[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13899

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DIANELIS MOLINA NODA, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20087-CMA-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13899

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Dianelis Molina Noda (“Noda”) for

defrauding her former employer, Greentree, Inc., by diverting 

payroll direct deposits issued in the name of former Greentree 

employees into her personal bank accounts. She received a 70-

month total sentence for five counts of wire fraud, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1343, and two counts of aggravated identity theft, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). She now appeals, alleging 

three enumerations of error. First, she argues that the district court 

violated her Sixth Amendment right to confront her accusers when 

it permitted COVID-19-positive witness Christopher Martin to 

testify by video. Second, Noda contends that the district court 

abused its discretion when it denied her COVID-19-based 

continuance requests, which she alleges led to the violation of her 

confrontation rights. Third, she maintains that her sentence is 

substantively unreasonable. Because Noda is not entitled to relief 

on any of her claims, we affirm her convictions and sentence. 

I. Background 

A. Procedural History 

A grand jury indicted Noda with five counts of wire fraud, 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Counts 1 through 5), and two 

counts of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1028A(a)(1) (Counts 6 and 7). 

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At a status conference in June 2021,1 Noda requested an 

August 2021 trial date, in part because she was pregnant and an 

August trial would not interfere with the birth of her child, who 

was due in late September 2021. The district court set trial for the 

two-week trial period beginning on August 16, and informed the 

parties that pretrial motions were due by July 12, 2021. On July 22, 

Noda moved to continue the trial, requesting a 30-day continuance 

“to allow sufficient time for defense counsel to fully review the 

discovery provided and allow defense counsel to fully investigate 

any other circumstances of the case.” The district court denied the 

motion, explaining that the motion had failed to show good cause 

for an additional extension. On August 6, Noda filed a “Notice of 

Trial Conflict,” informing the district court that her counsel had 

another trial scheduled to begin the same day as Noda’s trial. In 

response, the district court reset the trial date for August 23. 

During a calendar call hearing four days later, Noda again 

requested a continuance. As relevant to this appeal, she argued 

that a continuance was necessary because it was “too much of a 

risk to put a pregnant woman on trial” given the COVID-19 surge 

in Miami-Dade County. Noda acknowledged that, despite the 

pandemic, she was working in person at a law office in Miami at 

the time. The district court denied Noda’s continuance request 

1 Noda’s trial was initially set to begin in March 2021. A date was set for a 

change-of-plea hearing three times before Noda informed the district court 

that she would not be changing her not guilty plea. 

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13899

again, explaining that COVID-19 safety protocols would be in 

place, including face mask and social distancing requirements. The 

district court also reset trial for August 19. 

On August 13, Noda filed a motion requesting a 90-day 

continuance, again citing the risk of COVID-19 infection and 

illness. The district court denied the motion, explaining that the 

trial was expected to last only four days, that safety procedures like 

masking and social distancing were in place, and that the trial 

would occur in a courtroom retrofitted with COVID-19 safety 

measures. That same day, Noda moved to compel negative 

COVID-19 tests for all witnesses and trial participants, to be taken 

within 48 hours of their anticipated presence inside the courtroom. 

The district court denied the motion. 

Three days later, Noda filed motions for clarification 

regarding the district court’s COVID-19 safety protocols. The 

motions also sought to discover the vaccination status of 

government witnesses and to preclude unvaccinated witnesses 

from testifying, among other voir dire and COVID-19-related 

requests. The district court denied all Noda’s motions. The next 

day, Noda filed another COVID-19-related continuance motion, 

requesting a trial date in early November 2021. The district court 

struck this motion as unauthorized and untimely, noting that the 

motion was “repetitive of earlier [m]otions, disrespectful to the 

Court, and filled with histrionics.” The district court explained:

Defendant ultimately seeks to persuade the Court to 

postpone the trial in this case until the COVID-19 

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21-13899 Opinion of the Court 5

pandemic concludes. This, the Court will not do, 

particularly when several jury trials have already been 

safely conducted in this District, following a process 

designed to bring in a fair cross-section of the 

community. While the Court is mindful of 

Defendant’s concerns, numerous safety measures 

have been implemented, including mandatory 

temperature checks upon entrance to the courthouse, 

required masking and social distancing, plexiglass and 

glass dividers throughout the courtroom, the 

placement of three Intellipure air purifiers with UV 

lights inside the courtroom, the periodic cleaning of 

surfaces during trial, and the use of disposable 

microphone covers. Defendant and her counsel have 

made no effort to visit and examine the retrofitted 

courtroom where a safe, socially distanced trial will 

be conducted, despite the Court’s invitation they do 

so; in contrast, the prosecutors have visited that 

courtroom to familiarize themselves with the setting 

and its safety features.

Trial began a few days later. 

B. Factual Background

During a four-day jury trial, the government presented 

testimony from eleven witnesses. The testimony established that 

Noda worked in the office of Greentree, Inc.—a landscape 

maintenance company in south Florida—and that Noda was 

responsible for processing payroll. Noda input the hours that each 

employee worked on a weekly basis, entered each employee’s bank 

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6 Opinion of the Court 21-13899

account information into the payroll system, and updated the 

system if an employee quit. Greentree also kept physical personnel 

files with current and former employees’ personal identifying 

information, date of hiring, and date of termination. Because of 

her job duties related to payroll, Noda had access to these files. 

In March 2019, while Noda was absent from work, another 

employee who was sorting the payroll checks discovered pay stubs 

for former employees who no longer worked at Greentree. The 

bank account listed for these former employees was the same bank 

account that Noda used to receive her personal paycheck. 

Research into the matter revealed that, starting in August 2018, 

numerous ex-employees had received paychecks after they had 

been terminated and that these paychecks had been deposited into 

Noda’s bank accounts.2 Neither Greentree nor the former 

employees authorized these deposits, and they did not give Noda 

permission to use the employees’ personal identifying information. 

An FBI forensic accountant testified that, in February 2019 

alone, Noda received deposits from Greentree totaling more than 

her annual salary.3 And Noda’s spending habits reflected her 

2 Ultimately, the investigation revealed that 20 former employees’ identities 

were used to initiate around 300 direct deposits into Noda’s bank accounts 

between August 2018 and March 2019. In total, a little over $200,000 was 

withdrawn from Greentree’s bank account as a result of the transactions. 

3 Noda’s annual salary was $29,000. 

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21-13899 Opinion of the Court 7

increased income—from August 2018 to March 2019, Noda spent 

more than $178,000. 

As relevant to the issues on appeal, on the second day of 

trial, which fell on a Friday, Christopher Martin, an investigative 

security agent with Greentree’s payroll company, ADP, testified. 

He explained that ADP processed multiple direct deposit checks 

that went into a bank account in Noda’s name. 

The third day of trial was a Monday. That morning, Noda’s 

counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis that the government had 

withheld exculpatory evidence. Noda’s counsel explained that, 

over the weekend, the government told him that it had evidence 

of an online chat thread exchanged between ADP and a Greentree

employee named “Cristi” on November 28, 2018. The 

government explained that it just learned of these communications

from Martin, who had testified on Friday, and offered to recall him 

as a witness. The district court denied the motion for mistrial. The 

government then alerted the court that Martin had tested positive 

for COVID-19 over the weekend. In response to the suggestion 

that Martin testify by video, Noda’s counsel made a Sixth 

Amendment Confrontation Clause objection. After hearing from 

the parties, the district court overruled Noda’s objection, reasoning

that Noda’s “confrontation rights [would] not be[] violated” by 

Martin’s appearance by video “in light of [his] COVID positive 

status” and “because he ha[d] previously testified . . . in open court 

in the presence of [Noda].” 

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Martin then testified by video about the chat messages that 

occurred between someone at Greentree and an ADP 

representative on November 28, 2018. In the exchange, a person 

using the Greentree account—which appears under the username 

“Cristi”—asked an ADP representative if some of the Greentree 

employees could receive their pay stubs in an electronic, paperless

format.4 The ADP representative responded that, “[t]he only way 

to do this . . . [was to] make all pay stubs available online.” “Cristi,” 

the Greentree user, responded and stated that she wanted this 

paperless option for only certain employees. After the ADP 

representative replied, “[t]here is no way to only do this for specific 

employees, I apologize,” the Greentree user wrote back, “Okay. 

Thanks anyway,” and left the chat. Noda’s counsel then conducted 

cross-examination. 

At the end of trial, the jury found Noda guilty on all counts. 

Before Noda’s sentencing, a probation officer submitted a 

presentence investigation report (“PSI”), which calculated Noda’s 

advisory guidelines range as 61 to 70 months’ imprisonment.5 In 

4 Martin explained that the Greentree username appeared as “Cristi” on the 

chat function because that was the name listed as the user agent and owner of 

the Greentree account. Accordingly, there was no way to know who was 

actually writing the messages. 

5 Noda’s advisory guidelines range for Counts 1–5 was 37 to 46 months’ 

imprisonment and Counts 6 and 7 carried a mandatory consecutive term of 24 

months’ imprisonment, which resulted in a final advisory guidelines range of 

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21-13899 Opinion of the Court 9

her sentencing memorandum, Noda argued that “a guideline 

prison sentence is the appropriate sentence” and that an upward 

variance was not warranted. She also argued that a sentence 

between 61 and 70 months “would be sufficient taking into account 

the sentencing factors under § 3553(a).” 

At the sentencing hearing, after resolving Noda’s objections

to the PSI, the district court agreed with the PSI’s calculation of the 

guidelines range. The government requested a total sentence of 

five and a half years (or 66 months). Noda argued that “[t]his is not 

a case that deserves anything above the guidelines” and that the 

district court should not consider an upward variance. Noda’s 

counsel stated: 

[Sixty-six] months, I think as the Government has 

asked for, that would be a reasonable sentence. 

[Seventy] months is the top of the guidelines. I’ve 

advised my client that there’s a high likelihood she 

might get 70 months. But I don’t think anything 

more than that is deserved. This is not a case that falls 

outside of the normal fraud.

Noda again reiterated that “under the [§] 3553(a) factors, we 

believe a guideline sentence is appropriate in this case” and that 

Noda was “asking for a guideline sentence.” 

61 to 70 months’ imprisonment. She faced a statutory maximum term of 20 

years’ imprisonment. 

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Ultimately, the district court sentenced Noda to 70 months’ 

imprisonment to be followed by three years’ supervised release. It 

explained that a sentence at the top end of the guidelines range was 

appropriate in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. In particular, 

the court emphasized the “shocking” nature and circumstances of 

the offense and Noda’s continued failure to accept responsibility at 

sentencing. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion 

A. Whether Noda’s Sixth Amendment Right was violated 

Noda argues that the district court erred by allowing Martin 

to be recalled as a witness and testify by video over Noda’s 

Confrontation Clause objection. 

“[W]e review de novo [a defendant’s] claim that [her] Sixth 

Amendment rights were violated.” United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 

1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc).

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause “guarantees 

the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to be confronted 

with the witnesses against him.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 

673, 678 (1986) (quotations omitted). In general, this clause 

“guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses 

appearing before the trier of fact.” Yates, 438 F.3d at 1312

(quotations omitted).

The harmless error doctrine applies to violations of the 

Confrontation Clause. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684. When 

determining whether a Confrontation Clause error is harmless, we 

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21-13899 Opinion of the Court 11

analyze several factors, including: (1) “the importance of the 

witness[’s] testimony in the prosecution’s case”; (2) “whether the 

testimony was cumulative”; (3) “the presence or absence of 

evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the 

witness on material points”; (4) “the extent of cross-examination 

otherwise permitted”; and (5) “the overall strength of the 

prosecution’s case.” Id. 

Here, even assuming that the district court erred by 

permitting Martin to testify by video, such error was harmless. 

Noda protests that the admission of Martin’s video testimony was 

not harmless because the “government needed to prove that [] 

Noda was in the office on . . . November 28, 2018,” because it was 

a Thursday—the day payroll was processed. She contends that her 

absence from work on November 28, 2018, could mean that “the 

fraud would have been discovered much earlier, or could have 

involved another party.”6 

Turning to the Van Arsdall factors, Martin’s video testimony 

was undisputed, cumulative, and of minimal value to the 

prosecution’s robust case against Noda. Indeed, Noda admits as 

much on appeal. In her brief, Noda states that “the government 

6 Noda’s presence or absence in the office on November 28, 2018, is irrelevant 

to Noda’s ultimate guilt for the crimes for which she was charged. Noda 

provides no argument or explanation about how her absence on that day 

would be exculpatory. And even if her absence meant that her fraud would 

have been discovered earlier or suggested that she had an accomplice—as she

argues—those facts do not negate Noda’s culpability.

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12 Opinion of the Court 21-13899

did not have a true ‘need’ for [Martin’s] testimony, because it was 

clear that other witnesses could have offered the same evidence.” 

Noda also states that “there is no indication that [Martin] had any 

unique, specialized knowledge or expertise about the evidence.” 

Additionally, Noda was permitted to cross-examine Martin at 

length. Considering the government’s robust case against Noda—

which included testimony from numerous witnesses that Noda 

alone was responsible for payroll, that paychecks in the names of

former employees were deposited into Noda’s bank accounts, and 

that Noda spent significantly more than her annual salary during 

the relevant time period—we conclude that any error in permitting 

Martin to testify by video was harmless. 

B. Whether the district court abused its discretion by 

denying Noda’s request for continuances

Noda explains that the basis for each of her motions for

continuance “was the ongoing COVID pandemic and the fact that 

[she] was pregnant and not vaccinated.” She argues that she was 

prejudiced by the district court’s refusal to grant her motions for a 

continuance of trial because it resulted in a violation of her Sixth 

Amendment right to confront her accuser when Martin was 

permitted to testify by video on the third day of trial due to his 

COVID-19 positive status, as discussed above. 

“Trial courts are afforded ‘great latitude’ with respect to 

scheduling, and judges enjoy ‘broad discretion’ in ruling on 

motions for continuances.” United States v. Pendergrass, 995 F.3d 

858, 870 (11th Cir. 2021). Consequently, “[w]e review for abuse of 

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discretion a district court’s denial of a motion to continue trial, and 

the denial of such a request does not rise to error unless it is 

arbitrary and unreasonable and severely prejudices the moving 

party.” Id. (quotations omitted).

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 

denied Noda’s continuance requests because those denials did not 

prejudice her. As discussed above, even if the district court erred 

by allowing Martin to testify by video, such error was harmless. 

Thus, in the absence of any showing of prejudice to Noda, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion by denying her motions 

for continuance. Id. 

C. Whether Noda’s sentence is substantively reasonable

Noda argues that the district court’s sentence of 70 months’ 

imprisonment was substantively unreasonable considering the 

circumstances of this case and her personal history and 

characteristics. 

We review a sentence for substantive reasonableness under 

a deferential abuse of discretion standard, asking whether a 

sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the 

circumstances. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 52 (2007). 

The district court must issue a sentence that is “sufficient, but not 

greater than necessary” to comply with the purposes of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(2), which include the need for a sentence to reflect the 

seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just 

punishment, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from 

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14 Opinion of the Court 21-13899

future criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court must also 

consider the “nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant,” and “the need to 

avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with 

similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” Id.

§ 3553(a)(1), (6). Importantly, the weight given to a particular 

§ 3553(a) factor “is committed to the sound discretion of the district 

court,” and the district court is not required to give “equal weight” 

to the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 

1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted). 

The burden rests on the party challenging the sentence to 

show “that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the entire 

record, the § 3553(a) factors, and the substantial deference afforded 

sentencing courts.” Id. We will “vacate the sentence if, but only 

if, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district 

court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the 

§ 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range 

of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United 

States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) 

(quotations omitted). 

Noda failed to show that the district court abused its 

discretion in imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence. The 

district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and explained why a 

sentence at the top of the guidelines range was appropriate given 

the “shocking” nature of the offense and the fact that Noda 

continued not to accept responsibility or show any remorse at the 

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21-13899 Opinion of the Court 15

sentencing stage.7 Although she quarrels with the way that the 

district court weighed the various factors, the weight to be 

accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the 

sound discretion of the district court. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 

1254 (quotations omitted).

Moreover, Noda’s total 70-month sentence is within the 

applicable guidelines range and is below the statutory maximum of 

20 years’ imprisonment, which are both indicators of 

reasonableness. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 

2008) (“Although we do not automatically presume a sentence 

within the guidelines range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect 

[such a sentence] . . . to be reasonable.” (alteration adopted and 

quotations omitted)); United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 

1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a sentence that is below the 

statutory maximum is another indicator of reasonableness). 

7 Although Noda argues that the district court penalized her for exercising her 

right to trial, her argument is not supported by the record. At sentencing, it is 

true that the district court commented that Noda’s case was “very unusual” 

because she made the government prove its case at trial even though “the 

evidence was so overwhelming” and even at sentencing she “still [did] not 

accept responsibility for her theft and her identity theft.” However, the district 

court then explained that a sentence at the top of the guidelines range was 

warranted based on the nature and circumstances of the offenses and Noda’s 

failure to accept responsibility even after being confronted with the 

overwhelming evidence and her lack of remorse—“personal characteristics 

that cr[ied] out” for a top of the guidelines sentence. Thus, contrary to Noda’s 

argument, the district court did not improperly base her sentence on the fact 

that she went to trial.

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16 Opinion of the Court 21-13899

Accordingly, we conclude that her sentence is substantively 

reasonable. 

III. Conclusion 

Because Noda is not entitled to relief on any of her claims, 

we affirm her convictions and sentence. 

AFFIRMED. 

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