DEFENSE

ACQUISITIONS

Observations on the

Procurement of the

Navy/Marine Corps

Intranet

Statement for the Record by Allen Li, Associate Director,

Defense Acquisitions Issues, National Security and International Affairs

Division, and Jack L. Brock, Jr., Director, Governmentwide and Defense

Information Systems, Accounting and Information Management Division

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Subcommittees on Military Readiness and

Military Research and Development, Committee on Armed

Services, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 3:00 p.m. EST

Wednesday,

March 8, 2000

GAO/T-NSIAD/AIMD-00-116
1

Messrs. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees:

Thank you for the opportunity to submit this statement for the record. We have been

reviewing the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet effort (hereafter referred to as the Intranet) at

the request of the Chairman of the Military Research and Development Subcommittee.

This statement provides our observations on that effort and focuses on determining

whether the (1) Department of the Navy’s (hereafter referred to as the Navy) acquisition

approach and implementation plan are based on appropriate analyses, resolution of key

issues, and adequate risk management activities and (2) Office of the Secretary of

Defense is overseeing that effort with adequate review of relevant Navy analyses and

other program activities to ensure that system interoperability and information

assurance safeguards are implemented.1

The scope of the Intranet includes everything necessary for the transmission, receipt,

processing, and display of voice, video, and data—the capital infrastructure and

infrastructure improvements necessary to meet quality of service requirements, as well

as maintenance, training, and operation of that infrastructure. The Navy's acquisition

strategy assumes that these capabilities can be purchased from commercial vendors as a

service. Under the Navy’s acquisition approach, the Intranet contractor will own and

maintain all required desktop and network hardware and software and provide all

required information technology services. The contract service area is to include the

continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), Puerto Rico, and

Iceland for approximately 360,000 users.

On December 23, 1999, the Navy released a request for proposals for the Intranet (the

Intranet solicitation), with the expectation of awarding a firm, fixed price contract (with

performance incentives) in June 2000. The Navy states that the Intranet “is intended to

develop a long-term arrangement with the commercial sector which transfers the

responsibility and risk for providing and managing the vast majority of Department of the

1

Information assurance refers to the Department of Defense’s (DOD) and the services’ efforts to protect

and defend their information and information systems and networks.
2

Navy (DON) desktop, server, infrastructure and communication assets and services."

The transfer of responsibility and risk for providing these capabilities to the contractor is

being achieved by the use of a “seat management” contract—a concept that is relatively

new to government contracting. Under a seat management contract, the government

acquires desktop services and support as a utility and pays for them on a per seat basis.

Currently, no government contract has been awarded that rivals the Navy’s expected

single contract for over 360,000 seats for 5 years, with an option for an additional 3 years

and a multibillion dollar cost over its life.

On November 22, 1999, as part of our review, we sent the Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence a letter asking him to answer

several questions concerning the Navy's and his office's actions focusing on the Intranet.

Our analysis of his response, which we received on February 14, 2000, forms the

analytical framework of our observations. We also had many discussions with his staff

and cognizant Navy officials.

RESULTS IN BRIEF

The Navy’s acquisition approach and implementation plan for developing a Navy/Marine

Corps Intranet have a number of weaknesses that make the effort unnecessarily risky.

The Navy has been working toward awarding a contract in June of this year—the result

of an aggressive, service-established goal to accomplish an initial level of operational

capability by December 2001. However, the Navy has developed and issued its request

for proposals without

• developing a formal analysis of program alternatives and completing a business case

analysis, to determine an appropriate acquisition strategy for the proposed Intranet;

• resolving key programmatic issues such as how the Intranet arrangement is to be

managed within the Navy, how the Intranet will be funded, and how its information

technology and other personnel may be affected by the Intranet; and
3

• taking certain risk mitigation steps such as testing the proposed approach on a

smaller scale.

With regards to the Office of the Secretary of Defense's oversight of the Navy Intranet

effort, we found that this organization has not fully

• defined how it will oversee program requirements for the Intranet effort, and

• established that the Intranet approach will be consistent with the Department of

Defense's command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence systems

architecture, particularly the Department’s system interoperability and information

assurance requirements.

ACQUISITION APPROACH AND IMPLEMENTATION

SCHEDULE ARE UNNECESSARILY RISKY

The Navy established its acquisition approach for the Intranet in May 1999 and has been

working toward a goal of awarding a contract in June 2000, a date accelerated from an

earlier date of March 2001. The Navy accelerated its acquisition to provide a level of

initial operational capability by December 2001—an aggressive, service-established goal

not driven by specific mission needs. In the process, the Navy did not complete

important programmatic actions prior to issuing its request for proposals, including

(1) development of a formal analysis of alternative program options and a business case

analysis, (2) resolution of key programmatic issues such as how the Intranet will be

funded, and (3) risk mitigation efforts to offset the significant risks associated with such

a large servicewide undertaking—actions we believe could significantly reduce the risk

of the Intranet effort.
4

No Formal Analysis of Alternatives

or Business Case Analysis

DOD Directive 5000.1 and Regulation 5000.2-R contain mandatory and discretionary

policy and procedures for management of large dollar defense contracts. DOD

Regulation 5000.2-R was designed to establish a simplified and flexible management

framework for translating mission needs into stable, affordable, and well managed Major

Defense Acquisition Programs and Major Automated Information System acquisition

programs. The regulation defines a Major Automated Information System as an

automated information system acquisition program2 that is estimated to require total lifecycle costs in excess of $360 million in fiscal year 1996 constant dollars. Navy officials

told us that they do not believe Regulation 5000.2-R applies to the Intranet effort because

they do not believe it represents the type of activity for which the regulation was

intended. Also, in response to our November 22, 1999, letter, the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence stated, without

explanation, that the Intranet “does not meet the definitional criteria for Acquisition

Programs or Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS) Programs as defined in DOD

Regulation 5000.2-R.” Given that the regulation is intended to be flexible and tailorable

to meet the needs of individual programs, we have not received an adequate explanation

as to why it is not being used to manage the Intranet effort. The regulation states that it

serves as a general model for acquisition programs that do not meet the definition of a

major automated information system. While some of the requirements of Regulation

5000.2-R may not be necessary for this effort, which is based on the assumption that

services required for the Intranet currently are commercially available, in the absence of

an agreed upon oversight process, we have looked to the 5000 series of documents for

guidance on expected, reasonable, and sound management practices.

2

Regulation 5000.2-R defines an automated information system as a “combination of computer hardware

and software, data, or telecommunications, that performs functions such as collecting, processing,

transmitting, and displaying information” and an acquisition program as a “directed, funded effort designed

to provide a new, improved or continuing weapons system or [automated information system] capability in

response to a validated operational need.”
5

Regulation 5000.2-R states that an analysis of alternatives is to be prepared for covered

programs at the beginning of the acquisition process to aid and document decisionmaking by highlighting the relative advantages and disadvantages of the alternatives

being considered. Where appropriate, the analysis is to include discussion of

interoperability and commonality of components/systems that are similar in function to

other DOD, service, and agency programs. Additionally, this analysis is intended to

foster joint ownership and afford a better understanding of subsequent decisions by

early identification and discussion of reasonable alternatives among decisionmakers and

staffs at all levels. For Major Automated Information System acquisitions, the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence is to

designate himself or the service Chief Information Officer as the Milestone Decision

Authority—the individual who approves transitioning an acquisition program from one

acquisition phase3to the next. The Milestone Decision Authority may use those analyses

in determining whether to allow the program to transition into its next acquisition phase.

In our November 22, 1999, letter, we asked the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence—who also serves as the DOD

Chief Information Officer, whether an Analysis of Alternatives as called for in DOD

Regulation 5000.2-R had been developed for the Intranet. The Assistant Secretary stated

that a formal Analysis of Alternatives had not been developed. He went on to state,

however, that during the first half of 1999, senior Navy leadership reviewed and

considered numerous strategies for acquiring the Navy’s information technology

capabilities, including multiple implementations of information technology capability by

region or organization. He also stated that as a result of that review, the Navy leadership

decided that the requirements for a Navy-wide information technology capability could

be provided most efficiently and effectively by the private sector under a long-term

commercial-type contract for end-to-end information technology services. In a January

2000 message, the Chief of Naval Operations stated that the Secretary of the Navy and he

3

Regulation 5000.2-R lays out a management process that divides acquisition programs into phases. An

acquisition phase consists of all the tasks and activities needed to bring a program to the next major

milestone. Major milestones are the decision points separating acquisition phases.
6

had directed the establishment of the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet and made its use

mandatory for all Navy commands.

While it did not develop a formal Analysis of Alternatives, the Navy is presently

developing a business case analysis to demonstrate the viability of its chosen approach.

That analysis is to compare the current state of information technology affairs within the

Navy to the “to be” state called for in its Intranet solicitation and program plans.

However, the Navy did not complete its business case analysis prior to releasing its

request for proposals. Had the Navy done so, it might have been able to demonstrate the

viability of its approach and the superiority of that solution over other alternatives.

Key Programmatic Issues Are Unresolved

The Navy decided on its Intranet acquisition strategy and released its Intranet

solicitation without having resolved key programmatic issues. Specifically:

• Contract management issues remain to be worked out. The Navy recognizes that it

must have management policies, procedures, and tools in place to exercise

operational direction over critical segments of the infrastructure at the Navy and

Marine Corps level, and by theater commands. This operational direction includes

the ability to (1) set priorities for contracted services and (2) direct changes in

network security. The Intranet solicitation states that an organization will be

identified by the government to act as the central point of contact to the contractor

for Intranet operations. The Navy established a committee to determine how it

should govern the Intranet, including a concept for controlling Intranet operations,

and to analyze Intranet effort overlap with the Department's Command, Control,

Communications and Intelligence issues and policies. This committee is still working

to develop this organization, the roles and responsibilities of the various parties in the

organization, and the relationship of operational control and contract monitoring and

administration.
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• The Intranet funding plan is not fully developed. The Navy recognizes that funding

availability and overall affordability are significant risks facing the Intranet program.

Navy officials said that they will meet again to discuss the funding plan on March 16,

2000, but have no firm date to complete the plan, which is to identify the sources and

amounts of funding available for the Intranet contract. Navy officials state that

existing funding for information technology contracts and services will be adequate

to pay for the Intranet contract. However, Navy officials also said this existing

funding is dispersed in accounts that are not always identified as supporting

information technology activities. The Navy recognizes that the resolution of Intranet

funding availability and affordability issues may cause reductions in other noninformation technology operations, and thus other missions may be affected.

The Navy may also be significantly underestimating total program costs. The

business case analysis and the associated funding plan are designed to identify and

pay costs directly attributable to the Intranet contract. Other necessary program

costs that will not be accounted for include costs to integrate existing systems into

the Intranet. In a December 1999 briefing on its preparation for Year 2000

contingencies, the Navy reported that it has almost 600 mission critical and an

additional 1400 mission support systems. Navy officials told us that an unknown

number of these systems use different technology than planned for the Intranet. As a

result, additional costs will be incurred if they are to be integrated into the Intranet.

• A plan to manage the disposition of displaced personnel has not been completed.

Navy officials told us that no one would lose their job as a result of an award of an

Intranet contract. As a result, the Navy’s plan should address the costs of personnel

who will be displaced by the proposed Intranet contract. According to the Navy, the

number of such personnel will not be known until proposals are evaluated. Given

the Navy’s position, the costs to pay affected information technology staff are costs

that will require funding in addition to the Intranet contract costs. We believe the

future roles of the staff likely to be affected and their costs to the Navy should have

been weighed in determining an appropriate acquisition strategy.
8

Funding for the Navy’s Intranet also raises the question of whether the funding of a

multiyear contract for services should be specifically authorized by Congress. The Navy

is proceeding under the authority of 10 U.S.C. 2306(g), which permits the head of an

agency to enter into multiyear contracts for certain services. While 10 U.S.C. 2306b(i)(3)

requires that multiyear contracts for acquisition of property greater than $500 million be

specifically authorized by Congress, there is no similar requirement for multiyear

services contracts under section 2306(g). Navy officials stated that the Intranet contract

represents an acquisition of services, not property, and therefore the requirement for a

specific authorization does not apply. As a result, the Navy may enter into a multibillion

dollar contract without specific congressional authorization. In addition, a single

contract could be funded through a large number of programs using different funding

sources without Congress having a clear view of the effort’s scope, cost, and required

funding. Navy officials stated that they have not sought congressional authorization for

the Intranet effort.

Risk Mitigation Efforts Are Insufficient

The Navy does not plan to undertake certain risk mitigation efforts that we believe

would be appropriate. For example, its acquisition approach does not use modular

contracting and has not been tested.

Intranet does not use modular approach

The Navy’s Intranet acquisition approach does not use modular contracting as suggested

by the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.4 That act calls for the head of each executive agency

to use modular contracting for the acquisition of major systems of information

technology to the maximum extent possible.5The Clinger-Cohen Act states that under

modular contracting, an acquisition may be divided into smaller increments that (1) are

4

P.L.104-106, Feb.10, 1996.

5

41 U.S.C. 434.
9

easier to manage; (2) address complex objectives incrementally to enhance the

likelihood of achieving workable solutions; and (3) provide for delivery, implementation,

and testing of workable systems or solutions in discrete increments.

In our November 22, 1999, letter to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,

Control, Communications and Intelligence, we asked whether the provisions of the

Clinger-Cohen Act applied to the Intranet effort and whether that effort should involve

the use of a modular approach. The Assistant Secretary stated that all the requirements

of the act applied to the Intranet effort, “with the exception of that part requiring the use

of modular contracting.” The Assistant Secretary further stated that the Navy had

“determined that it is impracticable to contract for the NMCI [the Intranet] using

modular contacting, because an incremental contract with a minimal guaranteed revenue

stream would not provide sufficient incentive to attract the investment that the program

will require from industry.” We believe that without the benefit of a formal analysis of

alternatives, it is difficult to determine the basis of the Navy’s position. Alternatives to

the Navy’s current approach were identified. For example, a Navy Chief Information

Officer’s May 11, 1999, Intranet briefing to the Secretary of the Navy left open the

question of acquisition approach and included a program scope recommendation broken

into three increments: increment one comprising base and local area networks;

increment two comprising wide and metropolitan area networks, network distribution

services, management, and security; and increment three consisting of shipboard local

area networks, servers, end user devices, and productivity tools.

Intranet approach not tested

Despite relying on an untried combination of performance measures and management

mechanisms, the Navy did not test its Intranet approach prior to the release of the

Intranet solicitation, nor does it plan to test that approach before awarding a contract.

The Navy’s Intranet approach relies on a defined set of performance measures that are

intended to result in its obtaining a desired level of end-state service. These performance

measures reflect a combination of measures neither previously used by the Navy nor in
10

the acquisition of services sized as large as the proposed Intranet. Additionally, the Navy

is still developing a management oversight process for the Intranet contract—

mechanisms that have not been through a pilot test.

In our letter to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,

Communications, and Intelligence, we asked whether a small test of the Intranet

approach had been considered. The Assistant Secretary stated that a specific pilot for

the Navy Intranet was not done but noted that the Navy “has extensive experience in

‘pilot projects’ such as the Oahu Base Area Network (OBAN) and personal computer

leasing.” He further stated that the Navy also had the benefit of lessons learned from

other agencies and industry experiences. The Navy’s Oahu Base Area Network and

personal computer leasing experiences are not similar in scope or approach to the

planned Intranet. Based on our conversations with Navy officials and our on-site

observations of the Navy’s Oahu Base Area Network project, the proposed Intranet

contract represents a different approach to attaining the desired end-state, i.e., a services

contract versus a government-owned and operated network, such as the Oahu Base Area

Network. Also, based on our discussions with Navy officials, the Intranet solicitation

defines performance measures that were derived primarily from industry and literature

sources. The Navy was unable to direct us to a comparable Navy contract that mirrored

the intended approach to be used in their Intranet effort. In our view, without testing,

the Navy cannot be assured that it has a workable contract approach with measures of

performance that ensure it will obtain the needed capabilities.

We also asked the Assistant Secretary whether the Department planned to direct that the

Navy’s single contract, seat management approach be used departmentwide and across

all the services if it was shown to represent a superior approach to its current means of

operations. The Assistant Secretary responded that while the Navy Intranet approach

holds great promise for the Navy specifically and DOD at large in terms of

standardization and efficiency, it would be premature to mandate it as the Department’s

preferred approach. In our opinion, a pilot test could help provide DOD confidence in

the maturity of the Navy approach.
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS

NOT ESTABLISHED ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has allowed the Navy to undertake its Intranet

acquisition effort without having fully defined how the Department will oversee the

program. In addition, the Office of the Secretary has not determined that the Navy’s

approach fully supports the Department's Command, Control, Communications,

Computers and Intelligence systems architecture—particularly the Department’s system

interoperability and information assurance requirements.

Oversight by the Office of the Secretary of Defense is critical as the Navy’s Intranet

effort and the form it takes will have departmentwide implications. For example, the

Intranet may present a change in the model under which the Department acquires longhaul6 communications services—presently acquired through the Defense Information

Systems Agency. DOD policy mandates that the Defense Information Systems Agency is

to be the manager and sole provider of long-haul communications for the Department to

ensure effective, efficient, and economical use of long-haul services. Alteration of that

model by one service could significantly affect the way the other services and DOD

agencies implement their information technology networks—threatening the investment

in and benefits of a unified long-haul approach.

Oversight Process and Program

Requirements Are Undefined

The Office of the Secretary of Defense allowed the Navy to chose an acquisition

approach and release its Intranet solicitation without having defined a Department of

Defense oversight process or set program milestones and exit criteria7 consistent with

DOD Regulation 5000.2-R. In July 1999, the Navy briefed the Assistant Secretary of

6

Long-haul communications are long-distance telecommunications between posts, camps, and stations.

7

Exit criteria are established as goals for a program during an acquisition phase. They are used to track

program progress and serve as gates that, when successfully passed or exited, demonstrate that the

program is on track to achieve its final program goals and should be allowed to continue with additional

activities within an acquisition phase or be considered for continuation into the next acquisition phase.
12

Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence on its proposed Navy

Intranet acquisition plan. The Navy subsequently continued its program efforts with the

development and release of a solicitation to acquire the Navy/Marine Corps Intranet.

The Navy did this under the assumption that it was not subject to the regulatory

oversight mechanisms of DOD Regulation 5000.2-R, and without coming to agreement

with the Office of the Secretary of Defense on other appropriate oversight mechanisms,

milestones, and exit criteria. Despite a prior requirement by the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence that agreement on an

oversight mechanism was to be reached before a solicitation was released, DOD later

agreed with the Navy’s release of the Intranet solicitation without having that oversight

process in place.

In response to our November 22, 1999, letter, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence stated that the Intranet program

does not meet the definition of a Major Automated Information System acquisition

program set forth in Regulation 5000.2-R. The Assistant Secretary further commented,

however, that due to the high visibility, large dollar value, and significant impact of the

Navy effort on both the Navy and ultimately the Department, the Navy effort “will be”

designated as a initiative of special interest and that a tailored oversight framework is

being jointly developed and will be jointly approved.

In a December 3, 1999, letter to the Navy, the Assistant Secretary set two requirements

on the release of a solicitation for the Navy Intranet. Specifically, he stated that the Navy

and his office needed to (1) ensure compliance with the requirements of the ClingerCohen Act of 1996 and (2) “clearly define our mutual roles and responsibilities to allow

efficient and effective insight into the N/MCI [the Intranet] program goals and their

achievement.” While DOD and the Navy have not yet agreed on an appropriate oversight

process for the Intranet acquisition, DOD agreed to the Navy’s release of its Intranet

request for proposals. The Navy has received, and is evaluating, proposals.
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Interoperability and Information Assurance

Objectives Remain Uncertain

In July 1996, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Joint Vision 2010

establishing a mission need for “information superiority”—the capability to collect,

process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or

denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. In May 1997, the Commander of the Joint

Warfighting Center issued a “Concepts for Future Operations” that concluded that

attainment of information superiority will require the achievement of a fully integrated,

end-to-end connectivity of military information systems that does not currently exist.

For those visions of information superiority to be achieved, we believe DOD and the

services will need to acquire cost effective, information technology systems and

networks that offer interoperability and are protected, i.e., provide information

assurance. These goals are reflected in the Intranet goals.

In part, the Intranet’s goals are to

• remove access, connectivity, and throughput impediments to productivity and speed

of command;

• quickly and securely share knowledge around the globe;

• eliminate interoperability problems; and

• reduce the cost of voice, data, and video services.

Given that the Joint Vision 2010 represents a defensewide need for information

superiority, there is a need to ensure that the Navy will efficiently and effectively attain

that goal because of its implications for the attainment of defensewide information

superiority. Defense Information Systems Agency and Defense-wide Information

Assurance Program reviews of the Navy’s Intranet plans and key documents were not

completed prior to the release of the Intranet solicitation.
14

A Defense Information Systems Agency official told us that, a couple weeks prior to the

solicitation’s scheduled release, the Navy asked the Agency to review a large volume of

Intranet program documents to ensure their interoperability and information assurance

coverage. He said that, given the volume of documents and the short time provided for

review, his organization was unable to carry out the requested review.

Ensuring information assurance is a critical goal of the Office of the Secretary of

Defense. As we reported to the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development in

June 1998,8the Department of Defense is investing billions of dollars in information

superiority related systems to implement the Joint Vision 2010 concept. That concept

critically depends on the Department's information systems and their protection, i.e.,

providing information assurance. In 1997, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence report9

noted that the complexity

of managing DOD’s information assurance efforts had increased due to the proliferation

of networks across DOD and that its decentralized assurance management could not

deal with it adequately. That report stated that Department of Defense lacked effective

processes to (1) assess the operational readiness of its information systems and

networks, (2) identify its information assurance requirements, and (3) ensure that those

requirements are programmed and executed in accordance with DOD’s priorities. To

deal with these issues, DOD developed its Defense-wide Information Assurance

Program.

We discussed the Navy Intranet effort with the Director of the Defense-wide Information

Assurance Program. We were told that Defense-wide Information Assurance Program

staff had not reviewed the Intranet solicitation or program due to a severe staffing

shortage. The Director of the Defense-wide Information Assurance Program noted, for

example, that key billets in the architectural and acquisition divisions remained unfilled.

8

DOD’s Information Assurance Efforts (GAO/NSIAD-98-132R, June 11, 1998).

9

A Management Process of a Defense-wide Information Assurance Program (DIAP), Nov. 15, 1997.
15

OBSERVATIONS

Due to the number of significant open issues related to the Intranet effort, the Navy

would be prudent to move forward with an award of an Intranet contract only after such

issues are addressed. A well-defined and implemented oversight approach, such as the

traditional, tailorable process provided by DOD Regulation 5000.2-R, provides a

framework that minimizes risk. We believe that development of (1) a defined acquisition

process with exit criteria, (2) a formal analysis of existing alternatives, (3) specific

performance measures, (4) a small test of the Intranet approach, and (5) a funding plan

for the Intranet would add assurance that requirements are understood and that

anticipated savings are achievable.

----

This concludes our statement. We appreciate the opportunity to have it placed in the

record.

Contact and Acknowledgement

For further contacts regarding this statement, please contact Allen Li at (202) 512-4841 or

Jack L. Brock, Jr. at (202) 512-6240. Individuals making key contributions to this

statement included Robert Hadley, Joseph McDermott, Charles Rey, Karen Richey, John

Van Schaik, Bruce Thomas, Hai Tran, and William Woods.

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