SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2623-21 

DONALD TROUT, 

deceased, 

 Petitioner-Appellant, 

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, 

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' 

RETIREMENT SYSTEM, 

 Respondent-Respondent. 

____________________________

Submitted January 29, 2024 – Decided February 6, 2024 

Before Judges Mawla and Vinci. 

On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Public 

Employees' Retirement System, Department of 

Treasury, PERS No. xx3761. 

Alterman & Associates, LLC, attorneys for appellant

(Stuart J. Alterman, on the brief). 

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Jeffrey David Padgett, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2623-21

PER CURIAM 

 Appellant Donald Trout appeals from a March 17, 2022 final agency 

decision by the Board of Trustees (Board), Public Employee's Retirement 

System (PERS) denying his widow's request for accidental death benefits. We 

affirm. 

 Trout was employed by the Middlesex County Hazardous Materials Unit 

as a Hazmat Tech I when he passed away on August 27, 2021. That day, he was 

responding to an emergency call and while gathering his equipment at his work 

vehicle, he suffered a cardiac arrest and passed away. Trout's death certificate 

listed the cause of death as "sudden cardiac death ventricular fibrillation arrest." 

Trout's widow filed for accidental death benefits and the Board denied the 

request on December 10, 2021. The Board noted the Division of Pensions and 

Benefits requested Trout's medical records and the Division's Medical Review 

Board (MRB) reviewed the records and found Trout had "a history of prior 

cardiac surgery and treatment for hypertension and hyperlipidemia." Although 

Trout's heart attack occurred on the job, "the MRB [did] not see a particular 

incident that caused this event." The Board concluded the plain language of 

N.J.S.A. 43:15A-49(a)(1) and "binding case law" required it to deny the 

application. 
3 A-2623-21

 Appellant challenged the Board's decision and requested a hearing before 

an administrative law judge. However, the Board denied the hearing request 

because there was "no genuine issue of material fact in dispute." The Board 

then issued its March 17, 2022 written decision, recounting the underlying 

incident and the reasons it previously denied accidental disability benefits. 

 The Board explained N.J.S.A. 43:15A-49(a) requires that "the death of a 

member in active service [be] . . . a result of: (1) an accident met in the actual 

performance of duty at some definite time and place . . . ." It found Trout did 

not die of an accident, but "[r]ather . . . had a long history of pre-existing 

conditions[,] which ultimately resulted in his death." 

 The Board cited Russo v. Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 62 N.J. 142 

(1973). It noted although the pension fund in Russo was different than PERS, 

it "employ[ed] identical language to that of N.J.S.A. 43:15A-49." Russo was a 

custodian who died of a heart attack while performing his job duties. Id. at 144. 

The Board noted the Supreme Court denied the request for accidental death 

benefits because Russo's heart attack was not the result of an accident. Ibid. 

 The Board also cited Richardson v. Police & Fireman's Retirement 

System, which denied accidental death benefits to a police officer who suffered 

a heart attack while chasing a suspect. 192 N.J. 189, 214 (2007). There, the 
4 A-2623-21

Court held the death was not the result of an accident because "the work effort, 

alone or in combination with pre-existing disease, was the cause of the injury." 

Id. at 213. 

 Based on these cases, the Board concluded Trout's death was not the result 

of an accident. It further noted it considered appellant's "personal statements, 

written submission[,] and all documentation in the record." However, because 

the matter did "not entail any disputed questions of fact" the Board could decide 

the matter without an administrative hearing. 

 On appeal, appellant reasserts the arguments previously made to the

Board. Appellant argues Trout qualified for accidental death benefits because a 

heart attack is "undesigned and unexpected" and therefore qualifies as an 

accident. Further, the Board could not decide whether Trout's death was due to 

a pre-existing condition without a hearing. The Board's refusal to permit a 

hearing was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable because it should have 

allowed appellant to submit expert testimony regarding Trout's cause of death. 

 Our review of an administrative agency's final decision is limited. In re 

Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482 (2007). We afford "a 'strong presumption of 

reasonableness' to an administrative agency's exercise of its statutorily delegated 

responsibilities." Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014) (quoting City of 
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Newark v. Nat. Res. Council, Dep't of Env't Prot., 82 N.J. 530, 539 (1980)). 

Absent arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious action, or a lack of support in the 

record, the agency's final decision will be sustained. In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 

19, 27-28 (2007). 

We are not bound by an agency's interpretation of a statute, or its 

determination of a strictly legal issue. Allstars Auto Grp., Inc. v. N.J. Motor 

Vehicle Comm'n, 234 N.J. 150, 158 (2018). Although pension statutes are 

"remedial in character" and "should be liberally construed and administered in 

favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby," Geller v. Dep't of 

Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597-98 (1969), "eligibility is not to be liberally 

permitted," Smith v. State, Dep't of Treasury, 390 N.J. Super. 209, 213 (App. 

Div. 2007). 

 Pursuant to these principles, we affirm for the reasons expressed in the 

Board's decision because it is supported by sufficient credible evidence on the 

record as a whole. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). We add the following comments. 

Russo defined what an accident is for purposes of qualifying for accidental 

death benefits. The Court stated: 

In ordinary parlance, an accident may be found either 

in an unintended external event or in an unanticipated 

consequence of an intended external event if that 

consequence is extraordinary or unusual in common 
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experience. Injury by ordinary work effort or strain to 

a diseased heart, although unexpected by the individual 

afflicted, is not an extraordinary or unusual 

consequence in common experience. We are satisfied

that disability or death in such circumstances is not

accidental within the meaning of a pension statute when 

all that appears is that the employee was doing his usual 

work in the usual way. 

[62 N.J. at 154.] 

 The substantial, credible evidence in the record reveals Trout's heart 

attack was suffered by "ordinary work effort or strain" to his heart, not "an

unintended external event or in an unanticipated consequence of an intended 

external event . . . extraordinary or unusual in common experience." Ibid. For 

these reasons, the Board was not required to hold a hearing and properly applied 

N.J.S.A. 43:15A-49(a)(1) when it denied accidental death benefits.

 Affirmed.