UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

FRANK LEONARD BUTZ, 

 Plaintiff, 

 Case No. 2:15-CV-12233 

v. Judge Matthew F. Leitman 

 Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti 

JERRY CLAYTON and 

SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 

 Defendant. 

___________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS (DEs 10, 11 & 16) and PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST 

FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL (DE 18) 

I. RECOMMENDATION: The Court should grant Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss (DEs 10, 11 & 16) and deny without prejudice Plaintiff’s request for 

appointment of counsel (DE 18).1

 

II. REPORT: 

A. Background 

Plaintiff is a party to two cases in this Court.2

 On June 19, 2015, while 

incarcerated at the Washtenaw County Jail (WCJ) in Ann Arbor, Michigan, 

                                                            

1 Securus’s memorandum in support (DE 11) was docketed as a motion; therefore, 

when the Court rules upon Securus’s accompanying motion (DE 10), it should 

terminate both matters consistently.

2:15-cv-12233-MFL-APP Doc # 24 Filed 04/25/16 Pg 1 of 15 Pg ID 178
2 

Plaintiff Frank Leonard Butz (WCJ #144609) filed the instant lawsuit pro se

against (1) Jerry Clayton, the Washtenaw County Sheriff, in his official and 

personal capacities, and (2) “Securus Correctional Billing Services / Securus 

Technologies T-Netix Inc.” (See DE 1 at 1-2.)3 and 4 In sum, Plaintiff’s complaint 

                                                                                                                                                                                                2

 Plaintiff’s other lawsuit, also filed on June 19, 2015, concerns different 

conditions of confinement at Washtenaw County Jail (WCJ) and was filed against 

Wayne County Sheriff Jerry Clayton. See Case No. 2:15-cv-12232-MFP-APP 

(E.D. Mich.). (DE 1 at 3.) On December 28, 2015, the Clerk of the Court 

reassigned the instant case to Judge Leitman, as it appeared to be a companion case 

to the prior-filed lawsuit. (See DE 21.) 

3

 Defendant asserts Plaintiff was released from WCJ on June 17, 2015, two days 

before the instant matter was filed. (DE 16 at 9, 13.) Consistently, Plaintiff’s 

August 11, 2015 notice of change of address/contact information indicates that 

Plaintiff is no longer at WCJ and has moved to a private address in Three Rivers, 

Michigan. (DE 6.) 

4

The number of Defendants named by Plaintiff is somewhat unclear. Plaintiff’s list 

of parties includes Defendant Jerry Clayton, as well as Defendant “Securus 

Correctional Billing Services / Securus Technologies T-Netix Inc.” (DE 1 at 1-2.) 

However, the September 11, 2015 notice of appearance of counsel identifies this 

Defendant, singularly, as Securus Technologies, Inc. (DE 8.) Moreover, 

Plaintiff’s returns of service evidence three mailings of the summons and 

complaint: (1) for Washtenaw County Sheriff Jerry Clayton to what appears to be 

his office address, (2) for Securus Technologies / T-Netix Inc to an address for 

correspondence and (3) for Securus Correctional Billing Services to the address for 

payments. (See DE 15 at 3, 7 & 15; see also 

http://www.ewashtenaw.org/directory.html, 

https://securussim.securustech.net/Account/PreLoginContactUs.aspx, and 

https://securustech.net/contact-us.) Given these observations, and the appearance 

that, around 2004, T-Netix and Evercom Systems merged and formed Securus 

Technologies (see http://apps.securustech.net/history.asp), this report and 

recommendation will refer to two defendants – Clayton and Securus Technologies, 

Inc.

2:15-cv-12233-MFL-APP Doc # 24 Filed 04/25/16 Pg 2 of 15 Pg ID 179
3 

concerns the conditions and cost of phone service at WCJ. (See DE 1 at 3.) He 

seeks the following forms of relief, as quoted verbatim: 

1) Allow prisoners to purchase phone time at a reduced rate so 

they can afford to call their loved ones without putting a 

financial burden on their loved ones for their calls, and stop 

solicitatious interruptions. 

2) Pay me $2,000,000 (two million dollars) for my frustration[,] 

grief, and suffering. 

(DE 1 at 4.) 

B. Instant Motion 

Currently pending in this case are (1) Defendant Securus Technologies, 

Inc.’s (Securus’s) September 11, 2015 motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, 

motion for more definite statement (DE 10), regarding which a memorandum in 

support (DE 11) and declaration of Cindy A. Carey (DE 12) have been filed, and 

(b) Sheriff Clayton’s September 16, 2015 motion to dismiss (DE 16). 

The Court issued orders setting deadlines for Plaintiff’s responses to these 

motions. (See DEs 14, 17.) Instead of filing a substantive response to these 

motions, Plaintiff filed an “affidavit and response,” which lists ten challenges he 

faces and contains the following prayer for relief: 

Plaintiff Frank Butz prays the Court grant a hearing to determine if 

[P]laintiff can be appointed legal counsel, how to proceed, explain 

“Dismiss With Prejudice”, grant Defendant(s) Motions, or whatever 

the Court deems appropriate. 

2:15-cv-12233-MFL-APP Doc # 24 Filed 04/25/16 Pg 3 of 15 Pg ID 180
4 

(DE 18 at 1-2.) Notably, Plaintiff has twice filed this same “affidavit and 

response,” word for word, in response to motions filed in Case No. 2:15-cv-12232-

MFL-APP (9 & 13, 15 & 17).5

 Defendant Sheriff Clayton has filed a reply. (DE 

19.) 6

C. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 

Each of the defendants argues inter alia that Plaintiff has failed to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted. (See DE 10 ¶ 2, DE 11 at 5-6, DE 16 at 

10-12.) By way of background, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require “[a] 

pleading that states a claim for relief [to] contain: . . . a short and plain statement 

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). The rule governing defenses and objections provides corollary direction, 

                                                            

5

 Moreover, the same “affidavit and response” was filed a third time in Case No. 

2:15-cv-12232. (See DE 12.) However, it appears Plaintiff intended to file it with 

respect to motions to dismiss in the case at bar. (DEs 10, 11, 16.) 

6

 Technically, Defendants’ motions to dismiss (DEs 10 & 16) are unopposed and 

could be granted on that basis. “A respondent opposing a motion must file a 

response, including a brief and supporting documents then available.” E.D. Mich. 

LR 7.1(c)(1). Here, Plaintiff’s September 30, 2015 filing (DE 18) does not 

constitute a response to the substance of Defendants’ motions to dismiss, and 

Defendant Clayton makes note of this in his reply (DE 19 at 6-7). See also, i.e., 

Humphrey v. U.S. Attorney Gen.'s Office, 279 F. App’x 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2008) 

(“where, as here, plaintiff has not raised arguments in the district court by virtue of 

his failure to oppose defendants’ motions to dismiss, the arguments have been 

waived.”). Relatedly, the Court should construe Plaintiff’s September 30, 2015 

filing (DE 18) as a motion to appoint counsel and should deny it without prejudice 

to renewal if this case survives dispositive motion practice, proceeds to trial and/or 

if other circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel later arise.

2:15-cv-12233-MFL-APP Doc # 24 Filed 04/25/16 Pg 4 of 15 Pg ID 181
5 

namely that a party may assert the defense of “failure to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted . . .” by motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6), the Court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to 

plaintiff and accept all allegations as true.” Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 

608 (6th Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation 

omitted); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 

(concluding that a plausible claim need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” 

but it must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of 

the elements of a cause of action”). Facial plausibility is established “when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, 

including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the 

defendant’s conduct.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 

F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013). 

Furthermore, the Court holds pro se complaints to “less stringent standards 

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 

2:15-cv-12233-MFL-APP Doc # 24 Filed 04/25/16 Pg 5 of 15 Pg ID 182
6 

(1972). However, even in pleadings drafted by pro se parties, ‘“courts should not 

have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.”’ Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 

F. App’x 975, 976-77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 

(6th Cir. 1989)). Moreover, “courts may not rewrite a complaint to include claims 

that were never presented . . . nor may courts construct the Plaintiff’s legal 

arguments for him. Neither may the Court ‘conjure up unpled allegations[.]’” 

Rogers v. Detroit Police Dept., 595 F.Supp.2d 757, 766 (E.D. Mich. 2009) 

(Ludington, J., adopting report and recommendation of Binder, M.J.).7

D. Discussion 

 As an initial matter, I note that Plaintiff’s June 19, 2015 complaint is the 

only substantive matter he has filed in this case.8

 The crux of his complaint is 

limited to one-page and states as follows: 

I am not able to call any of my loved ones from any phone in any cell, 

as they have cell phones. They have to set up an account for my 

collect calls and the charges are outrageous. Some calls are 

interrupted by solicitatious recordings, and charged another 

                                                            

7 See also, Evans v. Mercedes Benz Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 11-11450, 2011 WL 

2936198, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 21, 2011) (“Even excusing plaintiff's failure to 

follow Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b), a pro se plaintiff must comply with basic pleading 

requirements, including Rule 12(b)(6).”). 

8

 Of the first twenty-three (23) matters filed in this case, Plaintiff has filed four 

(DEs 1, 6, 15 & 18), only one of which is substantive; the Court has filed eight 

matters (DEs 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 14, 17 & 21); Defendant Securus has filed five matters 

(DEs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12); and Defendant Clayton has filed six matters (DEs 13, 16, 

19, 20, 22 & 23). 

2:15-cv-12233-MFL-APP Doc # 24 Filed 04/25/16 Pg 6 of 15 Pg ID 183
7 

outrageous amount. Some calls only last a few minutes, and are 

charged an outrageous amount for 10 or 15 minutes. 

First though, initially, I am offered a free call that lasts long enough to 

say ‘hello’ then is interrupted for a solicitatious recording for my 

loved ones to accept my call by agreeing to set up arrangement to pay 

for my collect call, and then because they want to know what is the 

call about, they accept and are charged an outrageous amount. They 

are charged $15.00 or $20.00 for a 10 or 15 minute call, usually I have 

to repay them for the call, because they refuse to pay such outrageous 

amounts. 

(DE 1 at 3.) Upon consideration, the Court should grant Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss. (DEs 10 & 16.) 

1. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted as to either Defendant Clayton or Defendant 

Securus. 

As evidenced by the above-quoted paragraphs, Plaintiff’s June 19, 2015 

“Statement of Claim” does not identify the legal basis or bases for his claims, such 

as whether these allegations violate state and/or federal law. In fact, Plaintiff’s 

September 30, 2015 filing states, “I do not know if there are valid legal arguments 

to support any constitutional violation claim that I may or may not have, or if I 

have a valid legal argument to proceed.” (DE 18 ¶ 9.) This is in direct 

contravention of Rule 11, which states that “[b]y presenting to the court a pleading, 

written motion, or other paper[,]” an “unrepresented party certifies that to the best 

of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 

reasonable under the circumstances . . .” the “claims...and other legal contentions 

2:15-cv-12233-MFL-APP Doc # 24 Filed 04/25/16 Pg 7 of 15 Pg ID 184
8 

are warranted by existing law or by nonfrivilous argument for extending, 

modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law[.]” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 11(b)(2). In light of this admission, and for the reasons which follow, his claims 

are not “sufficient to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests.’” U.S. ex rel. SNAPP, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 532 

F.3d 496, 503 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court recognizes the possibility that he 

filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Civil action for deprivation of 

rights”). Even so, the United States Supreme Court has instructed: 

Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights,” but merely 

provides “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 

conferred.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3 . . . (1979). 

The first step in any such claim is to identify the specific 

constitutional right allegedly infringed. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 

386, 394 . . . (1989); and Baker v. McCollan, supra, 443 U.S., at 

140[]. 

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Here, Plaintiff fails to describe the 

law upon which his claims are based, no specific constitutional right has been 

identified, and it is not incumbent upon this Court to guess what it might be. 

Additionally, as Defendant Clayton points out, “[f]ederal courts . . . have 

consistently rejected First Amendment claims challenging high telephone rates on 

grounds that prisoners are not entitled to a specific rate for telephone calls and that 

2:15-cv-12233-MFL-APP Doc # 24 Filed 04/25/16 Pg 8 of 15 Pg ID 185
9 

prisoners failed to allege that the rates were so exorbitant as to deprive them of 

telephone access altogether.” Terry v. Calhoun Cty. Corr. Facility, No. 1:12-CV347, 2012 WL 5198376, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2012) (“[Terry] does not 

allege that he was unable to make telephone calls or otherwise communicate with 

friends and family as a result of the high telephone rates.”); LaPlante v. Lovelace, 

No. 2:13-CV-32, 2013 WL 5572908, at *15 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 9, 2013) (same). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that his loved ones had to set up an account for his collect 

calls, describes the charges as “outrageous,” contends there are solicitatious 

interruptions, and claims he usually has to reimburse his loved ones “because they 

refuse to pay such outrageous amounts.” (DE 1 at 3.) Nonetheless, even if 

Plaintiff intended to bring a First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he is 

not entitled to a specific telephone rate, nor has he alleged that the telephone rates 

at WCJ are so high that the rates deprive him of telephone access; indeed, on its 

face, the complaint indicates that he has successfully exercised his right to 

telephone access. 

2. Plaintiff has failed to allege Defendant Clayton’s personal 

involvement in the matters forming the basis of his 

complaint. 

Defendant Clayton is correct that “Plaintiff’s pleading[] fail[s] to allege any 

personal involvement by Defendant.” (DE 16 at 12-13.) “[A] complaint must 

allege that the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of 

2:15-cv-12233-MFL-APP Doc # 24 Filed 04/25/16 Pg 9 of 15 Pg ID 186
10 

federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing 

Hall v. United States, 704 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir.1983)). As can be seen from the 

above-quoted statement of claim (DE 1 at 3), Plaintiff has not made any specific 

allegation that Sheriff Clayton was “personally involved in or responsible for” any 

of the violations Plaintiff alleges. See Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F.App’x 762, 764 

(6th Cir. 2002) (“Frazier’s complaint contained no specific facts in support of his 

conclusory allegations that the defendants violated his constitutional and statutory 

rights. Moreover, Frazier failed to allege with any degree of specificity which of 

the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each of the 

alleged violations of his federal rights.”). 

In addition, to the extent Plaintiff names Sheriff Clayton as a defendant on 

the basis of the control he may have over the WCJ, “[t]he law is clear that liability 

of supervisory personnel must be based on more than merely the right to control 

employees: 

Without more, such a theory would allow liability on a respondeat 

superior basis-a basis expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in 

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 . . . (1978) 

under [§] 1983, and by this court in Jones v. City of Memphis, 586 

F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1978) in a direct constitutional action pursued in 

accordance with the case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 

403 U.S. 388 . . . (1971). 

 

Hays v. Jefferson Cty., Ky., 668 F.2d 869, 872 (6th Cir. 1982). In other words, 

“the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 lawsuits to impute 

2:15-cv-12233-MFL-APP Doc # 24 Filed 04/25/16 Pg 10 of 15 Pg ID 187
11 

liability onto supervisory personnel . . . unless it is shown that the defendant 

‘encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly 

participated in it.’” Horton v. Martin, 137 F. App’x 773, 775 (6th Cir. 2005) 

(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691–95 (1978), 

(quoting Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.1984)). As the District 

Court for the Western District of Michigan explained in a similar case: 

. . . while Plaintiff alleges that issues with the phones were referred to 

Defendants Frierson, Mason and Watson, he does not allege that those 

Defendants had any control whatsoever over the amount that inmates 

were charged for telephone calls. Because Plaintiff does not allege 

that Defendants Frierson, Mason and Watson actively engaged in 

unconstitutional conduct, he fails to state a claim against them. See 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[A] plaintiff must plead that each 

Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual 

actions, has violated the Constitution.”); see also Grinter v. Knight,

532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir.2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 

899 (6th Cir.2002). Plaintiff, therefore, fails to state a First 

Amendment claim based upon the telephone fees charged at CCCF 

[Calhoun County Correctional Facility]. 

Terry, 2012 WL 5198376, at *3. Plaintiff’s “Statement of Claim” not having even 

mentioned Defendant Sheriff Clayton by name or title (DE 1 at 3), Plaintiff has, 

likewise, not shown specific misconduct or direct participation on Defendant 

Clayton’s part. 

3. Defendant Securus is not a state actor under these 

circumstances. 

Defendant Securus explains that it “holds a public contract with the 

Washtenaw County Sheriff’s Office to provide and operate telecommunications 

2:15-cv-12233-MFL-APP Doc # 24 Filed 04/25/16 Pg 11 of 15 Pg ID 188
12 

equipment and telephone services to the [WCJ] . . . .” (DE 11 at 2.) Although not 

an argument advanced by Defendant Securus, this Court cannot help but note that 

“the provision of telephone services to inmates in a county jail, and then charging 

for them pursuant to its contract with the county, does not transform [defendant 

telephone company] into a state actor for purposes of § 1983.” See Pierce v. 

Kalamazoo Cty. Jail, No. 1:14-CV-684, 2014 WL 5599693, at *2 (W.D. Mich. 

Nov. 3, 2014); see also LaPlante, 2013 WL 5572908, at *16 (“the fact that 

Evercom provides telephone services to prisoners pursuant to a contract with the 

MCJ, alone, is insufficient to transform Evercom into a state actor for purposes of 

Section 1983.”); Iswed v. Caruso, No. 1:08-CV-1118, 2009 WL 4251076, at *3 

(W.D. Mich. Nov. 24, 2009) (“The fact that Embarq may contract with the state for 

delivery of telephone services does not render it a ‘state actor’ for purposes of § 

1983.”). But cf, Walen v. Embarq Payphone Servs. Inc., No. 06-14201, 2009 WL 

3012351, at *3-*4 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 17, 2009) (O’Meara, J., adopting report and 

recommendation of Whalen, M.J.) (in a case where six conversations between the 

plaintiff and his attorney were erroneously recorded, the telephone company 

qualified as a state actor where it provided the telephone monitoring system). In 

the instant matter, Plaintiff at best alleges that this defendant merely provided the 

telephone service itself, that calls were interrupted by commercial solicitations and 

that the toll charges were exorbitantly expensive. As the Supreme Court made 

2:15-cv-12233-MFL-APP Doc # 24 Filed 04/25/16 Pg 12 of 15 Pg ID 189
13 

clear in Rendell–Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982), “[a]cts of ... private 

contractors do not become acts of the government by reason of their significant or 

even total engagement in performing public contracts.” Without more, the 

allegations made here do not turn Securus into a state actor. 

4. Arguments Not Addressed and Conclusion 

Finally, if the Court agrees with my foregoing conclusions, then it need not 

address Defendant Clayton’s additional arguments relating to mootness and 

qualified immunity. (DE 16 at 13-15.)9

 Nor, despite the brief reference above, 

would the Court need to further address Defendant Clayton’s argument in reply 

that “Plaintiff’s Response reveals that Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed in violation 

of Rule 11, and this Court may dismiss his Complaint sua sponte[,]” (DE 19 at 9-

11.) In sum, the Court should simply conclude that Defendant Clayton is entitled 

to dismissal of the complaint against him, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 

because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and 

because he has failed to allege Defendant Clayton’s personal involvement. 

Likewise, if the Court agrees with my foregoing conclusions, then it need 

not address Defendant Securus’s additional arguments regarding failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies and insufficient service of process upon Defendant 

                                                            

9

Nevertheless, given Plaintiff’s apparent June 17, 2015 release from WCJ, his 

prayer to have the Court “allow prisoners to purchase phone time at a reduced 

rate,” (DE 1 at 4), does, even upon a cursory review, appear to be dismissible for 

both mootness and lack of standing. 

2:15-cv-12233-MFL-APP Doc # 24 Filed 04/25/16 Pg 13 of 15 Pg ID 190
14 

Securus (DE 11 at 2-5, 7-10) or, alternatively, seeking a more definite statement 

(DE 11 at 10-12). Instead, the Court should simply conclude that Defendant 

Securus is entitled to dismissal of the complaint against it, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 12(b)(6), because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted and/or because Defendant Securus is not a state actor for purposes of 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. 

III. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS 

 The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service, 

as provided for in Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d). Failure to 

file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas 

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 

505 (6th Cir. 1991). Filing objections that raise some issues but fail to raise others 

with specificity will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this 

Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 931 F.2d 

390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 

1370, 1273 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(d)(2), any objections 

must be served on this Magistrate Judge. 

 Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” and “Objection No. 

2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and 

2:15-cv-12233-MFL-APP Doc # 24 Filed 04/25/16 Pg 14 of 15 Pg ID 191
15 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an 

objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the 

objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 

72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, 

in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to 

Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without 

merit, it may rule without awaiting the response. 

Dated: April 25, 2016 s/Anthony P. Patti 

Anthony P. Patti 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was sent to parties of record 

on April 25, 2016, electronically and/or by U.S. Mail. 

 s/Michael Williams 

 Case Manager for the 

 Honorable Anthony P. Patti 

2:15-cv-12233-MFL-APP Doc # 24 Filed 04/25/16 Pg 15 of 15 Pg ID 192