UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

JOSHUA PRIEUR, 

 

Plaintiff, Civil Case No. 15-12547 

 Honorable Linda V. Parker 

v. 

 

ACUITY, 

Defendant. 

________________________________/ 

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

 This diversity jurisdiction action arises from Plaintiff’s claim for Michigan 

workers’ compensation benefits and Defendant’s request during the processing of 

the claim that Plaintiff attend an independent medical examination (“IME”).1

 In 

 

1 Plaintiff is a citizen of Michigan. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 1.) Defendant is a citizen of 

Wisconsin. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he suffered damages over $75,000. (Id.) 

The Sixth Circuit has instructed that “[i]n determining whether a claim’s value 

exceeds $75,000, we use the plaintiff’s alleged amount unless ‘it is apparent, to a 

legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed.’ ” Ozormoor 

v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 354 F. App’x 972, 973 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting St. Paul 

Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 298 (1938) (“the sum claimed 

by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith.”)). Such 

“legal certainty” generally is found “only when state law categorically bars the 

plaintiff from recovering the necessary amount. Id. (citing Kovacs v. Chesley, 406 

F.3d 393, 395-97 (6th Cir. 2005)). Therefore, courts have found jurisdiction even 

where the damages claimed appear to be overstated. Id. at 974 (citing cases). In 

his Complaint, Plaintiff claims that he suffered “mental anguish, outrage at loss of 

liberty, emotional distress, [and] loss of workers’ compensation benefits” due to 

(Cont’d . . .) 

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his Complaint, filed July 17, 2015, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant twice 

committed the tort of false imprisonment by requiring him to attend an IME or risk 

losing his workers’ compensation benefits.2

 Presently before the Court is 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss, filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) on August 13, 2015. The motion has been fully briefed. The Court finds 

the facts and legal arguments sufficiently presented in the parties’ pleadings and 

therefore is dispensing with oral argument pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan 

Local Rule 7.1(f). For the reasons that follow, the Court is granting Defendant’s 

motion.

 

Defendant’s wrongful conduct. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 10.) This Court has found no 

authority suggesting that Plaintiff would be precluded from recovering more than 

$75,000 on his claim under Michigan law. 

2 Plaintiff’s Complaint includes three “counts.” The first count alleges false 

imprisonment. The second count seeks class action status, injunctive relief and 

declaratory relief. The parties stipulated to the dismissal of this count on August 

13, 2015. (ECF No. 6.) In his last count, labeled “RICO Complaint,” Plaintiff 

acknowledges the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Jackson v. Sedgwick Claims 

Management Services, 731 F.3d 556 (2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2133 (2014), 

that racketeering activity leading to a loss or reduction of workers’ compensation 

benefits does not constitute the type of injury that will support a RICO claim. (See 

ECF No. 1 ¶ 15.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff indicates that “[i]f the Sixth Circuit or 

Supreme Court decide that Jackson was wrongfully decided,” he should be deemed 

to be asserting a RICO claim against Defendant. (Id.) The better practice would 

be for Plaintiff to seek leave to amend his complaint to add a RICO claim if such a 

claim becomes viable in the future. 

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I. Applicable Standard

 A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of 

the complaint. RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 

(6th Cir. 1996). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must 

contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need not contain 

“detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain more than “labels and 

conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . ..” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint does not 

“suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

As the Supreme Court provided in Iqbal and Twombly, “[t]o survive a 

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The 

plausibility standard “does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading 

stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that 

discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [conduct].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 

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In deciding whether the plaintiff has set forth a “plausible” claim, the court 

must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). This presumption, however, is not applicable to legal 

conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668. Therefore, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

II. Factual Background

 According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, he suffered traumatic brain injury in a 

work-related accident and his employer was insured for Michigan workers’ 

compensation benefits by Defendant. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 2, 3.) Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant sent letters to Plaintiff on October 8, 2013 and November 13, 2013, 

requesting that he submit to an examination by psychologist Dr. Rhonda LevyLarson on November 13 and 26, 2013. (Id. ¶ 6.) The letters advised Plaintiff: 

“Your failure to appear for this examination could substantially affect your right to 

workers’ compensation benefits.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant routinely 

uses such language when requesting that claimants undergo examinations. (Id. 

¶ 5.) 

 Michigan’s Workers’ Disability Compensation Act provides that if a 

claimant refuses to submit to or obstructs an employer’s or carrier’s requested 

examination of the claimant by a physician or surgeon, the claimant’s right to 

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compensation will be suspended and, during the period of suspension, may be 

forfeited. Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.385. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Levy-Larson 

is not a physician or surgeon authorized to practice medicine under the laws of 

Michigan. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 9.) 

 Plaintiff submitted to the examinations with Dr. Levy-Larson on November 

13, and 26, 2013. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he first examination was so 

stressful to [him] that he left during the examination.” (Id. ¶ 10.) He claims that 

both examinations inflicted “mental anguish, outrage at loss of liberty, emotional 

distress, loss of workers’ compensation benefits and other damages.” (Id.) 

III. Applicable Law and Analysis

 False imprisonment under Michigan law requires: “ ‘[1] an act committed 

with the intention of confining another, [2] the act directly or indirectly results in 

such confinement, and [3] the person confined is conscious of his confinement.’ ” 

Moore v. City of Detroit, 652 N.W.2d 688, 691 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting 

Adams v. Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 508 N.W.2d 464, 468 (Mich. 1982)). Defendant 

argues that Plaintiff fails to state a viable false imprisonment claim because he was 

free to leave the IMEs with Dr. Levy-Larson and therefore, by definition, was not 

“imprisoned” under Michigan law. (ECF No. 5 at Pg ID 22, citing Moore, 652 

N.W.2d at 690-91.) In response, Plaintiff contends “that false imprisonment exists 

where a person is physically free to move but financial coercion makes him stay 

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put, or, as in the case of [Plaintiff], go and submit to a lengthy psychological 

examination.” (ECF No. 7 at Pg ID 53.) In other words, Plaintiff claims that his 

fear of losing his workers’ compensation benefits caused him to attend the IMEs 

and this coercion amounted to an impermissible imprisonment. 

 In support of his argument, Plaintiff relies on two cases: Lavey v. Mills, 639 

N.W.2d 261 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) and Clarke v. K Mart Corporation, 495 

N.W.2d 820 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam). Lavey has no relevance here. 

Lavey involved a severely disabled child whose conservator claimed the child was 

falsely imprisoned when the defendants, suspecting the child of being the victim of 

sexual abuse, brought her for a gynecological examination without first obtaining 

parental consent or a court order. 639 N.W.2d at 263-64. The Michigan Court of 

Appeals, however, never decided whether the facts supported a claim of false 

imprisonment. Id. at 268 (declining to address the defendants’ argument that they 

were entitled to summary disposition on the plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim 

because the trial court neither considered nor decided the issue, having granting 

summary disposition instead based on statutory immunity). Instead, the court was 

presented only with the issue of whether the defendants were entitled to statutory 

immunity from this claim under Michigan’s Child Protection Law, Mich. Comp. 

Laws § 722.625. Id. at 267. The Michigan Court of Appeals did address whether 

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the defendant’s conduct could support a false imprisonment claim in Clarke, 

however. 

 In Clarke, the plaintiff was shopping at the defendant’s store and after 

checking out was stopped by two store supervisors. 495 N.W.2d at 821. One of 

the supervisors had seen part of the cashier’s transaction of the sale, which led the 

supervisor to believe that the cashier or the plaintiff had engaged in wrongdoing. 

Id. at 821-22. When they stopped the plaintiff, one of the supervisors snatched the 

bag holding the plaintiff’s purchases, worth $250.00. Id. The plaintiff was told 

this was a routine package check and she was detained for about ten or fifteen 

minutes while the items in the bag were matched with her receipt. Id. at 821. The 

plaintiff subsequently brought a lawsuit against the store alleging, inter alia, false 

imprisonment. 

 The Michigan trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary 

disposition with respect to the plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim, reasoning that 

there was no restriction on the plaintiff’s freedom of movement. Id. at 822. The 

plaintiff was neither “arrested nor detained in an office, she was free to roam 

through the store, and in fact was free to leave if she wished to do so.” Id. 

Although finding these observations “technically accurate,” the Michigan Court of 

Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, concluding that the lower court’s 

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“holding rest[ed] on an unduly narrow view of [the false imprisonment] tort.” Id. 

at 822-23. 

 The appellate court explained that while “ ‘[f]alse imprisonment is the 

unlawful restraint of an individual’s personal liberty or freedom of locomotion[,]’ ” 

id. at 823 (quoting Stowers v. Wolodzko, 191 N.W.2d 355, 363 (Mich. 1971)), 

“ ‘manual seizure is not necessary.’ ” Id. (quoting Tumbarella v. Kroger Co., 271 

N.W.2d 284, 288 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)) (additional quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Instead, there need only be “some form of personal coercion.” Id. The 

court turned to one example of “personal coercion” set forth in the Restatement of 

Torts: 

“A, the owner of a store, for the purpose of preventing B, a customer, 

from leaving the store, but without any privilege to do so, seizes and 

retains B’s purse, which contains a large sum of money. B reasonably 

believes that she can leave the store only at the risk of losing the purse 

and the money, and therefore remains in the store. A has confined B.” 

Id. at 823 (brackets omitted) (quoting 1 Restatement Torts 2d, § 40A at 61). 

The Clarke court apparently concluded that the withholding of the plaintiff’s 

$250 worth of merchandise constituted coercion, forcing the plaintiff to remain in 

the store. The court pointed out, however, “there is no false arrest if the plaintiff 

voluntarily agrees to stay with the defendant.” Id. (citing Bonkowski v. Arlan’s 

Dep’t Store, 174 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 1970) (the plaintiff returned to the store and 

agreed to an inspection of her purse upon a security guard’s request); Bruce v. 

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Meijers Supermarkets, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 132 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (the plaintiff 

voluntarily submitted to a search but, additionally, there was probable cause for her 

detention)). As the Michigan Supreme Court has explained: 

“There can be no such thing as an action for false imprisonment where 

the plaintiff has not been arrested; and while, as has been held, manual 

seizure is not necessary, there must be that, or its equivalent, in some 

sort of personal coercion.” 

Bonkowski, 174 N.W.2d at 771 (emphasis added) (quoting Hill v. Taylor, 15 N.W. 

899, 900 (Mich. 1883)). In other words, the defendant’s actions must have 

somehow constrained the plaintiff’s “liberty or freedom of movement.” 

Tumbarella, 271 N.W.2d at 287 (citing Stowers, 191 N.W.2d at 363) (additional 

citation omitted). 

 Plaintiff claims that, like the plaintiff in Clarke and the customer in the 

Restatement of Torts’ example, he was financially coerced to attend the IMEs with 

Dr. Levy-Larson. Plaintiff relies on the indication in Defendant’s letters to him 

that that “[his] failure to appear for this examination could substantially affect [his] 

right to workers’ compensation benefits.” There are several problems with 

Plaintiff’s argument, however. 

First, unlike the defendant in Clarke and the store owner in the Restatement 

example, Defendant did not seize anything of value which belonged to Plaintiff to 

force him to subject to the IMEs. Notably, Defendant did not advise Plaintiff that 

he would lose his right to benefits if he failed to appear for the IMEs; Defendant 

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indicated that he could lose his right to benefits. Second, “financial coercion” is 

not sufficient on its own to state a viable false imprisonment claim. False 

imprisonment requires a “restraint of [the] individual’s personal liberty or freedom 

of locomotion.” Clarke, supra. In Clarke and the Restatement of Torts example, 

an individual was confined to stay in one place, although not through physical 

force, by the coercive conduct of the store’s agents or owner. Plaintiff, in 

comparison, was asked to appear at an examination with Dr. Levy-Larson. His 

actions are more akin to those of the plaintiff in Bonkowski, where the Michigan 

court found no false imprisonment because the plaintiff voluntarily agreed to stay 

with the defendant at its agent’s request. Notably, although appearing for the first 

IME, Plaintiff left during the examination. This undermines any claim that he was 

“confined,” as required for a false imprisonment claim. 

Additionally, Plaintiff fails to cite to any Michigan case suggesting that 

Defendant’s conduct constituted false imprisonment or even “financial coercion.” 

The Court’s independent research uncovered no such case and none of the cases 

citing Clarke involve a scenario analogous to that case or the one now before the 

Court. In fact, none of the cases citing Clarke discuss the concept of “financial 

coercion” generally, or in support of a false imprisonment claim, specifically. 

Finally, it unlikely that the Michigan courts would find conduct like 

Defendant’s sufficient to support a false imprisonment claim. A finding that the 

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“coercion” asserted here constituted false imprisonment would mean that an 

insurance carrier violates the law anytime it requests verification of claim by 

requiring the claimant to undergo examination by someone other than a physician 

or surgeon licensed to practice medicine under the laws of the state-- whether it be 

a physical or mental examination or an examination under oath or deposition. 

The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations of false 

imprisonment fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED, that Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 

 s/ Linda V. Parker 

 LINDA V. PARKER 

 U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: November 3, 2015 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of 

record and/or pro se parties on this date, November 3, 2015, by electronic and/or 

U.S. First Class mail. 

 s/ Richard Loury 

 Case Manager 

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