SUMMARY 

May 17, 2018 

2018COA71

No. 17CA0303, State of Colorado v. Robert J. Hopp and 

Associates, LLC — Bankruptcy — Attorney Fees — Colorado 

Consumer Protection Act — Colorado Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act 

A division of the court of appeals considers whether the trial 

court erred when it imposed an award of attorney fees and costs 

against a defendant who had filed for bankruptcy and received a 

bankruptcy discharge before the underlying case in the trial court 

was filed. Defendant argues that the trial court was precluded from 

doing so by Bankruptcy Code § 727, which prohibits any attempt to 

collect from the debtor a debt that has been discharged, because 

the bankruptcy discharge applied to any claim for attorney fees and 

costs that could have been fairly or reasonably contemplated during 

the bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2012). 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion. 
Adopting the rationale set forth in In re Jensen, 395 B.R. 472, 

480 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008), the division concludes that, because 

the attorney fees award in this case is a civil penalty imposed under 

the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, it is not dischargeable 

under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (2012). Thus, the division concludes 

that the trial court did not err when it awarded attorney fees and 

costs against defendant. 
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2018COA71

Court of Appeals No. 17CA0303 

City and County of Denver District Court No. 14CV34780 

Honorable Shelley I. Gilman, Judge 

State of Colorado, ex rel. Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General for the State of 

Colorado; and Julie Ann Meade, Administrator, Uniform Consumer Credit 

Code, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees and Cross-Appellants, 

v. 

Robert J. Hopp & Associates, LLC; The Hopp Law Firm, LLC; National Title, 

LLC, d/b/a Horizon National Title insurance, LLC; First National Title 

Residential, LLC; Safehaus Holdings Group, LLC; Lori L. Hopp; and Robert J. 

Hopp, 

Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees, 

ORDER AFFIRMED 

Division I 

Opinion by JUDGE ROTHENBERG* 

Taubman and Harris, JJ., concur 

Announced May 17, 2018 

Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Jennifer H. Hunt, First Assistant 

Attorney General, Erik R. Neusch, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Rebecca 

M. Taylor, Mark L. Boehmer, Assistant Attorneys General, Denver, Colorado, 

for Plaintiffs-Appellees and Cross-Appellants 

Richards Carrington, LLC, Christopher P. Carrington, Ruth M. Moore, Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendants-Appellants and Cross-Appellees 

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. 

VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2017. 

1 

¶ 1 Plaintiffs, the State of Colorado, ex rel. Cynthia H. Coffman, 

Attorney General for the State of Colorado; and Julie Ann Meade, 

Administrator, Uniform Consumer Credit Code, brought a civil law 

enforcement action against defendants, foreclosure lawyer Robert J. 

Hopp; Hopp’s wife, Lori L. Hopp; Hopp’s law firms, Robert J. Hopp 

& Associates, LLC and The Hopp Law Firm, LLC (collectively, the 

law firms); as well as Hopp’s affiliated title companies, National 

Title, LLC, d/b/a Horizon National Title Insurance, LLC, and First 

National Title Residential, LLC; and Safehaus Holdings Group, LLC, 

a company owned by Hopp and Lori Hopp, which, through its 

subsidiary, provided accounting and bookkeeping services for the 

law firms and title companies. The State alleged that Hopp, the law 

firms, and their affiliated companies violated the Colorado 

Consumer Protection Act (CCPA) and the Colorado Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act (CFDCPA) by billing its mortgage servicer 

clients title insurance premium charges for foreclosure 

commitments when those full costs were not actually incurred, 

despite knowing that these fraudulent costs would be assessed 

against Colorado homeowners in foreclosure. The district court 

agreed with plaintiffs and entered judgment in their favor, except it 
2 

concluded there was insufficient evidence to find Lori Hopp 

personally liable for any alleged misconduct. 

¶ 2 Defendants now appeal the district court’s award of plaintiffs’ 

attorney fees and costs. Lori Hopp further appeals the district 

court’s denial of her request for her attorney fees. 

¶ 3 We affirm the district court’s order. 

I. Attorney Fees Orders 

¶ 4 The trial court awarded plaintiffs most of their reasonable 

attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing the enforcement action 

under the CCPA and CFDCPA. See § 5-16-133, C.R.S. 2017; § 6-1-

113(4), C.R.S. 2017. The trial court’s order awarding fees cites to 

the former location of the CFDCPA, section 12-14-135, C.R.S. 2014. 

The CFDCPA was repealed and replaced in 2017 and section 12-14-

135 was replaced by section 5-16-133, C.R.S. 2017. Plaintiffs 

requested attorney fees in the amount of $933,277 and $35,648 in 

costs. The trial court made numerous reductions to plaintiffs’ 

requested award: 

 The court concluded it was unreasonable to employ more 

than two attorneys and a paralegal at trial. It declined to 

award fees for any fees requested for staffing at trial 
3 

exceeding that level. It subtracted those amounts from 

the amount requested by plaintiffs, resulting in a lodestar 

amount of $903,106. 

 Considering the factors set forth in Colo. RPC 1.5, the 

trial court observed that plaintiffs recovered significantly 

less than they sought at the outset at trial. The court 

also noted its concern that plaintiffs did not realize that a 

substantial portion of penalties imposed under the 

FDCPA were not available until after trial. Thus, the 

court reduced the lodestar amount by twenty-five percent 

and awarded $677,329.50 for attorney fees. 

 Defendants challenged plaintiffs’ request for costs for 

deposing Lori Hopp and Brian Howard. Plaintiffs did not 

respond to defendants’ argument; therefore, the court 

reduced the costs award to $33,685.97. 

¶ 5 Lori Hopp requested her attorney fees and costs, arguing that 

plaintiffs’ action against her was substantially groundless under 

sections 13-17-101 to -106, C.R.S. 2017. She argued that, 

alternatively, C.R.C.P. 11(a) required imposing a sanction against 

plaintiffs by way of awarding her attorney fees. The court denied 
4 

her motion, concluding that, even though the state did not 

ultimately prove the CCPA claim against her, it was not groundless, 

nor were sanctions required against plaintiffs under C.R.C.P. 11(a). 

II. Underlying Judgment 

¶ 6 Defendants contend that, in the event the underlying 

judgment against them is reversed on appeal, the award of fees and 

costs against them should also be reversed because it depends on 

the validity of the underlying judgment on the merits. Because we 

affirm the underlying judgment in State v. Hopp, 2018 COA 69, 

announced today, reversal of the attorney fees award is not required 

on that basis. 

III. Bankruptcy 

¶ 7 Hopp contends the trial court erred when it imposed an award 

of attorney fees and costs against him because it was precluded 

from doing so by his discharge of debts in bankruptcy. We 

disagree. 

A. Preservation 

¶ 8 Hopp filed for bankruptcy on January 25, 2013, and obtained 

a discharge on February 10, 2014. Plaintiffs’ enforcement action 

was filed ten months later, on December 19, 2014. Plaintiffs 
5 

contend Hopp failed to preserve the issue of the effect of his 

bankruptcy discharge in the trial court because he raised this issue 

“for the first and only time” in his C.R.C.P. 59 motion after trial. 

Plaintiffs further argue that a C.R.C.P. 59 motion, which 

contemplates amending a judgment or seeking a new trial, was not 

the proper procedural avenue for raising a bankruptcy discharge. 

¶ 9 Hopp argues that he preserved his bankruptcy argument at 

numerous points in the proceedings. First, Hopp contends that he 

asserted in his answer to plaintiffs’ complaint that his bankruptcy 

discharge barred, at least in part, some of plaintiffs’ claims against 

him. He did not provide any further details about his bankruptcy 

in the answer. After trial, in his C.R.C.P. 59 motion to amend the 

court’s findings and conclusions, Hopp argued that his bankruptcy 

discharge precluded the trial court’s award of attorney fees against 

him because they were awarded to compensate the state for its 

actual pecuniary loss. The trial court declined to address this 

argument in the context of Hopp’s C.R.C.P. 59 motion because it 

held Hopp had presented no evidence of his bankruptcy at trial. 

Hopp does not dispute the trial court’s finding that he presented no 

evidence of his bankruptcy during the trial. 
6 

¶ 10 After plaintiffs submitted affidavits of attorney fees and costs, 

Hopp argued that the trial court, as part of its “punitive award” of 

attorney fees, was required to consider his bankruptcy in the 

context of his ability to pay. In light of his bankruptcy, Hopp 

alleged he was unable to pay the underlying judgment of penalties 

or plaintiffs’ requested attorney fees. 

¶ 11 Even assuming that Hopp properly preserved the 

consideration of the effect of his bankruptcy discharge on any 

attorney fees award in the trial court, we reject Hopp’s arguments 

on the merits. 

B. Prepetition Liability 

¶ 12 Hopp argues that the district court was precluded from 

awarding fees and costs against him by Bankruptcy Code § 727, 

which prohibits any attempt to collect from the debtor a debt that 

has been discharged. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2012). He contends that the 

bankruptcy discharge applies to any claim for attorney fees and 

costs that could have been fairly or reasonably contemplated during 

the bankruptcy case. We are not persuaded. 

¶ 13 Bankruptcy Code § 524(a)(1) voids any judgment at any time 

obtained for a determination of a personal liability of the debtor for 
7 

a debt discharged, as relevant here, under § 727, 11 U.S.C. 

§ 524(a)(1) (2012). A debt is not dischargeable, however, for “a fine, 

penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a 

governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary 

loss, other than a tax penalty.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (2012). The 

fine, penalty, or forfeiture may be criminal or civil in nature. In re 

Jensen, 395 B.R. 472, 480 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008). We review 

whether a particular debt meets the elements of § 523(a)(7), which 

is a question of law, de novo. Id. 

¶ 14 First, Hopp argues that, under In re Castellino Villas, A. K. F. 

LLC, 836 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2016), the attorney fees award 

constitutes a prepetition debt which was fairly contemplatable prior 

to the bankruptcy discharge, and therefore is subject to the 

discharge. In Castellino Villas, the Ninth Circuit reasoned as 

follows: 

When parties engage in prepetition litigation 

that could lead to an award of attorneys’ fees, 

they may fairly contemplate that the prevailing 

party will be awarded those fees. Therefore, a 

creditor’s contingent claim to such fees is 

discharged in bankruptcy, even if some fees 

are incurred post-petition. But when the 

prepetition litigation is resolved in bankruptcy 

so that any claim (including a contingent claim 
8 

for attorneys’ fees) against the debtor would be 

discharged, we cannot say that the debtor’s 

affirmative action to commence what amounts 

to “a whole new course of litigation,” was in the 

fair contemplation of the parties when the 

debtor filed a bankruptcy petition. Rather, the 

debtor’s decision to eschew the fresh start 

provided by bankruptcy and engage in new 

litigation is more akin to post-petition conduct 

that, by definition, was not in the fair 

contemplation of the parties prepetition.

Id. at 1035-36 (quoting Siegel v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 143 

F.3d 525, 534 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

¶ 15 Castellino Villas is inapposite here. The claims underlying the 

attorney fees award in Castellino Villas arose out of dischargeable 

debts. That is not true in this case. Hopp concedes that the award 

of penalties under the CCPA and CFDCPA is nondischargeable. The 

United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado has 

held that a civil penalty imposed under the CCPA is a 

nondischargeable penalty within the meaning of § 523(a)(7). 

Jensen, 395 B.R. at 482. Federal courts are divided on the issue of 

whether an award of attorney fees and costs may be held 

nondischargeable under § 523(a)(7). However, the bankruptcy 

courts look to state law to reach this determination. Id. at 487. 
9 

¶ 16 The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado has 

considered the CCPA’s attorney fees provision and noted that 

Colorado cases hold it serves both punitive and deterrent purposes. 

Id. (citing Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224, 231 (Colo. 1998)). The fact 

that such an award also serves to enable enforcement by defraying 

the government’s expenses did not change the primary purpose of 

the provision. Id. at 487-88. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court 

concluded that an award of attorney fees made under the CCPA’s 

mandatory provision was sufficiently penal to constitute a “fine, 

penalty or forfeiture” under § 523(a)(7) and was not dischargeable. 

Id. at 488. We are persuaded by the Bankruptcy Court’s 

interpretation of the CCPA’s attorney fees provision and apply it 

here. 

¶ 17 We further note that there is no reason to believe that the 

subsections of the CFDCPA allowing an award of attorney fees and 

costs payable to the administrator do not serve the same penal 

purposes as the CCPA. The CFDCPA serves a similar purpose as 

the CCPA, namely consumer protection. See Flood v. Mercantile 

Adjustment Bureau, LLC, 176 P.3d 769, 773 (Colo. 2008) (The 

FDCPA has the “remedial purpose of protecting consumers against 
10 

debt collection practices that take advantage of gullible, unwary, 

trustful, or cowed persons who receive a debt collection 

communication.”). Thus, we conclude that the trial court’s attorney 

fees awards made under the CCPA and the CFDCPA are not 

dischargeable, and we decline to order that they be vacated as void 

under 11 U.S.C. § 524. 

IV. Attorney Fees for Unpursued or Unsuccessful Claims 

¶ 18 Defendants contend the trial court erred when it failed to 

reduce plaintiffs’ attorney fees award by the amount of any fees 

incurred for their unpursued and unsuccessful claims. We 

disagree. 

¶ 19 “We review the reasonableness of a trial court’s award of 

attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. The determination of 

reasonableness of attorney fees is a question of fact for the trial 

court, and its ruling will not be disturbed on review unless patently 

erroneous and unsupported by the evidence.” Payan v. Nash Finch 

Co., 2012 COA 135M, ¶ 16 (citation omitted). 

¶ 20 Where a plaintiff brings multiple claims, but is only successful 

on some claims, we apply a method of claim segregation to 

determine to what extent an award of attorney fees can be awarded 
11 

under a fee-shifting statute. See Rocky Mountain Festivals, Inc. v. 

Parsons Corp., 242 P.3d 1067, 1073 (Colo. 2010). Where a plaintiff 

brought multiple claims involving a common core of facts or based 

on related legal theories, counsel’s work on an individual claim 

could not be distinguished from work on the entirety of the case. 

Id. (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)). 

Therefore, the court concluded that reducing the fee award for work 

on unsuccessful claims would be inappropriate. Id. However, 

where a plaintiff brought distinctly different claims for relief based 

on different facts and legal theories, and “the litigation could be 

justly conceived as a ‘series of discrete claims’ that had been ‘raised 

in separate lawsuits,’” an award of fees only for the plaintiff’s 

successful claims would be both practicable and appropriate to 

effect the purpose of the fee-shifting statute. Id. (quoting Hensley, 

461 U.S. at 434-35). 

¶ 21 Defendants objected to portions of plaintiffs’ attorney fee 

request. Defendants argued that plaintiffs failed to subtract from 

their request fees incurred in the pursuit of the following claims: 

 The claim alleging Hopp and the law firms billed 

incorrectly for foreclosure commitments that did not 
12 

result in title policies through LSI Default Title and 

Closing, also known as LSI Title Agency, which was 

unsuccessful at trial. 

 The claim alleging defendants misrepresented a fifteen 

dollar “filing cost” in bids and cure statements, which the 

trial court dismissed at summary judgment. 

 The claim, which plaintiffs withdrew prior to trial, that 

the law firms misrepresented $275 as a title search 

report fee on its files from servicer Fannie Mae. 

 The claim, which was also withdrawn prior to trial, that 

the law firms charged a standard C.R.C.P. 120 filing fee 

on foreclosure files for files even when the client was 

exempt from court filing costs. 

¶ 22 In its order, the trial court ruled as follows: 

The unpursued and unsuccessful claims and 

the successful claims involved a common core 

of facts and were based on related legal 

theories. Since the legal work on the 

unpursued and unsuccessful claims could not 

be distinguished from the work done on the 

whole of litigation, a reduction of the fee would 

be inappropriate. . . . Moreover, these 

unpursued and unsuccessful claims represent 

a small fraction of the case. 
13 

We agree with the trial court’s reasoning. Plaintiffs’ claims involved 

a common core of facts: namely, that the law firms submitted 

unlawful and inflated charges for costs paid by homeowners. All of 

plaintiffs’ claims were brought under the same legal theories, 

applying provisions of the CCPA and CFDCPA. Even though the 

unsuccessful and unpursued claims alleged different instances of 

misrepresentation, plaintiffs’ theory on each claim was similar — 

namely, that Hopp and the law firms, with the cooperation of their 

affiliated title firms, engaged in a general practice in their 

foreclosure work of billing loan servicers (and accordingly, 

homeowners in default) for certain costs that were not actually 

incurred. 

¶ 23 On the LSI claim, which proceeded to trial, plaintiffs alleged 

that Hopp and the law firms engaged in the same kind of 

misrepresentation with foreclosure commitment billing as it alleged 

in the claims in which it prevailed. The only difference between this 

claim and the successful claims was that, in the acts underlying the 

LSI claim, plaintiffs alleged that Hopp and the law firms ordered 

title commitments through LSI, rather than through its own 

affiliated title companies. 
14 

¶ 24 As for the claims withdrawn prior to trial, plaintiffs alleged 

that defendants similarly misrepresented other fees which they were 

not authorized to collect. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants 

routinely misrepresented the cost of a Fannie Mae title search 

report by always charging clients the maximum cost allowed by 

Fannie Mae, even though the routine market rate for the product 

was less than half that amount. Plaintiffs further alleged that 

defendants charged clients filing fees for standard Rule 120 cases, 

even when the client for whom the law firm filed the motion to 

authorize sale was exempt from filing costs by the state. Both of 

these claims were based on plaintiffs’ theory that defendants, as a 

routine practice in their foreclosure work, billed their loan servicer 

clients (and, accordingly, homeowners in default) for costs that were 

not actually incurred. The only difference between the unpursued 

claims and the successful claims was the specific category of the 

allegedly fraudulent costs being billed. 

¶ 25 Accordingly, the trial court’s decision to decline to reduce the 

attorney fees award on the basis of claim segregation was not 

patently erroneous or unsupported by the evidence presented at 
15 

trial. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See 

Payan, ¶ 16. 

V. Lori Hopp’s Fees Request 

¶ 26 Lori Hopp contends the trial court erred in rejecting her 

argument that she was entitled to her attorney fees and costs under 

sections 13-17-101 to -106 for defending against plaintiffs’ 

eventually unsuccessful claims against her. We disagree. 

¶ 27 We review a trial court’s decision whether to award attorney 

fees under section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2017, for an abuse of 

discretion. Anderson v. Pursell, 244 P.3d 1188, 1193 (Colo. 2010). 

“A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is ‘manifestly 

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.’” Id. at 1194 (quoting Colo. Nat’l 

Bank of Denver v. Friedman, 846 P.2d 159, 167 (Colo. 1993)).

¶ 28 A trial court is authorized to award “reasonable attorney fees 

against any attorney or party who has brought or defended a civil 

action, either in whole or in part, that the court determines lacked 

substantial justification.” § 13-17-102(2). An action lacks 

substantial justification if it is “substantially frivolous, substantially 

groundless, or substantially vexatious.” § 13-17-102(4). 
16 

¶ 29 Lori Hopp does not contend the claims against her were 

substantially vexatious or frivolous; rather, she argues that the 

claims were substantially groundless. A claim is groundless “if the 

allegations in the complaint, while sufficient to survive a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim, are not supported by any 

credible evidence at trial.” Stepanek v. Delta Cty., 940 P.2d 364, 

369 (Colo. 1997). A claim is also considered groundless if there is 

no evidence supporting an essential element of a claim, even if there 

is evidence supporting other elements. See Ranta Constr., Inc. v. 

Anderson, 190 P.3d 835, 847 (Colo. App. 2008). “A losing position 

is not necessarily groundless for purposes of awarding attorney 

fees, nor is a claim groundless solely because the plaintiff failed to 

establish a prima facie case if there is some credible evidence to 

support the claim.” In re Estate of Owens, 2017 COA 53, ¶ 50. 

¶ 30 When granting an award of fees under section 13-17-102(2), 

the trial court must consider the factors set forth in section 13-17-

103, C.R.S. 2017, which “give context and content” to the court’s 

determination whether a fee award is appropriate. Munoz v. 

Measner, 247 P.3d 1031, 1034 (Colo. 2011). These include, as 

relevant here, 
17 

(a) [t]he extent of any effort made to determine 

the validity of any action or claim 

before [it] was asserted; 

(b) [t]he extent of any effort made after the 

commencement of an action to reduce the 

number of claims or defenses being asserted or 

to dismiss claims or defenses found not to be 

valid within an action; 

(c) [t]he availability of facts to assist a party in 

determining the validity of a claim or defense; 

. . . 

(f) [w]hether . . . issues of fact determinative of 

the validity of a party’s claim or defense were 

reasonably in conflict; [and] 

(g) [t]he extent to which the party prevailed 

with respect to the amount of and number of 

claims in controversy. 

§ 13-17-103(1). A trial court is required to discuss 

only those factors enumerated in section 13-17-103 that 

are relevant to the case, and need not make specific findings with 

respect to factors that are not specifically at issue. Anderson, 244 

P.3d at 1197. 

¶ 31 While the trial court concluded plaintiffs failed to prove their 

CCPA claim against Lori Hopp by a preponderance of the evidence, 

the court explicitly noted that it “did not find that the State failed to 

present any credible evidence in support of the claim.” (Emphasis 

added.) It further ruled: 
18 

The State’s claim against Ms. Hopp arose from 

a rational argument based on credible evidence 

and law; namely, as the 85 percent owner of 

National Title and an active participant in the 

entities’ businesses through her bookkeeping 

and accounting services at SafeHaus 

Financial, Ms. Hopp approved, directed, 

participated, or cooperated in its conduct. 

Further, the longtime executive vice president 

of National Title identified Ms. Hopp as a 

person of authority. 

In its order, the court cited case law indicating that a losing 

position is not necessarily groundless for the purpose of awarding 

attorney fees. 

¶ 32 The trial court considered whether plaintiffs contemplated the 

validity of their claims before the commencement of the action, and 

whether their claim was rational in light of the facts available at 

that time. Lori Hopp’s position within the companies affiliated with 

Hopp and his law firms, as well as her hands-on role in 

bookkeeping and accounting for those entities raised the question 

of her knowledge of the extent of the misrepresentations made in 

billing in foreclosure files that were the basis of all claims in this 

action. Lori Hopp’s knowledge determined, in large part, her 

liability under the CCPA. See Crowe v. Tull, 126 P.3d 196, 204 

(Colo. 2006) (to establish a violation of the CCPA, a plaintiff must 
19 

show the defendant knowingly engaged in a deceptive trade 

practice). The extent of Lori Hopp’s knowledge was a question of 

fact which plaintiffs could only fully develop through the 

presentation of evidence at trial. Thus, the trial court’s decision 

that plaintiffs’ CCPA claim against Lori Hopp was not substantially 

groundless was not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. 

¶ 33 Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

declined to award Lori Hopp’s attorney fees. 

VI. Conclusion 

¶ 34 The order is affirmed. 

JUDGE TAUBMAN and JUDGE HARRIS concur.