UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

WILLIAM COWAN, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

TRENT MILLER, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 

Case No. 2:15-cv-12428 

District Judge Gershwin A. Drain 

Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti

___________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 14) 

I. RECOMMENDATION: The Court should deny Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment, because Plaintiff fully exhausted his administrative remedies 

in compliance with the Michigan Department of Corrections’ (“MDOC”) policy. 

II. REPORT 

 A. Background 

 

 Plaintiff, William Stokes Cowan, Jr., an inmate at the Chippewa 

Correctional Facility who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, filed his 

complaint on July 2, 2015 and his application to proceed without prepayment of 

fees on August 3, 2015. (DE 1 and 5.) The Court granted Plaintiff’s application 

on August 10, 2015. (DE 6.) In his complaint, Plaintiff brings claims under 42 

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U.S.C. § 1983,1 asserting that Defendant Trent Miller violated his rights under the 

First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by refusing to serve him a Ramadan 

meal, causing him to experience life-threatening hypoglycemia. 

 Plaintiff is a Type 1 diabetic. According to his pleading, missing a meal can 

cause hypoglycemia, which he describes as “body cells . . . deprived of glucose” 

leading to “sweating, nausea, anxiety, rapid forceful heartbeats, complete 

confusion, slurred speech, and unsteady movement.” (DE 1 at 7.) In addition, 

Plaintiff notes that the condition can cause blurred vision, black-outs, brain 

damage, or death if not treated promptly. 

 Plaintiff explains that on July 2, 2014, Defendant Miller refused to provide 

his morning Ramadan meal. (DE 1 at 8.) Later that day, he awoke to being 

“manhandled and surrounded by at least seven correctional officers.” (Id. at 7.) 

After restraining Plaintiff to the point of shoulder injury, the officers called health 

services, and a diagnosis of hypoglycemia was confirmed. (Id. at 8.) 

 He asserts that Defendant Miller took this action deliberately in retaliation 

for other, unnamed conduct. He also alleges that Defendant Jeffery Woods failed 

                                                            

1

 Plaintiff specifically notes that he brings this civil action pursuant to 84 U.S.C. 42 

§ 200, which does not exist in the United States Code. The causes of action raised 

in the complaint involve the deprivation of rights, privileges, and immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, and such an action is properly brought 

pursuant to § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Moreover, as Defendants point out, 

Plaintiff cites to Cruz v. Beta, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), an action brought pursuant § 

1983. 

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to investigate Defendant Miller’s actions. Finally, he names the MDOC as a 

Defendant, asserting that it is liable for hiring “heartless staff members.” (DE 1 at 

5.) Plaintiff asks the Court to remove Defendant Miller as a corrections officer and 

call for an outside investigation into the facility, as well as compensation of $1.5 

million for pain and suffering. 

B. The Instant Motion 

 Defendants Miller and Woods filed the instant motion on October 9, 2015. 

They assert they are entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies. As evidence, Defendants provide Plaintiff’s 

July 2, 2014 grievance (URF 14-07-2091-17A) and his July 4, 2014 grievance 

(URF 14-07-2127-26I), both of which describe Officer Miller’s failure to provide 

Plaintiff with his Ramadan meal on July 2, 2014. (DE 14-2 and 14-3.) Defendants 

assert that those reports are only grieved through Step II. Defendants also provide 

a list of grievances exhausted by Plaintiff, along with an affidavit of Jordan Garza, 

student assistant, certifying that the list is a true and accurate copy of the report. 

(DE 14-4.) Finally, they provide the MDOC grievance policy, which outlines the 

steps an inmate must take to fully grieve an issue. 

 Plaintiff opposes the motion. In his response, Plaintiff asserts that the 

grievances attached as exhibits to Defendants’ motion were, in fact, fully 

exhausted as evidenced by the record. He notes that on July 3, 2014, he “issued a 

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complaint to the warden, the deputy warden, the inspector, internal affair[s], and 

the civil service commission” in addition to the grievances he filed. (DE 17 at 2.) 

Plaintiff contends that the additional complaint served to exhaust his administrative 

remedies. 

 Defendants filed a reply on November 4, 2015. (DE 18.) They reiterate 

their initial arguments and assert that Plaintiff “does not seriously dispute the fact 

that he failed to exhaust to Step III” in his response. (Id. at 2.) 

 Plaintiff filed an unsolicited sur-reply on November 12, 2015, in which he 

disputes the grievances relied on by Defendants and again asserts that he exhausted 

his administrative remedies. (DE 19.) He specifically points to URF-14-07-2127-

26I, noting that Defendants’ evidence shows that the matter was fully exhausted. 

(Id. at 1.) Although the brief was filed in violation of Eastern District of Michigan 

Local Rule 7.1(d)(1)(A), I will consider it in this instance, but Plaintiff is cautioned 

that future filings that violate the Local Rules may be stricken.2

 

C. Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary 

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

                                                            

2

 Plaintiff is also directed to Magistrate Judge Patti’s Practice guidelines, which 

provide that “[a]dditional briefing, including sur-replies, will NOT be permitted 

unless requested by the Court. The Court will strike any improperly filed surreplies or other briefing not contemplated by the Local Rules.” Motion Practice 

Guideline, available at 

https://www.mied.uscourts.gov/index.cfm?pageFunction=chambers&judgeid=51. 

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fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing 

law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). The Court 

“views the evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may be drawn from the facts 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pure Tech Sys., Inc. v. Mt. 

Hawley Ins. Co., 95 F. App’x 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). 

 “The moving party has the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of 

material fact exists . . . .” Stansberry v. Air Wis. Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 

(6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (e)(2) 

(providing that if a party “fails to properly address another party’s assertion of 

fact,” then the court may “consider the fact undisputed for the purposes of the 

motion.”). “Once the moving party satisfies its burden, ‘the burden shifts to the 

nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue.’” Wrench LLC 

v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). The nonmoving 

party must “make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat 

the motion.” Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009); see also 

Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 432 F. App’x 435, 441 (6th Cir. 

2011) (“The nonmovant must, however, do more than simply show that there is 

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . [T]here must be evidence 

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upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving 

party to create a genuine dispute.”) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when “a motion for summary 

judgment is properly made and supported and the nonmoving party fails to respond 

with a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of its case. . . .” 

Stansberry, 651 F.3d at 486 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 371, 322-23 

(1986)). 

 C. Discussion 

 The record reveals that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies 

through Step III with respect to grievance URF-14-07-2127-26I. Accordingly, 

Defendants’ motion should be denied. 

1. Exhaustion Under the PLRA 

Under the PLRA, a prisoner may not bring an action “with respect to prison 

conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law . . . until such 

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

Congress enacted this provision to address the “outsized share” of prisoner 

litigation filings and to ensure that “the flood of nonmeritorious claims does not 

submerge and effectively preclude consideration of the allegations with merit.” 

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203-04 (2007). Put another way, the purpose of 

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§ 1997e(a) is to “reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.” 

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). In addition, exhaustion “gives an 

agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it 

administers before it is haled into federal court, and it discourages disregard of [the 

agency’s] procedures.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). 

 “There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that 

unexhausted claims cannot be brought into court.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 211. The 

prison’s grievance process determines when a prisoner has properly exhausted his 

or her claim. Id. at 219 (“The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply 

with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system, but it is the 

prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper 

exhaustion.”). Even where a prisoner has made some attempts to go through the 

prison’s grievance process, “[t]he plain language of the statute makes exhaustion a 

precondition to filing an action in federal court.” Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 

641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999). The prisoner “may not exhaust his [or her] 

administrative remedies during the pendency of the federal suit.” Id. (citations 

omitted); see also Woodford, 548 US at 95 (“A prisoner who does not want to 

participate in the prison grievance system will have little incentive to comply with 

the system’s procedural rules unless noncompliance carries a sanction . . . .”). 

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However, “inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in 

their complaints.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. Instead, failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies is an affirmative defense under the PLRA. As such, 

Defendants bear the burden of proof on exhaustion. Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 

452, 456 (6th Cir. 2012). 

 2. Grievance Procedures at the MDOC 

 Pursuant to its Policy Directive dated July, 9, 2007, the administrative 

remedies available at the MDOC are as follows. First, the inmate must attempt to 

resolve any issue with the staff member involved within two days of becoming 

aware of a grievable issue. (DE 14-5, ¶ P.) If the issues are not resolved within 

five days, the inmate may file a Step 1 grievance using the appropriate form. The 

inmate should receive a response within fifteen days of filing his or her grievance. 

If the inmate is dissatisfied with the disposition of the grievance, or does not 

receive a response ten days after the due date, he or she may file a Step II 

grievance using the appropriate form. (Id. at ¶ BB.) Similarly, if the inmate is 

dissatisfied with the Step II response or does not receive a response for ten days 

after the response was due, he or she may file a Step III grievance. (Id. at ¶ FF.) 

Step III grievances are “logged on a computerized grievance tracking system.” (Id. 

at ¶ GG.) The matter is fully exhausted after the disposition of the Step III 

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grievance. Surles, 678 F.3d at 455 (“A grievant must undertake all steps of the 

MDOC process for his grievance to be considered fully exhausted.”). 

 3. Plaintiff Pursued His July 4, 2014 Grievance to Step III 

Here, as acknowledged by Defendants, there were two grievances relating to 

the events described in his complaint. (DE 18 at 2.) The first (URF-14-07-2091-

17A) is dated July 2, 2014, in which he notes that he “explained to Officer Miller 

that he was in violation of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth [amendments] for not 

allowing me to eat.” (DE 14-2 at 2.) On July 4, 2014, the grievance was denied, 

with a statement that “Prisoner Cowan wishes to go to step II.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff 

filed his Step II appeal on July 14, 2014 and it was denied on July 22, 2014. (Id. at 

6.) 

The second grievance (URF-14-07-2127-26I) is dated July 4, 2014 and also 

describes Defendant Miller’s refusal to provide Plaintiff’s Ramadan meal on July 

2, 2014.3

 (DE 14-3 at 2.) Specifically, Plaintiff explains that he suffers from 

hypoglycemia and asserts that “Officer Miller tried to murder” him by “denying 

the morning Ramadan meal.” (Id. at 3.) He notes that he “awoke to being 

                                                            

3

 Defendants attempt to differentiate between these grievances, indicating that 

URF-1407-2091-17A involved the “denial of his Ramadan meal,” whereas URF1407-2127-26I involved “Miller’s intent to kill him.” (DE 18 at 2.) However, 

both grievances (and especially Plaintiff’s attachments to the grievances) describe 

the same event: Defendant Miller’s alleged refusal to provide Plaintiff a Ramadan 

meal and the resulting medical problems suffered by Plaintiff on July 2, 2014. 

Both of the grievances, on their own, adequately describe the events outlined in 

Plaintiff’s complaint. 

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manhandled and surrounded by a[t] least seven correctional officers.” (Id. at 2.) 

The language used in this grievance is nearly identical to that in his complaint, in 

which he states that he “awoke to being manhandled” and that “Officer Miller tried 

to murder [him] by causing [his] blood sugar levels to drop” by “den[ying] [him] 

the morning Ramadan meal. . . .” (DE 1 at 7-8.) This grievance was denied on 

July 16, 2014, with a note that Plaintiff did not report to the Officer station to 

receive his meal in the time allotted. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff filed a Step II appeal on 

July 25, 2014, which was denied on August 6, 2014. (Id. at 5-7.) 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not filed any Step III appeals with 

respect to the above grievances. They provide as evidence Plaintiff’s “MDOC 

Prisoner Step III Grievance Report” from May 2009 through the present. (DE 14-

4.) The report contains a sworn statement from a student assistant, presumably an 

intern, attesting that it is a “true and accurate copy of the report generated for 

William Cowan #229059 from the Michigan Department of Corrections database 

that tracks all prisoner/parolee grievances filed at Step III.” (DE 14-4 at 2.) The 

report contains a total of three Step III appeals. 

One of the appeals, labeled URF-14-07-2127-12z, indicates that the Step I 

grievance was received on July 7, 2014, the same date that Plaintiff’s July 4, 2014 

grievance is stamped as received. (DE 14-4 at 3 and DE 14-3 at 2.) The Step III 

response to that grievance (which is only identified as “URF 14072127”), states the 

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following: “Grievant is alleging unnecessary force treatment and unprofessional 

conduct by staff during an incident on July 2, 2014.” (Id. at 9.) The affiliated Step 

I and Step II grievance and response are identical to those included with URF-14-

07-2127-26I. (Compare DE 14-3 at 2-7 and 14-4 at 12-17.) Notably, Plaintiff 

attaches to his complaint his Step III appeal with respect to grievance URF-14-07-

2127-26I. (DE 1 at 10.) Accordingly, despite the Step III appeal being labeled 

slightly differently on the Step III Grievance Report (URF-14-07-2127-12z as 

opposed to URF-14-07-2127-26I), it refers to the July 2, 2014 incident described in 

Plaintiff’s complaint.4

 Defendants’ own evidence, therefore, establishes that 

Plaintiff fully exhausted this incident through Step III in compliance with the 

MDOC policy. 

Defendants do not address any of these documents in detail in their initial 

motion or reply. Nor do they assert that the appeals were improper or untimely in 

any way, and there is no indication in the record that Plaintiff failed to follow the 

MDOC policy with respect to this grievance and the associated appeals. As such, 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment should be denied because he fully 

exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his July 4, 2014 grievance. 

                                                            

4

 It is unclear why the three-digit/letter suffix of these grievance numbers differ, 

but the rest of the numerical sequence is the same. In any case, the responsibility 

for assigning such file numbers would necessarily fall upon Defendants. 

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III. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS 

 The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service, 

as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 

72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right 

of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections that raise some 

issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a 

party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of 

Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1273 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 

72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge. 

 Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” and “Objection No. 

2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an 

objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the 

objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich LR 

72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, 

in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to 

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Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without 

merit, it may rule without awaiting the response. 

Dated: April 27, 2016 s/Anthony P. Patti 

 Anthony P. Patti 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was sent to parties of record 

on April 27, 2016, electronically and/or by U.S. Mail. 

 s/Michael Williams 

 Case Manager to the 

Honorable Anthony P. Patti 

 

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