GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Technology, Committee on 

Science, and the Subcommittee on Government 

Management, Information and Technology, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

10 a.m.

Tuesday,

October 26, 1999

Y2K COMPUTING 

CHALLENGE

Nuclear Power Industry 

Reported Nearly Ready; 

More Risk Reduction 

Measures Can Be Taken

Statement of Joel C. Willemssen and Keith A. Rhodes

Directors, Accounting and Information Management 

Division

GAO/T-AIMD-00-27

Page 1 GAO/T-AIMD-00-27

Ms. Chairwoman, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittees:

Thank you for inviting us to participate in today’s hearing on the Year 2000 

(Y2K) readiness of our nation’s nuclear power industry. As with any 

industry, nuclear power plants must ensure that their systems are Y2K 

ready so that they can continue to operate and maintain an uninterrupted 

supply of electrical power. Given the nature of the nuclear power industry, 

a failure in systems could endanger safety and have potentially serious 

short- and long-term consequences.

As requested, after a brief background discussion, today we will 

(1) highlight the Y2K status of the nation’s nuclear power industry, 

(2) discuss the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) oversight of the 

industry’s Y2K readiness, (3) provide an overview of the industry’s 

contingency planning, and (4) comment on the international readiness of 

nuclear power plants. 

Background Our nation’s nuclear power industry currently consists of 103 operating 

nuclear power plants. These are run by 41 licensees at 66 sites. According 

to NRC officials, an additional 19 nuclear power plants have been 

decommissioned and are no longer operating, although 14 of them continue 

to store highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel. Ten additional facilities 

fabricate nuclear fuel. As figure 1 shows, most of the 103 currently 

operating nuclear power plants and the 10 nuclear fuel facilities are located 

in the eastern part of the country.
Page 2 GAO/T-AIMD-00-27

Figure 1: Nuclear Power Plants and Nuclear Fuel Facilities in the United States

Source: NRC and the Nuclear Energy Institute.

Similar to other industrial facilities, nuclear power plants face a wide range 

of internal and external Y2K risks. Internal risks include the potential loss 

of reactor monitoring and control and the loss of emergency equipment and 

services, while external risks may include the loss of off-site electric power, 

water supply, critical consumables, and the loss of emergency equipment 

and services.

Probably the most serious external risks faced by a nuclear power plant are 

the potential instability of the electric power grid and the loss of off-site 
Page 3 GAO/T-AIMD-00-27

electric power. Such events may cause reactor shutdowns, and result in a 

loss of power or “station blackout.” NRC studies show that a major 

contributor to reactor core damage occurrences is a station blackout event.

Figure 2: A Typical Nuclear Power Plant

Figure 2 shows the key components of a typical nuclear power plant, and 

highlights the location of critical safety equipment such as the emergency 

core cooling pumps. Typically, nuclear power plants have emergency safety 

systems, including auxiliary feed water (water pumping) systems and 

standby emergency diesel generators, for cooling the reactors. Normally 

idle, these systems are designed to be activated during any emergency—

such as loss of off-site power—that disrupts the reactor’s primary cooling 

systems.

Currently, all 103 operating nuclear power plants have active reactor cores 

and, along with 14 of the decommissioned plants, maintain on-site spent 

nuclear fuel pools. Both the reactor core and the spent fuel must be cooled 
Page 4 GAO/T-AIMD-00-27

to ensure that they are not exposed and do not release lethal radioactive 

material. 

NRC licenses, regulates, and inspects the design, construction, and 

operation of domestic power plants and nuclear fuel facilities. It has 

established regulations for the safe operation of the 103 operational 

reactors, and requires nuclear reactors to have multiple safety systems to 

control and contain the radioactive materials used in each plant’s 

operation. NRC also requires licensees to test and maintain safety 

equipment to ensure that this equipment, such as a reactor’s emergency 

cooling system, will operate when needed. 

The Nuclear Energy Institute1

 (NEI) has agreed to take the lead in 

developing industrywide guidance for addressing the Y2K issue at nuclear 

power plants. NEI was also tasked by the North American Electric 

Reliability Council (NERC) with monitoring and reporting on the nuclear 

power industry’s Y2K readiness. The Department of Energy has asked 

NERC to assess and report on the Y2K readiness of the electric power 

industry.

Most U.S. Nuclear 

Facilities Reported to 

Be Year 2000 Ready

Last month, NRC reported that 75 of the 103 nuclear power plants were 

Y2K ready, and that all of the 103 operational nuclear power plants had 

resolved Y2K-related problems that could affect the performance of 

systems needed to safely shut down the plants. NRC tracks a plant’sY2K 

status based on the readiness of systems in three categories: (1) safety 

systems, which can affect plant protection and emergency shutdown, 

(2) plant operating and plant support systems, and (3) site support systems, 

such as administrative systems. 

On October 22, 1999, NEI updated the industry’s Y2K readiness status and 

reported that 101 of the 103 nuclear power plants were Y2K ready. 

According to NEI, for the remaining two nuclear power plants—shown in 

figure 3—the safety and site support systems are considered to be Y2K 

ready. NEI reported that the two plants—Peach Bottom 3 and Farley 

2—still have remediation work to complete on their plant operating and 

support systems.

1

NEI is a policy organization of the nuclear industry that seeks to foster and encourage the 

safe utilization of nuclear energy.
Page 5 GAO/T-AIMD-00-27

Figure 3: Two Nuclear Power Plants Reported Not Y2K Ready as of October 22, 1999

Source: NEI.

Table 1 summarizes information provided by NEI on the scope of 

remediation work remaining at the two plants classified by NRC as not yet 

Y2K ready. The table shows that one of the plants—Peach Bottom 

Unit 3—will complete all remediation by the end of October 1999, while the 

second plant—Farley Unit 2—will not be ready until mid-December 1999.
Page 6 GAO/T-AIMD-00-27

Table 1: Scheduled Completion Dates for Non-Y2K-Ready Nuclear Power Plants as 

of October 22, 1999

Source: NEI.

NRC is also responsible for nuclear safety at the decommissioned nuclear 

power plants operating spent fuel storage facilities. NRC said that it 

contacted these plants in early 1999, and at that time the plants reported 

either that their systems were Y2K ready or would be in the near term. 

Six of the 10 nuclear fuel facilities reported to NRC that they were Y2K 

ready by September 1, 1999. The remaining four facilities have all provided 

NRC with status reports and schedules for remaining work, indicating that 

they will become Y2K ready by November 1, 1999. All of the nuclear fuel 

facilities, with the exception of two gaseous diffusion plants, have 

informed NRC that they plan to be shut down during the Year 2000 rollover 

period.

NRC Is Providing 

Oversight of Y2K 

Activities 

Since 1996, NRC has been working with the nuclear power industry—and 

NEI—to address Y2K in the nuclear power industry. In December 1996, 

NRC notified all nuclear power plants and fuel facilities about the potential 

problems that nuclear facility computer systems and software might 

encounter during the transition from 1999 to 2000. This notification was 

followed in May 1998 by a letter to all operating nuclear power plant 

licensees requiring that they submit a written response by July 1999 stating 

how they planned to address the Y2K problem. 

Licensee Plant(s) Open items

Scheduled 

completion 

date (1999)

Plant operating and plant support systems

Philadelphia 

Electric Company

Peach 

Bottom 3

Digital Feedwater System October 31

Turbine Vibration Monitor October 31

Southern Nuclear 

Operating 

Company

Farley 2 Turbine Digital Electro Hydraulic System December 16
Page 7 GAO/T-AIMD-00-27

In 1997, NRC asked NEI to take the lead in developing industrywide 

guidance for addressing the Y2K problems faced by the nation’s nuclear 

power plants. Responding to NRC’s request, in October 1997 NEI published 

its Y2K guide.2

 In our comments3 on the NRC Y2K approach and on NEI’s 

guide, we noted that they did not adequately address risk management, 

business continuity and contingency planning, remediation of embedded 

systems, and independent verification and validation (IV&V) of systems. 

While NEI did not revise its guide in response to our comments, NRC 

informed nuclear power plants that the NEI approach and our own Year 

2000 assessment guide4

 were approaches that plants might want to follow. 

NEI later addressed some of the issues we raised regarding its Y2K guide by 

issuing another guide5

 in August 1998 that focused on contingency planning 

and risk management.

Regarding reporting of Y2K readiness, in 1998 NRC required all plants to 

report by July 1, 1999, to confirm if their facilities were Y2K ready or would 

be by January 1, 2000. This request covered only the safety-related systems 

required by the plant license and NRC regulations. In January 1999, NRC 

expanded this reporting requirement to include plant operating and plant 

support and site support systems that, while not addressed by NRC 

regulations for safe operation and shutdown, are necessary for continuity 

of plant operations. 

In January 1999, NRC completed audits of 12 Y2K programs involving 42 of 

the 103 operating nuclear power plants. Areas assessed included software 

applications and embedded systems and components. Information 

obtained during these assessments indicated that no significant Y2K 

problems existed in the plants’ systems that would affect their ability to 

safely operate and shut down.

In March 1999, NRC expanded the scope of its assessments efforts to 

include all 103 operating nuclear power plant sites. NRC administered to 

2

Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness (NEI/NUSMG 97-07, October 1997). 

3

Year 2000 Readiness: NRC’s Proposed Approach Regarding Nuclear Powerplants

(GAO/AIMD-98-90R, March 6, 1998).

4

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: An Assessment Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, September 1997; 

initially published as an exposure draft in February 1997).

5

Nuclear Utility Year 2000 Readiness Contingency Planning (NEI/NUSMG 98-07, August 

1998). 
Page 8 GAO/T-AIMD-00-27

the 103 operational nuclear power plants a 452-question checklist covering 

items such as assignment of qualified personnel, testing for critical dates, 

and testing and validation of remediated software applications or 

embedded components. These assessments, completed by June 30, 1999, 

found that 14 of the 103 plants required additional follow-up reviews to 

more fully evaluate their Y2K programs. In the follow-up reviews, 

completed by August 13, 1999, NRC staff concluded that 13 of the 14 plants’ 

Y2K programs were consistent with industry guidance. The last plant 

reported to NRC that it made its Y2K program consistent with the guidance 

in September 1999. 

Regarding the decommissioned nuclear power plants, NRC has not issued 

specific Y2K guidance. However, it has notified the 14 plants with spent fuel 

on-site that they should follow the NEI Y2K guidance, and report on their 

Y2K readiness status. In early 1999, NRC also reviewed readiness activities 

at these 14 decommissioned plants that still have nuclear fuel. Through 

these reviews, NRC concluded that the licensees are implementing Y2K 

changes that address equipment and systems important to safety. At that 

time, the licensees reported that their computer systems were Y2K ready or 

would be in the near term. However, NRC does not know the current status 

for those decommissioned plants that previously reported they were not 

ready. Because of the risk posed by the spent fuel facilities at these sites, 

we believe that NRC should evaluate and report on the current Y2K status 

of these plants.

In June 1998 NRC required nuclear fuel facilities to report by December 31, 

1998, whether they were Y2K ready. For facilities expecting to be ready at 

some point during 1999, NRC asked for a status report of remaining work, 

and another report by July 1, 1999. In addition, between September 1997 

and October 1998, the major fuel facilities were asked Y2K-related 

questions during routine inspections. Based on these inspections, NRC 

concluded that the facilities were aware of the Y2K problem and were 

taking appropriate steps to address it. 

NRC has not required that licensees perform an IV&V of their Y2K 

programs. Use of IV&V would provide NRC—and nuclear power plants’ 

and nuclear fuel facilities’ managers—with additional assurance that all 

critical applications and systems are Y2K ready. In March 1998, when 

commenting on NRC’s proposed Y2K approach, we suggested that NRC 

require licensees to (1) describe their Y2K plans for IV&V of systems 

related to safety and (2) provide the results of IV&V with their written 

certification of Y2K readiness. NRC has not included such a requirement in 
Page 9 GAO/T-AIMD-00-27

its Y2K instructions to licensees. In discussing this with NRC officials, they 

emphasized that a rigorous quality assurance program exists at each 

nuclear facility to review and validate modifications to safety systems. 

While we recognize this, such programs do not deal with the broader issue 

of Y2K testing of safety systems, or systems supporting plant and site 

operations. 

Although we were told by NRC that some licensees obtained independent 

technical reviews of each nuclear facility’s Y2K system test plans and 

results, NRC did not have specific, current information identifying the 

types of Y2K IV&V reviews performed at nuclear power facilities. NRC 

noted that the industry had reported in April 1999 that multiple audits were 

completed at 65 of the 66 sites—56 audits by utility quality assurance 

departments, 36 by cross-utility audits, and 46 by third parties. However, 

neither NRC nor the industry issued guidelines establishing criteria to 

ensure consistency of reviews.

In the few months remaining, an opportunity exists for conducting targeted 

independent reviews of the licensees’ Y2K programs. Since neither NRC 

nor NEI’s guidance defined the criteria for what constituted an independent 

review, it would be of value for NRC to survey the plants to gain an 

understanding of what independent Y2K IV&V reviews were completed. 

Based on this information, NRC could then identify plants that may need 

reviews. 

Year 2000 Contingency 

Plans Developed by All 

Facilities, But 

Completion of Plan 

Testing Uncertain

For many years, nuclear power plants have had contingency plans to deal 

with a wide range of threats, including earthquakes, tornadoes, and 

blackouts. Licensees have now had to modify these plans to address the 

Y2K threat and its accompanying risks, both internal and external.

NRC officials told us that nuclear power plants are following the 

contingency planning process guidance developed by NEI. This NRCapproved guidance recommended management controls, preparation of 

individual system contingency plans, and development of an integrated 

contingency plan that allows the utility to manage Y2K-induced risks.

Between May and June 1999, NRC reviewed the contingency planning 

activities of 12 operating nuclear power plants, looking at the 

implementation of NEI’s guidance. All 12 plants’ planning activities were 

found to be consistent with the guidance, and appropriate management and 

oversight was being provided. In light of these results and follow-up visits, 
Page 10 GAO/T-AIMD-00-27

NRC concluded that plants were acceptably implementing industry 

guidance, and therefore determined that such detailed reviews focusing 

specifically on contingency planning were not necessary at additional 

plants. 

Concurrently, NRC had underway its assessment of Y2K readiness at all 

103 plants, as previously discussed. The 452-question checklist NRC was 

using for this assessment included 52 questions covering areas of 

contingency planning. Such areas included internal and external facility 

risks and whether an integrated Y2K contingency plan—a compilation of 

individual contingency plans that included the remediation actions planned 

for key rollover dates—was developed. Based on these assessments, NRC 

reported that all 103 nuclear power plants were using the NRC-approved 

industry guidance—guidance that included contingency planning—and 

that only one plant (Cooper Nuclear Station) had not yet completed its 

integrated contingency plan. NRC verified that this plant has since 

completed its plan.

While the nuclear power plants have reportedly completed Y2K 

contingency plans, it is unclear as to whether these facilities have validated 

their plans. NEI included validation as a step in its contingency planning 

process guidance to provide confidence that plans can be executed as 

intended. While NRC’s assessment at the 103 plants included questions on 

whether the nuclear facility validated contingency plans, NRC has not 

summarized the results of each question from all plants and therefore does 

not know how many plants responded affirmatively that they had indeed 

tested their plans. Further, NRC did not assess how the plans were being 

validated. 

The need for additional contingency preparation was also raised by public 

interest groups, most notably by the Nuclear Information and Resource 

Service. In December 1998, this group, concerned about the potential 

impact of Y2K problems on nuclear power plants, submitted three related 

petitions to NRC. 

The first petition requested that all licensed nuclear facilities be shut down 

by December 1, 1999, if their safety systems were not Y2K compliant, and 

remain shut down until all repairs were completed. The second petition 

requested that NRC require nuclear power plant licensees to conduct a 

successful, full-scale emergency planning exercise involving the failure of 

computers or digital systems as a result of the Y2K problem, again asking 

that plants not doing so be shut down. The third petition asked that nuclear 
Page 11 GAO/T-AIMD-00-27

facilities have operational emergency diesel generators to provide backup 

power, that a 60-day supply of fuel for these generators be available, and 

that the licensees provide alternate means of backup power such as solar 

panels or wind turbines. 

NRC denied all three petitions. While acknowledging the importance of the 

Y2K-related matters raised by the petitioners, it concluded that actions 

taken by nuclear plant licensees to address Y2K issues, coupled with NRC 

oversight, provided reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public 

health and safety. In responding on August 23, 1999, to the petition that 

NRC require nuclear power plants to conduct emergency planning 

exercises that cope with Y2K computer-related failures, NRC stated that 

this was not necessary because while the cause of computer and equipment 

failure may be different after December 31, 1999, the result and expected 

response would be the same as many situations encountered during 

emergency exercises and drills in the past. For example, NRC said in this 

response, it is typical in the development of scenarios for exercises and 

drills to assume that communications links, plant computers, and display 

and monitoring equipment will be out of service.

Because of the very nature of nuclear facilities, it is true that plants are 

already required by law to follow and maintain tested emergency plans.6

These plans are to provide emergency response capabilities that take into 

account a variety of circumstances and challenges, and the facilities are 

required to exercise their plans periodically, develop and maintain key 

skills of involved personnel, identify deficiencies in their emergency plans 

and personnel, and take appropriate action to correct identified 

deficiencies. However, it is unknown whether or not each plant has 

recently tested, through normal emergency exercises, scenarios addressing 

potential Y2K-induced failures. Therefore, given the known Y2K threat to 

nuclear facilities, we believe that NRC should obtain information on the 

scope and extent of nuclear power plants’ emergency exercises, and 

whether these exercises have incorporated Y2K scenarios.

Regarding the nuclear fuel facilities, NRC has not required these facilities 

to develop specific Y2K contingency plans. However, 8 of the 10 fuel 

facilities have informed NRC that they plan to be in safe shutdown during 

the transition to Y2K, and NRC inspections at the other two facilities found 

their contingency plans to be acceptable. For decommissioned plants, NRC 

6

10 CFR 50.47, 10 CFR 50.54 paragraphs (q), (s), and (t); and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.
Page 12 GAO/T-AIMD-00-27

applied the same requirements for the 14 plants with spent fuel as it did for 

the 103 operating plants. NRC could not say how many of the 

decommissioned plants completed contingency plans, as the agency had 

not reviewed them because NRC staff concluded that Y2K issues were 

highly unlikely to cause a potential threat to public health and safety at 

such plants. NRC also noted that decommissioned plants have an extended 

amount of time to take relatively simple corrective actions should Y2K 

failures occur.

Another important area that needs to be addressed is Day One planning. 

Each nuclear facility needs to develop a Day One strategy—a 

comprehensive set of actions to be executed by nuclear facilities during the 

last days of 1999 and the first days of 2000. We have recently issued Day 

One planning guidance that the Office of Management and Budget has 

encouraged federal agencies to use.7

No Day One guidance has currently been issued by the industry on what 

plants should be doing during the end of December and beginning of 

January 2000. NRC officials told us that nuclear power plants have taken 

certain actions to be ready for the Y2K rollover, such as requiring additional 

staffing and stockpiling consumables (i.e., diesel fuel for emergency diesel 

generators). However, these do not entail a comprehensive set of actions to 

be carried out systematically by every operational nuclear power plant. The 

actions that the nuclear power plants and fuel facilities take during this 

time will be just as critical as actions already taken to become Y2K ready. 

Accordingly, we believe that NRC should ensure that all nuclear facilities 

have developed appropriate Day One plans.

Little Is Known About 

Worldwide Year 2000 

Readiness of Nuclear 

Power Plants

Little current data are available on the Y2K readiness of the 331 nuclear 

power plants operating outside the United States. Figure 4 shows that 31 

other countries besides the United States are operating nuclear power 

plants. Nine of these countries have more than 10 nuclear plants each, for a 

total of 252 plants. The remaining 22 countries each have 10 or fewer, for a 

total of 79 plants. Figure 5 shows the location of operational nuclear power 

plants worldwide.

7

Y2K Computing Challenge: Day One Planning and Operations Guide (GAO/AIMD10.1.22, October 1999).
Page 13 GAO/T-AIMD-00-27

Figure 4: Ten Largest Nuclear Power Producers Worldwide

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency.

79

12

14

15

16

20

29

35

53

58

103

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

Others (22 countries)

Sweden

Canada

Korea

Ukraine

Germany

Russia

United Kingdom

Japan

France

United States

Number of Operational Nuclear Power Plants Worldwide
Page 14 GAO/T-AIMD-00-27

Figure 5: Location of Nuclear Power Plants Worldwide

Source: International Nuclear Safety Center, Argonne National Laboratory.

What information is available suggests that several other countries are 

taking steps to ready their nuclear power plants for the change of century. 

For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been 

working with its 128 member states to ensure that they are informed of the 

Y2K problem. The agency has published guidelines for its members’ use in 

addressing safety and operability concerns, and has sponsored 

international workshops in January and July of this year to provide 

assistance to members on the challenge of the Y2K issue. Based on 

information exchanged at these workshops, several countries reported that 

they were on their way to readying their nuclear power plants for 2000. 
Page 15 GAO/T-AIMD-00-27

Similarly, the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) has been working with its 

27 member countries8

—representing 85 percent of the world’s nuclear 

power capacity—to ensure awareness of nuclear safety during the 

transition to 2000. In February 1999, during NEA’s workshop on the impact 

of Y2K on the nuclear industry, some participants—including those from 

Canada, France, Japan, Spain, and Sweden—reported that most of their 

plants would be Y2K ready by July 1999. 

However, other countries appear to be behind the United States. For 

example, the Russian representatives at the NEA workshop noted that their 

State Regulatory Authorities of Nuclear Energy and the Federal Nuclear 

and Radiation Authority of Russia were still studying the impact of Y2K on 

the nuclear power industry. They also noted that some facilities and 

organizations do not probably fully appreciate the impact of Y2K on the 

nuclear power industry for their nuclear facilities. 

Similar concerns were raised by the National Intelligence Officer for 

Science and Technology during a hearing earlier this month.9

 Testifying on 

the intelligence community’s assessment of foreign Y2K efforts, he noted 

that both Russia and the Ukraine are particularly vulnerable to Y2K 

failures. He further noted that they got a late start in remediation and lack 

sufficient resources to identify and correct problems, and that the areas of 

greatest risk include the electric power grid and nuclear power plants.

It should be noted that NRC—with cooperation from NEA and IAEA—is 

developing a prototype of an international Y2K early warning system. This 

Internet-based system would be used by NRC and other regulators to share 

information concerning Y2K problems that affect plant operation, 

telecommunications, or grid reliability. To date, this effort includes mainly 

Canada, Europe, Mexico, and Far Eastern countries.

8

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 

Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the 

Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, 

and the United States. 

9

Statement of Lawrence K. Gershwin, National Intelligence Officer for Science and 

Technology, National Intelligence Council, before the Senate Special Committee on the Year 

2000 Technology Problem, October 13, 1999. 
Page 16 GAO/T-AIMD-00-27

In summary, while progress has been made in making the nation’s nuclear 

power plants and fuel processing facilities Y2K ready, some risk remains. 

At particular risk are the two plants that do not yet have their nonsafety 

systems ready, especially the one with a completion date scheduled for 

more than 30 days from now, ever closer to the turn of the century. 

Similarly, the four nuclear fuel facilities that were not Y2K ready by 

September 1, 1999, raise concern. Likewise, not knowing the current Y2K 

status of all 14 decommissioned plants with spent fuel also raises concern. 

Finally, the lack of information on two key issues—independent reviews of 

Y2K testing and emergency Y2K exercises—and the lack of requirements 

for Day One planning increases the Y2K risk to the nuclear power industry.

To further reduce risks, NRC and the nuclear power industry can still take 

specific actions to ensure Y2K-related plant safety. First, NRC should 

evaluate and report on the Y2K status of all decommissioned plants with 

spent fuel status that previously reported they were not Y2K ready. Second, 

NRC should survey the 103 operational nuclear power plants to gain an 

understanding of what independent reviews were completed. Based on this 

information, NRC could then identify plants that may need additional 

reviews. Third, it should obtain information on the scope and extent of 

nuclear power plants’ emergency exercises, and whether these exercises 

have incorporated Y2K scenarios. Finally, NRC should ensure that all 

nuclear facilities have developed Day One plans.

Ms. Chairwoman, Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement. We would 

be happy to respond to any questions that you or other members of the 

Subcommittees may have at this time.

Contact and 

Acknowledgments

For information about this testimony, please contact Joel Willemssen at 

(202) 512-6253 or Keith A. Rhodes at (202) 512-6412, or by e-mail at 

willemssenj.aimd@gao.gov or rhodesk.aimd@gao.gov. Individuals making 

key contributions to this testimony included Mirko Dolak, Troy Hottovy, 

William Isrin, Janet Jamison, and Michael Tovares.

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