UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

CRAIG LUNDSTED, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 14-cv-13981 

v. Honorable Thomas L. Ludington 

JRV HOLDINGS, LLC, et al., 

 Defendants. 

_______________________________________/ 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE, DETERMINING SETOFF RIGHTS, 

GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES, AND DIRECTING 

COMPENSATION 

 Plaintiff Craig Lundsted filed this case against Defendants JRV Holdings, LLC and 

Roosen, Varchetti & Oliver, PLLC on October 15, 2014. He alleged that Defendants violated the 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). 

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Lundsted’s TILA claims on March 16, 2015. Lundsted 

responded by filing an amended complaint that removed his TILA claims, leaving only his 

claims under the FDCPA. On April 24, 2015, within three weeks of filing his amended 

complaint, Lundsted accepted an offer of judgment from Defendants for the $1,000.00 statutory 

damages amount provided in the FDCPA. 

 In an effort to bring the case to a final resolution, the Court solicited closing documents 

from the parties. Those documents were due on August 28, 2015. A consent judgment, titled 

“partial consent judgment” was submitted that day by Lundsted. Without any reference to the 

inclusion of “partial” in the documents title, but otherwise purporting to close the case, the 

1:14-cv-13981-TLL-PTM Doc # 46 Filed 04/27/16 Pg 1 of 15 Pg ID 346
- 2 - 

Consent Judgment was entered on August 31, 2015 without inclusion of the term “partial” and 

the case was closed. 

I. 

The August 31, 2015 Consent Judgment provided that Plaintiff recover $1,000 from 

Defendants jointly and severally and further provided that Plaintiff had twenty-one days to 

submit a motion for attorneys’ fees and a bill of costs. See Consent J., ECF No. 26. The day after 

the Consent Judgment was filed Defendants filed a motion to vacate the judgment. They alleged 

that the Consent Judgment omitted the following language: “This offer is made without regard to 

and does not impact JRV’s rights to set-off the judgment it holds against Plaintiff.” Defs.’ Mot. 

Vacate Cons. J. 2, ECF No. 27. This language was originally included in Defendants’ offer of 

judgment and it was intended to preserve Defendants’ right to offset a judgment Defendant JRV 

Holdings obtained against Plaintiff in January of 2014 for $8,603.31. See Defs.’ Mot. Vac. J, 

ECF No. 27. 

 An in person status conference was held on November 30, 2015, at which Defendants 

explained that their desire to include the language concerning the offset in the Consent Judgment 

arose as a result of Plaintiff’s right to attorney’s fees. At the conference, neither party disputed 

that Plaintiff’s money judgment would be offset against Defendant JRV Holdings’ prior 

judgment. The parties could not reach agreement as to whether the non-prejudice language 

included in the offer of judgment but excluded from the Consent Judgment would have any 

effect on whether Defendants could offset any of Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees (as opposed to 

levying on the proceeds of the attorneys’ fees once in Plaintiff’s possession). Nevertheless, the 

parties agreed that the question of offset was unresolved. 

1:14-cv-13981-TLL-PTM Doc # 46 Filed 04/27/16 Pg 2 of 15 Pg ID 347
- 3 - 

Briefing was directed on two issues: Plaintiff’s right to attorneys’ fees and Defendants’ 

right to setoff. The parties timely briefed both issues. Lundsted claims that he is entitled to 

approximately $16,630.50 in attorneys’ fees and costs. Defendants dispute that figure. Lundsted 

also claimed in his briefing on setoff, that Defendants cannot offset JRV’s underlying judgment 

against his attorneys’ fees and costs award or his statutory judgment of $1,000.00 (a change in 

his position from the November 30, 2015 status conference). Defendants argue that they can set 

off JRV’s underlying judgment against both amounts. 

II. 

 The first issue that needs attention is Defendants’ unopposed motion to vacate the 

consent judgment entered on August 31, 2015. As explained in a prior order of this Court, there 

is no conceivable rationale for vacating the consent judgment on the basis of the language 

dispute between the parties. The addition of the non-prejudice language1

 would have no effect on 

the ability of Defendants, or at least JRV Holdings (the only Defendant with a judgment against 

Lundsted), to offset their judgment against the consent judgment. The desire to include the nonprejudice language likely arises from the fact that Defendants interposed setoff as an affirmative 

defense to Lundsted’s claims. Defendants perhaps fear, understandably, that leaving any mention 

of setoff out of the consent judgment forecloses their ability to do so. It does not. 

 “The right to setoff is a widely recognized common law right which allows entities that 

owe each other money to apply their mutual debts against each other, thereby avoiding ‘the 

absurdity of making A pay B when B owes A.’” In re Gordon Sel-Way, Inc., 270 F.3d 280, 290 

(6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 18 (1995)). Thus, it would 

be illogical that the very thing that creates the mutual indebtedness between Plaintiff and 

 1

 “This offer is made without regard to and does not impact JRV’s rights to set-off the judgment it holds 

against Plaintiff.” Defs.’ Mot. Vacate Cons. J. 2, ECF No. 27. 

1:14-cv-13981-TLL-PTM Doc # 46 Filed 04/27/16 Pg 3 of 15 Pg ID 348
- 4 - 

Defendants—the consent judgment—also extinguishes Defendants’ right to setoff those two 

debts against each other. Plaintiff does not contend that the consent judgment does so without the 

non-prejudice language and Defendants have no reason to fear that it does. The non-prejudice 

language is unnecessary to the consent judgment and its addition would add nothing material. 

The motion to vacate the consent judgment will be denied. 

III. 

 The next, and perhaps most important issue to be considered is the right of Defendants’ 

(again, just JRV Holdings) to set off against the present judgment a prior state court judgment 

against Lundsted. Defendant JRV argues that it can set off the state court judgment against both 

the judgment in this case and Lundsted’s reasonable attorneys’ fees (to be discussed below). 

Lundsted argues that JRV cannot set off its state court judgment against either. 

 Both parties have thoroughly briefed this issue. Neither party has, however, been able to 

furnish authority in full support of its position. The relevant question is whether judgment 

debtors in an action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act can set off that judgment 

against a state court judgment held against the FDCPA judgment creditor. More directly, if JRV 

holds a state court judgment against Lundsted, as it does, can it set off that judgment against 

Lundsted’s FDCPA judgment and his statutory entitlement to reasonable attorneys’ fees? 

 The limited caselaw that exists addressing this question suggests an answer between the 

parties’ positions. The state court judgment held by JRV can be set off against the FDCPA 

judgment. It may not be set off against Lundsted’s reasonable attorneys’ fees. Both of these 

issues were discussed in Brown v. Mandarich Law Grp., LLP, No. 13-CV-04703, 2014 WL 

2860631 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2014). The reasoning of the Brown court is persuasive and will be 

adopted here. A short discussion of the principles behind the conclusions reached in Brown

1:14-cv-13981-TLL-PTM Doc # 46 Filed 04/27/16 Pg 4 of 15 Pg ID 349
- 5 - 

follows, but the Brown court’s full explanation of the reasons for why set off does or does not 

apply will not be repeated in its entirety. 

A. 

 The procedure used in executing a judgment “must accord with the procedure of the state 

where the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

69(a)(1). No federal statute governs the execution of the two judgments at issue here. As 

explained above, the principle that countervailing judgments may be set off against one another 

is rooted in common law. See In re Gordon Sel-Way, Inc., 270 F.3d 280, 290 (6th Cir. 2001). 

 Lundsted argues that this generally applicable common law rule conflicts with the broad 

purpose of the FDCPA and should be disregarded in this case.2

 He does not provide authority 

wherein a federal court agreed with his contention. He argues that this Court has previously 

disallowed set off against FDCPA judgments in Isa v. Law Office of Timothy Baxter & 

Associates, No. 13-CV-11284, 2013 WL 5692850 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2013). But Isa is 

inapposite. Isa concerned an FDCPA judgment debtor satisfying its judgment by paying the 

FDCPA plaintiff’s underlying creditor. That is, there was no setoff at issue in Isa. The issue in 

Isa was whether an FDCPA judgment debtor could satisfy an FDCPA judgment by making a 

transfer payment to the plaintiff’s creditor. This Court held that it could not. 

As Isa observes, allowing such transfer payments would defeat the purpose of the 

FDCPA. That same logic does not apply where the FDCPA judgment debtor is also a judgment 

creditor from an underlying state court action, as is the case here. The court in Brown concluded 

rightly that “[p]ermitting an offset of statutory damages here does not take the sting out of the 

FDCPA damages against Defendant[s]. Defendant [JRV] collects $[1],000.00 less of the 

 2

 It should be noted that during a status conference with the Court, Lundsted represented that he did believe 

the FDCPA judgment was subject to setoff. He changed that position later during his briefing. 

1:14-cv-13981-TLL-PTM Doc # 46 Filed 04/27/16 Pg 5 of 15 Pg ID 350
- 6 - 

judgment legally owed by Plaintiff, representing a substantial penalty that will deter Defendant 

from repeating the same actions in the future.” Brown, 2014 WL 2860631, at *3. 

Lundsted goes on to cite a case from the Northern District of California that stated “setoff 

appears contrary to the established policies of FDCPA.” Reed v. Glob. Acceptance Credit Co., 

No. C-08-01826, 2008 WL 3330165, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008). But that quote, relied upon 

by Lundsted, is unhelpful out of context. The case itself, and other cases from that district 

similarly holding, are inapposite as well because they address the ability of a creditor to bring a 

counterclaim for the underlying debt in an FDCPA action. Cases such as Reed have held that a 

counterclaim for the underlying debt must be dismissed when brought against an FDCPA claim 

since the counterclaim is not compulsory and, for policy reasons, should not be permitted. 

Whatever the merits of those cases, they do not address the present situation, where the FDCPA 

judgment debtor has a prior state court judgment against the plaintiff for the underlying debt. 

There are no policy reasons for disregarding the common law rule of setoff. Defendant 

JRV is entitled to set off its liability against the state court judgment it holds against Lundsted on 

the underlying debt. 

B. 

 For different, but equally sensible reasons, Lundsted’s award of reasonable attorneys’ 

fees is not subject to offset against the FDCPA judgment. The Brown court reviewed four factors 

in deciding that attorneys’ fees are not subject to setoff: public policy, priority in time of the 

competing claims, separateness of the two actions seeking to be offset, and the nature of the 

attorney-client contract. Brown, 2014 WL 2860631, at *3–5. The Brown court concluded that the 

1:14-cv-13981-TLL-PTM Doc # 46 Filed 04/27/16 Pg 6 of 15 Pg ID 351
- 7 - 

factors weighed against setoff in a case with an identical fact pattern to the present case. Id. at 

*5.3

 First, public policy does not favor set off of attorneys’ fees. Unlike set off of the statutory 

penalty, allowing set off of attorneys’ fees would chill future FDCPA actions and discourage 

attorneys from taking FDCPA cases. See Brown, 2014 WL 2860631, at *3–4. Further, as the 

Brown court recognized, “[o]ffset is . . . patently unfair where it would effectively force 

attorneys to satisfy the debts of their clients.” Id. at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is 

not hard to envision a case where the underlying state court judgment exceeds the FDCPA 

judgment and its attendant attorneys’ fees. In such a circumstance, the setoff would swallow the 

FDCPA award and leave the FDCPA plaintiff’s attorney without any compensation for reaching 

a successful result. No attorney would bring an FDCPA claim when faced with such a prospect. 

 3

 Defendants argue that Brown is inapplicable because it applies California state law. But the Brown court 

explains that it looked to California law because “neither the Ninth Circuit nor the California Supreme Court provide 

a definitive answer as to whether attorney’s fee awards have priority over offset in an FDCPA claim.” Brown, 2014 

WL 2860631, at *3. Since setoff is a creature of common law, it was appropriate for the Brown court to look to 

California law on setoff in reaching its conclusions. Nevertheless, setoff is recognized under Michigan law. See 

Walker v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 572 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). Defendants do not explain how Michigan 

law on setoff would vary (save for one instance) such that Brown’s holding is inapplicable. 

Defendants only claim that Michigan law differs from California law, such that Brown is inapplicable, 

relies on Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.6008(b). That statute sets forth generally for the possibility of offsetting 

judgment executions: “Executions between the same parties may be set off one against another, if required by either 

party as follows.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.6008. Subsection (b) provides: 

Such set off shall not be allowed unless all the parties are mutual debtors and creditors. Nor shall 

set off be allowed where the sum due on the first execution shall have been lawfully assigned to 

another person before the creditor in the second execution becomes entitled to the sum due 

thereon, or as to so much of the first execution as may be due to the attorney in that suit for his 

taxable fees and disbursements. 

Id. (emphasis added). Defendants argue that this provision bars setoff of the first judgment creditor’s attorneys’ fees, 

it says nothing about barring the setoff of the second judgment creditor’s attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, Defendants 

conclude, the statute permits it. 

But the statute does not control all setoff claims under Michigan law. Rather, it encodes a means by which 

countervailing judgments may be executed. Setoff itself is still an equitable tool arising from the common law. 

Michigan courts have recognized the difference and acknowledged that § 600.6008 does not govern claims of 

equitable setoff: “Although there is no statute specifically authorizing courts to order judgments satisfied by setoff, § 

6008 . . . specifically authorizes the setoff of mutual executions. As such, § 6008 provides support for the notion that 

equitable setoff is an appropriate method of satisfying judgments.” Mahesh v. Mills, 602 N.W.2d 618, 620 (Mich. 

Ct. App. 1999). Accordingly, § 600.6008 does not explicitly permit the setoff of attorneys’ fees by a second-in-time 

judgment creditor and it does not govern the applicability of the equitable setoff rule. 

1:14-cv-13981-TLL-PTM Doc # 46 Filed 04/27/16 Pg 7 of 15 Pg ID 352
- 8 - 

 Second, the Brown court noted that attorneys have a lien against the proceeds of a 

judgment at the time the attorney is retained. Thus, the attorney lien predates, and takes priority 

over, the setoff claim. Although the Brown court was applying California law, the same rule 

applies in Michigan. See Doxtader v. Sivertsen, 455 N.W.2d 437, 439 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) 

(“This state recognizes a common-law attorney’s lien on a judgment or fund resulting from the 

attorney’s services.”). 

 Third, the Brown court expanded upon the notion of the priority attorney lien by noting 

that the two judgments sought to be offset arise from wholly different actions. The court 

acknowledged the fact that the defendant’s state court judgment was secured first “appears to 

weigh in favor of prioritizing offset.” Brown, 2014 WL 2860631, at *4. Ultimately, however, the 

attorneys’ fees claim had priority because the two actions were “wholly independent.” Id. Here, 

like in Brown, the two judgments arise from wholly independent actions. As a result, the attorney 

lien retains priority over the offset claim. 

 Finally, in this case, Lundsted and his attorney have a contingency fee agreement. The 

Brown court noted that it did not have any information about the plaintiff’s fee agreement with 

his attorney but that irrespective of the agreement it would not sway the inquiry. The same can 

be said here. A contingency fee agreement does to some degree favor setoff because a portion of 

the attorneys’ fees obtained (perhaps a good majority) will remain with Lundsted. But this alone 

is insufficient to overcome the other three factors that do not favor offset. Further, to the extent 

Lundsted retains any portion of the fee award, it is money in his possession that he will apply to 

his expenses, including debt expenses. While this result does border on the very problem that 

setoff seeks to avoid (A paying B for B to pay A), setoff remains an equitable remedy and the 

equities favor not allowing setoff to apply to attorneys’ fees. 

1:14-cv-13981-TLL-PTM Doc # 46 Filed 04/27/16 Pg 8 of 15 Pg ID 353
- 9 - 

IV. 

 The final issue raised by the parties is Lundsted’s entitlement to a “reasonable attorney’s 

fee as determined by the court.” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692k(a)(3). 

The starting point in determining the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees is the “lodestar” 

method. Wayne v. Vill. of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 531 (6th Cir. 1994). Under this method, a 

reasonable rate is calculated by multiplying “the number of hours reasonably expended” by “a 

reasonable hourly rate.” Id. (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Next, the resulting sum should be adjusted to reflect the result 

obtained.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Adjustments may be made “to reflect relevant 

considerations peculiar to the subject litigation.” Adcock-Ladd v. Sec’y of Treasury, 227 F.3d 

343, 349 (6th Cir. 2000). 

Lundsted seeks an award of $13,113.50 in attorneys’ fees in compensation for 54.2 hours 

of work performed by his attorneys on this case. Pl.’s Mot. Att’y Fees 5, ECF No. 37. In his 

reply brief in support of his motion for attorneys’ fees Lundsted asks for “approximately $3000 

extra in fees that Defendants’ arguments caused Plaintiff to incur” as compensation for spending 

“3.7 hours preparing the reply brief on offset, and almost 8 hours in preparing this reply brief.” 

Pl.’s Reply Br. 8 n.4, ECF No. 42. 

A. 

Lundsted’s request to be compensated for 54.2 hours of work is facially reasonable. 

Defendants make allegations that Lundsted’s attorneys “work[ed] up the file” after the case was 

settled. Defs.’ Resp. Br. 11, ECF No. 40. Defendants support this claim by arguing that two 

thirds of the hours Lundsted seeks to have compensated were accrued after the case settled. 

1:14-cv-13981-TLL-PTM Doc # 46 Filed 04/27/16 Pg 9 of 15 Pg ID 354
- 10 - 

Defendants also claim that they sought to resolve the question of Lundsted’s reasonable 

attorneys’ fees but Lundsted would not disclose his attorneys’ invoices. 

There is no evidence, however, that Lundsted’s attorneys “worked up the file” after 

settlement. Indeed, in the context of this FDCPA action, the “settlement” between the parties was 

only as to liability and the statutory damage amount. Both parties were aware that Lundsted’s 

entitlement to reasonable attorneys’ fees remained unresolved. The consent judgment submitted 

by the parties reflected as much. Similarly, the question of what portion of the monetary award 

received by Lundsted could be offset against JRV’s underlying judgment also was unresolved. 

Thus, the “settlement” referenced by JRV did not resolve the case and make any further work by 

Lundsted’s attorneys “waste.” Rather, the “settlement” signaled the resolution of a core issue in 

the case—liability—and the beginning of litigation over two important issues that liability gave 

rise to—attorneys’ fees and offset. 

Considering the posture of the case at the time Lundsted accepted JRV’s offer of 

judgment, the hours expended by JRV’s counsel were not unreasonable. While there may be 

reason for imposing a reduction on the lodestar figure, the hours used to produce that figure are 

reasonable. 

B. 

Lundsted explains that his attorneys and their paralegals charged four different rates for 

the work they performed on his case. The two partners that worked on his case billed $300.00 

per hour, the one associate billed $250.00 per hour, and the two paralegals billed $135.00 per 

hour. Defendants claim these figures are unreasonable. 

The rates are not unreasonable. Although Defendants selectively cite to one case from 

this district that denied such rates, many cases from this district have approved these rates and 

1:14-cv-13981-TLL-PTM Doc # 46 Filed 04/27/16 Pg 10 of 15 Pg ID 355
- 11 - 

even rates in excess of these. See, e.g., Litt v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, No. 13-12462, 

2015 WL 1849267, at *3–4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 22, 2015). The rates charged to Lundsted are 

reasonable. 

C. 

The last step in the lodestar analysis is determining if any reductions to the lodestar figure 

are warranted. The Sixth Circuit has incorporated the twelve factors set forth by the Fifth Circuit 

in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir.1974), as a starting 

point for determining if adjusting the lodestar figure is warranted. Adcock-Ladd, 227 F.3d at 

349.4

 “Accordingly, modifications [to the lodestar] are proper only in certain ‘rare’ and 

‘exceptional’ cases, supported by both ‘specific evidence’ on the record and detailed findings by 

the lower courts.” Adcock-Ladd v. Sec’y of Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 349-50 (6th Cir. 2000) 

(quoting Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 

(1986)). A district court awarding fees “must provide a clear and concise explanation of its 

reasons for the fee award.” Wayne, 36 F.3d at 533 (quoting Hadix v. Johnson, 65 F.3d 532, 535 

(6th Cir. 1995)). 

Lundsted’s fee award will be reduced for four reasons. 

1. 

First, Lundsted has billed for clerical tasks performed by paralegals and lawyers. 

“[P]urely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who 

performs them.” Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274, 288 n.10 (1989). Defendants 

 4

 “These factors are: (1) the time and labor required by a given case; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the 

questions presented; (3) the skill needed to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by 

the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time 

limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the 

experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the nature and length of 

the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.” Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 471–

72 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19). 

1:14-cv-13981-TLL-PTM Doc # 46 Filed 04/27/16 Pg 11 of 15 Pg ID 356
- 12 - 

catalog thirteen hours that they believe to have been spent on purely clerical tasks. That number 

is excessive. 

In lieu of closely scrutinizing billing records and identifying specific hours to be 

eliminated, courts are permitted to simply reduce the award amount to account for any billing 

discrepancies. See Helfman v. GE Grp. Life Assur. Co., No. 06-13528, 2011 WL 1464678, at *1 

(E.D. Mich. Apr. 18, 2011) (discussing across-the-board reductions in the context of a party only 

achieving limited success). Rather than performing an itemized deduction as Defendant chose to, 

or assigning a percentage to this single discrepancy, all justifications for a reduction will be 

considered before any reduction is assigned. 

2. 

Next, Lundsted’s attorneys billed at a full hourly rate for travel time. The Sixth Circuit 

has held that a court may apply a “relevant community” fee to an attorney’s representation where 

“a counselor has voluntarily agreed to represent a plaintiff in an out-of-town lawsuit[.]” See 

Adcock-Ladd v. Sec’y of Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 350 (6th Cir. 2000). This principle is 

appropriately applied to transportation costs when billed at a full hourly rate by an attorney 

travelling from outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.5 See Smith v. Freeman, 921 F.2d 1120, 

1122 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding no abuse of discretion where the district court compensated an 

attorney at a reduced rate for driving time). The billing of driving time at a full hourly rate favors 

some modest reduction. 

3. 

Third, Lundsted’s attorneys engaged in block billing. While not particularly egregious 

here, the block billing by Lundsted’s attorneys include some tasks that are clerical and some that 

 5

 Lundsted’s attorney that billed for driving time, Ronald Weiss, is located within this district’s territorial 

jurisdiction but outside of the division where the case has been heard. The same principal applies for attorneys from 

outside of the division. 

1:14-cv-13981-TLL-PTM Doc # 46 Filed 04/27/16 Pg 12 of 15 Pg ID 357
- 13 - 

are not. The practice of block-billing prevents accurately determining how much time was spent 

on tasks appropriately billed at a full rate and how much time was spent on purely clerical tasks. 

Block-billing falls below the standard of “sufficient detail” required to avoid a reduction of 

award. See Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining how a 

reduction for block-billing is reasonable because it “makes it more difficult to determine how 

much time was spent on particular activities”). A small reduction of Plaintiff’s award is 

warranted. 

4. 

Lastly, some of the itemized tasks submitted by Lundsted are incomplete. These entries 

total 3.8 hours. Billing records must “describe the work performed in sufficient detail to establish 

that the work is reasonably related” to the matter for which the fee is requested. In re Pierce, 190 

F.3d 586, 593-94 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Where the detail in the billing records is insufficient the 

Court has discretion to reduce the award accordingly. See Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 472 

(6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). Lundsted’s incomplete entries do not meet 

this billing standard. Accordingly, a reduction is warranted. 

5. 

In light of the foregoing adjustments, Lundsted’s reasonable attorneys’ fees will be 

reduced by a percentage reflecting those adjustments. Lundsted’s fees will be adjusted 

downwards by 15%. Thus, Lundsted’s total fee award is $11,145.63. 

D. 

The next topic that must be addressed is Lundsted’s request for additional fees related to 

his reply briefing on both topics under consideration. In his reply brief in support of his motion 

for attorney fees, Lundsted writes: 

1:14-cv-13981-TLL-PTM Doc # 46 Filed 04/27/16 Pg 13 of 15 Pg ID 358
- 14 - 

Plaintiff’s counsel spent 3.7 hours preparing the reply brief on offset, and almost 

8 hours in preparing this reply brief in effort to address all of the points argued by 

Defendants. This time was also necessarily spent on the reasonable prosecution of 

this case, and Plaintiff would request leave from the Court to supplement the 

motion to detail these fees and obtain the approximately $3000 extra in fees that 

Defendants’ arguments caused Plaintiff to incur in reply. 

Pl.’s Reply Br. 8 n.4, ECF No. 42. 

Plaintiff’s request will be denied. First, under the local rules, parties may not file countermotions in reply briefs. Eastern District of Michigan Electronic Filing Policies and Procedures 

R5(e) (cannot have a counter-motion in a reply). Nor may a party raise an argument for the first 

time in a reply brief. Second, the request made in Lundsted’s footnote, falls below the required 

specificity for submitting itemized fee bills. Finally, Lundsted’s reply brief in support of his 

motion for attorneys’ fees does not comport with the local rules formatting requirements. Under 

the local rules, reply briefs are limited to seven pages, E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(d)(3)(B), and all 

submissions must be in 14-point proportional font, E.D. Mich. LR 5.1(a)(3). Lundsted’s reply 

brief, which is the bulk of the hours he seeks to have compensated, is ten pages long and in 12-

point font. If considered on the merits, Lundsted’s claim for additional fees would warrant 

significant reduction on that basis, if not complete denial. 

E. 

The last issue of compensation is the costs billed by Lundsted. Lundsted billed 

Defendants for $518.00 in costs. Bill of Costs, ECF No. 38. This figure included $400.00 for 

“Fees of the Clerk” and $118.00 for “[f]ees for service of summons and subpoena.” Id. 

Defendants argue that they should not be billed for service fees because they waived service. 

Lundsted argues that irrespective of Defendants’ waiver, the costs were incurred and should be 

billed. The dispute over service costs arises out of an earlier dispute about whether service was 

1:14-cv-13981-TLL-PTM Doc # 46 Filed 04/27/16 Pg 14 of 15 Pg ID 359
- 15 - 

properly effectuated on Defendants. Defendants argued that they were not properly served but 

then eventually waived service. 

Lundsted will be compensated for service costs where service was effectuated but 

Defendants claimed it was not done properly and then Defendants ultimately waived service. 

This circumstance differs from a situation where a defendant waives service before it is even 

attempted. In such a situation imposing service costs would likely be unequitable. Here, 

imposing service costs is fair. 

V. 

 Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to vacate the consent judgment, 

ECF No. 27, is DENIED.

It is further ORDERED that Defendants are permitted a right to set off their liability in 

this matter against the underlying judgment they hold to the extent explained herein. 

 It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff Craig Lundsted’s motion for attorneys’ fees, ECF 

No. 37, is GRANTED in part. 

 It is further ORDERED that Defendants are DIRECTED to compensate Plaintiff Craig 

Lundsted $11,663.63 for costs and fees incurred in this matter. 

Dated: April 27, 2016 s/Thomas L. Ludington 

 THOMAS L. LUDINGTON 

 United States District Judge 

 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served 

upon each attorney or party of record herein by electronic means or first 

class U.S. mail on April 27, 2016. 

 s/Michael A. Sian 

 MICHAEL A. SIAN, Case Manager 

1:14-cv-13981-TLL-PTM Doc # 46 Filed 04/27/16 Pg 15 of 15 Pg ID 360