UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

Octavius Scott was part of a crew of robbers who broke into the homes of 

families of Indian and Asian descent, rounded up the occupants at gunpoint, 

including children and the elderly, bound them with duct tape, and then searched the 

homes for jewelry and cash, taking what they found. 

To his credit, Scott cooperated almost immediately and testified at the two 

trials of his co-defendants, helping to secure their convictions. When he was 

ultimately sentenced, Scott received significant cooperation credit as well as the 

benefit of the change in law on the “stacking” of convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 

Scott also received an additional downward variance, due in part to his mental health 

struggles. And then last year, the Court granted in part Scott’s request for a 

compassionate release sentence reduction due to the overly harsh nature of his pretrial and early post-sentencing detention. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

D3-OCTAVIUS SCOTT, 

 Defendant. 

Case No. 15-20200 

Honorable Laurie J. Michelson 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REDUCTION IN 

SENTENCE [582] 

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Scott is now back before the Court, pro se, again requesting compassionate 

release. (ECF No. 582.) He does not feel he is receiving adequate mental health 

treatment. Thus, Scott wants an additional one-year reduction in his prison time. The 

government opposes the request. (ECF No. 586.) The issues have been fully briefed 

and most have already been addressed during Scott’s sentencing and in connection 

with his prior motion for compassionate release. Thus, no further argument is 

necessary. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f). For the reasons that follow, the motion is 

DENIED. 

I. 

“For nine months in 2014, [Juan] Olaya led a three-to-four person ‘robbery 

crew.’ Criss-crossing the nation, the crew held up more than a dozen families at 

gunpoint, usually targeting Asian and South-Asian families.” United States v. Olaya, 

No. 21-1498, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 484, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 9, 2023). Chaka Castro 

planned and organized these armed invasions. United States v. Castro, 823 F. App’x 

375, 376 (6th Cir. 2020). Octavius Scott was one of the physical enforcers who entered 

the homes carrying a firearm. Along with Castro, Olaya, and other members of the 

crew, Scott was indicted for racketeering conspiracy, assault with a dangerous 

weapon in aid of racketeering, and use of a firearm during a crime of violence. (ECF 

No. 96.) 

Following his guilty plea to the conspiracy count and two § 924(c) counts (ECF 

No. 304), Scott was one of the government’s key witnesses in the separate trials of 

Castro and Olaya. It took many years for the cases to get to trial. As a result, Scott 

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spent nearly five and a half years in pre-trial detention. This exacerbated his mental 

health issues. Scott had a difficult upbringing marred by abuse, neglect, drug use, 

and an overall unstable living environment. (Presentence Report, ¶¶ 155–159, 168.) 

He later enlisted in the Army and served a stressful and dangerous tour of duty in 

Afghanistan, where he was responsible for clearing roads of improvised explosive 

devices. (ECF No. 582, PageID.10273.) Following his discharge from the Army, his 

marriage ended. Scott then got involved in the underlying criminal activity resulting 

in his cooperation, conviction, and prolonged detention. (Id. at PageID.10274.) 

Prior to Scott’s sentencing, and after being notified of his mental health 

struggles, the Court ordered a mental health evaluation and then a competency 

evaluation by the Bureau of Prisons. (ECF No. 273.) Scott has consistently been 

diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, persistent depressive disorder, and 

adjustment disorder with depressed mood and anxiety. (Presentence Report, ¶ 166; 

ECF No. 582, PageID.10276; ECF No. 587-1, PageID.10451 (sealed).) 

His mental health issues were addressed in the Presentence Report and at 

sentencing. (Presentence Report, ¶¶ 162–167; ECF Nos. 461, 551.) Indeed, the Court 

focused on the challenge in balancing Scott’s future potential—his continuous efforts 

to overcome significant adversity, his service to the country, his intelligence, and his 

remorse—with the significant and sometimes violent role he played in a serious and 

dangerous criminal enterprise. (ECF No. 551.) After thoroughly considering the 

sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the government’s motion for a 

downward departure to 192 months based on Scott’s substantial assistance, the Court 

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sentenced Scott to 174 months’ imprisonment on June 30, 2020. (ECF Nos. 470, 480.) 

The Court also recommended that Scott “be housed at FCI Bastrop,” a BOP 

correctional facility in Scott’s home state of Texas, “or a low security correctional 

institution.” (Id.) This was due to concern for Scott’s mental health and physical 

safety because of his role as a cooperator. 

Scott, however, was housed at FCI McKean, a medium-security prison in 

Pennsylvania. Scott did not feel safe at this facility, nor did he feel he was receiving 

adequate mental health treatment. Scott had been designated Care Level 1, which 

typically refers to relatively healthy inmates who “may have limited medical needs 

that can be easily managed by clinician evaluations every 6–12 months.” Fed. Bureau 

Prisons, Care Level Classification for Medical and Mental Health Conditions or 

Disabilities (May 2019), https://www.bop.gov. 

So in August 2021, Scott filed a motion for compassionate release. (ECF No. 

536.) He sought to have his sentence reduced by two years given the harshness of his 

confinement—primarily the exacerbation of his mental health issues with little 

rehabilitative or treatment opportunities during the pandemic lockdowns, his 

distance from family and community support for nearly seven years, and his constant 

fear for his safety. (Id.) These were not things the Court took into consideration at 

the sentencing. At that time, the Court did not know the true scope of the pandemic, 

expected Scott to be in a safe environment close to his home, and expected him to 

receive substantial mental health treatment following the pre-sentence psychological 

evaluations. After substantial briefing (ECF Nos. 536, 540, 541, 544, 554, 561) and 

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several hearings (ECF Nos. 568, 572), the Court granted the motion in part and 

reduced Scott’s sentence by 14 months (ECF Nos. 569, 572). 

About a year later, in May 2023, Scott was transferred to FCI Englewood in 

Colorado where he was enrolled in the Veterans Education Transitional Services 

program. (ECF No. 586, PageID.10382.) During his intake screening, he was again 

diagnosed with major depressive disorder and PTSD. (ECF No. 587-1, PageID.10458–

10459 (sealed).) But now, the BOP designated Scott as a Care Level 2, assuring, at a 

minimum, monthly mental health treatment sessions. (Id.) 

But Scott feels he is still receiving inadequate mental health treatment. (ECF 

No. 582.) At the same time, he says he has made great strides toward rehabilitation 

and that, given his lack of criminal history and time already served, he does not pose 

a future risk of danger to the community. (Id.) Thus, Scott seeks another one-year 

reduction off his sentence with a corresponding increase to his period of supervised 

release. (Id.) The government opposes the motion. (ECF No. 586.) The government 

contends that Scott is receiving regular mental health care, medication, and 

educational programming. (Id. at PageID.10381.) In support, the government has 

provided Scott’s recent medical and psychological treatment records from the BOP. 

(ECF No. 587 (sealed).) 

The Court agrees that an additional compassionate release reduction is not 

warranted. The Court has not been shy in expressing its desire for Scott to receive 

robust mental health care so he can successfully reacclimate to society and fulfill his 

noticeable potential. And while it would be generous to label Scott’s prison care as 

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robust, his situation is improving. True, Scott endured a lengthy period of pre-trial 

detention, which the Court took into account at sentencing. And he struggled at FCI 

McKean, which the Court took into account during his prior motion for compassionate 

release. But the record presently before the Court reveals that Scott is receiving more 

regular treatment and programming at Englewood and has been advised that even 

more is available upon request. (ECF No. 587-1 (sealed).) Scott has not demonstrated 

extraordinary or compelling circumstances warranting relief. Nor does an analysis of 

the § 3553(a) factors support a further sentence reduction. 

II. 

A district court generally “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has 

been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). One exception to this rule is compassionate 

release. The compassionate release statute allows the Court to reduce a defendant’s 

sentence if it finds, after a defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies or 

30 days after the warden receives a request for compassionate release, that 

“extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a reduction; that a reduction is 

“consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”; 

and that the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent they apply, 

support a reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Sentencing Commission has 

recently amended its policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to cover compassionaterelease motions filed directly by defendants (as well as those brought by the Director 

of the Bureau of Prisons). It remains the case, though, that without an “extraordinary 

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and compelling” reason, the district court may not grant compassionate release. See 

United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 572 (6th Cir. 2021). 

A. 

The First Step Act’s exhaustion requirement is mandatory. United States v. 

Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 832 (6th Cir. 2020). It has been satisfied here. Scott sought 

compassionate release from the McKean Warden on March 28, 2023 (ECF No. 586-5, 

PageID.10405), and was denied on March 31, 2023 (id. atPageID.10406). Scott also 

asked the Englewood Warden to file a motion for compassionate release on his behalf, 

which did not happen. (ECF No. 582, PageID.10368.) 

B. 

The next hurdle is whether Scott has an extraordinary and compelling reason 

to reduce his sentence by another year. 

District courts have defined an “extraordinary and compelling reason” as “one 

that is ‘beyond what is usual, customary, regular, or common,’ and is ‘so great that 

irreparable harm or injustice would result if [the relief] is not granted.’” United States 

v. Powell, No. 21-1262, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 28980, at *3–4 (6th Cir. 2021) (order) 

(citing cases). This is consistent with the Act’s legislative history, in which “[t]he 

Senate Judiciary Committee explained that § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) ‘applies, regardless of 

the length of sentence, to the unusual case in which the defendant’s circumstances 

are so changed, such as by terminal illness, that it would be inequitable to continue 

the confinement of the prisoner.’” Hunter, 12 F.4th at 570 (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-

225, at 121). 

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1. 

The Sentencing Commission’s amended policy statement, now in effect, 

expands the defendant’s medical circumstances that constitute “extraordinary and 

compelling reasons.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1). Scott primarily relies on two of them. 

First is the situation where a defendant is “suffering from a serious functional or 

cognitive impairment . . . that substantially diminishes [his] ability . . . to provide 

self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he . . . is 

not expected to recover.” § 1B1.13(b)(1)(B)(ii). According to Scott, he has an impaired 

mental state from his rough upbringing and military service that has been 

exacerbated by a lengthy and difficult period of pre-trial detention during the 

pandemic, and thus, a lack of adequate mental health care diminishes his ability to 

provide self-care. (ECF No. 582.) 

The Court disagrees. While Scott’s treatment records reveal his ongoing 

struggles with depression, anxiety, and anger management, nothing suggests they 

prevent Scott from providing self-care. (ECF Nos. 587-1, 587-2 (sealed).) From 

everything the Court has reviewed and observed, it appears Scott feeds and grooms 

himself, works, exercises, writes poetry, and participates successfully in 

programming. (See, e.g., ECF No. 587-1, PageID.10446 (Scott reported to his 

counselor in June 2023 that he is working, taking education courses, and 

participating in treatment programming through Psychology Services) (sealed); ECF 

No. 589, PageID.10584.) 

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The second potentially applicable extraordinary and compelling reason arises 

when a “defendant is suffering from a medical condition that requires long-term or 

specialized medical care that is not being provided and without which the defendant 

is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.” § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C). The core of 

Scott’s request for compassionate release is his deteriorating mental health, the 

BOP’s alleged inability to treat combat-related PTSD, and the BOP’s alleged failure 

to adequately treat Scott’s PTSD. (See ECF No. 589.) But this does not warrant a 

further reduction in Scott’s sentence. 

For starters, courts have held that “[PTSD] is neither extraordinary nor 

compelling” in the context of compassionate release. United States v. Morris, 643 F. 

Supp. 3d 750, 756 (E.D. Mich. 2022); see also United States v. Ruiz, No. 17-CR-227, 

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69820, at *6–7 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 12, 2021). And the fact that the 

U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs may provide more skilled treatment to veterans 

(see ECF No. 589, PageID.10531) does not mean the BOP is incapable of providing 

any. 

Nor is the BOP’s treatment of Scott so deficient as to rise to the level of 

extraordinary and compelling. Scott’s motion and reply brief cite compassionate 

release cases from across the country. But the inquiry into what constitutes 

extraordinary and compelling circumstances is very fact specific, and the defendants’ 

circumstances in those cases do not mirror this one. True, by designating Scott as 

Care Level 1, FCI McKean likely deprived him of additional, helpful treatment. But, 

contrary to what Scott argues, the Court’s prior ruling on his motion for 

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compassionate release already considered his struggles at McKean, including with 

his mental health, and was not limited to his detainment being far from home. (See 

ECF No. 572, PageID.10234–10235 (holding that there were “extraordinary and 

compelling reasons to reduce Scott’s sentence for [the] 14-month period [between 

November 10, 2020, and January 22, 2021,]” during which he was incarcerated at 

McKean, including “how far Scott has been from home and for how long[,]” “his 

programming needs, his mental health needs, his security needs, and the court’s 

sentencing recommendation, coupled with the obvious importance of providing Scott 

adequate rehabilitation to successfully reintegrate into society, [and] the lack of 

consistent BOP explanations”).)1 And the lack of treatment and programming during 

the pandemic affected all inmates, making it anything but extraordinary as to Scott. 

See, e.g., United States v. MacLloyd, No. 08-20289, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4588, at 

*3–4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2023) (“MacLloyd also alleges that as a result of the 

pandemic and staffing shortages, his facility is frequently in lockdown and conditions 

are harsher than contemplated when he was sentenced. However, such circumstances 

1 Scott is correct to point out that under the amended policy statement “an 

extraordinary and compelling reason need not have been unforeseen at the time of 

sentencing in order to warrant a reduction in the term of imprisonment.” § 1B1.13(e). 

This is a change from the current law in this Circuit. See Hunter, 12 F.4th at 570 

(“[F]acts that existed at sentencing cannot later be construed as ‘extraordinary and 

compelling reasons’ to reduce a final sentence.”) But the existence of the facts is not 

the issue here. The point is that in sentencing Scott to a below-guidelines sentence 

and in later reducing his sentence, the Court already relied on many of the facts Scott 

wants to use again for an additional reduction—e.g., his difficult upbringing, military 

service, post-deployment mental health difficulties which contributed to the 

commission of the underlying offense, lengthy pre-trial detention, court-ordered 

mental health evaluation revealing his PTSD, and the harsh conditions at FCI 

McKean due to the pandemic. They do not warrant yet another sentencing reduction. 

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affect all prisoners and therefore cannot be considered ‘extraordinary.’”); United 

States v. Brant, No. 18-20155, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 

22, 2022) (“[T]he Court agrees with the Government that loss of access to 

rehabilitative programming—whether because of the state detainer or the 

pandemic—does not constitute an ‘extraordinary and compelling reason’ for sentence 

reduction.”); United States v. McNeair, Nos. 22-25/15-322, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

129337, at *13 (W.D. Wash. July 25, 2023) (reiterating that “general conditions that 

affect inmates indiscriminately throughout the prison are insufficient to support an 

individual defendant’s claim for compassionate release”). 

More significant, while Scott had to endure additional time at McKean 

following the Court’s ruling, he was eventually transferred to FCI Englewood, a lowsecurity facility in Colorado. (ECF No. 587-1, PageID.10466 (sealed).) Prior to his 

transfer, he had successfully completed the non-residential drug and alcohol 

program. (Id. at PageID.10467–10470.) After his transfer, he was enrolled in the 

Veterans Education Transitional Services program, which is designed to address the 

“unique needs and challenges faced by incarcerated Veterans.” (ECF No. 586, 

PageID.10390; ECF No. 589, PageID.10571.) The government explains that the 

program is “based on a community model in which the environment intertwines 

uniformed service core values with veteran centric programs, services, and benefits 

education.” (ECF No. 586, PageID.10382–10383; ECF No. 589, PageID.10571.) 

On May 15, 2023, less than two weeks after his arrival at Englewood, Scott’s 

care level was “increased to CARE2,” which means he “is being seen monthly to 

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address symptoms related to his diagnoses of major depressive disorder and 

posttraumatic stress disorder.” (ECF No. 587-1, PageID.10451 (sealed).) Scott also 

had a clinical session on May 22, 2023, at his request, to discuss his difficulty 

adjusting to Englewood. (Id. at PageID.10455.) Given his mental health issues, he 

was subsequently enrolled in the Traumatic Stress and Resilience Workshop to begin 

group treatment. (Id. at PageID.10453, 10455.) After completing the workshop, 

Scott’s scores on the self-assessment measures indicated he may be experiencing 

trauma-related mental health symptoms. “As a result, he will be seen to discuss 

additional treatment options.” (Id. at PageID.10440.) 

Scott’s medical records reveal that he has participated in his monthly clinical 

contacts on June 9, 2023, July 7, 2023, August 3, 2023, and September 5, 2023. (Id. 

at PageID.10439, 10441, 10445, 10446.) He is reminded at every session that he can 

request additional mental health services between sessions. (Id.) Scott received a 

medication referral during his July 7 session and had another treatment session on 

July 11, 2023, to obtain medications for anxiety and depression. (ECF No. 587-2, 

PageID.10474–10475 (sealed).) While Scott did not receive any medications promptly, 

he was eventually given an anxiety medication on August 3. (ECF No. 587-1, 

PageID.10441 (sealed).) Scott has also successfully completed some health-related 

courses. (ECF No. 586, PageID.10385.) 

In short, Scott is now receiving monthly mental health visits and can request 

additional sessions as needed. Nothing suggests he has made any requests that have 

been denied. The Court appreciates Scott’s desire to obtain “better help in order to 

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recover and re-enter society more effectively and to be a better person.” (ECF 582, 

PageID.10281.) At present however, he has access to adequate treatment, workshops, 

and programs in Englewood. His preference for treatment at the VA is not an 

extraordinary and compelling reason for his early release. 

2. 

That leaves Scott’s rehabilitative efforts and his self-diagnosis that he is no 

longer a threat to society. The Sentencing Commission has recently confirmed that 

“[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), rehabilitation of the defendant is not, by itself, an 

extraordinary and compelling reason for purposes of [its] policy statement.” 

§ 1B1.13(d). But “rehabilitation of the defendant while serving the sentence may be 

considered in combination with other circumstances in determining whether and to 

what extent a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is warranted.” Id. 

Scott says that he has made strides in his self-reform despite the lack of 

programming and mental rehabilitation. (ECF No. 582, PageID.10290.) There is 

undoubtedly some truth to this, as Scott’s history is one of working to overcome the 

adversities in his life. But he is sparse on the details. In light of the restrictions during 

the pandemic and the amount of time Scott has been incarcerated, his level of 

rehabilitative activities does not jump out as extraordinary or compelling. Especially 

when compared with some of the cases he cites. See, e.g., United States v. Decator, 

452 F. Supp. 3d 320, 325–26 (D. Md. 2020) (defendant “participated in over 1,500 

hours of programming,” “completed more than 70 courses,” and obtained letters from 

a counselor prepared to provide training, two business owners prepared to offer 

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employment, and two clergy members prepared to welcome defendant into their 

congregations upon release); United States v. Redd, 444 F. Supp. 3d 717, 729 (E.D. 

Va. 2020) (record established defendant had no “major disciplinary infractions” over 

23 years of incarceration and no infractions at all in the past 5 years; that he 

“devot[ed] hundreds of hours to vocational programs”; that he “assist[ed] others in 

their rehabilitative efforts”; that he “car[ed] for mental health inmates”; and that he 

consistently “exceed[ed] his supervisor’s expectations at work”). 

Moreover, Scott’s personal characteristics, family support, and low probability 

of recidivism were all taken into account in the imposition of his below-guidelines 

sentence. Even when combined with Scott’s rehabilitative efforts, they do not create 

an extraordinary and compelling reason to further reduce his sentence. And finally, 

Scott’s persistent concerns about his ability to control his anger issues, as reflected 

in his treatment records (ECF No. 587-1 (sealed)), suggest that it may be a little 

premature to declare him risk-free. 

C. 

Even if extraordinary and compelling reasons existed, the relevant § 3553(a) 

factors do not support Scott’s request for a further sentence reduction. See United 

States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1008 (6th Cir. 2020) (“We have repeatedly recognized 

that district courts may deny relief under the § 3553(a) factors even if extraordinary 

and compelling reasons would otherwise justify relief.”). 

Scott engaged in serious and dangerous criminal activity that spanned several 

states and went on for many months. Families were terrified and traumatized. They 

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lost the security of their homes. Many lost their most valuable possessions. The 

government is right that even accounting for Scott’s history and characteristics, “any 

further reduction to Scott’s sentence would constitute a failure ‘to reflect the 

seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just 

punishment for the offense.’” (ECF No. 586, PageID.10396) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(2)(A)). 

III. 

For all these reasons, Scott’s motion for compassionate release is DENIED. The 

Court will, however, recommend that the BOP place Scott into a halfway house as 

early as possible. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 30, 2023 

 

 s/Laurie J. Michelson 

 LAURIE J. MICHELSON 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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