1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

MICHAEL DORMAN, et al., 

 Plaintiffs, Case No. 15-cv-12552 

 Hon. Matthew F. Leitman 

v. 

CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF CLINTON, 

 Defendant. 

__________________________________________________________________/ 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ 

MOTION FOR INTERIM ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS (ECF #43) 

I 

 Plaintiff Michael Dorman is the pastor of River of Life Ministries, INT 

(“RLF”), a church located in the Charter Township of Clinton (“Clinton Township”). 

(See Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 1-2, ECF #8 at Pg. ID 113.) In this action, Dorman and RLF 

allege, among other things, that Clinton Township violated the Religious Land Use 

and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (“RLUIPA”), 

when it prohibited them from using property located at 22515 Laurel (the “Laurel 

Property”) as a church. (Id. at Pg. ID 112-13.) More specifically, Dorman and RLF 

allege that Clinton Township (1) improperly required them to obtain a “Special Use 

Permit” before it would allow them to use the Laurel Property as a church and (2) 

Case 2:15-cv-12552-MFL-MKM ECF No. 64 filed 09/13/18 PageID.2348 Page 1 of 8
2 

then wrongly refused to grant them such a permit. (See id. at ¶¶ 27, 81-82, Pg. ID 

120, 137.) 

 On December 8, 2017, more than two years after Dorman and RLF filed this 

action, Clinton Township agreed to permit them to use the Laurel Property as a 

church. On that day, the parties submitted, and the Court signed and entered, a 

“Stipulated Order Granting Plaintiffs Land Use Approval.” (ECF #40.) The parties 

approved the order as to both “form” and “content.” (Id.) Among other things, the 

order provided that: 

[T]he [Laurel] Property shall be permitted to be used as a 

church effective immediately, and [Clinton Township] 

shall issue ... all necessary land use permits such that 

[Dorman and RLF] shall be permitted to utilize the 

[Laurel] Property for operation of a church subject to the 

terms of this stipulated order. 

 (Id. at Pg. ID 905.) 

II 

 On February 12, 2018, Dorman and RLF filed a motion for interim attorney 

fees and costs.1

 (See ECF #43.) In the motion, Dorman and RLF seek $62,322.00 in 

attorney fees and $1,280.29 in costs. (See id. at Pg. ID 911.) They argue that the 

Court should award these fees and costs pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees 

Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (“Section 1988(b)”). (Id. at Pg. ID 923.) 

 

1

 The Court held a hearing on the motion on April 23, 2018. 

Case 2:15-cv-12552-MFL-MKM ECF No. 64 filed 09/13/18 PageID.2349 Page 2 of 8
3 

Section 1988(b) permits a court to award interim attorney fees and costs to a 

“prevailing party” in a RLUIPA action. It provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n any 

action or proceeding to enforce a provision of .... [RLUIPA] ... the court, in its 

discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable 

attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). To be considered a 

“prevailing party,” a plaintiff must obtain “a judicially sanctioned change in the legal 

relationship of the parties.” Buckhannon Bd. of Care Home, Inc., 532 U.S. 598, 603 

(2001) (internal punctuation omitted). See also Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 

(1980) (holding that a respondent was a “prevailing party” under Section 1988(b) 

where the court entered a consent decree memorializing a settlement that granted her 

“substantially all” of the relief sought in her complaint). 

Dorman and RLF insist that they are a “prevailing party” under Section 

1988(b) because the Court entered an order that “change[d]” the parties’ “legal 

relationship” and required Clinton Township to allow them to use the Laurel 

Property as a church – the primary relief that Dorman and RLF sought in their 

Amended Complaint. Clinton Township initially countered that Dorman and RLF 

are not “prevailing parties” as a matter of law because the Court has not made any 

determination of the merits of their claim. (See Resp. to Mot., ECF #44 at Pg. ID 

1057.) But during the hearing on this motion, counsel for Clinton Township 

candidly acknowledged that Dorman and RLF are “prevailing parties” under the 

Case 2:15-cv-12552-MFL-MKM ECF No. 64 filed 09/13/18 PageID.2350 Page 3 of 8
4 

Supreme Court’s decision in Maher, supra, and that the Court does have discretion 

whether to award them interim attorney fees and costs under Section 1988(b). 

After acknowledging the Court’s discretion, counsel for Clinton Township 

argued that the proper exercise of that discretion would be to deny the request for an 

award of interim fees and costs. Counsel asserted that such an award would be 

inappropriate because the Court’s December 8, 2017, stipulated order did not make 

any findings with respect to the merits of Dorman’s and RLF’s claims and because 

the merits remain in dispute. But as Maher makes clear, a fee award may be 

appropriate even where a court never makes any findings on the merits. Indeed, in 

Maher, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he fact that respondent prevailed through a 

settlement rather than through litigation does not weaken her claim to fees. Nothing 

in the language of § 1988 conditions the District Court’s power to award fees on full 

litigation of the issues or on a judicial determination that the plaintiff’s rights have 

been violated.” Maher, 448 U.S. at 129 (emphasis added). 

Nor is the Court persuaded that it should exercise its discretion to deny an 

award of interim fees and costs to Dorman and RLF. Among the factors a Court 

considers when deciding whether to award interim fees and costs are whether the 

moving “party has prevailed on an important matter in [the] case, even if the party 

ultimately does not prevail on all issues,” whether the case is “complex,” and 

whether the case is “of long duration.” Webster v. Sowders, 846 F.2d 1032, 1036 

Case 2:15-cv-12552-MFL-MKM ECF No. 64 filed 09/13/18 PageID.2351 Page 4 of 8
5 

(6th Cir. 1988). Each of these factors supports an award of interim fees and costs 

here. As described above, Dorman and RLF have “prevailed on an important matter 

in the case” – perhaps the important matter in the case – namely, their ability to use 

the Laurel Property as a church. This case is also somewhat “complex.” It raises 

challenging and important RLUIPA issues that have been identified and explored 

during the hearings before the Court. And this action has been pending for more 

than three years. The lengthy duration of the proceedings has required Dorman and 

RLF to spend considerable legal fees in their efforts to use the Laurel Property as a 

church. In an unrefuted sworn certification, Dorman said that “[d]ue to delays in 

this litigation, RLF has exhausted all of its financial resources,” that the church is 

“essentially bankrupt and otherwise unable to pay any additional legal bills,” and 

that since 2017, he has had to “pa[y] [the] litigation costs and attorney fees in this 

matter on [his] own from [his] limited personal resources.” (Dorman Certification at 

¶¶ 15-17, ECF #43-2 at Pg. ID 939.) Under these circumstances, the Court concludes 

that an award of interim fees and costs is appropriate. 

III 

 The Court now turns to how much in interim fees and costs to award Dorman 

and RLF. As noted above, they seek $62,322.00 in attorney fees and $1,280.29 in 

costs. (See ECF #43 at Pg. ID 911.) Dorman and RLF incurred these fees and costs 

Case 2:15-cv-12552-MFL-MKM ECF No. 64 filed 09/13/18 PageID.2352 Page 5 of 8
6 

“prior to and as part of this litigation through December 31, 2017, as [they] sought 

and secured land use approval for their church.” (Id.) 

 Under Section 1988(b), Dorman and RLF are entitled to an award of their 

“reasonable attorney’s fee[s]” and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). “A reasonable 

attorney[‘s] fee is calculated by the lodestar method.” The Northeast Ohio Coal. for 

the Homeless v. Husted, 831 F.3d 686, 702 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 

465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984) and Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). 

Under this method, a “court multiplies a reasonable hourly rate by the proven 

number of hours reasonably expended on the case by counsel.” Geier v. Sundquist, 

372 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2004). “The primary concern in an attorney fee case is 

that the fee awarded be reasonable, that is, one that is adequately compensatory to 

attract competent counsel yet which avoids producing a windfall for lawyers.” Id.

 The Court first concludes that the hourly rates requested by Dorman’s and 

RLF’s counsel are “reasonable.” “To arrive at a reasonable hourly rate, courts use 

as a guideline the prevailing market rate, defined as the rate that lawyers of 

comparable skill and experience can reasonably expect to command within the 

venue of the court of record.” Id. Here, Dorman and RLF have presented evidence 

that the hourly rates their attorneys charged were reasonable based on the average 

hourly billing rate for similarly-experienced attorneys in the State of Michigan. (See 

ECF #43-12.) Notably, Clinton Township has not argued that these rates are 

Case 2:15-cv-12552-MFL-MKM ECF No. 64 filed 09/13/18 PageID.2353 Page 6 of 8
7 

unreasonable. Indeed, Clinton Township has not offered any objection to the manner 

in which Dorman and RLF calculated the fees and costs that they seek. 

 Next, the Court concludes that the “proven number of hours” that Dorman’s 

and RLF’s counsel worked on this matter were “reasonably expended.” Dorman and 

RLF have presented evidence – in the form of detailed bills of their counsel’s work 

and a certification from their counsel justifying those billings (see ECF ## 41-9 – 

41-11) – establishing the total “number of hours” that their counsel spent on this 

matter during the relevant time period. That total was reasonable given the complex 

nature of this case. Moreover, Clinton Township has not objected to any entry on 

any of the legal invoices submitted by Dorman and RLF or otherwise argued that 

any time counsel spent on the case was not “reasonably expended.”

Finally, the Court concludes that it is appropriate to award Dorman and RLF 

fees and costs incurred through December 8, 2017, the date on which they obtained 

the judicial relief that justifies the fee award (the ability to use the Laurel Property 

as a church). At this point, the Court declines to award fees and costs incurred 

beyond that date.2

 When the Court multiplies the reasonable hourly rate of 

Dorman’s and RLF’s counsel by the proven hours that counsel reasonably expended 

through December 8, 2017, it determines that Dorman and RLF are entitled to 

 

2

 Nothing in this order precludes Dorman and RLF from later seeking fees and costs 

incurred after December 8, 2017. 

Case 2:15-cv-12552-MFL-MKM ECF No. 64 filed 09/13/18 PageID.2354 Page 7 of 8
8 

$60,897.00 in fees. They are also entitled to $1,268.69 in unrefuted costs incurred 

during this same time period. 

IV 

For all of the reasons stated above, Dorman’s and RLF’s motion for interim 

attorney fees and costs (ECF #43) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN 

PART. Clinton Township shall pay to Dorman and RLF $60,897.00 in attorney fees 

and $1,268.69 in costs by no later than October 21, 2018. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 s/Matthew F. Leitman 

 MATTHEW F. LEITMAN 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: September 13, 2018 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the 

parties and/or counsel of record on September 13, 2018, by electronic means and/or 

ordinary mail. 

 s/Holly A. Monda 

 Case Manager 

 (810) 341-9764 

Case 2:15-cv-12552-MFL-MKM ECF No. 64 filed 09/13/18 PageID.2355 Page 8 of 8