UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Anthony R. Gandy, 

Defendant. 

________________________________/ 

Case No. 15-cr-20338-3 

Judith E. Levy 

United States District Judge 

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR EARLY TERMINATION OF SUPERVISED 

RELEASE [294] AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

REMAINING MOTIONS [280, 286] AS MOOT 

Before the Court is Defendant Anthony R. Gandy’s motion for early 

termination of supervised release. (ECF No. 294.) For the reasons set 

forth below, the Court grants Defendant’s motion. 

I. Background 

From approximately February 2009 to August 2013, Defendant and 

several co-conspirators engaged in a scheme to defraud the Internal 

Revenue Service (“IRS”) by submitting fraudulent tax returns for 21 

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fictitious trusts. As a result of this scheme, Defendant and his coconspirators illegally obtained $360,469.05 from the IRS. 

On June 9, 2015, Defendant was indicted on 29 counts, including 

conspiracy to commit mail fraud, mail fraud, interstate transportation of 

money taken by fraud, conspiracy to commit identity theft, aggravated 

identity theft, and engaging in an illegal monetary transaction. (ECF 

No. 1.) On March 2, 2017, a jury found Defendant guilty of Counts 1, 9, 

12, 16, 19–21, 32–35, 38, 41, 44, and 53 and not guilty as to Counts 3, 7, 

8, 10, 14, 17, 24, 27, 28, 31, 36, 43, and 46. (ECF No. 132.) On January 

23, 2018, the Court sentenced Defendant to “56 months on Counts 1, 9, 

12, 16, 19-21, 32-35, 44 and 53, to be served concurrently; and 24 months 

on Counts 38 and 41 to be served concurrently, but consecutively to 

Counts 1, 9, 12, 16, 19-21, 32-35, 44 and 53,” which resulted in “a total 

sentence of 80 months.” (ECF No. 215, PageID.2950.) The Court also 

imposed a term of supervised release: “3 years on Counts 1, 9, 12, 16, 19-

21, 32-35, 44 and 53; and 1 year on Counts 38 and 41.” (Id. at 

PageID.2951.) Defendant appealed his conviction, and the Sixth Circuit 

affirmed. See United States v. Gandy, 926 F.3d 248, 254 (6th Cir. 2019). 

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Defendant began serving his custodial sentence on February 27, 

2018. During Defendant’s incarceration, the COVID-19 pandemic arose, 

and Defendant submitted several pro se motions seeking compassionate 

release, home confinement, or a judicial recommendation for placement 

in a residential reentry center (“RRC”). (ECF Nos. 253, 259, 264, 280, 

286.) The Court did not grant any of Defendant’s motions.1

On January 14, 2022, Defendant began serving his term of 

supervised release.2 On July 6, 2023, the Court received a pro se motion 

from Defendant requesting early termination of his supervision. (ECF 

No. 294.) On July 31, 2023, the Government filed a response opposing 

early termination. (ECF No. 296.) In a memorandum to the undersigned, 

1 On June 23, 2020, the Court denied Defendant’s motion for compassionate 

release. (ECF No. 258.) On August 12, 2020, the Court denied Defendant’s motion for 

home confinement. (ECF No. 263.) On October 29, 2020, the Court denied Defendant’s 

motion for a judicial recommendation on RRC placement. (ECF No. 268.) Defendant 

subsequently filed a renewed motion for a judicial recommendation for a twelvemonth RRC placement (ECF No. 280) and a motion to amend the judgment for 

compassionate release. (ECF No. 286.) Those motions remain pending. 

2 In his motion, Defendant states that he has been on supervised release since 

January 18, 2022. (See ECF No. 294, PageID.4073.) However, in a memorandum to 

the undersigned, the Probation Department confirmed that Defendant’s supervision 

commenced on January 14, 2022. 

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the Probation Department indicates it has no objection to Defendant’s 

motion being granted. 

II. Legal Standard 

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), a court may “terminate a term of 

supervised release and discharge the defendant released at any time 

after the expiration of one year of supervised release . . . if it is satisfied 

that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released 

and the interest of justice.” In evaluating whether to terminate a 

defendant’s term of supervised release, the Court considers “the factors 

set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), 

(a)(6), and (a)(7).” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). These factors are 

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant; 

(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 

. . . ; 

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the 

defendant; and 

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or 

vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 

treatment in the most effective manner; 

. . . ; 

(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established 

for— 

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(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the 

applicable category of defendant as set forth in the 

guidelines . . . ; or 

(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised 

release, the applicable guidelines or policy statements 

issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . ; 

(5) any pertinent policy statement— 

(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . ; 

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 

defendants with similar records who have been found guilty 

of similar conduct; and 

(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

“The plain language of the statute illustrates that § 3583(e), in the 

typical case, allows a conduct-based inquiry into the continued necessity 

for supervision after the individual has served one full year on supervised 

release.” United States v. Suber, 75 F. App’x 442, 443–44 (6th Cir. 2003). 

However, “[t]he phrase ‘the interest of justice’ gives the district court 

latitude to consider a broad range of factors in addition to an individual’s 

behavior in considering whether to terminate the supervised release 

period.” Id. at 444 (citing United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th 

Cir. 1999)). Therefore, “a district court must conclude that the early 

termination of supervised release is warranted both by the individual’s 

conduct and also by the interest of justice.” Id. The Court’s decision “must 

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demonstrate consideration of the relevant factors even if the court does 

not describe its analysis of each factor.” United States v. Zai, No. 22-3371, 

2022 WL 17832201, at *5 (6th Cir. Dec. 21, 2022) (citations omitted). 

III. Analysis 

Defendant has now served more than eighteen months on 

supervised release. As such, Defendant has satisfied the entirety of his 

one-year term of supervised release on Counts 38 and 41 (aggravated 

identity theft) and more than half of his three-year term of supervised 

release on the remaining counts. 

During this period of supervision, Defendant has demonstrated 

exemplary conduct. In his motion, Defendant explains: “Since I[’ve] been 

home I’ve maintained a full-time [job] with the City of Detroit and have 

complied [with] everything asked of me from my probation officer, from 

paying my restitution monthly, no police contact, and reporting on time 

monthly and no fail[ed] urine test[.]” (ECF No. 294, PageID.4073.) The 

Probation Department confirms that Defendant has been employed fulltime as a field technician for the City of Detroit Water and Sewerage 

Department since January 31, 2022, has timely made monthly payments 

towards his outstanding financial obligations, has not had any 

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documented violations or police contact while under supervision, and has 

continually provided negative drug screens. Defendant has also 

completed the required substance abuse treatment assessment, did not 

require further treatment, and is not currently accessing substance 

abuse or mental health resources through supervision. Additionally, the 

Court notes that Defendant’s conduct on supervised release is a 

continuation of his complete compliance during more than 31 months on 

pretrial release in this case. 

Nevertheless, the Government opposes early termination, asserting 

that “[t]his Court has a right to expect compliance on supervised release 

from every defendant” and that “[c]ompliance with supervision for a yearand-a-half is not so exceptional as to warrant early termination.” (ECF 

No. 296, PageID.4078, 4079.) The Government further contends that “the 

§ 3553(a) factors, including the need to protect the public and provide 

adequate individual deterrence, continue to support the three-year term 

of supervised release.” (Id. at PageID.4080.) In particular, the 

Government emphasizes Defendant’s efforts to conceal the conspiracy 

and “that the crimes were committed while Defendant Gandy was on 

[state] supervision for another fraud offense.” (Id.) Further, the 

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Government argues that Defendant fails to “identify any substantial 

hardship from supervision.” (Id. at PageID.4079.)

The Court concludes that early termination of Defendant’s term of 

supervised release is appropriate. As the Government acknowledges in 

its response, “[t]he purpose of supervised release is to assist defendants 

with reintegration into society.” (Id.) Indeed, the undersigned regularly 

encourages defendants during sentencings to seek early termination of 

supervised release if they are in full compliance with the conditions of 

their supervision and can demonstrate successful reintegration into the 

community. In this case, Defendant’s conduct while on supervised release 

(and previous conduct while on pretrial release) demonstrates a 

consistent and successful effort to reintegrate into society. Despite the 

Government’s suggestion to the contrary, Defendant’s supervision has 

placed substantial limitations on his liberty. These include limits on 

Defendant’s ability to travel outside the Eastern District of Michigan and 

to engage in certain financial transactions. (See ECF No. 215, 

PageID.2952–2953.) Defendant is also subject to reporting obligations 

and limitations on certain social interactions, among other requirements. 

(See id.) It is not in the interest of justice to continue such restrictions 

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when Defendant has demonstrated that he is now a productive, lawabiding member of society. 

With respect to the § 3553(a) factors, the Court finds that further 

supervision of Defendant is unnecessary to protect the public from 

additional crimes or to provide Defendant with programming or 

treatment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C)–(D). Nor is supervision needed 

to provide restitution for the victim of the offense, as Defendant is in full 

compliance with his payment plan and will be obligated to continue 

making payments after his supervision ends. See id. § 3553(a)(7). 

Additionally, the eighteen months Defendant has already served on 

supervised release, along with the substantial custodial sentence 

imposed in this case, are sufficient to reflect “the nature and 

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 

defendant” and to specifically deter Defendant from engaging in similar 

criminal conduct. See id. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B). And given that an 

eighteen-month term of supervision falls within the Guideline range of 

one to two years calculated in Defendant’s presentence investigation 

report, the Court finds that the risk of unwarranted disparities in 

sentencing is minimal. See id. § 3553(a)(4), (a)(6). 

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Accordingly, considering Defendant’s conduct, the interests of 

justice, and the applicable § 3553(a) factors, the Court concludes that 

early termination of Defendant’s term of supervised release is warranted. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendant 

Anthony R. Gandy’s motion for early termination of supervised release. 

(ECF No. 294.) Defendant’s remaining term of supervised release is 

TERMINATED. 

Because Defendant is no longer in custody, the Court also DENIES 

Defendant’s motion for a judicial recommendation for a twelve-month 

RRC placement (ECF No. 280) and Defendant’s motion to amend the 

judgment for compassionate release (ECF No. 286) as MOOT. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 2, 2023 s/Judith E. Levy 

Ann Arbor, Michigan JUDITH E. LEVY 

United States District Judge 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s 

ECF System to their respective email or first-class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on August 2, 2023. 

s/Holly Ryan 

HOLLY RYAN 

Case Manager, in the absence of 

WILLIAM BARKHOLZ 

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