United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

February 1998 DRUG CONTROL

U.S. Counternarcotics

Efforts in Colombia

Face Continuing

Challenges

GAO/NSIAD-98-60

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-278692 

February 12, 1998

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

Chairman, Caucus on International

 Narcotics Control

United States Senate

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman

Chairman, Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert

Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security,

 International Affairs, and Criminal Justice

Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

House of Representatives

As you requested, we reviewed the status of drug control efforts in Colombia and the impact of

the 1996 and 1997 U.S. decisions to decertify Colombia as a drug-fighting ally. Specifically, we

examined (1) the nature of the drug-trafficking threat from Colombia; (2) the political,

economic, and operational implications of the decertification decisions; and (3) U.S. efforts to

plan and manage counternarcotics activities in Colombia.

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report

until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to appropriate congressional

committees, federal agencies discussed in the report, and other interested parties.

This report was prepared under the direction of Jess T. Ford, Associate Director, International

Relations and Trade Issues, who may be contacted on (202) 512-4268 if you or your staff have

any questions. Other major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Benjamin F. Nelson

Director, International Relations

 and Trade Issues
Executive Summary

Purpose The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, requires the President to

annually certify that major drug producing and transit countries have

cooperated fully with the United States or have taken adequate steps on

their own to achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives

established by the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. If the President determines

that a country is not meeting these standards, most forms of U.S.

economic and military assistance must be terminated. On March 1, 1996,

and again on February 27, 1997, the President determined that Colombia

was not fully cooperating with the United States or taking adequate steps

on its own to combat drug-trafficking activities. As a result of these

decisions, the United States implemented mandatory economic sanctions

and canceled or delayed millions of dollars worth of U.S. counternarcotics

assistance to Colombia.

The Chairmen, Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs,

and Criminal Justice, House Committee on Government Reform and

Oversight; the House Committee on International Relations; and the

Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, asked GAO to review the

efforts of U.S. and Colombian agencies, principally the Colombian police

and military, to conduct counternarcotics activities in Colombia.

Specifically, GAO examined (1) the nature of the drug-trafficking threat;

(2) the political, economic, and operational implications of the U.S.

decertification decisions; and (3) U.S. efforts to plan and manage

counternarcotics activities in Colombia.

Background Colombia is the world’s leading producer and distributor of cocaine and a

major source of heroin consumed in the United States. For the past two

decades, the United States has supported Colombia’s efforts to reduce

drug-trafficking activities and to stem the flow of illegal drugs to the

United States. As part of a national strategy for reducing the production of

and trafficking in illegal drugs worldwide, the United States set

counternarcotics objectives for Colombia that include increasing

Colombia’s political will and capabilities to destroy major drug-trafficking

organizations, eradicate drug crops, conduct enforcement efforts, and

strengthen its institutions to support a full range of counternarcotics

activities. To meet these objectives, the U.S Embassy in Colombia, through

its various components, including the State Department’s Narcotics Affairs

Section, law enforcement agencies, the Department of Defense, and

various other components, established an annual program plan.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Executive Summary

The Department of State funds most of the specific plan activities as part

of its International Narcotics Control Program. In addition, the

Department of Defense has provided some types of assistance and

equipment. Since fiscal year 1990, the United States has programmed

approximately $731 million in assistance and equipment to support

Colombian police and military units involved in counternarcotics

activities.

Results in Brief The narcotics threat from Colombia remains and may be growing, and U.S.

efforts in Colombia continue to face major challenges. The challenges GAO

identifies in this report are similar to those it has identified over the past

10 years. The United States has had limited success in persuading the

Colombian government to take aggressive actions to address corruption

within the government, which limits its ability to arrest and convict

traffickers. This lack of political will led to the President’s decision to

decertify Colombia in 1996 and 1997. For its part, the United States has

had difficulty implementing a well-planned and coordinated strategy to

assist Colombian authorities. Decisions on the provision of U.S. assistance

and equipment have been delayed for a number of reasons, and

coordination both within the Department of State and between State and

other involved federal agencies has often been poor or lacking. These

problems have hampered U.S. efforts to combat illegal narcotics

trafficking in Colombia.

According to recent State Department and Drug Enforcement

Administration reports, the cultivation of coca leaf in Colombia increased

by 50 percent between 1994 and 1996, and the prevalence of Colombian

heroin on the streets of the United States has steadily increased.

Significant obstacles, including widespread corruption and extensive

violence, impede U.S. and Colombian counternarcotics efforts. Colombian

insurgent groups have further complicated the situation, as they are

increasingly involved in drug-trafficking activities, making it difficult for

Colombian police and military forces to reduce drug-trafficking activities

within their borders.

Since the initial decertification decision in March 1996, Colombia has

taken several actions to address U.S. concerns, including passing laws to

hinder drug-trafficking and signing a maritime agreement with the United

States to allow greater pursuit of drug-trafficking suspects. It has also

continued to eradicate illicit drug crops and interdict drug-trafficking

activities. U.S. officials believe Colombia must now fully implement newly

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Executive Summary

passed laws on asset forfeiture, money-laundering, and trafficker

sentencing and show a willingness to investigate and punish corruption.

Decertification had little effect on Colombia’s economy because the

President chose not to apply discretionary sanctions against the country.

However, mandatory economic sanctions required by the decertification

decisions led to the termination of some U.S. economic aid and may have

hurt some U.S. businesses.

At the initial decertification decision in March 1996, the State Department

was not prepared to determine whether some programmed assistance

intended for the Colombian police and military could continue to be

provided. It took State, in conjunction with other executive branch

agencies, about 8 months to decide what could be provided. As a

consequence, about $35 million in programmed counternarcotics

assistance was canceled or delayed. However, the overall operational

implications of the cutoff on U.S. and Colombian counternarcotics

program is not clear. The Colombian police and military were able to

maintain or increase some types of operations by purchasing parts and

equipment on the commercial market that were once available through the

Department of Defense. Also, the U.S. Embassy helped fund some of the

activities with resources taken from other projects. However, Colombian

police told GAO that some operations could not be conducted because

certain types of assistance were not available.

The U.S. counternarcotics effort in Colombia has continued to experience

management challenges. For example, State and the U.S. Embassy were

unprepared for the financial consequences of a 1996 decision to expand

aerial crop eradication. Due to unplanned expenditures to support the

eradication effort, other Embassy counternarcotics activities, including

interdiction efforts, demand reduction within Colombia, and efforts to

strengthen Colombian law enforcement institutions, were scaled back or

lost support. Moreover, State did not take adequate steps to ensure that

equipment included in a 1996 $40-million assistance package from Defense

Department inventories could be integrated into the Embassy’s plans and

strategies to support the Colombian police and military counternarcotics

forces. As a result, the assistance package contained items that had limited

immediate usefulness to the Colombian police and military and will

require substantial additional funding to become operational. Moreover,

the military assistance was also delayed for 10 months because State and

the Embassy could not reach agreement with the government of Colombia

over acceptable end-use provisions to ensure that the assistance was not

being provided to units suspected of human rights violations.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Executive Summary

Principal Findings

Drug-Trafficking Activities

Are Expanding in

Colombia

The narcotics threat from Colombia continues and may be expanding.

Colombia provides almost three-quarters of the cocaine consumed in the

United States. In addition, according to a September 1996 Drug

Enforcement Administration report, increases in the amount of Colombian

heroin seized in the United States have been significant. The Department

of State reported in March 1997 that the amount of coca under cultivation

in Colombia increased from 44,700 hectares to 67,200 hectares, or about

50 percent, between 1994 and 1996. U.S. officials attribute this increase

partially to successes in reducing drug-trafficking activities in Peru, where

coca cultivation decreased by 18 percent.

According to the Drug Enforcement Administration, new cartels and

drug-trafficking groups have emerged as major drug-trafficking

organizations in Colombia. Furthermore, insurgent groups have

increasingly funded their activities through drug-trafficking. The two

groups posing the most serious threats to internal security are the

Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces and the National Liberation

Army, with a combined strength of 10,000 to 15,000 personnel. According

to a 1997 U.S. interagency report, Revolutionary Force units are involved

in growing coca, protecting coca fields from eradication, and providing

security for drug-processing facilities of various drug-trafficking

organizations. Recent reports also indicate that the two insurgent groups

are enhancing their capabilities and are gaining strength throughout the

country.

The Political, Economic,

and Operational

Implications of U.S.

Decertification of

Colombia

Colombia Has Taken Some

Actions to Address U.S.

Concerns

Since the initial presidential decertification decision in March 1996,

Colombia has taken steps to address some U.S. concerns, including

(1) enacting a new law allowing for the seizure of drug traffickers’ assets,

(2) approving legislation increasing sentences for drug-trafficking and

money-laundering activities, (3) signing a maritime agreement allowing the

United States to pursue suspected drug traffickers, and (4) passing a new

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Executive Summary

extradition law. However, State Department and U.S. law enforcement

officials say that Colombia must demonstrate greater political will by

taking certain actions, of which the key ones are

• addressing the pervasive public corruption that continues to weaken the

government and undermine law enforcement activities;

• taking additional steps to improve prison security; and

• fully implementing the newly passed laws on asset forfeiture, 

money-laundering, and trafficker sentencing.

According to State officials, these factors will be considered as part of the

1998 certification process.

Economic Sanctions May Have

Hurt U.S. Commercial Interests

The mandatory sanctions from decertification required the termination of

official U.S. export and investment support of certain transactions and

may have resulted in business losses. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

and the Narcotics Control Trade Act of 1974 contain both mandatory and

discretionary sanctions when the President denies certification to a

drug-producing or drug-transiting nation. Mandatory sanctions include the

termination of most forms of foreign assistance and bilateral loans, and a

U.S. vote against multilateral development bank loans to the decertified

country. Counternarcotics assistance provided through State’s

International Narcotics Control Program and disaster and humanitarian

aid are not subject to the restrictions. Discretionary sanctions include the

loss of trade preferences, the suspension of sugar quotas, tariff penalties,

and the curtailment of transportation arrangements. According to State

and U.S. Embassy officials, there was no intent to use discretionary

economic sanctions to harm Colombia’s economy because the Colombian

private sector is viewed as a positive influence in strengthening the

government of Colombia’s resolve to combat drug-trafficking activities.

The mandatory sanctions required by decertification have been cited as

harming U.S. business activity in Colombia. The State Department

reported that the 1996 decision required the Overseas Private Investment

Corporation and the Export-Import Bank to freeze about $1.5 billion in

investment credits and loans for U.S. companies investing in Colombia.

Also, a 1996 survey by the Council of American Enterprises—an American

business consortium in Colombia—indicated that its member companies

lost $875 million in sales because of the sanctions. State officials indicated

they have not conducted any in-depth assessment of the economic

consequences of decertification and could not validate the information in

the survey by the Council of American Enterprises.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Executive Summary

Overall Operational Impact of

Delays of Assistance Is Unclear

As a result of the initial decertification decision in March 1996,

approximately $35 million in U.S. counternarcotics aid was delayed or

canceled. The State Department, in conjunction with other executive

branch agencies, took about 8 months to decide how much of this aid

could continue to be provided. During this period, the United States did

not provide Colombia with some aviation spare parts, vehicles, or

ammunition and funding to repair a Colombian counternarcotics aircraft.

The overall impact of the assistance delays on Colombian

counternarcotics operations is unclear. According to U.S. and Colombian

officials, most counternarcotics operations were maintained by relying on

other resources. However, Colombian police officials indicated that they

could not conduct some planned operations due to the U.S. aid cutoff and

that some equipment purchased from the commercial market was more

expensive than equipment that could have been purchased through U.S.

military assistance channels.

The aid canceled or delayed included

• up to $30 million in counternarcotics Foreign Military Financing grant

assistance (helicopter spare parts, ammunition, and explosives);

• about $1.4 million in planned U.S. International Military Education and

Training assistance for Colombian police and military units involved in

counternarcotics operations: and

• about $3.6 million in counternarcotics assistance to the Colombian police

and military to be provided under the Foreign Military Sales program and

the State Department International Narcotics Control program.

The Foreign Military Sales and State assistance was released in October

1996, but the Foreign Military Financing grant aid and some military

training was frozen until August 1997, when the President released it as

part of a national security waiver.

According to U.S. Embassy and Colombian officials, the delays in U.S.

assistance prevented the Colombian police and military units from

receiving some U.S.-funded military training and from conducting some

planned counternarcotics activities. However, data from the Colombian

National Police shows that they were able to operate their interdiction and

eradication helicopters at higher levels from March 1996 to June 1997,

compared to the 2 months before decertification. U.S. military reports

indicated that each of the services conducted more counternarcotics

operations and seized more narcotics during 1996 than in 1995. The U.S.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Executive Summary

Embassy reported in February 1998 that cocaine seizures have increased

and that 42,000 hectares of coca were sprayed during 1997.

The impacts from assistance delays were minimized because the

Departments of State and Defense and the Colombian police and military

used other funding and procurement sources to obtain critical support

necessary to continue operations. Both the Colombian police and military

purchased spare parts directly from various commercial sources and used

their existing inventories to maintain their operational readiness rates.

These spare parts, however, were substantially more expensive than they

would have been had the Colombians had access to U.S. military

assistance. For example, the Colombian police reported that certain

helicopter parts bought commercially cost 150 percent more than parts

obtained through U.S. military sources. In addition, the U.S. Embassy used

some State and Defense funds to support Colombian police and military

eradication and interdiction efforts.

U.S. Embassy officials said that while the use of commercial and other

sources had enabled the Colombian police and military to continue

counternarcotics operations after the suspension of U.S. assistance, the

higher expenditures for items and effectiveness of operations could not be

sustained over a long period.

Planning and Management

Problems Hamper U.S.

Counternarcotics Efforts

in Colombia

State and the U.S. Embassy

Were Not Prepared to Manage

Increases in Aerial Eradication

In October 1996, the State Department, through its Bureau of International

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, decided to significantly increase

the level of U.S. support for and participation in Colombia’s aerial

eradication of coca and opium poppy, primarily to improve upon the

eradication results of 1995 and 1996. However, the Narcotics Affairs

Section at the U.S. Embassy was unprepared for the escalation in costs to

support this effort and was unable to fully support other planned

counternarcotics programs meant to achieve all of the Embassy’s

counternarcotics objectives.

During fiscal year 1997, State increased the number of aircraft and U.S.

contractor personnel involved in the aerial eradication program. The

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Executive Summary

contractor personnel’s role also changed from being primarily responsible

for training Colombian pilots and mechanics to directly maintaining

aircraft and actively participating in planning and conducting eradication

operations.

Throughout fiscal year 1997, the Narcotics Affairs Section continually

adjusted its estimates for the amount of funding needed to support its

program efforts from about $19 million in the beginning of the fiscal year

to $34 million by July 1997. According to various U.S. Embassy reports,

these changes were caused by unforeseen costs that the Embassy incurred

as the result of the State Department’s decision to increase support for

aerial eradication. For example, the Narcotics Affairs Section identified

$3 million to $4 million needed to upgrade security for contractor

personnel that was not included in the Embassy’s original budget.

In July 1997, the Embassy’s Narcotics Affairs Section informed the State

Department that because of the expanded aerial eradication effort, it had

to reallocate $11 million from other planned counternarcotics programs.

The Section went on to report that it could not continue to support

programs for Colombian police interdiction units, demand reduction, and

efforts to strengthen Colombian law enforcement institutions. Each of

these programs supports the Embassy’s program plan to fulfill U.S.

counternarcotics objectives in Colombia.

Drawdown Assistance Package

Was Poorly Planned

On September 30, 1996, the President, in accordance with 

section 506(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act, notified Congress that

Colombia would be provided about $40 million in assistance from Defense

Department inventories. However, the package was hastily developed and

did not include sufficient information on specific Colombian requirements,

the ability of the host country to operate and maintain the equipment, or

the funding necessary from the United States or Colombia to support it.

For example, Defense Department and Embassy officials said they were

given little time by the National Security Council to determine what

equipment was best suited to meet the needs of the Colombian police and

military counternarcotics forces. The package contained several items

(C-26 aircraft, patrol boats, and utility landing craft) that did not meet the

priority needs of the Colombian police and military. In addition, because

much of the equipment was not operationally ready for use, substantial

unbudgeted funding would be required for the equipment to be of value to

the Colombians. For example:

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Executive Summary

• Five C-26 aircraft included in the package could cost at least $3 million

each to modify to perform the surveillance mission desired by the

Colombian police and another $1 million to operate and maintain annually.

• Twelve UH-1H helicopters, delivered in May 1997, had an average of only

10 hours of available flying time left before substantial maintenance was

required. By July 1997, the Colombian police reported that only 2 of the 12

helicopters were operational.

• Six patrol boats required $600,000 to make them operational, and two of

the boats were missing key parts and operational panels.

In addition to these shortcomings, the military assistance was delayed for

10 months while the State Department and Embassy negotiated end-use

monitoring agreements with the government of Colombia to ensure that

the aid was not being provided to units suspected of human rights

violations. According to Embassy officials, State took 4-1/2 months to

provide guidance to the Embassy on the terms to be presented to the

Colombian government. The delay after that was partially due to the

Colombian government’s unwillingness to finalize an acceptable end-use

agreement.

Recommendation GAO recommends that the Secretary of State, in close consultation with the

Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council, take steps to

ensure that future assistance authorized under section 506(a)(2) of the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is, to the maximum extent possible,

compatible with the priority requirements identified in U.S.

counternarcotics programs and that adequate support resources are

available to maximize the benefits of the assistance.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In written and subsequent oral comments to a draft of this report, the

Department of State said GAO’s report was generally fair and well-balanced.

State believed the report could be improved by recognizing that the results

of its programs were very effective, as shown by the higher rates of

eradication, more seizures, and more support for key Colombian

institutions. State indicated that the section 506(a)(2) assistance program

to Colombia involved extensive interagency consultation prior to the 1996

decision. However, State officials subsequently told GAO that some items,

such as the C-26 aircraft, were added to the package at the last minute and

that adequate planning for equipment support requirements was not done

prior to the decision. State officials supported GAO’s recommendation and

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Executive Summary

acknowledged that better planning of Defense drawdown assistance is

desirable. (State’s comments are reprinted in app. I.)

GAO acknowledges in the report that State has reported increases in coca

eradication and cocaine seizures in 1997. However, management problems

between Washington and the U.S. Embassy might have been avoided if

State and other agencies had better planned eradication and assistance

efforts. GAO continues to believe that better planning and coordination of

Defense drawdown assistance and support requirements are needed to

optimize assistance provided to Colombia.

In written comments, the Department of Defense concurred with the

content of the report and agreed with GAO’s recommendation that steps be

taken to ensure future assistance authorized under section 506(a)(2) is

compatible with priority counternarcotics programs in Colombia (see 

app. II).

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

14

The U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Colombia 14

U.S. Agencies Involved in Counternarcotics Programs in

Colombia

16

Colombian Organizations Involved in Counternarcotics Activities 18

Certification of Drug-Producing Countries 18

Prior GAO Reports Identify Numerous Obstacles to U.S. and

Colombian Antidrug Programs

20

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 21

Chapter 2 

Drug-Trafficking

Activities Are

Expanding in

Colombia

22

Drug Cultivation and Trafficking Activities Are Increasing 22

Involvement of Insurgent Groups in Drug-Trafficking Is

Increasing

23

Conclusion 25

Chapter 3 

Political, Economic,

and Operational

Implications of the

U.S. Decertification of

Colombia

26

Colombia Has Made Some Progress but Has Not Fulfilled All U.S.

Counternarcotics Objectives

26

Economic Sanctions May Have Hurt U.S. Commercial Interests 27

Operational Implications of Assistance Delays Are Unclear 28

Chapter 4 

Planning and

Management

Problems Hamper

U.S. Counternarcotics

Efforts in Colombia

33

The State Department and the U.S. Embassy Were Not

Adequately Prepared to Manage the Consequences of Increases in

Aerial Eradication

33

Drawdown Assistance Package Was Poorly Planned 35

Conclusions 40

Recommendation 40

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of State 42

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense 50

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Contents

Appendix III: Major Contributors to This Report 51

Tables Table 1.1: Sources of Funding for Counternarcotics Assistance

Programs

15

Table 1.2: U.S. Counternarcotics Support for Colombian Police

and Military (fiscal years 1990-97)

16

Table 3.1: U.S. Assistance Canceled or Delayed by the March 1996

Decertification Decision

29

Table 4.1: Section 506(a)(2) Counternarcotics Assistance

Planned for Colombia

37

Figure Figure 2.1: Areas Where Illicit Drug Crops Are Grown and

Insurgents Operate

24

Abbreviations

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

ELN National Liberation Army

FARC Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces

FMF Foreign Military Financing

FMS Foreign Military Sales

IMET International Military Education and Training

INC International Narcotics Control

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Colombia is the world’s leading producer and distributor of cocaine and a

major source of heroin consumed in the United States. For the past two

decades, the United States has supported Colombia’s efforts to reduce

drug-trafficking activities and to stem the flow of illegal drugs to the

United States. Various U.S. agencies, including the Departments of State

and Defense and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), are

responsible for programs through which counternarcotics assistance is

provided to Colombian police and military units. From fiscal year 1990

through fiscal year 1997, the United States provided or planned to provide

these units with assistance worth approximately $731 million.

The U.S.

Counternarcotics

Strategy for Colombia

The United States has supported counternarcotics activities in Colombia

since the 1970s. Recently, the United States established three major

counternarcotics objectives to increase Colombia’s political will and

capabilities to (1) destroy major drug-trafficking organizations, (2) reduce

the availability of drugs through the eradication of illicit drug crops and

enforcement efforts, and (3) strengthen Colombian institutions to enable

them to support a full range of interdiction activities. These objectives

support the international goals in the U.S. national drug-control strategy.

The U.S. Embassy program plan for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 focused on

the eradication of illicit drug crops, the interdiction of narcotics and

precursor chemicals, justice sector reform, the reduction of

money-laundering activities and the seizure of drug-related assets, drug

awareness and drug use reduction within Colombia, and infrastructure

development.

Data provided by the Departments of State and Defense indicated that

during fiscal years 1990-97 the United States provided Colombia

approximately $731 million in counternarcotics assistance to support

Colombia’s eradication and interdiction efforts. As shown in table 1.1,

various sources of funding were used to program this assistance.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Table 1.1: Sources of Funding for

Counternarcotics Assistance

Programs

Source of assistance Type of assistance

International Narcotics

Control (INC) Program

Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

Program

Foreign Military Financing

(FMF) Program 

International Military

Education and Training

(IMET) Program

Section 506 (a)(2) 

Excess defense articles

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorizes this State

Department program, which provides assistance to

countries to combat the production and trafficking of illicit

narcotics overseas.

The Arms Export Control Act authorizes the Defense

Department to sell U.S. defense articles and services to

eligible countries. The countries may procure items using

their own funds, U.S. grant funds, or U.S. loan funds.

The Arms Export Control Act authorizes the Defense

Department to provide grant and loan funds to friendly

countries to improve their defense capabilities through

the acquisition of U.S. defense articles and services. 

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorizes the

provision of grants for professional military education and

management and technical training to students from

allied and friendly nations. 

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorizes the

President to approve the provision of U.S. military goods

and services to a foreign country for counternarcotics

assistance when it is in the U.S. national interest.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorizes the

Defense Department to provide excess equipment to the

governments of major drug-producing countries.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Table 1.2 presents the funding for these programs.

Table 1.2: U.S. Counternarcotics Support for Colombian Police and Military (Fiscal Years 1990-97) 

Dollars in millions

Fiscal year INC Programa FMS Program FMF Program

IMET

Program Section 506

Excess defense

articles Total

1990 $20.0 $3.7 $71.7 $1.5 $20.0 $3.8 $120.7

1991 20.0 10.2 47.0 2.6 0 7.1 86.9

1992 23.4 14.3 47.0 2.3 7.0 3.2 97.2

1993 25.0 14.6 26.0b 3.0 0 0 68.6

1994 20.0 67.6 7.7b 0.9 0 0 96.2

1995 18.9 21.9 10.0c 0.6 0 0 51.4

1996 22.9 10.4 0 0.1 40.5 0 73.9

1997 46.6 75.0 0 0.6 14.2 0 136.4

Total $196.8 $$217.7d $209.4 $11.6 $81.7 $14.1 $731.3

aFigures for fiscal years 1990-94 do not include State-supported aviation costs.

bPart of this assistance was frozen until August 1997.

cAll of this assistance was frozen until August 1997.

dFigures may include some FMS financed by the government of Colombia for other than

counternarcotics purposes.

Source: Departments of State and Defense.

U.S. Agencies

Involved in

Counternarcotics

Programs in Colombia

The Office of National Drug Control Policy is responsible for developing

the President’s national drug control strategy and coordinating the funding

of the federal agencies that implement programs to support the strategy. In

Colombia, the primary federal agencies involved in counternarcotics

programs are the Departments of State and Defense and DEA. Other

agencies that implement portions of the U.S. national drug control strategy

in Colombia are the U.S. Agency for International Development and

various U.S. intelligence agencies.

Department of State In the State Department, the Assistant Secretary for International

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is responsible for formulating and

implementing the international narcotics control policy, coordinating the

narcotics control activities of all U.S. agencies overseas, and overseeing

the INC Program. In 1996, the State Department incorporated

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 1 

Introduction

counternarcotics assistance that had been provided from other sources,

such as the FMF Program and economic development assistance provided

by the U.S. Agency for International Development, into the INC Program.

The State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs manages an air wing program through which it

provides funds to support eradication and interdiction operations in

several countries, including Colombia. The Bureau has contracted with

Dyncorp to provide logistical, operational and training support for these

operations.

The Narcotics Affairs Section at the U.S. Embassy manages the INC

Program. The Section provides equipment and training, operational

support, and technical assistance and coordinates with Colombian

agencies involved in counternarcotics activities.

Congress appropriated $230 million for State’s worldwide INC program for

fiscal year 1998. Of that amount, an estimated $30 million will be used to

support counternarcotics activities in Colombia, and an estimated

$50 million will be used to provide the Colombian police with new and

upgraded helicopters.

Department of Defense In the Defense Department, the Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy

and Support and the Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency

are primarily responsible for planning and providing equipment and

training to Colombia’s military and law enforcement agencies. The U.S.

Southern Command is the Defense Department’s principal liaison with

Colombia for coordinating the administration of U.S. counternarcotics aid.

In Colombia, the Department’s aid is primarily managed by the Embassy’s

U.S. Military Group. The Group’s responsibilities include coordinating

security assistance programs with the Colombian military and other U.S.

agencies involved in counternarcotics operations and monitoring

assistance provided to Colombian military units to ensure that it is being

used for counternarcotics purposes.

Drug Enforcement

Administration

DEA is the principal federal agency responsible for coordinating drug

enforcement intelligence overseas and conducting all drug enforcement

operations. DEA’s objectives are to reduce the flow of drugs into the United

States through bilateral criminal investigations; collect intelligence on

organizations involved in drug-trafficking; and support worldwide

narcotics investigations covering such areas as money-laundering, control

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 1 

Introduction

of chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics, and other financial

operations related to illegal drug activities. DEA also provides training to

Colombian law enforcement personnel through State’s INC Program.

Colombian

Organizations

Involved in

Counternarcotics

Activities

Most U.S. counternarcotics assistance has been used to assist both

Colombian National Police units and various military units involved in

operations to interdict drugs and eradicate drug crops and to support

other Colombian governmental entities that implement money-laundering

and asset forfeiture laws and investigate drug-trafficking organizations.

The Colombian National Police is the primary organization responsible for

interdiction and eradication operations, primarily through its Directorate

for Anti-Narcotics. The Colombian armed forces also support

counternarcotics activities, primarily in support of police counternarcotics

operations.

Certification of

Drug-Producing

Countries

The counternarcotics certification process, as mandated by section 490 of

the Foreign Assistance Act, has been a legal requirement since 1986.1

Congress created the process out of concern that the executive branch

was not being tough enough in eliciting cooperation in the antinarcotics

effort from countries that were either the main source of illicit drugs or

through which drugs transited to the United States. A primary intent of the

certification process is to strengthen the political will of a country to

combat illegal drug-trafficking activities. Section 490 requires the

President to certify by March 1 of each year which major drug-producing

and transit countries cooperated fully with the United States or took

adequate steps on their own to achieve full compliance with the goals and

objectives established by the 1988 United Nations Convention Against

Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances during the

previous year. If a country has not met the statutory objectives, the

President can either deny certification and impose sanctions or grant a

vital national interests certification, which recognizes that the requirement

to use sanctions against a noncooperating country would threaten the vital

national interests of the United States.

Since the certification process was first established in 1986, the number of

nations subject to the certification process has ranged from 24 to 31. The

number of nations denied certification has ranged from 3 to 6 annually,

and the number of nations granted a vital national interest certification has

1

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2291j).

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 1 

Introduction

ranged from 1 to 6. In every year prior to 1995, Colombia received full

certification. However, Colombia was granted a vital national interests

certification in 1995 and was denied certification in 1996 and 1997. The

March 1, 1996, decision to deny certification to Colombia was unique in

that it was the first time certification was denied to a major U.S.

counternarcotics partner and aid recipient.

Mandated sanctions imposed against countries denied certification include

the termination of most forms of foreign assistance, and the United States

is required to vote against multilateral development bank loans to that

country. Types of aid affected include sales and financing under the Arms

Export Control Act; nonfood assistance under Public Law 480; financing

by the U.S. Export-Import Bank; and most other foreign assistance, with

the exception of counternarcotics assistance provided through State’s INC

Program and humanitarian aid.

The President is also authorized to invoke discretionary trade sanctions

against decertified countries. These sanctions include the removal of trade

preferences under the Andean Trade Preferences Act and the Generalized

System of Preferences, the suspension of sugar quotas, tariff penalties, and

the curtailment of transportation arrangements.

To determine whether a country is fully cooperating with the United

States, the State Department establishes goals that it expects each country

to address in meeting U.S. counternarcotics objectives. The goals are

provided to each affected country through diplomatic exchanges in either

late spring or early summer of the year preceding the certification

decision. In 1995 and 1996, the United States provided Colombia with

goals it used in assessing whether Colombia would be certified on 

March 1, 1996, and again on February 28, 1997. In both instances, the

President determined that Colombia was not fully cooperating with the

United States in meeting U.S. counternarcotics drug objectives.

The President reached his decisions to decertify Colombia primarily

because of the following factors:

• Throughout the Colombian government, corruption undermined the

counternarcotics efforts of law enforcement and judicial officials.

• Colombia did not take sufficient steps to strengthen its prison security. As

a result, captured cartel members continued to manage their activities

from prison.

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 1 

Introduction

• The Colombian government took no legislative steps to safeguard the

confidentiality of U.S.-provided investigative information.

• The Colombian government had not passed legislation to implement the

extradition treaty it signed with the United States in 1979 and did not

respond to the U.S. request for the extradition of four major drug

traffickers.

• The Colombian government could not reach agreement with the United

States on testing and using a more effective granular herbicides to

eradicate coca.

Prior GAO Reports

Identify Numerous

Obstacles to U.S. and

Colombian Antidrug

Programs

Over the past 10 years, we have reported on various elements of the U.S.

counterdrug effort in Colombia.2

 For example, we reported on major

obstacles within Colombia that hinder U.S. antidrug programs. These

obstacles include the limited ability of some Colombian agencies to plan

and implement an effective counternarcotics strategy, the increasing

insurgency and narcoterrorism activities that limit Colombia’s ability to

maintain a presence in some narcotics-producing and -processing areas of

the country, the expansion of drug cartel operations into the production

and distribution of heroin, and widespread corruption in the Colombian

government.

We also reported on various U.S. management problems that hindered the

implementation of effective counternarcotics programs in Colombia.

Specifically, we reported that U.S. officials lacked data needed to evaluate

program effectiveness in Colombia. Further, we reported that the

Departments of State and Defense were not coordinating their efforts with

each other and did not have complete oversight over U.S. counternarcotics

programs because they had not developed an adequate end-use monitoring

system to ensure that U.S.-provided counternarcotics assistance was being

used as intended. Finally, we reported that even though U.S. legislation

prohibits counternarcotics aid from being provided to Colombian units

engaged in human rights abuses, it was difficult to implement because the

United States had not established procedures to make such a

determination.

2

Drug Control: U.S.-Supported Efforts in Colombia and Bolivia (GAO/NSIAD-89-24, Nov. 1, 1988); Drug

War: Observations on Counternarcotics Aid to Colombia (GAO/NSIAD-91-296, Sept. 30, 1991); The

Drug War: Colombia Is Undertaking Antidrug Programs, but Impact Is Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-93-158,

Aug. 10, 1993); and Drug War: Observations on the U.S. International Drug Control Strategy

(GAO/T-NSIAD-95-182, June 27, 1995).

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

The Chairmen, Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs,

and Criminal Justice of the House Committee on Government Reform and

Oversight; the House Committee on International Relations; and the

Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control asked us to review the

efforts of U.S. and Colombian agencies, principally the Colombian police

and military, to conduct counternarcotics programs in Colombia.

Specifically, we examined (1) the nature of the drug-trafficking threat;

(2) the political, economic, and operational impact of counternarcotics

activities in Colombia since the initial U.S. decertification decision; and

(3) U.S. efforts to plan and manage counternarcotics activities in

Colombia.

To address the threat issue, we received briefings from U.S. law

enforcement, intelligence, and military officials and reviewed

documentation in Washington, D.C., and at the U.S. Embassy in Colombia.

To address the impact of the 1996 and 1997 decertification decisions on

Colombia and U.S. efforts to plan and manage counternarcotics activities,

we visited various agencies in Washington, D.C.; Panama; and Colombia.

In Washington, D.C., we interviewed officials and reviewed planning,

implementation, and other related documents at the Office of National

Drug Control Policy, the Departments of State and Defense, DEA, and other

federal agencies. In Panama, we interviewed U.S. officials at the U.S.

Southern Command and reviewed documents related to counternarcotics

activities in Colombia. In Colombia, we interviewed Embassy officials,

including the Ambassador, and analyzed reports and other documents

from various U.S. agencies that were responsible for implementing

counternarcotics programs in Colombia. While in Colombia, we also

interviewed Colombian military, police, and civilian officials to obtain

their views on the issues discussed in this report. We analyzed Colombian

police reports and other documents to determine operational readiness.

We also analyzed information provided by the U.S. Embassy and the State

Department pertaining to all counternarcotics operations during 1996 and

1997. We did not validate any of the data found in the Embassy’s reporting

on the economic impacts of decertification.

Our review was conducted between March and December 1997 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 2 

Drug-Trafficking Activities Are Expanding in

Colombia

Despite U.S. and Colombian efforts to reduce drug-trafficking activities,

Colombian drug-trafficking organizations remain the center of the cocaine

trade and are becoming increasingly active in the heroin trade in the

United States. Furthermore, Colombian insurgent groups are becoming

more actively involved in drug-trafficking activities and are becoming

more powerful, making it more difficult for Colombian police and military

forces to reduce these activities within their borders.

Drug Cultivation and

Trafficking Activities

Are Increasing

Three-quarters of the world’s cocaine is produced in Colombia. In

addition, U.S. law enforcement agencies believe that Colombian

drug-trafficking organizations are becoming increasingly active in the

heroin trade. According to U.S. government estimates, Colombia produces

6.5 metric tons of heroin per year and about 600 to 700 metric tons of

cocaine.

Although Colombia was historically the world’s third largest cultivator of

coca leaf, behind Peru and Bolivia, it recently surpassed Bolivia as the

number two cultivator, with an estimated 67,200 hectares of coca under

cultivation in 1996. In March 1997, the State Department reported that

Colombian coca cultivation had increased by about 50 percent since 1994.

U.S. officials attributed this increase to the successful reduction of about

50 percent of the known air-related drug-trafficking activities between

Colombia and Peru between 1992 and 1996. According to U.S. reports, this

reduction led to a glut of cocaine base in Peru, which in turn led to a

plunge in the price of cocaine base and a subsequent reduction in coca

cultivation. In March 1997, the State Department reported that coca

cultivation in Peru declined by 18 percent between 1995 and 1996.

According to U.S. officials, drug-trafficking organizations thus began to

increase coca cultivation in Colombia to ensure a constant supply of coca

leaf.

The Colombian government has disrupted the activities of two major

drug-trafficking organizations, the Medellin and Cali cartels, by either

capturing or killing their key leaders. However, this disruption has not

reduced drug-trafficking activities. For example, in June 1996, a U.S. law

enforcement agency reported that a new generation of relatively young

drug traffickers was emerging in the North Coast, Northern Valle del

Cauca, and newer Cali cartels. In July 1997, a U.S. interagency report

stated that hundreds of Colombian criminal organizations are engaged in

cocaine-trafficking.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 2 

Drug-Trafficking Activities Are Expanding in

Colombia

U.S. and Colombian efforts to reduce drug-trafficking activities are made

more difficult by the ability of illicit drug organizations to change their

trafficking routes and methods of operations. Various U.S. officials stated

that since drug-trafficking activities by air between Colombian and Peru

were reduced, more activity is occurring on Colombian rivers. However,

there is no accurate information on the extent to which this is happening.

Involvement of

Insurgent Groups in

Drug-Trafficking Is

Increasing

Colombia’s ability to reduce coca cultivation and related drug-trafficking is

complicated by the presence of active insurgent groups and their

involvement in drug-trafficking activities throughout a large portion of the

country. The most active insurgent groups are the Colombian

Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and the National Liberation Army

(ELN). These two groups, with an estimated strength of about 10,000 to

15,000 personnel, have increasingly hindered the Colombian government’s

counternarcotics efforts.

In 1993, we reported that both these groups were involved in drug-related

activities and that they controlled or influenced large sections of

Colombia, particularly in the sparsely populated south.1

 Since that time,

our discussions with U.S. and Colombian officials and review of reports

indicated that the groups are more actively involved in drug-related

activities and are gaining more control throughout Colombia.

Figure 2.1 shows the major coca-producing and opium poppy-producing

areas and the locations of the two insurgent groups most actively involved

in drug-trafficking activities in Colombia during 1996.

1

The Drug War (GAO/NSIAD-93-158, Aug. 10, 1993).

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 2 

Drug-Trafficking Activities Are Expanding in

Colombia

Figure 2.1: Areas Where Illicit Drug Crops Are Grown and Insurgents Operate

Bogota

VENEZUELA

PANAMA

ECUADOR

Caribbean Sea

Pacific

Ocean

PERU

2

2

2

Opium Poppy Cultivation

Coca-Growing Areas

Revolutionary Armed Forces of

Colombia 

National Liberation Army

BRAZIL

ELN

ELN

ELN

ELN

ELN

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 2 

Drug-Trafficking Activities Are Expanding in

Colombia

According to U.S. officials, insurgent groups are in virtually all regions

where traffickers operate and have become more actively involved in

drug-related activities since the termination of Soviet and Cuban financial

support after the Soviet Union collapsed. In February 1997, a U.S.

interagency assessment of the role of the insurgents in drug-related

activities concluded that the insurgents, primarily the FARC, were

diversifying their involvement in several ways. For example, insurgents

provide security to assist traffickers in processing and transporting

narcotics in exchange for money and weapons. Furthermore, a few

insurgent groups are involved in localized, small-scale drug cultivation and

processing. In March 1997, the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern

Command testified before the Senate Armed Forces Committee that the

FARC’s narcotics-related income for 1995 reportedly totaled $647 million.

According to U.S. officials, the task of conducting counternarcotics

operations is made more difficult for the Colombian police and military

because of the increasing strength of the insurgent groups. These officials

stated that the insurgents are strengthening their control in certain

sections of Colombia. An October 1997 Defense Department analysis

concluded that the groups are becoming more sophisticated and pose a

greater threat to the Colombian military. In addition, narcotics-related

violence in Colombia has traditionally been extensive. For example, in

February 1997, the Director of the Colombian National Police and the

General Commander of the Military Forces of Colombia testified before

the House of Representatives that 366 Colombian police and military

personnel were killed in 1996 and that since 1980 more than 3,000

Colombian policemen have died.

Conclusion The narcotics threat from Colombia continues and may be expanding.

Drug-trafficking activities by Colombian organizations continue and

Colombian insurgent groups are becoming more actively involved in

supporting the drug-trafficking activities of these organizations. Coca

cultivation has increased significantly in recent years, and Colombian

heroin is becoming more prevalent in the United States. The continuing

narcotics threat presents significant challenges to U.S. and Colombian

counternarcotics agencies.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 3 

Political, Economic, and Operational

Implications of the U.S. Decertification of

Colombia

Since the initial decision to decertify Colombia in 1996, the State

Department has reported that Colombia has made some progress in

strengthening its political will to work with the United States to achieve

U.S. counternarcotics objectives. To show its commitment, Colombia

passed antidrug legislation, signed a maritime agreement to help

coordinate the apprehension of drug traffickers, and continued to conduct

counternarcotics operations. However, State Department officials believe

that Colombia must do more to fully cooperate with U.S. counternarcotics

efforts.

Decertification had little effect on Colombia’s economy, as the President

chose not to apply discretionary sanctions against the country. However,

economic sanctions mandated by decertification may have adversely

affected U.S. investment and business activity in Colombia.

When Colombia was initially decertified, the State Department was

unprepared to determine whether some programmed assistance intended

for the Colombian police and military could be provided. It took State, in

conjunction with other executive branch agencies, about 8 months to

decide what could be provided. As a consequence, approximately

$35 million in U.S. counternarcotics assistance was canceled or delayed.

The overall implications of the assistance delays are unclear. Colombia

has generally been able to mitigate the loss of assistance by using

alternative funding sources to purchase needed equipment, some of which

was provided by the Departments of State and Defense. Colombian police

officials indicated that some operations could not be conducted because

certain types of assistance were not available.

Colombia Has Made

Some Progress but

Has Not Fulfilled All

U.S. Counternarcotics

Objectives

As we noted earlier, Colombia was decertified in 1996 and 1997, primarily

because political corruption within the government of Colombia had

undermined the counternarcotics efforts of Colombia’s law enforcement

and judicial officials. Despite the fact that Colombia was decertified, U.S.

officials believe that Colombia has made some progress in meeting various

U.S. counternarcotics objectives. Examples of Colombia’s positive actions

follow:

• The government passed various laws to assist counternarcotics activities,

including money-laundering and asset forfeiture laws in February 1997,

and reinstated the extradition of Colombian nationals to the United States

in November 1997.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 3 

Political, Economic, and Operational

Implications of the U.S. Decertification of

Colombia

• The government signed a maritime agreement, along with a bilateral

ship-boarding agreement, with the United States in February 1997 that

provides for coordinated pursuit and apprehension of suspected drug

traffickers.

• Colombian law enforcement efforts resulted the capture or surrender of

six of the seven top echelon members of the Cali cartel in 1995 and 1996,

the reduction in the use of San Andres Island as a way station for drug

shipments, and the pursuit of an ambitious crop eradication program in

1997 by the Colombian police.

State Department officials believe that Colombia must take additional

actions to show its commitment to U.S. counternarcotics efforts. In

March 1997, the State Department informed the Colombian government

that to achieve certification from the United States, it would have to take

the following actions:

• Test and apply a more effective, safe, reasonably priced granular

herbicide.

• Amend legislation to allow for the unconditional extradition of Colombian

nationals involved in illegal narcotics activities.

• Fully and effectively implement newly passed laws on asset forfeiture,

money-laundering, and sentencing,

• Take all appropriate steps to stop drug traffickers from directing their

organizations from prison.

• Make every effort to support investigations and prosecutions to ensure

that corrupt officials are brought to justice.

According to State Department officials, these factors will be considered

as part of the next certification determination in early 1998.

Economic Sanctions

May Have Hurt U.S.

Commercial Interests

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Narcotics Control Trade Act of

1974 require certain mandatory sanctions and allow discretionary

sanctions when the President denies certification to a drug-producing or

transit nation.1

 Mandatory sanctions include suspension of U.S. economic

assistance, such as Export-Import Bank and Overseas Private Investment

Corporation financing, and voting against multilateral economic assistance

from organizations such as World Bank and the Inter-American

Development Bank. Discretionary sanctions include the removal of trade

preferences under the Andean Trade Preferences Act and the Generalized

1

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (P.L. 87-195) and the Narcotics Control Trade Act of

1974 (19 U.S.C. 2491 et. seq.).

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 3 

Political, Economic, and Operational

Implications of the U.S. Decertification of

Colombia

System of Preferences, the suspension of sugar quotas, tariff penalties, and

curtailment of air transportation arrangements. The President chose not to

apply discretionary sanctions against Colombia in either 1996 or 1997. On

the other hand, the mandatory sanctions under decertification may have

hurt U.S. businesses in Colombia.

State and U.S. Embassy officials said they did not conduct a detailed

analysis of the impact that economic sanctions would have had on

Colombia. However, they pointed out that in 1996 and 1997, they did not

recommend imposing discretionary sanctions because the United States

did not want to hurt sectors of the Colombian economy that were

pressuring the Colombian government to strengthen its counternarcotics

laws.

On the other hand, the State Department reported that the 1996

decertification decision required the Overseas Private Investment

Corporation and the Export-Import Bank to freeze about $1.5 billion in

investment credits and loans, including about $280 million for a U.S.

company to invest in Colombia’s oil industry. State also reported that a

1996 survey by the Council of American Enterprises, an American business

consortium in Colombia, concluded that because its U.S. member

companies could not receive financing from the Export-Import Bank

under decertification, they lost $875 million in potential sales, mostly to

Asian and European competitors. According to a State Department

official, State did not validate the information in the Council’s survey.

According to the Foreign Commercial Service Attache at the U.S.

Embassy, however, anecdotal information indicated that Colombian

businesses were considering the development of joint ventures with

European and Asian companies because decertification sanctions had

made the U.S. business environment uncertain.

Operational

Implications of

Assistance Delays Are

Unclear

After the decertification decision on March 1, 1996, the Departments of

State and Defense canceled or delayed about $35 million worth of

assistance to the counternarcotics units of the Colombian police and

military. The impact of this delay and the cancellation of assistance on

Colombian counternarcotics operations is unclear. Our review of U.S. and

Colombian records and discussions with various U.S. and Colombian

officials indicated that most counternarcotics operations were maintained

despite the aid cutoff. However, the Colombian police and military were

generally able to mitigate the loss of U.S. grant assistance by relying on

other resources, but at greater cost. According to Colombian officials, they

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 3 

Political, Economic, and Operational

Implications of the U.S. Decertification of

Colombia

could have conducted more counternarcotics operations if the assistance

had not been delayed.

Assistance Affected by

Decertification Decision

Table 3.1 shows the source and amount of the $35 million worth of

assistance and training that was either canceled or delayed because of the

March 1996 decertification decision.

Table 3.1: U.S. Assistance Canceled or

Delayed by the March 1996

Decertification Decision

Dollars in millions

Source of funding Amount Status

Counternarcotics FMF grant

assistance

$30.0 Delayed until August 1997

Counternarcotics assistance

provided under the FMS Program

2.5 Delayed until November 1996

IMET Program 1.4a Canceled

Department of State INC Program 1.1 Delayed until November 1996

aIncludes approximately $800,000 in fiscal year 1996 funds that were canceled due to

decertification. The $600,000 in fiscal year 1997 funds had to be canceled because the funding

was released too late in the fiscal year for Colombia to adequately meet its training needs.

Sources: Departments of Defense and State.

According to Defense Department officials, up to $30 million in FMF grant

aid that was delayed included items such as spare parts for vehicles,

fixed-wing aircraft, and helicopters; explosives and ammunition;

publications; and individual clothing items. The canceled training for

Colombian police and military officials in U.S. schools was in a variety of

areas, including human rights. On August 16, 1997, the President issued a

national security waiver, allowing the $30 million in grant aid and $600,000

in IMET assistance to be released to Colombian police and military units.

Without this waiver, the assistance could not have been provided because

of the decertification requirement.

The assistance delayed by State until November 1996 (about $2.5 million in

FMS and $1.1 million in its own funds) included items such as aviation

spare parts, vehicles, ammunition and funding to repair a Colombian

police DC-3 aircraft and to provide a flight simulator to train police pilots.

None of this assistance would have been delayed had State been

adequately prepared to judge whether the aid could have continued to be

provided on March 1, 1996. As early as February 1995, State’s Bureau of

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs had prepared a

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 3 

Political, Economic, and Operational

Implications of the U.S. Decertification of

Colombia

preliminary analysis of the types of assistance that could continue to be

provided in the event a country was decertified. State officials cited

interagency legal concerns as well as differences within the State

Department regarding policy concerns to explain why it took them 

8 months to issue their final guidance on the types of assistance that could

be provided.

U.S. and Colombian Efforts

to Maintain

Counternarcotics

Operations

According to U.S. Embassy and Colombian officials, the delays in U.S.

assistance prevented the Colombian police and military units from

receiving some training funded under the IMET Program and conducting

some planned counternarcotics efforts. However, these officials indicated

that most counternarcotics operations were not drastically affected

because alternative funding sources were available. They did note that

some equipment was more heavily used than it would have been had the

assistance been available.

According to U.S. and Colombian officials, the cancellation of U.S. military

assistance and training hurt efforts to improve military-to-military

relationships and to provide human rights training to Colombian military

officers. They also indicated that the delay in other assistance had some

impact on the ability of the Colombian police and military units to expand

counternarcotics operations. For example, Colombia’s Chief of the

Counternarcotics Police stated that because of the cutoff of U.S.

assistance, certain types of explosives could not be provided. As a result,

he stated, the police could destroy only 80 of the 210 airstrips they had

planned to destroy in 1996.

The impacts from assistance delays were minimized because the

Departments of State and Defense and the Colombian Ministry of Defense

used other funding and procurement sources to continue to provide

critical logistics, spare parts, and training to Colombia’s counternarcotics

forces to sustain operations. Both the Colombian police and military

purchased spare parts directly from various commercial sources and used

their existing inventories to maintain their operational readiness rates.

These parts, however, were substantially more expensive than they would

have been had U.S. grant assistance been available. For example, the

Colombian police reported that certain helicopter parts bought

commercially cost 150 percent more than parts purchased through U.S.

military assistance channels. In addition, the U.S. Embassy used some

State INC funds and some Defense Department funds to support Colombian

police and military eradication and interdiction efforts.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 3 

Political, Economic, and Operational

Implications of the U.S. Decertification of

Colombia

As a result of these actions, the Colombian police reported improvements

in operational rates for their helicopters. Police reports showed that

helicopter operational rates for counternarcotics operations were about

60 percent for the 2 months prior to the March 1, 1996, decertification

decision. However, from March 1996 to June 1997, the police helicopter

operational rates were consistently in the 70-percent range. In addition,

according to an Embassy report, the Colombian air force increased the

number of flying hours dedicated to counternarcotics activities from

10,182 in 1995 to 10,605 in 1996.

State Department data also indicates that Colombian police units were

able to continue conducting counternarcotics operations. For example, in

March 1997, the State Department reported that the number of cocaine

laboratories destroyed by the Colombian law enforcement agencies more

than doubled, from 396 in 1995 to 861 in 1996. During this same period, the

amount of cocaine seized increased from about 22 metric tons to 24 metric

tons. The U.S. Embassy reported that during 1997 the Colombian national

police seized about 31 metric tons of cocaine.

U.S. and Colombian officials stated that they were forced to rely much

more heavily on available equipment. For example, one of two DC-3

aircraft, cargo aircraft essential for supporting eradication and interdiction

operations of the Colombian police, was grounded by a serious accident in

August 1995. About 4 months after the accident occurred, the Colombian

police forwarded a request to the Narcotics Affairs Section to repair it. The

U.S. Embassy approved the request 2 days later. As a result of the

March 1996 decertification decision, the State Department could not

decide if it could provide funds to repair the aircraft. In July 1996, the U.S.

Embassy made the decision to repair the aircraft commercially, and

repairs were completed by the contractor in December 1996. A primary

reason for the delay in repairing the aircraft was that State Department

officials were unable to determine whether the repairs were allowed under

decertification. Because this aircraft was not available during this time, the

U.S. Embassy reported that the police had to double the use of the

remaining DC-3 to conduct operations. Even so, it was impossible for the

Colombian counternarcotics police to make up for the lost time, according

to Narcotics Affairs Section officials. Furthermore, according to the

Section, the counternarcotics police could not conduct additional

activities because of the inoperative DC-3.

Page 31 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 3 

Political, Economic, and Operational

Implications of the U.S. Decertification of

Colombia

Concerns Over

Sustainment of

Counternarcotics Activities

At the time of our visit in May 1997, U.S. Embassy officials said that while

the use of commercial and other sources had enabled the Colombian

police and military to continue counternarcotics operations after the

interruption in U.S. assistance, the higher expenditures for items and the

effectiveness of operations could not be sustained over a long period. In

May 1997, the U.S. Embassy reported that the government of Colombia, as

part of an overall budget reduction decision, had reduced the 1997 budget

for the Ministry of Defense by 30 percent less than the 1996 budget. U.S.

and Colombian officials stated that operations could not continue at their

current rate unless the United States provides additional assistance in the

future.

Part of the sustainment concerns may have been addressed when the

President issued a national security waiver in August 1997 that allowed the

release of counternarcotics assistance. Defense officials stated that this

assistance is now available for use by the Colombian air force and navy.

However, according to State officials, equipment for the Colombian army

is pending because the Colombian army has not complied with the

agreement it signed regarding the use of the assistance.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 4 

Planning and Management Problems

Hamper U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in

Colombia

As we noted earlier, for the past 10 years we have reported on a number of

management problems associated with U.S. counternarcotics activities in

Colombia. Some of these problems continue. For the past 2 years, U.S.

counternarcotics activities in Colombia have been hampered because the

State Department did not effectively plan and manage funding and

assistance to support the numerous and varied U.S. counternarcotics

objectives in Colombia. State and the U.S. Embassy could not fully support

planned counternarcotics activities because they were not well prepared

for the consequences of expanding the coca aerial eradication program.

Funding used to support the aerial eradication effort came at the expense

of other counternarcotics activities. Moreover, State did not take steps to

ensure that equipment included in a $40 million assistance package from

Defense Department inventories was consistent with the priority needs of

the counternarcotics forces of the Colombian police and military or with

the Embassy’s counternarcotics plan. As a result, the assistance package

included equipment that may be of limited benefit to the Colombian police

and military and will require additional funding not budgeted for in

Embassy plans. Moreover, the military assistance was delayed for 10

months because State and the Embassy could not reach agreement with

the government of Colombia over acceptable end-use provisions to ensure

that the assistance was not being provided to units suspected of human

rights violations.

The State Department

and the U.S. Embassy

Were Not Adequately

Prepared to Manage

the Consequences of

Increases in Aerial

Eradication

Beginning in October 1996, the State Department, through its Bureau of

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, decided to

significantly increase the U.S. level of support and participation in

Colombia’s aerial eradication operations against coca and opium poppy.

According to State officials, the decision was made primarily to improve

upon the results achieved in 1995 and 1996 in eradicating coca and opium

poppy. However, State had not developed an operational plan and had not

fully coordinated with the Narcotics Affairs Section in the Embassy to

implement the program increase. As a result, the Section was unprepared

for the escalation in costs to support this effort and was unable to fully

support other programs meant to achieve the Embassy’s counternarcotics

objectives. In addition, other components at the Embassy, including DEA

and Defense representatives, complained that the State Department was

not adequately supporting their activities to help meet the Embassy’s

counternarcotics objectives.

During fiscal year 1997, State increased the number of aircraft and U.S.

contractor personnel involved in the aerial eradication program. As of

Page 33 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 4 

Planning and Management Problems

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Colombia

July 1997, 112 contractor personnel—9 management and administrative

staff, 56 pilots and operations staff, and 47 maintenance staff—were in

Colombia. The contractor personnel’s role also changed from being

primarily responsible for training Colombian pilots and mechanics to

directly maintaining aircraft and actively participating in planning and

conducting eradication operations. The State Department estimates that

the direct costs of supporting the contractor in Colombia increased from

about $6.6 million in fiscal year 1996 to $14 million in fiscal year 1997.

Throughout fiscal year 1997, the Embassy’s Narcotics Affairs Section

continually adjusted its estimates of the amount of funding needed to

support eradication efforts, from about $19 million in the beginning of the

fiscal year to $34 million by July 1997. According to various Embassy

reports, these changes were caused by unforeseen costs incurred as the

result of the State Department’s decision to increase support for aerial

eradication. For example, in April 1997, the Narcotics Affairs Section

reported that it would require an additional $1.4 million for unanticipated

costs associated with providing adequate security for contractor personnel

at several remote eradication locations and that this estimate did not

include costs associated with other major sites used to conduct

eradication missions. According to the Section Director, an additional

$3 million to $4 million to upgrade security at these locations was not

included in the Embassy’s program budget. Furthermore, the Section

reported that it had to reallocate $11 million from other projects to

support various aspects of the increased eradication efforts. As a result, by

July 1997, the Section reported to State that it could not fully support

activities such as interdiction efforts, demand reduction, and other efforts

designed to strengthen the law enforcement institutions of Colombia. The

Section also reported its concerns about adequate funding for these

activities in fiscal years 1998 and 1999.

Various components at the U.S. Embassy also raised concerns about

State’s emphasis on eradication at the expense of their programs. For

example, U.S. military personnel in Colombia stated that the State

Department’s emphasis on eradication hurt their efforts to support the

Colombian armed forces’ ability to conduct their own counternarcotics

operations and to provide ground and air support to the Colombian police

when they are conducting eradication or interdiction missions, particularly

in areas where insurgent groups are active. DEA officials indicated that

State’s focus on coca eradication displaced support for opium poppy

eradication and other drug-related law enforcement activities. DEA officials

Page 34 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 4 

Planning and Management Problems

Hamper U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in

Colombia

also stated that the proposed coca eradication program failed to respond

to key elements of the U.S. counternarcotics objectives for Colombia.

State officials agreed that the Embassy was not well prepared to manage

the escalation of costs associated with the increase in support for aerial

eradication. However, they pointed out that the spray program has been

successful, with about 42,000 hectares of coca sprayed by the end of

December 1997. They indicated that State may not have adequate funding

support for all its programs in Colombia in fiscal year 1998 because State

will spend about $50 million to help the Colombians purchase three new

Blackhawk helicopters and upgrade UH-1H helicopters, in addition to the

regular INC Program. State officials told us the fiscal year 1998 INC Program

for Colombia is currently under review.

Drawdown Assistance

Package Was Poorly

Planned

On September 30, 1996, the President, under section 506(a)(2) of the

Foreign Assistance Act, announced that he intended to provide Colombia

with about $40 million in counternarcotics assistance from Defense

Department inventories. This action was justified on the basis that

important programs would grind to a halt without the aid and that past

investments in counternarcotics programs would suffer due to the

deterioration of equipment, training skills, and goodwill on the part of

those Colombians who daily put their lives at risk.

According to officials from the Departments of State and Defense and the

U.S. Embassy, key elements of the 1996 assistance package were hastily

developed, and some of the equipment in the package was not the best

suited to meet the priority needs of the Colombian counternarcotics

forces. In addition, support requirements were not fully assessed. Defense

Department and Embassy officials have expressed concern that using this

type of assistance without other sources of funds for the additional

support costs may not be the best method for meeting critical

counternarcotics needs of the Colombian police and military units.

Limited Planning and

Coordination Hampered

the Delivery of

Counternarcotics

Equipment and Resulted in

Additional Costs

According to Defense Department officials, an assistance package should

be developed with extensive input from the Departments of State and

Defense. This input includes information about specific requirements of

the recipient country, the ability of the recipient country to operate and

maintain the equipment provided, and the ability of the U.S. military to

meet its own needs without the equipment included in the assistance

package.

Page 35 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 4 

Planning and Management Problems

Hamper U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in

Colombia

Beginning in July 1996, the State Department, in conjunction with the U.S.

Embassy, began developing an initial list of equipment needed by the

Colombian police for inclusion in a possible section 506(a)(2) drawdown

assistance package. The U.S. Embassy prepared an initial list of equipment

for the Colombian police on July 29, 1996. Because this list did not contain

equipment for the Colombian military, the U.S. Embassy had to prepare an

expanded listing to include all counternarcotics equipment for both the

Colombian police and military. This list was sent to the Departments of

State and Defense on August 15, 1996. Defense Department and Embassy

officials stated that even though this expanded list was developed, they

were given insufficient time to assess the requirements for the Colombian

police and military and to identify the costs associated with operating and

maintaining the equipment. Furthermore, Defense Department officials

stated that they were given less than 2 weeks to conduct an analysis on the

availability of the equipment on the expanded list or the impacts that

withdrawing the equipment from defense inventories would have on the

readiness of U.S. forces. Finally, U.S. officials stated that some items, such

as the C-26 aircraft, were added by the National Security Council only 

3 days before the list was provided to the President for his approval.

Table 4.1 summarizes the type of counternarcotics assistance provided

and planned for delivery to the Colombian police and military forces.

Page 36 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 4 

Planning and Management Problems

Hamper U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in

Colombia

Table 4.1: Section 

506(a)(2) Counternarcotics Assistance

Planned for Colombia

Dollars in millions

Recipient/type of equipment Valuea

Colombian National Police

C-26 aircraft (2) $6.0

UH-1H helicopters (12) 1.8

Rations and commodities 1.7

Ammunition 0.4

Communications equipment 0.3

Subtotal $10.2

Colombian military forces

C-26 aircraft (3) $9.0

UH-1H helicopters (20) 3.0

Aircraft and helicopter spare parts 6.0

Utility landing craft (1) 1.5

River patrol craft (9) 0.7

Communications equipment 4.7

Field equipment 1.4

Training 2.5

Utility vehicles (15) 0.9

Subtotal $29.7

Total $39.9

aFigures do not include transportation costs.

Source: Defense Security Assistance Agency.

Limited planning and coordination of the package resulted in the delivery

of some assistance that did not meet the most pressing counternarcotics

needs of the Colombian police and military and added substantial

unanticipated support costs to operate and maintain, as illustrated in the

following four examples.

Example 1 The U.S. Embassy identified a requirement to provide Colombian police

and military units with an aircraft capable of performing surveillance

missions. According to officials from the Departments of State and

Defense, the National Security Council decided to address this

requirement by including five C-26 aircraft (two C-26 for the police and

three C-26 for the military) in the assistance package.1

 U.S. Embassy and

1

The C-26 aircraft is a military version of the Fairchild metro 10-passenger turboprop aircraft used by

the Air National Guard.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 4 

Planning and Management Problems

Hamper U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in

Colombia

Colombian officials stated these aircraft would not meet the surveillance

needs of the Colombian police and military as currently configured.

According to Department of State and Defense officials, no decision has

been made on how many of the aircraft will have to be modified to

perform the surveillance mission, but modifying each aircraft selected for

this mission will cost at least $3 million. According to U.S. Embassy

officials, the C-26 was not included in any requirement plan for either the

Colombian police or military, and other types of aircraft would have been

more desirable. In addition, both State and Defense have estimated that

operating and maintaining the aircraft will cost the Colombian police and

military at least $1 million annually.

The State Department has agreed to provide up to $1 million to support

the two C-26 aircraft assigned to the Colombian police. However, State has

no plans to provide support for the three C-26 aircraft assigned to the

Colombian military. Both U.S. and Colombian military officials stated that

it would be more expensive to maintain the logistics capability for such

aircraft because of the small number that have been provided. They

indicated that U.S. assistance should, to the maximum extent possible,

provide equipment to minimize expensive logistics.

Example 2 The 12 UH-1H helicopters in the assistance package were delivered to the

Colombian police in May 1997 with an average of less than 10 hours of

flying time available before substantial maintenance would have to be

done on them to meet performance standards. Two months after the

Colombian police received the helicopters, the Narcotics Affairs Section

reported that according to the Colombian police, only 2 of the 12

helicopters were operational and that unless sufficient funds were

provided to meet maintenance requirements, parts would be removed

from these helicopters to maintain its existing fleet of 38 helicopters. The

Section estimated the cost of the repairs at about $1.2 million. In

August 1997, the State Department said that it would provide additional

assistance to make the helicopters operational.

Example 3 The package listed a utility landing craft valued at $1.5 million to support

Colombian military operations against the transport of narcotics on rivers.

Defense Department officials stated that if they had been consulted

earlier, the craft would not have been listed in the package because not

enough of the craft were available for U.S. Army units. According to U.S.

military personnel, a smaller vessel with more limited range was offered to

Colombia as an alternative, but the Colombian military said the boat did

not meet its needs.

Page 38 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 4 

Planning and Management Problems

Hamper U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in

Colombia

Example 4 The six patrol craft included in the assistance package may be of limited

utility to the Colombian navy. The Defense Department reported that the

craft had been taken out of service in 1993 and required an estimated

$600,000 in maintenance to make them operational. However, the U.S.

Navy cautioned that even if the necessary repairs were made, the craft

might be of marginal utility due to their age. Additional costs will have to

be incurred before the craft will be useful to the Colombian navy. After the

boats were delivered, U.S. military officials discovered that at least two of

them were missing parts and that the electrical panels on others were

open, making the boats’ operational condition suspect. Furthermore,

although the boats were intended to serve as command and control

platforms, radios and other equipment had been removed prior to their

delivery. U.S. Embassy officials do not know the total amount of funding

needed to make the boats operational and to improve their combat

capabilities but stated that Colombia would have to use its own resources

to make them operational and combat ready.

U.S. Embassy and Defense officials also expressed concern about the

heavy reliance on the use of drawdown assistance for counternarcotics

activities in Colombia. They stated that equipment provided under 

section 506(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act usually requires

substantial support and additional funding for operations and

maintenance. They stated that such assistance was a poor substitute for a

well-thought out counternarcotics assistance program and could be

harmful if complementary funding was not provided.

Negotiations Over an

End-Use Monitoring

Agreement Delayed the

Delivery and Use of

Critically Needed

Equipment

In September 1996, Congress prohibited the obligation of INC funds to

assist units of foreign security forces when the Secretary of State has

credible evidence to believe that these units have committed gross

violations of human rights.2

 Therefore, the State Department decided that

no assistance would be provided to the military until Colombia signed an

acceptable end-use monitoring agreement to ensure that the assistance

was not being provided to units suspected of human rights violations.

However, State did not provide guidance to the Embassy on applying

human rights provisions to U.S. counternarcotics assistance until

February 13, 1997, almost 4-1/2 months after the legislation was enacted.

In the meantime, U.S, Embassy officials signed a preliminary end-use

monitoring agreement with the Colombian Ministry of Defense on

February 11, 1997. The U.S. Ambassador believed that this agreement

2

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1997

(P.L. 104-208).

Page 39 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 4 

Planning and Management Problems

Hamper U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in

Colombia

would be acceptable to the State Department. However, because of the

new guidance, he stated that he had to reopen negotiations with the

Colombians.

In February 1997, the U.S. Embassy determined that there were no human

rights concerns about the Colombian police and satisfactory progress was

being made in negotiating an end-use monitoring agreement with the

Colombian navy and air force. The 12 helicopters in the drawdown

assistance package were shipped to the Colombian police in May 1997.

Even though the 6 boats and 20 UH-1H hulks for the Colombian navy and

air force were also shipped in May, the State Department did not grant

approval for use of the equipment until the Colombian navy and air force

signed the end-use monitoring agreement in August 1997. According to

State Department officials, the lengthy negotiations occurred because

three different Colombian Ministers of Defense were involved in

negotiations during this period. State Department officials told us that

assistance to the Colombian army has still not been released because the

Colombian army has not fulfilled terms of the agreement.

Conclusions Implementation of U.S. counternarcotics activities in Colombia has been

hampered by a lack of planning and management coordination both within

the Department of State and between State and other involved federal

agencies. The State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Colombia were

not well prepared to implement an expanded aerial eradication program

and to support other counternarcotics activities. In addition, State did not

take adequate steps to develop and integrate a $40-million assistance

package for Colombian counternarcotics police and military units.

Officials from the Departments of State and Defense and the U.S. Embassy

said they had spent little time consulting on the makeup and

appropriateness of items in the package. However, in our view, the State

Department, in conjunction with the Defense Department and key

elements of the U.S. Embassy, should have taken adequate time to prepare

a priority list of available equipment and associated support costs before

the assistance package was finalized.

Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of State, in close consultation with the

Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council, take steps to

ensure that future assistance authorized under section 506(a)(2) of the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is, to the maximum extent possible,

compatible with the priority requirements identified in U.S.

Page 40 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Chapter 4 

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Hamper U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in

Colombia

counternarcotics programs and that adequate support resources are

available to maximize the benefits of the assistance.

Page 41 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of State

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 42 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of State

Now on p. 16.

See comment 1.

Now on p. 14.

See comment 2.

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of State

Now on p. 26.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

Now on p. 28.

Now on p. 29.

See comment 5.

Now on p. 30.

See comment 6.

See comment 7.

Now on p. 31.

See comment 8.

Page 44 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of State

Now on p. 31.

See comment 9.

See comment 10.

See comment 11.

Now on p. 39.

See comment 12.

Now on p. 33.

See comment 13.

Page 45 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of State

See comment 14.

See comment 10.

Now on p. 36.

Page 46 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of State

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter

dated January 22, 1998.

GAO Comments 1. We modified the table to reflect State’s comment regarding Foreign

Military Sales (FMS). However, according to Defense Department records,

all Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds were justified for

counternarcotics purposes.

2. We deleted the sentence containing the 62-percent figure.

3. We modified the text to reflect that alternative funding sources were

provided by both the Departments of State and Defense.

4. As our report states, Colombia’s Chief of the Counternarcotics Police

stated the Colombian police could destroy only 80 of the 210 airstrips it

had planned to destroy in 1996 because certain types of explosives could

not be provided as a result of the cutoff of U.S. assistance.

5. We modified the report to address State’s concern regarding the amount

of FMF grant aid that was delayed. We note, however, that aid was delayed

for over 17 months until the President issued a waiver in August 1997.

6. As we note in our report, the overall operational implications of the

cutoff on U.S. and Colombian counternarcotics activities is not clear. The

Colombian police and military were able to maintain or increase some

types of operations, but Colombian police told us that some operations

could not be conducted because certain types of assistance were not

available.

7. We modified the report to recognize that the decertification policy was

developed by State in conjunction with other executive branch agencies.

8. We have added information on the nature of the delay in repairing the

DC-3. As our report notes, the Colombian police were partially to blame

for the delay. However, the State Department was responsible for most of

the delay because it had difficulty making a decision on whether the

aircraft could be repaired under decertification.

9. We modified the report to recognize that some of the sustainment

concerns may have been addressed by the President’s August 1997

Page 47 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of State

national security waiver that allowed the release of counternarcotics

assistance.

10. We clarified our report in response to State’s comment. However, as

our report states, some items were added late in the approval process, and

the requirements of Colombia’s counternarcotics forces and the long-term

support costs associated with U.S. assistance were not fully considered.

After providing their written comments, State officials told us that the

planning of section 506(a)(2) assistance should be improved, as we

recommended. They said that Defense Department involvement in the

process was the most critical element in identifying the necessary

assistance.

11. We modified the text to reflect State’s comment.

12. We do not believe our report is contradictory. We agree with the State

Department that an end-use monitoring agreement is essential to ensure

that U.S. counternarcotics assistance is being used as intended. Our

criticism is directed at the time spent to develop criteria. As our report

points out, it took State almost 4-1/2 months to develop criteria for the

Embassy’s use in negotiating an acceptable end-use monitoring agreement

with the government of Colombia.

13. Our report recognizes that the Embassy had reported increases in the

amount of coca sprayed and drug seizures in 1997. However, documents

and interviews with Embassy officials did not support State’s comment

that increasing the funding for the counternarcotics police eradication

operations in 1997 had no impact on other drug enforcement activities.

According to these sources, support for law enforcement assistance and

institutional development; drug awareness and drug demand reduction;

and support for the Colombian armed forces were reduced during this

period.

14. Based on cable traffic, other documents, and discussions with

Embassy and State officials, it is clear that the Embassy was not well

prepared to manage the costs associated with the increase in support for

aerial eradication. As our report indicates, throughout fiscal year 1997, the

Narcotics Affairs Section continually adjusted its estimates of the amount

of funding needed to support eradication efforts, from about $19 million at

the beginning of the fiscal year to $34 million by July 1997. Furthermore,

according to the Narcotics Affairs Section Director, an additional

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of State

$3 million to $4 million needed to upgrade security at several locations

was not originally budgeted for.

Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Jess T. Ford, Associate Director

Allen Fleener, Senior Evaluator

Ronald D. Hughes, Senior Evaluator

James T. Strus, Senior Evaluator

Jose Pena, Evaluator

Nancy Ragsdale, Managing Editor

(711260) Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-98-60 Drug Control
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