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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

JONATHON WILLIAM-DURAND 

NEUHARD, 

Defendant. 

 / 

Case No. 2:15-cr-20425 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 

GERSHWIN A. DRAIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

DAVID R. GRAND

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE [28] 

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Jonathon Neuhard was charged in a July 9, 2015 indictment with 

Production of Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a); Receipt of 

Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2); and Possession of 

Child Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Dkt. No. 12, pp. 1–

3 (Pg. ID No. 21–23). Through the present motion filed on November 30, 2015, 

Defendant seeks to suppress all evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant 

executed April 1, 2015, as well as evidence derived from that initial search. Dkt. No. 

28, p. 1 (Pg. ID No. 59). 

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A hearing was held on this motion on February 23, 2016. Having considered 

the parties’ briefs in support of and in opposition to Defendant’s motion, their 

accompanying exhibits, and the remainder of the record, the Court now is prepared 

to rule on Defendant’s motion. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies this 

motion. 

II. BACKGROUND

On March 10, 2015, an individual (“Reporting Person,” or “RP”) reported to 

the Madison Heights Police Department that Defendant had sexually assaulted her 

minor daughters. Dkt. No. 28-1, pp. 4–5, ¶¶ D-1–D-7 (Pg. ID No. 80–88). Her 

daughters were ages nine (hereinafter, “Minor Victim One,” or “MV-1”) and seven 

(hereinafter “Minor Victim Two,” or “MV-2”). Id. at ¶¶ E-1–E-2. 

Detective Sergeant Marc Zupic interviewed RP on March 11, 2015. Id. at ¶ E. 

During the interview with Zupic, RP stated that she had left her daughters in the care 

of Defendant and his wife on February 20, 2015. Id. at ¶ E-3. MV-1 later told RP that 

Defendant took her to the basement, showed her pornographic movies, asked her if 

she was ready to have sex, and tried to put his hand down her pants. Id. at ¶ E-4. 

Defendant had resided at a residence on Brettonwoods Street in Madison Heights at 

the time of the abuse, but he was asked to move out after MV-1 and MV-2 disclosed 

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their abuse. Id. at ¶¶ D-5, E-6. He relocated to a residence on Christine Terrace. Id. at 

¶ E-6. 

 A week later, on March 17, 2015, MV-1 was interviewed by a child forensic 

interviewer while Zupic observed from another room. Id. at ¶ F. MV-1 stated that on 

a day when she was nine years old, Defendant had taken her down to the basement to 

watch a “sex video,” involving a naked “boy” and “girl,” where the “a girl suck[ed] 

a boy’s part” and then “the boy shoved his part into the girl.” Id. at ¶¶ F-4, F-8. 

Defendant allegedly told MV-1 that “this is what you have to do to me” and then 

tried to put his hand down her pants. Id. at ¶ F-5. MV-1 states that Defendant then 

took off his pants and underwear, attempted to take off her pants, and said “let me 

lick it,” in reference to MV-1’s genitals. Id. at ¶ F-6. MV-1 further stated that she 

saw Defendant’s penis and that Defendant began to masturbate in front of her. Id. at 

¶ F-7. 

MV-1 also stated that Defendant had abused her when she was younger. Id. at 

¶¶ F-9, F-11. When she was eight years old, MV-1 stated that Defendant tried to put 

his tongue in her mouth, touched her inside her clothes, and rubbed her genitals. Id. 

at ¶ F-9. MV-1 stated that Defendant tried to put his penis in her vagina and that 

Defendant’s actions “really hurt” her. Id. at ¶ F-10. Additionally, MV-1 stated that 

Defendant took pictures of her bare chest and genitals with his cell phone when she 

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was seven or eight years old. Id. at ¶ F-11. MV-1 also stated that Defendant pushed 

her head down so that his penis was in her mouth, and then “white stuff came out.” 

Id. at ¶ F-12. MV-1 did not tell anyone because she said that Defendant raised a 

knife and threatened to kill her. Id. at ¶ F-14. The alleged abuse occurred at the 

residence on Brettonwoods, according to MV-1. Id. at ¶¶ F-3, F-8, F-9. 

MV-2’s forensic interview commenced shortly after MV-1’s was completed. 

Id. at ¶ F-15. MV-2 stated that when she was six years old, Defendant reached inside 

her underwear and put his hand inside of her genitals, causing her pain. Id. at 

¶¶ F-21–F-23. MV-2 stated that this incident accorded in the backyard of the 

residence on Brettonwoods. Id. at ¶ F-20. Defendant allegedly held a blade and 

threatened to “beat the hell out of” MV-2 if she told anyone. Id. at ¶ F-25. 

Zupic was contacted by the caseworker with Child Protective Services who 

performed a home visit to Defendant’s residence on March 18, 2015. Id. at ¶¶ G–H. 

From speaking with the caseworker and the community manager of Defendant’s 

housing development, Zupic confirmed Defendant’s current address and the car he 

drove, which matched the description given by RP. Id. at ¶¶ E-7, G–J. Zupic also 

personally observed Defendant’s residence and car. Id. at ¶ J. 

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On March 26, 2015, a state court magistrate judge signed a warrant that 

authorized the search of Defendant’s current residence and car. Id. at 2–3 (Pg. ID 

No. 78–79). The search listed the property to be seized and searched as: 

Any and all records or evidence of the crime of child sexual 

assault/abuse, including but not limited to: proofs of residence, cell 

phones, smart phones, tablets, or any other handheld/portable 

electronic devices, computers, including laptops and notebooks, video 

game consoles, keyboards, monitors, scanners, printers, printed 

material, including copies of websites, emails and printed material, 

handwritten material, photographs related to child pornography of the 

victims . . . terminals, towers, computer hardware and software, 

external hard drives, modems, cables, digital cameras, handwritten 

notes and printed materials describing their operation, any password 

list(s) to enter secured files therein/thereafter, any and all information 

and/or data stored in the form of magnetic or electronic coding on 

computer media or media capable of being read by drives, CD’s or 

DVD’s, secure digital (SD) cards, removable hard disk cartridges, and 

any other device designed to store computer data, with the intent that all 

the aforementioned electronic and electronic storage devices that are 

seized will be analyzed by a forensic examiner. 

Id. at 2. The warrant was executed on April 1, 2015, id., and seven electronic 

items, including computers, tablets, and a phone, were seized. Dkt. No. 28, 

p. 4 (Pg. ID. No. 62). 

Forensic examination uncovered four images of child pornography on a 

memory card seized in the search. Id. at 5; Dkt. No. 34, p. 6 (Pg. ID No. 101). 

The photos’ metadata indicated that the photos were taken with a cell phone 

matching the one seized from Defendant’s residence. Dkt. No. 34, p. 7 (Pg. ID 

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No. 102). One image depicted a prepubescent female’s vagina; two images 

depicted a prepubescent female’s vagina with the hand of an adult spreading 

the labia; and one image depicted an adult male’s penis penetrating a 

prepubescent female’s vagina. Dkt. No. 34, pp. 6–7 (Pg. ID No. 101–02). In 

the photo, the child is sitting on what appeared to be a black and white 

zebra-striped sheet or blanket. Id. A blanket matching this description was 

visible in a dresser drawer of Defendant’s home, as shown in photographs 

taken during the execution of the warrant. Id. at 6. 

 Additionally, examination of one of Defendant’s computers resulted in 

the discovery of one image and two videos containing suspected child 

pornography. Dkt. No. 28, p. 5 (Pg. ID No. 63). 

On July 9, 2015, Defendant was charged in a three-count indictment 

with (1) Production of Child Pornography; (2) Receipt of Child Pornography; 

and (3) Possession of Child Pornography. Id. at 5–6. Defendant now seeks to 

suppress the images and video extracted from the computer and memory card. 

Id. at 3. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The Fourth Amendment requires that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon 

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 

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place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S.CONST. amend. IV. 

The Fourth Amendment specifies the two matters that must be “particularly 

describe[ed]” in the warrant: “the place to be searched” and “the persons or things to 

be seized.” United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97 (2006). With this provision, the 

Fourth Amendment sought to “curb the abuses of general warrants, devices which 

provided British officers with broad discretion to search the homes of citizens of the 

Colonies for evidence of vaguely specified crimes.” United States v. Richards, 659 

F.3d 527, 537 (6th Cir. 2011). 

The particularity requirement prevents general searches by requiring a neutral 

judicial officer confine the scope of the search to areas and items for which there 

exists probable cause that a crime had been committed. Baranski v. Fifteen 

Unknown Agents of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 452 F.3d 433, 441 (6th 

Cir. 2006). The Sixth Circuit has determined that the particularity requirement 

encompasses two main issues. Richards, 659 F.3d at 537 (quoting United States v. 

Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999)). The first issue is “whether the warrant 

supplies enough information to guide and control the agent’s judgment in selecting 

what to take.” Id. The second issue is “whether the category as specified is too broad 

in the sense that it includes items that should not be seized.” Id. “However, the 

degree of specificity required is flexible and will vary depending on the crime 

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involved and the types of items sought.” United States v. Ables, 167 F.3d 1021, 1033 

(6th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir. 

1988)). 

Even if a warrant is found to be overbroad, the finding does not require 

suppression of all items seized pursuant to the warrant. United States v. Abboud, 438 

F.3d 554, 576 (6th Cir. 2006). Instead, the court “is to sever the infirm portion of the 

search warrant from the remainder which passes constitutional muster.” United 

States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1027 (6th Cir. 1991). Items seized pursuant to 

valid portions of the warrant may be introduced as evidence, even if other portions 

of the search warrant were overbroad. Id. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The Motion To Suppress Will Be Denied Because The Evidence Was 

Seized Pursuant To Valid Search Warrants 

Defendant moves to suppress the evidence seized from his home on April 1, 

2015, September 14, 2015, and September 30, 2015 on the grounds that (1) the 

search exceeded the probable cause established by the warrant application and 

affidavit; and (2) the warrant on its face failed the particularity requirement of the 

Fourth Amendment, rendering it an invalid “general warrant.” See Dkt. No. 28. 

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1. The Police Had Probable Cause To Believe That A Crime Was 

Committed, And Limited The Scope Of The Search To Relevant 

Areas And Items 

Defendant first asserts that the affidavit attached to the search warrant 

presented “limited” facts to the magistrate to establish probable cause that all of 

Defendant’s electronics would contain child pornography. Dkt. No. 28, p. 7 (Pg. ID 

No. 65). Defendant argues that evidence of child molestation alone is insufficient to 

establish probable cause for a warrant to search for child pornography. Id. at 8. 

There must be a nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence 

sought to establish probable cause for the search warrant’s issuance. United States v. 

Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 747 (6th Cir. 2005). This has been interpreted as requiring 

the magistrate signing the warrant to have “a substantial basis for finding that the 

affidavit established probable cause to believe that the evidence would be found at 

the place cited.” United States v. Davidson, 936 F.2d 856, 859 (6th Cir. 1991) 

(quoting United States v. Loggins, 777 F.2d 336, 338 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). 

“A magistrate’s ‘determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by 

reviewing courts.’ ” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983) (quoting Spinelli v. 

United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969)). Resolution of doubtful or marginal cases 

should largely be determined by according preference to warrants, so that law 

enforcement officers are encouraged to continue seeking them. Id. at 237 n.10. 

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After reviewing the warrant and the affidavit, it is clear that the allegations of 

child sexual assault and abuse were sufficiently intertwined with allegations 

involving the creation and possession of child pornography to warrant a search of 

Defendant’s electronics for evidence of Defendant’s abuse of MV-1. The search 

warrant specifically sought evidence of “child sexual assault/abuse” based on 

MV-1’s allegations. Dkt. No. 28-1, p. 2 (Pg. ID No. 78). MV-1’s allegations, 

specifically referenced in the affidavit attached to the warrant, indicate that 

Defendant’s computers and portable electronic devices contained evidence of the 

alleged abuse, such as photos of her genitals and bare chest, and a “sex video” 

involving a “boy” and a “girl.” Id. at 5–6. Since MV-1 referred to the individuals 

engaging in sexual activities in the video as a “boy” and a “girl,” rather than a “man” 

and a “woman,” it is reasonable to conclude that the video MV-1 described involved 

child pornography. MV-1 provided details that indicated that the video was played 

on a computer belonging to Defendant, and the photos were taken while Defendant 

had his cell phone in his hand. Id. at 6. Accordingly, there was ample evidence 

provided to the magistrate to indicate that the photos and video sought by the 

warrant would substantiate MV-1’s allegations of sexual abuse. 

Defendant relies on United States v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286, 293 (6th Cir. 

2008) and United States v. Adkins, 169 F. App’x 961, 967 (6th Cir. 2006) to support 

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his argument that law enforcement had no probable cause to search for child 

pornography on his electronics. Although Adkins states that “[s]tanding alone, a high 

incidence of child molestation by persons convicted of child pornography crimes 

may not demonstrate that a child molester is likely to possess child pornography,” it 

goes on to find that a law enforcement agency’s “institutional knowledge” can 

support a finding that a defendant is reasonably likely to possess child pornography. 

169 F. App’x at 967. 

Hodson, which quoted the above dictum from Adkins, determined that the 

search warrant in question lacked probable cause because it searched for evidence of 

“an entirely different crime.” 543 F.3d at 292 (emphasis added). Hodson confided 

that he had molested his young nephew to an undercover detective on the internet. 

Id. at 287. After the police determined that there were no facts to substantiate his 

claim of child sexual abuse, they prepared a search warrant to search for evidence of 

child pornography instead of evidence of child molestation. Id. at 287–88. Unlike 

Hodson, where the statement of probable cause contained no information 

whatsoever relating to the defendant engaging in any aspect of child pornography, 

here the affidavit relays specific allegations that Defendant made MV-1 view child 

pornography and created child pornography by taking photos of MV-1’s genitals. 

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Based on the facts presented, the Court finds that the magistrate properly 

determined that the affidavit established probable cause to search for evidence of the 

alleged child assault/abuse on Defendant’s computer and portable electronic 

devices. 

2. The Warrant Was Sufficiently Particular In That It Supplied Enough 

Information To Guide And Control The Agents’ Judgment In 

Selecting Items To Seize 

Next, Defendant argues that the language of the search warrant was 

overbroad, and thus constituted a general search in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. Dkt. No. 28, p. 9 (Pg. ID No. 67). Defendant breaks his argument 

down into two points: (1) that the April search warrant failed to satisfy the 

particularity requirement due to its use of the words “any and all”; and (2) that the 

April search warrant failed to satisfy the particularity requirement by not including 

specific language directing the search of electronic devices. Id. at 11–14. 

Defendant relies heavily on Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), even 

though the comparison between Riley and the present case seems inapposite. In 

Riley, the Supreme Court held that a warrant is generally required before searching 

the contents of a cell phone. 134 S. Ct. at 2493 (“Our holding, of course, is not that 

the information on a cell phone is immune from search; it is instead that a warrant is 

generally required before such a search”). The present case does not involve a 

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warrantless search. Rather, it is undisputed that the police sought and received a 

warrant to search Defendant’s home prior to seizing and analyzing Defendant’s 

phone, tablet, and computers for evidence of the crimes alleged by MV-1. 

Accordingly, Riley is both factually and legally distinguishable. 

a) The Place To Be Searched Was Described With Particularity 

The Fourth Amendment specifies that “the place to be searched” must be 

described with particularity within the warrant. Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 97. Defendant 

briefly argues in his reply brief that the warrant did not establish a sufficient nexus 

between the location to be searched and the alleged abuse. Dkt. No. 41, p. 7 (Pg. ID 

No. 153). 

The Fourth Amendment does not limit places to be searched to only those 

locations where criminal activity actually occurred. Rather, the question is whether 

the affidavit supporting the search warrant demonstrated a connection between the 

evidence sought and the place to be searched. United States v. Brown, 801 F.3d 679, 

686 (6th Cir. 2015). “Whether an affidavit establishes a proper nexus is a 

fact-intensive question resolved by examining the totality of circumstances 

presented.” Id. at 687. 

In the present case, the abuse was alleged to have occurred at the residence on 

Brettonwoods, where Defendant had been allowed to live in the basement. However, 

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after the abuse allegations surfaced, Defendant was removed from that residence and 

relocated to the residence on Christine Terrace. It was reasonable for the magistrate 

to assume, in light of the facts, that Defendant took his possessions, including 

computers and portable electronics, with him when he moved. Additionally, the 

affidavit included statements that Zupic had verified Defendant’s new address with 

Child Protective Services and the Community Manager of Defendant’s 

neighborhood, prior to providing a detailed description of Defendant’s new 

residence on the first page of the affidavit. 

In light of all the facts presented, the Court determines that the warrant 

described the places to be searched with sufficient particularity and a proper nexus to 

the items to be seized. 

b) The Items To Be Seized Were Described With Particularity 

The Fourth Amendment also specifies that the warrant must describe “the 

persons or things to be seized” with particularity. Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 97. Defendant 

objects to the use of “any and all” language within the warrant, arguing that such 

language granted the searching officer too much discretion and converted the 

warrant into a general warrant. Dkt. No. 28, p. 12 (Pg. ID No. 70). 

The degree of specificity required in a search warrant is flexible and varies 

depending on the crime alleged and items sought. United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 

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1374, 1383 (6th Cir. 1988). “Thus a description is valid if it is as specific as the 

circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit.” Id. (quoting 

United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir. 1985)). “In the context of 

searches of electronic devices, while recognizing the inherent risk that criminals can 

easily ‘hide, mislabel, or manipulate files to conceal criminal activity,’ we must also 

take care not to give the Government free rein to essentially do away with the 

particularity requirement by allowing it to examine every file on the device.” United 

States v. Rarick, No. 14-4212, 2016 WL 75616, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 7, 2016). 

The Sixth Circuit recently considered arguments similar to Defendant’s in 

United States v. Rarick. See id. The defendant in that case objected to “the warrant’s 

expansive language authorizing the search of ‘any and all electronic data’ and ‘any 

and all communications,’ and the warrant’s failure to specify the date” of a video’s 

creation during searches of the defendant’s cell phone. Id., at *4. The Sixth Circuit 

affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress for several reasons. Id. 

First, the Rarick warrant contained portions that were specifically targeted to 

the “images” and “videos” that the officers had probable cause to search, although 

the exact folder location was unknown.1 Id. at *4. Second, the officers executed the 

 1 Rarick relies on United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527, 541 (6th Cir. 2011), 

for the holding that a search regarding a child pornography website was not 

overbroad where it authorized agents to search beyond the file directory on the 

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warrant as though overbroad portions had been excised and no evidence was offered 

against the defendant pursuant to those portions. Id. Additionally, the panel held that 

the failure to use a date filter before expanding the search was not unreasonable, 

even though the date and time of the media’s creation was known, given the Sixth 

Circuit’s approach of determining reasonableness on a case-by-case basis. Id. at *5. 

In the present case, even less specific information was known than in Rarick. 

Whereas there an adult police officer was able to specify the exact date and time that 

the videos or photos sought were recorded, here the specific time period when the 

photos were taken is less clear. See Dkt. No. 28-1, p. 6 (Pg. ID No. 82) (indicating 

that MV-1 could not remember whether she was 7 or 8 when Defendant took naked 

photos of her, allegedly on Christmas). Investigators in the present case did not 

know the specific file locations of the videos or photos prior to executing the 

warrant, so consequently the warrant could not limit search to exactly those 

locations. Accordingly, the description used in the warrant was as specific as 

possible, given the circumstances and nature of the activity being investigated.

 

server that contained the evidence. 2016 WL 75616, at *4. The broad search was 

necessary because the agents did not know where the evidence was stored on the 

server, although their investigation disclosed the exact server upon which the 

website was hosted. Id. 

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c) The Search Warrant Did Not Need To Include A Specific 

Search Methodology 

Defendant also contends that the search warrant was invalid because it did not 

contain specific instructions to the forensic examiner about how to analyze the 

electronics. Dkt. No. 28, pp. 13–14 (Pg. ID No. 71–72). The relevant portion of the 

warrant stated that “all of the aforementioned electronics and electronic storage 

devices that are seized will be analyzed by a forensic examiner.” Dkt. No. 28-1, p. 2 

(Pg. ID No. 78). 

In United States v. Richards, 659 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 2011), the Sixth Circuit 

agreed with the Tenth Circuit’s determination in United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 

1078, 1092 (10th Cir. 2009), that “it is folly for a search warrant to attempt to 

structure the mechanics of the search” and “a warrant imposing such limits would 

unduly restrict legitimate search objectives.” Richards, 659 F.3d at 538. Instead of 

requiring the use of a specific search protocol, the Sixth Circuit applies a 

reasonableness analysis. Id. at 539. “[S]o long as the computer search is limited to a 

search for evidence explicitly authorized in the warrant, it is reasonable for the 

executing officers to open the various types of files located in the computer’s hard 

drive in order to determine whether they contain such evidence.” Id. at 540 (quoting 

United States v. Roberts, No. 3:08–CR–175, 2010 WL 234719, at *15 (E.D. Tenn. 

Jan. 14, 2010)). 

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In the present case, the warrant contained language that explicitly restricted 

the search of listed items to “[a]ny and all records or evidence of the crime of child 

sexual assault/abuse,” id. at 2, a factor other courts have considered in determining 

the reasonableness of an electronic search. See United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 

1127 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding a warrant that did not limit the computer 

search/seizure to specific crimes to be invalid, but reversing the order to suppress 

under the good faith exception). Furthermore, there is no evidence that the forensic 

analyst searched for evidence of crimes other than those alleged by MV-1.2

 Viewing 

the facts as a whole, the search and analysis of Defendant’s electronics did not 

exceed the bounds of reasonableness required by the Fourth Amendment. 

B. The Court Will Not Hold An Evidentiary Hearing On The Motion 

“An evidentiary hearing is required only if the motion is sufficiently definite, 

specific, detailed, and non-conjectural to enable the court to conclude that contested 

issues of fact going to the validity of the search are in question.” United States v. 

Lawhorn, 467 F. App’x 493, 495 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Abboud, 

438 F.3d 554, 577 (6th Cir. 2006)). Defendants are not entitled to evidentiary 

hearings when their arguments are entirely legal in nature, such as challenges to 

 2

 Since MV-1 alleged that Defendant utilized and created child pornography 

during her abuse, it was reasonable for law enforcement to search for the alleged 

pornography to verify her allegations. 

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probable cause. Id. Because there are no factual issues in dispute with regard to 

Defendant’s motion, the Court determines that it is unnecessary to conduct an 

evidentiary hearing on the motion. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court will DENY Defendant’s Motion to 

Suppress Evidence. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 25, 2016 

 /s/ Gershwin A Drain 

 HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN 

 United States District Court Judge 

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