IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Walid Esmat Mitwalli, :

Petitioner :

: No. 240 M.D. 2023

v. :

: Submitted: July 5, 2024

PA Department of Corrections, :

Laurel Harry, Secretary, DOC Central :

Office Business Manager, et al., :

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE DUMAS FILED: September 3, 2024

Walid Esmat Mitwalli (Petitioner), proceeding pro se, has filed a 

petition for review in our original jurisdiction, challenging deductions made from 

his inmate account on the grounds that a sentencing order, issued in a related criminal 

matter, deferred these deductions until after his release from custody.1 The 

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), Secretary of Corrections Laurel 

Harry, and DOC’s Central Office Business Manager (collectively “Respondents”)2

1 Although styled a petition for mandamus, our Supreme Court has instructed that similar 

actions do not sound in mandamus. See Curley v. Smeal, 82 A.3d 418 (Pa. 2013); see also, e.g., 

Morgalo v. Gorniak, 134 A.3d 1139, 1145 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (en banc) (“[Mandamus] cannot 

be the basis upon which this Court may order [DOC] to stop the deductions and return previouslydeducted [sic] funds.”). 

2 Petitioner has not identified other respondents.
2

have filed an application for summary relief and seek judgment on the pleadings. 

For the reasons discussed below, we grant the application and dismiss Petitioner’s 

petition with prejudice. 

I. BACKGROUND3

On July 25, 2016, the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas 

(trial court) sentenced Petitioner to a term of 15 to 40 years and pay the costs of his 

prosecution.

4

 Petitioner is incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at 

Waymart (SCI-Waymart).

In October 2016, DOC informed Petitioner that it would begin 

deducting funds from his inmate account to pay those costs or fines associated with 

his sentence.5 On December 10, 2016, DOC commenced deductions from 

Petitioner’s account. Petitioner has filed several unsuccessful grievances 

challenging these deductions.

6

 

Petitioner initiated this action on May 10, 2023. Petitioner maintains 

that his sentencing order deferred deductions until after his incarceration and that 

DOC misinterpreted his sentencing order by taking deductions prematurely. He

seeks an order directing DOC to cease deductions from his inmate account and issue 

credit to the trial court for moneys collected to date.

3 Except as otherwise indicated, we derive this background from the pleadings and 

attachments thereto.

4

See Docket No. CP-46-CR-0006888-2013.

5 Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9728, most commonly referred to as “Act 84,” DOC has the 

authority to make deductions from an inmate’s account. Section 3 of the Collection of Inmate 

Debts Procedures Manual prescribes the procedures by which DOC will collect monies. DC-ADM 

005 §3. Inmates wishing to challenge the deductions must file a grievance within 15 working days 

of DOC’s Notice of Deduction Memo. Id.

6 Petitioner filed related grievances in November and December 2016. See Resp’ts’ 

Answer & New Matter, 6/21/23, Exs. C & E. Additionally, Petitioner filed a grievance in January 

2023. See Pet. for Rev., 5/22/23, ¶¶ 6,7.
3

The parties filed responsive pleadings. Thereafter, on September 28, 

2023, Respondents filed an application for summary relief. 

II. ISSUES 

Respondents present two issues for our consideration. First, 

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations. 

Resp’ts’ Br. at 3. Second, Respondents claim that Petitioner’s petition is barred by 

principles of res judicata. See id.

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review

Respondents seek summary relief in the nature of judgment on the 

pleadings. See Appl. for Summ. Relief, 9/28/23; Pa.R.A.P. 1532 (noting that relief 

is akin to that provided under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure); 

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1034(a) (“After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time 

as not to unreasonably delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the 

pleadings.”). “A motion for judgment on the pleadings is in the nature of a demurrer 

in which all of the nonmovant’s well-pleaded allegations are viewed as true, but only 

those facts specifically admitted by the nonmovant may be considered against him.”

Sch. Express, Inc. v. Upper Adams Sch. Dist., 303 A.3d 186, 194 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023)

(quoting Kerr v. Borough of Union City, 614 A.2d 338, 339 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992)). 

We will confine our review to the pleadings and documents properly attached to 

those pleadings. Id. The moving party’s right to relief must be clear and “so free 

from doubt that trial would be a fruitless exercise.” Id. (quoting N. Sewickley Twp.

v. LaValle, 786 A.2d 325, 327 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001)).
4

B. Statute of Limitations

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s claims are time-barred by the 

statute of limitations. Resp’ts’ Br. at 11. According to Respondents, the statute of 

limitations for claims challenging Act 84 deductions is two years. Id. Respondents 

note that the initial deduction from Petitioner’s inmate account occurred on 

December 10, 2016, yet Petitioner did not initiate this action until May of 2023, 

more than six years later. See id. at 11-12. Thus, Respondents conclude, the statute 

of limitations has expired. Id.

Petitioner’s counterargument is not entirely clear. See generally Pet’r’s 

Br. While he concedes that repeated, wrongful conduct will not toll the statute of 

limitations, Petitioner nevertheless suggeststhat this Court should recognize a novel,

continuing tort theory. See Pet’r’s Br. at 7. According to Petitioner, the Court should 

not focus on the initial deduction from his account, nor the ongoing deductions that 

followed, but rather the Court should focus upon Respondents’ “princip[al] error,”

which Petitioner asserts is a repeated misinterpretation and misapplication of his 

sentencing order. See id. at 7-8. Unlike the financial injury resulting from allegedly 

wrongful deductions, Petitioner concludes that this principal error constitutes a 

continuous tort that tolls the statute of limitations.7 See id. In what we discern to be 

an alternative argument, Petitioner also suggests that his reasonable diligence in

commencing this litigation warrants equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.8 

See id. at 7.

7 Petitioner offers no legal support for this conclusion but further asserts that Respondents 

have placed him in financial jeopardy that has “create[d] a liberty interest in . . . his property” and 

a “violat[ion] of their fiduciary duty to [him] . . . .” Pet’r’s Br. at 8. We do not reach the merits 

of these bald assertions.

8

In support, Petitioner cites Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784 (3d Cir. 2013) (granting a habeas 

petitioner equitable relief from a federal statute of limitations where that petitioner exercised 

reasonable diligence in the face of extraordinary circumstances). 
5

A statute of limitations is a procedural device that sets a time limit for 

bringing a legal claim. Rice v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 255 A.3d 237, 246 

(Pa. 2021). Such statutes “serve several purposes: imposing finality on the litigation 

system; providing defendants with an end to their potential liability; and avoiding 

litigation of disputes involving stale evidence.” Nicole B. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 237 

A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. 2020). Generally, upon expiration of the limitations period, the 

statute of limitations bars the claim. Rice, 255 A.3d 246-47.

The limitations period commences when a cause of action accrues. 42 

Pa.C.S. § 5502(a). A cause of action accrues when an injury is inflicted. Rice, 255 

A.3d at 246; Gleason v. Borough of Moosic, 15 A.3d 479, 484 (Pa. 2011). The 

length of a limitations period will depend on the nature of the claim. See, e.g., 42 

Pa.C.S. §§ 5524 (setting a two-year limitations period for a variety of claims 

including actions against government officers for the nonpayment of money), 5525 

(setting a four-year period for claims sounding in contract).

To ameliorate “the harsh result of barring otherwise legitimate claims,” 

courts may employ equitable principles to pause or “toll” the limitations period. 

Nicole B., 237 A.3d at 994. Equitable tolling is an “umbrella concept encompassing 

a variety of rationales.” Id. at 995 (cleaned up). For example, tolling may be 

permitted where there has been fraud or concealment, an injured party is unaware of 

the injury or its cause, or a plaintiff timely asserts his rights in the wrong forum. See 

id. at 995-96.

Nevertheless, a party bringing suit must exercise reasonable diligence 

to remain informed of the facts and circumstances upon which the right to recovery 

is based and to bring suit within the prescribed period. Gleason, 15 A.3d at 484. To 

demonstrate reasonable diligence, a party must demonstrate that “he exhibited those 
6

qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence and judgment which society requires 

of its members for the protection of their own interests and the interests of others.” 

Wilson v. El-Daief, 964 A.2d 354, 363 n.6 (Pa. 2009).

In Act 84 deduction cases, the relevant limitations period is two years. 

Morgalo v. Gorniak, 134 A.3d 1139, 1149 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (en banc); see 42 

Pa.C.S. § 5524(6).9 Further, an inmate’s cause of action accrues on the date of the 

first Act 84 deduction. Morgalo, 134 A.3d at 1149; Bundy v. Wetzel (Pa. Cmwlth., 

No. 553 M.D. 2016, filed Apr. 12, 2019), slip op. at 10-11, 2019 WL 1613026 at 

*5.

10

 Finally, it is well settled that a continuing violation, i.e., repeated or recurring 

deductions, does not toll the statute of limitations. Zellie v. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. 

Cmwlth., No. 97 M.D. 2011, filed Mar. 1, 2012), slip op. at 7-8, 2012 WL 8666741 

at *3.

11

Here, DOC made the first deduction from Petitioner’s inmate account 

on December 16, 2016. Resp’ts’ Answer & New Matter, Ex. D, at 1.12 Thus,

9 Section 5524(6) sets a two-year limitations period for “action[s] against any officer of 

any government unit for the nonpayment of money or the nondelivery of property collected upon 

on execution or otherwise in his possession.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524(6). The Morgalo Court reasoned 

that this section was most appropriate because DOC had collected funds from an inmate account 

and refused to return those funds on demand, thus constituting the nondelivery of property in its 

possession. 134 A.3d at 1149.

10 We may cite unreported decisions for their persuasive value. 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

11 The Zellie panel considered a challenge to Act 84 deductions but relied on precedent 

addressing analogous circumstances. See Casner v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., 658 

A.2d 865, 871 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (rejecting a continuing violation argument where union 

members allegedly suffered repeated and ongoing loss of pay and benefits). The Casner Court 

explained that crediting a continuing violation “rationale would effectively render the limitation

period for any cause of action alleging loss of payment meaningless . . . .” Id.; see also Fleming 

v. Rockwell, 500 A.2d 517, 519 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985) (succinctly rejecting as “totally without merit”

a plaintiff’s argument that a continuing constitutional violation tolled the statute of limitations 

because “[a]ccrual occurs at the time when the plaintiff could have first maintained the action to a 

successful conclusion”).

12 Petitioner concedes the date of the first deduction. Answer to New Matter, 7/20/23, ¶ 6.
7

Petitioner’s cause of action accrued on that date. Rice, 255 A.3d at 246; Morgalo, 

134 A.3d at 1149; Bundy, slip op. at 10-11, 2019 WL 1613026 at *5. Petitioner had 

two years from that date to commence this litigation. Morgalo, 134 A.3d at 1149; 

Bundy, slip op. at 10-11, 2019 WL 1613026 at *5; 42 Pa.C.S. §5524(6). However, 

Petitioner did not commence this litigation until May 10, 2023, more than six years 

after the initial deduction from his account. See Pet. for Rev. Thus, the relevant 

statute of limitations bars his claim. Rice, 255 A.3d 246-47.

Petitioner’s counterarguments are not persuasive. Specifically, we 

reject his argument that the focus of our inquiry should be on the alleged

misinterpretation of his sentencing order rather than the multiple deductions from 

his inmate account. Even if we were to accept Petitioner’s allegation that DOC has 

repeatedly and errantly interpreted the terms of his sentence, there is no legal support 

for his assertion that this “principal error” constitutes a continuing violation that 

would toll the statute of limitations.13 See Zellie, slip op. at 7-8, 2012 WL 8666741 

at *3. 

Further, we discern no equitable reasons to toll the limitations period. 

In this case, DOC informed Petitioner that it would commence Act 84 deductions 

approximately two months prior to its first deduction from Petitioner’s inmate 

account. See Resp’ts’ Answer & New Matter, 6/21/23, Ex. A. Therefore, DOC did 

not conceal its conduct. Indeed, Petitioner immediately viewed the deductions as 

injurious, filing his first grievance in November 2016, even before the initial 

13 We remain mindful of our standard of review, yet we cannot ignore the language of the 

sentencing order attached to Petitioner’s pleadings. The order begins by sentencing Petitioner to 

serve 15-40 years incarcerated in a state correctional institution, all of which fall under the 

supervision of DOC. See Pet. for Rev., Ex. A at 2. The order also directs that Petitioner will pay 

the costs of prosecution within “the first 15 [years]” of his “supervision/release from custody in 

monthly installments as directed, and as authorized by law.” Id. (emphasis added). Petitioner 

remains under the supervision of DOC. See Pet. for Rev., ¶ 2.
8

deduction from his account. See id. at Ex. C. Clearly then, Petitioner perceived an 

injury to his interests, challenged the deductions administratively, yet failed to bring 

this action within the prescribed limitations period. Thus, we do not agree with 

Petitioner’s suggestion that he has acted with reasonable diligence that warrants 

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. See Gleason, 15 A.3d at 484; Wilson, 

964 A.2d at 363 n.6.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Petitioner’s claim is time-barred. See Rice, 255 A.3d 

246-47. Therefore, we grant Respondents’ application for summary relief and 

dismiss Petitioner’s petition for review with prejudice.14 Pa.R.A.P. 1532; Sch. 

Express, 303 A.3d at 194.

______________________________

LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

14 Respondents also assert that Petitioner’s claims are barred by res judicata. Resp’ts’ Br. 

at 8. Petitioner previously filed a similar petition for review, and this Court likewise determined 

that Petitioner’s claims were time-barred. See Mitwalli v. Pa. Dep’t of Corrs. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 

15 M.D. 2019, filed Oct. 12, 2022) (per curiam mem. & order). However, in light of our 

disposition, we need not address Respondents’ second issue.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Walid Esmat Mitwalli, :

Petitioner :

: No. 240 M.D. 2023

v. :

:

PA Department of Corrections, :

Laurel Harry, Secretary, DOC Central :

Office Business Manager, et al., :

Respondents :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 3

rd day of September, 2024, the application for 

summary relief, filed on September 28, 2023, is GRANTED, and the petition for 

review, filed by Walid Esmat Mitwalli on May 10, 2023, is DISMISSED with 

prejudice.

______________________________

LORI A. DUMAS, Judge