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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

RICKEY BILLS, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 15-cv-11414 

 Hon. Matthew F. Leitman 

v. 

PAUL KLEE, et al., 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________________________________________/ 

ORDER (1) OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS (ECF No. 123) 

TO REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (ECF No. 120), (2) ADOPTING 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION OF REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION, AND (3) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING 

IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 100) 

Plaintiff Rickey Bills is a state inmate in the custody of the Michigan 

Department of Corrections (the “MDOC”). In this prisoner civil-rights action, Bills 

alleges that certain employees of the MDOC violated his constitutional rights. More 

specifically, Bills claims that (1) Defendants Renee Diver and Vaughn Stewart 

intentionally interfered with his access to the courts; and (2) Defendant Kristopher 

Steece retaliated against him for filing grievances and lawsuits by transferring him 

to a prison in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula. 

On June 18, 2021, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Bills’ 

claims. (See Mot., ECF No. 100.) The motion was referred to the assigned 

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Magistrate Judge. On February 10, 2022, the Magistrate Judge issued a report and 

recommendation in which he recommended that the Court (1) grant summary 

judgment against Bills on his retaliation claim against Steece; and (2) deny summary 

judgment against Bills on his access-to-the-courts claim against Diver and Stewart 

(the “R&R”). (See R&R, ECF No. 120.) 

Bills filed objections to the R&R on February 25, 2022. (See Objections, ECF 

No. 123.) He contends that the Magistrate Judge erred when he recommended that 

the Court grant summary judgment against him on his retaliation claim against 

Steece. (See id.) The Court has carefully reviewed Bills’ objections, and for the 

reasons explained below, they are OVERRULED. The Court will therefore 

GRANT summary judgment against Bills on his claim that Steece retaliated against 

him in violation of the First Amendment and DENY summary judgment against 

Bills on his claim that Diver and Stewart denied him access to the courts.1

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 Defendants did not file any objections to the portion of the R&R that recommended 

the Court deny their motion with respect to Bills’ access-to-the-courts claim against 

Defendants Diver and Stewart. The failure to object to an R&R releases the Court 

from its duty to independently review the matter. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 

149 (1985). In addition, the failure to file objections to an R&R waives any further 

right to appeal. See Howard v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th 

Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th 

Cir. 1987). Therefore, because Defendants have not filed any objections to the R&R, 

the Court will adopt Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and DENY summary 

judgment against Bills with respect to his access-to-the-courts claim against 

Defendants Diver and Stewart. 

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I 

A 

Bills is currently serving a life sentence in the custody of the MDOC. In 

March 2017, he was incarcerated at the Macomb Correctional Facility (“MRF”). 

(See Bills Location Log, ECF No. 100-3, PageID.1049.) Steece was a deputy 

warden at MRF at all relevant times. On March 23, 2017, Bills was transferred from 

MRF to the Kinross Correctional Facility (“Kinross”) in Michigan’s Upper 

Peninsula. (See id.) Bills alleges that Steece ordered the transfer in retaliation for 

Bills having previously filed lawsuits and grievances against other MDOC 

employees. (See Am. Compl., ECF No. 67, PageID.604.) Bills further claims that 

Steece “directed officials at [Kinross] to isolate [him]” when he arrived at that 

facility. (Id.) 

B 

Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Bills’ claims on June 18, 

2021. (See Mot., ECF No. 100.) Relevant here, Defendants argued the Court should 

enter summary judgment against Bills on his First Amendment retaliation claim 

against Steece because (1) Bills had not shown that “Steece knew of Bills’ lawsuits 

and grievances [...] when Bills was transferred,” (2) Bills’ transfer did “not rise to 

the level of an adverse action” because the transfer did not change his security level 

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and did not remove him from the prison’s general population, and (3) Steece did not 

“order or approve Bills’ transfer from MRF.” (Id., PageID.1031–1036.) 

 The Magistrate Judge agreed. In the R&R, he concluded, among other things, 

that Bills had “failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his 

transfer from MRF to [Kinross] constituted an adverse action.” (R&R, ECF No. 120, 

PageID.1397–1398.) In reaching this conclusion, the Magistrate Judge highlighted 

that “[a]ll of the salient MDOC paperwork reflect[ed] that Bills was kept at the same 

security level of II” after his transfer from MRF to Kinross and that there was “no 

evidence supporting Bills’ assertion that Steece ordered him to be ‘isolated’ upon 

his transfer.” (Id., PageID.1396.) 

Bills filed objections to the R&R on February 25, 2022. (See Objections, ECF 

No. 123.) Bills contends, among other things, that the Magistrate Judge erred when 

he concluded that Steece did not take an adverse action against him by having him 

transferred from MRF to Kinross. (See id., PageID.1424.) The Court will examine 

Bills’ reasoning in detail below. 

II 

When a party objects to portions of a Magistrate Judge’s report and 

recommendation, the Court reviews those portions de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(3); Lyons v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 351 F.Supp.2d 659, 661 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 

The Court has no duty to conduct an independent review of the portions of a report 

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and recommendation to which a party did not object. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 

140, 149 (1985). 

III 

A 

In order to prevail on his First Amendment retaliation claim against Steece, 

Bills must establish three elements: (1) he engaged in protected conduct, (2) Steece 

took an adverse action – i.e., an action that would deter a person of ordinary firmness 

from continuing to engage in that conduct – against him, and (3) Steece’s adverse 

action was motivated at least in part by that protected conduct. See Thaddeus–X v. 

Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999). As explained above, the Magistrate Judge 

concluded, among other things, that Bills could not establish the adverse action 

element of his claim. The Court agrees – albeit for a slightly different reason. 

Bills alleges that Steece took an adverse action against him by having him 

transferred from MRF to Kinross. The Sixth Circuit has explained that prisoner 

transfers generally do not constitute adverse actions because “prisoners are expected 

to endure more than the average citizen, and since transfers are common among 

prisons, ordinarily a transfer would not deter a prisoner of ordinary firmness from 

continuing to engage in protected conduct.” Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693, 701 

(6th Cir. 2005). For these reasons, “a prison official’s decision to transfer a prisoner 

from the general population of one prison to the general population of another is not 

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[generally] considered adverse.” LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 948 (6th Cir. 

2013). Likewise, where a prisoner is transferred between prisons at the same 

security level, such a transfer is not usually considered adverse. See Ward v. Dyke, 

58 F.3d 271, 275 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that where prisoner was transferred 

between two “Level II” facilities, transfer did not constitute an adverse action even 

where “defendants admit[ed] that [the prisoner] was transferred in part to give prison 

staff a respite from his continuous barrage of grievances”). 

 Bills has failed to show that Steece’s conduct amounted to an adverse action 

under these standards. At most, Bills has shown that Steece may have played some 

role in the decision to transfer him to Kinross. Bills made that showing by pointing 

out that Steece’s name appears on a security classification screen review form that 

was completed in connection with his transfer. (See ECF No. 100-5, PageID.1059-

1060.) Critically, however, that review form and the other paperwork completed at 

MRF in connection with Bills’ transfer to Kinross indicate that Bills’ security level 

at Kinross should be the same as it was at MRF – Level II – and that Bills should 

not be placed in a “special handling” unit, such as “administrative segregation” or 

“detention” following his transfer. (Id.) Thus, Bills has shown only that Steece may 

have had participated in a “decision to transfer [him] from the general population of 

one prison to the general population of another,” and to do so while maintaining his 

same security level; such a decision “is not [generally] considered adverse.” 

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LaFountain, 716 F.3d at 948. Bills has therefore failed to show that Steece’s alleged 

decision to transfer him to the general population and same security level at Kinross 

was an adverse action. 

B 

Bills counters that the Court’s analysis ignores the true circumstances of the 

transfer to Kinross that Steece ordered. He asserts that even though the review form 

bearing Steece’s name suggests that he was to be placed in the same security level 

upon arriving at Kinross, that is not what actually happened. He says that, in fact, 

he “never spen[t] any time” in the general population at Kinross. (Objections, ECF 

No. 123, PageID.1421.) He insists that, instead, as soon as he arrived at Kinross, he 

was placed into “segregation/‘suicide observation.’” (Id.) And he contends that even 

though Steece may have stated on the classification review form that he (Bills) 

should be placed in the same security level at Kinross, Steece actually directed the 

officials at Kinross to place him in segregation upon his arrival. (See id.) Bills says 

that Steece’s actual role in the transfer thus amounts to an adverse action. 

 But the evidence that Bills relies upon does not sufficiently establish any 

connection between Steece and the decision by officials at Kinross to place Bills in 

segregation upon his arrival at that facility. Bills first says that an unnamed 

psychologist at Kinross told him that someone in the “MRF Deputy Warden Office” 

told Kinross officials that Bills “should be locked up and placed in protected 

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custody[] for the protection of staff.” (Id.) But it would be pure speculation to 

conclude that Steece was the person in the “MRF Deputy Warden Office” to whom 

the psychologist was referring. Indeed, Bills has previously identified a second 

deputy warden at MRF who was involved in the decision to transfer him to Kinross 

– deputy warden Darnell Stewart (see Bills Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., ECF 

No. 112, PageID.1178–1179; Bills Aff., ECF No. 119, PageID.1319). And Bills has 

not presented an affidavit, declaration, or other statement from the psychologist 

confirming that she was talking about Steece, as opposed to Stewart or some other 

person in the MRF Deputy Warden Office. Simply put, the psychologist’s statement 

does not link Steece to Bills’ placement in segregation at Kinross. See, e.g., Clemente 

v. Vaslo, 679 F.3d 482, 495 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming summary judgment and 

explaining that “mere speculation [or] conjecture” is “insufficient to survive a 

motion for summary judgment”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 Bills next asserts that he was told that “prison officials from ‘down state’” 

played a role in his placement in segregation at Kinross (Bills Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. 

for Summ. J., ECF No. 112, PageID.1176), but he never identifies those “down 

state” officials or produces any evidence that any official at Kinross ever identified 

Steece as playing a role that decision. Nor has Bills presented any evidence that 

Steece communicated with anyone at Kinross with respect to Bills’ placement in 

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segregation at that facility. Simply put, Bills has not presented any evidence that 

Steece had any connection to his placement in segregation at Kinross. 

In sum, the record with respect to Bills’ transfer to Kinross reflects (at most) 

that Steece recommended that Bills be transferred to the same security level at 

Kinross. There is no evidence linking Steece to the decision by Kinross officials to 

deviate from Steece’s recommendation and place Bills in segregation upon his 

arrival. The record therefore fails to persuade the Court that Steece’s role in Bills’ 

transfer amounted to an adverse action. 

C 

 In the alternative, Bills argues that even if Steece participated in a decision to 

transfer him to a different facility at the same security level, that decision nonetheless 

constituted an adverse action because it was “reasonably foreseeable” that the 

transfer would cause him to suffer negative consequences. Siggers-El, 412 F.3d at 

702. See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[A] prison transfer 

or the threat of a transfer can be an adverse action if that transfer would result in 

foreseeable, negative consequences to the particular prisoner”). This argument fails 

because Bills has not identified any cognizable negative consequences here that 

transform his transfer to Kinross into an adverse action. 

 Bills first says that his transfer involved a foreseeable negative consequence 

because “up north facilities” like Kinross are known to be “disciplinary prisons and 

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prison[ers] who are transferred across the bridge [to Michigan’s Upper Peninsula] 

are [transferred] for disciplinary purpose[s].” (Objections, ECF No. 123, 

PageID.1424.) But Bills has not presented any actual evidence that the prisoner 

population of Kinross differs in any material respect from the prisoner population of 

MRF. Moreover, as the Sixth Circuit has explained, a transfer between prison 

facilities does not generally rise to the level of an adverse action even if the facility 

to which a prisoner is transferred is “less desirable”: 

Nor is it relevant that the new facility, although also 

a level II facility, is less desirable than the facility 

from which Ward was transferred. See Meachum [v. 

Fano], 427 U.S. [215,] 225 [(1976)] (“That life in 

one prison is much more disagreeable than in 

another does not in itself signify that a Fourteenth 

Amendment liberty interest is implicated when a 

prisoner is transferred to the institution with the 

more severe rules.”). 

The transfer here was to another level II facility; the 

fact that a prisoner may not like a certain prison 

location does not automatically transform a valid 

transfer into a constitutional violation. [Plaintiff] 

ha[d] no constitutional right to remain at a specific 

facility or to prevent a transfer to another level II 

facility for a permissible reason. 

Ward, 58 F.3d at 275. 

Bills next says that “[w]hen prisoners are transferred (500) miles away from 

love[d] ones,” such a transfer constitutes “a lost[] privilege[] that causes a great deal 

of stress and mental depression.” (Objections, ECF No. 123, PageID.1425.) While 

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being transferred far away from family could potentially qualify as a cognizable 

negative consequence in some circumstances, Bills has not presented any evidence 

that he suffered such a consequence here. For example, he has not presented any 

evidence as to where his friends and family live or work. Nor has he presented 

evidence that his friends and family actually visited him at MRF, and without such 

evidence it is impossible to determine whether his move to Kinross truly resulted in 

the loss of in-person contact with family and friends that he otherwise would have 

had if not for the transfer. 

Finally, Bills says that Steece “knew or should have known” that the transfer 

to Kinross would be especially traumatic to him because he was stabbed during a 

prison attack while imprisoned in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula 40 years ago. (Id., 

PageID.1425-1426.) Bills therefore says it was foreseeable to Steece that the 

transfer to Kinross would cause him mental anguish from this post-traumatic stress. 

(See id.) But Bills has not presented any evidence that Steece knew that Bills had 

been previously attacked at a facility in the Upper Peninsula or that it was 

“foreseeable” to Steece that transferring Bills to Kinross would be especially 

traumatic. And while Bills says that his “mental medical records [indicate] that he 

not been transferred up north” (id., PageID.1425), Bills has neither submitted those 

records to the Court nor provided evidence Steece had access to them or knew about 

them prior to the transfer. 

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D 

For all of these reasons, Bills has not shown that Steece took an adverse action 

against him. Accordingly, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion 

that Bills’ First Amendment retaliation claim against Steece fails as a matter of law. 

Bills’ objections to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to grant summary 

judgment against him on his First Amendment retaliation claim against Steece are 

therefore OVERRULED.

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IV 

For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 

 Bills’ objections to the R&R (ECF No. 123) are OVERRULED; 

 The recommended disposition of the R&R (ECF No. 120) is 

ADOPTED; and 

 Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 100) is 

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as set forth 

above. The motion is DENIED with respect to Bills’ access-to-thecourts claim against Defendants Diver and Stewart. The motion 

GRANTED with respect to Bills’ retaliation claim against 

Defendant Steece. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 s/Matthew F. Leitman 

 MATTHEW F. LEITMAN 

Dated: March 24, 2022 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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 Because the Court concludes that Bills has not established the required adverse 

action element of his First Amendment retaliation claim, it need not and does not 

address the Magistrate Judge’s alternative bases for granting summary judgment 

against Bills on his claim against Steece. 

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 I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the 

parties and/or counsel of record on March 24, 2022, by electronic means and/or 

ordinary mail. 

 s/Holly A. Ryan 

 Case Manager 

 (313) 234-5126 

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