UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, No. 15-CR-20338

-vs- U.S. District Judge Judith E. Levy

D-2 SHARON GANDY-MICHEAU,

Defendant.

 /

GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

I. BACKGROUND

This Court is familiar with the facts of this case, having presided over two 

trials. Defendant Sharon Gandy-Micheau was a part of a conspiracy and scheme to 

defraud the Internal Revenue Service.1

 Altogether, 22 fraudulent federal income 

tax returns for estates and trusts, Forms 1041, were prepared and filed with the IRS

in the names of nonexistent trusts. The returns requested refunds totaling 

 

 1 There were five other defendants. Anthony Gandy and Christopher Gandy 

were convicted at trial with defendant in March 2017. Durand Micheau was 

convicted at trial in May 2017. Shanel Seay agreed to cooperate and was placed 

on pretrial diversion. And Derrick McCoy was acquitted in March 2017.

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approximately $1.4 million. The IRS issued 14 refund checks, which were mailed 

to post office boxes connected to one or more of the defendants. The other eight 

returns did not lead to the issuance of refund checks because the fraudulent nature 

of those returns was detected by the IRS before the checks went out.

The 14 refund checks mailed to the defendants totaled $939,000. Of that 

amount, the defendants ultimately received $360,000 in cash through the 

negotiation of the checks. Four of the refund checks were cashed at check-cashing 

stores. The remainder were deposited into newly opened checking accounts 

established in the names of the trusts. Large cash withdrawals followed soon 

thereafter.

In light of the factors discussed below, the government requests this Court to 

find that defendant’s advisory guideline range is 63-78 months in prison and 

impose a sentence in light of that range. It also requests this Court to impose an 

additional two-year term of imprisonment to run consecutively to the underlying 

sentence. In addition, the government requests this Court to impose a three-year 

term of supervised release and order defendant to pay restitution to the IRS in the 

amount of $360,469.05, jointly and severally with her codefendants.

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II. THE POST-BOOKER SENTENCING PARADIGM

This Court no doubt is very familiar with the basic sentencing process that 

exists post-Booker. Although the guideline range is now advisory rather than 

mandatory, a district court “should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly 

calculating the applicable Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 

49 (2007). The district court should then consider the guideline range along with 

the other six factors prescribed in section 3553(a) before imposing sentence.2

 See, 

 

 2 Section 3553(a) reads:

(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence. — The court shall 

impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with 

the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in 

determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider —

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed —

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the 

law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 

training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 

effective manner;

(3) the kinds of sentences available;

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e.g, Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50. The Sixth Circuit “may conclude that a sentence is 

unreasonable when the district judge fails to ‘consider’ the applicable Guidelines 

range or neglects to ‘consider’ the other factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” 

United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005).

III. DEFENDANT SHARON GANDY-MICHEAU’S GUIDELINE RANGE

The probation officer calculated defendant’s guideline range to be 63-78

months. See PSR ¶ 76. The government agrees. Defendant has filed no 

objections to the Presentence Report.

 

(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for —

(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable 

category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines — (i) issued by the 

Sentencing Commission . . . ; and (ii) that . . . are in effect on the 

date the defendant is sentenced;

. . . .

(5) any pertinent policy statement —

(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . ; and

(B) that . . . is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced[;]

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants 

with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and

(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

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IV. THE 3553(a) FACTORS

A. Punishment and Crime Control

As this Court well knows, the key provision of the Sentencing Reform Act 

of 1984 is section 3553(a)(2), which provides that a district court

shall consider — . . .

(2) the need for the sentence imposed —

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect 

for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; 

and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or 

vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in 

the most effective manner[.]

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). “These four considerations – retribution, deterrence, 

incapacitation, and rehabilitation – are the four purposes of sentencing generally, 

and a court must fashion a sentence ‘to achieve the[se] purposes . . . to the extent

that they are applicable’ in a given case.” Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 

325 (2011) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a)).

These

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purposes can be categorized into two general philosophies. The first 

is just punishment, sometimes called “just desert” or retribution, 

which is the criteria of justification for deontological theories [i.e., 

theories of morality or ethics]. These trace their roots to the 

philosophy of Immanuel Kant or to the biblical lex talionis (“life for 

life . . . eye for eye, tooth for tooth . . .”). The second general 

philosophy is utilitarianism. Deterrence, incapacitation, and 

rehabilitation are all utilitarian crime-control measures tracing their 

philosophical roots to Jeremy Bentham.

Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and 

Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 

19, 21 n.6 (2003).

As described above, “just punishment” refers to the concept of retribution. 

Retribution is a part of the fabric of criminal justice. This factor, of course, does 

not alone dictate any particular sentence. It is simply one of a number of factors 

courts must consider. But, like any relevant factor, it should not be completely 

disregarded.

 Determining what punishment is just in any given case must also take into 

account the victims of the offense. Defendant’s crime, in and of itself, did not 

result in substantial harm to the government as a whole. But the impact of tax 

fraud on the revenues of the United States is immense. It is estimated that the U.S. 

Treasury loses hundreds of billions of dollars every year from the fraudulent 

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circumvention of the federal tax code. See New York Times, Nov. 28, 2011 (“The 

United States lost the most tax revenue in absolute terms – $337 billion – followed 

by Brazil and Italy.”).

3

Another section 3553(a)(2) factor, which is related, is deterrence. Although 

the government believes that defendant presents no risk of recidivism, that speaks 

to the principle of specific deterrence. But there is also general deterrence. As this 

court knows, general deterrence is the idea that others will be deterred from 

committing crimes if a sentencing judge makes an example of the defendant being 

sentenced. This is especially relevant to white collar crime and tax offenses. See

U.S.S.G. chapter 2, part T, subpart 1, introductory comments (“Criminal tax 

prosecutions serve to punish the violator and promote respect for the tax laws. 

Because of the limited number of criminal tax prosecutions relative to the 

estimated incidence of such violations, deterring others from violating the tax laws 

is a primary consideration underlying these guidelines.”).

To be clear, the government is not urging this court to impose a sentence that 

is unnecessarily punitive. It is simply asking this court to take into account all 

 

 3 Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/26/business/global/26ihttax26.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print.

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relevant factors in fashioning that sentence, including society’s interest in both just 

punishment and general deterrence.

B. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense

A district court “shall consider — (1) the nature and circumstances of the 

offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The scheme in this case was elaborate. As this 

Court will recall, the defendants filed applications with the IRS to obtain Employer 

Identification Numbers (EINs) for their fictitious trusts. A Form 1041 had to 

contain an EIN to be processed by the IRS.

The defendants rented numerous post office boxes and a box at a UPS store 

to make their scheme work. The fictitious trusts needed addresses, and the income 

tax refund checks had to be delivered somewhere other than the defendants’ 

homes, for obvious reasons.

The defendants illegally obtained and used the names, addresses, Social 

Security numbers, and other personally identifiable information of many strangers 

whose PII and ID cards had been lost or stolen.

The defendants used check-cashing stores. And they opened bank accounts

and a brokerage account in the names of trusts with phony trust documents and 

used those accounts to convert the refund checks into cash.

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Finally, the defendants recruited and exploited a number of friends and 

acquaintances to abet the scheme.

******************

Defendant Sharon Gandy-Micheau participated in all aspects of the scheme. 

She was there at the beginning. The first two income tax refund checks were 

issued in 2010 and 2011 in the amounts of $71,800 and $50,300. They were made 

payable to the Moorish Republic Trust and mailed to a post office box in Oak Park 

rented by her and her husband, Durand Micheau. Each of the two refund checks 

was negotiated through a bank account in the name of the Moorish Republic Trust

that listed defendant and her husband as the trustees. Durand Micheau was listed 

as “Durand Micheau El” on the first account and as “Gamba Mwenye El” on the 

second.

Defendant deposited the $71,800 check into the first account in May 2010 

and immediately began making cash withdrawals. The entire amount was gone in 

a week. She deposited the $50,300 check into the second account in August 2011. 

Within a day she had withdrawn $6,000 in cash and no doubt would have 

withdrawn the remaining $44,300 had the bank not quickly frozen the account.

Defendant also rented three post office boxes that were used a number of 

times to further the conspiracy. One post office box was the address on the Sharon 

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Trust Fund income tax return and was where the corresponding refund check was 

delivered in July 2012. Defendant cashed that check, in the amount of $33,800, at 

a check-cashing store.

The same post office box was the address on the Derrick McCoy Trust 

income tax return and was where the corresponding refund check was delivered in 

December 2012. That check, in the amount of $39,200, was cashed at a checkcashing store by Derrick McCoy.

Another post office box rented by defendant was the address on the Brandi 

Shorter Trust income tax return. (No refund check was issued.) That post office 

box was also used on the IRS application form for an EIN (employer identification 

number) for the Bank of America Investment Trust.

The third post office box rented by defendant was the address on the 

Brandon Bradley Trust income tax return and was where the corresponding refund 

check was delivered in February 2013. That check, in the amount of $34,200, was 

cashed at a check cashing store by Brandon Bradley.

In February 2013, defendant accompanied Shanel Seay, a family friend, and 

assisted her when Seay opened a bank account in the name of the Deshawntia 

Moorer Trust. Both defendant did the talking and had the trust documents. The 

income tax refund check deposited into the new account was payable to the 

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Deshawntia Moorer Trust in the amount of $88,700. Seay made a number of cash 

withdrawals and cleaned out the account in a month.

Two months later defendant accompanied Seay again when Seay opened a 

bank account in the name of the Randi Hardy Trust. That account was used to 

facilitate the conversion of the refund check payable to the Randi Hardy Trust into 

cash. The amount of that check was $83,600. Seay managed to withdraw about 

$5,500 before the bank froze the account.

The last income tax return was filed in August 2013. That return, in the 

name of the Alania Curry Trust, used an address in Baltimore, Maryland, which 

was odd. It did not result in a refund check. But a copy of that return was found in

defendant’s house in Detroit, where Durand Micheau also resided, when a federal 

search warrant was executed there in November 2013.

In sum, defendant was deeply involved in the conspiracy in several 

important ways and from its beginning until its end.

C. Defendant’s History and Characteristics

A district court “shall consider — (1) . . . the history and characteristics of 

the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Defendant was born in Columbus, 

Mississippi, and is 46 years old. See PSR ¶ 50. She has 7 siblings. See PSR ¶ 52. 

She is separated from her husband, Durand Micheau, and has three adult children. 

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See PSR ¶¶ 54-55. She is currently residing with one of them, in Hazel Park. See

PSR ¶ 56.

Defendant has a high school education but apparently no diploma. See PSR 

¶ 69. However, she claims to have graduated, and the government does not contest 

that. The PSR says that defendant has been unemployed for the last 13 years. See

PSR ¶ 71.

The PSR also notes that defendant has taken pain medication and 

antidepressants in the past and continues to use pain medication. See PSR ¶¶ 61-

63, 66.

It is not clear to the government how defendant’s mother is doing. 

Defendant’s sentencing memorandum, filed under seal on or about November 27, 

2017, states that her mother recently suffered a stroke and that she is her mother’s 

principal caregiver. See Defendant Sharon Gandy-Micheau’s Sentencing 

Memorandum, Request for Variance, p. 7.

However, the government received an email on November 20, 2017, from 

Anthony Gandy’s attorney (Paul Stablein) relating that their mother was admitted 

to Sinai Grace Hospital on account of a recent stroke. The email also said that 

their mother had just been transferred to a skilled nursing facility in Southfield that 

provides both inpatient and outpatient care. And it added that Anthony Gandy 

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“has been making the decisions for her and is the primary contact for the facility.” 

Anthony “is her primary caregiver.”

The Court may want to inquire about defendant’s mother’s current physical 

condition and living arrangements at the sentencing hearing.

D. Unwarranted Disparity

A district court “shall consider — . . . (6) the need to avoid unwarranted 

sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found 

guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The Supreme Court has 

observed that in enacting the Sentencing Guidelines, “Congress ‘sought uniformity

in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed by different 

federal courts for similar criminal conduct[.]’” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 

349 (2007). Thus, the more a district court imposes a sentence in the 

neighborhood of the applicable guideline range (here, 63-78 months), the more it 

contributes to national uniformity. “[I]t is fair to assume that the Guidelines, 

insofar as practicable, reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might 

achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 350.

E. Restitution

In addition, a district court “shall consider — . . . (7) the need to provide 

restitution to any victims of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7). The probation 

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officer believes that the appropriate amount of restitution to be paid to the IRS is 

$360,469.05, PSR ¶ 88, and the government agrees. Although defendant’s 

financial condition is very weak, see PSR ¶¶ 72-73, an order of restitution is 

required by the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. In 

some cases, for any number of reasons, the collection of restitution pursuant to an 

order of restitution is problematic. But that is the government’s problem, not the 

Court’s. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(m)(1)(A). 

V. AGGRAVATED IDENTITY THEFT

Defendant was convicted of three counts of aggravated identity theft (Counts 

38, 40, and 41). The aggravated identity theft statute provides in relevant part:

(a) Offenses. –

(1) In general. – Whoever, during and in relation to any felony 

violation enumerated in subsection (c), knowingly transfers, 

possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of 

identification of another person shall, in addition to the 

punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of 

imprisonment of 2 years.

. . . .

(c) Definition. – For purposes of this section, the term “felony 

violation enumerated in subsection (c)” means any offense that is a 

felony violation of –

. . . .

(5) any provision contained in chapter 63 (relating to mail, 

bank, and wire fraud)[.]

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18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), (c). Chapter 63 of Title 18 includes two offenses that 

defendant was charged with and convicted of: mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341) and 

conspiracy to commit mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1349).

The statute goes on to state that the 2-year sentence is mandatory and must 

be consecutive to the underlying sentence:

(b) Consecutive sentence. – Notwithstanding any other 

provision of law –

(1) a court shall not place on probation any person convicted of 

a violation of this section;

(2) except as provided in paragraph (4), no term of 

imprisonment imposed on a person under this section shall run 

concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on 

the person under any other provision of law, including any term 

of imprisonment imposed for the felony during which the 

means of identification was transferred, possessed, or used;

(3) in determining any term of imprisonment to be imposed for 

the felony during which the means of identification was 

transferred, possessed, or used, a court shall not in any way 

reduce the term to be imposed for such crime so as to 

compensate for, or otherwise take into account, any separate 

term of imprisonment imposed or to be imposed for a violation 

of this section; and

(4) a term of imprisonment imposed on a person for a violation 

of this section may, in the discretion of the court, run 

concurrently, in whole or in part, only with another term of 

imprisonment that is imposed by the court at the same time on 

that person for an additional violation of this section, provided 

that such discretion shall be exercised in accordance with any 

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applicable guidelines and policy statements issued by the 

Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 of title 28.

18 U.S.C. § 1028A(b).

In Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017), in the course of 

interpreting the meaning of another criminal statute (using a gun during a crime of 

violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)), the Supreme Court noted the aggravated identity 

theft statute and made the following observations:

“Congress has shown that it knows how to direct sentencing practices 

in express terms.” Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 103, 128 

S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007). Congress has shown just that in 

another statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. That section, which criminalizes 

the commission of identity theft “during and in relation to” certain 

predicate felonies, imposes a mandatory minimum sentence “in 

addition to the punishment provided for” the underlying offense. § 

1028A(a)(1). It also says that the mandatory minimum must be 

consecutive to the sentence for the underlying offense. § 

1028A(b)(2). . . . But § 1028A goes further: It provides that in 

determining the appropriate length of imprisonment for the predicate 

felony “a court shall not in any way reduce the term to be imposed for 

such crime so as to compensate for, or otherwise take into account, 

any separate term of imprisonment imposed or to be imposed for a 

violation of this section.” § 1028A(b)(3).

137 S. Ct. at 1177.

In sum, this Court should impose a term of imprisonment based on 

defendant’s advisory guideline range of 63-78 months. Then it should impose a 

second term of imprisonment of two years, which must run consecutively to the 

first term of imprisonment.

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VI. PROPORTIONALITY

The basic objective of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984

was to enhance the ability of the criminal justice system to combat 

crime through an effective, fair sentencing system. To achieve this 

end, Congress first sought honesty in sentencing. . . . Second, 

Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing 

the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses 

committed by similar offenders. Third, Congress sought 

proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes 

appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing 

severity.

U.S.S.G. ch. 1, part A, subpart 1 (“3. The Basic Approach (Policy Statement)”).

In any given case, the principle of proportionality means that, all other 

things being equal, a more culpable defendant should receive a harsher sentence 

than a less culpable defendant. This principle is reflected throughout the 

Sentencing Guidelines, and it informs the appellate review of federal sentences as 

well. The Sixth Circuit has written, “A sentence is substantively reasonable ‘if it is 

proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances of the offense and offender, 

and sufficient but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of § 

3553(a).’” United States v. Moon, 808 F.3d 1085, 1090 (6th Cir. 2015) (citations 

omitted); see also United States v. Smith, 505 F.3d 464, 470 (6th Cir. 2007)

(“Modern-day sentencing should be guided by ‘the principle of proportionality, 

which requires sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the 

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seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender’” 

[citation omitted].).4

 As this Court may recall, Christopher Gandy’s advisory guideline range, 

not taking into account the mandatory consecutive two-year term, was 63-78 

months. This was based on a total offense level of 26 and a criminal history 

category of I. See PSR ¶ 85 (C. Gandy). This Court sentenced him to 48 months’ 

imprisonment, and it also imposed the mandatory consecutive 24-month sentence 

 

 4 One section 3553(a) factor involves “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 

disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of 

similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). This addresses the related but different 

issue of sentence uniformity, as opposed to sentence proportionality. “Subsection 

3553(a)(6) is concerned with national disparities among the many defendants with 

similar criminal backgrounds convicted of similar criminal conduct. It is not 

concerned with disparities between one individual’s sentence and another 

individual’s sentence, despite the fact that the two are co-defendants.” United 

States v. Simmons, 501 F.3d 620, 623 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

Still, section 3553(a)(6) does nothing to undercut the overarching 

proportionality principle. “A district judge . . . may exercise his or her discretion 

and determine a defendant’s sentence in light of a co-defendant’s sentence.” Id. at

624; accord United States v. Mahbub, 818 F.3d 213, 233 (6th Cir. 2016). “If the 

district court does so and wishes to keep sentences among the defendants relatively 

fair, it is hard to believe that it could be wrong, let alone plainly wrong, to use 

proportions in doing so.” United States v. Mullet, 822 F.3d 842, 853 (6th Cir. 

2016).

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required by the aggravated identity theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. Thus, 

Christopher Gandy’s total term of imprisonment was 72 months.

Anthony Gandy’s advisory guideline range, not taking into account the 

mandatory consecutive two-year term, was 92-115 months. This was based on a 

total offense level of 26 and a criminal history category of IV. See PSR ¶ 83 (A. 

Gandy). Yesterday this Court sentenced him to 56 months’ imprisonment, and it 

also imposed the mandatory consecutive 24-month sentence required by the 

aggravated identity theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. Thus, Anthony Gandy’s total 

term of imprisonment was 80 months.

Defendant Sharon Micheau-Gandy’s advisory guideline range is the same as 

Christopher Gandy’s, 63-78 months, based on a total offense level of 26 and a 

criminal history category of I. See PSR ¶ 76.

A reasonably proportional sentence for Sharon Gandy-Micheau would be the 

sentence imposed on Christopher, 72 months. The government does not believe 

their overall criminal culpability differs in any material way. And while their 

personal circumstances are different, the government is not persuaded at this time 

that any of defendant’s circumstances indicate that she should receive a lighter 

sentence than her brother Christopher received. 

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VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, taking into account all of the section 

3553(a) factors, the government requests this Court to find that defendant’s 

advisory Sentencing Guidelines range is 63-78 months and to impose a combined 

term of imprisonment of no less than 72 months. In addition, the government 

requests this Court to impose a three-year term of supervised release and order 

defendant to pay restitution to the IRS in the amount of $360,469.05, jointly and 

severally with her codefendants.

Respectfully submitted,

MATTHEW SCHNEIDER

United States Attorney

s/Stephen L. Hiyama 

STEPHEN L. HIYAMA

Assistant United States Attorney

211 West Fort Street, Suite 2001

Detroit, Michigan 48226-3220

phone: 313-226-9674

e-mail: stephen.hiyama@usdoj.gov

Date: January 24, 2018 bar no.: P32236

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, No. 15-CR-20338

-vs- U.S. District Judge Judith E. Levy

D-2 SHARON GANDY-MICHEAU,

Defendant.

 /

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on January 24, 2018, I electronically filed the Government’s

Sentencing Memorandum with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system, which 

will send notification of such filing to the following ECF participant(s): Alvin 

Sallen.

s/Stephen L. Hiyama 

STEPHEN L. HIYAMA 

Assistant United States Attorney

211 West Fort Street, Suite 2001

Detroit, Michigan 48226-3220

phone: 313-226-9674

e-mail: stephen.hiyama@usdoj.gov

Date: January 24, 2018 bar no.: P32236

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