UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

 

MARK CHOMOS, 

Plaintiff, 

 

v. Case No. 15-10103 

WOODHAVEN POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 / 

OPINION AND ORDER (1) OVERRULING DEFENDANTS’ OBJECTIONS; 

(2) ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION; AND 

(3) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLMENT AND DISMISS 

 Pending before the court is the report and recommendation (Dkt. # 152) of United 

States Magistrate Judge David R. Grand, to whom the case had been referred to for 

review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). Defendants Woodhaven Police 

Department, Frank Zdankiewcz, Ryan Smith, Brian Baker, Toth, Burst, City of 

Woodhaven, and Michael Graham have filed a motion to enforce a purported settlement 

agreement and dismiss the case. (Dkt. # 137.) The magistrate judge recommends that 

this motion be denied, finding that there has been no “meeting of the minds” as to 

whether Defendants would structure the payment such that the State Treasurer would 

not be able to seize it under the State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act, Mich. 

Comp. Laws § 800.401 et seq. (Id.) 

 Defendants filed objections (Dkt # 156) to the report and recommendation and 

Plaintiff Mark Chomos has filed a pro se response. (Dkt. # 158). The court will overrule 

the objections, adopt the report and recommendation, and deny the motion for the 

reasons provided below.
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The filing of timely objections requires the court to “make a de novo 

determination of those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendations 

to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). See United States v. Raddatz, 447 

U.S. 667 (1980); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). This de novo 

review requires this court to examine the relevant pleadings and such evidence as may 

have been submitted in support of the motions. A failure to file objections, or a failure to 

file specific objections, constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. United States 

v. Walters, 638 F2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. 

Sec’y of HHS, 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991). 

 In order for this court to apply meaningful de novo review, it is insufficient for the 

objecting party to simply incorporate by reference earlier pleadings or reproduce an 

earlier unsuccessful motion for dismissal or judgment (or response to the other party’s 

dispositive motion). Insufficient objections to a magistrate judge’s analysis will ordinarily 

be treated by the court as an unavailing general objection. See Spencer v. Bouchard,

449 F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Overly general objections do not satisfy the 

objection requirement.”). 

 Defendants raise two objections to the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation. First, Defendants contend that the magistrate judge erroneously 

applied a subjective standard, as opposed to an objective standard, in finding that the 

parties’ agreement lacked a “meeting of the minds.” (Dkt. # 156, Pg. ID 3244-47.) 

Second, Defendants argue that the magistrate judge erred in noting that “Defendants 

were to make a $500 initial deposit into Chomos’ [sic] prisoner account, and no such 
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payment is reflected in Defendants’ proposed settlement agreement (or was ever 

made), arguing that Plaintiff waived that requirement. (Id. at Pg. ID 3247-51.)

 District courts have an equitable power to enforce a settlement agreement, 

Brock v. Scheuner Corp., 841 F.2d 151, 154 (6th Cir.1988). A valid settlement 

agreement, like a contract, requires a meeting of the minds on all the essential terms. 

Burkhardt v. Bailey, 260 Mich.App. 636, 655, 680 N.W.2d 453 (2004). “A meeting of the 

minds is judged by an objective standard, looking to the express words of the parties 

and their visible acts, not their subjective states of mind.” Kamalnath v. Mercy Mem. 

Hosp. Corp., 194 Mich.App. 543, 548, 487 N.W.2d 499 (1992). 

 In exercising its equitable power to enforce a settlement, such exercise is 

restricted to cases where there is no dispute or ambiguity as to either the entry into, or 

the terms of the agreement. Kukla v. National Distillers Products Co., 483 F.2d 619, 621 

(6th Cir.1973). To enforce a settlement, a “district court must conclude that agreement 

has been reached on all material terms.” Brock, 841 F.2d at 154. See also ThermaScan 

Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 217 F.3d 414, 419–20 (6th Cir.2000). 

 Defendants’ first objection is entirely premised on the assertion that “the objective 

actions of the parties clearly indicate a settlement without [terms relating to payment in 

such a way as to be protected from seizure] and Plaintiff has offered nothing more than 

his subjective understanding of the terms to counter this evidence.” (Dkt. # 156, Pg. ID 

3444-45.) Defendants further aver that the parties agreed to settle for $ 12,500 at the 

settlement conference, thus establishing the contract, and that “Plaintiff’s only argument 

against these facts is an affidavit of his own testimony . . . indicating that he understood 
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the terms differently.” (Id. at Pg. ID 3246-47 (emphasis in original).) The court 

disagrees. 

 Defendants point to a December 5, 2016 email with a “Proposed Full and Final 

Release and Stipulated Order of Dismissal,” claiming that it shows a memorialization of 

the settlement agreement. (Dkt. # 156-2.) But, as the magistrate judge noted, Plaintiff’s 

power of attorney responded the next day, December 6, 2016, stating that the “full and 

final release” contained multiple terms that were not agreed upon during the settlement 

conference and that Plaintiff would not accept the additions. (Dkt. # 147, Pg. ID 3193.) 

The magistrate judge quoted the following particularly relevant paragraph: 

Also, you specifically stated during [] the mediation that you would 

structure the settlement so that the MDOC would not be able to go after 

Mr[.] Chomos for any of the settlement money. Please include this 

language in the revised release as well, as it was a major factor in Mr. 

Chomo’s [sic] decision to settle. 

(Dkt. # 152, Pg. ID 3232 (quoting Dkt. # 147, Pg. ID 3193).) 

 This communication constitutes objective evidence that there was no mutual 

assent to the same material terms. Further, it took place a full week before the State 

Treasurer’s action was filed, severely undermining Defendants’ contention in their 

underlying brief that “the overwhelming and obvious implication is that Plaintiff’s 

decision to reject settlement was wholly driven by the initiation of the State Treasurer’s 

lawsuit.” (Dkt. # 156-2, Pg. ID 3259) (emphasis in original).) Curiously, Defendants do 

not address this communication in their objections at all. 

 Notwithstanding that the magistrate judge and Defendants’ counsel deny any 

representation about the structure of the payments taking place at the settlement 

conference, the agreement was not placed on the record and the court is presented with 

conflicting evidence regarding the essential terms purportedly agreed to. As the court’s 
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equitable power to enforce settlement may only be exercised “where there is no dispute 

or ambiguity as to either the entry into, or the terms of the agreement[,]” Kukla, 483 F.2d 

at 621, it may not use that power here. Accordingly, Defendants’ first objection is 

overruled and the motion must be denied. 

 The court need not address Defendants’ second objection. The court has read 

the report and recommendation and finds that it is well-reasoned, thorough, and correct. 

The court has reviewed all the accompanying briefing and finds Defendants’ second 

objection to be without merit. Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ objections (Dkt. # 156) are OVERRULED. The 

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation (Dkt. # 152) is ADOPTED in its entirety 

and incorporated by reference. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to enforce the purported 

settlement agreement and dismiss (Dkt. # 137) is DENIED. 

 The court notes that, in the absence of settlement, the issues identified in the 

court’s prior order referring all pretrial matters to the magistrate judge (Dkt. # 129) 

remain unresolved, and the referral order remains in effect. 

s/Robert H. Cleland / 

ROBERT H. CLELAND 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: May 10, 2017 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record 

on this date, May 10, 2017, by electronic and/or ordinary mail. 

s/Lisa Wagner / 

 Case Manager and Deputy Clerk 

 (313) 234-5522 

S:\Cleland\JUDGE'S DESK\C1 ORDERS\15-10103.CHOMOS.R&R.enforce.settlment.dismiss.TLH.docx