NATIONAL DEFENSE INTO THE 21st CENTURY:

DEFINING THE ISSUES

A Special Report from the Strategic Studies Institute

Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

June 6, 1997
ii

*******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of

this report may be obtained from the Publications and Production

Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-4133, FAX

(717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at rummelr@carlisleemh2.army.mil

*******

All 1994 and later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)

monographs are available on the Strategic Studies Institute

Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI's Homepage address is:

http://carlisle-www. army.mil/usassi/
iii

FOREWORD

The current Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the

recommendations to be made by the members of recently established

National Defense Panel (NDP) are of tremendous importance to the

U.S. Army as well as to the other armed services. This is a

difficult and challenging time, filled with the kind of tensions

that can foster, compel and exacerbate inter-service rivalries.

It is also a time of opportunity, if we can put aside more

parochial interests to address those vital defense issues that

will face the nation in the coming years.

The timing of the QDR comes at a watershed point in the

history of our nation and its defense establishment. Rather than

facing a single and symmetrical threat from a known enemy, as was

the case from 1946 until the end of the Cold War, the nation now

faces a range of multidimensional and asymmetrical threats. We do

so at a time of constrained budgets and ever more constrained

resources, as the nation and its Congress seek to balance the

budget by 2002. Simultaneously, the pace of development in

military technology is not only expanding more rapidly, but the

sophisticated weapons and the technology necessary to employ

those weapons are becoming more readily available to a range of

potential foes.

In March 1996, Colonel Jim Blundell of the Association of

the United States Army's Institute for Land Warfare and Dr. Earl

H. Tilford, Jr., of the U. S. Army War College's Strategic

Studies Institute envisioned a symposium that would bring all the

services together for an open and honest meeting aimed at

defining the complex issues that will face the services

individually and the Department of Defense corporately during the

Joint Strategy Review and Quadrennial Defense Review process. It

was a bold and innovative idea, one that ran against the

conventional propensity to defend service prerogatives while

pushing for a maximum benefit for the individual service. General

Andrew Goodpastor of the Atlantic Council and Dr. Robert Wood of

the Naval War College agreed that a joint effort to reach for a

higher order of discussion would be beneficial. Their

organizations became cosponsors. The Air War College was unable

to join as a cosponsor, but a representative of the U.S. Air

Force Air Command and Staff College's School for Advanced

Airpower Studies and a former Air Force Chief of Staff made

compelling presentations on an airpower panel organized by Dr.

Tilford.

The symposium, held February 24-25, 1997, in Arlington,

Virginia, was a resounding success. Soldiers, sailors, marines,

and airmen joined government officials, policymakers, civilian

academics, and the media for two days of forthright discussions.

What follows are summaries of the presentations and papers. To be
iv

sure, individual service positions were stated and restated. But

there was a distinct spirit of jointness expressed by virtually

every speaker as each acknowledged the absolute need to train and

fight together. At the conclusion of the symposium, there was a

general acknowledgement that the better interests of the nation

had, indeed, been served. The AUSA's Institute for Land Warfare

and the Strategic Studies Institute are pleased to present the

following SSI Special Report, "National Defense into the 21st

Century: Defining the Issues."

THEODORE G. STROUP, JR. RICHARD A. CHILCOAT

Lieutenant General, (USA, Ret.) Major General, U.S. Army

Managing Director Commandant

Institute for Land Warfare U.S. Army War College
v

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

EARL H. TILFORD, JR. is the Director of Research and Senior

Research Professor at the U.S. Army War College's Strategic

Studies Institute. In a 20-year Air Force career, he served in

assignments ranging from intelligence officer in Thailand,

nuclear targeteer at Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, and

Instructor in the Department of History at the U.S. Air Force

Academy to Editor of the Air University Review. After retiring

from the U.S. Air Force in 1989, Dr. Tilford was an Associate

Professor of History at Troy State University, Montgomery, and a

Visiting Professor of Military History at the Air Command and

Staff College. In 1993 he assumed his current position at the

Strategic Studies Institute. Dr. Tilford earned his B.A. and M.A.

in History at the University of Alabama and his Ph.D. in American

and European Military History at George Washington University.

His most recent publication is Eagle in the Desert: A Look Back

at the Persian Gulf War, a book he coedited with Air Force

historian, Dr. William P. Head. Crosswinds: The Air Force's Setup

in Vietnam, published in 1993 by Texas A&M University Press,

offered a critical assessment of air power during the Vietnam

War.
1

NATIONAL DEFENSE INTO THE 21st CENTURY:

DEFINING THE ISSUES

Introduction.

The U.S. Army War College, in cooperation with the

Association of the United States Army (AUSA), the U.S. Naval War

College, and the Atlantic Council of the United States,

cosponsored a symposium in late February 1997 to examine the

topic, "National Defense into the 21st Century: Defining the

Issues." The purpose of this symposium was to relate the national

interests of the United States to its long-term military

requirements and to define those challenges which will face the

Department of Defense, as well as those issues most pertinent to

each of the military services. This symposium was a sincere

effort by individuals from the various services, the Army's and

the Navy's premier professional military education institutions,

AUSA, and the Atlantic Council to search for a common understanding of the difficult issues facing all the services jointly

and each of them individually.

Over a period of two days, through four panels and three

special addresses, the presenters and more than 100 attendees

engaged in an enlightening and productive exchange of ideas and

points of view. What follows is a report on the four individual

panels and the comments of the Honorable John D. White, the

Deputy Secretary of Defense; Major General Mark R. Hamilton, U.S.

Army, Vice Director for Force Structure, Resources, and

Assessment on the Joint Staff; and retired U.S. Army General

Andrew J. Goodpaster, Chairman of the Atlantic Council of the

United States. General Jack N. Merritt, U.S. Army, Retired,

opened the symposium by describing its goals and agenda.
2

PANEL I

Setting the Framework:

U.S. Security Requirements

and Policy Realities for the Next Millennium

Dr. William T. Johnsen

Strategic Studies Institute

"The Future Roles of U.S. Military Power and Their Implications"

The Honorable Frederick L. Frostic

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Requirements and Plans

"Jointness and Service Priorities:

Reconciling Differences for a Common Defense"

Dr. Gordon Adams

Associate Director for National Security

and International Security Affairs

Office of Management and Budget

"Matching Our National Security Strategy

to Budgetary Resources"

The panel was charged with providing the strategic context

for the subsequent service-oriented panels and discussions. This

was no small task, involving as it did an overview of the

strategic environment, an assessment of the political landscape,

and the very harsh fiscal realities that will shape and determine

the national security environment in the first quarter of the

21st century.

Dr. William T. Johnsen, Associate Research Professor of

National Security Affairs at the U.S. Army War College's

Strategic Studies Institute, in his paper, "The Future Roles of

U.S. Military Power and Their Implications," began the conference

by stating that military power will continue to protect U.S.

national interests through deterrence, compellence, reassurance,

and support to the nation. These roles, Dr. Johnsen maintained,

will change both subtly and substantively as conventional

deterrence replaces nuclear deterrence as the foundation of U.S.

deterrent strategy. Compellence, more traditionally known as the

ability "to fight and win the nation's wars," will take on a

broader connotation, one requiring improved synchronization of

military power with other instruments of national power.

Simultaneously, the armed forces will be called upon to reassure

allies and friends around the world while providing important--

but expensive--support and services involved with relieving

natural and man-made disasters at home and abroad. According to

Dr. Johnsen, the recently articulated concept of preventive

defense will assume a much larger role, moving the United States
3

to a three-tiered strategy of preventing threats from emerging,

deterring risks that arise, and compelling adversaries as

necessary. It will expand the use of military power to include

promoting, as well as protecting, national interests. While

preventive defense is not without its risks, the United States

cannot afford to pass up this historic opportunity to shape the

international security environment.

The Department of Defense (DoD) will lead in imple- menting

preventive defense. Because the Army is best structured to carry

out this role, it has been and will be the primary agent for

doing so within the DoD. At the same time, the Army provides the

nation tremendous utility in the roles of deterrence,

compellence, reassurance, and support to the nation. Moreover,

Dr. Johnsen asserted, the Army is particularly well-suited for

countering asymmetric responses to U.S. military capabilities,

especially those devised to obviate our advantages in precision

strike.

Balancing the demands of preventive defense with the

continuing requirements of deterrence, compellence, and support

to the nation will have considerable consequences for the Army at

the national military and national strategy levels. For example,

at the national strategy level, leaders must forge consensus on

the U.S. international role, improve the interagency process, and

institutionalize close synchronization of the instruments of

national power, while avoiding excessive use of the military

instrument. At the national military level, officials must be

better prepared to participate in multinational efforts and to

coordinate their actions with international and nongovernmental

relief organizations. They have to examine whether to optimize 

forces and force structures for warfighting or to prepare forces

for operations across the full range of military operations. The

de facto DoD budget allocation paradigm may require revision to

support greater emphasis on preventive defense.

Within the Army, the implications are many, but force

structure and the allocation of tasks within the Total Army are

the most important. Dr. Johnsen offered three possible options

for addressing these issues:

• Option 1: Maintain an evolutionary course. This

alternative continues to support current force structure and mix,

but works on the margins to reduce the stress on

OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO.

• Option 2: The Active Component of the armed forces retains

primary responsibility for deterrence and, if necessary, fighting

and winning in two major theaters of war (MTWs). The Reserve

Components would have primary responsibility for preventive

defense missions.
4

• Option 3: The Active Component would retain primary

responsibility for deterrence, for fighting and winning one MTW,

and for conducting preventive defense tasks. The Reserve

Components would have primary responsibility for deterring and,

if necessary, fighting and winning in a second theater of war,

should it develop.

Dr. Johnsen ended by stating that no single alternative is

ideal, and that each has its pitfalls. It is quite likely that

any of these options would cause short-term but very sharp pain

for the Army. But the long-term gain for the nation of settling

on the best alternative could be significant.

The Honorable Frederick L. Frostic, Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Require- ments, then spoke

on "Jointness and Service Priorities: Reconciling Differences for

a Common Defense." Mr. Frostic began with an overview of the

world situation which, he said, has fostered new national

security requirements. The Cold War forced the United States to

develop the finest military establishment the world has ever

known, and the Army of today is a direct result of that

experience. No sane individual, or nation led by rational

leaders, would challenge the United States on this nation's

terms; which means that the armed forces must be prepared to

counter asymmetrical strategies. The old style of deterrence

simply will not work in this complex world.

Mr. Frostic then turned to some of the challenges facing the

United States. Unexpected contingencies are expensive. For

instance, moving U.S. forces back into Kuwait in October 1994 to

counter what appeared to be the aggressive intentions of the

Iraqis cost the Department of Defense $2 billion. These kinds of

contingencies, both larger and smaller, need to be addressed with

a better orchestration of all the elements of national power:

diplomatic as well as military. Furthermore, the United States,

as the world's only superpower, will not be intimidated by the

kind of terrorism that forced a withdrawal from Beirut in 1983

and that manifested itself in the Khobar Towers bombing last

year.

The United States is, however, vulnerable to some forms of

asymmetric warfare. While it is popular to talk about being the

world leader in information warfare, this is an area of

vulnerability. For example, most Americans are unaware of the

role that foreign nationals play in manufacturing computer

software in this country.

Mr. Frostic concluded by pointing out some challenges that

need to be addressed. He stated that the Army and the Air Force
5

are at two or three times their normal PERSTEMPO. The services

have to better integrate their reserve components into ongoing

operations to relieve some of that pressure. There must be a

better link between intelligence and command and control in power

projection operations. Finally, the logistics tail is too

cumbersome. Outsourcing may be a way to address that.

Dr. Gordon Adams, the Associate Director for National

Security and International Affairs at the Office of Management

and Budget, was the final speaker on the first panel. He began

his presentation, "Matching Our National Security Strategy to

Budgetary Resources," by stating that it is difficult to plan the

Defense budget in this era of uncertainty in the international

arena. The lack of a definable threat combines with the nation's

immense public debt to make the planning environment quite

difficult.

Although the national debt is forcing the DoD to make

difficult choices, the defense budget as a percentage of Gross

Domestic Product has been declining since the late 1980s.

However, since the defense budget accounts for over 50 percent of

discretionary spending, it will continue to be singled out for

scrutiny.

Post-Cold War restructuring is complete, and DoD is nearing

the end of the painful process of personnel reductions. While we

did a good job of staying ready throughout this period, the Army,

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force of today are not what they have

to be in the 21st century.

Dr. Adams addressed current and future defense budgets. The

good news is that further reductions are unlikely and that a very

slow growth at just above the annual rate of inflation is

probable. The bad news is that it is hard to fund contingencies.

Currently, these are funded out of Operations and Maintenance

(O&M) funds and, even when Congress votes supplemental funds to

cover the costs of unexpected contingencies, the O&M

opportunities have been lost. A proposal to fund a special

contingency account is currently being considered by Congress.

Defense procurement has declined 53 percent since 1990. The

plan is to increase the procurement account by 47 percent by

2002. This increase has been delayed because O&M shortfalls are

currently funded out of the procurement account. From Dr. Adams'

perspective, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) has to deal

with readiness, PERSTEMPO, infrastructure, modernization, and

outsourcing.

 Dr. Adams' conclusion was that today there is closer

coordination between the military and political components of
6

national security than ever before. An example of this is the

pressure brought on General Raoul Cedras of Haiti when he was

told that the 82nd Airborne Division was enroute to his country

and that it was time for him to yield to Washington's demands. To

maintain that kind of awesome capability, both the diplomatic and

military components have to be adequately funded now and in the

future.
7

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

The Honorable John T. White

Assistant Secretary of Defense

"An Update on the Quadrennial Defense Review"

At the conclusion of the first panel, the Deputy Secretary

of Defense, the Honorable John P. White, made the following

remarks.

I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today because

this is a critical moment for the Department of Defense, our

defense policy, and the armed forces we maintain to protect and

defend us. We are going to be counting on organizations like

yours for support as we make the tough but critical decisions

about our future.

We are at a pivot point in history, as the Cold War recedes

into the past and a new century rushes toward us. We have

prepared well for this point, having spent the past 4 years

building a national security strategy and the military forces

necessary to meet today's challenges. We also know we cannot

stand still. The chief characteristic of this world is rapid

change. To protect American security, we must stay ahead of

change--indeed, we must shape and direct that change.

If we are to shape the future, we have to resist the natural

impulse to be nearsighted--to focus our defense strategies,

resources, and choices mainly on the world as we know it. During

the Cold War when the threat forecast was relatively constant and

the adversaries were well-identified, our principal security

challenges were clear. But in today's world, when the threat

forecast is more blurry and changeable, we must focus a greater

share of our attention on the strategy and requirements for

meeting the unknown challenges of the long term.

In short, we need to strike a better balance between the

present and the future. That is one of our chief goals in the QDR

as we take a hard look at the world ahead, identify the

challenges that confront us, and determine the best and most

affordable way to meet those challenges.

Today I want to talk about how we are using the QDR to help

us make the key decisions that will guide our national defense

into the coming century. Some of our choices will be hard. They

will involve difficult trade-offs, and they will be

controversial. But unless we are willing to make them, we run the

risk of entering the next century unprepared for the challenges

we will face. Our strategy for the 21st century must drive our

choices in the QDR, but we must make these choices within the

resource constraints we face. This is the central challenge for
8

the QDR and the basic reason we have undertaken it: to develop a

new strategy and new capa-bilities for a new era with limited

resources.

First, let me tell you a little about the QDR. It is a

collaborative effort involving the Office of the Secretary of

Defense, the Joint Staff, the Commanders in Chief (CINCs), and

the services. At a general level, the review is being conducted

by seven panels, each with its own subject area--strategy, force

structure, modernization, readiness, infrastructure, human

resources, and information oper-ations and intelligence.

At more senior levels, this work is reviewed and integrated,

options are developed, and choices are framed for decision by the

Secretary. As we proceed, we will work closely with the National

Defense Panel, which is now established and prepared to review

our progress and to make recommendations for consideration by the

Department. We will present our final report to Congress by May

15, 1997, but will be consulting with them throughout the

process.

Our overarching goal in the QDR is a fundamental

reassessment of America's defense. It is about assessing and

balancing risk, developing an appropriate strategy, and making

tough choices about the capabilities we need to carry out that

strategy. As the Secretary has stressed, we are examining

everything: strategic assumptions, warfighting plans, force size

and disposition, investment programs, and supporting

infrastructure.

I want to emphasize four broad ideas about the QDR that I

hope to leave with you today:

• It is strategy-driven; that is, we will make choices based

on how best to meet the perceived threats and challenges of the

future.

• It is realistic. Therefore, we are taking into account the

resource constraints we face. We want our choices to be

executable. To ignore the resource constraints would be to

produce a work of no practical value.

• It is analytic and professional. We are engaged in a

serious analytic process to determine what we need, how we

structure our forces, and how we develop our program--always

informed by professional military judgments.

• Finally, at the end of the day, choices in the QDR are

about balancing risks. We must assess a changing world (knowing

our forecasts will often be wrong), and then evaluate the tradeoffs between present and future capabilities realistically, among
9

competing alternatives to accomplish the same mission, and among

the threats and challenges we may face and for which we must

prepare. Risks are unavoidable, so what is the correct balance?

A fundamental problem we must address in the QDR concerns

the overall balance of our defense program, specifically the

necessity of modernizing our force while maintaining highly ready

forces today for the broad range of missions our strategy

demands. If we continue as we have over the past few years, we

will be unable to modernize the force sufficiently. You are all

familiar with the call for increasing our funding for

procurement to a level of approximately $60 billion per year.

This is the level estimated to be required to replace our aging

equipment and to maintain our technological edge. We have not

been able to meet this goal in our past few budgets.

Let me illustrate this dilemma: Last year, we planned to put

$45.5 billion in the FY98 budget for procurement. But in the

budget we submitted to Congress this month, we actually asked for

only $42.5 billion--$3 billion less. As those of you who follow

the budget carefully know, this phenomenon has bedeviled us for

the past several years, although we have made improvements year

to year. There are three basic reasons why we have had this

problem.

First of all, we had to offset the costs of contingency

operations that were not provided for in last year's budget. This

is a chronic problem that often forces us to dip into our

readiness and modernization funds.

Second, every year we face a cost-forecasting problem. When

the services put together their budget plans, they are often too

optimistic about the cost of operations and support, such as

running military installations or conducting depot maintenance.

Consequently, in each budget year, they may have to spend more

money on operations and support than originally planned, and they

typically spend it out of procurement. It can really add up. We

had to shift $2.9 billion from the modernization account to pay

for these underestimated costs in the FY98 budget.

But, the problem is more complicated. Between 1990 and 1997,

our spending on procurement dropped about 53 percent. That was

appropriate during the post-Cold War drawdown, because we could

keep our forces modern by weeding out the older equipment.

Over the past 4 years, we took on an array of new

responsibilities and activities. We not only needed to size our

capabilities to deal with two nearly simultaneous major

contingencies, but we also faced a dramatic increase in other

activities, running the gamut from humanitarian and relief

operations in the Third World to the major deployment in Bosnia.
10

This was a new world for all of us and we needed to evolve and

adjust with it.

A new world with new challenges required us to focus

resources on the here and now. That was appropriate. We needed to

be successful in meeting these new challenges, and we have been.

Our current defense strategy and force structure have kept us

relatively safe in this uncertain, dynamic world. Indeed, we have

helped to make the world a less dangerous place. We have deterred

aggression in the Arabian Gulf. We have restored democracy to

Haiti. We have stopped the war in Bosnia and prevented it from

spreading throughout the heart of Europe. We have maintained

peace on the Korean peninsula. Meanwhile, we have helped to

reduce the former Soviet nuclear arsenals, heal the Cold War

fault lines in Europe, advance coopera- tion and stability in our

own hemisphere, and strengthen our alliance with Japan as we

advanced security in the Pacific. In short, we have made the 

world a safer place and, yes a better place. And the key to all

of this has been American engagement in the world. The focus on

the present has come at the expense of investment for the future.

We cannot continue this practice of ignoring future needs while

we operate in the present. We need to strike the proper balance

between these competing demands. This year we are beginning the

transition to a new era. As part of that transition, we need a

completely fresh examination of how we balance current and future

capabilities.

Some might challenge this assertion. Today we have the

world's most capable military, a powerful and flexible force

second to none. Our forces are ready, our people are of the

highest quality, and we continue to maintain our tech-nological

edge and to modernize the force. We have strong alliances, a

global presence, and the ability to meet any potential challenge

on today's battlefield. Why the call for reviewing our defense

strategy, making hard choices, reshaping the force?

The fundamental reason is the one I have already mentioned:

We cannot stand idle while the world changes around us. We must

actively shape events, revise our strategies as necessary, and

adapt to the changing environment.

In addition, as I have said, we must be assured that we have

struck the correct balance between present and future, and across

the array of risks that must be faced.

To do this right, the QDR will work through four levels of

analysis, beginning with a close examination of the challenges we

face and our objectives in meeting those challenges. Essentially,

this is a threat analysis, taking into account the potential

changes in the world over the coming years and the anticipated

challenges to our interests. It is also an attempt to identify
11

the opportunities available to us to shape the future in ways

favorable to our interests.

We must maintain our ability to meet today's challenges

while we position ourselves to prevent future threats from

emerging and to be able to defeat them if they do emerge.

With this view of the desirable future, we then must develop

a strategy to help achieve that world. This is the second level

of analysis. The core principles of that strategy have been

identified, even though we are still exploring many specific

means of implementation.

• First, we want to shape the international environ-ment, to

promote regional stability, to prevent or reduce conflict and

threats, and to deter aggression and coercion.

• Second, we want our forces to be able to respond to a full

spectrum of challenges--from deterring aggression and coercion in

crises, to conducting a wide range of contingency operations,

including fighting and winning theater wars.

These first two principles require the United States to remain

engaged in the world, to lead, and to work to influence the

actions of others--who can affect our national well-being.

• The third principle is that we must prepare now for the

challenges of an uncertain future. We must exploit the revolution

in military affairs, introduce best business practices into the

Department, and remain flexible to deal with unlikely but

potentially significant threats.

The third level in the QDR analysis is to translate the

strategy into specific elements of our overall defense posture--

what missions will our forces be equipped to undertake, what

range of capabilities will we need, how many forces are required,

and how should they be structured?

From that analysis will flow specific decisions--numbers and

kinds of forces, infrastructure, modernization of systems, R&D

programs, and so on. Only when we have made the decisions at the

other levels can we address the specific allocation of resources.

This is the fourth level. But once we have reached that level, we

must keep the decision process integrated, because a decision in

one area will affect what we should do in other areas.

For example, decisions about lift can affect both strategic

options--how we might choose to deal with a potential conflict--

and options for weapons systems in individual services. If we

alter a large modernization program because the threat has

changed, it can necessitate changes in force structure.
12

Conversely, changes in force structure can cause changes in

modernization programs and support infra-structure. In addition,

changes in one modernization program can affect others. Only by

making the connections and their implications clear can we have a

crisp and coherent debate over fundamental decisions.

Recognizing all these complexities and inter- dependencies

still begs the question of whether there is a need for hard

choices. The answer is clearly yes. There is a temptation to

assume--or hope--that the choices we face will not be as

difficult because we will find relief from budgetary pressures. I

believe this is wishful thinking. Given the pressures for deficit

reduction and a balanced budget by 2002, I do not believe we can

assume that the resources available for defense will be greater

than those available today. Will the current allocation of

resources allow us to do all we need to do? No. We have

demonstrated the shortfall in our ability to meet our

modernization goals. But it is worse than that. We need to

consider other requirements, including chronic underfunding of

real property maintenance and other infrastructure needs, unknown

contingencies, expanded ballistic missile and cruise missile

defense programs, and new initiatives to deal with the threats

from weapons of mass destruction and terrorism.

Can we fund these shortfalls by reducing our support costs?

Yes, to some extent. We probably need to consider further base

closing and realignment. I don't have to tell you how politically

difficult that will be, but when weighed against other choices

that option may begin to look more attractive. Moreover, it would

be unrealistic to expect that infrastructure reductions alone

could produce the invest- ment funds we need in the short term.

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), for example, has significant

up-front costs. We must continue to push acquisition reform, and

we will. We need to expand our outsourcing, and we will--

aggressively. But I want to assure you that these savings, even

at their most optimistic, will not be enough. The need is too

large. We must look to other areas for savings: operations,

modernization, force structure, and end strength. Unless we make

tough choices in these areas, we will not achieve the objectives

of the QDR.

The Department is taking the QDR very seriously. The entire

senior leadership of the Department is fully engaged. In my

judgment, a successful QDR is the only way we will be able to

achieve the necessary balance between meeting current needs,

investing for the future, and shaping that future in ways

favorable to our interests. We have the obligation to the country

to do just that.

Let me conclude by noting for you what I think constitute

the elements of a successful QDR. We must look across all
13

elements of the Department, questioning and evaluating the

reasons we are doing things the way we are. As the Secretary has

stated, everything is on the table. We must ask whether the tempo

of current operations is having an impact on the readiness of

selected units, and we must do something about it if that is the

case. We must ask whether the high state of readiness we maintain

across the board is appropriate given our strategy. We must ask

whether the current generation of planned modernization programs

are the right ones, and whether the quantities budgeted are

properly sized. And we must ask whether we are operating as

efficiently as possible in our business and management practices.

We must not shrink from these choices. The QDR will be

successful if it makes clear the connections and balances the

risks among choices at different levels--between threat analysis

and strategy, between strategy and program elements, and between

choices of alternative systems. If we have made those connections

clear, balanced the risks, made the tough choices, and

reallocated the resources to implement a sound program, then the

QDR will be a success.

One of the qualities that has made America the world's sole

superpower and undisputed leader of the free world is that we do

not shrink from making tough choices. Arthur Miller once said,

"What is paradise, but the absence of the need to choose?"

Building a strong force for an uncertain future under tight

fiscal constraints is certainly no paradise. It will involve some

hellish choices. But we cannot afford not to make them.

If we do the QDR right, it should touch off a national

debate over how to defend our country in the 21st century. This

debate is healthy, the timing is exactly right, and I am

optimistic that the end result will be a strong, sensible, and

affordable defense, and a secure nation. But that optimistic

outcome will occur only if we make honest choices. The only

sacred cow is a strong defense.

 To succeed, we will need your support. I urge all of you

who have supported a strong defense all these years to stand with

us as we make the hard choices necessary to keep our forces

strong and our nation secure.
14

PANEL II

Landpower in the 21st Century

Dr. Don Snider

Olin Distinguished Professor of National Security Studies

The U.S. Military Academy

"The Non-Revolution in Military Affairs"

General David M. Maddox, USA, Ret.

"Beyond Force XXI: Envisioning the Army After Next"

Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner, USA

Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

"The Army, Joint Operations and the Quadrennial Defense Review"

On the afternoon of February 24, the first of the service

specific panels, "Landpower in the 21st Century," convened. In

his paper, "The Non-Revolution in Military Affairs," Dr. Don

Snider stated that many of the service positions being developed

during the QDR have been predicated on the notion that there has

been a revolution in military affairs (RMA). To some, the RMA is

technologically driven: "going from metal benders to electron

chasers," as Dr. Snider put it. While many in the military

intellectual and academic communities may truly believe we are in

the midst of an RMA, Dr. Snider's position is that one is not

occurring and will not occur. An exception is in the field of

special opera-tions where the change began after the Vietnam War.

Past RMAs, such as the ones that occurred in the German

military in the interwar period, involved a change in culture

that is not evident today. Those revolutions in military affairs

involved technological advance, but, more to the point, they

involved putting together ideas, concepts, and doctrines with

technologies, and doing so in innovative ways. Education programs

for military elites helped to effect the changes and senior

leadership was generally supportive.

Today there are new technologies, but other conditions that

fostered earlier RMAs are not present. While the world situation

has changed, the strategic challenges facing the nation are not

being addressed very differently from the Cold War. Compellence,

deterrence, and support are not new. Furthermore, current

military leaders, while giving verbal support to the RMA, are not

fostering or supporting revolutionary change.

General David M. Maddox, in his presentation, "Beyond Force

XXI: Envisioning the Army After Next," suggested that the

distinctions are blurred between today's Army and Force XXI, and

that the lines between Army XXI and the Army After Next (AAN)
15

will be just as indistinct. The Army must remain ready to fight

and win, even though there is a continuing debate over why we

even need a highly trained and capable military. Too many

interpret "no peer threat" to mean "no threat" rather than

understanding that the United States, while it faces many

threats, is not in danger of finding its armed forces

technologically over- matched by any potential adversary.

But while the armed forces of the United States are not

likely to be engaged in conflict with forces as technologically

advanced, there are nations that can field formidable forces.

While the U.S. Air Force is the world's most technologically

advanced and second only to China's in size, and the U.S. Navy is

the world's best and largest seagoing force, the Army, although

qualitatively superior to any other land force, is also only the

world's eighth largest army. Iraq, Iran, and North Korea could

field large numbers of troops, and ground warfare in these MTWs--

even with complete air superiority and dominance of the

contiguous seas--would be far from easy.

If a future foe understands the Cold War capabilities

inherent in the U.S. armed forces of today, they can develop

asymmetric counters. A future foe does not need to be a "peer

competitor" to achieve technological superiority in specific,

perhaps in narrow, areas that could prove pivotal in a given

situation. For instance, a challenger might counter portions of

our information technologies. They might use medium range

ballistic missiles topped with nuclear or chemical and biological

warheads to preclude the establishment of bases. Selective

terrorist attacks mounted against stateside targets could be a

part of an effort to sap our national will.

Today's world is not at peace and, according to General

Maddox, the United States must stay actively engaged to shape the

international environment. The daily interaction fostered by

forward presence builds relationships that work to minimize

misunderstanding. Part of shaping the environment is being ready

to respond anywhere on the globe when human or natural disaster

strikes. In addition to disaster relief, we shape the environment

by responding to the full spectrum of missions to include

humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and assisting

in the transition from war to peace, as we are doing in Bosnia

today. While the objective of these missions may be to preclude

or end conflict, most of them contain the possibility of

transitioning into conflict. Therefore, our soldiers have to be

disciplined and trained for not only a variety of nontraditional

missions, but also for going to war when necessary.

How then is the Army going to go beyond Force XXI to

envision the Army After Next? Force XXI is already leveraging

information technologies into today's forces. It is more of a
16

process than a "force" in that the incorporation of information

technologies opens the door to new and innovative ways to perform

military tasks. To be sure, our thought processes and the tempo

of operations are changing and forces are becoming more agile.

Even as we are developing Force XXI, readiness demands

remain higher than ever. The Army, as a whole, must be manned,

equipped, and trained to accomplish a variety of missions. The

Reserve Components must share in this greater range of missions.

Light forces have to leverage more combat power while heavy

forces need to increase their deployability. With total

situational awareness, lighter forces can disperse over a greater

area and control that expanse by calling for responsive precision

fires when needed. The Army After Next will be significantly

different but, when the mission involves interacting with,

controlling, or influencing people, ground forces will have to

play a dominant role.

The Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Lieutenant

General Jay M. Garner, provided two visions of the future. The

first, "Looking Back From 2012: The 1996 QDR Process in

Retrospect," posited a hypothetical assessment of the U.S.

military in the first decade of the 21st century. In this

assessment, the armed forces of the United States are mostly

irrelevant, often impotent, and constantly in turmoil.

According to this scenario, forced by an overarching

guidance from the National Command Authority to reduce the size

of the budget, the United States relied too much on precision

engagement and reduced the size of its land forces. Technology

was supposed to make our smaller forces more effective while

treaty agreements were supposed to reduce the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Army became smaller and

put its second MTW responsibilities in the Reserve Component

while the Navy procured arsenal ships and upgraded information

age F-18s, and the Air Force procured F-22s and additional B-2s

by reducing its airlift forces, which were not needed given the

smaller land force projection requirements.

Meanwhile, the international environment deteriorated and

U.S. advantages in technologically sophisticated hardware were

thwarted by the evolution of asymmetric and niche warfare. A

number of potential enemies developed the Terrestrial

Reconnaissance Strike Complex, which involved coupling unmanned

aerial vehicles with long- range missiles. Targeting data was

made available from commercial satellite imagery and accuracy was

enhanced by the GPS. In-theater airfields became untenable, and

carrier battle groups were driven beyond the attack radius of

even the F-18E/Fs.
17

The enemies of the future chose to fight in cities, thus

obviating the effectiveness of our precision weapons. They

located their command and control centers around hospitals and

schools. They used civilians as human shields along their lines

of communications. They allowed CNN to televise these actions to

take advantage of a perceived aversion to bloodshed among many

Americans. Threats to use biological, chemical, and nuclear

weapons on our allies diminished the support from coalition

partners. Meanwhile, terrorist attacks carried out across the

United States forced a public outcry for protection, and large

portions of the National Guard and Reserves had to be used for

domestic policing and security. The United States lost the war of

2012 to a non-peer competitor who took advantage of every

weakness we created by the flawed assumptions resulting from the

Quadrennial Defense Review initiated in 1996 and the subsequent

actions of the first National Defense Panel.

 Then, Lieutenant General Garner presented his more

optimistic second vision for the world of tomorrow, "1997-2010:

The Way Ahead and Beyond." Using our knowledge of history, we

assumed in 1997 that conflict between peoples and nations would

persist. The United States would continue to ask its armed force

to engage in a range of missions in addition to being ready to

fight and win the nation's wars. And we undertook to plan for

what is likely to occur rather than for a world as we would like

it to be.

Indeed, the world continued to be a dangerous place.

Religious and ethnic conflict persisted while rogue nations,

organized crime, and transnational extremist groups threatened

global stability and domestic security. The proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threatened emerging democracies

and the stability of the world economy.

In this turbulent world, the U.S. military provided

stability. It was able to do so because the services remained

capable of fighting and winning the nation's wars. That deterred

many would-be aggressors. The armed forces were also able to

respond to natural disasters at home and abroad, conduct

humanitarian assistance operations, and shape the world

environment through its continuing contact with peoples all over

the world. It was a force for peace-keeping, peacemaking and

nation building.

Land forces proved to be a key element in the nation's

continued preeminence as a world power. The Army was, indeed,

able to exercise direct, continuing, and comprehensive control

over land, its resources, and its people. A robust Army was able

to make permanent the otherwise transitory advantages achieved by

air and naval forces. Time and again the deployment of land

forces was shown to be the gravest response that could have been
18

made, short of war, to demonstrate the national will to prevent

conflict.

Furthermore, the Army conducted a range of military options

short of war. It was used for preventive defense and peacetime

engagement activities like military-to-military contacts, nation

building endeavors, and humanitarian assistance operations. All

of this kept potential dangers from becoming full-blown threats.

The Army demonstrated its suitability for implementing the

National Military Strategy through engagement and preventive

defense activities. American soldiers on the ground, 24 hours a

day, engaged in the kind of person-to-person contact that

fostered cooperation and good will. In places like Bosnia, land

forces, in conjunction with our NATO allies, and with major

contributions from air and naval forces, finally brought peace.

In the dynamic and unpredictable geostra- tegic environment of

the 21st century, it was land forces that provided a full range

of choices to the nation and a hedge against uncertainty.

In summary, the United States needs to retain a fullspectrum capability to ensure full-spectrum dominance. It is

essential that we balance the acquisition of high technology

systems with the development of leaders, with new doctrine, and

with readiness. We need to balance our precision warfare

capabilities with decisive maneuver. There has to be a balance

between support to the nation and global engagement, and

lethality must be balanced with preventive defense. Above all, as

George Bernard Shaw put it, "Peace is not only better than war,

it is infinitely more arduous."
19

PANEL III

Seapower in the 21st Century

Major General John E. Rhodes, USMC

Director, Quadrennial Defense Review

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

"Naval Contributions to Joint Warfare in the 21st Century"

Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr., USN

Director, Office of Program Appraisal, U.S. Navy

"The Naval Philosophy for the QDR"

Dr. David A. Rosenberg

National War College

"Naval Forces and the RMA: Fact or Fiction?"

The second day of the symposium began with a look at

seapower in the 21st century. Major General John E. Rhodes, not

unlike the Army's Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, believes that

asymmetrical threats await the nation's armed forces in the 21st

century. General Rhodes, however, is convinced that the role of

naval forces will prove to be a critical component in countering

these threats. The goal of this particular presentation was to

link naval forces to three documents: The National Military

Strategy, Joint Vision 2010, and the Joint Strategy Review.

According to General Rhodes, the enduring truth is that the

United States is a maritime nation with worldwide interests, and,

of the world's 265 countries, 222 border the sea. Some 75 percent

of the world's people and 80 percent of its capitals are within

200 miles of the sea. Only three world capitals are more than 600

miles from the sea.

General Rhodes stated that according to Joint Vision 2010,

dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and

full dimensional protection together produce full-spectrum

dominance. Logistics is the key and logistical support is based

on sea transport. Furthermore, seabased logistics lessens the

footprint ashore, thereby contributing to force protection. He

then stated that the Joint Strategy Review concluded by

underscoring the need for peacetime engagement and overseas

presence. From his perspective, naval forces provide both.

The National Military Strategy, according to General Rhodes,

called for shaping the international strategic environment in a

way that would be advantageous to the United States. He pointed

out that naval forces do not need overflight permission, basing

agreements, or visas. They can operate virtually anywhere and be

within range of 75 percent of the world's population. In 1996,
20

for instance, vessels of the U.S. Navy visited 79 countries and

engaged in 106 major exercises with naval forces from 64

countries. The National Military Strategy is directed at

responding to threats, and naval forces are often nearby and

ready to engage.

The Joint Strategy Review also called for the kind of 

capabilities that can be provided best by naval forces. The JSR

concluded that peacetime engagement is crucial to shaping the

environment and will remain manpower intensive. Overseas presence

remains a valid concept and, according to the JSR, the nation

will face even greater challenges to its access to global lines

of communication. From 1991 to 1996, the Naval Operating Forces

have engaged in 51 operations from Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM

to oil cleanups in Alaska. In March 1996, it was the U.S. Navy

that rushed two carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Straits in

response to the People's Republic of China's missile tests and

maneuvers.

In his conclusion, General Rhodes stated that some missions,

like launching satellites, are not appropriate for the Marine

Corps. He sees a joint requirement to operate across the full

spectrum of operations, from fighting wildfires and providing

assistance to flood and earthquake victims in the United States,

to peacetime engagement, nation building, and crisis response

overseas. Together with the Air Force and Army, the U.S. Navy and

Marine Corps must be ready to join with our allies in joint

warfighting operations should they be necessary. His closing

statement was,

The unique ability of Naval Forces to operate across

the entire continuum of operations--from visible

presence off the coast, to crisis response or

peacekeeping missions, to all out war--will continue to

serve the Nation well in a Joint environment aimed at

achieving the objectives of Joint Vision 2010, the

Joint Strategy Review, and the National Military

Strategy.

Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Director of the Office

of Program Appraisal, U.S. Navy, then presented "The Naval

Philosophy for the QDR." Admiral Lautenbacher began by stating

the necessity for periodically reassessing the nation's defense

posture. Some of the decisions made before the Gulf War as a

result of the Base Force Review are still with us. The Bottom-Up

Review was spawned by a national debate over the kind of defense

we needed in the post-Cold War world. The Quadrennial Defense

Review and the actions to be taken by the National Defense Panel

are driven by the need to balance the budget. In budgetary terms,

the QDR is concerned with insuring an adequate procurement
21

account.

Admiral Lautenbacher then turned his attention to the wide

variety of capabilities that the Navy and Marine Corps team

brings to the national security arena. Innovation is apparent in

the Navy's initiatives to move from being primarily a blue water

navy of the Cold War to one positioned for joint warfare in the

littorals. Naval strategy is in harmony with both the QDR

strategy and Joint Vision 2010.

The Navy and the Marine Corps are embracing the revolution

in military affairs. The Arsenal Ship, a truly "smart" ship, will

be manned and armed in revolutionary ways. The CVX, a follow-on

carrier, a new attack submarine, and the LPD-17, a new amphibious

assault ship, are all being designed to take the Navy well into

the 21st century. But even today's programs are being enhanced

by the RMA. The Navy is looking at ways to put its submarines

under the control of UAVs. It is studying organic mine countermeasures and netted, integrated air defense systems. The admiral

believes wars of the future will be won by C4ISR (command,

control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance.)

The Navy and Marine Corps are committed to joint warfare.

They have engaged in more than 75 joint operations since 1991. In

1996 the Navy and Marine Corps participated in 22 joint

operations from the Western Hemisphere to Europe and Africa to

East Asia and the Far East.

Although committed to jointness, the Navy brings some unique

service capabilities to warfighting. On an average day about half

its ships, 175 or so, are underway. About 100 ships and 70,000

sailors and marines will be forward deployed and engaged in

dozens of exercises with friends and allies. When the nation

needs to respond to a crisis the naval option is paid for since

ships on station do not require additional deployment funds and

the cost of moving the equipment has already been allocated.

Naval forces are usually nearby whenever a crisis develops.

Finally, the Navy is a good investment. Ship life can be 40

to 50 years. The aircraft carrier, USS Midway, for instance, was

launched in 1943 and served in every conflict from World War II

to the Persian Gulf War before being decommissioned in 1993.

Likewise, the USS Saratoga, a carrier launched in 1955, served 40

years before being decommissioned in 1995. But beyond longevity,

aircraft carriers, with their embarked air wings, can conduct

enforcement, deny flight, surveillance, and strike missions

without the encumbrance of complex overseas basing or having to

negotiate overflight agreements.

In closing, Admiral Lautenbacher said that the QDR must
22

achieve the correct balance between operations and modernization.

He called for all the services to approach the QDR together since

we are on the same team when it comes to national defense and

applying our forces to the National Military Strategy.

Dr. David A. Rosenberg, a professor at the National War

College, then discussed "Naval Forces and the RMA: Fact or

Fiction?" He began with the very interesting assertion that while

navies do engage in revolutions in military affairs, change is

neither quick nor dramatic given the long life of ships. Warships

are, and for a long time have been, systems and systems of

systems.

According to Dr. Rosenberg there have been five naval

revolutions in the 20th century. The first was a failed attempt

by British Admiral Sir Jackie Fisher who tried to provide the

Royal Navy with a balanced fleet of battle cruisers and destroyer

flotillas, but got a fleet dominated by the dreadnoughts. The

second revolution was fostered by the German U-boat during World

War I. The third naval RMA was multifaceted and took place during

the interwar years. It involved aviation, amphibious warfare,

underway replenishment, and the introduction of long-range

submarines. The fourth RMA was the nuclear revolution which

included the emergence of ballistic missile firing submarines.

The fifth and last RMA has been the intelligence revolution that

has featured ocean surveillance and has provided the U.S. Navy

with the ability to track any adversary constantly.

Dr. Rosenberg pointed to the interwar period as one that

closely parallels today. During the 1920s and 1930s, arms

limitations agreements provided a controlled environment and the

temporal stability needed to effect change. Great Britain, Japan,

and the United States had time to experiment with aircraft

carriers and naval aviation. It was also a period of

organizational innovation when industry, science, and the Navy

were able to establish working relationships. Furthermore, the

U.S. Navy was not absorbed by deployments since fleets were

already based overseas. Education was important, and, although

graduate education did not prove feasible, many senior officers

attended the Naval War College twice; once for an operational and

tactical education useful to captains, and later for a more

strategically oriented course for flag officers. Finally, the

interwar period was one of shipbuilding and innovation. President

Franklin Roosevelt was an enthu- siastic supporter of the U.S.

Navy.

Today the Navy is not as well-configured for innovation,

although innovation is taking place. The Navy is more absorbed

with deployments, and overseas basing is not as prevalent. On the

other hand, today's Navy has a greater appreciation for graduate
23

education than did the Navy of the interwar period. Another

difference is that during the interwar period the Navy focused on

War Plan Orange, a war in the Pacific. Today we have no such

single war plan. Rather, the Navy's missions are many and varied.

Dr. Rosenberg closed by saying that there will be a

revolution from the sea only if it occurs on, over and under the

surface. The naval officer in the RMA must be capable of

commanding land, sea and air forces in a joint arena.
24

LUNCHEON ADDRESS

Major General Mark R. Hamilton, USA

Vice Director for Force Structure,

Resources and Assessments, J-8,

The Joint Staff

"The Quadrennial Defense Review: A Joint Perspective"

General Hamilton began by saying his mission was to provide

a joint perspective on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

While it is becoming trite to say that the world is different, in

truth it is very different. The QDR is focused on getting the

best defense possible for the nation as it faces this new world.

For over 40 years the United States built a military force

to contend with any failure in its strategy of deterrence and

containment. The armed forces were like life insurance in that

they were designed for use only in the most extreme eventuality.

The purpose of the QDR is to restructure the force so that the

new strategy of engagement and enlargement can succeed.

A major assumption of the Bottom Up Review (BUR) was that if

the forces we possessed could execute two major regional

conflicts, smaller tasks could be handled because they were

included in the MRCs. The reality has been that the lesser

included tasks have become the dominant ones.

Also, during the Cold War the military had a clear

accountability to the country. To be successful, we had to deter

war with the Soviet Union and contain the expansion of communism.

Since the end of the Cold War the measure of what constitutes

strategic success is not so easily defined.

The process for analysis in the QDR is quite different from

that of the BUR. The QDR is much more open where the BUR was a

closed process. There is a lot of consternation and pain

associated with the QDR because a great deal is at stake. What we

have yet to do is to assess today's force against today's

demonstrated requirements. What we have today is a force that is

doing something and doing it rather well, but what it is doing it

was not designed to do.

Pedagogically, we are in the category of "unconscious

competence." There are four of these categories or states of

awareness. Unconscious incompetence is a situation where you do

not know what you are doing, and you don't know that you are

doing the wrong thing. Conscious incompetence is when you are

aware that what you are doing is wrong. The state of conscious

competence is to know what you are doing and to know that it is

the right thing to do and that you are doing it correctly. We are

in the state of unconscious competence where we don't know
25

exactly what we are doing, but we know we are doing it well. We

need to move to a state of conscious competence.
26

PANEL IV

Air Power in the 21st Century

Dr. Caroline F. Ziemke

Institute for Defense Analyses

"The Changing Nature of Air Power"

General Larry D. Welch, USAF, Ret.

Institute for Defense Analyses

"The USAF into the 21st Century"

Major Mark J. Conversino

School for Advanced Airpower Studies

"The Changing Dynamic of Strategic Attack"

The Air War College was invited to participate in this

symposium as a cosponsor but was unable to do so. Of all the

panels, perhaps because an official service position was not

presented, this was the most ecumenical.

Dr. Caroline Ziemke led the presentations with "The Changing

Nature of Air Power." She began by challenging the notion that

the end of the Cold War marks the close of a half-century of

unprecedented strategic engagement by the United States. The

watershed change in America's strategic vision came at the close

of the 19th century when the nation moved from being a

continental hegemon to take its place among the world powers. The

irreversible step toward becoming an involved world power was

taken in 1898 and not in 1941 or 1945. The American strategic

personality has not changed with the end of the Cold War any

more than it changed during the 1920s and 1930s when we were in

an aberrant period of pseudo-isolationism. America is

fundamentally a strategic and international extrovert and will

remain so during the 21st century.

Early in the 20th century the United States adopted a

consistently realist, if not always realistic, military strategy

based on the assumption that the nation's economic and political

well-being could only be ensured by a prepon-derance of military

power. The most consistent element of Joint Vision 2010 is that

the nation must maintain full-spectrum dominance; not parity, not

advantage--but dominance. It is American air power, more than any

other aspect of the nation's considerable military might, that

impresses and intimidates those who might challenge that

dominance. Air power will continue to play a pivotal role in

future military operations.

Dr. Ziemke then challenged the assumption that the American

people are unwilling to accept casualties. She argued that it is
27

the political leadership, not the American people, who have an

aversion to casualties. What the American people want are clear

and honest explanations of the strategic rationale behind

military intervention and a statement of objectives.

Historically, public opinion has turned against military

operations when the price in blood exceeds the apparent progress

toward achieving reasonable and stated objectives. That was the

case in the American Civil War in 1862, in Korea, and it was

especially apparent when the Vietnam War seemingly became an

escalating stalemate, particularly after the Tet Offensive of

1968.

The problem is that the military technical revolution has

put the concept of "bloodless war" tantalizingly, if

chimerically, within reach. One of the most attractive advantages

of air power is, at least from the perspective of the national

political leadership, that it offers the illusion of bloodless

war. As Eliot Cohen put it, "Air power is an unusually seductive

form of military strength, in part because, like modern

courtship, it appears to offer gratification without commitment."

But "appears" is the operative word. There are limits to the

supposed bloodlessness of air power enhanced by precision guided

munitions. First, the ability to achieve pinpoint accuracy has

created the expectation of pinpoint accuracy. But worldwide

urbanization and the increasing integration of civilian and

military infrastructures point to a future in which air

operations have to be conducted in urban environments both rich

in targets and full of civilians. Second, warfare remains bloody

by nature. The neo-Douhetans, led by retired Air Force Colonel

John A. Warden, III, who claimed air power had for the first time

in history defeated a ground army, were premature in their

assessments. Neither the Persian Gulf War, nor anything that has

happened since, indicates that the fundamental Clausewitzian

dictum has been nullified: the key to military victory remains

seizing and holding territory and defeating the enemy's army on

the ground. Ground warfare is, and will remain, an inherently

bloody endeavor.

"So," Dr. Ziemke asked, "whither air power?" The National

Military Strategy (NMS), combined with our inherent commitment to

an idealistically-based foreign policy, guarantees a future for

American air power. From deterring and defeating aggression in

major regional contingencies to maintaining overseas presence and

countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, air

power offers unique and necessary capabilities that are essential

to fulfilling the NMS. Strategic air campaigns, gaining and

maintaining air superiority, air surveillance, precision strike,

strategic airlift, and the ability to evacuate innocents from

crisis areas are all unique capabilities of air power writ large:

USAF, USN, USMC, Army, Coast Guard, and civilian contracted

aviation. Finally, the extension of the U.S. national frontier
28

into space has profound impli-cations for space forces that may

have an effect on the future structure and missions of the U.S.

Air Force.

Former Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry D. Welch then

addressed the topic, "The USAF into the 21st Century." General

Welch stated that the overarching vision provided in the

Chairman's Joint Vision 2010 is full- spectrum dominance, at any

level, from peacekeeping and peace enforcement to major war. The

ingredients to achieve full-spectrum dominance are dominant

maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and fulldimension protection, each enhanced and focused by information

superiority. The key concept is dominance--not marginal

superiority, but dominance.

Full-spectrum dominance comes from dominant capabilities in

joint air, land and sea forces, with the mix depending on the

specific situation. Only effectively integrated joint land, sea,

and air forces can achieve full- spectrum dominance. Everyone

recognizes the importance of air power, joint Army, Navy, Marine

Corps, and USAF air power, and how it contributes to fullspectrum dominance.

A useful way to think about the future, according to General

Welch, is to examine relevant lessons from the past. Our success

with air power in the Gulf War resulted from an objective

examination of the failures of air power in Vietnam. Now we need

to ensure that the lessons of the Gulf War contribute to success

in what might be a very different 21st century. To do that, it is

useful to track five important lessons from Vietnam through the

Gulf War and on to the future.

• We have to trust the commanders on the scene with the

enormously complex business of conducting joint operations in

subordination to clearly defined objectives and constraints set

by the civilian political leadership.

• The need to conduct a coherent, integrated air campaign

focused on the joint force commander's objectives is vital.

• We must have dominant battlespace awareness.

• To dominate the battlespace, we must have the finest air

power technology available.

• Our air crews must be trained and ready to fight on the

first combat mission.

The contrast between how the United States used air power in

the Gulf War and how we misused it in Vietnam is clear and
29

instructive. Still, the value of history comes from the relevant

application of its lessons to future operations. In the 21st

century, U.S. air power will make a powerful, sometimes leading,

contribution to the battlespace dominance sought by U.S. or joint

coalition forces. When that is done, air power will have realized

its long touted but previously unrealized potential. True

advocates of air power are not those wild-blue yonder, go-italone enthusiasts. Rather, they are the staunch advocates of

integrated air-land-and-sea power; a joint team fighting together

to achieve full-spectrum dominance.

Major Mark J. Conversino, a professor at the School of

Advanced Airpower Studies, then addressed "The Changing Dynamic

of Strategic Attack." Major Conversino began by stating that

"strategic bombing," known today as strategic attack, remains the

single most controversial of all air power missions. The extreme

air power advocates continue to claim, as did the early theorists

like Italian Marshal Giulio Douhet, that the enemy's will can be

shattered and decisive victory achieved through aerial attack

alone. These claims have never been realized. Yet, in assessing

the experience gained from the strategic bombing campaigns of

World War II through the strategic air campaign of the Persian

Gulf War of 1991, advocates and skeptics alike bog down in

arguments that are, at best, tangential to the issue at hand: the

actual military effectiveness of strategic attack.

Conversino argued that it is time to leave Douhet, his likeminded contemporaries, and their prophecies to the historians.

Those arguments are dated and irrelevant in part because radical

changes in technology and the shift in the nature of modern

warfare away from the all-out exchange of nuclear weapons between

major world powers have combined to alter the very meaning and

nature of strategic attack.

To understand modern strategic attack, one has to understand

what modern strategic attack is not. First, it is not necessarily

a nuclear attack. Many cannot separate the mission from the

weapon, and nuclear weapons always had tactical as well as

strategic uses, at least theoretically. The term "strategic

bombing" has lost its utility in this regard, and, with the

changed realities of what constitutes strategic attack, the term

"strategic bombing," based largely on World War II-era

experiences, should be relegated to history books.

Second, recent experience indicates that the target struck

does not necessarily dictate the nature of the attack as

"strategic." The method of attack and the specific nature of the

target are largely irrelevant to the definition. In Bosnia, for

instance, ammunition dumps were "strategic" targets because the

Bosnian Serbs relied on them to achieve their objectives. During
30

the Gulf War, the Republican Guard, a fielded military force

constituting that outer ring of John Warden's five-ring model,

was a strategic target in that Saddam Hussein's continued

military and political viability depended upon that force; a

force we failed to destroy.

Third, strategic air attack is not Douhetan "city busting"

or "terror bombing." While even precision guided munitions cannot

be a guarantee against collateral damage and civilian deaths,

they do offer a great many more options than were present before

the last years of the Vietnam War. Strategic effects can be had

without widespread death and destruction being visited on either

the enemy's forces or on noncombatants.

While there are long-range aircraft and intercontinental

missiles, no specific platform is, in and of itself, "strategic."

In Vietnam "strategic" B-52s were used to support ground

operations in South Vietnam, while F-4 and F-105 fighter-bombers,

designed for tactical missions, hit targets in North Vietnam. In

1981, eight Israeli Air Force F-16s, each carrying a pair of

2,000 pound bombs, achieved the strategic effect of destroying

the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak. During the Gulf War,

misnamed F-117 Stealth "fighters," planes with an unrefueled

range of only 550 nautical miles, flew 2 percent of the strike

sorties but attacked 40 percent of the strategic targets. B-52s,

meanwhile, were notably absent from the skies over Baghdad.

A strategic attack is one that is designed to achieve an

effect on the war as a whole. Strategic goals help to dictate the

targets that must be hit to achieve that effect. Those may differ

from war to war.

Major Conversino concluded by stating that historians will

continue to debate the effectiveness of strategic bombing from

the 1930s through the Persian Gulf War. Furthermore, contemporary

discussion of strategic air power remains mired in theories of

air power from the 1920s and 1930s and affected by images of

bombing in World War II. If we are to properly anticipate

America's defense needs for the next century, we have to move

beyond academic quibbling to consider what strategic attack

represents today. In that sense, the distance that separates

Operation POINTBLANK from Operation DESERT STORM is greater than

the five decades that have passed between them.
31

SUMMATION

General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA, Ret.

Chairman

The Atlantic Council of the United States

"The Issues in Perspective"

I welcome very much the chance to meet with you whom I term

the "gluttons for punishment." You're going to stay right to the

end of it, and I welcome the chance to participate in this

session. To find the reason, you don't have to go beyond the

title of your conference, "National Defense into the 21st

Century: Defining the Issues." That, I must say, is a most timely

and demanding subject because of the daunting array of issues

that have to be thought through, and will need to be acted upon.

My task was to offer a summary and conclusion, the issues

and perspective. And I'm going to follow the course of a rather

wise man down in Texas that you may have heard of. He was asked

to talk about modern art in Texas. He accepted that and then

realized what he had done, and he said, "I'll talk about modern

art and Texas. I don't know much about modern art, but I'm sure

going to tell you about Texas."

Well, I wouldn't attempt to summarize what you've heard.

It's not possible, I'm sure, to do full justice to that in

anything like the time available or to test your patience to that

extent. But I will do the other part of what I was asked to do,

and that is to conclude your conference.

I'm going to do so by offering you a perspective and a

framework--a perspective for weighing the security issues

involved and a framework for placing them in what I would think

to be a manageable context, just as our decision-makers need to

do, and as we hope they will do in approaching this very

multifaceted challenge at all levels of our military forces.

Accordingly, I'm going to speak to three main topics: First, the

perspective, and there I'm going to talk about America's national

interests in the international arena that have military

implications. Next, the framework that I'll talk about is U.S.

security policies and decision guidelines that have military

implications. And the third is some of the military implications

that are associated with these national interests and security

policies and decision guidelines.

This, I think, is important to military officers and defense

officials for two main reasons. First, they must advise the

decisionmakers in the executive branch and in the Congress, and

ultimately they must be persuasive to the American people, whose

support is mandatory if we are to succeed in what we aim to do.
32

And second, they must anticipate decisions that have yet to

be made. They must build forces and they must develop operational

capabilities to deal with the international environment, and to

deal with it in ways that attempt to foresee what our

decisionmakers are going to ask them to do. And that, as I'm sure

all of us know from experience, is no small chore. Yet when the

future arrives, that's what military officers and defense

planners are going to be expected to do.

So let's take a bit of time and talk first about the

perspective that I mentioned to you, American national interests

in the international arena that have military implications. The

source of those interests is a primary question, and the source

to me can be really identified by asking the question, "Where is

American well-being now at risk in the international arena; where

is it likely to be at risk in the future?"

Some of our interests have no military implications, but

many--and, I would argue, the most important--do have military

implications. It's very important in my mind for all of us--

military officers, defense officials, military defense analysts,

the public at large, and the Congress--to have a good

understanding of what those interests are.

One of my colleagues and friends, Bob Ellsworth--former NATO

ambassador, former Deputy Secretary of Defense-- and I talked

about this a little over a year ago. We joined with Rita Hauser,

who is very experienced, very capable in this whole field of

public policy, and we established a self-constructed commission

on America's national interests. We enlisted the help of Graham

Allison and others--Dmitri Simes, numerous others--to assist us

in defining America's national interests. We found that the

interests fall into several well-recognized categories.

In order of their military implications, I would first speak

of security interests, that is, the security of the United States

and its allies, support for a condition of international peace

and security.

Beyond that, we have economic interests, especially where

our whole economic system could be severely, or even fatally,

damaged--for example, if an attempt were made to block our access

to Middle East oil, on which our country is dependent and the

countries of Europe and Japan are utterly dependent.

We also have humanitarian interests, where there is genocide

and ethnic cleansing. The military implications there are less

sure, less certain, as we saw in the prolonged uncertainty, the

prolonged dithering as to what our policy and our actions would

be in Bosnia.
33

In addition, we have environmental interests--oil spills,

for example, or the Chernobyl-type disasters--actual or

potential. And then we have instrumental interests that come from

these, or interests of a secondary character, political interests

in maintaining friendly relations with other countries. These, I

think, have to be differentiated carefully, where these political

interests support our other interests, our primary interests of

security or economic well-being or humanitarian policies, or

environmental conditions that would affect the United States.

Our instrumental interests include the maintenance of the

strength and the vitality of NATO, which serves to enable us to

safeguard or to pursue or to advance our security interests in

particular but humanitarian interests as well. And there may be

others.

Because of this large number and long list of interests, it

is immediately clear that setting priorities becomes imperative.

My contribution to that study on America's national interests was

to suggest something that has seemed useful to me over the years,

which was to divide these interests into the "blue chips," the

"red chips," and the "white chips."

The blue chips pertain to that short list of things that

deserve the title "vital"--those that have a bearing on and

importance to the survival of the United States and the values

that the United States represents. Let's put those in the bluechip category. Those blue chips, whatever their military

implications are, we do well to regard as absolutes.

When it comes to the red chips, things that are important

and are useful but do not go so far as to be vital, those are

going to require trade-offs. Those are going to require the kind

of assessment, "Is the game worth the candle? Will our people

continue to support the operation over a long period of time when

the costs begin to accumulate?"

I'm reminded in this regard of a rule that I ran into a long

time ago: to govern is to choose. We in the military should know

that very well. If you try to be strong everywhere, you'll be

strong nowhere; that's the principle of concentration. That's

also the principle of being very clear as to what your goal is,

and the discriminator to me is a pair of questions: "What has

enough impact on America and American well-being for our country

to support the use of our military forces?" And the second

question is: "Where can we have the needed impact on the

situation at costs that Americans are prepared to bear?"

I would suggest that it's best to consider these questions

early, because they are going to have to be considered either

early or late, and if we engage ourselves without having
34

confronted these questions, without having asked them, we are

liable to get ourselves into commitments that will not be

sustained. For those of you who shared with me our experience in

Vietnam, you'll know just what I'm talking about, I think.

When I served with President Eisenhower, one of his

fundamental rules was that when we approached a situation that

might involve combat, he called down the bipartisan leadership

from the Senate and the House of the United States Congress. He

would lay out the problem.

Then he would have Allen Dulles give an intelligence

briefing. Next, he would have Foster Dulles give a briefing on

the political considerations and political implications involved.

And then he would ask either the Secretary of Defense, or more

likely the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to lay out the

military implications. And then he would say, "When I put all of

this together, it seems to me that the best interest of our

country lies in taking the following action." And he said, "I

need to know whether you will stand with me in doing that."

At that moment, I can tell you that tension would begin to

rise in the room. And very often it was Senator Russell who then

said, "Well, Mr. President, we understand this, but of course

it's your decision, you are the President." And the President

said, "I know that and I'm quite prepared to make that decision,

but I need to know whether you're going to stand with me, because

that's important to my knowing whether I'm going to have the

support of the American people."

Well, this was quite a little minuet that they went through.

They went through it a number of times, and Eisenhower never

departed from stressing that necessity. And about the third

occasion when this occurred, I saw a very interesting thing. At

the point when Eisenhower said, "I need to know whether you're

going to stand with me," they all looked for the door. They all

were looking for a way to get out, but he would tell them, and

oftentimes he referred back to this, "I saw what happened with

President Truman, and that's not going to happen to me." The

result was that in every case, before that door opened and they

got out of the room, they had to declare themselves.

Now the reason I go back to this little anecdote is that I

think that's a fundamental rule. When the time came to think

about taking military action in Kuwait, I myself made a very

strong recommendation to the people in the White House. In fact,

I went over and talked with them and, I would say, overcame their

reluctance with this little anecdote, their reluctance to put

this issue to the Congress. I commend that principle to you. We

did the same thing, and many of you know that when the issue came

up of going into Bosnia, there were those of us--senior retired
35

military people--who joined together in sending a letter up

saying we needed a clear-cut decision from the Congress, a clearcut commitment to support the commitment. And I'm told that

Senator McCain, with that letter in hand, made his talk in the

Senate stressing the essentiality of getting that determination

from our Congress.

So I suggest that we think in terms of these blue chips

where there is use or threatened use of force against the United

States or its allies, our people, our territory, and our peaceful

conduct of our own affairs, and only then the red chips and the

white chips--our United Nations peace-keeping, most economic

issues, the humanitarian issues, the environmental issues, the

political relations.

I recall from my time many years ago in graduate school, one

of my professors who always spoke with a certain pungency said

that part of wisdom is to subordinate lesser interests to greater

ones. That seemed very wise to me, and over the years I've added

to it; even before that comes the need to determine which are

which, and make the hard choice to give priority of effort to the

greater interests in our security policies and our foreign policy

and security actions abroad.

But let me go on then and talk about the framework of

security policies and decision guidelines that have military

implications. I would offer the proposition that deterrence is

now the preferred policy path for us to follow--that we should

seek victory in achieving or safeguarding our interests without

the costs and losses of actual combat if those can be avoided.

That's part of the wisdom of Sun Tzu, if I remember

correctly, who said 2500 years ago or so that that's the wisest

course--to attain your ends without actual combat. That holds

good today, though it has to be thought through again in this new

circumstance where we find ourselves.

The Cold War focus is gone, and we have to reshape ourselves

to new needs. The requirement is still an effort to prevent

foreign actions and activities that we deem harmful, if possible

without bloodshed. But the first rule of deterrence, to my mind,

is that it has to be based on will and capability. If it is

thought that either the will to act is lacking or the capability

to act is lacking, if the crunch comes, deterrence will lack

effectiveness.

So we then have to consider what kind of military capability

is needed for deterrence. And there I would say it's useful to

think of two types of deterrence. One, you deter by having a

visible capability to punish through the devastating application

of force. But I would say that something additional is needed,
36

and that's deterrence through the visible capability to deny

success and to impose heavy costs and losses.

I recall that Churchill, speaking of the outward thrust of

the Soviet Union during his talk in Fulton, Missouri--the famous

Iron Curtain talk--said, "They seek the fruits of war without the

costs of war." When I served in NATO, I turned that around and

said, "It seems to me that we have to present to them a certainty

that they will bear heavy costs of war should they attack, and a

great uncertainty as to whether they can achieve results that

would be worth that."

I was asked one time if we could give assurance of the

ability to hold through conventional means alone. This was in

testimony here before the American Congress. And I said,

No, I don't think we can give that assurance. If they

come against us with their full force, take the losses

we could impose, which they could take, and sustain the

attack, then we have to expect--not a certainty, but we

have to expect--in a short period of days we would be

confronted with a necessity to add, to augment our

operations with nuclear weapons used at least

selectively, or face the possibility of complete

rupture of our defensive position and capability.

Well, General, doesn't that mean the Holocaust?

It may, it may. They have to think about that as well

as we. But it may not, because at that point they may

ask themselves, "What is there west of the Iron Curtain

for which we are willing to see Russia destroyed?"

I have to tell you the sequel to that. For some reason, that

was made public, and I added a comment in which I said, "If the

Russian political leaders don't ask themselves that question:

"What is there worth Russian destruction?--the Russian military

leaders I think will." The Russians picked this up, printed it in

Red Star (their publication for their armed forces), called me a

provocateur by suggesting there could be a difference between the

political and the military echelons, and circulated it to all of

their military.

I could not have paid them to do this. They really did my

work for me. I've asked myself in the years since, "Why in the

world did they do that?" But perhaps, just perhaps, it was a move

on their part to reintroduce, to my mind, a little restraint, a

little common sense about getting themselves into something that

could cause the destruction of their Russian motherland, which

is what really means the most to them.
37

But I talked about the capability to punish and the

capability to deny success and impose heavy losses. That takes

manifest will and capability. It means, in my opinion--and you'll

have to evaluate this, but I give you my view--it means American

presence in some key forward areas. We provided that in Europe

when we put our four additional divisions there in 1951 and 1952

when NATO was formed. That told the Soviets that they would have

to attempt to run over American forces if they were going to

attack in Western Europe. And I'll tell you I'm convinced that

was a very sobering and useful thought for them to entertain.

Another thing we can do is to show manifest will and

capability--movements of forces, a show of force--when a clash of

interests occurs, to demonstrate our intent. The next thing we

have to have is a credible and viable strategy, at policy level

and at military level.

Let me take just a moment on what I mean by "at policy level

and at military level." I've often heard that we had no military

strategy in Vietnam. I would challenge that. I was deputy

commander there with Abrams. He and I talked about that, and we

had a very clear notion of what we were aiming to do. It involved

North Vietnamese main force units, it involved local units, it

involved the communist infra-structure. It involved all the

different types of terrain that we had. It involved all of our

forces of different kinds on our side: land, air, and naval

forces. All of that had to be put together, and we had a very

clear conception of what we were undertaking to do.

I have to say that if you went a level higher to find out at

the policy level in our government what it was we were aiming to

do, you got a lot of different answers. I have to tell you I

didn't have all that much confidence in any of them. It was

nailing somebody's hide to the wall. Now what the hell does that

mean? I don't think it was ever clear, even to the speaker, just

what that meant.

But we should be clear as to what our strategy is, and we,

speaking at the military level, should insist that our political

leaders develop and pursue what I mean by a credible top-level

strategy. And it's not all that difficult. In my mind, it is

three things: what to do, how to do it, and what to do it with.

If you haven't thought that through, you haven't got a strategy;

you're muddling around. And muddling around with military units

in combat is a recipe for disaster.

If, indeed, deterrence is our aim, then I think there are

two stages of decision that we should be aware of. One is the

decisions that are needed in peacetime to create, maintain and

prepare plans for employment of forces in being that can be put

to use.
38

The second stage of decision comes when the contingency

occurs, and that's to employ the forces that are available. And

what does that tell us? It tells us that the forces available

should have maximum flexibility, because no one can foresee in

full, specific detail exactly how a crisis will arise or where it

will arise and how it will need to be dealt with.

So that feeds back to peacetime. When I talked about the

decisions of peacetime, about creating, maintaining, preparing

plans for the force, we have to take into account in peacetime

the provision of maximum flexibility when the crisis comes.

Let me say just a word about the study of the deterrence

environment. That's a study that should be kept current.

Regarding the major powers of the world, we live in a time when

there is limited need for a deterrent. There is no apparent cause

of conflict among the major powers of the world or between any

two of them, setting aside, for the moment, the strains over

Taiwan and mainland China.

The main need for a deterrent, this limited need, is to

maintain a stable nuclear relationship. I happen to believe that

that can be done and that it will be in our interest to do it, by

carrying out step-by-step reductions of nuclear dangers and

nuclear arsenals to the lowest verifiable level that's consistent

with stable security and that the condition of world relations

permits. Supported by that limited deterrent, we can then direct

our efforts to building positive security relationships,

especially with Russia and China.

The greater deterrence challenge is in dealing with the

numerous and diverse contingencies that are created and likely to

be created by lesser nations. I'm speaking here of the rogues

such as Saddam Hussein. No one can be sure what the future of

North Korea will be. We can work to try to keep them within the

framework of good sense, but we don't know whether that will

work.

We want to shape a stable and secure world order, and we are

faced with a multitude of problems, disorder, conflicts, unstable

governments, ethnic savagery, nuclear proliferation, use or

threatened use of chemical and biological weapons, statesponsored terrorism.

There is a long list, and they have to be thought about and

prepared for because they can jeopardize important interests that

will require a response on our part. The reason is that those

interests involve such things as our safety from attack, our

access to raw materials--especially oil, as I mentioned--our free

use of the seas for our commerce, and our humanitarian
39

commitments and obligations. It's important for us to be able to

deal with all of these as far as possible upstream. If you have

to deal with them early or deal with them late, it's better to

deal with them early. That's more challenging in terms of getting

congressional and public understanding and support, but it is

much more in our interest to do that, and that's a challenge for

our political leaders.

Now, let me just say a word--as I think we can--about the

military implications of these interests and deterrence policies

and decision and action guidelines. What do they tell us? They

tell us that we need a force in being capable of rapid

augmentation. It tells us that we need adequate capabilities for

the tasks anticipated--adequate in terms of size and composition,

adequate in terms of deliverable combat power, adequate in terms

of operational effectiveness, training, flexibility, and

sustainability.

We need, as I suggested, forward presence in certain key

areas. We need sea control if we're to have the assurance that

our other capabilities can be provided if called upon. It means

the ability to carry out swift action, to "be there fustest with

the mostest." You can't do better than Nathan Bedford Forrest,

and that should be a central element in our planning.

It tells us we need advanced technology, especially for air

attack. We need stealth, the ability to suppress casualties and

combat losses. We can't avoid them entirely, but by preparation,

you can carry out that suppression and thereby hold them to a

minimum. We need primary reliance on conventional arms.

The nuclear weapons will be an existential back-up and hedge

for a long time to come, at least 10 years or more. We could

reduce our nuclear weapons at the rate of about 2,000 a year, the

rate at which we built them. It'll take us 10 years to get down

to what I would regard as the lowest verifiable level, say, at

100-200 weapons. We may not get there, and it will have to be

done step by step. We'll have to know at every step that we've

done it prudently.

We need, as I suggested, the ability to punish with

overwhelming destructive combat power. We need the ability to

identify and destroy key target complexes; that applies in

particular to the chemical and biological. I don't question that

our nuclear capability will add an existential make-weight to

whatever we can do conventionally, but I regard the arguments

that we should rely on our nuclear capability as a cop-out, a

means of attempting to avoid the development of conventional

forces that can take on that job. And we need the ability to

seize, to destroy facilities, and to control key areas.
40

When you put all that together, I think you see in that the

tasks for our air forces, our naval forces, our Marines, and our

Army forces that are essential if we are to have the kind of

deterrent capability that I have described. In addition, we know

that we are going to be called on for peacekeeping and peace

enforcement activities and operations. This will take military

power. Powerful forces, command and control, intelligence,

logistic support; all of that needs to be carefully planned in

relation to the tasks that our forces may be asked to perform.

With regard to these activities, peacekeeping and peace

enforcement, the key question is not whether military forces can

do that job. The answer is, they can. But more important is the

need for clear mission statements, the need for clear command

channels, the need for clear higher direction and decisions. In

many cases, that's not primarily the responsibility of military

people, but military people have the responsibility to give

advice, indeed, to give insistence that those decisions be made.

Along with this, of course, is the need to avoid overcommitment

on tasks of limited importance to American security. We can't

fritter away our assets, which retain the fundamental

responsibility of meeting threats, dangers to American well-being

that go to the blue-chip level in terms of American security.

I was asked to conclude the conference, and I don't know a

better way of concluding it than by saying that when we put all

this together it is a daunting challenge that will require our

best effort in thinking it through, then referring back to

General Marshall, who reminded us so often, "Man is made for

action." It's not just thinking it through, it's acting on what

we have thought through.

I hope the conference has been of value in clarifying

thinking and clarifying the actions needed, and I commend all of

those whose initiative brought about this conference. Thank you

very much for the opportunity to meet with you.
41

CONCLUSION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This symposium brought together men and women, soldiers,

airmen, marines, and civilians from government, industry,

academia, and the media to speak and, more importantly, to

listen. Every speaker, even those who were clearly the specified

advocates for their respective services, emphasized both the need

for the current QDR and the absolute conclusion that defending

the United States is and will remain a joint endeavor. The honest

and forthright exchange of ideas, concepts, and opinions

furthered the process and, quite possibly, pushed the Department

of Defense closer to a successful QDR.

The planning and coordination for the symposium represented

a major undertaking on the part of the Association of the U.S.

Army. When the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) suggested that

the AUSA take the lead in putting together a symposium which

would endeavor to surface as many issues as possible facing all

the services, General Jack N. Merritt, (U.S. Army, Retired) and

Lieutenant General Richard L. West (U.S. Army, Retired) and

Colonel James D. Blundell (U.S. Army, Retired) immediately saw

the need and turned vision into reality. Mr. Gayden E. Thompson

of The Atlantic Council and Dr. Robert Wood of the U.S. Naval War

College also recognized the value of such a meeting and

coordinated participation by their respective organizations.

It was the hard work, however, of a few key individuals that

made this symposium successful. At AUSA, Colonel Jim Blundell

organized the team that brought the symposium together. Mr.

George Ehling, Mrs. Lori Johnston, Ms. Paula Brock, and Mrs.

Sandra Daugherty did the detailed work that was needed to make

the symposium run smoothly. Finally, Colonel Rod Paschall, (U.S.

Army, Retired) served as the symposium rapporteur. Without his

diligent pen, this SSI Special Report would not have been

possible.

The QDR is an event of extreme importance for the Department

of Defense, the individual services, and for the American people.

What is at stake is the future capability of the nation's

military. Now is the time to face the truth, to speak the truth,

and to put aside parochial interest so that the interests of us

all, the preservation and extension of freedom, may endure into

the coming millennium.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler