### In th e



# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-3313

U N I T E D S TAT E S O F A M E R I C A , Plaintiff-Appellee,

v
.
R I C H A R D E. B R O W N , Defen dant-Appellant.

A p p e a l f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r t h e S o u t h e r n D i s t r i c t o f I n d i a n a , E v a n s v i l l e D i v i s i o n
. N o
. 3 : 1 1 C R 0 0 0 1 1

- 0 0 1

— R i c h a r d L

. Y o u n g , C h i e f J u d g e
.
A R G U E D F E B R U A R Y 25, 2013

— D E C I D E D O C T O B E R 11, 2013

Before B A U E R , P O S N E R , and S Y K E S , Cir cui t Judges

. S Y K E S , Cir c u i t Ju dge

. For 20 y ears Ri chard Brown w as the offi ce manager and accoun tant for a clus ter of small bus iness es i n southern Indi ana owned by the W alker fami ly. In 2009 the fami ly patriarch di scov ered that Brown w as embezzling money by using company credi t cards and wri tin g company2 No. 12-3313
chec ks to pay for personal it ems and expenses. An audi t
rev ealed that duri ng the course of at least a decade, Brown had stolen hundreds of thousands of dollars, gr adually puttin g the bus i ness es in financi al straits an d destroy ing their credi t. A federal gr and jury indi cted Brown on mor e t han 150 counts of wi re fra ud , ma il fraud, and tax fraud. Brown pleaded gui lty to a single count of each of t he se cri mes. The advis o r y gui delines sentencing range w as 21 to 27 months’ i mpri so nm e nt, but t he di stric t judge thought that w as far too low

. The judge settled on a sentence of 60 months, a si gni fi cant

v arianc e from the top of the range. Judgment w as enter ed and Brown appealed.
W eeks l ater

, wi thout w arnin g, the judge fi led an amended judgm e nt and attached a wri tte n “statement of reasons” to “supp lement” the reasons he had giv en in o p en court for the sentence. Apparentl y a p p l yin g “departur e” analysi s, the judge recalculated the gui delines range, adding upw ard a d ju stments based on the amount Brown embezzled, the duration of the sch eme, and the vu l ne r a bil i ty of one of the vic tim s. On thi s
rev i sed calc ulati on, the gui delines range w as 41 to 51 months. Compared t o this range, the 60-month sentence s eemed li ke a less s i gni fi cant v arianc e from the g ui delines. On appeal Brown arg ues that the d i stric t judge violated Rule 32(h) of the Fe d e r a l Rules of Criminal Procedure by fai ling to giv e notic e of hi s inte nt t o a p ply upw ard “depar

tures.” He a l so arg ues that hi s 60-month sentence i s sub stantiv ely unreasonable.
W e affi rm. The judge’ s be l a t e d effort to adjust the gui delines range int r oduced compli cati ons but di d not violateNo. 12-3313 3
Rule 32(h). Th a t rule requires “reasonable notic e” when the di stric t court i s “contemplati ng” a departur e from the sentenci ng gui delines. F E D

. R. C R I M

. P . 32(h). B ut “[t]he o ld r egim e of ‘depart ures’ i s defunc t,” United States v
. Barlett, 567 F .3d 901, 909 (7th Ci r
. 2009), and Rule 32(h) does not apply to an upw ard

v arianc e from the advis or y gui delines ra ng e, see Irizarry v
. United S tat es , 553 U.S. 708, 714 (2008). Becaus e depart ures are obsolete, Rule 32(h) no longer has any w or k to do.
Mor eov er

, becau se the judge’ s wri tte n statement of reasons
w as fi led afterBrown appealed, the courtlacked the pow er to
s ub s tantiv ely alter the sentence b e c a u s e ju ri s d i c ti on h a d s h i fte d to thi s court. Brown’s sent ence di d not change, though the rat i onale for i t certainly di d. T o the ext ent that the j ud g e ’s recalculati on of the gui delines range amounts to a sub stanti v e change, i t i s a nulli ty becau se the court lacked jurisdi ct i on to make the change. If the recalculati o n si mply intro duced an i nconsi stency betw een the wri tte n statement and the or al prono unc ement of the se ntence, the or al prono unc ement cont ro ls. Ei ther w ay

, w e di sregar d the wri tte n statement of

reasons. Consi dered i n li ght of the court’s or al prono unc ement of sentence, the 60-month sentenc e i s reasonable.

I. Background
Fr om 1989 unti l 2009, Brown w or ked as the offi ce manager , book keeper

, and accoun tant for a gr oup of small bus iness es in Ev ansvi lle , Indi ana, owned by the W alker fami ly

. In that capac i ty he w as authorized to wri te company checks and use company credi t cards for bus iness purposes. Unbeknownst to the W alker s, for many y ears B r own abus ed the tr ust they4 No. 12-3313 placed i n hi m by payin g hi mself una ut ho rized bonuses

. He also repeat edly wrot e company chec ks and used co mpany credi t ca r ds for personal expenses li ke gas, household i tems, and home repairs. In addi tion to maki ng these personal purchas es, B ro wn also used company fund s t o pay the credi

tor s of hi s chu rch, the Oak Hi ll Chris tian Center , where he

serv ed as the bookk eeper
. Not surpri singly

, Brown fai led to repo rt any of thi s ext ra i ncome on his fe d e r al tax ret urns. He also fai led to repo rt money he earned doin g w or k for the ch urch. Instead, he had hi s compens ation made pay able to the Oak Hil l Chris tian Center and placed i n ti thi ng env elopes to conceal the income, and then clai med ch aritable dedu cti ons for the amounts. Brown’s cri mes came to li ght in October 2009 whi le he w as
on v acati on. Low ell W alker , the fami ly patriarch and the prim ary owner of the W alker enter pris es, inter ce p t ed an i nv oic e detailing the use of company ch e ck s t o pay for expenses relat ing to Brown’s rental proper ties

. Thi s preci pi tate d

an internal audi t, whi ch rev ealed the ext ent of Brown’s mi sus e of company fund s. When Brown ret urned from v acat io n, the W alker s confronted and fi red hi m. Brown clai med that he w as si mply reimbur sing hi mself for promis ed pay rais es that he

nev er r ecei v ed.
A federal gr and j ury indi cted Brown for embezzlement datin g fro m 2004 to October 2009, when he w as fi red. He w as charged i n a superseding indi ct ment wi th 135 counts of wi re fraud, 15 counts o f mail fraud, and 5 counts of tax fraud. He agr eed to plead gui lty to one count each of wi re and mai l fraud and one count o f t ax fraud. The plea agr eement called forNo. 12-3313 5
restituti on to the W

alker fami ly in the amount of $151,233 and $38,675 to the Inter nal Reve nu e Ser vic e for tax losses. The di stric t courtaccepted the gui lty pleas. Based o n the contents of the plea agr eement and the presentence repo rt, Brown’s offe n se lev el under the sentencing gui delines w as 16, whi ch when combined wit h a cri minal hi stor y catego ry I yielded an advis or y gui d e l ines range of 21 t o 27 months’ i mpri sonment. At the sentencing hearin g, the court accepted thi s gui del ines calc ulati on and then heard testim ony from three wi tnesses who spoke on Brown’s behalf. All three w ere fri ends from the Oak Hi ll Chris tian Center ; one
w as the pastor of the chu rch. They ext olled Brown’s ext ensi v e
se rv i ce to the chu rch and sai d they beli ev ed hi m t o be a n honest, loy al man. The court also heard from tw o members of the W alk e r fami ly: Barbara Wi lson, t he co -owner who conduc ted the i nternal audi t; and Low ell W alker , the he ad of the fami ly

. Wi lson testifi ed about Brown’s elaborat e method of concealing hi s embezzlement and how hi s decei t p l a ced the fami ly bus i ness es i n a precarious financ ia l si tuation and destro y ed their credi t. Wi lson, an exper i enced audi tor wit h a master’s degr ee i n bus i ness admini strat i on, also testifi ed that accordi ng to he r audi t, Brown embezzled company fund s on many hundreds o f occasi ons tot aling approx i mately $667,000. That tot al may understate the loss; Wi lson explain ed that becau se of mi ssing recor ds, her audi t w ent back only as far as 1996. When i t w as hi s t ur n to address the court, Brown mostly d escribed what he’d been up to since being fi red by th e W alker s: He’d taught at a techni cal college, provided services6 No. 12-3313

to the chu rch, obtained a master’s d e g r ee and mini ster’s li cens e, and serv ed as the l e gal guardian for a 70-y ear -old cousin who w as mentally handi capped. Before i mposing sentence the d i stric t court thor oughly exami ned the sentencing facto r s l i sted in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), placing speci al emphas i s on the so p histi cated nature of B rown’s embezzlement sch eme, i ts long du ra ti on , a n d the d e e p br each of tr ust that hi s conduc t entail ed. The judge acc e p t e d the results of the W

alker fami ly’s internal audi t and explain ed that the loss—more than $600,000—w as si gni fi cant for a small bus i ness
. On the other si de of the ledger , the judge recog ni zed that Brown had no cri minal hi stor y and had a gr eat deal of supp or t from members of hi s chu rch commu ni ty , inclu ding “somewhere betw een 40 and 50“ people who wr ote lette rs to the court on hi s behalf. These lette rs, the cour t sai d, stressed Brown’s “hi gh moral character , ... hi s fai rness, hi s dev otion to hi s chu rch, hi s commu ni ty , [all] the chari table thi ngs that he

w as inv olv ed wi th.”
In the e nd , ho wev er

, the judge contrasted the altruis tic pi cture painted by Brown’s supp or ter s wi th the admi tte d facts of the case. “It’ s almost lik e you hav e tw o personali ties,” the judge sai d. “ O ne is wi th y our chu rch,” and the other i s “a gr eedy i ndi vidu a l who just w ants to enrich hi mself at the expense of other s.” After touching on the remain ing § 3553(a) factors, the judge i mposed a sentence of 60 months concu rr ent
on each count of wi re a nd mai l fraud and a concu rr ent 36 months on the tax-fraud count. The judge e x p l a ined that t his v arianc e from the gui delines range w as based on “theNo. 12-3313 7 [§] 3553(a) factors and the ext ensi v e nature and duration of the defendant’s c rim i nal acti vity .” Th e c ou rt e n te red judgment on October 1, 2012. Brown fi led

a no t i ce of appeal four days later

. On October 24, 2012, t he di st r ict court i ssu ed an amended judgment and attached a wri tte n statement of re asons explain ing the sentence. The purpose of the amendmen t w as to corr ect a cleri cal mi stake, but the only d i fference betw een the or i gin al and amended judgments w as that the latter w ai v ed intere st on the restituti on
aw ard. In the attached statement of reasons, how ev er , the judge sought to supp lement hi s reasons for the sentence
announc ed i n open court. In an apparent effort to apply departur e analysi s, the judge recalculated Brown’s gui delines range. It’ s not entirely clear what t he judge w as t ry ing to accompli sh. He began by noting that the o r ig inal gui delines range
w as 21 to 27 months and then stated as follows: “After giving
r e spectfu l consi derat i on to the Sente ncing Gui delines, t he Court beli ev es the gui delines do not adequate l y reflect the seri ousness and entirety of the defendant’s conduc t.” The judge w ent on to find that Brown’s offense conduc t w arr anted the followi ng upw ard adj ustments to hi s offens e lev el: a tw olev el i ncrease for the amount of the loss (more than $600,000);

a tw o-lev el i ncrease for the ext ended dur ation o f t he sc he me; and a tw o-lev el i ncrease for “a vulnerable vic tim ” (referr ing to Low ell W

alker ’ s l ack of computer ski lls)

. These upw ard adjustments boosted Bro wn’s offense lev el from 16 to 22. The judge conclu ded that “an offense lev el of 22 prov i des a sentencing range of 41 to 51 mo nt hs and more adequately8 No. 12-3313

r e fl ects the defendant’s cri minal conduc t in thi s matter .” The judge then re-re viewed the § 3553(a) factors and reiterat ed that 60 months in pri son w as an appropriate sentence u nder all of the ci rcums tances.

II. Disc uss ion
Brown challen ges the di stric t court’s sentencing procedure and the sub stanti v e reasonableness of the sentence. W e rev i ew the procedural challen ge de nov o. United States v
. An n oren o , 713 F .3d 352, 356 (7th Ci r
. 2013). Our rev i ew of the sub stanti v e reasonableness of the sentence is mo re deferential; w e look only for an abus e o f d isc ret i on. See United States v
. Conaway , 713 F .3d 897, 901 (7th Ci r . 2013); Annoreno , 713 F .3d at 355–56. Brown’s prin ci pal arg ument i s that the di stric t co urt violated Rule 32(h) by fai ling to giv e notic e before a p p lyin g “dep a r t ur es” to recalculate hi s gui delines range in the postjudgment stat e me nt of reasons. Rule 32(h) prov i des that “[b] efore the court may depart from the appli cable sentencing range o n a gr ound not i denti fi ed for departur e ei ther in the presentence repo rt or in a party ’s pr ehearing submi ssi on, the court mus t giv e the parties reasonable notic e that i t i s contemplati ng such a departure .” F E D

. R. C R I M . P . 32(h). By i ts ter ms Rule 32(h) appli es only to departures fr o m a n other wi se appli cable guidelines r ange. See id. ; see also Iriza rry, 553 U.S. at 714. “ ‘Departur e’ i s a ter m of art under the Gui delines and refer s only to non-Gu i delines sentences i mposed under the framew or k set out in t he Gui delines.” Irizarry,No. 12-3313 9
553 U.S. at 714. Sinc e Boo ker w e hav e repeat edly emphas i zed 1 that formal depa rtu re a n a l ysi s i s obsolete. See, e.g. , United States

v
. Luc as , 670 F .3d 784, 791 (7th Ci r
. 2012); United States v
. Spano , 476 F .3d 476, 480 (7th Ci r
. 2007); United States v
. W alker , 447 F .3d 999, 1006 (7th Ci r
. 2006); United States v
. Blue, 453 F .3d 948, 952 (7th Ci r . 2006). W e reiterat e the point here. When the g uidelines w ere mandatory , departur e analysi s
w as the only w ay a d i stric t court could i mpose a sentence outsi de the other wi se appli cable gui delines ranges. Irizarry, 553 U.S. at 714; Spano , 476 F .3d at 480; United States v
. CastroJuarez , 425 F .3d 430, 434–35 (7th Ci r
. 2005). By maki ng the gui delines advis or y

, Boo ker remo ved those constrain ts. Now the di stric t court ’s obli gation i s si mply to calc ulate the guidelines r ange corr ectly and ar riv e at a reasonable sentence after

w ei ghi ng the sentencing factors in § 3553(a), v ary ing upw ard

or downw ard from the gui delines range in i ts di screti on. United S tat es v . Munoz , 610 F .3d 989, 994 (7th Ci r
. 2010) (c i tin g Ga l l v
. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)) ; Spano , 476 F .3d at 480. That i sn’t t o sa y that departur es are completely useles s; “di stric t courts can sti ll take gui dance fr o m the departur e prov i si ons i n the gui delines and apply them by w ay of analogy when asses sing the § 3553(a) facto rs.” Luc as , 670 F .3d at 791. But the only boundari es on the court’s Boo ker di screti on are the

more capac i ous § 3553(a) factors. So analogizing to departur es i s just one w ay for the di stric t court to explain a sentence; i t has no legal for ce or effect.

U n i t e d S t a t e s v. B o o k e r , 5 4 3 U

. S

. 2 2 0 ( 2 0 0 5 )

. 110 No. 12-3313
Wi th the demi se of departur es as a constrain t on the di stric t court’s sentencing di screti on, Rule 32(h) has lost all uti li ty

. See W alker , 447 F .3d at 1006–07. The rule does not apply to v ariances from the gui delines range. See Irizarry, 553 U.S. at 714–16; U nited States v
. Goo den , 564 F .3d 887, 891 (7th Ci r
. 2009) (p e r curi am); W

alker , 447 F .3d at 1006–07. Li kewi se, when a judge chooses to use departur e analysi s “by w ay of analogy ” to help explain a sentence t ha t v aries from the gui delines, Luc as , 670 F .3d at 791, the r ule does not apply

. Accordi ngly

, i f there w as err or below , i t w as not the di stric t court’s fai lure to giv e notic e under Rule 32(h), i t w as the court’s effort to recalculate Br own’s g ui delines r ang e after the notic e of ap p e a l w as fi led. At the sentencing hearin g, the di stric t 2 court corr ectly calc ulated the gui delines range and then v aried upw ardly based on the § 3553(a) factors, explain ing why the sentence w as appropr i ate. The c ou rt ’s p os t- appeal statement of reasons needless ly in tr oduced compl i cati on.

T h e g o v e r n m e n t m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t d i d n o t r e c a l c u l a t e t h e 2 g u i d e l i n e s r a n g e
. T h a t p o s i t i o n i s h a r d t o r e c o n c i l e w i t h t h e r e c o r d ;
a l t h o u g h a s w e ’ v e s a i d , i t ’ s n o t e n t i r e l y c l e a r w h a t t h e j u d g e w a s t r y i n g t o d o i n h i s w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t o f r e a s o n s
. A t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , t h e j u d g e
a c c e p t e d t h e o r i g i n a l g u i d e l i n e s r a n g e o f 2 1 t o 2 7 m o n t h s b a s e d o n a n
o f f e n s e l e v e l o f 1 6

. I n t h e s t a t e m e n t o f r e a s o n s a t t a c h e d t o t h e a m e n d e d j u d g m e n t , t h e c o u r t f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i m p o s e d t h r e e t w o - l e v e l i n c r e a s e s t o
r e a c h a n o f f e n s e l e v e l o f 2 2 , w h i c h r a i s e d t h e g u i d e l i n e s r a n g e t o 4 1 t o 5 1 m o n t h s
. T h e j u d g e e i t h e r r e c a l c u l a t e d t h e g u i d e l i n e s r a n g e o r w a s u s i n g d e p a r t u r e a n a l y s i s t o m o r e f u l l y e x p l a i n h i s d e c i s i o n t o i m p o s e a n a b o v e g u i d e l i n e s s e n t e n c e
. W e c a n ’ t t e l l w h i c h

. E i t h e r w a y , f o r t h e r e a s o n s
e x p l a i n e d i n t h e t e x t , w e d i s r e g a r d t h e p o s t

- j u d g m e n t w r i t t e n s t a t e m e n t o f

r e a s o n s
.No. 12-3313 11 Though nei ther Brown nor the government has recog ni zed i t, the real problem wi th the court’s recalculati on of the gui delines range is that the judge lacked the pow er t o amend hi s deci si on once the case w as in t his court. “The fi ling of a notic e of appeal i s an ev ent of jurisdi ct ional si gni fi canc e—i t confers jurisdi cti on on the court of appeals and di v ests the di stric t court of i ts contro l ov er those aspects of the case i nv olv ed i n the appeal.” Griggs v
. Provident Consum er Disc. Co. , 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (p e r cu riam ); see also United States v
. Burton , 543 F .3d 950, 952 (7th Ci r
. 2008); U n i te d S tat es v
. McHugh , 528 F .3d 538, 540 (7th Ci r
. 2008). “Only one court at
a tim e has jurisdi cti on ov er a subject.” McHugh , 528 F .3d at 540. The poin t of the rule i s t o “av oid the confus i on of placing the

same matte r be fo r e tw o courts at the same tim e and to preserv e the i ntegr i ty of the a ppeal process.” In re T eknek, LLC, 563 F .3d 639, 650 (7th Ci r . 2009). Th e r e are a few exceptions. “Anci llary i ssu es, such as atto rney’ s fees, may sti ll be dealt wi th by the di stric t court ev en after an appeal has been lodged[, and] [t]he di stric t court may also i ssu e or ders ‘i n ai d of the appeal, to corr ect cle ric al mi stakes under [F E D

. R. C R I M

. P

. 36], or in ai d of execution of a j udg ment that has not been stay ed or superseded.’ ” Burton , 543 F .3d at 952 (quoti ng Henry v
. Far m e r City State Bank , 808 F .2d 1228, 1240 (7th Ci r
. 1986)). Also, we held in Burton that the di stric t court may fi le a wri tte n sentenci ng memorandum

more ful l y e x plaining the sentence “up to the tim e when the judgment i s enter ed on i ts docket, and e ven there after , i f a proper post-judgment motion has been fi led.” Id. at 953. But a later -fi led sentencing memorandum “c annot effect a sub stantiv e change from the [sentenc e] announc ed at the hearin g.” Id.12 No. 12-3313
Thus, a wri tte n sentencing statement fi led after the sentencing i s permi ssi

ble i f i t si mply “replic ates” or “expands on the judge’ s reasonin g wi thout changing t he ulti mate judgment.” Id. But th e di stric t court i s “wi thout authority to make any sub stanti v e change i n the sentence after the appeal [i ]s lodged i n thi s court.” Id. 3 Here, the judge fi le d t he wri tte n statement of reasons sua sponte, after the notic e of appeal w as fi led, as an attachment to an amended j udg ment corr ecti ng a cleri cal er ro r
. The written statement purpor ted to recalculat e t he gui delines range and thus di ffered i n sub stance from the judge’ s or al explanation of the sentence. Becaus e jurisdi cti on had shi fted to thi s court, the judge lacked authority to make thi s sub stanti v e change, so w e wi ll di sregar d i t. See Kusay v
. United States , 62 F .3d 192, 194 (7th Ci r
. 1995) (an acti on take n by the di st ric t court wi thout jurisdi cti on i s a “nu lli ty”).
Ev en i f we construed the r e ca lcul ated range as a nonsub stanti v e change in the rat i onale for the sentence—after

a ll, the 60-month sentence w as unaffected—the judge’ s wri tten explanation i s plainly at odds wi th hi s or al statement from the bench

. In cases of co nfli ct betw een the wri tte n and or al prono unc ement of sentence, the or al prono unc ement contro ls. See United States v
. Cephus , 684 F .3d 703, 709 (7th Ci r
. 2012) (“What the judge says in sentencing a defendant t akes preceI n B u r t o n w e a l l u d e d t o t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f c l a s s i f y i n g a l a t e r - f i l e d w r i t t e n 3

s t a t e m e n t o f r e a s o n s a s a s u b s t a n t i v e c h a n g e o r m e r e l y a n o n s u b s t a n t i v e
e l a b o r a t i o n o f t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e s e n t e n c e
. U n i t e d S t a t e s v
. B u r t o n , 5 4 3 F

. 3 d 9 5 0 , 9 5 3 ( 7 t h C i r
. 2 0 0 8 )

. B e c a u s e o f t h i s d i f f i c u l t y , w e d i s c o u r a g e t h e u s e o f t h e s e s t a t e m e n t s a f t e r t h e n o t i c e o f a p p e a l h a s b e e n f i l e d

.No. 12-3313 13
dence ov er the wri tte n judgment” when the tw o co nfli ct.); United States v
. Alburay, 415 F .3d 782, 788 (7th Ci r
. 2008) (“If an i nconsi stency exis ts betw een an or al and the later wri tte n sent ence, the sentence prono unc ed from the bench contro ls.“ (internal quot ation marks omi tte d)). So we e v a l u a te the reasonableness of the 60-month sentence by refer ence to the court’s or al statement alone, wi thout reg ard t o t he later -fi led wri tte n statement of reasons. Our rev i ew is deferential. B ro wn’s main attack on the sentence i s that i t

v aries too gr eatly from the or i gin al gui delines range. Thi s mi sun derstands the scope of the di stric t court’s di screti on. “The judge’ s task i s to choose a reasonable sentence.” Bartlett , 567 F .3d at 909. A sentence i s reasonabl e “ if the di stric t court ‘giv es meaningful consi derat i on to the factors enumerated i n
... § 3553(a), i ncluding the advis or y sentencing gui delines, and arr i v es at a sentence that i s objectiv ely reasonable in li ght of the statuto ry factors and the indi vidu al ci rcums tances of the case.’ ” United States v
. Boroczk , 705 F .3d 616, 623 (7th Ci r
. 2013) (quoti ng United States v
. Shannon , 518 F .3d 494, 496 (7 t h Ci r
. 2008)). Judges “need not— indeed must not—begin wi th a presumpti on i n fav or of a Gui del ine sentence.” Bartlett , 5 6 7 F

. 3 d a t 909. So just as “there i s no need to start from t he perspe ct ive that an i n-range sentence usu ally i s best, there i s also no need to explain why some di fferent sentence i s better .” Id. In other w or ds, “a sentence cannot be called ‘unreasonable’ jus t be caus e the judge explain s why he chose that sentence,
r a t he r than explain i ng hi s deci si on from the Gui deline s’ perspecti v e.” Id.14 No. 12-3313
The di strict co urt gav e meaningful consi derat i on to the advis or y gui delines range and each of th e § 3553(a) factors, giving speci al w ei ght to the aggr a v a t ed nature and ci rcumstances of the offense. The court w as well wi thin i ts di screti on to emphas i ze t hese factors. The three counts of convic tion hardly captured the scope and duration of the sch eme. Brown stole from hi s employ er for many y ears caus ing sig nific ant losse s. O ver tim e he dealt a seri ous financi al blow to these

sm all fami ly bus i ness es and damaged their credi t. Bro wn quibbles that the court gav e insuffi ci ent wei ght to hi s chu rch

w or k and se r v ice to other s. But the court meaningfully consi dered Brown’s service to hi s chu rch and hi s supp or t from the chu rch’s members and si mply di scoun ted these fact o r s—not an unre asonable appro ach based o n t he double life that Brown had led. Mor eov er , the court di stingui shed Brown from other defendants who may turn to embezzlement in response t o cat astro phi c fami ly ev ents or desperate personal ci rcums tances; the court conclu ded that Brown’s motiv e w as pure gr eed.
Fin ally , Brown arg ues t ha t the di stric t court fai led to
accoun t f or “the n eed to av oid unw arr anted sentence di spari

ties among defendants wi th si mi lar recor ds who hav e been found gui lty of si mi lar conduc t.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)( 6). As the quali fi er “unw arr anted” reflects, thi s prov i si on leav es plenty of ro om for di fferences in sentences when w arr anted under the ci rcums tances. See United States v

. Boscarino , 437 F

. 3 d 6 3 4 , 638 (7th Ci r
. 2006) (“After all, § 3553(a)( 6) di sallows ‘ unwarra n ted sentence d isp ariti es’ (emphas i s added), not all sentence di fferences.”)

. And of course sentencing di spari ties become a poin t o f co ncer n only when the sentences being comparedNo. 12-3313 15

i nv olv e si mi lar conduc t and defendants wi th si mi lar recor ds. Brown c ompares h i s abov e-gui delines sentence to other cases i nv olving wi thi n-gui d e l in e s s e n te n c es for wi re- and mai l-fraud convic tions

. But he does not explain how the cases invo l v e conduc t si mi lar to hi s conduc t here; a di fferent sentence for the

same charge does not alone rais e a ny concern about unw ar ranted d i s p a ri ti e s u n d e r § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) ( 6 )

. B ro wn’s ab ove - gu i delines sentence w as reasonable.
A F F I R M E D

.