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## NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

AUGUST 1991



> I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY:  INTERESTS AND
> 
> GOALS.NEW ERAThe bitter struggle that divided the world for over two
> 
> generations has come to an end. The collapse of Soviet
> 
> domination in Eastern Europe means that the Cold War is
> 
> over, its core issue resolved. We have entered a new era,
> 
> one whose outline would have been unimaginable only three
> 
> years ago.This new era offers great hope, but this hope must be
> 
> tempered by the even greater uncertainty we face.  Almost
> 
> immediately new crises and instabilities came upon us. The
> 
> Gulf War was a forceful reminder that there are still
> 
> autonomous sources of turbulence in the world. In the
> 
> Soviet Union, while we have seen a healthy retrenchment in
> 
> foreign policy, we also see a continuing internal crisis,
> 
> with a danger of violence overhanging the hopes for
> 
> internal reform. We face new challenges not only to our
> 
> security, but to our ways of thinking about security.For over 40 years, the American grand strategy of
> 
> containment has reflected an era of expanding Soviet power,
> 
> Soviet aggression and Soviet Communism. We now find,
> 
> however, that the Soviet Union is far more inwardly focused
> 
> as it wrestles with its internal crises.  We do not know
> 
> what path the Soviet Union will ultimately take, but a
> 
> return to the same superpower adversary we have faced for
> 
> over 40 years is unlikely.That said, the Soviet Union remains the only state
> 
> possessing the physical military capability to destroy
> 
> American society with a single, cataclysmic attack and, in
> 
> spite of severe economic strains, the modernization of
> 
> Soviet strategic forces continues virtually across the
> 
> board. Even with a START Treaty, the Soviets will retain
> 
> more than 6,000 strategic weapons. The Soviets will also --
> 
> despite the heartening reductions we have seen in their
> 
> conventional capabilities -- retain some three million men
> 
> in their armed forces.  These enduring realities cannot be
> 
> ignored.Shaping a security strategy for a new era will require an
> 
> understanding of the extraordinary trends at work today --
> 
> a clear picture of what has changed and what has not, an
> 
> accurate sense of the opportunities that history has put
> 
> before us and a sober appreciation of the dangers that
> 
> remain.Politically, a key issue is how America's role of alliance
> 
> leader -- and indeed our alliances themselves -- will be
> 
> affected, especially in Europe, by a reduced Soviet threat.
> 
> The positive common basis of our alliances -- the defense
> 
> of democratic values -- must be reaffirmed and 
> 
> strengthened. Yet, differences among allies are likely to
> 
> become more evident as the traditional concern for security
> 
> that first brought them together diminishes in intensity.
> 
> We need to consider how the United States and its allies
> 
> can best respond to a new agenda of political challenges --
> 
> such as the troubled evolution of the Soviet Union or the
> 
> volatile Middle East -- in the framework of the moral and
> 
> political values we continue to share.In the realm of military strategy, we confront dangers more
> 
> ambiguous than those we previously faced. What type and
> 
> distribution of forces are needed to combat not a
> 
> particular, poised enemy but the nascent threats of power
> 
> vacuums and regional instabilities? How do we reduce our
> 
> conventional capabilities in ways that ensure we could
> 
> rebuild them faster than an enemy could build a devastating
> 
> new threat against us? How does the proliferation of
> 
> advanced weaponry affect our traditional problem of
> 
> deterrence? How should we think about these new military
> 
> challenges and what capabilities and forces should we
> 
> develop to secure ourselves against them?America will continue to support an international economic
> 
> system as open and inclusive as possible, as the best way
> 
> to strengthen global economic development, political
> 
> stability and the growth of free societies. But how can
> 
> these goals best be attained, especially if they are not
> 
> completely shared by all of our economic competitors? How
> 
> will the end of the Cold War and the increased economic
> 
> strength of our major trading partners influence economic,
> 
> political and even security relationships? In addition to
> 
> working actively to conclude successfully the Uruguay Round
> 
> of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, what other market-
> 
> opening objectives should the United States pursue, and
> 
> with whom should we pursue them?In the emerging post-Cold War world, international
> 
> relations promise to be more complicated, more volatile and
> 
> less predictable. Indeed, of all the mistakes that could be
> 
> made about the security challenges of a new era, the most
> 
> dangerous would be to believe that suddenly the future can
> 
> be predicted with certainty.  The history of the 20th
> 
> century has been replete with surprises, many unwelcome.In many ways, if there is a historical analogy for today's
> 
> strategic environment, it is less the late 1940s than it is
> 
> the 1920s.  In the 1920s, judging that the great threat to
> 
> our interests had collapsed and that no comparable threat
> 
> was evident, the Nation turned inward. That course had near
> 
> disastrous consequences then and it would be even more
> 
> dangerous now. At a time when the world is far more
> 
> interdependent -- economically, technologically,
> 
> environmentally -- any attempt to isolate ourselves
> 
> militarily and politically would be folly.Despite the emergence of new power centers, the United
> 
> States remains the only state with truly global strength,
> 
> reach and influence in every dimension -- political,
> 
> economic and military. In these circumstances, our natural
> 
> desire to share burdens more equitably with newly-strong
> 
> friends does not relieve us of our own responsibilities.America's role is rooted not only in power, but also in
> 
> trust. When, in the aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait,
> 
> the Saudis invited foreign forces onto their soil, King
> 
> Fahd observed:I trust the United States of America. I know that when
> 
> you say you will be committed, you are, in fact,tted. I know that you will stay as long assary to do what has to be done, and I know youleave when you are asked to leave at the end, and
> 
> that you have no ulterior motives.We cannot be the world's policeman with responsibility for
> 
> solving all the world's security problems. But we remain
> 
> the country to whom others turn when in distress. This
> 
> faith in us creates burdens, certainly, and in the Gulf we
> 
> showed that American leadership must include mobilizing the
> 
> world community to share the danger and risk. But the
> 
> failure of others to bear their burden would not excuse us.
> 
> In the end, we are answerable to our own interests and our
> 
> own conscience -- to our ideals and to history -- for what
> 
> we do with the power we have. In the 1990s, as for much of
> 
> this century, there is no substitute for American
> 
> leadership. Our responsibility, even in a new era, is
> 
> pivotal and inescapable.The Gulf crisis interrupted a time of hope. We saw a new
> 
> world coming, a world freer from the threat of terror,
> 
> stronger in the pursuit of justice, more secure in the
> 
> quest for peace. Democracy was gaining ground as were the
> 
> principles of human rights and political and economic
> 
> freedom. This new world is still within reach, perhaps
> 
> brought closer by the unprecedented international
> 
> cooperation achieved in the Gulf crisis.But even after such a success, we face not only the complex
> 
> security issues outlined above, but a new agenda of new
> 
> kinds of security issues. Our national power, for example,
> 
> ultimately rests on the strength and resilience of our
> 
> economy, and our security would be badly served if we
> 
> allowed fiscal irresponsibility at home to erode our
> 
> ability to protect our interests abroad, to aid new
> 
> democracies or to help find solutions to other global
> 
> problems. The scourge of illegal drugs saps our vitality as
> 
> a free people, diverts our energies from more positive
> 
> pursuits and threatens friendly democratic governments now
> 
> plagued by drug traffickers. The environmental depredations
> 
> of Saddam Hussein have underscored that protecting the
> 
> global ecology is a top priority on the agenda of 
> 
> international cooperation -- from extinguishing oil fires
> 
> in Kuwait to preserving the rain forests to solving water
> 
> disputes to assessing climate change. The upheavals of this
> 
> era are also giving rise to human migrations on an
> 
> unprecedented scale, raising a host of social, economic,
> 
> political and moral challenges to the world's nations.A security strategy that takes the Republic safely into the
> 
> next century will tend to these as well as to more
> 
> traditional threats to our safety and well-being.OUR INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE 1990sWe need, then, an approach to security broad enough to
> 
> preserve the basic sources of our national strength and
> 
> focused enough to deal with the very real threats that
> 
> still exist. Such an approach begins with an understanding
> 
> of our basic interests and objectives, interests and
> 
> objectives that even in a new era are enduring:The survival of the United States as a free and independent
> 
> nation, with its fundamental values intact and its
> 
> institutions and people secure.The United States seeks, whenever possible in concert with
> 
> its allies, to:-- deter any aggression that could threaten the security of
> 
> the United States and its allies and -- should deterrence
> 
> fail -- repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on
> 
> terms favorable to the United States, its interests and its
> 
> allies;-- effectively counter threats to the security of the
> 
> United States and its citizens and interests short of armed
> 
> conflict, including the threat of international terrorism;-- improve stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable
> 
> arms control agreements, modernizing our strategic
> 
> deterrent, developing systems capable of defending against
> 
> limited ballistic-missile strikes, and enhancing
> 
> appropriate conventional capabilities;-- promote democratic change in the Soviet Union, while
> 
> maintaining firm policies that discourage any temptation to
> 
> new quests for military advantage;-- foster restraint in global military spending and
> 
> discourage military adventurism;-- prevent the transfer of militarily critical technologies
> 
> and resources to hostile countries or groups, especially
> 
> the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and
> 
> associated high-technology means of delivery; and-- reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States
> 
> by encouraging reduction in foreign production, combatting
> 
> international traffickers and reducing demand at home.A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity
> 
> for individual prosperity and resources for national
> 
> endeavors at home and abroad.National security and economic strength are indivisible. We
> 
> seek to:-- promote a strong, prosperous and competitive U.S.
> 
> economy;-- ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral
> 
> resources, the oceans and space;-- promote an open and expanding international economic
> 
> system, based on market principles, with minimal
> 
> distortions to trade and investment, stable currencies, and
> 
> broadly respected rules for managing and resolving economic
> 
> disputes; and-- achieve cooperative international solutions to key
> 
> environmental challenges, assuring the sustainability and
> 
> environmental security of the planet as well as growth and
> 
> opportunity for all.healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations
> 
> with allies and friendly nations.To build and sustain such relationships, we seek to:-- strengthen and enlarge the commonwealth of free nations
> 
> that share a commitment to democracy and individual rights;-- establish a more balanced partnership with our allies
> 
> and a greater sharing of global leadership and
> 
> responsibilities;-- strengthen international institutions like the United
> 
> Nations to make them more effective in promoting peace,
> 
> world order and political, economic and social progress;-- support Western Europe's historic march toward greater
> 
> economic and political unity, including a European security
> 
> identity within the Atlantic Alliance, and nurture a closer
> 
> relationship between the United States and the European
> 
> Community; and-- work with our North Atlantic allies to help develop the
> 
> processes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
> 
> Europe to bring about reconciliation, security and
> 
> democracy in a Europe whole and free.A stable and secure world, where political and economic
> 
> freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.Our interests are best served in a world in which democracy
> 
> and its ideals are widespread and secure. We seek to:-- maintain stable regional military balances to deter
> 
> those powers that might seek regional dominance;--  promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes;--  promote the growth of free, democratic political
> 
> institutions as the surest guarantors of both human rights
> 
> and economic and social progress;--  aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions
> 
> from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion,
> 
> terrorism and illicit drug trafficking; and--  support aid, trade and investment policies that promote
> 
> economic development and social and political progress.II.  TRENDS IN THE WORLD TODAY:  NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND
> 
> CONCERNSFUNDAMENTAL TRANSFORMATIONSDespite the uncertainties that remain, we see a fundamental
> 
> transformation of the global strategic environment in
> 
> several areas. Our policies and strategy for the decade
> 
> ahead must be designed to adapt to these changes, and to
> 
> shape them in ways that benefit the United States and its
> 
> friends and allies.The Soviet FutureIf Central and Eastern Europe was the scene of the peaceful
> 
> Revolution of 1989, the dramatic story of 1991 is the
> 
> deepening crisis within the Soviet Union.  The old system
> 
> of Communist orthodoxy is discredited, yet its die-hard
> 
> adherents have not given up the struggle against change.
> 
> Fundamental choices -- of multi-party democracy, national
> 
> self-determination and market economic reform -- have been
> 
> postponed too long.  The economy is deteriorating. The
> 
> painful process of establishing new, legitimate political
> 
> and economic institutions has much farther to go.If reform is to succeed, Soviet leaders must move
> 
> decisively to effect institutional change. When invited and
> 
> where appropriate, we will offer our cooperation. But it is
> 
> clearly not in our interest to offer assistance in a way
> 
> that allows the Soviet government to avoid the hard choices
> 
> that in the longer run are the only hope for the people of
> 
> that country. At the July 1991 London Economic Summit, the
> 
> participants announced their support for special associate
> 
> status for the Soviet Union in the IMF and World Bank. This 
> 
> will give the Soviets access to the technical advice they
> 
> need to formulate and implement their reform program.The processes of reform inside the Soviet Union have
> 
> already had a revolutionary impact on Soviet foreign
> 
> policy. With former ideological imperatives giving way to a
> 
> new pragmatism, areas of cooperation have expanded. The end
> 
> of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe was a transforming
> 
> event. Soviet policy toward the unification of Germany was
> 
> constructive. The reduced role of ideology in Soviet
> 
> foreign policy has diminished the importance of many
> 
> developing areas as arenas of conflict with the West.
> 
> Soviet support in the UN Security Council for the
> 
> resolutions against Iraqi aggression was an important
> 
> contribution to the international effort. We are hopeful
> 
> that such cooperation can be expanded. Of course, the
> 
> Soviets would pay a severe political price for any return
> 
> to practices of an earlier era, exploiting regional
> 
> disputes and instabilities for their presumed advantage.Today, the threat of a U.S.-Soviet military conflict is
> 
> lower than at any time since the end of World War 11.  With
> 
> the ongoing withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern
> 
> Europe, the unilateral reductions now underway and the
> 
> recently signed CFE treaty (if faithfully implemented), the
> 
> threat of a sudden, massive offensive against NATO will
> 
> have been eliminated. Despite uncertainty over the Soviet
> 
> internal evolution, any attempt by the Soviets to resolve
> 
> such a threat would require lengthy preparation and be
> 
> enormously costly and virtually impossible to conceal.
> 
> Moreover, the START Treaty signed at the Moscow Summit will
> 
> significantly reduce US and Soviet strategic nuclear
> 
> arsenals.But Soviet military power is hardly becoming irrelevant.
> 
> The Soviet Union is and will remain a military super-power.
> 
> Beyond its modernized strategic arsenal, the Soviet Union's
> 
> conventional forces west of the Urals will dwarf any other
> 
> national force in Europe. While they no longer pose the
> 
> threat of a short-warning, theater-wide offensive, they
> 
> could still pose a potent threat to a single flank or
> 
> region. The size and orientation of Soviet military forces
> 
> must therefore remain critical concerns to the United
> 
> States and the overall health of the European system will
> 
> still require a counterweight to Soviet military strength.It is our responsibility as a government to hedge against
> 
> the uncertainties of the future. Elements of the U.S.-
> 
> Soviet relationship will remain competitive, and there is
> 
> always the danger that confrontations will re-emerge.  Our
> 
> evolving relationship is also not immune to Soviet attempts
> 
> to lay the problems created by decades of domestic tyranny,
> 
> misrule and mismanagement at the feet of "foreign enemies".
> 
> Nor is it immune to the implications of the forceful
> 
> repression of democratic forces, slowing the Soviet Union's
> 
> progress on a road that must be taken if it is to 
> 
> successfully meet the challenges before it. The internal
> 
> order of a state is ultimately reflected in its external
> 
> behavior. We will remain alert to the potential strategic
> 
> consequences of a return to totalitarian policies.The Growing Roles of Germany and JapanOne of the most important and far-reaching strategic
> 
> developments of a new era and a major success of America's
> 
> postwar policy -- is the emergence of Japan and Germany as
> 
> economic and political leaders. The United States has long
> 
> encouraged such a development, and our close ties with
> 
> these democracies have created the climate of reassurance
> 
> necessary for their evolution as stable and powerful
> 
> countries enjoying good relations with their neighbors. As
> 
> these countries assume a greater political role, the health
> 
> of American ties with them -- political, military and
> 
> economic -- will remain crucial to regional and even global
> 
> stability.  These links are not relics of an earlier
> 
> period. They are all the more needed in a new era as these
> 
> countries' roles expand.But we frequently find ourselves competitors -- sometimes
> 
> even bitter competitors -- in the economic arena. These
> 
> frictions must be managed if we are to preserve the
> 
> partnerships that have fostered reconciliation,
> 
> reassurance, democracy and security in the postwar period.
> 
> In this sense, ongoing trade negotiations now share some of
> 
> the strategic importance we have traditionally attached to
> 
> arms talks with the Soviet Union.The Gulf crisis has also reopened, with a new sense of
> 
> urgency, the question of responsibility-sharing -- not only
> 
> with respect to sharing the costs and risks of Gulf
> 
> operations, but also with regard to sharing the costs of
> 
> U.S. forces defending Europe and Japan. Our allies are
> 
> doing more, as befits their economic strength, but the
> 
> issue may grow more acute as we and they adjust to a new
> 
> era.The New EuropeIt is Europe more than any other area that has held the key
> 
> to the global balance in this century, and it is this
> 
> continent more than any other that is experiencing
> 
> fundamental change. The unification of Germany last October
> 
> quickened the pace to a new, more promising era and a
> 
> continent truly whole and free. As Europe is being
> 
> transformed politically, we are also lifting the military
> 
> shadows and fears with which we have lived for nearly half
> 
> a century.All across the Continent, the barriers that once confined
> 
> people and ideas are collapsing. East Europeans are
> 
> determining their own destinies, choosing freedom and
> 
> economic liberty. One by one, the states of Central and 
> 
> Eastern Europe have begun to reclaim the European cultural
> 
> and political tradition that is their heritage. All Soviet
> 
> forces are gone from Czechoslovakia and Hungary and
> 
> withdrawals from Germany and Poland are underway. The
> 
> military capability of the Soviet forces still remaining in
> 
> Eastern Europe is rapidly diminishing and the Warsaw Pact
> 
> has been dissolved.Basic to the new structure of peace we seek to build
> 
> throughout Europe is the continued vitality of the North
> 
> Atlantic Alliance -- the indispensable foundation of
> 
> transatlantic cooperation. To keep the Alliance strong and
> 
> viable in a new environment we must recognize that there
> 
> are important tasks beyond the changed -- but still
> 
> important -- requirement to balance and deter Soviet
> 
> military power. NATO must deter and defend against the
> 
> threat of aggression from any state against the territory
> 
> of a NATO member. NATO will also be essential in promoting
> 
> a stable security environment throughout Europe, an
> 
> environment based on democratic institutions and the
> 
> peaceful resolution of disputes, an environment free of
> 
> intimidation or attempts at hegemony. Finally, NATO still
> 
> serves as an indispensable transatlantic forum for
> 
> consultations on issues that affect common political and
> 
> security interests.  As the European Community heads toward
> 
> the new milestone of a single market by the end of 1992, we
> 
> enter a revolution of relations in the West, perhaps
> 
> ultimately as important strategically as the revolution
> 
> taking place in the East. It is no accident that Europeans
> 
> are contemplating greater West European cohesion in the
> 
> security field, even while preserving the vital
> 
> transatlantic framework. We will work to adapt NATO's
> 
> structures to encompass European desires for a distinct
> 
> security identity within the Alliance and we will encourage
> 
> greater European responsibility for Europe's defense. While
> 
> European governments will naturally take the lead in
> 
> developing their own institutions, these efforts will enjoy
> 
> our full support as long as they strengthen the Alliance.
> 
> We will also work to adapt Alliance command structures to
> 
> new realities -- the reassessment of risks, a new NATO
> 
> strategy, a different force structure -- in ways that
> 
> sustain the unique contribution of NATO's integrated
> 
> military command.The continued freedom, vitality and national independence
> 
> of the new Eastern European democracies are also critical
> 
> to the new structure of peace we seek to build throughout
> 
> Europe. Any reversal of the present positive trend in
> 
> Soviet policy would have serious implications. As the North
> 
> Atlantic allies declared in June: "Our own security is
> 
> inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe.
> 
> The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent
> 
> of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of
> 
> coercion or intimidation are therefore of direct and
> 
> material concern to us." We and our NATO allies have
> 
> established a program of contacts with the militaries of 
> 
> these states to support military establishments that will
> 
> sustain newly won freedoms and we have extended our
> 
> bilateral International Military Education and Training
> 
> (IMET) program to strengthen military professionalism and
> 
> to promote the principle of civilian oversight of the armed
> 
> forces.It is important that we not let euphoria over the easing of
> 
> East-West confrontation blind us to the potential security
> 
> problems within a new Europe. Historical enmities in
> 
> Western Europe have been largely consigned to the past but
> 
> disputes between and among some Eastern European states and
> 
> ethnic groups appear to have been merely frozen in time by
> 
> decades of Cold War. In the interwar period, the politics
> 
> of these states were often dominated by economic hardship,
> 
> competing nationalisms and overlapping territorial claims.
> 
> We have reason to be more hopeful today, but security
> 
> problems could emerge in the East in the course of the
> 
> 1990s. The powerful centrifugal forces in Yugoslavia are
> 
> particularly worrisome.The overall structure of peace in Europe must be made solid
> 
> enough to withstand the turmoil that looms ahead. We need
> 
> to develop the processes and principles of the Conference
> 
> on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and perhaps
> 
> other mechanisms to ease ethnic and national tensions and
> 
> to dampen and resolve conflicts.Europe also may be about to face a new problem, not new in
> 
> kind, but in scope: mass migrations and flows of refugees
> 
> in response to the breakdown of the communist world and the
> 
> magnetic attraction of Western European prosperity. From
> 
> the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, from North Africa and
> 
> the Near East, we could see thousands fleeing economic
> 
> hardship and seeking a better life. For Western European
> 
> countries, there could be enormous economic, social and
> 
> political strains -- an unprecedented challenge to the new
> 
> Europe, testing its moral and political character.REGIONAL TRENDSWhile Europe remains a central strategic arena, the Gulf
> 
> crisis reminded us how much our interests can be affected
> 
> in other regions as well.As the effects of the Cold War recede, regional disputes
> 
> are less likely automatically to be perceived as part of a
> 
> permanent -- frequently dangerous, sometimes violent --
> 
> global competition, thus allowing broader international
> 
> cooperation in their resolution.Less happily, in some regions this overall positive trend
> 
> could unleash local, destructive forces that were formerly
> 
> kept in check. As we saw in the Gulf, there is the danger
> 
> of locally dominant powers, armed with modern weaponry and
> 
> ancient ambitions, threatening the world's hope for a new 
> 
> era of cooperation. We see regimes that have made
> 
> themselves champions of regional radicalism, states that
> 
> are all too vulnerable to such pressures, governments that
> 
> refuse to recognize one another, and countries that have
> 
> claims on one another's territory -- some with significant
> 
> military capabilities and a history of recurring war. A key
> 
> task for the future will be maintaining regional balances
> 
> and resolving such disputes before they erupt in military
> 
> conflict.If the end of the Cold War lives up to its promise and
> 
> liberates U.S. policy from many of its earlier concerns, we
> 
> should be able to concentrate more on enhancing security --
> 
> in the developing world, particularly through means that
> 
> are more political, social and economic than military. We
> 
> must recognize the stark fact that our hopeful new era
> 
> still has within it dislocations and dangers that threaten
> 
> the fragile shoots of democracy and progress that have
> 
> recently emerged.  Malnutrition, illiteracy and poverty put
> 
> dangerous pressures on democratic institutions as hungry,
> 
> uneducated or poorly housed citizens are ripe for
> 
> radicalization by movements of the left and the right. Our
> 
> response to need and turmoil must increasingly emphasize
> 
> the strengthening of democracy, and a long-term investment
> 
> in the development of human resources and the structures of
> 
> free markets and free governments. Such measures are an
> 
> investment in our own security as well as a response to the
> 
> demands of simple justice.The Western HemisphereNowhere is this more true than in our own hemisphere, where
> 
> our fundamental aims are to deepen the sense of partnership
> 
> and common interest.Latin Americans have long argued that U.S. interest has
> 
> waxed and waned with the rise and fall of extrahemispheric
> 
> threats to regional security. Our policy has sought to
> 
> allay these fears, as it is founded on the principle of a
> 
> common destiny and mutual responsibility. The Western
> 
> Hemisphere is all the more significant to the United States
> 
> in light of today's global trends, political and economic.The resurgence of democracy, the worldwide phenomenon that
> 
> is such an inspiration to us, is heading toward a dramatic
> 
> achievement -- a completely democratic hemisphere. This
> 
> drive gained momentum last year with the election of
> 
> democratic governments in Nicaragua and Haiti, the
> 
> restoration of democracy in Panama, and several other
> 
> democratic elections. The electoral defeat of the
> 
> Sandinista government in Nicaragua is especially noteworthy
> 
> as it has led to the end of Soviet and Cuban military
> 
> assistance, thereby increasing the security of all of
> 
> Central America. The United States has provided political
> 
> and economic support for the new government and its program
> 
> for reconstruction and long-term development. Despite these 
> 
> successes, we realize that democratic institutions in much
> 
> of LatinEast Asia and the PacificEast Asia and the Pacific are home to some of the world's
> 
> most economically and politically dynamic societies. The
> 
> region also includes some of the last traditional Communist
> 
> regimes on the face of the globe.  Regional hotspots
> 
> tragically persist on the Korean peninsula and in Cambodia,
> 
> and there are territorial disputes in which progress is
> 
> long overdue, including the Soviet Union's continued
> 
> occupation of Japan's Northern Territories.In this complex environment, an era of Soviet adventurism
> 
> is on the ebb, even while its effects linger. This is
> 
> placing new stresses on Vietnam, Cambodia and North Korea
> 
> as Soviet military and economic aid declines and Moscow
> 
> seeks to improve relations with Seoul, Tokyo and other
> 
> capitals. China is coming to view its neighbors in a new
> 
> light, and is gradually adjusting to a changing perception
> 
> of the Soviet threat.Through a web of bilateral relationships, the United States
> 
> has pursued throughout the postwar period a policy of
> 
> engagement in support of the stability and security that
> 
> are prerequisites to economic and political progress. U.S.
> 
> power remains welcome in key states in the region, who
> 
> recognize the pivotal role we continue to play in the
> 
> regional balance. We remain a key factor of reassurance and
> 
> stability. By ensuring freedom of the seas through naval
> 
> and air strength and by offering these capabilities as a
> 
> counterweight in the region's power equations, we are
> 
> likely to remain welcome in an era of shifting patterns and
> 
> possible as new frictions.Today's basically healthy conditions cannot be taken for
> 
> granted. We will continue to be a beacon for democracy and
> 
> human rights. We will meet our responsibilities in the
> 
> security field. We will also remain actively engaged in
> 
> promoting free and expanding markets through Asian Pacific
> 
> Economic Cooperation, recognizing that economic progress is
> 
> a major ingredient in Asia's political stability and
> 
> democratic progress.As noted earlier, our alliance with Japan remains of
> 
> enormous strategic importance. Our hope is to see the U.S.-
> 
> Japan global partnership extend beyond its traditional
> 
> confines and into fields like refugee relief, non-
> 
> proliferation and the environment.  On the Korean
> 
> peninsula, we and the Republic of Korea seek to persuade
> 
> North Korea of the benefit of confidence-building measures
> 
> as a first step to lasting peace and reunification. We
> 
> firmly believe that true stability can only be achieved
> 
> through direct North- South talks. At the same time, the
> 
> United States remains committed to the security of the 
> 
> Republic of Korea as it continues to open its economic and
> 
> political systems. We are increasingly concerned about
> 
> North Korea's failure to observe its obligations under the
> 
> Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and consider this to be
> 
> the most pressing security issue on the peninsula.China, like the Soviet Union, poses a complex challenge as
> 
> it proceeds inexorably toward major systemic change.
> 
> China's inward focus and struggle to achieve stability will
> 
> not preclude increasing interaction with its neighbors as
> 
> trade and technology advance. Consultations and contact
> 
> with China will be central features of our policy, lest we
> 
> intensify the isolation that shields repression. Change is
> 
> inevitable in China, and our links with China must endure.The United States maintains strong, unofficial, substantive
> 
> relations with Taiwan where rapid economic and political
> 
> change is underway. One of our goals is to foster an
> 
> environment in which Taiwan and the Peoples Republic of
> 
> China can pursue a constructive and peaceful interchange
> 
> across the Taiwan Strait.In Southeast Asia, there is renewed hope for a settlement
> 
> in Cambodia. Only through resolution of the conflict in
> 
> Cambodia can there be the promise of our restoring normal
> 
> relations with that beleaguered nation and with Vietnam.
> 
> Hanoi and Phnom Penh have sadly delayed the day when they
> 
> can enjoy normal ties with us or their Southeast Asian
> 
> neighbors.  Of course, the pace and scope of our actions
> 
> will also be directly affected by steps that are taken to
> 
> resolve the fate of Americans still unaccounted for. The
> 
> resolution of this issue remains one of our highest
> 
> priorities.Even with the loss of Clark Air Base, we remain committed
> 
> to helping the Philippines make a success of its new
> 
> democracy and to fulfilling our legitimate defense function
> 
> there as allies and equals. In the South Pacific, we are
> 
> demonstrating renewed interest in and assistance for the
> 
> island states. Australia retains its special position as a
> 
> steadfast ally and key Pacific partner. We look forward to
> 
> the day when New Zealand will choose to resume its
> 
> responsibilities to the ANZUS alliance and rejoin Australia
> 
> and the United States in this important regional structure.The Middle East and South AsiaThe reversal of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was a
> 
> watershed event. Nonetheless, our basic policy toward the
> 
> region shows powerful continuity. American strategic
> 
> concerns still include promoting stability and the security
> 
> of our friends, maintaining a free flow of oil, curbing the
> 
> proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
> 
> missiles, discouraging destabilizing conventional arms
> 
> sales, countering terrorism and encouraging a peace process
> 
> that brings about reconciliation between Israel and the 
> Arab states as well as between Palestinians and Israel in a
> 
> manner consonant with our enduring commitment to Israel's
> 
> security.The regional environment since Desert Storm presents new
> 
> challenges and new opportunities. Even as we provide badly
> 
> needed relief and protection to refugees, we will work to
> 
> bring about greater security and a lasting peace.--  We will help states in the Middle East to fashionnal security arrangements that bolster deterrencencourage the peaceful resolution of disputes.--  We will work with parties inside and outside the region
> 
> to change the destructive pattern of military competition
> 
> and proliferation. This will involve confidence-building
> 
> and arms control measures as well as more global forms of
> 
> control over the supply of arms, especially weapons of massuction and the means to deliver them.--  We will encourage economic reconstruction and recovery,
> 
> using the political and economic strengths of the
> 
> victorious coalition to support economic openness and
> 
> cooperation. We will also encourage regional states to
> 
> evolve toward greater political participation and respect
> 
> for human rights.--  We will continue the effort to bring about a
> 
> comprehensive peace and true reconciliation between Israel
> 
> and the Arab states and between Israel and the
> 
> Palestinians.--  We will continue to demand that Iraq comply fully and
> 
> unconditionally with all relevant UN resolutions, including
> 
> Security Council Resolution 687 and its stipulation that
> 
> Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile-
> 
> related facilities be destroyed.--  We remain open to an improved relationship with Iran.
> 
> However, meaningful improvement can only occur after Iran
> 
> makes clear it is lending no support to hostage-taking or
> 
> other forms of terrorism.--  We will also continue to monitor Libyan behavior,
> 
> including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass
> 
> destruction and attempts to destabilize neighboring
> 
> governments.In South Asia, as elsewhere, we strongly believe that
> 
> security is best served by resolving disputes through
> 
> negotiations rather than military pressure. The dangers of
> 
> intermediate-range missile deployments and nuclear
> 
> proliferation in the sub-continent persist, however, and
> 
> this year we were unable to certify Pakistan's nuclear
> 
> program under the Pressler Amendment. We will continue to
> 
> encourage Indo-Pakistani rapprochement and the adoption of 
> 
> confidence-building measures and other concrete steps to
> 
> moderate their military competition. We also remain
> 
> committed to achieving a comprehensive political settlement
> 
> in Afghanistan.AfricaThe end of the Cold war should benefit Africa in that it
> 
> will no longer be seen as a battleground for superpower
> 
> conflict. In a world at peace, more attention and resources
> 
> should be freed to help the world's poorest.  Nonetheless,
> 
> many Africans now fear that the outside world will lose
> 
> interest in their troubled continent, just at the moment
> 
> when many negative trends from economic decline to AIDS to
> 
> environmental degradation are likely to accelerate.In a continent as diverse as Africa, democracy -- as it
> 
> emerges, reemerges, or begins its development -- may take
> 
> different forms, and its progress will be uneven.  But we
> 
> need not be inhibited in supporting values that have proved
> 
> universal -- political and human rights, democratic limits
> 
> on the powers of government, judicial independence, free
> 
> press and free speech. To those who think these goals are
> 
> out of reach because of Africa's poverty and disparate
> 
> cultures, we say that democracy remains the political
> 
> system most open to cultural diversity and most conducive
> 
> to economic advance. Freedom, in its universal meaning, is
> 
> Africa's birthright as much as it is anyone else's.In the economic realm, hope lies in reducing the burden of
> 
> statism and encouraging indigenous enterprise and human
> 
> talent, especially in agriculture. The most important steps
> 
> are those that must be taken by Africans themselves.
> 
> Concepts of democracy and market economics must be applied
> 
> in a continent where initially these concepts were rejected
> 
> because socialism was fashionable. That failed experiment
> 
> has now run its course, and political elites across Africa
> 
> are rediscovering basic truths about political and economic
> 
> freedom as the source of progress. We need to support this
> 
> growing realism, which recognizes the failures from the
> 
> past and which has produced pragmatic new leaders ready to
> 
> move in new directions. Benign neglect will not suffice.Africa is not without its beacons of hope. The efforts of
> 
> white and black leaders in South Africa to move that
> 
> country into a democratic, constitutional, post-apartheid
> 
> era merit our active support and we have provided it. We
> 
> have made clear our firm and enthusiastic support for the
> 
> brave endeavor on which they have embarked.Elsewhere in Africa, we can be proud of the role we played
> 
> in bringing to an end civil wars in Angola and Ethiopia. We
> 
> continue to play an active role in helping to resolve other
> 
> conflicts such as those in Liberia and Mozambique.Africa is now entering an age in which it can benefit from
> 
> past mistakes and build a realistic, self-sustaining
> 
> future. It is in our interest, for political as well as
> 
> humanitarian reasons, to help that process.III.  RELATING MEANS TO ENDS:  A POLITICAL AGENDA FOR THE
> 
> 1990SALLIANCES, COALITIONS AND A NEW UNITED NATIONSOur first priority in foreign policy remains solidarity
> 
> with our allies and friends. The stable foundation of our
> 
> security will continue to be a common effort with peoples
> 
> with whom we share fundamental moral and political values
> 
> and security interests. Those nations with whom we are
> 
> bound by alliances will continue to be our closest partners
> 
> in building a new world order.As our response to the Gulf crisis demonstrated, our
> 
> leadership in a new era must also include a broader concept
> 
> of international community and international diplomacy. If
> 
> tensions with the Soviet Union continue to ease, we will
> 
> face more ambiguous -- but still serious -- challenges. It
> 
> will be difficult to foresee where future crises will
> 
> arise. In many cases they will involve states not part of
> 
> one or another bloc. Increasingly we may find ourselves in
> 
> situations in which our interests are congruent with those
> 
> of nations not tied to us by formal treaties. As in the
> 
> Gulf, we may be acting in hybrid coalitions that include
> 
> not only traditional allies but also nations with whom we
> 
> do not have a mature history of diplomatic and military
> 
> cooperation or, indeed, even a common political or moral
> 
> outlook.  This will require flexibility in our diplomacy
> 
> and military policy, without losing sight of the
> 
> fundamental values which that diplomacy and policy are
> 
> designed to protect and on which they are based. To this
> 
> end, we are well served to strengthen the role of
> 
> international organizations like the United Nations.For over 40 years political differences, bloc politics and
> 
> demagogic rhetoric have kept the UN from reaching the full
> 
> potential envisioned by its founders. Now we see the UN
> 
> beginning to act as it was designed, freed from the
> 
> superpower antagonisms that often frustrated consensus,
> 
> less hobbled by the ritualistic anti-Americanism that so
> 
> often weakened its credibility.The response of the UN to Iraq's unprovoked aggression
> 
> against a member state has truly vindicated and rejuvenated
> 
> the institution. But even before that, the UN had
> 
> distinguished itself in fostering democratic change in
> 
> Namibia and Nicaragua. In the near future, we hope to see
> 
> it play a constructive role in Afghanistan, Cambodia, the
> 
> Western Sahara, El Salvador and elsewhere, assisting with
> 
> elections and the return of displaced persons, as well as
> 
> with peace-keeping.The role of the UN in improving the human condition and
> 
> ameliorating human suffering -- development, aid to
> 
> refugees, education, disaster relief -- will continue to
> 
> attract our leadership and resources. High on our agenda
> 
> for international cooperation are the global challenges
> 
> posed by illegal drugs, terrorism and degradation of the
> 
> environment.The costs of a world organization that can effectively
> 
> carry out these missions are already significant and will
> 
> increase as new tasks are undertaken. We have re-stated our
> 
> intention to pay in full our annual assessments and are now
> 
> paying arrearages. We intend to complete arrearages
> 
> payments no later than 1995 and to pay our share of any new
> 
> peacekeeping requirements. In voluntary funding, we will
> 
> pay our fair share and encourage others to do the same.THE CONTEST OF IDEAS AND THE NURTURING OF DEMOCRACYRecent history has shown how much ideas count. The Cold War
> 
> was, in its decisive aspect, a war of ideas. But ideas
> 
> count only when knowledge spreads. In today's evolving
> 
> political environment, and in the face of the global
> 
> explosion of information, we must make clear to our friends
> 
> and potential adversaries what we stand for.The need for international understanding among different
> 
> peoples, cultures, religions and forms of government will
> 
> only grow. In a world without the clear-cut East-West
> 
> divisions of the past, the flow of ideas and information
> 
> will take on larger significance as once-isolated countries
> 
> seek their way toward the international mainstream. Indeed,
> 
> information access has already achieved global proportions.
> 
> A truly global community is being formed, vindicating our
> 
> democratic values.Through broadcasts, academic and cultural exchanges, press
> 
> briefings, publications, speakers and conferences, we
> 
> engage those abroad in a dialogue about who and what we are
> 
> -- to inform foreign audiences about our policies,
> 
> democratic traditions, pluralistic society and rich
> 
> academic and cultural diversity. We will increase our
> 
> efforts to clarify what America has to contribute to the
> 
> solution of global problems -- and to drive home
> 
> democracy's place in this process.ARMS CONTROL
> 
> Arms control is an important component of a balanced
> 
> strategy to ameliorate the deadly consequences of global
> 
> tensions as well as to reduce their fundamental causes. Our
> 
> goal remains agreements that will enhance the security of
> 
> the United States and its allies while strengthening
> 
> international stability by:--  reducing military capabilities that could provide
> 
> incentives to initiate attack;--  enhancing predictability in the size and structure of
> 
> forces in order to reduce the fear of aggressive intent;--  ensuring confidence in compliance, through effective
> 
> verification.Our pursuit of these goals has profited from the recent,
> 
> positive changes in East-West relations. With renewed
> 
> commitment to conscientious implementation and the
> 
> resolution of remaining issues, we are within reach of
> 
> completing an arms control agenda that few imagined
> 
> possible.Much has already been accomplished. Within the past year we
> 
> and the Soviets have agreed to cease production of chemical
> 
> weapons and to destroy, using safe and environmentally-
> 
> sound procedures, the vast majority of our chemical weapons
> 
> stocks. We have agreed to new protocols to treaties on
> 
> limiting underground nuclear weapons tests and nuclear
> 
> explosions for peaceful purposes, incorporating
> 
> unprecedented on-site verification of compliance with the
> 
> limits set by the treaties. At the Paris Summit last
> 
> November, the United States, the Soviet Union and the other
> 
> nations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
> 
> Europe (CSCE) endorsed new measures to promote transparency
> 
> in military dispositions and practices.Also in Paris, the United States, our North Atlantic
> 
> allies, the states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
> 
> signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
> 
> (CFE), a historic agreement that will establish numerical
> 
> parity in major conventional armaments between East and
> 
> West from the Atlantic to the Urals.  The treaty will
> 
> require thousands of weapons to be destroyed and includes
> 
> unprecedented monitoring provisions. Submitting the treaty
> 
> to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification
> 
> was delayed by Soviet claims made after the treaty was
> 
> signed -- that some of its ground force equipment held by
> 
> units like naval infantry and coastal defense was not
> 
> covered by the agreement. The satisfactory resolution of
> 
> this question has opened the way for us to move forward.Soviet behavior on CFE complicated the completion of a
> 
> Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. However, during the London
> 
> Economic Summit, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev were able to
> 
> overcome the last few obstacles on START, ending nine long
> 
> years of difficult, technical negotiations. Signed in
> 
> Moscow, this agreement will mark a fundamental milestone in
> 
> reducing the risk of nuclear war-stabilizing the balance of
> 
> strategic forces at lower levels, providing for significant
> 
> reductions in the most threatening weapons and encouraging
> 
> a shift toward strategic systems better suited for
> 
> retaliation than for a first strike.Our efforts to improve strategic stability will not stop
> 
> here. We and the Soviets have pledged further efforts to
> 
> enhance strategic stability and reduce the risk of nuclear
> 
> war. We will seek agreements that improve survivability,
> 
> remove incentives for a nuclear first strike and implement
> 
> an appropriate relationship between strategic offenses and
> 
> defenses. In particular, we will pursue Soviet agreement to
> 
> permit the deployment of defenses designed to address the
> 
> threat of limited ballistic missile strikes, a growing
> 
> mutual concern. We are also consulting with our NATO allies
> 
> on the framework that will guide the United States in
> 
> future discussions with the Soviet Union on the reduction
> 
> of short-range nuclear forces in Europe.The United States has long supported international
> 
> agreements designed to promote openness and freedom of
> 
> navigation on the high seas. Over the past year, however,
> 
> the Soviet Union has intensified efforts to restrict naval
> 
> forces in ways contrary to internationally recognized
> 
> rights of access. We will continue to reject such
> 
> proposals. As a maritime nation, with our dependence on the
> 
> sea to preserve legitimate security and commercial ties,
> 
> freedom of the seas is and will remain a vital interest. We
> 
> will not agree to measures that would limit the ability of
> 
> our Navy to protect that interest, nor will we permit a
> 
> false equation to be drawn between our Navy and regional
> 
> ground-force imbalances that are inherently destabilizing.
> 
> Recent events in the Gulf, Liberia, Somalia and elsewhere
> 
> show that American seapower, without arbitrary limits on
> 
> its force structure or operations, makes a strong
> 
> contribution to global stability and mutual security.STEMMING PROLIFERATIONAs we put the main elements of European and East-West arms
> 
> control into place, attention will increasingly turn to
> 
> other regional and global arms control objectives. None is
> 
> more urgent than stopping the global proliferation of
> 
> nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as the
> 
> missiles to deliver them.The Gulf crisis drove home several lessons about this
> 
> challenge:--  International agreements, while essential, cannot cope
> 
> with the problem alone. Iraq is a party to both the 1925
> 
> Geneva Protocol and the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation
> 
> Treaty (NPT).  Notwithstanding its treaty obligations, Iraq
> 
> has used chemical weapons and pursued nuclear ambitions.--  Export controls must be strengthened. Chemical weapons
> 
> facilities in Libya and Iraq received technology and
> 
> equipment from Western companies.  Iraq used the deadly
> 
> product of its facilities against its own people. Iraqi and
> 
> several other nations' nuclear efforts and missile programs
> 
> have also benefited from outside assistance.--  A successful non-proliferation strategy must address
> 
> the underlying security concerns that drive the quest to
> 
> obtain advanced weapons and must encompass contingency
> 
> planning to deal with these weapons should prevention fail.We are pursuing a three-tiered non-proliferation strategy:
> 
> to strengthen existing arrangements; to expand the
> 
> membership of multilateral regimes directed against
> 
> proliferation; and to pursue new initiatives -- such as the
> 
> Chemical Weapons Convention and the initiative the
> 
> President launched in May for the Middle East.This latter effort reflects all the elements of our non-
> 
> proliferation strategy. It includes promising new
> 
> approaches, such as a proposed set of guidelines for
> 
> responsible conventional weapons transfers to the region
> 
> and a proposal to freeze acquisition, production and
> 
> testing of surface-to-surface missiles. It also seeks to
> 
> expand the membership of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and
> 
> the Biological Weapons Convention, and to strengthen the
> 
> application of these and other agreements where they are
> 
> already in force.In other areas, we have already tightened export controls,
> 
> streamlining export-licensing procedures while taking full
> 
> account of security needs. New standards will ensure that
> 
> the export of supercomputers will be subject to stringent
> 
> safeguards against misuse. Criminal penalties and other
> 
> sanctions against those who contribute to proliferation
> 
> will be expanded.To thwart the export of chemical and biological weapon-
> 
> related materials and technology, we have expanded our own
> 
> controls over precursor chemicals and proposed stringent
> 
> international controls, recognizing that only multilateral
> 
> measures will be truly effective in a competitive global
> 
> marketplace. This multilateral approach bore fruit in the
> 
> twenty-nation Australia Group of major chemical suppliers,
> 
> which agreed in May to control common lists of chemical
> 
> weapon precursors and equipment usable in chemical weapons
> 
> manufacture. The best non-proliferation measure, of course,
> 
> would be a completed Chemical Weapons Convention.Our efforts to stem the proliferation of threatening
> 
> missiles center on the multinational Missile Technology
> 
> Control Regime (MTCR), strengthened last year by the
> 
> inclusion of several new members. Since missile
> 
> proliferation efforts will surely persist, we and our MTCR
> 
> partners must improve controls, broaden membership further
> 
> and reinforce the emerging international consensus against
> 
> the spread of missile technology.In the nuclear sphere, last year's review conference of the
> 
> Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty produced a large measure
> 
> of consensus that the NPT remains essential to global
> 
> stability, although intransigence by a few delegations
> 
> blocked unanimous agreement to a final conference
> 
> declaration. The United States remains steadfast in support
> 
> of the NPT and the International Atomic Energy Agency
> 
> (IAEA), which provides technical assistance for civilian
> 
> uses of nuclear energy while safeguarding materials
> 
> essential for the development of nuclear weapons. Although
> 
> trouble spots remain, progress has been made. Iraqi nuclear
> 
> efforts have been set back substantially, while the UN
> 
> Special Commission implementing Security Council Resolution
> 
> 687 seeks dismantlement of all nuclear weapon-related
> 
> activities in Iraq.  Argentina and Brazil have agreed to
> 
> accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities and
> 
> to take steps toward bringing into force the Treaty of
> 
> Tlatelolco, which creates a Latin American nuclear-weapons-
> 
> free zone. Agreement by India and Pakistan to ban attacks
> 
> on each other's nuclear facilities also helped ease the
> 
> tense nuclear rivalry in that part of the world.The proliferation of advanced weapons poses an ominous
> 
> challenge to global peace and stability. To meet it, we
> 
> will work with our allies to address the causes of strife
> 
> while curbing exports to builders of weapons of mass
> 
> destruction.INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMSThe unprecedented scope and pace of change in today's world
> 
> -- and the increasing number of actors now able to threaten
> 
> global peace -- highlight the need for reliable information
> 
> and a sophisticated understanding of events and trends. The
> 
> global reach of American intelligence capabilities is a
> 
> unique national asset, crucial not only to our own
> 
> security, but also to our leadership role in responding to
> 
> international challenges.The Soviet Union necessarily remains a major concern of
> 
> U.S. policy. While changes in the Soviet Union promise
> 
> hope, the turbulence of change itself demands that we
> 
> monitor events and assess prospects for the future. Our
> 
> monitoring of Soviet military capabilities and the
> 
> effective verification of arms control treaties will remain
> 
> the bedrock of any effort to build confidence and a safer
> 
> world.In a new era there are also new tasks and new priorities.
> 
> Regional turmoil will place growing burdens on intelligence
> 
> collection, processing and analysis. At the same time, we
> 
> must track the threats posed by narcotics trafficking,
> terrorism and the proliferation of advanced weapons. We
> 
> must also be more fully aware of international financial,
> 
> trade and technology trends that could affect the security
> 
> of the United States, including its economic well-being.Sweeping political and economic changes also make for a
> 
> more challenging counterintelligence environment. Warmer
> 
> relations between the United States and former adversaries
> 
> will open new opportunities for the intelligence services
> 
> of those countries. Growing international economic
> 
> competition and potential regional instabilities vastly
> 
> broaden the scope of the potential intelligence threat. Our
> 
> traditional openness, combined with recent changes in
> 
> immigration laws and the sheer volume of information flow
> 
> in the United States, affords great access to sensitive
> 
> information and facilities as well as to individuals who
> 
> may be targets for intelligence collection.ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASSISTANCEForeign assistance is a vital instrument of American
> 
> foreign policy. Now as we look forward to expanded
> 
> cooperation with our prosperous fellow democracies, with a
> 
> growing number of regional organizations and with a
> 
> revitalized United Nations -- we are revisiting the
> 
> direction and priorities of our foreign assistance program.
> 
> We will focus our efforts and resources on five major
> 
> challenges:--  Promoting and consolidating democratic values: Our
> 
> programs will be an increasingly valuable instrument for
> 
> fostering political choice, human rights and self-
> 
> determination. From  Central America to South Africa to
> 
> Eastern Europe, we have used our influence to advance these
> 
> universal goals.--  Promoting market principles: U.S. assistance must
> 
> encourage economic reform and sustainable development.
> 
> Multilaterally -- through institutions like the
> 
> International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the
> 
> General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade -- we foster
> 
> policies that break down statist barriers to enterprise and
> 
> unleash the productive forces within every society.--  Promoting peace: The bonds of collective defense can be
> 
> strengthened through economic and security assistance. Such
> 
> programs allow friendly states to achieve the security and
> 
> stability essential for political freedom and economic
> 
> growth. They are also an indispensable tool in cementing
> 
> our alliance relationships enhancing interoperability,
> 
> promoting needed access and reaping goodwill.--  Protecting against transnational threats: International
> 
> terrorism, narcotics, AIDS and environmental degradation
> 
> threaten all peaceful nations. Our aid helps combat these
> 
> dangers.--  Meeting urgent human needs. We will respond quickly and
> 
> substantially to the suffering caused by natural or man-
> 
> made disasters.Managed wisely, our aid programs can play a key role in
> 
> fostering a world order that comports with our fundamental
> 
> values. But we must ensure that our resources are adequate,
> 
> that our programs pursue well-defined goals, and that we
> 
> retain the flexibility to respond to change and unforeseen
> 
> requirements and opportunities.  The changes we have
> 
> recently proposed to the Foreign Assistance Act will
> 
> eliminate obsolete and inconsistent provisions and set a
> 
> solid foundation for cooperation with the Congress on a
> 
> program that can respond to fast-moving events in the world
> 
> as quickly as they occur. Such reform is urgently needed if
> 
> our aid program is to be relevant to today's necessities.ILLICIT DRUGSThe international trade in drugs is a major threat to our
> 
> national security. No threat does more damage to our
> 
> national values and institutions, and the domestic violence
> 
> generated by the trade in drugs is all too familiar.
> 
> Trafficking organizations undermine the sovereign
> 
> governments of our friends and weaken and distort national
> 
> economies with a vast, debilitating black market and large
> 
> funding requirements for enforcement, criminal justice,
> 
> prevention and treatment systems. Demand reduction at home
> 
> and an aggressive attack on the international drug trade
> 
> are the main elements in our strategy. They must be pursued
> 
> together.During the 1990s, cocaine traffickers will likely try to
> 
> develop new markets in Europe -- particularly in light of
> 
> the impending relaxation of border controls between EC
> 
> countries -- and in those nations of East Asia experiencing
> 
> rapid economic growth. We can also expect increasingly
> 
> energetic efforts to import cocaine and heroin into the
> 
> United States, including the use of longer-range aircraft
> 
> entering U.S. airspace via Canada and of drug-laden cargo
> 
> containers transshipped to the United States via Europe and
> 
> the Pacific. Renewed assaults on the U.S. market by
> 
> increasingly sophisticated traffickers remind us of the
> 
> need to also attack the drug trade at the source -- its
> 
> home country base of operations.Such an effort begins with bolstering the political
> 
> commitment of drug producer and transit countries to
> 
> strengthen their laws, legal institutions and programs to
> 
> prosecute, punish, and -- where appropriate -- extradite
> 
> drug traffickers and money launderers. In the Andean
> 
> region, where most of the world's cocaine is cultivated and
> 
> refined, we seek to enhance the effectiveness of host-
> 
> nation law enforcement and military activities against
> 
> powerful and well entrenched trafficking organizations, and
> 
> to increase public and leadership awareness of the drug
> 
> threat. Our trade, aid and investment programs aim to
> 
> strengthen and diversify the legitimate economies of the
> 
> drug- producing Andean nations to enable them to overcome
> 
> the destabilizing effects of eliminating coca and its
> 
> derivatives, major sources of income. Our heroin strategy
> 
> will foster cooperation with other countries, to engage
> 
> their resources to dismantle their own cultivation and
> 
> refining industries, and reduce demand for drugs. We will
> 
> solicit the assistance of others in influencing producers
> 
> to whom we have limited access.IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEESAs a nation founded by immigrants and refugees, the United
> 
> States has a strong tradition of taking in those who flee
> 
> persecution and seek a better life. We open our doors
> 
> annually to tens of thousands of refugees and hundreds of
> 
> thousands of immigrants, welcoming both for the diversity
> 
> and strength they bring the Nation. We also have a
> 
> commitment to help the uprooted who are in danger or in
> 
> need, a commitment demonstrated in the past several months
> 
> by our role in the international effort to assist Iraqi
> 
> refugees and our reaching out to Africans and others.In 1990 the United States welcomed refugees from all
> 
> regions of the world. As in the past several years, the
> 
> majority came from the Soviet Union and Asia. In Vietnam,
> 
> we are dismayed by continued human rights abuses. Hanoi is,
> 
> however, allowing former political prisoners to emigrate.
> 
> The United States resettled 14,000 former political
> 
> prisoners and their family members from Vietnam in 1990 and
> 
> the number will increase this year. But we cannot take in
> 
> everyone. We must look to other countries to be more
> 
> receptive to those in need. Nor can the United States
> 
> Government fund and provide for every refugee in this
> 
> country. As in the past, our private sector has an
> 
> important role to play.As noted earlier, economic hardship, political uncertainty
> 
> and ethnic strife may generate large numbers of refugees in
> 
> Europe. Some will be true refugees and others will be
> 
> economic migrants, those who move to escape economic
> 
> misery. Though international responses must differ between
> 
> these two categories -- to be able to protect those who
> 
> flee persecution and may be in physical danger -- the
> 
> world's nations must be ready to respond quickly and
> 
> humanely to both.
> 
> For 16 million refugees worldwide, the United States offers
> 
> assistance through international programs and recognizes
> 
> the critical role of nongovernmental organizations in
> 
> providing care. Our budgeted refugee assistance levels have
> 
> increased, and we will do our fair share. We will also meet
> 
> our responsibility to search for diplomatic solutions to
> 
> the problems that spawn refugee flows.A period of turmoil and transition is often a period of
> 
> dislocation. If our diplomatic efforts and our aid programs
> 
> prove inadequate, the volume of refugees and migrants will
> 
> be an index of our failure. The world community will need
> 
> to be prepared.IV.  RELATING MEANS TO ENDS:  AN ECONOMIC AGENDA FOR THE
> 
> 1990SEvents of the past year have reaffirmed the critical link
> 
> between the strength and flexibility of the U.S. economy
> 
> and our ability to achieve national objectives.  Indeed,
> 
> strong macroeconomic performance on the part of the United
> 
> States is not only an economic objective but a prerequisite
> 
> for maintaining a position of global political leadership.ECONOMIC CHALLENGESEven as we now see a transformation of the global economy
> 
> along lines consistent with policies we nave pursued for
> 
> many years, new challenges -- the crisis in the Gulf and
> 
> its aftermath, the political and economic transformation in
> 
> Eastern Europe and potentially in the Soviet Union, the
> 
> resurgence of democracy and market economies in Central and
> 
> South America -- have placed new demands on our management
> 
> of economic policy. We must ensure that our domestic
> 
> economy and our economic involvement abroad are responsive
> 
> to a changing economic landscape.Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and actions taken by the
> 
> international coalition to resist Iraqi aggression,
> 
> especially tested our economic strength and our ability to
> 
> help manage international economic forces. Economies around
> 
> the world were affected by the volatility of oil prices and
> 
> the disruption of economic ties to countries in the Gulf.
> 
> Egypt, Turkey and Jordan were particularly hurt. We must
> 
> continue to work to ensure the economic health of these
> 
> countries as well as others that have suffered markedly
> 
> from this crisis. The United States will provide
> 
> leadership, but in close collaboration with major donors
> 
> and creditors and with international financial
> 
> institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund
> 
> and the World Bank.As always, a dynamic domestic economy plays a critical role
> 
> in helping us achieve national objectives in all spheres.
> 
> Policies to control inflation, reduce the Federal deficit,
> 
> promote savings, improve the labor force and encourage
> 
> competitiveness and entrepreneurial initiative remain
> 
> critical to our overall well-being and security. As
> 
> economies expand worldwide, the economic strength of others
> 
> will, of course, grow in relative terms.  This is not a
> 
> threat to us, but rather a success of Western policies.
> 
> That said, Americans must realize that the economic
> 
> strength vital to our national interests comes from
> 
> investing for the future, thus putting a premium on
> 
> domestic saving. Today's labor force and management, and
> 
> those of tomorrow, must also be committed to quality and
> 
> innovation. These are the fruits of hard work -- and a
> 
> prerequisite for continued global leadership.We continue to pursue a strategy that expands and
> 
> strengthens market economies around the world. This will
> 
> require international efforts to open markets and expand
> 
> trade; to strengthen cooperation among major industrial
> 
> countries and with international financial institutions;
> 
> and to apply imaginative solutions to the problems of
> 
> developing countries.MAINTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTHClear signs are emerging that the U.S. economy is pulling
> 
> out of its brief recession but uncertainty remains over
> 
> economic performance in much of the rest of the world.
> 
> Therefore, macroeconomic policies in all the major
> 
> countries must be designed to sustain global economic
> 
> recovery with price stability. Global growth is needed in
> 
> order to create a favorable economic and trade environment
> 
> for reform and reconstruction in Eastern Europe and the
> 
> USSR, and ensure as well the success of the democratic,
> 
> market-oriented measures that have been adopted worldwide.
> 
> The major countries must continue to strengthen global
> 
> coordination of economic policies to achieve these aims.GLOBAL IMBALANCESWhile the U.S. trade deficit has continued to decline,
> 
> trade imbalances with Japan and many other countries remain
> 
> substantial. Reducing these imbalances remains a priority.
> 
> I or the United States this requires a sustained effort to
> 
> reduce and ultimately eliminate budget deficits while also
> 
> encouraging private savings and investment in order to
> 
> preserve U.S. competitiveness. Countries with large trade
> 
> surpluses bear a special responsibility for maintaining
> 
> adequate growth in domestic demand and opening their
> 
> markets further to imports.DEBTThe aggregate debt of developing countries was projected to
> 
> reach $1.3 trillion in 1990, according to the World Bank.
> 
> Inappropriate domestic policies in debtor countries --
> 
> overvalued exchange rates, large budget deficits,
> 
> investment in inefficient public enterprises and
> 
> restrictions on trade and investment -- were major causes
> 
> of this debt accumulation and contributed to capital
> 
> flight. External shocks, high international interest rates
> 
> and recession in the 1980s also hurt. Recently this burden
> 
> has been exacerbated by the economic dislocations and
> 
> fluctuations in energy prices resulting from the Gulf
> 
> crisis.In March 1989, the United States proposed a new
> 
> international debt strategy that advanced voluntary
> 
> reduction of commercial bank debt and debt service to help
> 
> restore debtor financial health and pave the way for new
> 
> commercial bank lending. Implementation of a strong
> 
> economic reform program supported by the IMF and World Bank
> 
> is a prerequisite. So far, Mexico, Costa Rica, Nigeria, the
> 
> Philippines, Venezuela, Morocco, Uruguay and Chile have
> 
> negotiated agreements under these proposals. Others are
> 
> undertaking reforms to obtain such support.Creditor governments have also made substantial
> 
> contributions to relief through rescheduling of official
> 
> bilateral debt and have recently offered new treatment for
> 
> the official debt of lower middle income countries, as
> 
> mandated by last year's Houston Economic Summit, and for
> 
> Poland and Egypt. The Enterprise for the Americas
> 
> Initiative also promotes growth in Latin America by
> 
> emphasizing official debt reduction and investment reform.TRADECountries accept as natural that trade and investment
> 
> should flow freely within national boundaries or within
> 
> special regional groupings in order to improve economic and
> 
> social welfare. Internationally, this concept has met
> 
> varying degrees of acceptance. Countries have protected
> 
> certain sectors for national security, economic, industrial
> 
> or social reasons.For the last 50 years, significant efforts have been
> 
> undertaken, primarily through the General Agreement on
> 
> Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to expand trade among all nations
> 
> by opening markets and resolving trade disputes. The latest
> 
> and most ambitious effort has been the Uruguay Round of
> 
> Multilateral Trade Negotiations, begun in 1986. The Uruguay
> 
> Round is distinguished from previous efforts by the
> 
> intention of GATT members to extend GATT rules to areas
> 
> such as agriculture, services, investment, the protection
> 
> of intellectual property and textiles. At the Houston
> 
> Economic Summit in 1990, the United States, Canada, Japan,
> 
> France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the
> 
> European Community committed to removing trade barriers in
> 
> these politically difficult areas. The wise action of
> 
> Congress in extending "fast track" procedures for trade
> 
> agreements is evidence of America's commitment to
> 
> responsible leadership.The promise of the Uruguay Round has yet to be fulfilled,
> 
> however, primarily because of strong differences over the
> 
> scope and pace of efforts to dismantle the enormous
> 
> barriers to trade in agricultural goods. Given the
> 
> interdependence of modern economies, and the need to expand
> 
> trading opportunities for emerging democracies and other
> 
> developing countries, it is important that the Round be
> 
> brought to a successful conclusion. This is a test of the
> 
> ability and willingness of all countries to rise to the
> 
> challenges of a new world order and will require compromise
> 
> on all sides. The United States will do its part. A
> 
> successful Round will not end bilateral trade disputes but
> 
> it will enable countries to resolve them in a multilateral
> 
> context and on the basis of internationally agreed rules.The United States will continue its efforts to expand trade
> 
> further. We are working with Japan under the Structural
> 
> Impediments Initiative to lower trade barriers.  As noted
> 
> earlier, we are building on the successful U.S.-Canada Free
> 
> Trade Agreement by undertaking discussions with Mexico and
> 
> Canada which we expect will lead to a trilateral free trade
> 
> agreement linking all three economies. The Enterprise for
> 
> the Americas Initiative and preferential trade programs for
> 
> the Caribbean basin and the Andean region will also foster
> 
> trade liberalization.TECHNOLOGY
> 
> The interrelationship of economic and military strength has
> 
> never been stronger. Both are affected by the way
> 
> technology transfer is handled, particularly with respect
> 
> to export controls. Balances must be struck. Loss of
> 
> technological leadership can undermine military readiness
> 
> and strength. Not participating freely in worldwide markets
> 
> constrains economic growth. Recent changes to our strategic
> 
> trade policies reflect a new balance between these
> 
> competing factors.In cooperation with our Western partners in the
> 
> Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
> 
> (COCOM), we have completely overhauled export controls,
> 
> reducing them to a core list of only the most strategically
> 
> significant goods and technologies.  This action reflects
> 
> the emergence of democratic governments in Eastern Europe
> 
> as well as a reduced military threat to the United States
> 
> and our allies from a dissolved Warsaw Pact and a Soviet
> 
> army that is withdrawing. The result has been a two-thirds
> 
> reduction in the licenses that industry is required to
> 
> obtain prior to exporting.Treating the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe
> 
> differently from the Soviet Union, we and our COCOM
> 
> partners have adopted a wide-ranging special procedure for
> 
> Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia that ensures that
> 
> controlled technology imports are used for purely civilian
> 
> applications. We look forward to the day when we can remove
> 
> these countries completely from the list of proscribed
> 
> destinations. We have a strong interest in promoting the
> 
> growth of free markets in democratic societies. At the same
> 
> time we must be sure that the easing of COCOM controls does
> 
> not result in the proliferation of dangerous technologies
> 
> to other areas like the Middle East. For that reason, we
> 
> have -- in close cooperation with other supplier nations --
> 
> significantly improved controls on technologies useful in
> 
> developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the
> 
> missiles to deliver them.ENERGYSecure, ample, diversified and clean supplies of energy are
> 
> essential to our national economic prosperity and security.
> 
> For the foreseeable future, oil will remain a vital element
> 
> in our energy mix. For geological and economic reasons,
> 
> U.S. oil imports are likely to increase in coming years.
> 
> The rate of increase, however, could be reduced by
> 
> improving the efficiency with which oil is used in the
> 
> economy and by substituting alternative fuels.Security of oil supplies is enhanced by a supportive
> 
> foreign policy and appropriate military capabilities. We
> 
> will work to improve understanding among key participants
> 
> in the oil industry of the basic fundamentals of the oil
> 
> market. We will also maintain our capability to respond to
> 
> requests to protect vital oil facilities, on land or at
> 
> sea, while working to resolve the underlying political,
> 
> social and economic tensions that could threaten the free
> 
> flow of oil.The stability of the Gulf region, which contains two-thirds
> 
> of the world's known oil reserves, is of fundamental
> 
> concern to us. Political and military turbulence in the
> 
> region has a direct impact on our economy, largely through
> 
> higher oil prices and potential supply disruptions.
> 
> Diversification of both productive and spare capacity is
> 
> important to providing a cushion to the oil market.
> 
> Increased production, in an environmentally sound manner,
> 
> from other areas would also contribute to the security of
> 
> oil supplies.Because energy markets particularly the oil market are
> 
> global, our energy security requires close cooperation
> 
> among energy consumers. The aftermath of Iraq's invasion of
> 
> Kuwait demonstrates the need to improve strategic stock
> 
> levels within oil-consuming countries and the value of
> 
> international cooperation to help mitigate damage brought
> 
> about by sudden, serious disruptions of supply. The United
> 
> States should develop creative mechanisms to fill its
> 
> Strategic Petroleum Reserve to the statutorily required one
> 
> billion barrels, consistent with sound budgetary practices
> 
> and avoiding an unnecessary burden on the oil market.Our use of oil is the key source of our vulnerability to
> 
> world oil supply disruption. To reduce this vulnerability,
> 
> we must work to both reduce oil consumption and to use oil
> 
> more efficiently. The efficient use of energy in all
> 
> sectors of our economy is of particular importance.  We
> 
> must intensify The development of alternative sources of
> 
> energy (nuclear, natural gas, coal and renewables) and
> 
> support aggressive research and development of advanced
> 
> energy technologies to provide the clean, affordable,
> 
> reliable energy supplies we will need in the mid-21 st
> 
> century.To meet pressing environmental concerns, we must limit the
> 
> harmful effects of energy production, transportation and
> 
> use. The increased, safe use of nuclear power, for example,
> 
> can significantly reduce green-house gas emissions.THE ENVIRONMENTWe must manage the Earth's natural resources in ways that
> 
> protect the potential for growth and opportunity for
> 
> present and future generations. The experience of the past
> 
> half-century has taught that democratic political
> 
> institutions and free market economies enhance human well-
> 
> being. But even as we experience political and economic
> 
> success, we cannot ignore the costs that growth, unguided
> 
> by wisdom, can impose on our natural environment. A healthy
> 
> economy and a healthy environment go hand-in hand.
> 
> Solutions must be found that protect our environment while
> 
> allowing for the economic development needed to improve the
> 
> living standards of a growing world population.Global environmental concerns include such diverse but
> 
> interrelated issues as stratospheric ozone depletion,
> 
> climate change, food security, water supply, deforestation,
> 
> biodiversity and treatment of wastes. A common ingredient
> 
> in each is that they respect no international boundaries.
> 
> The stress from these environmental challenges is already
> 
> contributing to political conflict.  Recognizing a shared
> 
> responsibility for global stewardship is a necessary step
> 
> for global progress. Our partners will find the United
> 
> States a ready and active participant in this effort.SPACEThe time has come to look beyond brief space encounters and
> 
> to commit to a future in which Americans and citizens of
> 
> all nations live and work in space. We have developed a
> 
> plan to make this vision a reality and the National Space
> 
> Council, under Vice President Quayle, is charged with
> 
> bringing coherence, continuity and commitment to our
> 
> efforts. We have made solid progress in the five key
> 
> elements of our space strategy:--  Developing our space launch capability as a national
> 
> resource: This infrastructure will be to the 21st century
> 
> what the great highway and dam projects were to the 20th.
> 
> Reliable space launchers will provide the "highway" to
> 
> space and the solar system in the next century.--  Expanding human presence and activity beyond earth
> 
> orbit and into the Solar System: We are well underway with
> 
> unmanned exploration of the Solar System. Magellan, Viking
> 
> and Voyager have been spectacular successes, Galileo is on
> 
> its way to Jupiter, Ulysses has launched on its wide-
> 
> ranging orbit of the sun and soon we will begin missions to
> 
> Saturn and the Asteroid Belt. The Space Exploration
> 
> Initiative will build on the successes and expertise
> 
> developed in the Apollo, Skylab, Space Shuttle and
> 
> eventually the Space Station Freedom programs, ultimately
> 
> establishing permanent human settlements on the Moon and
> 
> putting humans on Mars.--  Obtaining scientific, technological and economic
> 
> benefits and improving the quality of life on earth:
> 
> Communications satellites already link people around the
> 
> globe; their contribution to the free flow of information
> 
> and ideas played a part in the Revolution of '89. We also
> 
> use space systems to  verify arms control treaties. But the
> 
> potential of space to improve life on earth has barely been
> 
> tapped. A very promising application is in the area of theonment -- monitoring and helping to understand the
> 
> process of ecological change, and holding significant
> 
> promise for new sources of energy, material and products.--  Capitalizing on the unique environment of space to
> 
> foster economic well-being: Private investment in space
> 
> will create jobs, boost the economy and strengthen our
> 
> scientific, engineering and industrial base. New commercial
> 
> markets will be created, and existing industries will
> 
> become stronger and more competitive in the world
> 
> marketplace. The recently approved commercial launch policy
> 
> is a first step in this process.--  Ensuring the freedom of space for exploration and
> 
> development: There are now some ten significant spacefaring
> 
> nations, with others on the way. Space will become in the
> 
> future what oceans have always been -- highways to
> 
> discovery and commerce. But as with sea lanes, space lanes
> 
> can be closed and can even be used as springboards for
> 
> attack. We must ensure the freedom to use space for
> 
> exploration and development, for ourselves and all nations.
> 
> Assured access to space requires a healthy military space
> 
> program. We must be able to monitor events in space, warn
> 
> of threats and intervene to protect important space assets.
> 
> This protection may take the form of passive measures to
> 
> enhance the survivability of critical systems. We must also
> 
> have the option of active defense systems, including an
> 
> anti-satellite system, to stop an aggressor before he can
> 
> use a space system to threaten objects or people in or from
> 
> space.V.  RELATING MEANS TO ENDS:  A DEFENSE AGENDA FOR THE
> 
> 1990SAs the war to liberate Kuwait clearly showed, the essential
> 
> demands on our military forces to deter conflict whenever
> 
> possible but to prevail in those that do arise -- are
> 
> certain to endure. Nonetheless, the specific challenges
> 
> facing our military in the 1990s and beyond will be
> 
> different from those that have dominated our thinking for
> 
> the past 40 years.In a world less driven by an immediate, massive threat to
> 
> Europe or the danger of global war, the need to support a
> 
> smaller but still crucial forward presence and to deal with
> 
> regional contingencies -- including possibly a limited,
> 
> conventional threat to Europe -- will shape how we
> 
> organize, equip, train, deploy and employ our active and
> 
> reserve forces. We must also have the ability to
> 
> reconstitute forces, if necessary, to counter any resurgent
> 
> global threat.As the war in the Gulf made clear, the easing of the Soviet
> 
> threat does not mean an end to all hazards. As we seek to
> 
> build a new world order in the aftermath of the Cold War,
> 
> we will likely discover that the enemy we face is less an
> 
> expansionist communism than it is instability itself. And,
> 
> in the face of multiple and varied threats to stability, we
> 
> will increasingly find our military strength a source of
> 
> reassurance and a foundation for security, regionally and
> 
> globally.In the face of competing fiscal demands and a changing but
> 
> still dangerous world, we have developed a new defense
> 
> strategy that provides the conceptual framework for our
> 
> future forces. This new strategy will guide our deliberate
> 
> reductions to no more than the forces we need to defend our
> 
> interests and meet our global responsibilities. It will
> 
> also guide our restructuring so that our remaining forces
> 
> are appropriate to the challenges of a new era. The four
> 
> fundamental demands of a new era are already clear: to
> 
> ensure strategic deterrence, to exercise forward presence
> 
> in key areas, to respond effectively to crises and to
> 
> retain the national capacity to reconstitute forces should
> 
> this ever be needed.NUCLEAR DETERRENCEDeterrence will indeed be enhanced as a result of the START
> 
> Treaty and U.S. force modernization efforts can go forward
> 
> with greater knowledge and predictability about future
> 
> Soviet forces. Nevertheless, even with the Treaty, Soviet
> 
> nuclear capabilities will remain substantial. Despite
> 
> economic and political difficulties, the Soviet Union
> 
> continues its modernization of strategic forces. Even in a
> 
> new era, deterring nuclear attack remains the number one
> 
> defense priority of the United States.Strategic Nuclear ForcesThe modernization of our Triad of land-based missiles,
> 
> strategic bombers and submarine-launched missiles will be
> 
> vital to the effectiveness of our deterrent in the next
> 
> century. We need to complete the Trident submarine program
> 
> with the eighteen boats and modern missiles necessary to
> 
> ensure a survivable force. The B-2 strategic bomber must be
> 
> deployed so that the flexibility traditionally provided by
> 
> the bomber force will be available in the future. The B-2
> 
> will also firmly plant our aerospace industry in a new era
> 
> of low-observable technology and the bomber itself will
> 
> have unique value across the spectrum of conflict. Finally,
> 
> we must continue the development of land-based, mobile
> 
> ICBMs in order to keep our deployment options open.Our command, control and communications capabilities arc
> 
> critical to nuclear deterrence and to ensuring the
> 
> survivability of our constitutional government under all
> 
> circumstances of attack. Our civil defense program is still
> 
> needed to deal with the consequences of an attack, while
> 
> also providing important capabilities to respond to natural
> 
> and man-made catastrophes.The safety, security, control and effectiveness of United
> 
> States nuclear weapon systems are also of paramount
> 
> importance. We are incorporating the most modern safety and
> 
> control features into our deterrent stockpile as rapidly as
> 
> practicable and developing new safety technologies for
> 
> future weapons. Older weapons that lack the most modern
> 
> safety features are being replaced or retired.Testing of nuclear weapons plays a key part in assuring the
> 
> safety and effectiveness of our deterrent forces.  While we
> 
> test only as much as is required for national security
> 
> purposes, testing is essential to ensure the reliability
> 
> and effectiveness of our weapons, to identify any safety
> 
> issues and to prove any corrective measures. A halt to
> 
> nuclear testing would not eliminate weapons or increase
> 
> security, but it would erode confidence in our deterrent
> 
> and severely restrict our ability to make improvements,
> 
> especially in nuclear safety.Just as our weapons must be safe, the facilities that
> 
> produce them must be safe, efficient, economical, and
> 
> environmentally sound. Our current facilities are being
> 
> renovated and brought up to modern standards. At the same
> 
> time we are moving forward to consolidate and reconfigure
> 
> the current large and older complex, looking toward one
> 
> that will be smaller, more flexible and more efficient. Our
> 
> production complex must be able to respond to potential
> 
> needs ranging from accelerated production to accelerated
> 
> retirement of weapons, depending on the security
> 
> environment in the years ahead.We must also recognize that the deterrence issues of a new
> 
> era are now at hand. Despite the threat still posed by the
> 
> existence of Soviet nuclear weapons, the likelihood of
> 
> their deliberate use by the Soviet state is declining and
> 
> the scenario which we frequently projected as the precursor
> 
> of their use -- massive war in Europe -- is less likely
> 
> than at any other time since World War II. These
> 
> developments affect questions of nuclear targeting, the
> 
> alert status and operational procedures of our forces and
> 
> ultimately the type and number of weapons sufficient to
> 
> ensure our safety and that of our allies. We have already
> 
> begun to make adjustments to our nuclear forces and to the
> 
> policies that guide them in recognition of the
> 
> disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and changes in the Soviet
> 
> Union itself.  Beyond this, while we have traditionally
> 
> focused on deterring a unitary, rational actor applying a
> 
> relatively knowable calculus of potential costs and gains,
> 
> our thinking must now encompass potential instabilities
> 
> within states as well as the potential threat from states
> 
> or leaders who might perceive they have little to lose in
> 
> employing weapons of mass destruction.Non-Strategic Nuclear ForcesBelow the level of strategic forces, we have traditionally
> 
> maintained other nuclear forces for a variety of purposes.
> 
> They have highlighted our resolve and have helped to link
> 
> conventional defense to the broader strategic nuclear
> 
> guarantee of the United States. This has helped remove
> 
> incentives that otherwise might have accelerated nuclear
> 
> proliferation. These systems have also served to deter an
> 
> enemy's use of such weapons and they have contributed to
> 
> the deterrence of conventional attack. These needs persist.In Europe, we and our allies have always sought the lowest
> 
> number and most stable types of weapons needed to prevent
> 
> war. Indeed, NATO has unilaterally reduced thousands of
> 
> nuclear weapons over the past decade, in addition to the
> 
> elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet weapons
> 
> as called for in the Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear
> 
> Forces. Changes in Europe have now allowed us to forgo
> 
> plans to modernize our LANCE missiles and nuclear artillery
> 
> shells and we will work to implement the commitments of the
> 
> London Declaration with respect to short-range nuclear
> 
> weapons currently deployed in Europe.Even with the dramatic changes we see in Europe, however,
> 
> non strategic nuclear weapons remain integral to our
> 
> strategy of deterrence. They make NATO's resolve
> 
> unmistakably clear and help prevent war by ensuring that
> 
> there are no circumstances in which a nuclear response to
> 
> military action might be discounted. In practical terms,
> 
> this means greater reliance on aircraft armed with modern
> 
> weapons. As the principal means by which Alliance members
> 
> share nuclear risks and burdens, these aircraft and their
> 
> weapons must be based in Europe. Such a posture is not
> 
> designed to threaten any European state but to provide a
> 
> secure deterrent in the face of unforeseen circumstances.Missile DefensesFlexible response and deterrence through the threat of
> 
> retaliation have preserved the security of the United
> 
> States and its allies for decades. In the early 1980s, we
> 
> began the Strategic Defense Initiative in the face of an
> 
> unconstrained Soviet ballistic-missile program and a
> 
> significant Soviet commitment to strategic defenses. SDI
> 
> was intended to shift deterrence to a safer, more stable
> 
> basis as effective strategic defenses would diminish the
> 
> confidence of an adversary in his ability to execute a
> 
> successful attack.Notwithstanding the continued modernization of Soviet
> 
> offensive forces and the pursuit of more effective
> 
> strategic defenses, the positive changes in our
> 
> relationship with the Soviet Union and the fundamental
> 
> changes in Eastern Europe have markedly reduced the danger
> 
> of a war in Europe that could escalate to the strategic
> 
> nuclear level. At the same time, the threat posed by global
> 
> ballistic-missile proliferation and by an accidental or
> 
> unauthorized launch resulting from political turmoil has
> 
> grown considerably. Thus, the United States, our forces,
> 
> and our allies and friends face a continued and even
> 
> growing threat from ballistic missiles.In response to these trends, we have redirected SDI to
> 
> pursue a system providing Global Protection Against Limited
> 
> Strikes (GPALS). With adequate funding, it will be possible
> 
> to begin to deploy systems that will better protect our
> 
> troops in the field from ballistic-missile attack by the
> 
> mid-l 990s and that will protect the United States itself
> 
> from such attacks by the turn of the century. GPALS is
> 
> designed to provide protection against a ballistic missile
> 
> launched from anywhere against a target anywhere in the
> 
> world. The system will be based on technologies which SDI
> 
> has pioneered, but would be both smaller and less expensive
> 
> than the initial deployment originally projected for SDI.GPALS offers many potential advantages: the United States
> 
> would be protected against limited strikes by ballistic
> 
> missiles; our forward-deployed forces would be better
> 
> defended against missile attacks; and our allies, many of
> 
> whom lie on the edge of troubled areas, could also be
> 
> better protected. The record of the PATRIOT against Iraqi
> 
> SCUDs highlights the great potential for defenses against
> 
> ballistic missiles, the critical role of missile defenses
> 
> and the need to improve such defenses further.GPALS could also provide incentives against further
> 
> proliferation of ballistic missiles. If these missiles did
> 
> not hold the potential to cause certain and immediate
> 
> damage, nations might be less likely to go to such great
> 
> lengths to acquire them. Access to U.S. assistance in
> 
> defenses may also provide an incentive for countries not to
> 
> seek ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruction.FORWARD PRESENCEMaintaining a positive influence in distant regions
> 
> requires that we demonstrate our engagement. The forward
> 
> presence of our military forces often provides the
> 
> essential glue in important alliance relationships and
> 
> signals that our commitments are backed by tangible
> 
> actions. Our presence can deter aggression, preserve
> 
> regional balances, deflect arms races and prevent the power
> 
> vacuums that invite conflict. While our forward deployments
> 
> will be reduced in the future, the prudent forward basing
> 
> of forces and the propositioning of equipment reduce the
> 
> burden of projecting power from the continental United
> 
> States. Indeed, certain regions -- like Europe and East
> 
> Asia -- represent such compelling interests to the United
> 
> States that they will demand the permanent deployment of
> 
> some U.S. forces for as long as they are needed and
> 
> welcomed by our allies as part of a common effort. But even
> 
> in these regions, the site of our forward deployments can
> 
> be smaller as the threat diminishes and the defense
> 
> capabilities of our allies improve. In other regions our
> 
> presence, while important, can take less permanent forms.Across the Atlantic: Europe and the Middle EastIn Europe, Soviet reductions and the dissolution of the
> 
> Warsaw Pact allow us to scale back our presence to a
> 
> smaller, but still significant, contribution to NATO's
> 
> overall force levels. This presence will include the
> 
> equivalent of a robust army corps, with a corps
> 
> headquarters, associated corps units, and two ground force
> 
> divisions supplemented by several air wings, appropriate
> 
> naval forces, and sufficient infrastructure to support a
> 
> return of additional forces. Such a force will preserve the
> 
> operational, not just symbolic, significance of our
> 
> presence.As called for in July at the London NATO Summit, we will
> 
> work with our allies to make our forces in Europe more
> 
> flexible and mobile and more fully integrated into
> 
> multinational formations. NATO will establish a
> 
> multinational Rapid Reaction Corps to respond to crises and
> 
> we expect Alliance forces, including those of the United
> 
> States, to be organized into multinational corps that would
> 
> function in peacetime, and not just be contingent
> 
> structures activated in a crisis. We will also exploit the
> 
> prospect of longer warning time in the event of a major
> 
> crisis by backing up our deployed forces with the ability
> 
> to reinforce them with active and reserve units from the
> 
> United States, supported by the ability to reconstitute
> 
> larger forces over time should the need arise.The aftermath of the crisis in the Gulf portends a need for
> 
> some measure of continuing presence in that region
> 
> consistent with the desires and needs of our friends.
> 
> While the United States will not maintain a permanent
> 
> ground presence, we are committed to the region's security.
> 
> We will work with our friends to bolster their confidence
> 
> and security through such measures as exercises,
> 
> propositioning of heavy equipment and an enhanced naval
> 
> presence. Our vital national interests depend on d stable
> 
> and secure Gulf.Across the Pacific
> 
> Our enduring interests in East Asia and the Pacific also
> 
> demand forces sufficient to meet our responsibilities and
> 
> to sustain our long-term relationships with friends and
> 
> allies. While East Asia has been considerably less affected
> 
> by the Revolution of '89 than Europe, the growing strength
> 
> and self-reliance of our friends in the region permit some
> 
> reduction in our presence.A phased approach, responding to global and regional
> 
> events, is the soundest. We have announced our intent to
> 
> adjust military personnel levels in the Philippines, the
> 
> Republic of Korea and Japan. This phase is designed to thin
> 
> out existing force structure and reshape our security
> 
> relationships. Before this phase ends in December 1992,
> 
> over 15,000 U.S. personnel will be withdrawn. Later phases
> 
> will reduce and reorganize our force structure further, as
> 
> circumstances permit.Korea represents the area of greatest potential danger, and
> 
> reductions there must be carefully measured against North
> 
> Korean actions. However, we have judged that the growing
> 
> strength of our Korean allies permits us to reduce our
> 
> presence and begin to move toward a security partnership in
> 
> which the Korean armed forces assume the leading role. We
> 
> are also encouraged by the progress of the Japanese
> 
> Government in rounding out its own self-defense
> 
> capabilities.The Rest of the WorldIn other regions, as the need for our presence persists, we
> 
> will increasingly rely on periodic visits, training
> 
> missions, access agreements, propositioned equipment,
> 
> exercises, combined planning and security and humanitarian
> 
> assistance to sustain the sense of common interest and
> 
> cooperation on which we would rely in deploying and
> 
> employing our military forces. As the Gulf crisis clearly
> 
> showed, our strategy is increasingly dependent on the
> 
> support of regional friends and allies. In fact -- during
> 
> crises -- the cooperation and support of those local states
> 
> most directly threatened will be critical factors in
> 
> determining our own course of action.CRISIS RESPONSEDespite our best efforts to deter conflict, we must be
> 
> prepared for our interests to be challenged with force,
> 
> often with little or no warning. The Gulf crisis was ample
> 
> evidence that such challenges will not always be small or
> 
> easily resolved. Because regional crises are the
> 
> predominant military threat we will face in the future,
> 
> their demands -- along with our forward presence
> 
> requirements -- will be the primary determinant of the size
> 
> and structure of our future forces.The regional contingencies we could face are many and
> 
> varied. We must be prepared for differences in terrain,
> 
> climate and the nature of threatening forces, as well as
> 
> for differing levels of support from host nations or
> 
> others. We must also be able to respond quickly and
> 
> effectively to adversaries who may possess cruise missiles,
> 
> modern air defenses, chemical weapons, ballistic missiles
> 
> and even large armor formations. Although our forward
> 
> deployed forces speed our ability to respond to threats in
> 
> areas like the Pacific or Europe, there are other regions
> 
> where threats, while likely to be less formidable, may
> 
> prove no less urgent.MobilityIn this new era, therefore, the ability to project our
> 
> power will underpin our strategy more than ever. We must be
> 
> able to deploy substantial forces and sustain them in parts
> 
> of the world where propositioning of equipment will not
> 
> always be feasible, where adequate bases may not be
> 
> available (at least before a crisis) and where there is a
> 
> less developed industrial base and infrastructure to
> 
> support our forces once they have arrived. Our strategy
> 
> demands we be able to move men and materiel to the scene of
> 
> a crisis at a pace and in numbers sufficient to field an
> 
> overwhelming force. The 100-hour success of our ground
> 
> forces in the war to liberate Kuwait was stunning, but we
> 
> should not allow it to obscure the fact that we required
> 
> six months to deploy these forces. As our overall force
> 
> levels draw down and our forward-deployed forces shrink, we
> 
> must sustain and expand our investment in airlift, sealift
> 
> and where possible -- propositioning. We must also ensure
> 
> unimpeded transit of the air and sea lanes and access to
> 
> space through maritime and aerospace superiority. our
> 
> security assistance must, among other things, enhance the
> 
> ability of other nations to facilitate our deployments.
> 
> And, over the longer term, we must challenge our technology
> 
> to develop forces that are lethal but more readily
> 
> deployable and more easily sustained than today's.Readiness and Our Guard and Reserve ForcesFor almost two decades, our Total Force Policy has placed a
> 
> substantial portion of our military manpower in high-
> 
> quality, well-trained, well-equipped and early-mobilizing
> 
> Guard and Reserve units. Compared to maintaining such a
> 
> force in the active component, this was a cost-effective
> 
> strategy, a prudent response to an international security
> 
> environment where the predominant threat was major conflict
> 
> in Europe or global war with the Soviets, with warning of
> 
> such a conflict measured in weeks or even days.That environment has been transformed. Today we must
> 
> reshape our Guard and Reserve forces so that they can
> 
> continue their important contributions in new
> 
> circumstances. While we still face the possibility of
> 
> sudden conflict in many of the regional contingencies that
> 
> could concern us, these threats -- despite their danger --
> 
> will be on a smaller scale than the threat formerly posed
> 
> by the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies. This will
> 
> allow a smaller force overall, but those units oriented
> 
> towards short-warning, regional contingencies must be kept
> 
> at high readiness.Over time we will move to a Total Force that permits us to
> 
> respond initially to any regional contingency with units --
> 
> combat and support -- drawn wholly from the active
> 
> component, except for a limited number of support and
> 
> mobility assets. Since many support functions can be more
> 
> economically maintained in the reserve component, we will
> 
> still rely on reserve support units in any extended
> 
> confrontation. The primary focus of reserve combat units
> 
> will be to supplement active units in any especially large
> 
> or protracted deployment. To hedge against a future need
> 
> for expanded forces to deal with a renewed global
> 
> confrontation, which -- though possible -- is less likely
> 
> and clearly less immediate than previously calculated, some
> 
> reserve combat units will be retained in cadre status.This approach will allow us to maintain a Total Force
> 
> appropriate for the strategic and fiscal demands of a new
> 
> era: a smaller, more self-contained and very ready active
> 
> force able to respond quickly to emerging threats; and a
> 
> reduced but still essential reserve component with emphasis
> 
> on supporting and sustaining active combat forces, and --
> 
> in particularly large or prolonged regional contingencies -
> 
> - providing latent combat capability that can be made ready
> 
> when needed.Even as we restructure for a new era, we will continue to
> 
> place a premium on the quality of our military personnel,
> 
> the backbone of any effective fighting force.  True
> 
> military power is measured by the professional skills and
> 
> dedication of our young men and women. In six weeks and
> 
> 1()0 decisive hours, today's military proved it is the most
> 
> skilled and effective fighting force this Nation has ever
> 
> possessed. As we make the adjustments appropriate to a new
> 
> environment, we will preserve this precious resource.RECONSTITUTIONBeyond the crisis response capabilities provided by active
> 
> and reserve forces, we must have the ability to generate
> 
> wholly new forces should the need arise.  Although we are
> 
> hopeful for the future, history teaches us caution. The
> 
> 20th century has seen rapid shifts in the geopolitical
> 
> climate, and technology has repeatedly transformed the
> 
> battlefield. The ability to reconstitute is what allows us
> 
> safely and selectively to scale back and restructure our
> 
> forces in-being.This difficult task will require us to invest in hedging
> 
> options whose future dividends may not always be measurable
> 
> now. It will require careful attention to the vital
> 
> elements of our military potential: the industrial base,
> 
> science and technology, and manpower. These elements were
> 
> easily accommodated in an era when we had to maintain large
> 
> standing forces, when we routinely invested heavily in
> 
> defense R&D and when new items of equipment were broadly
> 
> and extensively produced. We will now have to work much
> 
> more deliberately to preserve them.The standard by which we should measure our efforts is the
> 
> response time that our warning processes would provide us
> 
> of a return to previous levels of confrontation in Europe
> 
> or in the world at large. We and our allies must be able to
> 
> reconstitute a credible defense faster than any potential
> 
> opponent can generate an overwhelming offense.ManpowerReconstitution obviously includes manpower.  Relatively
> 
> large numbers of personnel, trained in basic military
> 
> skills, can be raised in one to two years. But skilled,
> 
> seasoned leaders -- high-quality senior NCOs and officers -
> 
> - require many years to develop and we must preserve this
> 
> critical nucleus to lead an expanding military force. This
> 
> must be reflected in how we man active, reserve and cadre
> 
> units over the long term.Defense TechnologyAnother challenge will be to maintain our edge in defense
> 
> technology, even as we reduce our forces.  Technology has
> 
> historically been a comparative advantage for American
> 
> forces, and we have often relied on it to overcome
> 
> numerical disparities and to reduce the risk to American
> 
> lives.Our technological edge in key areas of warfare will be even
> 
> more important at lower levels of forces and funding, and
> 
> in the complex political and military environment in which
> 
> our forces will operate. But maintaining this margin will
> 
> become increasingly difficult as access to advanced
> 
> weaponry spreads and as our defense industry shrinks. Even
> 
> in regional contingencies it will not be uncommon for our
> 
> forces to face high-technology weapons in the hands of
> 
> adversaries. This spread of advanced systems will surely
> 
> erode the deterrent value of our own -- and our competitive
> 
> edge in warfare -- unless we act decisively to maintain
> 
> technological superiority.We will, of course, have to decide which technologies we
> 
> want to advance and how we will pursue them.  Our focus
> 
> should be on promising, high-leverage areas, especially
> 
> those that play to our comparative advantages and exploit
> 
> the weaknesses of potential adversaries, whoever and
> 
> wherever they may be. Stealth, space-based systems,
> 
> sensors, precision weapons, advanced training technologies
> 
> all these proved themselves in the Gulf, yet when these
> 
> programs (and others) were begun, no one foresaw their use
> 
> against Iraq. Our investment strategies must hedge against
> 
> the unknown, giving future Presidents the flexibility that
> 
> such capabilities provide.We must be able to move promising research through
> 
> development to rapid fielding when changes in the
> 
> international environment so require. The "generation
> 
> leaps" in technology and fielded systems that some have
> 
> suggested may not be possible. We will have to build some
> 
> systems, as the early production effort is a vital
> 
> component of technology development.Production, even in limited numbers, will also facilitate
> 
> the development of innovative doctrine and organizational
> 
> structures to make full use of the new technologies we
> 
> field. In an era of tight fiscal constraints, our
> 
> development efforts must also strive to make our weapons
> 
> less expensive as well as more effective.In the competition for scarce resources, emphasis on
> 
> technology development -- to pursue those new capabilities
> 
> that may be most decisive in the longer term -- may mean
> 
> accepting some continued risk in the near term. But
> 
> accepting such risk may well be prudent in a period of
> 
> reduced East-West tensions.The Industrial BaseProviding and sustaining modern equipment to support a
> 
> rapid expansion of the armed forces is an equally difficult
> 
> proposition. We will need a production base to produce new
> 
> systems and a maintenance and repair base to support them.
> 
> These requirements pose unique problems, as reduced defense
> 
> budgets are shrinking the defense industrial sector
> 
> overall. As we make procurement and investment decisions,
> 
> we will have to place a value on the assured supply and
> 
> timely delivery of defense materials in time of crisis.In the near term, some of these problems can be ameliorated
> 
> by retaining and storing equipment from units being
> 
> deactivated. Over the longer term, however, as stored
> 
> equipment becomes obsolete, the issue becomes our
> 
> capability to expand production or use alternative sources
> 
> of supply. We will need the capacity for industrial surge,
> 
> accelerating orders that are already in the pipeline. We
> 
> will also have to plan for production from new or
> 
> alternative industrial capacity. It may also be possible to
> 
> reduce unneeded military specifications to make greater use
> 
> of items that can be created by the commercial production
> 
> base. Above all, we must continue to involve the creative
> 
> resources of our national economy and ensure that
> 
> corporations continue to have incentives to engage in
> 
> innovative defense work.
> 
> A SMALLER AND RESTRUCTURED FORCEOur future military will be smaller. Assuming there are no
> 
> unforeseen, worrisome trends in the security environment,
> 
> by mid-decade our force can be some 25 percent smaller than
> 
> the force we maintained in the last days of the Cold War.
> 
> The changes we have seen in the overall international
> 
> environment have made this smaller force possible, and the
> 
> increasing demands on our resources to preserve the other
> 
> elements of our national strength have made it necessary.Minimum Essential Military Forces The Base ForceYet these planned reductions will cut our forces to a
> 
> minimally acceptable level -- to a Base Force below which
> 
> further reductions would not be prudent. These minimum
> 
> forces represent our national security insurance policy and
> 
> consist of four basic force packages: Strategic Forces,
> 
> Atlantic Forces, Pacific Forces and Contingency Forces.Our Strategic Forces must continue to meet the enduring
> 
> demands of nuclear deterrence and defense. The conventional
> 
> force packages provide forces for forward presence as well
> 
> as the ability to respond to crises. Our Atlantic Forces
> 
> will be postured and trained for the heavy threats
> 
> characteristic of Europe and Southwest Asia and must be
> 
> modern and lethal enough to deal with these threats.
> 
> Pacific Forces will be structured for an essentially
> 
> maritime theater, placing a premium on naval capabilities,
> 
> backed by the essential air and ground forces for enduring
> 
> deterrence and immediate crisis response. U.S.-based
> 
> reinforcements will be lighter than those we envisage for
> 
> the Atlantic, as befits the potential contingencies in the
> 
> Pacific. Contingency Forces will include the Army's light
> 
> and airborne units, Marine expeditionary brigades, special
> 
> operations forces and selected air and naval assets. They
> 
> will be largely based in the United States and -- since
> 
> they must be able to respond to spontaneous and
> 
> unpredictable crises -- they will largely be in the active
> 
> component. At times, the quick deployment of such a force
> 
> in itself may be enough to head off confrontation. At other
> 
> times, we may need actually to employ this force to deal
> 
> with insurgencies, conduct anti-drug or anti-terrorist
> 
> operations, evacuate non-combatants or as we did in Desert
> 
> Shield  -- be the first into action while heavier forces
> 
> are alerted and moved.The reductions projected by the mid-1990s are dramatic. It
> 
> will be important to manage their pace rationally and
> 
> responsibly. We must accommodate the actions taken in
> 
> support of Desert Storm and Desert Shield and we must be
> 
> attentive to the professional skills of the armed forces
> 
> that have been built up over the past decade -- and which,
> 
> as the war made clear, remain vital to our national
> 
> security. But now that the war has been won, and as long as
> 
> no unanticipated ominous trends emerge, we will get back on
> 
> the spending path agreed to before hostilities began.
> 
> Highly effective military forces can be supported within
> 
> the levels agreed to by Congress in the 1990 Budget
> 
> Agreement if we can end unneeded programs, consolidate
> 
> bases, streamline procedures and adjust overall manpower
> 
> levels without arbitrary restrictions.VI.  TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURYThe 20th century has taught us that security is
> 
> indivisible. The safety, freedom and well-being of one
> 
> people cannot be separated from the safety, freedom and
> 
> well-being of all. Recently, the Gulf crisis strengthened
> 
> this sense of international community. Many of the
> 
> underlying forces now at work in the world are tending to
> 
> draw that global community even closer together.
> Technology, especially the explosion of communication and
> 
> information, has accelerated the pace of human contact. The
> 
> growing acceptance of the democratic ideal -- evidenced in
> 
> the erosion of totalitarianism and the expansion of basic
> 
> human freedoms -- has also brought the world closer
> 
> together. The expansion of commerce and the growing
> 
> acceptance of market principles have accelerated the
> 
> movement toward interdependence and the integration of
> 
> economies. Even the threats posed by the proliferation of
> 
> weapons of enormous destructiveness have begun to draw the
> 
> community of nations together in common concern.As we move toward the 21st century, this interdependence of
> 
> peoples will grow and will continue to demand responsible
> 
> American leadership. Guided by the values that have
> 
> inspired and nurtured our democracy at home, we will work
> 
> for a new world in which peace, security and cooperation
> 
> finally replace the confrontation of the Cold War, and
> 
> overcome the kind of threat represented by Iraq's
> 
> aggression.Developments in the Soviet Union and elsewhere have set in
> 
> motion a change in the strategic landscape as dramatic as
> 
> that which the Nation experienced when Soviet policy first
> 
> forced the Cold War upon us. The great threat to global
> 
> peace has ebbed and we now see a Soviet state and society
> 
> struggling to overcome severe internal crisis.
> 
> Notwithstanding the uncertainties about the future course
> 
> of the Soviet Union, that state's willingness -- indeed, in
> 
> many ways, its ability -- to project power beyond its
> 
> borders has been dramatically reduced for the foreseeable
> 
> future. Our strategy for this new era recognizes the
> 
> opportunities and challenges before us, and includes among
> 
> its principles:--  reinforcing the moral ties that hold our alliances
> 
> together, even as perceptions of a common security threat
> 
> change;--  encouraging the constructive evolution of the Soviet
> 
> Union, recognizing the limits of our influence and the
> 
> continuing power of Soviet military forces;--  supporting the independence and vitality of the new
> 
> Eastern European democracies even as we deal with the
> 
> uncertainties of the Soviet future;--  championing the principles of political and economic
> 
> freedom as the surest guarantors of human progress and
> 
> happiness, as well as global peace;--  working with others in the global community to resolve
> 
> regional disputes and stem the proliferation of advanced
> 
> weapons;--  cooperating with the Soviet Union and others in
> 
> achieving arms control agreements that promote security and
> 
> stability;--  reducing our defense burden as appropriate, while
> 
> restructuring our forces for new challenges;--  tending more carefully to our own economic
> 
> competitiveness as the foundation of our long-term
> 
> strength; and--  addressing the new global agenda of refugee flows, drug
> 
> abuse and environmental degradation.We are a rich and powerful nation, and the elements of our
> 
> power will remain formidable. But our wealth and our
> 
> strength are not without limits. We must balance our
> 
> commitments with our means and, above all, we must wisely
> 
> choose now which elements of our strength will best serve
> 
> our needs in the future. This is the challenge of strategy.In this country we make such choices for peace just as we
> 
> make the awful choices of war -- as a democracy.  When
> 
> President and Congress work together to build an effective
> 
> security posture and policy -- was was done in the 1980s --
> 
> we are successful. In the Gulf, our armed forces benefited
> 
> from the legacy of investment decisions, technological
> 
> innovations, and strategic planning that came in the decade
> 
> before. Today's planning decisions will determine whether
> 
> we are well or ill prepared for the contingencies that will
> 
> confront us in the future.This is a heavy responsibility, shared between the
> 
> President and Congress. We owe our servicemen and women not
> 
> only the best equipment, but also a coherent strategy and
> 
> posture geared to new realities. This coherence can only<
> 
> come from a partnership between the Branches. Divided, we
> 
> will invite disasters. United, we can overcome any
> 
> challenge.In the Gulf, the dictator guessed wrong when he doubted
> 
> America's unity and will. The extraordinary unity we showed
> 
> as a Nation in the Gulf assured that we would prevail. It
> 
> also sent the message loud and clear that America is
> 
> prepared for the challenges of the future, committed and
> 
> engaged in the world, as a reliable ally, friend and
> 
> leader.
> 
> (END TEXT)