United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

December 1997 NATIONAL MISSILE

DEFENSE

Schedule and Technical

Risks Represent

Significant

Development

Challenges

GAO/NSIAD-98-28

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-275013 

December 12, 1997

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Jeff Bingaman

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

In response to your request, we are providing an initial assessment of the

technical and schedule risks associated with the National Missile Defense

(NMD) program. The Department of Defense (DOD) has indicated that it

intends to ask for $2.3 billion more for this program but has not released

final plans showing how it intends to use the additional funds. The

information provided in this letter is necessarily limited to the NMD

acquisition strategy formally defined and approved by DOD as of

September 19, 1997. Although changes are expected when final plans are

released, the information in this letter should be a useful point of

reference from which to analyze those new plans. We will continue to

obtain information on these risks and other issues you asked us to

examine.

Background While the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) had been

developing and maturing technologies for use in an NMD system for a

number of years, in October 1996 it began developing a specific NMD

system to provide protection against limited ballistic missile attacks

targeted at the United States. Its mission is to detect, identify, engage,

intercept, and destroy threatening ballistic missiles prior to their impact

on any of the 50 states. The program focuses on the development of a

system that could support a deployment readiness review in fiscal year

2000. The review would determine whether the initial system has been

adequately demonstrated and if the existing threat justifies deployment of

an initial capability by fiscal year 2003. This plan is commonly referred to

as the “3+3” program. Figure 1 shows the program schedule, assuming a

decision in fiscal year 2000 to deploy the system.

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Figure 1: NMD Program Schedule

Deployment

Readiness Review

(system deployment

decision)

Start date for the

development of 

the 3+3 Program

Prime Contract

Award

Integrated System

Test

Initial Operational

Capability

Task name 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

While DOD is still determining the specific design of the initial NMD system,

its features will include (1) space-based and ground-based sensors to

provide early warning of attacking missiles; (2) ground-based radars to

identify and track the threatening warheads; (3) ground-based interceptors

to collide with and destroy incoming warheads; and (4) a battle

management, command, control, and communications system. The NMD

system architecture would evolve over time through incorporation of

advanced element technologies to defend against more sophisticated

threats. For example, the Space and Missile Tracking System, a

space-based sensor constellation of infrared tracking and discrimination

satellites providing early-trajectory capabilities, will be added to the

system at a later time.

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Results in Brief DOD faces significant challenges in the NMD program because of high

schedule and technical risks. Schedule risk is high because the schedule

requires a large number of activities to be completed in a relatively short

amount of time. The sequential nature of key development activities—such

as not being able to proceed in earnest until a prime NMD contractor is

selected in the spring of 1998—magnifies time pressures. Furthermore,

developing and deploying an NMD system in the 6 years allotted under the

3+3 program will be a significant challenge for DOD given its past history

with other weapon systems. For example, NMD’s acquisition schedule is

about one-half as long as that of the only other U.S.-based ballistic missile

defense system. DOD acknowledges the high schedule risk.

Technical risks are high because the compressed development schedule

only allows limited testing. The NMD acquisition strategy calls for

conducting (1) one system test prior to the initial system deployment

decision—a test that would not include all system elements or involve

stressing conditions such as threats employing sophisticated

countermeasures or multiple warheads—and (2) one test of the integrated

ground-based interceptor before production of the interceptor’s booster

element must begin. If subsequent tests reveal problems, costly redesign

or modification of already produced hardware may be required.

Compressed NMD

Schedule Presents

Challenges

Under the formally defined acquisition strategy, a large number of

activities need to be completed in a relatively short time frame, and recent

slips in program events have increased the program’s schedule risk. DOD

and BMDO officials have acknowledged the high schedule risk. According to

testimony by the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and

Technology, the program’s schedule will remain high risk despite planned

funding increases recommended by the recent Quadrennial Defense

Review (QDR). DOD does not yet have a firm plan for how the additional

funds will be used. Developing the NMD system will present DOD with

significant challenges. The NMD schedule is shorter than most other major

system acquisition programs.

Many Activities Must Be

Accomplished in Short

Time Frame

Even though the NMD development program officially began in

October 1996, many development activities cannot proceed in earnest until

BMDO selects a firm to serve as the prime contractor for the system. This

underlines the sequential nature of many planned development activities.

BMDO does not expect to complete this selection process until the spring of

1998. Then, the final design process cannot begin until the selected prime

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
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contractor has time to examine and analyze the requirements and

architectures. For example, one of the prime contractor’s responsibilities

will be to develop and procure one or more radars for the system. There

are two radar candidates, and until the prime contractor has had time to

examine them, analyze their performance in selected settings and

architectures, and make a selection of one or more of the candidates, the

radar procurement process cannot begin. Similarly, the acquisition of the

booster for the ground-based interceptor cannot begin until the prime

contractor has assessed the alternatives, which include developing a new

booster, using an existing booster, or modifying an existing design to meet

the NMD requirements.

Furthermore, a number of activities are dependent on the final system

design. For example, after the design is determined, sites will have to be

selected. DOD will have to obtain land, build or modify facilities, and

conduct environmental impact studies. According to a preliminary analysis

by the NMD system engineering contractor,1

 the ability to (1) construct and

install radars and interceptor communication sites in the 3-year

deployment window; (2) obtain easements, land, and rights-of-way for

sites; and (3) conduct environmental impact studies by 2003 will present a

significant challenge.

Recent Delays Have

Increased Schedule Risk

Recent delays have increased schedule risk. Since the 3+3 program was

approved, BMDO has experienced a 7-month delay in establishing the joint

program office to manage the acquisition and a 6-month delay in awarding

concept definition contracts leading to the selection of a prime contractor.

Also, a sensor flight-test failure resulted in a 6-month testing delay.2

According to the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and

Technology, these slips have increased the schedule risk.

Schedule Risk Will Remain

High Despite Funding

Increases

DOD officials have acknowledged the high risk involved in the schedule. In

order to help maintain the fiscal year 2003 deployment option, the

Department’s recent QDR recommended significant increases in program

funding through fiscal year 2000. The QDR was commissioned to provide a

comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force structure, force

modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of

1

The system engineering contractor is responsible for helping the NMD project office generate, verify,

and validate requirements while the prime contractor will be responsible for designing, developing,

integrating, and testing the NMD system.

2

This test was rescheduled and flown in June 1997, and according to BMDO, the test was successful.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
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the defense program and policies. It considered three alternatives for

dealing with the future of the NMD program. Two of the alternatives would

have slipped the earliest possible schedule for system deployment to a

date later than fiscal year 2003. The alternative selected in the QDR is

predicated on adding an estimated $2.3 billion to the program in fiscal 

year 1998 through fiscal year 2003, while retaining the potential

deployment of the system in fiscal year 2003. However, according to the

former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, the

additional funding will not reduce the high schedule risk inherent in the

program. DOD does not yet have a firm plan for how the additional funds

will be used.

Acquisition Schedule Is

Shorter Than Most Other

Major Systems

The acquisition schedule is about one-half as long as the Safeguard’s—the

only other U.S.-based ballistic missile defense system.3

 The NMD schedule

is also shorter than schedules projected for acquisition of most other U.S.

missile defense programs. For example, the Theater High Altitude Area

Defense program is currently projected to require 13 years to reach its first

unit-equipped milestone. The Patriot PAC-3 system is projected to take 

5 years from the beginning of engineering and manufacturing development

to reach the first unit-equipped date, even though it is only a modification

to an existing air defense system.

The NMD acquisition schedule is also shorter than the average time

projected to acquire and field 59 other major weapon systems that we

examined.4

 These are the programs for which DOD had Selected

Acquisition Reports in December 1996. These systems are projected to

take an average of just under 10 years from the beginning of their

development until they reach an initial operating capability date. The

estimated fielding times for the 59 programs ranged from 5 years to 

19 years. (See app. I.)

3

Development of Safeguard system components began in 1963 and the system’s single site at Grand

Forks, North Dakota, achieved full operational capability in 1975. The program was terminated in 1976.

4

We reviewed all of the December 31, 1996, Selected Acquisition Reports for systems that contained

both (1) an acquisition milestone I date (approval to begin developing a new system) or a milestone II

date (approval to begin engineering and manufacturing development) and (2) an initial operating

capability date. We measured the time estimated from either milestones I or II to the initial operating

capability date for the 59 programs that met that criteria. The mean time between these milestones

was 9.9 years. The median was 9.1 years.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
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Limited Testing

Planned Before

Possible Deployment

Decision in Fiscal

Year 2000

Because of the compressed development schedule, only a limited amount

of flight test data will be available for the system deployment decision in

fiscal year 2000. By that time, BMDO will have conducted only one

system-level flight test, and that test may not include all system elements

or involve stressing conditions such as targets that employ sophisticated

countermeasures or multiple warheads. As a result, not all technical

issues, such as discrimination,5

 will be resolved by the time of the

deployment review. Also, the current schedule will permit only a single

test of the integrated ground-based interceptor before production of the

interceptor’s booster element6

 must begin. If subsequent tests reveal

problems, costly redesign or modification of already produced hardware

may be required.

Few Flight Tests Prior to

Deployment Decision

The current development schedule provides for only three flight intercept

tests prior to the fiscal year 2000 deployment decision. Only one of these

will be an integrated system test, and that test will not be comprehensive

because it will not include all system elements. If the test fails, the

deployment review would be left with only ground test data and

partial-system flight data when considering the deployment option. This

presents a high performance and schedule risk to the program. According

to BMDO, the lack of back-up test hardware is a primary contributor to

program risk. For example, this lack of a back-up target caused the

6-month delay in rescheduling the sensor flight test after the January 1997

test failure.

Additionally, the single integrated system test planned prior to the fiscal

year 2000 deployment review will not assess the NMD system’s capabilities

against stressing threats such as those that use sophisticated

countermeasures or multiple warheads. The test is to be conducted

against a single target with only simple countermeasures such as decoys.

No test against multiple warheads is planned.

The integrated system test, as currently planned, will not include all

elements of the planned system. For example, the current plan is to use a

payload launch vehicle rather than the actual ground-based interceptor

booster because, according to NMD program officials, it will probably not

5

Discrimination is the system’s ability to distinguish between warheads and other, nonthreatening

objects such as decoys and debris that may be present and detected by radars and other sensors.

6

The ground-based interceptor will consist of a booster and an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle. The

booster is to propel the kill vehicle to a point in space near the attacking warhead. The kill vehicle is to

locate, identify, and collide with the attacking warhead.

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
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be available in time for the test. A lack of flight test data on the booster

before the deployment review could impact the credibility of the

interceptor’s performance evaluation as well as the overall system

assessment. According to the NMD program’s system engineering

contractor, there is a high risk that the evaluation of the NMD capability will

be incomplete or not representative of the true system capability. DOD

acknowledged the testing limitations and they were highlighted in the

program’s own risk assessment.

Some Technical Issues Will

Not Be Resolved in Tests

There are a number of technical concerns that will not be resolved by the

time of the potential fiscal year 2000 deployment decision. For example,

DOD still has not shown that the type of interceptors planned for the

system—hit-to-kill interceptors—can provide a reliable defense under

stressing conditions. To date, there have been very few tests of hit-to-kill

interceptors and even fewer successful intercepts. Of the 20 intercept

attempts since the early 1980s, only 6, or about 30 percent, have been

successful. While these intercepts provide proof of the principle of

hit-to-kill intercept, they do not demonstrate that the concept can be

employed reliably or under stressing conditions.

Also, according to the system engineering contractor, the test program will

not test system-level discrimination capabilities sufficiently to ensure that

requirements can be met. The accurate discrimination of incoming threat

objects from nonthreatening objects such as decoys and debris that may

be present is vital to the system’s ability to successfully defend the United

States from an attack. Without discrimination, too many interceptors may

be wasted on nonthreatening objects and attacking warheads could escape

identification. To perform the discrimination task, data from a number of

different types of sensors—both internal and external to the system—will

have to be obtained, correlated, associated, or fused by the battle

management, command, control, and communications system. According

to the system engineering contractor, NMD system discrimination

requirements will exceed previous experience and a number of concerns

exist. These include concerns about the development and validation of

algorithms for (1) optical and infrared sensor discrimination, (2) fusing

data from sensors of different technologies, and (3) resolving any

differences or ambiguities between radar and optical data.

Limited Number of

Interceptor Tests

Represents Risk

The tentative schedule for the ground-based interceptor shows that

full-scale production would need to start by January 2000 to achieve an

initial operating capability by 2003. To meet this schedule, DOD would have

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
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to award the contract for interceptor production after only one flight test

of the combined booster and its designated kill vehicle. If subsequent tests

reveal problems, the design may have to be revised and costly,

time-consuming changes made.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred that the NMD

program faces significant challenges because of high schedule and

technical risk. It also stated that the report is generally accurate, but

provided some clarifying comments on the program’s status, comparison

of certain flight tests, and impact of testing and test hardware on risk.

DOD’s comments and our evaluation are presented in appendix II. DOD also

provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

Scope and

Methodology

To assess the NMD program’s schedule and technical risks, we reviewed

available program plans, test plans, milestone schedules, requirements

documents, and management reports. To determine the level of risk and

major factors contributing to it, we analyzed the program’s status, strategy

for accomplishing the remaining development work and meeting fielding

requirements, and approaches to demonstrating the system’s capabilities

and military suitability. We also discussed schedule and technical risks

and plans for mitigating them with officials at the Ballistic Missile Defense

Office, Washington, D.C.; the Office of the Director, Operational Test and

Evaluation, Alexandria, Virginia; and the Army NMD Project Office,

Huntsville, Alabama. To provide a basis for comparison with the NMD

program schedule, we obtained schedule data for 59 other major

acquisition programs from DOD’s Selected Acquisition Reports.

We conducted our work from September 1996 through September 1997 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents

earliler, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its

issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to other

interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the

Directors of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the Office of

Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others

upon request.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
B-275013 

If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please contact

me at (202) 512-4841. The major contributors to this report were 

Lee Edwards, Bobby Hall, and Tom Hopp.

Allen Li

Associate Director

Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
Appendix I 

Time Required to Develop and Field Major

Systems

System Begin development

Initial operational

capability

Elapsed time

(years)

Program 1a b a 7

Joint Direct Attack Munition for F/A-18 Oct. 1993 Sept. 1999 6

Brilliant Anti-Tank Feb. 1985 Nov. 1999 15

Army Tactical Missile System Block II May 1995b Mar. 2004 9

Program 3a c a 8

Longbow Apache-Airframe Modifications Aug. 1985 Oct. 1998 13

Sense and Destroy Armor Mar. 1988b July 1999 11

Javelin May 1986 Oct. 1996 10

Comanche Program June 1988 July 2006 18

Program 4a c a 8

Program 5a b a 7

F-22 Oct. 1986 Nov. 2004 18

Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile Nov. 1978 Sept. 1991 13

Navy EHF SATCOM Program Jan. 1982b Apr. 1994 12

DDG-51 Guided Missile Destroyer June 1981 Feb. 1993 12

New SSN/New Attack Submarine Aug. 1994 Oct. 2005 11

High Speed Nuclear Attack Submarine Dec. 1983 May 1997 13

Trident II Missile Oct. 1977 Mar. 1990 12

Airborne Warning and Control System Radar System Improvement Dec. 1988b Dec. 1999 11

Joint Stars Sept. 1985b Sept. 1997 12

Minuteman III Guidance Replacement Program Aug. 1993 Jan. 2000 6

Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program June 1994b Jan. 2002 8

Program 7 a b a 11

Abrams Tank Upgrade Feb. 1985b Feb. 1993 8

Army Tactical Missile System-Antipersonnel/Antimateriel Warhead Feb. 1986b Aug. 1990 5

Longbow Hellfire Aug. 1985 July 1998 13

Cooperative Engagement Capability May 1995b July 2000 5

Hawkeye (mission computer upgrade only) Sept. 1994b June 1999 5

LHD1 Amphibious Assault Ship Oct. 1981 Nov. 1990 9

Program 8a c a 11

MIDS-LVT Dec. 1993b Apr. 2000 6

Multi-Mission Helicopter Upgrade (SH-60R) July 1993b Oct. 2002 9

Tomahawk Improvement Program (RGM-109) Sept. 1994b Aug. 2000 6

Marine Corps H-1 Upgrade Program Oct. 1996b June 2005 9

Jet Flight Training System Sept. 1984 Apr. 1993 9

Strategic Sealift Aug. 1992 Jan. 1998 5

Coastal Minehunter Ship (MHC-51) June 1986 Sept. 1996 10

(continued)

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
Appendix I 

Time Required to Develop and Field Major

Systems

System Begin development

Initial operational

capability

Elapsed time

(years)

F/A-18E/F Naval Strike Fighter (Hornet) May 1992b Sept. 2000 8

Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft Dec. 1982 July 2001 19

AOE6 Class Fast Combat Support Ship July 1982 June 1995 13

Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Mar. 1995 June 2006 11

B-1B Mission Upgrade Program-Computer Apr. 1993 Dec. 2001 9

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System May 1984 Jan. 1997 13

Crusader Field Artillery System Nov. 1994 June 2006 12

Combat Service Support System Version 3 Dec. 1990 Oct. 1997 7

Forward Area Air Defense Command, Control, and Intelligence July 1986b Sept. 1994 8

Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles May 1987 Jan. 1996 9

Airborne Laser Nov. 1996 Sept. 2006 10

Milstar Satellite June 1983 June 1997 14

Joint Service Imagery Processing System July 1986 Dec. 1994 8

Bradley Fighting Vehicle Upgrade Jan. 1994 Aug. 2000 7

Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System Feb. 1976 Dec. 1990 15

C-17 Globemaster III Feb. 1985b Jan. 1995 10

Joint Primary Aircraft Training System Jan. 1993 Aug. 2001 9

Program 9a b a 8

Program 10a b a 11

All Source Analysis System Sept. 1993b Dec. 1999 6

B-1 Conventional Mission Upgrade Program—Joint Direct Attack Munition Apr. 1993 Dec. 1998 6

National Airspace System—Air Traffic Control July 1992 Apr. 2000 8

Average 9.9

aInitial operational capability dates for these systems are classified. To avoid classification,

system name and milestone dates are not shown.

bDate reflects beginning of milestone II (approval to enter engineering and manufacturing

development) because these systems began in that phase.

cDate reflects beginning of milestone I (approval to begin development of a new program)

because these systems began in that phase.

Source: DOD Selected Acquisition Reports, December 31, 1996.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 4.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on DOD’s letter dated November 14,

1997.

GAO Comments 1. As requested, we focused on the program’s schedule and technical risk.

However, we revised the text to show that a lengthy period of technology

development preceded the specific program’s initiation in October 1996

and that successful testing has occurred. Even though DOD has built

structural facilities for the prototype radar and is on track to meet

established ground and flight tests, the program’s schedule and technical

risks remain high, as DOD itself acknowledges.

2. We do not state that the risk from limited flight testing was not known

when the program was initiated or that officials did not know at that time

that the flight tests would be constrained by range safety and other

considerations. Even though known, the test limitations significantly

increase the level of technical risk. We clarified the text to show that DOD

acknowledges these limitations and that they were highlighted in the

program’s own risk assessment.

3. We agree that the testing programs are not directly comparable and

revised the text to delete the comparison. The point we were making is

that because of the constrained schedule, the amount of flight testing is

less than would normally be expected. This point remains valid.

4. We added information to show that the lack of back-up hardware

contributes to program risk and that the lack of a back-up target caused

the 6-month delay in rescheduling the sensor flight test.

(707208) Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-28 National Missile Defense Risks
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