NOT RECOMMENDED F OR F ULL-TEXT PUBLICATION F ile Nam e: 11a0471n.06 No. 09-4364 UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT

MOHAMED A WAD, Petitioner-Appellant,

v. ERI C H. HOL DER, J R., ATTORNEY G ENERAL Respondent-Appe llee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) O N PE T I T I O N FOR REVI EW FROM THE BO ARD OF I MMI GRATI ON APPEAL S

BEFORE: KEITH, CLAY, and COOK, Circuit Judges. KEITH, Circuit Judge. This case arises out of petitioner Mohamed Awad’ s appea l of the denial of his application for asy lum, withholding of remova l, an d protec tion under the United Nations Convention A g ainst Torture (CAT). Awad admits tha t he failed to f ile his a pplication for asy lum within the one-y ear limit ations period. Howeve r, he a sserts on appe al that he mer its re lief under the “extraordinar

y circ umstances” except io n to th e o n e -y ear bar. Alterna tively , he alleg es that,

as a member of the Palestinian political g roup Fatah, he should be g rante d withholding of remova l and protec tion under the CAT beca use of perse cution by Hamas, a rival political g roup in Palestine. The g overnme nt alleg es in response that we should dismiss the first claim for lack of jurisdiction and

we should deny the second and third claims on the m er i t s . For the rea sons discussed below, we, here by , DISMISS Awad’ s as y l u m cl aim as for lack of jurisdiction to revie w and AF F IRM the BIA’s dec ision as to Awad’s withholding of re moval and CAT cla ims.

1No. 09-4364, Awad v. Holder, Attorney Gene ral F A C T U A L B A C K G R O U N D Mohamed Awad enter ed the United States on or about J anuar y 17, 2006 as a non-immigra nt visitor. I n J une 2006, Awad marrie d Michelle Thomas, an Americ an cit i z en . S hortly there afte r, Thomas filed a marria g e-ba sed visa petition on Awad’ s behalf

. Awad, concurrently , filed an application for

adjustment of status to lawful per manent re sident. Sometime afte r Awad filed his applicat i o n , h e rec eived a reque st from the Depa rtment of Homeland Sec urity

(DHS) r equesting additional information re lated to his application. Awa d did not return the form as his marri age had beg un to fall apar t. Realizing that he would no longe r be el i gi b l e for a marria g e-ba sed visa, he applied for asy lum, withholding of remova l and protec tion under the CAT on April 9, 2007, more than one y ear afte r he initially arr ived in the United States. His initi al visa petition was denie d on May 21, 2007. Pursuant to a Notice t o Ap p ear filed by the Attorney Gene ral, the g overnme nt instit uted

remova l proce eding s ag ainst Awad on J uly 23, 2007. The notice stated that Awad was elig ible for

remova l as he had overstay ed the init ial non-immigra nt visa pursuant to which he had entered the United States. Awad’ s remova l hear ing was held on J anuar y 29, 2008. At the hear ing, Awad conce ded his

remova bility , but rea sserted the three afor ementioned bases for relief

. He did not desig nate a country of remova l. The immigra tion judge (I J ) desig nated Palestine, or in the alternat i v e, I s ra el as appropr iate destinations. During his hearing , Awad e x plained that he did not initially plan to apply for a sy lum upon

arr iving in the United States in J anuar y 2006. Rather, he obtained a tourist visa in Palestine simply to g et awa

y from “the trouble,” after Hamas, a rival party , solidified their power . Administrative Record [A.R.], at 111. Awad e x plained that he a pplied for a sy lum in April 2007 as a re sult of the failure of his marria g e and H amas’s suc cess in ele ctions in the West Bank, whe re he had lived.

2No. 09-4364, Awad v. Holder, Attorney Gene ral Awad rec ounted that befor e coming to the United States, he worke d as a chemist in a fac tory and sold medical equipment. As a salesper son, Awad sold chemica ls later used for medical purposes. I f the conce ntration of a chemica l, such as h y d rogen peroxide, was high, cer tain substances could be used to make explos ives. Consequently , part of Awad’ s sales job require d him to repor t to the Palestinian Authority , the g overnme nt in the West Ba nk, any individual wh o attempted to buy suspicious substances. Awad repor ted at least six orders fo r ch em icals that he believed c ould have be en used to make bombs. Awad explained that his job r equire d him to make such repor ts; in fac t, his lice nse to w ork

as a salesman was conting ent upon his co m p l i ance . Awad also noted that he made such repor ts beca use he believes that violent acts undermine the Palestinian-I srae li p eac e proce ss. Be cause Awad complied with the repor

ting require ment, Hamas considere d him to be “a spy for the g overnme nt.” Id. at 120. Members of Hamas “follow[ed] [hi m] and they hurt [hi m] , they spoke with [hi m] on [hi s] phone.” Id

. at 121. He believed that “Hamas burn[ed] [hi s] car , which was in the street,” and broke his car ’s windshield. Id

. Awad did not rec all the date of the incident involving his car , but believed that it occur

red in September or October 2005. Be tween 2003 and 2005, Awa d re ceive d approximately ten threa tening letters on his car and in his apar tment stating that his actions aided a

corr upt g overnme nt. The letters, alleg edly from members of Hamas, stated that Awad was a traitor, that he was supporting I srae l, and that he would fa ce de ath if he did not stop cooper ating with the ruling Palestinian party

. Hamas members also alleg edly distributed simil ar letters throug hout his neig hborhood. The le tters indicated that Awad would be killed if he continued his job. Awad also expressed fea r that Hamas would kill him beca use it s m em b ers stabbed his brother, an active Fatah member. Thoug h his brother was able to fig ht his attacke rs off on the first

occa sion, they ret u rn ed a second time and murdered him. Awad' s brother incited his attacke rs by alleg edly ref

using to allow Ha m as to place political signs on his house. Hamas members also attacke d Awad’ s y oung est brother , also a F atah membe r.
3No. 09-4364, Awad v. Holder, Attorney Gene ral Awad did not leave his job until J anuar y 2006 when he arr ived in the United States. Awad explained that approximately five day s befor e he left t he W es t Ba n k , Hamas won elections in the Gaza Strip, and fig hting ensued betwee n Hamas and Fat ah

. Awad’ s mother, fathe r, oldest and y oung est brothers, and sisters rema in in the West Ba nk. The I J found Awad’ s alleg ations reg arding the threats he rec eived to be c redible. On J anuar y 29, 2008, the I J denied Awad’ s applications for asy lum, withholding of remova l, and relief pu rs u an t to the CAT, but g rante d his reque st for voluntary depar ture from the United States. Noting that an applicant must file an asylum application within one y ear of ar riving in the United States or establish chang ed or extraordinary circ umstances, the I J denied Awad’ s asylum application. The i m m i gra t ion judge found that Awad’ s marria g e to a United States citizen and pending application for

adjustment of status did not constitut e an e x traordina ry circ umstance. As to Awad’ s reque st for withholding of remova l, which is not subject to the one-y ear filing deadline, th e I J h el d t h at Awad failed to establish that he experience d past perse cution or a clea r probability that he would suffe r future perse cution on ac co u n t o f a p rotec ted g round. I n the I J ’s opinion, Hamas targ eted Awad “bec ause he was info rm i n g t he police when their ag ents wer e attempting to obtain c hemicals to build bombs.” Id. at 85. Fi n al ly , the I J denied Awad’s application for protection under the CAT, finding that t h er e

was no evidenc e that Hamas or any other entity would torture Awad in Palestine. Fur ther, acc ording t o the I J , even assuming that Hamas would torture Awad, there was no evidenc e that th e Fatah-c ontrolled secur ity forc es would approve o f or ignor e such abuse; rathe r, in light of the importance of his occupation, Fatah w ould likely attempt to protect him. Awad timely appea led the I J ’s ruling s to the Boa rd of I mmigration Appea ls (B I A). The BIA aff irmed t he I J ’s deter

mination that Awad wa s not eligible f or asy lum because he fa iled to file his application within one y ear of arr iving in the United States, or to establish extraordinary or chang ed circ umstances. Id

. at 25. The BIA then addre ssed the merits of his cl ai m s for withholding of

4No. 09-4364, Awad v. Holder, Attorney Gene ral

remova l and protec tion under the CAT. The BIA specific ally aff irmed the I J ’s finding that Awad’ s problems with Hamas s t em m ed only from his employ ment-depe ndent status as an informant. Finally , the BIA aff

irmed the denial of Awad’ s reque st for CAT protec tion. Id

. at 26. Specifica lly , it found that Awad did not demonstrate a likelihood of torture by or with the ac q uiesce nce of a g overnme nt official. Id

. at 27. Awad, subse quently , petitioned this court to review the B I A’s dec ision. S T A N D A R D O F R E V I E W “This court revie ws any leg al conclusions de novo and fac tual finding s and cre dibilit y deter minations for substantial evidenc e. ” Z hao v. Holder , 569 F.3d 238, 246 (6th Cir. 2009) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). Under the defe rential substantial evidenc e standard, fac tual finding s of the Boa rd, including cre dibilit y d eter minations, are “conc lusive unless any

rea sonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contra ry .” Pablo-Sanche

z v. Holder , 600 F.3d 592, 594 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)( 4)(B )). Be cause the Boa rd adopted the I J ' s decision and provided additional rea soning of its own, we revie w the I J ’s re as o n i n g as supplemented by the BIA’s analy sis. See G ilaj v. Gonzalez , 408 F.3d 275, 282- 83 (6th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). D I S C U S S I O N As n o t ed , Awad raises two issues on appea l. First, he alleg es that his filing of a separat e application for transition to lawful perma nent status, resulting from his marria g e, should constitute

an extraordinary circ umstance and excuse his failure to file his application within the one-y ear time frame g ener ally require d of asy lum applicants. Second, he alleg es that t h e I J an d t h e BIA

er ro neously denied his motions for withholding of remova l and protec tion under the CAT on the merits. We assess ea ch cla im in turn below.

5No. 09-4364, Awad v. Holder, Attorney Gene ral I. We Lack Jurisdiction to Review Whether Awad’s Case P rese nts an Extraordinary Circ um stance. To be elig ible for asy lum, an alien must file h is application for relief within one y ear of

arr iving in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2)( B)

. There are , howeve r, two exceptions to this rule. First, if the conditions in the country from which the p et itioner hails have chang ed, the one-y ear bar may not apply

. Id. § 1158(a) (2)(D ); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a) (4). Second, ex traordina ry circ umstances “may excuse the failure to file within the [one] -y ear period as long as the alien filed the application within a rea sonable period g iven those circ umstances.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a) (5). As noted, Awa d, on appea l, relies exclusively on the extraordinar

y circ umstances e x ception. The g overnme nt contests this court’s jurisdiction to hear Awad’ s appea l as to whether or not the pendenc y of a separ ate application for status as a l aw fu l perma nent resident constitutes an extraordinary circ umstance excusing the applicant’ s failure to file within his or her first y ear in the United States. Section 1158(a) (3) of Title 8 of the United States Code, as orig inally understood, prec luded courts from revie wing a question dealing with the one-year time limit to file an asy lum application. See Ca s tellano-Chacon v. INS , 341 F.3d 533, 544 (6th Cir. 2003). Section 106(1)( A)(iii) of the REAL I D Act, Pub. L

. 109- 13, 119 Stat. 231 (codifie d as amende d in scatter ed sections of 8 U.S.C.) (2005) ( “REAL

I D”) , howeve r, par

tially modified this statutory

mandate: Nothing in

. . . an y o t h er provision of this chapte r (other than this section) which limit s or elim i n at es judicial revie w, shall be construed as prec luding revie w of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for revie w filed with an appr opriate c ourt of appe als in acc ordanc e with this section. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (D). The Six th Circuit examined the impact of the REAL I D Act on our j u ri s d i ction in Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales , 453 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2006). I n that case , the petitioner soug ht revie w of the BI A' s denial of her asy lum application on the g rounds that it was time-barr ed, and that she failed to establish “cha

ng ed circ umstances” that would have excused the delay

. Id

. at 745-46. The Six th

6No. 09-4364, Awad v. Holder, Attorney Gene ral Circuit held that it lacke d jurisdiction to revie w the BIA’s decision as to whether circ umstances had chang ed in the West Ba nk beca use “the arg

ument reg arding chang ed circ umstances [was] predominantl y fac tual.” Id

. at 748 n.3 (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Fang Huang v. Mukase

y , 523 F.3d 640, 650-51 (6th Cir. 2008)

. The Court e mphasized, how ever , that the jurisdictional bar was not absolute, but rathe r, applied b eca use the case called for “a particula rized inquiry into the nature of a petitioner' s claim,” i.e., the deg ree of violence in the West Ba nk. Almuhtaseb , 453 F.3d at 748 n.3 (no t i n g that wher e one petitioner’s “ar g ument reg arding chang ed circ umstances is predominantly fac tual

. . . an o t h er p et itioner might prese nt leg al or constitutional issues reg arding a chang ed-c ircumstance s claim that would be within our jurisdiction to consider” (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted)). Awad contends that, unlike Almuhtaseb , hi s case prese nts a question of law. Awad relies primarily on the fac t that, unlike Almuhtaseb in which the court would have had to make a judgme nt

as to the nature and deg ree of the violence in the p et i t i o n er ’s home country , there are no fac tual issues for this court to resolve. There are no questions as to what happene d in this case ; no versions of rea lity for this court to choose betwee n. The question is simply whether the circ umstances of this

case , which ar e ag ree d upon, are sufficie nt to qualify for the sta

tutory exception. As we rece ntly explained in Khozhaynova v. Holder , “questions i n v o l v i n g the application of statutes or regulations to undisputed fac ts, sometimes ref err ed to a s mix ed questions of fac t and law” are not the pure questions of law over which we have jurisdiction. 641 F.3d 187, 192 (6th Cir. 2011) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather, our jurisdiction is rese rved to purely leg al questions, suc h as whether the alien' s crime was an ag g ravated fe lony , Patel v. Ashcroft , 401 F.3d 400, 407 (6th Cir. 2005), or “whe ther the BI A used the corre ct s tandar d in revie wing the I J ' s decision and wh et h er [t he BIA] assig ned to [t he alien] the corr ect burden of proof.” Tran v. Gonzales , 447 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir. 2006). Awad’ s argument is prec isely the sort of argument we reje cted in Khozhaynova , and ther efor e, it must fail.

7No. 09-4364, Awad v. Holder, Attorney Gene ral Acc ording ly , we dismiss this claim for lack of jurisdiction. II. The BIA Pr operly Denied Awad’s Request f or Withhold ing of

Rem oval. Awad also seeks revie w of the Boa rd' s denial of his application for withholding of remova l under the I mmigration and Nationality Act (I NA). Pursuant to § 241(b)(3) of the I NA, the Attorney Gene ral may not remove a

n individual to a country if “the alien' s life or fre edom would be threatene d in that coun t ry b ec au s e of the alien’s

rac e, religion, natio n al i t y , membership in a particular social g roup, or political opinion.” Berri v. Gonzales , 468 F.3d 390, 397 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (quoting 8 U .S.C. § 1231(b)( 3)). To prove he or she is elig ible for withholding of remova l, the petitioner must show that there is a clea r probability that he or she would be subject to perse cution if remove d. Fang Huang , 523 F.3d at 651. A petitioner satisfies t he “clear probability ” st andar d by establishing that “it is more likely than not” that he or she would be subjec t to persec ution if removed. 8 C.F .R. § 1208.16(b)(2)

. Persec ution is “the infliction of harm or suffe ring by t he g overnme nt, or persons a g overnme nt is unwilling or unable to control, to overc ome a char acte ristic of the victim.” Pilica v. Ashcroft , 388 F.3d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing In re Kasinga , 21 I & N. Dec

. 357 (B I A 1996)). “‘[P] erse cu t i o n i s an extreme conce pt that does not include ever y sort of trea tment our society reg ards as offe nsive.’” Japarkulov a v. Holder , 615 F.3d 696, 699 (6 t h Cir. 2010) (alter ation in orig inal) (quoting Ali v. Ashcroft , 366 F.3d 407, 410 (6th Cir. 2004)). T h e I NA does not define “per secution,” but we have held that i t “‘ require s more than a few isolated incidents of verba l hara ssment or intimi dation, u n ac co m p anied by any phy sical punishment, infliction of harm, or signific ant depriva tion of liberty .’” Id

. (quoting Mikhailev itch v. INS , 146 F.3d 384, 390 (6th Cir. 1998)). Ex amples of perse cution include “‘de tention, arr est, inte rr o gation, prosec ution, imprisonment, i l l ega l sear ches, confiscation of proper ty , surveillance , beating s, or torture.’ ” Id

. (quoting Gilaj , 408 F.3d at 285).

8No. 09-4364, Awad v. Holder, Attorney Gene ral A. Awad Cannot Dem onstrate “P ast P erse cution.” The regulatio n s g overning withholding of remova l provide that if the petitioner has demonstrated past perse cution in the proposed country of remova l, a rebuttable presumption arises that the petit ioner’s life or free d o m wi l l b e threa tened in the future if he or she i s remove d to that country . 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)( 1)(i). Both the I J and the BIA held that while they found Awad’ s alleg ati o n s reg arding his hara s s m en t b y members of Hamas to be cre dible, the incidents combined wer e not sufficie nt to constitute past perse cution. The BI A di d not explain it s decision bey ond citing a list of cases that it alleg ed supported this conc lusion. We ag ree with both courts that Awad cannot establish that he meets the standard for having suffe red past perse cution. Awad, in support of his claim, relies on ten threa tening letters he rec eived and the firebombing of his car . He prese nts no evidenc e of phy sical abuse or a depriva tion of liberty

. W h ile “phy sical abuse is not an absolute prer equisite to a finding of perse cution,” threa t s al o n e amount to perse cution only in exceptional case s. Japarkulov a , 615 F.3d at 700-01. “Only ‘threats

o f a m o s t immediate and menac ing nature ’ can possibly qualify as past perse cution.” Id

. at 7 0 1 (quoting Boyk

ov v. I NS , 109 F.3d 413, 416 ( 7th Cir. 1997)). Unquestionably , the threa ts Awad fac ed are troubling. Howeve r, the Six th Circuit has

re j ec t ed such claims by persons who have suffe red simil ar abuse. For example, in Morente v. Holder , 401 F. App’x 17, 21-22 (6th Cir. 2010), the Six th Circuit was prese nted evidenc e consisting of the pe titioner’s prior kidnapping and a series of t hreats he rec eived. With reg ard to the thre ats,

on one occa sion, the petitioner was confr onted with a fac e-to-f ace threa t by an arme d assailant. Id

. at 22. Additionally , his family rec eived anony mous threa tening letters afte r he left Guatema la. Id

. Nonethele ss, the court conclude d that the threa ts wer e not of such an immediate and menac ing nature

so as to find that the petitioner suffe red past perse cution. Id

. at 22-23. Given that the circ umstances

9No. 09-4364, Awad v. Holder, Attorney Gene ral of Morente did not amount to past perse cution, we ca n n o t say that the evidenc e prese nted here

– threa tening letters and the firebombing of Awa d’s ca r – satisfies the standa

rd either

. B. Awad Cannot Dem onstrate That He Will S uf fer P erse cution. Given that Awad cannot meet the standard for showing that he suffe red past perse cution, he must prove by a clea

r probability that he will, upon his return, suffe r political perse cution based on one of the five prote cted g round stated a bove. Wit hhol d i n g o f re m oval is “not available to an alien who fea rs retribution solely over persona l matters.” Z

o a r a b v. Mukase

y , 524 F.3d 777, 781 (6th Cir. 2008). That said, when an ap p l i ca n t demonstrates that he or she “wa s perse cuted on the basis of more than one fac tor,” the applicant is elig ible for withholding of remova l “so long as one of those fac tors is a protec ted g round under the I

NA.” Marku v . Ashcroft , 380 F.3d 982, 988 n.10 ( 6th Cir. 2004). The BIA reje cted Awad’ s reque st on the g rounds that he failed to establish a nexus betwee n the harm he fe ar ed h e wo uld suffe r and his political aff iliation with Fatah, the protec ted class on which he relies. Rather, the BIA found that based on the evidenc e befor e it, any threa ts he fac ed or would fac e wer e on acc ount of his job – whi ch re q u i red that he repor t persons purcha sing larg e quantities of par

ticular c hemicals – not his political beliefs. I n signific ant reg ards, this c ase rese mbles the Six th Circuit's decision in Adhiyappa v. INS , 58 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995). I n Adhiyappa , the Six th Circuit denied with h o l d i ng of remova l to a g overnme nt informant who was threa tened by the Tamil Tig ers afte r he beg an to repor t individuals to the g overnme nt as his job require d. Id

. at 263-68. L ike this case , afte r he beg an rep o rting individuals, members of milit ant separ atist g roups came to h is house, called him a traitor, and threa tened to kill him if he continued to provide names to the authorities. Id

. at 263. L ike this case , Adhiy appa alleged that the Tig ers perse cuted him on the basis of his persona l support for the g overnme nt. Id

. at 267. The S ix th Circuit, apply ing the requisite def ere ntial standard, found that

10No. 09-4364, Awad v. Holder, Attorney Gene ral the petitioner had not shown that his perse cutors acte d on acc ount of his political opinion. Id

. at 267- 68. L ikewise, we cannot find, based on the evidenc e Awad has prese nted, that the BI A’s finding that Awad’ s perse cutors were motivated by his employ ment was not supported by rea sonable, substantial, and p ro b at i v e evidenc e. Awad prese nts no evidenc e of perse cution befor e he beg an repor ting individuals as he was require d to do by his employ ment. Nor does he prese nt any evidenc e that his alleg ed Hamas perse cutors were in fac t awa re of his political bel i efs. Rather, any alleg ed perse cution beg an only afte r he beg an repor ting individuals. I n fa ct , t he threa tening letters he

rec eived stated as much; the letters specific ally threa tened Awad’ s safe ty if he did not stop repor ting individuals. Fur

thermore , while some of the letters acc used Awad of collabora ting with Fatah and I srae l, t h e s p ecif

ic collaboration that the letters obviously ref err ed to was the repor

ting done in

connec tion with his employ ment. Given the fac ts of this case , it seems l i k el y that Awad’ s perse cutors would have threa tened any one who repor ted them, reg ardle ss of their political beliefs. Awad, in response , cites the Six th Circuit’s rec ent decisions in Al-Ghorbani v. Holder , 585 F.3d 980 (6th Cir. 2009), and Haider v. Holder , 595 F.3d 276 (6th Cir. 2010). Both cases ar e distinguishable. I n Al-Ghorbani , the petitioner marrie d the dau gh t er of a milit ary g ener al in his native country of Yemen without the g ener al’s permission. 585 F.3d at 985. I n response , the g ener al shot his own son and t h re at ened to kill his daug hter and the petitioner. Id

. at 985-86. The Six th Circuit found that the g ener al’s persona l motives could not be unrave led from his motives based on the petit ioner’s social class, because the precise reason that he opposed the m ar ri age was because of the social class to which the petitioner belong ed. Id

. at 997-98. This case is distinguishable. As noted above, here Awad’ s perse cutors do not seek to hurt him because he was a member of Fatah who beg an to repor t t h em . R at h er, the evidenc e available – namely , the timing of the threa ts he

rec eived and his pe rsec utors’ lack of knowledg e as to his individual beliefs – seems to suppor t the

11No. 09-4364, Awad v. Holder, Attorney Gene ral BIA’s finding that his perse cutors would have pers ec u t ed him once he beg an to repor t them reg ardle ss of Awa d’s per sonal political beliefs. The S ix th Circuit’s decision i n Haider is even less re l evant. I n Haider , the court imputed

a political opinion to the petitioner on the g rounds that police in his home country hara ssed him and assumed that he associate d with te rror ist g roups. 595 F.3d at 285-86. Unlike this case , in Haider , no evidenc e of an alterna

te justification f

or the police’s actions was available

. Thus, Awad failed to demonstrate either past perse cution or a fea r of future perse cution such that he would be entitled to withholding of re moval under the I NA. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the B I A’s denia l of Awa d’s petition. III. Awad Does Not Quali fy for P rote ction Under the Convention Against Torture. Finally , Awad alleg es that he should be g rante d protec tion under the CAT. An applicant for withholding of remova l under the CAT must establish that he more likely than not would be tortured in the proposed country of remova l. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c) (2). The applicant' s testimony , “if cre dible, may be sufficie nt to sustain the burden of proof without corr oboration.” Id

. I n assessing the risk of torture, we must consider: “[e]vidence of past torture inflicted on the applicant;

. . . [e] vidence that the applicant could reloc ate to a part of the country wher e he or she is not likely to be tortured;

. . . [e] vidence of g ross, flag rant or mass violations of human rig hts within the country of remova l, wher e applicable ; and . . . [o] ther re levant informa tion r eg arding conditions in the country of re moval.” Id

. § 208.16(c) (3). Neither party nor the BI

A provides much discussion of Awad’ s final claim. The claim is not mentioned in either party ’s brief bey ond Awad’ s single mention of it and the g overnme nt’s response that, on this acc ount, Awad has waived the claim. The BIA’s opinion, likewise, mere ly regurg itated the standar d that Awad is require d to me et and stated that he had not satisfied it. Ac cording ly , we

are left with the opinion o f t h e I J wh o found that Awad had failed to establish that he would be tortured upon returning to the W est Ba nk and that even if he had t h er e i s no evidenc e it would be

12No. 09-4364, Awad v. Holder, Attorney Gene ral done with the acquie scenc e of Fatah, which would likely protec t him beca use of h i s em p l oy

ment position. Ba sed on the record before the court, we cannot find t h at t h e I J incorre ctly conclude d that Awad woul d not be tortured with the acquiesce nce of a gover nment officia l. We need not decide whether the evidenc e was sufficie nt to support a finding that Awad fac ed a threa t of torture. As the I J noted, even if he did, there is no evidenc e to support the conclusion that the Palestinian Authority would not act to protec t him, particularly in light of the se nsitive nature of his employ

ment. C O N C L U S I O N For the fore g oing rea sons, we, here by : a) DISMISS the petition to revie w the BIA’s denial of Awad’ s claim for asy lum as for lack of jurisdiction; and b) AF F IRM th e BI A’ s d en i al of Mohamed Awad’ s claims for withholding of remov al and protec tion under the United Nations Convention Ag ainst Torture.

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