United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

October 1997 DRUG CONTROL

Update on U.S.

Interdiction Efforts in

the Caribbean and

Eastern Pacific

GAO/NSIAD-98-30

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-277852 

October 15, 1997

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,

 International Affairs, and Criminal Justice

Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

House of Representatives

The Honorable Bill McCollum

Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime

Committee on the Judiciary

House of Representatives

Drug traffickers use a 6-million square mile area that includes the

Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, Central America, the northern coast of

South America, Mexico, and the Eastern Pacific—commonly referred to as

the “transit zone”—to move illegal drugs into the United States. In

April 1996, we reported1

 that (1) the level of Caribbean illegal drug

activities—especially maritime operations—had increased, (2) many

Caribbean nations had limited resources and capabilities to conduct

effective antidrug operations, (3) funding and capabilities for U.S.

interdiction efforts had declined, and (4) the executive branch had not

developed a plan of action to implement the U.S. strategy to counteract

cocaine smuggling in the transit zone.

As you requested, we have reviewed what has happened in this area since

our April 1996 report. Our specific objectives were to review changes in

(1) the nature of current drug-trafficking activities through the transit

zone; (2) host nation efforts, capabilities, and impediments to an effective

counternarcotics program; (3) U.S. agencies’ capabilities, including

funding, in interdicting drug-trafficking activities in the region; and (4) the

status of U.S. agencies’ efforts to plan, coordinate, and implement U.S.

interdiction activities.

Background Under the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy, the United States has

established domestic and international efforts to reduce the supply and

demand for illegal drugs. The strategy includes five goals intended to

integrate the budgets and activities of all organizations involved in

counterdrug efforts. The goals focus on education, law enforcement, and

treatment in the United States and on eradication, alternative

1

Drug Control: U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean Decline (GAO/NSIAD-96-119, Apr. 17, 1996).

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development, interdiction, support for host nations, money laundering,

and other issues outside the United States.2

 Goal four of the National Drug

Control Strategy is “to shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from

the drug threat.” In its efforts to achieve this goal, the United States has

efforts underway to detect, monitor, and interdict illegal narcotics moving

through the transit zone.

From 1986 to 1996, the United States spent about $103 billion on efforts to

reduce drug supply and demand. About $20 billion of this amount was

expended on international counternarcotics efforts, including $4.1 billion

to support crop eradication, alternative development, and increased

foreign law enforcement capabilities and $15.6 billion for interdiction

activities. Funding for drug interdiction in the transit zone declined from

about $1 billion in 1992 to $600 million in 1996.

In 1988, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) was

established to set priorities and objectives for national drug control,

develop an annual drug control strategy, and oversee the strategy’s

implementation. The U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, who reports to ONDCP,

is responsible for coordinating the efforts of all U.S. agencies involved in

drug interdiction. The Department of State coordinates U.S. efforts in host

countries, including training provided by U.S. agencies. The Department of

Defense (DOD) supports U.S. law enforcement agencies by tracking and

monitoring suspected drug-trafficking activities. Within the transit zone,

the U.S. Coast Guard is the lead agency for maritime drug interdiction and

co-lead with the U.S. Customs Service for air interdiction. They provide

aircraft and ships to assist with detection and monitoring activities. The

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is responsible for coordinating

drug enforcement intelligence gathering overseas and conducting law

enforcement operations. DEA’s activities in the Caribbean are managed by

its Puerto Rico-based field division and in the Bahamas by its Miami field

division.

On September 17, 1997, the executive branch revised the National

Interdiction Command and Control Plan that called for creating several

joint interagency task forces that are intended to strengthen interagency

coordination of U.S. drug control efforts. According to the revised plan,

the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-East, located in Key West, Florida,

is responsible for detection, monitoring, sorting, and handoff of suspect air

2

The international aspect of the strategy focuses on supply reduction and is guided by a presidential

directive issued in November 1993 that called for a gradual shift in emphasis from the transit zone to

the source countries. Funding for source country activities against drug trafficking increased from

$231.5 million in fiscal year 1996 to $313.7 million in fiscal year 1997.

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and maritime drug-trafficking events in the Pacific Ocean east of 92 west

longitude, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, Central America north of

Panama, and surrounding seas and the Atlantic Ocean. JIATF-East is

composed of personnel from various defense and civilian law enforcement

agencies. JIATF-South, located in Panama, focuses on source country

initiatives and the detection and monitoring of suspect drug targets for

either subsequent handoff to participating national law enforcement

agencies or to JIATF-East for further monitoring.

Results in Brief Since our April 1996 report, the amount of drugs smuggled and the

counternarcotics capabilities of host countries and the United States have

remained largely unchanged. Cocaine trafficking through the Caribbean

and Eastern Pacific regions continues, and drug traffickers are still relying

heavily on maritime modes of transportation. Recent information shows

that traffickers are using “go-fast” boats, fishing vessels, coastal freighters,

and other vessels in the Caribbean and fishing and cargo vessels with

multiton loads in the Eastern Pacific. Also, recent estimates indicate that,

of all cocaine moving through the transit zone, 38 percent (234 metric

tons) is being shipped through the Eastern Pacific.

Although the United States has continued to provide technical assistance

and equipment to many Caribbean and other transit zone countries, the

amount of cocaine seized by most of the countries is small relative to the

estimated amounts flowing through the area. The counterdrug efforts of

many transit zone countries continue to be hampered by limited resources

and capabilities. Moreover, the United States does not have bilateral

maritime agreements with 12 transit zone countries to facilitate

interdiction activities.

Also since our prior report, the United States has increased funding but

has had limited success in detecting, monitoring, and interdicting air and

maritime trafficking in the transit zone. JIATF-East assets devoted to these

efforts have stayed at almost the same level. However, drug-trafficking

events are usually not detected and, when detected, often do not result in

narcotics seizures. U.S. counternarcotics officials believe that the Eastern

Pacific—a major drug-threat area—could benefit from greater attention.

JIATF-East has requested additional resources from DOD to address Eastern

Pacific drug trafficking, believing that cocaine seizures it supports could

be doubled. DOD has not determined what, if any, additional support will be

allocated to the Eastern Pacific above current force levels. In 1996, the

U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Coast Guard initiated two intensive

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operations in and around Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands that

resulted in increased cocaine seizures and a disruption in drug-trafficking

patterns.

In response to our recommendation in our earlier report that ONDCP

develop a regional plan of action, ONDCP officials told us that it developed

an overall strategy that identifies agency roles, missions, and tasks to

execute the drug strategy and establish task priorities. However, the

strategy does not include quantitative objectives for activities that would

establish a defined baseline for developing operational plans and resource

requirements. According to ONDCP, its performance measurement system

remains incomplete, as of October 1, 1997, because proposed measurable

targets, the core of ONDCP’s system, are still under review. Until these

measurable targets are developed, it will not be possible to hold agencies

accountable for their performance. In addition, law enforcement agencies

with jurisdiction in the Caribbean are in the process of developing a

regional plan led by DEA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S.

Customs Service. This plan is expected to be completed by January 1998.

Cocaine Flow

Through the Transit

Zone Continues to

Threaten the United

States

According to the Department of State’s 1997 International Narcotics

Control Strategy Report, about 760 metric tons of cocaine were produced

in South America in 1996.3 Of this amount, U.S. officials estimate that

about 608 metric tons moved through the transit zone destined for U.S.

markets and 40 metric tons transited to Europe. The officials

acknowledge, however, that estimates of the amount of cocaine that

enters the United States are based on limited intelligence and other

information and may not reflect the actual cocaine flow.4

 Maritime

conveyances continue to be the predominant means for smuggling cocaine

into the United States.

The Eastern Pacific and Western and Eastern Caribbean are the principal

cocaine smuggling routes from South America to the United States. U.S.

interagency 1996 estimates indicated that of the 608 metric tons of cocaine

destined for the United States, 234 metric tons flowed through the Eastern

3

According to the Department of State, estimated worldwide cocaine availability is based on potential

production of crop harvest yield and the assumption that all coca leaf will be converted to cocaine.

4

JIATF-East officials said factors such as seizure data, shipments to non-U.S. markets, and

consumption in the source zone were not considered in cocaine flow assessments prior to 1997.

However, the U.S. international counternarcotics policy interagency working group, responsible for

generating cocaine flow estimates, plans to include these factors in preparing its estimate of the 1997

flow. The working group is composed of U.S. law enforcement and defense agencies involved in

counternarcotics programs.

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B-277852 

Pacific, 264 metric tons flowed through the Western Caribbean, and 110

metric tons flowed through the Eastern Caribbean. About 52 percent of

the U.S.-bound cocaine transited Mexico and Central America. As shown

in figure 1, the United States is the principal destination for cocaine

smuggled in the transit zone.

Figure 1: 1996 Cocaine Flow in the

Western Hemisphere

Source: U.S. Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement.

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U.S. interagency estimates for the first 2 quarters of 1997 showed that

cocaine continued to be moved mostly by maritime conveyances and

Mexico was the principal destination. According to interagency estimates,

Mexico and Central America received 59 percent of the cocaine during this

period. The Caribbean countries accounted for 30 percent of the flow, and

11 percent was shipped directly to the United States from source

countries. Also, U.S. law enforcement agencies noted some changes in

trafficking patterns in and around Puerto Rico. They attributed this change

to increased U.S. law enforcement efforts in this area.

According to the DEA Caribbean Field Division, the Eastern Caribbean

corridor remains a prolific drug-trafficking route. South American

traffickers continue to use the Bahamas and islands in the Leeward,

Windward, and Hispaniola routes as staging and transshipment areas.

Cocaine loads originate in Colombia or Venezuela and are moved by air or

large motherships to smaller vessels in the Eastern Caribbean. The many

unguarded airstrips and coastlines of the Caribbean islands make it easy

for traffickers to refuel or store cocaine for further shipment directly to

the United States or through Puerto Rico.

According to DEA, Puerto Rico is a popular gateway to the United States

and a principal staging destination for South American drug traffickers.

Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica have also experienced

increased drug-smuggling activity. For example, DEA has indicated that, in

the past, the role of Dominicans in the drug business was limited to

“pick-up crews” and couriers who assisted Puerto Rican smugglers. Today,

Dominicans have sophisticated drug-smuggling operations and use

advanced security systems and telephone communications to move and

sell cocaine in the Caribbean and the United States, according to DEA. Even

with heightened enforcement, offshore airdrops along the southern coast

of the Dominican Republic and in the Mona Passage between Puerto Rico

and the Dominican Republic continue. In addition, the Department of

State has reported that thousands of kilograms of cocaine have been

smuggled over the border from Haiti into the Dominican Republic, whose

army has had little success in stopping the flow of drugs.

Although the Eastern Caribbean remains a major route for illegal drug

trafficking, the larger quantities of cocaine pass through Mexico via the

Eastern Pacific and Western Caribbean corridors. U.S. interagency

estimates show that, in 1996, 314 metric tons of cocaine reached Mexico

for eventual movement to the United States through the Eastern Pacific

and Western Caribbean channels. Of this amount, about 70 percent was

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shipped through the Eastern Pacific. Multiton shipments of cocaine depart

Colombia, Panama, or Ecuador predominantly by noncommercial

maritime means and travel north via the Pacific Ocean. Shipments reach

Mexico directly or are unloaded at sites along the Central American coast

to smaller vessels. The U.S. interagency also estimates that about

30 percent of the cocaine entering Mexico passed through the Western

Caribbean.

Cocaine Seizures in the

Transit Zone

Overall cocaine seizures in the transit zone5 have increased from 61 metric

tons in 1994 to 66 metric tons in 1995 and to 80 metric tons in 1996,

according to JIATF-East. These amounts include seizures by U.S. agencies

at sea and local law enforcement authorities in Mexico and Caribbean and

Central American countries. Of the 1996 seizures, 53 metric tons were

seized by transit zone countries and 27 metric tons were seized by the

United States at sea. Seizures by Mexico and Central American countries

accounted for about 40 of the 80 metric tons seized in 1996.

Maritime Smuggling

Continues to Dominate

Activity in the Transit Zone

Since 1993, cocaine traffickers have continued to increase their reliance

on maritime vessels. According to JIATF-East, the number of known

maritime drug-trafficking events has increased by 41 percent, from 174

events in 1993 to 246 in 1996. A “known event” is the confirmed movement

of illegal drugs supported by seizure of drugs, observation of activities that

can reasonably be attributed to drug smuggling, or reliable intelligence.

Table 1 shows air and maritime known events for 1992-96.

5

These seizures do not include those made in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, which are

considered arrival zone seizures.

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Table 1: Air and Maritime

Drug-Trafficking Events, 1992-96 Air Maritime

Year Events

Percent

of total Events

Percent

of total

1992

344

Not

applicable a a

1993 217 55 174 45

1994 154 41 223 59

1995 125 33 249 67

1996 86 26 246 74

Note: Events originating in Mexico and the Far East were excluded.

aMaritime data for 1992 are not available.

Source: JIATF-East.

According to JIATF-East, the most significant maritime drug-smuggling

modes of transportation involve “go-fast” boats in the Caribbean and

fishing vessels in the Eastern Pacific. The “go-fast” boats are difficult to

detect and interdict because they are small and capable of speeds that

enable them to successfully evade law enforcement pursuits, according to

the U.S. Coast Guard. The boats are between 25 and 45 feet in length, can

routinely carry up to a ton of cocaine per trip, travel predominantly by

night, and have refueling capability to complete cocaine runs in one day.

In the first quarter of 1997, 38 of the 69 known maritime events, or

55 percent, in the transit zone involved “go-fast” boats. As illustrated in

figure 2, maritime smuggling events by “go-fast” boats is on an upward

trend.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
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Figure 2: Maritime Smuggling Events in the Caribbean, 1995-97 (first quarter)

a

Fishing vessel

Sailing vessel

Coastal freighter

Yola

Go fast

Motor vessel

Pleasure craft

Unknown

0

20

40

60

80

100

Number of known events

1995 1996 1997

aData for 1997 are through March 31.

Source: JIATF-East.

DEA has also reported an increase in the use of canoes by Jamaican

smugglers and “yolas” by Dominican smugglers. The yola is an open vessel

with twin motors for propulsion and the ability to refuel rapidly. DEA

reported that Bahamian and Jamaican transportation groups use yolas to

smuggle cocaine loads into the Bahamas from either airdrops or

boat-to-boat transfers off the coast of Jamaica. These groups then use the

territorial waters of Cuba to shield their movements for eventual

unloading to pleasure craft, which can easily blend in with inter-island

boat traffic. A U.S. Customs Service official told us that “go-fast,”

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B-277852 

recreational, and commercial fishing vessels move rapidly from the

Bahamas to smuggle drugs into Florida.

In the Eastern Pacific, cocaine traffickers use large fishing vessels that

have been retrofitted with hidden compartments and have been known to

carry as much as 11 metric tons of cocaine. The largest amount of cocaine

is smuggled through the Eastern Pacific, and the vast majority is delivered

into Mexico, where it continues northbound over land. JIATF-East reported

that, between May and December of 1996, there were 27 known or

possible events in the Eastern Pacific. Figure 3 shows typical maritime

vessels most commonly used by drug traffickers in the Caribbean and

Eastern Pacific corridors.

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Figure 3: Typical Maritime Vessels Used by Drug Traffickers in the Transit Zone

Source: JIATF-East.

Host Nation

Counterdrug

Capabilities Remain

Limited

As we reported in April 1996, host countries in the Caribbean continue to

be hampered by inadequate counternarcotics capabilities. While the drug

flow through the transit zone continues at about the same level, drug

seizures by most countries in this region are minimal. During the last 

2 years, the United States has continued its efforts to strengthen host

countries’ capabilities to complement and support U.S. interdiction efforts.

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These efforts include commitments made at the May 1997

Caribbean/United States Summit in Barbados and new bilateral

agreements that promote increased air and maritime cooperation with

countries that have not yet signed agreements. The Department of State

points out, however, that the best-trained, best-equipped antidrug units

cannot succeed for long without the determined commitment of host

government political authorities.

Capabilities in Transit Zone

Countries

As we reported in April 1996, many host nations have weak economies and

insufficient resources for conducting law enforcement activities in their

coastal waters. In the Caribbean, St. Martin6

 has the most assets for

antidrug activities, with three cutters, eight patrol boats, and two

fixed-wing aircraft, whereas other Caribbean countries have much less.

Nevertheless, the United States depends on support from host nations and

several European countries to help stop the drug flow through the transit

zone.

In our 1996 report, we also noted that the need for law enforcement

training for host governments had been evident for some time. In

recognition of this need, the Department of State provided about

$7 million for training 6,700 persons throughout the world in fiscal 

year 1996. Other U.S. agencies also have funded and conducted training

for some host nations. In addition, at the Barbados Summit, the United

States committed to continuing to provide technical assistance in such

areas as law enforcement, judicial systems, antimoney laundering, and

other counterdrug activities. To further assist in implementation of U.S.

commitments, the Director of ONDCP issued budget guidance that tasks

departments and agencies to implement commitments made at the

summit.

In March 1997, the Department of State reported corruption-related

problems in various transit zone countries, including Antigua, Aruba,

Belize, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, St. Kitts, St. Vincent,

and others. Once the influence of drug trafficking becomes entrenched,

corruption inevitably follows and democratic government may be placed

in jeopardy. Even in countries where the political will to support antidrug

activities exists, corruption can hinder counterdrug efforts. As we have

previously reported, low salary levels for law enforcement officers and

6

According to a Department of State official, St. Martin is not an independent nation and receives some

support from France and the Netherlands.

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B-277852 

other public servants throughout much of the transit zone make them

susceptible to accepting bribes.7

As shown in table 2, the amount of cocaine seized in eight Caribbean

countries rose from 6.79 metric tons in 1995 to 14.16 metric tons in 1996.8

The Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, Cuba, Haiti, the Netherlands Antilles,

and the United Kingdom Virgin Islands recorded some increase in 1996,

while seizures in the Dominican Republic and Jamaica declined.

Significantly, Cuba accounted for most of the 1996 increase, represented

by one seizure of 6.2 metric tons from the disabled Honduran vessel

Limerick that was boarded by the U.S. Coast Guard and later drifted into

Cuban waters.

Table 2: Cocaine Seizures in Selected

Caribbean Countries, 1992-96 In metric tons

Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Bahamas 4.80 1.90 0.49 0.39 0.41

Cayman Islands N/A N/A 0.05 0.31 2.20

Cuba 0.31 0.24 0.24 0.16a 6.30

Dominican Republic 2.36 1.07 2.80 3.60 1.20

Haiti 0.06 0.15 0.72 0.55 1.40

Jamaica 0.49 0.16 0.18 0.57 0.24

Netherlands Antilles 0.09 0.37 N/A 0.11 0.71

U.K. Virgin Islands 0.03 0.70 0.45 1.10 1.70

Total 8.14 4.59 4.93 6.79 14.16

aData is January to August.

N/A = Not available.

Sources: Annual National Narcotics Intelligence and Consumers Committee Reports and

International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports.

One of JIATF-East’s goals for Caribbean countries is to increase their

seizure rates to at least 15 percent of the cocaine estimated to be passing

through their territories. In 1996, cocaine seizures in most Caribbean

countries were much lower than 15 percent. In Jamaica, for example, the

seizure rate was only 1.2 percent, while in Haiti it was 4.5 percent; the

7

Drug War: Observations on the U.S. International Drug Control Strategy (GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182,

June 27, 1995).

8

JIATF-East identified these countries as important transit zone countries.

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Dominican Republic, 3.6 percent; and Mexico, 7 percent.9 JIATF-East

determined that, if these four countries had achieved a 15-percent seizure

rate during 1996, seizures would have increased by 32 metric tons—from

26.12 metric tons to 58.65 metric tons.

United States Lacks

Bilateral Maritime

Agreements With 12

Nations

In its March 1997 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the

Department of State noted that, during 1996, the U. S. government had

negotiated an assortment of treaties and agreements designated to serve

as important new tools in fighting drug trafficking. One type of bilateral

agreement is the maritime counterdrug agreement, generally consisting of

six parts and granting the United States full or partial permission for

shipboarding, shiprider, pursuit, entry to investigate, overflight, and order

to land. There are 12 countries in the region with which the United States

currently has no formal counterdrug agreements. These include Barbados,

Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, French West Indies, Guatemala,

Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Suriname. Department of

State officials told us the U.S. government is undertaking efforts to obtain

additional agreements but that progress has been impeded by host

government concerns about sovereignty and legal issues. The United

States currently has six-part agreements with 5—Antigua & Barbuda,

Grenada, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, and Trinidad & Tobago—of the 28

countries in the region and partial agreements (from one to four parts)

with 11 other countries. See table 3 for information regarding U.S. bilateral

counterdrug agreements with transit zone countries.

9

Mexico is considered part of the transit zone and is where most cocaine seizures occur on land. In

1996, Mexican seizures were 23.6 metric tons.

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Table 3: U.S. Bilateral Counterdrug Agreements, as of August 1997

Shipboarding Shiprider Pursuit

Entry to

investigate Overflight Order to land

Antigua & Barbuda X X X X X X

Bahamas X X

Barbadosa

Belize X X X X

Costa Rica

Cuba

Dominica X X X X

Dominican Republic X X X X b

Ecuador

El Salvador

French West Indies

Grenada X X X X X X

Guatemala

Haiti X X X

Honduras

Jamaicaa

Mexico

Netherlands Antilles X X X X

Nicaragua

Panama X

St. Kitts & Nevis X X X X X X

St. Lucia X X X X X X

St. Vincent/Grenadines X X X X

Suriname

Trinidad & Tobago X X X X X X

Turks & Caicos X- air only

U.K. West Indies X X

Venezuela X X-air only

(Table notes on next page)

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Note: Empty cells indicate no agreement in this area.

aAgreements with Barbados and Jamaica have been signed but implementation is pending

ratification by host government parliaments and approval of implementation legislation.

bThe Dominican Republic has granted temporary overflight authority over its territorial waters to

dissuade and detect illegal migration and illegal drug trafficking through March 15, 1998.

Shipboarding: = Standing authority for the U.S. Coast Guard to stop, board, and search foreign

vessels suspected of illicit traffic located seaward of the territorial sea of any nation.

Shiprider: = Standing authority to embark law enforcement officials on vessel platforms of the

parties. These officials may then authorize certain law enforcement actions.

Pursuit: = Standing authority for U.S. law enforcement assets to pursue fleeing vessels or aircraft

suspected of illicit drug traffic into foreign waters or airspace. May also include authority to stop,

board, and search pursued vessels.

Entry to investigate: = Standing authority for U.S. law enforcement assets to enter foreign waters

or airspace to investigate vessels or aircraft located therein suspected of illicit drug traffic. May

also include authority to stop, board, and search such vessels.

Overflight: = Standing authority for U.S. law enforcement assets to fly in foreign airspace when in

support of counterdrug operations.

Order to land: = Standing authority for U.S. law enforcement assets to order to land in the host

nation aircraft suspected of illicit drug traffic.

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.

Bilateral agreements are not uniform and some provide very limited rights

to U.S. law enforcement authorities. For example, a U.S.-Belize agreement

allows U.S. Coast Guard personnel to board suspected Belizean-flagged

vessels on the high seas without prior notification to the Government of

Belize. Also, the U.S. shiprider agreement with Panama contains

restrictions that require U.S. Coast Guard vessels operating in Panamanian

territorial waters to be escorted by a Government of Panama ship. In

contrast, other agreements do not include this restriction.

U.S. Funding and

Efforts in the Transit

Zone

Although budgets for most federal activities in the transit zone increased

in fiscal year 1997, the number of JIATF-East maritime and air assets and

resources for detection and monitoring have remained relatively

unchanged since fiscal years 1995-96 (we have provided data through

August 1997, however). Seizures of drugs supported by JIATF-East have

dropped. In addition, JIATF-East believes the Eastern Pacific merits greater

attention. Assets have been inadequate in this area, JIATF-East says.

Although JIATF-East has asked for additional resources from DOD to

support an 18-month operation in the Eastern Pacific, DOD has not decided

whether to grant this request. In the Caribbean, two agencies—the U.S.

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Coast Guard and the U.S. Customs Service—increased their counterdrug

efforts, including conducting two “surge” operations to seize and disrupt

cocaine smuggling activity in and around Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin

Islands in 1996. Furthermore, intelligence sharing among some U.S.

agencies has been problematic.

U.S. Counternarcotics

Funding Has Increased

Since Fiscal Year 1995

U.S. counternarcotics funding in the transit zone increased by about

$33 million from fiscal year 1995 to fiscal year 1996 and is estimated to

increase by an additional $97 million in fiscal year 1997, as shown in 

table 4. Most of the fiscal year 1997 increase is due to a onetime allotment

to DOD to modify a P3 aircraft for interdiction activities. According to

JIATF-East officials, the modifications have not yet been completed. The

officials also noted that, when the P3 becomes operational, it is likely to be

used in the transit zone as well as in other areas as needed.

Table 4: U.S. Counternarcotics Funding in the Transit Zone, Fiscal Years 1991-98

Estimate Request

Dollars in millions

Agency 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

DOD $407.1 $504.5 $426.0 $220.4 $214.7 $228.9 $304.6 $238.1

USCG 565.2 443.9 310.5 234.1 301.2 323.2 335.7 388.7

USCS a a 16.2 12.5 10.1 4.5 6.2 6.6

DEA 26.2 28.8 29.1 28.7 29.6 34.0 31.7 36.7

State 35.9 36.2 14.0 7.9 10.6 8.5 18.4 18.5

Total $1,034.4 $1,013.4 $795.8 $503.6 $566.2 $599.1 $696.6 $688.6

Legend

USCG = U.S. Coast Guard

USCS = U.S. Customs Service

Note:

1. U.S. Coast Guard data for 1994 are different from the data presented in our April 1996 report

because of updated information provided by the U.S. Coast Guard.

2. U.S. Customs Service data do not include funding for Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

These areas are territories of the United States, and funding is not included as part of the transit

zone.

aCustoms data for 1991-92 are not available.

Source: Indicated federal agencies.

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JIATF-East Maritime and

Air Assets Remain

Unchanged

Between fiscal year 1995 and 1996, there was little change in JIATF-East

maritime assets and flight hours devoted to interdiction in the Caribbean

and the Eastern Pacific (see tables 5 and 6). However, a significant decline

in DOD funding began in fiscal years 1993 and 1994. These declines resulted

in a 40-percent reduction in U.S. maritime assets by fiscal year 1994. As

indicted in table 5, the number of shipdays in 1996 was 1,645 shipdays less

than in 1993, when it was at its highest level. The reductions involved

almost all classes of ships.

Table 5: JIATF-East Maritime Assets, 1992-97 (through July)

In number of shipdays

Ship type 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

1997

(through July)

DOD

Logistics 287 71 40 0 0 0

Cruiser 558 753 742 488 360 256

Destroyer 699 602 118 224 336 114

Frigate 2,008 1,441 785 727 509 333

Amphibious 87 188 9 0 0 0

Coast Guard 0 138 0 401 654 421

Othera 533 1,255 974 1,005 944 607

Total 4,172 4,448 2,668 2,845 2,803 1,731

Note: U.S. Coast Guard shipdays do not include all U.S. Coast Guard efforts in the transit zone.

For example, in 1991, 1992, and 1994, the U.S. Coast Guard reported no shipdays devoted to

JIATF-East, but spent 4,872, 3,395, and 1,659 shipdays, respectively, in its overall counterdrug

activities. The decline in 1994 efforts was a direct result of extensive resources diverted from the

counterdrug missions to support massive alien migration operations.

aOther ship types include hydrofoils, patrol craft, and T-AGOS radar ships.

Source: JIATF-East.

Flight hours by JIATF-East air assets to support detection and monitoring

declined by only 4 percent between 1995 and 1996. However, the drop

between 1993 and 1994 was 27 percent, reflecting a decrease in DOD

funding in fiscal year 1994. The flight hours for P3C, a maritime patrol

aircraft, have continued to decline from 1992 through August 1997.

JIATF-East stated that the maritime patrol aircraft are required for

addressing both the “go-fast” boat threat in the Caribbean and fishing

vessels in the Eastern Pacific.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
B-277852 

Table 6: JIATF-East Air Assets, 1992-1997 (through August)

In number of flight hours

Aircraft type 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

1997

(through August)

C130 417 97 0 0 0 0

C141 268 35 0 0 0 0

E2 4,547 3,608 4,098 3,501 3,618 2,288

E3 2,734 3,177 1,761 1,125 963 882

F15/F16 574 393 455 348 266 148

KC135 995 1,233 827 800 813 360

P3C 16,270 12,122 9,822 9,811 9,290 5,936

S3 1,644 311 228 0 12 0

SH2F 2,876 1,854 262 0 0 395

SH60B 4,611 3,710 1,980 2,930 2,751 1,361

C5 76 0 0 0 0 0

EC130 62 0 0 0 0 0

H46D 58 0 0 0 0 0

UH60 633 0 0 0 0 0

OV10 240 0 0 0 0 0

U2 512 0 0 0 0 0

Total 36,517 26,540 19,433 18,515 17,713 11,370

Note: Flight hours are not inclusive of all U.S. transit zone efforts.

Source: JIATF-East.

Seizures Supported by

JIATF-East Have Declined

JIATF-East-supported seizures in 1996 were substantially less than its peak

of nearly 70 metric tons seized in 1992 and slightly less than in 1995 (see

fig. 4). Also, maritime seizures have continued to increase as a proportion

of total seizures.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
B-277852 

Figure 4: Interagency Cocaine Seizures Supported by JIATF-East, 1989-97 (first quarter)

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

0

20

40

60

80

1.51

41.80

60.64

69.96

50.90

28.22

38.70

36.23

21.50

Metric tons

Surface events Air events

Note: Data for 1997 are through March 31.

Source: JIATF-East.

Limited U.S. Success

Against Maritime Drug

Smuggling

JIATF-East believes its capabilities to detect and monitor maritime vessels

in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific are restricted. Even when a

drug-smuggling event is detected, U.S. capability to interdict the smugglers

is limited. For example, only about 52 percent of the 246 known maritime

events detected in 1996 resulted in an apprehension, seizure, or jettison.

“Go-Fast” Boats According to a JIATF-East official, detecting and monitoring “go-fast” boats

is difficult because there is often little tactical intelligence on when these

events will occur and limited marine patrol aircraft assets equipped with

radar and night-vision capability to deal with this problem. For example,

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
B-277852 

during the first quarter of 1997, JIATF-East detected only 8 of 23 “go-fast”

events that originated in South America. JIATF-East noted that U.S. law

enforcement agencies detected six additional events without JIATF-East

support. Of the eight detected events, six were detected by maritime patrol

aircraft and resulted in three jettisons and three seizures. The remaining

two events were detected by radar ships but escaped and presumably

completed their delivery. In addition, U.S. Coast Guard officials told us

that, other than visual identification of the wake of “go-fast” boats,

detection is nearly impossible without more-advanced sensors, especially

at night when most of these events occur.

Limited Coverage in the

Eastern Pacific

According to U.S. officials, the small amount of aircraft and maritime

assets hinders U.S. interdiction efforts in the Eastern Pacific. In that area,

U.S. air and marine capability to interdict commercial and noncommercial

fishing vessels is limited. In May 1996, JIATF-East initiated Operation Caper

Focus to better define the nature of the cocaine smuggling threat in the

Eastern Pacific. Before the operation began, JIATF-East had little

intelligence on the smuggling methods used and quantities being

transported in this area. JIATF-East estimated that, from May 1996 through

June 1997, 43 known or possible maritime smuggling events occurred in

the Eastern Pacific, and only 4 resulted in seizures. These events were

detected from among hundreds of fishing vessels that routinely operate in

the Eastern Pacific. JIATF-East officials indicated they have relatively little

chance of detecting and monitoring these events because they currently

have only 2 surface ships and about 200 flight hours of marine patrol

aircraft per month dedicated to the area.

Air Events Detected but

Few Seizures Made

In 1996, JIATF-East reported that of 86 known air events, 26 resulted in an

apprehension, seizure, or jettison. According to JIATF-East, a successful

interdiction generally involves a number of steps. It may start with an

initial detection by Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar (ROTHR) systems or

a radar ship, followed by a handoff to an asset equipped with an Airborne

Early Warning (AEW) system. The aircraft will find the detected suspect

and hand it off to an interceptor aircraft, which will monitor the suspect

for ultimate handoff to a law enforcement agency. An analysis by

JIATF-East showed that if any of the required assets, especially

AEW-equipped assets, are not in place, the chances of a successful

interdiction diminish.

A JIATF-East analysis of known air events from October 1996 to May 1997

showed that something usually went wrong that prevented a successful

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
B-277852 

interdiction. During this period, there were 27 known events in the

Yucatan region. Of these, five were not known until after the drugs were

delivered. In the remaining 22 detected events, only 4 resulted in a

successful seizure. The main reasons for lack of success were limitations

in ROTHR to handoff tracks, lack of AEW-equipped assets, and inadequate

response and apprehension capabilities by host nation law enforcement

agencies. For example, the analysis showed that without AEW-equipped

assets, JIATF-East was able to track and hand off the suspect aircraft to law

enforcement agencies only 18 percent of the time. Even when an

AEW-equipped asset was available, JIATF-East analysis showed that it was

able to track the suspect aircraft to the handoff point only 45 percent of

the time because either the AEW-equipped asset or the interceptor failed to

pick up the track from ROTHR. Finally, the lack of available local law

enforcement support further reduced the results of adequate tracking. For

example, JIATF-East reported that of the seven adequately monitored

tracks, three did not result in a seizure because local law enforcement

authorities in Guatemala did not have the assets to respond.

Radar Capability Limited In 1994, the United States had 26 various radar assets that supported

counterdrug efforts. Between 1994 and 1995, however, DOD deactivated

nine radar assets. When this occurred, U.S. law enforcement officials told

us that reductions in radar capability hampered their operations.10

However, during 1994 and 1995, the United States activated two ROTHR

systems to cover the Caribbean. Although the ROTHR systems provide a

larger area of coverage footprint than microwave radars, ROTHR has less

probability to handoff (rather than detect) an air event to law enforcement

agencies because it is not as accurate in vectoring in interceptions as

microwave radars. (See app. I for an overview of radar coverage

capability.)

JIATF-East acknowledged that reduced radar capability continues to limit

operational successes today. According to JIATF-East, radar assets have not

changed since our prior report and radar capabilities have further been

exacerbated by a long term outage of the Guantanamo Bay radar because

of no funding for operations and maintenance. In commenting on our draft

report, U.S. Coast Guard officials told us the Guantanamo Bay radar is

expected to be reactivated in the near future.

JIATF-East Has Requested

Additional Resources

Although JIATF-East acknowledges that U.S. capabilities to detect and

monitor “go-fast” boats in the Caribbean and aircraft throughout the

10Drug Control: U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean Decline (GAO/NSIAD-96-119, Apr. 17, 1996).

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
B-277852 

transit zone are limited, it currently believes that targeting multiton cargo

vessels in the Eastern Pacific provides the richest target of opportunity to

seize large quantities of cocaine. Accordingly, JIATF-East has requested two

additional ships and an additional 450 aircraft surveillance flight hours per

month from DOD.

11 JIATF-East believes that with these assets the United

States can increase annual cocaine seizures by an additional 40 metric

tons. DOD, however, has indicated that it will not be able to fully support

JIATF-East’s request because of other priorities.

At present, two surface ships and about 200 flight hours are assigned to

the Eastern Pacific per month. Most of the assigned U.S. air and marine

assets support Caribbean interdiction efforts. JIATF-East officials told us

that, although the United States could seize larger amounts of cocaine in

the Eastern Pacific, JIATF-East is unwilling to transfer assets from the

Caribbean. The Director of JIATF-East told us that the Caribbean

counternarcotics programs have more “voice and visibility” in terms of

political support from both the United States and island nations. He

acknowledged that the United States has worked with Caribbean nations

to build continued support for fighting the war on drugs and any

movement of assets may have undesirable political consequences.

Between May and December of 1996, JIATF-East temporarily shifted assets

from the Caribbean to implement Operation Caper Focus in the Eastern

Pacific. The temporary operation resulted in 27 metric tons of cocaine that

were either seized or jettisoned, as well as improved intelligence on

smuggling methods and routes in the region. Before this operation, few

seizures had occurred in this region, and none took place during the first

quarter of 1997—after the operation ended.

As previously discussed, JIATF-East has requested additional assets from

DOD to support an 18-month Eastern Pacific operation.12 JIATF-East

estimated such assets would double the seizures it supports from the

current level of 40 metric tons annually to 80 metric tons. In June 1997,

ONDCP provided interagency budget guidance that directed the agencies to

expand operational support to Operation Caper Focus. In July, ONDCP

informed high-level DOD officials that interdiction resources were

inadequate to support the national strategy and that the interdiction

effectiveness of Operation Caper Focus was at risk. According to DOD

11The JIATF-East request included additional P3 flight hours and additional ships (for example, a Navy

frigate and oiler).

12JIATF-East estimates that $24.4 million in incremental funding would be required. The funding

includes $12.6 million for forward deployment of aircraft to Panama and the increased intelligence

cost at JIATF-East, and $11.8 million for a U.S. Navy oiler.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
B-277852 

officials, a decision is pending as to what, if any, additional support will be

allocated to the Eastern Pacific above current force levels.

Increased Interdiction

Efforts by U.S. Law

Enforcement Agencies

Since 1995, the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Customs Service have reported

some increases in interdiction activities in the transit zone. Both agencies

conduct counterdrug activities that are in addition to the shipdays and

flight hours provided in support of JIATF-East. For example, in 1996, the

U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Coast Guard launched Operations Gateway

and Frontier Shield, respectively, to disrupt cocaine trafficking in and

around Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. According to ONDCP

officials, the operations have been successful, as indicated by increases in

the street prices of cocaine in Puerto Rico. DEA officials noted that the

wholesale price, considered a better indicator, doubled in San Juan,

Puerto Rico, from April to late May 1997. As of September, prices had

declined but were still higher than in April.

Seizures of cocaine during the first year of Operation Gateway increased

by about 30 percent in comparison to seizures before the start of the

operation. In the year prior to the operation, seizures were about 11 metric

tons while seizures during the first year of the operation were about 14

metric tons. Actual fiscal year 1996 funding for Operation Gateway was

$2.4 million, and planned funding for fiscal year 1997 was $30.1 million. In

its One-Year Report on the Operation (covering the period ending

February 28, 1997), the U.S. Customs Service noted a number of problems,

including duplication and confusion in the procurement of equipment and

services, a lack of public affairs coordination with other agencies, and

lengthy delays in filling numerous authorized staff positions. The U.S.

Customs Service noted, however, that some of these problems were not

within its control and did not affect the overall performance of Operation

Gateway.

The first 3 months of the U.S. Coast Guard’s Operation Frontier Shield

began with an initial “surge” of activity. Subsequently, operations were

somewhat reduced but remained higher than before the operation began.

According to the U.S. Coast Guard, shipdays and flight hours devoted to

counterdrug missions increased to support the surge operation.13 During

the first 10 months of the operation, cocaine seizures totaled 10.7 metric

tons, an increase of 5.8 metric tons over the prior comparable 10-month

13According to the U.S. Coast Guard, shipdays increased from 2,481 in fiscal year 1995 to 3,421 in fiscal

year 1997; flight hours increased from 9,405 in fiscal year 1995 to 14,500 in fiscal year 1997. The

increase was generally attributed to operations around Puerto Rico. The U.S. Coast Guard shipdays

and flight hours include counternarcotics activities in both the transit zone and the arrival zone.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
B-277852 

period.14 In July 1997, the Secretary of Transportation reported that

“assessments show a decisive shift in drug traffic away from the Frontier

Shield area of operation” and that “drug runners are being forced to move

their operations elsewhere.” U.S. Coast Guard officials stated that the shift

in trafficking routes was anticipated in planning Operation Frontier Shield

and that additional efforts are planned or underway to address this

trafficking shift.

Intelligence Sharing Issues In 1996, we reported that intelligence sharing was a contentious issue

among various collectors and users of such data, including most federal

counterdrug agencies. Since then, some initiatives to improve intelligence

sharing have begun. For example, an interagency review, initiated by

ONDCP on September 18, 1997, is underway to look at the national drug

intelligence architecture. The review will assess the drug intelligence

missions, functions, and resources of the major federal counterdrug

agencies.15 According to ONDCP, coordination among the intelligence

program and between intelligence producers and consumers will be a

focus of the review.

In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation noted that other law

enforcement agencies with jurisdiction in the Caribbean are developing a

regional plan for law enforcement in the Caribbean that calls for

expanding intelligence coordination. A draft of the regional plan is

scheduled to be completed by January 1998.

JIATF-East officials told us that there are inherent barriers in sharing

information between and among federal counternarcotics agencies.16

Specifically, law enforcement agencies are mainly focused on individuals

and drug organizations in the context of building cases for arresting and

prosecuting criminals. In contrast, JIATF-East is focused on tactical

operations and obtaining information in support of detecting and

monitoring suspects and making successful and timely law enforcement

interdictions.

14According to a U.S. Coast Guard official, some of the increases may include seizures also reported by

the U.S. Customs Service for Operation Gateway. The interagency process is expected to remove any

duplication.

15The missions of the constituent centers, such as the National Drug Intelligence Center, the El Paso

Intelligence Center, the Director of Central Intelligence Crime and Narcotics Center, and the Financial

Crimes Enforcement Network, will be reviewed.

16We are currently conducting a review of information sharing among federal counternarcotics

agencies.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
B-277852 

DEA officials referred to their comments in our prior report that noted that

there are limitations on what intelligence DEA can legally provide other

federal agencies developed from grand jury information, wiretaps, and

court sealing orders. They also noted that some intelligence is not released

to protect sources and the integrity of ongoing investigations. DEA officials

also stated that the El Paso Intelligence Center17 provides JIATF-East with

the necessary information to track suspect aircraft and vessels until the

respective U.S. and foreign authorities can take appropriate law

enforcement action.

U.S. Caribbean

Counterdrug Action

Plan Not Fully

Developed

In April 1996, we recommended that the Director of ONDCP develop a

Caribbean plan of action that should at a minimum determine resources

and staffing needed and delineate a comprehensive strategy to improve

host nation capabilities. In response to our recommendation, ONDCP told us

it provided a framework for addressing strategic objectives in the transit

zone in its classified annex to the National Drug Control Strategy issued in

February 1997. ONDCP officials noted that the operational tasks for

implementing the framework, including targets for measuring performance

in that area, are still under development. They also noted that

implementation of the strategy for the transit zone is the responsibility of

other federal agencies such as the U.S. Coast Guard, DEA, and DOD.

According to ONDCP, its performance measurement system will provide

policymakers with new insights about which programs are effective and

which are not. The system is intended to help guide adjustments to the

National Drug Control Strategy as conditions change, expectations are

met, or failure is noted. The goals of the strategy form the foundation of a

10-year plan, supported by a 5-year budget. Each goal is to be related to a

measurable objective, further defined by an outcome that the objective is

to produce by 2002. Each outcome is to be quantified by performance

targets that identify measurable attainments. ONDCP has instructed

agencies to develop plans, without being constrained by budget

considerations, identifying how they will make meaningful progress

toward achieving a drug control mission. As of October 1, 1997, the

performance measurement system remains incomplete because proposed

measurable targets, the core of ONDCP’s system, are still under review.

Since these measurable targets have not yet been developed, agencies

cannot be held accountable for their performance.

17The center is the national tactical drug intelligence center and provides actionable intelligence to

JIATF-East.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
B-277852 

Organizational Issues In April 1994, ONDCP and the participating agencies approved the National

Interdiction Command and Control Plan. This plan provided for

establishing three geographically oriented counterdrug joint interagency

task forces. The task forces were to be led and staffed by DOD, the U.S.

Customs Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard. A major premise of the plan

was that the full-time personnel assigned to the task forces would become

stakeholders in their operations. It was anticipated that this would ensure

close planning and operational coordination; the availability of federal

assets; and a seamless handoff of suspected air, sea, or land targets. Other

agencies that either had an interest in or were affected by the operation

were to provide liaison personnel. Nevertheless, participating agencies

have not provided the required staffing to JIATF-East and, thus, it has been

dominated by DOD personnel and has not achieved the intended

interagency composition. According to ONDCP, the revised September 17,

1997, plan places the task forces more under the control of DOD

sponsorship rather than remaining an interagency center.

As of July 1997, little has changed since our last report; many of the key

civilian positions have remained unfilled. Thus, JIATF-East is still

predominately staffed by DOD personnel and has not achieved the

interagency mix initially hoped for at its creation. Of the 184 authorized

permanent positions, 132 were DOD, 21 were U.S. Coast Guard, and 31 were

other agencies’ position. Thirty-seven authorized positions were vacant.

DOD had filled 117 of its 132 authorized positions and the U.S. Coast Guard

had filled 17 of 21. However, various other agencies had assigned staff to

only 13 of 31 authorized positions, compared to having assigned staff to 

11 of 27 authorized positions as of November 1995. The U.S. Customs

Service, for example, had filled only 7 of 22 positions, compared to 1995

when it had filled 8 positions; the 1 authorized Department of State

position has never been filled. JIATF-East has periodically requested the

civilian agencies to staff these positions, but the agencies have not done

so.

Conclusion Since our last report, JIATF-East has more clearly identified the problem of

“go-fast” boats in the Caribbean and fishing vessels in the Eastern Pacific,

identified shortcomings in its detection and monitoring capabilities, and

requested additional resources to address the problem. Also, the U.S.

Coast Guard and the U.S. Customs Service have launched two surge

operations in and around Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands that have

resulted in seizing additional quantities of cocaine and changing

drug-trafficking patterns. By identifying the anticipated benefits from

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
B-277852 

providing additional resources to the transit zone, JIATF-East has taken an

important step in adding accountability to the drug-interdiction effort.

Notwithstanding these efforts, the overall amount of cocaine seized in the

transit zone has not disrupted the flow and availability of cocaine in the

United States.

We believe ONDCP has not fully addressed our prior recommendation to

develop a regional plan. We continue to believe that a transit zone plan

that includes quantitative goals and objectives that will allow

policymakers to determine resource requirements and to evaluate the

potential benefits of regional interdiction efforts is essential. An effective

transit zone operation is an integral part of the U.S. strategy to limit drug

availability in the United States. But it alone will not be the solution to the

drug problem. A regional plan should be a subset to ONDCP’s overall

strategy. Therefore, it is important that ONDCP develop a comprehensive

plan that provides a blueprint for how efforts in the transit zone countries

are going to reduce the flow of cocaine. Without such a plan, it is not

possible to judge the merits of individual activities in terms of what are the

most cost-effective measures in the counterdrug effort.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

ONDCP in its written response (see app. II) stated that it is in general

agreement with this report. It provided clarification and information on

(1) its future plans, (2) the importance of source country efforts in

complementing those in the transit zone, (3) activities of the U.S. Coast

Guard, (4) results from the Bridgetown Summit, and (5) the changes to the

revised National Interdiction Command and Control Plan. ONDCP

recognized that current assets in the transit zone are inadequate to

accomplish the strategy and identified recent initiatives to implement the

strategy. These initiatives included a Caribbean action plan, a short-term

enhancement to transit zone interdiction, a 5-year asset plan for the transit

zone, intelligence sharing efforts, and a deterrence study. These initiatives

are expected to provide linkage between planning, development of

performance measures, and assets required to implement the strategy.

However, ONDCP did not provide time frames for completing these

initiatives.

We obtained oral comments on a draft of this report from the Department

of State, DOD, DEA, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs Service, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation. None of these agencies disagreed with

our principal findings or our conclusions. However, several of these

agencies indicated we had not provided enough information about U.S.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
B-277852 

counterdrug activities in the transit zone other than those directed by

JIATF-East. In response to their concerns, we have expanded our discussion

of these other activities, particularly those of the U.S. Coast Guard and the

U.S. Customs Service, and have added data on overall drug seizures in the

region. Each of the commenting agencies suggested points of clarification

and we have incorporated them into the report where appropriate. In

addition, we modified the report to include some updated information

provided by DOD and the U.S. Coast Guard on operational capabilities in

the transit zone.

Scope and

Methodology

To determine the nature of drug-trafficking in the transit zone, we

obtained reports from the U.S. Coast Guard, DEA, the U.S. Customs

Service, JIATF-East, ONDCP, and interagency assessments on cocaine

smuggling activities. We analyzed and compared the data from these

reports with data from prior years to assess the degree of change in the

cocaine flow to the United States and drug traffickers’ methods, routes,

and modes of transportation. We also obtained assessment briefings about

the cocaine threat from DEA headquarters in Washington, D.C.; the U.S.

Coast Guard Seventh District and U.S. Customs Service in Miami, Florida;

and JIATF-East in Key West, Florida.

To obtain information on host nation capabilities and impediments to their

counternarcotics efforts, we reviewed various Department of State cables

and other relevant documents, including the annual International

Narcotics Control Strategy Reports. We interviewed officials from DEA, the

U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Customs Service, the Department of State, and

JIATF-East and obtained information on (1) host nation counterdrug

capabilities, (2) the amount of cooperation with the U.S. counterdrug

activities, and (3) the extent of corruption in host nations. We also

interviewed officials from the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of State,

and JIATF-East for information on the status of U.S. bilateral maritime

agreements with host countries.

To assess U.S. counterdrug capabilities, we reviewed program and budget

documents and related information from numerous federal agencies,

including ONDCP, the Departments of Defense and State, the U.S. Coast

Guard, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator.

We obtained summary reports from the U.S. Customs Service on

Operation Gateway and the U.S. Coast Guard on Frontier Shield to

determine their impact on reducing the flow of cocaine to United States.

We interviewed and obtained information from JIATF-East and other

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
B-277852 

federal agencies on the resources and capabilities of U.S. interdiction

efforts in the transit zone. We also documented U.S. funding trends from

1991 to 1998 and assets devoted to detection and monitoring to 1996.

We interviewed key officials from DOD and U.S. law enforcement agencies

to determine the extent of U.S. planning, coordination, and

implementation of counterdrug programs in the transit zone. We met with

ONDCP officials on the status of its implementation of our recommendation

to develop a plan of action for the Caribbean and its efforts to develop

performance measures for U.S. counternarcotics initiatives. To obtain

information on interagency staffing at JIATF-East, we reviewed documents,

obtained briefings, and interviewed cognizant JIATF-East officials.

We conducted our review between April and September 1997 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As arranged with you, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier,

we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its issue

date. At that time, we will send copies to other interested congressional

committees, the Director of ONDCP, the Secretaries of State and Defense,

the U.S. Attorney General, the Commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service,

the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Interdiction

Coordinator, the Administrator of DEA, and the Director of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation. We will make copies of this report available to

others upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call

me at (202) 512-4268. The major contributors to this were 

Janice Villar Morrison, George Taylor, and Louis Zanardi.

Jess T. Ford, Associate Director

International Relations and Trade Issues

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Radar Surveillance

Capabilities

34

Appendix II 

Comments From the

Office of National

Drug Control Policy

35

Tables Table 1: Air and Maritime Drug-Trafficking Events, 1992-96 8

Table 2: Cocaine Seizures in Selected Caribbean Countries,

1992-96

13

Table 3: U.S. Bilateral Counterdrug Agreements, as of

August 1997

15

Table 4: U.S. Counternarcotics Funding in the Transit Zone,

Fiscal Years 1991-98

17

Table 5: JIATF-East Maritime Assets, 1992-97 18

Table 6: JIATF-East Air Assets, 1992-1997 19

Figures Figure 1: 1996 Cocaine Flow in the Western Hemisphere 5

Figure 2: Maritime Smuggling Events in the Caribbean, 1995-97 9

Figure 3: Typical Maritime Vessels Used by Drug Traffickers in

the Transit Zone

11

Figure 4: Interagency Cocaine Seizures Supported by JIATF-East,

1989-97

20

Figure 1.1: Radar Surveillance 34

Abbreviations

AEW Airborne Early Warning

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DOD Department of Defense

JIATF Joint Interagency Task Force

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

ROTHR Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
Appendix I 

Radar Surveillance Capabilities

In 1994, the United States had 26 various radar assets that supported

counterdrug efforts in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific. Between 1994

and 1995, DOD deactivated nine radar assets. However, during 1994 and

1995, the United States activated two Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar

(ROTHR) systems to cover the Caribbean, as shown in figure 1.1. According

to the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-East, radar surveillance

capabilities illustrated for 1995 remained current as of September 1997.

Figure 1.1: Radar Surveillance

1994 1995

Source: Department of Defense.

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the Office of National Drug

Control Policy

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the Office of National Drug

Control Policy

See comment 1.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the Office of National Drug

Control Policy

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the Office of National Drug

Control Policy

See comment 1.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the Office of National Drug

Control Policy

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the Office of National Drug

Control Policy

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the Office of National Drug

Control Policy

The following are GAO’s comments on the Office of National Drug Control

Policy’s letter dated October 3, 1997.

GAO Comments 1. We provided additional information concerning this point in the report.

2. We recognize that the overall funding levels are not a reflection of the

assets allocated to JIATF-East. Accordingly, we have added several

footnotes to make this distinction in the report.

(711265) Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-98-30 Drug Control
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