IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APP EAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CHRISTINA D. BOWMAR, Appellant,

v. Case No. 5D14-2134 SUNTRUST MORTGAGE, INC., ET AL., Appellees. ________________________________/ Opinion filed April 22, 2016

A ppeal from the Circuit Court for Seminole County, Robert J. Pleus, Jr., Senior Judge. Christina D. Bowmar, Longwood, pro se. Michael W. Smith, of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Orlando, for Appellee, MTGLQ Investors, L.P. No Appearance for other Appellees.

PER CURIAM. Christina D. Bowmar appeals the final judgment of foreclosure entered by the trial court in favor of SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. ("SunTrust"). We reverse. On October 30, 2008, SunTrust filed a foreclosure complaint aga inst Bowmar alleging that she was in default of her obligations under the a djustable rate promissory2 note and mortgage she executed on April 20, 2005. SunTrust ass igned the note and the mortgage to MTGLQ Investors, L.P. ("MTGLQ") on June 8, 2010 , and placed an undated special indorsement on the original note to MTGLQ. Sun Trust filed a motion to amend its complaint on February 5, 2013, and the trial court gr anted the motion on March 25, 2013. The amended foreclosure complaint replaced Sun Trust as the party plaintiff with MTGLQ. A bench trial was held on May 14, 2014, at which MTGLQ called F rank Denson, an employee of its loan servicer, to testify as a witness. Den son's testimony laid a predicate for the admission of business records. See Nationsta r Mortg., LLC v. Berdecia, 169 So. 3d 209, 212-13 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (quoting Y israel v. State, 993 So. 2d 952, 956 (Fla. 2008)). However, the only documents actu ally admitted into evidence were two assignments of the mortgage between SunTrust and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") and the assignme nt of the note and mortgage from SunTrust to MTGLQ. The original note and mortgag e, the acceleration letter, and the payment history were not admitted into evidence at trial. At the close of the case, the trial court rendered the final judgment of forecl osure in favor of SunTrust,

not MTGLQ. This was error. A foreclosure plaintiff must have standing at both the time whe n the foreclosure complaint is filed and when the final judgment is entered. See Pennington v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 151 So. 3d 52, 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (cit ing Focht v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 124 So. 3d 308, 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)). The entry of a final judgment of foreclosure in favor of a nonparty is fundamental error. See B eaumont v. Bank of New York Mellon, 81 So. 3d 553, 554 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (citing Bes eau v. Bhalani, 904 So.3 2d 641 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)); see also Grudem v. Fed. Nat'l Mort g. Ass'n, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D716, D717 n.1; 2016 WL 1062830 at *3 (Fla. 5th DCA Mar. 18, 2016). In this case, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Sun Trust even though SunTrust was no longer a party to the case after the amended co mplaint was filed. See Estate of Eisen v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 126 So. 3d 323, 32 9-30 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013); Lindy's of Orlando, Inc. v. United Elec. Co., 239 So. 2d 69, 72 -73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970) (quoting Griffin v. Workman, 73 So. 2d 844, 847 (Fla. 1954)). MTGLQ acknowledges that the final judgment was rendered for SunTrust in error, but claims that it is "an obvious scrivener's error." Whether this error is categorized as a scrivener's error or not, the trial court effectively rendered an unenforceable judg ment. MTGLQ cannot

enforce it because it was entered in favor of SunTrust. SunTru st cannot enforce it because it was no longer a party to the action and was no longe r the holder of the note. Commercial Laundries, Inc. v. Golf Course Towers Assocs., 568 S o. 2d 501, 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Because SunTrust was not a party when the final judgment of foreclosure was rendered, the trial court's issuance of the fin al judgment of foreclosure in favor of SunTrust constitutes fundamental error requiring re versal. See Grudem, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D716, D717 n.1; Beaumont, 81 So. 3d at 554; Bese au, 904 So. 2d at

642. Even if SunTrust were the proper party, entitlement to foreclos ure requires the admission into evidence of "the subject note and mortgage, an a cceleration letter, and some evidence regarding the . . . outstanding debt on the note. " Kelsey v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., 131 So. 3d 825, 826 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (citing Er nest v. Carter, 368 So. 2d 428, 429 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)). Denson's discussion of these documents without4 their admission into evidence was insufficient to establish MTG LQ's entitlement to

foreclosure. 1 See 66 Team, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D757 n.2; 2016 WL 1128425 at *1 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA Mar. 23 , 2016) (citing Wolkoff v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 153 So. 3d 280, 281 -82 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)); see also Gonzalez v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 18 0 So. 3d 1106, 1108 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (reiterating that the testimony of a witnes s regarding business records not entered into evidence at trial is insufficient to p rove standing in a foreclosure case (citing Schmidt v. Deutsche Bank, 170 So. 3d 938, 941 (Fla . 5th DCA 2015))). Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment of foreclosure, and remand for a new trial. See Grudem, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D716 (reversing and remanding for a new trial when the trial court abruptly terminated the proceeding before the neces sary documents were admitted into evidence).

REVERSED and REMANDED for NEW TRIAL

TORPY, BERGER and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.

1 MTGLQ's failure to bring the note, mortgage, acceleration lett er, and payment history into evidence appears attributable to the accelerated p ace of the proceedings set by the trial court to get through the forty-five foreclosur e bench trials on its docket that day.