FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

SKYDIVE SACRAMENTO 

Complainant, 

vs. 

THE CITY OF LINCOLN, CALIFORNIA 

Respondent 

1^ 

n 

E e E i w 

OQT - 2 2009 

AIRPORT/ENVIRONMENTAL 

LAW, AGC-600 

F RN 

Docket No. 16-09-09 

COMPLAINANT'S CONSOLmATED REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S ANSWER 

(TO COMPLAINT), DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN SPECIFIC CLAIMS 

OF VIOLATION BY RESPONDENT AND ANSWER IN 

OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 

Please serve: 

Richard J. Durden 

Richard J. Durden, Attorney at Law 

27987 Richmond Hill Road 

Conifer, Colorado 80433 

616/901-6516 

avlawyer@vahoo.com 

Counsel for Complainant 

Scott P. Lewis 

Christine M. Griffin 

ANDERSON & KREIGER L.L.P. 

One Canal Park, Suite 200 

Cambridge, MA. 02141 

T: 617/621-6560 

F: 617/621-6660 

slewis@andersonkreiger. com 

cgriffm@andersonkreiger.com 

Counsel for Respondent 

NOW COMES Complainant, Skydive Sacramento, by and through its attorney and for its 

Consolidated Reply to Respondent's Answer (to Complaint), Dismissal of Certain Specific 

Claims of Violation by Respondent and Answer In Opposition to Respondent's Motion to 

Dismiss, states as follows: 
For the sake of efficiency and brevity. Complainant herein combines its Reply to 

Respondent's Answer (per 14 CFR §16.23(e) for which Respondent is allowed a rebuttal), its 

Dismissal of Certain Specific Claims of Violation by Respondent (for which no responsive 

pleading is required or permitted) and its Answer in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to 

Dismiss (per 14 CFR §16.19(c), for which no further pleading is permitted). 

Respondent's supporting evidentiary material provided Complainant, for the first time, 

certain information regarding the City's approach to the drop zone lease which allows 

Complainant to now dismiss some of its claims of violation by the City. Complainant recognizes 

that the City is currently under significant financial pressures, as is Complainant. Had 

Respondent even once agreed to Complainant's repeated requests to negotiate the drop zone 

lease it appears that all but a few of the issues that are a part of the Complaint in this matter 

could have been resolved. It is possible that instead of both parties expending funds they cannot 

afford on this matter, Skydive Sacramento could now have been operating on the airport drop 

zone, and expanded its business and would have been bringing more money into the City's 

coffers as it purchased even more fuel from the City and skydiving enthusiasts frequented area 

motels and restaurants in greater numbers than at present. 

As will be set out below, based on information the City has now provided, Skydive 

Sacramento is dismissing a number the specific allegations of violation by the City, while 

opposing the City's Motion to Dismiss its remaining claims of violation by the City. 

I. Complaint's Reply to Respondent's Answer to Complaint and Dismissal Of Specific 

Causes of Action for Violations by Respondent 

A. In paragraph 22 of Respondent's Answer (Answer), the City asserts that the drop 

zone and proposed buildings to support the drop zone are in an area denoted as "non-aviation" in 
the Airport Layout Plan (Respondent's exhibit 12). An examination of the exhibit itself shows 

that the area for the drop zone and supporting structures is north of the "non-aviation" area where 

non-aviation businesses currently hold leases and the City is dumping trash. The area for the 

drop zone and proposed buildings is clearly marked "aviation reserve". Respondent's 

misrepresentation here, and again, later regarding the fuel discount and liability insurance, 

should not be overlooked even though Complainant is dismissing its claim of violation regarding 

its desire to erect buildings adjacent to the drop zone. 

B. Paragraph 35 of Respondent's Answer asserts that City offered a discount for fuel 

purchases of 300 gallons "in a single purchase from the Airport's jet fuel truck". Respondent has 

only asserted the single purchase condition on the discount in its Answer. In the promises by the 

airport manager to the principal of Skydive Sacramento, Pat Garcia, regarding the discount, no 

such limitation or condition was mentioned. When City published its January 2009 newsletter, 

the Log Pile, announcing the discount, no such condition was stated (exhibit 7 to the Complaint). 

When Pat Garcia made numerous telephone calls to the airport manager (none of which were 

ever answered or returned) regarding the discoimt and followed up v^th an email to the airport 

manager which was also not answered (exhibit 31), the airport manager did not take the 

opportunity to tell Mr. Garcia that purchases had to be made 300 gallons at a time as opposed to 

in one day. 

As set out in the Complaint, Respondent regularly purchases more than 300 gallons in a 

day as it carries skydivers aloft. There are no aircraft currently based on the Airport that can 

hold 300 gallons of fuel. An interpretation of a fuel purchase discount that disqualifies every 

aircraft based on the Airport is ludicrous, unless it is confirmation of unwritten City policies to 

not support aeronautical users based on the Airport. 
As Respondent provided no evidence to counter its own newsletter, the economic harm 

suffered by Complainant due to Respondent's discriminatory treatment on the fuel discount must 

be taken as established and the veracity of Respondent's other denials placed in question. 

It should be further noted that Respondent confirmed that Complainant is one of the 

largest fuel purchasers on the Airport but that the largest users are not based on the Airport. It is 

a telling comment regarding the economic health of the aeronautical enterprises based on the 

Airport and a reflection of the attitude of management of the Airport in that the home-based 

businesses are weak enough that they do not purchase more fuel than transient operators. In the 

case of Complainant, its fuel purchases, and revenue to the City, are expected to significantly 

increase if and when the City removes unreasonable and unattainable restrictions on it and it can 

use the airport drop zone. 

C. Paragraph 48 of Respondent's Answer, begins a fascinating exercise in evasion 

regarding commercial general liability insurance. To start with. Complainant carries all of the 

insiirance required by the City except for a commercial general liability policy that includes 

coverage for skydiving operations. 

Each of the three versions of the draft lease Respondent presented to Complainant called 

for a specific level of coverage of "commercial general liability" insurance that included 

coverage for skydiving. As may be seen from the exhibits provided by Complainant (e.g. exhibit 

20 to the Complaint) and in the Complaint itself. Complainant repeatedly pointed out to the City 

that such coverage for a commercial skydiving operator simply did not exist. The City was 

aware of the absence of any coverage for a commercial skydiving operator and yet, in the 

discussions between counsel for the City and for Complainant, the City specifically refused to 
reduce its liability insurance requirement to match liability insurance actually available to a 

commercial skydiving operator. 

To this day there is no liability insurance available to commercial skydiving operators 

(see exhibit 30 to the Complaint). 

Suddenly, Respondent says that it did not really mean commercial general liability 

coverage (despite requiring and getting such insurance on the part of all of its tenants - see the 

leases attached in support of its Motion to Dismiss), it really meant "aviation general liability 

insurance" (Answer, paragraph 48, page 18). 

Respondent didn't bother to advise this tribunal that "aviation general liability insurance" 

is simply another name for "commercial general liability insurance" and did not provide any 

evidence regarding its newly discovered insurance or that it exists to cover commercial 

skydiving operators or is available to them. 

As City is aware, but chooses to ignore or attempt to evade, aviation insurance is sold as 

a product. Complainant has been dealing with the insurance issue ever since the first proposed 

lease was issued by City and is painfully aware what insurance products exist. If there were an 

insurance product that provided liability coverage for skydiving. Complainant would have 

purchased it long ago. It would have added City as an additional insured to the policy (as it did 

with its automobile insurance policy - Complainant is fully aware that adding a landlord as an 

additional insured is standard practice and has no disagreement with such a requirement) and 

would have also added its subcontractors and this entire problem would not exist. 

City cannot blithely waltz in and say that there is really no liability insurance problem 

and then say that all Respondent has to do is buy "aviation general liability insurance" and add 
City as an additional insured and everyone can go happily on their way without producing 

evidence that such insurance exists and covers skydiving. 

To add to the Respondent's Kafkaesque pleading, in the very next paragraph of 

Respondent's Answer, "aviation general liability insurance" transmogrifies into "Aircraft 

Liability Coverage" which "should be increased to $1,000,000 per occurrence, $2,000,000 

aggregate, and should be expanded to include coverage for bodily injury, property damage, and 

any damage to or caused by passengers..." Respondent did not bother to provide any evidence 

that such insurance exists or that it is available to Complainant. Respondent purchases aircraft 

insurance and is fully aware that there is no insurance that provides coverage for damage caused 

by passengers in an aircraft. When Respondent came up with new type of insurance, it was up to 

Respondent to provide evidence it even exists and is available to a commercial skydiving 

operator at the described coverage level. 

As Complainant has demonstrated, no matter what name Respondent tries to come up 

with to confuse the issue, liability insurance that covers skydiving risks for commercial 

skydiving operators does not exist; it is unattainable. 

Respondent, in its Answer, did not address that very fundamental issue of this Part 16 

Complaint, that of requiring unattainable insurance. In its Answer, Respondent failed to provide 

any evidence to overcome the showing of Complainant that there was no available insurance 

coverage for commercial skydiving liability and, therefore. Specific Violation Counts A and B of 

Complainant's Complaint regarding unattainable liability insurance that covers skydiving for 

commercial skydiving operators and subcontractors must be taken as established and judgment 

entered for Complainant on those Counts. 
D. In several locations in City's Answer it asserted that the airport manager and other 

City officials would not speak wdth the principal of Skydive Sacramento because of a letter sent 

by Complaint's counsel. City provided no evidence to support such a claim. To the contrary, 

counsel for the City repeatedly indicated to counsel for Complainant that there was no restriction 

on City personnel communicating with Mr. Garcia, principal of Skydive Sacramento. (See 

Complaint exhibits 11,12, 13, 14 and 17 in which counsel for the City states, "I anticipate the 

City will be contacting you in the near future concerning this matter.") Further, while City 

asserts that the airport manager had no phone calls from Pat Garcia, Mr. Garcia was leaving 

messages for the airport manager regarding the fuel discount, including following up with exhibit 

31, a email from Mr. Garcia to Mr. Daly. Mr. Daly had numerous chances to tell Mr. Garcia that 

the 300 gallon fuel discount was only per fill up, but did not bother to do so. 

E. City's AFl and AF2 assert, without supporting evidence, that the parties were 

engaged in negotiating a drop zone lease. As shown by the evidence provided by Complainant, 

City would unilaterally issue a draft lease. Complainant would indicate that there were numerous 

problems with it and ask for a chance to negotiate the terms with City officials, even going so far 

as to draft suggested language, rather than have the City simply issue another version of the draft 

lease. At no time did City ever negotiate; it simply issued leases. 

F. Respondent did not provide any evidence to dispute Complainant's showing of 

economic impact. Section V. of the Complaint, and thus it must be accepted as established. 

II. Complainant's Dismissal of Certain Specific Claims of Violation by Respondent 

As a result of Respondent's pleadings. Complainant has been provided information it 

would have been expected to receive had Respondent simply been willing to sit down and 
negotiate a lease agreement. For example, had Complainant been advised that the auto insurance 

requirement set out in the lease was the same as for other commercial operators, it would not 

have objected to it. As stated in its Complaint, the FAA requires that Respondent apply "equal" 

standards to commercial aeronautical enterprises on an airport: Section 3-12, Administration of 

Policy, of FAA Order 5190.6A establishes requirement for standards that are established for 

commercial operators for aeronautical activity on an airport so as to avoid unjust discrimination: 

"Such conditions must, however, be fair, equal and not unjustly 

discriminatory." (Emphasis added) 

Respondent has conveniently ignored the "equal" language in its Answer. Nevertheless, upon 

reviewing the lease agreements and other documentation provided by Respondent, Complainant 

has observed that the City's proposed lease does treat Complainant equally with other 

commercial operators in a number of specific areas. As result, as it promised in the Complaint, 

Complainant hereby dismisses the following portions and causes of action of its Complaint: 

A. Specific Violations sections C. and E. regarding automobile insurance. The 

requirement for automobile insurance appears to be applied equally among commercial operators 

and is attainable. 

B. Specific Violations section H. regarding Rent. City has demonstrated that other 

lessees who are on the airport in a location where buildings (other than temporary) may not be 

erected are treated equally with Complainant. 

C. Specific Violations section I. regarding Lease Term. 

D. Specific Violations section K. regarding Use. Complainant offered to have the 

drop zone be used for hot air balloon launches as a way of help defuse the ongoing fight between 

the airport manager and hot air balloonists who had been using the airport over launch sites, and 

to provide additional area for helicopter practice, but dismisses this section of its Complaint. 

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The material provided by City regarding sewer hookup and buildings is adequate for 

Complainant to dismiss its claim regarding erecting buildings, although Complainant still desires 

to make a long term capital improvement in the form of buildings to support the drop zone. 

E. Specific Violations sections L, M. and N. regarding Indemnity and Time. The 

leases provided by City show that it treats commercial operators equally in this regard. 

Complainant retains and continues to pursue all claims of violation by Respondent it has 

not specifically dismissed. 

III. Answer in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 

In its Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, Respondent spends 

some time reiterating the law on burden of proof in a Part 16 action. Neither party disagrees that 

the Complainant has the initial burden of proof in this matter. The cases point out that once 

Complainant has met its initial burden of proof, the burden shifts to Respondent. As referenced 

in the cases cited, the standard for meeting the burden of proof is preponderance of the evidence. 

There is no "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard as in a criminal action; there is no super or 

elevated burden of proof As will be seen below. Complainant has met its burden of proof on its 

claims it has not dismissed. 

A. Unattainable Insurance. Complaint sections A. B. and D. 

As set forth in the Complaint and discussed above, the draft drop zone lease requires 

Complainant and its subcontractors to provide commercial general liability insurance. Since this 

Complaint was filed. Complainant has found that it can add its subcontractors to its insurance 

policies which name the City as an additional insured, thus Complainant and its subcontractors 

are, together, able to comply with City's insurance requirements when such policies and levels of 
coverage are available for purchase. Therefore, from information currently available to 

Complainant, the insurance requirements affect Complainant and its subcontractors equally. 

The problem that cannot be avoided by evasive language or creative titles for nonexistent 

insurance lies when the airport sponsor establishes requirements for a type of insurance, and/or 

level of coverage, that is unattainable. Simply put, it is the perfect strategic loophole through 

which an airport sponsor that wants to keep a user it doesn't desire, but who meets all the safety 

requirements, off of an airport. The implications for aeronautical users of federally-funded U.S. 

airports are frightening. 

The City has happily taken hundreds of thousands of dollars for grant money and, in so 

doing, promised to comply with federal statues and Federal Aviation Regulations regarding 

airport access. 

The City agreed that it would not grant exclusive rights to users of the airport under 49 

u s e §40103(e). The FAA published its guidelines on compliance with the Code as well as its 

regulations (FAA published interpretations of its own regulations are binding unless 

demonstrated to be frivolous) in AC 150/5190-6. In Section 1.2 it makes it blindingly clear that 

an airport sponsor's policy, actions or requirements that have the effect of prohibiting an 

aeronautical activity are in violation of the exclusive rights prohibition: 

"An exclusive rights violation occurs when the airport sponsor 

excludes others, either intentionally or unintentionally, from 

participating in an on-airport aeronautical activity." 

Whether a liability insurance requirement is written into a City's municipal code or just 

into a lease, if it is in violation of the statutes and grant agreements under which the City 

received airport fimding, it cannot stand. FAA Order 5190.6A, 49 USC §§47107 and 40103(e) 

10 
and the City's grant obligations make it clear that standards for commercial operators must be 

"relevant to the proposed activity, reasonably attainable and uniformly applied". 

Unattainable cannot even remotely be considered to be reasonably attainable. 

The drop zone lease, as written, requires commercial general liability insurance that 

covers skydiving. Complainant has presented uncontroverted evidence that such insurance does 

not exist for commercial skydiving operations. 

Respondent has not disagreed that an unattainable insurance requirement violates the 

Code, Federal Aviation Regulations and grant requirements. Instead, Respondent attempts to 

claim that there really is no problem, because it did not actually mean commercial general 

liability insurance (as it did in the leases with the other commercial operators on the airport), 

instead it meant something else. First, in its Answer, it used different phrases for liability 

insurance coverage, described above. Then, in its Motion to Dismiss, realizing that it did not 

have a good argument on the unattainable insurance issue, moved it to the end of its brief, and 

said (at page 14): 

"Skydive's aircraft liability coverage should be increased to 

$1,000,000 per occurrence, $2,000,000 aggregate, and should be 

expanded to include coverage for bodily injury, property damage, 

and any damage to or caused by passengers, and the City should 

be listed as an additional insured" 

as if it were merely a matter of tweaking Complainant's aircraft liability coverage to solve the 

niggling little issue of liability insurance. 

After the two new phrases Respondent created for liability insurance in its Answer, the 

next straw it reaches for is a change to an aircraft insurance policy, as if it could magically be 

transformed to cover skydiving risks and new coverage limits set. 

If only it were that easy. 

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Once again. Respondent provided no evidence that such insurance coverage exists or can 

be purchased by Complainant. 

To reiterate, Skydive Sacramento has searched the insurance market for liability 

insurance coverage that will cover it, as a commercial skydiving operation, for skydiving. Such 

insurance does not exist. 

Insurers sell insurance products. City recognizes this and, in all of its commercial leases 

on the airport, requires the commercial operator to cany a specific insurance product, 

commercial general liability insurance. It covers the operator for liability and, by naming the 

City as an additional insured, covers the City for the same liability risk. 

There is no insurance product that covers a commercial skydiving operator for liability 

for skydiving. The City is aware of this. Complainant provided evidence of this that the City 

has not disputed. Complainant has purchased all of the other insurance the City requires, the 

remaining requirement is unattainable. 

Now City is trying to put up a moving target to confuse the issue. 

Complainant carries aircraft insurance at the highest level of coverage it has been able to 

buy. It carries automobile insurance at the level demanded by the City and meets all of the 

City's insurance requirements other than commercial general liability insurance that covers 

skydiving. It is not trying to avoid buying liability insurance that covers skydiving; the insurance 

does not exist. This tribunal should see through Respondent's attempt to confuse the issue with a 

bogus compromise for nonexistent insurance coverage. 

City has named a few other types of "insurance" that it says will satisfy it. However, 

once Complainant met its burden of proof in showing that there is no available liability insurance 

for skydiving operators that covers skydiving, the burden of proof switched to the City to 

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produce evidence that such an insurance product that meets the municipal ordinance, by any 

name, exists and is obtainable by Complainant. City has failed to meet its burden of proving that 

there is an attainable insurance product that meets the requirements of the municipal ordinance 

and the drop zone Lease. 

Complainant is entitled to an Order from the FAA stating that an airport sponsor, the 

City, may not place a requirement for unobtainable insurance and/or levels of coverage on 

Complainant, an aeronautical user of the Airport, for it or its subcontractors, as a condition of 

leasing and using the drop zone on the Airport. 

B. Requirement That No Lessees On the Airport, Other Than Complainant, Pay For 

the City's Liability Insurance. Complaint Section F. 

Respondent purchases, and keeps in force, a policy of airport liability insurance. The 

insurance covers a number of, but not all, possible aeronautical activities on the Airport. It 

covers some aeronautical activities that do not take place on the Airport. 

Respondent has produced copies of all of its leases with all of the commercial and 

noncommercial operators on the Airport. Together, these operators and lessees are involved in a 

variety of aeronautical activities from hangar construction and rental through flight training, 

aircraft maintenance, and aircraft sales, to name some. Not a single one of them has to pay for 

the airport's insurance that covers its particular aeronautical activity. While the Airport keeps 

track of the various activities on the Airport, it has not seen fit to charge any aeronautical user, 

commercial or otherwise, for its share of the City's liability insurance. City has had years to do 

so. 

Now, for the first time in its history, despite the fact that there has been skydiving on the 

airport in the past, the City has decided to identify one particular aeronautical enterprise to be 

dunned for the City's insurance. Complainant has been singled out for the honor. 

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Atkin Air, the largest Fixed Base Operator on the airport has gone out of business in the 

last few weeks; yet there is no indication that the City is going to seek to save money on its 

liability insurance by buying insurance that does not provide coverage the activities Atkin Air 

undertook that are no longer being carried out on the Airport. 

Ultralights are a relatively recent aeronautical user of the Airport, yet there is no 

indication that the City charged them when the City obtained liability coverage that included 

ultralight use on the Airport. 

In its Motion to Dismiss, Respondent took some time to set out the differences between 

the commercial operators and lessees, aviation and non-aviation, on the Airport as a basis for 

what it said was legitimate economic discrimination based on size and/or capital improvements. 

The City asserted that it treated each commercial operator or lessee that fit into a particular 

category the same. While the issues regarding such economic behavior have been mooted by the 

dismissals of specific allegations of violations by Complainant, if Respondent is heard to make 

arguments of legitimate discrimination based on size of commercial operation or lessee's capital 

investment in the airport, they should sound hollow here, where no matter how Complainant is 

compared to the other commercial operators or lease holders or aeronautical users of the Airport, 

it is now the only one singled out for special, unfair, treatment. 

Complainant is entitled to equal treatment with other aeronautical users of the Airport 

under 49 USC §§ 47107 and 40103(e), Section 3-12, Administration of Policy of FAA Order 

5190.6A and the grant assurances. Every single type of aeronautical use on the airport creates 

some risk for the City, as well as a benefit. Complainant has yet to find a single case in which an 

airport sponsor has been held liable for a skydiving accident or incident; and Respondent has not 

14 
produced such a case. To focus on one particular aeronautical user to pay for a portion of the 

City's insurance premium, is to treat that user in an unequal fashion no matter what the premium. 

C. Unequal Lease Recitals. Complaint Section G. 

Skydive Sacramento's Complaint set out the gratuitously insulting "Recitals" in the 

preamble to the draft lease, notably items C, D, E, F, G and H. They refer to someone's estimate 

of expected use levels of the Airport and a reminder, true for any aeronautical user of any sort, 

commercial operator, transient pilot or hangar lessee, that if the person does not comply with 

safety rules, he, she or it can be tossed off the Airport. 

Interestingly enough, as Complainant suspected, such recitals do not appear on any of the 

other leases between the City and aeronautical or non-aviation lessees on the Airport. City has 

made it glaringly clear with the recitals, beyond the simple economic discrimination outlined by 

Complainant, that Skydive Sacramento and its customers are not welcome on the Airport and if 

they are going to be there they had better just shuffle quietly to the back of the aeronautical bus 

and not cause any problem for their betters. 

Once signed, the lease between the parties here will become a public document. Potential 

customers of Skydive Sacramento will see that the City has placed recitals on this lease that it 

has with no other lessee; recitals that strongly imply that Complainant is unsafe and unwelcome 

on airport and might be kicked off at any time. Complainant faces strong competition from other 

skydiving operations in the area. To place such recitals in the lease would obviously have an 

adverse competitive effect Complainant. 

For the shockingly unequal treatment of Complainant, for the violations outlined in the 

Complaint, Complainant is entitled to an Order striking the referenced recitals from any lease 

between Complainant and Respondent. 

15 
D. Irreconcilable Lease Inconsistencies. Complaint Section J. 

It appears from City's Motion to Dismiss that it is amenable to amendment of Section 5 

of the draft lease as it recognizes that setting forth a number of specific operating requirements, 

regulations and practices in the Lease itself, as they exist at the time of the Lease, provides a 

potentially fatal inconsistency with Section 8 of the Lease requiring compliance v/ith all 

applicable laws and regulations. 

Section 8 of the lease appears in virtually identical form in all of the airport leases. 

Complainant has absolutely no objection to Section 8 or its wording. 

Nothing remotely similar to Section 5 appears in any of other the Airport leases. 

There are numerous rules, regulations, statutes, agreements and good operating practices 

that apply to all aeronautical users and all lessees on the Airport. 

Section 8 covers the waterfront. 

Charitably, perhaps in a misguided attempt to be redundant. Respondent installed Section 

5 in the Lease even though it is covered by Section 8. As outlined in the Complaint, the 

documents referenced in Section 5 are of the sort expected to be amended over time. Once 

amended. Complainant cannot comply with the amended version without being in violation of 

Section 5 of the Lease, wdth obvious economic effect; Complainant would be kicked off of the 

Airport. Respondent has proposed additional wording to Section 5 to avoid future 

noncompliance. The simple solution is to strike the redundant and unfair section of the Lease. 

Because Section 5 of the Lease is another example of blatantly unequal and 

discriminatory treatment of Complainant, and because it appears in no other Lease on the 

Airport, the appropriate response for an Order declaring it to be in violation as outlined in the 

Complaint and striking it from the Lease. 

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IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above. Complainant respectfully requests that Respondent's 

Motion to Dismiss be denied and an Order entered declaring that Airport standards for a 

commercial aeronautical enterprises that are not attainable, notably liability insurance, are in 

violation of 49 USC §§ 47107,40103(e) and an airport sponsors grant assurances and prohibiting 

City from imposing liability insurance requirements on Complainant and its subcontractors that 

are unobtainable; thus striking the portions of Section 11 of the Lease regarding skydiving 

commercial general liability coverage and policy limits that are not available. Complainant 

further seeks an Order confirming the terms of Section 3-12 of FAA Order 5190.6 A 

implementing 49 USC §§ 47107,40103(e) and grant assurances, that conditions on those who 

engage in commercial aeronautical enterprise on an airport be treated equally, and/or prohibiting 

City from imposing terms in the following Lease sections: 1 I.e. (Complainant to pay for City's 

liability insurance for its specific aeronautical activity and Recitals C, D, E, F, G and H. Finally, 

Complainant seeks an Order requiring that City enter into a lease with Complainant within thirty 

days that is in compliance with the Order(s) the FAA issues in this matter and the City's grant 

assurances and that City take no retaliatory action against Complainant for filing this Complaint. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Richard J. Durden, Attorney at Law 

Attorney for Complainant 

Dated: AjoArA J ^ ^'^<^ By: ^^_/^^ig^i ^ 

Durden 

2t'987^ichmond Hill Road 

Conifer, Colorado 80433 

(616)901-65156 

17 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify in accordance with 14 CFR Part 16.15(a) that today I served the 

foregoing Complainant's Consolidated Reply to Respondent's Answer (To Complaint) and 

Answer in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss on the following persons at the 

following addresses by United States Postal Service Express Mail: 

Scott P. Lewis 

Anderson & Kreiger, LLP 

One Canal Park, Suite 200 

Cambridge, MA. 02141 

Office of the Chief Counsel 

FAA Part 16 Airport Proceedings Docket 

AGC-610 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, SW 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

^th Dated this 30"" day of September, 2009 

hard J. Djf " 

For Comp^wnant 

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