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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ELIAS V.*

(AC 38487)

Alvord, Keller and Pellegrino, Js.

Argued May 11—officially released September 20, 2016

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, Suarez, J.)

Katherine C. Essington, assigned counsel, for the

appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state’s attorney, and Chris A. Pelosi, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. The defendant, Elias V., appeals from

the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial,

of three counts of sexual assault in the first degree in

violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1); one count

of sexual assault in the second degree in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (1); one count of sexual

assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A); two counts of risk of injury

to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a)

(1); and three counts of risk of injury to a child in

violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (2). On appeal,

the defendant claims that (1) the court improperly

excused a juror before trial without first notifying the

defendant or his counsel; (2) the court committed plain

error concerning the constancy of accusation testimony

at trial; and (3) the prosecutor engaged in impropriety

in his cross-examination of the defendant and in closing

argument. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the

jury reasonably could have found the following facts.

In 2003, the defendant began to sexually abuse his older

daughter E.V., who was nine years old at the time. Over

the next eight years, the defendant frequently subjected

E.V. to various forms of sexual abuse, including forced

vaginal penetration, attempted anal penetration, oral

sex, masturbation, and other sexual contact with her

intimate parts.1

In addition to sexually abusing E.V., there was extensive testimony about the defendant regularly exposing

E.V. and his younger daughter, K.V., to other forms of

abuse that jeopardized their health and welfare. For

example, the defendant was very possessive of E.V. and

K.V., and he would inspect K.V. in the shower to ensure

that she was a virgin, check E.V.’s body after school

for hickeys, and dress both of the girls in boys clothing.

He would also force E.V. and K.V. to consume alcohol.

Finally, the defendant was prone to violent outbursts,

and he would regularly physically abuse K.V. and occasionally physically abuse E.V. The defendant’s violent,

controlling, and, at times, paranoid behavior was often

exacerbated by his use of crack cocaine.

The events that led to the defendant’s arrest were

set in motion by two reports, made by E.V.’s and K.V.’s

schools, to the Department of Children and Families

(department) in 2011. While E.V. was enrolled in high

school, the defendant would frequently require E.V. to

stay home under the pretense of having her take care

of the house so that he could sexually abuse her. In

the fall of 2010, E.V. confided in a teacher, with whom

she had taken classes throughout her four years of high

school, that she often missed school because her father

insisted that she stay home ‘‘to take care of him, the

house, and her little brother,’’2 not because she was
ill, as she had previously indicated. The teacher then

notified the principal, school social worker and the

school resource officer about the potential truancy

issue. Over the next few months, the school resource

officer spoke to E.V.’s parents about her absenteeism

in an attempt to resolve the issue. When E.V.’s absenteeism persisted, the school resource officer contacted the

department on March 3, 2011.

That same day, K.V. arrived home late from school

because the public bus she took home had broken

down. When she arrived home, the defendant extensively beat her, leaving bruises on her face and body,

because she was late and he did not believe her excuse.

On March 4, 2011, despite the visible bruising, K.V. went

to school.3 At the urging of friends, K.V. went to the

school counselor, who called the department. The

department sent an investigator, Gloria Rodriguez, to

interview K.V. about the potential physical abuse. Rodriguez was also provided with the report E.V.’s school had

made about her absenteeism and potential educational

neglect. After interviewing K.V. and her mother, M.V.,

Rodriguez suspected that E.V. was being sexually

abused at home. When Rodriguez interviewed E.V., she

directly asked her whether she was being sexually

abused, and E.V. confirmed that she was being sexually

abused by her father.

On February 3, 2014, a trial commenced on a ten

count long form information, charging the defendant

in eight counts for his sexual abuse of E.V. and in two

counts for his sexual and nonsexual abuse of E.V. On

February 10, 2014, the jury returned a guilty verdict on

all counts. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims on appeal that the court

improperly excused a regular juror before trial without

first notifying the defendant or his counsel. Because

the defendant failed to preserve this claim for appeal,

he seeks Golding review,4 arguing that the court violated his state and federal constitutionalrights by excusing a juror without first notifying the defendant or his

counsel. Alternatively, the defendant seeks reversal

under the plain error doctrine, arguing that the trial

court failed to ‘‘articulate sufficient facts to support the

conclusion that the juror was no longer able to perform

her duties due to her diagnosis,’’ as required by General

Statutes § 54-82h (c). The state responds that both

claims are unreviewable under Golding and do not warrant reversal under the plain error doctrine because the

substitution of a regular juror for an alternate juror

does not implicate a defendant’s constitutional rights

and the court complied with § 54-82h (c) when it dismissed the jurorfor good cause. We agree with the state.

A

We first address the defendant’s claim that the court
violated his state and federal constitutional rights when

it excused the juror without first notifying the defendant

or his counsel.5 The defendant argues that he was entitled to notice prior to the excusal of the juror on the

basis of the right to individual voir dire under article

first, § 19, of the Connecticut constitution, as amended

by article four of the amendments; the right to counsel

under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the

United States constitution; and the due process right

to be present at all critical stages of a prosecution under

the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United

States constitution.6

The defendant seeks Golding review. ‘‘Under Golding, a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional

error not preserved at trial only if the following conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the

alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional

magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right;

(3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and

. . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if

subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to

demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional

violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of

any one of these conditions, the defendant’s claim will

fail. The appellate tribunal is free, therefore, to respond

to the defendant’s claim by focusing on whichever condition is most relevant in the particular circumstances.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dixon, 318

Conn. 495, 511, 122 A.3d 542 (2015).

We conclude that the defendant’s constitutional

claims are unreviewable because he has failed to allege

claims of constitutional magnitude as required by the

second prong of Golding.

1

The defendant argues that article first, § 19, of the

Connecticut constitution, requires a court to notify a

defendant when a selected juror indicates that she is

no longer able to participate in the proceeding so that

defense counsel has an opportunity, if necessary, to

voir dire the juror.7 We disagree.

Article first, § 19, provides in pertinent part that ‘‘[t]he

right to question each jurorindividually by counsel shall

be inviolate.’’ Article first, § 19, does not, however, vest

parties with an absolute right to question prospective

and selected jurors individually at any time. Instead,

our Supreme Court has interpreted article first, § 19,

as constitutionalizing only ‘‘certain rights . . . regarding the selection of individual jurors,’’ namely, the right

‘‘to challenge jurors peremptorily’’ and the ‘‘right of the

parties to have counsel conduct individual examinations of prospective jurors . . . .’’ (Emphasis added;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Rozbicki v. Huybrechts, 218 Conn. 386, 391–93, 589 A.2d 363 (1991);

see also State v. Griffin, 251 Conn. 671, 699, 741 A.2d
913 (1999) (‘‘[t]he purpose of voir dire is to facilitate

[the] intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges and

to help uncover factors that would dictate disqualification for cause’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Here, the defendant challenges the court’s decision

to excuse a selected juror without first notifying him

or counsel. Therefore, article first, § 19, is inapposite,

and this claim does not merit Golding review.

2

The defendant also invokes his right to counsel under

the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United

States constitution and his due process right to be present under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the

United States constitution to support his claim that

he was entitled to notice prior to the juror’s excusal.

Because of the interrelated nature of these claims, we

address them together.

‘‘[T]he right to personal presence at all critical stages

of the trial and the right to counsel are fundamental

rights of each criminal defendant.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Bonner, 290 Conn. 468, 491,

964 A.2d 73 (2009). Whether a particular matter constitutes a critical stage depends not on the timing but on

the nature of the matter.

‘‘The cases have defined critical stages [for the right

to counsel] as proceedings between an individual and

agents of the State (whether ‘formal or informal, in

court or out,’ . . .) that amount to ‘trial-like confrontations,’ at which counsel would help the accused ‘in

coping with legal problems or . . . meeting his adversary’ ’’; (citation omitted) Rothgery v. Gillespie County,

554 U.S. 191, 212 n.16, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 171 L. Ed. 2d

366 (2008); as well as proceedings in which ‘‘counsel’s

absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a

fair trial’’; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226, 87

S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967). In the context of the

right to be present, ‘‘courts have evaluated the extent to

which a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by [the

defendant’s] absence or whether his presence has a

relation, reasonably substantial, to the [fullness] of his

opportunity to defend against the charge’’ when

determining whether a proceeding is a critical stage.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gilberto

L., 292 Conn. 226, 237, 972 A.2d 205 (2009).

In this case, the court’s decision to excuse the juror

because of a medical diagnosis did not amount to a

‘‘trial-like’’ confrontation between the state and the

defendant. Nor did it implicate the defendant’s right

to a fair trial; ‘‘the mechanisms for providing for and

dismissing alternate jurors, and the circumstances

under which they may be substituted for regular jurors,

do not implicate [state orfederal] constitutionalrights.’’

State v. Williams, 231 Conn. 235, 244, 645 A.2d 999

(1994), overruled in part on other grounds by State v.
Murray, 254 Conn. 472, 487, 757 A.2d 578 (2000) (en

banc);8

see also State v. LaBrec, 270 Conn. 548, 559,

854 A.2d 1 (2004). Finally, the discretionary decision

to excuse the juror in this circumstance was a straightforward judicial administrative action not implicating

the defendant’s ability to defend himself later at trial.9

We conclude that the defendant’s claims are unreviewable because the excusal of the juror in this case

does not implicate the defendant’s constitutional rights

as required by the second prong of Golding.

B

The defendant also seeks reversal under the plain

error doctrine, arguing that the court violated § 54-82h

(c) by making insufficient factual findings of good cause

before excusing the juror.10 The state responds that

consideration of the defendant’s claim under the plain

error doctrine is inappropriate in this case because the

decision to excuse a juror is committed to the sound

discretion of the court, and the court in this case was

within its discretion to grant the juror’s request to be

excused due to a medical condition. We agree with

the state.

The plain error doctrine permits the court to ‘‘reverse

or modify the decision of the trial court if it determines

. . . that the decision is . . . erroneous in law. . . .’’

Practice Book § 60-5. It ‘‘is not . . . a rule of reviewability. It is a rule of reversibility. That is, it is a doctrine

that this court invokes in order to rectify a trial court

ruling that, although either not properly preserved or

neverraised at all in the trial court, nonetheless requires

reversal of the trial court’s judgment, for reasons of

policy.’’ State v. Cobb, 251 Conn. 285, 343 n.34, 743 A.2d

1 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 841, 121 S. Ct. 106, 148

L. Ed. 2d 64 (2000). ‘‘A party cannot prevail under plain

error unless it has demonstrated that the failure to grant

relief will result in manifest injustice.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. LaBrec, supra, 270

Conn. 559.

In the present case, we perceive no impropriety that

would result in manifest injustice. ‘‘Under settled principles, [a] court may excuse a regular juror if that juror,

for any reason, becomes unable to perform his or her

duty. General Statutes § 54-82h (c). The power to

excuse a juror under this section is expressly premised

on a finding of cause. . . . Whether in the circumstances just cause exists to excuse a juror is a matter

within the discretion of the . . . court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Apodaca, 303 Conn. 378,

386, 33 A.3d 224 (2012).

‘‘We have recognized that unavailability due to illness

may constitute cause to excuse a juror,’’ even if the

medical condition will render the juror available for a

short or indeterminable period. State v. Gonzalez, 315

Conn. 564, 583, 585, 109 A.3d 453 (2015); see, e.g., State
v. Apodaca, supra, 303 Conn. 386–87 (trial court’s decision to excuse juror that was ill overnight with flu and

unable to confirm when she would return was not abuse

of discretion). Here, the trial court articulated a proper

basis for its decision to excuse the juror: the juror was

diagnosed with a medical condition that prevented the

juror from taking part in the trial.

The defendant nevertheless insists that the trial court

was obligated to ‘‘state the diagnosis or medical condition of the juror on the record, describe her current

physical condition, or detail what medical treatment or

intervention was necessary.’’ Neither the plain language

of § 54-82h (c) nor our case law interpreting it11 mandate

an invasion of the juror’s privacy interests in this

manner.

From our careful review of the record, we conclude

that the defendant has not met this stringent standard

for reversal under the plain error doctrine concerning

his unpreserved claim.

II

We next address the defendant’s claims that the court

(1) sua sponte should have stricken testimony that

exceeded the scope of the constancy of accusation doctrine, and (2) erroneously instructed the jury concerning the proper usage of constancy of accusation

testimony.12 Because the defendant failed to preserve

these issues at trial, he now claims that they warrant

reversal under the plain error doctrine. We conclude

that both claims are unreviewable.

In sex crime cases, a person to whom a sexual assault

victim has reported the assault may testify about the

report, but this testimony is subject to certain restrictions. State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 290–91 n.7, 677

A.2d 917 (1996) (en banc); Conn. Code Evid. § 6-11 (c).

First, the witness may testify only ‘‘with respect to the

fact and timing of the victim’s complaint’’ and the details

regarding ‘‘the assault must be strictly limited to those

necessary to associate the victim’s complaint with the

pending charge, including, for example, the time and

place of the attack or the identity of the alleged perpetrator.’’ State v. Troupe, supra, 304. Second, ‘‘such evidence is admissible only to corroborate the victim’s

testimony and not for substantive purposes.’’ Id. With

this legal framework in mind, we address each of the

defendant’s claims in turn.

A

The defendant first claims that the court sua sponte

should have stricken the testimony by M.V. and Rodriguez about the types of sexual acts the defendant

engaged in with E.V. because it went beyond the fact

and timing of E.V.’s complaint.13 The state responds that

this claim cannot be reviewed because defense counsel

never objected to this testimony, and the court was

under no obligation to strike the evidence sua sponte.
We agree with the state.

It is well settled that ‘‘when opposing counsel does

not object to evidence, it is inappropriate for the trial

court to assume the role of advocate and decide that

the evidence should be stricken. . . . The court cannot

determine if counsel has elected not to object to the

evidence for strategy reasons. . . . Experienced litigators utilize the trial technique of not objecting to inadmissible evidence to avoid highlighting it in the minds

of the jury. Such court involvement might interfere with

defense counsel’s tactical decision to avoid highlighting

the testimony. When subsequent events reveal that it

was an imprudent choice, however, the defendant is not

entitled to turn the clock back and have [the appellate

court] reverse the judgment because the trial court did

not, sua sponte, strike the testimony and give the jury

a cautionary instruction.’’ (Citations omitted.) State v.

Wragg, 61 Conn. App. 394, 399, 764 A.2d 216 (2001) (no

plain error for the court to refrain from striking, sua

sponte, the constancy of accusation testimony).

We therefore conclude that it was not plain error

for the court to refrain from sua sponte striking the

constancy of accusation testimony of M.V. and

Rodriguez.

B

The defendant next claims that the court’s instruction

on the constancy of accusation testimony was defective

in two respects:(1)the court erroneously omitted M.V.’s

name from the instruction and (2) the instruction was

misleading concerning the permissible use of the constancy of accusation testimony. We disagree.

On February 6, 2014, the court conducted a charging

conference in chambers at which it provided a copy of

the draft jury instructions to both counsel and received

their comments. On February 7, 2014, the court memorialized this conference on the record, discussing the

changes that counsel requested. In pertinent part,

defense counsel had requested a delay reporting

instruction under the constancy of accusation instruction, and the court granted that request.14 Notably, the

constancy of accusation charge referenced only Rodriguez’ testimony about E.V.’s report of sexual abuse to

her, not M.V.’s testimony about E.V.’s report of sexual

abuse to her. The defendant did not request that M.V.’s

name be included in the charge nor did he object to

the omission.

As the defendant concedes, because defense counsel

participated in a charging conference, did not submit

a written request to charge the jury concerning M.V.’s

testimony, and expressed satisfaction with the instruction, which referenced only the testimony of Rodriguez,

he waived any challenge to the jury instruction at trial

under State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447, 482–83, 10 A.3d

942 (2011); see also State v. Coleman, 304 Conn. 161,
174–75, 37 A.3d 713 (2012)(recognizing that a defendant

can expressly and implicitly waive a claim of instructional error). Consequently, the defendant asserts that

both instructional error claims warrant consideration

under the plain error doctrine.

As an initial matter, ‘‘[t]his court has adhered to the

view that waiver thwarts a finding that plain error

exists.’’ State v. Bialowas, 160 Conn. App. 417, 430, 125

A.3d 642 (2015) (collecting cases). However, even if we

were to assume, without deciding, that the defendant’s

waiver would not preclude him from seeking such relief;

see State v. Darryl W., 303 Conn. 353, 371–72 n.17, 33

A.3d 239 (2012) (‘‘[w]e recognize that there appears to

be some tension in our appellate case law as to whether

reversal on the basis of plain error could be available

in cases where the alleged error is causally connected

to the defendant’s own behavior’’); we conclude that

the defendant cannot demonstrate that the claimed

impropriety was so clear, obvious and indisputable as

to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal.

The defendant first argues that the court erred by

not including M.V.’s name in the jury instruction. To

prevail, the defendant would have to demonstrate that

a failure in an evidentiary instruction to refer to all of

the evidence that the instruction could possibly encompass is plain error. There is, however, no such general

rule. Nor is there such a rule in the constancy of accusation context in particular. See State v. Troupe, supra,

237 Conn. 305 (stating only that ‘‘the defendant is entitled to an instruction that any delay by the victim in

reporting the incident is a matterforthe jury to consider

in evaluating the weight of the victim’s testimony’’);

Conn. Code Evid. § 6-11 (c) (not requiring limiting

instruction where there has been no request).

‘‘It is well established in Connecticut . . . that the

trial court generally is not obligated, sua sponte, to give

a limiting instruction.’’ State v. Cator, 256 Conn. 785,

801, 781 A.2d 285 (2001); see also State v. Hill, 307

Conn. 689, 705 n.12, 59 A.3d 196 (2013). ‘‘The failure

by the trial court to give, sua sponte, an instruction that

the defendant did not request, that is not of constitutional dimension and that is not mandated by statute

or rule of practice is not such an obvious error that

it will affect the fairness and integrity of and public

confidence in the judicial proceedings.’’(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Eason, 47 Conn. App. 117,

120, 703 A.2d 130 (1997), cert. denied, 243 Conn. 962,

705 A.2d 552 (1998). We conclude therefore that the

defendant’s first claim of instructional error fails to

meet the stringent requirements of plain error review.

Next, the defendant argues that the jury instruction

undoubtedly leftthe jury with the impression thatRodriguez’ testimony about E.V.’s out-of-court report of sexual abuse could be used as substantive evidence of that

abuse or to corroborate all of E.V.’s in-court testimony
concerning all of the offenses, not just to corroborate

the fact that E.V. reported the defendant’s sexual abuse

to Rodriguez. We disagree.

‘‘The pertinent test is whether the charge, read in its

entirety, fairly presents the case to the jury in such a

way that injustice is not done to either party under the

established rules of law. Thus, [t]he whole charge must

be considered from the standpoint of its effect on the

[jurors] in guiding them to the proper verdict . . . and

not critically dissected in a microscopic search for possible error.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Apodaca, supra, 303 Conn. 390–91.

In this case, the court’s instruction, when read in its

entirety, adequately conveyed to the jury the limited

permissible usage of the constancy of accusation testimony. The court began its charge by explaining the

difference between E.V.’s in-court testimony about her

abuse, which ‘‘[y]ou may use . . . as evidence and

proof of the facts asserted,’’ and Rodriguez’ testimony

about E.V.’s out-of-court report of abuse, the usage of

which ‘‘was limited in scope to the fact and timing of

the complainant’s complaint, the time and place of the

alleged sexual assault, and the identity of the alleged

perpetrator.’’ (Emphasis added.)

The court went on to instruct the jury that the constancy of accusation testimony ‘‘is to be considered by

you only in determining the weight and credibility’’ of

E.V.’s testimony, not ‘‘to prove the truth of the matter

asserted in the out-of-court statement.’’ Finally, toward

the close of its charge, the court again instructed the

jury concerning the limited permissible usage of this

evidence. The court explained that if the jury found

that E.V.’s in-court and out-of-court statements about

her abuse were consistent, the jury ‘‘may find her testimony in the court to be corroborated or supported with

respect to the fact and timing of her complaint, the

time and place of the alleged sexual assault, and the

identity of the alleged perpetrator.’’ (Emphasis added.)

Notably, the court’s description of the permissible

uses of the constancy of accusation testimony at the

beginning and end of its charge was virtually identical

to the Supreme Court’s description of the permissible

uses of constancy of accusation testimony in Troupe.

See State v. Troupe, supra, 237 Conn. 304 (stating that

a witness ‘‘may testify only with respect to the fact and

timing of the victim’s complaint’’ and that the details

of the assault ‘‘must be strictly limited to those necessary to associate the victim’s complaint with the pending charge, including, for example, the time and place

of the attack or the identity of the alleged perpetrator’’

[emphasis added]); see also Conn. Code Evid. § 6-11

(c) (‘‘A person to whom a sexual assault victim has

reported the alleged assault may testify that the allegation was made and when it was made . . . . Any testimony by the witness about details of the assault shall
be limited to those details necessary to associate the

victim’s allegations with the pending charge.’’).

Likewise, the court’s instruction as a whole is virtually identical to the instruction provided on the Judicial

Branch’s website for constancy of accusation testimony. See Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions (4th

Ed. 2008) § 7.2-1 (Rev. to May 20, 2011), available at

http://www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part7/7.2-1.htm (last

visited September 9, 2016). While this fact is not determinative of the matter before this court, as the Judicial

Branch website instructions are nonbinding, it is

instructive; particularly, when the instruction comports

with the explanation of the doctrine set forth in our

case law, as the instruction in this case did. See State

v. Coleman, supra, 304 Conn. 176 (finding no plain error

where ‘‘the instruction at issue is provided on the judicial branch’s website’’ and accords with relevant case

law).

Upon reviewing the constancy of accusation instruction given by the court in its entirety, therefore, a showing of plain error has not been made.

III

Finally, we turn to the defendant’s claims of prosecutorial impropriety. Specifically, the defendant claims

that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor

(1) injected extraneous matters into the trial and (2)

improperly appealed to the passions and emotions of

the jury. We conclude that there was no impropriety.

We review claims of prosecutorial impropriety under

a two step analytical process. ‘‘The two steps are separate and distinct. . . . We first examine whether prosecutorial impropriety occurred. . . . Second, if an

impropriety exists, we then examine whether it

deprived the defendant of his due process right to a

fair trial. . . . In other words, an impropriety is an

impropriety, regardless of its ultimate effect on the fairness of the trial. Whether that impropriety was harmful

and thus caused or contributed to a due process violation involves a separate and distinct inquiry.’’ (Citations

omitted.) State v. Fauci, 282 Conn. 23, 32, 917 A.2d 978

(2007). ‘‘The defendant bears the burden of satisfying

both of these analytical steps.’’ State v. O’Brien-Veader,

318 Conn. 514, 524, 122 A.3d 555 (2015).

A

The defendant first claims that the prosecutor

injected extraneous matters into the trial by suggesting

during his cross-examination of the defendant that the

defendant was lying to avoid being labeled in prison as

a sex offender. The state responds that the defendant’s

claim is evidentiary in nature and therefore is not preserved. We agree with the state.

At trial, the defendant elected to testify on his own

behalf. During his cross-examination of the defendant,
the prosecutor, without objection, suggested that the

defendant had a motive to lie to avoid being labeled in

prison as a sex offender that sexually assaulted his

daughter.15

‘‘Although our Supreme Court has held that unpreserved claims of prosecutorial impropriety are to be

reviewed under the [factors enunciated in State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523, 540, 529 A.2d 653 (1987)], that

rule does not pertain to mere evidentiary claims masquerading as constitutional violations.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Alex B., 150 Conn. App.

584, 589, 90 A.3d 1078, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 924, 94

A.3d 1202 (2014); see also State v. Rowe, 279 Conn. 139,

151–52, 900 A.2d 1276 (2006) (declining to review a

claim of prosecutorial impropriety that was evidentiary

in nature). The defendant has failed to bring to our

attention any law suggesting that it is constitutionally

improper for a prosecutor to cross-examine a criminal

defendant about his motive to lie, just as he would any

other witness.

It is well settled that ‘‘[a]n accused in taking the stand

subjects himself to the same rules and is called on to

submit to the same tests which could by law be applied

to other witnesses.’’ State v. Palozie, 165 Conn. 288,

298, 334 A.2d 468 (1973) (holding that the state was

permitted to question the defendant concerning his use

of a ‘‘strap’’ on his children during a time period not

within the information because it was relevant on the

issue of the credibility of the defendant). This includes

an examination of the defendant’s motive to lie. State

v. Leconte, 320 Conn. 500, 510, 131 A.3d 1132 (2016)

(‘‘[a]s an appropriate and potentially vital function of

cross-examination, exposure of a witness’ motive, interest, bias or prejudice may not be unduly restricted’’

[internal quotation marks omitted]); State v. Warholic,

278 Conn. 354, 381, 897 A.2d 569 (2006) (‘‘[q]uestions

about a witness’ motive are proper because they seek

to elicit facts from which a jury can make credibility

determinations’’); State v. Holliday, 85 Conn. App. 242,

261, 856 A.2d 1041 (‘‘[o]ur jurisprudence instructs that

a prosecutor may comment on a witness’ motivation

to be truthful or to lie’’), cert. denied, 271 Conn. 945,

861 A.2d 1178 (2004).

The defendant has not cited any authority for the

proposition that a prosecutor cannot question a defendant about his motive to lie because it relates to the

collateral consequences of conviction in the case. Here,

the defendant was charged in eight counts with offenses

relating to his sexual abuse of E.V. If convicted of even

one of these multiple counts, the defendant would not

only be a ‘‘sex offender,’’ but a sex offenderthat sexually

abused his daughter. Exploring the defendant’s motive

to lie to avoid the well-known16 stigmatizing effects of

this classification did not inject an extraneous matter

into the trial.
‘‘[R]obing garden variety claims [of an evidentiary

nature] in the majestic garb of constitutional claims

does not make such claims constitutional in nature.

. . . Putting a constitutional tag on a nonconstitutional

claim will no more change its essential character than

calling a bull a cow will change its gender.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ruffin, 144 Conn.

App. 387, 399, 71 A.3d 695 (2013), aff’d, 316 Conn. 20,

110 A.3d 1225 (2015). Here, the challenge to the crossexamination of the defendant by the prosecutor is evidentiary in nature and is unpreserved. Accordingly, it

is not reviewable under Williams.

B

The defendant next alleges three acts of impropriety

concerning the prosecutor’s closing argument. First,

the defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly

suggested that ‘‘defendants in child sexual assault cases

have an increased motive to lie forfear of being ‘labeled’

as a sex offender in jail.’’ Second, the defendant argues

that the prosecutor’s remarks improperly appealed to

the emotions and prejudices of the jurors by repeatedly

calling the defendant a ‘‘sex offender.’’ Finally, the

defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly

appealed to the emotions and prejudices of the jurors

by encouraging them to find the defendant guilty

because he was a ‘‘bad person’’ rather than on the basis

of the evidence. We conclude that the prosecutor’s

remarks were not improper.

The following additional facts are necessary to our

resolution of these claims. During his closing argument,

the prosecutor explained to the jurors that the case

required them to assess the credibility of all of the

witnesses, and he reviewed the evidence that corroborated various witnesses’ testimony. Toward the end of

his closing argument, the prosecutor made the following remarks:

‘‘But basically, for the sex assault, it comes down to

E.V. and this defendant; so, you’re going to have to

compare their testimonies. Who is more credible?

Okay?

‘‘E.V.: Obedient. Never lied. Honor student. We saw

the way she testified. God-fearing, as he said, as he put

a knife—as she put a knife to her father where she

almost had enough where she put a knife to his—his

throat and said God won’t forgive me if I did it. You

have E.V. and that person.

‘‘Person to person, who’s always promised to change

for years and years and years and never did. Similar to

how he told E.V. after every time he penetrated her, I

would stop. So, you have that person. You also have the

person who would take the moneys—family’s [social

security disability] money for her son—for his son,17

take the mom’s employment money, take rent money,

and spend it all on drugs.
‘‘Also, [you] have a person impairing them, a person

who continually beat [K.V.] for years—approximately

seven years with his fists, his hands, his boots; hit her

about the face, arms, legs, ribs, and stomach. More or

less a person who never had a job. More or less a person

who, for some reason—and I submit to you the reason

was to be alone with her so she could sexually assault

her—so he could sexually assault her—would keep her

home from school; a person who lied to housing; who

left [M.V.] with a $7000 bill; and also, a person who will

be labeled a sex offender. So, with that said, ladies and

gentlemen, I ask you: Who has the motive there to tell

the truth?’’

Defense counsel then addressed the jury and stated

that the evidence ‘‘should actually probably not be

reviewed’’ as it related to the defendant’s testimony

concerning the risk of injury to a child offenses charged

in counts nine and ten of the information. He argued

that while the defendant admitted to using crack, taking

his family’s money, and ‘‘making his family’s life hell,’’

he was not admitting to sexually assaulting E.V. He

urged the jury to focus on the credibility of the state’s

witnesses as it related to the sexual abuse offenses

charged in counts one through eight of the information.

In particular, he argued that E.V. had a motive to lie

about being sexually abused by the defendant to protect

herself and her sister from the defendant’s physical

abuse.18

The prosecutor then began his rebuttal as follows:

‘‘Motivation, I mean, no father wants to admit he sexually assaulted his daughter between the ages of nine

and sixteen. Let’s face it, ladies and gentlemen, that’s

the motivation. You don’t want to be labeled as a sex

offender, okay?’’

As the alleged impropriety occurred during closing

argument, we set forth the applicable legal principles.

‘‘[P]rosecutorial [impropriety] of a constitutional magnitude can occur in the course of closing arguments.

. . . [B]ecause closing arguments often have a rough

and tumble quality about them, some leeway must be

afforded to the advocates in offering arguments to the

jury in final argument. [I]n addressing the jury, [c]ounsel

must be allowed a generous latitude in argument, as

the limits of legitimate argument and fair comment cannot be determined precisely by rule and line, and something must be allowed for the zeal of counsel in the

heat of argument. . . . Nevertheless, [w]hile a prosecutor may argue the state’s case forcefully, such argument must be fair and based upon the facts in evidence

and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Necaise, 97 Conn. App. 214, 229–30, 904 A.2d

245, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 942, 912 A.2d 478 (2006).

1
We first examine whether the prosecutor improperly

argued that the defendant had a motive to lie to avoid

being labeled a sex offender. Again, ‘‘[i]t is not improper

for a prosecutorto remark on the motives that a witness

may have to lie.’’ State v. Thompson, 266 Conn. 440,

466, 832 A.2d 626 (2003); see also State v. Ancona, 270

Conn. 568, 607, 854 A.2d 718 (2004) (‘‘[i]t is permissible

for a prosecutor to explain [in closing argument] that

a witness either has or does not have a motive to lie’’),

cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1055, 125 S. Ct. 921, 160 L. Ed.

2d 780 (2005). Nor is it improper for a prosecutor to

suggest that the defendant, in particular, has a motive to

lie so long as that motive is based on the ‘‘ascertainable

motives of the witnesses’’ rather than the prosecutor’s

personal opinion. State v. Stevenson, 269 Conn. 563,

585, 849 A.2d 626 (2004); see also State v. Fauci, supra,

282 Conn. 39–40 (‘‘in a case that essentially reduces

to which of two conflicting stories is true, it may be

reasonable to infer, and thus to argue, that one of the

two sides is lying,’’ particularly where the argument

only ‘‘underscored an inference that the jury could have

drawn entirely on its own, based on the evidence presented’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

In this case, the prosecutor’s remark that the defendant had a motive to lie to avoid being labeled a sex

offender simply underscored an inference that the jury

could have readily drawn on its own in light of the

charges and the evidence presented at trial. Accordingly, the remark was not improper.

2

Next, we examine whetherthe prosecutorimproperly

appealed to the emotions and passions of the jury ‘‘by

attaching the inflammatory label of child sex offender

to him’’ and by attempting to persuade the jury to find

the defendant guilty because he was a ‘‘bad person,’’

rather than on the evidence presented. We conclude

that the prosecutor did not improperly appeal to the

emotions and passions of the jury.

‘‘We begin with the well established proposition that

[a] prosecutor may not appeal to the emotions, passions

and prejudices of the jurors. . . . When the prosecutor

appeals to emotions, he invites the jury to decide the

case, not according to a rational appraisal of the evidence, but on the basis of powerful and irrelevant factors which are likely to skew that appraisal.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ceballos, 266 Conn.

364, 394, 832 A.2d 14 (2003).

‘‘We have held, however, that [i]t is not improper for

the prosecutor to comment [on] the evidence presented

at trial and to argue the inferences that the jurors might

draw therefrom. . . . We must give the jury the credit

of being able to differentiate between argument on the

evidence and attempts to persuade them to draw inferences in the state’s favor, on one hand, and improper
unsworn testimony, with the suggestion of secret

knowledge, on the other hand.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Fauci, supra, 282 Conn. 36.

Similarly, ‘‘[t]he state’s attorney should not be put in

the rhetorical straitjacket of always using the passive

voice, or continually emphasizing that he [or she] is

simply saying I submit to you that this is what the

evidence shows, or the like.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Stevenson, supra, 269 Conn. 583–84.

Turning first to the prosecutor’s use of the phrase

‘‘sex offender,’’ we conclude that this remark was not

improper. Contrary to what the defendant suggests,

the prosecutor did not label the defendant as a ‘‘sex

offender’’ during his remarks; instead, he argued that

the defendant had a motive to lie to avoid being labeled

a sex offender upon conviction, and that remark was a

permissible commentary. See State v. Stevenson, supra,

269 Conn. 585 n.15 (remark that ‘‘[t]he defendant has

everything to gain if he lies on the stand. After all, it is

he [who will] be punished in this case if he is found

guilty’’ was permissible commentary on the defendant’s

motive to lie).

Next, the defendant argues that by reviewing the evidence that he took the family’s money for drugs, physically abused K.V., had an insubstantial employment

history and lied to housing authorities, the prosecutor

encouraged the jury to find the defendant guilty of the

sex offenses because he was a bad person, rather than

on the evidence presented. The state responds that the

prosecutor was not attempting to inflame the passions

of the jury, but rather the prosecutor was permissibly

recalling the undisputed evidence presented at trial

about the defendant’s character to assist the jurors’

assessment of the defendant’s credibility. We agree with

the state.

Again, the critical issue relative to the claimed impropriety is whether the disputed remarks encouraged the

jury to find the defendant guilty on the basis of emotion,

rather than on a rational appraisal of the trial evidence,

not simply whether the remarks might have painted a

negative portrait of the defendant’s character. Here, the

prosecutor never suggested to the jury that because the

evidence showed that the defendant was a bad person,

he must have sexually assaulted his daughter. Instead,

and just prior to the disputed remarks, the prosecutor

acknowledged that the sexual assault charges boiled

down to a credibility assessment of E.V. and the defendant. The prosecutor then proceeded to review, in a

straightforward manner, the undisputed evidence presented at trial concerning both E.V.’s and the defendant’s character. See State v. Camacho, 282 Conn. 328,

377, 924 A.2d 99 (2007)(‘‘[a]s a general matter a prosecutor may use any evidence properly admitted at trial’’),

cert. denied, 552 U.S. 956, 128 S. Ct. 388, 169 L. Ed. 2d

273 (2007).
Notably, the disputed remarks were based not only

on the testimony of the state’s witnesses, but also the

defendant’s own admissions at trial. During his testimony, the defendant admitted that he would take his

wife’s income and his son’s disability benefits to purchase not only cocaine but also to purchase pornography and alcohol for himself.19 The defendant

acknowledged that during the time in question he

worked only part-time and was eventually fired due to

his poor performance. The defendant admitted that he

lied on multiple occasions to the housing authority

about the family’s income to secure rent at a reduced

rate under Section 8, and he testified that, on one occasion, when M.V. disclosed to the housing authority their

actual income, the family was charged approximately

$7000 for unpaid rent.20 Finally, the defendant testified

extensively not only about the fact that he continuously

physically abused K.V., but also the manner in which

he assaulted her.21

Compared to other prosecutorial remarks our

Supreme Court has found to be improper, the prosecutor’s remarks in cataloguing the evidence in this case

were of a dispassionate nature.22 The prosecutor did

not employ any crude phrases or inflammatory language. The only fact he lingered on was the physical

abuse of K.V., which served as a basis forthe criminality

charged in counts nine and ten of the information.23

We conclude therefore that the prosecutor did not

improperly appeal to the emotions and passions of the

jury during closing argument.24

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the

victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline

to use the defendant’s full name or to identify the victims or others through

whom the victims’ identities may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-

86e. We therefore refer to the defendant as Elias V. and to the victims by

their initials.

1 For example, the defendant’s sexual abuse of E.V. began with his touching and rubbing her vagina over her clothing. Later, the defendant would

force E.V. to perform oral sex or masturbate him while watching pornography or viewing pornographic magazines.

2 E.V. and K.V.’s brother has a physical disability and is wheelchair-bound.

3 On other occasions when the defendant left visible marks on K.V., he

insisted that she stay home from school until the marks were less apparent.

4 See State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified

by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).

5 The record is unclear as to the exact date that the juror was excused.

On February 3, 2014, the first day of trial, the court began the proceeding

by informing counsel that ‘‘during the course of last week, one of the jurors

called indicating that she had a—was diagnosed with a medical condition

and she could not take part [in] this process. So, the court unilaterally

excused her; so, we will need to pick an alternate to replace her.’’

6 Although the defendant also asserts a due process violation under article

first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution, because he has not provided an

independent analysis of his due process claim under the state constitution,

we limit our consideration to the dictates of the federal constitution. See

State v. Arthur H., 288 Conn. 582, 602, 953 A.2d 630 (2008).

The defendant also argues that the court violated his sixth amendment

right to a public trial by dismissing the juror outside the courtroom during
a break in the proceedings. The record, however, reflects that there was

neither a break in the proceedings nor a closure of the courtroom because

the juror was excused by the court during the week before trial. Because

we conclude that the court was not required to notify counsel before excusing the juror and because the court memorialized the circumstances surrounding the juror’s excusal on the record, we reject the defendant’s claim

that his right to a public trial has been implicated.

7 Although the defendant initially argued in his briefs before this court

that he was entitled to a hearing and voir dire of the juror prior to the juror’s

excusal, at oral argument before this court, the defendant clarified that, at

a minimum, his counsel needed to be notified in advance of the juror’s

potential excusal.

8

‘‘Although we overruled Williams in part in State v. Murray, [supra, 254

Conn. 487], [w]e [did] not, however, overrule that part of State v. Williams,

supra, 231 Conn. 243–44, wherein we concluded that the mechanisms for

providing for and dismissing alternate jurors, and the circumstances under

which they may be substituted for regular jurors . . . does not implicate

constitutional rights and are thus for the legislature to decide.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted). State v. LaBrec, supra, 270 Conn. 558 n.12.

9 The defendant’s reliance on State v. McNellis, 15 Conn. App. 416, 546

A.2d 292, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809, 548 A.2d 441 (1988), forthe proposition

that the proceedings involving the substitution of an alternate juror for a

regular juror constitutes a critical stage of the proceedings is misplaced. In

McNellis, we stated that ‘‘[t]he voir dire of the jurors concerning possible

jury tampering was a critical stage of the criminal proceeding’’ for the

purposes of the defendant’s right to be present, not that the decision to

replace a regular juror with an alternate was in and of itself a critical stage

of a criminal proceeding. (Emphasis added.) Id., 432.

As the state correctly notes, the processes for addressing allegations of

potential juror impartiality, bias, or prejudice are also different in kind

from those used to address illness. Those allegations squarely implicate a

defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury and, at times, require a

court sua sponte to conduct a preliminary inquiry to assure itself that the

defendant’s rights are being preserved. See State v. Brown, 235 Conn. 502,

527–29, 668 A.2d 1288 (1995). Conversely, when a juror reports that he or

she is no longer able to participate in a trial that has not commenced because

of a recent medical diagnosis, the fairness and impartiality of the defendant’s

trial is not implicated.

10 In announcing the excusal of the juror, the court informed the parties

that a juror had called and explained that she ‘‘was diagnosed with a medical

condition and she could not take part [in] this process.’’ Neither the state

nor the defendant inquired further or raised an objection.

11 The defendant cites Apodaca for the proposition that he was entitled

to examine the juror on her medical condition. In Apodaca, on the morning

of the fifth day of trial, a juror called the criminal case flow coordinator to

report flu-like symptoms. State v. Apodaca, supra, 303 Conn. 383. The

resulting discussion on the record about the juror’s illness stemmed from

the participants’ need to resolve whether the juror should be excused or trial

should be delayed. Id., 383–85. Nothing in the Supreme Court’s resolution of

Apodaca suggested that the trial court was required to report the details of

the juror’s illness on the record before excusing her; the court merely needed

to articulate a proper basis for its decision. See id., 386–87.

12 The defendant also urges this court to modify the constancy of accusation doctrine so that it does not apply to sexual assault cases involving

minors and to limit, or overrule, State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 677 A.2d

917 (1996) (en banc), in its entirety. We decline to address these claims

other than to note that ‘‘as an intermediate appellate body, we are not at

liberty to discard, modify, reconsider, reevaluate or overrule the precedent

of our Supreme Court.’’ DePietro v. Dept. of Public Safety, 126 Conn. App.

414, 422 n.3, 11 A.3d 1149, cert. granted on other grounds, 300 Conn. 932,

17 A.3d 69 (2011) (appeal withdrawn June 26, 2012).

13 On the second day of trial, and after E.V.’s testimony, M.V. testified that

E.V. told her once that ‘‘dad told me that if I didn’t put his penis in my

mouth he was going to penetrate me.’’ On the third day of trial, Rodriguez

testified as follows about her initial interview with E.V.:

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: . . . Did she give you an account of how she had

been sexually assaulted by [the defendant]?

‘‘[The Witness]: She disclosed vaginal and anal penetration. She disclosed

oral sex that she was obligated to do to [the defendant], and she disclosed

positions as sixty-nine.
‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. And did she disclose how long she had been

getting sexually assaulted for?

‘‘[The Witness]: She said that she has been sexually abused since she was

seven, and she told me that between the age of nine and ten, that’s when

he—the penetration started.’’

14 The court instructed the jury concerning the constancy of accusation

testimony as follows:

‘‘The complainant testified here in court before you. You may use her

testimony as evidence and proof of the facts asserted in that testimony, and

give it the weight you find is reasonable.

‘‘The state offered evidence of out-of-court statements made by the complainant to another person that the defendant sexually assaulted her. The

person to whom the state alleges that complaint—that complainant made

those statements to was Gloria Rodriguez.

‘‘Under our law, the testimony of this witness was limited in scope to the

fact and timing of the complainant’s complaint, the time and place of the

alleged sexual assault, and the identity of the alleged perpetrator.

‘‘This evidence is to be considered by you only in determining the weight

and credibility you will give the complainant’s testimony as it pertains to

all charges.

‘‘This evidence of out-of-court statements by the complainant of a sexual

assault against her by the defendant is not to be considered by you to prove

the truth of the matter asserted in the out-of-court statement.

‘‘In determining whether or not the out-of-court statements corroborate

the complainant’s testimony in court, you should consider all of the defendant’s—I’m sorry—you should consider all ofthe circumstances under which

they were made, and to whom, and whether the statements made to these

persons were or were not consistent with [the] complainant’s testimony

in court.

‘‘To the extent you find what she said outside the courtroom is consistent

with her testimony in court, you may find her testimony in the court to be

corroborated or supported with respect to the fact and timing of her complaint, the time and place of the alleged sexual assault, and the identity of

the alleged perpetrator.

‘‘You may consider any delay by the complaining witness in reporting the

incidents in evaluating the weight and the credibility of the complaining

witness’ testimony.’’

15 The following colloquy occurred during the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defendant:

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Isn’t it ironic, though, you wanted her to go to school

and you kept her home?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yeah.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And you kept her home to sexually assault her, right?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Never.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. Because the stakes are high here, right? You’re

on trial for sex assault crimes, correct?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: All right. You’re incarcerated?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Right. And you don’t want to be labeled as a sex

offender who sexually assaults his younger daughter, right?

‘‘[The Defendant]: That didn’t happen so, no, I don’t want to.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Right. And—and if you’re labeled a sex offender in

jail, that’s not good, right?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I suppose so.’’

16 See Anthony A. v. Commissioner of Correction, 159 Conn. App. 226,

240, 122 A.3d 730 (‘‘We can hardly conceive of a state’s action bearing more

stigmatizing consequences than the labeling of a prison inmate as a sex

offender. . . . One need only look to the increasingly popular Megan’s laws,

whereby states require sex offenders to register with law enforcement officials who are then authorized to release information about the sex offender

to the public, to comprehend the stigmatizing consequences of being labeled

a sex offender.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]), cert. granted on other

grounds, 319 Conn. 934, 125 A.3d 208 (2015); accord State v. Misiorski, 250

Conn. 280, 295, 738 A.2d 595 (1999) (‘‘[c]onstitutional privacy interests are

implicated . . . because . . . [t]he damage to [citizens’] reputations

resulting from [disclosure] stigmatizes them as currently dangerous sex

offenders, can harm their earning capacities, and can cause them to be

objects of derision in the community’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).

17 The defendant and M.V. received social security disability benefits for
their son’s physical disability. See footnote 2 of this opinion.

18 For example, defense counsel made the following closing argument

concerning E.V.’s motive to lie:

‘‘And there’s K.V. being assaulted and going to school. Well, that’s going

[to] hustle things up. [The department] is involved. [The department] talks

to K.V. [The department] thinks, right, we see the physical assault, but we’re

not liking the kind of looking down and away, not making direct contact,

and that we think something else is up. Well, there was a lot that was up,

even without thinking about whether [or] not there was sex. But that’s what

the social worker assumed; there must be sexual assault too.

‘‘And to the extent the ideas had already begun [to take] the form of, we

cannot stand to have dad around anymore, he needs to go, at that moment,

when the social worker says to E.V. prompts a disclosure, the idea formed:

This will do it. This will do the trick.’’

At the end of his summation, defense counsel returned to that theme,

arguing:

‘‘The question is—the real question here, is, did he sexually assault E.V.,

and he told you he did not.

‘‘So, right, [the prosecutor is] right. Did he believe E.V.? He’s supposed

to look at all the charges individually and consider them individually, but

there’s really no debate if you believe it. If you have some question about

[E.V.’s] motivations for making these allegations, then that’s what I’m trying

to say, you know, I think she had pretty good motivations for making them;

it’s just a question of whether they’re true. If that’s the way you view the

case, then I would respectfully request that you acquit [the defendant] of

counts one through eight. Thank you.’’

19 For example, on cross-examination, the prosecutor, without objection,

engaged in the following colloquy with the defendant:

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: You took all her money, right, from [your wife’s] job?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Did she say anything then?

‘‘[The Defendant]: She didn’t say anything.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Do you know why?

‘‘[The Defendant]: No.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: She just said, here’s my check, or did you steal it?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I only asked for it.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And explain that. How did you ask for it?

‘‘[The Defendant]: If she got a few dollars I can—can have.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: When you say a few dollars, what do you mean?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Forty, $50.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And she wasn’t making any money, right?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Not much, no.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: You took your son’s [social security disability]

check, right?

‘‘[The Defendant]: On occasions, yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Why did you take that?

‘‘[The Defendant]: To drug myself.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And didn’t your ex-wife say, why you taking all this

money?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: What did you say to her?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I said I—you high, you need the money. I never

answered that, I just need it.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: You—you never answered it. I don’t under—can you

repeat that?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I say, I never answer when I wanted the money, I just

say and you don’t need it. You don’t think, you know, you just want to keep

getting high.’’

20 E.V. and K.V. testified that the arrearage was $8000, while the defendant

on cross-examination agreed with the prosecutor that the arrearage was

$7000.

21 For example, on cross-examination, the prosecutor, without objection,

engaged in the following colloquy with the defendant:

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. Does discipline mean hitting [K.V.] physically?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Not supposed to, but yes. That’s what I was doing.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. And tell us how you hit her that day?

‘‘[The Defendant]: To be honest, I don’t—I don’t remember. I know hurt

her with my hand. Every part of the body, I don’t remember?

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: You don’t remember?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I don’t remember which part I hit her with.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. How many—
‘‘[The Defendant]: But I know I did it.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Let me finish my question. How many times did you

hit her in the body that day?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Multiple times.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Multiple times?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: In the head?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: You clapped her ears.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: You punched her.

‘‘[The Defendant]: I punched her, yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: You kicked her.

‘‘[The Defendant]: I don’t remember that.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: You had boots, right?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I wasn’t home.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: You weren’t home?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I wasn’t home.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. Were you wearing boots?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Sneakers.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Sneakers?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, sir.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Do you own boots?

‘‘[The Defendant]: What’s that?

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Do you own boots?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: They have steel toe on them?

‘‘[The Defendant]: No.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. And then you also pretended that you were

going to throw her down the stairs, right, but you didn’t?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Did I push her?

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: You were going to but then you held back, right?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Was she crying?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Screaming?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: What was she saying?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Stop.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: And you’re beating her so hard she was [huddled] on

the ground, correct?

‘‘[The Defendant]: That happen when I stop.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: That happened, but she lost her breath; she couldn’t

breathe at one point.

‘‘[The Defendant]: I cannot tell.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: You cannot tell? You were on crack that day too?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. What time is this at?

‘‘[The Defendant]: The afternoon.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: How much—how much crack did you smoke at that

time?

‘‘[The Defendant]: No idea.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. And this is not the first time you beat her, right?

‘‘[The Defendant]: No.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: You beat her on Wethersfield Avenue.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: You beat her on New Donald Street.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: You beat her on Barbour Street.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Continuously, correct?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Okay. Kicking?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Fist?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I never used fist.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Oh, you never used your fist. You use your hand?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Open hand.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Is it possibly—is it possible that when you swung at

her it might have hit her with [your] fist?

‘‘[The Defendant]: It couldn’t be because I used my open hand.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Oh, Okay. Did you kick.

‘‘[The Defendant]: On occasions, yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: In the stomach?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Possible.
‘‘[The Prosecutor]: In the ribs?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: In the head?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.’’

22 See State v. Oehman, 212 Conn. 325, 333, 562 A.2d 493 (1989)(prosecutor

characterized the defendant as a ‘‘ ‘liar,’ ’’ ‘‘ ‘coward,’ ’’ and a ‘‘ ‘spoiled killer

with a gun’ ’’ that ‘‘ ‘has no principles’ ’’); State v. Williams, supra, 204 Conn.

546–47 (prosecutor called defendant, inter alia, ‘‘ ‘child-beater,’ ‘baby-beater’

and ‘infant-thrasher,’ ’’ ‘‘a ‘liar,’ ‘drunken drug user, convicted felon, child

beater,’ ‘stupid,’ ‘savage child beater,’ ‘drunken bum,’ ‘evil man,’ ’’ and

referred to principal defense witness as ‘‘ ‘liar,’ ’’ ‘‘ ‘stupid,’ ’’ an ‘‘ ‘evil

woman,’ and an ‘evil, terrible woman’ ’’); State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 561,

482A.2d 300 (1984)(prosecutor,reading from a prepared text, denounced the

defendants as ‘‘ ‘murderous fiends,’ ‘rats,’ ‘utterly merciless killers,’ and

‘inhumane, unfeeling and reprehensible creatures’ ’’), cert. denied, 469 U.S.

1192, 105 S. Ct. 967, 83 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1985).

23 Both counts charged the defendant with risk of injury to a child by

exposing E.V., inter alia, to his physical abuse of K.V.

24 Having concluded that the defendant’s claims do not constitute prosecutorial impropriety, we need not address the factors set forth in State v.

Williams, supra, 204 Conn. 540, to determine whether the defendant was

deprived of his right to a fair trial as a result of prosecutorial impropriety.