J-A03028-19

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

DENNIS BEST, GREGORY S. MILLER, 

JOSEPH BRUNO, ROBERT LANSHCAK, 

ERIC A. GARRETT, RICHARD 

SCHENKER, ROBERT M. YEAGER, 

BRUCE ROSA, ANTHONY TEDESCO, 

RENEE MILLER, HEIDI A. KIZAK, 

MARY LOU WILSON, PATRICIA 

NAPOLITAN, CORY BECK, RICHARD 

ARTHUR, RYAN LECHNER, DAVID J. 

DEVENNEY, CHAD ROWE, BENJAMIN 

SHARPER, LUANN IACINO, AND 

ANTHONY VENDILLI 

Appellants

v.

UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND 

FORESTRY, RUBBER,

MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED 

INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE 

WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION 

A/K/A UNITED STEEL WORKERS OF 

AMERICA AND THE COUNTY OF 

MERCER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1111 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered July 9, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Civil Division at No(s): 

2017-1411

BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 23, 2019

Appellants, Dennis Best, et al., appeal from the order sustaining the 

preliminary objections filed by Appellees, United Steel, Paper and Forestry,

Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers 
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International Union a/k/a United Steel Workers of America (“USW”) and the 

County of Mercer (“Mercer County”). Because the appeal is within the 

jurisdiction of our sister appellate court, we order that the appeal be 

transferred to the Commonwealth Court.

The trial court set forth the history of this case as follows:

[Appellants] are all present and past employees of the 

Mercer County Sheriff’s Department. In 1996, the employees of 

the Mercer County Sheriff’s Department sought to form a public 

employee union which was to be represented by USW, having the 

name of USW Local Union No. 1355. While employed by the 

Mercer County Sheriff’s Department, each of the [Appellants] 

executed a USW Check-Off Authorization which authorized Mercer 

County to deduct union dues from their pay each month while 

each [Appellant] was “in employment with the collective 

bargaining unit in the employer.” The individual check-off 

authorizations were executed by each [Appellant] at the time of 

their initial employment with the Mercer County Sheriff’s 

Department, were identical in their form, and authorized Mercer 

County to remit the deducted dues to the USW.

This labor union was never certified by the Pennsylvania 

Labor Relations Board (‘‘PLRB”), however, as a collective 

bargaining unit. The Pennsylvania Public Employee Relations Act1

[(“PERA”)] requires certification of any collective bargaining unit 

by the PLRB before it becomes official. Both [Appellees] were 

informed by the PLRB that their attempt to certify the employees 

of the Mercer County Sheriff’s Department as a collective 

bargaining unit had been denied. However, even with that 

knowledge, [Appellees] negotiated and entered into numerous 

collective bargaining agreements between 1996 and 2016. Also 

during that time, [Appellee] Mercer County deducted union dues 

from the pay of [Appellants], and remitted the dues to [Appellee] 

USW.

1 Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, No. 195, art. I, § 101 

et seq; 43 P.S. 1101.101 et seq. (Supp. 1974-75)
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Trial Court Opinion, 7/9/18, at unnumbered 2–3.

Appellants initiated this matter with the filing of a praecipe for writ of 

summons on May 9, 2017. Appellants filed their complaint on February 23, 

2018. On March 15, 2018, both Appellees filed preliminary objections, which

alleged that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, 

because the matter should have been before the PLRB pursuant to the PERA. 

USW’s Brief in Support of Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs’ Complaint, at 3; 

Mercer County’s Preliminary Objections to Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Brief, at 

13. Appellants filed a brief in opposition to the preliminary objections on May 

1, 2018. On July 9, 2018, the trial court sustained Appellees’ preliminary 

objections. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal on August 7, 2018. The 

trial court did not order Appellants to file a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925.

Appellants present the following questions for our review:

I. Whether the trial court erred in holding that it lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction to entertain the individual breach of 

contract claims asserted by the appellants against the 

county in light of the facts and holding in the case of

Hollinger v. Dept. of Public Welfare, 365 A.2d 1245 (Pa. 

1976)?

II. Whether the trial court erred in holding that it lacked subject 

matter jurisdiction to entertain the individual breach of duty 

of fair representation claims asserted by appellants against 

the USW in light of the facts and holding in the case of Case 

v. Hazleton Area Educational Personnel Ass’n, 928 A.2d 

1154 (Pa. Cmnwlth. Ct. 2007)?

Appellants’ Brief at 3.
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Before we consider the issues raised by Appellants in their brief, we 

must determine whether we have jurisdiction over this matter or whether to 

transfer the case to Commonwealth Court.1 Specifically, it appears that 

jurisdiction lies with the Commonwealth Court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 762. 

That statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

§ 762. Appeals from courts of common pleas

(a) General rule.--Except as provided in subsection (b), the 

Commonwealth Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals 

from final orders of the courts of common pleas in the following 

cases:

* * *

4) Local government civil and criminal matters.

(i) All actions or proceedings arising 

under any municipality, institution 

district, public school, planning or zoning 

code or under which a municipality or 

other political subdivision or municipality 

authority may be formed or incorporated 

or where is drawn in question the 

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1 Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 751 addresses the transfer of 

erroneously filed cases and states as follows:

(a) General rule. If an appeal or other matter is taken to 

or brought in a court or magisterial district which does not 

have jurisdiction of the appeal or other matter, the court or 

magisterial district judge shall not quash such appeal or 

dismiss the matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to 

the proper court of this Commonwealth, where the appeal or 

other matter shall be treated as if originally filed in transferee 

court on the date first filed in a court or magisterial district.

Pa.R.A.P. 751(a) (emphases added).
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application, interpretation or 

enforcement of any:

(A) statute regulating the 

affairs of political 

subdivisions, municipality 

and other local authorities 

or other public 

corporations or of the 

officers, employees or 

agents thereof, acting in 

their official capacity[.]

42 Pa.C.S. § 762(a)(4)(i)(A) (emphases added).

We are mindful this Court has explained that where neither party has 

objected to our jurisdiction of an appeal, we may exercise jurisdiction pursuant 

to 42 Pa.C.S. § 704(a)2 and Pa.R.A.P. 741(a).3 However, we also “retain the 

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2 Section 704 of the Judicial Code provides, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 704. Waiver of objections to jurisdiction.

(a) General rule. — The failure of an appellee to file an objection 

to the jurisdiction of an appellate court within such time as may 

be specified by general rule, shall, unless the appellate court 

otherwise orders, operate to perfect the appellate jurisdiction of 

such appellate court, notwithstanding any provision of this title, 

or of any general rule adopted pursuant to section 503 (relating 

to reassignment of matters), vesting jurisdiction of such appeal in 

another appellate court.

42 Pa.C.S. § 704(a).

3 Rule 741 is based on 42 Pa.C.S. § 704, and states, in part, as follows:

Rule 741. Waiver of Objections to Jurisdiction.
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power and, indeed, the responsibility to determine whether retention of 

jurisdiction in this case is appropriate or, alternatively, whether the matter 

should be transferred to the Commonwealth Court.” Wilson v. School 

District of Philadelphia, 600 A.2d 210, 211 (Pa. Super. 1991) (citations 

omitted). Furthermore, once we have:

concluded that this matter is within the Commonwealth Court’s 

jurisdiction, it is within our discretion to determine whether 

transfer to that court is appropriate. In making this 

determination, we conduct a case-by-case analysis. We may 

retain jurisdiction if such action would serve the interests of 

judicial economy, but should transfer the matter if to do so would 

serve other interests, such as avoiding the establishment of 

possibly conflicting lines of authority.

Id. at 213 (citations omitted). As we have long stated, “we should be most 

cautious in assuming jurisdiction over matters that properly belong before the 

Commonwealth Court.” Lara, Inc., v. Dorney Park Coaster Co., Inc., 534 

A.2d 1062, 1066 (Pa. Super. 1987).

It is undisputed that the instant case is a civil matter that involves a 

political subdivision, i.e. Mercer County, and encompasses a dispute with 

employees of the Mercer County Sheriff’s Department. Moreover, the 

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(a) General rule. The failure of an appellee to file an objection 

to the jurisdiction of an appellate court on or prior to the last day 

under these rules for the filing of the record shall, unless the 

appellate court shall otherwise order, operate to perfect the 

appellate jurisdiction of such appellate court, notwithstanding any 

provision of law vesting jurisdiction of such appeal in another 

appellate court.

Pa.R.A.P. 741(a).
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overarching issue presented in Appellants’ complaint involves an alleged 

violation of the PERA relative to the withholding of union dues from Appellants’ 

monthly pay. The PERA’s public policy declaration states that the purpose of 

the act is to promote orderly and constructive relationships between all public 

employers and their employees. 43 P.S. § 1101.101. Consequently, the PERA 

governs the collective bargaining process between all public employers and 

public employees. Indeed, the PERA, passed in 1970, gave rank-and-file 

public employees the right to be represented by unions, to negotiate 

contracts, and to strike in the event of an impasse. Curley v. Board of 

School Directors, 641 A.2d 719, 724-725 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).

Here, our review reflects that jurisdiction is properly vested in the 

Commonwealth Court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 762(a)(2)(ii) because the 

matter draws into question the applicability, interpretation, or enforcement of 

the PERA. Our further analysis indicates the preferable course in this matter 

is to transfer the appeal to the Commonwealth Court. Indeed, the 

Commonwealth Court’s expertise in this area is apparent because the relevant 

case law cited by Appellants reveals the Commonwealth Court has historically 

entertained appeals in similar matters. Accordingly, we transfer this appeal.

Appeal transferred to Commonwealth Court.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/23/2019