Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2111 | April 25, 2024 Page 1 of 19

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana

Kenneth Kesler, M.D.,

Appellant-Plaintiff,

v.

Indiana University Health Care Associates, Inc., d/b/a/ 

Indiana University Health Physicians (IUHP),

Appellee-Defendant.

April 25, 2024

Court of Appeals Case No.

23A-PL-2111

Appeal from the 

Marion Superior Court

The Honorable 

Heather A. Welch, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49D01-2307-PL-27885
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2111 | April 25, 2024 Page 2 of 19

Opinion by Senior Judge Baker

Judges Pyle and Felix concur.

Baker, Senior Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Kenneth Kesler, M.D. sought a declaratory judgment, seeking relief from the 

restraints contained in a noncompetition clause of the Employment Agreement 

he entered into with Indiana University Health Care Associates, Inc. d/b/a 

Indiana University Health Physicians (IUHP). IUHP responded by filing its 

answer, verified counterclaim for declaratory judgment, and a request for a 

temporary restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction, and permanent 

injunction. After a hearing, the trial court issued its order granting IUHP’s 

request for a preliminary injunction and enjoined Dr. Kesler from treating 

patients within the geographically restricted area provided in the 

noncompetition clause in his Employment Agreement. Dr. Kesler brings this 

interlocutory appeal from the court’s order. Concluding that the court’s order 

did not reflect consideration of all competing interests in support of the result 

reached, we reverse and remand. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Dr. Kesler is a board-certified thoracic surgeon who has developed a surgical 

procedure to remove complex germ cell cancer tumors in the chest area. 
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During his career, he has developed a group of around 156 referring physicians 

who are primarily medical oncologists not employed by IUHP. 

[3] In 2014, Kesler entered into an Employment Agreement with IUHP, which 

took effect on January 1, 2015. The Employment Agreement contained a 

restrictive covenant not to compete for a period of two years after the 

termination of his employment with IUHP and within the defined geographical 

thirty-mile range. 

[4] Dr. Kesler provided IUHP with written notice of his intent to terminate the 

Employment Agreement as of July 14, 2023. After that date, he was employed 

by Community Health Network at Community North Hospital, a hospital 

within the thirty-mile geographically restricted area. Within days of the 

termination of his employment with IUHP, Dr. Kesler filed a declaratory 

judgment action seeking relief from the restrictive covenant not to compete. 

IUHP responded by filing its answer, verified counterclaim for declaratory 

judgment, and a request for a TRO, preliminary injunction, and permanent 

injunction. 

[5] The trial court held a hearing on IUHP’s motion requesting a TRO and 

preliminary injunction. During the hearing, IUHP presented argument and 

relied on the verified pleadings and responses filed in the action. Among other 

things, IUHP argued “it’s actually in the public interest to enforce—uh—the 

contracts between the parties in this way [by enforcing the non-competition 

clause].” Tr. Vol. II, p. 13. IUHP further claimed that “the suggestion that 
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there’s harm to patients is really refuted by–uh—sort of by Dr. Kesler himself. 

Um—you know—subject to his non-solicitate [sic], he agrees that patients can 

and—we agree that patients can continue to treat with him if they choose—

uh—to relocate their care.” Id. 

[6] Dr. Kesler offered exhibits and testimonial evidence. He testified about his 

education, experience, training, employment, and referral network. He agreed 

with the statement that there was no one at IUHP who performs the same 

surgical procedure he does on the complex germ cell tumors in the chest. Over 

ninety-five percent of his patients are new patients. Dr. Kesler’s counsel argued 

that “there certainly is a strong public interest that Dr. Kesler be able to perform 

these surgeries. At this time, the only place Dr. Kesler has surgical procedures 

[sic]—perform these procedures is at Community Hospital.” Id. at 28. IUHP 

responded that, “[w]e’re not limiting whether patients can treat with Dr. Kesler. 

We are asking that the Court enforce the reasonable restrictive covenant on 

where Dr. Kesler may situate his practice—uh—going forward if he’s providing 

the same medical services.” Id. at 29. 

[7] The trial court entered its order granting a preliminary injunction in favor of 

IUHP, and enjoined Dr. Kesler from treating patients within the restricted 

geographical area set out in the Employment Agreement. 
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Discussion and Decision

A. Confusion Apparent in the Record

[8] Before we address the dispositive issue in this appeal, we pause to note the 

confusion in the record as to what the appealed order really is. The trial court’s 

order setting a hearing says it is considering a “Motion For Temporary 

Restraining Order,” but makes reference in the order to IUHP’s “Motion for 

Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction” and concludes by 

setting a “virtual hearing on the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 

Preliminary Injunction.” Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 94 (emphasis added). 

The record also shows that the parties believed they were attending a hearing 

solely addressing the request for a temporary restraining order. See Tr. Vol. II, 

p. 6. (“We know that this is a TRO hearing, not the full preliminary injunction 

hearing.”) p. 7 (“TRO is to preserve the status quo until the–the preliminary 

injunction hearing.”). The court announced at the beginning of the hearing that 

“We’re here today on the Defendant’s motion for a temporary restraining 

order.” Id. at 5. And the final line of the trial court’s order reads, “Either 

counsel may petition the Court to schedule a preliminary injunction hearing.” 

Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 22. 

[9] However, immediately preceding that sentence, the trial court’s appealed order

says, “Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court hereby GRANTS IUHP’s 

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. Until this 

controversy is resolved on the merits, Dr. Kesler is enjoined from violating the 

noncompete in the Employment Agreement and treating patients within the 30-
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mile radius of his Employment Agreement.” Id. (emphasis added). And in 

setting out the “STANDARDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A TRO AND 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION,” the trial court’s order mistakenly cites State 

v. Econ. Freedom Fund, 959 N.E.2d 794, 803 (Ind. 2011), to set out the 

requirements for obtaining a TRO. See id at 15. Freedom Fund, however, sets 

out the requirements to obtain a preliminary injunction. 959 N.E.2d at 803. It 

is Indiana Trial Rule 65(B)(1) which governs the requirements for a temporary 

restraining order, namely, that “it clearly appears from specific facts shown by 

affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, 

loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or his 

attorney can be heard in opposition.” Additionally, Trial Rule 65(D)

establishes that the trial court’s order granting a TRO shall include or be 

accompanied by findings under Trial Rule 52. 

[10] And the record is blurred in yet another way. After setting out the court’s 

assessment of the evidence under subheadings that follow the requirements for 

a preliminary injunction, the order also discusses the “Bond Amount” and finds 

that because “no TRO may issue without adequate security. . . . “security should 

be provided” under Trial Rule 65(C) (emphasis added). Trial Rule 65(C) states 

“No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving 

of security by the applicant.” (emphasis added). 

[11] We conclude that the trial court’s order should be considered an order granting 

a preliminary injunction. The order says, “[u]ntil this controversy is resolved 

on the merits . . .” Id. at 22. Although, one could argue that “merits” refers to 
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a preliminary injunction hearing, where the likelihood of success on the merits 

would be considered, the parties argued, and the court issued findings on the 

requirements for a preliminary injunction. Additionally, under our case law, 

the court’s issuance of a TRO is not reviewable on appeal, and is superseded 

anyway, by the apparent grant of the preliminary injunction. See Witt v. Jay 

Petroleum, Inc., 964 N.E.2d 198, 203 (Ind. 2012) (entry of TRO is not 

appealable); Vickery v. Ardagh Glass Inc., 85 N.E.3d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2017) (claims arising from the grant of a TRO become moot when superseded 

by a preliminary or a permanent injunction), trans. denied. 

B. Issue

[12] The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the issuance of the preliminary 

injunction was supported by the evidence and was proper. We conclude that it 

was not. 

C. Standard of Review

[13] “The grant or denial of a request for a preliminary injunction rests within the 

sound discretion of the trial court, and our review is limited to whether there 

was a clear abuse of that discretion.” Buffkin v. Glacier Group, 997 N.E.2d 1, 9 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “When determining whether to grant a preliminary 

injunction, the trial court is required to make special findings of fact and state 

its conclusions thereon.” Id. “When findings and conclusions thereon are 

made, we must determine if the trial court’s findings support the judgment.” Id.

“We will reverse the trial court’s judgment only when it is clearly erroneous.” 
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Id. “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the record lacks evidence or 

reasonable inferences from the evidence to support them.” Id. “A judgment is 

clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction 

that a mistake has been made.” Id. “We consider the evidence only in the light 

most favorable to the judgment and construe findings together liberally in favor 

of the judgment.” Id. “Also, the power to issue a preliminary injunction 

should be used sparingly, and such relief should not be granted except in rare 

instances in which the law and facts are clearly within the moving party’s 

favor.” Id.

[14] “To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party has the burden of 

showing by a preponderance of the evidence the following: (1) a reasonable 

likelihood of success at trial; (2) the remedies at law are inadequate; (3) the 

threatened injury to the movant outweighs the potential harm to the nonmoving 

party from the granting of an injunction; and (4) the public interest would not 

be disserved by granting the requested injunction.” Id. “If the movant fails to 

prove any of these requirements, the trial court’s grant of an injunction is an 

abuse of discretion.” Id. 

D. Not All Preliminary Injunction Requirements Met 

[15] We next examine the record to determine whether there is evidence to support 

the trial court’s findings and whether those findings support the trial court’s 

conclusions. See id. Here, we are most concerned with the showing as to (3) 

the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the potential harm to the 
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nonmoving party from the granting of an injunction, and (4) the public interest 

would not be disserved by granting the requested injunction. Concluding that 

the trial court’s order is not supported as to some of the findings leading to the 

ultimate conclusion that a preliminary injunction is warranted, we find the trial 

court erred.

D.1. Trial Court’s Findings And Evidentiary Support or Lack Thereof

[16] In its order, the court concluded, in pertinent part, as follows:

C. Balance of Harms and Public Interest

1. Dr. Kesler asserts that a TRO in IUHP’s favor 

would be contrary to the public interest because he has 

patients who are in need of surgical intervention to protect 

their health and lives, and the noncompete impairs 

patients’ legitimate interest in selecting the physician of 

their choice. Opp., pp. 6-7.

2. However, without an injunction, IUHP would lose 

the benefit of the non-compete agreement contained in the 

Employment Agreement, to which Dr. Kesler agreed. 

IUHP could also lose goodwill if Dr. Kesler is not 

enjoined from competing with IUHP.

3. Dr. Kesler freely entered the Employment 

Agreement that contained this non-competition provision. 

Courts in Indiana have long recognized the freedom of 

parties to enter into contracts and have presumed that 

contracts represent the freely bargained agreement of the 

parties. Trimble v. Ameritech Publ., Inc., 700 N.E.2d 1128, 

1129 (Ind. 1998). The Indiana Supreme Court has 

“continue[d] to believe that “it is in the best interest of the 

public not to restrict unnecessarily persons’ freedom of 

contract.” This Court further notes there is not evidence 

of an unequal bargaining power between the parties at this 
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early stage of the case.

4. Dr. Kesler’s potential harm appears to be that he 

will have to move his practice more than 30 miles away 

from IU Health University Hospital and IU Health 

Methodist Hospital. IUHP notes that Dr. Kesler himself 

pointed out that numerous Indiana hospitals are equipped 

with the resources Dr. Kesler needs for his practice. 

Memo., p. 15.

5. The Court acknowledges that, under the 

noncompete, Dr. Kesler could still provide treatment 

outside the Restricted Territory, and it is not uncommon 

for his patients to willingly travel to him for treatment.

6. The Court finds that the injuries to IUHP outweigh 

the harm to Dr. Kesler.

7. The Court further finds the best interest of the 

public would be served in enforcing the Employment 

Agreement, which appears to be a valid contract.

8. The Court further notes that Ind. Code § 25-22.5-

5.5-2.5(b)—providing that a primary care physician and an 

employer may not enter into a noncompete agreement—

would not apply to Dr. Kesler because, admittedly, he is 

not a primary care physician.

Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II, pp. 11-12.

D.2. The Parties’ Arguments

[17] Dr. Kesler’s counsel argued that there are no thoracic surgeons at IUHP 

performing the surgical procedure Dr. Kesler developed to remove complex 

germ cell cancer tumors in the chest area. Counsel further remarked that there 

were “20—some—uh patients on [Exhibit B] who are very sick—who need 

cancer surgery. And there certainly is a strong public interest that Dr. Kesler be 

able to perform these surgeries.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 28. Dr. Kesler testified that 
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“the referring physicians have categorically said no, I want Dr. Kesler to care 

for my patient. Or the patients have done that.” Id. at 22. And in his response 

to IUHP’s request for a TRO, Dr. Kesler argued, “Physician non-competition 

agreements involve other considerations because it impairs ‘[t]he patients’ 

legitimate interest in selecting the physician of their choice . . .” Appellant’s

App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 91 (citing Central Ind. Podiatry, P.C. v. Krueger, 882 N.E.2d 

723, 727 (Ind. 2008)). He further asserted that “[t]he patient’s confidence in 

selecting the physician of their choice” is an important consideration. Id. The 

Krueger decision specifically said, “the confidence of a patient in the physician is 

typically an important factor in the relationship that relocation would displace.” 

882 N.E.2d at 727.

[18] On the other hand, IUHP argued that it “has a protectible interest in 

maintaining goodwill with patients and its patient base, and the restrictive 

covenant provides a reasonable and necessary means to protect that interest.” 

Appellee’s Conf. Br. p. 11. It also argued that the restrictive covenant was a 

“crucial aspect” of the Employment Agreement and that “approximately 29% 

of Dr. Kesler’s patients reside within the Restricted Territory.” Id. At the 

hearing, IUHP argued that “it’s actually in the public interest to enforce—uh—

the contracts between the parties in this way.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 13. 

[19] IUHP further argued that “[a]vailable data on Dr. Kesler’s patients confirms 

that Dr. Kesler has had 2270 unique patients from 2019 to present, and 17,371 

encounters. This same data confirms that patients remain as patients for two 

years on average, across IU Health.” Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. II, p. 80 
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(Counterclaim). IUHP defined its suggested monetary damages based on data 

that Dr. Kesler’s “patients remain as patients for two years on average, across 

IU Health” and that the “total value of all those patients over the next two 

years would have been $2.8 Million.” Appellee’s Conf. Br. p. 21. 

[20] As for the nature of Dr. Kesler’s patients, however, he testified at the hearing 

that over ninety-five percent of his patients are new patients, not repeat patients. 

He also provided Exhibit B, which was a list of referral sources, or referring 

physicians, he developed relationships with prior to entering into the 

Employment Agreement. And he testified that “the vast majority of my referral 

prior to IU Health employment came from outside IU Health Physicians.” Tr. 

Vol. II, p. 20. Exhibit C was identified as a list of patients referred to Dr. Kesler 

since his separation from IUHP and “none of them” are part of “the IUHP 

patient base.” Id. at 22.

D.3. Analysis

[21] As for the trial court’s findings in this area, there is no dispute as to Findings

Number 4, 5, and 8. Dr. Kesler could provide services outside the 

geographically limited area and his patients would travel to receive his services. 

And no one disputes that Dr. Kesler is not a primary care physician. We now 

address the findings which remain.
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D.3.a. Public Interest—Contracts or Physician of Choice

[22] We will address the trial court’s Findings Number 1, 2, 3 and 7 together

because they each pertain to the various positions about what is in the public’s 

interest. 

[23] Despite Dr. Kesler’s argument that the noncompete impairs patients’ legitimate 

interest in selecting the physician of their choice, IUHP made no showing that 

the public interest would not be disserved by the entry of a preliminary 

injunction. In Fumo v. Medical Group of Michigan City, Inc., 590 N.E.2d 1103, 

1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), we held that:

the availability of the particular specialty practiced by the 

physician is a matter to be considered by the trial court in looking 

at the totality of the circumstances. Where a specialist offers 

services uniquely or sparsely available in a specified geographical 

area, an injunction may be unwarranted because the movant is 

unable to meet the burden of showing that the public would not 

be disserved. 

And “[t]he effect of the injunction upon the public interest must be weighed 

with the relative potential harms to the parties.” Id. at 1108. 

[24] Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, IUHP has not demonstrated that 

it has suffered any harm. Dr. Kesler’s statement that none of the postseparation patients who were referred to him were members of IUHP’s patient 

base is unrefuted. IUHP simply responded that 29 percent of the patients lived 

in the particular restricted area under the noncompetition clause. However, 

had Dr. Kesler moved his practice 30.01 miles from University Hospital and 
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Methodist Hospital, patients from that restricted area could have freely traveled 

to Dr. Kesler’s new location at the same risk of suggested “harm” to IUHP. 

IUHP drafted and negotiated for that provision. Thus, IUHP anticipated the 

loss of future patients upon Dr. Kesler’s departure had he moved his practice 

30.01 miles from downtown Indianapolis and cannot now complain that the 

loss of those same patients constitutes present harm attributable to a geographic 

violation of the restrictive covenant.

[25] This leads us to the next point which is the unreasonableness or futility of the 

geographic restriction at issue here. Although this also pertains to IUHP’s 

likelihood of success at trial on the merits, IUHP has not demonstrated that the 

geographic limitation here does not disserve the public while providing a benefit 

to IUHP. IUHP has no thoracic surgeons who perform the complex 

procedures Dr. Kesler performs. Therefore, the restriction does nothing more 

than prevent Dr. Kesler from exercising his specific skill set. The record here 

shows there simply are no thoracic surgeons at IUHP with whom Dr. Kesler is 

in direct competition. 

[26] And as for goodwill considerations, IUHP has not made a showing that the 

complex procedures he performs involve trade secrets or confidential 

information. “Indeed, ‘[a]lthough an employer has a protectible property 

interest in the good will of his business (including secret or confidential 

information), the same is not true regarding the general knowledge, information 

or skills gained by the employee in the course of his employment.’” Buffkin, 997 

N.E.2d at 11 (quoting Brunner v. Hand Indus., Inc., 603 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ind. Ct. 
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App. 1992)). Furthermore, “‘[W]hile an employer, under a proper restrictive 

agreement, can prevent a former employee from using his trade or business 

secrets, and other confidential knowledge gained in the course of the 

employment, and from enticing away old customers, he has no right to 

unnecessarily interfere with the employee’s following any trade or calling for 

which he is fitted and from which he may earn his livelihood and he cannot 

preclude him from exercising the skill and general knowledge he has acquired 

or increased through experience or even instructions while in the 

employment.’” Id. (quoting Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., 234 Ind. 398, 411, 

127 N.E.2d 235, 241 (Ind. 1955)) (citation omitted). 

[27] Here, the trial court’s findings “do not reflect consideration of all competing 

interests or disclose the reasons for the result reached[]” regarding whether the 

public interest would be disserved by issuing the preliminary injunction. Id. 

Dr. Kesler provided unrefuted evidence that he was the only thoracic surgeon in 

the particular area who performed the surgical procedure he developed to 

remove complex germ cell cancer tumors in the chest area. IUHP responded by 

making an argument appropriate for the underlying matter, viz., it is in the 

public interest not to restrict unnecessarily persons’ freedom of contract. 

[28] However, IUHP offered no evidence to show that the public would not be 

disserved in the particular area. More recently our supreme court found that a 

preliminary injunction would not disserve the public because the employer 

“provided qualified physicians to meet the needs of all patients who would have 

seen Krueger.” Krueger, 882 N.E.2d at 734. Such is not the case here based on 
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the record before us. And again, importantly, IUHP has not demonstrated any 

harm related to a geographic violation of the restrictive covenant.

[29] The trial court addressed the public interest in the provision of those services in 

the particular area by reference to the geographic restrictions contained in the 

noncompetition clause. The court found “it is not uncommon for [Dr. Kesler’s] 

patients to willingly travel to him for treatment.” Appellant’s App. Conf. Vol. 

II, p. 21. This highlights, however, that IUHP would “lose” those patients 

whether Dr. Kesler practiced 1 mile, 30.1 miles, or 100 miles away from 

downtown Indianapolis. It is Dr. Kesler’s departure that is the source of 

IUHP’s “loss.” However, the court’s findings do not show that it considered 

whether the public in the particular area would be disserved by the absence of 

Dr. Kesler’s service. And IUHP has not shown that it has other physicians who 

provide the same services in the particular area. 

[30] Almost one third of Dr. Kesler’s patients, who are in poor health, would have 

to travel further to receive his unique medical services. Instead, the court found 

that IUHP’s loss of the benefit of its bargain in terms of the noncompetition 

clause in the Employment Agreement, i.e., the suggested lost revenue in the 

amount of $2.8 million, outweighed the harm to Dr. Kesler by having to move 

his practice out of the geographically restricted area. Yet, IUHP was aware that 

upon Dr. Kesler’s departure, which was allowed under the Employment 

Agreement, it would lose the continued revenue from his patients. 

Consequently, it has not shown any harm beyond that which it anticipated 

anyway under the terms of the Employment Agreement should Dr. Kesler 
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leave. IUHP has not tied its suggested revenue loss to a geographic violation of 

the restrictive noncompetition covenant.

[31] Although “Indiana courts recognize the freedom of parties to enter into 

contracts,” Fresh Cut, Inc. v. Fazli, 650 N.E.2d 1126, 1129 (Ind. 1995), “Indiana 

courts have long stated that covenants which restrict a person’s employment 

opportunities are strongly disfavored,” see Buffkin, 997 N.E.2d at 9-10, and “‘an 

employer must show some reason why it would be unfair to allow the employee 

to compete with the former employer.’” Clark’s Sales and Serv., Inc. v. Smith, 4 

N.E.3d 772, 780 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Pathfinder Commc’ns Corp. v. 

Macy, 795 N.E.2d 1109, 1110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)), trans. denied. Here, IUHP 

has failed to established a valid reason why it would be unfair for Dr. Kesler to 

practice at Community North Hospital.

[32] The question before us is limited to whether the issuance of the preliminary 

injunction was proper. Here, the trial court’s findings do not show its 

consideration of the risk to the public within the geographic limitation brought 

about by the restriction of Dr. Kesler’s services. And IUHP has not shown 

harm related to the geographic limitation of the noncompetition clause. As 

such, we order that the preliminary injunction be dissolved. 

D.3.b. Irreparable Harm—Balance of Harms

[33] The trial court’s Finding Number 6 says that the harm to IUHP outweighs the 

harm to Dr. Kesler. IUHP has advanced the proposition that the loss of the

patients who would have stayed within the IU Health system for two years 
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would result in a $2.8 million loss due to Dr. Kesler’s employment within the 

Community Health Network. However, it is not the violation of the geographic 

limitation of the noncompetition clause that they would suffer the suggested 

$2.8 million loss; it is Dr. Kesler’s departure itself, which is authorized and was 

contemplated under the Employment Agreement. As such, IUHP has 

demonstrated no harm attributable to a violation of the noncompetition clause. 

And Dr. Kesler could, in theory, move his practice. Yet, the consideration 

missing from the trial court’s consideration is the harm to the public if health 

care services are unavailable due to the grant of injunctive relief. For some of 

these very ill patients, the harm could be irreparable. We conclude that the trial 

court erred by granting the preliminary injunction and the same must be 

dissolved.

Conclusion

[34] We conclude that the trial court’s findings do not show a consideration of the 

disservice to the public by enjoining Dr. Kesler’s medical practice. IUHP has 

failed to show it has suffered harm. Dr. Kesler could move his practice. But 

the record shows the public suffers from the injunctive relief granted here. 

Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred by concluding that IUHP 

was entitled to injunctive relief and by issuing the preliminary injunction. 

Therefore, we reverse and remand this matter to the trial court with instructions 

to dissolve the preliminary injunction.

[35] Reversed and remanded. 
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Pyle, J., and Felix, J., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Robert E Saint

Russell T. Clarke, Jr.

Emswiller, Williams, Noland, & Clarke, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Laurie E. Martin

Gregory A. English

Christopher D. Wagner

Hoover Hull Turner LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana