1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

ANTHONY JOSEPH 

JACKSON, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant. 

 

Case No. 2:15-cv-11161 

Judge Marianne O. Battani 

Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti 

___________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 10) and DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 12) 

I. RECOMMENDATION: For the reasons that follow, it is 

RECOMMENDED that the Court GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (DE 10), GRANT IN PART AND 

DENY IN PART Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (DE 12), AFFIRM 

IN PART the Commissioner’s decision and REMAND to the Administrative Law 

Judge for further consideration consistent with this Report. 

II. REPORT 

 Plaintiff, Anthony Joseph Jackson, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner 

of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his applications for disability 

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insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income benefits (SSIB). This 

matter is before the United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and 

Recommendation on Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (DE 10), the 

Commissioner’s cross motion for summary judgment (DE 12), Plaintiff’s answer 

(DE 13) and the administrative record (DE 8). 

A. Background 

1. Plaintiff’s Prior Application 

By way of background, the record contains the transcript of a July 22, 2010 

hearing before ALJ David Begley, at which Plaintiff testified and was represented 

by counsel, and at which VE Carol Bennett testified. (R. at 53-100). ALJ 

Begley’s August 6, 2010 decision included a finding that Plaintiff had an RFC to 

perform a full-range of sedentary work activity. (R. at 101-116). On December 

13, 2011, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (R. at 117-

123).

2. Plaintiff’s Current Application 

 Plaintiff filed his applications for DIB and SSIB, which are at issue in this 

appeal, on February 1, 2012, alleging that he has been disabled since December 14, 

2011, at age 38. (R. at 218-221, 222-227.) Plaintiff alleges disability as a result 

of: broken back, broken feet, fractured hip, bipolar disorder, anxiety, depression, 

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stroke and hernia. (R. at 237-240, 241-252.) Plaintiff’s applications were denied 

on July 24, 2012. (R. at 124-138, 139-153; see also R. at 156-166, 167-175.) 

On July 30, 2012, Plaintiff sought a de novo hearing before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (R. at 176-177.) ALJ John A. Ransom held a 

hearing on August 27, 2013, at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel and 

Vocational Expert (VE) Judith Findora testified. (R. at 24-52.) On September 12, 

2013, ALJ Ransom determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning 

of the Social Security Act. (R. at 7-23.) 

Plaintiff requested review of the hearing decision. (R. at 283-286.) On 

January 26, 2015, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (R. at 

1-6.) Thus, ALJ Ransom’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision. 

Plaintiff then timely commenced the instant action on March 27, 2015. (DE 

1.) 

B. Plaintiff’s Medical History 

In his current application for benefits, Plaintiff alleges that he has been 

disabled since December 14, 2011. (See R. at 218.) Approximately 550 pages of 

Plaintiff’s medical records were available to ALJ Ransom. R. at 287-837 (Exhibits 

B1F-B25F). Of particular import are those which were submitted after ALJ 

Begley’s August 6, 2010 decision. (R. at 101-116, Exhibits 12F – 25F (R. at 514-

837).) 

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Although Plaintiff’s medical records will be discussed in detail as necessary 

below, I note here that Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident on or 

about September 25, 2012, after he had already requested de novo review on the 

instant application for benefits but before ALJ Ransom held the related hearing. 

As a result, he was admitted to Genesys Regional Medical Center. (R. at 769-773, 

774-778.) During this time, Plaintiff underwent ankle, foot and chest x-rays, brain 

and cervical spine CTs, a chest/abdomen/pelvis CT and an MRI of the cervical 

spine. (R. at 755-767). He was discharged on October 2, 2012. (R. at 768.) 

 C. Hearing Testimony (August 27, 2013) 

 1. Plaintiff’s Testimony 

 Plaintiff Anthony Joseph Jackson testified at the August 27, 2013 hearing. 

(R. at 26-50.) He has not worked since 2009. (R. at 27.) He referenced an injury 

to his right foot, which was apparently punctured by the gas pedal in a 2009 motor 

vehicle accident. (See R. at 43.)1

 Plaintiff also testified to having rods and screws 

in his thoracic spine and stated he is “always in pain.” (R. at 30.)2

 During 

September 2012, he was in another motor vehicle accident, this one allegedly 

occurring from a seizure he suffered while withdrawing from a prescription 

 

1 Plaintiff was admitted to Tarrant County Hospital District in Fort Worth Texas on 

March 4, 2009 following a motor vehicle collision. (R. at 309-316.) 

2

 Here, it is not clear if Plaintiff is referring to his March 5, 2009 surgery 

performed by Paul H. Cho, M.D. for a T11 to L3 fusion and L1 laminectomy for 

decompression. (See R. at 317-319.)

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medication. His back was injured. (R. at 27-28.) According to Plaintiff, the big 

problem is his mid-back. (R. at 29.) 

Plaintiff has had problems with his ankle. (R. at 32.) Plaintiff claims that, if 

he wears his brace and takes his medication, he can walk for about ten minutes. 

(R. at 33.) The pain in his ankle is normally seven on a scale of ten; however, the 

pain in his back is worse. (R. at 34.) Plaintiff testified that, during a typical 

afternoon, he will spend a total of approximately two hours lying down. (R. at 37; 

see also R. at 34-37, 45-46.) He has been using a cane on and off since 2009. (R. 

at 42.) 

Plaintiff further testified that he has been sober for almost 11 months. (R. at 

32.) With respect to psychiatric treatment, he explained that he treats with a 

therapist at Hope Network once per month and has been prescribed Xanax. (R. at 

28, 38-39.) He further noted that he has racing thoughts, and his mental problems 

affect his social life. (R. at 39-40.) 

 2. Vocational Expert Testimony

 VE Judith Findora testified as to two hypotheticals, the first of which 

assumed credibility: 

 Q: Okay. I would like you to assume for me, if you would, that he 

is 40 years of age with his education and his past work as it appears in 

the record, and assume further, if you would, that he has the 

limitations and impairments that he's alleged and that his testimony is 

credible. Assuming those facts and your opinion, would he be able to 

perform any of his past work or any other sedentary or light work? 

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A: No. 

Q: Why not? 

A: Primarily his testimony about the amount of time he spends 

lying down during the day. 

(R. at 50-51 (emphasis added).) The ALJ then asked a second hypothetical, 

this time taking away credibility: 

Q: Assume for me, if you would, that he could perform sedentary 

work. He'd require a job with the following restrictions. He would 

need a sit/stand option at will with no repetitive bending, twisting or 

turning. No crawling, squatting, kneeling. Occasional stair climbing. 

No air or vibrating tools. No overhead work. Limited contact with the 

public. Low stress work. Occasional supervision. Use of a cane as 

needed. Assuming those facts, in your opinion, would there be jobs in 

existence in significant numbers in the regional economy that he could 

perform? 

A: Yes. There are administrative support workers. Those number 

approximately 4,000 regionally, which is the State of Michigan. There 

are bench assemblers. Those number approximately 1,500 regionally. 

There are stock handlers and hand packers numbering approximately 

2,000 regionally. 

(R. at 51.) 

 D. The Administrative Decision3

 

3 Social Security Regulations require ALJs to resolve a disability claim through a 

five-step sequential evaluation of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4). 

Although a dispositive finding at any step terminates the ALJ’s review, see Colvin 

v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007), if fully considered, the sequential 

review considers and answers five questions: 

 1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? 

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 ALJ Ransom rendered his decision on September 12, 2013. (R. at 7-23.) At 

Step 1, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in any substantial gainful 

activity since December 14, 2011, the alleged onset date. (R. at 12.) 

At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: 

status post motor vehicle accident (with a compression fracture deformity at T10 

and L1), a dysthymic disorder, an anxiety disorder and history of alcohol 

dependence in remission. (R. at 13.) 

At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments. (R. at 13-14.) 

At Step 4, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to 

perform sedentary work in a job that provides for: a sit/stand option at will; no 

repetitive bending, twisting or turning, no crawling, squatting or kneeling and only 

 

 2. Does the claimant suffer from one or more severe impairments? 

 3. Do the claimant’s severe impairments, alone or in combination, meet 

or equal the criteria of an impairment set forth in the Commissioner’s Listing of 

Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 1? 

 4. Considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity, can the 

claimant perform his or her past relevant work? 

 5. Considering the claimant’s age, education, past work experience, and 

residual functional capacity, can the claimant perform other work available in the 

national economy? 

See 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4); see also Henley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 264 (6th 

Cir. 2009); Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001). 

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occasional climbing of stairs, no use of air or vibrating tools; limited contact with 

the public, performing low stress work that requires only occasional supervision, 

with no overhead work and the ability to use a cane as needed. (R. at 14-17.) 

Moreover, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work. 

(R. at 18.) 

At Step 5, the ALJ found that, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work 

experience, and RFC, there are other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 

national economy that Plaintiff can perform, including administrative support 

person, (bench) assembler, and stock handler and packer. (R. at 18-19.) 

 E. Standard of Review

 The District Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final 

administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). When reviewing a case 

under the Social Security Act, the Court “must affirm the Commissioner’s decision 

if it ‘is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal 

standards.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. at 2009) 

(quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. at 2007)); see 

also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as 

to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Under 

this standard, “substantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence 

but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

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might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 

(quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 

1994)). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, the 

court does “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide 

questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); 

Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247 (“It is of course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, 

to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including that of the claimant.”). 

 Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. 

The Court must “‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from 

[the] weight’” of the Commissioner’s decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 

395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 

(1951)). Nevertheless, “if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, this 

Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is substantial evidence in the record that 

would have supported an opposite conclusion.’” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

581 F.3d 399, 406 (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). 

Finally, even if the ALJ’s decision meets the substantial evidence standard, “‘a 

decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its 

own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or 

deprives the claimant of a substantial right.’” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting 

Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)). 

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F. Analysis

In his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff sets forth an overriding 

statement of error that “the Decision of the Commissioner is not supported by 

substantial evidence in the whole record,” with the following sub-arguments: 

1. The ALJ failed to mention, much less evaluate, several critical 

exhibits or parts of exhibits. 

2. There is also a major defect in the ALJ’s credibility 

determination, or lack thereof. 

3. The ALJ’s decision is not in accordance with Drummond v. 

Commissioner of Social Security, 126 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 1997). 

(DE 10 at 1 ¶ 2, DE 10 at 7-10.) The Commissioner opposes Plaintiff’s motion, 

specifically asserting that: 

1. The ALJ was not required to discuss every record in the decision. 

2. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility determination. 

3. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s weighing of the opinion 

evidence. 

4. Drummond does not require remand in this case. 

 

(DE 12 at 14-24.) Plaintiff filed an “Answer,” which is most accurately described 

as a reply brief. (DE 13.) 

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The Undersigned will address each of the issues raised by Plaintiff and the 

parties’ arguments in turn.4

 

1. The ALJ properly considered the physical and most of the 

mental evidence of record, but the ALJ’s consideration of 

Plaintiff’s alleged bipolar disorder is lacking. 

Plaintiff alleges that ALJ Ransom “failed to mention, much less evaluate, 

several critical exhibits or parts of exhibits.” Plaintiff further alleges that “large 

chunks of records including entire impairments are not even discussed.” In 

particular, he takes issue with the ALJ’s treatment, or alleged lack of treatment, of 

Exhibits B13F (R. 553-573), B14F (R. 574-599), B18F (R. 651-672), B19F (R. at 

673-710), B22F (R. at 755-780), B24F (R. at 782-807) and B25F (R. at 808-837). 

 

4 Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment contains a single sentence which states 

that, “The ALJ . . . afforded ‘great weight’ (AR 17) to a non-examining State 

physician who examined in July, 2012, before the last auto accident.” (DE 10 at 9.) 

The Commissioner treated this as a distinct assignment of error, to which she 

accorded a separate issue for review worthy of an entire sub-section of her brief. 

(DE 12 at 20-21.) However, in his reply, Plaintiff explains that he “only referred 

to the fact that the ALJ gave ‘great weight’ to an opinion issued during a relevant 

period to a non-examining physician who reviewed records several months before 

a new accident actually added to the pathology[,]” and further notes that the 

Commissioner “does not correctly identify...the errors assigned by Plaintiff . . . .” 

(DE 13 at 1 ¶ 1, DE 13 at 6.) Thus, this report avoids any significant discussion of 

the third issue identified by the Commissioner and only addresses three 

assignments of error, as clarified by Plaintiff in his reply. This initial confusion 

would have been avoided if Plaintiff had complied with E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(d)(2), 

which requires that a brief in support of a motion or response must “must, at the 

beginning, contain a concise statement of the issues presented . . . .” (Emphasis 

added.)

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(See DE 10 at 8-9.) In other words, Plaintiff argues, “the ALJ did not review 

evidence which contradicted his findings.” (DE 13 at 4-5.) 

 Here, the Court should conclude that the ALJ properly considered the 

physical and most of the mental medical evidence of record, but the Court should 

also conclude that the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s alleged and documented 

bipolar disorder is lacking: 

a. Consideration of physical medical evidence and 

resulting limitations 

i. Left foot/ankle 

 During the Step 4 RFC determination, ALJ Ransom expressly considered 

Plaintiff’s April 18, 2012 report of left foot pain; a September 26, 2012 x-ray of the 

left ankle, which revealed “[o]ssific fragment at the distal to the medial malleolus 

appears chronic[,]” and “[s]ee definite evidence of acute fracture[;]” and Susan 

Mosier-LaClair, M.D.’s May 30, 2013 assessment of “left end-stage subtalar joint 

arthritis status post possible old talus or calcaneus fracture.” (R. at 16, 736, 755, 

827-828.) 

Plaintiff contends that Exhibits B13F (Denton Regional Medical Center) and 

B14F (Paul H. Cho, M.D.) “showed new left ankle pathology and an opinion by a 

treating physician that Plaintiff could not work at sedentary work even if it had a 

sit/stand option.” (DE 10 at 8.) To the extent Plaintiff contends that “he cannot 

perform sedentary work even with a sit/stand option[,]” (DE 10 at 4, 8 &10), he 

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seems to rely upon Dr. Cho’s July and August 2010 opinions (R. at 592-594, 590-

591 [Ex. 14F]). 

As an initial matter, neither Exhibit 13F nor Exhibit 14F was available to 

ALJ Begley. (R. at 116, 553-573, 574-599.) Instead, these items were before the 

Appeals Council at the time it issued its December 13, 2011 denial of Plaintiff’s 

request for review. (R. at 120-121.) 

Moreover, an ALJ’s failure to directly address each piece of evidence is not, 

alone, a basis for remand. See Kornecky v. Commissioner of Social Security, 167 

F.App’x 496, 507-508 (6th Cir. 2006) (“While it might be ideal for an ALJ to 

articulate his reasons for crediting or discrediting each medical opinion, it is well 

settled that: ‘[a]n ALJ can consider all the evidence without directly addressing in 

his written decision every piece of evidence submitted by a party. Nor must an 

ALJ make explicit credibility findings as to each bit of conflicting testimony, so 

long as his factual findings as a whole show that he implicitly resolved such 

conflicts.’”) (quoting Loral Defense Systems–Akron v. N.L.R.B., 200 F.3d 436, 453 

(6th Cir.1999)). 

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff points the Court’s attention to the October 30, 

2010 Denton Regional Medical Center – Emergency Department notes concerning 

injury to Plaintiff’s left foot and left ankle (R. at 555-562 [Ex. 13F]), to Paul Cho, 

M.D.’s August 18, 2010 opinion that Plaintiff could not perform sedentary work on 

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a full-time basis (R. at 592-594 [Ex. 14F]) and to Dr. Cho’s September 8, 2010 

opinion that, from a neurosurgical stand point, Plaintiff could not perform at the 

sedentary level full time with the ability to change positions as needed (R. at 590-

591 [Ex. 14F]), these records predate Plaintiff’s alleged December 14, 2011 date of 

onset. See Moore v. Colvin, No. 14-12310, 2015 WL 4066735, at *4 (E.D. Mich. 

July 2, 2015) (Cohn, J.) (“an ALJ is limited to considering medical evidence 

rendered after the alleged onset date.”).5

 Moreover, “a treating physician's opinion 

 

5 Plaintiff attempts to distinguish his case by noting that ALJ Begley’s August 6, 

2010 decision (R. at 101-116) predates the October 30, 2010 records from Denton 

Regional Medical Center (R. at 553-573 [Ex. B13F]) and several records of Dr. 

Cho, such as those dated August 16, 2010, September 27, 2010, September 8, 

2010, and August 18, 2010 and November 17, 2010 (R. at 575-577, 590, 592-593 

[Ex. B14F]). (See DE 13 at 6.) In addition, Plaintiff disputes the accuracy of the 

December 14, 2011 onset date, claiming it should have been August 7, 2010 – the 

day after ALJ Begley’s August 6, 2010 decision, a point he brought to the attention 

of ALJ Ransom by a letter dated August 23, 2013 (R. at 280), four days before the 

August 27, 2013 hearing. (See DE 10 at 3 & 4, DE 13 at 7.) Plaintiff suspects this 

effected ALJ Ransom’s failure to mention Exhibits 13F and 14F. (DE 10 at 4-5.) 

In the event benefits are awarded, it seems that Plaintiff will be due a ruling on this 

issue. The December 14, 2011 onset date was listed in Plaintiff’s February 1, 2012 

application summary, and ALJ Ransom relied upon it in his decision. (R. 12, 218). 

Importantly, to the extent Plaintiff states, “we apprised the ALJ that the onset date 

was not correct but no ruling was made[,]” I note that “[i]n the Sixth Circuit 

(Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee), adjudicators must follow Social 

Security Ruling (SSR) 13-3p: Title II: Appeal of an Initial Medical Disability 

Cessation Determination or Decision, which extends the period adjudicated in a 

closed period of disability and CDR cessation cases through the date the prior 

determination or decision was issued. In these cases, the earliest onset date that can 

be set is the day after the date of the prior ALJ decision.” SSA – POMS: DI 

20101.025. Thus, while this report does not address Plaintiff’s allegation that 

“[t]he ALJ should have reviewed this at the least to determine claimant’s status as 

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is only entitled to such special attention and deference when it is a medical 

opinion. When a treating physician instead submits an opinion on an issue reserved 

to the Commissioner—such as whether the claimant is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to 

work’—the opinion is not entitled to any particular weight.” Turner v. Comm'r of 

Soc. Sec., 381 F. App'x 488, 492-493 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). 

ii. Lumbar 

 During the Step 4 RFC determination, the ALJ expressly cited the March 6, 

2012 notes of Fengxia Qiao, M.D. Although this Court interprets these notes by 

Dr. Qiao as indicating that palpation-spinal tenderness was normal, ALJ Ransom 

considered these notes as indicating tenderness in the lumbar spine. (See R. at 16, 

719-723.) Additionally, the ALJ cited the September 25, 2012 CT scan, which 

revealed “[m]oderate compression fracture deformities T10 and L1[,]” (R. at 764), 

the March 7, 2013 CT scan, which revealed “[c]ompression fracture of T8, T10, 

L1[,]” (R. at 781), and the May 15, 2013 MRIs, each of which showed some 

compression fracture, one of which notes “no significant central canal stenosis[,]” 

and another which notes “[n]o . . . mass effect upon the thoracic spinal cord.” (R. 

at 812-813, 814-815). (R. at 17.) 

Here, pointing to the results of Plaintiff’s September 25, 2012 CT of the 

chest, abdomen and pelvis, which revealed “moderate compression fracture 

 

of the erroneous alleged onset date[,]” (DE 13 at 7), the Commissioner will need to 

address this issue in the event benefits are awarded. 

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deformities T10 and L1[,]” and “approximately 2 mm retropulsion of the L1 

segment results in some degree of central canal narrowing,” Plaintiff claims the 

ALJ failed to mention the now moderate lumbar disease. (DE 10 at 8, DE 13 at 4, 

R. at 764-765.) However, as noted above, the ALJ expressly considered the March 

7, 2013 CT scan results (R. at 781) and the May 15, 2013 MRI results (R. at 812-

813, 814-815) – dates following the September 25, 2012 moderate compression to 

which Plaintiff refers (R. at 764-765), and acknowledged that, following the 

September 2012 automobile accident, Plaintiff requires significant restrictions due 

to back and ankle pain (R. at 17). Moreover, the ALJ added a host of functional 

limitations to his sedentary RFC, such as a sit/stand option at will; various 

limitations on bending, twisting, turning, crawling, squatting, kneeling and 

climbing of stairs; and no overhead work. (R. at 14.) 

iii. Records from McLaren Flint (Exhibits B23F, 

B25F) 

 During the Step 4 RFC finding, the ALJ expressly considered some records 

from McLaren Flint (Exhibits 23F, 25F), such as the March 7, 2013 thoracic spine 

CT (R. at 781); the May 15, 2013 MRI of the lumbar spine (R. at 812-813); the 

May 15, 2013 MRI of the thoracic spine (R. at 814-815); the May 30, 2013 notes 

of Susan Mosier-LaClair, M.D. (R. at 827-828); and the July 16, 2013 physician 

record regarding hypertension, which notes that Plaintiff ambulates with a cane (R. 

at 808). (See R. at 17.) In his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff claims the 

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ALJ “glossed over” Exhibit B25F (R. at 808-837). Specifically, Plaintiff 

complains: 

(a) The ALJ does not mention M. Nasser Sabbagh, M.D.’s 

December 3, 2012 assessment that “[p]otentially we are dealing with 

benzodiazepine withdrawal, although the presence of 

encephalomalacia in the frontal region definitely puts him at risk for 

having partial seizures with secondary generalization.” (R. at 836-

837.) Dr. Sabbagh’s assessment referred to the September 25, 2012 

brain CT, which suspected some mild generalized atrophy and found 

“some focal low density / encephalomalacia in the left subfrontal area 

. . . .” (R. at 757-758.) 

(b) The ALJ does not mention John C. Kohn, D.O.’s February 8, 

2013 assessment that “[t]here are paravertebral muscle spasm and 

tenderness throughout the thoracic and lumbar area[,]” with reflex 

changes and positive motion studies (R. at 833-835.) 

(c) The ALJ mentions the May 15, 2013 CT scans of the lumbar 

and thoracic spine, (see R. at 17, 812-813, 814-815),6

 but the ALJ 

does not mention Dr. Kohn’s March 11, 2013 assessment that “[t]here 

was mention of ventral impression on the thecal sac, and the 

radiculitis he is experiencing could be due to this problem.” (R. at 

830.) 

(d) The ALJ acknowledges Susan Mosier-LaClair, M.D.’s May 30, 

2013 assessment that Plaintiff had left end-stage subtalar joint 

arthritis, but the ALJ omits her diagnoses that Plaintiff had moderate 

pre existing hindfoot and midfoot arthritis and injury deep peroneal 

nerve versus low back etiology. (R. at 17, 828) 

 

6 The Court suspects the ALJ’s reference to “no mass effect on the thoracic spine 

cord[,]” (R. at 17), is a reference to the May 15, 2013 thoracic spine MRI results 

(R. at 815). 

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(e) The ALJ mentions the May 15, 2013 MRI of the lumbar spine,7

but the ALJ does not mention the multilevel foraminal narrowing and 

small central disc protrusion both at the L5-S1 level (R. at 17, 812-

813). 

(DE 10 at 8-9.) 

 To the extent Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s failure to expressly 

mention Dr. Sabbagh’s December 3, 2012 notes about seizures related to 

medication withdrawal or frontal lobe atrophy (DE 13 at 4, R. at 836-837), 

Plaintiff testified that he had a seizure caused by withdrawal from a prescription 

medication (R. at 27-28), and ALJ Ransom acknowledged Plaintiff’s claim that he 

has a history of seizures (R. at 15). Thus, the ALJ’s failure to expressly refer to 

Dr. Sabbagh’s letter, to the extent it was based upon seizures, was harmless. 

Winter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-11962, 2013 WL 4604782, at *10 (E.D. 

Mich. Aug. 29, 2013) (“even if the ALJ's picture of Plaintiff was somewhat 

incomplete, Plaintiff has not persuaded the Court that the ALJ's view of her 

resulted in prejudice.”) (referencing Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396 (2009)). 

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff apparently takes issue with the ALJ’s 

failure to discuss Plaintiff’s development of muscle spasms in the lumbar and 

thoracic spinal areas since ALJ Begley’s August 6, 2010 decision (DE 13 at 6, R. 

at 101-116), such as those mentioned by Dr. Kohn in his February 8, 2013 notes 

 

7 The ALJ refers to this test as a CT scan of the lumbar spine, when it was an MRI 

of the lumbar spine. (R. at 17, 812-813.)

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(R. at 833-835), Plaintiff has not shown how the RFC limitations imposed by ALJ 

Ransom inadequately address such spasms. The burden of challenging the ALJ’s 

Step 4 RFC determination lies with Plaintiff. Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 

F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Through step four, the claimant bears the burden of 

proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by her impairments and 

the fact that she is precluded from performing her past relevant work . . . .”). 

b. Consideration of mental medical evidence and 

resulting limitations 

i. Dysthymic disorder, anxiety disorder and 

alcohol dependence 

At Step 2, ALJ Ransom concluded that Plaintiff’s severe impairments 

included a dysthymic disorder, an anxiety disorder and a history of alcohol 

dependence in remission. (R. at 13.) At Step 3, ALJ Ransom found Plaintiff has 

moderate difficulties in social functioning. (R. at 13.) Within the Step 4 RFC 

determination, ALJ Ransom expressly noted therapist Wiggins’s January 2012 

diagnoses of generalized anxiety disorder and alcohol dependence and Global 

Assessment of Functioning (GAF)8 score of 60 (R. at 660), as well as psychologist 

 

8 The GAF scale was used to report a clinician’s judgment of an individual’s 

overall level of functioning. Clinicians selected a specific GAF score within the 

ten-point range by evaluating whether the individual was functioning at the higher 

or lower end of the range. See American Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and 

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 33–34 (American Psychiatric Association, 

4th ed. text rev. 2000) (DSM-IV-TR). However, “the most recent version of the 

DSM does not include a GAF rating for assessment of mental disorders.” Bryce v. 

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Dr. Dickson’s July 23, 2012 diagnoses of dysthymic disorder and anxiety disorder, 

with alcohol dependence and Xanax dependence in remission and GAF score of 54 

(R. at 753). (R. at 16). In addition, although not expressly cited by the ALJ, 

Plaintiff was diagnosed with anxiety and alcoholism during January 2012 (R. at 

624, 626), and, on April 6, 2012, Dr. Qiao noted that Plaintiff was anxious. (R. at 

728.) 

ALJ’s Ransom’s Step 4 RFC determination included the limitations of 

“limited contact with the public,” and “performing low stress work that requires 

only occasional supervision . . . .” (R. at 14.) These limitations appear to be 

intended to accommodate the Step 2 severe mental impairments of dysthymic 

disorder and anxiety disorder, if not also the severe mental impairment of alcohol 

dependence in remission. (R. at 13.) 

ii. Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) 

Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ’s failure to mention Ellen Johnson, 

D.O.’s March 6, 2012 GAF assessment of 49. Plaintiff contends the 11-point 

decrease in GAF score from January 2012 to March 2012 shows a severe 

impairment in the area of vocational functioning. (See DE 10 at 8, R. at 686). To 

the extent Plaintiff argues that Dr. Johnson’s March 6, 2012 GAF assessment of 49 

(R. at 686) “fairly detracts from the weight of” therapist Wiggins’s January 24, 

 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-CV-14618, 2014 WL 1328277, at *10 (E.D. Mich. 

Mar. 28, 2014). 

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2012 GAF assessment of 60 (R. at 660), or to the extent Plaintiff argues this was 

“cherry picking” on the ALJ’s part in contravention of Minor v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 513 F.App’x 417, 435 (6th Cir. 2013) (see DE 13 at 4), the ALJ expressly 

cited the later, July 23, 2012 GAF assessment of 54 by Dr. Dickson (R. at 16, 

753). Such a score is consistent with moderate limitations.9

Moreover, even if Plaintiff is correct that an eleven point drop in Plaintiff’s 

GAF score – from an initial score of 60 to a subsequent score of 49 after therapy 

was undertaken – shows “a severe impairment in the area of vocational 

functioning[,]” or “a severe limitation[,]” (see DE 10 at 8, DE 13 at 4), Plaintiff has 

not shown that the limitations imposed by the ALJ inadequately address Plaintiff’s 

GAF assessments. As previously noted, the burden of challenging the ALJ’s Step 

4 RFC determination lies with Plaintiff. Jones, 336 F.3d at 474. 

iii. Bipolar disorder 

Plaintiff’s disability report indicates that he seeks benefits in part for bipolar 

disorder. (R. at 242.) This was acknowledged in the July 24, 2012 disability 

determination explanation. (R. at 124, 129, 139, 143.) In fact, each of the July 24, 

2012 disability determination explanations referred to March 5, 2012 records, 

 

9 “Individuals with scores of 51–60 are classified as having ‘moderate symptoms ... 

or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few 

friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers).’” Byrne v. Astrue, No. 3:11CV00353, 

2012 WL 5988639, at *4 n.5 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 29, 2012) (report and 

recommendation of Ovington, M.J.) (quoting DSM–IV–TR at 34). 

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presumably from Hamilton Community Health Network (HCHN), as indicating 

“bipolar affective disorder.” (R. at 130, 144.) This actually seems to have been a 

reference to the March 6, 2012 visit, wherein Dr. Qiao of HCHN noted a history of 

bipolar affective disorder. (See R. at 719-723; see also R. at 746.) 

However, the ALJ’s September 12, 2013 decision does not appear to address 

bipolar disorder. (R. at 10-19.) That is not to say the ALJ did not consider other 

mentally related diagnoses. For example, the ALJ expressly cited: an apparent 

diagnoses of anxiety and alcoholism made at Hurley Medical Center on January 8, 

2012 (R. at 624); the January 23, 2012 notes of Fengxia Qiao, M.D., which listed a 

history of alcoholism (R. at 643); Wiggins’s January 24, 2012, biopsychosocial 

assessment, wherein he diagnosed generalized anxiety disorder and alcohol 

dependence and assessed a GAF of 60 (R. at 660);10 Wiggins’s February 23, 2012, 

request for psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff (R. at 651); Wiggins’s April 3, 2012, 

note that Plaintiff “reported no drug or alcohol use . . . .” (R. 674); and Wiggins’s 

April 23, 2012 notes that Plaintiff did not show up for his session (R. at 673.) (See

R. at 15-16.) 

Nonetheless, the Court is aware of medical records which touch upon the 

issue of bipolar disorder. For example, Ellen Johnson, D.O.’s March 6, 2012 

 

10 Wiggins’s diagnostic summary stated, among other things, “Client has not been 

clinically diagnosed with a me[n]tal health disorder, but he is curren[tl]y being 

treated by his PCP for panic attack and anxiety.” (R. at 660.) 

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psychiatric evaluation diagnoses generalized anxiety disorder and appears to rule 

out bipolar disorder; however, her diagnostic summary lists “polysubstance, . . . 

bipolar, . . . generalized anxiety, alcohol dependence, and Xanax dependence.” (R. 

at 685-687.) Also, while the ALJ did expressly refer to the March 6, 2012 notes of 

Fengxia Qiao, M.D., the ALJ did not mention that these notes also indicate that 

Plaintiff was anxious and easily distracted and acknowledge a history of bipolar 

affective disorder. (R. at 16, 721-722.) Furthermore, Plaintiff was assessed at 

Hope Network on February 15, 2013 by Deborah Casey, LMSW, who checked 

“markedly ill” for “overall bipolar illness.” (R. at 795-807, 801.) 

Moreover, the March 14-15, 2013 psychiatric evaluation by Hope Network’s 

Duncan Magoon, M.D., summarizes: “A 40-year-old white male successful and 

competent along with substance abuse, which basically covered his bipolar 

symptoms for many years until auto accidents, unable to work, unable to function, 

getting more and more frantic since disability is a far distant goal.” (R. at 788-794, 

793.) Thereafter, the July 10, 2013 notes of Dawn Angle, LLMSW indicate that 

Plaintiff “has had bipolar symptoms intermittently throughout his life . . . .” (R. at 

784.) 

Citing Dr. Magoon and/or Angle’s notes, Plaintiff claims “[t]here is no 

mention that he has underlying bipolar disease, masked by his prior alcohol 

usage.” (DE 10 at 6 & 8, DE 13 at 4, R. at 784, 793) Given that bipolar disorder 

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can be a seriously disabling condition, and given the Commissioner’s failure to 

respond to Plaintiff’s assertion by mentioning bipolar disorder in her motion for 

summary judgment (see DE 12), this Court is without direction on this issue. 

Therefore, in conjunction with my recommendation below that the case should be 

remanded for the ALJ to explain his credibility determination, the Court should 

also remand for the ALJ to address the issue of Plaintiff’s alleged bipolar disorder. 

2. The ALJ failed to explain his credibility determination. 

In his Step 4 RFC determination, ALJ Ransom acknowledged that 

“whenever statements about the intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting 

effects of pain or other symptoms are not substantiated by objective medical 

evidence, the undersigned must make a finding on the credibility of the statements 

based on a consideration of the entire case record.” He then considered Plaintiff’s 

hearing testimony. (See R. at 15.) Ultimately, after giving express consideration 

to several medical records, ALJ Ransom found that Plaintiff’s “statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not 

entirely credible for the reasons explained in this decision.” (R. at 15-17.) 

Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s credibility determination. Specifically, 

Plaintiff contends that “the ALJ makes conclusions without any showing of how 

Claimant was non-credible, or in what specific areas and/or statements he was noncredible.” (DE 10 at 9.) In other words, Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s statement 

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about his credibility is vague and does not comply with SSR 96-7p, which 

concerns “assessing the credibility of an individual's statements[.]” (DE 13 at 5.) 

Specifically: 

It is not sufficient for the adjudicator to make a single, conclusory 

statement that “the individual's allegations have been considered” or 

that “the allegations are (or are not) credible.” It is also not enough for 

the adjudicator simply to recite the factors that are described in the 

regulations for evaluating symptoms. The determination or decision 

must contain specific reasons for the finding on credibility, supported 

by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to 

make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the 

weight the adjudicator gave to the individual's statements and the 

reasons for that weight. 

(SSR 96-7P (S.S.A. July 2, 1996) (emphasis added).) 

 The Court should conclude that the ALJ’s credibility determination here is 

not supported by substantial evidence. True, “[t]he ALJ's assessment of credibility 

is entitled to great weight and deference, since he [or she] had the opportunity to 

observe the witness's demeanor.” Infantado v. Astrue, 263 F. App’x 469, 475 (6th 

Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, “an ALJ's assessment of a claimant's credibility must be 

supported by substantial evidence.” Walters v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 

531 (6th Cir. 1997). “[B]lanket assertions that the claimant is not believable will 

not pass muster . . . .” Thoroughman v. Colvin, No. CV 14-141-WOB-CJS, 2015 

WL 8228055, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 2, 2015), report and recommendation adopted

2015 WL 8228956 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 7, 2015). “[W]here subjective pain complaints 

play an important role in the diagnosis and treatment of the condition, providing 

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justification for discounting a claimant's statements is particularly important.” 

Rogers, 486 F.3d 234, 248 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Hurst v. Sec'y of Health & 

Human Servs., 753 F.2d 517, 519 (6th Cir.1985)). 

 In this case, the ALJ’s September 12, 2013 credibility statement does not 

comply with SSR 96-7p. (See R. at 15-17.) As noted above, the ALJ expressly 

considered Plaintiff’s hearing testimony within the Step 4 RFC determination. (R. 

at 15.) However, with regard to credibility, the ALJ simply states, “the claimant’s 

statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these 

symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this decision.” (R. 

at 17.) This does not constitute “specific reasons for the finding on credibility . . . 

.” and, thus, does not make clear to Plaintiff and subsequent reviewers the ALJ’s 

reasons for the weight he assigned to Plaintiff’s credibility. See SSR 96-7p. 

The Commissioner asks the Court to speculate about the ALJ’s reasons, 

based on an unexpressed “negative inference” and certain other activities in which 

Plaintiff was engaged. (See DE 12 at 18-19.) For example, in determining that 

Plaintiff has mild restriction in activities of daily living at Step 3, and even in 

reviewing Plaintiff’s testimony at Step 4, the ALJ referred to Plaintiff’s testimony 

about shopping. (R. at 13, 15, 47-48.)11 The ALJ also referred to Plaintiff’s 

 

11 Plaintiff testified that he grocery shops “here and there. Like once every few 

months . . . .” (R. at 48.) 

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testimony that he “[p]lay[s] with the dog, tr[ies] to read, write, you know, just talk 

on the phone . . . .” and also noted Plaintiff’s testimony about driving. (R. at 15, 

35, 49.) Moreover, as the Commissioner points out, the ALJ credited some of 

Plaintiff’s testimony. For example, the ALJ credited Plaintiff’s testimony 

regarding use of a cane by imposing the limitation of “the ability to use a cane as 

needed[,]” (R. at 14, 15, 41-42); the ALJ credited Plaintiff’s testimony about 

reaching above the shoulder by imposing the limitation of “no overhead work[,]” 

(R. at 14, 15, 44); and the ALJ credited Plaintiff’s testimony about being able to sit 

for about 30 minutes by imposing the limitation of “a sit/stand option at will[,]” (R. 

at 14, 15, 46). 

Still, the Court is still left to speculate as to what the ALJ thought was 

relevant based on a summary of Plaintiff’s testimony and a multitude of earlier 

citations to the medical record. (R. at 15-17.) “‘It is more than merely ‘helpful’ 

for the ALJ to articulate reasons ... for crediting or rejecting particular sources of 

evidence. It is absolutely essential for meaningful appellate review.’” Hurst v. 

Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 753 F.2d 517, 519 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting 

Zblewski v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 75, 78 (7th Cir.1984)). ALJ Ransom’s September 

12, 2013 determination, in which he merely explains that “the claimant’s 

statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these 

symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this decision[,]” (R. 

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at 17), does not articulate reasons crediting or rejecting particular sources of 

evidence. 

Moreover, the paucity of the ALJ’s credibility determination is particularly 

consequential in the instant matter because of the manner in which he phrased his 

hypotheticals. As noted in Section C.2 of this report, when asked to assume the 

credibility of Plaintiff’s testimony, the VE testified that Plaintiff would not be able 

to perform any of his past work or any other sedentary or light work, due to “his 

testimony about the amount of time he spends lying down during the day.” (R. at 

50-51.) Yet, while the ALJ acknowledges Plaintiff’s testimony about lying down 

and napping (R. at 15, 35, 37), he does not specify which part of the record, if any, 

contradicts or undermines Plaintiff’s testimony about what portion of his day is 

spent lying down. However, when asked to assume that Plaintiff could perform 

sedentary work with certain restrictions, i.e., that Plaintiff’s testimony was not

credible, the VE testified that Plaintiff could perform jobs as an administrative 

support worker, a bench assembler and a stock handler / hand packer. (R. at 50-

51.) In other words, the VE’s opinion completely hinges on credibility. The 

Court should, therefore, remand this case with instructions that the ALJ consider 

Plaintiff’s credibility in accordance with SSR 96-7p and give clear explanation for 

the same, so as to allow for meaningful appellate review on this issue. On appeal, 

the Court cannot be tasked with trying to figure out which portions of this 

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voluminous record the ALJ subjectively thought were relevant to his credibility 

assessment.12

3. The ALJ’s opinion is consistent with the Drummond

decision. 

Plaintiff argues that ALJ Ransom improperly applied Drummond v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 126 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 1997). (See DE 10 at 10, DE 13 at 6.) In 

Drummond, the Sixth Circuit directed: “Absent evidence of an improvement in a 

claimant's condition, a subsequent ALJ is bound by the findings of a previous 

ALJ.” Drummond v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 126 F.3d 837, 842 (6th Cir. 1997) 

(emphasis added). 

The Court should conclude, as the Commissioner argues, that Drummond

does not require remand in this case. (See DE 12 at 22-24.) The administrative 

record in this case contains two ALJ decisions: (1) on August 6, 2010, ALJ Begley 

found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform, on a continuing and sustained basis, 

the exertional and non-exertional requirements of a full range of sedentary work

activity (R. at 101-116), and (2) on September 12, 2013 ALJ Ransom found that 

 

12 This Court has previously commented on an ALJ’s use of template language. See 

Hemingway v. Commissioner of Social Security, No. 14-cv-12184, 2015 WL 

4967060, *9 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2015) (Michelson, J., accepting report and 

recommendation of Patti, M.J.) (“Here, the ALJ provided a sufficiently specific 

explanation for her credibility determination, and linked the template language to 

the evidence in the record, pursuant to the rule.”). In this case, the ALJ’s complete 

failure to link the template language to the evidence in the record was compounded 

by the ALJ’s use of hypotheticals which hinged on credibility. 

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Plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work, with several limitations (R. at 7-

23.) Thus, the latter RFC determination was more restrictive. (See Kepke v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-13944, 2015 WL 348747, at *16 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 

2015) (Friedman, J., adopting report and recommendation of Binder, M.J.) (“this 

case is differentiated from Drummond in that the ALJ ultimately found Plaintiff 

more restricted in terms of the current RFC than the prior decision.”). 

Instead, Plaintiff’s Drummond argument is more accurately a challenge to 

ALJ Ransom’s determination that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform sedentary work 

with the additional restrictions listed. For example, Plaintiff argues his condition 

has worsened since the first decision, specifically listing: 

 a disabling mental condition / severe psychiatric conditions, 

likely referring to a January 8, 2012 head CT, a January 2012 

SUD biopsychosocial assessment, a March 2012 SUD 

psychiatric evaluation, and a July 10, 2013 program discharge 

summary (R. at 627, 660, 686, 784); 

 

 another accident with additional injuries and impairments, 

likely referring to the September 25, 2012 notes that the 

accident was caused by a seizure (R. at 776); 

 a severe ankle problem, likely referring to the September 26, 

2012 left ankle x-ray and Dr. Mosier-LaClair’s May 30, 2013 

assessment (R. at 755, 828); 

 more serious lumbar disease, likely referring to the September 

25, 2012 chest/abdomen/pelvis CT and the February 8, 2013 

notes of Dr. Kohn (R. at 764-765, 833-835); 

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 frontal area brain atrophy, likely referring to Dr. Sabbagh’s 

December 3, 2012 notes (R. at 836-837); 

 

 muscle spasms in the lumbar and thoracic spinal areas, likely 

referring to Dr. Kohn’s February 8, 2013 notes (R. at 833-835); 

and 

 

 a T8 fracture causing possible radiculitis, likely referring to the 

March 7, 2013 thoracic spine CT, the May 15, 2013 thoracic 

spine MRI, and Dr. Kohn’s March 11, 2013 notes (R. at 781, 

814-815, 830). 

(DE 10 at 10, DE 13 at 6.) 

However, in arriving at the latter RFC determination, ALJ Ransom 

specifically acknowledged Drummond and the prior decision by ALJ Begley, 

generally noting: “The evidence of record supplied after the prior decision 

confirms the claimant is now limited to less than a full range of sedentary work.” 

(R. at 17 (emphasis added).) Specifically, 

The record confirms the claimant underwent medical determination 

after his September 2012 automobile accident. The claimant now 

requires significant restrictions due to back and ankle pain. However, 

there is no indication the claimant has stenosis in the thoracic or 

lumbar spine or that he requires surgery. The claimant has significant 

arthritis in his ankle. However, there is no indication he could not 

perform a job that provides for a sit/stand option. The claimant is 

currently not going to a pain clinic and there is no indication the 

claimant is scheduled for surgery. No physician has disabled the 

claimant. 

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(Id.) These observations appear to be accurate.13 Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff 

challenges ALJ Ransom’s conclusion that Plaintiff is now capable of performing a 

limited range of sedentary work, this report has already concluded that substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination. 

G. Conclusion

 In light of the above analysis, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court 

GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment (DE 10), GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART Defendant’s motion 

for summary judgment (DE 12), AFFIRM IN PART the Commissioner of Social 

Security’s decision, and REMAND to the ALJ for further consideration consistent 

with this Report. Upon remand, the ALJ should be directed to provide an 

explanation of Plaintiff’s credibility, in compliance with SSR 96-7p, with further 

directions requiring the ALJ to explain whether Plaintiff’s alleged and documented 

bipolar disorder was considered in rendering an RFC opinion. If it was, the ALJ 

must explain how it was accounted for; if it was not, the RFC must take account of 

this mental health condition and be re-evaluated. In addition, should benefits be 

awarded, the ALJ will need to consider the appropriate onset date. 

III. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

 

13 For example, the March 15, 2013 MRI shows no significant stenosis (R. at 812-

813, 814-815).

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 The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service, 

as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 

72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right 

of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections that raise some 

issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a 

party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of 

Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1273 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 

72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge. 

 Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” and “Objection No. 

2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an 

objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the 

objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 

72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, 

in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to 

Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without 

merit, it may rule without awaiting the response. 

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Dated: February 11, 2016 s/Anthony P. Patti 

 Anthony P. Patti 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was sent to parties of record 

on February 11, 2016, electronically and/or by U.S. Mail. 

 s/Michael Williams 

 Case Manager for the 

 Honorable Anthony P. Patti 

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