Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Readiness and Management 

Support, Committee on Armed 

Services, U.S. Senate 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

April 2001 DEFENSE LOGISTICS 

Unfinished Actions 

Limit Reliability of the 

Munition Requirements 

Determination Process 

GAO-01-18 
Page i GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

Letter 1

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 16 

Appendix II Related DOD Inspector General and General 

Accounting Office Reports 17 

Appendix III Comments From the Department of Defense 19 

Appendix IV GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgment 21 

Contents 
Page 1 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

April 5, 2001 

The Honorable James M. Inhofe 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness 

 and Management Support 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The military services’ budget for conventional munitions1

 is about 

$4.2 billion in fiscal year 2001 and is projected to increase annually until 

fiscal year 2005 when the budget is expected to be about $5.4 billion. To 

determine the number and type of munitions needed, the services annually 

evaluate their munition requirements using a multiphase analytical 

process. The accuracy of this process is critical as its outcome defines the 

numbers and types of munitions necessary to defeat potential threats; 

affects munitions planning, programming, and budgeting decisions; and 

influences industrial production base decisions. Since 1994, the 

Department of Defense Inspector General has issued 17 reports and we 

have issued 3 reports identifying weaknesses and expressing concerns 

about the accuracy of the process used by the Department of Defense to 

determine these requirements. The Department of Defense has 

acknowledged the weaknesses and is working to achieve a more accurate 

process for determining these requirements. 

As requested, we assessed the Department of Defense’s progress in 

improving the requirement determination process. Specifically, this report 

addresses (1) the extent to which actions have been taken to improve the 

process and (2) those areas where additional actions are needed. The 

scope and methodology of our work are described in appendix I. This is 

the second in a series of reports that addresses ammunition management 

issues.2

 1

 Conventional munitions are nonnuclear ammunition or ordnance, including rockets, 

missiles projectiles, and bombs required by a given force structure to neutralize a threat. 

2 Defense Management: Army Could Achieve Efficiencies by Consolidating Ammunition 

Management (GAO/NSIAD-99-230, Sept. 30, 1999). 

United States General Accounting Office 

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

The Department of Defense is improving the munition procurement 

requirement determination process. Improvements are being implemented 

to correct weaknesses in the process that could result in over or 

understated requirements. Improvements include coordinating the threat 

assessment, updating projections about the amount of time it would take a 

potential enemy to repair and return damaged targets to the battlefield and 

damage assessments for input into the services’ battle simulation models, 

modifying the target allocation process, and making a more 

comprehensive risk assessment—all important components of the 

requirement determination process. 

Notwithstanding the above improvements, uncertainties remain about the 

process’s reliability because of actions to be completed and other issues 

that are still under deliberation. The Department has yet to complete a 

database providing detailed descriptions of the types of targets on large 

enemy installations that would likely be encountered based on warfighting 

scenarios; information the services and warfighting Commanders in Chief3

also need in order to make accurate munitions decisions. And although the 

Department has provided $34 million to update its munitions effectiveness 

database, it has not set a time frame for completing the update. Finally, the 

Department is debating whether (1) to include greater specificity in its 

warfighting scenarios and (2) to rate the warfighting scenarios by the 

probability of their occurrence.4

 These process components significantly 

affect the numbers and types of munitions needed to meet the warfighting 

Commanders in Chief’s objectives. Until the Department completes all of 

these improvements and fully incorporates them into the requirement 

determination process, concerns about the reliability of the process will 

remain and could adversely affect munitions planning, programming, 

budgeting, and industrial production base decisions. 

This report recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics take the 

lead in establishing a plan for resolving the outstanding issues. Such a plan 

should include time frames for resolving the outstanding issues, metrics 

 3

 The Commander in Chief is the senior U.S. military officer of the Unified Combatant 

Command. The Unified Combatant Command is composed of forces from two or more 

military services, has broad and continuing missions, and is normally organized on a 

geographical basis. There are currently nine Unified Combatant Commands. 

4

 These scenarios present conditions that may exist during the conduct of two major 

theaters of war. 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

for measuring progress, and milestones for implementing the proposed 

changes. The Department concurred with the report and outlined actions 

it has underway addressing all aspects of the report’s recommendations. 

The military services annually determine their current and future munition 

procurement requirements in accordance with the Defense Planning 

Guidance.5

 Historically, the Defense Planning Guidance has directed the 

military services to arm a given force structure to win two nearly 

simultaneous major theaters of war. In recent years, the Department of 

Defense has engaged in a number of military operations that vary in size 

and circumstance from a major theater of war; consequently, the current 

National Military Strategy6

 and the Defense Planning Guidance call for the 

services to prepare for a number of small-scale contingency 7

 operations in 

addition to the two major theaters of war. 

The conditions under which small-scale operations are fought may differ 

from conditions in a major theater war, which may increase the services’

requirements for highly technical precision munitions8

 designed to limit 

loss of life and expensive military assets. The increased use of precision 

munitions in recent conflicts reduced inventories and raised questions 

about whether adequate attention had been paid to the impact of smallscale contingencies on the ability of U.S. forces to respond and sustain 

operations for the two major theaters of war. Of the approximately 

$4.2 billion of munitions the services are planning to procure in fiscal year 

2001, 46 percent (or $1.9 billion) will be used to procure precision 

munitions designed to reduce the number of conventional munitions 

 5

 The Secretary of Defense and his staff prepare the Defense Planning Guidance, issue 

policy, and articulate strategic objectives that reflect the National Military Strategy. It 

includes the Secretary of Defense’s force and resource guidance to the military 

departments, other combat support agencies and the unified commands. 

6

 The National Military Strategy provides the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces over the next 3 to 5 years. 

7

 Small-scale contingencies include, among other operations, peacekeeping operations, 

humanitarian relief and evacuations, monitoring and enforcing cease-fires, and other 

arrangements designed to separate parties recently in conflict. 

8

 Precision munitions refer both to guided and smart munitions. Guided munitions are 

one-on-one munitions-one munition for one target-that are guided to their target through a 

targeted acquisition sensor or laser designation system. Smart munitions are “fire and 

forget” and have an autonomous capability to search, detect, classify, select, and engage 

targets with a lethal mechanism. 

Background 
Page 4 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

needed to defeat enemy targets while at the same time limiting loss of 

expensive weapons systems and life. By fiscal year 2005, the services are 

planning to increase their procurement of precision guided munitions by 

about 5 percent. 

In 1994, to generate consistent munition requirements Department-wide, 

and to ensure that the military services have both an adequate supply and 

the appropriate types of munitions to address changing mission needs, the 

Department of Defense standardized the process by which the services 

determine their munition requirements. In 1997, the Department of 

Defense issued Instruction 3000.4, which sets forth policies, roles and 

responsibilities, time frames, and procedures to guide the services as they 

develop their munition requirements. This instruction is referred to as the 

Capabilities-Based Munitions Requirements process and is the 

responsibility of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics. 

The instruction describes a multiphased analytical process that begins 

when the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy develops, in consultation 

with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military services, and 

the warfighting Commanders in Chief, policy on munition requirements for 

the Defense Planning Guidance. The Defense Intelligence Agency uses the 

Defense Planning Guidance and its accompanying warfighting scenarios as 

well as other intelligence information to develop a threat assessment. This 

assessment contains estimates and facts about the potential threats that 

the United States and allied forces could expect to meet for each of the 

two major theaters of war scenarios. The warfighting Commanders in 

Chief, responsible for the major theaters of war scenarios, in coordination 

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, use the threat assessment to allocate each 

service a share of the identified targets by phases of the war. 

Next, the services develop their combat requirements using battle 

simulation models and scenarios to determine the number and mix of 

munitions needed to meet the Commanders in Chief’s objectives 

separately by each major theater of war scenario. To develop these 

requirements, the services draw upon and integrate data and assumptions 

from the Defense Planning Guidance requirements, warfighting scenarios, 

and target allocations, as well as estimates of repair and return rates for 

enemy targets and projected assessments of damage to enemy targets and 

installations. Other munition requirements include munitions (1) needed 

for forces not committed to support combat operations, (2) to provide a 

post-major theater of war combat capability, and (3) to train the force, 

Requirements Process 
Page 5 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

support service programs, and peacetime requirements. These 

requirements, in addition to the combat requirement, comprise the 

services’ total munitions requirement. The total munitions requirement is 

then balanced along with projected inventory and affordability to 

determine how many of each munition the services will procure within 

their specified funding limits and used to develop the services’ Program 

Objectives Memorandum9 and Presidential budget submission. 

Despite Department efforts to standardize the process and generate 

consistent requirements, many questions have been raised about the 

accuracy or reliability of the requirements determination process. 

Between the Department of Defense Inspector General and our agency, 20 

reports have been issued that state that systemic problems — such as 

questionable and inconsistently applied data, inconsistency of processes 

among and between services, and unclear guidance — have inflated the 

services’ requirements for certain categories of munitions. A list of these 

reports is included in appendix II. The Department acknowledged these 

weaknesses and recognized that inflated requirements can negatively 

affect munitions planning, programming, and budget decisions, as well as 

assessments of the size and composition of the industrial production base. 

As a result, the Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 2000-2005, 

dated April 1998, directed that a Capabilities-Based Munitions 

Requirements working group10 develop recommendations to improve the 

accuracy of the process. In October 1998, the group recommended several 

corrective actions to address weaknesses identified by both the Inspector 

General and our agency. 

 9

 A Program Objectives Memorandum details the specific forces and programs that the 

service proposes over the 6 year Future Years Defense Plan period to meet the military 

requirements identified in the planning guidance within the financial limits that are 

mandated by the Secretary of Defense. 

10 Representatives from the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation, the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense for Policy and Requirements and Plans, the Joint Staff, the Combatant 

Commands, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the military services make up the 

Capabilities-Based Munitions Requirements working group. 

Prior Audits Note 

Problems 
Page 6 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

Based on the recommendations of the Capabilities-Based Munitions 

Requirements working group, the Department has improved several key 

components of the requirements determination process. Process 

improvements include Department-wide coordination of the threat 

assessment, updated projections as to the amount of time it takes a 

potential enemy to repair and return damaged targets to the battlefield and 

target damage assessments, modifications to the target allocation process, 

and a risk assessment that includes the impact of small-scale contingency 

operations. The Department expects these improvements to correct 

weaknesses in the process that can result in over- or understated munition 

requirements. 

The Defense Intelligence Agency develops an annual threat assessment 

that identifies potential threats that the United States and allied forces 

could expect to meet for each of the two major theaters of war scenarios. 

The Capabilities-Based Munitions Requirements instruction directs that 

the Commanders in Chief and the Joint Chiefs of Staff use the threat 

assessment to allocate targets to each of the services. The Department has 

identified weaknesses in this area and taken steps to strengthen this 

assessment. 

Defense Intelligence Agency officials stated that in the past, the services 

could, based on input from their own intelligence sources or direction 

from the warfighting Commanders in Chief, develop an independent threat 

analysis that could result in the services planning to destroy the same 

targets and, consequently, overstating munitions requirements. To resolve 

this issue, the working group directed that the Defense Intelligence 

Agency fully coordinate the threat assessment with the services and 

throughout the Defense intelligence communities. In accordance with this 

directive, the Defense Intelligence Agency coordinated the most recent 

threat assessment that describes the threat for the fiscal year 2002-2007 

planning cycle. By adopting a coordinated threat assessment, the 

Department expects to be better able to ensure that the services’ munition 

requirements will be more accurate. 

Actions Being Taken 

to Improve the 

Process 

Coordinated Threat 

Assessment 

• Coordinated threat assessment 

• Revised repair rates for damaged targets and target damage 

assessments 

• Modified the target allocation process 

• Revised risk assessments 
Page 7 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

Repair rates are a projection of the amount of time it takes a potential 

enemy to repair and return a target to the battlefield and determine the 

number of attacks needed to destroy a target, which directly influences 

munition quantities. Since the services use these rates as input into their 

warfighting simulation models to determine their munition requirements, 

these rates should be current and reflect a country’s existing repair 

capability. In response to a Department of Defense Inspector General 

review of this process, the Department has taken steps to address the 

quality of its data on projected repair rates. 

A Department of Defense Inspector General audit11 of service 

requirements for specific categories of munitions reported that the 

services used repair rates that overstated the requirement for these 

munitions. According to an official from the Joint Staff, the services were 

using repair rates for countries from the Cold War era that were able to 

repair and return damaged property to the battle more quickly than could 

countries used in today’s war planning scenarios. To address this issue, in 

December 1999, the Defense Intelligence Agency updated and 

standardized the repair rates the services used in their battle simulation 

models, and the Department expects these actions will address the issue 

of overstated requirements. 

Battle damage assessments are more critical to munitions requirement 

planning with the increased use of precision guided munitions and 

changes in warfighting. Previously, munitions were fired from a range that 

allowed a visual damage assessment, but precision guided munitions are 

often fired miles from the target, which eliminates the ability to visually 

assess whether the target has been damaged or destroyed. Knowing in 

advance the probability that a specific munition will destroy the target is 

necessary to accurately determine the number and mix of munitions that 

will be required. 

To improve battle damage assessments, the Defense Intelligence Agency 

developed battle damage assessment factors that measure (1) whether a 

target was hit, (2) the extent of the damage, and (3) whether the objective 

was met. These factors are more predictive if the munition has a guidance 

system that provides damage information to the launch site. According to 

a Navy official, using the newly developed battle damage assessment 

 11 Summary of the DOD Process for Developing Quantitative Munitions Requirements, 

Department of Defense Inspector General, Feb. 24, 2000. 

Revised Repair Rates and 

Assessments 
Page 8 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

factors for the fiscal year 2002-2007 requirements planning cycle 

significantly reduced the requirement for certain categories of naval 

munitions. According to an official from the Joint Staff, these assessments 

have also reduced the potential for overstated munition requirements for 

the services’ air components. 

Allocating targets to the services is one of the most critical steps in the 

requirement determination process as it defines the services’ role in the 

war fight and determines the number and type of munitions for which the 

services need to plan. In accordance with the Capabilities-Based 

Munitions Requirements instruction, the warfighting Commanders in Chief 

are required to allocate targets to the services for their area of 

responsibility. This is an area that has proven problematic in reaching an 

agreement among the services, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided 

direction to strengthen the process. 

In response to a Department of Defense Inspector General audit12 critical 

of the Central Command’s allocation process, a 1999 pilot project was 

initiated that transferred the U.S. Central Command’s target allocation role 

to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who, in coordination with the services, 

developed a methodology to allocate targets. According to officials at the 

Joint Staff and the Central Command, the methodology was intended to 

better align the Commanders in Chief’s near-term objectives (which 

generally cover a 2-year period) and the services’ long-term planning 

horizon (which is generally 6 years). Another benefit of the pilot was that 

the Joint Staff could validate the services’ munition requirements by 

matching requirements to target allocations. 

The Army, the Navy, and a warfighting Commander in Chief objected to 

the pilot’s results and criticized the methodology used to allocate the 

targets because it allocated significantly more targets to the Air Force and 

fewer targets to the Army. Army officials objected that the methodology 

did not adequately address land warfare, which is significantly different 

than air warfare.13 The Navy did not concur with the results, citing the lack 

 12 Threat Distributions for Requirements Planning at U.S. Central Command and U.S. 

Forces Korea, Department of Defense Inspector General, May 20, 1998. 

13 The Army’s position was that unlike the air services that plan munition requirements to 

destroy assigned targets, assigning specific targets to a land battle is meaningless as the 

number of targets destroyed may not be an accurate measure of a successful operation. 

Specifically, in a land battle, circumventing the enemy or surrounding them and cutting off 

their supply lines may meet the Commander in Chief’s operational plan. 

Improved Target 

Allocation Process 
Page 9 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

of recognition for the advanced capabilities of future munitions. U. S. 

Central Command officials disagreed with the results, stating that a 

change in methodology should not in and of itself cause the allocation to 

shift. In July 2000, citing substantial concerns about the pilot, the Under 

Secretary of Defense, Acquisition and Technology suspended the target 

allocation for fiscal year 2000 and directed that the services use the same 

allocations applied to the fiscal year 2002-2007 Program Objectives 

Memorandum. 

In August 2000, the Joint Chiefs of Staff structurally changed the threat 

allocation process to address the services’ and the warfighting 

Commander in Chief’s objections. The warfighting Commanders in Chief 

will now prepare a near-term target allocation using a methodology 

developed by the Joint Chiefs. Each warfighting Commander in Chief will 

develop two allocations—one for strike (air services) forces and one for 

engagement (land troops) forces for his area of responsibility. The first 

will allocate specific targets to strike forces under the assumption that the 

air services can eliminate the majority of enemy targets. The second 

allocation will assume that less than perfect conditions exist (such as bad 

weather), which will limit the air services’ ability to destroy their assigned 

targets and require that the engagement force complete the mission. The 

Commanders in Chief will not assign specific targets to the engagement 

forces, but they will estimate the size of the expected remaining enemy 

land force. The Army and the Marines will then be expected to arm 

themselves to defeat those enemy forces. The Joint Staff will use the 

Commanders in Chief’s near-year threat distribution and extrapolate that 

information to the last year of the Program Objectives Memorandum for 

the purpose of the services’ munitions requirement planning. The 

Department expects that these modifications should correct over- or 

understated requirements and bridge the gap between the warfighting 

Commanders in Chief’s near-term interest and objectives and the services’

longer planning horizon. 

Until recently, the Department lacked an assessment of the impact of 

small-scale contingencies on munition requirements, and uncertainties 

existed regarding the impact on service abilities to meet the requirements 

of the two major theaters of war. However, the Department has taken 

action to better address this issue. 

Department Is Making Its 

Risk Assessment More 

Comprehensive 
Page 10 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

In October 1999, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council14 directed that 

the Joint Staff coordinate an assessment of the risk associated with 

current and projected munition inventories available for two major 

theaters of war and inventories depleted by a challenging sequence of 

small-scale contingency operations. According to an official from the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, the increased use of precision guided munitions during the 

contingency operation in Kosovo15 prompted several Department studies 

that addressed whether the military services have sufficient munitions to 

fulfill the two major theaters of war requirement. However, initial studies 

focused on the difference between the services’ two theaters of war 

requirement and the actual number of munitions procured, but did not 

demonstrate the impact of shortfalls of specific munitions on the services 

ability to respond to two major theaters of war. 

The assessment, completed in April 2000, which focused on inventories of 

precision guided munitions, concluded that small-scale contingencies 

would have a negligible impact on the Commanders in Chief’s ability to 

meet the two major theaters of war requirement. An official from the Joint 

Staff stated that the study’s conclusion was based on the assumption that 

in a major theater war, precision guided munitions might be used during 

the early phases of the war for critical targets and then other, less accurate 

munitions could be substituted. However, according to an Air Force 

official, the assessment did show that small-scale contingency operations 

negatively affect inventories of some precision munitions, which may limit 

the Commanders in Chief’s flexibility in conducting two major theater 

wars. Department officials added that the assessment should give the 

services information they need to plan for inventories of specific 

munitions that would be affected more than others during contingency 

operations. 

The Department is incorporating the actions that have been taken to 

improve the process into a revised Capabilities-Based Munitions 

 14 The Joint Requirements Oversight Council was formed over a decade ago to make 

decisions about what mix of weapons is required to meet future threats and to ensure 

against program duplication by the services. The Council is composed of the Vice 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Vice Chief of Staff, 

U.S. Air Force; the Vice Chief of Naval Operations; and the Assistant Commandant, U.S. 

Marine Corps. 

15 While Kosovo is characterized as a contingency operation, Air Force officials have stated 

that Kosovo stressed Air Force resources, based on the number of missions flown, much 

like a major theater of war. 
Page 11 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

Requirements instruction that it expects to issue in the spring 2001 and to 

be used to determine the services’ fiscal year 2004-2009 requirements. 

Notwithstanding the corrective actions the Department has taken or has 

underway to improve the process, other key components have either not 

been completed or not been decided upon. The Department has not 

completed a database listing detailed target characteristics for large 

enemy installations based on warfighting scenarios and has not developed 

new munitions effectiveness data to address deficiencies the services and 

the Commanders in Chief have identified. Completion dates for these tasks 

have been exceeded or not established. Additionally, the Department has 

not determined whether to create more detailed warfighting scenarios in 

the Defense Planning Guidance or to rate scenarios in terms of their 

probability. Such an action could increase reliability of the requirement 

determination process and ensure consistency in the services’ analyses in 

support of their requirements. The Department is in the process of 

incorporating the completed actions into a revised Capabilities-Based 

Munitions Requirements instruction to be issued in the spring 2001 and 

used by the services to determine their fiscal year 2004-2009 munitions 

procurement requirements. However, the Department has no clear plan of 

action for resolving these issues or a time frame for their completion. Until 

the remaining tasks are completed and incorporated into the process, 

questions are likely to remain regarding the accuracy of the munition 

requirements process as well as the Department’s ability to identify 

munitions most appropriate to defeat potential threats. 

According to Department officials, the Department lacks a common 

picture of the number and types of targets on large enemy installations as 

identified in the warfighting scenarios and as a result, the services have 

been identifying targets on enemy installations differently. According to an 

official from the Joint Staff, the Department has been concerned that this 

lack of common target characteristics could over- or understate 

requirements for certain munition categories. To resolve this issue, the 

Joint Chiefs instructed the Defense Intelligence Agency, in coordination 

with the warfighting Commanders in Chief, to develop target templates 

Unresolved Issues 

Affect Reliability of 

Munition 

Requirements Process 

List of Targets Is Overdue 

• List of targets 

• Munitions effectiveness data 

• Warfighting scenarios 
Page 12 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

that would provide a common picture of the types of potential targets on 

enemy installations. According to Defense Intelligence Agency officials, 

the services and the Commanders in Chief could also use this information 

to attack these targets with munitions that would minimize damage to the 

installation, reduce reconstruction costs after a conflict, and allow U.S. 

forces to use it if needed. An official from the Joint Staff stated that while 

the Defense Intelligence Agency was to complete the target templates by 

August 31, 2000, it has yet to do so and a specific completion date has not 

been established. 

How effective a munition is against a target can predict the number of 

munitions necessary to defeat it. According to an official at the Office of 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 

funding to maintain the manual containing this information has historically 

been limited. The Department recognizes that munitions effectiveness data 

is a critical component for requirements planning and that outdated 

information could over- or understate munition requirements. To address 

this shortfall, the Department provided $34 million in fiscal year 2001 to 

update and publish munitions effectiveness data for use by the services in 

their battle simulation models. At the time of our review, the Department 

did not know when this project would be completed. 

The Defense Planning Guidance contains an appendix of warfighting 

scenarios that detail conditions that may exist during the conduct of the 

two major theaters of war; these scenarios are developed with input from 

several sources, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Joint Staff, 

and the services. This appendix provides a common base line from which 

the services determine their munition requirements. However, according 

to several Department officials, the warfighting scenarios in the Defense 

Planning Guidance need to include more detail. Specifically, these officials 

stated that information about the potential constraints under which the 

war will be fought and casualty and asset loss guidance can affect the 

types and numbers of munitions the services plan to procure. Some 

Department officials stated that the Defense Planning Guidance used to 

contain specifics on the conduct of the war fight; however, when the 

Department adopted the Capabilities-Based Munitions Requirements 

instruction, the detail was eliminated in favor of broader guidance. 

Conversely, other Department officials disagree with the need for 

increased guidance. According to an official from the Office of Secretary 

of Defense, Requirements and Plans, additional guidance and specificity is 

Munitions Effectiveness 

Data Not Yet Updated 

Department Undecided on 

Specificity Needed in 

Warfighting Scenarios 
Page 13 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

not necessary because the services should use the scenarios in the 

Defense Planning Guidance to plan their force structure rather than their 

munition requirements. Some Air Force and Army officials agree, stating 

that the Defense Planning Guidance provides sufficient guidance for 

munition planning for the mandatory two major theaters of war scenarios. 

The chief of the Army Combat Support War Reserve Branch suggested that 

specific guidance would only be necessary if the Army was required to 

plan for small-scale contingencies with restrictions on the conduct of the 

war fight. However, according to some Department officials, while the 

Defense Planning Guidance provides the services a basis for their force 

structure, it is also an integral part of the requirements determination 

process. From this vantage point, Department officials suggest that if 

small-scale contingency operations are becoming a part of an overall 

military strategy then the Defense Planning Guidance should reflect this by 

incorporating more detailed guidance on the conduct of such operations. 

By providing additional guidance on the conduct of the war fight, such as 

limiting loss of weapon systems and lives, the services would be better 

able to plan their munition requirements to ensure the stated conditions 

were met. 

In addition to lacking sufficient specificity on warfighting scenarios, the 

Defense Planning Guidance does not rank the scenarios by the probability 

of their occurrence. In 1998, we reported that the services were using the 

warfighting scenario that supported additional requirements for specific 

munitions. In addition, the requirement for a specific Army munition was 

inflated partly because the Army disregarded the Defense Planning 

Guidance scenarios and instead used two scenarios it had developed 

independently. Consequently, the requirement for the munition was tripled 

and the Army’s justification for the requirement was inconsistent with the 

Commanders in Chief’s objectives and the Army’s doctrine. 

To ensure that the services plan for the most likely scenario in the Defense 

Planning Guidance and not use unlikely events to support certain 

munitions, the Capabilities-Based Munitions Requirements working group 

requested that the Defense Intelligence Agency develop probability factors 

for the various warfighting scenarios. While the Defense Intelligence 

Agency has developed these factors, at the time of our review, the 

Department was still debating whether to prioritize the scenarios. 

The Department is working to ensure that the requirements determination 

process results in accurate numbers and types of munitions necessary to 

defeat threats as specified in the Defense Planning Guidance. While the 

Conclusion 
Page 14 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

Department has made progress and has identified specific areas still 

requiring attention, there is no clear plan with time frames for resolving 

key issues. Some of these issues have only been partially completed and 

others are in the early stages of evolution. Specifically, target templates 

have not been completed and munitions effectiveness data has not been 

updated, nor have decisions been made regarding more detailed 

warfighting scenarios and the ranking of scenarios. Consequently, the 

reliability of the services’ munitions requirements remain uncertain and 

could adversely affect munitions planning, programming, budgeting, and 

industrial production base decisions. Until these issues are resolved and a 

revised Capabilities-Based Management Requirements instruction is 

issued, the accuracy of the munitions requirements will remain uncertain. 

To ensure that additional actions are taken to improve the munitions 

requirements determination process we recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics to take the lead in establishing a plan for resolving 

outstanding issues. Such a plan should include time frames for resolving 

the outstanding issues, metrics for measuring progress, and milestones for 

implementing the proposed changes. Specific areas needing attention 

include 

• completing target templates, 

• publishing the updated munitions effectiveness data, 

• resolving the issues involving the level of detail to include in the Defense 

Planning Guidance and whether to attach probability data to the 

warfighting scenarios, 

• incorporating all improvements to the munitions requirement process in a 

revised Capabilities-Based Munitions Requirements instruction, and 

• establishing a time frame for reassessing munitions requirements once all 

improvements have been implemented. 

The Director of Strategic and Tactical Systems in the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics provided 

written comments to our report, which are included in appendix III. The 

Department concurred with the report and outlined actions underway 

addressing all aspects of the report’s recommendations such as resolving 

the issues involving the level of detail to include in the Defense Planning 

Guidance and whether to attach probability data to the warfighting 

scenarios, incorporating all improvements to the munitions requirement 

process in a revised Capabilities-Based Munitions Requirements 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 15 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

instruction, and establishing a time frame for reassessing munitions 

requirements once all improvements have been made. The Department 

also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as 

appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees; the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; the 

Acting Secretary of the Army, Joseph W. Westphal; the Acting Secretary of 

the Air Force, Lawrence J. Delaney; the Acting Secretary of the Navy, 

Robert B. Pirie, Jr.; the Director, Office and Management and Budget, 

Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.; and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 

Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-8412 if you or your staff has any questions 

concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours, 

Barry W. Holman, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 16 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

To assess the extent to which actions have been taken to improve the 

munition requirements determination process, we reviewed the 

Department’s Instruction 3000.4, Capabilities-Based Munitions 

Requirements to ascertain roles and oversight responsibilities and to 

identify required inputs into the process. We reviewed the Defense 

Planning Guidance for fiscal years 2000-2005 and the update for fiscal 

years 2001-2005 to determine what instruction the Department provided to 

guide the services as they determine their munition requirements. To 

identify factors that affect the accuracy of the requirements determination 

process, we reviewed 20 Department of Defense Inspector General and 

GAO reports relating to the Department’s munitions requirements 

determination process. We also reviewed the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council memorandums to determine the focus of the Joint 

Staff’s study on the impact of small-scale contingency operations on 

inventories of specific munitions. We met with service officials to 

determine how each service develops its munition requirements and 

obtained data on the assumptions and inputs that go into its simulation 

models. We also obtained information on how each service reviews the 

outcome of its munitions requirement process. In addition, we obtained 

information on the Commanders in Chief’s Operating Plan, Integrated 

Priority List, and other planning data necessary to assist the services with 

their requirements planning. 

To address those areas needing additional action, we met with Department 

and service officials to obtain their views on the impact of how the 

unresolved issues could affect the accuracy of the requirements 

determination process. In addition, we obtained documentation pertaining 

to the areas still needing action. We met with senior officials and 

performed work at the Offices of Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.; 

the Joint Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C.; and the Defense Intelligence 

Agency, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C. We also interviewed 

senior officials from Army Combat Support War Reserve Branch, 

Washington D.C.; Navy Requirements Planning, Naval Air Acquisition 

Program, and Naval Surface Fire Support, Washington, D.C.; Air Force 

Munitions Requirements Weapons Division, Crystal City, Virginia; U.S. 

Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii; U.S. Central Command, McDill Air 

Force Base, Tampa, Florida; and U.S. Force Korea, Seoul, Korea. We 

performed our review from December 1999 through November 2000 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix II: Related DOD Inspector General 

and General Accounting Office Reports 

Page 17 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

Summary of the DOD Process for Developing Quantitative Munitions 

Requirements, Department of Defense Inspector General, Feb. 24, 2000. 

Air Force Munitions Requirements, Department of Defense Inspector 

General, Sept. 3, 1999.

Defense Acquisitions: Reduced Threat Not Reflected in Antiarmor 

Weapon Acquisitions (GAO/NSIAD-99-105, July 22, 1999). 

U. S. Special Operations Command Munitions Requirements, 

Department of Defense Inspector General, May 10, 1999. 

Marine Corps Quantitative Munitions Requirements Process, 

Department of Defense Inspector General, Dec. 10, 1998.

Weapons Acquisitions: Guided Weapon Plans Need to be Reassessed 

(GAO/NSIAD-99-32, Dec. 9, 1998). 

Navy Quantitative Requirements for Munitions, Department of Defense 

Inspector General, Dec. 3, 1998.

Army Quantitative Requirements for Munitions, Department of Defense 

Inspector General, June 26, 1998.

Management Oversight of the Capabilities-Based Munitions 

Requirements Process, Department of Defense Inspector General, June 22, 

1998.

Threat Distributions for Requirements Planning at U.S. Central 

Command and U.S. Forces Korea, Department of Defense Inspector 

General, May 20, 1998. 

Army’s and Marine Corps’ Quantitative Requirements for Blocks I and 

II Stinger Missiles, Department of Defense Inspector General, June 25, 

1996.

U.S. Combat Air Power – Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction 

Capabilities Could Save Billions, Department of Defense Inspector 

General, May 13, 1996.

Summary Report on the Audits of the Anti-Armor Weapon System and 

Associated Munitions, Department of Defense Inspector General, 

June 29, 1995.

Appendix II: Related DOD Inspector General 

and General Accounting Office Reports 
Appendix II: Related DOD Inspector General 

and General Accounting Office Reports 

Page 18 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

Weapons Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions in Inventory, 

Production, and Development (GAO/NSIAD-95-95, June 23, 1995).

Acquisition Objectives for Antisubmarine Munitions and Requirements 

for Shallow Water Oceanography, Department of Defense Inspector 

General, May 15, 1995. 

Army’s Processes for Determining Quantitative Requirements for 

Anti-Armor Systems and Munitions, Department of Defense Inspector 

General, March 29, 1995. 

The Marine Corps’ Process for Determining Quantitative Requirements 

for Anti-Armor Munitions for Ground Forces, Department of Defense 

Inspector General, Oct. 24, 1994.

The Navy’s Process for Determining Quantitative Requirements for 

Anti-Armor Munitions, Department of Defense Inspector General, 

Oct. 11, 1994.

The Air Force’s Process for Determining Quantitative Requirements for 

Anti-Armor Munitions, Department of Defense Inspector General, 

June 17, 1994.

Coordination of Quantitative Requirements for Anti-Armor Munitions, 

Department of Defense Inspector General, June 14, 1994.
Appendix III: Comments From the 

Department of Defense 

Page 19 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

Appendix III: Comments From the 

Department of Defense 
Appendix III: Comments From the 

Department of Defense 

Page 20 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and 

Staff Acknowledgment 

Page 21 GAO-01-18 Defense Logistics 

Ronald Berteotti (214) 777-5702 

Patricia J. Nichol (214) 777-5665 

In addition to those named above, Patricia Sari-Spear made key 

contributions to this report. 

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgment 

GAO Contacts 

Acknowledgment 

(709458) 

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