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MICHELLE WATKINS v. JAMES WATKINS

(AC 35995)

Keller, Mullins and Schaller, Js.

Argued May 21—officially released August 5, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

Haven at Meriden, J. Fischer, J.)

Michael J. Fenton, with whom, on the brief, was

George H. Romania, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Eric B. Caines, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

MULLINS, J. The plaintiff, Michelle Watkins, appeals

from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court

in favor of the defendant, James Watkins, on her negligence action. The plaintiff claims that the court erred

in concluding that the parties’ separation agreement

was clear and unambiguous and therefore precluded

her negligence action because, in her view, the

agreement was ambiguous. The plaintiff also claims

that, notwithstanding the fact that the court concluded

that the separation agreement was clear and unambiguous, the court erred in declining to consider extrinsic

evidence of the parties’ intent, which would have shown

that the plaintiff’s negligence action was not precluded

by the separation agreement. We disagree with the

plaintiff’s claims and affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts

and procedural history. The plaintiff and the defendant

were married on June 12, 2004. During their marriage,

on or about January 7, 2011, the plaintiff and defendant

were involved in an altercation that resulted in the

plaintiff sustaining serious personal injuries. Following

their altercation, the parties remained married for

another fourteen months, until March 14, 2012.

On March 14, 2012, two things happened. First, the

plaintiff, by service of process, commenced the present

negligence action against the defendant based on the

January 7, 2011 incident. In her complaint, the plaintiff

alleged that on January 7, 2011, her then husband, the

defendant, ‘‘negligently and carelessly caused physical

contact with [her] thereby causing [her] to fall to the

ground inside [their] residence causing her to sustain

injuries . . . .’’ Second, after the plaintiff had served

the defendant with the negligence complaint,the parties

executed a separation agreement, and the court, Conway, J., dissolved their marriage. Both parties were

represented by counsel in the preparation of the separation agreement and in the ultimate dissolution of

their marriage.

At issue in the present appeal are two paragraphs in

the parties’ separation agreement. The first paragraph

at issue is paragraph E underthe prefatory section titled

‘‘Recital,’’ and it provides: ‘‘REASONS FOR SEPARATION AGREEMENT: The parties wish to be legally free

to live separate and apart from one another for the

remainder of their natural lives. Wife and Husband

desire to settle all financial and property matters

between them created by their marriage by effectuating

an equitable asset and liability distribution and by terminating all present and future rights and obligations,

except those reserved or created hereunder, which

either of them now has or hereafter may have with

respect to any property or estate of the other or in
respective estates upon the death of either.’’

The second paragraph at issue is § 10, titled ‘‘Mutual

Releases,’’ and it provides: ‘‘This Agreement is the entire

agreement of the parties. Except as to the obligations

created hereunder and reservant to the parties hereto,

the rights set forth in this Agreement is the entire understanding of the parties and each party hereby releases

and relinquishes to the other party any and all claims

that either party has against the other for any and all

property rights and causes of action from any behavior

or occurrence that happened during the marriage.’’

On the basis of the foregoing separation agreement,

the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment

with respect to the plaintiff’s negligence action. The

defendant claimed that he was entitled to judgment as

a matter of law because there was no genuine issue of

material fact that the separation agreement precluded

the plaintiff from bringing any claim against the defendant for any behavior that happened during their marriage. The defendant attached to his motion, as exhibits,

the separation agreement, the plaintiff’s answers to the

defendant’s requests for admissions, and his own affidavit. These materials revealed that there was no dispute

that the plaintiff’s alleged injuries occurred during her

marriage to the defendant.

The plaintiff in turn filed an objection to the motion

for summary judgment. The plaintiff attached to her

objection, as exhibits, excerpts from the separation

agreement and her own affidavit. In her affidavit, the

plaintiff claimed that it was her understanding, based

on the parties’ conversations between themselves and

their attorneys, that the negligence action would not

be covered under the separation agreement.

Afterreviewing the parties’ submissions and the separation agreement, the court, J. Fischer, J., granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Specifically,

the court ruled that the mutual releases provision of

the parties’ separation agreement was clear and unambiguous and operated to foreclose the plaintiff from

bringing the present negligence action against the

defendant. The court noted that both parties were represented by counsel and thus were to be held accountable

for the unambiguous language used within the four

corners of the separation agreement. As such, and given

the clarity of the agreement, the court declined to consider any extrinsic evidence regarding the parties’

intent. Ultimately, the court concluded that ‘‘there [was]

no genuine issue of material fact that the separation

agreement preclude[d] the plaintiff from bringing the

instant cause of action against the defendant.’’ This

appeal followed.

We begin our analysis with the well settled standard

of review applied to a court’s decision to grant a motion

for summary judgment. ‘‘Our review of the trial court’s
decision to grant [a] motion for summary judgment is

plenary. . . . In seeking summary judgment, it is the

movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. . . . To satisfy his burden

the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear

what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as

to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.

. . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to

the opponent. . . . Once the moving party has met its

burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed

factual issue. . . . It is not enough . . . for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are

insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact

and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45].’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Rickel v. Komaromi, 144 Conn. App. 775, 779–80, 73

A.3d 851 (2013).

The plaintiff asserts five claims, all of which are variations on the same theme. The essence of all of her claims

is that the court erred in granting summary judgment

because the separation agreement, when read in its

entirety, was ambiguous as to whether her negligence

action was precluded by the mutual releases provision.

In particular, she contends that ambiguity exists in the

agreement because the agreement did not specifically

preclude her negligence action. She also argues that

ambiguity exists in the agreement with respect to her

negligence action because, in her view, the entire

agreement arises out of a divorce action and is limited

to addressing only financial and property matters.

Therefore, the plaintiff argues, because her negligence

action did not specifically relate to a financial or property matter, her negligence action was not covered

under the mutual releases provision.

Relatedly, the plaintiff contends that the court erred

by precluding her from introducing and relying on

extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent with respect

to the separation agreement. She contends that, even

though the court had deemed the agreement clear and

unambiguous, the court erroneously concluded that it

could not consider extrinsic evidence that would have

demonstrated that the parties did not intend for the

separation agreement to encompass the negligence

action. We are not persuaded by the plaintiff’s claims,

and we reject her attempt to import ambiguity into the

separation agreement where none exists.

‘‘Our Supreme Court has instructed that interpretation of a separation agreement incorporated into a dissolution decree is guided by the general principles

governing the construction of contracts. . . . A contract must be construed to effectuate the intent of the
parties, which is determined from the language used

interpreted in light of the situation of the parties and

the circumstances connected with the transaction. . . .

[T]he intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair

and reasonable construction of the written words and

. . . the language used must be accorded its common,

natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can

be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract.

. . . Where the language of the contract is clear and

unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect

according to its terms. A court will not torture words

to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves

no room for ambiguity . . . . Similarly, any ambiguity

in a contract must emanate from the language used in

the contract rather than from one party’s subjective

perception of the terms.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Nassra v. Nassra, 139 Conn. App. 661, 667,

56 A.3d 970 (2012).

‘‘[T]he mere fact that the parties advance different

interpretations of the language in question does not

necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous. . . . [A] contract is ambiguous if the intent of the

parties is not clear and certain from the language of

the contract itself. . . . The contract must be viewed

in its entirety, with each provision read in light of the

other provisions . . . and every provision must be

given effect if it is possible to do so. . . . If the language

of the contract is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the contract is ambiguous.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cruz

v. Visual Perceptions, LLC, 311 Conn. 93, 103, 84 A.3d

828 (2014).

‘‘If contract language is definitive of the parties’

intent, then the interpretation of the language becomes

a question of law for the court. . . . Our review, in

such a case, is plenary. . . . If, however, the language

is not clear, then the intention of the parties as represented in the contract becomes a question of fact. . . .

If the fact in question is genuinely material to the resolution of the issue, then it is not the proper subject of

summary judgment.’’ (Citations omitted.) Best Friends

Pet Care, Inc. v. Design Learned, Inc., 77 Conn. App.

167, 176, 823 A.2d 329 (2003). We conclude that the

mutual releases provision is clear and unambiguous.

As a result, our review is plenary, and in determining

the intent of the parties to the agreement, it is the

language of the agreement and the intent expressed

therein that controls. Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. BFA Ltd.

Partnership, 287 Conn. 307, 314, 948 A.2d 318 (2008).

Here, reading the language of the separation

agreement, the mutual releases provision states that

‘‘each party hereby releases and relinquishes to the

other party any and all claims that either party has

against the other for any and all property rights and

causes of action from any behavior or occurrence that
happened during the marriage.’’ (Emphasis added.)

This language is not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Its scope—‘‘any and all claims

that either party has against the other’’—is broad, and

its subject—claims for property rights and causes of

action from any behavior or occurrence that happened

during the marriage—is well defined. This language

means precisely what it says: that each party releases

the other from any and all causes of action from any

behavior or occurrence that happened during the

marriage.

In construing the mutual releases provision of the

separation agreement in this case, this court’s decision

in Davis v. Davis, 112 Conn.App. 56, 63–65, 962A.2d 140

(2009), is instructive. In Davis, this court considered

whether a mutual release provision in the parties’ separation agreement precluded the plaintiff wife from

bringing her negligence based claims against the defendant husband for conduct that occurred after the dissolution of the parties’ marriage. Id. The provision read:

‘‘Subject to the provisions of this [a]greement, and

reserving the right to pursue any action for divorce or

dissolution of the parties’ marriage or any breach of

this [a]greement, each party has released and by this

[a]greement does for himself or herself and his or her

heirs, legal representatives, executors, administrators,

and assigns, release and forever discharge the other of

and from all cause or causes of action, claims, rights

or demands whatsoeverin law orin equity, which either

of the parties ever had or now has against the other,

including, without limitation, all claims or rights which

now exist or may hereafter arise by reason of the marriage of the parties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 63.

This court concluded ‘‘that the language ofthe separation agreement is clear and unambiguous.’’ Id., 64. The

court noted that ‘‘the mutual release provision in the

separation agreement provide[d] that each party

release[d] the otherfrom ‘all claims orrights which now

exist or may hereafter arise by reason of the marriage of

the parties.’ . . . The language of the agreement

clearly and unambiguously limit[ed] the mutual release

to any and all claims existing at the time the separation

agreement was entered and to any and all additional

claims arising out of the marriage.’’ (Citation omitted;

emphasis in original.) Id. Because the conduct at issue

in Davis occurred after the parties’ divorce, however,

this court ultimately concluded that the mutual releases

provision did not bar the plaintiff’s claims against the

defendant. Id., 64–65.

The language that the parties used in the release in

Davis is strikingly similar to the language that the parties have used in the mutual releases provision in this

case. In fact, the agreement language in this case is even

clearer and more straightforward than the agreement
language at issue in Davis. In this case, the agreement

more plainly and simply states the parties’ intent to

release each other from any and all causes of action

arising from behavior or events occurring during their

marriage. Consequently, the mutual releases provision

at issue in this case clearly and unambiguously limits

the release to any and all claims arising from behavior

or occurrences that happened during the marriage.

Unlike in Davis, however, the parties here do not

dispute that the basis of the plaintiff’s negligence action,

which is the January 7, 2011 altercation, occurred during their marriage. Accordingly, the mutual releases

provision precludes the plaintiff from bringing the present negligence action, as it is based on behavior that

occurred during their marriage.

In reaching our conclusion, we observe, as did the

court in Overberg v. Lusby, 921 F.2d 90, 91–92 (6th Cir.

1990), that ‘‘the separation agreement that [the parties]

executed was [clearly] intended to tie up all loose ends

and resolve all of the claims or disputes that might arise

from the marriage relationship’’ and that ‘‘if the [plaintiff

did] not intend a release of all known claims . . . she

could [have] expressly reserve[d] a tort claim from the

settlement and then subsequently sue[d] in tort.’’

Similarly, here, as in Overberg, the reasonable interpretation of the separation agreement is that it was

intended to tie up all loose ends and to resolve any

and all claims or disputes with respect to property and

causes of action arising from any behavior or occurrences that happened during the parties’ marriage. Both

parties were represented by counsel in the drafting and

execution of the separation agreement. The plaintiff

chose not to reserve expressly her negligence action

from the separation agreement. She cannot now escape

the clear intent expressed in the mutual releases provision, namely, that she agreed to release the defendant

from any and all causes of action for behavior that

occurred during the marriage.1

Finally, we likewise reject the plaintiff’s argument

that the court erred by disregarding her extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent. The plaintiff contends that

she was entitled to introduce and rely on such evidence

under the ‘‘intent rule,’’ regardless of whether the court

deemed the agreement to be ambiguous. We disagree.

The ‘‘intent rule’’ was articulated by our Supreme

Court in Sims v. Honda Motor Co., 225 Conn. 401, 419,

623 A.2d 995 (1993). In Sims, the question before the

court was the proper construction of General Statutes

§ 52–572e (b), specifically, whether a tortfeasor must

be named specifically in a release in order to be discharged of liability thereby. Id., 405–406. Ultimately,

our Supreme Court held that ‘‘[u]nder § 52–572e . . .

the contracting parties’ intent, not the operation of a

legal rule [of contract interpretation], determines the
scope of a release.’’ Id., 413. Accordingly, when applying

§ 52-572e, ‘‘[a] trial court may consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent regarding the scope of the

release regardless of whether the court determines that

the language of the release is ambiguous.’’ Id., 419. The

court reasoned that it was necessary to create a special

‘‘intent rule’’ of contract interpretation for § 52–572e in

order to avoid frustrating the goal of that statutory

provision.2 The court observed: ‘‘By abrogating the common law rule that a release of one tortfeasor discharges,

by operation of law, all joint tortfeasors, § 52–572e preserves the right of the injured party to choose to release

one or all joint tortfeasors in accordance with the intent

of the negotiations between the injured party and the

settling tortfeasor.’’ Id., 413.

Sims is factually distinct and legally inapposite to

the present case. As this court noted in Embalmers’

Supply Co. v. Giannitti, 103 Conn. App. 20, 45, 929

A.2d 729, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 931, 934 A.2d 246

(2007), our Supreme Court did not intend for the rule

in Sims to apply to all releases. In fact, ‘‘after Sims,

our Supreme Court clarified that Sims should not be

read as a rejection of the four corners doctrine of contract interpretation. See Levine v. Massey, 232 Conn.

272, 278 n.7, 654 A.2d 737 (1995). Instead, the court

described it as a narrow exception to the general rule

of contract construction that was needed to avoid frustrat[ing] the purpose of a remedial statute.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Embalmers’ Supply Co. v.

Giannitti, supra, 45.

In the present case, there is no remedial statute at

issue. This case also does not involve joint tortfeasors.

Thus, the narrow exception to the general rules of contract construction created by Sims and the intent rule

are simply inapplicable to this case. Accordingly, normal principles of contract interpretation apply to the

court’s interpretation of the separation agreement. As

such, the court properly applied the oft stated principle

that ‘‘[e]xtrinsic evidence may be considered in

determining contractual intent only if a contract is

ambiguous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Orange Palladium, LLC v. Readey, 144 Conn. App. 283,

297, 72 A.3d 1191 (2013). Because the court properly

concluded that the separation agreement was clear and

unambiguous, it properly declined to considerthe plaintiff’s extrinsic evidence in determining the parties’

intent.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

Indeed, it is worthy of note that § 11 of the separation agreement, titled

‘‘Mutual Drafting,’’ states that ‘‘this Agreement was drafted cooperatively

by the parties’ counsel in consultation with the parties. Neither party shall

be entitled to claim the benefit of any ambiguity from the drafting hereof.’’

2 General Statutes § 52–572e (b) provides that ‘‘[a] release by the injured

person, or his legal representative, of one joint tortfeasor does not discharge

the other tortfeasors unless, and only to the extent, the release so provides.’’
Our Supreme Court stated that ‘‘the purpose of § 52–572e . . . is to permit

the release of one joint tortfeasor to effect the release of other joint tortfeasors only if the settling parties so intended.’’ Sims v. Honda Motor Co.,

supra, 225 Conn. 414.