UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

Eric Santifer, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Inergy Automotive Systems, LLC, 

and Jim Rebbeck, 

Defendants. 

________________________________/

Case No. 15-cv-11486 

Judith E. Levy 

United States District Judge 

Mag. Judge Anthony P. Patti 

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION [52] 

 On February 1, 2017, the Court granted the above-named 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 50.) On March 24, 

2017, pro se plaintiff Eric Santifer filed a letter with the Court, arguing 

he “did not receive competent legal representation in this matter,” and 

refiling the objections he filed in response to the Magistrate Judge’s 

Report and Recommendation, which recommended granting the motion 

for summary judgment. Plaintiff has also requested a record of the initial 

scheduling hearing and a copy of defendants’ deposition. (Dkt. 52.) 

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 This Court will treat plaintiff’s letter and refiled objections as a 

motion for reconsideration. For the reasons set forth below, the motion 

for reconsideration is denied. 

I. Background 

On April 24, 2015, plaintiff filed this lawsuit against defendants, 

arguing they wrongfully terminated him on the basis of race. The facts 

of this case have been set forth in detail in the Report and 

Recommendation (Dkt. 47), and will be incorporated by reference here. 

On February 1, 2017, the Court granted defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment on the ground that plaintiff’s claim was time-barred. (Dkt. 50.) 

Specifically, the Court held that plaintiff received notice from the EEOC 

that it had completed its investigation of his administrative action, and 

would be mailing his right to sue (“RTS”) notice on January 15, 2015. (Id.

at 4.) Therefore, because plaintiff knew the letter would be mailed that 

day, the ninety-day statute of limitations began to run on January 20, 

2015 under the five-day mail rule, and plaintiff had until April 20, 2015, 

to file a complaint in federal court. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff did not file the 

complaint until April 24, 2015, four days after the statute of limitations 

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expired, and defendants were therefore entitled to summary judgment. 

(Id. at 6–7.) 

II. Legal Standard 

A motion for reconsideration should be granted “if the movant 

demonstrates a palpable defect by which the court and the parties have 

been misled and that a different disposition of the case must result from 

a correction thereof.” In re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 728 F.3d 567, 573–

74 (6th Cir. 2013). “A palpable defect is one that is ‘obvious, clear, 

unmistakable, manifest, or plain.’” Majchrzak v. Cty. of Wayne, 838 F. 

Supp. 2d 586, 596 (E.D. Mich. 2011). 

III. Analysis 

Plaintiff argues the Court erred in granting defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment for the same reasons as set forth in the objections to 

the Report and Recommendation. He also argues that he lacked 

sufficient legal counsel, and therefore the five-day mail rule should not 

apply to him. 

First, the Court considered plaintiff’s refiled objections in its 

original order denying the objections and granting defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment. Plaintiff has presented no new arguments to 

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support the objections. Thus, there is no palpable defect in the Court’s 

prior opinion and order, and the Court denies plaintiff’s motion on these 

grounds. See L.R. 7.1(h)(3) (“the court will not grant motions for 

rehearing or reconsideration that merely present the same issues ruled 

upon by the court”). 

Plaintiff asserts he lacked competent legal representation in this 

matter, and the five-day mail rule therefore should not apply to him. As 

the Court stated in its prior opinion and order: 

The rule may seem harsh, but the Sixth Circuit is clear that 

“notice is given and hence the ninety-day limitations term 

begins running, on the fifth day following the EEOC’s mailing 

of an RTS notification . . . by virtue of a presumption of actual 

delivery and receipt within that five-day duration, unless the 

plaintiff rebuts that presumption with proof that he or she did 

not receive notification within that period.” GrahamHumphreys, 209 F.3d at 557 (emphasis in original). And this 

Court cannot alter this rule even for a pro se plaintiff, as “[t]he 

federal courts have strictly enforced Title VII’s ninety-day 

statutory limit.” Id. 

(Dkt. 50 at 6.) 

Accordingly, plaintiff is not entitled to relief on the ground that he 

has proceeded pro se in this litigation. 

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IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s motion for 

reconsideration (Dkt. 52) is DENIED. 

As for plaintiff’s request for a copy of the scheduling hearing and 

defendants’ depositions, plaintiff is directed to contact Magistrate Judge 

Patti’s chambers and defendants for the relevant records. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 28, 2017 s/Judith E. Levy 

Ann Arbor, Michigan JUDITH E. LEVY 

United States District Judge 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s 

ECF System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on March 28, 2017. 

s/Felicia M. Moses 

FELICIA M. MOSES 

Case Manager 

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