UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

Joseph Odish, Cranbrook Capital 

Consulting Group, LLC, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Apple, Inc., Timothy Cook, 

Northrop Grumman Corp., Wesley 

Bush, Nuance Communications, 

Inc. Cognitive Code Corp., Leslie 

Spring, Mimi Chen, John Chen, 

Salvatore Difazio, Robert Rosen, 

International Business Machines 

Corp, Joel Bock, Patrick Miller, 

Oracle Corp., U.S. Dentons, 

Defendants. 

________________________________/

Case No. 15-cv-11955 

Hon. Judith E. Levy 

Mag. Judge Mona K. Majzoub 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION [45] 

Before the Court is plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) motion (Dkt. 45) for relief 

from the order entered on October 28, 2015 dismissing the Cognitive 

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Code defendants1 and imposing limitations on plaintiffs’ proposed 

second amended complaint. (Dkt. 35.) 

Plaintiffs Joseph Odish and Cranbrook Capital Consulting Group, 

LLC, initiated this lawsuit on June 1, 2015, and filed their first 

amended complaint on August 24, 2015, naming seventeen individual 

and corporate defendants, and bringing claims involving violations of 

securities, anti-trust, and civil rights laws, fraud, and conversion, as 

well as retaliation against a federal whistleblower, and a claim of 

patent manipulation. (Dkt. 5.) Summons for each of the defendants 

were issued on June 4, 2015 (Dkt. 4), although no notice of service 

appears on the docket. On August 26, 2015, counsel for the Cognitive 

Code defendants nonetheless filed an appearance in this matter and 

moved to dismiss. (Dkt. 10, 11.) On August 31, 2015, plaintiffs filed a 

request to strike their first amended complaint from the record on the 

grounds that it contained “errata” and privileged information. (Dk. 12.) 

On September 2, 2015, plaintiffs moved for leave to file a second 

amended complaint. (Dkt. 16.) 

 

1 Cognitive Code Corporation, Salvatore Difazio, Leslie Spring, Mimi Chen, 

and John Chen. 

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The Court granted the Cognitive Code defendants’ motion on the 

grounds that the cognizable claims and issues raised by plaintiffs were 

entirely precluded by the final judgment of the United States District 

Court for the Central District of California. (Dkt. 35 at 34-40; Odish v. 

Cognitive Code Corp., No. CV 12-9069, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68630 

(C.D. Cal. May 27, 2015).) In the same order, the Court granted 

plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, but with 

restrictions regarding precluded content and length. (Id. at 51.) 

For the reasons provided below, plaintiffs’ motion for relief from 

judgment is DENIED. 

I. Background 

As described in the October 28, 2015 order, plaintiffs Joseph 

Odish, an attorney licensed in Michigan, and his wholly owned 

company, Cranbrook Capital Consulting Group, LLC, are no strangers 

to the Eastern District of Michigan. (Dkt. 35 at 2-5.) In the interests of 

brevity, the Court will rely on the facts set forth in its earlier opinion 

and order. (Id. at 4-14.) 

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II. Plaintiffs’ Motion 

Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the dismissal of the Cognitive 

Code defendants and lifting of the twenty-page limit imposed on their 

leave to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiffs argue in their 

motion that Odish is a “federal whistleblower” and victim of a sustained 

set of fraudulent acts and retaliation at the hands of defendants. (Dkt. 

45 at 2-3.) Odish opposes this Court’s characterization of him as a 

vexatious litigant on the grounds that even though he has brought at 

least nine lawsuits in less than three years against an overlapping set 

of defendants, only two complaints have been served in this District. 

(Id. at 3; see Dkt. 35 at 3 n.1.) With regard to his request for leave to 

amend, plaintiff asserts that the scope and complexity of his claims 

cannot be fairly represented in only twenty pages. (Id. at 4, 12-14.) He 

recounts a factual and procedural history with the Cognitive Code 

defendants (id. at 5-6), and adds that he discovered material evidence in 

support of his claims after the conclusion of the California lawsuit. (Id.

at 7.) Plaintiffs argue that under Rule 60(b)(1) they are entitled to 

relief from a mistake they made that resulted in their filing of a socalled “errata” first amended complaint. (Id. at 12.) They also assert 

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that defendants’ fraudulent acts will go unpunished if this Court does 

not allow this lawsuit to proceed. (Id. at 14-15.) Finally, they argue 

that there are alleged patent frauds that justify relief. (Id. at 16-18.) 

Defendants oppose plaintiffs’ motion by arguing that plaintiffs 

have raised none of the grounds on which Rule 60(b) relief can be 

granted. (Dkt. 55 at 2.) They assert that the preclusive effect of the 

California lawsuit bars all of plaintiffs’ claims against them, meaning 

that plaintiffs’ lack standing to sue them in this Court. (Id. at 55.) 

They further note that Rule 60(b)(1) does not provide relief for 

“carelessness or inexcusable neglect,” such as the “errata” first amended 

complaint. (Id. at 3-4.) They also argue that plaintiffs have not shown 

either that they had a meritorious claim, or that defendants’ unfair 

conduct prevented them from prosecuting that claim. (Id. at 4-6.) 

Finally, they note that plaintiff Odish has provided no evidence to 

support his claimed status as a whistleblower. (Id. at 6-7.) 

III. Legal Standards 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) grants a district court the discretion to 

determine whether relief from a judgment or order is warranted, 

provided that one of the following rationales is present: 

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(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 

newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 

have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 

Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 

intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other 

misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) 

the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a 

prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 

otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 

judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any 

other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 

judgment. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “[R]elief under Rule 60(b) is ‘circumscribed by 

public policy favoring finality of judgments and termination of 

litigation.’” Ford Motor Co. v. Mustangs Unlimited, Inc., 487 F.3d 465, 

468-69 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trs. of UMWA 

Combined Ben. Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2001)). 

 The Sixth Circuit has authorized relief under subsection (1) of 

Rule 60(b) “in only two situations: (1) when a party has made an 

excusable mistake or an attorney has acted without authority, or (2) 

when the judge has made a substantive mistake of law or fact in the 

final judgment or order.” United States v. Reyes, 307 F.3d 451, 455 (6th 

Cir. 2002) (citing Cacevic v. City of Hazel Park, 226 F.3d 483, 490 (6th 

Cir. 2000)). Neither an attorney’s strategic miscalculation nor his 

mistake of the law is a proper basis for such relief. Id. (citing McCurry 

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v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 298 F.3d 586, 592-94 (6th Cir. 

2002); FHC Equities L.L.C. v. MBL Life Assur. Corp., 188 F.3d 678, 685 

(6th Cir. 1999)). “[T]he case law consistently teaches that out-and-out 

lawyer blunders—the type of action or inaction that leads to successful 

malpractice suits by the injured client—do not qualify as ‘mistake’ or 

‘excusable neglect’ within the meaning of [Rule 60(b)(1)].” McCurry, 298 

F.3d at 595 (quoting Helm v. Resolution Trust Corp., 161 F.R.D. 347, 

348 (N.D. Ill. 1995), aff’d, 84 F.3d 874 (7th Cir. 1996)). 

 “To prevail on a motion under Rule 60(b)(2), a ‘movant must 

demonstrate (1) that it exercised due diligence in obtaining the 

information and (2) [that] the evidence is material and controlling and 

clearly would have produced a different result if presented before the 

original judgment.’” Hurst v. Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass’n, No. 15-1586, 

2016 WL 700351, at *7 (6th Cir. Feb. 23, 2016) (quoting Good v. Ohio 

Edison Co., 149 F.3d 413, 423 (6th Cir. 1998)). And a motion for relief 

under this provision of Rule 60(b) is not a proper procedure “to raise 

arguments which could, and should, have been made before judgment 

issued.” Id. (quoting Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. 

Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998)). 

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 Under Rule 60(b)(3), the moving party must “show that the 

adverse party committed a deliberate act that adversely impacted the 

fairness of the relevant legal proceeding [in] question.” Info-Hold, Inc. 

v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 455 (6th Cir. 2008). Fraud is 

defined for purposes of Rule 60(b)(3) analysis as “the knowing 

misrepresentation of a material fact, or concealment of the same when 

there is a duty to disclose, done to induce another to act to his or her 

detriment.” Id. at 456. The movant’s showing must be “by clear and 

convincing evidence that the district court’s judgment was obtained by 

fraud or misconduct.” Crehore v. U.S., 253 Fed. App’x 547, 549 (6th Cir. 

2007) (citing Jordan v. Paccar, Inc., No. 95–3478, 1996 WL 528950, at 

*9 (6th Cir. Sept.17, 1996) (per curiam)). Conclusory allegations of 

fraud do not suffice. McManus v. St. Joseph Hosp. Corp., 79 Fed. App’x 

170, 172 (6th Cir. 2003). 

“[T]he decision to grant Rule 60(b)(6) relief is a case-by-case 

inquiry that requires the trial court to intensively balance numerous 

factors, including the competing policies of the finality of judgments and 

the incessant command of the court's conscience that justice be done in 

light of all the facts.” Thompson v. Bell, 580 F.3d 423, 442 (6th Cir. 

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2009) (quoting Blue Diamond Coal Co., 249 F.3d at 529). “Courts . . . 

must apply subsection (b)(6) only as a means to achieve substantial 

justice when something more than one of the grounds contained in Rule 

60(b)’s first five clauses is present.” Ford Motor Co., 487 F.3d at 468 

(quoting Olle v. Henry & Wright Corp., 910 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 

1990). The meaning of “something more” is admittedly ephemeral, 

since the first five clauses typically cover the grounds for relief. Id.

(citing Pruzinsky v. Gianetti (In re Walter), 282 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 

2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 885, 123 S.Ct. 118, 154 L.Ed.2d 144 

(2002)). Nonetheless, relief under Rule 60(b)(6) requires “exceptional 

circumstances” not otherwise described by clauses one through five. In 

re Walter, 282 F.3d at 440. Intervening changes in the law do not 

generally qualify for Rule 60(b)(6) relief, and the principle supporting 

finality in judgment is especially applicable in evaluation of a motion 

under Rule 60(b)(6). McGuire v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst., 738 

F.3d 741, 750 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Ford Motor Co., 487 F.3d at 468). 

“Relief is limited to ‘unusual and extreme situations where principles of 

equity mandate relief.’” Id. (quoting Ford Motor Co., 487 F.3d at 468). 

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IV. Analysis 

Plaintiffs have shown no basis for relief under Rule 60(b) from the 

judgment dismissing the claims against the Cognitive Code defendants 

or from the order granting plaintiffs leave, with restrictions, to file a 

second amended complaint. 

A. Mistake or Excusable Neglect 

Plaintiffs’ argument that they made a simple error and filed an 

“errata” version of their first amended complaint is simply not a 

sufficient basis to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(1). First, plaintiffs’ socalled “errata” version was by their own admission not filed in error at 

all, but rather, was filed “[i]n a move to outsmart [defendants’ counsel 

Fredman] and render his motion [to dismiss] moot. I revised and 

amended the complaint, asserting new claims. The [first amended] 

complaint on file is still not the true complaint.” (Dkt. 7 at 2.) 

Plaintiffs’ filing “error” is far from the kind of “mistake” anticipated by 

the opportunity for relief under Rule 60(b)(1). Rule 11(b) bars an 

attorney from filing a pleading that is intended “to harass, cause 

unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” The 

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Court cannot ignore a fundamental rule governing federal civil 

procedure and reward a litigant for such conduct.2

Even without plaintiffs’ admission that they deliberately filed an 

amended complaint that “is still not the true complaint,” it is well 

established that “clients must be held accountable for the acts and 

omissions of their attorneys.” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick 

Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 396 (1993). This is no less the case 

when the client has himself as an attorney. C.f. Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 

432, 437-38 (1991) (“The adage that ‘a lawyer who represents himself 

has a fool for a client’ is the product of years of experience by seasoned 

litigators.”). As the Fifth Circuit aptly explained in a case cited with 

approval in McCurry, 298 F.3d at 595, 

Were this Court to make an exception to finality of judgment 

each time a hardship was visited upon the unfortunate client 

of a negligent or inadvertant [sic] attorney, even though the 

result be disproportionate to the deficiency, courts would be 

unable to ever adequately redraw that line again, and 

meaningful finality of judgment would largely disappear. 

Far more disproportionate penalties have been suffered for 

far less egregious violations of our rules of procedure. 

 

2 Indeed, by separate order also issued today, the Court has granted 

defendants monetary sanctions under Rule 11 for, inter alia, this specific act by 

plaintiffs. 

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Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 769 F.2d 281, 288-89 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing 

cases). Rather, “the proper focus is upon whether the neglect of [the 

parties] and their counsel is excusable.” McCurry, 298 F.3d at 595 

(quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs., 507 U.S. at 397) (emphasis in original). 

 Here, there is no excusable neglect or mistake; there is only an 

attorney’s admitted abuse of his right to file an amended complaint, or, 

at best, his blunder in filing an incorrect version. Plaintiffs do not 

mention in their motion this earlier admission and instead now claim 

that a mistake they made in editing their complaint resulted in the 

filing of the “errata” first amended complaint. (Dkt. 45 at 12 n.2.) Even 

if the Court puts aside the admission of bad faith, plaintiffs filed the 

first amended complaint on August 24, 2015, and then filed a “request 

for first amended complaint to be stricken from record as a result of 

errata and privileged information” a week later, on August 31, 2015, 

which was five days after defendants filed their motion to dismiss on 

August 26, 2015. Plaintiffs’ request to strike did not provide any 

specific information or reason, other than that it contained “innocent 

Errata and Privileged and potentially prejudicial information.” (Dkt. 2.) 

The Court is left with plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a second 

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amended complaint, in which they assert that hundreds of exhibits—

presumably directed at the Cognitive Code defendants—will support 

their proposed second amended complaint. (Dkt. 16 at 6.) But such 

extensive revisions hardly comport with the kind of simple error that 

plaintiffs explain resulted in the “errata” version being filed. 

Moreover, as the Court reasoned in its October 28, 2015 order, to 

grant plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint in a way that included 

any claims against the Cognitive Code defendants “would be to turn a 

blind eye to their well-documented [] pattern of ineffective lawsuits 

pressing increasingly well-worn claims, at least an essential subset of 

which have now reached final adjudication through the California 

Case.” (Dkt. 35 at 48.) Issue and claim preclusion, as well as gross 

prejudice to defendants, prevented the Court from granting such leave 

then, and nothing about plaintiffs’ claims of a filing error justify relief 

from that decision now. Indeed, to hold otherwise would be to 

countenance plaintiffs’ admitted bad-faith conduct in filing their first 

amended complaint. 

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B. Newly Discovered Evidence 

Plaintiffs appear to argue that newly discovered evidence also 

presents grounds for relief from the Court’s order. (Dkt. 45 at 7 

(discussing “additional evidence (Exhibit 246 on July 27, 2015, 

previously submitted by reincorporated herein)” implicating defendant 

Northrop in the Cognitive Code business from its early start-up days).) 

However, plaintiffs fail to explain how such evidence would have 

achieved a different outcome in the Court’s dismissal of the claims 

against Cognitive Code for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Moreover, July 27, 2015 is before plaintiffs filed their first amended 

complaint, their motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, 

and their response to defendants’ motion to dismiss; therefore, this 

reason is not a proper basis on which to seek relief under Rule 60(b)(2). 

See Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 146 F.3d at 374. 

C. Fraud, Misrepresentation, or Other Conduct of the 

Adverse Party 

Plaintiffs assert at great length in nearly all of their filings—

including the motion currently before the Court—that the Cognitive 

Code defendants have engaged in extensive fraud in their business 

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dealings with plaintiffs, their contracts with the United States 

government, and their litigation before the district court for the Central 

District of California. (See, e.g., Dkt. 1, Dkt. 5, Dkt. 16, Dkt. 18, Dkt. 

21, Dkt. 22, Dkt. 29, Dkt. 39, Dkt. 40, Dkt. 41, Dkt. 45, Dkt. 48, Dkt. 

58.) However, the issue before this Court on plaintiffs’ motion for relief 

from judgment is confined to whether fraud or misconduct was involved 

in representations by defendants regarding this lawsuit and the Court’s 

order dismissing the Cognitive Code defendants. Plaintiffs have not 

pointed to any specific evidence directly affecting the litigation of this 

case, and to the extent that plaintiffs suggest such misconduct by the 

Cognitive Code defendants, the Court finds such assertions to be 

lacking a factual basis and implausible. There is no evidence to support 

the relief sought here under Rule 60(b)(3), let alone enough to meet the 

required clear-and-convincing standard. See Jordan, 1996 WL 528950 

at *9. And considering plaintiffs’ admitted false filing of their first 

amended complaint, if there has been any bad faith in the litigation of 

this matter, it has been at the hands of plaintiffs, not defendants. As 

for the allegations of fraud on the California court, this Court is not in 

any conceivable way an appropriate forum to vindicate such issues. 

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D. Other Circumstances Necessitating Relief 

Plaintiffs argue that relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is necessitated by 

Odish’s alleged status as a federal whistleblower who has purportedly 

faced retaliation and other injuries at the hands of defendants. These 

allegations may very well constitute the “something more” suggested by 

the Sixth Circuit, but this Court’s familiarity with plaintiffs’ many 

lawsuits against defendants and sober reflection on plaintiffs’ conduct 

in this case strongly counsel against any relief on this basis. 

Plaintiffs first sought to redress the alleged fraud against the 

United States and retaliation against Odish through a qui tam action 

filed on February 17, 2014 in this District. (Odish et al. v. Northrop 

Grumman Corp. et al., No. 14-cv-10736, E.D. Mich.) However, the 

United States declined to intervene in that matter, and the Honorable 

Mark A. Goldsmith subsequently ordered the matter unsealed. (Case 

No. 14-cv-10736, Dkt. 26.) That lawsuit was terminated after plaintiffs 

filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on December 3, 2014, in the face a 

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show-cause order issued that same day for failure to prosecute. (Id. at 

Dkt. 32.)3 

Given Odish’s pursuit of the alleged wrongdoings by defendants 

through the appropriate channel of a whistleblower lawsuit, the Court 

is satisfied that the United States government has been adequately 

notified of the issues involved. By declining to intervene in the prior 

qui tam case, the government has signaled that it has evaluated the 

issue, and there is no proper basis under Rule 60(b)(6) for this Court to 

grant relief in order to avoid a substantial injustice. 

V. CONCLUSION 

Plaintiffs have failed to present any basis on which relief can be 

granted under Rule 60(b); therefore, their motion is DENIED. 

Plaintiff is hereby granted thirty days to renew his motion for 

leave to file a second amended complaint. The proposed amended 

complaint must be attached to plaintiff’s motion, and it must only state 

factual allegations and claims that are not precluded by the California 

 

3 A second intended qui tam lawsuit brought by plaintiff Odish against the 

same defendants was dismissed by the Court for plaintiff’s failure to file the lawsuit 

in accordance with the statutory mandates. (Case No. 15-cv-13395, Dkt. 5.) 

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district court’s judgment or the orders of this Court. Should plaintiffs 

determine that the twenty-page allowance does not suffice for their 

amended complaint, even within the narrowed contours dictated by this 

Court’s order of October 28, 2015, they may state in their memorandum 

of law the reasons why the page limit is insufficient. The attached 

proposed amended complaint must nonetheless comply with the 

following requirements: 

1. There can be no factual allegations in the amended 

pleadings that contradict this ruling or the order of October 

28, 2015, contradict the final adjudication of the California 

Case, or rely on answers to questions that contradict the 

California court’s rulings or this ruling. 

2. Plaintiffs may allege no claims against the Cognitive Code 

defendants, as they are dismissed from this case. 

3. Plaintiffs may not exceed twenty pages in filing their second 

amended complaint, and these twenty pages must otherwise 

entirely comport with L.R. 5.1 governing the filing of papers 

in this Court. 

(Dkt. 35 at 51.) Failure to abide by any of the above conditions will 

constitute a violation of the Court’s express order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 11, 2016 s/Judith E. Levy 

Ann Arbor, Michigan JUDITH E. LEVY 

United States District Judge 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s 

ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on March 11, 2016. 

s/Felicia M. Moses 

FELICIA M. MOSES 

Case Manager 

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