UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

RASHAD J. JONES, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent. 

4:15-cr-20438 

 

HON. TERRENCE G. BERG 

ORDER DENYING IN PART 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS AND 

TRANSFERRING REMAINING 

CLAIMS 

Petitioner Rashad J. Jones was convicted of the offense of felon in 

possession of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), after a jury trial. On 

August 10, 2016 this Court sentenced him to serve 48 months in prison. 

Petitioner now moves the court to vacate or modify his sentence under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 on the ground that he was not given credit for time spent 

in federal custody before he began serving his federal sentence. In 

another related claim, Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to move the Court, under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, to 

reduce his sentence to reflect the amount of time already spent in federal 

custody before sentencing. Because Petitioner’s post-sentencing claim 

alleging incorrect computation of his federal sentence by the Federal 

Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) falls within the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 2241, not 

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28 U.S.C. § 2255, that claim must be transferred to the Western District 

of Wisconsin, which has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s custodian, the 

Federal Correctional Institution in Oxford, Wisconsin. See United States 

v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893–94 (6th Cir. 1991) (explaining that an attack 

on the execution of a sentence is properly cognizable under 

28 U.S.C. § 2241, and that such claims must be filed in the court with 

jurisdiction over the prisoner’s custodian). Petitioner’s other claim under 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel may be 

properly adjudicated by this Court. As will be explained, however, in the 

discussion below, that claim has no merit and will be dismissed. The 

Court will transfer Petitioner’s remaining claim arising from the BOP’s 

computation of his sentence to the Western District of Wisconsin, where 

he is currently incarcerated.

BACKGROUND 

Petitioner was sentenced to 48 months in prison after a jury found 

that he had possessed ammunition as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

922(g)(1). Petitioner avers he was in federal custody “from the day of 

arrest to the day of sentencing”—from June 29, 20151 to August 10, 2016. 

ECF No. 47 PageID.298; ECF No. 51 PageID.306. But the record 

indicates he first appeared in this Court on writ from the Genesee County 

Sheriff’s Department on July 17, 2015. ECF No. 3 PageID.7; ECF No. 12 

 

1 The government states that Petitioner was in federal custody “since his detention 

hearing, which occurred three days” after his arrest. ECF No. 51 at 2. 

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PageID.30. And he was again transported to federal court from the 

Genesee County Jail by the County’s sheriff department on September 

10, 2015. ECF No. 13 PageID.31; ECF No. 15 PageID.37. He remained in 

Genesee County’s custody at the time of his federal trial on January 19, 

2016. See ECF No. 22 PageID.51. At sentencing, this Court made clear 

that Petitioner’s 48-month federal sentence would be served “consecutive 

to the undischarged terms of imprisonment with the Michigan 

Department of Corrections,” meaning consecutive to any prison term that 

might be imposed for his state parole violation. ECF No. 46 at 

PageID.283 (Amended Judgment). 

After sentencing, Petitioner was transferred to the custody of the 

Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) to address his pending 

state parole violation. See ECF No. 47 PageID.298. Petitioner asserts 

that, within approximately 30 days, the MDOC then transferred him to 

the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to begin 

serving his federal sentence at the Federal Correctional Institution in 

Oxford, Wisconsin. Id. Accordingly, from the record it appears Petitioner 

was in state custody in connection with his parole violation until he was 

transported to Oxford Federal Correctional Institution (“Oxford FCI”) on 

or about November 17, 2017. Information on the BOP website indicates 

Petitioner is currently scheduled for release on April 3, 2021. 

 Petitioner explains that when he received his Sentence Monitoring 

Computation Data Sheet at Oxford FCI, he noticed that the BOP had not 

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given him credit “for the time served while he was in direct federal credit” 

before arriving at Oxford FCI, and that he “only received credit for 2 

months and 26 days.” ECF No. 47 PageID.292. Unfortunately, Petitioner 

did not attach the BOP’s computation data sheet to his petition, which 

makes discerning the time he has already served in state and in federal 

custody difficult. From the record before the Court, however, it appears 

Petitioner was not in federal custody until he arrived at Oxford FCI. 

Nevertheless, Petitioner now asks the Court to vacate or modify his 

sentence to reflect the length of time he spent in federal custody before 

sentencing. Id. at PageID.298. Additionally, Petitioner claims that 

sentencing counsel was ineffective in failing to ask the Court to give 

Petitioner credit for time already spent in federal custody before he began 

serving his federal sentence. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Miscalculation of Sentence Credit Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 

Petitioner’s claims concerning the correct calculation of sentence 

credit must be raised under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Where a petitioner is 

attacking the manner or execution of his sentence, rather than alleging 

that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or federal 

law; is in excess of the maximum authorized by law; or is otherwise 

subject to collateral attack, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 “does not apply.” Jalili, 925 

F.2d 889, 893 (citing United States v. Hutchings, 835 F.2d 184, 186 (8th 

Cir. 1987); Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1980)). 

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Instead, a challenge to the execution of a sentence is properly cognizable 

in a 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) habeas petition. Jalili, 925 F.2d at 893. The Sixth 

Circuit has held that claims alleging that the BOP failed to properly 

award sentence credit are properly addressed in a § 2241 petition. See 

United States v. Westmoreland, 974 F.2d 736, 737–38 (6th Cir. 1992); see 

also Jalili, 925 F.2d at 893. 

Because “[t]here is no statute of limitations for federal prisoners 

filing habeas petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,” Petitioner’s claim 

related to computation of sentencing credit is timely. Wooten v. Cauley, 

677 F.3d 303, 306 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Morales v. Bezy, 499 F.3d 668, 

672 (7th Cir. 2007)). But this Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate that 

claim. A federal prisoner challenging the manner in which his sentence 

is being executed must file a § 2241 habeas petition in the district with 

jurisdiction over his custodian, here, the Federal Correctional Institution 

in Oxford, Wisconsin. Robinson v. Morrison, 27 F. App’x 557 (6th Cir. 

2001); In re Gregory, 181 F.3d 713, 714 (6th Cir. 1999). Because 

Petitioner is confined in a federal prison located in the Western District 

of Wisconsin, this Court will transfer Petitioner’s remaining claim to that 

district. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

A prisoner serving a sentence imposed by a federal court may 

challenge that sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 “upon the ground that 

[it] was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

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States . . . the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or 

. . . the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is 

otherwise subject to collateral attack.” As relief, the prisoner may ask the 

court which imposed the sentence to correct, vacate, or set it aside. The 

law is clear that “§ 2255 claims that do not assert a constitutional or 

jurisdictional error are generally cognizable only if they involved ‘a 

fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage 

of justice.’” Snider v. United States, 908 F.3d 183, 189 (6th Cir. 2018) 

(quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). This standard is met only in “exceptional 

circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of 

habeas corpus is apparent.” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 

(1962). Accordingly, not every alleged error of law can be raised on a 

§ 2255 motion. Davis, 417 U.S. at 346. 

Petitioner urges that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness because “counsel did not motion the 

court . . . for a reduction of his sentence for time that he spent in direct 

federal custody, [which] the BOP may not award him under 5G1.3.” ECF 

No. 47 PageID.296. Claims for ineffective assistance of counsel are 

reviewed under the two-part test outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under that framework, a defendant must show both 

that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that counsel’s deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. To establish prejudice, a 

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“defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different.” Seaman v. Washington, 506 F. App’x 349, 354 (6th Cir. 

2012) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Further, “[j]udicial scrutiny of 

counsel’s performance must be highly deferential” and “[a] court must 

indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669. 

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is meritless 

because the BOP, not the sentencing Court, computes and applies 

sentencing credit in the first instance.2 United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 

329, 334 (1992) (explaining that § 3585(b) “does not authorize a district 

court to compute the credit at sentencing.”). Calculation of a federal 

prisoner’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3585, including its commencement 

date and any credit for time spent in custody before sentencing, is 

therefore reserved for the Attorney General, acting through the BOP. 

United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334–35 (1991); Westmoreland, 974 

F.2d at 737–38 (providing that a district court cannot consider a habeas 

 

2 Petitioner’s § 2255 claim may also time barred because this Court’s original 

judgment, which Petitioner did not appeal, was entered on September 1, 2016. See 

ECF No. 44. He did not file his habeas petition until December 26, 2017, after the 

one-year statute of limitations for § 2255 claims, which generally runs from “the date 

on which the judgment of conviction becomes final,” had expired. Clay v. United 

States, 537 U.S. 522, 524 (2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)). An amended judgment 

was entered in Petitioner’s case on March 24, 2017, to correct a clerical error. See 

ECF No. 46. The Court declines to address whether the amended judgment reset 

Petitioner’s one-year statute of limitations because it is reaching the merits of his 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim and finds that the claim is without merit. 

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petition asserting a right to sentence credits under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) 

until the Attorney General has computed credit). Though a district court 

may review the BOP’s computation of sentencing credit, it can only do so 

after the BOP has made its calculation and can grant relief only “when 

sentencing credits are miscalculated.” Woody v. Marberry, 178 F. App’x 

468, 471 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Chase, 104 F. App’x 561, 

562 (6th Cir. 2004)). 

Given that the Strickland framework provides that the Court 

should take a deferential view of counsel’s performance and presume that 

it falls within the range of reasonableness, it is reasonable to expect that 

Petitioner’s trial and sentencing counsel was aware that the BOP, not the 

sentencing court, determines whether a defendant should be given 

sentencing credit for time served. The Court therefore finds no indication 

of deficient performance by trial counsel. Moreover, Petitioner cannot 

show that trial counsel’s allegedly deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense because this Court could not have granted any motion to reduce 

Petitioner’s sentence based on time served—it has no authority to 

compute or apply sentencing credit before the BOP. Because Petitioner 

cannot meet either element of the Strickland test for ineffective 

assistance of counsel, his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel under 

28 U.S.C. §2255 must be denied. 

Further, to the extent Petitioner is arguing that counsel was 

ineffective for failing to argue at sentencing that his undischarged state 

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term of imprisonment and federal sentence must run concurrently, that 

claim is also denied. Petitioner appears to be under the impression that 

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) applies to his federal sentence. See ECF No. 47 

PageID.298. But § 5G1.3(b) applies only to terms of imprisonment that 

“result[ ] from another offense that is relevant conduct to the instant 

offense of conviction.” See ECF No. 50 PageID.308. Instead, it is 

§ 5G1.3(d) that is relevant to Petitioner’s sentence because he was on 

state parole at the time he committed a federal offense, causing his state 

parole to be revoked. Under § 5G1.3(d), in any case “involving an 

undischarged term of imprisonment, the sentence for the instant 

[federal] offense may be imposed to run concurrently, partially 

concurrently, or consecutively to the prior discharged term of 

imprisonment.” At sentencing, this Court ordered that Petitioner would 

serve a federal sentence of “48 months, consecutive to the undischarged 

terms of imprisonment with the Michigan Department of Corrections.” 

ECF No. 46 PageID.283 (emphasis added). Accordingly, his federal 

sentence and his state court term of imprisonment for violating state 

parole are to run consecutively, not concurrently. Petitioner has not 

presented any facts to the Court that indicate its sentence was imposed 

in violation of the Constitution or federal law, or that it was in excess of 

the maximum sentence authorized by law or otherwise subject to 

collateral attack under § 2555, nor has he presented any facts that lead 

the Court to believe Petitioner’s counsel should have lodged any objection 

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at sentencing, or that he was in any way prejudiced by counsel’s failure 

to do so. Accordingly, Petitioner’s habeas claim asking the Court to vacate 

or modify its previous sentence based on ineffective assistance of counsel 

will be denied. 

CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Petitioner’s claim 

seeking modification or vacatur of his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

(ECF No. 47). Petitioner’s remaining claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 

regarding the proper calculation of time served in federal custody, is 

hereby TRANSFERRED to the Western District of Wisconsin. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 28, 2019 s/Terrence G. Berg 

TERRENCE G. BERG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Certificate of Service 

I hereby certify that this Order was electronically filed, and the 

parties and/or counsel of record were served on June 28, 2019. 

s/A. Chubb 

Case Manager 

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