C

Product D

Manufacturing

Product A

Product B

Product C

Product D

Manufacturing

Product A

Product B

Product C

Product D

Deliver A

Deliver B

Deliver C

Deliver D
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 11 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

In the 1980s, companies began to look for better ways to bring the

knowledge of the people in different functions together in the design

phase of a new product to reduce rework and shorten cycle times. They

organized teams made up of a cross section of the different functional

disciplines and gave them responsibility for developing an entire product.

These efforts evolved into the IPT approach as it is known today. In the

1990s, Boeing received acclaim for the success of its 777 aircraft, which

was developed by using design/build teams, which were IPTs.

The essence of the IPT approach is to concentrate in a single organization

the different areas of expertise needed to develop a product, together with

the authority and responsibility to design, develop, test, and manufacture

the product. Figure 2 illustrates some of the areas of expertise that can be

brought into the structure of an IPT organization.

Figure 2: IPT Approach to Product Development

Source: GAO.

Under the IPT approach, each team possesses the knowledge to

collaboratively identify problems and propose solutions, minimizing the

amount of rework that has to be done. When this knowledge is

accompanied by the authority to make key product decisions, IPTs can

make trade-offs between competing demands and more quickly make

design changes, if necessary. For example, design engineers on a

Caterpillar IPT initially proposed that very large differential gears be used

to transmit power from the engine to the rear wheels on a large vehicle.

While other team members did not see a problem, an experienced

production engineer on the team noted that no gear manufacturer made a

gear that large and that to create such a production capability would be

Product A Product B Product C Product D

Deliver

A

Deliver

A

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Deliver

B

Deliver

B

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Deliver

C

Deliver

C

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Deliver

D

Deliver

D

Product A Product B Product C Product D

Deliver

A

Deliver

A

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Deliver

A

Deliver

A

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Deliver

B

Deliver

B

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Deliver

B

Deliver

B

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Deliver

C

Deliver

C

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Deliver

C

Deliver

C

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Deliver

D

Deliver

D

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Engineering Finance 

Manufacturing Test and

Evaluation

Deliver

D

Deliver

D
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 12 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

risky. Consequently, the design engineers revised the design to enable

existing differential gears to be used, saving significant time in the

process. In the functional approach to product development, this design

problem might not have been discovered until late in product

development, when the manufacturing organization got involved.

DOD accepts IPTs as a vehicle for getting better acquisition outcomes.

This acceptance was formalized in May 1995, when the Secretary of

Defense directed that the concept of IPTs be applied throughout the

acquisition process to the maximum extent possible. DOD employs three

basic levels of IPTs: (1) the Overarching IPT works above the program

level and its primary responsibility is to advise the Defense Acquisition

Executive on issues related to all of the programs the executive is

responsible for, (2) the Working-Level IPT also works above the program

level and links the program manager to the Overarching IPT, and (3) the

Program IPT represents the program level and executes the tasks to

design, develop, and manufacture a weapon system. The first two types of

IPTs perform oversight on a program and other than the program manager,

do not typically include people from the program office. Within DOD, IPTs

were to become the main element of an overall management approach that

calls for considering all aspects of a weapon system, including

performance features, manufacturing processes, and logistic support,

throughout design and development.

While the basic DOD and commercial product development processes are

similar, the number and responsibilities of key players differ. In the

commercial world, there are two main players in product development—

the product developer and the customer. Figure 3 describes the role of the

product developer and the customer in commercial product development.

Adoption of the IPT

Concept in DOD
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 13 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Figure 3: Players in Commercial Product Development

Source: GAO.

The DOD process for product development and acquisition is somewhat

more complex because it involves at least three major players—the DOD

customer, the DOD program office, and the product developer, as

illustrated in figure 4.

Figure 4: Players in DOD’s Product Development Programs

Source: GAO.

The additional player complicates the task of taking a product from

concept to delivery because the knowledge and authority to accomplish

the tasks are distributed between the product developer and the program

management office. Thus, to concentrate knowledge and authority in IPTs

for weapon systems, organizational and functional barriers must be

bridged.

An organization

that is buying a

product to be

built to the buyers

specifications

and needs

An organization

that is buying a

product to be

built to the buyer’s

specifications

and needs

A manufacturing firm that is responsible for developing

and producing the product. The firm has a product team

that has the knowledge, capabilities and resources to

translate the customer’s specifications and needs into

a product that can be designed and produced with

agreed-upon resources

A firm that is responsible for developing

and producing the product. The firm has a product team

that has the knowledge, capabilities and resources to

translate the customer’s specifications and needs into

a product that can be designed and produced with

agreed-upon resources

Customer Product Developer

DOD 

Customer program office

Product 

developer

The warfighting

community that

uses weapons to

perform combat

missions and

creates the

demand for

new weapons

The warfighting

community that

uses weapons to

perform combat

missions and

creates the

demand for

new weapons

The DOD acquisition

workforce that

develops a strategy

for acquiring a

new weapon and

marshals the

resources to

execute the strategy

The DOD acquisition

workforce that

develops a strategy

for acquiring a

new weapon and

marshals the

resources to

execute the strategy

The defense

firm that

designs,

develops, and

manufactures

the weapon

system
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 14 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

The Chairman and the Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Readiness and

Management Support, Senate Committee on Armed Services, requested

that we conduct a body of work to examine various aspects of the

acquisition process to identify best practices that can improve the

outcomes of weapon system programs. To date, we have issued reports on

advanced quality concepts, earned value management techniques used to

assess progress on major acquisition programs, management of a

product’s transition from development to production, management of the

supplier base, technology maturation, training program offices on the

application of best practices, testing and evaluation, and setting product

requirements (see related GAO products at the end of this report.)

This report covers the use of IPTs in new product development. Our

overall objective was to evaluate best practices for creating effective IPTs

which can help management of weapon systems. Specifically, we

examined (1) whether and how integrated product teams affect decisionmaking and product outcomes, (2) what factors are key to creating

effective integrated product teams, and (3) how the environment in which

products are managed affects the prospects for effective integrated

product teams.

We follow a similar overall methodology for conducting best practices

reviews of DOD’s process for developing new weapon systems. We start

by identifying an aspect of weapon system development—in this report,

the use of integrated product teams—that has been shown to have a

significant impact on the outcomes of new product developments. Our

sources for such information include the large body of individual weapon

system reviews we have conducted over many years; studies from other

sources, such as the Defense Science Board; and discussions with defense

experts, including past and current DOD officials, defense industry

representatives, and analysts from private organizations that study defense

issues. Before beginning a review of a particular topic, we confirm with

DOD officials that the topic is one in which the potential for improvement

is significant. Once we have identified the topic, we use a case study

approach because case studies provide the in-depth knowledge needed to

understand individual practices. They show how practices affect program

outcomes as well as issues surrounding their adoption and

implementation. In selecting case studies, we look for examples of (1)

excellent practices from leading commercial firms, (2) typical or prevailing

practices within DOD organizations, and (3) where possible, DOD

organizations that exhibit excellent practices.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 15 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

To obtain information about teaming practices and identify the best

practices in the use of IPTs in the commercial world, we conducted

literature searches and contacted university faculty, industry associations,

and consultants in the use of product development teams. We selected

several companies known for their exceptional use of integrated teams in

product development that resulted in better product performance and

reduced development cycle time. We visited each company to discuss (1)

the way teams contribute to better product development outcomes, (2) the

structure and organization of teams, and (3) the organizational support

and commitment needed to enable teams to achieve their potential. In

addition, we obtained an understanding of the overall teaming process and

the practices that the companies believed were critical for successful

teams. We selected at least one team from each company for an in-depth

review. After our visits, we prepared individual company summaries from

which we developed a model that represents best teaming practices. The

firms we visited and a description of the teams we selected follows.

• DaimlerChrysler, an automobile manufacturer located in Auburn Hills,

Michigan. DaimlerChrysler’s Minivan Platform team is responsible for the

design, development, and production of new minivans. Team Epic, part of

the minivan platform team, designs and develops electric vehicles.

• 3M, a manufacturer of a variety of industrial and consumer products

located in St. Paul, Minnesota. 3M’s Pluto team is responsible for the

development of a new dental material.

• Hewlett-Packard, a high technology electronic products manufacturer

located in Palo Alto, California. Hewlett-Packard’s Snakes Program is

responsible for developing new computer workstations.

Our report summarizes a number of best commercial practices in the use

of IPTs. As such, we do not suggest that all commercial firms use best

practices or imply that all commercial practices represent the best. Due to

the highly competitive nature of the businesses these firms are involved

with, we do not always attribute an individual practice to a specific

company.

To obtain insights into the dynamics of IPTs used in new weapon system

development efforts, we conducted case studies of five DOD weapon

systems. At the program offices, we interviewed key managers for an

overall perspective of the program. We focused our work on the teams

responsible for executing the development of the weapon system and we

interviewed members of those teams. We selected at least three different

teams at each program office. The programs were Advanced Amphibious

Assault Vehicle, CH-60S Fleet Combat Support Helicopter, Extended
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 16 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Range Guided Munitions, Global Broadcast Service, and Land Warrior. A

description of each program follows.

• The Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle is an Acquisition Category I2

Marine Corps program. It is a high-speed amphibious armored personnel

carrier that will replace the current family of amphibious assault vehicles.

Its purpose is to transport troops from ships to the shore. The vehicle is

estimated to weigh about 37 tons and be able to carry 17 combat-equipped

Marines plus a crew of 3. It is to travel in excess of 20 knots in the water

and travel over land at 45 mph. Its armament includes a 7.62 mm machine

gun and a 30 mm cannon. Total budgeted program cost is about $8.7

billion for 1,013 vehicles. It is expected to begin fielding in fiscal year 2006.

• The CH-60S Fleet Combat Support Helicopter is an Acquisition Category I

Navy program. The CH-60S helicopter is the replacement for the current

CH-46D. It is a combination of the Army’s UH-60 Blackhawk and the

Navy’s SH-60 Seahawk and is designed to provide the Navy with a

capability to replenish forces performing search and rescue missions and

airborne mine countermeasures missions at sea. Program costs are

estimated at $4.3 billion. The program began in 1998 with initial fielding

expected in 2002.

• The Extended Range Guided Munition is an Acquisition Category II Navy

program. The weapon is a projectile, 5 inches in diameter, that is fired

from guns aboard Navy surface ships. The projectile incorporates a rocket

motor, an internal global positioning system, and an inertial navigation

system. These systems will give the projectile guidance and control to a

fixed target location determined prior to firing. The rocket motor will

provide greater range capabilities than current projectiles. The program

began in 1996 and is expected to begin fielding in 2004.

 2

 DOD makes distinctions among categories of weapon systems, primarily according to the

level of investment required. Acquisition Category I programs are defined as major defense

acquisition programs estimated to cost over $365 million for research, development, test

and evaluation, or have procurement costs of more than $2.190 billion (both in fiscal year

2000 constant dollars). Acquisition Category II programs are defined as acquisition

programs estimated to cost over $140 million for research, development, test and

evaluation, or have procurement costs of more than $660 million (both in fiscal year 2000

constant dollars).
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 17 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

• The Global Broadcast Service is an Acquisition Category I joint-service

program. It will augment and interface with other communications

systems and provide continuous, high speed, one-way flow of high-volume

data, audio, imagery, and video information to forces around the globe. It

consists of a satellites, fixed and transportable transmitters, and fixed and

transportable receivers. The program began in 1996 and is expected to

begin production in late 2002.

• The Land Warrior is an Acquisition Category II Army program. It is an

integrated fighting system for dismounted combat soldiers. It consists of

five subsystems: computer/radio, software, protective clothing and

individual equipment, integrated helmet assembly, and weapons. The

Army currently expects to procure 34,000 units for a total cost of about

$2.1 billion. The Land Warrior is designed to enhance lethality, command

and control, survivability, mobility, and sustain individual soldiers and

infantry units. The program began in 1996, and production is expected to

begin in fiscal year 2003.

To select DOD programs, we identified programs from each of the services

that had experienced problems in meeting cost, schedule, or performance

goals and at least one program that was meeting its development

objectives. We selected programs in the engineering, manufacturing, and

development phase of the acquisition process so that the teaming

practices being reviewed would reflect those of a single prime contractor

and enough progress would have been made to determine whether the

program was meeting its objectives. We also selected weapon programs

that entered this phase after the 1995 policy was implemented to ensure

that the programs had a reasonable chance to implement the IPT policy.

To address potential variances due to program size, we selected programs

from different acquisition category levels. The Land Warrior program

provided a range of analytical information. The performance problems

described in the report occurred in 1999 and earlier, and revealed

limitations in the program’s teaming arrangements. The report also covers

the current program manager’s efforts to overcome these limitations

through teaming and other actions.

We selected three teams from each program office to review in detail. We

used a structured questionnaire to interview approximately 80 IPT leaders,

members, and contractors. Individual team leaders and members also

completed a survey we had prepared regarding how respondents viewed

their teams and their role on the teams. The information collected from

the interviews and the survey was compiled into a database to facilitate a

comparative analysis. Through the analysis, we determined a team’s
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 18 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

composition, product responsibility, and the environment in which the

team operates. In addition, we collected information regarding the process

used by the teams to make significant decisions. We flowcharted

commercial and DOD program office team decisions to identify the

number and level of organizations required to make actual decisions, as

well as the length of time it took to make the decision.

To better understand the environment under which IPTs operate, we

reviewed current DOD policy directives and guidance on using IPTs in

weapon system program offices. We met with officials from the Office of

the Secretary of Defense and the services responsible for the

implementation of IPTs in DOD. We analyzed studies on IPTs conducted

by external organizations such as the Center for Naval Analyses and the

Institute for Defense Analyses. We reviewed evaluations conducted on

implementation of IPTs by the Army, the Navy, and the National Center for

Advanced Technologies.

We also drew on knowledge gained from our prior best practices work. In

particular, we have developed a good base of knowledge regarding

differences in the commercial and DOD environments as they relate to

developing new products. We applied this knowledge in our assessment of

the environmental factors that affect the implementation of IPTs in both

sectors.

We conducted our review from December 1999 through February 2001 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Chapter 2: IPTs Help Programs Achieve

Better Outcomes

Page 19 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Of the eight programs we reviewed, four exhibited the characteristics

considered the hallmark of IPTs—the ability to efficiently make product

development decisions that cut across different lines of expertise.

Compared with the other four programs, these IPTs had the knowledge

and authority to make decisions in less time, with fewer consultations

outside the team, and with fewer reviews and approvals. At the time of our

review, their products were developed or were being developed within the

time frames and budgets originally estimated. In most cases, the IPTs

developed products that outperformed previous products that were

developed without IPTs. The IPTs were credited with making these results

possible; they were thus not only more efficient; they were also more

effective.

The teams from the remaining four programs relied heavily on

consultations with individuals outside of the team to obtain the knowledge

and approval to make significant decisions. While no team is expected to

operate in isolation, the degree of outside consultations made the

decision-making process of these teams much longer and less efficient—

much like the process that predated IPTs. The four programs with less

effective teams all experienced difficulty in meeting product development

objectives—manifested by cost growth, schedule delays, and/or

performance problems. While it is difficult to prove a direct cause and

effect relationship, in some cases, managers cited the teams’

ineffectiveness as directly contributing to the problems; in other cases, the

teams were not in a position to solve or prevent problems.

Officials at the leading commercial firms and DOD’s Advanced

Amphibious Assault Vehicle program believe that because of the

knowledge and authority that resided in their IPTs, the teams required

fewer external reviews and approvals. Consequently, the decision-making

process was significantly shortened—from months to a week or less.

While IPTs do not work in isolation, effective IPTs are self-sufficient,

containing the variety of expertise to recognize early when decisions are

needed, such as trade-offs between competing demands, and the authority

necessary to make these decisions. An example is 3M’s Pluto IPT, which

was responsible for developing a technology capable of producing a low

shrinking dental material. The team needed to make a choice concerning

the first product to be marketed based on this new technology. The choice

was between producing a simpler material that could be delivered to

customers sooner or taking more time to deliver a more technically

advanced material. The team assessed the trade-offs and decided in favor

of delivering the simpler product sooner and the more technically

Chapter 2: IPTs Help Programs Achieve

Better Outcomes

IPTs Can Improve the

Decision-Making

Process
Chapter 2: IPTs Help Programs Achieve

Better Outcomes

Page 20 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

advanced material later. Figure 5 depicts the decision-making process

used by this IPT.

Figure 5: Decision-Making Process Employed by 3M’s Pluto Team

3M’s Pluto IPT had the knowledge and authority to make a significant trade-off between product

performance and schedule.

Source: GAO.

Pluto team members represented the key areas of expertise needed for the

product and were able to assess the technical feasibility of the two options

as well as the cost and schedule trade-offs. The team conducted the

necessary evaluations and research to make its decision, which was

supported by upper management.

Officials from the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle program cite

similar experiences with IPTs. For example, the Firepower IPT developing

the 30-mm gun challenged a requirement that the targeting system

maintain accurate calibration for several days at a time. The team’s design

engineers believed the requirement would be costly to achieve. The team’s

user representative reported that gun operators, as a standard practice,

calibrated the targeting system daily before each mission. Therefore, the

Above

Program

Within

Program

Within

Team

Team confers 

with manager 

on decision

Team confers 

with manager 

on decision

Team decides on 

simpler product

Team decides on 

simpler product

Team has knowledge 

and authority to 

assess feasibility 

of options and 

conduct evaluations 

and market research

Team has knowledge 

and authority to 

assess feasibility 

of options and 

conduct evaluations 

and market research

Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4

Simpler

product

Sooner?

Simpler

product

Sooner?

More

advanced

product?

More

advanced

product?

Team 

leader 

challenges 

team with

choice

Team 

leader 

challenges 

team with

choice

Above

Program

Within

Program

Within

Team

Team confers 

with manager 

on decision

Team confers 

with manager 

on decision

Team decides on 

simpler product

Team decides on 

simpler product

Team has knowledge 

and authority to 

assess feasibility 

of options and 

conduct evaluations 

and market research

Team has knowledge 

and authority to 

assess feasibility 

of options and 

conduct evaluations 

and market research

Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4

Simpler

product

Sooner?

Simpler

product

Sooner?

More

advanced

product?

More

advanced

product?

Simpler

product

Sooner?

Simpler

product

Sooner?

More

advanced

product?

More

advanced

product?

Team 

leader 

challenges 

team with

choice

Team 

leader 

challenges 

team with

choice
Chapter 2: IPTs Help Programs Achieve

Better Outcomes

Page 21 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

requirement for maintaining accuracy could be reduced to 1 day—a tradeoff that made for a less sophisticated and less costly design. Such a

decision can prevent problems later in the development cycle that

additional technical sophistication can cause. Figure 6 depicts the

decision-making process used by this IPT.

Figure 6: Decision Process Followed by the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle

Firepower IPT

The Firepower IPT made a significant decision to trade performance and reduce cost.

Source: GAO.

The mix of expertise on the Firepower IPT provided the knowledge to

identify the problem and reach a decision to make the trade-off between

cost and performance. The IPT was able to make the decision in 1 week

and only had to consult with one organization outside of the team—the

group that set the original performance requirements.

The teams at the four remaining DOD programs had a less efficient

decision-making approach. These teams had to routinely consult with

several organizations because the knowledge and authority to make

significant decisions did not reside within the team. When these teams

were faced with a significant issue that outstripped their knowledge and

Less Effective Teams

Had a More

Sequential DecisionMaking Process

Other

Organizations

Within

Program

Office

Within

Product

Team

Day

1

Day

2

Day

5

Day

6

Day

3

Day

4

Design to

original

requirement?

Design to

original

requirement?

Change

requirement

ease design?

Change

requirement

ease design?

Team decides

to reduce

requirement and

lower design risk

Team decides

to reduce

requirement and

lower design risk

Recognition

that calibration

requirement

poses design

challenge

Recognition

that calibration

requirement

poses design

challenge

Team confers with

organization that

established requirements

Team confers with

organization that

established requirements

Team

assesses

user needs

for calibration

Team

assesses

user needs

for calibration

Other

Organizations

Within

Program

Office

Within

Product

Team

Day

1

Day

2

Day

5

Day

6

Day

3

Day

4

Day

1

Day

2

Day

5

Day

6

Day

3

Day

4

Design to

original

requirement?

Design to

original

requirement?

Change

requirement

ease design?

Change

requirement to

ease design?

Team decides

to reduce

requirement and

lower design risk

Team decides

to reduce

requirement and

lower design risk

Recognition

that calibration

requirement

poses design

challenge

Recognition

that calibration

requirement

poses design

challenge

Team confers with

organization that

established requirements

Team confers with

organization that

established requirements

Team

assesses

user needs

for calibration

Team

assesses

user needs

for calibration
Chapter 2: IPTs Help Programs Achieve

Better Outcomes

Page 22 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

authority, decision-making involved a lengthy and inefficient sequential

process to obtain information and approval.

In one case, a contractor team working on a weapon system found that a

performance requirement could not be met without increasing the weight

of the weapon system. The consequence of the increased weight was that

more vehicles would be required to transport the system, increasing the

logistic burden on the users. The problem was referred to the program

office team that was responsible for ensuring that the contractor met

performance requirement or the type of vehicles required. The team

lacked the authority to change the performance requirement. After 6

months and numerous requests for knowledge and authority, the decision

was made to accept the added weight and to increase the number of

vehicles. Figure 7 depicts the decision-making process the team used.

Figure 7: Sequential Decision-Making Process for Adding Vehicles to Accommodate More Weapon System Weight

This DOD team, when faced with a significant trade-off issue, required 6 months to reach a decision

and had to involve many players from various levels outside of the team.

Source: GAO.

The program office team expended a great deal of effort to collect,

analyze, and exchange information with six other teams within the

program office (such as logistics and testing), the program manager level,

the prime contractor, and representatives from all three military services

that were to use the weapon system. Moreover, the team had to consult

Within

Program

Within

team

Above

Program

Month

1

Month

2

Month

5

Month

6

Month

3

Month

4

Team considers

the option of

adding

transport vehicles

Team considers

the option of

adding

transport vehicles

Information

exchanged

with services

Information

exchanged

with services

Team reevaluates

impact of option

Team reevaluates

impact of option

Option discussed

with program

management

team

Option discussed

with program

management

team

Team recommends

adding transport

vehicles

Team recommends

adding transport

vehicles

Information

exchanged

with services

Information

exchanged

with services

Information

obtained from

6 other teams

Information

obtained from

6 other teams

Contractor

informs team

of issue

Contractor

informs team

of issue Information

obtained from

6 other teams

Information

obtained from

6 other teams

Program

management

Team makes

decisions to

add vehicles

Program

management

Team makes

decisions to

add vehicles

Within

Program

Within

team

Above

Program

Month

1

Month

2

Month

5

Month

6

Month

3

Month

4

Team considers

the option of

adding

transport vehicles

Team considers

the option of

adding

transport vehicles

Information

exchanged

with services

Information

exchanged

with services

Team reevaluates

impact of option

Team reevaluates

impact of option

Option discussed

with program

management

team

Option discussed

with program

management

team

Team recommends

adding transport

vehicles

Team recommends

adding transport

vehicles

Information

exchanged

with services

Information

exchanged

with services

Information

obtained from

6 other teams

Information

obtained from

6 other teams

Contractor

informs team

of issue

Contractor

informs team

of issue Information

obtained from

6 other teams

Information

obtained from

6 other teams

Program

management

Team makes

decisions to

add vehicles

Program

management

team makes

decisions to

add vehicles
Chapter 2: IPTs Help Programs Achieve

Better Outcomes

Page 23 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

with these organizations each time new information was obtained—a form

of rework. Despite this complicated process, a representative from the

prime contractor observed that the decision should have taken less time to

make. Furthermore, the representative stated that the contractor was not

significantly involved in making the decision and questioned the decision

because it increased the complexity of the design and placed additional

vehicle and manpower burdens on the system’s user.

Officials from the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle program painted

a similarly complex picture when they analyzed how the gun calibration

decision would have been made without IPTs. They estimated that the

decision would have taken 6 months to reach because the required

knowledge and authority would have been much more widely dispersed

among other teams and organizations. Figure 8 depicts the program

office’s assessment of how the decision to meet the gun calibration

requirement would have been made without an IPT.
Chapter 2: IPTs Help Programs Achieve

Better Outcomes

Page 24 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Figure 8: How Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Gun Calibration Decision Would Have Been Made Without IPTs

Making the same gun calibration decision on the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle program

without an IPT would have required more time to obtain knowledge and authority outside the team,

particularly above the program level.

Source: GAO.

This decision would have required sequential consultation with six

different functional organizations, the program management office, the

user community, and the defense contractor. When facing such a decision

path, it is understandable that the team that had the original idea might

decide not to propose the change, finding it easier to pursue the technical

solution rather than the requirement trade-off. Representatives from the

other weapon system programs that experienced problems meeting

development objectives described similar processes that required the

teams to consult with multiple organizations for information, concurrence,

or authorization before a decision could be made.

Within

DOD

Program

Office

Within

Contractor

Program

Office

Other

Organizations

Month 

1

Month

2

Month

5

Month

6

Month

3

Month

4

Proposal referred

to DOD 

Contracting

Representative

Proposal referred

to DOD 

Contracting

Representative

Contractor team 

gets corporate

approval to

seek change

Contractor team 

gets corporate

approval to

seek change

Design to 

original

requirement?

Design to 

original

requirement?

Change

requirement

to ease design?

Change

requirement

to ease design?

Program

office

assesses

proposal

Program

office

assesses

proposal

Program office 

seeks information 

from engineering 

and cost experts 

and consults 

with users

Program office 

seeks information 

from engineering 

and cost experts 

and consults 

with users

Change referred

to DOD 

Contracting

Representative

Change referred

to DOD 

Contracting

Representative

Change sent

to corporate

headquarters

Change sent

to corporate

headquarters

Team

implements

change

Team

implements

change

Contractor

identifies

trade-off

Contractor

identifies

trade-off

Program

office

gets approval

to make

change

Program

office

gets approval

to make

change

Within

DOD

Program

Office

Within

Contractor

Program

Office

Other

Organizations

Month 

1

Month

2

Month

5

Month

6

Month

3

Month

4

Proposal referred

to DOD 

Contracting

Representative

Proposal referred

to DOD 

Contracting

Representative

Contractor team 

gets corporate

approval to

seek change

Contractor team 

gets corporate

approval to

seek change

Design to 

original

requirement?

Design to 

original

requirement?

Change

requirement

to ease design?

Change

requirement

to ease design?

Program

office

assesses

proposal

Program

office

assesses

proposal

Program office 

seeks information 

from engineering 

and cost experts 

and consults 

with users

Program office 

seeks information 

from engineering 

and cost experts 

and consults 

with users

Change referred

to DOD 

Contracting

Representative

Change referred

to DOD 

Contracting

Representative

Change sent

to corporate

headquarters

Change sent

to corporate

headquarters

Team

implements

change

Team

implements

change

Contractor

identifies

trade-off

Contractor

identifies

trade-off

Program

office

gets approval

to make

change

Program

office

gets approval

to make

change
Chapter 2: IPTs Help Programs Achieve

Better Outcomes

Page 25 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

We observed a consistency between the effectiveness of teams and

product outcomes on the eight cases we studied: programs that were

meeting product development objectives had more effective IPTs than the

programs that were having problems. Table 1 depicts the product

outcomes for the eight cases.

Table 1: Effective IPTs Also Had Successful Product Development Outcomes

Program Cost Status Schedule Status Performance Status

Effective IPTs

DaimlerChrysler Product costs

lowered

Decreased development cycle

months by 50 percent

Improved vehicle designs

Hewlett-Packard Decreased cost by

over 60 percent

Decreased development

schedule by over 60 percent

Improved system integration and

product designs

3M Outperform cost

goals

Product delivery estimates

shortened by 12 to18 months

In comparison to current products,

improved performance by 80 percent

Advanced Amphibious Assault

Vehicle

Current product

unit cost lower

than original

product estimate

Ahead of original development

schedule

Demonstrated 5 fold increase in

speed

Less Effective IPTs

CH-60S helicopter aSchedule delayed Software and structural difficulties

Extended Range

Guided Munition

Increases in

development costs

Schedule slipped 3 years Redesigning due to technical

difficulties

Global Broadcast Service Experiencing cost

growth

Schedule slipped 1 1/2 years Software and hardware design

shortfalls

Land WarriorbCost increase of

about 50 percent

Schedule delayed 4 years Overweight equipment, inadequate

battery power and design

a Program official told us that program costs increased due to a requirement for additional capabilities

and an increase in the number of helicopters.

b

The Land Warrior performance problems cited here primarily reflect the first version of the system,

circa 1999. The system has since been redesigned but had not completed testing at the time of our

review.

Source: GAO analysis of commercial and DOD data.

In addition to meeting product development objectives, the successful

programs were often surpassing the performance of their predecessors in

both time to market and performance. These improvements were

attributed in large part to the effectiveness of the IPTs. The four programs

with less effective teams were experiencing the kinds of problems that,

while not unusual for weapon system programs, DOD hoped IPTs could

help solve.

Improved Product

Outcomes Attributed

to IPTs
Chapter 2: IPTs Help Programs Achieve

Better Outcomes

Page 26 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Officials at leading commercial firms and the Advanced Amphibious

Assault Vehicle program attribute their successful product outcomes

directly to their IPTs. Specifically, DaimlerChrysler officials attributed

reduced cycle time, improved product performance, and better market

success to their switch to IPTs. Hewlett-Packard officials stated that the

company’s teaming approach resulted in higher product quality, better

design results, and improved system integration. A Hewlett-Packard

official stated that the Snakes Program team simultaneously developed

three computer workstations in 9 months, half the time normally required,

with four times the performance of existing workstations. A HewlettPackard IPT developing printer equipment increased productivity six-fold,

despite using one-quarter fewer employees, and reduced the product

defect rate to 2 percent—of which the majority were cosmetic defects. In

another example, company officials said that in the past, test equipment

was developed at a cost between $25,000 and $70,000 and required up to 4

years to develop—which was well behind the performance of their

competitors. Now, their IPT approach enables the company to develop a

higher quality product in two-thirds less time and with a price of $10,000 to

$25,000.

A 3M official in the dental products division stated that the Pluto IPT

created a revolutionary dental material that surpasses similar products on

the market. The team leader reported that members developed a material

that shrinks 50 percent less than current materials and can withstand 80

percent more stress. In addition, team members filed five patents, of which

four have been issued—a valuable benefit to the company. The team

leader attributes the IPT’s decision-making—including the trade-off

between product performance and schedule—with shortening the product

development time as much as 18 months. In addition, the team leader

believes that the IPT will outperform the competition because 3M’s

patents make it difficult for other companies to bring a product to market

in a similar technology area. Lastly, Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle

program officials believe their IPT approach was critical to the program’s

ability to meet or exceed its cost, schedule, and performance objectives

since it began in 1995—atypical for large DOD programs.

The remaining four DOD cases we reviewed experienced problems,

including schedule delays, cost overruns, or a failure to meet performance

objectives. For example, the schedule and cost targets were increased for

the Extended Range Guided Munition Program because key performance

requirements proved too difficult to meet within the original estimates.

Also, the Land Warrior program manager restructured the program’s

Effective IPTs Helped

Reduce Product Cost and

Cycle Time

Programs With Less

Effective IPTs

Experienced Poor

Outcomes
Chapter 2: IPTs Help Programs Achieve

Better Outcomes

Page 27 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

operations, including selecting a new contractor, after the initial version of

the equipment proved too heavy and ineffective in testing. Restructuring

the program and redesigning, developing, and testing an improved version

of the equipment added cost and time to the effort. Finally, the CH-60S and

Global Broadcast Service programs also experienced schedule delays

when technical problems were revealed as the software or systems were

tested; GBS also experienced cost growth.

It is difficult to isolate a cause and effect relationship between less

effective teams and program problems. However, in some cases, program

officials and team members did link ineffective teams to poor product

outcomes. Several team members attributed poor outcomes to one

program’s IPT structure or the IPT’s ineffective decision-making process.

Specifically, one team member stated that the inability of the IPT—which

was led and primarily staffed by contractor employees—to make a

decision on a key technical component resulted in an overall program

schedule delay, cost increase, and reduced performance requirements. A

team leader from another program observed that the program’s

structure—which required teams to report to one another—slowed the

decision-making process and resulted in difficulties in establishing

performance requirements. He added that some of the discrepancies in the

requirements could have been avoided. In another case, a team member on

a program experiencing cost and schedule increases identified a potential

technical issue and proposed a change in the weapon’s design. The

contractor, who had final authority, refused the change and moved

forward with the original design. This design was ultimately deemed

unacceptable by the user.
Chapter 3: Authority and Knowledge Are Key

to IPT Effectiveness

Page 28 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Effective IPTs possess the knowledge and authority essential to the kind

of decision-making that is their hallmark. Knowledge is sufficient when the

team has the right mix of expertise to master the different facets of

product development. Authority is present when the team is responsible

for making both day-to-day decisions and delivering the product. These

two elements are essential to determining whether a team is in fact an IPT.

Other factors significantly enhance an IPT’s effectiveness. For the

programs we studied, effective IPTs had key members physically

collocated where possible to facilitate the communication, interaction,

and overall operations. When physical collocation was not possible,

resources were provided to connect members through virtual means, such

as shared software. Effective IPTs were also given control over selecting

members, and changes in membership were driven by the team’s need for

different knowledge or skills.

In the programs experiencing product development problems, the teams

either did not have responsibility for product development or were

missing key areas of expertise. Although called IPTs, in reality, they were

not. If a team is missing either the knowledge or the authority to recognize

and make difficult decisions, it is ill-equipped to carry out the role

expected from an IPT. Some of these programs had separate DOD and

defense contractor teams, which further dispersed knowledge and

authority. Moreover, DOD did not routinely collocate team members. Less

effective teams also did not have control over their composition. Team

membership fluctuated often but did not appear to be directly tied to the

needs of the project; members left and joined the team due to personnel

rotation policies or other reasons.

Research shows that product development responsibility and crossfunctional membership are fundamental IPT elements. If a team lacks

expertise, it will miss opportunities to recognize potential problems early;

without authority, it can do little about them. IPTs in leading commercial

firms and the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle program had the right

cross section of functional disciplines to develop new products. Their IPTs

were responsible for developing and delivering the product and making

day-to-day decisions on cost, design, performance, quality, test, and

manufacturing issues. The combination of product responsibility and

expertise equipped the IPTs with the information needed to tackle crucial

issues—like trade-offs—without having to rely heavily on organizations

outside the IPT. Once so-equipped, the collocation of team members and

control over the selection of members made the IPTs even better.

Chapter 3: Authority and Knowledge Are Key

to IPT Effectiveness

The Best IPTs Had the

Knowledge, Authority,

and Other Elements

to Be Effective
Chapter 3: Authority and Knowledge Are Key

to IPT Effectiveness

Page 29 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Along with being responsible for developing a complex new dental

material, 3M’s Pluto IPT had the authority to conduct research, select

material attributes based on customer needs, determine the delivery

schedule, estimate the cost of the material, and perform and evaluate the

scientific experiments to create the material. To meet these expectations,

the team possessed all key areas of expertise. Figure 9 illustrates the

variety and types of expertise found on the IPT.

Figure 9: Organization of 3M’s Pluto IPT

3M’s Pluto IPT has representation from all of the functional disciplines needed to design, develop,

and produce the new dental material.

Source: GAO analysis based on discussions with 3M.

Hewlett-Packard’s Snakes IPT consisted of representatives from research

and development, marketing, quality, leadership, finance, and

Product Responsibility and

Cross-functional

Membership Are Essential

IPT Elements

Team

Leader

Marketing Marketing

Technical/

Professional

Service

Technical/

Professional

Service

Material

Specialist

Material

Specialist

Dentist Dentist

Hardgoods

Engineer

Hardgoods

Engineer

Regulation

Specialist

Regulation

Specialist

Manufacturing

Engineer

Manufacturing

Engineer Chemist Chemist

Team

Leader

Marketing Marketing

Technical/

Professional

Service

Technical/

Professional

Service

Material

Specialist

Material

Specialist

Dentist Dentist

Hardgoods

Engineer

Hardgoods

Engineer

Regulation

Specialist

Regulation

Specialist

Manufacturing

Engineer

Manufacturing

Engineer Chemist Chemist
Chapter 3: Authority and Knowledge Are Key

to IPT Effectiveness

Page 30 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

manufacturing. Collectively, the IPT is responsible for designing,

developing, and building new computer workstations. Company officials

noted that the breadth of knowledge on the IPT not only speeds the pace

of development but the amount of innovation as well. They also stated that

IPTs may also include customers and suppliers.

Similarly, Daimler Chrysler’s Minivan platform team comprise design

engineers and representatives from planning, finance, marketing,

procurement, and manufacturing. They are vested with full authority to

design, develop, and produce new vehicle lines. Given the complexity of

developing a vehicle, smaller IPTs concentrate on developing component

parts, such as the door. Even the door IPT includes specialists for sheet

metal, glass, hardware, wiring, electrical switches, customer liaison, and

manufacturing. This IPT addresses day-to-day issues on designing door

features, determining performance characteristics, and constructing the

door. Equally important, the IPT is responsible for ensuring the entire door

is ready when production of the vehicle starts. If it is not, the IPT could

delay the entire delivery schedule.

Similarly, the Firepower IPT on the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle

program has responsibility for designing, developing, prototyping, and

testing the gun system, including the barrel, ammunition feeder, and the

gunner’s station. The IPT has members from engineering, testing, logistics,

cost estimating, manufacturing, and modeling and simulation. Importantly,

these members are drawn from the Marine Corps acquisition workforce,

weapon system operators, and the defense contractor and subcontractors

responsible for building the system.
Chapter 3: Authority and Knowledge Are Key

to IPT Effectiveness

Page 31 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

All of the IPTs that were producing good outcomes had their core team

members physically working in the same location. Based on actual results,

officials from the three commercial firms and the Advanced Amphibious

Assault Vehicle office shared the view that collocation provided many

benefits and cited it as a key factor to positioning an IPT for success. For

example, collocated IPT members can raise issues earlier, perform tasks

faster, and reach decisions quicker than core members who are

geographically dispersed.

Figure 10: Hewlett-Packard Printer

Hewlett-Packard uses special software, the internet, and communication devices to virtually collocate

remote IPT members that develop new products such as the printer shown here.

Source: Hewlett-Packard.

When collocated, team members can have frequent ad hoc meetings to

share information and identify issues that could require tradeoffs. Face-toface informal communication greatly adds to information flow, better

Collocated Members

Provide Benefits to IPTs
Chapter 3: Authority and Knowledge Are Key

to IPT Effectiveness

Page 32 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

cohesion, and a full understanding of other members’ roles—all of which

help foster team unity and performance. Company representatives told us

that the regular informal interaction reduces the need for formal team

meetings—such meetings account for a small percent of an IPT member’s

time. Lastly, company officials told us that collocated teams are able to

build trust, which can improve their functioning.

Company leaders observed negative team dynamics when members were

geographically dispersed. Without constant face-to-face interaction, team

members were inclined to have separate discussions and make decisions

regarding product development without involving one another. On

occasion, this resulted in a disconnect and took the members in opposing

directions. Representatives from one company observed that when

members are at remote locations, it is difficult to have team cohesion, and

the individuals must work harder to achieve the same level of efficiency as

the collocated representatives. Several officials stated that remote IPT

members can be excluded from spontaneous informal communications or

interactions. As a case in point, the leader of one IPT is very concerned

that a contemplated move of some members 1 mile from the core team

could damage the team’s effectiveness.

The three commercial firms and the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle

program went to great lengths to collocate IPT members. When Daimler

Chrysler relocated its operations, the firm constructed a facility to house

all platform team members in one location, including 800 to 900

permanent engineers, 300 to 500 contract engineers; representatives from

planning, finance, procurement, manufacturing; and some key suppliers.

Officials at 3M report that they also constructed a facility to collocate their

IPT members.
Chapter 3: Authority and Knowledge Are Key

to IPT Effectiveness

Page 33 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Figure 11: The Marine Corps Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle

Collocation has facilitated communications between DOD and contractor personnel during the

development of the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle shown here.

Source: DOD.

The Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle program office and the defense

contractor for the vehicle are collocated—which is atypical for most DOD

programs. The original program manager believed that IPTs are the right

way to manage the program and that collocation was essential to effective

IPTs. As a result, he required the contractor to lease a facility—at DOD’s

cost—to house the its research and development operation on one floor

and the DOD program office staff on another floor. A Marine Corps IPT

member explained that a contractor, when not collocated, may work in

isolation and periodically brief DOD. Much of the work done to that point

might need to be redone if issues arose. He added that working side by

side with the contractor has eliminated the need for formal meetings or

briefings because DOD and contractor members are equally informed

regarding the program’s status and progress.

Given that the commercial firms we reviewed have worldwide facilities,

physical collocation of every team member, particularly key suppliers, is

not always feasible. When team members can not be physically collocated,
Chapter 3: Authority and Knowledge Are Key

to IPT Effectiveness

Page 34 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

leading firms connect remote members through virtual means. The best of

these are shared software and databases that enable team members in one

location to see the results of work done in another location. For example,

if the product designs are stored in a computer database, when one team

member makes a change, the other members can see it in near real-time.

Other companies use advanced equipment to improve their video

conferencing capabilities or enable online team meetings through the

Internet. Still, officials at 3M and Daimler Chrysler believe that virtual

collocation does not replicate the benefits of face-to-face interactions. As a

result, companies temporarily collocate remote members during key

phases of product development to enable them to work side by side with

their team.

IPTs at leading commercial firms are given control over selecting

members. The firms believe that it is very important a team have the right

expertise on the team. As a result, team leaders are hand-selected by upper

management based on reputation, knowledge, and/or expertise. In turn,

team leaders select team members they believe have the expertise and the

interpersonal skills that would match the team’s needs.

At 3M, when a new team is formed, an announcement is sent to employees

notifying them of team’s purpose, time frame, and skills needed.

Employees are allowed to volunteer for teams. Team leaders select team

members from the pool of volunteers. According to company officials, the

self-nomination process allows staff to demonstrate commitment and

alignment with the team goals and ensures that the team members share a

common purpose.

Membership on commercial IPTs can change for different reasons, such as

attrition or promotion. However, we found that the predominant reason to

change members was to meet the changing needs of the team. At one

company, as the product moved through the development phases, the mix

of expertise was sometimes changed as the team’s need for knowledge

and skills changed. For example, conceptual staffs, such as design

engineers, are needed in the initial stages but may be replaced with test

engineers as the product proceeds.

Control Over Membership

Can Enhance IPTs
Chapter 3: Authority and Knowledge Are Key

to IPT Effectiveness

Page 35 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

The four DOD programs that were experiencing problems had teams that

lacked the key elements— product responsibility and cross-functional

representation—found in the successful cases. In our view, these teams

were IPTs in name only. Most of these teams did not have responsibility

for decisions on product development issues or delivering the product.

Teams that could claim product responsibility did not have sufficient

cross-functional representation. Regardless of whether product

responsibility or expertise was lacking teams were incapable of identifying

problems and resolving them expeditiously through a collaborative

decision-making process. Moreover, the teams did not exhibit other

characteristics—collocation and control over membership—that

contribute to effectiveness. Neither characteristic appears to be required

or encouraged by DOD policy and team leaders and members perceived

difficulties in adopting these characteristics within DOD.

Seven of the 12 teams we studied were not responsible for the delivery of a

weapon system or a component, nor were they responsible for day-to-day

decisions on product development issues. Instead, the teams were

responsible for monitoring or managing a part of the development process.

For example, several teams exclusively managed the test process—under

DOD guidance—including reviewing the contractor’s test procedures,

scheduling the system for developmental and operational tests, and

ensuring that the test certification requirements were met. Other teams

were responsible for monitoring the contractor to ensure performance

requirements were met, addressing logistics issues when the system was

fielded, tracking system costs, or handling contract management issues.

Still other teams primarily focused on planning, coordinating, or

developing acquisition strategies and program schedules—and bore no

direct responsibility for delivering the weapon system or one of its

components.

The remaining five teams that believed they had product responsibility for

the most part excluded representatives from critical product development

functions such as design or manufacturing. Instead of being integrated into

the team, members from the missing functions were consulted by the team

as issues arose, which made decisions take longer. For example, one team

co-leader stated that his team’s responsibility was limited to technical

issues; people from other key disciplines, such as cost, were not team

members. When a cost issue occurs, the leader needs to contact cost

experts for their input. Another team leader from the same program stated

that his team is primarily comprised of mechanical engineers with

responsibility for many issues, including design, requirements,

Most DOD Teams Did

Not Possess the Key

Ingredients of IPTs

DOD Teams Lacked the

Knowledge and Authority

Necessary for IPTs
Chapter 3: Authority and Knowledge Are Key

to IPT Effectiveness

Page 36 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

manufacturing, schedule, and production. However, representatives from

cost, test, quality, or logistics were not team members. Those represented

are invited to participate in team activities when an issue arises. We were

told that a team for one program had all of the key functional disciplines,

including members from the cost and testing functions. However, after

meeting with those individuals, it was clear that they were not real

members; they were either unaware of the team’s existence or had not

attended a meeting for a long period of time.

Knowledge and authority were further dispersed on the 12 DOD teams

because their programs operated with two sets of teams—one belonging

to DOD and the other belonging to the contractor. The DOD teams

interacted with the defense contractor staff to solve problems or to

provide periodic updates but did not routinely include representation from

the contractors. When DOD program officials did participate on contractor

IPTs, they typically served as the customer representative, not fully

participating team members. Program office and contractor teams met

separately and addressed issues independently, and involvement was

limited to sequential reviews.

When limited by lack of product responsibility or lack of requisite

expertise, a team must go to other teams and organizations to get the

knowledge and authority needed to make decisions. The result is a

sequential decision-making process, with numerous rework loops.

Program managers and team leaders put in extra effort to overcome these

limitations. One program manager created temporary teams on an ad hoc

basis to address specific product issues, such as difficulties in meeting a

weight requirement. Team leaders in other programs informed us that they

frequently invite individuals from other disciplines to participate in their

team meetings on an as-needed basis to obtain a broader perspective. The

Land Warrior program manager went so far as to create a “shadow” IPT

organization to manage the program on a day-to-day basis, while leaving

the formal, functionally organized teams in place. He noted that the formal

structure had been set up and members assigned before he became the

program manager. Finding this structure difficult to manage effectively, he

created the shadow organization and staffed it with team members of his

choice.

Most of the DOD teams on the less successful programs were not fully

collocated, and none of the teams were collocated with their contractor

counterparts. Many of the team members found that this made it difficult

to communicate on a real time basis and they had to work harder to

DOD Teams Typically Did

Not Collocate
Chapter 3: Authority and Knowledge Are Key

to IPT Effectiveness

Page 37 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

operate well. One leader stated that he is not always aware of what other

teams are doing that may affect his team. A contractor official observed

that the DOD team that she interfaced with could have taken less time if

they were collocated and able to work the issue side by side.

DOD guidance does not address collocation, despite its advantages, as a

means to enhance IPT effectiveness. DOD officials cite the cost and

logistical difficulties with relocating geographically dispersed programs

and defense contractors as the primary reason for not collocating core

team members. For example, one program manager noted that his

program involves a variety of DOD agencies, commands, and all three

services located throughout the United States and several foreign

countries, including Italy and Korea. The program manager thought it

impractical to collocate all of the organizations. Appropriately, DOD still

supports developing the capabilities for shared databases and other

technical means to replicate collocation. Marine Corps and contractor

officials from the amphibious vehicle program had the same initial

misgivings about collocation. Today, they told us they cannot imagine

running a program any other way. Officials from leading commercial firms

stated that they also confronted cost and logistical issues but believed that

the investment to collocate was warranted relative to the investment made

in a new product development.

Most team leaders had little say in the composition of their teams. Team

members also had little input into the teams they were assigned to as the

functional organizations made the assignments. If defense contractor

representatives are included on the team, they are typically chosen by

their organizations without DOD’s involvement.

Although some team leaders stated that they would like the opportunity to

select the members, DOD does not routinely empower teams to do so. In

fact, the DOD Integrated Product and Process Development Handbook

states that the “selection of team members for IPTs often lies outside the

direct control of the IPT leader.” According to DOD guidance, IPT

members should be drawn from a functional discipline—organizations

such as engineering and financial management that operate independently

of weapon system programs. Generally, the functional leaders assign team

members to IPTs, and while some negotiation can occur, program and IPT

leaders have little say over choosing members.

DOD teams also did not have control over the membership changes. In

general, we found that membership fluctuated frequently, and the majority

DOD Teams Do Not

Control Membership
Chapter 3: Authority and Knowledge Are Key

to IPT Effectiveness

Page 38 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

of the team members were not original members. For example, at one

program office, 71 percent of the team members were not original

members. One team member told us that his team has had four different

team leaders since he became a member 2 years ago. Another team

member had four different program managers within 4 years. Unlike

commercial firms, where changes in membership were driven by changes

in the team’s needs, the reasons for turnover in DOD teams were seldom

driven by the needs of the team. For example, some military personnel

stated that they join and leave teams frequently because military policy is

to rotate people every 3 years, but they can rotate as often as 18 months.

Unsurprisingly, the majority of military personnel stated that it was not

likely that they would be involved on the IPT through the program’s life

cycle—which can last 15 years.

Regardless of the reason, team members and leaders observed that

frequent turnover results in a loss of corporate knowledge and sets the

team back. For example, one member stated that when new members join

the team, there is an inclination to revisit issues and past decisions, which

can slow the team’s progress. Another team member noted that when the

IPT is initially launched, goals and mission statements are established.

When original members rotate, the IPT can lose sight of the objectives and

lose some of the advances gained in the early stages.
Chapter 4: Differences in DOD and

Commercial Teaming Approach Reflect

Different Environments

Page 39 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Differences in the environment in which teams operate can have a

significant effect on successfully implementing the IPT approach. We

found that leading commercial firms provided a more supportive

foundation for IPTs. Company leaders committed to the IPT approach and

backed up that commitment through actions designed to ensure that

implementation was not left to chance. In short, they created a different,

more conducive environment for IPTs. While DOD endorses the IPT

approach and has issued policies and other guidance, it has not taken

steps to ensure that IPTs are implemented at the program execution level.

In essence, the IPT approach has been left to germinate in an unchanged

environment that is not necessarily conducive to IPTs. Successful

implementation is thus more dependent on the ingenuity of individuals

working on programs.

Differences in how commercial firms and DOD managers measure success

and in the pressures they face in starting programs significantly affects the

environment for integrated product teams. Commercial products’ success

is measured in terms of the customer’s acceptance of the final product and

cycle times short enough to beat the competition. These conditions create

incentives for gaining knowledge early, forming realistic goals and

estimates, and holding teams accountable for delivering the product—all

of which favor an IPT approach. In DOD, the pressures to successfully

launch new programs and protect their funding, coupled with long cycle

times, create incentives to be overly optimistic in setting program goals

and to focus on process—versus product—concerns. DOD’s necessary

reliance on defense contractors introduces another complication for IPTs

because two major organizations (DOD and defense contractors) are

responsible for the product, and they do not necessarily share the same

incentives. Notably, the amphibious vehicle program has overcome these

obstacles and made IPTs work in the DOD environment.

DaimlerChrysler, 3M, and Hewlett-Packard all provided an environment

that supported the IPT approach to product development. Corporate

leaders not only embraced the IPT approach, but demonstrated their

commitment by reorganizing to better align their structure with IPTs and

making targeted investments in physical assets, training, and other forms

of help. The firms delegated considerable power to IPTs, such as in setting

product development goals, but held the teams accountable for delivering

on those goals. In addition, the pressures of successfully competing in the

marketplace—that foster realism, short cycle times, and satisfying the

customer—play well to the strengths of the IPT approach.

Chapter 4: Differences in DOD and

Commercial Teaming Approach Reflect

Different Environments

Commercial Firms

Provided a Different,

Supportive

Environment for IPTs
Chapter 4: Differences in DOD and

Commercial Teaming Approach Reflect

Different Environments

Page 40 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Although DaimlerChrysler and 3M did not plan to restructure their

organizations when they decided to implement IPTs, they found that their

former organizations were at odds with the IPT approach. For example, in

the 1980s, DaimlerChrysler (then Chrysler) had separate organizations for

key functions, such as engineering, finance, and manufacturing. Moreover,

engineers were organized around the types of components—such as

climate control—rather than product types. This organization made it

difficult even for all of the engineers working on a particular vehicle to

talk with one another, let alone interact with functions other than

engineering, such as finance. DaimlerChrysler realized that IPTs could not

simply be patched across such organizations. This realization was

followed by a corporate reorganization along platform lines—classes of

vehicles—to reinforce the emphasis on products, rather than functions or

components.

Figure 12: DaimlerChrysler’s Town and Country Minivan

DaimlerChrysler reorganized around platform teams to better support its IPT approach.

Source: DaimlerChrysler.

The companies took other steps to reinforce their commitment to IPTs.

For example, DaimlerChrysler officials noted that some employees were

resistant to the IPT approach. To encourage employee acceptance and

ensure organizational and product goals were achieved, a two-pronged

Leading Commercial Firms

Demonstrate Commitment

Through Action
Chapter 4: Differences in DOD and

Commercial Teaming Approach Reflect

Different Environments

Page 41 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

performance appraisal process was instituted that solicited input from

both an IPT member’s immediate supervisor and other members and

organizations the member interfaced with. We found that at 3M and

Hewlett-Packard, the IPT leader either prepared the members’

performance evaluations or provided significant input to it. Officials noted

that capturing an individual’s performance on an IPT was a driving factor

in garnering acceptance of the IPT approach.

In addition to the physical infrastructure investments made to collocate

and integrate the workplace, the companies invested other resources to

ensure that IPTs were successfully implemented at the product

development level. In an earlier report on best training practices, we noted

that leading firms focus on a few, key initiatives at any one time1

 and

deliver targeted, hands-on training to ensure that implementation is

successful at the product development level. DaimlerChrysler, 3M, and

Hewlett-Packard took the same approach. These companies offered

extensive front-end planning assistance. For example, Hewlett-Packard

helps new teams plan and define their priorities and track their progress. A

company official believed this help could reduce a project’s time by 10 to

20 percent. At 3M, the company provided team sponsors, who were top

managers that established the IPT and assisted the team with leadership

and high-level decision-making. In some cases, the companies provided

facilitators that assisted IPTs with hands-on guidance to enhance their

daily performance.

 1 Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System Programs

Implement Best Practices (GAO/NSIAD-99-206; Aug. 16, 1999).
Chapter 4: Differences in DOD and

Commercial Teaming Approach Reflect

Different Environments

Page 42 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Figure 13: 3M Dental Products

3M top managers served as team sponsors

Source: 3M

According to officials from the leading commercial firms, achievable,

clear, and shared goals are vital to an IPT’s success. The goals include the

timing of bringing a product to market, its features, and a cost that will

appeal to customers yet yield an acceptable profit. The three companies

routinely involve their IPTs early in the product development process,

giving them the opportunity and authority to affect a product’s goals.

While subject to some constraints, IPT leaders and members were given

the flexibility to make trade-offs between competing objectives. The role

3M’s Pluto team played in trading off product sophistication for an earlier

delivery date is a prime example of a team being given both the

opportunity to be involved in goal-setting and the authority to affect the

goals.

There is a consequence for IPTs having such influence over product

goals—the product’s success is readily measurable, and the teams are held

accountable for its success. If the product is delivered late, does not

perform as expected, or costs more than it could sell for profitably, the

Companies Give IPTs

Control Over the Product

but Hold Them

Accountable
Chapter 4: Differences in DOD and

Commercial Teaming Approach Reflect

Different Environments

Page 43 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

IPT is responsible. If a product fails because it does not meet one or more

of its goals, the team is held accountable for that failure. This consequence

helps the team to be aggressive but realistic in setting goals and motivates

the team toward achievement of goals as it develops the product.

Based on our current and previous work on best practices,2

 the demands

leading commercial firms make of new product developments create a set

of incentives that mesh well with the IPT approach. These firms insist on a

solid business case for starting a new product, which centers on designing

and manufacturing a product that will sell well enough to make an

acceptable profit. Barring an unforeseen change in the market, if the firm

delivers the right product on time and for the right price, the customer will

buy and the product succeeds. To ensure success, leading commercial

firms insist on having high levels of knowledge about the technological,

design, and production content of the product. In particular, before a new

product development is launched, leading firms ensure that technology

development is complete and that immature technology is not allowed

onto a product. To meet market demands and stay competitive, the firms

consciously limit cycle time—the length of time it takes to develop a new

product. The leading commercial firms we have visited had cycle times

that ranged from 18 months to just over 4 years.

With product success clearly defined in terms of customer acceptance and

cycle times kept short, accountability is readily established in terms of

delivering a quality product on time. This reality helps keep an IPT focused

on the product itself, can minimize membership changes, and fosters

trade-offs. Candor in recognizing risks early and realism in making

estimates are fostered because doing otherwise, such as overselling

product performance or delivery dates, can set the team up for

disappointing the customer and failing. Similarly, the leading firms’

insistence on demonstrated knowledge about technology maturity and

other aspects of the product reinforces realism because knowledge is

more directly linked to product success than promises or projections. The

IPT, with its full cross section of expertise, is ideally suited to having the

key aspects of product knowledge on hand to provide realism, minimize

surprises, and quickly respond to potential problems.

 2

 See related GAO products.

Incentives in Commercial

Environment Are

Conducive to IPTs
Chapter 4: Differences in DOD and

Commercial Teaming Approach Reflect

Different Environments

Page 44 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

In the programs we reviewed, DOD’s environment was not conducive to

IPTs. DOD has not backed up its commitment to the IPT approach with

investments and other actions to ensure success at the program execution

level. Teams typically were not involved in the goal-setting process and

could not really be held accountable for goals that were unrealistic.

Moreover, the pressures on launching and funding new programs created

incentives that posed obstacles for IPTs. Shared responsibility between

program offices and contractors further complicated the environment for

IPTs.

After DOD formally adopted the IPT approach in 1995, it mandated the use

of the IPTs on all weapon programs to the extent possible and made a

significant amount of IPT information, instructions, directives, and

manuals available. However, some of the information is too vague and is

not practical for implementation at the program execution level.

Moreover, the policy is not coupled with top-level action—instead,

implementation falls on the shoulders of the program offices. For example,

the 1995 policy memorandum directing program offices to implement IPTs

does not include the factors essential for an effective IPT. Other IPT

policies designate as IPTs teams that have a legitimate purpose but cannot

practically operate as effective IPTs. For example, the Overarching and

Working-Level IPTs are oversight in nature and cannot be expected to

execute the day-to-day responsibilities of an IPT. Also, the policies specify

that some IPTs be comprised of a single functional discipline or

profession, such as test and evaluation and cost, that by definition do not

possess the mix of expertise to make the cross-functional decisions

expected of an IPT. It is not that these teams should not exist, but that

assigning the designation of “IPT” to teams for which it should not apply

dilutes the designation. It contributes to the view that IPTs are nothing

new. On that point, over half of the team members we interviewed stated

that DOD’s adoption of IPTs resulted in little change at the program

execution level; most saw IPTs as simply a new name for an old approach.

No DOD organization ensures or monitors implementation of IPTs, leaving

implementation dependent on the circumstances of the individual program

and the capability of the government and contractor managers. According

to a representative from the DOD organization that writes IPT guidance,

the organization’s role is not to ensure or monitor the program offices’

implementation of the guidance. An IPT point of contact for one of the

services informed us that his office makes IPT information available but

that implementation is left up to the programs. While a reasonable amount

of latitude for IPTs is good, DOD has not provided top-level attention, as

DOD Environment

Not As Conducive to

IPTs

DOD-Level Support for

IPTs Does Not Extend

Much Beyond Policy
Chapter 4: Differences in DOD and

Commercial Teaming Approach Reflect

Different Environments

Page 45 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

leading commercial firms have, to ensure that the guidance is followed at

the program execution level. At the program or program execution level,

resources provided to IPTs varied and were not part of a systematic

approach to ensure IPT effectiveness. For example, 71 percent of the team

members we interviewed said that if program offices provided support, it

was usually in response to a team request.

While commercial firms went through an organizational transformation to

support IPTs, in many respects DOD maintained the status quo after it

adopted the IPT policy. Organizations set up years ago around functional

disciplines, such as engineering and financial management, continue to

write guidelines for their functions, and to hire, train, and manage the

career progression of the acquisition workforce. Thus, they still wield

considerable control over members of program teams. When a program

office is set up to develop and produce a new weapon system, the staff is

drawn from these organizations but maintains their professional ties to

them. Program offices and their IPTs are in essence superimposed over

the standing functional organizations. Performance appraisals for staff

working on the weapons we reviewed are still largely controlled by the

functional organizations, not the program teams. Nearly 80 percent of the

team members we interviewed said that they continue to be evaluated by

superiors in their parent functional organization, not the IPT leader.

Furthermore, most team members were not aware whether their

performance appraisers received input from the IPT supervisors.

In the programs experiencing developmental problems, DOD did not

systematically involve IPTs in setting product development goals. Often,

these goals were not realistic and resulted from overselling a new program

in its early stages. This made it unlikely for any team, regardless of

capability, to meet the goals and difficult to hold team members

accountable for results. According to most IPT members we interviewed,

key product goals, such as system cost, delivery schedule, and

performance requirements were often fixed and outside of the team’s

control. Their responses are captured in figure 14.

Teams Did Not Have

Control Over Goals
Chapter 4: Differences in DOD and

Commercial Teaming Approach Reflect

Different Environments

Page 46 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Figure 14: Percentage of DOD IPT Members That Perceived Key Product Elements

As Outside the Team’s Control

Over half of the team members believe the key product elements—cost, schedule, requirements are

outside of the team’s control.

Source: GAO analysis.

In some cases, the key product goals were established during the initial

concept stage—years before IPTs were set up. We have previously

reported that such goals are often set optimistically, reducing the

probability that they can be achieved despite best efforts. One program

manager told us that overselling at the concept stage locked the program

and its IPTs into unachievable goals. Of the IPT members interviewed, 45

percent stated that the fixed elements hampered their decision-making

ability. For example, an IPT leader told us that during the concept stage, a

requirement was set that the program would use commercial off-the-shelf

technology. When a key piece of commercial software unexpectedly

became unavailable and there were uncertainties regarding the reliability

of other commercial products, the IPT could not change the requirement.

No Elements are 

Fixed

14%

Two Elements Fixed

18%

Three Elements 

Fixed*

51%

One Element Fixed

17%
Chapter 4: Differences in DOD and

Commercial Teaming Approach Reflect

Different Environments

Page 47 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

It was the team leader’s opinion that the requirement led to problems that

contributed to significant delays in the delivery schedule.

DOD teams were not routinely held accountable for product outcomes.

Two program managers informed us that instead their teams were held

accountable for how well they managed aspects of the acquisition process,

such as test and evaluation. A program manager with cost and schedule

overruns was hesitant to hold the teams accountable because the original

goals were never achievable. Similarly, a team leader unable to maintain

the program schedule stated that his team was not a failure because the

schedule goal was unrealistic and out of the team’s control. Another team

member noted that IPTs can influence key program elements but that the

teams are not penalized when their actions lead to cost and schedule

overruns.

DOD’s incentives for managing weapon systems do not put IPTs in as good

a position to succeed as their commercial counterparts. Programs are

started with a legitimate desire for an improved combat capability.

However, the intense competition for funds needed to launch a new

weapon system program encourages the conceptualization of a new

weapon that offers significantly greater—even unique—performance

relative to its predecessor. As a result, new programs are often started

with immature technologies, that deny managers and teams the high levels

of product knowledge that are important to realism. Moreover, new

programs must fit into forecasts of available funding; as a result,

incentives are strong to make optimistic estimates of cost and cycle time.

Because actual cycle times can be very long, lasting 10 to 15 years, the

more tangible goals for teams become securing the next increment of

funding and getting approval for moving into the next stage of

development—process, versus product, goals. Weapon system programs

are developed in a more critical environment in which evidence of

problems, such as an unreachable performance goal, can invite criticism

and a potential loss of funding and other support. Thus, the candor needed

to identify and resolve trade-offs, for which IPTs are ideally suited, is

implicitly discouraged.

Accountability for meeting weapon system goals is difficult to establish.

Unlike the commercial environment, in DOD the customer is very involved

throughout the development cycle and becomes increasingly vested in a

particular weapon. The DOD customer is thus not likely to walk away

from a weapon even if it took longer, cost more, and performed less than

anticipated. Long cycle times, coupled with DOD’s policy for rotating

Incentives in DOD

Environment Create

Obstacles for IPTs
Chapter 4: Differences in DOD and

Commercial Teaming Approach Reflect

Different Environments

Page 48 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

military personnel, also impair accountability. Military personnel,

including most program managers, stay with a program for a limited

amount of time and then are rotated to new assignments. A DOD analysis

shows that a program with an 11-year development cycle will have, on the

average, four program managers. Most of the military personnel we

interviewed did not expect to participate on a team throughout the

program’s development. Other team members believed that, as a result,

military personnel may have less accountability or commitment to the

team.

DOD’s employment of defense contractors to design and build its weapon

systems is an additional complication for IPTs that commercial firms do

not face. With the exception of two programs, the DOD and contractor

personnel worked on separate teams, usually in different geographic

areas. Team leaders and members informed us that a lack of trust between

the DOD program office and the contractor might inhibit effective

teaming. Team members also perceive that the DOD program office teams

and the contractor might have conflicting incentives or competing

interests. For example, a team leader noted that contractors are paid to

participate in IPT activities. As a result, the leader believed the contractor

had an incentive to generate meaningless IPT documents to receive credit

for the activities. According to a member of another team, the contractor

was not interested in a proposal made by the DOD team that could reduce

the program schedule because it would have reduced the contractor’s

payment. On the other hand, a contractor representative cited the

contractor’s inability to convince DOD team members that increasing the

test schedule would unnecessarily extend the program schedule.

In other cases, DOD team members believed the contractors resisted

trade-offs and other changes that could have prevented problems because

the contractor would be paid more money to correct rather than to

prevent problems. Consistent with the competitive pressures at the start of

a program, one team co-leader stated that the contract proposal process

may encourage contractors to underestimate cost and schedule estimates

and overestimate performance expectations to win the contract. Those

estimates then contribute to unrealistic program baselines. The point is

not so much that the team members’ statements are accurate, but that

their perceptions pose obstacles to effective IPTs and further blur

accountability for successfully delivering the product.
Chapter 4: Differences in DOD and

Commercial Teaming Approach Reflect

Different Environments

Page 49 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

The Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle program has many of the

teaming characteristics of leading commercial firms. This accomplishment

was made possible by the unique environment—or culture—that the

program’s initial manager created to center around the IPT approach. The

IPTs were responsible for delivering components of the vehicle and had

the knowledge and authority to make trade-offs, such as reducing the

calibration requirement for the 30-mm gun3

. Unlike the other DOD cases,

Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle IPTs were not made to fit among

standing organizations and procedures. Clearly, the program manager’s

vision and entrepreneurship were the driving forces behind the program’s

success with IPTs—traits that one cannot reasonably expect to find across

the board. However, his recognition of the need to create a culture for

such teams, the steps he took to create that culture, and the other

conditions that helped make IPTs successful on this program are both

observable and replicable.

The original program manager saw IPTs as the key to the new vehicle’s

success and collocation as the only way to break down the barriers

between DOD program offices and contractors. By making collocation a

requirement in the request for contract proposals, he forced the contractor

and DOD program office staff to work in the same facility—the first DOD

weapon system program office to do so. Moreover, he created one set of

teams—comprised of both Marine Corps and contractor staff. Officials and

team members from both the Marine Corps and the contractor were

adamant that the IPT structure, bolstered by collocation, created a positive

working relationship by helping to break down barriers to trust, improving

communication, and creating common goals between the Marine Corps

and the program office for developing the vehicle.

The program manager actively sought to create a shared understanding of

the customer’s needs among Marine Corps and contractor staff. He

provided opportunities for the contractor’s engineers to learn first hand

the user’s conditions and needs. For example, he had the contractor’s staff

spend a night aboard an amphibious ship and stay in the troop

compartment. Contractor staff drove the existing amphibious assault

 3

 Another example of trade-offs made by amphibious vehicle IPTs includes that between

the baseline transmission and the six-speed transmission. Although the six-speed

transmission required a greater investment during the development phase of the program,

it is expected to result in a 21 to 1 rate of return during the life-cycle of the vehicle.

Additional benefits of the six-speed transmission are a 5 percent decrease in fuel

consumption and a 40 percent increase in the interval before maintenance is required.

Amphibious Vehicle

Program Found Ways

to Provide a More

Supportive IPT

Environment
Chapter 4: Differences in DOD and

Commercial Teaming Approach Reflect

Different Environments

Page 50 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

vehicle to understand the environment that Marines were operating in and

the limitations of the current vehicle. Contractors also took Marine Corps

leadership training classes, where they heard the experiences of a Marine

Corps corporal who almost drowned in the current vehicle. Moreover,

because the prototypes for the new vehicle are being built in the facility

where the IPTs work, the teams can see and experience first hand the

results of their design efforts. This provides immediate feedback to the

team members and fosters a sense of ownership.

Other features of the program were conducive to effective IPTs. Because

the program was the most important acquisition for the Marine Corps, it

had full and stable funding, and the program manager had the full backing

of the Marine Corps hierarchy. This enabled the program to provide

financial incentives, including bonuses to the contractor personnel, when

key performance requirements were exceeded and to make significant

investments in training and information systems. We have previously

reported that the program emulated the best practices of leading

commercial firms in targeting hands-on training to staff on key initiatives,

including IPTs.4

 The program also developed a paperless communication

system; a virtual product model of the amphibious vehicle; and an on-line,

real-time shared data source that enabled teams to operate from the same

set of records. Moreover, the program is one of the few we have found that

matured key technologies, most notably the propulsion system, before the

program was started.5

 Finally, the program has had very low turnover in

key personnel; the original program manager stayed with the program for

10 years. Both he and the deputy program manager worked on the

enabling technologies in a science and technology effort before the

program began.

 4 Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System Programs

Implement Best Practices (GAO/NSIAD-99-206, Aug. 16, 1999).

5 Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve Weapon

System Outcomes (GAO/NSIAD-99-162, July 30, 1999).
Chapter 4: Differences in DOD and

Commercial Teaming Approach Reflect

Different Environments

Page 51 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

The effect the environment has on the success of IPTs is consistent with

what we have observed on other best practices. In previous reports on

how best practices can improve the weapon acquisition process, we have

consistently pointed out that practices are adopted because they help a

program—commercial or defense—succeed in its environment (see

Related GAO Products). Thus, to identify specific best practices from

commercial firms and simply recommend that DOD adopt them will not

produce the desired improvement. Rather, one must first address how to

change the factors that reinforce the prevailing—and suboptimal—

practices. In our reports, we have identified a number of actions DOD

needs to take to make the weapon system acquisition environment more

conducive to adopting best practices. DOD has agreed with these reports

and with the need to make changes in its environment. Perhaps the most

significant action DOD has taken to date has been to revamp its policies

that guide weapon acquisitions to emulate some of the conditions that

encourage best practices. DOD’s success in implementing these policies

on individual weapon system programs will affect several conditions

important to creating effective IPTs.

Actions we have previously recommended or suggested DOD take that we

believe can help IPTs operate successfully are summarized in the points

that follow:

• Mature key technologies and match available resources with weapon

system requirements before launching a development program.

• Develop an initial version of a weapon system that provides a worthwhile

capability and introduce more advanced capabilities in later versions as

the enabling technologies mature.

• Make the acquisition process knowledge-based by focusing on attaining

key aspects of product knowledge—technology maturity, design maturity,

and production process maturity—at the right times.

• Keep weapon system development cycle times to 5 years or less and tie a

program manager’s tenure to the full cycle.

• Target training on key improvements to acquisition management to

program offices and ensure that it is delivered to the program office work

site.

• Involve key suppliers—that is, those firms that make key components and

subsystems for prime contractors—early in the design and development

process.

• Send the right signals on individual weapon system decisions—that is,

decisions that reinforce the above principles rather than make exceptions

to them.

Previous GAO

Recommendations

and DOD Actions Are

Aimed at Making the

Weapon System

Environment More

Conducive to Best

Practices
Chapter 4: Differences in DOD and

Commercial Teaming Approach Reflect

Different Environments

Page 52 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

These actions, collectively, can (1) lower the pressures to oversell weapon

system performance and underestimate costs and schedules at program

launch, (2) infuse more knowledge of a new weapon system earlier and

throughout the development process, (3) make people more capable of

delivering the weapon system as promised, and (4) hold people more

accountable for delivering the weapon system.

DOD has made important changes to its policies that guide how weapon

systems are acquired and managed, commonly referred to as the “5000

series.” Among these changes are (1) changing the launch point for new

weapon system programs and calling for technologies to be mature before

including them on a program and (2) adopting an evolutionary approach to

developing new weapons, allowing for better versions with more advanced

technologies to be fielded when they are ready. In other statements and

memoranda, DOD has called for limiting cycle time to 5 to 7 years, agreed

to take steps to better match technology and other resources with

requirements before launching new programs, and revamped its

professional education for the acquisition workforce to be more

responsive to managers’ needs and more capable of providing needed help

to the workplace.

These are positive steps toward creating a better environment for best

practices. Clearly, more steps remain to be taken. Perhaps the most

important of these is implementation at the service and individual program

level. Thus far, the positive changes we have seen on specific programs,

including IPTs, have been the result of extraordinary effort on the part of

individual executives and managers. The systemic pressures and

incentives that reinforce the practices of the past have been slow to

change.
Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations

Page 53 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

When properly armed with knowledge and authority, IPTs improve

decision-making and help better products to be developed more quickly.

They do this by reducing rework in product planning, design, and

manufacturing; reducing cycle time and costs; and improving first-time

product quality. At issue is not so much whether to employ IPTs but rather

how to employ them effectively. Leading commercial firms have been

successful with IPTs because (1) they have given their teams the key

elements of IPTs, (2) they have taken action and made investments at the

corporate level to ensure implementation occurs at the program execution

level, and (3) their competitive environment creates incentives that align

well with IPTs. In addition, their IPTs have worked in conjunction with

other good management practices, such as maturing technologies before

they are turned over to a team responsible for delivering the final product.

DOD has rightly endorsed IPTs as a vehicle to improve management of the

development of weapon systems. On the programs that were experiencing

problems in meeting their objectives, IPTs were not effective because they

did not have the knowledge or authority to recognize problems early and

resolve them. The teams were at a disadvantage because they did not

possess the key elements of IPTs and in fact were IPTs in name only; DOD

did not back policies up with actions to ensure IPTs were implemented at

the program execution level; and the DOD environment for managing

weapon systems created obstacles, not incentives, for IPTs.

In leading commercial companies, the corporate environment has become

conducive to IPTs, so that the typical program manager can employ IPTs

effectively. In DOD, it takes a rare program manager to make IPTs work.

Much of the success of IPTs on the amphibious vehicle program, for

example, can be attributed to extraordinary individual efforts and unique

circumstances, rather than to a systematic DOD approach. The challenge

for DOD is to create the conditions under which the resources and tools

typically provided to most weapon system program managers will enable

the effective use of IPTs. We have previously reported on how DOD can

create conditions more conducive to adopting best practices and DOD has

taken initial actions to do so. These changes could make the DOD

environment more conducive to IPTs. If DOD is successful in

implementing changes at the individual program execution level, it will be

more likely that the typical program manager will be able to create

effective IPTs. Still, DOD must take specific steps to put program offices in

a better position to create the elements of effective IPTs.

Chapter 5: Conclusions and

Recommendations

Conclusions
Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations

Page 54 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense designate as IPTs only those

teams that will have the day-to-day responsibility for developing and

delivering a product, such as a weapon system, and the cross-section of

expertise to do so. For those teams so designated, we recommend the

Secretary of Defense use the IPT practices and characteristics in this

report to develop and communicate to program offices standards for

defining what constitutes an effective IPT. Such standards could then be

used to (1) determine the extent that IPTs have been effectively

implemented in weapon system programs and (2) track progress in

implementing IPTs.

We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense put program offices in a

better position to create and sustain effective IPTs by

• refining the IPT designation to be used exclusively for new product

development teams encompassing core components;

• ensuring IPTs have the sufficient knowledge and authority by (1) giving

them responsibility for a deliverable product, along with the authority to

make decisions on that product and (2) providing representation from

each functional area of expertise critical to product design, development,

and manufacture;

• enabling IPT leaders to participate in program goal setting and holding the

teams accountable for achieving those goals;

• encouraging and supporting program managers’ efforts to collocate team

members, including contractor personnel;

• providing program managers and team leaders with greater authority and

control over selection of IPT members, rating authority, and rotation of

members; and

• establishing indicators to enable program and team management to

evaluate the performance of IPTs, such as the efficiency of the decisionmaking process employed by a team.

Finally, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense help program

managers and team leaders become catalysts for IPT implementation by

• devoting professional education to make existing and prospective program

managers and IPT leaders aware of and capable of creating the culture

necessary to foster IPTs in weapon system programs;

Recommendations for

Executive Action
Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations

Page 55 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

• drawing lessons from programs like the Advanced Amphibious Assault

Vehicle to (1) bridge barriers between program offices and contractors

and (2) use collocation to break down barriers and create trust; and

• supporting IPT s with the resources—such as information technology,

training, and expert help—needed to maximize their effectiveness.

DOD concurred with a draft of this report and most of its

recommendations and agreed to emphasize the practices and

characteristics discussed in the report concerning the operation of

program offices’ integrated product teams. (See app. I.)

DOD partially concurred with the recommendation that only those teams

with day-to–day responsibility for a product and the necessary cross

section of expertise be designated as integrated product teams. It noted

that while such teams are unique and require certain conditions and

investments, the designation “integrated product team” has spread

throughout the workforce and has benefited other teams as well. DOD did

not want to lose those benefits by limiting the designation. DOD’s position

reflects the practical reality that the designation of integrated product

teams is now difficult to restrict. Given the Department’s recognition that

program office integrated product teams require certain conditions and

investments to succeed that other integrated product teams may not need,

we believe that if the Department takes the actions contained in our other

recommendations, the objective of the recommendation will be achieved.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Appendix I: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 56 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Appendix I: Comments From the Department

of Defense
Appendix I: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 57 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Now on pp. 7 and 54.

Now on pp. 7 and 54.
Appendix I: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 58 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Now on pp. 7, 54, and 55.

Now on pp. 7 and 54.
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and

Staff Acknowledgments

Page 59 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Jack L. Brock (202) 512-4841

Paul L. Francis (202) 512-2811

In addition to those named above, Russ Allen, Kathleen Joyce, Gordon

Lusby, Marco Martinez, Elisabeth Ryan, and Yelena Thompson made key

contributions to this report.

Appendix II: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 60 GAO-01-510 Best Practices

Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to

Better Weapon System Outcomes (GAO-01-288 March 8, 2001).

Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better

Weapon System Outcomes (GAO/NSIAD-00-199 July 31, 2000).

Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better

Weapon System Decisions (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137, Apr. 26, 2000).

Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System

Programs Implement Best Practices (GAO/NSIAD-99-206, Aug. 16, 1999).

Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can

Improve Weapon System Outcomes (GAO/NSIAD-99-162, July 30, 1999).

Defense Acquisitions: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program

Outcomes (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116, Mar. 17, 1999).

Defense Acquisition: Improved Program Outcomes Are Possible

(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-123, Mar. 17, 1998).

Best Practices: DOD Can Help Suppliers Contribute More to Weapon

System Programs (GAO/NSIAD-98-87, Mar. 17, 1998).

Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires

Changes in DOD’s Environment (GAO/NSIAD-98-56, Feb. 24, 1998).

Major Acquisitions: Significant Changes Underway in DOD’s Earned

Value Management Process (GAO/NSIAD-97-108, May 5, 1997).

Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer

Improvements for DOD (GAO/NSIAD-96-162, Aug. 26, 1996).

Related GAO Products

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