USAF CULTURE AND COHESION: 

BUILDING AN AIR AND SPACE FORCE FOR THE 21ST 

CENTURY 

James M. Smith 

INSS Occasional Paper 19 

Air Force Planning Series 

June 1998 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the 

Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This 

paper is approved for public release by SAF/PAS; distribution is 

unlimited. The findings of this paper are the result of research conducted 

during summer and fall 1997 under the auspices of an INSS grant. 

******* 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Dr. James M. Smith is a member of the faculty 

of the 34th Education Squadron, Military Art and Science (MAS), at the 

USAF Academy. He is also an adjunct associate professor for USAFA’s 

Department of Political Science. He is a retired USAF Lt Col who holds 

a Doctorate in Public Administration degree focusing on Public Policy 

from the University of Alabama. While on active duty he served as an 

Air Force exchange professor at West Point, teaching comparative 

service culture lessons in two senior political science electives, The 

Politics of Defense Policy and The National Security Seminar. Dr. Smith 

has written other articles on service culture and cohesion including: a 

chapter for USAFA’s 1997 MAS 440 text, Introduction to Joint and 

Multinational Operations, entitled “Service Cultures, Joint Culture, and 

the US Military,” and a paper “Joint Service Culture: Is It Possible? Is 

It Advisable?” which he presented to the annual meeting of the 

International Security Studies Section, International Studies Association, 

at Norfolk, VA, in October 1997. 

******* 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited and should be forwarded 

to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: hayspl.dfe@usafa.af.mil 

******* 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures vii 

Foreword ix 

Executive Summary xi 

Introduction 1 

Culture 2 

USAF Culture 10 

Cultural Cohesion 16 

The USAF in the Late 1990s 18 

 Institutional/Occupational Orientation 26 

 Mission/Priority/Allegiance 35 

 Technology/Space 36 

 The USAF in 1997 44 

Building A Cohesive Force 47 

Closing 53 

Appendix 1: Survey Instrument 54

Endnotes 63 
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LIST OF FIGURES 

Figure 1: Mosher’s Schematic of a Professionalized Government Agency 4

Figure 2: USAF General Officer Profile 14 

Figure 3: Military Higher Education Profile FY 1996 21 

Figure 4: USAF Line Officer Education Profile FY 1996 21 

Figure 5: Survey Response Demographics, Aug 1997 24 

Figure 6: Survey Response, Additional Demographics, Aug 1997 25 

Figure 7: Survey Response, PME Completed, Aug 97 26 

Figure 8: I/O Orientation by Rank 27 

Figure 9: I/O Orientation by Specialization 28 

Figure 10: I/O Orientation by Rating 29 

Figure 11: I/O Orientation by Specialization and Rank (Ops) 29 

Figure 12: I/O Orientation by Specialization and Rank (Support) 30 

Figure 13: I/O Orientation by Specialization and Rank (Science) 31 

Figure 14: I/O Orientation by Commissioning Source 31 

Figure 15: I/O Orientation by PME Completed 32 

Figure 16: I/O Orientation by Gender 33 

Figure 17: I/O Orientation by Joint Experience 33 

Figure 18: USAF Mission, Priority, and Allegiance Rankings 35 

Figure 19: Technology/Space by Rank 37 

Figure 20: Technology/Space by Specialization 38 

Figure 21: Technology/Space by Rating 39 

Figure 22: Technology/Space by Specialization and Rank (Ops) 40 

Figure 23: Technology/Space by Specialization and Rank (Support) 40 

Figure 24: Technology/Space by Specialization and Rank (Science) 40 

Figure 25: Technology/Space by Commissioning Source 41 

Figure 26: Technology/Space by PME Completed 41 

Figure 27: Technology/Space by Gender 42 

Figure 28: Technology/Space by Joint Experience 42 
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FOREWORD 

 This paper by Dr. James Smith of the USAF Academy’s 

Military Art and Science faculty explores the critical issue of Air Force 

culture and cohesion. It uses surveys of Air Force Officers attending the 

Professional Military Education schools at Maxwell AFB to provide a 

snapshot of how today’s officers view important issues such as their role 

in the Air Force and the mission of the Air Force. By analyzing this 

data, Dr. Smith finds—contrary to other widely read but more 

pessimistic studies—that there are definite cohesion problems but also a 

significant degree of consensus among Air Force Officers on their role 

and on key Air Force issues. Dr. Smith argues that the Air Force can 

build upon these areas of consensus and evolve into a more cohesive 

organization. However, his analysis also reveals that progress toward 

building greater Air Force cohesion will have to overcome barriers such 

as relatively high levels of occupationalism among the pilots who form 

the largest group within the Air Force’s core elite and significant 

disagreement over the role of space in the Air Force’s future. We are 

very pleased to publish Dr. Smith’s second occasional paper and 

announce that he was recently named as the new INSS Director. 

About the Institute 

 INSS’ primary sponsors are the Policy Division of the Nuclear 

and Counterproliferation Directorate, Headquarters USAF (XONP) and 

the Dean of the Faculty, USAF Academy. Our other current sponsors 

include: the Air Staff’s Directorate for Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance (XOI); OSD Net Assessment; the Defense Special 

Weapons Agency; the Army Environmental Policy Institute; the On-Site 

Inspection Agency, and the Plans Directorate of United States Space 

Command. The mission of the Institute is to promote national security 
x

research for the Department of Defense within the military academic 

community, and to support the Air Force national security education 

program. Its primary purpose is to promote research in fields of interest 

to INSS’ sponsors: international security policy (especially arms control 

and counterproliferation), Air Force planning issues, regional security 

policy, conflict in the information age (including the revolution in 

military affairs and information warfare), environmental security, and 

space policy. 

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

disciplines and across services to develop new ideas for USAF policy 

making. The Institute develops topics, selects researchers from within 

the military academic community, and administers sponsored research. 

It also hosts conferences and workshops that facilitate the dissemination 

of information to a wide range of private and government organizations. 

INSS is in its sixth year of providing valuable, cost-effective research to 

meet the needs of the Air Staff and our other sponsors. We appreciate 

your continued interest in INSS and its research products. 

PETER L. HAYS, Lt Col, USAF 

Director
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

 The Air Force has a cohesion problem, and it is firmly rooted in 

Air Force culture, subcultures, and organizational dynamics within the 

diverse, complex entity that is today’s USAF. This paper analyzes the 

roots and the current manifestations of that cohesion problem—defines 

and develops the problem itself—as a basis for some broad suggestions 

as to how the USAF can begin to mold itself into a more cohesive force 

for the 21st century. 

 By the late 1980s the primary Air Force internal divisions 

revolved around technologies, with splits between pilots and all others, 

among pilots based on the type of aircraft flown, and with space 

beginning to assert its claim on a piece of the core. The Air Force 

essence was centering on technology. Dr. Donald B. Rice, former 

Secretary of the Air Force, noted the overwhelming identification by 

USAF members with their weapon system over their service. Carl 

Builder characterizes the contemporary USAF as lacking any integrating 

vision, noting fractionalization with the space faction now heading off on 

its own toward a separate force future. He sees attachment to 

technologies without any glue to bind those technologies together around 

traditional roles and missions of airpower, with the result a dominance of 

occupationalism over institutional attachments. To Builder, the USAF 

has no strong, unifying mission or vision, so loyalty has devolved to 

functions, technologies, and occupations. 

 This study surveyed USAF officers to find more detailed 

answers to questions about what the Air Force looks like today--how it is 

oriented, where its main fracture lines lie, and what the intensity of its 

faultlines might be across specialties and ranks. The survey was 

administered to the students entering Professional Military Education 

(PME) courses at Maxwell AFB, AL in the late summer of 1997. The 
xii

study finds that the current picture is not quite as “bad” as one might 

think based on previous studies. It indicates that there is a common 

foundation upon which to build a more cohesive air and space force for 

the future. 

 The survey identified differences on Institutional/Occupational 

orientation based on rank, occupation, rating, PME completion, and joint 

experience; but found that the relative rankings of alternative missions, 

priorities, and allegiances indicated higher degrees of agreement across 

the USAF. The responses on technology and space indicated significant 

differences, and these must be targeted to bridge the gaps in these areas. 

The key differences were on the military utility of space, an issue that 

stands out in this study and is at the center of debates over the future of 

space within the USAF and calls for the creation of a separate space 

force. 

 So fractionalization was found, but for the most part the 

differences were perhaps not as striking as were some areas of similarity. 

The USAF line officer corps appears to provide a basic infrastructure 

upon which cohesion can be built. Building or fostering cohesion within 

a complex organization is a difficult task, but it is one that has been and 

can be successfully accomplished. What must be remembered is that 

culture change and cohesion are products of senior leadership reaching 

down into the organization—it is an internal, active, top-down process. 

It must begin with the clear definition of a single, unifying mission, and 

then that vision must be actively disseminated across the diverse 

subcultures and fractionated specialties before it can be embraced and 

begin to take effect. 

 The USAF strategy and structure must be realigned to achieve 

the critical operational tasks, roles, missions, and functions at the heart of 

the vision. This requires unified, active leadership reaching down to 

reshape the service through clear and cohesive guidance socialized 
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across the organization. Key here is creating a cohesive and 

encompassing team focus around which the diverse subcultures and 

specialties can (and will want to) coalesce. Rewards and incentives, 

promotions, and training must all be brought into alignment with this 

team concept to provide the “glue” needed to hold the reshaped service 

together until it fuses into a common whole. The new team must be 

socialized from the beginning of one’s service, and the culture and vision 

must then be reinforced across one’s career, not just in formal PME 

programs, but also via active mentoring by leadership at every level. The 

informal dimension will be key to the broadest success of this 

socialization effort, and it rests in the active mentoring of junior officers 

by USAF leaders, a harder process to institutionalize and standardize. 

The final result must be changed output in terms of the performance and 

cohesion of the USAF team within and across the 21st century 

battlespace, and simple or singular attempts at solution may not be 

enough. 

 As the USAF completes this transition, it must also remember 

that the perceived coherence of the other U.S. military services must not 

be taken as a direct “fix” to unique Air Force issues and problems. The 

Air Force is simply not the Army, nor is it the Navy, and it is certainly 

not the Marine Corps. The Air Force must find its own answers within 

its own set of cultures and pressures: it must define, build, and sustain its 

own team within and against its own mission and vision. The team must 

be built, reinforced, and employed as a team, not just its parts, and the 

USAF incentive system must be aligned with that team concept. Hightech, complex, matrix teams can be productive, loyal, unified, and 

effective, and the USAF can and should expect or accept no less. 

 True, the Air Force has a cohesion problem. But the Air Force 

also has a common infrastructure upon which to begin to build its future, 

inclusive, more cohesive team. It needs to define that team, consolidate 
xiv

its missions around that team, and actively promulgate, reward, and 

support its vision into the 21st century air and space future. The effort 

must be extensive and pervasive, incorporating formal education and 

training but focusing also on day-to-day, unit-level efforts to live the 

team concept. It must come from the top, but it must reach down to and 

through commanders at all levels in a continuing, cradle-to-grave effort 

across each airman’s career. The fracture lines are real, and the 

technological and mission diversity pressures tend to pull the Air Force 

apart, so it must put real and focused effort into pulling together, not as a 

single entity, but as a team coming into harmony around shared missions 

and common goals. A team effort is possible, even if a single unified 

entity is not, and the effort must be made to bring that team onto the 

field. 
USAF Culture and Cohesion: 

Building an Air and Space Force for the 21st 

Century

INTRODUCTION 

Today’s Air Force has a cohesion problem. The Strategic Air Command 

(SAC) and Tactical Air Command (TAC) have gone away, melding into 

Air Combat Command (ACC), but you still hear “fighter wonks” and 

“bomber weenies” deride each other. You hear pilots badmouth 

navigators (and vice versa), and what is this with a distinctive blue 

“flight” suit for the “missile pukes?” You don’t even want to hear what 

the non-rated folks have to say about the “leather jacket brigade!” Or 

what the “near earth air force” has to say about the “pigs in space.” And 

what about the “computer geeks” and those “airhead engineers?” 

Overstated? Perhaps. But there have been graphic examples of each of 

these internal United States Air Force (USAF) divisions over recent 

years. Indeed, the Air Force has a cohesion problem, and it is firmly 

rooted in Air Force culture, subcultures, and organizational dynamics 

within the diverse, complex entity that is today’s USAF. 

 The purpose of this paper is to analyze the roots and the current 

manifestations of that cohesion problem—to define and develop the 

problem itself—as a basis for some suggestions as to how the USAF can 

begin to mold itself into a more cohesive force for the 21st century. It 

starts by examining exactly what organizational culture is, particularly as 

that broad concept more narrowly applies to the Air Force. The paper 

then examines several traditional cultural depictions of the USAF, and it 

expands on those traditional views and its own analysis to outline a 
2

detailed cultural description of the Air Force today. Based on that 

expanded cultural view, it examines the applicability of cohesionbuilding activities in several other government agencies in suggesting 

how to increase the cohesion of the current and future Air Force. 

CULTURE 

Every organization has a culture, that is, a persistent, 

patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of 

and human relationships within an organization. 

Culture is to an organization what personality is to an 

individual. Like human culture generally, it is passed 

on from one generation to the next. It changes slowly 

if at all.1

This statement captures the key points of organizational culture—a 

patterned way of thinking, focused on central tasks (operations) and 

relationships (administration), passed on by generations, slow to 

change—and each deserves a brief expansion. 

 Any organization’s patterned way of thinking revolves around 

what is variously called its essence or the beliefs of the corps around its 

core. The central career professionals, those most closely associated 

with the organization’s core operation around its central tasks, define the 

mission and decide on the capabilities needed to carry out that mission. 

Designating the mission and the capabilities also indicates the specific 

qualifications and focus of the organization’s members.2

 The elite group 

at the center of the organization’s mission, the elite profession (or the 

corps at the core), stakes out the boundaries of the organization (its roles 

and missions), exercises control over the operations of the organization 

(with spillover influence on the policies which direct that operation), 
3

controls the personnel system for that core operation and its supporting 

operations, and establishes a career system to institutionalize that control. 

Dr. Frederick Mosher maintains that within even the most complex 

organization, a single professional elite possesses knowledge, skills, and 

orientations identical to the mission and activity of the organization. 

This is the corps elite, or the elite profession within the organization, and 

it defines the essence, sets the culture, and determines the vision which 

define the organization.3

 Mosher diagrams the modern governmental 

organization as depicted at Figure 1. 

 The key relationships within the complex government 

organization revolve around that operational core. The modern 

organization is comprised, first, of workers (category 6) who carry out 

the organization's defined tasks within its operational environment. 

These are the doers of the organization, but they do not rise to the 

policymaking levels that define the organization's essence. Next are the 

administrative professions (category 5) who provide service support for 

the organization’s mission. An example here is finance. Administrative 

professions are essential to the organization, but will have little role in 

defining its essence. Then come Mosher's supporting line professions 

(category 4), who provide direct support to the organization’s core 

mission. For the Air Force, this would include the Reserve and the 

National Guard, who directly participate in core operations, but who do 

not define Air Force culture. Category 3, the staff professions such as 

legal and scientific personnel, are essential parts of the team, but again 

do not normally set its culture. And category 1 represents the political 

appointees who directly oversee the military force—the Secretary of the 

Air Force and the Secretary's staff. They would seem to be in a position 

to define the vision and culture of the Air Force, but culture cannot be 

imposed from outside—it arises from within the core line professions. 
4

Figure 1: Mosher’s Schematic of a Professionalized Government Agency 

KEY: 1. Political appointees from outside the agency; 2. The elite profession, 2a. The elite 

segment of the elite profession; 2b, c, d. Other segments of the elite profession; 3. Staff 

professions; 4. Line professions; 5. Administrative professions; 6. Workers, including

supervisors, paraprofessionals, clerical, manual, and others.

3

Journeyman 

professionals 

4a 4b 2d 2c 2b 2a

1 

6

5

Journeyman 

workers 

Political 

appointees 
5

That leaves Mosher's category 2, the elite professions. This is the group 

which most defines and promulgates Air Force culture. It is composed 

of the operators who directly undertake the central missions of the 

USAF—air (and today space) military operations—such as pilots, 

logisticians, maintainers, and intelligence officers. These elites are at the 

heart of the organization’s task environment, and they provide the 

majority of the senior leadership that also operates in the 

administrative/political external environment.4

 But even within category 

2, certain professions (2a) have a more significant impact on the 

organization’s culture than do others. 

 In large organizations or those with complex missions, 

secondary elites emerge around their particular sub-mission or mission 

segment. These secondary elites can exist within any segment of the 

organization, including within the corps at the core of the organization. 

The organization can exhibit tensions and conflict across these elites as 

each espouses its own organizational vision based on its particular 

experience and focus. Thus, a rank ordering often develops among the 

core elites, with resultant intra-organizational mission competition, 

making analysis of the relationships among these various elites key to a 

full understanding of the organization.5

 These subcultures often develop 

around the many and varied “professions” within today’s complex 

military service. 

 Professor Samuel Huntington discussed the existence of both 

“associational” professions (those existing outside of government but 

with roles inside government organizations such as law or medicine) and 

“bureaucratic” professions (those developed specifically within the 

government to fill its unique needs such as foreign service officer or 

military officer).6

 Mosher uses the terms “general” professions and 

“public service” professions, and adds “emerging” professions such as 

(in the early 1980s) computer scientists which often have a civilian 
6

counterpart, but are not yet established enough to be considered 

universal either within government or across the broader society.7

 

Professor Charles Moskos details the significance of these professions by 

categorizing military members as relatively more or less “institutional” 

or “occupational.” Institutional values and behaviors reflect the 

“calling” of service, with emphasis on military service, competence, and 

mission. Occupational values and behaviors revolve around the 

technical specialty, with emphasis on the job rather than the organization 

within which it is carried out. Moskos notes that both sets of values and 

behaviors coexist within organizations and individuals. But he 

emphasizes that “associational” or “general” professions that have nonmilitary and non-governmental applications are more open to 

“occupational” associations while “bureaucratic” or “public service” 

professions that are centered within the military or the government are 

more prone to “institutional” associations. Herein lies one source of 

internal division within a complex organization containing both types of 

professions.8

 But when challenged from outside the organization, these 

subcultures may come together and present a unified face to external 

organizational challenges.9

 So Mosher sees the military service, in broad terms, as 

consisting of workers (technical specialists in the service technologies 

and missions), supporting and staff managers (officers in what the Army 

would call combat support and combat service support specialties), and 

management professionals (officers within the core or elite profession of 

the service—the Army's combat arms).10 This trichotomy is not unlike 

the more general description of a modern business organization offered 

by Dr. Edgar Schein, who uses the categories operators (carrying out the 

tasks of the organization within its task environment), engineers (lending 

technical support to the core mission within the task environment while 

bridging into both the broader community of engineers outside of the 
7

organization and the fringes of the administrative, political, and policy 

environment of the organization), and executives (who determine 

organizational policy and interact directly with the administrative or 

political environment of the organization).11 It is that group of 

management professionals or executives which are of central interest in 

examining the organization's culture. 

 It is also that group which makes up the core elite leadership 

which is most important to the relative cohesion of the organization. Dr. 

James Wilson finds that if the culture is shared and endorsed across the 

various subgroups which comprise the organization, then a sense of 

mission exists, and the organization is relatively cohesive both internally 

and in its approach to the outside world. Able leaders attempt to shape 

the culture toward that cohesive sense of shared mission, but this is often 

a very difficult bridge-building exercise.12 A RAND study agrees, 

stating that a “collective, shared sense of a distinct identity and purpose 

appears to be a hallmark of the most successful institutions.” The RAND 

study calls this the organizational vision, and further states that such a 

shared vision lends the organization relevance, clarity, realism, 

inspiration, and a positive internal and external public image.13 

 The organizational cultures of the U.S. military services, and of 

the other organizations within the U.S. national security bureaucracy 

(Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, etc.), are particularly 

strong because these organizations employ a career system based on the 

“closed career principle.” These organizations recruit personnel upon 

completion of basic education, and these personnel spend their career 

almost exclusively in that one organization. They are educated, trained, 

and advanced by the organization based on its internal rules and 

priorities, and there is almost no lateral entry into the organization except 

at the entry level—career personnel are protected from outside 

competition.14 The services recruit and indoctrinate new members 
8

around their core mission and its requirements, thus ensuring cultural 

continuity across generations. They provide tailored professional 

education programs to prepare career officers to move up the chain of 

responsibility for the core mission, and they promote these career 

personnel into the decision and policymaking levels within their career 

elite with only limited external veto and no real external competition. 

The service culture is institutionalized by the organization and 

internalized by its members. 

 Organizational culture has significant impact on organizational 

behavior. On the positive side of the coin, culture gives the organization 

its mission identity, sense of commitment, and professional focus. It 

defines the organization, and it is at the center of shaping the operational 

focus and capabilities it brings to its combat task environment. But it 

also takes on an administrative dimension, shaping the responses of the 

organization to its mission rivals and those with whom it must operate in 

carrying out its mission. This behavior is not always productive. Even 

more importantly, organizations fight hardest when they feel that their 

core mission is being challenged. The organization will favor policies 

that promote the core mission, it will fight for autonomy in performing 

that core mission, and it will seek to defeat any challenges to those 

functions that it associates with its core. It will be largely indifferent to 

functions it sees as peripheral to its core, even if those functions are part 

of its assigned purpose. Finally, it will try to push out, or reject 

accepting, non-core missions as possible detractions from its core 

focus.15 All of these effects are possible inside the organization, between 

the various subcultures, just as they are evident outside it in terms of 

service rivalries. 

 To the extent that these behaviors spur excellence in mission 

accomplishment through competition, they are seen as positive. 

However, sometimes they lead to dysfunctional results, and there is no 
9

easy or immediate solution. Organizational culture changes slowly and 

primarily in response to internal pressures to adapt to a changed 

operational environment, not in response to external direction. Cultural 

change is referred to in terms of cultural epochs, some as short as five 

years, but most occurring over a decade, a generation, and some as long 

as a century.16

 Dr. Earl Walker argues that true organizational change requires 

a cultural transformation—not simply accommodation and incremental 

modification but changed organizational output in terms of structure, 

professional incentives, and changed professional behaviors. 

Incremental modifications fail to keep pace with changes in the 

organization’s task environment, leading overseers within the political 

environment to perceive organizational failure. The organization is thus 

faced with a choice between reorganizing itself to fit the new reality, 

assigning itself a future of irrelevant mediocrity, or risking termination or 

absorption into a “vital” organization, possibly a rival. The 

reorganization option, implying organizational (cultural) change, consists 

of several steps: recognition of pressures due to changes in the 

organization’s external environment; perception that existing 

performance is inadequate; formulation of a new organizational strategy 

(planned outputs, goals, and objectives) to meet the changed 

environment; modification of the organization’s structure to 

accommodate new tasks and relationships; transformation of the 

organization’s culture to meet the realigned elite professions and their 

relative priorities; and, finally, changed output in terms of organizational 

performance and product as a result of the new strategy, structure, and 

culture.17

 Alternatively, Dr. Stephen Rosen sees the “problem” of 

completing change and building cohesion within the system of 

subcultures which are today’s military service—changing organizational 
10

culture—as a function of creating shared values and legitimacy leading 

to a common “theory of victory” (or vision), an alignment of new or 

changed tasks with “critical” tasks identified and ranked, a realigned 

distribution of power within the organization reflecting the new 

hierarchy of missions, and new or changed career paths to grow 

organizational members into future leadership positions at all levels.18 

So the organization struggles hard to protect its turf, its budget, its 

mission, and its self-identity as long as it can. Transitions are painful to 

the organization, and this is a time of transition for the U.S. military. 

Therefore, we turn to an examination of traditional Air Force service 

culture as prelude to addressing the changing operational environment 

and the transitioning Air Force culture. 

USAF CULTURE 

Traditional Air Force essence evolved around strategic bombing, 

particularly the aerial delivery of nuclear bombs against the Soviet 

Union. Internally, the primary contender for influence was the group 

advocating tactical airpower—from close air support to the Army to the 

delivery of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield. Another 

challenge to primacy within the service came from advocates of missileborne nuclear weapons in lieu of the manned bomber. The strategic 

corps was so powerful as to prevent the emergence of another power 

center from the airlift community, even after the success of the Berlin 

Airlift—airlift remained a secondary mission removed from the core of 

nuclear bombing.19

 The challenge of the missile community to bomber pilot 

domination forced the Air Force to adapt to external demands and 

incorporate missile technology, even to advocate missile development 

and procurement. However, the corps never dropped their demand for at 
11

least coequal attention and money for bombers, and the expanded nuclear 

mission—bomber or missile delivered—remained at the core of Air 

Force culture across much of the Cold War.20

 Air Force promotion rates to the rank of Colonel from 1954 

through 1971 reflect the assertion that senior leaders define 

organizational culture and that the organization rewards and promotes 

core elites at a higher rate than peripheral officers. But the Air Force 

core elite was changing. First, the promotion potential of those officers 

assigned to the core strategic mission—including both bomber pilots and 

missileers—declined across this period. From a high in 1954-55 of 

promotion rates three times as high as those in the rest of the Air Force, 

Strategic Air Command (SAC) officers steadily declined to promotion 

rates below the Air Force average by 1966. This trend continued 

through 1971. Observers also trace the “below the zone,” or accelerated, 

promotion rates for SAC officers from 1962 through 1971. For those 

officers identified for early, “fast track” promotion to Colonel, SAC was 

above the Air Force average in 1962 and 1963, falling below the average 

for all but one of the subsequent years across the study. For flyers within 

the Air Force, however, including all flyers—strategic, tactical, and 

transport—promotion rates to Colonel remained above the Air Force 

average for all but one year across 1956-1971. The core of the Air Force 

might be turning away from the strategic mission from 1966 on, but 

flying airplanes remained the Air Force focus.21 From the 1960s, the Air 

Force adapted its culture to accept a primary role for the aerial delivery 

of tactical nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, but strategic bomber pilots 

remained at the top of the Air Force until the early 1980s, when for the 

first time a tactical pilot became Air Force Chief of Staff. 

 Builder sees this shift from strategic elements at the center of 

the core of the Air Force to tactical dominance in largely negative 

terms—the USAF has lost its guiding vision (strategic airpower theory) 
12

and thus its cultural cohesion. According to this view, the cohesive core 

around decisive, strategic airpower through World War II gave way to 

nuclear deterrence shortly after the founding of the independent Air 

Force. This wedding of the Air Force to nuclear deterrence gave entry to 

the missile and space community, which accelerated the shift to a focus 

on technologies over missions. The lack of a strategic role in Korea and 

Vietnam gave rise to the tactical subculture as well, splitting the USAF 

core and leaving only weapon systems as a focal point.22 Dr. James 

Mowbray attributes this shift to replacement of aerospace power at the 

heart of USAF doctrine with less defined “national objectives,” thus 

leading to a devolution to sub-mission identities around these diverse 

objectives.23

 By the late 1980s, then, the primary Air Force internal divisions 

revolved around technologies, with splits between pilots and all others; 

with missiles beginning to assert a claim on a piece of the core, and 

between the types of systems the pilots flew—between fighter and 

bomber pilots, between transport pilots and “combat” fliers, and even 

between air-to-air and deep interdiction pilots and close air support 

pilots. The Air Force essence was centering on the technology of the 

flying machine, even to the extent that it could be described in religious 

terms. 

The Air Force could be said to worship at the altar of 

technology. The airplane was the instrument that gave 

birth to independent air forces; and the airplane has, 

from its inception, been an expression of the miracles 

of technology. . . . There is a circle of faith here: If the 

Air Force fosters technology, then that inexhaustible 

fountain of technology will ensure an open-ended 

future for flight (in airplanes and spacecraft); and that, 

in turn, will ensure the future of the Air Force.24 
13

Builder touched a grain of truth here. For example, cannon and shell, 

instruments of war, abound around the periphery of the West Point plain, 

but the central area closest to the cadets who will lead the future Army is 

reserved for statues of military leaders of note—Washington, 

MacArthur, Eisenhower, and even Patton. At the Air Force Academy, 

busts of air leaders, from the Wright Brothers through Hap Arnold, 

surround the central area, but upon that area one finds static displays of 

the F-4 and F-105 from Vietnam and the F-15 and F-16 from Desert 

Storm. Technologies of flight take center stage. 

 Given that “worship” of technology, the Air Force core 

measures itself in terms of aerospace performance and technological 

quality—the clear emphasis is on quality over quantity, and the selfidentity is with the platforms flown or launched. Given its future 

orientation and attachment to technology, the Air Force still remembers 

its struggle with the Army for independence, and it is sensitive to 

challenges to that independence or to its attachment to the ground 

combat mission. It emphasizes the strategic dimensions of aerial combat 

over the ground support roles to continue to assert its case for autonomy 

as a service.25 The Air Force is “the keeper and wielder of the decisive 

instruments of war—the technological marvels of flight that have been 

adapted to war.”26

 The Air Force was best positioned of all the services for Desert 

Storm, but not necessarily for the end of the Cold War. The traditional 

Air Force core mission had been strategic deterrence of the Soviet 

Union. That mission continued with the end of the Cold War—Russia 

and three other former republics still had strategic nuclear weapons—but 

would continue to dwindle as the Russian weapons drew down with time 

toward START II limits. Foreseeing this loss of mission, the Air Force 

issued a new vision statement, Global Reach—Global Power, promoting 
14

conventional long-range power projection and precision bombing against 

regional threats.27

 This vision reflected a continuation of changes that had been 

occurring within the Air Force since Vietnam. Advances in conventional 

technology, precision, and lethality had accompanied the takeover of Air 

Force leadership by the “fighter mafia.” Tactical pilots had supplanted 

bomber pilots, and Global Reach—Global Power gave voice to their 

vision of how air power should (would) be employed in the new world 

order. This was a significant shift in the Air Force elite, but it happened 

gradually and deliberately, and subsequently somewhat limited its major 

disruptive effects within the Air Force.28 Today the leadership transition 

is complete. As of June 1997, nine of the 11 active Air Force four-star 

generals were fighter pilots, and the remaining two were bomber pilots.29 

See Figure 2 for details. By September 1997 one of the bomber pilots 

had retired, and was replaced by yet another fighter pilot. Note that all 

were pilots. 

Figure 2: USAF General Officer Profile

Rank Number Fighter 

Pilot 

Bomber 

Pilot 

Airlift/ 

Tanker 

Pilot 

NonRated Grad 

Degree 

ISS SSS 

O-10 11 9 2 0 0 11 10 11 

O-9 36 18 4 3 11 34 29 35 

Senior 

Leadership 

47 27 

57% 

6 

13% 

3 

6% 

11 

23% 

45 

96% 

39 

83% 

46 

98% 

O-8 78 39 6 

(1 Nav) 

12 20 74 68 78 

O-7 122 44 

(2 Nav) 

11 23 

(1 Nav) 

41 118 107 118 

All 

Leadership 

247 112 

45% 

24 

10% 

39 

16% 

72 

29% 

237 

96% 

214 

87% 

242 

98% 

Source: http://www.af.mil/news/biographies/ as of 9 June 1997. 
15

 Whatever its purpose and genesis, Global Reach—Global 

Power gave voice to exactly the rapid, lethal air power which the Air 

Force employed in the Gulf War. The precision, decisive air power 

employed in the Gulf positioned the Air Force out in front of the other 

services for the force cutback debate following Desert Storm. It was 

developing a clear vision of its future, and it demonstrated that it was 

ready to carry out that vision. While the other services struggled to 

define themselves coming home from the Gulf, the Air Force pushed for 

its faster, higher, stealthier future.30 That push emphasized technology 

and rapid force projection, and it also emphasized expansions in the roles 

that space and information dominance will play in future conflicts.31 The 

Air Force may have seen its core mission reduced, and it may have seen 

its core elite shift from the bomber mafia to the fighter mafia with an 

accompanying shift from a strategic to an operational focus, but it 

maintains its attachment to the future technologies of air and space 

combat—the decisive instruments of future war now codified in Global 

Engagement.

32 As this vision matures, and if it can withstand the push 

toward a narrower, more surface warfare orientation from the Army and 

Marine Corps revolving around the Joint Vision 2010 process,33 the 

transition to a high-end operational (theater) decisive air and space 

power vision may become complete, allowing the USAF culture to 

complete the transition toward its preferred 21st century.34

 As Global Engagement summarizes this transition and the 

vision that forms its foundation, “Global Reach—Global Power prepared 

the Air Force to deal with the challenges of the transition era following 

the Cold War. Global Engagement . . . charts a course that will take the 

Service beyond this transitional period and into the future.” It continues 

“Our Vision Statement remains: Air Force people building the world's 

most respected air and space force . . . global power and reach for 
16

America.”35 That vision is based on Air Force people, who must adapt to 

and embrace the new technologies, mission, organizational concepts, and 

eventually the new culture that the transition entails. The Air Force must 

continue to transition toward an Air and Space Force, reinventing itself 

as a cohesive entity based on its realigned culture. 

CULTURAL COHESION 

Transitions are painful, with shifting power structures, relationships, 

tasks, rewards and incentives. The USAF has been undergoing such a 

transition at least since Vietnam, and it continues through to today. The 

consequences are profound, leading to the lack of cohesion we see in that 

Air Force today. Many observers have detailed either the depths or 

directions of the transitional fractionalization of the USAF. Their 

observations are summarized here as prelude to a discussion of the 

methodology and results of an attempt to confirm and extend those 

observations—to more fully define the “cohesion problem” the Air Force 

faces in the late 1990s. 

 Dr. Rice, former Secretary of the Air Force, noted the 

overwhelming identification by USAF members with their weapon 

system over their service. He also noted an emphasis on operational 

factors leading to an anti-intellectual bent and little resulting attachment 

to any broader USAF mission or doctrine.36 Builder agrees. He 

characterizes the contemporary USAF as lacking an integrating vision, 

noting fractionalization with the space faction now heading off on its 

own toward a separate force future. He sees attachment to technologies 

but without any glue to bind those technologies together around 

traditional roles and missions of airpower, with the result a dominance of 

occupationalism over institutional attachments. To Builder, the USAF 

has no strong, unifying mission or vision, so loyalty has devolved to 
17

functions, technologies, and occupations.37

 As noted earlier, Margiotta makes similar observations. He 

states that in his experience he served in or with 30-40 different “air 

forces,” with the only common elements between them a single colored 

uniform and a universal belief that each member and faction was serving 

the cause of the national defense. He observed that combat functions, 

centered on the flightline and silo and on the shared dangers and 

hardships of USAF operations, exhibited more institutional attachments. 

Support functions, removed from the flightline and silo, exhibited a more 

bureaucratic orientation and closer integration with civilian specialists, 

tending more toward occupational identifications. The highest 

technology areas of research and development, according to Margiotta, 

are indistinguishable from civilian R&D institutions. He sees technology 

as the organizational essence of the Air Force, with this trend reinforced 

through the partnership effort with civilian aerospace industry needed to 

bring new weapon systems on line. The USAF fighting force is small, 

well educated, highly specialized around discrete technologies, and 

functionally organized around that functional specialization. In such an 

atmosphere, technology management is more prized than combat 

leadership.38

 Moskos notes that institutional and occupational orientations are 

not necessarily a zero-sum game, but coexist along a continuum, varying 

within individuals and across services, branches, ranks, and functional 

specialties.39 And Dr. Frank Wood summarizes two decades of attempts 

to measure institutional and occupational attitudes within the changing 

USAF across the 1970s and 1980s. He observes that the high technology 

emphasis of the USAF makes it most susceptible to specialization and 

occupational attachments, particularly as those USAF specialties have 

civilian air and space equivalents. As the USAF task environment 

reoriented from strategic combat to deterrence and pursuit of political 
18

objectives, the service fragmented around its sub-specialties. The 

expanded role of, and exposure to, civilian contractors deepened this 

fragmentation toward occupationalism. He also notes that economic 

realities, with their increasing emphasis on a management orientation 

(versus a combat or results orientation) and economic analysis further 

deepened the occupational linkages.40

 Wood reports that in the 1980s 70 percent of USAF officers 

surveyed saw flying assignments as of decreasing prestige and 

managerial assignments of increasing prestige. This trend was most 

pronounced among majors and lieutenant colonels—middle ranking 

career officers. In the same time period, junior officers were also found 

to value the technical expertise and managerial responsibilities of support 

positions over flying assignments. And 63 percent of senior officers felt 

that combat experience should not be a prerequisite for promotion to 

general—to the highest positions of USAF leadership. The Air Force 

was clearly becoming more occupational in its orientations. Further 

evidence was that 40-50 percent of junior officer flyers identified 

themselves as pilots first—they just happened to be practicing that 

occupation for the USAF. Perhaps surprisingly, since the pilot force is at 

the heart of USAF combat operations—supposedly the more institutional 

part of a modern service—the pilot force was found to be the more 

occupational of USAF specialties, with support officers identifying more 

closely with institutional management.41 Based on all of these 

observations and analyses, this study sought to employ some of these 

same concepts to capture a “snapshot” of the USAF in the late 1990s. 

The USAF in the Late 1990s 

This study maps selected characteristics of the USAF corps elite, the 

organizational culture setters of the service—its general officers—and of 

the USAF officer corps as a service highly susceptible to occupational 

attachments. Then it employs a survey instrument to further delineate 
19

selected elements of cohesion and fragmentation across specialties, 

ranks, and leadership generations. The overall result is a snapshot of an 

organization defined by its subcultures and fracture lines more than, or at 

least as much as, its common base or heart. 

 Again, from studies of the USAF from the 1970s and into the 

1980s, we expect the Air Force to represent a spectrum of attachments to 

both the institution and to its many occupations, but with a fairly strong 

lean toward the occupations in many cases. The Air Force should be a 

confederation of technical specialties, with this fractionalization a 

function of the technical nature of the service, its resulting close and 

continuous contact with civilian contractors and specialists from 

equivalent occupations, and of its bureaucratic, management practices 

dating from the 1970s.42 Distinctive uniforms, flight jackets, badges, and 

pay bonuses have helped retain critically skilled officers, but they have 

also helped to deepen individual identification with subcultures and splits 

between those various factions at the higher, service level. The 

occupational orientation resulting from technology and skill orientation 

is deepened by the pursuit of skill-related higher education that is so 

characteristic of the Air Force officer corps.43 This set of occupational 

factors sets the Air Force apart from the ground combat services, which 

have been hypothesized to be, and demonstrated to be, more institutional 

in their orientation. The Marine Corps has been found to be the most 

institutional of the services, for example.44 The lack of direct civilian 

equivalents for many of their core skills is a factor here. 

 Within the relatively more occupational USAF into the 1980s, 

senior officers were found to be more institutional in their orientations 

and junior officers more occupational.45 The closed career institutional 

selection and professional military education processes can help account 

for this finding. Further, among the mid-career and senior Air Force 

officers, aircraft and missile operators were found to be the most 
20

institutional with support officer specialties found to be more 

occupational and research and development specialties the most 

occupational in their orientations. Among junior officers, however, the 

operators—particularly the pilots—were found to be more occupational 

in their orientations than were support officers.46 By the 1980s, the Air 

Force was a service of fragmented specialists, well educated in and 

oriented toward their occupational skills, with more institutional 

attachments found primarily as a function of advancing rank and 

“professional” exposure within the officer corps. But do these trends 

hold true into the 1990s and approaching the 21st century? More current 

data is needed to begin to address possible approaches to increasing 

USAF cohesion today. 

 An initial profile of USAF officers points to a continuation and 

perhaps even a deepening of some of the factors seen as contributing to 

USAF occupational orientation and fragmentation. A primary indicator 

of continuing USAF attachment to technology and to a continuing 

occupational orientation is education. The data reported at Figure 2 

point out that 96 percent of all USAF generals have earned at least one 

graduate degree. The data at Figure 3 remind us that the Air Force is by 

far the most educated of the services, with 60 percent of all USAF 

members enrolled in some post-secondary education in 1996 and 2861 

USAF members earning graduate degrees that year. The former figure 

represents almost 60 percent of the total Air Force members and almost 

40 percent of the total enrollees from the military services (the USAF is 

only about 20 percent of the total military strength). The latter figure 

represents over 70 percent of all graduate degrees awarded to members 

of the U.S. military. Figure 4 data reinforce this profile of a highly 

educated specialist service. Air Force line officers, over half of whom 

hold graduate degrees, are clearly a well-educated group. And again by 

comparison, the Navy was reported earlier in 1997 to have only 77 
21

serving line officers with doctoral degrees—the USAF has almost 900.47

Figure 3: Military Higher Education Profile FY 1996

Post Secondary Army Navy Marine 

Corps 

Air Force Total 

Personnel 495,000 424,500 174,000 388,200 1,481,700 

Number Enrolled 

199,882 140,704 48,272 232,090 620,948 

Percentage 

Service Enrolled 40% 33% 28% 60% 42% 

Grad Degrees 322 647 123 2861 3953 

Sources: Air Force Times, 11 August 1997; and Secretary of Defense, 

Annual Report to the President and the Congress, March 1997. 

Figure 4: USAF Line Officer Education Profile FY 1996

Highest Degree Held Number Percentage 

Below Baccalaureate 137 0.22% 

Baccalaureate 30,423 48.85% 

Masters 30,824 49.50% 

Doctorate/Professional 891 1.43% 

Source: Air Force Magazine, May 1996. 

 Air University conducted two earlier surveys of almost 2000 of 

its staff, faculty, and students in 1996 to support the development of a 

curriculum for the proposed Air and Space Basic Course for all newly 

commissioned Air Force officers. These surveys indicated that the 

USAF officer corps recognizes that its members display careerist 

attitudes and identify primarily with their technical specialties.48 In 

summarizing the results of the Airman's Basic Course Curriculum 

Structure Survey and the Shared Institutional Values Survey, one analyst 
22

states “The responses indicate that officers value unit cohesion, identify 

with technical specialties and do not persuasively articulate airpower 

doctrine.”49 This would seem to indicate that in the absence of a shared 

vision or sense of mission, Air Force officers turn to their occupations 

and immediate unit built around that occupation for their primary 

identification. This is symptomatic of a fractionated confederation of 

subcultures rather than a cohesive military service. 

 Beyond these “snapshot” descriptive data and survey results, 

this study also surveyed USAF officers to find more detailed answers to 

questions about what the Air Force looks like today—how it is oriented, 

where its main fracture lines lie, and the intensity of its faultlines across 

specialties and ranks. The survey instrument was designed primarily 

from a series of institutional/occupational (I/O) questions used by several 

researchers across the past two decades.50 The surveys were designed to 

be broken out by rank and career specialization in order to disaggregate 

the USAF into major subcultures around the I/O dimension. Eleven 

questions were “standard” I/O questions borrowed from established 

questionnaires. Ten other questions were adapted I/O questions designed 

to focus on Air Force technology, missions, and priorities. The other 

four questions were added to attempt to capture attitudes on Air Force 

issues of the late 1990s, specifically space, cyberspace, and technology. 

The survey instrument is at Appendix 1. 

 The survey was submitted for USAF approval, but was 

administered only to the students entering PME courses at Maxwell 

AFB, AL in the late summer of 1997. The three primary schools 

surveyed, the Squadron Officer School (SOS), the Air Command and 

Staff College (ACSC), and the Air War College (AWC), form a 

representative cross section of all Air Force specialties. They capture 

junior officers (SOS students are Lieutenants and Captains generally 

with less than seven years of service), mid-career officers (ACSC 
23

students are Majors with ten to twelve years of service), and senior 

officers (AWC students are Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels with over 

15 years of service who are being prepared for senior USAF leadership 

positions). 

 The survey was administered at the very beginning of the 

educational programs when the students had just arrived from USAF 

field assignments and before any leveling of attitudes could take place as 

a result of cross-specialty contacts within these programs. The survey 

was targeted at active-duty, line officers—members of the corps elite 

segments and primary supporting segments of the service. These are the 

culture-setting segments of the Air Force—its core culture and primary 

subcultures are best represented here. Further, SOS is designed to 

capture a broad cross-section of the USAF junior officers—it is not 

highly selective in attendance policies. But ACSC and the AWC are 

very selective, with only the “top” selectees for mid-career and senior 

ranks offered the opportunity to attend. This actually produces a sample 

which best represents the culture and its adherents according to Mosher's 

closed career model. A review of Figure 2 reminds us that almost 90 

percent of current USAF generals completed intermediate service school 

(ACSC or another service's equivalent)—with a few unable to complete 

due to mid-career operational requirements—and 98 percent completed 

senior service school (AWC or an equivalent sister service or national 

program). Other studies have indicated that completion of professional 

education programs is highly correlated with selection for Air Force 

command assignments (97 percent of USAF wing commanders in 

December 1990 were intermediate service school graduates)51 and for 

senior-level promotion (from 1976-1983, 93 percent of USAF officers 

selected for promotion to Colonel were senior service school 

graduates).52 And the service professional education programs 

themselves should provide a deepening of attachment to service values 
24

and culture. The survey for this study was administered to Air Force 

professional education program students as a take-home project, with 

target students and returns as reported at Figures 5-7. 

 Figure 5 indicates that of the 1030 valid responses, 9 percent 

were from Lieutenant Colonels (O-5s) at the Air War College, 35 percent 

were from Majors (O-4s) at ACSC, and 56 percent were from Captains 

(O-3s) at SOS. The few Captains in the ACSC class were coded as 

Majors here to differentiate the senior Captains, all of whom are already 

on the promotion list to Major if they are attending ACSC, from the more 

junior Captains in the SOS class. The respondents included 38 percent 

rated officers (pilots and navigators) and 62 percent nonrated (all other 

officers), with 48 percent from operational specialties (pilots, navigators, 

and space and missile officers), 35 percent from support specialties 

(intelligence, weather, logistics, security, base engineering, computers 

and communications, and services career fields), and 16 percent from 

scientific and engineering specialties (scientist, research engineer, and 

acquisitions career fields)—all based on primary Air Force Specialty 

Codes (AFSCs). Intelligence officers were considered in the support 

officer category for this analysis. While intelligence is now being 

classified as an operational career field by the Air Force, that change is 

considered too recent to have had marked cultural effects among 

intelligence officers. 

Figure 5: Survey Response Demographics, Aug 1997

School Rank Number Rated Nonrated Ops Ops Spt Sci/Engr 

AWC O-5 95 36 59 41 34 20 

ACSC O-4 361 131 230 161 137 63 

SOS O-3 574 221 353 297 194 83 

Total 1030 388 642 499 365 166 
25

Figure 6: Survey Response, Additional Demographics, Aug 1997 

School OTS ROTC USAFA Other Male Female Joint No 

Joint 

AWC 21 50 24 0 86 9 45 50 

ACSC 125 155 78 3 322 39 46 315 

SOS 85 334 138 17 507 67 0 574 

Total 231 539 240 20 915 115 94 936 

 Figure 6 breaks out the respondents by source of commission, 

with an overall 22 percent having entered the USAF through Officer 

Training School (OTS), 52 percent via Reserve Officer Training Corps 

(ROTC) programs, 23 percent through the Air Force Academy 

(USAFA), and 2 percent via other commissioning programs. Further, 89 

percent were male and 11 percent female, and 9 percent had served a 

joint-assignment tour while 91 percent had served only USAF tours. 

Several Captains at SOS indicated in their survey responses that they had 

served a joint tour, often with explanatory notes indicating a temporary 

duty assignment with a joint task force, or completion of flight training at 

Pensacola or Fort Rucker, or even a joint-spouse assignment, so all SOS 

Captains were coded as having no joint tour. The purpose of examining 

joint-assignment effects here is to determine if long-term exposure to the 

other, more institutional and less technologically oriented services 

moderates USAF culture, and neither short-term exposure nor exposure 

prior to USAF culturization would necessarily lead to those effects. 

Finally, Figure 7 indicates that 6 percent of the respondents had already 
26

completed AWC in some form, 12 percent had completed ACSC, 38 

percent had completed SOS, 2 percent had completed a non-USAF PME 

program, and 43 percent had completed no PME. 

Figure 7: Survey Response, PME Completed, Aug 97 

AWC ACSC SOS Joint/Other None 

61 126 389 15 439 

Institutional/Occupational Orientation. Figures 8-17 present 

the results of analyses on the institutional/occupational (I/O) orientations 

of officers in the late 20th century USAF. Expectations from earlier 

studies are that the senior officers will be relatively more institutional in 

their orientations than are junior officers, that operators will be relatively 

more institutional than are the support specialties, and that among junior 

officers the nonrated group will be relatively more institutional than are 

rated officers. 

 Figure 8 indicates that the first of those expectations is also true 

in 1997. For the group of questions reported at the top of the chart, a 

lower mean indicates a more institutional orientation. Noteworthy here 

is the stepwise progression of the pool average of responses to all 

questions in the group, with Lieutenant Colonels at 1.99, Majors at 2.02, 

and Captains at 2.37. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) for these survey 

responses indicates whether these differences, while apparent, are 

statistically significant—whether these in fact are different responses or 

whether they only appear to be different as a result of sampling error. 

For seven of the nine questions in the first group the test indicates highly 

significant statistical differences, with an eighth indicating less striking 

but still significant differences. Further, the pooled response to all nine 

questions indicates highly significant statistical differences. So officer 

attitudes become more institutionally oriented with advancement in rank, 

and with both self-selection and USAF selection into the career elite. 
27

Figure 8: I/O Orientation by Rank 

 O-5 

Mean SD 

O-4 

Mean SD 

O-3 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Significance 

Q2 

Q5 

Q8 

Q12 

Q15 

Q17 

Q20 

Q24 

Q25 

Pool 

2.13 1.28 

2.84 1.15 

2.37 1.19 

1.87 1.00 

1.84 0.97 

1.78 0.96 

1.80 0.92 

1.47 0.91 

1.80 0.98 

1.99 

2.07 1.26 

2.69 1.07 

2.34 1.08 

1.88 0.91 

2.01 0.87 

1.89 0.92 

1.99 0.92 

1.60 0.85 

1.74 0.96 

2.02 

2.03 1.25 

3.25 1.20 

2.71 1.14 

2.12 1.09 

2.53 1.15 

2.33 1.15 

2.29 1.03 

2.11 1.17 

1.97 1.10 

2.37 

0.300 0.741 

27.920 0.000* 

13.168 0.000* 

7.343 0.001* 

37.112 0.000* 

25.384 0.000* 

16.660 0.000* 

33.335 0.000* 

5.893 0.003** 

56.287 0.000* 

Q3 

Q6 

Pool 

3.33 1.13 

3.19 1.14 

3.26 

3.18 1.10 

3.09 1.19 

3.14 

3.10 1.17 

3.30 1.07 

3.20 

1.843 0.159 

3.840 0.022 

1.000 0.468 

 * Significant at 0.001. ** Significant at 0.005 

 The data for responses to questions three and six also indicate 

that Lieutenant Colonels are the most institutionally oriented, as higher 

means here indicate a more institutional orientation. However, the 

Captains indicate relatively more institutional orientation than do the 

Majors, and neither the individual questions nor the pool indicate 

significant differences between ranks on these questions. Overall, then, 

higher rank correlates with a more institutional orientation in today’s 

USAF. 

 Contrary to earlier studies, Figure 9 indicates that both support 

officers and scientific/engineering officers are more institutional in their 

orientations than are operational officers (pilots, navigators, and space 

and missile officers), with support officers slightly more institutional 

than the scientific/engineering officers. As with rank, seven of the I/O 
28

questions and the first pool of nine questions indicate statistically highly 

significant differences between specializations on I/O orientation. This 

finding raises concern. Theoretically, the higher technology support 

functions—those with direct civilian counterparts—should be more 

occupational in orientation. In today’s Air Force, it is the core operators 

who exhibit relatively more occupational attachments. 

 Figure 10 shows that while nonrated junior officers were seen 

as more institutional than were rated junior officers in earlier studies, 

today nonrated officers indicate a more institutional orientation than do 

rated officers across all ranks surveyed. Further, eight of the individual 

questions and the first pooled responses indicate differences that are 

highly statistically significant between these two groups across the ranks. 

In the 1997 USAF, nonrated officers are clearly more institutionally 

oriented than are rated officers. 

Figure 9: I/O Orientation by Specialization 

 Operations 

Mean SD 

Support 

Mean SD 

Science 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Sig 

Q2 

Q5 

Q8 

Q12 

Q15 

Q17 

Q20 

Q24 

Q25 

Pool 

1.90 1.23 

3.37 1.17 

2.68 1.19 

2.06 1.04 

2.51 1.15 

2.28 1.12 

2.24 1.01 

2.02 1.13 

1.86 1.03 

2.33 

2.35 1.19 

2.68 1.10 

2.35 1.07 

1.95 1.02 

2.01 0.91 

1.97 1.01 

1.97 0.94 

1.70 0.99 

1.83 1.05 

2.09 

1.80 1.15 

2.69 1.10 

2.58 1.07 

1.99 1.01 

2.22 1.05 

2.01 1.04 

2.19 1.06 

1.80 1.07 

2.01 1.09 

2.15 

14.213 0.000* 

13.665 0.000* 

3.054 0.000* 

1.195 0.281 

4.683 0.000* 

2.953 0.000* 

3.867 0.000* 

2.929 0.001* 

0.888 0.559 

5.139 0.000* 

Q3 

Q6 

Pool 

3.05 1.16 

3.24 1.08 

3.15 

3.29 1.10 

3.23 1.16 

3.27 

3.13 1.15 

3.11 1.13 

3.12 

1.906 0.030 

1.491 0.121 

1.780 0.047 

 * Significant at 0.001. 
29

Figure 10: I/O Orientation by Rating 

Rated 

Mean SD 

Nonrated 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Sig 

Q2 

Q5 

Q8 

Q12 

Q15 

Q17 

Q20 

Q24 

Q25 

Pool 

1.73 1.17 

3.54 1.13 

2.74 1.19 

2.08 1.06 

2.53 1.17 

2.32 1.14 

2.31 1.01 

2.08 1.14 

1.89 1.05 

2.36 

2.23 1.22 

2.70 1.10 

2.43 1.09 

1.97 1.01 

2.14 1.00 

2.01 1.03 

2.04 0.98 

1.74 1.02 

1.86 1.05 

2.13 

41.885 0.000* 

137.705 0.000* 

18.454 0.000* 

2.970 0.085 

31.422 0.000* 

20.640 0.000* 

17.639 0.000* 

24.663 0.000* 

0.183 0.669 

42.282 0.000* 

Q3 

Q6 

Pool 

2.98 1.18 

3.21 1.09 

3.10 

3.25 1.11 

3.22 1.14 

3.24 

14.369 0.000* 

0.010 0.920 

6.037 0.140 

 * Significant at 0.001. 

This analysis also addresses I/O orientation by rank within career 

specialty (Figure 11 Operations, Figure 12 Support, and Figure 13 

Figure 11: I/O Orientation by Specialization and Rank (Ops) 

 O-5 

Mean SD 

O-4 

Mean SD 

O-3 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Sig 

Q2 

Q5 

Q8 

Q12 

Q15 

Q17 

Q20 

Q24 

Q25 

Pool 

2.02 1.21 

3.17 1.02 

2.66 1.11 

2.05 1.02 

1.88 0.95 

1.88 0.98 

1.90 0.97 

1.51 0.87 

1.63 0.83 

2.08 

1.82 1.13 

3.01 1.06 

2.39 1.13 

1.81 0.79 

2.17 0.93 

1.91 0.92 

2.02 0.88 

1.70 0.86 

1.65 0.87 

2.06 

2.41 1.04 

3.59 1.19 

2.83 1.20 

2.20 1.13 

2.78 1.21 

2.53 1.17 

2.41 1.04 

2.26 1.22 

2.01 1.11 

2.51 

0.638 0.529 

14.401 0.000* 

7.354 0.001* 

7.512 0.001* 

23.311 0.000* 

20.127 0.000* 

10.659 0.000* 

10.659 0.000* 

7.449 0.001* 

43.570 0.000* 

Q3 

Q6 

3.46 1.07 

3.44 1.03 

3.09 1.15 

3.17 1.18 

2.97 1.18 

3.26 1.03 

3.342 0.036 

1.090 0.337 
30

Pool 3.45 3.13 3.12 2.604 0.075 

 * Significant at 0.001. 

Figure 12: I/O Orientation by Specialization and Rank (Support) 

 O-5 

Mean SD 

O-4 

Mean SD 

O-3 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Sig 

Q2 

Q5 

Q8 

Q12 

Q15 

Q17 

Q20 

Q24 

Q25 

Pool 

2.56 1.35 

2.50 1.26 

1.91 1.29 

1.79 1.09 

1.53 0.83 

1.56 0.89 

1.62 0.95 

1.29 0.84 

1.76 1.07 

1.84 

2.40 1.15 

2.38 0.99 

2.27 1.00 

1.87 0.91 

1.83 0.75 

1.85 0.87 

1.85 0.78 

1.48 0.81 

1.77 1.03 

1.97 

2.28 1.19 

2.93 1.09 

2.48 1.05 

2.04 1.07 

2.12 0.97 

2.13 1.09 

2.12 1.01 

1.92 1.07 

1.88 1.07 

2.22 

0.945 0.389 

11.343 0.000* 

4.888 0.008 

1.535 0.217 

12.868 0.000* 

6.584 0.002** 

6.338 0.002** 

11.545 0.000* 

0.491 0.612 

14.810 0.000* 

Q3 

Q6 

Pool 

3.32 1.27 

3.03 1.34 

3.18 

3.26 1.01 

3.11 1.16 

3.19 

3.31 1.13 

3.36 1.13 

3.34 

0.129 0.879 

2.387 0.093 

1.299 0.274 

 * Significant at 0.001. ** Significant at 0.005. 

Scientific/Engineering). In all three groups, senior officers were more 

institutional in their orientations, with statistically highly significant 

differences indicated for eight questions and the first pool for operations 

and for three questions and the first pool for support. There were also 

two questions for which the support officers indicated less significant but 

real differences. Of note, there were no statistical differences indicated 

across the ranks of scientific and engineering officers—these officers are 

indistinguishable on their I/O orientations between ranks. 

 Figure 14 indicates that there are no statistically significant 

differences in I/O orientation among the subject officers based on 

commissioning source. The officers only differ on two questions based 

on source of commission. While source of commission is often seen as a 

primary shaping influence on culture and attitudes, any differential 

effects may not survive the common influences of service in the USAF. 
31

Figure 13: I/O Orientation by Specialization and Rank (Science) 

 O-5 

Mean SD 

O-4 

Mean SD 

O-3 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Sig 

Q2 

Q5 

Q8 

Q12 

Q15 

Q17 

Q20 

Q24 

Q25 

Pool 

1.60 1.10 

2.75 1.07 

2.55 0.94 

1.65 0.75 

2.30 1.08 

1.95 1.00 

1.90 0.72 

1.70 1.08 

2.20 1.06 

2.07 

2.02 1.62 

2.54 1.09 

2.35 1.11 

2.05 1.16 

1.98 0.87 

1.92 1.02 

2.21 1.22 

1.59 0.87 

1.87 1.02 

2.06 

1.81 1.16 

2.80 1.12 

2.77 1.04 

2.02 0.94 

2.39 1.15 

2.10 1.08 

2.25 1.00 

1.99 1.18 

2.06 1.14 

2.24 

0.382 0.683 

0.988 0.374 

2.868 0.060 

1.290 0.278 

2.722 0.069 

0.544 0.581 

0.899 0.409 

2.643 0.074 

0.892 0.412 

2.132 0.122 

Q3 

Q6 

Pool 

3.05 1.00 

2.95 0.94 

3.00 

3.27 1.15 

2.87 1.26 

3.07 

3.05 1.19 

3.33 1.04 

3.19 

0.718 0.489 

3.153 0.045 

0.495 0.611 

Figure 14: I/O Orientation by Commissioning Source 

 OTS 

Mean SD 

ROTC 

Mean SD 

USAFA 

Mean SD 

Other 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Sig 

Q2 

Q5 

Q8 

Q12 

Q15 

Q17 

Q20 

Q24 

Q25 

Pool 

2.27 1.24 

2.83 1.11 

2.27 1.05 

2.03 0.98 

2.14 0.96 

2.10 1.03 

2.00 0.86 

1.88 1.11 

1.93 1.03 

2.16 

2.06 1.22 

3.05 1.20 

2.67 1.15 

2.01 1.06 

2.35 1.10 

2.13 1.12 

2.13 1.02 

1.83 1.05 

1.82 1.01 

2.23 

1.80 1.26 

3.13 1.18 

2.52 1.13 

1.95 0.92 

2.30 1.14 

2.14 1.04 

2.25 1.02 

1.93 1.11 

1.90 1.11 

2.21 

2.65 1.60 

2.90 1.25 

2.50 1.22 

2.55 1.36 

2.10 1.17 

2.30 1.26 

2.60 1.39 

2.15 1.18 

2.30 1.34 

2.45 

6.126 0.000* 

2.491 0.042 

5.527 0.000* 

1.878 1.112 

2.208 0.666 

0.419 0.795 

2.880 0.022 

1.076 0.367 

1.658 0.158 

1.952 0.119 

Q3 3.27 1.17 3.11 1.10 3.10 1.22 3.35 1.14 1.908 0.107 
32

Q6 

Pool 

3.26 1.12 

3.27 

3.23 1.13 

3.17 

3.14 1.12 

3.12 

3.40 0.75 

3.38 

0.990 0.412 

1.338 0.261 

Significant at 0.001. 

 Figure 15, on the other hand, indicates some significant I/O 

orientation differences based on level of PME completed. Basically, the 

higher the level of PME, the more institutional the orientation based on 

statistically highly significant differences on six of nine questions plus 

the pool of the questions in group one. As with the correlation of 

institutional orientation and higher rank, the officers at the higher levels 

of PME completion have committed to a career in the Air Force, “buying 

in” to that institution. They have also been exposed to more institutional 

education, which has the dual effects of promulgating institutional values 

and exposing the student to a range of career specialization concerns and 

views. The PME process is an institution-building process. 

Figure 15: I/O Orientation by PME Completed 

 AWC 

Mean SD 

ACSC 

Mean SD 

SOS 

Mean SD 

Other 

Mean SD 

None 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Sig 

Q2 

Q5 

Q8 

Q12 

Q15 

Q17 

Q20 

Q24 

Q25 

Pool 

2.15 1.38 

2.74 1.20 

2.34 1.25 

1.98 1.10 

1.87 1.02 

1.70 0.94 

1.72 1.00 

1.52 0.99 

1.84 1.11 

1.99 

2.13 1.17 

2.71 1.06 

2.42 1.07 

1.78 0.78 

1.99 0.95 

1.87 0.92 

1.95 0.95 

1.50 0.78 

1.77 0.92 

2.01 

2.02 1.25 

2.87 1.17 

2.40 1.13 

1.98 0.96 

2.20 0.96 

2.00 1.01 

2.10 0.96 

1.81 1.02 

1.79 0.96 

2.13 

2.27 1.22 

3.60 0.99 

2.60 1.30 

1.87 0.92 

2.20 1.15 

2.20 1.08 

2.13 0.74 

1.60 0.63 

1.87 1.06 

2.26 

2.05 1.27 

3.26 1.18 

2.74 1.12 

2.12 1.12 

2.51 1.17 

2.37 1.15 

2.28 1.03 

2.09 1.18 

1.99 1.13 

2.38 

0.391 0.815 

10.435 0.000* 

5.748 0.000* 

2.979 0.018 

10.500 0.000* 

11.599 0.000* 

6.352 0.000* 

10.557 0.000* 

2.276 0.059 

19.365 0.000* 

Q3 

Q6 

Pool 

3.34 1.12 

3.08 1.23 

3.22 

3.31 1.10 

3.25 1.06 

3.28 

3.16 1.12 

3.14 1.15 

3.15 

3.33 1.29 

3.80 0.94 

3.57 

3.06 1.17 

3.28 1.09 

3.17 

1.780 0.131 

2.074 0.082 

1.241 0.292 

 * Significant at 0.001. 

The results of the I/O orientation comparison by gender are 

shown in Figure 16. Noteworthy here is that there are no significant 

differences between male and female officers on this dimension of their 
33

service. Only one question shows any real difference, and it is not highly 

significant. Self-selecting female and male USAF officers are oriented 

to the same level of institutional identification according to the responses 

to this survey. 

Figure 16: I/O Orientation by Gender 

 Male 

Mean SD 

Female 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Sig 

Q2 

Q5 

Q8 

Q12 

Q15 

Q17 

Q20 

Q24 

Q25 

Pool 

2.02 1.26 

3.05 1.18 

2.57 1.14 

1.99 1.03 

2.28 1.09 

2.12 1.09 

2.15 1.01 

1.89 1.09 

1.87 1.05 

2.22 

2.31 1.15 

2.72 1.12 

2.35 1.12 

2.20 0.98 

2.32 1.00 

2.15 1.04 

2.06 0.95 

1.75 1.03 

1.88 1.04 

2.19 

5.492 0.019 

8.112 0.004** 

3.932 0.048 

4.374 0.037 

0.138 0.710 

0.047 0.828 

0.807 0.369 

16.770 0.196 

0.002 0.961 

0.175 0.675 

Q3 

Q6 

Pool 

3.14 1.15 

3.23 1.13 

3.18 

3.26 1.10 

3.17 1.08 

3.22 

1.227 0.268 

0.292 0.589 

0.134 0.714 

 ** Significant at 0.005. 

Figure 17: I/O Orientation by Joint Experience 

 Joint 

Mean SD 

No Joint 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Sig 

Q2 

Q5 

Q8 

Q12 

Q15 

Q17 

Q20 

Q24 

Q25 

Pool 

2.11 1.11 

2.57 1.05 

2.28 1.15 

1.85 0.93 

1.84 0.89 

1.72 0.73 

1.77 0.90 

1.54 0.87 

1.72 0.93 

1.93 

2.05 1.27 

3.06 1.18 

2.57 1.13 

2.03 1.03 

2.33 1.09 

2.17 1.10 

2.18 1.00 

1.90 1.09 

1.89 1.06 

2.24 

0.344 0.558 

15.394 0.000* 

4.934 0.027 

2.536 0.112 

17.037 0.000* 

11.671 0.001* 

12.240 0.000* 

7.832 0.005** 

1.569 0.211 

25.766 0.000* 

Q3 3.29 1.19 3.14 1.14 1.500 0.221 
34

Q6 

Pool 

3.11 1.25 

3.20 

3.23 1.11 

3.19 

0.846 0.358 

0.036 0.849 

 * Significant at 0.001. ** Significant at 0.005. 

 Finally, Figure 17 indicates that there is some differentiation in 

I/O orientation based on completion of a joint assignment. Those who 

have been exposed to the other services and their more institutional basis 

are indicated as being themselves more institutional in their orientation 

on five of nine questions plus the pool of those nine questions. These 

differences are statistically highly significant for all but one of the 

questions. While these joint-experienced officers are also more senior 

and have completed some higher levels of PME (joint billets normally 

are reserved for Majors with intermediate service school a prerequisite 

for assignment), joint experience indicates a more institutional 

orientation within the USAF. 

 In summary, for institutional versus occupational orientation, 

the USAF is seen as differentiated on the basis of rank, (the more senior, 

the more institutional), rating (with nonrated more institutional), 

specialization (with operators the least institutional, and with a more 

institutional orientation associated with increased rank among operators, 

support officers, and scientific/engineering officers), PME completion 

(higher PME, more institutional), and joint experience (joint tour, more 

institutional). No differences in I/O orientation were found based on 

either source of commission or gender. Again, the relatively more 

occupational orientation of the rated officers and operators—the USAF 

core elite segments—raises concerns for building institutional cohesion. 

But at least as significant as the I/O orientation differences 

reported above, the survey indicates that on all I/O responses other than 

one, the mean response was on the institutional side of the mid-range for 

that question. In other words, while some USAF officers are more 

institutional than others, none are fully occupational in their orientation. 
35

The differences among these two orientations are relative, and the USAF 

line officer corps remains a relatively institutional body. Further, the 

standard deviations are not enormous for any of these questions, 

indicating that while USAF officers have differences, they are all in the 

same general range in their I/O orientations. Thus, while other studies 

have chosen to label differences among officers as indicating that one 

group is more or less occupational than another, this study reports 

relative degrees of institutional orientation. Finally, question five, the 

one question for which means did fall over the midpoint and into the 

occupational side of the spectrum, asked whether the USAF required 

participation in too many activities unrelated to the officer’s job. USAF 

leadership should note that officers feel that they are being tasked with 

unnecessary duties, and this perception is strong enough to stand out as 

the singular “irritant” noted in this survey. 

Mission/Priority/Allegiance. Figure 18 presents the relative 

rankings about the officer’s perception of USAF mission, priorities, and 

allegiances. In each category, three questions were asked asserting “The 

mission of the Air Force is . . . ,” or “The number one Air Force priority 

should be . . . ,” or “Within the Air Force, I owe most allegiance to . . .” 

For the mission questions, the choices were designed to represent the 

operational mission (question 1), technology (question 4), and the “team” 

aspect of joint service (question 7). For priorities, the choices were 

people (question 11), technology (question 13), and operational mission 

(question 16). For allegiance, the choices were career field (question 

19), operational mission (question 21), and personal concerns (question 

23). 

Figure 18: USAF Mission, Priority, and Allegiance Rankings 

Mission Priority Allegiance 

1* Operational Mission 1* Operations First 1 Operations 

2* Joint Team Mission 2* People First 2 Career Field 
36

3 Technology Mission 3 Technology First 3 Personal Concerns 

 For USAF mission, the relative ranking of the choices was 

operational mission first, team support second, and technology third for 

all categories surveyed except for the Lieutenant Colonel scientific and 

engineering officers, who ranked team support first, operational mission 

second, and technology third. Similarly, on the relative rankings for 

allegiance, all categories of officers surveyed ranked operational mission 

first, career field second, and personal concerns third. For priorities, 

most groups of officers ranked operational mission first, people second, 

and technology third. However, people were ranked first and operational 

mission second by the following groups: scientific and engineering 

officers; Lieutenant Colonels within every one of the three specialization 

categories (operations, support, and scientific/engineering); officers who 

had completed senior, intermediate, or other service PME programs; 

women; and officers who had served a joint tour. The operational 

mission/people differentiation was close for most groups, but these two 

clearly were seen as more important priorities than technology. For a 

service that “worships” technology (by comparison with the other 

services), technology is not seen as the priority or as the central mission 

by USAF officers. Finally, the group that entered the Air Force via 

“other” commissioning sources ranked both technology and operational 

mission as their highest priority, with people a very close second. 

 USAF officers in 1997 generally put their operational mission 

first in their relative concerns—well ahead of technology, for example. 

Further, little differentiation is seen within the support officers, the 

scientific and engineering officers, across the various sources of 

commission, or between men and women on these questions—these 

groups are relatively homogeneous on their relative rankings for mission, 

priority, and allegiance. Larger and significant variations are seen across 
37

ranks, ratings, PME completion levels, and joint-experience categories 

here. 

Technology/Space. Figures 19-28 present the data from the 

final focus of the survey, USAF officer attitudes about technology and 

space. Questions 10, 18, and 22 sought to elicit responses about how 

important technology and technological expertise are today and into the 

future as opposed to more traditional operational skills and resources. 

Higher scores here indicate stronger roles for technology. Questions 9 

and 14 sought responses on the role that space/cyberspace will play into 

the future. Higher scores here indicate a more significant role for space. 

These questions were also grouped into a technology pool and a space 

pool for analysis. Particular note should be made of question 9, which 

asked for a response to the statement “The Air Force should be renamed 

the Air and Space Force.” 

Figure 19: Technology/Space by Rank 

 O-5 

Mean SD 

O-4 

Mean SD 

O-3 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Sig 

Q10 

Q18 

Q22 

Pool 

2.67 1.17 

2.46 1.04 

2.24 0.96 

2.46 

2.38 1.14 

2.37 0.95 

2.14 0.84 

2.30 

2.16 1.12 

2.42 1.02 

2.46 0.99 

2.35 

10.186 0.000* 

0.536 0.585 

13.197 0.000* 

1.300 0.090 

Q9 

Q14 

Pool 

2.56 1.54 

3.37 1.14 

2.97 

2.36 1.36 

3.24 1.14 

2.80 

2.08 1.36 

2.82 1.14 

2.45 

7.920 0.000* 

21.099 0.000* 

20.139 0.000* 

 * Significant at 0.001. 

 Figure 19 demonstrates that while there are some significant 

differences between ranks on their attitudes toward the place of 

technology within the USAF, and that the Lieutenant Colonels had the 

highest regard for the role that technology will play, these differences 

overall were not significant. For space, however, there were statistically 
38

highly significant differences between the ranks across both questions 

and the pool. Here the higher the rank, the higher the regard for the 

place of space within the USAF. Senior officers have different and 

higher expectations for the roles played by technology and space within 

the institution. 

 Figure 20 indicates that there are even greater differences on 

attitudes toward technology and space across USAF specialties. 

Operators have a high regard for technology, but are less appreciative of 

a significant role for space. Conversely, scientific and engineering 

officers are less enamored of technology, but have the highest regard for 

space. Support officers are the least inclined toward technological roles 

and are in the middle on space. Statistically highly significant 

differences exist between these specialty groups on all but one question 

and both pools. The USAF is divided among specialties on the 

importance of technology and space. 

Figure 20: Technology/Space by Specialization 

 Operations 

Mean SD 

Support 

Mean SD 

Science 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Sig 

Q10 

Q18 

Q22 

Pool 

2.22 1.12 

2.19 0.96 

2.25 0.89 

2.33 

2.28 1.14 

2.55 1.01 

2.29 0.97 

2.09 

2.52 1.19 

2.73 0.96 

2.63 1.04 

2.15 

1.557 0.099 

6.708 0.000* 

2.807 0.001* 

5.397 0.000* 

Q9 

Q14 

Pool 

2.08 1.31 

2.80 1.16 

2.44 

2.22 1.40 

3.25 1.13 

2.74 

2.64 1.50 

3.13 1.14 

2.89 

8.779 0.000* 

7.914 0.000* 

11.926 0.000* 

Significant at 0.001. 

 Figure 21 indicates that rated officers value technology and its 

role more than nonrated officers, but that nonrated officers are much 

more inclined to see a significant role for space. The wide difference 

between the two groups on question 18 drives the difference overall on 
39

technology. This question, “In the Air Force of the 21st century, 

technical skills will be more important than operational expertise,” may 

have been seen by the rated officers as a direct challenge to their 

preeminence within the service of the future, and by the nonrated officers 

as the door to their assumption of a more central role within the USAF 

hierarchy. Also, the mean rated officer response to question 9, on 

changing the name of the Air Force to the Air and Space Force, was the 

largest reported degree of disagreement seen. Rated officers are in the 

central position within USAF culture today, and they are acting to retain 

that position by pushing out any new core missions or fringe groups. 

Rating is still another source of division on technology and space. 

Figure 21: Technology/Space by Rating 

 Rated 

Mean SD 

Nonrated 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Sig 

Q10 

Q18 

Q22 

Pool 

2.20 1.09 

2.13 0.92 

2.26 0.89 

2.36 

2.34 1.17 

2.57 1.01 

2.37 0.99 

2.13 

3.993 0.046 

49.541 0.000* 

3.684 0.055 

28.806 0.000* 

Q9 

Q14 

Pool 

1.81 1.14 

2.62 1.10 

2.22 

2.47 1.46 

3.25 1.13 

2.86 

57.350 0.000* 

76.870 0.000* 

106.261 0.000* 

Significant at 0.001. 

 Figures 22, 23, and 24 report, respectively, the attitudes of 

operations officers, support officers, and scientific and engineering 

officers by rank within each specialty. There are some differences in 

attitude by rank within the operators, with senior officers more inclined 

toward technology in one area while junior officers are more inclined 

toward technology in another. For space, however, senior rank among 

operators is clearly and significantly associated with a higher regard for 

the place of space within the USAF. For support officers there are no 
40

highly significant differences across rank regarding technology, while as 

with operators higher rank is significantly associated with a higher 

regard for the role of space. Note here that the pool mean on space is 

higher than 3.00, indicating agreement for a central position of space in 

the future USAF. Both the Lieutenant Colonels and Majors within 

scientific 

Figure 22: Technology/Space by Specialization and Rank (Ops) 

 O-5 

Mean SD 

O-4 

Mean SD 

O-3 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Sig 

Q10 

Q18 

Q22 

Pool 

2.80 1.05 

2.34 0.96 

1.98 0.72 

2.37 

2.29 1.09 

2.14 0.90 

2.06 0.79 

2.17 

2.10 1.12 

2.20 0.99 

2.40 0.93 

2.23 

7.901 0.000* 

0.726 0.484 

9.990 0.000* 

1.740 0.177 

Q9 

Q14 

Pool 

2.56 1.42 

3.00 1.20 

2.78 

2.17 1.27 

3.09 1.16 

2.63 

1.97 1.30 

2.62 1.11 

2.30 

4.329 0.014 

9.509 0.000* 

8.663 0.000* 

 * Significant at 0.001. 

Figure 23: Technology/Space by Specialization and Rank (Support) 

 O-5 

Mean SD 

O-4 

Mean SD 

O-3 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Sig 

Q10 

Q18 

Q22 

Pool 

2.41 1.33 

2.47 1.13 

2.15 1.10 

2.34 

2.43 1.19 

2.53 0.98 

2.10 0.86 

2.36 

2.14 1.06 

2.58 1.02 

2.45 0.99 

2.39 

2.800 0.062 

0.194 0.823 

5.724 0.004** 

0.143 0.867 

Q9 

Q14 

Pool 

2.47 1.64 

3.71 0.91 

3.09 

2.40 1.35 

3.39 1.07 

2.90 

2.06 1.38 

3.08 1.18 

2.57 

3.029 0.050 

6.288 0.002** 

7.051 0.001* 

 * Significant at 0.001. ** Significant at 0.005. 

Figure 24: Technology/Space by Specialization and Rank (Science) 

 O-5 

Mean SD 

O-4 

Mean SD 

O-3 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Sig 

Q10 2.85 1.09 2.51 1.16 2.45 1.23 0.934 0.395 
41

Q18 

Q22 

Pool 

2.70 1.03 

2.95 0.83 

2.83 

2.57 0.91 

2.43 0.89 

2.50 

2.86 0.96 

2.71 1.16 

2.67 

1.602 0.205 

2.418 0.092 

1.802 0.168 

Q9 

Q14 

Pool 

2.70 1.69 

3.55 1.19 

3.13 

2.78 1.50 

3.30 1.17 

3.04 

2.52 1.46 

2.90 1.05 

2.71 

0.554 0.576 

3.860 0.023 

2.329 0.101 

and engineering officers also post a mean higher than 3.00 on the role of 

space, but there are no significant differences within the scientific and 

engineering community on either technology or space. 

Figure 25: Technology/Space by Commissioning Source 

 OTS 

Mean SD 

ROTC 

Mean SD 

USAFA 

Mean SD 

Other 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Sig 

Q10 

Q18 

Q22 

Pool 

2.37 1.14 

2.49 0.96 

2.25 0.87 

2.37 

2.25 1.16 

2.43 1.04 

2.34 0.98 

2.37 

2.28 1.11 

2.27 0.96 

2.35 0.94 

2.30 

2.45 1.23 

2.50 0.69 

2.60 1.10 

2.52 

0.594 0.667 

1.658 0.157 

0.950 0.434 

0.808 0.489 

Q9 

Q14 

Pool 

2.38 1.33 

3.15 1.10 

2.77 

2.19 1.44 

3.06 1.19 

2.63 

2.13 1.30 

2.77 1.14 

2.45 

2.30 1.66 

3.30 1.17 

2.80 

1.292 0.271 

4.270 0.002** 

4.125 0.006 

 ** Significant at 0.005. 

Figure 26: Technology/Space by PME Completed 

 AWC 

Mean SD 

ACSC 

Mean SD 

SOS 

Mean SD 

Other 

Mean SD 

None 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Sig 

Q10 

Q18 

Q22 

Pool 

2.67 1.21 

2.48 0.99 

2.21 0.99 

2.45 

2.44 1.09 

2.38 0.97 

2.26 0.95 

2.36 

2.31 1.17 

2.33 0.96 

2.18 0.83 

2.28 

2.07 1.16 

2.47 0.99 

2.40 0.99 

2.31 

2.18 1.11 

2.47 1.04 

2.49 1.02 

2.38 

3.536 0.007 

1.019 0.396 

5.621 0.000* 

1.514 0.196 

Q9 

Q14 

Pool 

2.59 1.50 

3.38 1.20 

2.99 

2.57 1.39 

3.34 1.04 

2.96 

2.18 1.34 

3.05 1.17 

2.62 

2.40 1.45 

3.20 1.26 

2.80 

2.10 1.39 

2.84 1.15 

2.47 

4.108 0.003** 

6.971 0.000* 

8.075 0.000* 

 * Significant at 0.001. ** Significant at 0.005. 

 As Figure 25 indicates, there are few differences among the 
42

officers from different commissioning sources on technology and space. 

Only one question shows any statistical difference, and that difference is 

not highly significant. Source of commission is not a source of division 

here. Similarly, level of PME completion is not a source of division on 

attitudes toward the role of technology according to the data at Figure 26. 

Only one question elicited highly significant differences. However, for 

space the differences are more significant, with higher levels of PME 

completion being generally associated with more accepting attitudes 

toward space. Greater knowledge and exposure may lead to greater 

acceptance of and expectations for space. 

Figure 27: Technology/Space by Gender 

 Male 

Mean SD 

Female 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Sig 

Q10 

Q18 

Q22 

Pool 

2.30 1.15 

2.37 1.00 

2.33 0.96 

2.33 

2.17 1.05 

2.73 0.97 

2.34 0.91 

2.41 

1.274 0.259 

13.760 0.000* 

0.017 0.896 

1.475 0.225 

Q9 

Q14 

Pool 

2.20 1.39 

2.96 1.17 

2.59 

2.37 1.36 

3.43 1.03 

2.90 

1.396 0.238 

18.571 0.000* 

9.615 0.002** 

 * Significant at 0.001. ** Significant at 0.005. 

Figure 28: Technology/Space by Joint Experience 

 Joint 

Mean SD 

No Joint 

Mean SD 

ANOVA 

F Score Sig 

Q10 

Q18 

Q22 

Pool 

2.34 1.17 

2.43 1.02 

2.08 0.90 

2.28 

2.28 1.14 

2.40 1.00 

2.35 0.95 

2.35 

0.320 0.572 

0.266 0.606 

5.127 0.024 

0.716 0.398 

Q9 

Q14 

Pool 

2.50 1.43 

3.33 1.11 

2.92 

2.19 1.38 

2.99 1.16 

2.59 

3.881 0.049 

6.995 0.008 

8.465 0.004** 

 ** Significant at 0.005. 
43

 As Figure 27 indicates, female officers would appear to have a 

higher regard for the roles of both technology and space than do male 

officers. These differences, however, for the most part are not 

statistically highly significant. Finally, as shown in Figure 28, while 

joint experience would appear to lessen one’s regard for technology and 

heighten one’s appreciation for the role of space within the USAF, these 

differences are more apparent than real, at least in a statistical sense. 

Gender and joint experience are not major sources of division on either 

technology or space. 

 Thus, on technology and space the major sources of division 

within today’s USAF are found in terms of rank, rating, and specialty, 

with lesser differences across levels of PME completion. The most 

significant findings here are that rated officers take a much dimmer view 

of the role of space within the USAF than do nonrated officers, perhaps 

because they are trying to protect their favored position at the top and at 

the center of the Air Force from a perceived challenger. While rated 

officers took the dimmest view of space, senior support officers and 

scientific and engineering officers rated it as most significant. Also, 

senior USAF officials should note that the standard deviations for 

question 9, “The Air Force should be renamed the Air and Space Force,” 

were the highest of any question in the survey, indicating the widest 

range of disagreement within all groups measured on this question. 

While Global Engagement states “We are now transitioning from an air

force into an air and space force on an evolutionary path to a space and 

air force,”53 USAF officers are, particularly within the rated community, 

not yet ready to make that transition. Ironically, if the USAF does not 

become more accepting and supportive of a key space role within the 

existing force, it may find itself in the position of the U.S. Army relative 

to the Army Air Corps and encourage the development of a separate 
44

space force as the only viable alternative. 

The USAF in 1997. In summary for the survey then, the 

expectations were, first, that the 1997 USAF would be a fractionated 

body, one lacking a common vision that had thus devolved into 

functional, technical, and occupational communities with little 

integrating these groups. Second, this Air Force should be largely 

occupational in its orientation, with the high levels of technology present 

in most USAF missions combining with high levels of education among 

the USAF officers to further this occupational orientation. The junior 

officers (as opposed to more senior), the support officers (as opposed to 

operators), and, among the junior operators, the rated officers (as 

opposed to nonrated junior operators) were expected to be the most 

occupational in orientation. This force would be a complex mix of 

communities with no integrating vision, no glue, to hold or bring them 

together into a cohesive entity. 

 This study finds that the picture, while consistent with many of 

those expectations, is not quite as “bad” as one might think based on 

previous studies. Certainly the USAF today is a highly technical force 

with a complex mix of specialties across a wide range of core and 

secondary missions. Certainly the USAF today is a highly educated 

force—much more so than the other services. And just as certainly there 

are differences and fracture lines across this large and complex Air 

Force, some of them apparently pronounced based on everyday 

observation. But this study indicates that there is a common foundation, 

a basic infrastructure underlying gaps which may not be as wide as some 

might think, upon which to build a more cohesive air and space force for 

the future. 

 This study of 1030 line USAF officers in the late summer of 

1997, Captains at SOS, Majors at ACSC, and Lieutenant Colonels at 

AWC, represents a cross section of the middle ranks, specialties, ratings, 
45

sources of commission, levels of PME completion, genders, and joint 

experience found across the entire USAF. These respondents are 

representative of USAF culture and cohesion today. The group was 

surveyed on institutional/occupational orientation (I/O), 

mission/priority/allegiance rankings, and attitudes toward technology and 

space to determine sources and depths of differences across the USAF. 

 On I/O orientation, which is a continuum of attitudes between 

these two poles, not an absolute choice of only two positions, significant 

differences were seen based on rank, occupation, rating, PME 

completion, and joint experience. The higher ranking, more service 

educated, and joint experienced officers were found to be relatively more 

institutional in their orientations, along with the support officers and 

scientific and engineering community, and the nonrated officers. The 

relatively less institutional orientation of rated officers and core elite 

operators is certainly a concern for cohesion building. But most 

noteworthy here was that in only one subcategory and for a single 

question was the mean response recorded as over the centerline of the 

continuum and into the occupational side. While earlier reports stated 

that this group or that group was more or less occupational in its 

orientation, this study chooses to report relative degrees of institutional 

orientation. That in itself should provide a bit more optimism as to the 

possibility of at least bridging the I/O gaps within the USAF officer 

corps. Only one question (number 5) on non-mission related duties, the 

omnipresent military “Mickey Mouse,” brought a series of mean 

responses over 3.00, and only the most junior operational officers (rated 

officers and space and missile officers) registered a pool mean score over 

the 2.50 midpoint (theirs a 2.51), or an “occupational” answer. 

 On the relative ranking of alternative missions, priorities, and 

allegiances, the survey found higher degrees of agreement across the 

USAF. Few differences were seen on mission choices, with “team” 
46

efforts being elevated over operational combat mission as the highest 

mission by more senior scientific and engineering officers. And no 

differences in rankings were noted for allegiances. Only priority showed 

some differences, with several subgroups ranking operational mission 

over people as number one and more senior officers generally reversing 

those two priorities. 

 Finally, the responses on technology and space showed 

significant differences, and these should be targeted to bridge the real 

gaps here. Some differences were seen on technology, with more senior 

officers, operators and rated officers, and those with higher levels of 

PME completion generally looking more positively on the role 

technology plays in the USAF. But the key differences here were on 

space. Senior officers, support and scientific and engineering officers, 

nonrated officers and those with more PME and a joint assignment, as 

well as female officers all demonstrated a higher regard for the role of 

space. Most noteworthy, again, was the rated officer response, which 

was very low on space, standing out as a true gap from the rest of the 

USAF on this issue. Further, the range and degree of difference was 

greatest on this issue of the Air and Space Force. This is the fracture line 

that truly stands out in this study, and it is significant to the future of 

space within the USAF. 

 So fractionalization was found on the basis of rank, occupation, 

and rating with lesser degrees of difference found for level of PME 

completion and joint experience, and for rank within the occupational 

categories of operations and support officers. Few differences were 

found for source of commission or gender, or within the scientific and 

engineering community, across the questions surveyed here. And again, 

for the most part the differences were perhaps not as striking as were 

some of the areas of similarity. Operational and occupational focus will 

lead to some degree of difference in reaction to various areas 
47

surrounding USAF culture and mission, but the gaps appear here to be 

bridgeable. The USAF line officer corps appears to provide a basic 

infrastructure upon which cohesion can be built. 

BUILDING A COHESIVE FORCE 

Building or fostering cohesion within a complex organization is a 

difficult task, but it is one that has been and can be successfully 

accomplished. What must be remembered is that culture change and 

cohesion are products of senior leadership acting in concert with leaders 

reaching down into the organization—it is an internal, active, top-down 

process. It must begin with the clear definition of a single, unifying 

mission or vision, one that is attuned to the task structure of the 

organization and which all key elite segments of the organization can 

embrace. Then that vision must be actively disseminated across the 

diverse subcultures and fractionated specialties before it can be embraced 

and begin to take effect. 

 Completing a USAF organizational transformation requires 

completing its cultural transformation, remaking the Air Force into its 

21st century Air and Space Force vision.54 First, this process requires a 

careful alignment of the USAF conception of its task environment with 

the perception of that environment held within the general, political 

environment (the national security bureaucracy, especially the 

Department of Defense the Joint Staff). This is the clear vision required 

from senior leadership at the top of the corps elite. The USAF Global 

Engagement vision statement and its core competencies, especially as 

these are consistent with the Joint Vision 2010 process (Joint Vision 

2010, the Concept for Future Joint Operations, and the Joint Vision 

Implementation Master Plan for the moment), provides a solid start to 

building this identity.55
48

 Second, the USAF strategy and structure must be realigned to 

achieve the critical operational tasks, roles, missions, and functions at the 

heart of the vision—the expeditionary, decisive application of air and 

space power at the halt phase of operational-level conflict. This “new 

way of war” entails the application of new technologies and new 

operational concepts, and it requires active adaptation of today's Air 

Force. This is the place for unified, active leadership reaching down to 

reshape the service through clear and cohesive guidance. Air Force 

Doctrine Document (AFDD)-1, the “Little Red Book,” and its successor 

AFDD-2, and the evolving expeditionary halt phase air dominance 

strategy all are key parts of this strategic effort. The results of the survey 

analysis for this study indicate that the role of space within the USAF 

must be a central feature of this revised strategy and structure to retain 

space within the organization. Otherwise, space may be forced to seek 

an independent identity in order to survive and prosper as a distinct 

mission element. 

Third, the changed culture, realigned and reinforced elites, and 

revised priorities must be socialized across the organization. Key here is 

creating a cohesive, encompassing team focus around which the diverse 

subcultures and specialties can (and will want to) coalesce. Rewards and 

incentives, promotions, and training must all be brought into alignment 

with this team concept to provide the “glue” to hold the reshaped service 

together until it fuses into a common whole. The new team culture must 

be socialized from the beginning of one’s entry into the closed career 

system, either via precommissioning education, initial specialty training, 

or a common USAF orientation. This culture and vision must then be 

reinforced across one’s career, not just in formal PME programs, but also 

via active mentoring by leadership at every level. 

 The test Air and Space Basic Course (ASBC) and the 

continuum PME process being studied at Air University may be steps in 
49

this direction, with the joint education cradle-to-grave career progression 

suggested in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 

1800.01 being a viable model for the USAF program. However, the 

informal dimension will be key to the broadest success of this 

socialization effort, and it rests in the active mentoring of their juniors by 

USAF leaders, a harder process to institutionalize and standardize. As 

cited earlier, the ASBC curriculum support surveys that Air University 

conducted in 1996 indicated that the focus for junior officer socialization 

should be on core values, ethics, teamwork, and Air Force missions. 

Secondary emphasis should be on Air Force history and doctrine, or 

airmindedness.56 The Air Force must note that shared values are 

certainly a foundation upon which to begin to build cohesion, but that 

one must also define and promulgate a clear and unifying vision, a sense 

of shared mission in which each member can see a direct and important 

stake, before a unified service can arise. The final result here must be 

changed output in terms of the performance and cohesion of the USAF 

team within and across the 21st century battlespace, and simple or 

singular attempts at solution may not be enough. 

 As the USAF completes this transition, it must also remember 

that the perceived coherence of the other U.S. military services must not 

be taken as a direct “fix” to unique Air Force issues and problems. The 

Air Force is simply not the Army, nor is it the Navy, and it is certainly 

not the Marine Corps. Their programs will not automatically transfer 

unchanged to the USAF. Each must be analyzed, evaluated, and adapted 

for Air Force applications. Dr. Arnold Kanter’s research pointed to the 

differences among service cultures and cohesion.57

 He found the Army to be the most closely integrated service. 

This could be attributed to interbranch mobility across one’s career, with 

many officers serving one or more tours in different branches of the 

service. Kanter also saw multi-branch bases as contributing to cross-
50

branch understanding and communication, and ultimately to cohesion. 

In fact, the Army operates as an interdependent, combined arms team, 

with each specialty area interacting with and depending directly on 

others for support. The operational Army is a team—it lives as that team 

on its bases, it deploys to the field to live even more closely together in 

that team, and it lives or dies in combat based on direct linkages and 

mutual support between the members of that team. The National 

Training Center experience of the 1990s reinforces this team concept. 

The Army is built for cohesion. 

 Kanter does not address the Marine Corps, but it has all of the 

cohesive elements found with the Army plus the additional advantages of 

a narrow mission set and a small size. The Marines are organized into an 

organic whole, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Marines live in that 

integrated organization, they deploy at sea for extended periods in that 

structure, and they face both their operational and political environments 

as a singular team. They are focused and challenged as a unit, and they 

see themselves in that light—the Marines are a cohesive warrior unity. 

They have much in common with Wilson’s model cohesive unit, the U.S. 

Forest Service, which is small, remotely stationed, field oriented, and 

institutionally cohesive.58

 Kanter credits the Navy with being the second most cohesive of 

the three largest services. Navy skills are more distinct and diverse than 

the Army, but the naval task force is also an interdependent operational 

organization. This operational interdependence provides a binding force 

across weapons systems and specialties, and this cohesion is reinforced 

through multi-specialty interaction in the ports and wardrooms of the 

fleet. As with the Army, operational deployments and combat 

interdependencies mold the force together into a fairly cohesive whole. 

 By contrast, Kanter sees the USAF as the least cohesive of the 

services. He attributes its fragmentation to the specialized nature of its 
51

technologies, the specialization of its wing structure, and its relative 

isolation of one specialized unit from the others. The basis of the 

problem here is technology. USAF technologies are diverse and 

specialized, and both efficiencies and effectiveness come from 

organizing around those unique technical assets. The operational Air 

Force mixes assets within operations, but they live apart and work in 

isolation until they join up enroute to the operational target. And direct 

support technologies which are integrated into the actual operation may 

physically be even continents away at the time they are “interoperating” 

with a force. Further, the USAF mission mixes several operational foci, 

from surface warfare support, through theater and global airlift, to 

strategic operations, and into space. There is much less “glue,” less 

single-mission simplicity, and less combined physical contact than is 

seen with the other services. The Air Force cannot be the Marines, and 

Marine answers may not even begin to address Air Force questions. 

 Perhaps the Air Force should look outside the military into other 

complex government agencies and civilian organizations for models as 

well. High technology enterprises in the non-military sector might offer 

relevant inputs for USAF cohesion issues. One place to look is certainly 

to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). It is not 

the USAF, either, but it can offer at least as much relevant experience as 

can the other services. NASA also faced a period of transition leading 

up to the Challenger disaster, and it is now facing an institutional 

renewal at least as fundamental as that facing the USAF. Professor 

Howard McCurdy outlines issues of culture and cohesion in the 

confederation of cultures known as NASA, finding that the integrative, 

cohesive matrix culture which characterized the Apollo era gave way to 

bureaucratic entropy and disorder leading up to Challenger. The political 

environment decreased its support for NASA, the bureaucratic pressures 

became paramount, and “conservers” pursuing a survival mentality 
52

replaced “innovators” at the core of the organization.59 Today, in line 

with Administrator Dan Goldin’s emphasis on “better, faster, cheaper,” 

NASA is attempting to reinvigorate its high-tech, multiple subculture 

matrix team around new missions and goals, and the USAF should take 

note of those efforts. 

 Regardless of the models examined, the Air Force must find its 

own answers within its own set of cultures and pressures: it must define, 

build, and sustain its own team within and against its own mission and 

vision. The officer corps is the key to that effort. Military officers lead 

the various units at all levels, and through that leadership set the example 

and the climate of the primary groups with which USAF members 

identify. And those same officers provide the linking mechanism, the 

glue, that binds those individual units into a force, both across the 

functions and up and down the Air Force.60 The officers set, 

disseminate, and perpetuate the culture, and they must all become 

involved in reinventing the Air Force team. The Air Force officer corps 

must share essential values, define the service core mission(s) within the 

operational and political environments, create a unifying vision, and 

undertake strategic planning and action to promulgate that vision.61

 A start should come from clearly defining the Air Force team, 

one that includes both air and space power functions within the 

operational context of the 21st century battlespace. For example, Global 

Engagement projects that “In the future, any military or civilian member 

who is experienced in the employment and doctrine of air and space 

power will be considered an operator.”62 Air Force leadership can build 

on that expanded operational concept to define the future, inclusive 

USAF team. However, the team must be real—it must be backed 

tangibly through policy and incentives (promotion, status) from the top 

down. The team concept and its underlying vision must be disseminated 

at all levels, not just through formal means but through active, 
53

continuous involvement of all commanders. It must be a formal and 

informal, cradle-to-grave continuum of Air Force corps concepts, not 

just core concepts. The team must be built, reinforced, and employed—

as a team, not just its parts—and the USAF incentive system of 

recognition and advancement must be aligned with that team concept. 

High-tech, complex, matrix teams can be productive, loyal, unified, and 

effective—the USAF can and should expect or accept no less. 

CLOSING 

True, the Air Force has a cohesion problem. But the Air Force also has a 

common infrastructure upon which to begin to build its future, inclusive, 

more cohesive team. It needs to define that team, consolidate its 

missions around that team, and actively promulgate, reward, and support 

its vision into the 21st century air and space future. The effort must be 

extensive and pervasive, incorporating formal education and training but 

focusing also on day-to-day, unit-level efforts to live the team concept. 

It must come from the top, but it must reach down to and through 

commanders at all levels in a continuing, cradle-to-grave effort across 

each airman’s career. The fracture lines are real, and the technological 

and mission diversity pressures tend to pull the Air Force apart, so it 

must put real and focused effort into pulling together, not as a single 

entity, but as a team coming into harmony around shared missions and 

common goals. A team effort is possible, even if a single unified entity 

is not, and the effort must be made to bring that team onto the field. 
54

APPENDIX 1: SURVEY INSTRUMENT 

This survey supports a study being conducted for the USAF Institute for 

National Security Studies (INSS) under air staff sponsorship. It has been 

approved by the Air Force Personnel Center Survey Branch. Do NOT

indicate your name on the survey—only aggregated results will be used. 

Copies of the completed study will be available from USAF INSS, 

USAF Academy, CO 80840 after 1 October 1997. Circle your responses 

on this survey form. 

1. Current Rank: 

a. O-1 or O-2 

b. O-3 

c. O-4 

d. O-5 

e. O-6 

2. Source of Commission: 

a. OCS 

b. OTS 

c. ROTC 

d. USAFA 

e. Other: ___________ 

3. Primary Career Field: 

a. 13xx missiles/space/weapons 

b. 14xx intelligence 

c. 15xx weather 

d. 21xx logistics 

e. 31xx or 71xx security 
55

f. 32xxx base engineering 

g. 33xxx computers/comm 

h. 34xx-38xx services/support 

i. 61xxx scientist 

j. 62xxx engineering 

k. 63xx-65xx acquisition mgt 

l. 11xx pilot 

m. 12xx navigator 

For Pilots and Navigators, Mission Type: 

a. Airlift, Strategic 

b. Airlift, Tactical 

c. Bomber 

d. Fighter, air-to-air 

e. Fighter, attack/CAS 

f. Fighter, bomber/AI 

g. Fighter, recce 

h. Helicopter 

i. Special Operations 

j. Strategic recce/C2 

k. Tanker 

l. Trainer 

4. Most Recent Assignment: 

a. 13xx missiles/space/weapons 

b. 14xx intelligence 

c. 15xx weather 

d. 21xx logistics 

e. 31xx or 71xx security 

f. 32xxx base engineering 
56

g. 33xxx computers/comm 

h. 34xx-38xx services/support 

i. 61xxx scientist 

j. 62xxx engineering 

k. 63xx-65xx acquisition mgt 

l. 11xx pilot 

m. 12xx navigator 

5. PME: (highest level completed) 

a. None 

b. SOS 

c. ACSC 

d. AWC 

e. Other Service/Joint 

6. Have you ever served in a joint assignment? 

a. Yes 

b. No 

7. Your Gender? 

a. Male 

b. Female 

 
57

Please indicate your responses according to the following scale: 

0—No Opinion; 1—Strongly Disagree; 2—Disagree; 3—Neither 

Agree nor Disagree; 4—Agree; 5—Strongly Agree 

1. The mission of the Air Force is to fly and fight. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

2. If I left the Air Force tomorrow, I think it would be very difficult to 

get a job in private industry with pay, benefits, duties, and 

responsibilities comparable to those of my present job. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

3. Air Force members should take more interest in mission 

accomplishment and less interest in their personal concerns. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

4. The mission of the Air Force is to advance technology and 

engineering. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

5. The Air Force requires me to participate in too many activities that 

are not related to my job. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

6. I wish that more Air Force members had a genuine concern for 

national security. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

Please indicate your responses according to the following scale: 
58

0—No Opinion; 1—Strongly Disagree; 2—Disagree; 3—Neither 

Agree nor Disagree; 4—Agree; 5—Strongly Agree 

7. The mission of the Air Force is to support the team which acts to 

further the national interest. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

8. An individual can get more of an even break in civilian life than in the 

Air Force. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

9. The Air Force should be renamed the Air and Space Force. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

10. In the post-Cold War world, the Air Force should cut people, bases, 

and scale back on missions in order to develop and acquire new systems 

and technologies. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

11. The number one Air Force priority should be taking care of Air 

Force people. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

12. Differences in rank should not be important after duty hours. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

Please indicate your responses according to the following scale: 

0—No Opinion; 1—Strongly Disagree; 2—Disagree; 3—Neither 
59

Agree nor Disagree; 4—Agree; 5—Strongly Agree 

13. The number one Air Force priority should be the advancement of air 

and space technologies. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

14. In the Air Force of the 21st century, space and cyberspace will be 

more important than atmospheric missions. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

15. No one should be compelled to accept an assignment he or she does 

not want. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

16. The number one Air Force priority should be fighting and winning 

aerial combat. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

17. What a member of the Air Force does in his or her off-duty hours is 

none of the military’s business. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

18. In the Air Force of the 21st century, technical skills will be more 

important than operational expertise. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

Please indicate your responses according to the following scale: 

0—No Opinion; 1—Strongly Disagree; 2—Disagree; 3—Neither 

Agree nor Disagree; 4—Agree; 5—Strongly Agree 
60

19. Within the Air Force, I owe the most allegiance to my particular 

career field. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

20. Compensation should be based primarily on one’s technical skill 

level and not on rank and seniority. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

21. Within the Air Force, I owe the most allegiance to the core Air Force 

combat mission. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

22. Promotion and assignment should be based primarily on technical 

expertise rather than operational experience. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

23. Within the Air Force, I owe the most allegiance to personal interests 

and concerns. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

24. I normally think of myself as a specialist working for the Air Force 

rather than as an Air Force officer. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 

Please indicate your responses according to the following scale: 

0—No Opinion; 1—Strongly Disagree; 2—Disagree; 3—Neither 

Agree nor Disagree; 4—Agree; 5—Strongly Agree 
61

25. In today’s technical Air Force, we really don’t need so much 

military ritual and tradition as in times past. 

 0 1 2 3 4 5 
62
63

ENDNOTES

 

 1 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why 

They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 91. 

 2

 Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, 

D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), 28. 

 3

 Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service (New York: 

Oxford University Press, 1982), 122-123. 

 4

 Ibid., 124-130. 

 5

 Ibid., 130-133. 

 6

 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard 

University Press, 1957), 10. 

 7

 Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service, 116-117. 

 8

 Charles C. Moskos, Jr., “The Emergent Military: Calling, Profession, or 

Occupation,” in Frank D. Margiotta, ed., The Changing World of the American 

Military (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1978), 199-206; see also his update Charles C. 

Moskos, “Institutional and Occupational Trends in Armed Forces,” in Charles C. 

Moskos and Frank R. Wood, eds., The Military: More Than Just a Job?

(Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988), 15-26. 

 9

 Arnold Kanter, Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective (Chicago: 

University of Chicago Press, 1975), 18, states “Interservice cleavages ordinarily 

will dominate intraservice distinctions.” 

 10 Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service, 121. 

 11 Edgar H. Schein, “Culture: The Missing Concept in Organization Studies,” 

Administrative Science Quarterly 41 (June, 1996): 236-239. 

 12 Wilson, Bureaucracy, 95-96. 

 13 John K. Setear, Carl H. Builder, M.D. Baccus, and Wayne Madewell, The 

Army in a Changing World: The Role of Organizational Vision (Santa Monica, 

CA: RAND Corporation, June 1990), 67-80. The quote is from page 67. 

 14 Frederick C. Mosher, “Some Observations about Foreign Service Reform: 

‘Famous First Words,’” Public Administration Review (November/December 

1969): 605. 

 15 Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 39-40. 

 16 Wallace Earl Walker, Changing Organizational Culture: Strategy, 
64

 

Structure, and Professionalism in the U.S. General Accounting Office

(Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1986), 3-13. 

 17 Ibid., 7-13. 

 18 Stephen Peter Rosen, “New Ways of War: Understanding Military 

Innovation,” International Security 13 (Summer 1988): 141-143. 

 19 Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, 28-32. 

 20 Wilson, Bureaucracy, 105-106. 

 21 Kanter, Defense Politics, 102-111. 

 22 Carl H. Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: The Role of Airpower Theory in the 

Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 

1994); see also Carl H. Builder, “Keeping the Strategic Flame,” Joint Force 

Quarterly 14 (Winter 1996-1997): 76-84. 

 23 James A. Mowbray, “Air Force Doctrine Problems: 1926-Present,” 

Airpower Journal 9 (Winter 1995): 31-32. 

 24 Carl H. Builder, The Army in the Strategic Planning Process (Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, April 1987), 26. 

 25 Ibid., 22-48; and Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military 

Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 

1989), 31-43. 

 26 Builder, The Army in the Strategic Planning Process, 47 (italics added). 

 27 Peter D. Feaver and Kurt M. Campbell, “Rethinking Key West: Service 

Roles and Missions After the Cold War,” in Joseph Kruzel, ed., 1993 American 

Defense Annual (New York: Lexington Books, 1993), 166-168. 

 28 James F. Dunnigan and Raymond M. Macedonia, Getting It Right: 

American Military Reforms After Vietnam to the Persian Gulf and Beyond (New 

York: William Morrow and Company, 1993), 224-233; and Larry Grossman, 

“Air Force: Streamlining for Leaner Times,” Government Executive (December 

1991): 15. 

 29 From official biographies posted at www/af.mil/news/biographies/ as of 9 

June 1997. 

 30 James Kitfield, “The Drive for ‘Global Reach,’” Government Executive

(December 1991): 10, 18-20, 40; and Charles M. Westenhoff, “Why We Need an 

Air Force,” Joint Force Quarterly 6 (Autumn/Winter, 1994-95), 65-66. 

 31 Merrill McPeak, “Ideas Count,” Joint Force Quarterly 1 (Summer 1993): 
65

 

24; and Sheila E. Widnall and Ronald R. Fogleman, “Global Presence,” Joint 

Force Quarterly 7 (Spring 1995): 94-99. 

 32 Ronald R. Fogleman and Sheila E. Widnall, Global Engagement: A Vision 

for the 21st Century Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Air Force, 

1997). 

 33 See Paul Van Riper and Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Preparing for War in the 

21st Century,” Parameters XXVII (Autumn 1997): 4-14, for a coherent summary 

of the Army and Marine Corps surface focus and its conception of airpower as a 

surface support function. 

 34 See Benjamin S. Lambeth, “The Technology Revolution in Air Warfare,” 

Survival 39 (Spring 1997): 65-83, for one description of what that USAF future 

might look like. 

 35 Fogleman and Widnall, Global Engagement, 26. 

 36 Reported in Col Edward C. Mann III, Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm 

and the Air Power Debates (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1995), 

163-164. 

 37 Builder, The Icarus Syndrome, 6-8. 

 38 Franklin D. Margiotta, “Changing Military Manpower Realities: 

Implications for the Next Decade,” in Franklin D. Margiotta, James Brown, and 

Michael J. Collins, eds., Changing U.S. Military Manpower Realities (Boulder, 

CO: Westview, 1983), 22-24. 

 39 Moskos, “Institutional and Occupational Trends in Armed Forces,” 15-24. 

 40 Frank R. Wood, “At the Cutting Edge of Institutional and Occupational 

Trends: The U.S. Air Force Officer Corps,” in Moskos and Wood, The Military: 

More Than Just a Job?, 27-30. 

 41 Wood, “At the Cutting Edge of Institutional and Occupational Trends,” 31-

32. 

 42 Margiotta, “Changing Military Manpower Realities,” 22; Wood, “At the 

Cutting Edge of Institutional and Occupational Trends,” 27; and John H. Johns, 

ed., Cohesion in the US Military (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 

University Press, 1984), 56. 

 43 Franklin D. Margiotta, “A Military Elite in Transition: Air Force Leaders in 

the 1980s,” Armed Forces and Society 2 (Winter 1976): 155-184; and Johns, 

Cohesion in the US Military, 58. 

 44 Johns, Cohesion in the US Military, 56-57. 
66

 

 45 David R. Segal, John D. Blair, Joseph J. Lengermann, and Richard C. 

Thompson, “Institutional and Occupational Values in the U.S. Military,” in 

Margiotta, Brown, and Collins, eds., Changing U.S. Military Manpower 

Realities, 112; and Johns, Cohesion in the US Military, 54. 

 46 Frank R. Wood, “Air Force Junior Officers: Changing Prestige and 

Civilianization,” Armed Forces and Society 6 (Spring 1980), 483-506; Wood, 

“At the Cutting Edge of Institutional and Occupational Trends,” 32, and James 

H. Slagle, “The Junior Officer in the 1980s,” Air University Review 33 

(November-December 1981): 90-96. Segal et al were surprised to find no real 

difference between the institutional and occupational orientations of operational 

versus support Army personnel during this same timeframe. See Segal, et al, 

“Institutional and Occupational Values in the U.S. Military,” 120-121. 

 47 Scott Wilson, “Instructors at Academy Fear Changes,” Baltimore Sun (17 

July 1997), section A. 

 48 Cheryl E. Monday, “Executive Summary: Air and Space Basic Course 

Surveys,” HQ Air University, undated. 

 49 Lt Col McCoy, “Talking Paper on Analysis of Basic Course Surveys,” HQ 

AU/XOP, 12 December 1996. 

 50 Moskos and Wood, The Military: More Than Just a Job?, present several 

I/O surveys in their Appendix, 293-296. 

 51 Ronald L. Stevens, “An Analysis of the Effects of Intermediate Service 

School Professional Military Education Completion on the Careers of United 

States Air Force Officers,” U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 

1991. 

 52 James H. Brown, William B. Davitte, and Kenneth E. Roth, “Promotion 

Success of Resident Air War College Graduates,” Air War College, May 1984. 

 53 Fogleman and Widnall, Global Engagement, 7. 

 54 Walker, Changing Organizational Culture, 7-13. 

 55 Air Force Doctrine Document 1: Air Force Basic Doctrine (Maxwell AFB, 

AL: Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center, 1977), 36-40 outlines the fit 

between USAF core competencies and Joint Vision 2010. 

 56 Monday, “Executive Summary;” and McCoy, “Talking Paper.” 

 57 Kanter, Defense Politics, 18-20. 

 58 Wilson, Bureaucracy, 107. 

 59 Howard E. McCurdy, Inside NASA: High Technology and Organizational 
67

 

Change in the U.S. Space Program (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 

1993). See also Diane Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky 

Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA (Chicago: University of Chicago 

Press, 1996), for a sociological discussion of NASA culture and the problems of 

integrating high-technology oriented subcultures. 

 60 See Johns, Cohesion in the US Military, 8-9, 43, and 91-93 on the officer 

role in building military cohesion. 

 61 Cynthia D. Scott, Dennis T. Jaffe, and Glenn R. Tobe, Organizational 

Vision, Values and Mission (Menlo Park, CA: Crisp Publications, 1993), 5, 

suggest a five stage process: clarify values, scan the current situation 

(environment), define the mission, create a vision, and implement the vision 

(based on strategic planning). 

 62 Fogleman and Widnall, Global Engagement, 19. The italics are from the 

original.