UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

JAMES FARRELL, 

 

 Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 14-11781 

 Honorable Stephen J. Murphy 

 v. Magistrate Judge David R. Grand 

 

US BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 

AS GRANTOR TRUSTEE, WELLS FARGO 

BANK, N.A., 

 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT [4] AND TO GRANT DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/DISMISSAL [36] 

I. RECOMMENDATION 

 Before the Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) 

are Defendants US Bank National Association and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment/Dismissal [36] of Plaintiff James Farrell’s (“Farrell”) complaint, and 

Farrell’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment [4]. For the following reasons, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment/Dismissal [36] be 

GRANTED, and Farrell’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment [4] be DENIED. 

II. REPORT 

 A. Background 

 On April 23, 2004, Farrell executed a mortgage (“Mortgage”) in favor of Wells Fargo 

Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) against his property located at 52 Tweed Lane, Lake Orion, MI 

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48362 (“Property”). [36 at 1].1

 The Mortgage was recorded on May 12, 2004. [Id.] On May 

28, 2010, the Mortgage was assigned to Defendant U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. 

Bank”) as Grantor Trustee for the holders of Bears Stearns ARM Trust. [Id.] Farrell failed to 

make payments and defaulted on the Mortgage, and the matter was referred to Trott & Trott, P.C. 

for foreclosure by advertisement proceedings. [Id.] A sheriff’s sale of the Property was 

conducted on December 7, 2010, wherein U.S. Bank purchased the Property for $347,750.74. 

[Id. at 2]. The deed was recorded on December 14, 2010. [Id.]. 

 On May 31, 2011, in a prior Eastern District of Michigan action also assigned to the 

Honorable Stephen J. Murphy, III, Farrell filed a complaint against Wells Fargo, U.S. Bank, and 

others alleging a variety of violations of state and federal law. [36 at Ex. D]. Farrell also moved 

for a temporary restraining order in that complaint, which was denied on June 3, 2011. [Id. at 

Ex. E]. Farrell’s claims against Wells Fargo were dismissed with prejudice on March 30, 2012. 

[Id. at Ex. E, F]. Farrell’s appeal of that ruling to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was 

dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction on July 10, 2012. [Id. at Ex. H]. Farrell’s claims 

against U.S. Bank were dismissed with prejudice on June 30, 2012. [Id. at Ex. I, J]. 

 On August 28, 2012, U.S. Bank filed summary proceedings against Farrell in the 52-3 

District Court for the State of Michigan. [36 at 3]. That court granted U.S. Bank a judgment of 

 

1

 Because a motion to dismiss tests a complaint’s facial sufficiency, it generally must be 

considered without resort to matters outside the pleadings. See Wysocki v. Int’l Bus. Mach. 

Corp., 607 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 2010). However, “documents attached to the pleadings 

become part of the pleadings and may be considered on a motion to dismiss.” Commercial 

Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 335 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 10(c)); see also Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 463 n.1 (6th Cir. 2010). Similarly, 

“when a document is referred to in the pleadings and is integral to the claims” it may be 

considered at the motion to dismiss stage. Commercial Money Ctr., 508 F.3d at 335-36. See 

also Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 177 F .3d 507, 514 (6th Cir.1999). The documents 

referenced herein, which were attached to the parties’ briefs, all satisfy the above criteria, and 

thus can be considered part of the pleadings. 

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possession for the Property on January 14, 2013. [Id. at Ex. K]. Farrell then appealed that 

judgment to the Oakland County Circuit Court, which on July 3, 2013, affirmed the lower court’s 

decision. [Id. at Ex. L]. 

 On September 25, 2013, Farrell filed a Petition for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy in the U.S. 

Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. [36 at 4]. On October 17, 2013, Wells 

Fargo, as servicer to U.S. Bank, moved for relief from the automatic stay of bankruptcy; Farrell 

failed to respond, and the bankruptcy court granted relief from the stay. [Id. at Ex. M]. 

 On December 5, 2013, Farrell filed an Adversary Proceeding against Wells Fargo and 

U.S. Bank in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, in which he moved 

to set aside the foreclosure sale of the Property, to vacate the Order Granting Relief from the 

Automatic Stay, and for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order to enjoin his 

eviction from the Property. [36 at Ex. N]. The bankruptcy court denied these motions on 

February 28, 2014. [Id. at Ex. O]. Farrell subsequently filed motions for reconsideration and for 

leave to appeal, which were both denied. [Id. at Ex. Q]. On March 4, 2014, U.S. Bank and 

Wells Fargo filed a Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, which was granted by the 

bankruptcy court on April 8, 2014. [36 at Ex. R]. Farrell filed a motion to vacate that order and 

a motion for a stay, which were both denied. [Id. at Ex. S, T]. 

 On April 14, 2014, U.S. Bank filed a Motion for Re-Issuance of Order of Eviction for 

Immediate Execution in the 52-3 District Court. Farrell filed a response, and an oral argument 

was held on May 5, 2014. [36 at 5]. On June 5, 2014 the 52-3 District Court issued an Opinion 

and Order granting the Motion for Re-Issuance of Order of Eviction for Immediate Execution. 

[Id. at Ex. U]. 

 Also on May 5, 2014, Farrell filed the instant complaint against U.S. Bank and Wells 

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Fargo, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) (nine counts) 

and violations of the Michigan Foreclosure by Advertisement statute (two counts). [1]. That 

same day, Farrell filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction [3], Motion for Declaratory 

Judgment [4], and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order seeking to enjoin his eviction from 

the Property. [5]. This Court found that Farrell had not established his entitlement to a 

temporary restraining order because he failed to show that eviction was imminent, failed to show 

that he was likely to succeed on the merits, and failed to serve the defendants with his motion, 

and thus recommended denying that motion in a May 14, 2014 report and recommendation. [9]. 

That recommendation was adopted by the district court on June 3, 2014. [15]. 

 On June 9, 2014, Farrell filed another Motion for Temporary Restraining Order seeking 

to enjoin his eviction from the Property. [21]. In a June 30, 2014, report and recommendation, 

this Court addressed both Farrell’s second motion for a temporary restraining order and his May 

5, 2014 motion for preliminary injunction. [34]. The Court found that Farrell’s statutory 

redemption period had lapsed, that he again failed to establish that he was likely to succeed on 

the merits, did not make a sufficient demonstration of irreparable harm, and failed to address 

whether the public or any other party would be harmed by those remedies. [Id. at 4-6]. That 

recommendation was adopted by the district court on August 5, 2014. [57]. 

 Presently before the Court are the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment/Dismissal, 

which was filed on July 2, 2014 [36], and Farrell’s aforementioned Motion for Declaratory 

Judgment [4]. 

B. Legal Standard 

 A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. of Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests a complaint’s legal 

sufficiency. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement 

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of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The 

plausibility standard “does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply 

calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of 

illegal [conduct].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Put another way, the complaint’s allegations 

“must do more than create speculation or suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action; they 

must show entitlement to relief.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 

523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56). 

In deciding whether a plaintiff has set forth a “plausible” claim, the court must accept the 

factual allegations in the complaint as true. Id.; see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 

(2007). That tenet, however, “is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” to 

prevent a complaint from being dismissed on grounds that it fails to sufficiently comport with 

basic pleading requirements. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. See also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; 

Howard v. City of Girard, Ohio, 346 F. Appx. 49, 51 (6th Cir. 2009). Furthermore, a court is not 

required to “create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading.” Clark v. Nat’l 

Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). Ultimately, “[d]etermining whether 

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the 

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. 

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Pleadings filed by pro se litigants are entitled to a more liberal reading than would be 

afforded to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 

2007). Nonetheless, “[t]he leniency granted to pro se [litigants] . . . is not boundless,” Martin v. 

Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004), and “such complaints still must plead sufficient facts 

to show a redressable legal wrong has been committed.” Baker v. Salvation Army, No. 09-

11424, 2011 WL 1233200, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2011). 

C. Analysis 

 Defendants argue that Farrell’s complaint should be dismissed because his claims are 

barred by the doctrines of Rooker-Feldman and res judicata, and because his claims under the 

FDCPA are barred by the statute of limitations. [36]. 

 1. Rooker-Feldman Bars Counts Ten and Eleven of Farrell’s Complaint 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal courts, with the exception of the Supreme 

Court, from exercising jurisdiction over a claim alleging error in a state court decision. See Hall 

v. Callahan, 727 F.3d 450, 453 (6th Cir. 2013); Coles v. Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 857 (6th Cir. 

2006) (noting that the doctrine bars “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries 

caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and 

inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 

Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see also District of Columbia Court of 

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 

 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar all claims which merely relate to a prior state 

court proceeding. See Todd v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., 434 F.3d 432, 436–37 (6th Cir. 

2006). Rather, the doctrine bars only claims which allege harm arising out of a state court 

decision itself; stated otherwise, Rooker-Feldman bars actions where “the point of [the] suit is to 

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obtain a federal reversal of a state court decision.” Givens v. Homecomings Fin., 278 F. App’x. 

607, 609 (6th Cir.2008). See also Brown v. First Nationwide Mortgage Corp., 206 F. App’x 

436, 439 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A] complaint in which the plaintiff contends he was injured by the 

defendants, rather than by the state court decision itself, is not barred by Rooker–Feldman, even 

if relief is predicated on denying the legal conclusion reached by the state court.”); Burks v. 

Washington Mut. Bank, F.A., No. 07-13693, 2008 WL 4966656, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 17, 

2008) (“Although some of plaintiffs’ claims challenge factual conclusions underlying the state 

court decision, none of the claims directly challenge the decision or allege injury as a result of 

the decision. . . . Furthermore, the relief requested by plaintiffs will not vitiate or overturn the 

state court decision because plaintiffs do not seek possession of the home. For these reasons, 

none of plaintiffs’ claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman.”). Thus, although Rooker-Feldman

bars a federal district court from considering a request that would necessarily overturn a state 

court judgment, “[i]f a federal plaintiff presents an independent claim, even one that denies a 

state court's legal conclusion in a case to which the plaintiff was a party, there is jurisdiction, and 

state law determines whether the defendant prevails under preclusion principles.” Exxon Mobil 

Corp., 544 at 282. 

Two recent Eastern District of Michigan cases further illuminate the salient distinction.

In Rice v. Wojtowicz, No. 13-CV-12456, 2014 WL 4829625, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 2014), a 

plaintiff filed a complaint in this court alleging that certain defendants committed fraud during a 

state court proceeding that resulted in foreclosure of his home. The defendants argued that 

Rooker-Feldman barred the plaintiff’s federal court action. The federal court rejected the 

defendants’ argument, holding that Rooker-Feldman’s bar did not apply because the plaintiff 

was: 

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not seeking an injunction or other equitable relief-he is not asking for his 

house back, or requesting the court nullify the state court tax foreclosure. 

The injury derives from the defendants’ conspiracy to steal his house-not 

the state court ruling. The Court can remedy that injury through monetary 

damages without revising or nullifying the state court judgment. 

Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction over the constitutional claims. 

Id. 

In contrast, in Colbert v. Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass’n, No. 12-13844, 2013 WL 1629305 

(E.D. Mich. Apr. 16, 2013), a plaintiff who unsuccessfully challenged the foreclosure of his 

home in state court sought to have the federal court grant him quiet title and set aside the 

Sheriff’s sale of the property. The court found that because granting that relief would necessitate 

the reversal of the state court judgment granting possession to the defendants, the plaintiff’s 

claims were barred by Rooker-Feldman. Id. at 7. See also Kafele v. Lerner, Sampson & 

Rothfuss, L.P.A., 161 F. App’x 487, 490 (6th Cir. 2005) (“That the plaintiffs’ claims are indeed 

‘inextricably intertwined’ is evident from the fact that there is simply no way for this or any 

other court to grant relief without disturbing the judgments of foreclosure entered by the state 

court”). Thus, to the extent Farrell’s claims seek relief that would necessitate reversing a remedy 

issued in the prior state court adjudication, they are barred by Rooker-Feldman. 

Here, two of Farrell’s claims fit that bill. In Counts 10 and 11 of his complaint, Farrell 

seeks to void the foreclosure, to be awarded “QUIET TITLE against the defendants in favor of 

the undersigned, and [that he] be granted statutory damages, costs, and fees pursuant to 15 USC 

SECTION 1692(k)(a), as well as be granted other damages, costs, and fees pursuant to MCL 

600.2919a for defending this action together with other relief as the Honorable Court of Record 

deems just.” [1 at 14-18]. Since this Court cannot void the foreclosure or grant quiet title to the 

Property without reversing the relief granted by the state court2

, Counts 10 and 11 of the instant 

 

2

 Similarly, it cannot award money damages which Farrell alleges flow directly from the 

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complaint are barred by Rooker-Feldman, and should be dismissed. [33 at Ex. 11]. 

Farrell defends against this analysis by asserting that a state court judgment is disturbed 

only “upon motion by Plaintiff in the state court, and upon proper adjudication within the state 

court.” [61 at 3]. But that argument simply misconstrues Rooker-Feldman. As discussed above, 

under that doctrine, lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to consider a claim which seeks relief

that would require reversal of a prior state court judgment – in other words, a “federal claim 

[that] only succeeds by declaring that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” 

Battah v. ResMAE Mortgage Corp., 746 F. Supp. 2d 869, 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (citing Loriz v. 

Connaughton, 233 Fed. Appx. 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2007)). The relief that Farrell seeks, to void the 

foreclosure and award quiet title to the Property, is the very thing he was denied in state court; 

thus granting that relief would necessarily entail reversing the decision of the state court. 

Furthermore, Farrell’s suggestion that the state court decision “may not be valid, as it appears the 

court presumed the incorrect status of Defendants” further demonstrates that, at least as to 

Counts 10 and 11, he is essentially seeking direct appellate review by this Court of the state court 

determination, which is impermissible under Rooker-Feldman. [61 at 3]. 

As discussed above, however, while Farrell’s FDCPA claims are potentially at odds with 

many of the determinations made by the state court, they flow from the Defendants’ alleged 

conduct, rather than the state court ruling itself. Thus, Rooker-Feldman does not bar those 

claims.

2. Res Judicata Also Bars Counts Ten and Eleven of Farrell’s Complaint 

Defendants argue that to whatever extent Farrell’s claims are not barred by Rooker-

 

allegedly improper foreclosure and title cloud. See Bridgewater Operating Corp. v. Feldstein, 

346 F.3d 27, 29-30 (2nd Cir. 2003) (a claim for money damages which is “inextricably 

intertwined” with issues previously decided by a state court is barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine). 

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Feldman, they are barred by res judicata. [36 at 12-16]. They are only partly correct. Federal 

courts must give full faith and credit to state-court decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Abbott v. 

Michigan, 474 F.3d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Federal courts must give the same preclusive 

effect to a state-court judgment as that judgment receives in the rendering state.”). Accordingly, 

this Court must apply Michigan preclusion law in determining whether the prior state-court 

foreclosure proceedings bar this suit. 

In Michigan, res judicata “bars a second, subsequent action when (1) the prior action was 

decided on the merits, (2) both actions involve the same parties or their privies, and (3) the 

matter in the second case was, or could have been, resolved in the first.” Abbott, 474 F.3d at 331 

(quoting Adair v. State, 680 N.W.2d 386, 396 (2004)). “Michigan has adopted a broad 

application of the doctrine of res judicata, which bars not only claims actually litigated in the 

prior action, but all claims arising out of the same transaction that the parties, exercising 

reasonable diligence, could have raised in the prior action but did not.” Berkshire v. Klimowicz, 

No. 13-11599, 2014 WL 1032048, at *6 (E.D. Mich., Mar. 17, 2014). 

Notwithstanding this general principle, under Michigan law, res judicata does not bar 

claims which could have been but were not raised during summary proceedings, including 

foreclosure proceedings. As explained in Garza v. Freddie Mac, 2010 WL 4539521, at *3 (E.D. 

Mich. Nov. 3, 2010), “Michigan courts recognize a statutory exception to res judicata in the case 

of summary proceedings. . . . Claims are not precluded on the basis that they could have been 

brought in the earlier proceeding. Instead, res judicata only applies to claims actually litigated in 

a summary proceeding.” See also, M.C.L. § 600.5750 (“A judgment for possession under 

[Michigan's foreclosure] chapter does not merge or bar any other claim for relief.”). 

Accordingly, in the summary proceedings context, only those claims actually raised and litigated 

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are barred. 

In her January 14, 2013 order, the Honorable Julie Nicholson of the 52-3 Judicial District 

Court granted possession of the Property to Defendants, and found that Farrell’s affirmative 

defenses were without merit. [33 at Ex. 11]. Specifically, Judge Nicholson held that Defendant 

U.S. Bank was the mortgagee, and that it properly foreclosed by advertisement. [Id.] Farrell 

appealed that determination to the Oakland County Circuit Court, which affirmed the trial court 

in a July 3, 2013 order. [33 at Ex. 12]. In that order, the Honorable James Alexander found that 

Farrell admitted he was in default on his mortgage payments, that Wells Fargo properly assigned 

its interest to U.S. Bank on May 28, 2010, and that Farrell’s note-splitting argument was without 

merit. [Id.].3

 

Counts 10 and 11 of Farrell’s complaint are barred by res judicata because they ask the 

Court to determine matters already decided in the state proceedings. [1 at 14-17]. In Count 10, 

Farrell again claims that the foreclosure of the Property was improper because Wells Fargo 

Home Mortgage was defunct at the time of foreclosure. [1 at 14-15]. In Count 11, Farrell 

alleges that Defendants fraudulently produced an assignment of mortgage with the intent to 

defraud him of the Property. [1 at 16-17]. By determining that “[U.S. Bank] met all of the 

requirements to foreclose by advertisement,” Judge Nicholson determined these issues on the 

merits against Farrell, and thus foreclosed his attempts to relitigate Counts 10 and 11 of his 

complaint. [33 at Ex. 11]. 

3. The Statute of Limitations Bars Counts One through Nine of Farrell’s 

Complaint 

Farrell’s only remaining claims – Counts 1 through 9 – arise under the FDCPA. 

 

3

 It does not appear that any of Farrell’s FDCPA claims were raised in the state foreclosure 

proceedings. Thus none are barred here by res judicata.

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Defendants argue that these claims are barred by the statute of limitations. [36 at 16-17]. 

Actions under the FDCPA must be brought within one year from the date on which the alleged 

violation occurs. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692(k). Farrell alleges that Defendants violated the 

FDCPA in letters relating to the foreclosure and in the May 28, 2010 Assignment of Debt 

document [1 at 9-14]. The specific allegations made in these claims are not relevant, as they are 

barred by the statute of limitations. 

While Farrell fails to state the particular dates on which the allegedly infringing letters 

were received, attached to his complaint are letters from the Defendants with dates ranging from 

March 3, 2010 to May 20, 2010. [1 at Ex. 6.11-6.17]. The foreclosure sale of the Property was 

held on December 7, 2010. [36 at Ex. C]. Farrell has failed to establish the existence of any 

event occurring after the foreclosure sale which could serve as the basis for a FDCPA violation. 

Farrell’s complaint in this action was not filed until May 5, 2014. [1 at 18]. Because Farrell’s 

complaint was filed more than one year after the letters were received and the date of the 

foreclosure sale, the statute of limitations bars his FDCPA claims based on these events. 

Farrell argues that his “FDCPA claims are not time-barred, as the violations. . . are 

ongoing, including the eviction hearings and other hearings, the many pleadings in multiple 

courts, all of which are false and misleading representations, or unfair practices. . . as Defendants 

are threatening to take actions that they cannot legally take as debt collectors.” [61 at 4]. 

However, the pursuit of debt-collection litigation generally does not constitute a continuing 

violation of the FDCPA. See Slorp v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, No. 13-3402, 2014 WL 

4800100, at *7 (6th Cir. Sept. 29, 2014) (noting that no court of appeals has held that pursuit of 

such litigation is a continuing violation of the FDCPA, and finding that a debt collector who 

reaffirmed certain deceptive statements throughout the litigation was not liable for a continuing 

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FDCPA violation); Ball v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 12-CV-0604, 2012 WL 1745479, at 

*5 (N.D. Ohio May 16, 2012) (noting that maintaining litigation is not a continuing violation of 

the FDCPA); Ruth v. Unifund CCR Partners, No. 08-CV-2689, 2009 WL 585847, at *11 (N.D. 

Ohio Mar. 6, 2009) aff’d, 604 F.3d 908 (6th Cir. 2010) (same). Consequently, neither 

Defendants’ pursuit of the foreclosure action nor their defenses in this action constitutes a 

continuing violation of the FDCPA. Thus, Counts 1 through 9 of Farrell’s complaint for 

damages under the FDCPA are time barred and should be dismissed. 

4. Conclusion 

 Farrell’s claims to void the alleged wrongful foreclosure, award him a quiet title to the 

Property, and to pay him money damages related thereto in Counts 10 and 11 are barred by 

Rooker-Feldman. Insofar as he asserts that Defendants acted unlawfully in foreclosing upon the 

Property, res judicata also bars Counts 10 and 11. Finally, Farrell’s FDCPA claims (Counts 1 

through 9) are barred by the statute of limitations.4

 

 II. RECOMMENDATION 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo’s 

 

4

 Farrell moves for declaratory judgment with respect to whether either defendant is a debt 

collector. [4]. However, their status as debt collectors is immaterial in light of this Court’s 

recommendation that Farrell’s FDCPA claims be dismissed. Accordingly, Farrell’s motion 

should be denied. On July 9, 2014, Farrell filed a “Demand for Response to Motion for 

Declaratory Judgment.” [38]. This motion is similarly moot, and will be denied in a separate 

order filed today. Farrell also moves for sanctions against Defendants. [46]. He argues that his 

debt to Defendants was discharged in his bankruptcy proceeding, that the assignment of the 

Mortgage to U.S. Bank was a “blatant felony forgery,” and that Defendants are debt collectors 

not permitted to foreclose on the Property. [46 at 2-4]. These are merely reassertions of the 

same arguments Farrell made in his prior state and federal court proceedings, and they are barred 

for the aforementioned reasons. Moreover, Farrell did not comply with Rule 11(b)’s requirement 

that his request is supported by “factual contentions [that] have evidentiary support.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 11(b)(3). Although Farrell’s motion is supported by the various exhibits he attached 

thereto, for the reasons discussed above, none of that evidence shows that Defendants acted in a 

manner which would subject them to sanctions. For all of these reasons, Farrell’s motion for 

sanctions [46] will be denied in a separate order. 

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Motion for Summary Judgment/Dismissal [36] be GRANTED, and Farrell’s Motion for 

Declaratory Judgment [4] be DENIED. 

Dated: December 29, 2014 s/David R. Grand 

Ann Arbor, Michigan DAVID R. GRAND 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS 

The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to act within fourteen (14) days of service of a copy hereof as 

provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file specific 

objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985); Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir.1991); United States v. Walters, 

638 F.2d 947, 949–50 (6th Cir. 1981). The filing of objections which raise some issues, but fail 

to raise others with specificity, will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this 

Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Secretary of HHS, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir.1991); 

Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir.1987). Pursuant to 

E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2), a copy of any objections is to be served upon this magistrate judge. A 

party may respond to another party’s objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). Any such response should be concise, and 

should address specifically, and in the same order raised, each issue presented in the objections. 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record 

via email addresses the court has on file. 

 s/Eddrey O. Butts 

 EDDREY O. BUTTS 

 Case Manager 

Dated: December 29, 2014 

2:14-cv-11781-SJM-DRG Doc # 92 Filed 12/29/14 Pg 14 of 14 Pg ID 2057