J-E01004-24 

2024 PA Super 140 

 

 

DELAWARE VALLEY LANDSCAPE 

STONE, INC., ITS ASSIGNEES AND 

NOMINEES 

 v. 

RRQ, LLC, ALLAN J. NOWICKI AND 

THE ALLAN J. NOWICKI AND 

DIANNE M. NOWICKI FAMILY TRUST

APPEAL OF: THE ALLAN J. NOWICKI 

AND DIANNE M. NOWICKI FAMILY 

TRUST 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 2103 EDA 2021 

Appeal from the Judgment Entered October 8, 2021 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s): 

2020-04002 

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, 

J., NICHOLS, J., KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and LANE, J. 

OPINION BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JULY 8, 2024

Appellant, The Allan J. Nowicki and Dianne M. Nowicki Family Trust 

(Nowicki Family Trust),1 appeals from the judgment entered in this quiet title 

action in favor of Appellee, Delaware Valley Landscape Stone, Inc., which 

canceled a deed that Appellant recorded. Appellant argues that its appeal is 

timely filed, that the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s petition to strike 

____________________________________________ 

1

 The Nowicki Family Trust is the sole appellant in this matter because codefendants Allan J. Nowicki and RRQ, LLC did not appeal from the October 8, 

2021 judgment. 
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the default judgment, and that the trial court’s order entering final judgment 

in favor of Appellee does not comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. We 

reverse the trial court’s order, strike the judgment, and remand for further 

proceedings. 

The underlying facts of this case are well known to the parties. See

Trial Ct. Op., 12/9/21, at 1-5. Briefly, on May 20, 2020, Appellant recorded 

a deed purporting to convey title to the subsurface rights in and under a parcel 

of real property (the Property) from co-defendant RRQ, LLC to Appellant 

Nowicki Family Trust. On June 12, 2020, Appellee purchased the Property at 

a sheriff’s sale. Subsequently on August 11, 2020, Appellee filed a complaint 

to quiet title naming Appellant, RRQ, LLC, and Allan J. Nowicki (collectively, 

Defendants) as defendants.2 Therein, Appellee requested, among other 

things, that the trial court declare Defendants are barred from asserting any 

right, lien, title or interest in the Property and direct the Office of the Recorder 

of Deeds of Bucks County to cancel the May 20, 2020 deed. See Compl., 

8/11/20, at 1-4, R.R. at 6a-9a.3 

Appellee attempted to effectuate service on Appellant via the sheriff. 

See Sheriff’s Return of Service, 9/23/20; Sheriff’s Return of Service, 9/1/20. 

____________________________________________ 

2

 In addition to being sued in his personal capacity, co-defendant Allan J. 

Nowicki is also the sole member of co-defendant RRQ, LLC and a co-trustee 

of Appellant, Nowicki Family Trust. Appellant’s other co-trustee, Dianne M. 

Nowicki, was not named personally as a defendant in this case. 

3

 We may cite to the reproduced record for the parties’ convenience. 
J-E01004-24 

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Appellant subsequently filed affidavits of service indicating that a process 

server personally served Defendants with copies of the complaint on January 

4, 2021. See Affs. of Service, 1/9/21, R.R. at 21a-23a. 

Appellee obtained a default judgment against Defendants on February 

11, 2021. On February 22, 2021, Allan J. Nowicki filed a pro se petition to 

strike/open the default judgment on behalf of all Defendants.4 See R.R. at 

30a-90a. The trial court denied that petition on August 17, 2021.5 See R.R. 

at 227a. Appellee then filed a motion for entry of final judgment. See R.R. 

at 237a-43a. On October 8, 2021, the trial court entered final judgment in 

favor of Appellee, barring Defendants from asserting any interest in the 

Property, and directing the Recorder of Deeds to cancel the May 20, 2020 

deed. See R.R. at 259a. 

Allan J. Nowicki and Dianne M. Nowicki (collectively, the Trustees) 

subsequently filed a timely pro se notice of appeal on behalf of Appellant 

____________________________________________ 

4

 Specifically, Allan J. Nowicki began his petition to strike/open default 

judgments as follows: “and now, Allan J. Nowicki, sole-member of RRQ, LLC, 

co-trustee of the . . . Nowicki Family Trust[,] and Allan J. Nowicki personally 

files Defendants[’] petition to strike/open default judgments entered against 

them on February 11, 2021 . . . .” R.R. at 32a (formatting altered). 

5

 The trial court’s order is dated August 16, 2021, but was served on the 

parties on August 17, 2021. See Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1) (providing that the date 

of entry of an order is the day the clerk of court mails or delivers copies of the 

order to the parties); see also Pa.R.C.P. 236. 
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Nowicki Family Trust in their capacity as its trustees.6 The Trustees also filed 

a pro se court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court issued an 

opinion addressing the Trustees’ claims. 

On appeal, a three-judge panel of this Court held that the Trustees could 

not represent Appellant Nowicki Family Trust pro se, struck the Trustees’ brief 

filed on behalf of Appellant, and directed Appellant to retain counsel. See 

Delaware Valley Landscape Stone v. RRQ, LLC, 284 A.3d 459, 465 (Pa. 

Super. 2022). Counsel subsequently entered an appearance on behalf of 

Appellant and filed a new appellate brief.7 

On March 3, 2023, the same three-judge panel issued a memorandum 

decision affirming the judgment in favor of Appellee. See Delaware Valley 

Landscape Stone v. RRQ, LLC, 2103 EDA 2021, 2023 WL 2706705 (Pa. 

Super. filed Mar. 3, 2023) (unpublished mem). Specifically, the panel, relying 

on precedential decisions of this Court, concluded that Appellant’s appeal was 

untimely with respect to the trial court’s August 17, 2021 order denying 

Appellant’s petition to strike the default judgment. See id. Appellant 

subsequently filed a timely application for reargument en banc, which we 

____________________________________________ 

6

 As noted previously, neither co-defendant RRQ, LLC nor co-defendant Allan 

J. Nowicki, in his personal capacity, appealed from the October 8, 2021 

judgment. 

7

 On February 22, 2023, Appellee filed a letter indicating that it did not intend 

to file a new brief, and instead would rely on its previously filed brief. 
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granted. Accordingly, this Court withdrew the panel’s March 3, 2023 

memorandum decision. 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 

1. Is an appeal timely filed when it is filed within thirty (30) days 

of the entry of the final judgment[] or does Pa.R.A.P. 311(a) 

require that it be filed within thirty (30) days of the [trial] 

court’s refusal to strike/open a default judgment? 

2. In a quiet title action, wherein a plaintiff seeks relief pursuant 

to Pa.R.C.P. 1061(b), is it permissible for a plaintiff to 

personally serve a defendant by a competent adult, or is a 

plaintiff required to serve a defendant via sheriff’s service? 

3. Does the [trial] court’s failure to follow the requirements of 

Pa.R.C.P. 1066 in fashioning its final judgment render it a legal 

nullity? 

Appellant’s Substituted Brief at 3 (emphasis in original). 

Timeliness of the Appeal 

In its first issue, Appellant argues that the instant appeal is timely with 

respect to the August 17, 2021 order denying Appellant’s petition to strike 

and/or open the default judgment. Id. at 7-15. Specifically, Appellant claims 

that although Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1) allows a litigant to take an immediate 

interlocutory appeal from an order refusing to open or strike off a judgment, 

the Rule “is permissive and does not mandate a party to immediately appeal 

the interlocutory order.” Id. at 10. Appellant contends “[t]he word ‘may’ 

does not require strict adherence or action, as opposed to the word ‘shall’ 

which demands certain actions be taken.” Id. Appellant further notes that 

Rule 311 provides that a party’s “failure to file an appeal of an interlocutory 
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order does not waive any objections to the interlocutory order.” Id. at 11 

(quoting Pa.R.A.P. 311(g)). Appellant concludes that this Court should apply 

the “plain an[d] unambiguous language” of Rule 311 and hold that Appellant 

was not required to immediately appeal the order denying its petition to strike 

and/or open the default judgment and this appeal was timely filed. Id. at 15. 

“It is well-established that timeliness is jurisdictional, as an untimely 

appeal divests this Court of jurisdiction to hear the merits of the case.” 

Affordable Outdoor, LLC v. Tri-Outdoor, Inc., 210 A.3d 270, 274 (Pa. 

Super. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “The timeliness of an 

appeal is a question of law. Accordingly, our scope of review is plenary and 

our standard of review is de novo.” Day v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of Borough 

of Carlisle, 931 A.2d 646, 650 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted). 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 903 states, in relevant part, “[e]xcept as 

otherwise prescribed by this rule, the notice of appeal required by Rule 902 

(manner of taking appeal) shall be filed within 30 days after the entry of the 

order from which the appeal is taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 311 provides, in relevant part: 

(a) General Rule.—An appeal may be taken as of right and 

without reference to Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) from the following types of 

orders: 

(1) Affecting Judgments.—An order refusing to open, 

vacate, or strike off a judgment. If orders opening, vacating, 

or striking off a judgment are sought in the alternative, no 

appeal may be filed until the court has disposed of each claim 

for relief. 

* * * 
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(g) Waiver of Objections. 

(1) Except as provided in subdivision (g)(1), failure to file an 

appeal of an interlocutory order does not waive any 

objections to the interlocutory order: 

(i) RESCINDED. 

(ii) Failure to file an appeal from an interlocutory order 

under subdivision (b)(1) or subdivision (c) of this rule shall 

constitute a waiver of all objections to jurisdiction over the 

person or over the property involved or to venue, etc., and 

the question of jurisdiction or venue shall not be considered 

on any subsequent appeal. 

(iii) Failure to file an appeal from an interlocutory order 

under subdivision (e) of this rule shall constitute a waiver of 

all objections to such an order. 

(iv) Failure to file an appeal from an interlocutory order 

refusing to compel arbitration, appealable under 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 7320(a)(1) and subdivision (a)(8) of this rule, shall 

constitute a waiver of all objections to such an order. 

Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1), (g)(1)(i)-(iv) (emphasis added). 

Additionally, “an appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of 

a . . . trial court.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). Further, the Comment to Rule 311 states 

that “[t]he appeal rights under this rule and under Pa.R.A.P. 312, Pa.R.A.P. 

313, Pa.R.A.P. 341, and Pa.R.A.P. 342 are cumulative, and no inference shall 

be drawn from the fact that two or more rules may be applicable to an appeal 

from a given order.” Pa.R.A.P. 311, Cmt. 

The thirty-day appeal period for an interlocutory order that is 

immediately appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 311(a) begins to run from the date 

of entry of that order, unless the trial court expressly and timely grants 

reconsideration of that order. See Leonard v. Andersen Corp., 445 A.2d 
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1279, 1281 (Pa. Super. 1982). In Leonard, the trial court entered an order 

transferring the case from Philadelphia to Bucks County. Id. at 1280. An 

order directing a change of venue in a civil matter is an interlocutory order 

immediately appealable as of right. Pa.R.A.P. 311(c). The plaintiffs filed a 

timely motion for reconsideration, but the trial court did not act on that motion 

within the thirty-day appeal period. Leonard, 445 A.2d at 1280. The 

plaintiffs subsequently filed a notice of appeal more than thirty days after the 

entry of the order changing venue. Id. The Leonard Court held that because 

the trial court did not expressly grant reconsideration within the thirty-day 

appeal period, its subsequent order was a nullity and did not toll the appeal 

period. Id. at 1281. This Court further explained that under Rule 311, the 

plaintiffs’ failure to take a timely interlocutory appeal from the order changing 

venue “preclude[d] any subsequent appellate review of it[]” and dismissed 

the appeal as untimely. Id. (citing then-Pa.R.A.P. 311(d)(1)(ii)).8 

In Hammel v. Hammel, 636 A.2d 214 (Pa. Super. 1994), the 

defendant appealed from the order granting the plaintiff’s motion for judgment 

on the pleadings. Hammel, 636 A.2d at 216. On appeal, the defendant also 

argued that the trial court erred by denying his petition to open/strike a 

confessed judgment. Id. at 216-17. This Court quashed the appeal with 

____________________________________________ 

8

 At the time Leonard was decided, Pa.R.A.P. 311(d)(1)(ii) provided that the 

failure to take an immediate interlocutory appeal from an order changing 

venue waived any objections to that order on a subsequent appeal. See

Leonard, 445 A.2d at 1281. That provision is now found at Pa.R.A.P. 

311(g)(1)(ii). 
J-E01004-24 

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respect to the trial court’s order denying the petition to open/strike the 

confessed judgment. Id. at 217. The Hammel Court explained: 

Under Pa.R.App.P. 311(a)(1), an appeal may be taken as of right 

from “[a]n order refusing to open, vacate or strike off a 

judgment.” In other words, such an order would be considered 

“final” and subject to attack on appeal. See Note to Rule 311 

(amended effective July 6, 1992). Consequently, the 

[defendant’s] failure to perfect an appeal from the court’s 

December 29, 1992, order denying his petition to open/strike 

judgment renders any attack of that order untimely and waived. 

See Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co., 348 A.2d 734 

(Pa. 1975). 

Id. 

The Hammel Court did not cite Leonard to support its conclusion that 

the defendant’s appeal from a final order was untimely with respect to a prior 

order from which the defendant could have taken an interlocutory appeal as 

of right. See id. Our Supreme Court decided Bell before the Rules of 

Appellate Procedure went into effect on July 1, 1976. See Pa.R.A.P. 101, 311. 

Instead, the Bell Court analyzed Section 501 of the former Appellate Court 

Jurisdiction Act of 1970, 17 P.S. § 211.501, to determine “whether orders 

denying class action status are ‘final’” appealable orders within the meaning 

of that statute. Bell, 348 A.2d at 735. The Bell Court did not address whether 

an appeal from a final order was untimely with respect to an earlier, 

interlocutory order which was appealable as of right. 

Subsequently, this Court applied Leonard and Hammel to appeals from 

a subsequent order or judgment where the appellant did not take an 

immediate interlocutory appeal from order refusing to open, vacate, or strike 
J-E01004-24 

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off a judgment. See, e.g., Blackburn v. King Inv. Grp., LLC, 162 A.3d 461, 

463-64 (Pa. Super. 2017). In Blackburn, the trial court denied the 

defendant’s petition to open and/or strike the confession of judgment. 

Blackburn, 162 A.3d at 462. Thereafter, the defendant filed a notice of 

appeal after the trial court modified the judgment amount. Id. at 463. On 

appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying the petition 

to open the confession of judgment. Id. The Blackburn Court quashed the 

appeal, explaining that “the appeal period under Pa.R.A.P. 311 begins to run 

from the entry of the interlocutory order appealable as of right”. Id. at 464 

(citing Leonard, 445 A.2d at 1280-81). This Court also stated that the 

“[f]ailure to timely appeal from an order denying a petition to open, vacate, 

or strike off a judgment renders any attack of that order untimely and waived.” 

Id. (citing Hammel, 636 A.2d at 217; Bell, 348 A.2d 734) (quotation marks 

omitted); see also Porter v. Nikita Lodging, Inc., 274 A.3d 1272, 1280-

81 (Pa. Super. 2022) (applying Blackburn and Hammel to conclude that 

where the defendants appealed from an order imposing sanctions, this Court 

lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendants’ issues relating to an earlier 

injunction because the defendants did not take a timely appeal from the 

injunction). 

The plain language of Rule 311 indicates that a party may, but is not 

required to, file an interlocutory appeal as of right from an order denying a 

petition to strike and/or open a judgment. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1). Except 

for the types of orders specifically enumerated in Pa.R.A.P. 311(g)(1)(ii)-(iv), 
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a party who chooses not to file an immediate interlocutory appeal as of right 

does not waive any of their issues relating to that interlocutory order in a 

subsequent appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(g)(1). An order refusing to open, 

vacate, or strike off a judgment is not one of the types of orders included in 

Pa.R.A.P. 311(g)(1)(ii)-(iv). Therefore, a party may wait until a final 

judgment is entered before seeking appellate review of an order refusing to 

open, vacate, or strike off a judgment. See Pa.R.A.P. 311, Cmt. (explaining 

the appellate rights under Rules 311 and 341, among other rules, are 

cumulative). 

We reiterate that Rule 311 specifically provides that the failure to take 

an immediate interlocutory appeal from an order changing venue precludes 

appellate review of that order in an appeal from a subsequent order or 

judgment. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(g)(1)(ii). Therefore, because Leonard

involved an order changing venue, not an order denying a petition to strike 

and/or open a judgment, the Blackburn Court erred in relying on Leonard

to conclude that the failure to take an immediate interlocutory appeal from an 

order refusing to open, vacate, or strike off a judgment rendered the appeal 

untimely. Compare Blackburn, 162 A.3d at 464; with Leonard, 445 A.2d 

at 1280-81. 

Further, the Hammel Court erred in relying on Bell, a case that 

predated the adoption of the Rules of Appellate Procedure and did not discuss 

appellate review of interlocutory orders where the appellant has appealed 

from a subsequent order or judgment, to conclude that the appeal was 
J-E01004-24 

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untimely with respect to the order denying his petition to open/strike the 

confessed judgment. Compare Hammel, 636 A.2d at 216-17 with Bell, 348 

A.2d at 735-39. 

For these reasons, we conclude that Hammel, Blackburn, and their 

progeny must be overruled to the extent that they are inconsistent with the 

plain language of Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1) and (g)(1).9 

Here, the trial court denied Appellant’s petition to strike/open the default 

judgment on August 17, 2021 on the basis that Appellant did not file a notice 

of appeal within thirty days of that date. Subsequently, on October 8, 2021, 

the trial court entered final judgment in favor of Appellee and canceled 

Appellant’s deed. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from that final 

judgment. 

____________________________________________ 

9

 We emphasize that our decision does not affect Rule 903’s requirement that 

a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of the entry of the order 

being appealed. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Therefore, if a party wishes to take 

an interlocutory appealable as of right, the party must file a notice of appeal 

within thirty days of the entry of that interlocutory order. See, e.g., Jacobs 

v. Stephens, 204 A.3d 402, 409 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2019); Leonard, 445 A.2d 

at 1281. Otherwise, a party must file a notice of appeal within thirty days of 

the entry of a final order or judgment. See, e.g., K.H. v. J.R., 826 A.2d 863, 

871 (Pa. 2003) (explaining that “in the context of a single action, a notice of 

appeal filed from the entry of judgment will be viewed as drawing into question 

any prior non-final orders that produced the judgment” (citation omitted)); 

Pa.R.A.P. 341, Cmt. (stating that “[a] party needs to file only a single notice 

of appeal to secure review of prior non-final orders that are made final by the 

entry of a final order. Where, however, one or more orders resolves issues 

arising on more than one docket or relating to more than one judgment, 

separate notices of appeal must be filed” (citations omitted)). 
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Applying the plain language of Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1) and (g)(1), we 

conclude that Appellant’s decision not to take an immediate interlocutory 

appeal from the August 17, 2021 order and to defer seeking appellate review 

until after the entry of a final judgment did not waive Appellant’s issues and 

that the instant appeal is timely with respect to the August 17, 2021 order. 

We now address Appellant’s substantive claims. 

Petition to Strike the Default Judgment 

Appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying its petition to 

strike the default judgment because Appellee failed to properly serve 

Appellant with the complaint. Appellant’s Substituted Brief at 15-25. 

Appellant claims that service was defective because Appellee utilized a process 

server to serve Appellant with the complaint instead of the sheriff as required 

by Pa.R.C.P. 400(a). Id. at 17-20, 25. Appellant contends that the trial court 

erred by concluding Appellee properly served Appellant pursuant Pa.R.C.P. 

400(b)(1), which permits personal service by any competent adult. Id. at 20-

24. Specifically, Appellant argues that Rule 400(b)(1) is not applicable to this 

matter because Rule 400(b)(1) governs service of process in matters involving 

a request for injunctive relief and Appellee’s complaint did not include any 

such claim. Id. Therefore, Appellant concludes that the trial court erred by 

denying Appellant’s petition to strike and/or open the default judgment 

because Appellee failed to serve Appellant with the complaint via sheriff as 

required under Rule of Civil Procedure 400(a). Id. at 25. 
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Appellee responds that service was proper pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 

400(b)(1). Appellee’s Brief at 8-12. Appellee asserts that Rule 400(b)(1) is 

applicable here because Appellee’s complaint included a request for injunctive 

relief. Id. at 10. Specifically, Appellee refers to paragraph three of the prayer 

for relief, which requested that the trial court direct the Recorder of Deeds to 

cancel the deed that Appellant recorded. Id. 

Our standard of review regarding the denial of a petition to strike a 

default judgment is as follows: 

An appeal regarding a petition to strike a default judgment 

implicates the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Issues 

regarding the operation of procedural rules of court present us 

with questions of law. Therefore, our standard of review is de 

novo and our scope of review is plenary. 

A petition to strike a judgment is a common law proceeding which 

operates as a demurrer to the record. A petition to strike a 

judgment may be granted only for a fatal defect or irregularity 

appearing on the face of the record. A petition to strike is not a 

chance to review the merits of the allegations of a complaint. 

Rather, a petition to strike is aimed at defects that affect the 

validity of the judgment and that entitle the petitioner, as a matter 

of law, to relief. A fatal defect on the face of the record denies 

the prothonotary the authority to enter judgment. When a 

prothonotary enters judgment without authority, that judgment is 

void ab initio. When deciding if there are fatal defects on the face 

of the record for the purposes of a petition to strike a default 

judgment, a court may only look at what was in the record when 

the judgment was entered. 

A judgment is void on its face if one or more of three jurisdictional 

elements is found absent: jurisdiction of the parties; subject 

matter jurisdiction; or the power or authority to render the 

particular judgment. The term “jurisdiction” relates to the 

competency of the individual court, administrative body, or other 

tribunal to determine controversies of the general class to which 

a particular case belongs. Moreover, it is never too late to attack 
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a judgment or decree for want of jurisdiction, as any such 

judgment or decree rendered by a court which lacks jurisdiction 

of the subject matter or the person is null and void, and can be 

attacked by the parties at any time. A petition to strike a 

judgment founded on a jurisdictional deficiency is therefore not 

subject to the same “timeliness” considerations as a petition to 

open the judgment. 

Green Acres Rehab. and Nursing Ctr. v. Sullivan, 113 A.3d 1261, 1267-

68 (Pa. Super. 2015) (Green Acres) (citations omitted and formatting 

altered); see also Vogt v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 900 A.2d 912, 916 

(Pa. Super. 2006) (explaining that “a judgment is properly stricken where the 

record indicates a fatal flaw such as defective service” (citation omitted)). 

It is well established that 

Service of process is a mechanism by which a court obtains 

jurisdiction of a defendant, and therefore, the rules concerning 

service of process must be strictly followed. Without valid service, 

a court lacks personal jurisdiction of a defendant and is powerless 

to enter judgment against him or her. Thus, improper service is 

not merely a procedural defect that can be ignored when a 

defendant subsequently learns of the action against him or her. 

However, the absence of or a defect in a return of service does 

not necessarily divest a court of jurisdiction of a defendant who 

was properly served. The fact of service is the important thing in 

determining jurisdiction and proof of service may be defective or 

even lacking, but if the fact of service is established jurisdiction 

cannot be questioned. 

Cintas Corp. v. Lee’s Cleaning Servs., Inc., 700 A.2d 915, 917-18 (Pa. 

1997) (citations omitted and formatting altered). 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 400 states, in relevant part: 

(a) Except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c) and in Rules 

400.1 and 1930.4, original process shall be served within the 

Commonwealth only by the sheriff. 
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(b) In addition to service by the sheriff, original process may be 

served also by a competent adult in the following actions: 

(1) a civil action in which the complaint includes a request for 

injunctive relief under Rule 1531, . . . . 

Pa.R.C.P. 400(a), (b)(1); see also Pa.R.C.P. 410(a) (stating that “[i]n actions 

involving title to, interest in, possession of, or charges or liens upon real 

property, original process shall be served upon the defendant in the manner 

provided by Rule 400 et seq.”).10 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1061, which governs quiet title 

actions, provides: 

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the procedure in 

the action to quiet title from the commencement to the entry of 

judgment shall be in accordance with the rules relating to a civil 

action. 

(b) The action may be brought 

* * * 

(2) where an action of ejectment will not lie, to determine any 

right, lien, title or interest in the land or determine the validity 

or discharge of any document, obligation or deed affecting any 

right, lien, title or interest in land . . . . 

Pa.R.C.P. 1061(a), (b)(2). 

Rule 1066 provides, in relevant part: 

(b) Upon granting relief to the plaintiff [in a quiet title action], the 

court 

* * * 

____________________________________________ 

10 We also note that a defendant, or a defendant’s authorized agent, may file 

an acceptance of service. See Pa.R.C.P. 402(b). 
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(2) shall enter a final judgment that a document, obligation or 

deed affecting a right, lien, title or interest in the land is 

cancelled or is valid, invalid or discharged . . . 

(3) shall enter a final judgment ordering the defendant, the 

prothonotary, or the recorder of deeds to file, record, cancel, 

surrender or satisfy of record, as the case may be, any plan, 

document, obligation or deed determined to be valid, invalid, 

satisfied or discharged, . . . 

(4) shall enter any other order necessary for the granting of 

proper relief. 

Pa.R.C.P. 1066(b)(2)-(4). 

“An injunction is a court order prohibiting or commanding virtually any 

type of action.” Levin v. Barish, 481 A.2d 1183, 1187 (Pa. 1984); see also 

Mazzie v. Commonwealth, 432 A.2d 985, 988 (Pa. 1981) (explaining that 

there is “a distinction between mandatory injunctions, which command the 

performance of some positive act to preserve the status quo, and prohibitory 

injunctions, which enjoin the doing of an act that will change the status quo”). 

However, not every order that prohibits a party from taking certain actions is 

an injunction. See, e.g., Beckman v. Abramovitz, 496 A.2d 53, 54-55 (Pa. 

Super. 1985) (holding that an order freezing the defendants’ corporate assets 

was not an injunction where the trial court did not follow the procedures for 

issuing a preliminary injunction set forth in Pa.R.C.P. 1531). 

An injunction can be a preliminary injunction or a permanent injunction, 

each of which has a different test for its issuance. See WellSpan Health v. 

Bayliss, 869 A.2d 990, 996 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2005). 
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Our Supreme Court has explained: 

There are six “essential prerequisites” that a party must establish 

prior to obtaining preliminary injunctive relief. The party must 

show: 1) “that the injunction is necessary to prevent immediate 

and irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated by 

damages”; 2) “that greater injury would result from refusing an 

injunction than from granting it, and, concomitantly, that issuance 

of an injunction will not substantially harm other interested parties 

in the proceedings”; 3) “that a preliminary injunction will properly 

restore the parties to their status as it existed immediately prior 

to the alleged wrongful conduct”; 4) “that the activity it seeks to 

restrain is actionable, that its right to relief is clear, and that the 

wrong is manifest, or, in other words, must show that it is likely 

to prevail on the merits”; 5) “that the injunction it seeks is 

reasonably suited to abate the offending activity”; and, 6) “that a 

preliminary injunction will not adversely affect the public interest.” 

Warehime v. Warehime, 860 A.2d 41, 46-47 (Pa. 2004) (citation omitted). 

The elements of a permanent injunction are: 1) the party seeking the 

injunction has established that its right to relief is clear; 2) an injunction is 

necessary to avoid an injury where there no adequate remedy at law, i.e., 

damages will not compensate for the injury; and 3) a greater injury will result 

from refusing rather than granting injunctive relief. See Kuznik v. 

Westmoreland Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 902 A.2d 476, 489 (Pa. 2006); 

WellSpan Health, 869 A.2d at 995. 

Here, the trial court explained: 

In the instant case, [Appellant] avers that the fatal defect or 

irregularity that appears on the face of the record relates to 

service of the Complaint. More specifically, [Appellant] contends 

that it was improper to be served by a competent adult, and that 

he instead should have been served by a sheriff as required by 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 400(a). [Appellant’s] 

reliance on Rule 400(a) is misplaced. 
J-E01004-24 

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While it is generally true that original service of process in the 

Commonwealth must be served by a sheriff, this rule is not 

without exceptions. One such exception allows service of original 

process to be made by a competent adult in an action where there 

is a request for injunctive relief. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 400(b)(1). 

“[A]n injunction is a court order that prohibits or commands 

virtually any type of action.” Woodward Twp. v. Zerbe, 6 A.3d 

651, 658 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010). In this case, [Appellee’s] 

complaint specifically requested that this court enter an order 

directing “the Office of the Recorder of Deeds of Bucks County 

cancel [the] deed dated and recorded May 20, 2020 in the Office 

of the Recorder of Deeds of Bucks County as instrument no. 

2020030545[.]” Accordingly, since [Appellee’s] complaint 

requested a form of injunctive relief, service by a competent adult 

was permissible. 

Based on the forgoing, it is clear that service of [Appellant] was 

proper because of [Appellee’s] request for a mandatory injunction 

in the complaint. Accordingly, [Appellant] failed to show the 

presence of a fatal defect or irregularity on the face of the record, 

and as such, striking the default judgment entered on February 

11, 2021, was not warranted. 

Trial Ct. Op. at 9-10 (footnotes omitted and some formatting altered). 

Based on our review of the record, we are compelled to disagree with 

the trial court. Appellee’s complaint is captioned as “civil action — quiet title.” 

R.R. at 6a. In its prayer for relief, Appellee requested that the trial court: 

1. Declar[e] that [Appellee] holds free and clear title to Property; 

2. Declar[e] that Defendants are barred from asserting any right, 

lien, title or interest in the Property based upon or arising out 

of the deed dated and recorded May 20, 2020 in the Office of 

the Recorder of Deeds of Bucks County as instrument no. 

2020030545; 

3. Direct[] that the Office of the Recorder of Deed of Bucks County 

cancel [the] deed dated and recorded May 20, 2020 in the 

Office of the Recorder of Deeds of Bucks County as instrument 

no. 2020030545; 
J-E01004-24 

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4. Impos[e] punitive damages in excess of $50,000.00 upon all 

Defendants, jointly and severally, for their outrageous and 

reckless conduct in this regard; and 

5. [Grant] such other and further relief as may be just and 

equitable under the circumstances. 

Id. at 8a (some formatting altered). 

In a quiet title action, the trial court may grant relief to the plaintiff by 

ordering “the recorder of deeds to file, record, cancel, . . . any . . . deed 

determined to be . . . invalid[.]” See Pa.R.C.P. 1066(b)(3). Therefore, 

Appellee’s request for an order directing the Office of the Recorder of Deed of 

Bucks County to cancel Appellant’s deed was within the scope of relief that 

the trial court may grant in a quiet title action. See id.; accord Beckman, 

496 A.2d at 54-55. Further, Appellee did not plead any of the elements of a 

preliminary or permanent injunction in its complaint such as injunctive relief 

is necessary to avoid an injury that cannot be adequately compensated by 

damages and that a greater injury would result from the trial court’s refusal 

to grant injunctive than from granting it. Compare R.R. at 6a-9a with

Kuznik, 902 A.2d at 489 and Warehime, 860 A.2d at 46-47. 

For these reasons, we conclude that Appellee did not properly plead a 

request for an injunction in its complaint. Therefore, Appellee was required 

to utilize the sheriff to serve Appellant and Appellee was not permitted to 

effectuate service by a competent adult. See Pa.R.C.P. 400(a), (b)(1). 

Consequently, the service of the complaint on Appellant via process server 

was improper. See id.; Cintas Corp., 700 A.2d at 917-18. Improper service 
J-E01004-24 

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is a fatal defect on the face of the record that denied the prothonotary the 

authority to enter judgment. See Cintas Corp., 700 A.2d at 917-18; Green 

Acres, 113 A.3d at 1267-68; Vogt, 900 A.2d at 916. Therefore, the trial 

court committed an error of law by denying Appellant’s petition to strike the 

default judgment. 

For these reasons, we reverse the order denying Appellant’s petition to 

strike the default judgment, strike the February 11, 2021 default judgment 

and the October 8, 2021 final judgment, and remand for further 

proceedings.11 

Order reversed. Judgment stricken. Case remanded for further 

proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Date: 7/8/2024 

____________________________________________ 

11 Because we hold that the February 11, 2021 default judgment must be 

stricken, we need not address Appellant’s arguments relating to its petition to 

open the default judgment or to the October 8, 2021 final judgment.