[Cite as State v. Conn, 2021-Ohio-2727.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

ADAMS COUNTY 

State of Ohio, : Case No. 20CA1118 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

v. : DECISION AND 

 JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Justin Conn, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellee. : RELEASED 8/05/2021 

______________________________________________________________________ 

APPEARANCES: 

 

C. David Kelley, Prosecuting Attorney, and Mark R. Weaver and Ryan M. Stubenrauch, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, Adams County Prosecutor’s Office, West Union, Ohio, 

for appellant. 

Patrick T. Clark and Gregory W. Meyers, Assistant State Public Defenders, Office of the 

Ohio Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for appellee. 

______________________________________________________________________ 

Hess, J. 

{¶1} The state of Ohio appeals from a judgment of the Adams County Court of 

Common Pleas granting Justin Conn’s motion to suppress evidence. However, the state 

did not timely file a Crim.R. 12(K) certification by the prosecuting attorney that the appeal 

is not taken for the purpose of delay and that the ruling on the motion has rendered the 

state’s proof with respect to the pending charges so weak in its entirety that any 

reasonable possibility of effective prosecution has been destroyed. As a result, we lack 

jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the appeal. Although the state has moved for leave 

to file an amended notice of appeal in an attempt to correct the defect, we cannot allow 

amendment of a notice of appeal where jurisdiction is lacking in the first instance. 

Accordingly, we dismiss the motion and the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
Adams App. No. 20CA1118 2

 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶2} The Adams County grand jury indicted Conn on one count of aggravated 

robbery and one count of having weapons while under disability. Conn pleaded not guilty 

and filed a motion to suppress evidence. The trial court conducted a hearing on the 

motion, and on July 23, 2020, the court issued a judgment entry granting the motion to 

suppress. The next day, the state filed a notice of appeal from that entry stating that “[t]he 

attorney for the Plaintiff-Appellant hereby certified [sic] that the judgment herein appealed 

is final as defined in R.C. 2505.02 and Civ.R. 54(B), and is authorized by R.C. 

2945.67(A).” 

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

{¶3} The state assigns one error for our review: “The trial court erred in granting 

Defendant-Appellee’s motion to suppress in its judgment entry dated July 23, 2020.”1

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS 

{¶4} Before we address the merits of the appeal, we must decide whether we 

have jurisdiction to do so. “Courts of appeals shall have such jurisdiction as may be 

provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the 

courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district * * *.” Ohio Constitution, 

Article IV, Section 3(B)(2). Our review of the record revealed a jurisdictional issue, and 

we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding it. See generally State v. 

Smith, 4th Dist. Highland No. 10CA13, 2011-Ohio-1659, ¶ 3 (“We are required to sua 

sponte raise jurisdictional issues when they become apparent”). 

1 The assignment of error is taken from page i of the state’s appellate brief; the assignment of error is stated 

differently on page 4 of the brief. 
Adams App. No. 20CA1118 3

 

{¶5} R.C. 2945.67(A) permits a prosecuting attorney to appeal as a matter of 

right any decision of a trial court in a criminal case which grants a motion to suppress 

evidence. Crim.R. 12(K) states: 

Appeal by state. When the state takes an appeal as provided by 

law from an order suppressing or excluding evidence, * * * the prosecuting 

attorney shall certify that both of the following apply: 

(1) the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay; 

(2) the ruling on the motion * * * has rendered the state’s proof 

with respect to the pending charge so weak in its entirety that

any reasonable possibility of effective prosecution has been 

destroyed * * *. 

The appeal from an order suppressing or excluding evidence shall 

not be allowed unless the notice of appeal and the certification by the 

prosecuting attorney are filed with the clerk of the trial court within seven 

days after the date of the entry of the judgment or order granting the motion. 

(Emphasis added.) “As an exception to the general rule that the state may not appeal 

orders from criminal prosecutions, Crim.R. 12(K) must be strictly construed.” State v. 

Charette, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2012-P-0045, 2012-Ohio-5937, ¶ 14, citing State v. 

Bassham, 94 Ohio St.3d 269, 271, 762 N.E.2d 963 (2002). 

{¶6} In State v. Buckingham, 62 Ohio St.2d 14, 402 N.E.2d 536 (1980), the 

Supreme Court of Ohio considered “the conditions under which a Court of Appeals 

has jurisdiction to entertain the state’s appeal from a trial court decision in a criminal case 

granting defendant’s pre-trial motion to suppress evidence.” Buckingham at 14-15. The 

court explained that in State v. Collins, 24 Ohio St.2d 107, 265 N.E.2d 261 (1970), it 

“concluded that such a decision is a final order within the meaning of R.C. 2505.02 and 

the Ohio Constitution ‘where prosecution is irretrievably foreclosed through the 

suppression of evidence.’ ” Id. at 15, quoting Collins at 110. The court also explained 
Adams App. No. 20CA1118 4

 

that in Collins, “proof that prosecution was ‘irretrievably foreclosed’ emanated from the 

state’s representation in oral argument ‘that the deprivation of the use of the evidence 

suppressed below rendered it virtually impossible * * * to obtain a conviction * * *.’ 

” (Omissions in Buckingham.) Id. at 15-16, quoting Collins at 109-110. The court stated: 

Consistent with Collins, [former] Crim.R. 12(J) has now formalized 

the procedure through which the state must represent that prosecution 

would be “irretrievably foreclosed,” by requiring the prosecutor to certify 

“that (1) the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay; and (2) the granting 

of the motion has rendered the state’s proof with respect to the pending 

charge so weak in its entirety that any reasonable possibility of effective 

prosecution has been destroyed.” Moreover, in State v. Waller (1976), 47 

Ohio St.2d 52, 57, 351 N.E.2d 88, and paragraph two of the syllabus, this 

court held that the time limitation, diligent prosecution and recognizance 

provisions of [former] Crim.R. 12(J), as well as the above certification, are 

valid, mandatory procedural requirements under Section 5(B), Article IV of 

the Ohio Constitution. 

(Footnotes omitted.) Id. at 16. Taking Collins and Waller together, the court held that an 

appellate court “has jurisdiction to entertain the state’s appeal from a trial court decision 

in a criminal case granting defendant’s pre-trial motion to suppress evidence only where 

the state has complied with [former] Crim.R. 12(J).” Id. at syllabus and 16. The court 

held that in one case before it, the appellate court correctly dismissed the appeal because 

the state did not comply with the rule, and in another case, the appellate court erred in 

dismissing the appeal because the state did comply with the rule. Id. at 16-17. 

{¶7} Following Buckingham, this court and other courts of appeals have 

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction appeals in which the state failed to comply with the 

certification requirement, which is now in Crim.R. 12(K). State v. Bowlin, 4th Dist. 

Highland No. 809, 1993 WL 79281 (Mar. 16, 1993); State v. McKnight, 5th Dist. Richland 

No. 07 CA 62, 2008-Ohio-3931; Toledo v. Pryll, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-12-1015, 2013-
Adams App. No. 20CA1118 5

 

Ohio-1593; Cleveland v. Wagner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81730, 2003-Ohio-1358 

(“Wagner”); State v. Carlucci, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2010-L-143, 2011-Ohio-1164. 

{¶8} In its supplemental brief, the state “concedes that the required certification 

under Crim.R. 12(K) is missing from its notice of appeal” and “that such an omission, if 

not corrected, would deprive this Court of jurisdiction to hear this case under Ohio 

Supreme Court precedent.” However, the state “asserts that both the Rules of Appellate 

Procedure and persuasive case law on the issue permit the State to file and this Court to 

accept a motion for leave to amend the notice of appeal to ensure the required certification 

language is present.” The state relies on In re Hester, 1 Ohio App.3d 24, 437 N.E.2d 

1218 (10th Dist.1981), and State v. Moncrease, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 76145, 76146, 

and 76147, 2000 WL 377496 (Apr. 13, 2000), to support its position. The state also filed 

a motion for leave to file an amended notice of appeal. Citing Wagner, Conn asserts that 

the state relies on case law that has been overruled or abrogated. Conn maintains that 

the jurisdictional defect cannot be cured because more than seven days have passed 

since the date of the entry of the judgment granting the motion to suppress. 

{¶9} In Hester, the state appealed a juvenile court’s decision granting a motion 

to suppress. Hester at 25. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 

because the state failed to certify, in accordance with Juv.R. 22(F) (which is similar to 

Crim.R. 12(K)), that the granting of the motion had rendered proof available to the state 

so weak in its entirety that any reasonable possibility of proving the complaint’s 

allegations had been destroyed. Id. at 25. The state moved to amend its notice of appeal 

and certification to add the appropriate language to the certification. Id. The defendant 

opposed the motion, relying on the syllabus in Buckingham and arguing that if the 
Adams App. No. 20CA1118 6

 

Buckingham court had believed the state’s failure to comply with former Crim. 12(J) “could 

have been cured by amendment, the court would have so allowed.” Id. at 25-26. 

{¶10} The Tenth District Court of Appeals found that because Buckingham did not 

explain how the state failed to comply with former Crim.R. 12(J), Buckingham could not 

be read as the defendant argued. Id. at 26. The court did not “feel that the inadvertent 

failure of the state to include all of the proper language within its certification” was an error 

that could not be corrected by amendment. Id. It explained: “If this court is empowered 

to allow for the amendment of a timely filed notice of appeal, pursuant to [former] App.R. 

3(E), so that said notice may comply with [former] App.R. 3(C), we find no reason why a 

court of appeals cannot allow the amendment of a timely filed notice of appeal and 

certification so that there may be full compliance with [former] Crim.R. 12(J) and Juv.R. 

22(F).” (Emphasis sic.) Id. The court observed that if it did not allow the amendment, 

“the substantial right of society to the diligent prosecution of those accused of crime * * * 

would be adversely affected.” Id. The court held that “[w]here the state has timely filed 

a notice of appeal from the granting of a motion to suppress, but has failed to make a 

proper certification as required by Juv.R. 22(F), a court of appeals may, pursuant to 

[former] App.R. 3(E), allow the amendment of the timely filed notice of appeal and 

certification so that there may be full compliance with Juv.R. 22(F).” Id. at syllabus. The 

court overruled the defendant’s motion to dismiss and granted the state’s motion to 

amend the notice of appeal and certification. Id. at 26. 

{¶11} In Moncrease, the state appealed from an order granting a motion to 

suppress, and the Eighth District Court of Appeals observed “that the notice of appeal 

originally filed by the state did not include the certification required by [former] Crim.R. 
Adams App. No. 20CA1118 7

 

12(J).” (Footnote omitted). Moncrease at *1-2. “Three weeks after the original notice 

was filed, the state filed an amended notice of appeal, which included the [former] Rule 

12(J) certification, but did not obtain prior leave to amend.” Id. Citing Buckingham, the 

court acknowledged that the certification “is jurisdictional,” but the court agreed “with the 

Hester court that the certification required by [former] Crim.R. 12(J) may be supplied by 

amendment.” Id. at *2-3. The court found that “Appellate Rule 3(F) * * * suggests the 

timeliness of the notice of appeal is critical, but at least some of the contents of the notice 

can be corrected by amendment, with leave of court.” Id. at *2. The court found that “the 

certification is necessarily supplied after the judgment, not in it; the timing of the 

certification does not affect the timeliness of the appeal.” Id. at *3. The court concluded 

the defendants would “not be prejudiced if the state is allowed to amend its notice to 

include the [former] Crim.R. 12(J) certification,” granted the state leave to file an amended 

notice of appeal, and found it had jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. 

{¶12} We do not find Hester and Moncrease persuasive. In Hester, it appears 

that the state timely filed a partial Juv.R. 22(F) certification because the defendant only 

argued that the state failed to make one of the two certification statements required by 

that rule. See Hester, 1 Ohio App.3d 24, 25, 437 N.E.2d 1218. Although we are not 

convinced that the state can complete a partial certification after the seven-day time limit 

in Crim.R. 12(K) or Juv.R. 22(F), we are not confronted with that issue here. In this case, 

the state did not timely file a certification containing either statement required by Crim.R. 

12(K) within the seven-day time limit. 

{¶13} In addition, the Eighth District Court of Appeals has criticized Hester and 

implicitly overruled Moncrease. Wagner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81730, 2003-Ohio-
Adams App. No. 20CA1118 8

 

1358, ¶ 2-4. In Wagner, the city of Cleveland filed a timely notice of appeal from an order 

suppressing evidence but failed to timely file a Crim.R. 12(K) certification. Id. at ¶ 1. More 

than seven days after the date of the entry of the order, the city moved to amend its notice 

of appeal to include the certification. Id. at ¶ 2. The appellate court explained that 

“[a]lthough such amendments were allowed in State v. Moncrease and In re 

Hester, these opinions cannot be sustained under the syllabus of State v. Buckingham * 

* *.” (Footnotes omitted.) Id. at ¶ 2. The appellate court stated: 

The syllabus in Buckingham states that this court has jurisdiction 

over this appeal “only where the state has complied with Crim.R. 12(J) 

[currently Crim.R. 12(K)].” Buckingham does not admit a distinction 

between timely notice and timely certification, but instead requires 

compliance with all provisions of the rule before jurisdiction is obtained. 

Furthermore, Crim.R. 12(K) states that the appeal “shall not be

allowed unless the notice of appeal and the certification by the prosecuting 

attorney are filed with the clerk of the trial court within seven days after the 

date of the entry of the judgment or order granting the motion.” Nothing in 

App.R. 3(F) can cause the certification to be “filed with the clerk of the trial 

court” within seven days where it was not so filed originally. Even if one 

believed that App.R. 3(A) could overcome Crim.R. 12(K), the requirement 

of filing the certification with the trial court leaves no doubt that it is an 

inseparable part of the notice of appeal under App.R. 3(A). Therefore, 

jurisdiction cannot be obtained without timely certification, and this court 

cannot allow amendment of a notice of appeal where subject matter 

jurisdiction is lacking in the first instance. 

(Alteration in Wagner.) Id. at ¶ 3-4. Thus, the court dismissed the appeal. Id. at ¶ 1. 

{¶14} We agree generally with the reasoning in Wagner and conclude that we lack 

jurisdiction to allow the state to amend its notice of appeal to include the Crim.R. 12(K) 

certification and to consider the merits of this appeal. Crim.R. 12(K) states that an appeal 

from an order suppressing evidence “shall not be allowed” unless the state files a notice 

of appeal and the required certification with the clerk of the trial court within the sevenday time limit. App.R. 3(F)(1) authorizes an appellate court to allow the amendment of a 
Adams App. No. 20CA1118 9

 

notice of appeal “within its discretion” and “upon such terms as are just.” But nothing in 

the rule “can cause the certification to be ‘filed with the clerk of the trial court’ within seven 

days where it was not so filed originally.” Wagner at ¶ 4. If the state does not comply 

with Crim.R. 12(K), we lack jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. See Buckingham, 62 Ohio 

St.2d 14, 402 N.E.2d 536, at syllabus. And we cannot allow amendment of a notice of 

appeal where jurisdiction is lacking in the first instance. Wagner at ¶ 4. 

{¶15} For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the motion for leave to file an 

amended notice of appeal and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

MOTION DISMISSED. APPEAL DISMISSED.
Adams App. No. 20CA1118 10

 

JUDGMENT ENTRY 

It is ordered that the MOTION IS DISMISSED and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. 

Appellant shall pay the costs. 

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Adams 

County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution. 

 IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS 

BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is

temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted. 

The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of 

Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay 

is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day 

period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of 

Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of 

the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the 

appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such 

dismissal. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Smith, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion. 

 For the Court 

 

 BY: ________________________ 

 Michael D. Hess, Judge 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

 Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment 

entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with 

the clerk.