J-S41040-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ERIC A. CHAMBERS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 720 MDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 27, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-22-CR-0000392-2012

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 09, 2023

Appellant, Eric A. Chambers, appeals pro se from the January 27, 2022 

order dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm. 

A prior panel of this Court summarized the relevant facts of this case as 

follows:

On September 9, 2011, Jalil Walters (“Jalil”) and his 

two brothers, Ibrahiim Muhammad (“Ibrahiim”) and 

Lewin Chism, Jr. (“Lewin”), were drinking at their 

grandmother’s house with family members and their 

friend, Mike Burgress (“Mike”). Lewin was admittedly 

intoxicated, having consumed three beers and several 

shots of liquor. Jalil had also consumed several shots 

and a beer. The group decided to continue drinking 

at the Jazzland Bar, located on Walnut Street in 

Harrisburg.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Upon arrival, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Lewin 

began to feel anxious and uncomfortable; he told his 

brothers that he wanted to leave as he thought other 

people in the bar were thugs and gangsters. Lewin 

left the bar, which prompted Jalil, Ibrahiim, and Mike 

to follow in an effort to calm him down.

Appellant and Demond Bates, who was security at the 

bar, followed them outside. Appellant approached 

Lewin and asked him what he had been saying about 

the clientele in the bar. Appellant then took a gun out 

of his pants and pointed it in Lewin’s face. The 

brothers asked Bates to interject, which he refused to 

do. Appellant then secreted the gun on his person and 

went back inside the bar.

A short time later, appellant exited the bar again, and 

this time he was “even more aggressive.” Appellant 

stated he was going to kill one of them. Appellant, 

who was “irate and angry,” pointed the gun at 

Ibrahiim’s chest. The brothers claimed appellant 

pulled the trigger and at that split second, Jalil jumped 

in front of the gun taking the bullet that was fired. All 

of the brothers identified appellant as the shooter in a 

photographic lineup and in the courtroom. All of the 

brothers also stated that the gun used was a revolver. 

After Jalil was shot, the group flagged down a police 

vehicle, which then called for an ambulance. Jalil was 

hospitalized for six to eight days and underwent two 

surgeries. The bullet had traveled through his left 

elbow, which it shattered, and his abdomen. The 

bullet is to remain in his abdomen indefinitely, as the 

doctors were afraid his internal organs might rupture 

if they removed it.

Mike, however, claimed that the shooting occurred 

right after the group exited the bar, and that the 

bouncer was most likely the shooter. Mike was 

standing approximately five feet from the shooter who 

he described as heavy set with hair on his head and a 

beard, not a goatee. Mike testified he was “unsure” if 

any of the individuals present at trial was the shooter, 

including appellant, who was bald with a goatee; he 
J-S41040-22

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averred he did not see the shooter in the courtroom. 

Lewin, Ibrahiim, Jalil, and Mike were also unable to 

give consistent descriptions of the shooter or what he 

was wearing. Demond Bates, who worked as a 

bouncer on the night in question, was familiar with 

appellant but did not see him in the area at any point.

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 113 A.3d 359 (Pa.Super. 2014) (unpublished 

memorandum at *1) (citations to notes of testimony and footnote omitted), 

appeal denied, 116 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2015). 

The relevant procedural history of this case was summarized by a prior 

panel of this Court as follows:

On May 16, 2013, a jury found Appellant guilty of 

attempted murder, aggravated assault, persons not to 

possess a firearm, firearms not to be carried without 

a license, simple assault, and recklessly endangering 

another person. On July 17, 2013, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 25 to 50 

years of incarceration and assessed a $ 4,000.26 fine. 

Appellant filed a timely appeal.

On November 25, 2014, this Court affirmed 

Appellant’s convictions, but vacated the portion of the 

judgment of sentence in which the trial court assessed 

the $ 4,000.26 fine. On June 2, 2015, the Supreme 

Court of Pennsylvania denied Appellant’s petition for 

allowance of appeal.

On July 24, 2015, Appellant filed the underlying pro 

se PCRA petition, his first. On April 22, 2016, the 

PCRA court appointed counsel. On March 20, 2017, 

Appellant, although represented by counsel, filed a 

pro se “motion to withdraw counsel,” in which he 

sought the removal of PCRA Counsel because 

Appellant and PCRA Counsel had “yet to come to a 

mutual understanding of what [Appellant]’s 

arguments/claims to be raised are[,]” and requested 

to proceed with PCRA proceedings representing 

himself. Motion to Withdraw Counsel, 3/20/17, ¶ 3. 
J-S41040-22

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In response, on April 17, 2017, PCRA Counsel filed a 

petition for leave to withdraw as counsel in which he 

likewise sought removal from Appellant’s case based 

on Appellant’s withdrawal motion and “fundamental 

issues [that] have made representation unreasonably 

difficult.” Petition for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel, 

4/17/17, ¶ 4. On October 20, 2017, the court granted 

PCRA Counsel’s petition to withdraw. There is no 

indication in the record that the court held a 

Grazier[

1] hearing. 

On July 19, 2018, the PCRA court held a hearing on 

Appellant’s PCRA petition during which Appellant 

represented himself. On September 20, 2018, the 

PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition.

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 216 A.3d 380 (Pa.Super. 2019) (unpublished 

memorandum at *1) (some citations omitted; footnote added).

On April 12, 2019, a panel of this court vacated the PCRA court’s 

September 20, 2018 order denying Appellant’s first PCRA petition and 

remanded this matter for a Grazier hearing. See id. Following a Grazier

hearing, the PCRA court determined that Appellant did not knowingly and 

voluntarily waive his right to counsel and appointed Kaitlyn Clarkson, Esq. 

(“Attorney Clarkson”) to represent him.

On April 24, 2020, [Attorney Clarkson] filed a 

Supplemental Petition for PCRA relief. In this 

Supplemental Petition, Attorney Clarkson only 

identified one issue of merit, namely the calculation of 

[Appellant’s] credit for time served. As to the 

remaining issues, Attorney Clarkson sent [Appellant] 

a letter certifying that they lacked merit in accordance 

with the requirements of [Commonwealth v. 

Turner], 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and 

____________________________________________

1 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
J-S41040-22

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[Commonwealth v. Finley], 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. 

1988) (en banc). This Turner/Finley letter was 

attached to the April 24, 2020 Supplemental Petition.

Thereafter, on May 21, 2020, [Appellant] filed a 

Motion to Proceed pro se and be permitted to file a 

Supplemental PCRA. We scheduled another Grazier

Hearing for July 9, 2020. Following that hearing, we 

permitted Attorney Clarkson to withdraw as counsel 

and [Appellant] to proceed pro se. [Appellant] was 

given sixty (60) days to file a Supplemental Petition 

for PCRA Relief. Following several requests for 

extensions, [Appellant] filed his Amended PCRA 

Petition on March 1, 2021. Also following several 

requests for extensions, the Commonwealth filed its 

response on September 30, 2021. 

PCRA court opinion, 12/20/21 at 3 (citation formatting corrected).

On December 20, 2021, the PCRA court provided Appellant with notice 

of its intention to dismiss his petition without a hearing, pursuant to 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). The PCRA court also filed an opinion that same day 

addressing each of Appellant’s claims. Appellant did not respond to the PCRA 

court’s Rule 907 notice. Thereafter, on January 27, 2022, the PCRA court 

entered an order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition and all the amendments 

thereto. This appeal followed.

2

Appellant raises the following 11 issues for our review:

1. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible 

error, where it abused its discretion and showed 

judicial bias in its memorandum opinion denying 

____________________________________________

2 The record reflects that Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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Appellant’s PCRA petition, absent a written 

finding of facts and conclusion of law?

2. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible 

error and abused its discretion, in conducting an 

evidentiary hearing for 3 claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel (IAC), without trial 

counsel’s presence (to explain his 

actions/inactions)?

3. Whether PCRA court committed reversible error 

in finding no merit and denying Appellant’s

claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing 

to motion for the suppression of Jalil Walters’

identification, which was obtained from

Detective Ryan Neal’s suggestive and tainted 

identification process?

4. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible 

error, in violating Appellant’s due process 

protections of the Fourteenth amendment to the 

United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 

9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, when the 

PCRA court denied that all post-conviction 

counsel were ineffective, for failing to fulfill their 

duties, to review the entire record, for issues of 

merit?

5. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible 

error and upheld the violation of Appellant’s due 

process rights, in the prosecution, conviction, 

and sentence for Ibrahiim Muhammad, that 

shocked one’s sense of justice, when 

Muhammad was never a complainant, victim, 

nor the subject of Appellant’s trial?

6. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible 

error, in denying Appellant relief when all 

counsel were ineffective for failing to raise the 

due process, procedural and constitutional 

violations, for Ibrahiim Muhammad being

named as a victim or complainant of any 

offenses, after trial ended, during jury 

instructions?
J-S41040-22

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7. Whether the PCRA court was in error, in failing 

to find trial counsel ineffective, when trial 

counsel failed to have ballistic testing done on 

the available exculpatory and tangible evidence 

of the bullet fragments and clothing (for GSR), 

that was removed from victim Walters, that 

would have proven his client’s innocence, and in 

turn, prove that all post-conviction counsel were 

ineffective for failing to raise (IAC) of trial 

counsel?

8. Whether the PCRA court erred, abused its 

discretion, and lowered the Commonwealth’s 

burden of proof, in failing to find all prior counsel 

ineffective, for failing to raise the erroneous jury 

instruction for attempted murder, that omitted 

the element of malice?

9. Whether the PCRA court’s upholding of the 

illegal maximum sentence of 40 years[’] 

incarceration at count 1, was in error and in 

conflict with the sentencing code, when the trial 

court assessed Walters’ injury at count 2, to 

Muhammad’s non- injury at count 1?

10. Whether the PCRA court’s upholding of the 

illegal sentence of 9-18 years[’] incarceration at 

count 2; 18 [Pa.C.S.A. §] 2702(a)(4), was in 

error, exceeded the statutory maximum and 

conflicts with the sentencing code for a seconddegree felony?

11. Whether the trial court accepted the jury’s 

erroneous guilty verdicts of guilty, on the 

firearm offenses (counts 3 and 6) when the 

Commonwealth failed to prove all of the 

essential elements of the uniform firearms act, 

and whether the [PCRA] court erred, abused its 

discretion, and committed reversible error in 

denying that all prior counsel were ineffective 

for failing to raise the omittance of the missing 

essential elements of the Commonwealth's 

prosecution of their client?
J-S41040-22

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Appellant’s brief at 5-7.

3

Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition 

is limited to the examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is 

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “This Court grants 

great deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those 

findings merely because the record could support a contrary holding.” 

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 143 A.3d 394, 397 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation 

omitted). In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a defendant must plead and 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence 

arose from one or more of the errors listed at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). 

These issues must be neither previously litigated nor waived. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9543(a)(3). 

Preliminarily, we observe that a number of Appellant’s claims involve 

allegations of trial court error that could have been raised on direct appeal. 

To the extent Appellant failed to do so, we conclude that Appellant has waived 

these claims under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b) (stating, “an issue 

is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, 

____________________________________________

3 For the ease of discussion, we have elected to address Appellant’s claims in 

a different order than presented in his appellate brief.
J-S41040-22

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at trial, ... on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.”); see also 

Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 296 (Pa. 2017).

Additionally, to the extent Appellant challenges to the trial court’s jury 

instructions and the sufficiency and weight of the evidence – issues 5, 8 and 

11 – we note that these claims have been previously litigated on direct appeal 

and found to be without merit by this Court. See Commonwealth v. 

Chambers, 113 A.3d 359 (Pa.Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum at 

*3-6), appeal denied, 116 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2015). Accordingly, these claims 

are not cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3) (stating, 

“[t]o be eligible for relief under this subchapter, the petitioner must plead and 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence ... [t]hat the allegation of error has 

not been previously litigated[.]”). A specific issue has been previously 

litigated if “it has been raised and decided in a proceeding collaterally 

attacking the conviction or sentence.” Id. at § 9544(a)(3).

Appellant next argues that the PCRA court demonstrated judicial bias in 

its December 20, 2021 opinion by “relying solely on the Commonwealth’s and 

[Attorney] Clarkson’s perspectives [and] failing to prove any specific facts to 

reach its conclusion[.]” Appellant’s brief at 15-16 (issue 1). This claim is 

baseless.

Our Supreme Court has stated the following with respect to a claim of 

judicial bias:

Under our PCRA statute, relief may be due where a 

conviction or sentence results from “a violation of the 
J-S41040-22

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Constitution of this Commonwealth or the Constitution 

or laws of the United States which, in the 

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined 

the truth-determining process that no reliable 

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken 

place.” 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2)(i). The 

Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state 

“shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 

without due process of law.” U.S. Const. XIV, Sec. 1. 

Due process concerns extend to the actions of the 

judiciary; accordingly, litigants are guaranteed an 

absence of actual bias on the part of any judge 

adjudicating their case. The concept of bias 

encompasses matters in which an adjudicator has a 

direct, personal, substantial, [or] pecuniary interest in 

the outcome of the matter. While a fair trial is indeed 

a basic requirement of due process, most matters 

relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a 

constitutional level. In order to determine whether a 

judge harbors an unconstitutional level of bias, the 

inquiry is an objective one wherein the requisite 

question is whether the average judge ... is likely to 

be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional 

potential for bias. The Supreme Court has determined 

that there is an impermissible risk of actual bias when 

a judge has had significant, personal involvement ... 

in a critical decision regarding [the litigant’s] case. 

Commonwealth v. Fears, 250 A.3d 1180, 1193-1194 (Pa. 2021) (internal 

quotation marks and case citation omitted; some brackets in original), cert. 

denied, ___ A.3d ___, 142 S. Ct. 1235 (2022).

Here, even a cursory review of Judge Andrew Dowling’s December 20. 

2021 written opinion reveals that it did not contain any bias, and certainly 

none that reached the levels of constitutional interference. Accordingly, 

Appellant’s claim to the contrary is entirely unfounded.
J-S41040-22

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Appellant’s remaining claims allege the ineffectiveness of both his trial 

and PCRA counsel. See Appellant’s brief at 19-31, 37-53 (issues 3-4 and 6-

8).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the PCRA, 

a petitioner must establish the following three factors: “first[,] the underlying 

claim has arguable merit; second, that counsel had no reasonable basis for 

his action or inaction; and third, that Appellant was prejudiced.” 

Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1020 (Pa.Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 523 (Pa. 2014). 

[A] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he 

proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his 

conviction or sentence resulted from the [i]neffective 

assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of 

the particular case, so undermined the 

truth-determining process that no reliable 

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken 

place. 

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotation 

marks omitted; some brackets in original), citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9543(a)(2)(ii).

“[C]ounsel is presumed to be effective and the burden of demonstrating 

ineffectiveness rests on appellant.” Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 

1238, 1242 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 30 A.3d 487 

(Pa. 2011). 

Our Supreme Court has set forth the proper framework for alleging a 

layered ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the context of the PCRA:
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Succinctly stated, a petitioner must plead in his PCRA 

petition that his prior counsel, whose alleged 

ineffectiveness is at issue, was ineffective for failing 

to raise the claim that the counsel who preceded him 

was ineffective in taking or omitting some action. In 

addition, a petitioner must present argument, in briefs 

or other court memoranda, on the three prongs of the 

[ineffectiveness] test as to each relevant layer of 

representation. . . . [T]his means that the arguable 

merit prong of the [ineffectiveness] test as to the 

claim that appellate counsel was ineffective in not 

raising trial counsel’s ineffectiveness consists of the 

application of the three-prong [ineffectiveness] test to 

the underlying claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. 

If any one of the prongs as to trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness is not established, then necessarily the 

claim of appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness fails. Only 

if all three prongs as to the claim of trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness are established, do prongs 2 and 3 of 

the [ineffectiveness] test as to the claim of appellate 

counsel’s ineffectiveness have relevance, requiring a 

determination as to whether appellate counsel had a 

reasonable basis for his course of conduct in failing to 

raise a meritorious claim of trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness (prong 2) and whether petitioner was 

prejudiced by appellate counsel’s course of conduct in 

not raising the meritorious claim of trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness (prong 3).

Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 470, 482 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).

Instantly, our review of Appellant’s oft-disjointed, 70-page pro se brief 

indicates that he has failed to properly raise his layered ineffectiveness claims 

by applying the three-prong ineffectiveness test to each level of 

representation. A determination that trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance is a prerequisite to finding that any subsequent counsel was himself 

ineffective, and no such findings were demonstrated in this case. See 

Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa.Super. 2010). 
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Accordingly, we could find Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims waived on this 

basis alone. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 161 A.3d 960, 969 (Pa.Super. 

2017), appeal denied, 176 A.3d 850 (Pa. 2017).

In reaching this decision, we note that Appellant’s status as a pro se

litigant does not absolve him from responsibility for compliance with the rules.

Although this Court is willing to liberally construe 

materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status 

confers no special benefit upon the appellant. To the 

contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in 

a legal proceeding must . . . assume that his lack of 

expertise and legal training will be his undoing.

Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 498 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation 

omitted).

In any event, even if we were to reach the merits of Appellant’s claims, 

we would find they warrant no relief, and adopt the December 20, 2021

opinion of the PCRA court as our own, which in turn relies, in part, on the 

analysis set forth in Attorney Clarkson’s well-reasoned Turner/Finley letter 

attached to Appellant’s April 24, 2020 supplemental PCRA petition.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the January 27, 2022 order of the 

PCRA court dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition. 

Order affirmed.
J-S41040-22

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/09/2023
COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

V. 

ERIC CHAMBERS, 

Defendant 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, 

DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL - PCRA 

: NO. 392-CR-2012 

Pa.R.A.P. 192S(a) OPINION 

J1 

AND NOW, this 3 f day of _ _,,/2 __ ~_,,_Y ___ , 2022, in accordance 

with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure I 925(a)( 1 ), this Court finds the issues 

raised by Appellant, Eric Chambers, in rus Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal 

of our December 20, 2021 and January 27, 2022 Orders are adequately addressed in the 

Memorandwn Opinion filed on December 20, 2021 , and no additional opinion will be fil ed. 

Distribution: ~/,/Jr iY f :30,.,,,., 

The Hon. Andrew H. Dowling -J)) 

Dauphin County District Attorney's Office -::CO 

BY THE COURT: 

-~ -And,£ie:1 

Smart Communications/PADOC, Eric Chambers/#LC6450, SCI at Houtzdale, P.O. Box 

33028, St. Petersburg, FL 33733 M~, 

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Circulated 12/21/2022 11:10 AM
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, 

DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

V. 

ERIC CHAMBERS, 

Defendant 

CRIMINAL - PCRA 

NO. 392-CR-2012 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Presently pending before this Court is Defendant/Petitioner's pro se Amended 

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The background of this case is as follows: On September 9, 

2011, Lewin Chism, Ibrahim Muhammad, Jalil Walters and Mike Burgess were drinking alcohol 

at their grandmother's residence. They then went to the Jazzland Bar in Harrisburg to continue to 

drink alcohol. At ,some point, Mr. Chism left the bar and Mr. Muhammad, Mr. Walters and Mr. 

Burgess followed him out of the bar. At that time, Petitioner, Eric Chambers, also exited the bar 

and, following a verbal altercation, pointed a firearm at Mr. Chism. Petitioner then put the firearm 

away and re-entered the Jazzland bar. 

As the four men were walking away from the bar, Petitioner came out of the bar a 

second time and pointed a firearm at Mr. Muhammad. Petitioner pulled the trigger to the firearm, 

and Mr. Walters jumped in front of Mr. Muhammad and was struck by a bullet. 

Following a trial, on May 16, 2013, Petitioner was found guilty of Criminal Attempt 

Homicide, Aggravated Assault, Persons Not to Possess a Firearm, Carrying a Firearm Without a 

License, Simple Assault by Physical Menace, and Recklessly Endangering Another Person. On 

July 17, 2013, Petitioner was sentenced as follows: 

1. Count 1 - Criminal Attempt Homicide - 20-40 years at a State Correctional Institution 

2. Count 2 - Aggravated Assault - 9-18 years at a State Correctional Institution 

1 

L/ L,-1 
3. Count3-PersonNotto Possess Firearm-5-10 years at a State Correctional Institution, 

concurrent with Count 1 

4. Count 4 - Carrying a Firearm Without a License - 3-6 years at a State Correctional 

Institution, consecutive with Count 1 , ,, .. 

5. Count 5 - Simple Assault by Physical Menace - 1-2 years at a State Correctional 

Institution, concurrent with Count 1 

6. Count 6 - Recklessly Endangering Another Person - 1-2 years at a State Correctional 

Institution, concurrent with Count 1. , 

Petitioner filed a pro se PCRA on July 24, 2015, and we a)Jpointed Damian 

' 

DeStefano, Esquii'e to represent him, Petitioner was unhappy with Attorney DeStefano's 

representation, and Attorney Destefano ultimately filed a Petition to Withdraw as Counsel, 

averring that fundamental disagreements had arisen between Petitioner and Attorney DeStefano 

regarding the issues that Petitioner wanted to raise and the merits of those issues. We granted 

Attorney DeStefano's Petition to Withdraw by Order dated October 20, 2017 and granted 

Defendant thirty days to file a supplemental PCRA that raises all issues that he would like the 

Court to consider. '.The Commonwealth 'was then graiited forty-five days to file a response. . ~--

Pet/tioner ultimately fil!rf a supplemental PCRA, and the Commonwealth filed a 

response to same.' Upon review of Petitioner's 'PCRA and the Commonwealth's response, we 

determined that Petitioner only raised three issues that had arguable merit, and dismissed 

Petitioner's remaiJing issues for the reasons set forth in the Commonwealth's response. We held 

1 

a Hearing on July 19, 2018 that was limited to those three issues, all of which claimed ineffective 

assistance of counsel. We later entered an Order on September 20, 2018, wherein we denied the 

supplemental PCRA. 

Petitioner appealed our September 20, 2018 Order to the Superior Court. The 

Superior Court ultimately vacated our September 20, 2018 Order and remanded the case back to 

•. 1 .., 

this Court for a he/rring pursuant to Com. v. Grazier, 1713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). We held a Grazier 

I 

., . ~- ' 

2 
Hearing and, upon a determination that Petitioner did not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 

waive his right to PCRA counsel, we appointed the McShane Law Firm to represent Petitioner. 

On April 24, 2020, Kaitlyn Clarkson, Esquire from the McShane Law Firm filed a 

Supplemental Petition for PCRA relief. In this Supplemental Petition, Attorney Clarkson only 

identified one iss~e of merit, namely the calculation of Petitioner's credit for time served. As to 

' ' ,:\·, 

the remaining issues, Attorney Clarkson sent Petitioner a letter certifying that they lacked merit in 

' accordance with the requirements ofCo'm. v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Com. v. Finley. 

550 A.2d 213 (Pa.1988) (en bane). This Turner/Finley letter was attached to the April 24, 2020 

Supplemental Petition. 

Thereafter, on May 21, 2020, Petitioner filed a Motion to Proceed pro se and be 

permitted to file a Supplemental PCRA. We scheduled another Grazier Hearing for July 9, 2020. 

Following that He~ring, we permitted Attorney Clarkson to withdraw as counsel and Petitioner to 

proceed pro se. Petitioner was given sixty (60) days to file a Supplemental Petition for PCRA 

Relief. Following several requests for extensions, Petitioner filed his Amended PCRA Petition on 

March 1, 2021. Also following several request~ f9r extensions, the Commonwealth filed its 

'.' i 

response on September 30, 2021. 

\ ,, 

In his Supplemental PCRA, Petitioner has made several claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must 

overcome the prJsumption that counsel is effective by establishing the following: (1) the 

underlying legal claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action 

or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice because of counsel's ineffectiveness. 

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 158-59, 527 A.2d 973, 975-76 (1987). "A petitioner 

establishes prejudice when he demonstrates 'that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

3 ' '"' :') 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."' Com. v. 

Johnson, 600 Pa. 329, 345-46, 966 A.2d 523, 532-33 (2009) (internal citations omitted). 

Petitioner's first claim is that Trial Counsel was ineffective in failing to object, 

' 

failing to file a motion to suppress and failing to raise issues concerning Jalil Walters' 

identification. Petitioner claims that this identification was a result of a suggestive identification 

process. We find that this claim has no arguable merit for the reasons set forth in the 

Commonwealth's response as well as Attorney Clarkson's Turner/Finley letter. As such, we 

hereby incorporate as if fully set forth herein pages 2-4 of the Commonwealth's response and 

pages 19-22 of Attorney Clarkson's Turner/Finley let,ter . 

. Petitioner's second claim is that all prior counsel were constitutionally ineffective 

. , . ./' ' ~ 

when they failed t,o object at trial and failed to properly raise and argue on appeal that the trial 

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to ·prosecute and sentence Petitioner for the attempted 

murder of lbrahirii Muhammad. We find that this issue does not have arguable merit for the 

reasons set forth on page 4 of the Commonwealth's response and pages 10-12 of Attorney 

Clarkson's Turner/Finley letter, and we incorporate them both herein. 

In his third claim, Petitioner asserts that his all of his prior counsel were ineffective 

when they failed to have the existing available, tangible evidence of the bullet fragments 

ballistically tested and scrutinized by a forensic technician to determine the caliber of the firearm 

used. Petitioner claims that this would have established his innocence but does not provide any 

support for this cl1im. This issue also has no arguable merit as Petitioner has not provided any 

. 1 

support for his claim that the caliber of the weapon used could have been determined from the 

bullet fragments. We further iricorporate as if fully set forth herein pages 4-5 of the 

Commonwealth's fesponse and pages 7-8 of Attorney Clarkson's Turner/Finley letter. 

4 
Petitioner's fourth claim is that all prior counsel were ineffective when they ignored 

tangible, available and admissible evidence of Jalil Walters' clothing. Petitioner alleges, without 

i ,J-;, 

support, that this would have established his innocence. Again, this claim does not have arguable 

merit as Petitioner provides no support for ~hat he assumes would have been found on the clothing 

! 

or how this would have affected his trial. His argument consists of pure speculation, which is 

insufficient to stat\l a meritorious claim for post-conviction relief. We also incorporate as if fully 

set forth herein page 5 of the Commonwealth's response and page 9 of Attorney Clarkson's 

Turner/Finley letter. 

In his fifth claim, Petitioner asserts that all prior counsel were ineffective in failing 

to object to the jury instruction on the attempted murder oflbrahirn Muhammad. Petitioner claims 

that this instruction was illegal and unconstitutional for several reasons. However, this issue was 

previously litigate.cl and found by the Pe~sylv~ia;Superior Court to be rneritless. Petitioner ! :n \ .,. cannot obtain post~conviction relief based. on previously litigated claims. See Corn. v. Santiago, .,., 

. ,: ·' \ 

579 Pa. 46, 73, 85_5 A.2d 682, 698 (20.04) ("Appellant cannot attempt to resurrect this claim 'by 

! 

alleging ineffectiJe assistance of prior counsel ~d presenting new theories of relief to support 

previously litigate~ claims."') ( citations omitted). 

' 

Petitioner's sixth claim is that all prior counsel were ineffective when they failed to 

assert that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for attempted murder. This 

claim was also previously litigated on direct appeal and thus cannot now be a basis for postconviction relief. 

The seventh claim is that Petitioner's sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, and 

all prior counsel were ineffective for failing· tci ~ddress this issue during sentencing or post- ,. 

conviction proceedings. We find that .this issue is rneritless for the reasons stated in the 

'· 

,· 

5 

. 

,. 
'.~ 

Commonwealth's response and Attorney Clarkson's Turner/Finley letter. To that end, we hereby 

incorporate as if fully set forth herein pages 6-7 of the Commonwealth's response and pages 25-

28 of Attorney Clarkson's Turner/Finley letter. 

Petitioner's eighth and final allegation is that he received an illegal sentence on the 

charge of Aggravated Assault. This issue is also meritless for the reasons set forth in pages 7-8 of 

the Commonwealth's response and pages 28-29 of Attorney Clarkson's Turner/Finley letter, and 

we hereby incorporate those pages herein .. ,. 

' 

For the foregoing reasons, we enter the following Order: 

6 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

V. 

ERIC CHAMBERS, 

Defendant 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, 

DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL - PCRA 

: NO. 392-CR-2012 

O

,RDER ~o~ I 

AND NOW, this _2__ day of lfe c- e ..,. b ~/ , upon consideration of 

Petitioner Eric Chambers' PCRA Petition and the Commonwealth's response thereto, for 

the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED that 

the Court intends to dismiss the Petition without an evidentiary hearing. 

The Petitioner is hereby given notice of this Court's intent to dismiss 

his PCRA Petition and has twenty (20) days from the date of this Order to file a 

Response to this Notice of Intent to Dismiss 

BY THE COURT: 

Andrew H. Dowling, J. c 

Distribution: I 'A-1-.D -'J-.I @II: 5 3 AM 

The Hon. Andrew H. Dowling JD 

Mari L. Hamb}ight, Deputy District Attorney .ID 

Smart Communications/PADOC, Eric Chambers/#LC6450, SCI at Houtzdale, P.O. Box 

33028, St. Petersburg, FL 33733 yY) CUJ...