United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Secretary of Defense

February 1998 AIR FORCE

BOMBERS

Moving More B-1s to

the Reserves Could

Save Millions Without

Reducing Mission

Capability

GAO/NSIAD-98-64

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-275839 

February 26, 1998

The Honorable William S. Cohen

Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard forces continue to receive key

consideration in formulating both Department of Defense (DOD) and Air

Force long-range force structure plans. As we reported during an earlier

review of Air Force bombers,1

 the reserve component carries out many of

the same missions as the active duty units, generally at lower cost. During

our current work, we focused on the cost and operational implications of

assigning more B-1 bombers to the reserve component. Specifically, we

(1) assessed whether operational factors preclude greater reserve

component participation in the B-1 mission and (2) developed options for

increasing the number of B-1s assigned to reserve component units and

analyzed their effect on operations and costs.

Background The B-1, a long-range heavy bomber that began operations in 1986, was

designed primarily to carry nuclear munitions. Effective October 1997, B-1

units were no longer assigned the nuclear mission.2

 The B-1 continues,

however, to support Air Force conventional wartime missions, and

planned modifications will provide the B-1 the future capability to deliver

precision-guided munitions.

The Air Force is currently authorized 70 “mission-coded” B-1s, that is,

aircraft that are fully funded in terms of operations and maintenance, load

crews, and spare parts. Currently, 52 B-1s are operated by active duty

units. The remaining 18 are assigned to the reserve component—10 to the

Kansas Air National Guard and 8 to the Georgia Air National Guard.

The Air Force has announced plans to increase the number of fully funded

B-1s to 84 over the next several years by funding aircraft currently held in

reserve. It is expected that this fleet of 84 aircraft will be assigned to both

active and reserve component units, as shown in table 1.

1

Air Force Bombers: Options to Retire or Restructure the Force Would Reduce Planned Spending

(GAO/NSIAD-96-192, Sept. 30, 1996).

2

Although the B-1 nuclear mission has been withdrawn, the U.S. has plans for reconstitution of B-1

nuclear capability should the need arise.

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Table 1: Announced B-1 Force

Structure Air Force Base Type unit B-1s

Dyess, Tex. Active 36

Ellsworth, S. Dak. Active 24

McConnell, Kans. Air National Guard 10

Mt. Home, Idaho Active 6

Robins, Ga. Air National Guard 8

Total 84

Source: U.S. Air Force.

Results in Brief Air Force active and reserve components consider essentially the same

operational factors in determining whether a mission is suitable for the

reserve component. Factors Air Force officials consider include

• overseas presence,

• peacetime training,

• mission response times,

• personnel tempo, and

• personnel recruiting.

Our assessment of these factors showed that they do not preclude

assigning more B-1s to the reserve component. B-1s are not based

overseas, peacetime training can be scheduled around part-time reservists’

civilian employment, reserve units could mobilize to meet mission

response times, and personnel tempo rates for B-1 unit personnel do not

exceed the Air Force’s maximum desired standard. However, the lack of

availability of recruitable personnel in some locations limits where reserve

units can operate.

If the Air Force were to assign more B-1s to the reserve component than

are currently planned, the cost to operate the B-1 fleet could be

reduced—without adversely affecting day-to-day peacetime training or

critical wartime missions or closing any bases. We developed six options

for assigning more B-1s to the reserves. Based on Congressional Budget

Office cost savings projections and our analysis of other one-time costs,

we estimate that implementing these options could produce savings

ranging from $87.1 million to $235.3 million during the last 5 years

(1999-2003) of the current Future Years Defense Program.3

3

The Future Years Defense Program is an authoritative record of current and projected force structure,

costs, and personnel levels that has been approved by the Secretary of Defense.

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Operational Factors

Do Not Preclude

Assigning More B-1s

to the Reserves

In general, reserve component B-1 units are considered just as capable of

carrying out operational missions as their active duty counterparts. Both

the Kansas and Georgia B-1 reserve units train to mobilize and deploy fully

mission-ready B-1s on short notice to support the conventional war plans

of theater commanders in chief. Like their active duty counterparts,

reserve component units are routinely subjected to standardized Air Force

operational evaluations. In a recent Air Force operational readiness

inspection, unit personnel and aircraft from the Kansas Air National Guard

demonstrated their ability to satisfactorily perform their assigned wartime

mission. The Georgia unit attained initial operational capability status in

December 1997 and expects to conduct its first operational inspection in

November 1998.

Our analysis of five operational factors the Air Force considers in

assessing whether a mission is suitable for reserve component

participation indicates that assigning more B-1s to the reserve component

than the Air Force has announced would not adversely affect peacetime

and wartime missions. The following summarizes the results of this

analysis.

Overseas Presence When aircraft are permanently based overseas, enough aircraft must be in

the active component to ensure that an adequate number of stateside

positions are available for personnel returning from overseas. However,

since B-1s are based only in the United States, the assignment of more B-1s

to the reserve component would not affect overseas presence and

stateside rotations.

Peacetime Training For a mission to be suitable for the reserve component, peacetime training

requirements must allow sufficient lead times to enable part-time

reservists to arrange absences from their full-time civilian employment.

According to Air National Guard B-1 unit officials, aircrews must fly about

four times per month, which can easily be scheduled around part-time

reservists’ civilian employment. Moreover, the B-1 has not been involved

in any peacetime operations that have required frequent or unscheduled

participation by reserve component personnel.

Mission Response Times Except for the additional 24 hours reserve component units are allowed to

recall unit personnel and mobilize their forces prior to deployment, there

is little distinction between the kinds of wartime missions assigned to

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reserve component units and their active duty counterparts.

Notwithstanding the additional time that reserve component units may

require to mobilize, regional combatant commands stated that current

conventional threat warning times provide ample time for reserve

component B-1 units to mobilize and meet the earliest planned mission

response times. Should an unforeseen contingency arise with little or no

warning, other active duty bomber units would continue to retain the

capability to provide the first response.

Personnel Tempo B-1 personnel have not experienced excessive peacetime personnel tempo

rates—frequent and lengthy temporary duty assignments away from their

home operating locations. This is due in part to the political sensitivities of

other countries to the temporary overseas basing of B-1s during

peacetime. Air Force data showed that B-1 personnel were on temporary

duty for an average of 48 days during fiscal year 1997, much less than the

Air Force’s maximum desired standard of 120 days. Thus, personnel tempo

rates would not preclude placing more B-1s in the reserve component.

Personnel Recruiting The ability to recruit personnel into the reserve component is highly

dependent on the location of the unit. Recruiting officials said it is not

possible to recruit sufficient reserve component personnel at two of the

current five B-1 locations. None of our options include placing more B-1s

in the reserve component at these locations. For the three other locations,

recruiting officials said that recruiting sufficient reservists was possible

given adequate time and resources but that recruiting would be difficult

for some of our options.

Savings Could Accrue

If More B-1s Were

Assigned to the

Reserves

Force mix studies on active and reserve forces4 have traditionally asserted

that it is less costly to operate a reserve component unit than an active

duty unit of comparable size and mission. Indeed, the potential for savings

was the primary reason cited by the Air Force for establishing reserve

component B-1 units with the Kansas and Georgia Air National Guard. In

its September 1994 response to the Senate Appropriations Committee’s

request for details on transferring bombers to the reserve component, the

Air Force stated that placing bombers in the reserve component was

fiscally prudent, with no anticipated loss in war-fighting capability.

4

We examined force mix studies prepared by the Department of Defense, the U.S. Air Force, the Air

Force Reserve Command, the Air National Guard, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Rand

Corporation.

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The force mix studies we reviewed noted that the cost to operate a reserve

component unit is generally lower than for an active duty unit for several

reasons. First, reserve component aircrews are more experienced than

their active duty counterparts and require fewer flying hours to meet

mission training requirements. Second, reserve component units employ

fewer full-time military personnel than active units. Additionally, because

of the part-time manning of traditional reserve component units, there are

fewer requirements for permanent and costly base infrastructure—such as

family housing and base medical care facilities—necessary to support

full-time active duty personnel and their families.

Table 2 describes six options for assigning more B-1s to the reserves and

shows the estimated savings the Air Force could achieve by implementing

these options. Savings range from $87.1 million to $235.3 million during

fiscal years 1999-2003.

Table 2: Potential Savings From Implementing B-1 Reserve Component Force Mix Options (fiscal years 1999-2003)

Dollars in millions

Option

Number of reserve

component

mission-coded B-1s

Percent of reserve

component

mission-coded B-1s

B-1

locations

Estimated

savings

Air Force announced force structure plan 18 21 5 0

1 - Convert in place an existing active unit 30 36 5 $87.1

2 - Convert in place the B-1 aircrew training unit 36 43 5 130.6

3 - Convert in place the B-1 aircrew training unit and

an operational squadron 42 50 5 174.2

4 - Consolidate B-1s at two bases, one active and one

reserve 54 64 2 208.6

5 - Consolidate B-1s at one active and two reserve

locations 48 57 3 230.0

6 - Convert in place a base and assign B-1s to the

reserve component 54 64 5 235.3

Source: GAO and Congressional Budget Office cost analyses.

By way of illustration, option 1—converting in place an existing active

squadron of 12 aircraft—could produce $87.1 million in operational

savings over the 5-year period.5

 Option 5—consolidating B-1s at one active

and two reserve locations—may be more challenging to implement but

could result in greater savings. For example, under option 5, the Air Force

5

Includes direct and indirect cost savings such as fuel, maintenance, military pay, training, and medical

care.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-64 Air Force Bombers
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would need to convert one active duty base to a reserve component base

and consolidate B-1 operations at two other existing locations, one active

and one reserve. As shown in table 2, this option could save an estimated

$230 million over the 5-year period. The savings include $217.7 million

from operational savings and $43.3 million from the elimination of B-1

military construction projects programmed at two of the bases where the

B-1 would no longer be assigned. In calculating the net savings, we took

into account one-time costs of about $26 million to move an active duty

C-130 unit at the converted base to another location and $5 million to

construct a squadron operations facility to accommodate an additional B-1

unit at another location.

It should be noted that the estimated $230-million savings under option 5

and the $208.6-million savings under option 4 do not include additional

savings the Air Force expects would result from reducing the number of

B-1 operating locations to less than five. According to Air Force active and

reserve component logisticians, reducing the requirement to support five

B-1 bases would help ease current shortages in B-1 support equipment and

war reserve mobilization kit spare parts reported by B-1 operating units

and reduce future expenditures for B-1 support equipment and spare parts.

Moreover, converting an active base to a reserve component base could

result in lower costs to operate hospital, family housing, and other

facilities associated with active duty units.

Appendix I presents the potential costs and savings related to each option

and the actions the Air Force would need to take to implement each

option.

Recommendation Whether the Air Force chooses among our options or develops options of

its own, we believe millions of dollars could be saved without reducing

mission capability by placing more B-1s in the reserve component.

Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the

Secretary of the Air Force to prepare a plan to place more B-1s in the

reserve component and seek congressional support for the plan.

As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires you to submit a written statement on

actions taken on this recommendation to the Senate Committee on

Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government Reform

and Oversight not later than 60 days after the date of the report and to the

Senate and House Committees on Appropriations with the agency’s first

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-64 Air Force Bombers
B-275839 

request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the

report.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with

our findings. While DOD agreed that the mix of B-1s at active and reserve

components needs further study, it believed that our recommendation that

the Secretary of the Air Force develop a plan to place more B-1s in the

reserve component is too strong without looking at war mobilization

requirements and severe limitations on basing options. DOD believes it has

the right mix of B-1s in the active and reserve components and stated that

it has no plans at this time to move more B-1s to the reserves or to

implement any of our force mix options. DOD agreed, however, to (1) use

our report, along with other analyses, to develop a mission-capable,

cost-effective force mix; (2) study in detail our force mix options where

savings may exist; and (3) ask the Secretary of the Air Force to thoroughly

review our report to determine whether it is operationally feasible and

cost-effective to move more B-1s to the reserves. DOD also said that after

the Air Force conducts a thorough review of the bomber force mix, the

results will be incorporated into the upcoming budget cycles.

We agree that war mobilization requirements and basing options are

important factors and, in fact, considered them in our analysis.

Specifically, we assessed five operational factors, including mission

response times, that the Air Force considers in determining whether a

mission is suitable for reserve component participation. Except for the

additional 24 hours reserve component units are allowed to recall unit

personnel and mobilize their forces prior to deployment, there is little

distinction between the kinds of wartime missions assigned to reserve

component B-1 units and their active duty counterparts. Furthermore, we

note that in its September 1994 response to the Senate Appropriations

Committee’s request for details on transferring bombers to the reserve

component, the Air Force stated that placing bombers in the reserve

component could be done with no anticipated loss in war-fighting

capability. Because our audit revealed no operational reason to limit the

number of B-1s in the reserve component to the current level, and a range

of basing options is available, we continue to believe that our

recommendation is sound.

DOD further expressed concern that some of our options would

significantly change bases’ loading patterns and that it lacks continuing

base closure authority. We agree with DOD that several of our options

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-64 Air Force Bombers
B-275839 

could result in changes to the base aircraft loading patterns. However, DOD

has a range of options for moving more B-1s into the reserve component

that could be accomplished within existing authority. We met with Air

Combat Command civil engineering officials and were assured that the B-1

bases included in our force mix options have the capacity to accommodate

additional B-1s being moved to the reserves.

Lastly, DOD stated that the Congressional Budget Office’s model appears to

overstate the savings for our options by excluding modernization and

initial training costs. Since the entire B-1 fleet is already being modernized,

the same modernization costs will be incurred whether the B-1s are in the

active or reserve component. We acknowledge that the model did not

capture some of the one-time costs, including initial training costs, that

would be incurred. However, additional costs would be relatively small

and would be recouped from the annual operational savings realized by

adding B-1s to the reserve component.

DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II.

Scope and

Methodology

We held extensive discussions with Air Force officials in Headquarters,

U.S. Air Force; the Air Force Reserve Command; the Air National Guard;

and the Air Combat Command and researched reports, documents, and

prior studies to determine the operational factors the Air Force uses to

assess the suitability of missions for the reserve component. We used

these factors to develop criteria to assess the feasibility of increasing the

reserve component’s participation in the B-1 mission.

We visited all five B-1 bases and the Air Combat Command to assess the

active and reserve component units’ mission requirements and operational

capabilities. We discussed force mix issues with operations, plans, and

training officials. From these visits, we obtained information such as

planned force structure, base capacity, recruiting potential, and military

construction costs and used it to develop force mix options.

We analyzed the recruiting, response times, and cost implications for each

option. Estimates of recruiting potential were developed by the Air Force

Reserve and the Air National Guard. To assess how more B-1s in the

reserve component would impact wartime mission response requirements,

we obtained information from operational plans, unit capability

requirements, and the combatant commands for the theaters in which the

B-1 would be employed. To assess the potential savings from placing more

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B-275839 

B-1s in the reserve component, we used operational cost estimates

developed by the Congressional Budget Office and other costs Air Force

officials provided such as for the military construction and movement of

an operational unit that would be required to implement some of our

options. We did not determine whether any of the options we presented

would require congressional notification under 10 U.S.C. 2687, base

closures and realignments. Neither did we obtain estimates of one-time

personnel costs, such as severance pay for civilian employees or change of

station costs for active duty personnel.

We performed our review from September 1996 to December 1997 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional

committees and members, the House National Guard and Reserve Caucus

and the Senate National Guard Caucus, the Secretary of the Air Force, the

Commander of the Air Combat Command, the Commander of the Air

Force Reserve Command, the Director of the Air National Guard, the

Director of the Congressional Budget Office, and the Director of the Office

of Management and Budget.

Please contact me at (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any questions

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-64 Air Force Bombers
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Options for Assigning

More B-1s to the

Reserve Component

12

Option 1: Convert in Place an Existing Active Unit 12

Option 2: Convert in Place the B-1 Aircrew Training Unit 12

Option 3: Convert in Place the B-1 Aircrew Training Unit and an

Operational Squadron

13

Option 4: Consolidate B-1s at Two Bases, One Active and One

Reserve

14

Option 5: Consolidate B-1s at One Active and Two Reserve

Locations

15

Option 6: Convert in Place a Base and Assign B-1s to the Reserve

Component

16

Appendix II 

Comments From the

Department of

Defense

18

Appendix III 

Major Contributors to

This Report

21

Tables Table 1: Announced B-1 Force Structure 2

Table 2: Potential Savings From Implementing B-1 Reserve

Component Force Mix Options

5

Table I.1: B-1 Force Structure for Option 1 12

Table I.2: B-1 Force Structure for Option 2 13

Table I.3: B-1 Force Structure for Option 3 13

Table I.4: B-1 Force Structure for Option 4 14

Table I.5: B-1 Force Structure for Option 5 15

Table I.6: B-1 Force Structure for Option 6 16

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-64 Air Force Bombers
Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-98-64 Air Force Bombers
Appendix I 

Options for Assigning More B-1s to the

Reserve Component

Option 1: Convert in

Place an Existing

Active Unit

• Convert an existing active 12-aircraft squadron at Dyess Air Force Base,

Texas, to a reserve squadron at Dyess.

• No change at the other four B-1 locations.

Table I.1 shows the number of B-1s at each base under the Air Force’s

announced plan and under our option 1.

Table I.1: B-1 Force Structure for Option 1

Dyess Ellsworth McConnell Mt. Home Robins Total

AC RC AC RC AC RC AC RC AC RC AC RC

Plan 36 0 24 0 0 10 6 0 0 8 66 18

Option 1 24 12 24 0 0 10 6 0 0 8 54 30

Legend:

AC = active component

RC = reserve component

Estimated Savings The Congressional Budget Office estimated that this option would save

$87.1 million in operational expenses. These expenses include direct and

indirect costs such as fuel, maintenance, military pay, training, and

medical care.

Other Impacts According to Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard recruiters,

recruiting to implement this option is possible. These officials estimate

that an additional three to eight recruiters would be needed for about 

2 years to recruit the required personnel. The cost for these additional

recruiters is relatively minor and was not deducted from the savings

shown above.

Option 2: Convert in

Place the B-1 Aircrew

Training Unit

• Convert an existing active 18-aircraft aircrew training squadron at Dyess

Air Force Base, Texas, to a reserve squadron at Dyess.

• No change at the other four B-1 locations.

Table I.2 shows the number of B-1s at each base under the Air Force’s

announced plan and under our option 2.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-64 Air Force Bombers
Appendix I 

Options for Assigning More B-1s to the

Reserve Component

Table I.2: B-1 Force Structure for Option 2

Dyess Ellsworth McConnell Mt. Home Robins Total

AC RC AC RC AC RC AC RC AC RC AC RC

Plan 36 0 24 0 0 10 6 0 0 8 66 18

Option 2 18 18 24 0 0 10 6 0 0 8 4 8 3 6

Estimated Savings The Congressional Budget Office estimated that this option would save

$130.6 million in operational expenses.

Other Impacts Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard recruiters concluded that

recruiting for this option would be difficult. They estimated that an

additional three to eight recruiters would be needed for about 2 years to

recruit the required personnel. The cost for these additional recruiters is

relatively minor and was not deducted from the savings shown above.

Option 3: Convert in

Place the B-1 Aircrew

Training Unit and an

Operational Squadron

• Convert an existing active 18-aircraft aircrew training squadron and a

6-aircraft squadron at Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, to reserve squadrons

at Dyess.

• No change at the other four B-1 locations.

Table I.3 shows the number of B-1s at each base under the Air Force’s

announced plan and under our option 3.

Table I.3: B-1 Force Structure for Option 3

Dyess Ellsworth McConnell Mt. Home Robins Total

AC RC AC RC AC RC AC RC AC RC AC RC

Plan 36 0 24 0 0 10 6 0 0 8 66 18

Option 3 12 24 24 0 0 10 6 0 0 8 42 42

Estimated Savings The Congressional Budget Office estimated this option would save

$174.2 million in operational expenses.

Other Impacts Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard recruiters concluded that

recruiting for this option would be difficult but not impossible. They

estimated an additional four to eight recruiters would be needed for 

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-64 Air Force Bombers
Appendix I 

Options for Assigning More B-1s to the

Reserve Component

2 years to recruit the required personnel. The cost for these additional

recruiters is relatively minor and was not deducted from the savings

shown above.

Option 4: Consolidate

B-1s at Two Bases,

One Active and One

Reserve

• Establish a reserve component unit of 54 B-1s at Dyess Air Force Base by

reducing to zero both the active duty unit of 36 B-1s at Dyess and the

reserve component units of 10 and 8 B-1s at McConnell and Robins Air

Force bases, respectively.

• Convert Dyess from an active to a reserve component base.

• Increase the active duty unit at Ellsworth from 24 to 30 B-1s by reducing

the active duty B-1 unit at Mt. Home from 6 to zero.

• Move an active duty C-130 unit at Dyess to another (unspecified) location.

Table I.4 shows the number of B-1s at each base under the Air Force’s

announced plan and under our option 4.

Table I.4: B-1 Force Structure for Option 4

Dyess Ellsworth McConnell Mt. Home Robins Total

AC RC AC RC AC RC AC RC AC RC AC RC

Plan 36 0 24 0 0 10 6 0 0 8 66 18

Option 4 0 54 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 54

Estimated Savings and

Costs

The Congressional Budget Office estimated that this option would save

$261.3 million in operational expenses. Additionally, $43.3 million in

military construction funds planned for fiscal years 1999-2003 would be

saved by removing the B-1 units from Mt. Home and Robins. However,

according to estimates from Air Force officials, these savings would have

to be reduced by $26 million to cover the cost of relocating the C-130 unit

at Dyess and by $70 million for military construction costs at Dyess to

accommodate the additional 18 B-1s. Thus, the net potential savings are

estimated at $208.6 million.

Other Impacts This option could produce other savings that are not shown in table I.4.

For example, reducing the B-1 operating bases to two could help ease the

shortages in B-1 support equipment and mobilization kit spare parts

reported by B-1 operating units and reduce future expenditures for B-1

support equipment and spare parts. Converting Dyess from an active to a

reserve component base could also produce an undetermined amount of

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-64 Air Force Bombers
Appendix I 

Options for Assigning More B-1s to the

Reserve Component

savings from reduced permanent and costly base infrastructure—such as

family housing and base medical care facilities—necessary to support

full-time active duty personnel and their families. Moreover, by placing

additional B-1s at Dyess and Ellsworth, the Air Force could take advantage

of unused capacity at those locations.

Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard recruiters concluded that

recruiting for this option at Dyess would be difficult but not impossible.

They estimated an additional six to eight recruiters would be needed for

about 2 years to recruit the required personnel. The cost for these

additional recruiters is relatively minor and was not deducted from the

savings shown above.

Option 5: Consolidate

B-1s at One Active

and Two Reserve

Locations

• Establish a reserve component unit of 38 B-1s at Dyess Air Force Base by

reducing the active duty unit at Dyess from 36 to zero B-1s and adding 2

more B-1s to Dyess from Robins.1

• Convert Dyess from an active to a reserve component base.

• Increase the active duty unit at Ellsworth from 24 to 36 B-1s by reducing

the active duty unit B-1s at Mt. Home from 6 to zero and the reserve unit

B-1s at Robins from the remaining 6 to zero.

• Move an active duty C-130 unit at Dyess to another (unspecified) location.

• No change to the reserve component unit at McConnell.

Table I.5 shows the number of B-1s at each base under the Air Force’s

announced plan and under our option 5.

Table I.5: B-1 Force Structure for Option 5

Dyess Ellsworth McConnell Mt. Home Robins Total

AC RC AC RC AC RC AC RC AC RC AC RC

Plan 36 0 24 0 0 10 6 0 0 8 66 18

Option 5 0 38 36 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 36 48

Estimated Savings and

Costs

The Congressional Budget Office estimated that this option could save

$217.7 million in operational expenses. Additionally, $43.3 million in

military construction funds planned for fiscal years 1999-2003 could be

saved by removing the B-1 units from Mt. Home and Robins. However,

according to estimates from Air Force officials, these savings would have

to be reduced by $26 million to relocate the C-130 unit at Dyess and

1

The additional two B-1s were added to create a squadron-sized unit.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-64 Air Force Bombers
Appendix I 

Options for Assigning More B-1s to the

Reserve Component

$5 million to construct a squadron operations facility at Ellsworth to

accommodate an additional operational unit. Therefore, net potential

savings under this option are estimated at $230 million.

Other Impacts This option could produce savings that are not shown in table I.5. For

example, reducing the requirement to support fewer than five operating

bases could help ease the shortages in B-1 support equipment and

mobilization kit spare parts reported by B-1 operating bases and reduce

future expenditures for B-1 support equipment and spare parts. Converting

Dyess from an active to a reserve component base could also produce an

undetermined amount of savings from reduced permanent and costly base

infrastructure—such as family housing and base medical care

facilities—necessary to support full-time active duty personnel and their

families. Moreover, by moving 12 additional B-1s to Ellsworth, the Air

Force could take advantage of the unused capacity at Ellsworth.

Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard recruiters determined that

recruiting at Dyess would be very difficult but not impossible. They

estimated that an additional four to eight recruiters would be needed for at

least 2 years to recruit the required personnel. The cost for these

additional recruiters is relatively minor and was not deducted from the

savings shown above.

Option 6: Convert in

Place a Base and

Assign B-1s to the

Reserve Component

• Establish a reserve component unit of 36 B-1s at Dyess Air Force Base by

reducing the active duty unit at Dyess from 36 to zero.

• Convert Dyess from an active to a reserve component base.

• Move an active duty C-130 unit at Dyess to another (unspecified) location.

• No change at the other four B-1 locations.

Table I.6 shows the number of B-1s at each base under the Air Force’s

announced plan and under our option 6.

Table I.6: B-1 Force Structure for Option 6

Dyess Ellsworth McConnell Mt. Home Robins Total

AC RC AC RC AC RC AC RC AC RC AC RC

Plan 36 0 24 0 0 10 6 0 0 8 66 18

Option 6 0 36 24 0 0 10 6 0 0 8 30 54

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-64 Air Force Bombers
Appendix I 

Options for Assigning More B-1s to the

Reserve Component

Estimated Savings and

Costs

The Congressional Budget Office estimated that this option would save

$261.3 million in operational expenses. However, to convert Dyess to a

reserve component base, the active C-130 unit at Dyess would have to be

moved at an estimated cost of $26 million. Therefore, net potential savings

under this option are estimated at $235.3 million.

Other Impacts Converting Dyess from an active to a reserve component base could

produce an undetermined amount of savings from reduced permanent and

costly base infrastructure—such as family housing and base medical care

facilities—necessary to support active duty personnel and their families.

Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard recruiters assessed the

recruiting for this option to be difficult but not impossible. They estimated

that an additional six or more recruiters would be needed for about 

2 years to recruit the required personnel. The cost for these additional

recruiters is relatively minor and was not deducted from the savings

shown above.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-64 Air Force Bombers
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-64 Air Force Bombers
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-64 Air Force Bombers
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-98-64 Air Force Bombers
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Gary K. Weeter, Assistant Director

Norfolk Field Office George O. Morse, Evaluator-in-Charge

Leslie M. Gregor, Senior Evaluator

Suzanne K. Wren, Senior Evaluator

(701100) Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-98-64 Air Force Bombers
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