UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ARTHUR R. TALBOT, et al.,

Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 15-12393

Honorable Matthew F. Leitman

v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford

 

TIMOTHY P. CONNORS, 

Defendant. 

___________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS [R. 7] AND DISMISS THIS SUIT WITH PREJUDICE

I. INTRODUCTION

Pro se plaintiffs Arthur R. Talbot, Kelley A. Bezrutch, and Internet 

Applications and Solutions, Inc. (“IAS”; collectively, “Plaintiffs”), allege that

Timothy P. Connors, a Washtenaw County Circuit Court judge who 

presided over three of Plaintiffs’ state-court actions between 2006 and 

2011, deprived them of their “opportunity to adequately present their 

cases.” [R. 1, PgID 13]. This matter is before the Court on Judge Connors’ 

motion to dismiss.1

 [R. 7]. The Court RECOMMENDS GRANTING Judge 

Connors’ motion because the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity bars 

 1 The Honorable Matthew F. Leitman referred this action to the undersigned 

to resolve all pretrial matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). 

[R. 6].

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Plaintiffs’ claims. 

II. BACKGROUND

Mr. Talbot and Ms. Besrutch are both officers of IAS. Between 2006 

and 2011, Plaintiffs were parties in three state-court lawsuits over which 

Judge Connors presided. Judge Connors’ decisions and rulings in the 

three state-court proceedings form the basis of this action.

In the first state-court action, Plaintiffs sued Bank of Ann Arbor 

(“BoAA”) for fraud, collusion, and breach of fiduciary duty. [R. 1, PgID 3]. 

After a hearing on BoAA’s summary disposition motion, Judge Connors 

ruled from the bench in favor of BoAA, and subsequently denied 

reconsideration. [Id., PgID 4-6]. Plaintiffs allege that Judge Connors “was 

biased in favor of BoAA and unfairly took a stance contrary to Plaintiffs’ 

position because [he] was hosting ongoing fund-raising for his election 

campaigns in BoAA bank branches where his election campaign account 

was held.” [R. 1, PgID 4]. Plaintiffs also claim that Judge Connors was 

biased because BoAA’s attorney had contributed to his campaign. [Id., 

PgID 4, 7]. 

In the second suit over which Judge Connors presided, Talbot and 

Bezrutch sued IAS’s former commercial landlord “for personal injury 

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caused by years of black mold poisoning.” [R. 1, PgID 7]. Plaintiffs allege

that they learned “from a close confidant of [Judge Connors] that [he] had a 

strong belief that black mold could not cause injury and that such cases 

were mainly insurance scams.” [Id.]. They further allege that Judge 

Connors stated in an article interview that he is not in favor of detailed 

forensic evidence or expert testimony. [Id., PgID 8]. Plaintiffs contend that 

those statements indicated that Judge Connors was “biased, dismissive, 

and held a personal distrust of black mold plaintiffs and the science behind 

black mold mycotoxin toxicity,” and that they were forced to accept a token 

settlement as a result. [Id., PgID 8 & 12.]. 

In the third action before Judge Connors, IAS’s landlord sued 

Plaintiffs for post-eviction rent payments. [R. 1, PgID 8]. Plaintiffs allege 

that Judge Connors entered a default after Plaintiffs failed to file a timely 

answer; did not allow them to file an answer because it was late; entered a 

default judgment; denied a motion to set aside the default judgment; 

entered a judgment against them without holding a hearing; denied their 

motion for relief from judgment; and ordered that the case be submitted to 

alternative dispute resolution with the black mold case. [Id., PgID 8-11]. 

They claim that Judge Connors gave “undue deference” to IAS’s former 

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landlord because his attorney was Judge Connors’ longtime acquaintance. 

[Id., PgID 12]. 

Plaintiffs’ suit against Judge Connors alleges (1) violations of 

Fourteenth Amendment Rights; (2) violation of 28 U.S.C. §1983; (3) 

violation of MCR 2.003(C)(1)(b); (4) violation of MCR 2.003(C)(1)(f); and (5) 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. [R.1]. Judge Connors argues that the 

complaint should be dismissed because he is entitled to absolute immunity. 

[R. 7]. Plaintiffs filed a response, and Judge Connors filed a reply brief. [R. 

9; R. 10].

III. ANALYSIS

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) tests a complaint’s legal sufficiency. Although the federal rules 

only require that a complaint contain a “short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” see Rule 8(a)(2), the 

statement of the claim must be plausible. “To survive a motion to dismiss, 

a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007)). The Court construes pleadings filed by pro se litigants more 

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liberally, but they still must plead a plausible claim for relief. See Davis v. 

Prison Health Services, 679 F.3d 433, 437-38 (6th Cir. 2012). 

Plaintiffs do not plead a plausible claim for relief because Judge 

Connors is entitled to judicial immunity for his judicial acts. It is wellestablished that judges are generally absolutely immune from civil suits for 

money damages. Bright v. Gallia Cty., Ohio, 753 F.3d 639, 648 (6th Cir. 

2014). “[A]bsolute judicial immunity can be overcome only in two 

instances: ‘First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, 

i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity. Second, a judge is 

not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete 

absence of all jurisdiction.’” Id. at 649 (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 

9, 11-12 (1991)). Judicial immunity is broadly construed; “[o]nly in the 

absence of subject matter jurisdiction are judicial actors devoid of the shield 

of immunity.” Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, “judicial immunity is not 

overcome by allegations of bad faith or mailice.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; 

see also Bright, 753 F.3d at 649-50 (although judge’s actions were “petty, 

unethical, and unworthy of his office,” he was entitled to absolute judicial 

immunity because he had subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying 

proceedings”). 

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Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations are based on Judge Connors’ actions in 

ruling on motions, submitting cases to alternative dispute resolution, 

dismissing a lawsuit, and entering judgment. As the presiding judge in the 

three state-court actions, Judge Connors had subject matter jurisdiction 

over each case’s proceedings. The allegations Plaintiffs raise all relate to 

decisions and rulings Judge Connors took within his judicial capacity, and 

he is entitled absolute immunity regardless of whether he was biased or 

acted in accordance with his personal beliefs. See Bright, 753 F.3d at 649-

50.

In their response, Plaintiffs argue that their counsel in the rent case 

brought by IAS’s former landlord “were not privy to ex-parte 

communications made by” Judge Connors to opposing counsel that he 

would not entertain any challenges except “simple math calculations” and 

that there was “no point to the damages hearing.” [R. 9, PgID 82]. This 

allegation is reflected in Plaintiffs’ complaint. [R. 1, PgID 11]. Nonetheless, 

even if Judge Connors engaged in the alleged ex parte communications, 

absolute immunity would still apply. See Alexander v. Rosen, 804 F.3d 

1203, 1298 (6th Cir. 2015) (“although one judge allegedly engaged in ex 

parte communications with state officials, those communications occurred 

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as part of the judge's attempt to resolve the case before him, which means 

they are still protected by absolute immunity”) (citations omitted); see also

Amir v. Harris, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124316, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 

2008) (holding that judge was entitled to absolute judicial immunity for ex 

parte communications). 

Plaintiffs do not raise any action Judge Connors took that falls under 

one of the two exceptions to judicial immunity. Accordingly, Judge Connors 

is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for his actions in the three state 

court proceedings. Given this conclusion, the Court need not address 

other shortcomings in Plaintiffs’ complaint, such as IAS improperly 

appearing before this Court without legal representation,2 or the fact that 18 

U.S.C. § 242 is a criminal statute that provides no private right of action.

3

 2 See Rowland v. California Men's Colony, Unit II Men's Advisory Council, 

506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993) (corporations, partnerships, or associations can 

appear in federal court only through a licensed attorney); United States 

S.E.C. v. Merklinger, 489 F. App'x 937, 939-40 (6th Cir. 2012) (“A corporate 

officer may not appear in federal court on behalf of the corporation; rather, 

the corporation must be represented by counsel.”)

3 See Booth v. Henson, 290 Fed. Appx. 919, 921 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding 

that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff’s claim filed under 18 

U.S.C. § 242 because he had no private right of action under the criminal 

statute).

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS GRANTING 

Judge Connors’ motion to dismiss [R. 7] and DISMISSING this action with 

prejudice. 

s/Elizabeth A. Stafford

ELIZABETH A. STAFFORD

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: January 12, 2016

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Either party to this action may object to and seek review of this 

Report and Recommendation, but must act within fourteen days of service 

of a copy hereof as provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any 

further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. 

Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 

638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections which raise some issues but 

fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all objections that party 

might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Secretary of 

HHS, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers 

Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). A copy of any objection 

must be served upon this Magistrate Judge. E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2).

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Each objection must be labeled as “Objection #1,” “Objection #2,” 

etc., and must specify precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than fourteen days after 

service of objections, the non-objecting party must file a response to 

the objections, specifically addressing each issue raised in the objections in 

the same order and labeled as “Response to Objection #1,” “Response to 

Objection #2,” etc. The response must be concise and proportionate in 

length and complexity to the objections, but there is otherwise no page 

limitation.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF 

System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on January 12, 2016.

s/Marlena Williams 

MARLENA WILLIAMS

Case Manager

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