19–006 

112TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session 112–323 

UNITED NATIONS TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, 

AND REFORM ACT OF 2011 

DECEMBER 8, 2011.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State 

of the Union and ordered to be printed 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

DISSENTING VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 2829] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred the bill 

(H.R. 2829) to promote transparency, accountability, and reform 

within the United Nations system, and for other purposes, having 

considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment 

and recommends that the bill as amended do pass. 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

The Amendment ...................................................................................................... 2 

Summary .................................................................................................................. 40 

Background and Purpose ........................................................................................ 42 

Hearings ................................................................................................................... 50 

Committee Consideration and Votes ...................................................................... 51 

Committee Oversight Findings ............................................................................... 51 

New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures ...................................................... 52 

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate .......................................................... 52 

General Performance Goals and Objectives .......................................................... 53 

New Advisory Committees ...................................................................................... 53 

Congressional Accountability Act ........................................................................... 53 

Earmark Identification ............................................................................................ 54 

Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion .......................................................... 54 

Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ..................................... 61 

Dissenting Views ..................................................................................................... 65 


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THE AMENDMENT

The amendment is as follows: 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘United Nations Transparency, 

Accountability, and Reform Act of 2011’’. 

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Definitions. 

TITLE I—FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS 

Sec. 101. Findings. 

Sec. 102. Apportionment of the United Nations regular budget on a voluntary basis. 

Sec. 103. Budget justification for United States contributions to the regular budget of the United Nations. 

Sec. 104. Report on United Nations reform. 

TITLE II—TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE 

UNITED NATIONS 

Sec. 201. Findings. 

Sec. 202. Definitions. 

Sec. 203. Oversight of United States contributions to the United Nations System. 

Sec. 204. Transparency for United States contributions. 

Sec. 205. Integrity for United States contributions. 

Sec. 206. Refund of monies owed by the United Nations to the United States. 

Sec. 207. Annual reports on United States contributions to the United Nations. 

TITLE III—UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS 

Sec. 301. Annual publication. 

Sec. 302. Annual financial disclosure. 

Sec. 303. Policy with respect to expansion of the security council. 

Sec. 304. Access to reports and audits. 

Sec. 305. Waiver of immunity. 

Sec. 306. Terrorism and the United Nations. 

Sec. 307. Report on United Nations personnel. 

Sec. 308. United Nations treaty bodies. 

Sec. 309. Equality at the United Nations. 

Sec. 310. Anti-Semitism and the United Nations. 

Sec. 311. Regional group inclusion of Israel. 

Sec. 312. United States policy on Taiwan’s participation in United Nations entities. 

Sec. 313. United States policy on Tier 3 human rights violators. 

TITLE IV—STATUS OF PALESTINIAN ENTITIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS 

Sec. 401. Findings. 

Sec. 402. Statement of policy. 

Sec. 403. Implementation. 

TITLE V—UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 

Sec. 501. Findings. 

Sec. 502. Human rights council membership and funding. 

TITLE VI—GOLDSTONE REPORT 

Sec. 601. Findings. 

Sec. 602. Statement of policy. 

Sec. 603. Withholding of funds; refund of United States taxpayer dollars. 

TITLE VII—DURBAN PROCESS 

Sec. 701. Findings. 

Sec. 702. Sense of congress; statement of policy. 

Sec. 703. Non-participation in the Durban process. 

Sec. 704. Withholding of funds; refund of United States taxpayer dollars. 

TITLE VIII—UNRWA 

Sec. 801. Findings. 

Sec. 802. United States contributions to UNRWA. 

Sec. 803. Sense of Congress. 

TITLE IX—INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 

Sec. 901. Technical cooperation program. 

Sec. 902. United States policy at the IAEA. 

Sec. 903. Sense of Congress regarding the nuclear security action plan of the IAEA. 

TITLE X—PEACEKEEPING 

Sec. 1001. Reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations. 

Sec. 1002. Policy relating to reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations. 

Sec. 1003. Certification. 

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

In this Act: 


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(1) EMPLOYEE.—The term ‘‘employee’’ means an individual who is employed 

in the general services, professional staff, or senior management of the United 

Nations, including consultants, contractors, and subcontractors. 

(2) GENERAL ASSEMBLY.—The term ‘‘General Assembly’’ means the General 

Assembly of the United Nations. 

(3) MEMBER STATE.—The term ‘‘Member State’’ means a Member State of the 

United Nations. Such term is synonymous with the term ‘‘country’’. 

(4) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means the Secretary of State. 

(5) SECRETARY GENERAL.—The term ‘‘Secretary General’’ means the Secretary 

General of the United Nations. 

(6) SECURITY COUNCIL.—The term ‘‘Security Council’’ means the Security 

Council of the United Nations. 

(7) UN.—The term ‘‘UN’’ means the United Nations. 

(8) UNITED NATIONS ENTITY.—The term ‘‘United Nations Entity’’ means any 

United Nations agency, commission, conference, council, court, department, 

forum, fund, institute, office, organization, partnership, program, subsidiary 

body, tribunal, trust, university or academic body, related organization or subsidiary body, wherever located, that flies the United Nations flag or is authorized to use the United Nations logo, including those United Nations affiliated 

agencies and bodies identified as recipients of United States contributions under 

section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364), but not including the International 

Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, the International Development Association, the 

International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 

Agency, and the World Trade Organization. 

(9) UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.—The term ‘‘United Nations System’’ means the 

aggregation of all United Nations Entities, as defined in paragraph (8). 

(10) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTION.—The term ‘‘United States Contribution’’ 

means an assessed or voluntary contribution, whether financial, in-kind, or otherwise, from the United States Federal Government to a United Nations Entity, 

including contributions passed through other entities for ultimate use by a 

United Nations Entity. United States Contributions include those contributions 

identified pursuant to section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364). 

(11) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— 

(A) the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Appropriations, and Oversight 

and Government Reform of the House of Representatives; and 

(B) the Committees on Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate. 

TITLE I—FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS 

SEC. 101. FINDINGS. 

Congress makes the following findings: 

(1) The United States pays billions of dollars into the United Nations system every year (almost $7.7 billion in 2010, according to the White House Office of 

Management and Budget), significantly more than any other nation. 

(2) Under current rules and contribution levels, it is possible to assemble the 

two-thirds majority needed for important United Nations budget votes with a 

group of countries that, taken together, pay less than 1 percent of the total 

United Nations regular budget. 

(3) The disconnect between contribution levels and management control creates significant perverse incentives in terms of United Nations spending, transparency, and accountability. 

(4) The United Nations system suffers from unacceptably high levels of waste, 

fraud, and abuse, which seriously impair its ability to fulfill the lofty ideals of 

its founding. 

(5) Amidst the continuing financial, corruption, and sexual abuse scandals of 

the past several years, American public disapproval of United Nations has 

reached all-time highs. A 2011 Gallup poll revealed that 62 percent of Americans believe that the United Nations is doing a poor job, a negative assessment 

shared by a majority of respondents from both political parties. Research polling 

by another firm in late 2006 found that 71 percent of Americans think that the 

United Nations is ‘‘no longer effective’’ and needs to be significantly reformed, 

while 75 percent think that the United Nations ‘‘needs to be held more accountable’’. 


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(6) Significant improvements in United Nations transparency and accountability are necessary for improving public perceptions of and American support 

for United Nations operations. 

(7) Because of their need to justify future contributions from donors, voluntarily funded organizations have more incentive to be responsive and efficient 

in their operations than organizations funded by compulsory contributions that 

are not tied to performance. 

(8) Catherine Bertini, the former UN Under-Secretary General for Management and director of the World Food Program (WFP), has stated that ‘‘Voluntary funding creates an entirely different atmosphere at WFP than at the 

UN. At WFP, every staff member knows that we have to be as efficient, accountable, transparent, and results-oriented as possible. If we are not, donor 

governments can take their funding elsewhere in a very competitive world 

among UN agencies, NGOs, and bilateral governments.’’. 

(9) Article XVII of the Charter of the United Nations, which states that ‘‘[t]he 

expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by 

the General Assembly’’, leaves to the discretion of the General Assembly the 

basis of apportionment, which could be done on the basis of voluntary pledges 

by Member States. 

(10) Unlike United States assessed contributions to the United Nations regular budget, which are statutorily capped at 22 percent of the total, there is no 

cap on voluntary contributions. 

(11) The United States, which contributes generously to international organizations whose activities it recognizes as credible, worthwhile, and efficient, contributes more than 22 percent of the budget of certain voluntarily funded 

United Nations Specialized Agencies. 

SEC. 102. APPORTIONMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS REGULAR BUDGET ON A VOLUNTARY 

BASIS. 

(a) UNITED STATES POLICY.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United States to seek to shift the funding mechanism for the regular budget of the United Nations from an assessed 

to a voluntary basis. 

(2) ACTION AT UNITED NATIONS.—The President shall direct the United States 

Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to shift the funding mechanism for the regular budget of the United Nations to a voluntary basis, and to 

make it a priority to build support for such a transformational change among 

Member States, particularly key United Nations donors. 

(b) CERTIFICATION OF PREDOMINANTLY VOLUNTARY UN REGULAR BUDGET FINDING.—A certification described in this section is a certification by the Secretary of 

State to the Appropriate Congressional Committees that at least 80 percent of the 

total regular budget (not including extra-budgetary contributions) of the United Nations is apportioned on a voluntary basis. Each such certification shall be shall be 

effective for a period of not more than 1 year, and shall be promptly revoked by the 

Secretary, with notice to the appropriate congressional committees, if the underlying 

circumstances change so as not to warrant such certification. 

(c) WITHHOLDING OF NONVOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Beginning 2 years after the effective date of this Act and 

notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds may be obligated or expended for a United States assessed contribution to the regular budget of the 

United Nations in an amount greater than 50 percent of the United States 

share of assessed contributions for the regular budget of the United Nations unless there is in effect a certification by the Secretary, as described in subsection 

(b). 

(2) ALLOWANCE.—For a period of 1 year after appropriation, funds appropriated for use as a United States contribution to the regular budget of the 

United Nations but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to paragraph (1) may be obligated and expended for that purpose upon the certification 

described in subsection (b). After 1 year, in the absence of such certification, 

those funds shall revert to the United States Treasury. 

SEC. 103. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE REGULAR 

BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS. 

(a) DETAILED ITEMIZATION.—The annual congressional budget justification shall 

include a detailed itemized request in support of the contribution of the United 

States to the regular budget of the United Nations. 

(b) CONTENTS OF DETAILED ITEMIZATION.—The detailed itemization required 

under subsection (a) shall— 


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(1) contain information relating to the amounts requested in support of each 

of the various sections and titles of the regular budget of the United Nations; 

and 

(2) compare the amounts requested for the current year with the actual or 

estimated amounts contributed by the United States in previous fiscal years for 

the same sections and titles. 

(c) ADJUSTMENTS AND NOTIFICATION.—If the United Nations proposes an adjustment to its regular assessed budget, the Secretary of State shall, at the time such 

adjustment is presented to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), notify and consult with the appropriate congressional 

committees. 

SEC. 104. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 

Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on United Nations reform. 

(b) CONTENTS.—The report required under subsection (a) shall describe— 

(1) progress toward the goal of shifting the funding for the United Nations 

Regular Budget to a voluntary basis as identified in section 102, and a detailed 

description of efforts and activities by United States diplomats and officials toward that end; 

(2) progress toward each of the policy goals identified in the prior sections of 

this title, and a detailed, goal-specific description of efforts and activities by 

United States diplomats and officials toward those ends; 

(3) the status of the implementation of management reforms within the 

United Nations and its specialized agencies; 

(4) the number of outputs, reports, or other mandates generated by General 

Assembly resolutions that have been eliminated; 

(5) the progress of the General Assembly to modernize and streamline the 

committee structure and its specific recommendations on oversight and committee outputs, consistent with the March 2005 report of the Secretary General 

entitled ‘‘In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for 

all’’; 

(6) the status of the review by the General Assembly of all mandates older 

than 5 years and how resources have been redirected to new challenges, consistent with such March 2005 report of the Secretary General; 

(7) the continued utility and relevance of the Economic and Financial Committee and the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee, in light of the 

duplicative agendas of those committees and the Economic and Social Council; 

and 

(8) whether the United Nations or any of its specialized agencies has contracted with any party included on the Lists of Parties Excluded from Federal 

Procurement and Nonprocurement Programs. 

TITLE II—TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS 

SEC. 201. FINDINGS. 

Congress makes the following findings: 

(1) As underscored by continuing revelations of waste, fraud, and abuse, oversight and accountability mechanisms within the United Nations system remain 

significantly deficient, despite decades of reform attempts, including those initiated by Secretaries General of the United Nations. 

(2) Notwithstanding the personal intentions of any Secretary General of the 

United Nations to promote institutional transparency and accountability within 

the United Nations System, the Secretary General lacks the power to impose 

far reaching management reforms without the concurrence of the General Assembly. 

(3) Groupings of Member States whose voting power in the General Assembly 

significantly outpaces their proportional contributions to the United Nations 

system have repeatedly and successfully defeated, delayed, and diluted various 

reform proposals that would have enabled more detailed oversight and scrutiny 

of United Nations system operations and expenditures. 

(4) To an unacceptable degree, major donor states, including the United 

States, lack access to reasonably detailed, reliable information that would allow 

them to determine how their contributions have been spent by various United 


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Nations system entities, further contributing to the lack of accountability within 

the United Nations system. 

SEC. 202. DEFINITIONS. 

In this title: 

(1) TRANSPARENCY CERTIFICATION.—The term ‘‘Transparency Certification’’ 

means an annual, written affirmation by the head or authorized designee of a 

United Nations Entity, provided to the Department of State, that the Entity 

will cooperate with the Department of State and Congress, including by providing the Department of State and Congress with full, complete, and unfettered access to Oversight Information as defined in this title. 

(2) OVERSIGHT INFORMATION.—The term ‘‘Oversight Information’’ includes— 

(A) internally and externally commissioned audits, investigatory reports, 

program reviews, performance reports, and evaluations; 

(B) financial statements, records, and billing systems; 

(C) program budgets and program budget implications, including revised 

estimates and reports produced by or provided to the Secretary General and 

the Secretary General’s agents on budget related matters; 

(D) operational plans, budgets, and budgetary analyses for peacekeeping 

operations; 

(E) analyses and reports regarding the scale of assessments; 

(F) databases and other data systems containing financial or programmatic information; 

(G) documents or other records alleging or involving improper use of resources, misconduct, mismanagement, or other violations of rules and regulations applicable to the United Nations Entity; and 

(H) other documentation relevant to the oversight work of Congress with 

respect to United States contributions to the United Nations system. 

(3) ACCOUNTABILITY CERTIFICATION.—The term ‘‘Accountability Certification’’ 

means an annual, written affirmation by the head or authorized designee of a 

United Nations Entity provided to the Secretary of State that the Entity— 

(A) provides the public with full, complete, and unfettered access to all 

relevant documentation relating to operations and activities, including 

budget and procurement activities; 

(B) implements and upholds policies and procedures to protect whistleblowers; 

(C) implements and upholds policies and procedures to require the filing 

of individual annual financial disclosure forms by each of its employees at 

the P–5 level and above and to require that such forms be made available 

to the Office of Internal Oversight Services, to Member States, and to the 

public; 

(D) has established an effective ethics office; 

(E) has established a fully independent, autonomous, and effective internal oversight body; 

(F) has adopted and implemented, and is in full compliance with, International Public Sector Accounting Standards; and 

(G) has established a cap on its administrative overhead costs. 

SEC. 203. OVERSIGHT OF UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM. 

(a) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is to enhance oversight of United States 

contributions to the United Nations System and the use of those contributions by 

United Nations Entities, in an effort to eliminate and deter waste, fraud, and abuse 

in the use of those contributions, and thereby to contribute to the development of 

greater transparency, accountability, and internal controls throughout the United 

Nations System. 

(b) IMPLEMENTATION.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Department of State shall collect and maintain current 

records regarding Transparency Certifications and Accountability Certifications 

by all United Nations Entities that receive United States contributions and submit that information for inclusion in the report required under section 207. 

(2) NOTIFICATION.—The Department of State shall keep the appropriate congressional committees fully and promptly informed of how United Nations Entities are spending United States contributions. 

(3) REFERRALS.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall promptly report to the Attorney General and to the appropriate congressional committees when the 

Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe a Federal criminal law 

has been violated by a United Nations Entity or one of its employees, contractors, or representatives. 


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(B) NOTIFICATION.—The Secretary of State shall promptly report, when 

appropriate, to the appropriate congressional committees, and to the Secretary General or to the head of the appropriate United Nations Entity, 

cases in which the Secretary of State reasonably believes that mismanagement, misfeasance, or malfeasance is likely to have taken place within a 

United Nations Entity and disciplinary proceedings are likely justified. 

(4) CONFIRMATION OF TRANSPARENCY BY UNITED NATIONS ENTITIES.— (A) PROMPT NOTICE BY DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—Whenever information or 

assistance requested from a United Nations Entity by the Department of 

State pursuant to a Transparency Certification is, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, unreasonably refused or not provided in a timely manner, 

the Secretary of State shall notify the appropriate congressional committees, the head of that particular United Nations Entity, and the Secretary 

General of the circumstances in writing, without delay. 

(B) NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE.—If and when the information or assistance 

being sought by the Department of State in connection with a notification 

pursuant to subparagraph (A) is provided to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State shall so notify in writing to the appropriate congressional committees and the head of that particular United 

Nations Entity. 

(C) NONCOMPLIANCE.—If the information or assistance being sought by 

the Department of State in connection with a notification pursuant to subparagraph (A) is not provided within 90 days of that notification, then the 

United Nations Entity that is the subject of the notification is deemed to 

be noncompliant with its Transparency Certification, and 

(D) RESTORATION OF COMPLIANCE.—After the situation has been resolved 

to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State shall 

promptly provide prompt, written notification of that fact and of the restoration of compliance, along with a description of the basis for the Secretary of State’s decision, to the appropriate congressional committees, the 

head of that United Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and any office 

or agency of the Federal Government that has provided that United Nations Entity with any United States contribution during the prior 2 years. 

(5) CONFIRMATION OF ACCOUNTABILITY BY UNITED NATIONS ENTITIES.— 

(A) PROMPT NOTICE BY SECRETARY OF STATE.—Whenever a United Nations Entity that has provided an Accountability Certification is, in the 

opinion of the Secretary of State, not in full compliance with any or all of 

the provisions of that certification, the Secretary of State shall notify the 

appropriate congressional committees, the head of that particular United 

Nations Entity, and the Secretary General of the circumstances in writing, 

without delay. 

(B) NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE.—If and when the United Nations Entity resumes full compliance with its Accountability Certification following the 

provision of the notification pursuant to subparagraph (A), the Secretary of 

State shall so notify in writing the appropriate congressional committees 

and the head of that United Nations Entity. 

(C) NONCOMPLIANCE.—If the United Nations Entity named in the notification in subparagraph (A) does not resume full compliance with its Accountability Certification to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State within 

90 days of that notification, then the United Nations Entity that is the subject of the notification is deemed to be noncompliant with its Accountability 

Certification, and the Secretary of State shall provide prompt, written notification of that fact to the appropriate congressional committees, the head 

of that United Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and any office or 

agency of the Federal Government that has provided that United Nations 

Entity with any United States Contribution during the prior 2 years. 

(D) RESTORATION OF COMPLIANCE.—After the situation has been resolved 

to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State shall 

promptly provide prompt, written notification of that fact and of the restoration of compliance, along with a description of the basis for the Secretary of State’s decision, to the appropriate congressional committees, the 

head of that United Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and any office 

or agency of the Federal Government that has provided that United Nations Entity with any United States contribution during the prior 2 years. 

(6) REPORTING.— 

(A) REPORTING.—In the report submitted by the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget to Congress pursuant to section 207, the Secretary of State shall submit for inclusion a section that, among other 

things, includes a list and detailed description of the circumstances surVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:48 Dec 09, 2011 Jkt 019006 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\HR323.XXX HR323

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rounding any notification of compliance issued pursuant to paragraph (4)(C) 

or (5)(C) during the covered timeframe, and whether and when the Secretary has reversed such finding of noncompliance. 

(B) PROHIBITED DISCLOSURES.—Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to authorize the public disclosure of information that is— 

(i) specifically prohibited from disclosure by any other provision of 

law; 

(ii) specifically required by Executive Order to be protected from disclosure in the interest of national defense or national security or in the 

conduct of foreign affairs; or 

(iii) a part of an ongoing criminal investigation. 

(C) PRIVACY PROTECTIONS.—The Secretary of State shall exempt from 

public disclosure information received from a United Nations Entity that 

the Secretary of State believes— 

(i) constitutes a trade secret or privileged and confidential personal 

financial information; 

(ii) constitutes confidential personal medical information; 

(iii) accuses a particular person of a crime; 

(iv) would, if publicly disclosed, constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; and 

(v) would compromise an ongoing law enforcement investigation or 

judicial trial in the United States. 

SEC. 204. TRANSPARENCY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS. 

(a) FUNDING PREREQUISITES.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no 

funds made available for use as a United States Contribution to any United Nations 

Entity may be obligated or expended if— 

(1) the intended United Nations Entity recipient has not provided to the Secretary of State within the preceding year a Transparency Certification as defined in section 202(1); 

(2) the intended United Nations Entity recipient is noncompliant with its 

Transparency Certification as described in section 203(b)(4)(C); 

(3) the intended United Nations Entity recipient has not provided to the Secretary of State within the preceding year an Accountability Certification as defined in section 202(3); or 

(4) the intended United Nations Entity is noncompliant with its Accountability Certification as described in section 203(b)(5)(C). 

(b) TREATMENT OF FUNDS WITHHELD FOR NONCOMPLIANCE.—At the conclusion of 

each fiscal year, any funds that had been appropriated for use as a United States 

Contribution to a United Nations Entity during that fiscal year, but could not be 

obligated or expended because of the restrictions of subsection (a), shall be returned 

to the United States Treasury, and are not subject to reprogramming for any other 

use. Any such funds returned to the Treasury shall not be considered arrears to be 

repaid to any United Nations Entity. 

(c) PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER.—The President may waive the limitations of this subsection with respect to a particular United States Contribution to a particular 

United Nations Entity within a single fiscal year if the President determines that 

failure to do so would pose an extraordinary threat to the national security of the 

United States and provides notification and explanation of that determination to the 

appropriate congressional committees. 

SEC. 205. INTEGRITY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS. 

(a) LIMITATION.—(1) No funds made available for use under the heading ‘‘Contributions to International Organizations’’ may be used for any purpose other than 

an assessed United States contribution to a United Nations Entity or other international organization. 

(2) No funds made available for use under the heading ‘‘International Organizations and Programs’’ may be used for any purpose other than a voluntary United 

States contribution to a United Nations Entity or other international organization. 

(3) No funds made available for use under the heading ‘‘Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities’’ may be used for any purpose other than a United 

States contribution to United Nations peacekeeping activities, to the International 

Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, or to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 

(b) TREATMENT OF FUNDS WITHHELD FOR NONCOMPLIANCE.—At the conclusion of 

each fiscal year, any funds that had been appropriated for use as a United States 

contribution to a United Nations Entity during that fiscal year, but could not be obligated or expended because of the restrictions of subsection (a), shall be returned 

to the United States Treasury, and are not subject to reprogramming for any other 


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use. Any such funds returned to the Treasury shall not be considered arrears to be 

repaid to any United Nations Entity. 

SEC. 206. REFUND OF MONIES OWED BY THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES. 

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 

(1) United States taxpayer funds overpaid to United Nations Entities and 

payable back to the United States sometimes remain in the hands of the United 

Nations because the United States has not requested the return of those funds. 

(2) Such funds have been paid into, among other United Nations Entities, the 

United Nations Tax Equalization Fund (TEF), which was established under the 

provisions of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 973 (1955), and 

which is used to reimburse United Nations staff members subject to United 

States income taxes for the cost of those taxes. 

(3) In recent years, the TEF has taken in considerably more money than it 

has paid out, with the United States apparently overpaying into the TEF by 

$52.2 million in the 2008–2009 timeframe alone. 

(4) According to the United Nations Financial Report and Audited Financial 

Statements released on July 29, 2010, ‘‘As of 31 December 2009, an amount of 

$179.0 million was payable to the United States of America pending instructions as to its disposition.’’. 

(5) That balance was allowed to accrue notwithstanding United Nations Financial Regulation 4.12, which states that any such surpluses ‘‘shall be credited 

against the assessed contributions due from that Member State the following 

year.’’. 

(6) Allowing the United Nations to regularly overcharge the United States 

and to retain those overpayments, or to spend them on wholly unrelated activities, is a disservice to American taxpayers and a subversion of the Congressional budget process. 

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States— 

(1) to annually instruct the United Nations to return to the United States any 

surplus assessed contributions or other overpayments by the United States to 

any United Nations Entity; and 

(2) to use the voice and vote of the United States to press the United Nations 

to reform its TEF assessment procedures to reduce the repeated discrepancies 

between TEF income and expenditures. 

(c) CERTIFICATION AND WITHHOLDING.—For each and every fiscal year subsequent 

to the effective date of this Act, until the Secretary of State submits to the appropriate congressional committees a certification that the United Nations has returned 

to the United States any surplus assessed contributions or other overpayments by 

the United States to any United Nations Entity, the Secretary of State shall withhold from the regular budget of the United Nations an amount equal to the amount 

of the funds that the United Nations has yet to return to the United States. 

SEC. 207. ANNUAL REPORTS ON UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS. 

(a) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 

this Act and annually for two years thereafter, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall submit to Congress a report listing all assessed and voluntary contributions of the United States Government for the preceding fiscal year 

to the United Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies and related bodies. 

(b) CONTENTS.—Each report required under subsection (a) shall set forth, for the 

fiscal year covered by such report, the following: 

(1) The total amount of all assessed and voluntary contributions of the United 

States Government to the United Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies and related bodies. 

(2) The approximate percentage of United States Government contributions to 

each United Nations affiliated agency or body in such fiscal year when compared with all contributions to such agency or body from any source in such fiscal year. 

(3) For each such contribution— 

(A) the amount of such contribution; 

(B) a description of such contribution (including whether assessed or voluntary); 

(C) the department or agency of the United States Government responsible for such contribution; 

(D) the purpose of such contribution; and 

(E) the United Nations or United Nations affiliated agency or related 

body receiving such contribution. 


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TITLE III—UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE 

UNITED NATIONS 

SEC. 301. ANNUAL PUBLICATION. 

The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the 

United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

United Nations to ensure the United Nations publishes annually, including on a 

publicly searchable internet Web site, a list of all United Nations subsidiary bodies 

and their functions, budgets, staff, and contributions, both voluntary and assessed, 

sorted by donor. 

SEC. 302. ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE. 

The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the 

United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

United Nations to implement a system for the required filing of individual annual 

financial disclosure forms by each employee of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, and funds at the P–5 level and above, which shall be made 

available to the Office of Internal Oversight Services, to Member States, and to the 

public. 

SEC. 303. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EXPANSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. 

It is the policy of the United States to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 

United States at the United Nations to oppose any proposals on expansion of the 

Security Council if such expansion would— 

(1) diminish the influence of the United States on the Security Council; or 

(2) include veto rights for any new members of the Security Council. 

SEC. 304. ACCESS TO REPORTS AND AUDITS. 

The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the 

United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

United Nations to ensure that Member States may, upon request, have access to 

all reports and audits completed by the Board of External Auditors. 

SEC. 305. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY. 

The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the 

United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

United Nations to ensure that the Secretary General exercises the right and duty 

of the Secretary General under section 20 of the Convention on the Privileges and 

Immunities of the United Nations to waive the immunity of any United Nations official in any case in which such immunity would impede the course of justice. In exercising such waiver, the Secretary General is urged to interpret the interests of the 

United Nations as favoring the investigation or prosecution of a United Nations official who is credibly under investigation for having committed a serious criminal offense or who is credibly charged with a serious criminal offense. 

SEC. 306. TERRORISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 

States at the United Nations to work toward adoption by the General Assembly of— 

(1) a definition of terrorism that— 

(A) builds upon the recommendations of the December 2004 report of the 

High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change; 

(B) includes as an essential component of such definition any action that 

is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do, or abstain from doing, any act; and 

(C) does not propose a legal or moral equivalence between an action described in subparagraph (B) and measures taken by a government or international organization in self-defense against an action described in such 

subparagraph; and 

(2) a comprehensive convention on terrorism that includes the definition described in paragraph (1). 

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that— 

(1) authoritarian regimes often inaccurately label peaceful, pro-freedom, prodemocracy movements as terrorist movements in order to undermine the legitimacy of those movements; and 

(2) any United Nations definition of terrorism should not be used to undermine a peaceful, pro-freedom, pro-democracy movement against authoritarian 

rule. 


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SEC. 307. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this 

Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 

a report— 

(1) concerning the progress of the General Assembly to modernize human resource practices, consistent with the March 2005 report of the Secretary General entitled ‘‘In larger freedom: towards development, security and human 

rights for all’’; and 

(2) containing the information described in subsection (b). 

(b) CONTENTS.—The report shall include— 

(1) a comprehensive evaluation of human resources reforms at the United Nations, including an evaluation of— 

(A) tenure; 

(B) performance reviews; 

(C) the promotion system; 

(D) a merit-based hiring system and enhanced regulations concerning termination of employment of employees; and 

(E) the implementation of a code of conduct and ethics training; 

(2) the implementation of a system of procedures for filing complaints and 

protective measures for work-place harassment, including sexual harassment; 

(3) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of a rotation requirement for nonadministrative positions; 

(4) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of a prohibition preventing personnel and officials assigned to the mission of a member state to the 

United Nations from transferring to a position within the United Nations Secretariat that is compensated at the P–5 level and above; 

(5) policy recommendations relating to a reduction in travel allowances and 

attendant oversight with respect to accommodations and airline flights; and 

(6) an evaluation of the recommendations of the Secretary General relating 

to greater flexibility for the Secretary General in staffing decisions to accommodate changing priorities. 

SEC. 308. UNITED NATIONS TREATY BODIES. 

The United States shall withhold from United States contributions to the regular 

assessed budget of the United Nations for a biennial period amounts that are proportional to the percentage of such budget that are expended with respect to a 

United Nations human rights treaty monitoring body or committee that was established by— 

(1) a convention (without any protocols) or an international covenant (without 

any protocols) to which the United States is not party; or 

(2) a convention, with a subsequent protocol, if the United States is a party 

to neither. 

SEC. 309. EQUALITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS. 

(a) DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AND REPORT.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—To avoid duplicative efforts and funding with respect to Palestinian interests and to ensure balance in the approach to Israeli-Palestinian 

issues, the Secretary shall, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act— 

(A) complete an audit of the functions of the entities listed in paragraph 

(2); and 

(B) submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing audit findings and conclusions, and recommendations for the elimination of such duplicative entities and efforts. 

(2) ENTITIES.—The entities referred to in paragraph (1)(A) are the following: 

(A) The United Nations Division for Palestinian Rights. 

(B) The Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. 

(C) The United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace 

Process and Personal Representative to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority. 

(D) The NGO Network on the Question of Palestine. 

(E) The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the 

Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied 

Territories. 

(F) Any other entity the Secretary determines results in duplicative efforts or funding or fails to ensure balance in the approach to Israeli-Palestinian issues. 

(b) IMPLEMENTATION BY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE.— 


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(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent 

Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 

United States at the United Nations to seek the implementation of the recommendations contained in the report required under subsection (a)(1)(B). 

(2) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS.—Until such recommendations have been implemented, the United States shall withhold from United States contributions to 

the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for a biennial period amounts 

that are proportional to the percentage of such budget that are expended for 

such entities. 

SEC. 310. ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS. 

The President shall direct the United States permanent representative to the 

United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

United Nations to make every effort to— 

(1) ensure the issuance and implementation of a directive by the Secretary 

General or the Secretariat, as appropriate, that— 

(A) requires all employees of the United Nations and its specialized agencies to officially and publicly condemn anti-Semitic statements made at any 

session of the United Nations or its specialized agencies, or at any other 

session sponsored by the United Nations; 

(B) requires employees of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, 

programs, and funds to be subject to punitive action, including immediate 

dismissal, for making anti-Semitic statements or references; 

(C) proposes specific recommendations to the General Assembly for the 

establishment of mechanisms to hold accountable employees and officials of 

the United Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, and funds, or 

Member States, that make such anti-Semitic statements or references in 

any forum of the United Nations or of its specialized agencies; 

(D) continues to develop and implements education awareness programs 

about the Holocaust and anti-Semitism throughout the world, as part of an 

effort to combat intolerance and hatred; and 

(E) requires the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 

Human Rights (OHCHR) to develop programming and other measures that 

address anti-Semitism; 

(2) secure the adoption of a resolution by the General Assembly that establishes the mechanisms described in paragraph (1)(C); and 

(3) continue working toward further reduction of anti-Semitic language and 

anti-Israel resolutions in the United Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, and funds. 

SEC. 311. REGIONAL GROUP INCLUSION OF ISRAEL. 

The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the 

United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

United Nations to expand the Western European and Others Group (WEOG) in the 

United Nations in Geneva to include Israel as a permanent member with full rights 

and privileges. 

SEC. 312. UNITED STATES POLICY ON TAIWAN’S PARTICIPATION IN UNITED NATIONS ENTITIES. 

The Secretary of State shall direct the United States Permanent Representative 

to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at 

the United Nations to ensure meaningful participation for Taiwan in relevant 

United Nations Entities in which Taiwan has expressed an interest in participating. 

SEC. 313. UNITED STATES POLICY ON TIER 3 HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS. 

The Secretary of State shall direct the United States Permanent Representative 

to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at 

the United Nations to ensure that no representative of a country designated pursuant to section 110 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107) 

by the Department of State as a Tier 3 country shall preside as Chair or President 

of any United Nations Entity. 

TITLE IV—STATUS OF PALESTINIAN ENTITIES 

AT THE UNITED NATIONS 

SEC. 401. FINDINGS. 

Congress makes the following findings: 

(1) In 1989, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) launched an effort 

to evade direct negotiations for peace with the State of Israel by instead purVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:48 Dec 09, 2011 Jkt 019006 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\HR323.XXX HR323

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suing Palestinian membership in international organizations, which could imply 

de facto recognition of a Palestinian state by the United Nations. 

(2) The Executive Branch, with significant support from Members of Congress, successfully stopped the PLO’s effort by credibly threatening, as noted in 

a May 1, 1989 statement by then-Secretary of State James A. Baker, ‘‘that the 

United States [would] make no further contributions, voluntary or assessed, to 

any international organization which makes any change in the P.L.O.’s present 

status as an observer organization.’’. 

(3) The United States success in this case demonstrates that withholding contributions and placing conditions on their payment can result in real reforms, 

stop counter-productive developments, and advance United States interests at 

the United Nations. 

(4) The Palestinian leadership has recently resumed its effort to evade direct 

negotiations for peace with the State of Israel by seeking recognition of a Palestinian state from foreign governments and in international forums. 

(5) Efforts to bypass negotiations and to unilaterally declare a Palestinian 

state, or to appeal to the United Nations or other international forums or to foreign governments for recognition of a Palestinian state or membership or other 

upgraded status for the Palestinian observer mission at those forums, would 

violate the underlying principles of the Oslo Accords, the Road Map, and other 

relevant Middle East peace process efforts. 

(6) On December 15, 2010, the House of Representatives passed House Resolution 1765, in which, inter alia, the House of Representatives: 

(A) ‘‘reaffirms its strong opposition to any attempt to establish or seek 

recognition of a Palestinian state outside of an agreement negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians’’; 

(B) ‘‘supports the Administration’s opposition to a unilateral declaration 

of a Palestinian state’’; and 

(C) ‘‘calls upon the Administration to . . . lead a diplomatic effort to persuade other nations to oppose a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state 

and to oppose recognition of a Palestinian state by other nations, within the 

United Nations, and in other international forums prior to achievement of 

a final agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.’’. 

(7) Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo, United States Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, stated on July 26, 2011, ‘‘Let there be no 

doubt: symbolic actions to isolate Israel at the United Nations in September will 

not create an independent Palestinian state . . . The United States will not 

support unilateral campaigns at the United Nations in September or any other 

time.’’. 

(8) On September 16, 2011, the Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications stated that ‘‘We would veto actions through the Security 

Council and oppose action through the Security Council associated with a unilateral declaration of [Palestinian] statehood.’’. 

SEC. 402. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

It is the policy of the United States to oppose the recognition of a Palestinian 

state by any United Nations Entity, or any upgrade, including but not limited to 

full membership or non-member-state observer status, in the status of the Palestinian observer mission at the United Nations, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Palestinian Authority, or any other Palestinian administrative organization 

or governing entity, at any United Nations Entity, prior to the achievement of a 

final peace agreement negotiated between and agreed to by Israel and the Palestinians. 

SEC. 403. IMPLEMENTATION. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 

States at the United Nations to advance the policy stated in section 402. 

(b) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS.—The Secretary of State shall withhold United States 

contributions from any United Nations Entity that recognizes a Palestinian state or 

upgrades in any way, including full membership or non-member-state observer status, the status of the Palestinian observer mission at the United Nations, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Palestinian Authority, or any other Palestinian 

administrative organization or governing entity, at that United Nations Entity, 

prior to the achievement of complete and final peace agreement negotiated between 

and agreed to by Israel and the Palestinians. Funds appropriated for use as a 

United States contribution to the United Nations but withheld from obligation and 

expenditure pursuant to this section shall immediately revert to the United States 

Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid to any United Nations 

Entity. 


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TITLE V—UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS 

COUNCIL 

SEC. 501. FINDINGS. 

Congress makes the following findings: 

(1) Since its establishment in 2006, the United Nations Human Rights Council has failed to meaningfully promote the protection of internationally recognized human rights, and has proven to be even more problematic than the 

United Nations Human Rights Commission that it was created to replace. 

(2) The United Nations Human Rights Council suffers from fundamental and 

severe structural flaws present since its establishment by the United Nations 

General Assembly, such as the fact that it draws its members from the General 

Assembly without any substantive membership criteria, with the perverse result that a number of the world’s worst human rights abusers are members of 

the council. 

(3) For example, the majority of members of the United Nations Human 

Rights Council are rated ‘‘Not Free’’ or only ‘‘Partly Free’’ by Freedom House. 

Only a minority of members were rated ‘‘Free’’. 

(4) The structure and composition of the United Nations Human Rights Council have made it subject to gross political manipulation, with the result that, 

during its almost five years of operation, the Council has passed over 40 resolutions censuring the democratic, Jewish State of Israel, as compared to only a 

handful censuring the dictatorships in Burma, North Korea, and Syria, just one 

addressing the severe, ongoing human rights abuses in Libya, Iran, and 

Belarus, and none addressing the severe, ongoing human rights abuses in 

China, Cuba, Russia, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and elsewhere. 

(5) The United Nations Human Rights Council’s agenda contains a permanent 

item for criticism of the democratic, Jewish State of Israel, but no permanent 

items criticizing any other state. 

(6) The United Nations Human Rights Council has established, or preserved 

the existence of, a number of ‘‘Special Procedures’’ mechanisms to address country-specific situations or thematic issues. These mechanisms include a number 

of ‘‘special rapporteurs’’ whose expenses and staff support are paid for by contributions to the United Nations. 

(7) The United Nations Human Rights Council has also established an ‘‘Advisory Committee’’ whose expenses and staff support are paid for by contributions 

to the United Nations. 

(8) Some of these special rapporteurs and members of the Advisory Committee have displayed consistent bias against the United States, Israel, and the 

Jewish people, while providing support to human rights abusers. 

(9) Richard Falk, the United Nations ‘‘Special Rapporteur on the situation of 

human rights in Palestinian territories occupied since 1967’’, has compared 

Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians to the Holocaust, questioned the veracity 

of the events of September 11, 2001, and posted a cartoon on his blog depicting 

Americans and Jews as bloodthirsty dogs. 

(10) Jean Ziegler, a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council Advisory Committee and former United Nations ‘‘Special Rapporteur on the Right 

to Food’’, has accused former President George W. Bush and former Israeli 

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of committing ‘‘state terrorism’’, has called for an 

investigation of Israel by the International Criminal Court for ‘‘war crimes’’ following Israel’s war against Hezbollah in 2006, has visited Cuba and praised the 

Cuban regime’s provision of food to the Cuban people, and has stated that 

Zimbabwean dictator Robert Mugabe ‘‘has history and morality with him’’. Ziegler was also involved in the establishment of the ‘‘Al-Gaddafi International 

Prize for Human Rights’’, a prize established by, funded by, and named after 

Libyan dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi, and awarded in the past to Fidel Castro, 

Hugo Chavez, Louis Farrakhan, and Roger Garaudy, who has denied the Holocaust, questioned the veracity of the events of September 11, 2001, and supported Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s call for Israel to be ‘‘wiped off 

the map’’. 

(11) Miguel D’Escoto Brockmann, a member of the United Nations Human 

Rights Council Advisory Committee who has previously served as President of 

the United Nations General Assembly and as foreign minister for the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, has implicitly accused the United States of ‘‘terrorism’’, has called former President Ronald Reagan a ‘‘butcher’’, has called for 

a international boycott of Israel, has stated that the Palestinians were being 

‘‘crucified’’ by Israel, has called Israel’s defensive Operation Cast Lead in the 


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Gaza Strip a ‘‘monstrosity’’ and ‘‘genocide’’, has urged the United Nations to use 

the term ‘‘apartheid’’ in discussing Israeli treatment of Palestinians, has embraced Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after Ahmadinejad delivered an 

anti-American, anti-Israel address to the United Nations General Assembly, has 

stated that charges of genocide against Sudanese dictator Omar Hassan al 

Bashir are ‘‘racist’’, and has declared Fidel Castro ‘‘World Hero of Solidarity’’, 

stating that Castro ‘‘embod[ied] virtues and values worth emulation by all of 

us’’. 

(12) Halima Warzazi, a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council 

Advisory Committee, has compared Israel to Nazi Germany, and used her previous membership in a United Nations apparatus to shield Saddam Hussein 

from censure for gassing Iraqi Kurds in Halabja. 

(13) The ongoing five-year review of the United Nations Human Rights Council concluded on June 17, 2011, and failed make any significant reforms to its 

fundamental and severe structural flaws, including its absence of substantive 

membership criteria, or to remove the permanent agenda item on Israel. 

(14) On June 17, 2011, John F, Sammis, United States Deputy Representative 

to the Economic and Social Council, stated that ‘‘The Geneva process [of the 

five-year review] failed to yield even minimally positive results, forcing us to 

dissociate from the outcome . . . the final resolution [for the five-year review] 

also fails to address the core problems that still plague the Human Rights 

Council . . . The United States has therefore voted ‘no’ on the resolution . . . 

the Council’s effectiveness and legitimacy will always be compromised so long 

as one country in all the world is unfairly and uniquely singled out while others, including chronic human rights abusers, escape scrutiny . . . The resolution before us today does nothing to address the Council’s failures nor move it 

any closer to the founding values of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’’. 

(15) United States membership in the Human Rights Council has not led to 

reform of its fundamental flaws diminished the Council’s virulently anti-Israel 

behavior. The Council has passed fourteen resolutions criticizing Israel since 

the United States joined in 2009. 

SEC. 502. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP AND FUNDING. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—For each and every fiscal year subsequent to the effective date 

of this Act, until the Secretary of State submits to Congress a certification that the 

requirements described in subsection (b) have been satisfied— 

(1) the Secretary of State shall withhold from a United States contribution 

each fiscal year to a regular budget of the United Nations an amount that is 

equal to the percentage of such contribution that the Secretary determines 

would be allocated by the United Nations to support the United Nations Human 

Rights Council; 

(2) the Secretary of State shall not make a voluntary contribution to the 

United Nations Human Rights Council; and 

(3) the United States shall not run for a seat on the United Nations Human 

Rights Council. 

(b) CERTIFICATION.—The annual certification referred to in subsection (a) is a certification made by the Secretary to Congress that— 

(1) the United Nations Human Rights Council’s mandate from the United Nations General Assembly explicitly and effectively prohibits candidacy for Human 

Rights Council membership of a United Nations Member State— 

(A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council; and 

(B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation for human rights 

abuses; 

(2) the United Nations Human Rights Council does not include a United Nations Member State— 

(A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council; 

(B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation for human rights 

abuses; 

(C) which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 

6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act), section 40 of the 

Arms Export Control Act, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 

1961, or other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism; or 

(D) which the President has designated as a country of particular concern 

for religious freedom under section 402(b) of the International Religious 

Freedom Act of 1998; and 


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(3) the United Nations Human Rights Council’s agenda or programme of work 

does not include a permanent item with regard to the State of Israel. 

(c) SPECIAL PROCEDURES.—The Secretary of State shall withhold from a United 

States contribution each year to a regular budget of the United Nations an amount 

that is equal to the percentage of such contribution that the Secretary determines 

would be allocated by the United Nations to support the United Nations ‘‘Special 

Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Palestinian territories occupied 

since 1967’’, and any other United Nations Human Rights Council ‘‘Special Procedures’’ used to display bias against the United States or the State of Israel or to 

provide support for the government of any United Nations Member State— 

(1) subject to sanctions by the Security Council; 

(2) under a Security Council-mandated investigation for human rights abuses; 

(3) which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) 

of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect pursuant to the 

International Emergency Economic Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export 

Control Act, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of 

international terrorism; or 

(4) which the President has designated as a country of particular concern for 

religious freedom under section 402(b) of the International Religious Freedom 

Act of 1998. 

(d) REVERSION OF FUNDS.—Funds appropriated for use as a United States contribution to the United Nations but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to this section shall immediately revert to the United States Treasury and shall 

not be considered arrears to be repaid to any United Nations Entity. 

TITLE VI—GOLDSTONE REPORT 

SEC. 601. FINDINGS. 

Congress finds the following: 

(1) On January 12, 2009, the United Nations Human Rights Council passed 

Resolution A/HRC/S–9/L.1, which authorized a ‘‘fact-finding mission’’ regarding 

Israel’s conduct of Operation Cast Lead against violent militants in the Gaza 

Strip between December 27, 2008, and January 18, 2009. 

(2) The resolution pre-judged the outcome of its investigation by one-sidedly 

mandating the ‘‘fact-finding mission’’ to ‘‘investigate all violations of international human rights law and International Humanitarian Law by . . . Israel, 

against the Palestinian people . . . particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, due 

to the current aggression’’. 

(3) The mandate of the ‘‘fact-finding mission’’ makes no mention of the relentless rocket and mortar attacks, which numbered in the thousands and spanned 

a period of eight years, by Hamas and other violent militant groups in Gaza 

against civilian targets in Israel, that necessitated Israel’s defensive measures. 

(4) The ‘‘fact-finding mission’’ included a member who, before joining the mission, had already declared Israel guilty of committing atrocities in Operation 

Cast Lead by signing a public letter on January 11, 2009, published in the Sunday Times, that called Israel’s actions ‘‘war crimes’’. 

(5) The mission’s flawed and biased mandate gave serious concern to many 

United Nations Human Rights Council Member States which refused to support 

it, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, Canada, France, Germany, 

Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 

(6) The mission’s flawed and biased mandate was never broadened or revised 

by any plenary meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Council, and troubled many distinguished individuals who refused invitations to head the mission. 

(7) On September 15, 2009, the ‘‘United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the 

Gaza Conflict’’ released its report, which is commonly referred to as the 

‘‘Goldstone Report’’. 

(8) The Goldstone Report repeatedly made sweeping and unsubstantiated determinations that the Israeli military had deliberately attacked civilians during 

Operation Cast Lead. 

(9) The authors of the Goldstone Report admit that we did not deal with the 

issues . . . ‘‘regarding the problems of conducting military operations in civilian 

areas and second-guessing decisions made by soldiers and their commanding officers in the fog of war’’. 


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(10) In the October 16, 2009 edition of the Jewish Daily Forward, Richard 

Goldstone, the head of the ‘‘United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza 

Conflict’’, is quoted as saying, with respect to the mission’s evidence-collection 

methods, ‘‘If this was a court of law, there would have been nothing proven’’. 

(11) The Goldstone Report, in effect, denied the State of Israel the right to 

self-defense, and never noted the fact that Israel had the right to defend its citizens from the repeated violent attacks committed against civilian targets in 

southern Israel by Hamas and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations operating 

from Gaza. 

(12) The Goldstone Report largely ignored the culpability of the Government 

of Iran and the Government of Syria, both of whom sponsor Hamas and other 

Foreign Terrorist Organizations. 

(13) The Goldstone Report usually considered public statements made by 

Israeli officials not to be credible, while frequently giving uncritical credence to 

statements taken from what it called the ‘‘Gaza authorities’’, i.e., the Gaza leadership of Hamas. 

(14) Notwithstanding a great body of evidence that Hamas and other violent 

Islamist groups committed war crimes by using civilians and civilian institutions, such as mosques, schools, and hospitals, as shields, the Goldstone Report 

repeatedly downplayed or cast doubt upon that claim. 

(15) In one notable instance, the Goldstone Report stated that it did not consider the admission of a Hamas official that Hamas often ‘‘created a human 

shield of women, children, the elderly and the mujahideen, against [the Israeli 

military]’’ specifically to ‘‘constitute evidence that Hamas forced Palestinian civilians to shield military objectives against attack’’. 

(16) Hamas was able to significantly shape the findings of the investigation 

mission’s Goldstone Report by selecting and prescreening some of the witnesses 

and intimidating others, as the Goldstone Report acknowledges when it notes 

that ‘‘those interviewed in Gaza appeared reluctant to speak about the presence 

of or conduct of hostilities by the Palestinian armed groups . . . from a fear of 

reprisals’’. 

(17) Even though Israel is a vibrant democracy with a vigorous and free 

press, the Goldstone Report erroneously asserts that ‘‘actions of the Israeli government . . . have contributed significantly to a political climate in which dissent with the government and its actions . . . is not tolerated’’. 

(18) The Goldstone Report recommended that the United Nations Human 

Rights Council endorse its recommendations, implement them, review their implementation, and refer the report to the United Nations Security Council, the 

Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, and the United Nations General 

Assembly for further action. 

(19) The Goldstone Report recommended that the United Nations Security 

Council— 

(A) require the Government of Israel to launch further investigations of 

its conduct during Operation Cast Lead and report back to the Security 

Council within six months; 

(B) simultaneously appoint an ‘‘independent committee of experts’’ to 

monitor and report on any domestic legal or other proceedings undertaken 

by the Government of Israel within that 6-month period; and 

(C) refer the case to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 

after that 6-month period. 

(20) The Goldstone Report recommended that the United Nations General Assembly consider further action on the report and establish an escrow fund, to 

be funded entirely by the State of Israel, to ‘‘pay adequate compensation to Palestinians who have suffered loss and damage’’ during Operation Cast Lead. 

(21) The Goldstone Report ignored the issue of compensation to Israelis who 

have been killed or wounded, or suffered other loss and damage, as a result of 

years of past and continuing rocket and mortar attacks by Hamas and other 

violent militant groups in Gaza against civilian targets in southern Israel. 

(22) The Goldstone Report recommended ‘‘that States Parties to the Geneva 

Conventions of 1949 start criminal investigations [of Operation Cast Lead] in 

national courts, using universal jurisdiction’’ and that ‘‘following investigation, 

alleged perpetrators should be arrested and prosecuted’’. 

(23) The concept of ‘‘universal jurisdiction’’ has frequently been used in attempts to detain, charge, and prosecute Israeli and United States officials and 

former officials in connection with unfounded allegations of war crimes and has 

often unfairly impeded the travel of those individuals. 

(24) On September 20, 2009, United Nations High Commissioner for Human 

Rights Navanethem Pillay wrote, ‘‘I lend my full support to Justice Goldstone’s 

report and its recommendations’’. 


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(25) The State of Israel, like many other free democracies, has an independent judicial system with a robust investigatory capacity and has already 

launched numerous investigations, many of which remain ongoing, of Operation 

Cast Lead and individual incidents therein. 

(26) Several nations have indicated that they intend to further pursue consideration of the Goldstone Report and implementation of its recommendations by 

the United Nations Security Council, the United Nations General Assembly, the 

United Nations Human Rights Council, and other multilateral fora. 

(27) On September 30, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the 

underlying mandate for the Goldstone Report as ‘‘one-sided’’. 

(28) On September 17, 2009, Ambassador Susan Rice, United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, expressed the United States’ ‘‘very 

serious concern with the mandate’’ underlying the Goldstone Report and noted 

that the United States views the mandate ‘‘as unbalanced, one-sided and basically unacceptable’’. 

(29) Israeli President Shimon Peres has called the Goldstone Report a ‘‘blood 

libel’’. 

(30) The Goldstone Report reflects the longstanding, historic bias at the 

United Nations against the democratic, Jewish State of Israel. 

(31) The Goldstone Report is being exploited by Israel’s enemies to excuse the 

actions of violent militant groups and their state sponsors, and to justify isolation of and punitive measures against the democratic, Jewish State of Israel. 

(32) On November 3, 2009, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly 

adopted House Resolution 867, which stated that the House of Representatives: 

(A) ‘‘considers the [Goldstone Report] to be irredeemably biased and unworthy of further consideration or legitimacy’’; 

(B) ‘‘supports the Administration’s efforts to combat anti-Israel bias at 

the United Nations, its characterization of the [Goldstone Report] as ‘unbalanced, one-sided and basically unacceptable’, and its opposition to the resolution on the report’’; 

(C) ‘‘calls on the President and the Secretary of State to continue to 

strongly and unequivocally oppose any endorsement of the [Goldstone Report] in multilateral fora, including through leading opposition to any 

United Nations General Assembly resolution and through vetoing, if necessary, any United Nations Security Council resolution that endorses the 

contents of this report, seeks to act upon the recommendations contained 

in this report, or calls on any other international body to take further action regarding this report’’; 

(D) ‘‘calls on the President and the Secretary of State to strongly and unequivocally oppose any further consideration of the ‘Report of the United 

Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’ and any other measures 

stemming from this report in multilateral fora’’; and 

(E) ‘‘reaffirms its support for the democratic, Jewish State of Israel, for 

Israel’s security and right to self-defense, and, specifically, for Israel’s right 

to defend its citizens from violent militant groups and their state sponsors’’. 

(33) On October 16, 2009, the United Nations Human Rights Council voted 

25–6 (with 11 Member States abstaining and 5 not voting, and with the United 

States voting against) to adopt resolution A–HRC–S–12–1, which endorsed the 

Goldstone Report and condemned Israel, without mentioning Hamas, other such 

violent militant groups, or their state sponsors. The United States voted against 

the resolution. 

(34) On November 5, 2009, the United Nations General Assembly voted 114– 

18 (with 44 Member States abstaining, and with the United States voting 

against) to adopt resolution A/RES/64/10, which, among other things: 

(A) endorsed the United Nations Human Rights Council’s resolution A– 

HRC–S–12–1, which endorsed the Goldstone Report and condemned Israel, 

without mentioning Hamas, other such violent militant groups, or their 

state sponsors; 

(B) requested that the Secretary General of the United Nations transmit 

the Goldstone Report to the United Nations Security Council; 

(C) expressed its ‘‘appreciation’’ to the ‘‘United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’’ for its ‘‘comprehensive report’’; 

(D) expressed grave concern regarding ‘‘reports regarding serious human 

rights violations’’ during Operation Cast Lead, including the findings in the 

Goldstone Report; and 

(E) recommended ‘‘that the Government of Switzerland, in its capacity as 

depositary of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian 

Persons in Time of War, undertake as soon as possible the steps necessary 

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va Convention on measures to enforce the Convention’’ in the West Bank, 

the Gaza Strip, and ‘‘East Jerusalem’’. 

(35) On February 26, 2010, the United Nations General Assembly voted 98– 

7 (with 31 Member States abstaining, and with the United States voting 

against) to adopt resolution A/RES/64/254, which built on the determinations of 

A/RES/64/10. 

(36) On March 24, 2010, the United Nations Human Rights Council voted 29– 

6 (with 11 Member States abstaining and one not voting, and with the United 

States voting against) to adopt resolution A/HRC/13/L.30, which, among other 

things— 

(A) called upon ‘‘all concerned parties, including United Nations bodies, 

to ensure their implementation of the recommendations contained in the 

[Goldstone Report]’’; 

(B) requested that the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 

Rights submit a ‘‘progress report on the implementation of the present resolution to the [Human Rights] Council at its fourteenth session’’ in May and 

June 2010; and 

(C) decided to ‘‘follow up on the implementation of the present resolution 

at [the] fifteenth session’’ of the Human Rights Council in September 2010. 

(37) On March 25, 2011, the United Nations Human Rights Council voted 27– 

3 (with 16 Member States abstaining, and with the United States voting 

against) to adopt resolution A/HRC/16/L.31, which, among other things— 

(A) called upon ‘‘all concerned parties, including United Nations bodies, 

to ensure the full and immediate implementation of the recommendations 

contained in the [Goldstone Report]’’; 

(B) recommended that the United Nations General Assembly again consider the Goldstone Report at its sixty-sixth session, and urged the General 

Assembly to submit the report to the United Nations Security Council ‘‘for 

its consideration and appropriate action,’’ including referral to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; 

(C) requested that the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 

Rights submit a ‘‘progress report on the implementation of the present resolution to the Human Rights Council at its eighteenth session of September 

2011’’; and 

(D) decided to ‘‘follow up on the implementation of the present resolution 

at [the] nineteenth session [of the Human Rights Council] of March 2012’’. 

(38) On April 1, 2011, Richard Goldstone, the head of the ‘‘United Nations 

Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’’ that authored the Goldstone Report, 

wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post that renounced the Goldstone Report’s 

claim that the Israeli military deliberately attacked civilians during Operation 

Cast Lead. Goldstone wrote that the Israeli military’s investigations with respect to incidents in Operation Cast Lead ‘‘indicate that civilians were not intentionally targeted as a matter of policy’’. 

(39) Efforts to delegitimize the democratic State of Israel and deny it the 

right to defend its citizens and its existence can be used to delegitimize other 

democracies and deny them the same right. 

SEC. 602. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

It is the policy of the United States to— 

(1) consider the Goldstone Report irredeemably biased and unworthy of further consideration or legitimacy; 

(2) strongly and unequivocally oppose any consideration, legitimization, or endorsement of the Goldstone Report, or any other measures stemming from this 

report, in multilateral fora; 

(3) lead a high-level diplomatic campaign in support of the revocation and repudiation, by the United Nations General Assembly, of the Goldstone Report 

and any United Nations resolutions stemming from the report, including: 

(A) United Nations General Assembly resolutions A/RES/64/10 and A/ 

RES/64/254; and 

(B) United Nations Human Rights Council resolutions A–HRC–S–12–1, 

A/HRC/13/L.30, and A/HRC/16/L.31; and 

(4) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other responsible countries 

not to endorse, support, or legitimize the Goldstone Report or any other measures stemming from the report. 

SEC. 603. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS; REFUND OF UNITED STATES TAXPAYER DOLLARS. 

(a) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS.—The Secretary of State shall withhold from the 

United States contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations an amount 

that is equal to the percentage of such contribution that the Secretary determines 


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would be or has been expended by the United Nations for any part of the Goldstone 

Report or its preparatory or follow-on activities. 

(b) REFUND OF UNITED STATES TAXPAYER DOLLARS.—Funds appropriated for use 

as a United States contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations but 

withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to subsection (a) shall immediately revert to the United States Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to 

be repaid to any United Nations Entity. 

TITLE VII—DURBAN PROCESS 

SEC. 701. FINDINGS. 

Congress makes the following findings: 

(1) The United States is opposed to racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, 

and related intolerance, and has long been a party to the Convention on the 

Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 

(2) Expensive and politically skewed international conferences can disserve 

and undermine the worthy goals that they are ostensibly convened to support. 

(3) The goals of the 2001 United Nations World Conference Against Racism— 

held in Durban, South Africa, and commonly referred to as ‘‘Durban I’’—were 

undermined by hateful, anti-Jewish rhetoric, and anti-Israel political agendas, 

prompting both Israel and the United States to withdraw their delegations from 

the Conference. 

(4) The official government declaration adopted by Durban I, the ‘‘Durban 

Declaration and Program of Action’’, focused on the ‘‘plight of the Palestinian 

people under foreign occupation’’, and thereby singled out one regional conflict 

for discussion and implicitly launched a false accusation against Israel of intolerance towards the Palestinians. 

(5) On September 3, 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell explained the withdrawal of the United States delegation from Durban I by stating that ‘‘you do 

not combat racism by conferences that produce declarations containing hateful 

language, some of which is a throwback to the ‘days of Zionism’ equals racism; 

or supports the idea that we have made too much of the Holocaust; or suggests 

that apartheid exists in Israel; or that singles out only one country in the 

world—Israel—for censure and abuse’’. 

(6) The late United States Representative Tom Lantos, who participated as 

a member of the United States delegation to the Durban Conference, supported 

that delegation’s withdrawal and wrote in 2002 that the conference ‘‘provided 

the world with a glimpse into the abyss of international hate, discrimination 

and, indeed, racism’’. 

(7) On December 19, 2006, the United Nations General Assembly approved 

a resolution initiating preparations for a Durban Review Conference (commonly 

referred to as ‘‘Durban II’’), which was held between April 20 and 24, 2009, in 

Geneva, Switzerland. 

(8) The chair of the preparatory committee for Durban II was Libya, and the 

co-chairs included Iran and Cuba. 

(9) Throughout the preparatory process for Durban II, member states of the 

Organization of the Islamic Conference urged that the conference again focus 

criticism on Israel and single out the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for discussion, 

and also urged that the conference advocate global speech codes that would impose restrictions contrary to fundamental freedoms recognized in the provisions 

of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 

(10) In testimony before the House of Representatives on April 2, 2008, thenAssistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Kristen Silverberg 

stated that the United States had decided against participating in preparatory 

activities for Durban II because ‘‘[there is] absolutely no case to be made for 

participating in something that is going to be a repeat of Durban I. We don’t 

have any confidence that this will be any better than Durban I’’. 

(11) On September 23, 2008, the House of Representatives passed House Resolution 1361, which, among other things, called on the President to ‘‘urge other 

heads of state to condition participation in the 2009 [Durban II] Conference on 

concrete action by the United Nations and United Nations Member States to 

ensure that it is not a forum to demonize any group, or incite anti-Semitism, 

hatred, or violence against members of any group or to call into question the 

existence of any state’’ and urged all United Nations Member States ‘‘not to 

support a 2009 Durban Review Conference process that fails to adhere to established human rights standards and to reject an agenda that incites hatred 

against any group in the guise of criticism of a particular government or that 

seeks to forge a global blasphemy code’’. 


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(12) The present United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Dr. 

Navanethem Pillay, who served as Secretary General of Durban II, has repeatedly sought to downplay the level of hateful, anti-Jewish rhetoric and antiIsrael political agendas present at Durban I, describing it as merely ‘‘the virulent anti-Semitic behavior of a few non-governmental organizations on the sidelines’’ and praising the biased 2001 Durban Declaration and Programme of Action as ‘‘[t]he legacy of this Conference’’, has repeatedly sought to downplay the 

level of hateful, anti-Jewish rhetoric and anti-Israel political agendas present at 

Durban II and its preparatory activities, and has repeatedly praised and urged 

the full implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action. 

(13) High Commissioner Pillay has repeatedly and publicly criticized nations, 

including the United States, which announced that they would not participate 

in Durban II, but has almost never publicly criticized governments who succeeded in using the conference and its preparatory activities to single out Israel 

for criticism and to attempt to restrict fundamental freedoms. 

(14) A United Nations press release on September 8, 2008, regarding an address by High Commissioner Pillay, disturbingly dismissed objections raised by 

non-governmental organizations to Durban II as ‘‘ferocious, and often distorted, 

criticism by certain lobby groups focused on single issues’’. 

(15) During February of 2009, the United States actively participated in intergovernmental consultations on Durban II’s ‘‘draft outcome document’’ and engaged in high-level diplomatic efforts to dramatically reverse the path of Durban II by directing it towards meaningful efforts to combat intolerance and bigotry and directing it away from efforts to undermine the cause of fighting discrimination through singling out Israel for implicit criticism and calling for restrictions on fundamental freedoms. 

(16) On February 27, 2009, a State Department spokesman stated that, despite United States efforts to redirect the path of Durban II, ‘‘the document 

being negotiated has gone from bad to worse, and the current text of the draft 

outcome document is not salvageable . . . A conference based on this text would 

be a missed opportunity to speak clearly about the persistent problem of racism’’ and therefore, the United States would not participate in further consultations and negotiations regarding the ‘‘draft outcome document,’’ and would not 

participate in Durban II itself unless the ‘‘draft outcome document’’ was radically shortened and revised to eliminate objectionable material. 

(17) On April 17, 2009, the third and final session of the preparatory committee for Durban II proposed a final ‘‘draft outcome document’’ that contained 

a number of provisions advocating restrictions on freedom of expression, and 

that also implicitly singled out and criticized Israel for racism by reaffirming, 

in its very first paragraph, the 2001 Durban Declaration and Programme of Action. 

(18) On April 18, 2009, a State Department spokesman announced that ‘‘the 

United States will not join the [Durban II] conference’’, noting that ‘‘The current 

document . . . still contains language that reaffirms in toto the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (DDPA) from 2001, which the United States has 

long said it is unable to support . . . The United States also has serious concerns 

with relatively new additions to the text regarding ‘incitement’, that run 

counter to the U.S. commitment to unfettered free speech.’’. 

(19) On April 19, 2009, the President stated at a press conference that ‘‘I 

would love to be involved in a useful conference that addressed continuing 

issues of racism and discrimination around the globe . . . we expressed in the 

run-up to this conference our concerns that if you incorporated—if you adopted 

all the language from 2001, that’s just not something we could sign up for . . 

. our participation would have involved putting our imprimatur on something 

that we just don’t believe . . . Hopefully . . . we can partner with other countries 

on to actually reduce discrimination around the globe. But this wasn’t an opportunity to do it.’’. 

(20) Canada, Israel, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Australia, and 

New Zealand also did not participate in Durban II, and the Czech Republic 

walked out of the Conference during its proceedings, never to return. 

(21) Libya was the chair of the Main Committee of Durban II, and vice presidents of Durban II included Libya, Iran, and Cuba. 

(22) Speaking at Durban II on April 20, 2009, Iranian leader Mahmoud 

Ahmadinejad called the democratic State of Israel ‘‘totally racist’’ and ‘‘the most 

cruel and repressive racist regime’’, and called for Israel’s destruction, stating 

that ‘‘Efforts must be made to put an end to the abuse by Zionists . . . Governments must be encouraged and supported in their fights aimed at eradicating 

this barbaric racism’’. 


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(23) In his speech at Durban II, Ahmadinejad also propagated anti-Semitic 

conspiracy theories, saying that ‘‘Those who control huge economic resources 

and interests in the world . . . mobilize all the resources, including their economic and political influence and world media, to render support in vain to the 

Zionist regime’’. 

(24) Disgusted by Ahmadinejad’s biased and incendiary statements, delegates 

from about two dozen nations walked out of the assembly hall in protest, but 

most delegations remained, and a large number of delegations and observers repeatedly applauded Ahmadinejad’s remarks. 

(25) On April 21, 2009, governments participating in Durban II adopted by 

consensus an ‘‘outcome document’’ that contained a number of provisions advocating restrictions on freedom of expression, and that also implicitly singled out 

and criticized Israel for racism by reaffirming, in its very first paragraph, the 

2001 Durban Declaration and Program of Action. 

(26) Throughout Durban II, many speakers singled out Israel for criticism or 

called for restrictions on fundamental freedoms, including representatives of 

Iran, Libya, Cuba, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, 

Indonesia, Qatar, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Egypt, Lebanon, 

Yemen, Bahrain, Tunisia, Bangladesh, Switzerland, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Arab League, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and 

a number of other organizations and countries. 

(27) During Durban II, several speakers who sought to draw attention to genuine instances of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, related intolerance, 

and human rights violations by the governments of Iran, Libya, and China were 

repeatedly interrupted by the delegations from those governments and instructed by the conference’s chair to not refer specifically to those governments. 

(28) On December 18, 2009, the United Nations General Assembly approved 

Resolution A/RES/64/148, which urged the ‘‘full and effective implementation of 

the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action’’ and called for a ‘‘one-day 

plenary event to commemorate the ten-year anniversary [of Durban I] during 

the high-level segment of the General Assembly to be devoted to racism, racial 

discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance during its sixty-fifth session, in 2011’’. The United States, joined by 12 other nations, voted against this 

resolution. 

(29) On December 24, 2010, the United Nations General Assembly adopted 

Resolution A/RES/65/240, authorizing the holding of a ‘‘one-day high-level meeting of the General Assembly to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, at the level of Heads 

of State and Government, on the second day of the general debate of the sixtysixth session’’ in September of 2011. The resolution also states that the meeting 

(commonly referred to as ‘‘Durban III’’) will adopt a ‘‘political declaration aimed 

at mobilizing political will at the national, regional, and international levels for 

the full and effective implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action and its follow-up processes.’’. The resolution also requests 

that the United Nations Secretary General ‘‘establish a programme of outreach, 

with the involvement of Member States and United Nations funds and programmes as well as civil society, including non-governmental organizations, to 

appropriately commemorate the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action.’’ The resolution also requests that 

‘‘the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the 

Department of Public Information of the Secretariat . . . launch a public information campaign for the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action’’. The United States, 

joined by 21 other nations, voted against this resolution. 

(30) The Government of Canada announced that it would not participate in 

the Durban III meeting. Canadian Minister of Citizenship, Immigration, and 

Multiculturalism Jason Kenney stated that ‘‘Our government has lost faith in 

the entire tainted Durban process. Canada will not participate in this charade 

any longer. We will not lend our country’s good name to a commemoration of 

what has widely been characterized as a hatefest . . . Canada is clearly committed to the fight against racism, but the Durban process commemorates an 

agenda that actually promotes racism rather than combats it.’’. 

(31) The Government of Israel announced that it would not participate in the 

Durban III meeting, stating that ‘‘Israel is part of the international struggle 

against racism. The Jewish people was itself a victim of racism throughout history. Israel regrets that a resolution on an important subject—elimination of 

racism—has been diverted and politicized by the automatic majority at the UN, 

by linking it to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (2001) that 

many states would prefer to forget. The Durban Conference of 2001, with its 


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antisemitic undertones and displays of hatred for Israel and the Jewish World, 

left us with scars that will not heal quickly . . . Under the present circumstances, as long as the [Durban III] meeting is defined as part of the infamous ‘Durban process’, Israel will not participate . . .’’. 

(32) On June 2, 2011, the United States publicly announced that it would not 

participate in the Durban III meeting. The Department of State’s deputy 

spokesman stated that the ‘‘Durban process includes displays of intolerance and 

anti-Semitism, and we don’t want to see that commemorated. In our conversations about this commemoration, we’ve not seen the kind of progress that we 

think is indicative. We remain unconvinced that the conference is moving in a 

new direction.’’. 

(33) The Governments of Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 

France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, and the 

United Kingdom also did not participate in the Durban III meeting. 

(34) On September 22, 2011, at the Durban III meeting, the United Nations 

General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/66/3, a ‘‘political declaration’’ 

which ‘‘[r]eaffirm[ed] that the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action... 

and the outcome document of [Durban II]. . . are a comprehensive United Nations framework and solid foundation for combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance’’, ‘‘[r]ecall[ed] that the aim of [Durban 

III] is to mobilize political will at the national, regional and international levels 

and reaffirm our political commitment to the full and effective implementation 

of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action and the outcome document 

of [Durban II], and their follow-up processes, at all these levels’’, and 

‘‘welcome[d] the continued engagement of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to incorporate the implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action into the United Nations system’’. 

(35) On September 22, 2011, the White House Press Secretary stated that 

‘‘Since its inception. . . the Durban process has included ugly displays of intolerance and anti-Semitism. . . Last December, the United States voted against 

the resolution establishing [Durban III] because we did not want to see the 

hateful and anti-Semitic displays of the 2001 Durban Conference commemorated. Over the last few months, we did not participate in negotiations on [Durban III’s] Political Declaration document and, like many other countries, we 

were not present when the Declaration was adopted. We are also deeply disappointed that the rules established for credentialing non-governmental organizations to participate were used by some delegations to silence voices critical 

of the Durban process.’’. 

(36) Durban I, Durban II, Durban III, and their preparatory and follow-on activities, have made little or no demonstrable contribution to combating racism, 

racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance. 

(37) To date, several million dollars from the United Nations regular budget 

has been expended on Durban I, Durban II, Durban III, and their preparatory 

and follow-on activities. 

(38) The United States is the largest contributor to the United Nations system, and is assessed for a full 22 percent of the United Nations regular budget, 

which is funded by assessed contributions from Member States. 

(39) Funding for Durban I, Durban II, Durban III, and their preparatory and 

follow-on activities through the United Nations regular budget has resulted in 

United States taxpayer dollars being used for those purposes. 

(40) Congress, through its adoption of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 

2008 (Public Law 110–161) withheld from the United States assessed contribution for fiscal year 2008 to the United Nations regular budget an amount equivalent to the United States share of the United Nations Human Rights Council 

budget, including its share of the Council-administered preparatory process for 

Durban II. 

SEC. 702. SENSE OF CONGRESS; STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that— 

(1) the Durban I, Durban II, and Durban III conferences, and their preparatory and follow-on activities, were subverted by members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and irredeemably distorted into a forum for antiIsrael, anti-Semitic, and anti-freedom activity; 

(2) by walking out of the Durban I conference, and by not participating in the 

Durban II conference, and announcing that it would not participate in the Durban III meeting, the United States Government upheld and reaffirmed the fundamental commitment of the United States to combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance; 


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(3) the Governments of Canada, Israel, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Australia, New Zealand, and the Czech Republic should be commended for 

their decision to not participate or cease participation in the Durban II conference; 

(4) the Governments of Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Italy, New Zealand, Poland, and the United Kingdom should be commended for their decision 

to not participate in Durban III; and 

(5) the Administration should expeditiously and unequivocally announce that 

it will not participate in, support, or legitimize any part of the Durban process. 

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States to— 

(1) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other responsible countries— 

(A) not to participate in, support, legitimize, or fund any part of the Durban process, and 

(B) to withhold from their respective contributions to the regularly assessed biennial budget of the United Nations an amount that is equal to 

the percentage of such respective contributions that they determine would 

be or has been allocated by the United Nations for any part of the Durban 

III meeting or its preparatory or follow-on activities, or for any other part 

of the Durban process; and 

(2) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to explore credible, alternative forums 

for combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance. 

SEC. 703. NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE DURBAN PROCESS. 

None of the funds made available in any provision of law may be used for United 

States participation in any part of the Durban process. 

SEC. 704. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS; REFUND OF UNITED STATES TAXPAYER DOLLARS. 

(a) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS FOR THE DURBAN PROCESS.—The Secretary of State 

shall withhold from the United States contribution to the regular budget of the 

United Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of such contribution that 

the Secretary determines would be or has been expended by the United Nations for 

any part of the Durban I or Durban II conferences, the Durban III meeting, their 

preparatory or follow-on activities, or any other part of the Durban process, including— 

(1) the ‘‘public information campaign for the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action’’ 

requested by United Nations General Assembly Resolution A.RES/65/240; 

(2) the Intergovernmental Working Group on the Effective Implementation of 

the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action; 

(3) the ‘‘group of independent eminent experts on the implementation of the 

Durban Declaration and Programme of Action’’; and 

(4) the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards. 

(b) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS FOR OTHER BIASED AND COMPROMISED ACTIVITIES.— 

Until the Secretary of State submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 

certification, on a case-by-case basis, that the requirements described in subsection 

(d) have been satisfied, the United States shall withhold from the United States contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations an amount that is equal to 

the percentage of such contribution that the Secretary determines has been allocated by the United Nations for any conference, meeting, or other multilateral 

forum, or the preparatory or follow-on activities of any conference, meeting, or other 

multilateral forum, that is organized under the aegis or jurisdiction of the United 

Nations or of any United Nations Entity. 

(c) REFUND OF UNITED STATES TAXPAYER DOLLARS.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Funds appropriated for use as a United States contribution 

to the regular budget of the United Nations but withheld from obligation and 

expenditure pursuant to subsection (a) shall immediately revert to the United 

States Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid to any United 

Nations Entity. 

(2) ALLOWANCE.—Funds appropriated for use as a United States contribution 

to the regularly assessed biennial budget of the United Nations but withheld 

from obligation and expenditure pursuant to subsection (b) may be obligated 

and expended for that purpose upon the certification described in subsection (d). 

Such funds shall revert to the United States Treasury if no such certification 

is made by the date that is one year after such appropriation, and shall not be 

considered arrears to be repaid to any United Nations Entity. 


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(d) CERTIFICATION.—The certification referred to in subsection (b) is a certification 

made by the Secretary of State to the appropriate congressional committees concerning the following: 

(1) The specified conference, meeting, or other multilateral forum did not reaffirm, call for the implementation of, or otherwise support the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (2001) or the outcome document of the Durban 

II conference (2009) or the Durban III meeting (2011). 

(2) The specified conference or forum was not used to single out the United 

States or the State of Israel for unfair or unbalanced criticism. 

(3) The specified conference or forum was not used to propagate racism, racial 

discrimination, anti-Semitism, denial of the Holocaust, incitement to violence or 

genocide, xenophobia, or related intolerance. 

(4) The specified conference or forum was not used to advocate for restrictions 

on the freedoms of speech, expression, religion, the press, assembly, or petition, 

or for restrictions on other fundamental human rights and freedoms. 

(5) The leadership of the specified conference or forum does not include a 

Member State, or a representative from a Member State— 

(A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council; 

(B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation for human rights 

abuses; or 

(C) the government of which the Secretary of State has determined, for 

purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers 

Act), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, section 620A of the Foreign 

Assistance Act of 1961, or other provision of law, is a government that has 

repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. 

TITLE VIII—UNRWA 

SEC. 801. FINDINGS. 

Congress makes the following findings: 

(1) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 302 (1949) created the 

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 

East (UNRWA) with the temporary, strictly humanitarian mandate to ‘‘carry 

out . . . direct relief and works programmes’’ for Palestinian refugees. 

(2) UNRWA has acknowledged that it is the ‘‘only UN agency that reports directly to the UN General Assembly, and whose beneficiary population stems 

from one nation-group’’, and is responsible solely for Palestinian refugees, while 

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is responsible 

for other refugees across the world. 

(3) UNHCR’s definition of a refugee is, in accordance with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, any person who ‘‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership 

of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his 

nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 

of the protection of that country . . .’’. 

(4) UNRWA’s much broader definition of a ‘‘Palestine refugee’’ is any person, 

and his descendants, whose ‘‘normal place of residence was [the former British 

Mandate of] Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who 

lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.’’. 

(5) UNRWA’s overly inclusive definition of a ‘‘Palestine refugee’’ has resulted 

in an increase in UNRWA’s reported number of ‘‘Palestine refugees’’ from under 

one million in 1950 to over 4.5 million today, encompassing multiple generations of descendants of the original Palestinian refugees. 

(6) Hundreds of thousands of ‘‘Palestine refugees’’ are citizens of recognized 

states, including Jordan. 

(7) UNRWA, unlike UNHCR, does not offer refugees the option of resettlement and reintegration into their country of refuge or a third country. Efforts 

by UN officials in the 1950s to offer resettlement and reintegration as an option 

for Palestinian refugees were dropped under fierce opposition from Arab governments, and have not been taken up since. 

(8) Through its overly inclusive definition of a ‘‘Palestine refugee’’ and its refusal to offer refugees the option of resettlement and reintegration, UNRWA 

contributes to the perpetuation of the suffering of Palestinian refugees, who 

have been exploited by Arab governments and Palestinian militant groups for 

over six decades as a political tool with which to assail Israel. 

(9) Almost all of UNRWA’s almost 30,000 staff are Palestinian refugees themselves, presenting a clear conflict of interest. 


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(10) UNRWA’s total annual budget, including its core programs, emergency activities and special projects, exceeds $1 billion. 

(11) The United States has long been the largest single contributing country 

to UNRWA. 

(12) From 1950 to 2010, the United States has contributed almost $3.9 billion 

to UNRWA, including an average of over $210 million per year between fiscal 

years 2007 and 2010. 

(13) Section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2221(c)) 

states that ‘‘No contributions by the United States shall be made to the United 

Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East except on the condition that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency take 

all possible measures to assure that no part of the United States contribution 

shall be used to furnish assistance to any refugee who is receiving military 

training as a member of the so-called Palestine Liberation Army or any other 

guerrilla type organization or who has engaged in any act of terrorism.’’. 

(14) Then-Deputy Secretary of State Jacob J. Lew testified before the House 

Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 13, 2009, that ‘‘We have the highest level 

of scrutiny in terms of UNRWA’’. 

(15) However, in contravention of United States law, UNRWA does not ask 

its personnel or aid recipients if they are members of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. 

(16) Even though the United States remains the largest single contributing 

country to UNRWA, until 2010, UNRWA did not make available its list of staff 

for screening through United States watch lists, including that of the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, refused a United States 

request to do so in 2005, and still does not do so for its list of aid recipients. 

(17) UNRWA claims that it has fulfilled its obligations under section 301(c) 

of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by screening personnel through the 

United Nations Consolidated List pursuant to United Nations Security Council 

Resolution 1267, but the names on that list are largely members of Al-Qaeda 

and the Taliban, not of Palestinian Foreign Terrorist Organizations such as 

Hamas, Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, or Palestinian Islamic Jihad. 

(18) Former UNRWA commissioner-general Peter Hansen, stated in 2004 that 

‘‘I am sure that there are Hamas members on the UNRWA payroll and I don’t 

see that as a crime.’’. 

(19) A number of UNRWA personnel have been discovered to be affiliated 

with Foreign Terrorist Organizations, including, inter alia: 

(A) Issa Batran (now deceased), a commander of Hamas’s al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and senior rocket-maker who taught at an UNRWA school 

in Gaza; 

(B) Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi (now deceased), who reportedly 

carried out a homicide bombing that killed seven Americans and one Jordanian at Forward Operating Base Chapman in Afghanistan on December 

30, 2009, reportedly worked as a physician at an UNRWA clinic in Amman, 

Jordan, and had longstanding ties to violent Islamist extremism; 

(C) Said Siam (now deceased), a longtime Hamas official who eventually 

served as Hamas’s Interior Minister in Gaza, and who taught at an 

UNRWA school in Gaza; 

(D) Awad al-Qiq (now deceased), a rocket-builder for Palestinian Islamic 

Jihad who served as headmaster of an UNRWA school in Gaza; 

(E) Nahd Atallah, an UNRWA staff member in Gaza, who was arrested, 

convicted, and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment by an Israeli military 

court of using his UN travel document to bypass Israeli checkpoints in 

Gaza in order to transport armed Palestinian militants; and 

(F) an UNRWA teacher who reportedly praised homicide bombers and 

permitted Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin (now deceased) to speak to an assembly of students at an UNRWA school. UNRWA did not terminate the 

teacher’s employment, instead only giving him a letter of censure. 

(20) UNRWA staff unions, including the teachers’ union, are frequently controlled by members affiliated with Hamas. 

(21) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay noted in a 2009 report 

that— 

(A) ‘‘UNRWA . . . obviously does not take ‘all possible measures’ in practice’’ to assure that United States contributions do not provide assistance 

to any refugee with ties to Foreign Terrorist Organizations, in accordance 

with section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; 

(B) ‘‘UNRWA makes no attempt to weed out individuals who support extremist positions . . . UNRWA has taken very few steps to detect and 

eliminate terrorists from the ranks of its staff or its beneficiaries, and no 


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steps at all to prevent members of terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, 

from joining its staff.’’; 

(C) ‘‘[I]t is rare for an area staff member . . . to report or confirm that 

another staff member has violated rules against political speech, let alone 

exhibited ties to terrorism. Not surprisingly, external allegations of improper speech or improper use of UNRWA facilities are difficult to prove, 

as virtually no one is willing to be a witness against gang members.’’; and 

(D) ‘‘[T]here are no formal procedures for deregistering or denying services to a properly registered refugee, no matter what he or she does.’’. 

(22) The late Representative Tom Lantos, in a May 13, 2002 letter, expressed 

his concern that— 

(A) ‘‘UNRWA is perpetuating, rather than ameliorating, the situation of 

Palestinian refugees’’; 

(B) ‘‘UNRWA officials have . . . failed to prevent their camps from becoming centers of terrorist activity’’; and 

(C) ‘‘for too long, UNRWA has been part of the problem, rather than the 

solution, in the Middle East . . . UNRWA camps have fostered a culture 

of anger and dependency that undermines both regional peace and the wellbeing of the camps’ inhabitants.’’. 

(23) UNRWA has long held accounts at the Arab Bank and the Commercial 

Bank of Syria (CBS), financial institutions that the United States deems or believes to be complicit in money laundering and terror financing. 

(24) The Arab Bank is reportedly at the center of United States investigations 

into how tens of millions of dollars have flowed to Palestinian groups that allegedly used some of those funds to pay off suicide bombers and their relatives, 

and is also reportedly being sued in Federal court by American victims of attacks in Israel, with attorneys for the victims accusing the bank of facilitating 

Acts of International Terrorism. 

(25) On May 11, 2004, the Department of the Treasury designated CBS as 

a financial institution of ‘‘primary money laundering concern’’ pursuant to section 311 of the USA Patriot Act, stating that ‘‘CBS had been used by terrorists 

and their sympathizers and acted as a conduit for the laundering of proceeds 

generated from the illicit sale of Iraqi oil’’ and that ‘‘numerous transactions that 

may be indicative of terrorist financing and money laundering have been transferred through CBS, including two accounts at CBS that reference a reputed 

financier for Usama bin Laden.’’. 

(26) On August 10, 2011, the Department of the Treasury designated CBS, 

pursuant to Executive Order 13382, for serving as an ‘‘agent for designated Syrian and North Korean proliferators’’. 

(27) CBS is controlled by the Government of Syria, a State Sponsor of Terrorism. 

(28) The curriculum of UNRWA schools, which use the textbooks of their respective host governments or authorities, has long contained materials that are 

anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, and supportive of violent extremism. 

(29) As far back as over forty years ago, former UNRWA commissioner-general Laurence Michelmore admitted that UNRWA schools were supporting a 

‘‘bitterly hostile attitude to Israel.’’. 

(30) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay noted in a January 2009 

report that ‘‘[T]eachers in UNRWA schools were often afraid to remove posters 

glorifying ‘martyrs’ (including suicide bombers) for fear of retribution from 

armed supporters of the ‘martyrs.’ ’’. 

(31) UNRWA officials have compromised UNRWA’s strictly humanitarian 

mandate by engaging in political agitation, propaganda, and advocacy agitation 

against Israel and in favor of Hamas, as reflected by the following, inter alia: 

(A) UNRWA officials have repeatedly called for the United States and 

other nations to deal directly with Hamas and have repeatedly called for 

political ‘‘reconciliation’’ between Hamas and Fatah. 

(B) UNRWA officials have repeatedly castigated Israel for her actions to 

defend innocent civilians from rocket and mortar attacks from violent extremist groups in Gaza and from other Acts of International Terrorism, and 

has repeatedly blamed Israel, not Hamas and other violent extremist 

groups, for present restrictions on access to Gaza. 

(C) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay noted in a 2009 report that: ‘‘Although it occasionally issued mild, pro forma criticisms of Palestinian attacks (most of which were clearly war crimes), [UNRWA] put 

more effort into criticizing Israeli counterterrorism efforts (which were condemned using language associated with war crimes, though any such 

crimes were far from proved) . . . UNRWA never seems to acknowledge 


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that Israel, since its 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, has launched strikes on 

the territory largely in order to halt rocket attacks and other assaults.’’. 

(D) Lindsay also noted that ‘‘UNRWA—through its leaders and press 

spokespersons—is constantly involved in political speech . . . These onesided speeches on political matters do not further the goals of a humanitarian and supposedly nonpolitical agency.’’. 

(E) UNRWA Commissioner-General Filippo Grandi described as a ‘‘massacre’’ Israel’s May 31, 2010 naval operation, and use of self-defense measures, to seize the Mavi Marmara ship in order to enforce its naval blockade 

of the Gaza Strip. 

(F) Former UNRWA commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd stated in a 

2009 meeting with Congressional staff that ‘‘We [UNRWA] are not just humanitarian.’’. 

(G) In January of 2009, UNRWA spokesman Christopher Gunness called 

for an investigation as to whether Israel had committed ‘‘a war crime.’’. 

(H) On December 30, 2008, former UNRWA commissioner-general Karen 

AbuZayd stated that only Israel was responsible for the start of the most 

recent conflict in Gaza. 

(I) On May 25, 2008, in an interview with Press TV, which is controlled 

by the Government of Iran, former UNRWA commissioner-general Karen 

AbuZayd reportedly claimed that Hamas was free from corruption and 

‘‘more popular than ever’’. 

(J) On October 5, 2007, former UNRWA commissioner-general Karen 

AbuZayd blamed Israel for violent extremist groups in Gaza launching 

rockets and mortars against Israeli civilian targets, stating that residents 

of Gaza ‘‘have absorbed—and continue to experience—military incursions in 

which civilian lives, livelihoods, and property have been destroyed, and to 

which they have responded with the continuous firing of Qassam rockets 

into Israel.’’. 

(K) On March 8, 2007, former UNRWA commissioner-general Karen 

AbuZayd, comparing the 1948 Arab-Israeli War with more recent conflicts 

between Israel and Palestinian militant groups, stated that ‘‘[T]here is a 

striking historical continuity in the systematic approach to use overwhelming and disproportionate force in the name of security; to separate 

and exclude Palestinians from the mainstream; to eject them from their 

land; and to occupy Palestinian land.’’. 

(L) On January 19, 2005, former UNRWA commissioner-general Peter 

Hansen stated that ‘‘My job [is] to represent the refugees.’’. 

(M) In 2002, former UNRWA commissioner-general Peter Hansen falsely 

accused Israel of carrying out a ‘‘massacre’’ in UNRWA’s Jenin refugee 

camp after Israeli forces entered the camp, a base of operations for Palestinian militant groups, to carry out defensive operations to halt repeated 

homicide bombings in Israel. 

(N) In 1964, UNRWA allowed its staff to attend the conference in Jerusalem where the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was established. 

(32) Despite UNRWA’s contravention of U.S. law and activities that compromise its strictly humanitarian mandate, UNRWA continues to receive 

United States contributions, including $237.8 million in fiscal year 2010. 

(33) The bilateral ‘‘Framework for Cooperation’’ that the United States concluded with UNRWA for 2010 actually ‘‘commends’’ UNRWA and does not commit UNRWA to vetting its aid recipients through United States watch lists. 

(34) Assistance from the United States and other responsible nations allows 

UNRWA to claim that criticisms of the agency’s behavior are unfounded. 

UNRWA spokesman Christopher Gunness has dismissed concerns by stating 

that ‘‘If these baseless allegations were even halfway true, do you really think 

the U.S. and [European Commission] would give us hundreds of millions of dollars per year?’’. 

(35) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay noted in a 2009 report 

that: 

(A) ‘‘The United States, despite funding nearly 75 percent of UNRWA’s 

national budget and remaining its largest single country donor, has mostly 

failed to make UNRWA reflect U.S. foreign policy objectives . . . Recent 

U.S. efforts to shape UNRWA appear to have been ineffective . . .’’; 

(B) ‘‘[T]he United States is not obligated to fund agencies that refuse to 

check its rolls for individuals their donors do not wish to support.’’; 

(C) ‘‘A number of changes in UNRWA could benefit the refugees, the Middle East, and the United States, but those changes will not occur unless the 

United States, ideally with support from UNRWA’s other main financial 

supporter, the European Union, compels the agency to enact reforms.’’; and 


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(D) ‘‘If the [UNRWA commissioner-general’s] power is used in ways that 

are conflict with the donors’ political objectives, it is up to the donors to 

take the necessary actions to ensure that their interests are respected. 

When they have done so, UNRWA—given the tight financial leash it has 

been on for most of its existence—has tended to follow their dictates, even 

if sometimes slowly.’’. 

(36) The Government of Canada has recently placed restrictions on its contributions to UNRWA, demonstrating consequences for UNRWA’s malfeasance 

and setting an example for the United States and other donor governments. 

SEC. 802. UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRWA. 

Section 301 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by striking subsection (c) and inserting the following new subsection: 

‘‘(c)(1) WITHHOLDING.—Contributions by the United States to the United Nations 

Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), to any 

successor or related entity, or to the regular budget of the United Nations for the 

support of UNRWA or a successor entity (through staff positions provided by the 

United Nations Secretariat, or otherwise), may be provided only during a period for 

which a certification described in paragraph (2) is in effect. 

‘‘(2) CERTIFICATION.—A certification described in this paragraph is a written determination by the Secretary of State, based on all information available after diligent inquiry, and transmitted to the appropriate congressional committees along 

with a detailed description of the factual basis therefor, that— 

‘‘(A) no official, employee, consultant, contractor, subcontractor, representative, or affiliate of UNRWA— 

‘‘(i) is a member of a Foreign Terrorist Organization; 

‘‘(ii) has propagated, disseminated, or incited anti-American, anti-Israel, 

or anti-Semitic rhetoric or propaganda; or 

‘‘(iii) has used any UNRWA resources, including publications or Web 

sites, to propagate or disseminate political materials, including political 

rhetoric regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; 

‘‘(B) no UNRWA school, hospital, clinic, other facility, or other infrastructure 

or resource is being used by a Foreign Terrorist Organization for operations, 

planning, training, recruitment, fundraising, indoctrination, communications, 

sanctuary, storage of weapons or other materials, or any other purposes; 

‘‘(C) UNRWA is subject to comprehensive financial audits by an internationally recognized third party independent auditing firm and has implemented an 

effective system of vetting and oversight to prevent the use, receipt, or diversion 

of any UNRWA resources by any foreign terrorist organization or members 

thereof; 

‘‘(D) no UNRWA-funded school or educational institution uses textbooks or 

other educational materials that propagate or disseminate anti-American, antiIsrael, or anti-Semitic rhetoric, propaganda or incitement; 

‘‘(E) no recipient of UNRWA funds or loans is a member of a Foreign Terrorist 

Organization; and 

‘‘(F) UNRWA holds no accounts or other affiliations with financial institutions 

that the United States deems or believes to be complicit in money laundering 

and terror financing. 

‘‘(3) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

‘‘(A) FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.—The term ‘Foreign Terrorist Organization’ means an organization designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization 

by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219(a) of the Immigration 

and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)). 

‘‘(B) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means— 

‘‘(i) the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Appropriations, and Oversight 

and Government Reform of the House of Representatives; and 

‘‘(ii) the Committees on Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate. 

‘‘(4) EFFECTIVE DURATION OF CERTIFICATION.—The certification described in paragraph (2) shall be effective for a period of 180 days from the date of transmission 

to the appropriate congressional committees, or until the Secretary receives information rendering that certification factually inaccurate, whichever is earliest. In the 

event that a certification becomes ineffective, the Secretary shall promptly transmit 

to the appropriate congressional committees a description of any information that 

precludes the renewal or continuation of the certification. 

‘‘(5) LIMITATION.—During a period for which a certification described in paragraph 

(2) is in effect, the United States may not contribute to the United Nations Relief 


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and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) or a successor 

entity an annual amount— 

‘‘(A) greater than the highest annual contribution to UNRWA made by a 

member country of the League of Arab States; 

‘‘(B) that, as a proportion of the total UNRWA budget, exceeds the proportion 

of the total budget for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR) paid by the United States; or 

‘‘(C) that exceeds 22 percent of the total budget of UNRWA.’’. 

SEC. 803. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

It is the sense of Congress that— 

(1) the President and the Secretary of State should lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other responsible nations to withhold contributions to 

UNRWA, to any successor or related entity, or to the regular budget of the 

United Nations for the support of UNRWA or a successor entity (through staff 

positions provided by the United Nations Secretariat, or otherwise) until 

UNRWA has met the conditions listed in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of section 301(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as added by section 802 

of this Act); 

(2) citizens of recognized states should be removed from UNRWA’s jurisdiction; 

(3) UNRWA’s definition of a ‘‘Palestine refugee’’ should be changed to that 

used for a refugee by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 

Refugees; and 

(4) in order to alleviate the suffering of Palestinian refugees, responsibility for 

those refugees should be fully transferred to the Office of the United Nations 

High Commissioner for Refugees. 

TITLE IX—INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY 

AGENCY 

SEC. 901. TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAM. 

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 

(1) The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 

with the objectives of seeking to ‘‘accelerate and enlarge the contribution of 

atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world’’ and to ‘‘ensure . . . that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision 

or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose.’’. 

(2) The United States, via assessed contributions, is the largest financial contributor to the regular budget of the IAEA. 

(3) In 1959, the IAEA established what is now called the Technical Cooperation Program, financed primarily through voluntary contributions by member 

states to the Technical Cooperation Fund, to provide nuclear technical cooperation (TC) for peaceful purposes to countries worldwide. 

(4) The United States is the largest financial contributor to the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Fund. 

(5) A March 2009 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

found that ‘‘neither [the Department of State] nor IAEA seeks to systematically 

limit TC assistance to countries the United States has designated as state sponsors of terrorism—Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria—even though under U.S. law 

these countries are subject to sanctions.’’. 

(6) The GAO report also found that ‘‘Together, [Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria] 

received more than $55 million in TC assistance from 1997 through 2007.’’. 

These four countries have received continued assistance since 2007. 

(7) The GAO report also found that ‘‘proliferation concerns about the [Technical Cooperation Program] have persisted because of the assistance it has provided to certain countries and because nuclear equipment, technology, and expertise can be dual-use—capable of serving peaceful purposes . . . but also useful in contributing to nuclear weapons development.’’. 

(8) The GAO report also found that ‘‘[The State Department] reported in 2007 

that three TC projects in [Iran] were directly related to the Iranian nuclear 

power plant at Bushehr.’’. 

(9) The GAO report also found that ‘‘The proliferation concerns associated 

with the [Technical Cooperation Program] are difficult for the United States to 

fully identify, assess, and resolve . . . [because] there is no formal mechanism 

for obtaining TC project information during the proposal development phase . 

. . [l]imited [Department of] State documentation on how proliferation concerns 


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of TC proposals were resolved . . . [and s]hortcomings in U.S. policies and IAEA 

procedures [including monitoring proliferation risks] related to TC program fellowships.’’. 

(10) The GAO report noted that ‘‘IAEA officials told us that the [Technical 

Cooperation Program] does not attempt to exclude countries on the basis of 

their status as U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism or other political considerations’’ and that, according to the Deputy Director General for the Technical Cooperation Program, ‘‘there are no good countries and there are no bad 

countries’’ with respect to provision of technical cooperation by the IAEA. 

(11) The GAO report also found that ‘‘given the limited information available 

on TC projects and the dual-use nature of some nuclear technologies and expertise, we do not believe [the State Department] can assert with complete confidence that TC assistance has not advanced [weapons of mass destruction] programs in U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism’’. 

(12) The GAO report also found that ‘‘we do not share [the State Department’s confidence in IAEA’s internal safeguards to prevent TC projects from 

contributing to weapons development . . .]’’. 

(13) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) prohibited 

any of the funds authorized to be appropriated for ‘‘International Organizations 

and Programs’’ from being made available for the United States proportionate 

share for programs for Libya, Iran, Cuba, or the Palestine Liberation Organization, inter alia. 

(14) The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1998 (Public Law 105–118) prohibited any of the funds made 

available by such Act for the IAEA from being made available for programs and 

projects of the IAEA in Cuba. 

(15) The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (Public Law 

105–277) required the United States to withhold a proportionate share of funding to the IAEA for projects in Cuba regarding the Juragua Nuclear Power 

Plant and the Pedro Pi Nuclear Research Center. 

(16) The GAO report asked Congress ‘‘to consider directing [the State Department] to withhold a share of future annual contributions to the [Technical Cooperation Fund] that is proportionate to the amount of funding provided from 

the fund for U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism and other countries of 

concern, noting that such a withholding is a matter of fundamental principle 

and intended to foster a more consistent U.S. policy toward such nations’’. 

(17) The IAEA has repeatedly reported that the Government of Iran continues 

its work on heavy water-related projects and its enrichment of uranium, in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 

1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010). 

(18) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) decided ‘‘that 

technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices shall 

only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or other humanitarian purposes 

[inter alia] . . . but that no such technical cooperation shall be provided that 

relates to . . . proliferation sensitive nuclear activities . . .’’. 

(19) The IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on 

February 25, 2011 that the Government of Iran now has approximately 7,000 

centrifuges for enriching uranium, is running almost 5,000 of them, and has increased its stockpile of low-enriched uranium to over 3,600 kilograms, considered sufficient for further enrichment into enough high-enriched uranium for 

more than one atomic bomb. The Government of Iran has also reportedly produced a stockpile of over 40 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 20 percent 

U–235. 

(20) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to the IAEA Board 

of Governors, including in his report of February 25, 2011, about the ‘‘outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme’’. 

(21) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to the IAEA Board 

of Governors, including in his report of February 25, 2011, that ‘‘the [IAEA] remains concerned about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military-related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.’’. 

(22) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to the IAEA Board 

of Governors, including in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘Iran has not 

implemented the Additional Protocol, which is a prerequisite for [the IAEA] to 

provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material 

and activities. Nor has [Iran] agreed to [the IAEA’s] request that Iran provide, 

as a transparency measure, access to additional locations related, inter alia, to 

the manufacturing of centrifuges, research and development on uranium enrichVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:48 Dec 09, 2011 Jkt 019006 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\HR323.XXX HR323

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ment, and uranium mining and milling, as also required by the Security Council.’’. 

(23) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly reported to the IAEA Board 

of Governors, including in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘as a result of 

the continued lack of cooperation by Iran in connection with . . . issues which 

give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme, [the IAEA] has made no substantive progress on these issues.’’. 

(24) Iran has refused to comply with resolutions adopted by the IAEA Board 

of Governors on September 12, 2003, November 26, 2003, March 15, 2004, June 

18, 2004, November 29, 2004, August 11, 2005, September 24, 2005, February 

4, 2006, and July 31, 2006, regarding ‘‘Iran’s many failures and breaches of its 

obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement’’ and continues to 

block IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities, in violation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement. 

(25) According to multiple news reports, Iran recently denied access to its enrichment site at Natanz to IAEA inspectors, and has also denied a request by 

the IAEA to place one or more additional surveillance cameras at the enrichment site at Natanz. 

(26) In April of 2008, United States Government officials publicly revealed 

that Syria was building at the Dair Alzour site, with North Korea’s assistance, 

a secret nuclear reactor that was based on a North Korean model capable of 

producing plutonium for nuclear weapons and that was weeks away from becoming operational before an Israeli air strike reportedly destroyed the reactor 

in September 2007. 

(27) On April 28, 2008, General Michael Hayden, the former Director of the 

Central Intelligence Agency, stated that the Syrian reactor at Dair Alzour could 

have produced enough plutonium for 1 or 2 bombs within a year of becoming 

operational. 

(28) The IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on 

November 19, 2008 that the Syrian facility at Dair Alzour bore features that 

resembled those of an undeclared nuclear reactor, adding that ‘‘Syria has not 

yet provided the requested documentation in support of its declarations concerning the nature or function of the destroyed building, nor agreed to a visit 

to the three other locations which the IAEA has requested to visit.’’. 

(29) The IAEA Director General publicly stated to the IAEA Board of Governors, on June 15, 2009, that ‘‘the limited information and access provided by 

Syria to date have not enabled the Agency to determine the nature of the destroyed facility’’ at Dair Alzour site, that uranium particles have been found in 

samples taken from a second site, the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor facility 

in Damascus, and that the particles found at both sites ‘‘are of a type not included in Syria’s declared inventory of nuclear material.’’. 

(30) Commercial satellite photos published on February 23, 2011, indicate efforts by the Government of Syria to conceal its activities at an additional site, 

Marj as Sultan, which may be connected to the Dair Alzour facility. 

(31) The IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board of Governors on 

February 25, 2011 that ‘‘Syria has not cooperated with the [IAEA] since June 

2008 in connection with the unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site 

and the other three locations allegedly functionally related to it. As a consequences, the [IAEA] has not been able to make progress towards resolving the 

outstanding issues related to those sites.’’. 

(b) PROHIBITION.—No funds from any United States assessed or voluntary contribution to the IAEA may be used to support any assistance provided by the IAEA 

through its Technical Cooperation program to any country, including North Korea 

that— 

(1) is a country the government of which has been determined by the Secretary of State, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 

1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms 

Export Control Act, or other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism; 

(2) is in breach of or noncompliance with its obligations regarding— 

(A) its safeguards agreement with the IAEA; 

(B) the Additional Protocol; 

(C) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; 

(D) any relevant United Nations Security Council Resolution; or 

(E) the Charter of the United Nations; or 

(3) is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance with the obligations specified in paragraph (2). 

(c) WITHHOLDING OF VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS.—Not later than 30 days after 

the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall withhold from 


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the United States voluntary contribution to the IAEA an amount proportional to 

that spent by the IAEA in the period from 2007 to 2008 on assistance through its 

Technical Cooperation Program to countries described in subsection (b). 

(d) WITHHOLDING OF ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS.—If, not later than 30 days of the 

date of the enactment of this Act, the amount specified in subsection (c) has not 

been withheld and the IAEA has not suspended all assistance provided through its 

Technical Cooperation Program to the countries described in subsection (b), an 

amount equal to that specified in subsection (c) shall be withheld from the United 

States assessed contribution to the IAEA. 

(e) WAIVER.—The provisions in subsections (c) and (d) may be waived if— 

(1) the IAEA has suspended all assistance provided through its Technical Cooperation Program to the countries described in subsection (b); or 

(2) the President certifies that the countries described in subsection (b) no 

longer pose a threat to the national security, interests, and allies of the United 

States. 

(f) UNITED STATES ACTIONS AT IAEA.—The President shall direct the United 

States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence 

of the United States at the IAEA to block the allocation of funds for any assistance 

provided by the IAEA through its Technical Cooperation Program to any country described in subsection (b). 

(g) REPORT.—Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this 

Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the implementation of this section. 

SEC. 902. UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE IAEA. 

(a) ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE.— 

(1) OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE.— 

(A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to 

use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to establish an Office of Compliance in the Secretariat of the IAEA. 

(B) OPERATION.—The Office of Compliance shall— 

(i) function as an independent body composed of technical experts 

who shall work in consultation with IAEA inspectors to assess compliance by IAEA Member States and provide recommendations to the 

IAEA Board of Governors concerning penalties to be imposed on IAEA 

Member States that fail to fulfill their obligations under IAEA Board 

resolutions; 

(ii) base its assessments and recommendations on IAEA inspection 

reports; and 

(iii) take into consideration information provided by IAEA Board 

Members that are 1 of the 5 nuclear weapons states as recognized by 

the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 483) 

(commonly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’’ or the 

‘‘NPT’’). 

(C) STAFFING.—The Office of Compliance shall be staffed from existing 

personnel in the Department of Safeguards of the IAEA or the Department 

of Nuclear Safety and Security of the IAEA. 

(2) COMMITTEE ON SAFEGUARDS AND VERIFICATION.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, 

vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to ensure that the Committee on Safeguards and Verification established in 2005 shall develop and 

seek to put into force a workplan of concrete measures that will— 

(A) improve the ability of the IAEA to monitor and enforce compliance by 

Member States of the IAEA with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and 

the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency; and 

(B) enhance the ability of the IAEA, beyond the verification mechanisms 

and authorities contained in the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards 

Agreements between the IAEA and Member States of the IAEA, to detect 

with a high degree of confidence undeclared nuclear activities by a Member 

State. 

(3) PENALTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE IAEA.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 

United States at the IAEA to ensure that a Member State of the IAEA that 

is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations 

has its privileges suspended, including— 

(i) limiting its ability to vote on its case; 


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(ii) being prevented from receiving any technical assistance; and 

(iii) being prevented from hosting meetings. 

(B) TERMINATION OF PENALTIES.—The penalties specified under subparagraph (A) shall be terminated when such investigation is concluded and 

such Member State is no longer in such breach or noncompliance. 

(4) PENALTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY.— The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the 

IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to 

ensure that a Member State of the IAEA that is found to be in breach of, in 

noncompliance with, or has withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty shall return to the IAEA all nuclear materials and technology received from 

the IAEA, any Member State of the IAEA, or any Member State of the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty. 

(b) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.— (1) VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS.—Voluntary contributions of the United States 

to the IAEA should primarily be used to fund activities relating to Nuclear Safety and Security or activities relating to Nuclear Verification. 

(2) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The President shall direct the United 

States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to— 

(A) ensure that funds for safeguards inspections are prioritized for countries that have newly established nuclear programs or are initiating nuclear 

programs; and 

(B) block the allocation of funds for any other IAEA development, environmental, or nuclear science assistance or activity to a country— 

(i) the government of which the Secretary of State has determined, 

for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, 

section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the 

Arms Export Control Act, or other provision of law, is a government 

that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism 

and the government of which the Secretary has determined has not dismantled and surrendered its weapons of mass destruction programs 

under international verification; 

(ii) that is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance with 

its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the Charter of 

the United Nations; or 

(iii) that is in violation of its IAEA obligations or the purposes and 

principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 

(3) DETAIL OF EXPENDITURES.—The President shall direct the United States 

Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of 

the United States at the IAEA to secure, as part of the regular budget presentation of the IAEA to Member States of the IAEA, a detailed breakdown by 

country of expenditures of the IAEA for safeguards inspections and nuclear security activities. 

(c) MEMBERSHIP.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent 

Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 

States at the IAEA to block the membership on the Board of Governors of the 

IAEA for a Member State of the IAEA that has not signed and ratified the Additional Protocol and— 

(A) is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA 

obligations or the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; or 

(B) that is in violation of its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 

(2) CRITERIA.—The United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA 

shall make every effort to modify the criteria for Board membership to reflect 

the principles described in paragraph (1). 

(d) SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOL.—The President shall direct the United States 

Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 

United States at the IAEA to make every effort to ensure that the IAEA changes 

the policy regarding the Small Quantities Protocol in order to— 

(1) rescind and eliminate the Small Quantities Protocol; 

(2) require that any IAEA Member State that has previously signed a Small 

Quantities Protocol to sign, ratify, and implement the Additional Protocol, provide immediate access for IAEA inspectors to its nuclear-related facilities, and 

agree to the strongest inspections regime of its nuclear efforts; and 

(3) require that any IAEA Member State that does not comply with paragraph 

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ance from any IAEA Member State and subject to the penalties described in 

subsection (a)(3). 

(e) NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF IRAN AND SYRIA.— (1) UNITED STATES ACTION.—The President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 

United States at the IAEA to make every effort to ensure the adoption of a resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors that, in addition to the restrictions already imposed, makes Iran and Syria ineligible to receive any nuclear material, 

technology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA Member State and ineligible for any IAEA assistance not related to safeguards inspections or nuclear 

security until the IAEA Board of Governors determines that Iran or Syria, as 

the case may be— 

(A) is providing full access to IAEA inspectors to its nuclear-related facilities; 

(B) has fully implemented and is in compliance with the Additional Protocol; and 

(C) has permanently ceased and dismantled all activities and programs 

related to nuclear-enrichment and reprocessing. 

(2) PENALTIES.—If an IAEA Member State is determined to have violated the 

prohibition on assistance to Iran or Syria described in paragraph (1) before the 

IAEA Board of Governors determines that Iran or Syria, as the case may be, 

has satisfied the conditions described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of such 

paragraph, such Member State shall be subject to the penalties described in 

subsection (a)(3), shall be ineligible to receive nuclear material, technology, 

equipment, or assistance from any IAEA Member State, and shall be ineligible 

to receive any IAEA assistance not related to safeguards inspections or nuclear 

security until such time as the IAEA Board of Governors makes such determination with respect to Iran or Syria, as the case may be. 

(f) REPORT.—Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of this Act 

and annually for 2 years thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate 

congressional committees a report on the implementation of this section. 

SEC. 903. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ACTION PLAN OF THE 

IAEA. 

It is the sense of Congress that the national security interests of the United 

States are enhanced by the Nuclear Security Action Plan of the IAEA and the Board 

of Governors should recommend, and the General Conference should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear Security Action Plan into the regular budget of the 

IAEA. 

TITLE X—PEACEKEEPING 

SEC. 1001. REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. 

It is the sense of Congress that— 

(1) although United Nations peacekeeping operations have contributed greatly 

toward the promotion of peace and stability for over 6 decades and the majority 

of peacekeeping personnel who have served under the United Nations flag have 

done so with honor and courage, the record of United Nations peacekeeping has 

been severely tarnished by operational failures and unconscionable acts of misconduct; 

(2) in response to such failures, successive Secretaries General of the United 

Nations have launched numerous reform efforts, including the high-level Panel 

on United Nations Peace Operations, led by former Foreign Minister of Algeria 

Lakhdar Brahimi, the 2005 report by the Special Advisor on the Prevention of 

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, His Royal Highness Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid AlHussein of Jordan, and the 2009 New Partnership Agenda, known as the ‘‘New 

Horizon’’ reports; 

(3) despite the fact that the United Nations has had over a decade to implement many of these reforms, nearly four years to implement the reforms in the 

Zeid Report, and the fact that Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, his predecessor 

Kofi Annan, and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations repeatedly 

have expressed their commitment ‘‘to implementing fundamental, systematic 

changes as a matter of urgency,’’ a number of critical reforms continue to be 

blocked or delayed by Members States who arguably benefit from maintenance 

of the status quo; 

(4) further, audits of procurement practices in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, conducted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, and 

the now-defunct United Nations Procurement Task Force have uncovered ‘‘sigVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:48 Dec 09, 2011 Jkt 019006 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\HR323.XXX HR323

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nificant’’ corruption schemes and criminal acts by United Nations peacekeeping 

personnel; and 

(5) if the reputation of and confidence in United Nations peacekeeping operations is to be restored, fundamental and far-reaching reforms, particularly in 

the areas of planning, management, procurement, training, conduct, and discipline, must be implemented without further delay. 

SEC. 1002. POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. 

It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue reform of United Nations 

peacekeeping operations in the following areas: 

(1) PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT.— 

(A) GLOBAL AUDIT.—As the size, cost, and number of United Nations 

peacekeeping operations have increased substantially over the past decade, 

independent audits of each such operation should be conducted annually, 

with a view toward ‘‘right-sizing’’ operations and ensuring that all operations are efficient and cost effective. 

(B) PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPARENCY.—The logistics established within 

the United Nations Department of Field Support should be streamlined and 

strengthened to ensure that all peacekeeping missions are resourced appropriately, transparently, and in a timely fashion while individual accountability for waste, fraud and abuse within United Nations peacekeeping missions is uniformly enforced. 

(C) REVIEW OF MANDATES AND CLOSING OPERATIONS.—In conjunction with 

the audit described in subparagraph (A), the United Nations Department 

of Peacekeeping Operations should conduct a comprehensive review of all 

United Nations peacekeeping operation mandates, with a view toward identifying objectives that are practical and achievable, and report its findings 

to the Security Council. In particular, the review should consider the following: 

(i) Except in extraordinary cases, including genocide, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations should not be tasked 

with activities that are impractical or unachievable without the cooperation of the Member State(s) hosting a United Nations peacekeeping operation, or which amount to de-facto Trusteeship outside of 

the procedures established for such under Chapter XII of the United 

Nations Charter, thereby creating unrealistic expectations and obfuscating the primary responsibility of the Member States themselves in 

creating and maintaining conditions for peace. 

(ii) Long-standing operations that are static and cannot fulfill their 

mandate should be downsized or closed. 

(iii) Where there is legitimate concern that the withdrawal from a 

country of an otherwise static United Nations peacekeeping operation 

would result in the resumption of major conflict, a burden-sharing arrangement that reduces the level of assessed contributions, similar to 

that currently supporting the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in 

Cyprus, should be explored and instituted. 

(D) LEADERSHIP.—As peacekeeping operations become larger and increasingly complex, the Secretariat should adopt a minimum standard of qualifications for senior leaders and managers, with particular emphasis on specific skills and experience, and current senior leaders and managers who 

do not meet those standards should be removed. 

(E) PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING.—Pre-deployment training on interpretation of the mandate of the operation, specifically in the areas of use of force, 

civilian protection and field conditions, the Code of Conduct, HIV/AIDS, and 

human rights should be mandatory, and all personnel, regardless of category or rank, should be required to sign an oath that each has received 

and understands such training as a condition of participation in the operation. 

(F) GRATIS MILITARY PERSONNEL.—The General Assembly should seek to 

strengthen the capacity the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 

Operations and ease the extraordinary burden currently placed upon the 

limited number of headquarters staff by lifting restrictions on the utilization of gratis military personnel by the Department so that the Department 

may accept secondments from Member States of military personnel with expertise in mission planning, logistics, and other operational specialties. 

(2) CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE.— 

(A) ADOPTION OF A UNIFORM CODE OF CONDUCT.—A single, uniform Code 

of Conduct that has the status of a binding rule and applies equally to all 

personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of 


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category or rank, including military personnel, should be adopted and incorporated into legal documents governing participation in such an operation, 

including all contracts and Memorandums of Understanding, promulgated 

and effectively enforced. 

(B) UNDERSTANDING THE CODE OF CONDUCT.—All personnel, regardless of 

category or rank, should receive training on the Code of Conduct prior to 

deployment with a peacekeeping operation, in addition to periodic follow-on 

training. In particular— 

(i) all personnel, regardless of category or rank, should be provided 

with a personal copy of the Code of Conduct that has been translated 

into the national language of such personnel, regardless of whether 

such language is an official language of the United Nations; 

(ii) all personnel, regardless of category or rank, should sign an oath 

that each has received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that each pledges 

to abide by the Code of Conduct, and that each understands the consequences of violating the Code of Conduct, including immediate termination of participation in and permanent exclusion from all current and 

future peacekeeping operations, as well as the assumption of personal 

liability and victims compensation, where appropriate, as a condition of 

appointment to any such operation; and 

(iii) peacekeeping operations should continue and enhance educational outreach programs to reach local communities where peacekeeping personnel of such operations are based, including explaining 

prohibited acts on the part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel 

and identifying the individual to whom the local population may direct 

complaints or file allegations of exploitation, abuse, or other acts of 

misconduct. 

(C) MONITORING MECHANISMS.—Dedicated monitoring mechanisms, such 

as the Conduct and Discipline Teams already deployed to support United 

Nations peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Sudan, Kosovo, Liberia, Lebanon, 

Timor Leste, Cote d’Ivoire, Western Sahara, and the Democratic Republic 

of Congo, should be present in each operation to monitor compliance with 

the Code of Conduct, and should report simultaneously to the Head of Mission, the United Nations Department of Field Support, the United Nations 

Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the Associate Director of the 

Office of Internal Oversight Services for Peacekeeping Operations (established under section 1114(b)(9)). 

(D) INVESTIGATIONS.—A permanent, professional, and independent investigative body should be established and introduced into United Nations 

peacekeeping operations. In particular— 

(i) the investigative body should include professionals with experience 

in investigating sex crimes and the illegal exploitation of resources, as 

appropriate, as well as experts who can provide guidance on standards 

of proof and evidentiary requirements necessary for any subsequent 

legal action; 

(ii) provisions should be included in all Memorandums of Understanding, including a Model Memorandum of Understanding, that obligate Member States that contribute troops to a peacekeeping operation 

to designate a military prosecutor who will participate in any investigation into credible allegations of misconduct brought against an individual of such Member State, so that evidence is collected and preserved in a manner consistent with the military law of such Member 

State; 

(iii) the investigative body should be regionally based to ensure rapid 

deployment and should be equipped with modern forensics equipment 

for the purpose of positively identifying perpetrators and, where necessary, for determining paternity; and 

(iv) the investigative body should report directly to the Associate Director of the Office of Internal Oversight Services for Peacekeeping Operations, while providing copies of any reports to the Department of 

Field Support, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Head 

of Mission, and the Member State concerned. 

(E) FOLLOW-UP.—The Conduct and Discipline Unit in the headquarters of 

the United Nations Department of Field Support should be appropriately 

staffed, resourced, and tasked with— 

(i) promulgating measures to prevent misconduct; 

(ii) receiving reports by field personnel and coordinating the Department’s response to allegations of misconduct; 


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(iii) gathering follow-up information on completed investigations, particularly by focusing on disciplinary actions against the individual concerned taken by the United Nations or by the Member State that is 

contributing troops to which such individual belongs, and sharing such 

information with the Security Council, the Department of Peacekeeping 

Operations, the Head of Mission, and the community hosting the peacekeeping operation; and 

(iv) contributing pertinent data on conduct and discipline to the database required pursuant to subparagraph (H). 

(F) FINANCIAL LIABILITY AND VICTIMS ASSISTANCE.—Although peacekeeping operations should provide immediate medical assistance to victims 

of sexual abuse or exploitation, the responsibility for providing longer-term 

treatment, care, or restitution lies solely with the individual found guilty 

of the misconduct. In particular: 

(i) The United Nations should not assume responsibility for providing 

long-term treatment or compensation under the Sexual Exploitation 

and Abuse Victim Assistance Mechanism by utilizing assessed contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations, thereby shielding individuals from personal liability and reinforcing an atmosphere of impunity. 

(ii) If an individual responsible for misconduct has been repatriated, 

reassigned, redeployed, or is otherwise unable to provide assistance, responsibility for providing assistance to a victim should be assigned to 

the Member State that contributed the contingent to which such individual belonged or to the manager concerned. 

(iii) In the case of misconduct by a member of a military contingent, 

appropriate funds shall be withheld from the troop contributing country 

concerned. 

(iv) In the case of misconduct by a civilian employee or contractor of 

the United Nations, appropriate wages shall be garnished from such individual or fines shall be imposed against such individual, consistent 

with existing United Nations Staff Rules, and retirement funds shall 

not be shielded from liability. 

(G) MANAGERS AND COMMANDERS.—The manner in which managers and 

commanders handle cases of misconduct by those serving under them 

should be included in their individual performance evaluations, so that 

managers and commanders who take decisive action to deter and address 

misconduct are rewarded, while those who create a permissive environment 

or impede investigations are penalized or relieved of duty, as appropriate. 

(H) DATABASE.—A centralized database, including personnel photos, fingerprints, and biometric data, should be created and maintained within the 

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of 

Field Support, and other relevant United Nations bodies without further 

delay to track cases of misconduct, including the outcome of investigations 

and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel who have engaged 

in misconduct or other criminal activities, regardless of category or rank, 

are permanently barred from participation in future peacekeeping operations. 

(I) COOPERATION OF MEMBER STATES.—If a Member State routinely refuses to cooperate with the directives contained herein or acts to shield its 

nationals from personal liability, that Member State should be barred from 

contributing troops or personnel to future peacekeeping operations. 

(J) WELFARE.—Peacekeeping operations should continue to seek to maintain a minimum standard of welfare for mission personnel to ameliorate 

conditions of service, while adjustments are made to the discretionary welfare payments currently provided to Member States that contribute troops 

to offset the cost of operation-provided recreational facilities, as necessary 

and appropriate. 

SEC. 1003. CERTIFICATION. 

(a) NEW OR EXPANDED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS CONTINGENT UPON PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS REFORMS.— 

(1) NO NEW OR EXPANDED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.— 

(A) CERTIFICATION.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), until the 

Secretary of State certifies that the requirements described in paragraph 

(2) have been satisfied, the President shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations to oppose the creation of 

new, or expansion of existing, United Nations peacekeeping operations. 


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(B) EXCEPTION AND NOTIFICATION.—The requirements described under 

paragraph (2) may be waived with respect to a particular peacekeeping operation if the President determines that failure to deploy new or additional 

peacekeepers in such situation will significantly contribute to the widespread loss of human life, genocide, or the endangerment of a vital national 

security interest of the United States. If the President makes such a determination, the President shall, not later than 15 days before the exercise of 

such waiver, notify the appropriate congressional committees of such determination and resulting waiver. 

(2) CERTIFICATION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS REFORMS.—The certification 

referred to in paragraph (1) is a certification made by the Secretary to the appropriate congressional committees that the following reforms, or an equivalent 

set of reforms, related to peacekeeping operations have been adopted by the 

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations or the General Assembly, as appropriate: 

(A) A single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the status of a binding 

rule and applies equally to all personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of category or rank, has been adopted by the 

General Assembly and duly incorporated into all contracts and a Model 

Memorandum of Understanding, and mechanisms have been established for 

training such personnel concerning the requirements of the Code and enforcement of the Code. 

(B) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, serving in a peacekeeping operation have been trained concerning the requirements of the 

Code of Conduct and each has been given a personal copy of the Code, 

translated into the national language of such personnel. 

(C) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, are required to sign an 

oath that each has received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that each 

pledges to abide by the Code, and that each understands the consequences 

of violating the Code, including immediate termination of participation in 

and permanent exclusion from all current and future peacekeeping operations, as well as the assumption of personal liability for victims compensation as a condition of the appointment to such operation. 

(D) All peacekeeping operations have designed and implemented educational outreach programs to reach local communities where peacekeeping 

personnel of such operations are based to explain prohibited acts on the 

part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and to identify the individual to whom the local population may direct complaints or file allegations of exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct. 

(E) The creation of a centralized database, including personnel photos, 

fingerprints, and biometric data, has been completed and is being maintained in the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations that 

tracks cases of misconduct, including the outcomes of investigations and 

subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel, regardless of category or 

rank, who have engaged in misconduct or other criminal activities are permanently barred from participation in future peacekeeping operations. 

(F) A Model Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations 

and each Member State that contributes troops to a peacekeeping operation 

has been adopted by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations that specifically obligates each such Member State to— 

(i) uphold the uniform Code of Conduct which shall apply equally to 

all personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of category or rank; 

(ii) designate a competent legal authority, preferably a prosecutor 

with expertise in the area of sexual exploitation and abuse where appropriate, to participate in any investigation into an allegation of misconduct brought against an individual of such Member State; 

(iii) refer to its competent national or military authority for possible 

prosecution, if warranted, any investigation of a violation of the Code 

of Conduct or other criminal activity by an individual of such Member 

State; 

(iv) report to the Department of Field Support and the Department 

of Peacekeeping Operations on the outcome of any such investigation; 

(v) undertake to conduct on-site court martial proceedings, where 

practical and appropriate, relating to allegations of misconduct alleged 

against an individual of such Member State; and 

(vi) assume responsibility for the provision of appropriate assistance 

to a victim of misconduct committed by an individual of such Member 

State. 


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(G) A professional and independent investigative and audit function has 

been established within the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 

Operations and the Office of Internal Oversight Services to monitor United 

Nations peacekeeping operations. 

SUMMARY

Title I—Funding of the United Nations: 

States the policy of the U.S. to pursue shifting the UN regular 

budget to a voluntary basis (rather than the current assessed 

basis). This will allow the U.S. to fund only UN agencies and programs that advance U.S. interests and values, and the resulting 

competition among UN entities for funding will likely make those 

entities more transparent, accountable, and effective. This title 

gives the UN two years after this bill’s enactment date to phase in 

this reform before the U.S. is required to withhold funds. However, 

after two years, should less than 80% of the UN regular budget be 

funded on a voluntary basis, then the U.S. shall, until the 80% 

threshold is met, withhold 50% of its non-voluntary regular budget 

contributions assessed by the UN. Note that this creates a sliding 

incentive scale, not an ‘‘all-or-nothing’’ sanction: The more the UN 

makes its regular budget voluntary, the less we withhold, up until 

the UN hits 80% voluntary funding, at which point there would be 

no withholdings. 

Title II—Transparency and Accountability for U.S. Contributions to 

the United Nations: 

Authorizes the Secretary of State to investigate and audit the 

use of U.S. contributions to the UN, and makes funding of UN entities contingent upon their providing the Secretary with written 

pledges to cooperate in sharing basic oversight information with 

the Secretary and Congress and to operate in a fully accountable 

manner (including by taking a number of specific measures to ensure accountability), and complying with those pledges. Also protects Congress’s role in determining funding levels to UN entities, 

by prohibiting U.S. contributions to the UN from being used for 

any purpose other than the specific purposes for which it was made 

available by Congress (for example, funds made available for assessed contributions could not be used for voluntary contributions 

and vice versa). Also makes it U.S. policy to seek repayment to the 

U.S. Treasury of any overpayments made to any UN entity, and to 

seek reform of the UN Tax Equalization Fund. 

Title III—U.S. Policy at the United Nations: 

States U.S. policy on various issues relating to the UN (e.g., 

transparency, reform, Security Council expansion, terrorism, antiSemitism, treatment of Israel, Taiwan, positions of human rights 

violators at the UN) and requires reports from the State Department on UN reform and personnel practices. 

Title IV—Status of Palestinian Entities at the United Nations: 

Opposes efforts by the Palestinian leadership to evade a negotiated settlement with Israel and undermine opportunities for 

peace by seeking de facto recognition of a Palestinian state by the 

UN (through gaining membership for ‘‘Palestine’’ in UN agencies or 

programs). Withholds U.S. contributions from any UN agency or 


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program that upgrades the status of the PLO/Palestinian observer 

mission. 

Title V—United Nations Human Rights Council: 

States that the U.S. may not run for a seat on the Council, and 

must withhold a proportionate share of our UN regular budget contribution equal to our proportion of Council funding, until State can 

certify that the Council does not include Members: subject to Security Council sanctions; under Security Council-mandated human 

rights investigation; that are state sponsors of terrorism; or that 

are ‘‘countries of particular concern’’ for religious freedom violations. 

Title VI—Goldstone Report: 

Declares it is U.S. policy to lead a high-level diplomatic campaign 

calling for the UN to revoke and repudiate the Goldstone Report, 

which falsely accused Israel of deliberately attacking Palestinian 

civilians during Operation Cast Lead. Would also withhold U.S. 

funding from the Goldstone Report and its preparatory and followon measures. Also declares it is U.S. policy to strongly and unequivocally oppose any consideration, legitimization, or support of 

the Goldstone Report, or measures stemming from the report, in 

international organizations, and to encourage other nations to repudiate the report. 

Title VII—Durban Process: 

Withholds U.S. funding from any part of the UN’s irreparably 

flawed Durban process, which was supposed to fight racism and 

bigotry, but which has been hijacked by rogue regimes and used to 

advance an anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, anti-Western, anti-freedom 

agenda. Supports the decision of the U.S. and other countries to 

not participate in the Durban 2 and 3 conferences. States that it 

is U.S. policy to lead a high-level diplomatic campaign to encourage 

other countries not to participate in, fund, or legitimize any part 

of the Durban process, and to develop credible alternative forums 

to fight racism and bigotry. Prohibits funding for U.S. participation 

in any part of the Durban process. 

Title VIII—UNRWA: 

Prohibits U.S. funding to the United Nations Relief and Works 

Agency, which aids Palestinian refugees. Despite failing to meet 

the requirements under U.S. law to obtain assistance, UNRWA has 

received about $500 million in FY 2009 and 2010 alone, with over 

$230 million in further funding included in the Administration’s 

FY 2012 budget request. The prohibition on funding would remain 

until UNRWA: vets its staff and aid recipients via U.S. watch lists 

for ties to Foreign Terrorist Organizations; stops engaging in antiIsrael propaganda and politicized activities; improves its accountability and transparency; and stops banking with financial institutions under U.S. designation for terror financing or money laundering. 

Title IX—International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): 

Directs the U.S. Permanent Representative to the IAEA to advance a number of reforms at the organization, including measures 


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to strengthen the IAEA’s ability to monitor member states’ compliance with their obligations and ensure that states not in compliance do not receive nuclear-related assistance from the IAEA or 

other countries. Withholds U.S. funding from the IAEA in proportion to the amount the IAEA spends on technical assistance to 

state sponsors of terrorism, like Iran and Syria. 

Title X—Peacekeeping: 

Calls for far-reaching reforms in the areas of planning, management, conduct and accountability in UN peacekeeping, and mandates U.S. opposition to new or expanded peacekeeping missions 

until the most critical, but immediately achievable, reforms are instituted (subject to a Presidential waiver based on vital U.S. national security interests or to prevent genocide or other widespread 

loss of human life). States it is U.S. policy to promote the conduct 

of independent, annual audits of each peacekeeping operation to 

guarantee that all missions are efficient and cost effective. Promotes the review of all peacekeeping operation mandates with a 

view toward identifying objectives that are practical and achievable. Addresses misconduct and sexual exploitation by personnel 

associated with peacekeeping missions by supporting the introduction of pre-deployment training, the adoption of a code of conduct, 

and the establishment of an investigative body to probe allegations 

of wrongdoing. 

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

Since the United States took a leading role in the founding of the 

United Nations in 1945, the U.S. has strongly engaged in the UN 

to advance U.S. interests and values, and to hold the UN accountable to its founding mission. Unfortunately, the UN continues to 

fall far short of the noble goals for which it was founded, and the 

UN’s failures continue to have real and adverse consequences for 

American citizens, interests, and allies. It is precisely because of 

the significance of the UN that reforming it is such an urgent priority. Accordingly, the United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 2011 seeks to implement lessons learned 

from past UN reform efforts by the U.S. in order to pave the way 

for new action to make the UN more transparent, accountable, objective, and effective. 

The fundamental problem with the UN is that it consumes more 

and more U.S. taxpayer dollars each year, and then uses American 

contributions to fund activities that undermine U.S. interests and 

values. According to the Office of Management and Budget, in Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, the U.S. contributed a record $7.692 billion to 

the UN system—over 21 percent more than the previous year’s 

total, which had also been a record. U.S. annual contributions to 

the UN system have more than doubled in the past decade. These 

dramatic funding increases—even at a time of skyrocketing deficits 

and debt for the U.S. Government—reflect similar dramatic increases in the UN’s budget. The UN’s ‘‘regular budget’’ (its biennial 

operating budget) has more than doubled in the past decade, from 

$2.49 billion in 2000–2001 to $5.16 billion in 2010–2011. As Ambassador Joseph Torsella, the U.S. Representative to the UN for 

Management and Reform, has stated, ‘‘For a decade now, the 

United Nations regular budget has grown dramatically, relentVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:48 Dec 09, 2011 Jkt 019006 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR323.XXX HR323

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lessly, and exponentially.’’ Likewise, the UN’s biennial peacekeeping budget has more than quadrupled in the past decade, from 

$1.7 billion in 2000–2001 to $7.2 billion in 2010–2011. 

In return for their tax dollars, the American people received a 

UN that continues to be pervaded by non-transparency, malfeasance, mismanagement, corruption, waste, fraud, abuse, and bias. 

For example, the UN’s ‘‘Oil-for-Food’’ program, intended to address 

the humanitarian needs of ordinary Iraqis, was exploited by Saddam Hussein’s regime, which used it to evade economic sanctions 

and, according to the Government Accountability Office, ‘‘obtain[ed] 

illicit revenues ranging from $7.4 billion to $12.8 billion.’’ A UNappointed ‘‘Independent Inquiry Committee’’ headed by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker (the ‘‘Volcker Committee’’) accused the former director of the ‘‘Oil-for-Food’’ program of taking 

bribes in exchange for steering program contracts to an Egyptian 

businessman. That official was later indicted in the Southern District of New York for bribery, wire fraud, and conspiracy to commit 

wire fraud and theft or bribery. In 2005, the Volcker Committee 

found that ‘‘the cumulative management performance of the [UN] 

Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General fell short of the 

standards that the [UN] should strive to maintain.’’ Consequently, 

the Volcker Committee made six major recommendations for UN 

reform, noting: ‘‘The inescapable conclusion from the Committee’s 

work is that the [UN] needs thoroughgoing reform—and it needs 

it urgently . . . real change must take place, and change over a 

wide area . . . To settle for less, to permit delay and dilution, 

would be to invite failure. It would, in reality, further erode public 

support, undercut effectiveness, and dishonor the ideals upon 

which the United Nations is built.’’ 

This Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 

also investigated the ‘‘Oil-for-Food’’ program, releasing on December 7, 2005 a report entitled: ‘‘The Oil-for-Food Program: The Systemic Failure of the United Nations.’’ The report stated: ‘‘Problems 

associated with the [‘‘Oil-for-Food’’ program] are not isolated or 

unique to that particular UN-administered program. The [program], and the myriad of problems associated with it, are symptomatic of a pervasive mismanagement and failure of leadership at 

the UN . . . Without a successful effort by the UN to create a culture of accountability and transparency, the ability of the organization to perform its core functions will be undermined.’’ 

Another example of the need for UN reform was the ‘‘Cash-forKim’’ scandal at the UN Development Program (UNDP) office in 

North Korea. In 2008, a Senate subcommittee found that: (1) 

UNDP’s local staff was selected by the North Korean regime, and 

UNDP paid staff salaries directly to the regime—in foreign currency—with no way to know that the funds were not being diverted 

to enrich the regime; (2) UNDP prevented proper oversight and undermined whistleblower protections by limiting access to its audits 

and refusing to submit them to the UN Ethics Office’s jurisdiction; 

(3) the regime used its relationship with UNDP to move money outside North Korea; and (4) UNDP transferred funds to a company 

tied to an entity designated by the U.S. as North Korea’s financial 

agent for weapons sales. 

In March of 2011, Ambassador Mark Wallace, former U.S. Representative to the UN for Management and Reform, testified before 


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this Committee that ‘‘UNDP . . . was acting in violation of its own 

rules and regulations and had served as a large and steady source 

of hard currency to [North Korea] and Kim Jong Il’s regime. In addition to hard currency, we discovered that dual-use equipment on 

the U.S. Commerce Control List were sent to North Korea without 

UNDP obtaining proper licenses for re-export in contravention of 

U.S. export control laws. We discovered that a number of other fiduciary controls related to the hiring and management of local personnel and project oversight had been grossly neglected. Most troubling, in the course of our investigation, a whistleblower that had 

cooperated with both the U.S. Mission as well as the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, was mistreated by UNDP 

management in retaliation for raising legitimate concerns about 

UNDP’s operations in North Korea.’’ 

In the wake of this scandal, UNDP briefly pulled out of North 

Korea, but it later returned and continues to select staff from a list 

of candidates hand-picked by the North Korean regime. 

In another example illustrative of the need for immediate action 

to address the UN’s failures, an independent Procurement Task 

Force (PTF) uncovered cases of corruption tainting hundreds of millions of dollars in UN contracts. In response, the UN shut down the 

PTF, transferring its functions and open cases to the UN’s Office 

of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), which has largely failed to 

continue the PTF’s work. When the former head of OIOS, UnderSecretary-General Inga-Britt Ahlenius, attempted to hire the chairman of the PTF, former U.S. prosecutor Robert Appleton (who later 

appeared before this Committee in a briefing on UN reform in January of 2011), as OIOS’s lead investigator, UN Secretary-General 

Ban Ki-moon blocked the appointment. As Ahlenius’s term in office 

neared its conclusion, she stated in an internal report (later leaked) 

to Secretary-General Ban that, with respect to the UN, ‘‘There is 

no transparency, there is lack of accountability. Rather than supporting the internal oversight which is the sign of strong leadership 

and good governance, you have strived to control it which is to undermine its position. I do not see any signs of reform in the [UN].’’ 

Unsurprisingly, Secretary-General Ban has not released 

Ahlenius’s report to the public, despite direct Congressional requests to do so. Former UN Deputy-Secretary-General Mark 

Malloch Brown has also stated that ‘‘There’s a huge redundancy 

and lack of efficiency’’ in the UN system and that the UN’s budget 

is ‘‘utterly opaque, un-transparent, and completely in shadow.’’ 

The UN has also continued to single out one country—the democratic, Jewish State of Israel—for condemnation. The UN Human 

Rights Council—the majority of whose members are not free democracies, and include many repressive regimes—has devoted the 

plurality of its country-specific resolutions and special sessions to 

attacking Israel, and the Council’s sole country-specific agenda 

item focuses on condemnation of Israel. 

The UN’s Durban process, including the ‘‘Durban III’’ meeting 

held at the UN General Assembly in September of 2011, continues 

to single out Israel and implicitly accuse it of racism against the 

Palestinians. The UN General Assembly also continues to pass 

multiple resolutions each year condemning Israel, and multiple UN 

bodies function for the sole purpose of propagandizing against 

Israel for purported human rights abuses against the Palestinians. 


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Finally, many UN bodies continue to be tarnished by the presence of authoritarian regimes in positions of leadership. The Cuban 

dictatorship is the vice chair of the Human Rights Council, Iran is 

a vice president of the General Assembly and a member of the 

Commission on the Status of Women, and North Korea and Cuba 

recently chaired the Conference on Disarmament, to cite but a few 

examples. 

This UN bias against democracies has real-world consequences. 

For example, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), in contravention of its obligations under the Oslo Accords, has chosen to 

bypass direct negotiations with Israel and instead seek de facto recognition of a ‘‘Palestinian state’’ by the UN via the granting of 

membership in UN bodies to ‘‘Palestine.’’ While the PLO’s application for UN membership remains pending before the UN Security 

Council, the General Conference of the UN Educational, Scientific, 

and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) recently voted to grant full 

membership in UNESCO to ‘‘Palestine.’’ In addition to discrediting 

the UN itself, this step has further undermined chances for peace 

and security in the Middle East, has rewarded Palestinian rejection 

of direct negotiations and recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, 

and has set a dangerous precedent by granting to a non-state actor 

privileges previously reserved for sovereign states. 

That the UN is in dire need of reform is not in dispute. The question is how to achieve such reform. According to Ambassador Susan 

Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, the Obama Administration has embarked on a ‘‘new era of engagement’’ regarding the UN, marked by unconditional and full payment of U.S. assessed contributions to the UN in the hope that such payments will 

increase U.S. influence. As Ambassador Rice said, ‘‘We pay our 

bills. We push for real reform.’’ 

This ‘‘money now, reform later’’ strategy has failed. For example, 

the Administration has rightfully urged the UN to cut its budget 

and cancel a planned pay raise for UN personnel. Instead, the UN 

is poised to go through with the pay raise and increase the UN regular budget for the next biennium. As Ambassador Torsella said, 

this budget increase ‘‘does not represent a break from ‘business as 

usual,’ but rather a continuation of it.’’ 

Likewise, in the six years since the Volcker Committee released 

its recommendations for sweeping reforms, such reforms have not 

been forthcoming. The Congressional Research Service, in a communication to the Committee earlier this year, stated that ‘‘Based 

on the information we have to date, it appears that many of the 

Volcker recommendations have not been implemented . . . there 

are many recommendations in the report that have not been implemented (creating a COO position, distinguishing Secretariat/Security Council roles, and overhauling management and hiring practices, to name a few) . . . [and] of those recommendations that appear to have been implemented, it’s difficult to determine whether 

they came about because of the Volcker report. Moreover, there is 

some disagreement as to whether these newly implemented management reforms are actually effective.’’ 

The Obama Administration also decided to seek to reform the 

Human Rights Council from within by joining it. However, the 

Council’s ‘‘five-year review,’’ which concluded earlier this year, 

failed to enact any of the structural reforms, such as meaningful 


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membership standards, that are needed to turn the Council from 

a rogues’ gallery to a useful entity for advancing human rights. The 

Council’s abominable permanent agenda item regarding Israel also 

remained in place. The Administration itself called the review process a ‘‘race to the bottom.’’ The Council has continued to adopt one 

anti-Israel resolution after another. And the Council generally continues to fail to address longstanding human rights violations until 

and unless the perpetrating regimes are already extraordinarily 

isolated and the violations have become so blatant and public that 

inaction becomes impossible to justify politically. For example, the 

Council included Qaddafi’s Libyan regime as a member until that 

regime began murdering Libyans in the streets in the spring of 

2011; the Syrian regime was also poised to become a member of the 

Council until it likewise ramped up its public brutality earlier this 

year. The longstanding human rights violations perpetrated by the 

Qaddafi and Assad regimes for decades prior to this year did not 

lead to any action by the Council, and the Council still has failed 

to act to condemn abuses by China, Cuba, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, 

etc. U.S. membership has not reformed the Council in any lasting, 

strategic way, but it has legitimized a fundamentally illegitimate 

body that the New York Times once called ‘‘an ugly sham, offering 

cover to an unacceptable status quo.’’ 

Likewise, the Obama Administration’s ‘‘new era of engagement’’ 

failed to prevent UNESCO from voting to grant membership to 

‘‘Palestine.’’ 

A fundamental lesson has not been learned: The reason the U.S. 

pays so much to the UN and gets such backwards results in return 

is that at the UN, the member countries that call the shots do not 

have to pay the bills. The UN’s main source of budgetary funding 

is assessed (mandatory) contributions. The U.S. is assessed 22 percent of the cost of the UN’s regular budget. In contrast, two-thirds 

of the member countries together pay a total of less than one percent of the regular budget. But they can and do vote together to 

adopt bloated and skyrocketing budgets and deplorable programming decisions, and then pass the costs on the principal donor 

countries, such as the U.S. Because the Administration pays U.S. 

assessed contributions in full, with no strings attached, the U.S. 

has surrendered its strongest leverage to actually advance our interests, support our allies, and achieve reforms at the UN. 

As long as other countries and UN bureaucrats know that the 

U.S. will pay every cent of its dues, no matter what, there is no 

incentive for real, sweeping, and lasting reforms. At the UN, the 

deck is stacked against the U.S. A game-changer is needed, and 

that game-changer is H.R. 2829, the United Nations Transparency, 

Accountability, and Reform Act. 

This legislation builds on lessons learned by conditioning U.S. 

funding to the UN on a number of vital reforms and other actions 

needed to advance U.S. interests. The most important reform is to 

shift the funding basis for the UN regular budget from assessed to 

voluntary contributions, so that U.S. taxpayers, through their elected representatives in Congress, can choose how much of their tax 

dollars go to the UN and what those dollars are spent on. A shift 

to voluntary funding will help end the UN’s entitlement culture 

and thereby force UN bodies to perform better and cut costs in 


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order to justify their budgets in a competitive funding environment—basic free market principles. 

This voluntary funding model works for the UN Children’s Fund 

(UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and other UN agencies, and it can work for the 

UN as a whole. As Catherine Bertini, the former head of the World 

Food Program, has said, ‘‘Voluntary funding creates an entirely different atmosphere at WFP than at the UN. At WFP, every staff 

member knows that we have to be as efficient, accountable, transparent, and results-oriented as is possible. If we are not, donor governments can take their funding elsewhere in a very competitive 

world among UN agencies, NGOs, and bilateral governments.’’ 

Shifting more of the UN’s funding to a voluntary basis has been 

advocated by many other advocates for UN reform. Ambassador 

John Bolton, former U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, 

stated that ‘‘[O]nly one UN reform is worth the effort, and without 

it nothing else will succeed: Voluntary contributions must replace 

assessed contributions. If America insisted it would pay only for 

what works, and that we get what we pay for, we would revolutionize life throughout the UN system. There is simply no doubt 

that eliminating the ‘entitlement’ mentality caused by relying on 

assessed contributions would profoundly affect UN officials around 

the world.’’ He has also stated that ‘‘Contrary to the claims of those 

who oppose moving toward voluntary funding, such a system would 

not necessarily threaten UN activities. Many independent UN-affiliated funds, programs, and specialized agencies currently work 

well relying on voluntary funding. Such funding has remained fairly stable from year to year, with donor nations consistently and reliably providing money for activities that they support. Indeed, in 

many cases, voluntary funding has increased sharply. Almost without exception, only voluntarily funded activities that fail to meet 

donor expectations of performance experience reductions in funding 

levels. This type of financial accountability is precisely what is 

needed at the UN.’’ 

Similarly, Ambassador Wallace testified before the Committee 

that ‘‘[M]any of the UN’s best performing agencies do so because 

they have to actually compete with their counterparts in the world 

of nongovernmental organizations . . . The United States should 

strongly consider promoting the application of this [voluntary] 

funding model to other UN agencies. Contrary to what some critics 

have suggested, this will not necessarily result in the United States 

abandoning the United Nations . . . Given the inability of the UN 

to reduce superfluous mandates and implement the most basic performance requirements for many agencies, it is time for Member 

States, and by extension the taxpayers, to begin imposing those 

standards ourselves. It is time for agencies within the UN community to know that, in many cases, there is competition. The net 

winners will be not only Member States, but the people many of 

these agencies are designed to help in the first place.’’ 

Brett Schaefer, an expert on the United Nations at the Heritage 

Foundation, testified before the Committee that ‘‘Shifting activities 

funded currently through assessed budgets to voluntary funding 

would make it easier for Congress to support the programs that it 

wishes and withhold funding for those it does not. Having U.N. organizations compete for funding would also contribute to efficiency 


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and effectiveness and improve responsiveness to member state requests. With this in mind, Congress should: Seek to shift funding 

for U.N. activities and organizations from assessed budgets to voluntary contributions.’’ 

And in 2005, the bipartisan Gingrich-Mitchell Task Force on the 

United Nations concluded that ‘‘The United States should work 

with other member-states to identify which of the operational programs now receiving funds from the assessed budget should be 

funded entirely by voluntary contributions . . . Many UN programs . . . might function better if funded entirely by voluntary 

contributions . . . having them rely entirely on voluntary contributions imposes a kind of market discipline, forcing them to produce 

results in order to receive continued funding.’’ 

To achieve this reform of shifting to a voluntary funding basis, 

as well as several other vital reforms throughout the UN system, 

this legislation ties U.S. contributions for the UN to the implementation of these reforms. This is a common-sense approach: If person 

A contracts with person B for the provision of a service to person 

A, but person B does not meet basic, minimum standards in providing that service, then person A could withhold payment until he 

gets what he contracted for. If, instead, person A pays his bills to 

person B on time and in full, as the Executive Branch does to the 

UN, then he will never get what he actually paid for. For years— 

for decades—the UN has defaulted on its founding purposes and 

obligations, and thus has been in breach of contract with the 

United States. 

Some have claimed that that withholding assessed contributions 

to the UN would violate U.S. treaty obligations, or that this method simply does not work and would lead to diminished U.S. leadership in the world. However, past experience proves otherwise. 

Withholding of assessed contributions to the UN does not constitute a violation of treaty obligations. Article 17(2) of the UN 

Charter states that ‘‘The expenses of the [UN] shall be borne by 

the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.’’ However, 

in the 1957 case of Reid v. Covert, the Supreme Court ruled that 

‘‘[A]n Act of Congress, which must comply with the Constitution, 

is in full parity with a treaty, and that when a statute which is 

subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the 

extent of conflict renders the treaty null.’’ Therefore, whenever 

Congress has enacted legislation requiring withholding of U.S. assessed contributions to the UN, those statutory requirements have 

superseded U.S. treaty obligations. 

Further, as Thomas E.L. Dewey of the Heritage Foundation 

wrote in 1986, ‘‘[I]t has not been established convincingly that any 

nation has an absolute obligation . . . to pay an assessed contribution to the United Nations... The reality is that withholding assessed contributions is a longstanding and near universal practice 

since the founding of the U.N.’’ 

The United States cannot be expected to bind itself, against its 

interests, to treaty provisions that have been nullified by international practice (not to mention U.S. law). The Executive Branch 

has previously recognized this point. In 1965, during the Johnson 

Administration, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, U.S. Permanent 

Representative to the UN and a former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, announced, with the acquiescence of Congress, what 


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is commonly referred to as the ‘‘Goldberg Reservation.’’ Ambassador Goldberg stated that ‘‘. . . if any member can insist on making an exception to the principle of collective financial responsibility with respect to certain activities of the organization, the 

United States reserves the same option to make exceptions to the 

principles of collective financial responsibility if, in our view, strong 

and compelling reasons exist for doing so. There can be no double 

standard among the members of the [UN].’’ As Ambassador Goldberg later wrote in the late 1980s to one of his successors as Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, 

‘‘. . . there can be no question that under the ‘Goldberg Reservation’ the United States reserves the right to withhold assessments 

for UN activities which, in our opinion, do not serve our national 

purpose.’’ 

Having determined that withholding assessed contributions does 

not violate treaty obligations, the remaining question is whether 

this method works. The answer is yes. 

In the 1980s, a Democratic House of Representatives and a Republican Senate enacted the Kassebaum-Solomon amendment, 

which conditioned payment of 20 percent of U.S. assessed contributions to the UN regular budget and specialized agencies on the implementation of reforms in voting on budgets. Key reforms in this 

regard were achieved and, for over a decade, helped to restrain the 

growth of UN budgets. When the U.S. later acquiesced in the abandonment of these budgetary reforms, UN budgets predictably skyrocketed. 

In 1993, Congress conditioned funding for the UN on the UN 

General Assembly’s creation of an inspector general for oversight. 

The next year, the General Assembly created OIOS, an imperfect 

body that has, nonetheless, aided somewhat in addressing the UN’s 

pervasive problems. 

In the late 1990s, Senators Jesse Helms and Joe Biden worked 

together to draft legislation, adopted by Congress, that conditioned 

payment of U.S. arrears to the UN on the implementation of real, 

meaningful reforms that saved U.S. taxpayers money. 

Another prominent example of successful ‘‘smart withholding’’ 

spans over two decades. In 1989, Yasser Arafat’s PLO sought de 

facto recognition of a ‘‘Palestinian state’’ from the UN via the 

granting of membership in UN agencies, including UNESCO and 

the World Health Organization (WHO), to ‘‘Palestine.’’ This campaign looked unstoppable until the George H.W. Bush Administration threatened, in the words of Secretary of State James A. Baker, 

‘‘that the United States [would] make no further contributions, voluntary or assessed, to any international organization which makes 

any change in the P.L.O.’s present status as an observer organization.’’ UN agencies recognized that their funding was in danger and 

quickly deferred indefinitely action on the PLO’s membership application. Instead of weakening U.S. leadership abroad, the George 

H.W. Bush Administration’s readiness to set meaningful and real 

standards for the payment of U.S. contributions to the UN 

strengthened America’s hand in advancing U.S. interests and protecting U.S. allies at the UN. That Administration went on to 

achieve many other successes at the UN, including multiple key 

UN Security Council resolutions against Saddam Hussein’s regime 


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in Iraq, as well as the UN General Assembly’s repeal in 1991 of 

its infamous ‘‘Zionism is racism’’ resolution. 

Two separate Democratic Congresses adopted legislation to support the George H.W. Bush Administration’s position with respect 

to the status of the PLO at the UN. In 1990, Congress adopted the 

Foreign Relations Authorization Act for 1990 and 1991, which included a provision stating that ‘‘No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or any other Act shall be available for the 

United Nations or any specialized agency thereof which accords the 

Palestine Liberation Organization the same standing as member 

states.’’ Likewise, in 1994, Congress adopted the Foreign Relations 

Authorization Act for 1994 and 1995, which included a provision 

stating that ‘‘The United States shall not make any voluntary or 

assessed contribution—(1) to any affiliated organization of the 

United Nations which grants full membership as a state to any organization or group that does not have the internationally recognized attributes of statehood, or (2) to the United Nations, if the 

United Nations grants full membership as a state in the United 

Nations to any organization or group that does not have the internationally recognized attributes of statehood, during any period in 

which such membership is effective.’’ Each of the two bills originated in the Committee and were both authored by the Committee’s chairman. 

Fast-forwarding to this year, the Obama Administration’s rhetoric did not stop UNESCO from granting membership to ‘‘Palestine.’’ Indeed, it appeared likely that other UN bodies would soon 

follow suit, despite extensive U.S. diplomacy in opposition. Then, 

on October 31, 2011, after the General Conference of UNESCO cast 

its fateful vote in this regard, the Obama Administration announced that it would implement the aforementioned U.S. laws 

and stop contributions to UNESCO. This use of ‘‘smart withholding’’ provoked exactly the kind of reaction that U.S. law intended. UN Secretary-General Ban, who had previously posed with 

PLO leader Abu Mazen when the latter presented his application 

for UN membership, sharply changed course and stated that Palestinian efforts to join other UN agencies are ‘‘not beneficial for Palestine and not beneficial for anybody.’’ At the time of this report, 

it is unclear if the PLO will continue to pursue membership in 

other UN agencies in the face of strong opposition from forces 

which would normally not stand in the way of anti-Israel measures 

but are afraid of the repercussions for U.S. funding of the UN. 

In short, at the UN, money talks, and smart withholding works. 

It is time to apply this principle across the UN system in order to 

achieve reforms in the interest of the American people, American 

allies, and all responsible nations. The United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act does just that. 

HEARINGS

During the present Congress, the full Committee has held numerous sessions on United Nations reform, including the following: 

January 25, 2011, ‘‘The United Nations: Urgent Problems that 

Need Congressional Action.’’ (Brett Schaefer, Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs, the Margaret Thatcher 

Center for Freedom, the Heritage Foundation; Robert AppleVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:48 Dec 09, 2011 Jkt 019006 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR323.XXX HR323

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ton, former chairman of the United Nations Procurement Task 

Force; Claudia Rosett, Journalist-in-Residence, the Foundation 

for Defense of Democracies; Hillel C. Neuer, Executive Director, UN Watch; Peter Yeo, Vice President for Public Policy and 

Public Affairs, the United Nations Foundation and Executive 

Director, the Better World Campaign; and Mark Quarterman, 

Senior Adviser and Director, Program on Crisis, Conflict, and 

Cooperation, the Center for Strategic and International Studies) 

March 3, 2011, ‘‘Reforming the United Nations: Lessons Learned.’’ 

(Hon. Mark D. Wallace, President and Chief Executive Officer, 

United Against Nuclear Iran, and former United States Representative to the United Nations for Management and Reform; Hon. Terry Miller, Director of the Center for International Trade and Economics, the Heritage Foundation, and 

former United States Representative to the United Nations 

Economic and Social Council, United States Observer at the 

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and 

Global Issues; and Ted Piccone, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director for Foreign Policy, the Brookings Institution) 

April 7, 2011, ‘‘Reforming the United Nations: The Future of U.S. 

Policy.’’ (Hon. Susan Rice, U.S. Permanent Representative to 

the United Nations) 

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION AND VOTES

On October 13, 2011, the Foreign Affairs Committee marked up 

the bill, H.R. 2829, pursuant to notice, in open session. 

1) The Committee considered en bloc and adopted by unanimous consent five amendments: An amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by the Chairman, three amendments offered by Mr. Connolly, and one amendment offered 

by Mr. Fortenberry. 

2) An amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by the 

Ranking Member, Mr. Berman, was not agreed to, by voice 

vote. 

H.R. 2829, as amended, was agreed to by Roll Call vote of 23 

ayes—15 noes. 

Voting YES: Ros-Lehtinen, Smith (NJ), Burton, Gallegly, Rohrabacher, Manzullo, Royce, Chabot, Wilson (SC), Mack, McCaul, 

Poe, Bilirakis, Schmidt, Johnson (OH), Rivera, Kelly, Griffin, 

Marino, Duncan (SC), Buerkle, Ellmers, and Turner. 

Voting NO: Berman, Ackerman, Payne, Sherman, Engel, Meeks, 

Carnahan, Connolly, Deutch, Cardoza, Higgins, Schwartz, Bass 

(FL), Keating, and Cicilline. 

COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of House Rule XIII, the Committee reports that the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of House 

Rule X, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report, 

particularly the ‘‘Background and Purpose,’’ ‘‘Summary,’’ and ‘‘Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion’’ sections. 


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NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY AND TAX EXPENDITURES

In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate of new budget authority, entitlement authority, and tax expenditures or revenues contained in 

the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional 

Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget 

Act of 1974. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

U.S. CONGRESS, 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 

Washington, DC, November 18, 2011. 

Hon. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Chairman, 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MADAM CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has 

prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2829, the United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 2011. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Sunita D’Monte, who can 

be reached at 226–2840. 

Sincerely, 

DOUGLAS W. ELMENDORF. 

cc: Honorable Howard L. Berman 

Ranking Member 

H.R. 2829—United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 2011 

As ordered reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

on October 13, 2011 

H.R. 2829 would require the Department of State to increase its 

oversight of the United Nations (U.N.) and would withhold assessed and voluntary contributions to the U.N. and its entities if 

certain conditions are not met. 

The department conducts oversight of the U.N. and most of its 

entities through the U.N. Transparency and Accountability Initiative. H.R. 2829 would impose new oversight requirements on the 

department. Under the bill, the department would be required to 

obtain and maintain certain annual certifications from each U.N. 

entity that receives U.S. funding. In addition, the department 

would be required to report to the Congress in several instances, 

including: 

• If an entity refuses or delays an inquiry by the department 

related to a certification or does not comply with its certification; 

• If an entity or one of its employees, contractors, or representatives violates federal criminal law; 

• If there is mismanagement, misfeasance, or malfeasance 

within an entity justifying disciplinary action; 

• Regarding how entities spend U.S. contributions; and 


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• Detailing an itemized budget request for U.S. contributions 

to the U.N. regular budget. 

Based on information from the department, CBO estimates that 

to implement the bill the State Department would hire two additional people at an annual cost of less than $500,000, which would 

increase discretionary costs by $2 million over the 2012–2016 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts. 

The bill would withhold contributions to the U.N. and its entities 

if certain conditions—such as funding the U.N.’s regular budget 

through voluntary contributions instead of assessments—are not 

met. Under current law, there are no existing appropriations or 

specified authorizations of appropriations provided for 2012 or future years for contributions to the U.N. or its entities. Therefore, 

CBO would not attribute any savings to the bill’s provision that 

might result in withholding future contributions. 

Enacting the bill would not affect direct spending or revenues; 

therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. 

H.R. 2829 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would 

impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Sunita D’Monte. The 

estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis. 

GENERAL PERFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

As explained more specifically in the narrative portions of this 

report (Background and Purpose, Summary, and Section-by-Section 

Analysis and Discussion), the principal goal of H.R. 2829 is to obtain greater transparency and accountability in the funding and 

management of the United Nations, to ensure that the U.S. taxpayer dollars provided to UN system entities are in fact serving the 

values and interests of the United States. To that end, among other 

things, the bill: Seeks to shift the funding for the UN regular budget from an assessed to a voluntary basis; requires basic oversight 

cooperation from UN system entities as a condition of U.S. funding; 

withholds U.S. contributions from any UN agency or program that 

grants de facto recognition of a Palestinian state outside of a negotiated settlement with Israel; precludes U.S. funding to and participation in the UN Human Rights Council until certain basic reforms 

are certified; withholds U.S. funding from any part of the UN’s 

flawed Durban conference process; precludes U.S. funding to the 

UN Relief and Works Agency until certain basic reforms are certified; and seeks basic reforms of the International Atomic Energy 

Agency and UN Peacekeeping. 

NEW ADVISORY COMMITTEES

H.R. 2829 does not establish or authorize any new advisory committees. 

CONGRESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

H.R. 2829 does not apply to the Legislative Branch. 


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EARMARK IDENTIFICATION

H.R. 2829 does not contain any congressional earmarks, limited 

tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits as defined in clauses 9(e), 

9(f), and 9(g) of House Rule XXI. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

(AS AMENDED BY CHAIRMAN ROS-LEHTINEN’S MANAGER’S

AMENDMENT)

Section 1—Short title; table of contents. 

Section 2—Definitions. 

TITLE I: FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Section 101—Findings. 

Contains findings regarding the limited control the U.S. has over 

the amount and use of its financial contributions to the UN, the 

presence of the rampant corruption at the UN, and the need for reform of the UN’s funding structure. 

Section 102—Apportionment of the United Nations Regular Budget 

on a Voluntary Basis. 

States that it is U.S. policy to pursue shifting the UN regular 

budget to a voluntary basis (rather than continue the assessed/ 

mandatory structure). This title gives the UN two years after this 

bill’s enactment date to phase in this reform. After two years, 

should less than 80% of the UN regular budget be funded on a voluntary basis, then the U.S. shall, until the Secretary of State certifies that the 80% threshold is met, withhold 50% of its assessed 

(non-voluntary, regular budget contributions) assessed by the UN. 

This is not an ‘‘all-or-nothing’’ sanction: The more the UN makes 

its regular budget voluntary, the less we withhold, until the UN 

budgeting is at least 80% voluntary, at which point there would be 

no further U.S. withholdings. 

If and when the Secretary makes the above certification that the 

80% threshold has been met, withheld funds could be expended for 

a period of one year after their appropriation. After that one-year 

period concludes, any unspent funds must be returned to the U.S. 

Treasury, unless the Secretary certifies that the 80% threshold continues to be met. 

Section 103—Budget Justifications for United States Contributions 

to the Regular Budget of the United Nations. 

Requires that the annual congressional budget justification include an itemized request for contributions to the UN, including 

comparisons with previous years’ contributions. Also requires the 

Secretary of State to notify and consult with Congress if the UN 

proposes an adjustment to its regular budget. 

Section 104—Report on United Nations Reform. 

Requires that the Secretary of State submit a report to Congress 

describing progress towards the goals described in this section, and 

the progress of the UN General Assembly to modernize and 

streamline its activities and review its mandates. 


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TITLE II: TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED STATES

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Section 201—Findings. 

Contains findings related to the need for management reforms at 

the UN to increase transparency and accountability. 

Section 202—Definitions. 

Section 203—Oversight of U.S. Contributions to the United Nations 

System. 

Requires the Department of State to collect and maintain records 

of Transparency and Accountability Certifications (written pledges 

to cooperate in sharing basic oversight information with the Department of State and Congress and to operate in a fully accountable manner, including by taking a number of specific measures to 

ensure accountability) by all UN entities. 

Requires the Department of State to keep Congress informed of 

how UN entities are spending U.S. contributions. 

Requires the Secretary of State to: 

• notify Congress and the Attorney General when she has reasonable grounds to believe a federal criminal law has been violated by a UN entity or one of its employees, contractors, or 

representatives; • notify Congress, and the UN, of cases where she believes mismanagement or wrongdoing has likely taken place within a 

UN entity and disciplinary proceedings are likely justified; • notify Congress and the UN whenever a UN entity unreasonably refuses to provide, or delays in providing, information or 

assistance pursuant to a Transparency Certification; notify 

Congress and the UN when a UN entity has not provided such 

requested information within 90 days of the above notification 

(if that occurs, then that UN entity is deemed to be noncompliant with its Transparency Certification(s)); • notify Congress and the UN when that entity has resumed full 

compliance with its Transparency Certification; • notify Congress and the UN whenever a UN entity is no longer 

in compliance with its Accountability Certification. [If a UN 

entity has not resumed compliance within 90 days of the above 

notification, then that UN entity is deemed to be noncompliant 

with its Accountability Certification.] Requires the Secretary of 

State to notify Congress and the UN when that entity has resumed full compliance with its Accountability Certification. 

Also requires the Secretary of State to submit for inclusion in the 

report authorized by section 207 of this Act a list and detailed description of the circumstances surrounding notifications of compliance and noncompliance. Clarifies that this reporting requirement 

does not authorize the public disclosure of sensitive information. 

Requires privacy protections with respect to such reporting. 

Section 204—Transparency for United States Contributions. 

Mandates that U.S. funding may be provided to a UN entity only 

if that entity has provided a Transparency Certification and Accountability Certification to the Department of State and is in compliance with those certifications. The President may waive this reVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:48 Dec 09, 2011 Jkt 019006 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR323.XXX HR323

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quirement on a case-by-case basis if he determines and certifies to 

Congress that failure to waive would pose an extraordinary threat 

to U.S. national security interests. 

Section 205—Integrity for United States Contributions. 

Requires funds made available under the Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) account to be used solely for assessed 

contributions to a UN entity or international organization. Requires funds made available under the International Organizations 

and Programs (IO&P) account to be used solely for voluntary contributions to a UN entity or international organization. Requires 

funds made available under the Contributions to International 

Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account to be used solely for United 

Nations peacekeeping activities, for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, or for the International Criminal 

Tribunal for Rwanda. Requires that funds appropriated for use as 

a U.S. Contribution to a UN Entity but not obligated or expended 

because of restrictions in this section be returned to the Treasury 

at the end of the fiscal year, and not be considered arrears to be 

repaid to any UN entity. 

Section 206—Refund of Monies Owed by the United Nations to the 

United States. 

Finds that U.S. taxpayer funds overpaid to the UN, particularly 

to the UN Tax Equalization Fund, often remain in the hands of the 

UN. States that it is U.S. policy to instruct the UN to return these 

funds to the U.S. Treasury. 

Section 207—Annual Reports on United States Contributions to the 

United Nations. 

Continues the authorization for an annual report (presently authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act) by the Office 

of Management and Budget of all United States assessed and voluntary contributions to the United Nations. 

TITLE III: UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Section 301—Annual Publication. 

States that the United States shall use its influence at the UN 

to ensure the annual publication of all UN subsidiary bodies, their 

functions, budgets, staff, and contributions, sorted by donor. 

Section 302—Annual Financial Disclosure. 

States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to implement a system for filing individual financial disclosure forms by 

employees at the UN and its specialized agencies, which will be 

available to the Office of Internal Oversight Services, to Member 

States, and to the public. 

Section 303—Policy with Respect to Expansion of the Security 

Council. 

States that it is U.S. policy to oppose expansion of the UN Security Council that would diminish the influence of the U.S. at the 

Security Council or include veto rights for new members. 


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Section 304—Access to Reports and Audits. 

States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to ensure 

that member states have access to reports and audits completed by 

the Board of External Auditors. 

Section 305—Waiver of Immunity. 

States that the U.S. shall use its influence to ensure that the UN 

Secretary-General waives the immunity of UN officials in cases in 

which immunity would impede the course of justice. 

Section 306—Terrorism and the United Nations. 

States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to work 

towards the adoption of a definition of terrorism that builds upon 

recommendations of the December 2004 report of the High-Level 

Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, includes actions intended to do harm to civilians for purposes of intimidation of a government, and does not propose legal or moral equivalency between 

these actions and actions by a government in self-defense. States 

that any UN definition of terrorism should not be used to undermine peaceful, pro-freedom, pro-democracy movements against authoritarian regimes. 

Section 307—Report on United Nations Personnel. 

Requires that the Secretary of State submit to Congress a report 

on human resources practices and reforms at the UN. 

Section 308—United Nations Treaty Bodies. 

Withholds U.S. contributions from the UN regular budget proportionate to the percentage of the regular budget expended for a UN 

human rights treaty monitoring body or committee established by 

conventions to which the U.S. is not a party. 

Section 309—Equality at the United Nations. 

Requires completion of an audit regarding duplicative efforts at 

the UN with regard to the Palestinians and making recommendations for the elimination of duplicative entities. Withholds U.S. contributions from the UN budget proportionate to the percentage of 

our contributions that would be expended for those entities, until 

U.S. recommendations for elimination of duplicative entities have 

been implemented. 

Section 310—Anti-Semitism and the United Nations. 

States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to ensure 

that anti-Semitic behavior at the UN is condemned by the UN and 

that the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 

develop programming to address anti-Semitism. 

Section 311—Regional Group Inclusion of Israel. 

States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to expand 

the UN’s Western European and Others Group (WEOG) to include 

Israel as a permanent member. 


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Section 312—United States Policy on Taiwan Participation in 

United Nations. 

States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to ensure 

meaningful participation for Taiwan in relevant UN entities in 

which Taiwan has expressed an interest in participating. 

Section 313—United States Policy on Tier 3 Human Rights Violators. 

States that the U.S. shall use its influence at the UN to the ensure that no representative of a country designated pursuant to 

section 110 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 by the 

Department of State as a Tier 3 country shall preside as chair or 

president of any UN entity. 

TITLE IV: STATUS OF PALESTINIAN ENTITIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Section 401—Findings. 

Describes the PLO’s previous efforts to obtain de facto recognition by the UN of a unilaterally-declared Palestinian state, as well 

as how the U.S. successfully derailed those efforts by threatening 

to cut off U.S. contributions to any UN entity that upgraded the 

status of the PLO. 

Section 402—Statement of Policy. 

States that it is the policy of the U.S. to oppose recognition of a 

Palestinian state by any UN entity prior to the achievement of a 

final peace agreement negotiated between and agreed to by Israel 

and the Palestinians. 

Section 403—Implementation. 

Instructs the Secretary of State to withhold funds to any UN entity that upgrades the status of the Palestinian observer mission in 

any way. 

TITLE V: UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

Section 501—Findings. 

Describes the flawed structure of the UN Human Rights Council 

and the Council’s failure to address numerous egregious human 

rights violations, while spending a disproportionate amount of time 

and resources to condemn the democratic, Jewish state of Israel. 

Section 502—Human Rights Council Membership and Funding. 

Instructs the Secretary of State to withhold assessed contributions to the UN regular budget proportionate to the percentage of 

that budget allocated for the Human Rights Council, prohibits voluntary contributions to the Council, and prohibits the U.S. from 

running for a seat on the Council, until the Secretary of State can 

certify that the Council does not include Members: subject to Security Council sanctions; under Security Council-mandated human 

rights investigation; that are state sponsors of terrorism; or that 

are ‘‘countries of particular concern’’ for religious freedom violations. Also withholds funds equal to the percentage spent on Council apporteurs with mandates used to display bias against the U.S. 

or Israel or to support foreign governments that are: subject to SeVerDate Mar 15 2010 04:48 Dec 09, 2011 Jkt 019006 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6601 E:\HR\OC\HR323.XXX HR323

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curity Council sanctions; under Security Council-mandated human 

rights investigation; state sponsors of terrorism; or ‘‘countries of 

particular concern’’ for religious freedom violations 

TITLE VI: GOLDSTONE REPORT

Section 601—Findings. 

Describes the anti-Israel bias that pervaded the commissioning 

and drafting of the Goldstone Report. Notes longstanding Congressional and Executive Branch opposition to the Report. 

Section 602—Statement of Policy. 

States that it is U.S. policy to reject the Goldstone report, oppose 

its legitimacy, and lead a multilateral campaign to revoke and repudiate the report and UN resolutions stemming from the report. 

Section 603—Withholding of Funds; Refund of United States Taxpayer Dollars. 

Instructs the Secretary of State to withhold from the U.S. contribution to the UN regular budget an amount proportionate to the 

percentage of our contributions determined to have been expended 

on the Goldstone Report and related activities. 

TITLE VII: DURBAN PROCESS

Section 701—Findings. 

Describes the anti-Semitic, anti-Israel, anti-Western bias that 

has pervaded the Durban process. 

Sec 702—Sense of Congress; Statement of Policy. 

States that the Durban conferences were distorted into forums 

for anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, anti-freedom activities and commends 

those countries that did not participate in various parts of the Durban Process. States that it is U.S. policy to create a credible alternative to the Durban process and to encourage other countries to 

withhold participation and funding from the Durban process. 

Section 703—Non-Participation in the Durban Process. 

Prohibits U.S. funds from being used for U.S. participation in 

any part of the Durban process. 

Section 704—Withholding of Funds; Refund of United States Taxpayer Dollars. 

Instructs the Secretary of States to withhold from the United 

States contribution to the UN regular budget an amount equal to 

the percentage of that contribution that would be or has been spent 

on the Durban process. 

TITLE VIII: UNRWA

Section 801—Findings. 

Describes UNRWA’s strictly humanitarian mandate and longstanding problematic behavior, including its refusal to vet its staff 

and aid recipients through U.S. terrorist watch lists, its employment of multiple violent extremists, its anti-Israel and pro-Hamas 

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tioned by the U.S. Government for money laundering, terror financing, and support for arms proliferators. 

Section 802—United States Contributions to UNRWA. 

Prohibits funding to UNRWA until the Secretary of State certifies that: none of UNRWA’s officials, employees, or affiliates are 

members of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, or have disseminated 

anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic rhetoric or propaganda; 

no UNRWA infrastructure is being exploited by Foreign Terrorist 

Organizations; UNRWA is subject to comprehensive and independent financial audits and has implemented an effective vetting 

and oversight system, UNRWA-funded schools do not use biased 

educational materials, no recipient of UNRWA funds is a member 

of a Foreign Terrorist Organization, and UNRWA holds no accounts or other affiliations with financial institutions that the U.S. 

believes to be complicit in money laundering or terror financing. If 

the Secretary of State makes such a certification, U.S. annual funding to UNRWA may exceed neither 22 percent of UNRWA’s budget, 

nor the highest annual contribution made by an Arab League member state, nor the proportion of the total budget of the UN High 

Commissioner for Refugees paid by the U.S. 

Section 803—Sense of Congress. 

Expresses the sense of Congress that the President and the Secretary of State should lead a diplomatic effort to encourage other 

nations to withhold contributions to UNRWA until UNRWA implements key reforms. 

TITLE IX: INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Section 901—Technical Cooperation Program. 

Describes how rogue regimes, several of whom are known to violate UN nonproliferation sanctions, have received assistance from 

the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Program (TCP). States that no 

U.S. contributions to the IAEA may be used to provide assistance 

through the TCP to countries that have been designated by the 

U.S. as supporting international terrorism or that are in breach of 

various non-proliferation treaties and resolutions. If the IAEA does 

not suspend assistance to the aforementioned countries, the U.S. 

must withhold from contributions to the IAEA an amount proportionate to the percentage of such contributions that would be used 

for technical assistance to these terrorist regimes and countries of 

proliferation concern. 

Section 902—United States Policy at the IAEA. 

States that the U.S. shall use its influence to establish an Office 

of Compliance to ensure that all member states fulfill their obligations under IAEA Board resolutions. States that U.S. contributions 

to the IAEA should be used primarily support nuclear safety and 

security or activities relating to nuclear verification. States that the 

U.S. will use its influence to ensure the adoption of resolutions 

making Iran and Syria ineligible to receive IAEA assistance. 


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Section 903—Sense of Congress Regarding the Nuclear Security Action Plan of the IAEA. 

Expresses the sense of Congress that the IAEA General Conference should adopt a resolution incorporating the Nuclear Security Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA. 

TITLE X: PEACEKEEPING

Section 1001—Reform of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. 

Notes that while UN peacekeeping operations have contributed 

greatly to the promotion of peace and security, the record of UN 

peacekeeping is tarnished by operational failures and misconduct. 

Section 1002—Policy Relating to Reform of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. 

Calls for far-reaching reforms in the areas of planning, management, conduct and accountability in UN peacekeeping States it is 

U.S. policy to promote the conduct of independent, annual audits 

of each peacekeeping operation to guarantee that all missions are 

efficient and cost effective. Promotes the review of all peacekeeping 

operation mandates with a view toward identifying objectives that 

are practical and achievable. Addresses misconduct and sexual exploitation by personnel associated with peacekeeping missions by 

supporting the introduction of pre-deployment training, the adoption of a code of conduct, and the establishment of an investigative 

body to probe allegations of wrongdoing. 

Section 1003—Certification. 

Mandates U.S. opposition to new or expanded peacekeeping missions until the Secretary of State certifies that the most critical, 

but immediately achievable, reforms are instituted (subject to a 

Presidential waiver based on vital U.S. national security interests 

or to prevent genocide or other widespread loss of human life). 

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill, 

as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics, 

existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman): 

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE XII—FAMINE PREVENTION AND FREEDOM FROM 

HUNGER 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 3—INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS

SEC. 301. GENERAL AUTHORITY.—(a) * * * 

* * * * * * * 


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ø(c) No contributions by the United States shall be made to the 

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in 

the Near East except on the condition that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency take all possible measures to assure that no 

part of the United States contribution shall be used to furnish assistance to any refugee who is receiving military training as a 

member of the so-called Palestine Liberation Army or any other 

guerrilla type organization or who has engaged in any act of terrorism.¿ 

(c)(1) WITHHOLDING.—Contributions by the United States to the 

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in 

the Near East (UNRWA), to any successor or related entity, or to the 

regular budget of the United Nations for the support of UNRWA or 

a successor entity (through staff positions provided by the United 

Nations Secretariat, or otherwise), may be provided only during a 

period for which a certification described in paragraph (2) is in effect. 

(2) CERTIFICATION.—A certification described in this paragraph 

is a written determination by the Secretary of State, based on all 

information available after diligent inquiry, and transmitted to the 

appropriate congressional committees along with a detailed description of the factual basis therefor, that— 

(A) no official, employee, consultant, contractor, subcontractor, representative, or affiliate of UNRWA— 

(i) is a member of a Foreign Terrorist Organization; 

(ii) has propagated, disseminated, or incited antiAmerican, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic rhetoric or propaganda; or 

(iii) has used any UNRWA resources, including publications or Web sites, to propagate or disseminate political 

materials, including political rhetoric regarding the IsraeliPalestinian conflict; 

(B) no UNRWA school, hospital, clinic, other facility, or 

other infrastructure or resource is being used by a Foreign Terrorist Organization for operations, planning, training, recruitment, fundraising, indoctrination, communications, sanctuary, 

storage of weapons or other materials, or any other purposes; 

(C) UNRWA is subject to comprehensive financial audits by 

an internationally recognized third party independent auditing 

firm and has implemented an effective system of vetting and 

oversight to prevent the use, receipt, or diversion of any 

UNRWA resources by any foreign terrorist organization or 

members thereof; 

(D) no UNRWA-funded school or educational institution 

uses textbooks or other educational materials that propagate or 

disseminate anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic rhetoric, 

propaganda or incitement; 

(E) no recipient of UNRWA funds or loans is a member of 

a Foreign Terrorist Organization; and 

(F) UNRWA holds no accounts or other affiliations with financial institutions that the United States deems or believes to 

be complicit in money laundering and terror financing. 

(3) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

(A) FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.—The term ‘‘Foreign 

Terrorist Organization’’ means an organization designated as a 


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Foreign Terrorist Organization by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)). 

(B) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term 

‘‘appropriate congressional committees’’ means— 

(i) the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Appropriations, 

and Oversight and Government Reform of the House of 

Representatives; and 

(ii) the Committees on Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of 

the Senate. 

(4) EFFECTIVE DURATION OF CERTIFICATION.—The certification 

described in paragraph (2) shall be effective for a period of 180 days 

from the date of transmission to the appropriate congressional committees, or until the Secretary receives information rendering that 

certification factually inaccurate, whichever is earliest. In the event 

that a certification becomes ineffective, the Secretary shall promptly 

transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a description 

of any information that precludes the renewal or continuation of the 

certification. 

(5) LIMITATION.—During a period for which a certification described in paragraph (2) is in effect, the United States may not contribute to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 

Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) or a successor entity an annual amount— 

(A) greater than the highest annual contribution to 

UNRWA made by a member country of the League of Arab 

States; 

(B) that, as a proportion of the total UNRWA budget, exceeds the proportion of the total budget for the United Nations 

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) paid by the United 

States; or 

(C) that exceeds 22 percent of the total budget of UNRWA. 

* * * * * * * 


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DISSENTING VIEWS

Introduction 

We are all familiar with the flaws, shortcomings, and outrages 

of the United Nations, both past and present, and believe that UN 

reform is and must remain an important priority for the United 

States. However, we strongly oppose this misguided and irresponsible legislation, which—in the guise of ‘‘reform’’—would result in 

an unprecedented diminution of American diplomatic influence and 

likely lead to the U.S. withdrawing from the organization. 

The United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform 

Act of 2011 is premised on the notion that withholding our dues 

is the only way to leverage meaningful change at the UN. But 

there’s simply no evidence to support that argument. Previous attempts at withholding did not lead to any significant and lasting 

reforms—they succeeded only in weakening our diplomatic standing and influence, and undermining efforts to promote transparency, fiscal responsibility and good management practices in the 

UN system. For those reasons, the George W. Bush Administration 

opposed the late Chairman Henry Hyde’s UN bill, which was not 

nearly as draconian as this legislation. 

We also note the Department of State’s strong objections to this 

legislation, which the Secretary expressed in her October 12, 2011 

letter to the Chairman and Ranking Member. The Secretary 

warned ‘‘If implemented, the bill’s requirement to withhold 50 percent of U.S. assessed contributions to the United Nations absent a 

shift to voluntary-only funding would undercut international collaboration in advancing core U.S. national security interest such as 

stauncher nuclear proliferation, combating terrorism, fully implementing sanctions on countries such as Iran and North Korea, preventing conflict around the globe, supporting elections in countries 

just undergoing transition to democracy, fighting pandemic disease, 

providing life-saving humanitarian relief to countries such as Haiti, 

and supporting peaceful transitions in placed such as the new nation of South Sudan.’’ 

Unilateral Shift to Voluntary Contributions Simply a Backdoor 

Mechanism for Pulling U.S. out of UN 

Title I of H.R. 2829 states that the U.S. must withhold 50 percent of our assessed contributions unless the President certifies 

that at least 80 percent of the entire UN regular budget is funded 

by voluntary contributions within two years. Republicans argue 

that by funding the UN regular budget on a voluntary basis, the 

U.S. will be able to pick and choose what it pays for—a multilateral a la carte funding scheme. The unrealistic and reckless certification requirement is premised on the preposterous assumption 

that the U.S. would succeed in amending the United Nations Charter, which requires a two-thirds vote of all UN member states and 


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unanimous approval by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The UN Charter has been amended only four times 

in its 66-year history, most recently in 1973 when the body approved an enlargement of the Economic and Social Council to better reflect the growth in UN member states. The notion that in two 

years time the US could force through an amendment to unravel 

the financial stability of the organization over what would likely be 

near unanimous opposition strains credulity. 

Given the near certitude that the President would be unable to 

make such a certification, the withholdings in Title I would almost 

inevitably come into force two years after this legislation was 

signed into law. Ironically, even if the UN Human Rights Council 

was truly reformed, the Goldstone Report was completely repudiated, and the UN instituted more meaningful audit and oversight 

disclosure requirements, this bill would still defund the UN if it 

didn’t adopt an 80% voluntarily funded regular budget. As such, it 

is clear to us that the withholdings language contained in Title I 

is not meant to promote effective management reforms or tackle 

the political biases exhibited at the UN and its funds, programs, 

and specialized agencies. Rather, Title I can only be viewed as a 

thinly veiled attempt to defund the United Nations and ultimately 

reduce U.S. influence and relevance at the organization. 

Empty rhetoric on voluntarily funded UN agencies 

Republicans argue that UN agencies and programs which are 

funded on a voluntary basis are inherently more accountable to 

U.S. interests. This view is expressed in the findings contained in 

Title I, which state: ‘‘Because of their need to justify future contributions from donors, voluntarily funded organizations have more 

incentive to be responsive and efficient in their operations than organizations funded by compulsory contributions that are not tied to 

performance.’’ The Republicans claim this funding arrangement 

would give the U.S. greater flexibility to choose among various UN 

entities and initiatives, supporting those it prefers and un-funding 

those it considers problematic, irresponsible, or beyond salvage. 

The logical conclusion would be that the United Nations would be 

more sensitive to U.S. preferences, introduce healthy competition 

among UN agencies seeking U.S. dollars, and provide an incentive 

for greater UN transparency and accountability. 

We agree that voluntary funding is appropriate for certain UN 

entities—particularly those focused on short- or medium-term humanitarian or disaster relief situations. In fact much of the UN’s 

development and humanitarian assistance efforts are funded on a 

voluntary basis. But by seeking to force a shift to all voluntary contributions, this legislation would unravel the financial 

underpinnings of the entire UN regular budget, which would lead 

other nations to respond in kind by adopting their own, selective 

approach to financing the organization. It is not unreasonable to 

expect that UN programs vital to U.S. foreign policy and national 

security interests would face funding reductions as a result. For example, the UN special political missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

which are funded through the UN regular budget—largely out of 

the insistence of the U.S.—would almost certainly see severely diminished financial support from other UN member states, and thus 


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reduced legitimacy. Other U.S. priorities at the UN, such as the advancement of women, the protection of human rights, and counterterrorism cooperation could likely faced reduced funding under a 

voluntary funding scheme. These costs of a la carte funding may 

not be readily apparent on the surface, but they are very real. 

Limiting the UN’s Ability to Protect Woman and Children 

While much of the attention on H.R. 2829 has centered on the 

bill’s impact on UN funding, a little-noticed provision, Section 308, 

would have grave consequences for the UN’s ability to protect and 

promote the rights of women and children. This section would withhold all U.S. contributions to the UN’s regular budget proportionate to the percentage of the regular budget expended for a UN 

human rights treaty monitoring body or committee established by 

conventions to which the U.S. is not a party. 

Though no explanation of this provision was presented in the 

Chairman’s opening remarks or given more than a cursory explanation in the Majority’s section by section analysis, its impact 

would be gravely detrimental to the UN’s ability implement the 

UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the UN Convention 

on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 

If the purpose of this provision was to prevent the implementation 

of these two key human rights conventions, we are puzzled why the 

Majority made no mention of their opposition to either convention 

in the text of H.R. 2829, especially given the voluminous findings 

contained in other parts of the legislation. 

Using Middle East Issues as Subterfuge 

Republicans have attempted to paint this legislation as a direct 

response to the Palestinians’ various UN membership gambits, the 

Goldstone Report, the Durban Process, and innumerable examples 

of bias exhibited at the UN against Israel. While we share the Majority’s deep frustration and anger over the many continued instances of such bias, the Republicans have used the issue of Israel’s 

treatment at the UN as a smokescreen to obscure their true agenda. Indeed, nowhere in Title I—the section of the legislation containing the most draconian withholding proposals—are Middle East 

issued referenced. Even if the various anti-Israel entities at the UN 

were reformed or abolished, the withholdings provisions contained 

in Title I would still be triggered. 

We also note that the provisions concerning full Palestinian 

membership in the UN are duplicative of current law. Public Law 

103–236, Title IV, § 410 and Public Law 101–246, Title IV already 

requires withholding of US funds from any UN entity that grants 

full membership to the Palestinian Authority. These provisions of 

law automatically went into effect after the UNESCO General Conference voted to grant full membership to the Palestinians earlier 

this year. However, we note that the Palestinian Authority publicly 

stated that it was not swayed by U.S. threats to defund the organization if they were successful in their attempts to gain full membership in UNESCO. Nor were the member states of UNESCO, 

who voted overwhelmingly in support of the Palestinians’ membership gambit. 


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Undermines Iran sanctions attempts 

The top foreign policy priority of this Congress has been preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. Yet if 

this bill were enacted into law, attempts to slow Tehran’s nuclear 

program would undoubtedly be weakened. Ambassador Susan Rice, 

the United States Permanent Representative to the UN, has stated 

explicitly that the previous round of multilateral sanctions passed 

by the United Nations Security Council would not have possible 

without the direct and sustained engagement of the U.S. at the 

UN. In her letter to the Chairman and Ranking Member, Secretary 

Clinton expressed her concerns that: ‘‘If we diminish our global 

stature, the United States would surrender a key platform which 

to shape international priorities, such as obtaining tough sanctions 

on Iran. The restrictions regarding U.S. contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency, for example, are counterproductive 

to our non-proliferation efforts to secure nuclear material worldwide, and would undercut our successes in isolating countries such 

as Iran.’’ 

Were this legislation to pass, not only would we defund the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1737, 

otherwise known as the Iran Sanctions Committee, which is funded 

out of the UN’s regular budget, but we would hamstring our ability 

to push through future rounds of sanctions at the UN. During the 

last period of sustained U.S. arrearages accrued at the UN, we lost 

our seat on the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, which was a severe blow to U.S. prestige and limited our ability to influence the UN budget. The consequences of 

once again falling into arrears could be much worse. 

Sensible Democratic Alternative Rejected 

Committee Democrats offered a sensible alternative that acknowledged the reality that Congress cannot legislate change at 

the UN like we can in the Executive Branch. Instead, the Democratic substitute sought to provide direction to and strengthen the 

Administration’s efforts to push for greater transparency, accountability, and ethical standards at the UN. It would do this by enshrining in law the State Department’s UN Transparency and Accountability Initiative (UNTAI)—originally conceived by former 

U.S. Ambassador for UN Management Reform, Mark Wallace, a 

George W. Bush Administration appointee—which would strengthen the U.S. government’s ability to monitor the UN’s progress on 

management reform. By enshrining UNTAI into law, we would ensure that the initiative will endure into the future and that Congress can play a more effective oversight role. 

While Republicans claim they want to improve transparency and 

accountability at the UN, they have paid woefully little attention 

to enhancing the U.S. capacity to systematically and quantifiably 

monitor the UN’s progress on key management criteria. Rather 

than building upon the successful monitoring efforts of Ambassador 

Wallace, the Republicans initially attempted to task the Government Accountability Office with responsibilities the GAO determined ‘‘would be duplicative of other accountability mechanisms in 

place, would require extensive GAO resources, and would not be 

cost-beneficial.’’ While the Majority amended H.R. 2829 to reflect 


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many of the concerns raised by the GAO, it does little to build upon 

the Department’s existing UN reform monitoring and evaluation 

capacities. By contrast, the Democratic substitute would mandate 

rigorous reviews and monitoring programs for various peacekeeping efforts, and make it the policy of the United States to work 

with the UN to institute a number of needed management reforms. 

By ensuring that the US retains its full voice and vote at the 

UN, the Democratic substitute would be a far more effective tool 

for promoting real reform and countering anti-Israel bias in the 

UN. 

Overall Package Harms America’s Standing and Ability to Lead the 

International Community 

As described above, this bill includes a number of provisions that 

would harm America’s foreign policy and national security interests 

and undermine our diplomatic influence and standing in the international community. It is clear that proponents of the legislation 

have little interest in promoting responsible reforms at the United 

Nations, but rather seek to disengage the U.S. from multilateral institutions. Given the untold damage this bill would do to US interests around the globe, we have absolutely no hesitation in urging 

our colleagues to reject this misguided and damaging legislation. 

HOWARD L. BERMAN. 

GARY L. ACKERMAN. 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA. 

DONALD M. PAYNE. 

BRAD SHERMAN. 

GREGORY W. MEEKS. 

RUSS CARNAHAN. 

ALBIO SIRES. 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY. 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH. 

BRIAN HIGGINS. 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ. 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY. 

FREDERICA WILSON. 

KAREN BASS. 

WILLIAM KEATING. 

DAVID CICILLINE. 

Æ 


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