NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 13

- 4471

___________ BRENDA LEE SENEY,

Appellant

v. COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY

____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States Di strict Court

for the District of Delaware (D.C. Civil Action No. 1

- 12

- cv - 01706 ) District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

September 2, 2014 Before: HARDIMAN, NYGAARD and ROTH , Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : September 26, 2014 )

___________ OPINION

___________ PER CURIAM Brenda Lee Seney, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware denying her motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). In its decision, the District Court determined that2

s ubstantial evidence supported the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of Seney’ s application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). We will affirm for substantially the same

reasons set forth in the District Court’s opinion

. I. In June 2009, Seney applied for DIB and SSI. Seney alleged that she was di sabled due to symptoms associated with multiple sclerosis (“MS”) , which began in October 2007 whe n she was 35 years old . After t he diagnosis, Seney began therapy and

treatment

. Prior to the onset of the alleged disability, Seney, a high school graduate, held a variety jobs including as a warehouse worker, fast food worker, and a cleaner. The ALJ held a hearing, during which documentary evidence of Sen ey’s health was presented

. Seney, her spouse, and a voca tional expert tes tified at the hearing

. 1
In her decision , t he ALJ performed the five

- step, sequential analysis for determining whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a) , 416.920 (a) ; see also Barnhart v. Thomas , 540 U.S. 20 , 24

- 25 (2003). T he ALJ det ermined: (1) Seney was not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the a lleged onset date; (2) Seney had severe impairments; (3) Seney did not have an impairment or c ombination of impairments that wa s the same or equivalent to an impairment listed by the Social Security Administration as presumptively precluding any gainful activity; (4) Seney was

1 The District Court fully su mmarized the evidence and testimony presented du ring the hearing in its opinion

. See Seney v. Colvin , 982 F. Supp. 2d 345, 348

- 53 (D. Del. 2013).3

unable to perform her past relevant work; and (5) Seney possessed sufficient residual functional capacity to perform other available jobs in the national ec onomy. Consequently, the ALJ concluded that Seney was not disabled from October 2007 through the date of the decision. The Appeals Council denied Seney’s request to review the ALJ’s decision, making
that decision the final decision of the Commissioner. In December 2012, Seney filed an actio n in the District Court seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision denying her claim for DIB and SSI. The parties filed cross

- motions for summary judgment, and the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner. Seney timely appealed.
II. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the ALJ’s legal conclusion s and review the factual findings for substantial evidence. Chandler v. Comm ’r of Soc. Sec. , 6 67 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). Substantial evidence is “‘ more th an a mere scintilla,’ ” and is defined as “ ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.’” Plummer v. Apfel , 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Ventura v. Sh alala , 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995) )

. If the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided the factual inquiry differently. Hartranft v. Apfel , 181 F.3d 358, 3 60 (3d Cir. 19 99).4 III. Seney first argues that the ALJ did not sufficiently credit the opinions of her treating physicians. While an ALJ must generally give great weight to a claimant’s treating physician, an ALJ may discredit the treating physician’s opinion if oth er evidence contradicts it. 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1527 (c) , 416.927(c) ; Morales v. Apfel , 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Chandler , 667 F.3d at 361. Here , it was appropriate for the ALJ to discredit portions of the opinions of Seney’s treating physi cians. In particular, Dr. Lee Dresser’ s opinion that Seney could stand or walk for only less than two hour s in an eight

- hour day and was incapable of low stress jobs, was not supported by objective medical evidence . E vidence showed that Seney’s MS had
im proved with treatment a nd that she was free from various symptoms , including weakness , numbness, and balance problems . Dr. Dresser’s own notes from treatment
indicated a fair prognosis , observing that Seney had near

- normal strength in her lower extremitie s and a stable gait. T he ALJ fully credited Dr. Dresser’s opinion that Seney
coul d sit for six hours in an eight

- hour day because the medical evidence supported that opinion

. Dr. Fucci’s opinion, presented in the form of a written prescription, stated that Seney had MS, that her condition was worsening, and that she would need to be out of work. This opinion was also appropriately discredited. Principally , there were no medical records or note s of treatment indicating how Dr. Fucci had arrived at his opinion, and it was contrary to the evidence showing that Seney was responding positively to5

treatment. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the opinions of Dr. Dresser and Dr . Fucci were not wholly substantiated

. Next, S eney argues that the ALJ did not sufficiently credit her subjective

co mplaints of disabling symptoms . In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner considers “all . . . symptoms, including pain, and the exten t to which [these] symptoms c an reasonably be accepted as consistent with objective medical evidence

. . . .” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a). W hen evaluati ng subjective complaints of disabling symptoms , the ALJ must assess the persistence and intensity of the claimant’s pain a s well as the extent to which it impairs her ability to work . 20 C.F .R. §§ 404.1529(c) (1) , 416.929(c) (1) . Allegations of disabling symptoms must be consistent with objective medical evidence, and the ALJ must explain why any allegations were rejected. S ee Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin. , 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000). The AL J first determined that Seney had a medical impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce pain and other symptoms . However, during the second step of the inquiry, the ALJ determined that Seney could perform a range of sedentary work despite her symptoms

. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ considered the treatment needed for Seney’s condition, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c) (3) (v), 416.929(c) (3) (v); the positi ve res ults from that trea tment, the medication that she w as taking , and its side effects, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 (c) (3) (iv), 416.929(c) (3) (iv); her ability to perform many daily function s , including managing her own personal care, cooking, childcare, cleaning, and shopping, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i),6

416.929(c)(3)(i); and the opinion s of three state agency phy sicians who concluded that she had a range of limitations on her ability to work but that she could ultimately perform sedentary work. See Hartr anft , 181 F.3d at 362

. Consequently , the ALJ’s decision to not credit Seney’s allegations of disabling pain and other symptoms is supported by substantial evidence. Seney also argues that the ALJ did not properly consider the vocational expert’s
testimon y. In particular, Seney contends that the ALJ’s conclusion was contrary to the vocational expert’s response t o a hypothetical question. ALJ s routinely pose hypothetical questions to vocational experts in order to determine a claimant’s ability to perform alternative employment. See Johnson v. Comm’ r of Soc. Sec. , 529 F.3d 198, 205

- 06 (3d Cir. 2008). “‘ While the ALJ may proffer a variety of assumptions to the expert, the vocational expert’ s testimony concerning a claimant’s ability to perform alternative employment may only be considered for purposes of determining disability if the question accurately portrays the claimant’s individual p hysical and mental impairments.’”
Burns v. Barnhart , 312 F.3d 113, 123 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Pode d worny v. Harris , 7 45 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984))

. The ALJ asked the vocational expert two hypothetical questions. The first hypothetical question did not include all of Seney’s allegations of disabling symptoms and posited that the individual could stand and walk in exc ess of two hours in an eight

- hour workday and that she could sit for six hours in a workday. In response to that question, the vocational expe rt concluded that the hypothetical individual could perform alternative work. The second hypothetical question i ncluded all of7

Seney’s allegations of disabling symptoms . In that case, the vocational expert responded that the individual could not perform alternative work. While Seney conte nds that the ALJ should credit the vocational expert’s response to the second hypothetical, t he ALJ properly did not rely on that response because it included allegations of disabling symptoms that , for the reasons discussed above, were not credibly established. Cf. Chrupcala v. Heckler , 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987). Seney alleges that her condition has worsened since her hearing. However, those new allegations are immaterial to the ALJ’s determination that Seney was not disabled from October 2007 until the time of her hearing, and we are unable to rev iew them

. Cf. Matthew s v. Apfel , 239 F.3d 589, 592

- 93 (3d Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
IV. For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court that the ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial evidence.