U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

72–522 DTP WASHINGTON : 2001

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NAZI WAR CRIMES

DISCLOSURE ACT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,

INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 27, 2000

Serial No. 106–227

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250

Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

DOUG OSE, California

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin

HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

DAVID A. KASS, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian

LISA SMITH ARAFUNE, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY

STEPHEN HORN, California, Chairman

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

DOUG OSE, California

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin

JIM TURNER, Texas

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

J. RUSSELL GEORGE, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

HEATHER BAILEY, Professional Staff Member

BRYAN SISK, Clerk

TREY HENDERSON, Minority Professional Staff Member

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C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on June 27, 2000 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Kurtz, Dr. Michael J., Assistant Archivist of the United States, National

Archives and Records Administration; Elizabeth Holtzman, esq.; Thomas Baer, and Richard Ben-Veniste, members of the Interagency Working Group; Kenneth Levit, special counsel, Office of the Executive Director, Central Intelligence Agency; John Collingwood, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional and Public Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Colonel Lewis Thompson, Commander of the 902d

Military Intelligence Group, Intelligence and Security Command, U.S.

Army .............................................................................................................. 7

Lantos, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of California .............................................................................................................. 59

Maloney, Hon. Carolyn B., a Representative in Congress from the State

of New York ................................................................................................... 48

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Baer, Thomas, member, Interagency Working Group, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 25

Collingwood, John, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional and Public

Affairs, Federal Bureau of Investigation, prepared statement of ............. 35

Holtzman, Elizabeth, esq., prepared statement of ......................................... 21

Horn, Hon. Stephen, a Representative in Congress from the State of

California:

Information concerning derogatory information ..................................... 91

Letter dated February 8, 2000 ................................................................. 70

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 3

Kurtz, Dr. Michael J., Assistant Archivist of the United States, National

Archives and Records Administration, prepared statement of ................. 9

Lantos, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, prepared statement of ...................................................................... 61

Levit, Kenneth, special counsel, Office of the Executive Director, Central

Intelligence Agency, prepared statement of ................................................ 30

Maloney, Hon. Carolyn B., a Representative in Congress from the State

of New York, prepared statement of ........................................................... 49

Thompson, Colonel Lewis, Commander of the 902d Military Intelligence

Group, Intelligence and Security Command, U.S. Army, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 45

Turner, Hon. Jim, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 5

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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NAZI WAR

CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

TUESDAY, JUNE 27, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,

INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room

2154 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen Horn (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Horn, Biggert, Turner, Maloney, and

Owens.

Staff present: J. Russell George, staff director and chief counsel;

Heather Bailey, professional staff member; Bonnie Heald, director

of communications; Bryan Sisk, clerk; Will Ackerly, Chris Dollar,

and Meg Kinnard, interns; Trey Henderson, minority counsel; and

Jean Gosa, minority clerk.

Mr. HORN. A quorum being present, this hearing of the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology will come to order.

The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998 was enacted to ensure that documents held by the U.S. Government that pertain to

the Holocaust would be declassified and made available to the public.

In October 1999, the National Archives and Records Administration and the Interagency Working Group released an interim report

to Congress on the declassification of these Second World War documents. According to the report, more than 300,000 pages of documents were to have been declassified by the fall of 1999. But at the

time, less than half of that amount had been declassified.

Since then, most agencies have picked up the pace to declassify

documents of this era. Yesterday, the Interagency Working Group

announced 400,000 pages of newly declassified documents were released today, mostly from the Office of Strategic Services, a forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency.

By the time this declassification process is completed, roughly 5

to 8 million pages documenting this horrific period in history will

be available for public scrutiny.

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I would especially like to welcome representative Tom Lantos,

my colleague from California, who authored the Nazi War Crimes

Disclosure Act. I welcome all of our witnesses today, and look forward to their testimony.

And I welcome Mrs. Maloney.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Stephen Horn follows:]

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Mr. HORN. So we have the group before us that has really done

a wonderful job in pressing all of the various points of the executive branch to make sure that this complete bipartisan proposal

was made several years ago in both the Senate and the House, and

we are glad to have with us today the ones as we have entitled

this, the government compliance on the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. We look forward to you witnesses, who have devoted a

tremendous amount of your time, and we will give you a little

background.

I think you have all been here before. Since we are an investigative committee, we do swear in all witnesses. When we have called

upon you in accord with the agenda, the full text of your written

remarks goes automatically into the record. We don’t want you to

read your written remarks. We don’t have the time for it.

Take about 5 to 8 minutes for each person. What we want is a

dialog after all of that to see where the loose ends are and what

can be done by you and what can be done by the Congress, if we

need to do it.

For example, Japanese war crimes and other situations like that,

do we need to amend the law? Can we do it under this authority?

I have a lot of lawyers in front of me with no fees to send to me,

so we would welcome your views, gentlemen.

So stand if you will, and I am going to swear you in and then

Mr. Turner will make an opening statement.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. HORN. The clerk will note that all witnesses have said yes,

and I now yield to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Turner, for an

opening statement.

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I will just file my opening statement

for the record.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Jim Turner follows:]

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Mr. HORN. Mrs. Maloney or Mrs. Biggert.

We will go directly to our guests and again we are delighted with

all of you and your hard work.

We will start with Dr. Michael J Kurtz, Assistant Archivist of

the United States for the National Archives and Records Administration.

STATEMENTS OF DR. MICHAEL J. KURTZ, ASSISTANT ARCHIVIST OF THE UNITED STATES, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND

RECORDS ADMINISTRATION; ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN, ESQ.,

THOMAS BAER, AND RICHARD BEN-VENISTE, MEMBERS OF

THE INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP; KENNETH LEVIT, SPECIAL COUNSEL, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; JOHN COLLINGWOOD,

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AND

PUBLIC AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION;

AND COLONEL LEWIS THOMPSON, COMMANDER OF THE

902d MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, INTELLIGENCE AND

SECURITY COMMAND, U.S. ARMY

Mr. KURTZ. Thank you. I am appearing here in my capacity as

Chair of the Interagency Working Group for implementing the Nazi

War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998. On behalf of the IWG, I would

like to thank you for holding this hearing and for your ongoing

leadership on this matter. And certainly I want to note the contribution of Congresswoman Maloney in sponsoring the original

legislation and the interest of Congressman Lantos and Senator

DeWine.

I would like to briefly introduce the panel members. President

Clinton appointed three public members to serve on the Interagency Working Group, and we have all three members—former

Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman, who has been involved with

these issues for a considerable period of time; Mr. Thomas Baer,

former Assistant U.S. Attorney and businessman who joins us from

Los Angeles, CA; Mr. Richard Ben-Veniste, well known for his service to Congress and the government in a variety of capacities.

Next to Mr. Ben-Veniste we have Kenneth Levit, who represents

the Central Intelligence Agency, and John Collingwood from the

FBI and Colonel Thompson, Commander of the 902nd Military Intelligence Group which has jurisdiction over some of the most important Army records.

I think everyone is well aware of the bill and what we are

charged to do, and I would like to report what we have achieved

since our October interim report and mention several challenges

that lie ahead of us.

The agencies have screened, originally, approximately 600 million pages as potentially relevant to the act, records that might

contain war crimes information. That has been refined to approximately 90 million pages, and so the search for relevant documents

continues as well as the declassification effort. To date, we have declassified 1.5 million pages for release. And we estimate, by the end

of the project, we should have 5 to 8 million pages completed after

the relevant searches have been completed and the declassification

actions.

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The agencies that we have here on the panel are the ones that

have the bulk of the documentation that remains to be reviewed,

and this—the way we organized our work, the Interagency Working Group first focused on what we called phase one, which is Germany and the European Theater of Operations; and we are beginning to focus on phase two, which relates to Japan and the Far

Eastern situation. So we will be dealing with the totality of war

crimes activities, worldwide, as part of World War II and its aftermath.

There is an extensive amount of work to do. We have a statutory

deadline of January 2002, to complete our work, and it is a very

daunting task. There is a great deal, obviously, from the brief summary that I have given of how much remains to be done. In addition, we need to begin the work with the Japanese records.

I should also note, as far as resources go, we have not received

a direct appropriation to support this effort. But through the support from the Office of Special Investigations of the Department of

Justice and from the National Archives and from the Archivist, we

have received financial support that has enabled us to set up a

very important infrastructure. By that I mean, we have two historians who serve as consultants to the IWG.

The validity of that approach was proven yesterday with the release of documentation and their ability to put it into context and

not just have a disgorging of a mass of undigested documentation.

We also have an audit team working for the IWG that works

with the agencies to review their declassification actions, to raise

any issues to our attention and facilitate an early resolution.

I would also note that as we are going through our work we have

ascertained that a great deal of the documentation is in very poor

physical condition requiring some extensive preservation action

which I would be glad to discuss later. There is also a need for continued staff and enhanced staff support for the IWG to get through

the remaining work related to Germany as well as dealing in the

Far Eastern arena. So I would like to just conclude my comments

and permit time for others to speak.

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kurtz follows:]

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Mr. HORN. We will now call on Elizabeth Holtzman, former

Member of Congress and a member of the Interagency Working

Group. Welcome.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to appear before you. Again I want to join the Chair of the IWG in acknowledging your leadership and that of Representative Carolyn

Maloney, without whose help we would not be here today.

I will skip most of my prepared remarks to focus on what the

challenges are in the future. The first issue, in my opinion, has to

do with finishing the job of declassification. I think it is important

to note that despite serious and intensive efforts being made by all

of the agencies, only a fraction of the job of declassification has

been completed. I believe this committee needs to ascertain how

the agencies expect to finish their task within the 3 years of IWG’s

existence.

Remember, the process of declassification thus far has been on

a page-by-page, line-by-line method and that going through millions of pages, page by page, line by line is extremely time-consuming. I need to point out, too, that even though it has taken us this

long to get this far and we are nowhere near complete, we have not

yet touched the issue of the Japanese war crimes and that is another huge area. I would ask the committee to consider whether

this can all be accomplished within the legislative framework, and

what the committee can do to help us speed up this process. And

this is not to diminish from the intensive effort that the agencies

are making at that point.

The second issue has to do with the completeness of our search.

As the members of this committee probably know, there is no

magic button that you can push that states Nazi war criminals and

you get all of the files. In fact, most of the files are organized by

name and so you need to know the name of the Nazi war criminal.

You have to know the answer before you even ask the question.

Part of this problem has been addressed by Eli Rosenbaum and

the Office of Special Investigations, which has compiled a list of

some 57,000 former SS officers. That list has been enhanced by the

U.N. War Crimes Commission list and supplemented by several

hundred other names.

But I think it is fair to say, Mr. Chairman and members of this

committee, that those names are just a fraction of the universe of

war criminals. If we just look for those names, we will never find

the totality of Nazi war criminals, and it is hard to say what percentage we will have found. I believe we have to develop new strategies to become more inclusive.

One strategy I suggest is to consider as relevant all files under

programs that we know employed numbers of Nazi war criminals,

such as Operation Rollback, and there may be a variety of others.

If we have to operate only on the basis of knowing the answer before we ask the question, we will never be able to get the answers

that we need.

The third issue is a familiar one to Members of Congress, but I

also read the front pages of the paper today, so it should not be

quite as difficult as it has been in the past, and that has to do with

resources.

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You will be very pleased to note that we have been extremely economical. We have operated on the thinnest, narrowest shoestring

we have ever seen. We don’t have a full-time staff director; we

don’t have a staff. We have been functioning, thanks to Michael

Kurtz and the National Archives, with borrowed resources; and we

have done, I think, an amazing job. But we can’t do it anymore on

this shoestring because, as probably you have seen in the Washington Post today—it was a very important story, indicating the significance of some of the materials that have just recently been declassified—we have to hire two historians to accomplish that result;

and they themselves will not be able to go through 8 million pages

of documents and begin to tell the American people what the significance of the materials is.

Dr. Kurtz pointed to the necessity of preservation of materials.

We have worked with a number of committees, on both the Senate

and the House side, on a bipartisan basis because this is a bipartisan matter, to get some funding to permit us to do our job properly;

and I would hope that this committee would assist us in that effort.

I believe we have asked for $5 million, and I would hope that we

can get your support in that effort.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

Mr. HORN. Thank you. Those are very good challenges and we

need to get a thorough airing of them before we close up the session this morning.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Holtzman follows:]

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Mr. HORN. Mr. Baer, you are a member of the Interagency Working Group?

Mr. BAER. Yes, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to address you and

to comment on our work. I also want to take this opportunity to

thank Michael Kurtz and staff and the other members of the IWG

represented here today. All have made a sincere commitment to

fulfill our mandate. The agency heads and their representatives

have made a concerted effort to declassify documents 60 years on,

but much remains to be done.

Because the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, under which they

are operating, imports the exceptions to declassification contained

in the Defense Act of 1947, such as sources and methods, the agencies have taken the position that a page-by-page review, which Ms.

Holtzman just referred to, is indicated as opposed to bulk declassification.

I strongly believe that bulk declassification is permissible under

the statute, but I have not been successful in persuading the agencies. Without engaging in any extended analysis, which I will be

glad to do, the gist of my argument is that the statute says that

the agency heads may invoke the exceptions, not that they must

do so.

When one measures the time and expense attendant upon pageby-page review against the possible danger to the security of the

United States arising from bulk declassification of World War II

and cold war documents, it would appear that the benefits of bulk

declassification outweigh the detriments of revelation of source and

method secrets of the 1940’s and 1950’s. I believe that this analysis

would justify agency head discretion to bulk declassifying for most

agencies and most collections.

The agencies differ. They say that revelation of sources and

methods of the 1940’s and 1950’s imperils their operations today.

Learned Hand wrote, ‘‘The spirit of liberty is the spirit that is not

too sure it is right.’’ Similarly, I confess that I am not too sure that

I am right. On the merits of what we have released and what we

will release in the future, it will be for historians to judge its significance—an opportunity, Mr. Chairman, that this overdue and

wise legislation finally affords them.

I will be glad to answer any questions later on. Thank you.

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Baer follows:]

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Mr. HORN. We now go to Mr. Ben-Veniste, member of the Interagency Working Group.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to report the substantial progress that is reflected in Dr. Kurtz’s statement and the substantial materials which are appended to his formal statement by way of a report to this committee.

Yesterday’s release of 400,000 pages of OSS documents and the

media coverage that it received, including today’s front page story

in the Washington Post, reflects the importance of the new material which was released. In particular, the information related to

the intercepted and decoded messages from the Nazi high command, relating to the Nazi’s murderous plan for the Jews of Italy

in the fall of 1943, will continue to stimulate the debate about

whether something could have been done to provide assistance to

the Jews of Italy. After all, the Italian people were unwilling, despite the Axis Alliance to carry out Hitler’s plan for the murder of

the Jewish population of Europe. And yet when these materials

were made available and decoded and available in real time, nothing was done to provide warning to the Jews of Italy, and that is

reflected in the documents that were released yesterday. And that

is a reflection of the strength of our democracy in being able to

shed light on these materials.

After all, they would not have been made available but for the

fact that the British foreign intelligence services, together with the

CIA and the efforts of Director Tenet and Mr. Levit here at my left

in persuading the British intelligence services to release this material was responsible for its being made available yesterday. It could

not have been made available but for these efforts.

The material released also touches on other areas of vital interest to supplement the historical record. For example, the Allied

treatment of Nazi war criminals during the postwar period is very

much reflected in some of the materials we received yesterday, and

we expect a great deal more information to be released on that subject. Similarly, business relationships, including insurance contracts and what happened with those, are also reflected in these

materials.

We are hopeful that the attention received from the disclosures

will stimulate World War cooperation from governments who still

maintain the stamp of secrecy on documents of important historical

value. Our country owes you and others on this committee, Mrs.

Maloney and others, and in the Senate as well as President Clinton, a debt of gratitude for putting our country in the forefront of

openness and strength in carrying forth the objectives of this important legislation. This is, as it should be, in our democracy.

I would like, on a personal note, to express my deep appreciation

for the work of Dr. Kurtz and his staff at the National Archives.

They have worked unfailingly to make the objectives of this legislation a reality; and of course there is much, much more work to be

done and more to come. Our panel of experts are also owed a debt

of gratitude.

This was a proposal that sort of came about, I think, stimulated

by the public members reflecting on the fact that we did not have

the historical basis within our own resources to analyze this material, to separate the wheat from the chaff and the new from the

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old. And it is our fervent hope that with the supplemental appropriation, we will be able to provide much more in the way of resources to analyzing this information and to explaining it, as was

done yesterday with respect to only 400,000 pages of material, only

a portion of which our historical panel had the opportunity to actually review, simply by reason of resources and no other reason— certainly not from lack of interest.

I would also like to thank the CIA and the FBI and Director

Tenet and Director Freeh, as well as the Department of the Army,

for their commitment to carry out this—the objectives of this legislation, again without any direct appropriation to do so.

The funds that have been requested I think will be very well

spent for the purposes of providing additional resources in historical analysis, in preserving the documents, many of which are deteriorating, many of which were on paper that was used during

World War II, where maybe these kinds of materials was not of the

best quality. In fact, they used inferior quality paper, which is in

the process of deteriorating.

Finally, I think these resources, additional resources, will provide

us the opportunity to hold an international symposium where we

can explain the efforts that our government has made, the challenges which we have faced and—to stimulate discussion and,

hopefully, emulation from other democracies throughout the world

to do what we have attempted to do and are beginning to do with

our own records.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. We thank you for that excellent presentation.

We now have Kenneth Levit, Special Counsel, Office of the Executive Director to the CIA.

Mr. LEVIT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here

today to report to you about the progress of the Central Intelligence Agency with regard to the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act.

I can report to you that the declassification effort pursuant to this

act is among the largest records declassification effort in our history. CIA is committed to a thorough search for all documents that

may have anything to do with Nazi war crimes, so they can be

identified and declassified in an expeditious manner.

As you alluded to in your statement, Mr. Chairman, yesterday

CIA and the National Archives released to the public over 400,000

pages of previously withheld records relating to the Office of Strategic Services, that deal with World War II and the European Theater. Much of this material deals directly on the issue of war

crimes, and approximately 6,100 pages of that collection were released exclusively as a result of CIA’s program to implement the

act and reflect our commitment to work with foreign governments

who passed us intelligence, in secret, related to war crimes.

The vast majority of the 6,100 pages contain information from

original foreign government reports or from foreign government

sources, usually British or French, and consist primarily of POW

interrogation reports, refugee and emigre debriefings, OSS missions into France and Norway, Operation Safe Haven, the interagency program to identify and block the transfer of German assets, as well as British intercepts of German messages between

Rome and Berlin.

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I should say that these releases came as a result of the direct efforts and hard work by Director Tenet to reach out to his foreign

colleagues that run the services, the intelligence services, of these

countries so that these documents could be released. Director Tenet

has taken a personal interest in ensuring that these records can be

opened and as much can be made known as possible with regard

to these war crimes and their history.

The debriefing reports of refugees and emigres, many of whom

narrowly escaped persecution or death at the hands of the Nazis,

add significant detail to the historical record and to our understanding of the period of time. CIA has redacted very little information from the OSS records, and in fact we have not held—and

particularly with regard to the 6,100 pages of foreign government

records, a single page that we have identified as relevant. And the

very few redactions consist of names and other identifications of

British sources and the names of CIA employees.

I think this speaks well of the way that the legislation was crafted and, more importantly, the spirit of the legislation, which CIA

and the Intelligence Community on behalf of the work of Director

Tenet is seeking to implement in its full spirit.

In addition to the first tranche of 6,100 pages, we expect to release an additional 3,096 pages of OSS material in the coming

weeks, that we feel is directly relevant to the issue of war crimes.

I would also like to report to you, Mr. Chairman, that our efforts

will not stop at the OSS; rather, our search for relevant documents

will also address the records of the CIA, including the operational

files that are otherwise exempt from the 25-year declassification

program, as well as the Freedom of Information Act. There is no

blanket exemption. Relevant documents will be identified and,

where possible, declassified to the fullest extent.

A couple of months ago the Interagency Working Group came to

closure on the approach CIA would use to declassify many of its

most sensitive files, and the public can expect significant releases

of CIA material by the end of summer.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I will only reiterate the commitment

of Director Tenet and of the CIA in this effort. We hope that we

will do all that we can in order to allow as much relevant material

as possible to be fully released. These documents provide powerful

testimony to our generation and to those of the future. By learning

from them, we may hope to be better equipped to fulfill our common commitment, the commitment to ‘‘never again.’’

Mr. HORN. Thank you. That was a very thorough statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Levit follows:]

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Mr. HORN. We now have Mr. John Collingwood, Assistant Director, Office of Congressional and Public Affairs, FBI.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The most important thing that I can communicate to the committee today is that we in the FBI collectively share the enthusiasm

that your committee has for this project. Recognizing that the FBI

is primarily a domestic agency with mostly domestic records, already we have physically reviewed approximately 1.9 million pages

and have identified and are processing for release 166,000 pages

relevant under the act.

As Congresswoman Holtzman described, the challenge for the

FBI, as for all agencies, is to locate relevant records within our central record system, a system of records that has been in existence

since 1921. Arguably, when we finish, we will have screened approximately 6 billion pages of records. The vast majority, as you

would expect, however, will not be relevant. They will pertain to

traditional FBI-type activities—bank robberies, organized crime,

cybercrime and terrorism—and these are, as Congresswoman

Holtzman described, normally retrievable through indices searches.

To ensure that we comply with the act, and comply not only with

the letter of the act but with the spirit of the act, we have worked

with the group, the IWG, and Archives to develop what we describe

as a three-pronged approach to resolving this dilemma.

The first is through the traditional indices search mechanism.

We have conducted approximately 60,000 name searches against

both our automated indices and our manual indices. We have, as

well, identified—working with Archives, identified nine file series

that the FBI maintains that most likely would contain relevant

documents. The file series—and the FBI maintains its records in

file series, such as all bank robberies are put together and all terrorism cases are put together—is ongoing; and we have identified

nine separate series that are most likely to contain relevant materials. We have finished the review of six of those series, and the

remainder are in process.

In addition, we are—as we go through these records, we are identifying and conducting additional research on our own. We are

searching out records that pertain to names of individuals and organizations and operations that we find in the records that are produced. The results, to date, hopefully reflect our enthusiasm for

this project.

Of the 1.9 million actual pages that I identified, 166,000 have

been deemed relevant; 149,000 came through indices searches, and

another 11,000 came through the file by file searches that are ongoing, and additional research has identified an additional 27,000

pages. We are processing those pages as resources permit and

accessioning them to Archives as quickly as we can; and consistent

with the other agencies’ approach to this, the redactions are minimal, and often instances of redactions are limited to the simple

number of the source or the like. The primary redactions from the

FBI are those instances of information received from foreign governments, and we expect that information ultimately to be disclosed.

In conclusion, I think we are clearly committed to releasing the

maximum volume of records, whether previously classified or not.

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The FBI for a long time didn’t mark documents for classification

because we maintain all of our documents as if they were classified. We have spent approximately $2 million on this effort. We

have 31 people working full time, and we are absolutely committed

to finishing on schedule and know of no reason that we will not.

From a personal standpoint, I would like to mention that it was

not until this project that I personally had an appreciation for what

Archives does for this country. Dr. Kurtz and all of his staff and

everybody at the National Archives make a contribution to preserving the history of this country that I never before realized the magnitude and I suspect that the American people do not realize the

importance of. They are really the unsung heroes when it comes to

this type of thing.

Finally, I am not sure, as the legislation was drafted, who had

the idea of adding public members to the IWG, but it was indeed

a brilliant idea. Anyone who suspects in any way, shape or form

that any of the government agencies that are involved in this effort

are going to be less than fully forthcoming with their documents

need only discuss that with our three public members, who provide

us the closest possible oversight.

Thank you.

Mr. HORN. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Collingwood follows:]

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Mr. HORN. Colonel Lewis Thompson is Commander of the 902d

Military Intelligence Group of the Intelligence and Security Command of the U.S. Army. I was fascinated by your piece here, because I was in the 458th Strategic Intelligence Unit, and we had

a whole bunch of German-speaking colonels. You could have used

them and put them to work.

Colonel THOMPSON. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to represent the Army and

provide testimony on this important subject.

I am Colonel Lewis Thompson, the Commander of the 902d Military Intelligence Group, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. My group conducts the Army’s strategic counterintelligence

mission. My group also contains the Army’s investigative records

repository.

With me today are two substantive experts, Lieutenant Colonel

Jasey Briley, the Commander of the 310th Military Intelligence

Battalion that houses the Investigative Records Repository; and

Mr. Andy Swicegood, from the battalion operations section.

The Investigative Records Repository is the Army’s repository for

some intelligence and all counterintelligence related investigative

files. It contains over 1.9 million pages of paper and microfilm files,

some of which date back to World War II. These aging files and

film have been deteriorating for many years. Recognizing their historical value, the Army initiated efforts in 1992 to digitize all of the

holdings in the repository.

In 1995, the President signed Executive Order 12958 requiring

the review for declassification determination of all classified holdings 25 years of age or older, to be completed not later than April

21, 2000.

In October 1998, the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act was signed

requiring us to review all repository holdings, declassify to the

maximum extent possible related files and provide those files to the

National Archives and Records Administration.

The digitization of the files in our repository that began in 1992

is not directly related to the Executive order or public law, but facilitates our compliance with both. In order to comply with the

Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, we must review over 1.9 million

files, subsequently releasing what we currently estimate to be

15,000 files pertinent to the act. Without the digitization initiative,

we estimate the process would take more than 181 man-years to

complete. With digitization, we estimate we will be able to complete the task in about 7 months.

In order to facilitate this effort, the Secretary of the Army has

made $1.3 million available to the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command for the conversion of the reels of microfilm to optical disk. I currently have over 100 military and civilian employees

dedicated to this effort, working three shifts around the clock 6

days a week, with the 7th day allocated to systems maintenance

and backup. We are working toward a completion date of October

1, 2000.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this testimony today.

I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.

Mr. HORN. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Thompson follows:]

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Mr. HORN. Right now we are going to turn to two of our Members who are very devoted to this issue. We mentioned earlier Mrs.

Maloney, she will be one of them, and the Honorable Tom Lantos,

who has a great perspective of the whole historical situation.

I believe Mrs. Maloney has some comments and then Mr. Lantos.

STATEMENT OF HON. CAROLYN B. MALONEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mrs. MALONEY. First of all, I would like to congratulate all of the

members of the panel and the members of the public group that I

made sure were part of the legislation—Tom Baer, Richard BenVeniste and my good friend, Liz Holtzman, who has a long history

of accomplishment on this issue.

I must say that this was one of the first bills that I introduced

in 1992, and it was a long, hard effort to get it passed into law;

and I congratulate my dear friend and colleague, Chairman Horn,

for his consistent support. We had many, many hearings, probably

more than he would like, but he was always there with hearings,

with oversight, and in support of the legislation; and of course Senator DeWine, who carried it in the Senate.

Congressman Lantos is an incredibly important Member of Congress on many fronts. He also brings a deep understanding, as the

only Holocaust survivor to be elected to Congress, and he is certainly a moral mentor to me and to all of our colleagues.

I would like to put my comments in the record, but I would like

to respond with a few questions to the people who are here today;

and you are just in time, because the supplemental budget may be

on the floor this week, and as you said, we need to get our $5 million, or extra, resources in.

I am glad it was enacted into law, but I am very concerned about

certain foreign nations that are not cooperating with us in the release of documents. It is very, very important, and it is incredibly

important that we complete the work, including Japan—a complete

analysis of what happened in Japan. And many of the people here

have said that you expect that you will be able to complete the

work by October 2001, and I believe that would include the Japanese aspect also.

All I can say is that it is incredibly important. These documents

will increase all our understanding of what happened, when it was

known, what efforts were there to protect Nazi war criminals after

the war, why those efforts were there; and I have a series of questions, and then I hope my colleagues on this panel will join me in

working to make sure that the moneys are part of the supplemental that come up today.

But I think you’ve started an important journey, but we must

complete it with all of the aspects, including Japan.

I yield back the balance of my time.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney follows:]

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Mr. HORN. Now with the next witness, both a member and a colleague, we are delighted to have Mr. Lantos here, the gentleman

from California, who probably knows more on this subject than the

rest of us put together.

STATEMENT OF HON. TOM LANTOS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to associate myself with the laudatory comments of my friend, Congresswoman

Maloney, with respect to the group before us and the ones who may

not be here.

Mr. Chairman, I have a comprehensive statement I would like to

place in the record.

Mr. HORN. We will put it in the record as read.

Mr. LANTOS. First, I want to thank you for your unwavering support and strong and deep personal commitment to bring to justice

Nazi war criminals through the full declassification of documents

in possession of the National Archives. I also want to thank my

good friend, Jim Turner, the ranking member, for his invaluable

work. And I would be derelict in my responsibilities if I did not pay

tribute to the former ranking member, Dennis Kucinich, for his

strong commitment to declassification issues in the pursuit of Nazi

war criminals and human rights offenders around the world.

I want to single out Congresswoman Maloney, who introduced

this legislation and shepherded it through, and who has a passionate and deep personal commitment to bring justice and closure to

this issue and all other issues; and I publicly want to thank her

for this.

I also want to recognize the contribution of my friend, Senator

Mike DeWine.

Mr. Chairman, the goal of the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act

is to declassify and make public any remaining documents in U.S.

possession concerning Nazi crimes, criminals, and looted property.

At the same time, this right to know must be balanced against legitimate reasons to continue to withhold certain documents. Since

we are dealing with documents that are half a century old, clearly

the bias should be in favor of declassification.

President Clinton created the IWG. It is composed of a group of

most distinguished individuals, and they have done an outstanding

job in fulfilling this mandate. Some million and a half pages have

been released, 400,000 pages were released just yesterday with

some startling consequences. These documents are now available to

the public, to scholars at the National Archives.

I regret, Mr. Chairman, that we in Congress have failed to provide the funds needed for the work of declassification, but fortunately, the National Archives and the Office of Special Investigations provided some funding to assist in the project. We in Congress should do more to fund this important task.

I would like to say a word about the Japanese issue, Mr. Chairman. While the original legislation does include language that permits declassification of records relating to war crimes created

under the Imperial Japanese Government, there are some areas

where additional legislation is necessary. I am currently completing

draft legislation which my staff has discussed with officials of the

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National Archives. My written statement includes considerable detail on this legislation; I expect to introduce it within the next few

days. Among the most important provisions of my legislation will

be to extend the life of declassification for 1 more year.

A great deal has been accomplished, but much remains to be

done and this additional year is essential for the work to be completed.

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I hope the subcommittee will consider my legislation expeditiously.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Tom Lantos follows:]

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Mr. HORN. As you know, the subcommittee has always moved

very rapidly on most of these things.

I want to go back to some fundamentals here so we get it out

on the table. One of the ways of getting at this is file by file and

name. Another is bulk. I would just like to go down the line and

say—and get from each of you, since you are all experts, what is

the problem there and what can we do to resolve it?

Mr. KURTZ. My agency colleagues, I am sure, can amplify, Mr.

Chairman, but from my perspective, I think there are three problems.

First, sources and methods: I think that is a particular issue for

both the CIA records, for the Army’s records, and I think also, to

some extent, for the FBI records; and all of them also share—perhaps the CIA to the greatest extent—foreign government issues. It

is very significant that Director Tenet and Ken Levit have worked

so assiduously on the foreign government issue, because much of

what was released yesterday, that had a rather startling impact,

would not be possible without their cooperation.

But I am concerned over the time limits. Even if we get an additional year, we still have all of the Japanese issues to deal with,

which in some ways are more complicated from a records point of

view than the German records issue; and a file-by-file through everything is very—very time-consuming. I would hope that we would

be able to work out with the agencies some sort of triage.

Not everything needs to go through a page-by-page or a line-byline. I think we might agree certain categories of information do,

and if we can refine this and get a more targeted strategy so we

can get through more rapidly those records that permit that, we

would have time to deal with the issues that are most knotty.

Mr. HORN. We obviously have a lot of Holocaust scholars in this

country, and we can turn them loose once you have a series of files

there. Is that the plus of the bulk approach, get them into the situation where scholars can say, I would like to see X number of files,

even if they don’t have a name?

Mr. KURTZ. Well, my experience with bulk declassification goes

back to the President’s Executive order in 1994 on World War II

records, and the National Archives very much supports an approach, whether bulk or survey—whatever term might be used—to

avoid to the greatest extent possible line-by-line, and there are

many advantages. One, it gets into the hands of those who want

and need them in a more expeditious fashion; it is more economical

from the point of view of resources; and it enables the government

to focus on those areas where there might be some sensitivity.

Mr. HORN. Now, have you in your role with this Interagency

Working Group been able to obtain various documents internationally from, say, Russia and Japan; or is that something that you are

considering in the future?

Mr. KURTZ. Well, let me address Japan.

I had a meeting with the archivist from Japan several months

ago, and we discussed trying to get documentation or a report from

them to detail where the records are now that were captured by

the United States, brought to the United States and then returned

to Japan in 1958. There are serious questions about their availability and access.

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Mr. HORN. Before we returned them, did anybody have the sense

to make microfilm out of those records?

Mr. KURTZ. The government did not follow the same policy with

the Japanese documents as with the German Government before

they were returned.

Mr. HORN. What was the difference?

Mr. KURTZ. It was 1958, and I am not sure. I was alive, yes, definitely. But anyway, we are going back and forth with the archivist

of Japan to get a useful report, where these records are and are

they available; and so far, not a great deal of success.

Mr. HORN. How about the Russian records?

Mr. KURTZ. We have not started dealing with the Russians.

Mr. HORN. Isn’t that a likely possibility to see what they knew

at what point in time?

Mr. KURTZ. Yes.

Mr. HORN. Because I know that we have a few Russian generals

who came from their equivalent of OSS.

Mr. KURTZ. That is a good point.

Mr. HORN. We will just go down the line.

Ms. Holtzman.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think it is not names versus—well, it may be. It is bulk versus

line-by-line, and if we are going line-by-line, then the question is,

are there strategies that can help us in terms of the names issue.

Even if we do bulk declassification, what are we going to declassify?

Obviously, agencies like the CIA and the Army have very deep

concerns about protecting what needs to be protected. But I would

say, Mr. Chairman, it may well be that we can take the position

with regard to documents of World War II that we can just bulk

declassify those, unless, of course, there are any documents that we

know of that have formulas for atomic weapons or poison gas or

something like that.

But aside from that, it is hard to understand why—aside from

the principle of preserving the secrecy of foreign information or the

principle of preserving sources. We are talking about matters that

are over 53 years old, 54, 55 years old; yesterday some of the documents were 57 years old. So I would say, there are some approaches like that.

But we can take some timeline, the end of World War II—obviously, the more recent, the more reason there may be not to disclose. Privacy concerns, as well, may come up. I would say that is

one area that this committee could give us guidance.

My own personal view is, if we could do bulk declassification

within some kind of timeframe, that would save time and money.

Second, if we don’t know the names, how are we going to get the

information? I would hope that the agencies would agree, and we

could work out, with the help of the Archives and their excellent

staff, a method of agreeing that all documents within certain programs would be relevant; whether they then would be

declassifiable would be another subject.

But I think the other thing that it just raises with regard to the

issue of Japan, I don’t even know, Mr. Chairman, if we returned

those documents to the Japanese, that we will be given access to

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those documents, but it would be quite extraordinary for us to have

returned the documents and not be permitted to see them.

Mr. HORN. Do we know who was in charge? Was it the State Department or the Army or what? We ought to write the appropriate

people and ask them to give us whatever historically happened

there. We do know that Secretary Dulles was very anxious to get

a peace treaty with Japan, and we know a lot of things, but the

question is, who had the control of them?

Mr. KURTZ. I would recommend, Mr. Chairman, checking with

the Department of State, because they handled all of the negotiations on treaties, records, claims. So if there was any requirement

written into any agreements about providing access, it should be

known to the Department of State.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I think this would be appropriate for us to

make inquiries and report back to this subcommittee what we have

found about the historical record relating to the return of those

documents, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. Mr. Baer.

Mr. BAER. Thank you for asking about this subject. Briefly, the

legislation contemplates this vital issue and is a major question,

bulk versus line-by-line or bulk versus a search.

Mr. Chairman, in the Congressional Record of 1998, August 6,

you said, ‘‘Much of the government information on alleged Nazi

war criminals has remained secret even though researchers have

filed Freedom of Information Act requests to secure copies of the

records. Federal agencies have routinely denied these requests, citing exemptions for national defense, foreign relations and intelligence. More than half a century after the Second World War, it

is time,’’ you said, ‘‘to end the sweeping equity exemptions that

have shielded Nazi war criminals from full public disclosure.’’

Now, the legislation imports two points of view, reflecting the

committee and Congress’ desire to change the method of releasing

this. No. 1, unlike Freedom of Information Act requests where people have to be making requests, the burden here is placed upon the

government agency to make revelations. And the revelations do require exemptions for sources and methods, but the legislation says

they can’t be blanket, they can’t be general, there has to be a specification of injury to the United States made by the agency head.

So the legislation changes the Freedom of Information Act from initiated by a person seeking information to initiated by an agency.

The second element of the legislation which speaks to bulk declassification is the necessity of speed, because time is running out.

In that connection, Representative Maloney, in the debate, said, ‘‘It

is our intention that affected agencies should declassify all documents recommended by the Interagency Working Group as quickly

as possible. It is our expectation that all such documents become

public as soon as possible, preferably within the first year and most

certainly by the end of the 3-year period during which the IWG is

in existence.’’ So that the scheme is agency action rather than request, speed rather than delay.

Fortunately, I have looked into this, to try to fulfill my obligations as a member by asking for some advice, and I went to a place

I know quite well called the Yale Law School, and I asked them

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to look into this; and they provided me with a letter of opinion,

which I furnished to the staff and which I am sure you have.

Mr. HORN. And I would like to put it in the record at this point

if there is no objection. It is by Robert A. Burt, a professor of law

at the Yale Law School; and this is correspondence to Mr. Thomas

H. Baer as of February 8, 2000.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. BAER. That’s correct. Just to complete this, the issue here is

a complicated issue with certain collections and certain protections

of national security. The release of sources and methods of the

1940’s and 1950’s, it is argued by the agencies, with those agencies

imperils current intelligence because individuals who are spies or

otherwise covert operatives for the United States in 2000 do not

want to continue their activity if they are in peril of ever having

their names released or their activities disclosed by the fact of release later on; and I recognize that.

But Ms. Holtzman, I think, and Dr. Kurtz, in his typical effective

way, have put their fingers on it. There has to be some method of

wedding this protection with bulk declassification; and guidance is

important. For example, if the committee were to say, look, find a

method of inclining your way toward bulk while preserving this;

that is what we want you to do—I think that kind of guidance

would be important.

Finally, I am not a historian, but it is the position of the historian community that bulk declassification is the most effective

method because the integrity of the documents, their placement,

one to the other, in and of itself gives great help to the historian

in making the record.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. Thank you.

Mr. Ben-Veniste.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think John Collingwood of the FBI put it very gently in terms

of the debate which we have had internally, within the Interagency

Working Group, about the speed and the methodology of the declassification effort. To a large extent, with respect to the European

Theater records, I think we may be at a point where this is mooted

out. It is our understanding that the Army, who has the largest repository of relevant records, will release all of its relevant records

in October.

Without getting into some of the internal discussions we had, we

have seen various representatives come and go before our Interagency Working Group until we had received assurances that we

are now basing our report to you on. But should those assurances

not hold to be true, you can be guaranteed of our return quickly

before this subcommittee to explore whether something went wrong

and what the nature of the representations made to us were and

on what basis they were made.

But at this point Secretary Caldera has assured us that the

records not just at Fort Meade, but if I am not incorrect, all of the

records within the possession of the U.S. Army, which of course

had the lead in terms of the wartime and postwar intelligencegathering effort and dealing with the former Nazis and the de-Nazification program and whatever exceptions were made to that—

those records, which we feel are very important in illuminating the

historical record, are due to be released in October.

With respect to Japan, which we have not even begun to deal

with, the question of bulk declassification becomes far more relevant from a practical standpoint, because we are nowhere with respect to those materials; and I think we should give very important

consideration to the issue of bulk declassification there, again, with

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the caveat that things involving our nuclear secrets, things involving the potential for information of some potential danger to our society to fall into the wrong hands through this release of information should continue to be something of concern.

But by the same token, we’ve learned that this material has been

available through other sources for quite some time. So although

theoretically we are concerned about its dissemination from a practical standpoint I think there needs to be some rule of reason applied.

Mr. HORN. Mr. Levit.

Mr. LEVIT. Thank you. I don’t think it will come as a big shock

to the committee that, as a CIA representative, we have a hard

time with the idea of bulk declassification. A couple of problems for

starters: The National Security Act, in 1947, charges the Director

to protect sources and methods. If material is shipped out without

being reviewed, that is a hard mandate to live up to.

The second issue is the Kyl amendment that poses questions for

review on a page-by-page theory of materials for declassification,

for review of restricted data information. So it is a question that

I think we need to address whether or not bulk declassification is

even possible in light of that legislation.

That said, I don’t think this issue is quite as binary as it is sometimes presented. There are classes of documents—let’s go back to

the World War II era records and separate out from those those

that are not foreign government information. I can tell you that at

the CIA we have a pretty efficient, fast, systematic method of declassifying records; we call it the ‘‘declassification factory.’’ We have

been at this under the Executive order for some time, and they are

declassifying millions of pages a year.

Most of the 400,000 pages that came out yesterday were mainly

a product of the 25-year program, although they were rereviewed

under the guidelines for this statute to make sure that we weren’t

redacting more than we should.

But I think that there are classes of documents that can get a

level of review that is different than other classes. When we go to

our operational files, for instance, we will have to give a line-byline review of those records. There is no other way in order to protect sources and methods because they are chock full. But on some

of these older records, things that are not foreign government information, we can move this quickly. It is not bulk, but it is fast.

One footnote: We have released in the last 20–25 years World

War II era—or OSS information, more specifically over 14 million

pages—so this 400,000 pages that was released yesterday is just

another chapter of that release; and I think we are approaching the

very near end of all of those records.

Thank you.

Mr. HORN. Mr. Collingwood.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. It is a larger process issue, and for the FBI,

it really does not come down necessarily to a classification issue.

For example, in all of the records that the FBI, to date, has

accessioned to Archives, 367 pages have been withheld because

they maintain classification. Of those 367, none remain classified

because of U.S. or FBI information, all remain classified because of

foreign government interests and because they were collected from

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foreign governments under long-standing agreements with foreign

government organizations. We would expect all 367 pages to be declassified in whole or in part when we get permission from those

governments.

But the protection of foreign government information to law enforcement is critical, particularly now; it has become more critical

than at any time in our history as we deal with international organized crime, terrorism, cybercrimes and others. The interaction between foreign law enforcement agencies and domestic law enforcement agencies has become so commonplace, and these agreements

have become so important, that they are critical.

But bulk declassification does not address that, and there is really no way to get around that because of the existing agreements.

I agree with what Ken is saying. Like the CIA, we have a process

for declassifying this stuff, and we would describe it as an incredibly fast pace, but because of the way that the documents are created and maintained, it is nearly impossible just to give wholesale,

bulk declassification of the documents.

Mr. HORN. Colonel Thompson.

Colonel THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Department of Defense is on record as opposed to bulk declassification, sir. I will add that we will meet our requirements

without the need for bulk declassification.

As for our process, we faced three challenges at the outset of this

task, first, the sheer volume of material. I mentioned earlier that

we have 1.9 million files; 1.2 million of those are contained on

microfilm, which complicates the task. So the challenge in the volume was to figure out how to reduce the volume that would enable

us to meet our objectives.

The second challenge is the age of the film. It is very brittle. It

breaks, and it is not as simple as having one file located on one

roll. Sometimes they are located on multiple rolls, and you have to

find them.

The third challenge was resourcing. We had to triple the work

force in our repository to undertake this task. We also had to—in

addition to building and training the team, we had to develop a

process that enabled us to get our hands around the magnitude of

this task and pare down the volume of material.

We put together a state-of-the-art, cutting-edge process. We

think that it is the most advanced of its kind in the country using

sophisticated search engines. We are currently processing 60,000 to

70,000 files or about 1 million images per week on the microfilm.

To date, of the 11,500 reels of microfilm, we have already digitized

over 8,000 or about 960,000 files. Out of those, our search engine

has identified 7,539 files as possibly relevant. Further inspection of

those files has given us an indication that at least 4,064 are definitely relevant; that is, approximately 40,000 pages.

Thank you.

Mr. HORN. Thank you. I now yield to the gentleman from Texas,

Mr. Turner, for questioning.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I listen to you, it certainly causes me to want to thank each

of you who have served on this Interagency Working Group, particularly the public members who have devoted so much time and

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energy and effort to this endeavor. I cannot help but be impressed

once again, as I listen to you, regarding the importance of peeling

back the layers of secrecy, one document at a time, of the darkest

chapter in the history of modern man. And I can’t help but feel a

recommitment to being sure that this work is continued, irrespective of how tedious, irrespective of how legally challenging it may

be to determine the proper way to accomplish the task.

And I particularly want to thank Mrs. Maloney, whose 6-year

crusade led us to the point of the creation of this effort, and who

brings a great deal of insight in terms of the progress that has

been made.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield all of the time that I have

for questioning to Mrs. Maloney and let her pursue that inquiry.

Mr. HORN. Let us pursue it for about 10 minutes.

Mrs. MALONEY. I thank Mr. Turner for yielding to me and, again,

the chairman.

I would like to get back to the time question. One of you mentioned that only a third of the job is done. Will we be able to complete it by the timeframe that we have before us? I include Japanese records. That was our intent, and it was mentioned in the legislation.

Mr. KURTZ. I would say, picking up what Mr. Ben-Veniste was

talking about, the extra challenges, I don’t think by January 2002

we will be able to complete the totality of the European and Pacific

Theaters. So when Congressman Lantos was discussing the need

for an additional year, I think that would be a year well used.

Mrs. MALONEY. Do you think that you could complete it in an additional year?

Mr. KURTZ. Yes, I do.

Mrs. MALONEY. Would other members of the panel like to comment on the timeframe and what is needed with regard to Japanese war criminals and the funding and everything else to complete the job?

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Congresswoman Maloney, I just want to say that

I have some questions as to whether we will complete the European Theater within the timeframe. I know that we have made terrific progress, and I really take my hat off to every one of the agencies involved. You can see, just from the statements of Colonel

Thompson, the kind of effort that the Army is making; and you can

see from the statements of both representatives—very able representatives of the CIA and the FBI what kind of efforts they are

making, but you have to note, for example, with regard to the CIA

the release yesterday was of OSS materials.

This is pre the end of World War II. We have many years after

the end of World War II that have to be looked at. Can that process

be completed? I don’t mean that with any criticism.

So I would say that I think it is good to keep the pressure on.

So if we give the IWG an extra year to focus on the Japanese materials—but that is one of the reasons that I raised the question

about the timeframe. Perhaps the agencies could give you a sense

of whether they will complete—in their own mind, whether they

can complete the assigned task, putting Japan aside, within the

time allotted.

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Mr. BAER. Representative Maloney, the agencies are putting on

a Herculean effort; there is no question. Their cooperation has been

outstanding for the most part. But I would have to agree with Ms.

Holtzman, perhaps for a slightly different reason.

With the current resources of the IWG, which is a loan from this

one and a loan from that one, it is almost impossible to complete

the task, particularly the public information function, the outreach

to historians, the educational function, within that timeframe. Although they will come up with as much as they can, Dr. Kurtz and

the members of his staff are not really sufficient, and I think they

would agree with this, to complete it without separate resources.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Let me focus on another issue.

We have received status reports from the relevant agencies,

which all indicate completion of their task within the European

Theater within the statutory period. However, from my point of

view, which is something that we have recurrently discussed, the

process of identifying the relevant records is to some extent an

interactive process.

There will be materials which will be reviewed and which will

then stimulate the request for other records in other files. This, in

turn, implicates the sources for reviewing these materials by experts in the period, who will then be able to identify other things

which may have been overlooked.

So the process in its first iteration may well be completed within

time, and we are entirely hopeful and very thankful for the dedication that you have heard expressed here today from the relevant

agencies; but in practical terms, I don’t think there is anyone here

who can give the assurance that the task, as I have outlined it,

could be completed within that time period on the basis of the resources presently available.

And that excepts the Japanese question from our analysis. We

have not even begun to get our arms around the Japanese document issue.

We have not seen Congressman Lantos’ legislation. We are very

interested in seeing it, but we can certainly give no assurance, Congresswoman Maloney, at this point—at least I cannot—about the

conclusion of the effort.

Mrs. MALONEY. How much time do you think would be needed

to review the Japanese documents also?

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Certainly the additional year is very well advised. But until we really have the opportunity to get our arms

around the challenge, which is the way we began functioning with

respect to the Nazi documents—it took us a substantial amount of

time to identify who had the records, where they were and what

the processes would be for reviewing them.

Obviously we have learned a lot, and those lessons will be applied to the issue of the Japanese documents. And by the same

token, suggestions—the potential for bulk declassification would be

most useful in that regard to the extent we get our arms around

the issue quickly, and it would appear more feasible.

But at this point, perhaps Dr. Kurtz could be more informative

with respect to the Japanese issue.

Mr. KURTZ. I would like to discuss how we are going to begin our

efforts with the Japanese documents. We meet monthly. Our July

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meeting is focused on various search strategies for the Japanese

records. We are not going to have available to us the wonderful tool

that the Office of Special Investigations was able to put together;

but there are a variety of search strategies, and we are going to

be presenting them to the IWG to get their input and feedback to

see if we can craft an effective strategy.

I would also like to comment on former Congresswoman

Holtzman’s idea or suggestion about how to ensure kind of a more

complete search, so that there is a higher level of reliability possible. I agree with her. I think we can work out using various program and operational names, putting out a requirement that all

records that fall within those operations and programs be deemed

relevant. I think we can really raise the reliability and effort level,

and I am confident that this is something that we can work out

with all of the members of the IWG.

I think the other issue I would just want to reiterate—and Congresswoman Maloney is well aware of it as the author of the legislation—is that we feel fully confident, under the terms of the existing legislation, to move and to deal with the Japanese records; and

that a second or supplemental IWG is not something that would be

required in order to do our work.

Mrs. MALONEY. OK. Anyone else?

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. Our projections of completing what is on the

table right now are based primarily on an identified universe of

documents. We know what the parameters are that we have to deal

with, and we know the resources that are being applied to it.

Mr. Ben-Veniste is exactly correct: In the process of producing

documents, we have identified several thousand additional names

that we have searched. We have reviewed 27,000 additional pages

and identified 6,000 additional relevant pages. So given that the

task at hand can grow to some unknown degree during this process, but not speaking for the other agencies, but confident that they

will give you the same response, we are of course willing to produce

whatever additional resources we need to complete the task at

hand within the time we are required to do so.

Mrs. MALONEY. Do you think that we can complete the Japanese

section too within the time designated in the bill?

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. No. The projections that we have now are

based on the European Theater.

Mrs. MALONEY. The Japanese, do you have any sense for that?

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. We have not yet surveyed our own records to

know what the possible parameters would be.

Mrs. MALONEY. Earlier you mentioned, and Mr. Levit mentioned,

some documents were not released because of foreign government

objections. Can you mention which foreign government and the impact of the foreign government objection?

Mr. LEVIT. I am happy to handle that question, Congresswoman.

Thus far, we have only received the fullest cooperation from all of

the foreign governments that we have approached. We have not

crossed the barrier where a foreign government has asked us to

withhold a document that we believed was relevant. They have

sought to review documents. They have sought to make sure that

their other government agencies were aware of the record at issue,

but we have not received a denial.

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So I am thankful that I am able to report to you that at this

point we are getting the fullest level of cooperation. I will use this

point to dovetail for a moment into the time question.

Our plan, our intent, our projection, is to conclude within the 3-

year window, and again I am referring to the European Theater.

The wild card, in my view, is the universe of documents which is

foreign government information. When you consult with foreign

governments, when they take possession of copies of documents

and ask to consult with their government agencies which have equities in a certain foreign government document, you are in their

hands to allow some time to pass. So thus far, the review by foreign governments has been extraordinarily expeditious, but I think

we have to be concerned about those records that may take more

time.

Mrs. MALONEY. Yet you testified earlier that some documents

were being kept classified because of foreign government concerns,

I thought. Didn’t you say that?

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. I mentioned we have 367 documents, but we

have every expectation that those will be declassified and released

consistent with what Ken is saying. It is just a matter of going

through the process.

So from our perspective, while it is an unknown, it does not appear at this point to be a substantial unknown for us.

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. My time is up. Back to the chairman.

Mr. HORN. I thank the gentlewoman from New York, and I now

yield to the gentlewoman from Illinois.

Mrs. BIGGERT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kurtz, I believe you mentioned at some point about the condition of some of the documents that you have that are on microfilm. And then I think you mentioned about some of the Japanese

documents that have been returned without any record of them or

without copying them.

Why were they returned?

Mr. KURTZ. Well, let me deal with the preservation question, and

then I will go into the Japanese records issue.

These World War II documents—and they are paper and microfilm—they were created on very poor paper, and so many of the

files being transferred to us from other agencies are crumbling.

You pick them up and they are falling apart. Our concern as an

IWG, our concern as the National Archives, we are not going to fulfill the mandate to make records available if they are falling apart.

So we have begun at the National Archives to put together a preservation strategy to identify the records that are most at risk, and

if we are able to get the resources required, we are going to start

an extensive preservation effort.

On the Japanese records, I received some information from my

staff regarding your original questioning, Mr. Chairman. Apparently when the State Department negotiated with Japan the return

of the records, there was no provision for access. That was not included in the agreement.

I would have to speculate, as far as the situation was different

with Japanese records from German records, I think there was

more extensive interest in the captured German records. There was

much more vigorous war crimes and trial efforts in Germany in

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comparison to the Far East, and the American Historical Association in the mid-50’s was very interested in these captured German

records and put a great deal of pressure to ensure that there would

be copies of these records here in the United States. So the government developed a film and restitute program.

There was not similar interest with Japanese records at that

time.

Mrs. BIGGERT. Maybe I should ask the question of Colonel

Thompson and Mr. Collingwood and Mr. Levit, if the records pertaining to Japan were returned with any conditions. In other

words, does the United States have any right of review of those

records that were returned?

Mrs. BIGGERT. Mr. Ben-Veniste.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. Perhaps I can at least raise the question that

we don’t have a conclusive answer to, and that was the fact that

apparently the historical record reveals that within our government there was discussion and, indeed, there seems to have been

agreement that a condition should have been placed, or would be

placed, on the return of the Japanese documents providing for access by appropriate American Government officials to those materials, on request.

That does not appear to have been reflected in the treaty agreement itself, I am advised; but as I indicated to Chairman Horn earlier, I think it is appropriate for us to undertake the research with

respect to that question—it is a very important, perhaps critical,

question with respect to these documents—and report back to this

subcommittee what we have found.

Mr. KURTZ. The IWG——

Mrs. BIGGERT. Mr. Levit or Mr. Collingwood or Colonel Thompson, do you have any information as to whether there were any

conditions placed on the return of the documents?

Mr. LEVIT. I am simply not in a position to comment upon it. I

don’t know.

Mr. COLLINGWOOD. The same would hold true for me. Our task,

when we turn to that, will be producing those documents which remain in our possession, which we will be glad to do.

Colonel THOMPSON. I have no knowledge, ma’am.

Mrs. BIGGERT. Mr. Baer.

Mr. BAER. One of the things about the three of us is, we are not

in the government, so we are allowed to take a nonbureaucratic approach. Assuming for purposes of argument that they were imprudently returned without any right of review, the ordinary person’s

suggestion would be that someone should talk to them and ask

them to please make them available. I suppose that it would be

very useful for the Congress, for this committee, to advise us in

writing that we should take this up with the Department of State

to have a bilateral discussion for purposes of achieving what it is

your question suggests.

Mrs. BIGGERT. Thank you.

Dr. Kurtz, have you had any discussions with the Japanese Government regarding the return or review of these documents?

Mr. KURTZ. The conversation that I have had was with the archivist of Japan, and our focus in the discussion was to get a report

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from him to describe where these records went, what repository in

Japan has them, and what are the conditions for access.

I agree very much with Mr. Ben-Veniste’s comment about doing

some research on this issue and getting back to the committee. We

certainly—the IWG staff will do that first of all for the IWG, and

we certainly will respond to the subcommittee.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. There is an obvious practical question that is

raised by the review of a large repository of Japanese records, and

that is that these records will be in Japanese. It also calls into

question the issue of resources to be able to review such materials.

So, seriatim, things lead back to the same issue of resources available to us to do the kind of effective job in implementing this important legislation that I know that the Congress and the administration expect.

Mrs. BIGGERT. How many of the documents that—well, with the

documents that are in German with the Nazi documents—I would

assume that most all of them are, unless they have been translated.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. A large number decoded were translated, but

we have already released a cache of captured German documents

which were in the original language; and perhaps Dr. Kurtz can expand on that.

Mr. KURTZ. The bulk of the documentation released to date is in

English. As Mr. Ben-Veniste noted, the decodes that were released

yesterday had already been translated, and it was a relatively

small cache of German records that are now available but not

translated. The bulk of the documents released so far are in

English.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Most will be in English because it deals with

contact between American agencies and various foreign—and

Americans on the issue of Nazi war criminals.

With regard to the issue of Japan, I think once we get a better

handle on exactly what happened here, whether it was the intention of our government and the Japanese Government to allow, for

example, access, and they just forgot to write it in; or whether it

was the intention not to. I think you need to know that before you

can take appropriate action, and we need to know that before we

can take appropriate action. Once the facts are known, this committee can act.

I would hope that the Japanese Government would understand

that this material should be open in the interest of justice and

truth. After all, we gave the documents back, and they should be

open to American scholars and Japanese scholars. I think there is

a great deal of interest in Japan about this subject, as well, as

there will be here undoubtedly, too.

Mrs. BIGGERT. Are there other foreign countries or allies who

may still have some of the documentation that they might have acquired that we would be seeking also under this legislation?

Mr. KURTZ. We have discussed at the IWG trying to utilize what

resources we have, and I think that is where Mr. Ben-Veniste’s

point—and also raised by Congresswoman Holtzman and Mr. Baer

about resources. With additional resources, we want to contact the

British and other governments to ascertain what they are releasing, so we can create a unified pool of knowledge, what they and

85

we are all making available, and see where there are gaps in information and documentation, where there is overlap and where there

is complement.

Mr. BAER. Mrs. Biggert, you should also know that we are planning a major international conference with, I believe—Dr. Kurtz,

there are going to be 30 countries that have these historical commissions?

Mr. KURTZ. Right.

Mr. BAER. Thirty countries that have historical commissions that

are somewhat similar to what we are doing. And so we would intend that there be an international movement.

Also recently, in Stockholm, you may recall that there was a

meeting in which the foreign minister of Sweden spoke out in favor

of the sorts of things that this Congress has done, namely revelation finally of these secrets worldwide. So the point is extremely

well taken.

Mrs. BIGGERT. Could the IWG advise this committee when it determines the status of the Japanese records and whether we should

pursue a formal request, or not, if that is not possible?

Mr. KURTZ. Certainly. We will make a report when the facts are

known and analyzed.

Mrs. BIGGERT. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. Before I turn to Major Owens, I want to clear the

record here on the Japanese situation.

Mr. Bilbray has put in, with Mr. Lipinski, the following bill, H.R.

3561, on February 1, 2000; and the essence of it gets down to the

records of the Japanese Imperial Army in a manner that does not

impair any investigation or prosecution conducted by the Department of Justice for certain intelligence matters and for other purposes.

Do you think that that bill is too limited in terms of the Japanese Imperial Army, or how should Mr. Lantos draft it? What do

we know about the number of records that will not come under the

Japanese Imperial Army?

Mr. KURTZ. Mr. Chairman, I would think that using the framework that Congresswoman Maloney and others who crafted the

original Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act would be perhaps more

useful. In other words, any bill that is just restricted to the Japanese Imperial Army, does not get at foreign ministry records, navy

records or intelligence records.

So something crafted, which was very broad in the Nazi War

Crimes Disclosure Act, with the appropriate date span that would

have to be worked out for the Japanese records, I think that—I

would be concerned if anything is just restricted to the Imperial

Army.

Mr. HORN. I would be interested in another aspect of this. Ever

since I came here in 1992, along with Mrs. Maloney, I have been

worried about the so-called ‘‘comfort woman’’ situation. Do you consider that under your jurisdiction in terms of the exploitation of

these women by the Japanese Imperial Army?

Mr. KURTZ. I would, yes.

Mr. HORN. My reaction is, we don’t ever seem to get a reaction

from the Japanese Government. They just deny it—sorry, denied.

86

I suspect that we will have problems with this, and what we

need is a Freedom of Information welfare group in Japan to say,

we would like to see the government’s various documents. Maybe

that is the way that you do it.

Now, I am delighted to yield to my colleague from New York,

Major Owens.

Mr. OWENS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome

Liz Holtzman, a former Member of Congress.

I would like not to be redundant. However, I had ‘‘comfort

woman’’ in my notes here also. Let me just try to summarize my

notes and ask a broad question here.

Are we dealing with a situation which has been caused by official

apathy, that nobody really cares about these records; bureaucratic

sluggishness, somebody does care, but we will get around to it

sooner or later? Are we dealing with a mystique which surrounds

this whole classification phenomenon?

I have gone to many classified hearings and been upset that information we get, 90 percent is already in the New York Times.

There is a lot of tendency to classify and hold on to things that

don’t need to be classified.

Are we dealing with a situation where something of great value

is being—a number of things of great value are being held back?

Is there some Rosetta Stone among all of these documents that will

lead to the discovery of some other startling and unusual facts? It

was a Swiss Guard, I believe, who blew the whistle on some burning of records from Swiss banks several years ago; and he set in

motion a whole series of events which led to billions of dollars

being put up by the Swiss banks and Swiss Government.

And also a fallout from that was the situation in Germany where

billions of dollars are being set forth for the forced labor workers

who were forced to work in German industry. So there is a lot at

stake in some of these records.

Is there some kind of conspiracy behind the scenes that keeps

them from being expedited with a great sense of urgency? It has

been over 50 years, and we hear about current intelligence being

imperiled by records that are 50 years old. Statutes of limitations

are involved, and some things you might discover there is no way

to prosecute certain kinds of crimes.

The Japanese have sort of acknowledged the ‘‘comfort women’’

situation, but refused to apologize. That is a minor matter compared to deliberately fostering epidemics and infecting populations.

These are events which are pivotal in the 20th century and in

the history of the world in terms of the kinds of things that have

happened as a result of it. So I would just like to have a response.

And let me start with you, Ms. Holtzman, in terms of what is at

stake here.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. It makes a difference on a lot of levels. There are

some people today who deny the Holocaust. Just in the materials

that were opened yesterday, it turns out that British intelligence

was overhearing and listening in on conversations among German

prisoners of war; and they had captured generals, and the generals

were discussing a specific atrocity that took place in one of the Baltic countries in extreme detail.

87

Well, someone could say, what does he know and maybe he made

it up. It turns out that there is one video that was taken by the

Germans of these kinds of atrocities where Jews were taken, they

had to dig the ditches and then were shot to death. Hundreds of

Jews, one on top of each other. The one single video that the German army made is of exactly this description of the incident that

was given by the German general. That provides stark and important evidence, a small piece of evidence, that the atrocities took

place.

What else was at stake? These documents also raise questions,

very important questions, that we as a Nation, Britain as a nation,

have to look at. I don’t know if the Japanese want to confront these

issues yet, but the issues—what was disclosed yesterday, did we do

enough during World War II to prevent the atrocities, or were the

atrocities committed against Jews something that is not even a

footnote—that is important to know about ourselves. Maybe this

will never happen again.

The other question that was raised pursuant to just yesterday’s

revelation, a top aide to Hitler who was sent directly to Italy to

oversee the annihilation of Italy was given a free pass for 15 years

at the end of World War II. He should have been tried in Nuremberg. Why wasn’t he? Was he given a free pass because he may

have helped in the surrender of the German armies in northern

Italy? That is raised by these materials.

Other questions raise other questions about the U.S. conduct and

the conduct of our allies, and Mr. Ben-Veniste mentioned it, it is

one of the great tests of a democracy, the willingness to look in a

mirror and learn what happened and learn from our mistakes. Of

course, there are other practical consequences here, too, sure. Will

some of this material be available for survivors seeking assets?

That’s possible. There may be some information with respect to the

collaboration of German industries; that may be here, too.

Who knows what we will find in the Japanese documents if we

ever get access to them, the atrocities that nobody knows of yet

that have not hit the front pages—‘‘comfort women,’’ countries have

denied that they have engaged in certain conduct and they can be

proven.

For example, one of the claims that the Germans have made is

that their army wasn’t involved in atrocities, it was only the SS,

it was only that evil group of people. Well, these documents prove

differently. There are some people who argue that the German people were totally unified in their support of Hitler and their hatred

of the Jews and yet if you read these documents, there was tremendous disgust among some of the generals and their discussions of

what had been done and disdain for Hitler and condemnation of

him.

These are things that we can all learn from, and I think that the

work of this—and who can say now all of the lessons that can be

drawn from these materials? But these secrets must be made public, and we can learn a lot about our country and I hope prevent

what happened in the past, at least that, from what is undertaken

here.

Mr. BAER. I just want to respond to one part of your question

which is the issue of delaying or a culture of secrecy continuing or

88

some kind of foot-dragging that your question suggested that you

wanted to know about.

That culture has dramatically changed in the agencies before you

today. The three of us, the three public members, along with Mr.

Kurtz and the National Security Council, have met with Director

Freeh personally and with Director Tenet personally; and I think

it is fair to say—and the others can speak for themselves—we were

extraordinarily impressed by their intention to put it out from the

top of these agencies, that these secrets were not going to be kept

any longer, and that the legislation was going to be enforced and

then, from the very top, the word was going to go forth.

This stuff is going to be revealed, so there—this has changed. In

fact, Director Tenet and Mr. Levit here today are to be commended

for the work they did in getting out the material that we have got.

As to what is at stake, it is simply a matter of the record of

American history. We cannot make that conclusion, the historians

will have to do so, but the fact is that the America of today, the

America of today, Mr. Owens, is the America that the world admires principally because of its efforts to defeat the forces of evil

during World War II. And secret from this reputation and revealed

to some degree has been a somewhat checkered record with respect

to what happened and what knowledge was available.

Today’s Washington Post says it quite very eloquently on the

page 1 story by Michael Dobbs. So continuation of this effort is

vital to liberty and democracy because it makes available to us, our

children and grandchildren, what the real truth is and makes it

known to people in government today that you can’t turn to somebody and say, quote, no one will ever know.

Mr. OWENS. In terms of resources, if the private sector foundations were to offer enormous sums of money to help get the resources that you need and the bodies you need to do the declassification—and I am a former librarian, you need some former librarians—would that be acceptable and speed the process? If foundations were to offer——

Mr. BAER. We tried it. When we met in January 1999, with Dr.

Kurtz and all of us together, we didn’t have any money, and we

don’t have any money today. The first thing that we tried to do was

raise money, I know that I did, from a lot of people. I went to some

of the places that you would think that I would go.

Mr. OWENS. No positive response?

Mr. BAER. No.

Mr. OWENS. Would you have accepted it if you had gotten a positive response?

Mr. BAER. Of course.

Mr. OWENS. The Army would accept it?

Mr. BAER. We are talking about the Interagency Working Group,

this level. The Army would have to speak for themselves. But we

actually entered into an effort to try to raise money from foundations for the group that has been created by the legislation. But we

were unable to do so; I was unable to do so.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. I think this was a very personal and desultory

effort to raise the funds, but we think the appropriate place to receive funds for this public group is from the Congress appropriating

them. We have scrounged around, and have depended on the kindVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:37 Jun 21, 2001 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\72522.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
89

ness of the National Archives and the Department of Justice for

the limited funds we have received.

Mr. OWENS. We have a $200 billion surplus anticipated this year,

and we will keep adding money over the next 10 years. It is a matter of how important is this to our decisionmakers.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. We think that it is important not only to supplement the historical record, but also to demonstrate the strength

of our democracy.

As my two colleagues, Ms. Holtzman and Mr. Baer have very eloquently stated, we have the strength in this country to look at ourselves in the mirror and recognize that where we have made mistakes, we can shine the light on those as well and learn from them.

This legislation is a very important manifestation of the strength

of our democracy, and it shows the world that we are willing to

look at these issues.

In terms of the culture of secrecy, yes, these records have been

kept secret, and I don’t believe we have seen anything at this point

to indicate that it is the result of some conspiracy or dark motive,

but rather these agencies exist for the purpose of maintaining the

important secrets of our country in connection with national security; and this material has been lumped in with that generalization. We are dealing with an appropriate culture of secrecy for the

CIA and, to some lesser extent, the FBI as well and the Army; but

with respect to these records, we can all say with a reasonable degree of common sense, there isn’t any reason to have maintained

their secrecy this long other than the inertial forces that continue.

This was kind of like turning an aircraft carrier in the opposite

direction. We are dealing with agencies that are based on a culture

of secrecy, and we have seen very significant cooperation and personal dedication efforts which are manifested in the resources that

have been applied to making this statute work and to provide the

public with the information that is contained in these records.

Let me say that one of the areas that I feel will be very important from a historical perspective, in addition to everything we

have heard about, is the question of the postwar utilization of certain tainted individuals, tainted by war crimes, by our intelligence

services. I think the exposition of this information will stimulate an

appropriate debate which will be useful for us going forward in the

future as to the role of expediency; and when the analysis is made

of the postwar, cold war period, whether the expedient use of individuals who had tainted histories was in fact, in the final analysis,

a disservice rather than a service to our country.

Only when these materials are released and historians have

them available to them for this discussion can those conclusions be

accurately reached on the basis of vigorous debate.

Mr. OWENS. I think my time is up, but the situation is galloping

into greater complexity that you have just outlined. Right now,

there is a new movement in Germany, stating that the Holocaust

helped to stop communism. I worry about the capacity to retrieve

these records having decreased. They are deteriorating and decaying, and there are a lot of things that you will never get after 50

years.

Mr. BEN-VENISTE. The category of Holocaust deniers, it is my

view that they are in the same category as people who believe that

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the world is flat. I doubt that this information will change many

minds in that category, nor do I care. I think what is important is

that the historical record is supplemented so that people of integrity and intelligence can look at this material and learn from it.

Mr. HORN. I have to conclude this hearing. We want to send you

a few questions, but it will go too long now and we have problems

on the floor and so forth. But I would like to ask Dr. Colonel

Thompson the exhibits you gave us, is that appropriate if we add

that to the record?

Colonel THOMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. HORN. Without objection, that will be put in the record.

Mrs. MALONEY. My office has been calling your office, Dr. Kurtz.

Are the documents up on the Internet now?

Mr. KURTZ. They are at the National Archives in College Park,

and I will make sure that one of my staff members calls your office

and assists with any access issues.

Mrs. MALONEY. Great. We have not been able to secure them yet,

and we have been calling.

Mr. KURTZ. We will take care of that.

Mr. HORN. My one last question will be, will you review these

documents that might have been produced by occupied countries—

for example, Poland, Ukraine, the USSR, we talked about earlier,

and Austria which was occupied by Russia, at least in the postwar

period. Has there been any thought of trying to—we mentioned

Russia, so apparently they aren’t in the ball game, but what about

Austria?

Mr. KURTZ. We really have not had an opportunity. We have

been focused on the task at hand. As we look toward trying to have

completion in the European phase of the operation, we need to consider any other contacts with nations that we need to make.

Mr. HORN. Well, thank you. I thank each of you because you

have done a marvelous job, and I wish you would let us know on

the monetary side. We can go and try to beg the cardinals that run

various and sundry things. It happens to be, if you are under the

Department of Justice, we just missed the vote; that passed last

night. If you are under the Archives, I think you have got a fund

there where you can solve some of those problems.

Since I spent yesterday at your Suitland facility——

Mr. KURTZ. I understand that it was time well spent, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. It was.

Mr. KURTZ. IWG funding would be under the Treasury, Postal

bill for the National Archives.

Mr. HORN. So, Mr. Kolbe. I will be with him in a few minutes.

Mr. KURTZ. Mr. Chairman, I have some documents from yesterday’s release, some copies that you might find of interest, perhaps

using them with Mr. Kolbe. I will be happy to make them available

to you.

Mr. HORN. Without objection, they will be put in the hearing

record at this point.

I welcome—Dr. Kurtz, I would welcome a budget of sorts as to

what is needed.

[The information referred to follows:]

91

92

93

Mr. KURTZ. Yes. We will be glad to provide that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HORN. Thank you all. With that, we have a staff that we

thank; and that is Russell George back there, chief counsel, staff

director; Heather Bailey, professional staff member with this hearing; Bonnie Heald, director of communications; Bryan Sisk, clerk;

Bill Ackerly, intern; Chris Dollar, intern; Meg Kinnard, intern.

And the minority staff, Trey Henderson as counsel and Jean

Gosa is the minority clerk. And we thank the Official Reporter of

Debates, Doreen Dotzler.

With that, we thank you all.

[Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned,

subject to the call of the Chair.]

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