For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. 

Tuesday, 

March 27, 2001 

GAO-01-556T 

COMBATING TERRORISM 

Comments on 

Counterterrorism 

Leadership and National 

Strategy 

Statement for the Record 

Raymond J. Decker, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans 

Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO
1 GAO-01-556T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to submit this statement for the record to comment on the need for overall

leadership and a national strategy to combat terrorism. We have conducted extensive evaluations

of programs to combat terrorism—many of them for this subcommittee—going back almost five

years. We list our related reports and testimonies at the back of this statement. In fiscal year

2001, the federal government will spend approximately $11 billion to combat terrorism. In the

event of a domestic terrorist incident, states and the affected local governments have the primary

responsibility for managing the consequences of a terrorist attack. However, the federal

government can assist state and local authorities if they lack the capability to respond adequately.

SUMMARY

Based on our prior and ongoing work, two key issues emerge that the new President and

Congress will face concerning programs to combat terrorism. First, the overall leadership and

management of such programs are fragmented within the federal government. No single entity

acts as the federal government’s top official accountable to both the President and Congress.

Fragmentation exists in both coordination of domestic preparedness programs and in efforts to

develop a national strategy. The Department of Justice worked with other agencies to develop

the Attorney General’s Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan.

While this plan is the current document that most resembles a national strategy, we believe it still

lacks some critical elements to include measurable desired outcomes, linkage to resources, and a

discussion of the role of state and local governments.

ADDRESSING OVERALL LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

Overall leadership and management efforts are fragmented because there is no single leader in

charge of the many functions conducted by different federal departments and agencies. The

President appointed a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and

Counterterrorism within the National Security Council in May 1998 who was tasked to oversee a

broad portfolio of policies and programs related to counterterrorism. However, this position had

no budget authority over areas in which essential decisions were being made on federal efforts in

combating terrorism. Furthermore, despite the creation of the National Coordinator, no single

entity acts as the federal government’s top official accountable to both the President and

Congress.

Coordinating domestic preparedness programs is another example of fragmented leadership and

management with the federal government. Our past work has concluded that the multiplicity of

federal assistance programs requires focus and attention to minimize redundancy of efforts and

eliminate confusion at the state and local level. Both the Federal Emergency Management

Agency and Department of Justice provide liaison and assistance to state and local governments.
2 GAO-01-556T 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency provides grant assistance to the states to support

state and local terrorism consequence management planning, training, and exercises. In addition,

states work with two offices in the Department of Justice—the National Domestic Preparedness

Office and the Office of State and Local Domestic Preparedness. Justice’s National Domestic

Preparedness Office was authorized by Congress in 1999 and established for the purpose of

coordinating federal terrorism crisis and consequence preparedness programs for the state and

local emergency response community.1 The Office of State and Local Domestic Preparedness

currently assists states in the development of their State Domestic Preparedness Strategic Plans.

This effort includes funding, training, equipment acquisition, technical assistance, and exercise

planning and execution. The overlap of federal efforts and lack of a single federal focal point for

state and local assistance have highlighted the need for improved leadership and management.

Efforts to develop a national strategy provide additional evidence that there is fragmented

leadership and management. In addition to the existing Attorney General’s 5-year plan, the

National Security Council and the Department of Justice’s National Domestic Preparedness

Office are each planning to develop national strategies. The danger in this proliferation of

strategies is that state and local governments—which are already confused about the multitude of

federal domestic preparedness agencies and programs—may become further frustrated about the

direction, execution, and management of the overall effort.

Several recent congressional proposals, commission recommendations, and associations’ remarks

share our concerns about the fragmentation of leadership and management. Their observations

suggest the usefulness of a single entity within the federal government to administer programs to

combat domestic terrorism.

DEVELOPING A NATIONAL STRATEGY

Combating terrorism requires our nation to focus on a comprehensive national strategy. A

national strategy should articulate a clear vision statement that defines what the nation hopes to

achieve through its combating terrorism programs. Key aspects of the national strategy should

include (1) roles and missions of federal, state, and local entities and (2) establish objectives,

priorities, outcome-related goals with milestones, and performance measures to achieve those

goals.2 Ultimately, a national strategy should serve as an effective mechanism for ensuring that

all elements of the national effort are clearly integrated and properly focused to eliminate gaps

and duplication in programs to combat terrorism. Furthermore, this will provide a framework to

guide top-level decisions affecting programs, priorities, and funding considerations.

 

1

P.L. 106-113, Nov. 29, 1999.

2 In our view, the national strategy should incorporate chief tenets of the Government Performance and Results Act

of 1993 (P.L. 103-62). The Results Act holds federal agencies accountable for achieving program results and

requires federal agencies to clarify their missions, set program goals, and measure performance toward achieving

those goals.
3 GAO-01-556T 

In December 1998, the Department of Justice issued the Attorney General’s Five-Year Plan as

mandated by Congress.3 Congress intended the plan to serve as a baseline for the coordination of

a national strategy and operational capabilities to combat terrorism. This classified plan, which

represents a substantial interagency effort, includes goals, objectives, performance indicators and

recommends specific agency actions to resolve interagency problems. In March 2000, the

Department of Justice released an update on the plan, which reported on the accomplishments

made by various agencies during fiscal year 1999 on their assigned tasks. The Department of

Justice contends that this plan, taken in combination with related presidential decision directives,

represents a comprehensive national strategy. We agree that the Attorney General’s Five-Year

Plan is the current document that most resembles a national strategy. However, we believe that

additional work is needed to build upon the progress the plan represents and develop a

comprehensive national strategy. Specifically, additional progress should be made in the

following areas.

• Based upon our review, the Five-Year Plan does not have measurable desired outcomes. We

have reported that a national strategy should provide goals that are related to clearly defined

outcomes. For example, the national strategy should include a goal to improve state and local

response capabilities. Desired outcomes should be linked to a level of preparedness that

response teams should achieve. Without this specificity in a national strategy, the nation will

continue to miss opportunities to focus and shape combating terrorism programs to meet the

threat.

• Also based upon our review, the Five-Year Plan also lacks linkage to budget resources. We

have reported that the nation lacks a coherent framework to develop and evaluate budget

requirements for combating terrorism programs since no national strategy exists with clearly

defined outcomes. The establishment of a single focal point within the federal government

for combating terrorism can provide a mechanism to direct and oversee combating terrorism

funding. Moreover, this focal point could ensure that adequate funding is applied to key

priorities while eliminating unnecessary spending in duplication efforts to combat terrorism.

• Other experts, such as the Gilmore Commission testifying today, suggest that a national

strategy should be developed in close coordination with state and local governments since

they play a major role in preparing against and responding to acts of terrorism. Based upon

our preliminary analysis, we agree with this position. Local responders will be the first

response to mitigate terrorist incidents. Therefore, they should participate in the development

of a national strategy and their roles and responsibilities should be clearly defined.

 

3 The Plan was mandated in the Conference Committee Report of the 1998 Appropriations Act for the Departments

of Commerce, Justice, and State; the Judiciary, and Related Agencies.
4 GAO-01-556T 

As with the need for a single focal point, recent congressional proposals, commission

recommendations, and associations’ remarks share our views on the continued need for a

national strategy.

----

Today, various experts will testify on the need for a single national entity to lead and manage

programs to combat terrorism and to develop a national strategy. Based on our research and

analysis and the efforts of these experts, there appears to be a growing consensus that the federal

government needs to address both of these issues now.

GAO CONTACTS AND STAFF ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For future contacts about this statement for the record, please contact Raymond J. Decker,

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at (202) 512-6020. Individuals making key

contributions to this statement include Stephen L. Caldwell, Deborah Colantonio, and Krislin

Nalwalk.
5 GAO-01-556T 

RELATED GAO PRODUCTS

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities

Remain to Improve Coordination (GAO-01-14, Nov. 30, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218,

July 26, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Bill H.R. 4210 to Manage Selected Counterterrorist

Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-172, May 4, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat Terrorism

(GAO/NSIAD-00-85, Apr. 7, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145,

Apr. 6, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction

Training (GAO/NSIAD-00-64, Mar. 21, 2000).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw on Year 2000

Experiences (GAO/AIMD-00-1, Oct. 1, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and

Biological Attack (GAO/NSIAD-99-163, Sept. 7, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181,

June 9, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist Operations

(GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism (GAO/TNSIAD/GGD-99-107, Mar. 11, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and

Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23,

1998).

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program

Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).
6 GAO-01-556T 

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management

and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy

(GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

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