STRATEGIC HORIZONS:

THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

Steven Metz

March 7, 1997
ii

******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release;

distribution is unlimited. The author would like to thank Dr.

Douglas V. Johnson, Dr. William T. Johnsen, Professor Douglas

Lovelace, and Dr. Gary L. Guertner for insightful comments on

earlier drafts of this report.

******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5244. Comments also may

be conveyed directly to the author by calling (717) 245-3822, FAX

(717) 245-3820, or by email at metzs@carlisle-emh2.army.mil.

Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications and

Production Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-

4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at

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monographs are available on the Strategic Studies Institute

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iii

FOREWORD

A year ago the Chief of Staff of the Army initiated the Army

After Next Project (AANP) as a means of stimulating constructive

thinking about the Army's future throughout the service. AANP has

quickly developed into a primary vehicle for long-range planning.

Under the leadership of the Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC), the AANP has conducted an ambitious program of studies,

symposia and workshops, culminating in a Winter War Game and

Senior Seminar held at Carlisle, January 27-February 6, 1997.

In addition to supporting TRADOC's AANP through the world

class simulation and gaming facilities of the Center for

Strategic Leadership, the Army War College has begun a

complementary research project, combining the talents of faculty

and students. A key line of initial inquiry for us has been to

forecast the nature of the future security environment in which

the Army will operate.

That is the task Dr. Steven Metz set for himself in this

monograph. In the pages that follow he propounds "currents of

change" that will determine the future and sketches a series of

plausible future security systems. Each system is characterized

by the forms of conflict that will dominate it, the major

strategic issues the United States might face, and the resulting

military implications. While Dr. Metz's analysis leads to

observations certain to be controversial, he illustrates quite

clearly the primacy that environmental context will have in

shaping our national security outlook and military strategy.

Thus, Dr. Metz's observations on trends and systems warrant

careful consideration as national policymakers and the Army's

leaders build the military force of the future.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this

study as the fourth in its series of Army After Next

publications.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

STEVEN METZ is the Henry R. Stimson Professor of Military Studies

at the U.S. Army War College. He has been a research professor at

the War College's Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) since 1993.

Before that, he taught at the Air War College, the U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College, and several universities. He

holds a B.A. and M.A. in international studies from the

University of South Carolina, and a Ph.D. in political science

from the Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Metz has co-authored a

number of SSI studies dealing with the future security

environment including The Future of American Landpower, The

Principles of War in the 21st Century, and Strategy and the

Revolution in Military Affairs and written on this topic for

Parameters, Special Warfare, Current History, and Military

Review. Dr. Metz has also spoken widely on future warfare and

been interviewed by media in the United States and around the

world.
v

SUMMARY

It is important to analyze long-term changes in the global

security environment in order to begin preparation for the postForce XXI U.S. Army. Existing currents of change suggest a number

of feasible yet very different future security environments as

defined by the primary source and form of violence conflict. Each

would require a different type of U.S. Army.

Part I: Currents of Change. The most important overarching

currents of change which will shape the future security

environment include:

• Interconnectedness" which is the increasing electronic and

physical linking of individuals, groups, commercial entities, and

organizations of all sorts;

• The compression of time; and,

• "Demassification" which is the replacement of very large

commercial and political entities with smaller, more flexible

ones.

In the realm of technology, the information revolution will

continue and blend with ongoing changes in engineering to allow a

range of "brilliant" machines and various types of

nanotechnology. Eventually the information revolution will meld

with a nascent biological revolution growing from genetic

engineering.

For the future security environment, the most important economic

currents of change are:

• The continued transnationalization of corporations and

markets;

• The emergence and consolidation of post-industrial,

knowledge-based economies;

• The geographic shift of industry;

• The transformation of corporations from hierarchies to

networks; and,

• The outright collapse of formal economies in parts of the

world.

Important political currents of change include:
vi

• The devolution of power from sovereign nation-states;

• Changes in the nature of security; and,

• A decline in the legitimacy of states.

The most salient social and demographic currents of change are:

• Continued population growth and urbanization;

• Continue escalation of crime; and,

• The emergence of economically superfluous segments of

state populations.

The ethical and psychological currents shaping the future

security environment include:

• An intensified search for new frameworks of personal

identity; and,

• Increased resistance to rapid and radical change.

The most important military currents of change are:

• Increased heterogeneity among global armed forces; and,

• A redefinition of civil-military relations.

Part II: Alternative Futures. There are five forms that the

security environment of the year 2030 and beyond might take. Each

would require a radically different U.S. military.

A state-based, balance-of-power system is one in which

sovereign nation-states seek their national interests, sometimes

using traditional forms of military force. State-on-state war

remains the most significant form of armed conflict. In such a

system, shifting coalitions maintain the balance and serve as

counterweights to powerful states. As the most powerful state,

the United States is likely to see coalitions designed to

constrain it. For the U.S. military, warfighting would remain the

primary mission. Both unilateral and coalition capabilities would

be necessary. The United States could face a peer competitor, but

this would more likely be a coalition rather than a single state.

Many other opponents would use asymmetric counters to American

military strength.

A trisected global security system is the most likely one.

In this, the world would be divided into three tiers. The First

Tier would be composed of advanced, stable regions and states
vii

with information-based economies. There would be significant

political, economic, cultural, and military integration within

the First Tier. First Tier states would not wage traditional war

against each other. The Second Tier would consist of a range of

diverse and autonomous nation-states, most with industrial-based

economies. These states would retain traditional military forces,

and would occasionally wage war on each other. Most Second Tier

states would acquire weapons of mass destruction. The Third Tier

would be characterized by endemic violence, ungovernability, and

a range of ecological problems. Armed forces would take the form

of militias, warlord armies, and terrorist gangs. Third Tier

states would not have the capability to wage sustained, largescale warfare. The U.S. military would need very different

capabilities in each tier, so the grand strategy framed by

American policymakers would determine the shape of the armed

forces. While the U.S. military would use traditional force

against Second and Third Tier enemies, it would seldom if ever

wage sustained campaigns.

An ideology-based system is one in which conflict arises

from the reemergence of transnational ideologies and mass belief

systems. Most conflict would occur along the fault lines between

ideological blocs, and the use of force would be only partially

contained by normative restraints. This means that wars can

easily escalate, even to the point of full-scale world war

between hostile ideological blocs. The U.S. military would be

larger and more robust in an ideology-based system than in the

other feasible alternatives. Power projection and support to

allies would remain key components.

In a security system characterized by internal collapse,

internal violence rather than state-on-state war poses the

greatest problems. Many weak states will fragment or collapse,

and even strong, developed states will face internal violence,

often provoking draconian responses. The U.S. military will not

be configured for conventional warfighting, but will focus on the

sorts of functions handled today by Special Forces, such as raids

and support to allies.

Finally, a system dominated by economic warfare would see

the intense, sometimes violent struggle for resources and markets

cause armed conflict. Transnational entities would develop their

own security interests separate from states. Intelligence

gathering and security would undergo privatization, with powerful

transnational security firms performing functions that state

militaries cannot or will not. In the use of force, though, there

would be pressure to minimize collateral damage and civilian

casualties. In such a system, the U.S. military would need only a

very limited capacity for traditional warfighting and would,

instead, focus on information warfare. Nonlethal weapons of all

kinds would be particularly significant.
viii

Conclusions. It is not yet clear which of the alternative

future security systems will actually come to pass. In any of

them, though, factors such as non-state enemies and weapons of

mass destruction are likely to be important. At this point, all

the U.S. military can do is continue to debate and analyze the

implications of each so that it is prepared once the future

system does begin to take shape.
1

STRATEGIC HORIZONS:

THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

Introduction.

As a new millennium approaches, the world is poised at the

confluence of two great forces. One is the revolutionary

transformation of the global security environment as the Cold War

system transmutates into something else. The second is a

compression of time, a quickening of the pace of change so

extreme that it, too, must be considered revolutionary. Of all

the effects these two forces will have, one is particularly

relevant for political leaders, national security professionals,

and military planners: strategy, with its drive to synchronize

diverse efforts and shape the long-term future, will be more

significant than ever before in human history.

Yet, however important it is for those shaping national

security to peer into the future, this is never easy. Futurism is

a complex endeavor demanding creativity, imagination, and a

willingness to take intellectual risks. At the same time, it is

vital. Because changing or adapting a military takes so long and

because the price of failing to do so in the right way and at the

right time is so high, security professionals and military

planners absolutely must grapple with the long-term future. To do

so demands a rigorous methodology built on heuristic devices. One

useful approach, pioneered by Charles W. Taylor and others,

stresses trends. The futurist selects relevant strategic trends,

projects the consequences, outcomes, interactions, and

probabilities of these trends and derives plausible alternatives

from them.1 During this process, the strategic futurist must

remain sensitive to subtle, indirect, and often unexpected

relationships both outside and inside the realm of national

security. This methodology can be used to generate an array of

alternative future security systems, each distinguished primarily

by the source and form of armed conflict.2

For the U.S. Army, such analysis is well worth the effort.

Since a land force configured to deal with one sort of future

security system might be ineffective in another, construction of

the Army that will take shape after Force XXI is fielded depends

heavily on futurism. By exploring the implications of alternative

future security environments now, the Army can offer the best

possible advice to civilian decisionmakers plotting the nation's

future, provide usable estimates of the military force structures

and risks associated with a variety of alternative future

security systems, and lay the foundation for rapid institutional

adaptation as the contours of the future security system become

clearer. Even though the precise form of the future security

environment cannot be predicted with certainty, feasible
2

alternatives and guideposts can and should be developed now. This

study is intended to lay a foundation for such thinking.

PART I: CURRENTS OF CHANGE

Overarching Currents.

In a time of intense and far-reaching change, the metaphoric

term "currents" may best capture the force of change driving

nearly all aspects of human life. Currents of change are like

oceanic ones. Not all are of equal power and importance as they

swirl and intermix. Some fade for a while, only to reemerge far

away. And, just as there are warm and cold oceanic currents,

currents of change can be positive, negative, or a combination of

the two. The relationships between currents of change are

exceedingly complex, but to make sound judgements about the

future requires understanding them.

Three overarching currents are particularly important in

shaping the future security environment. The first is what can be

called "interconnectedness"--the increasing electronic and

physical linking of individuals, groups, commercial entities, and

organizations of all sorts.3

 In coming decades, this will

probably accelerate as cultures converge and sometimes merge

while a wide range of communities develop tighter economic and

political links. Interconnectedness reflects the tremendous

improvements made in the technology of communications and

transportation as well as equally vast increases in the

affordability of the long-distance transfer of information and

the movement of people and goods. At its extreme,

interconnectedness leads to economic interdependence, political

unity, and cultural homogenization. Even when it does not go this

far, interconnectedness already affects nearly all aspects of

life in most societies and is likely to do so to an even greater

extent in the future.

A second overarching current is the compression of time. In

the economic, political, and social realms, the decision-action

cycle--the collection and assessment of information, analysis,

decisionmaking, the implementation of decision outcomes, and

adjustment--is accelerating. As a result, the life span of ideas,

concepts, procedures, and organizations is declining. For success

in nearly any endeavor, creativity and innovation must be

continuous rather than episodic. This will play a major role in

shaping the future security environment, in part because it

brings immense, sometimes unbearable pressure on governments. As

Alvin Toffler writes, "The acceleration of change has overpowered

the decisional capacity of our institutions, making today's

political structures obsolete, regardless of party ideology or

leadership."4
3

A third overarching current is "demassification."5 It

represents a reversal of the centuries-long trend toward the

concentration of production and power which led to things like

the "mass media," gave larger industries and corporations a

competitive advantage over smaller ones, and gave large political

entities an advantage over smaller ones. Today, technology and

human factors are leading toward fragmentation of industrial

megaliths and allowing "niche" companies and organizations to

compete with and sometimes surpass larger ones. The same

phenomenon may soon appear in the realm of politics. At the same

time, personal identity is demassifying as mass, "one size fits

all" belief systems no longer seem to meet the psychological

needs of modern citizens with access to electronic media and

computer-based networked communications. For the first time in

history, individuals have the power to create, craft, and

customize a belief system rather than being forced to adapt to

existing ones. The implications of this are immense and include

things like the erosion of the power of leadership in societies

where individualized belief systems become the norm. Taken to its

ultimate, this might cause humans to totally redefine the meaning

of basic social units like community and society.

Technological Currents.

Within the parameters of these macro-level currents, a

number of other changes are likely to shape the future security

environment. Some of the most important are technological. Large

parts of the world are in the midst of what appears to be

permanent and intense technological change as new machines, new

systems and, more importantly, new uses for new machines appear

at a breathtaking pace. Technology can augment both political

stability and instability. On the positive side, nonlethal

weapons can limit the blood cost of conflict resolution and

provide governments innovative ways to meet citizen needs and

demands.6 On the negative side, technology can create new

vulnerabilities by allowing attacks on national and transnational

information systems.7 Technology also allows organizations and

individuals using violence to communicate and cooperate, and can

amplify discontent. Technological change can also shape the

global security system by exacerbating the difference between

"haves" and "have nots," whether individuals or states. This can

generate resentment, hostility and, potentially, conflict as

technology serves as a visible reminder of stratification and

unsettling psycho-social change. In the early 19th century,

England was swept by a violent movement known as the "Luddites."

These handicraftsmen sought, among other things, to destroy the

textile machinery that was replacing them. Today, rapid change is

already spawning neo-Luddites, like the "Unabomber," who see

technology as dangerous or a challenge to human dignity or
4

quality of life and who are increasingly willing to use violence

to oppose the change associated with technology. While the

Unabomber's claim to represent an organized movement appears to

be pure fantasy, the rise of such a movement is certainly

possible and may even be likely.

In the past, new technology tended to emerge at a pace which

allowed the maturation of the technology itself and for social,

political, economic, and ethical adaptation to it. Today, the

compression of time and the quantum increase in global

communication mean that technology is often superseded even

before it matures or society fully adapts to it. For instance,

today electronic information technology built around the silicon

microchip plays a large role in driving social, political,

economic, and ethical change. It is becoming a major source of

wealth and power, a means of stratification both within and

between societies, and, increasingly, a seamless part of social,

economic, and political life rather than a "stand alone"

mechanism used only by specialists. This is a sign of the ongoing

social maturation of information technology. But even though the

end of the information revolution is not yet in sight, it is

already possible to speculate on what will supersede it. First

will come a blending of the information revolution with ongoing

changes in engineering and manufacturing leading to dramatically

improved robotics, "brilliant" machines capable of complex

decisionmaking, and nanotechnology in which the ability to

manipulate and manufacture individual molecules allows the

construction of tiny but complex machines. Eventually this may

fuse with a concomitant biological revolution arising from the

science of genetic engineering leading to manufactured entities

that are part machine, part living organism. Cyborgs--once

relegated to science fiction--are now conceivable. A

biotechnological revolution of this form will have immense

political, social, and ethical implications and could

dramatically shake the foundation of human beliefs and

perceptions.

Given the complexity, expense, and massive potential of the

machines that might emerge from a fusion of the information,

mechanical, and biological revolutions, it is possible that one

of the great political issues of the latter half of the 21st

century will pit those who oppose the construction of such

machines on moral grounds against those who advocate them. The

result may be violent conflict. The fusion of the information,

mechanical, and biological revolutions will eventually change the

way military power is applied as well. Close engagements

involving human soldiers may become a historic anachronism

superseded by combat between robots or cyborgs. Such a situation

will, of course, only come to pass after the careers and even the

lives of today's political and military decisionmakers. But, it

is equally true that directions set by contemporary
5

decisionmakers, especially those concerning the human dimensions

of technology, its social functions, and ethical constraints,

will shape the future.

Economic Currents.

Many futurists subscribe to Karl Marx's notion that

economics drive all other currents of change. While this may be

an oversimplification, the central role of economics must not be

underestimated. For those concerned with national security, the

most important economic currents are: (1) the continued

transnationalization of corporations and markets; (2) the

emergence and consolidation of post-industrial, knowledge-based

economies (or, at least, economies built on information sectors);

(3) the shift of industry to new geographic regions, particularly

the Pacific rim; (4) corporate restructuring from hierarchies to

networks; (5) demassification and the emergence of niche markets

and firms; and, (6) the outright collapse of formal economies in

some parts of the world.

In the coming decades, the ability of governments to control

commercial firms or use the economic element of national power

will continue to erode. When governments attempt to use or

tightly control commercial firms, businesses will simply move

elsewhere. The near future may even see a reemergence of the

struggle for power between states and commercial organizations

that subsided during the past hundred years as states gained the

advantage. Economic changes also have a "bottom up" effect on the

global security environment. A large proportion of the world's

population is attempting to adapt to economic change or economicdriven social change. In any social, political, or economic shift

of revolutionary proportions, there are losers who resist the

process. Given this, those unable to adapt to the economic

changes taking place or in danger of being left behind may resist

violently. In the regions of the world where formal economies

collapse, states themselves will disintegrate or become impotent,

thus spawning endemic violence. This is already underway in much

of Sub-Saharan Africa including Somalia, parts of Zaire, Liberia,

and Sierra Leone, as well as parts of Asia such as Afghanistan.

It may spread in coming decades.

Political Currents.

At least three political currents are likely to shape the

future security environment. One is the devolution of power from

sovereign nation-states. Even though there is a resurgence of

nationalism in the former Soviet bloc, the ability of the

sovereign nation-state to adequately meet the needs of its

citizens is eroding. As Jessica T. Mathews puts it, "The steady

concentration of power in the hands of states that began in 1648
6

with the Peace of Westphalia is over, at least for a while."8 In

the 20th century, the first great blow to the sovereign nationstate came from the two world wars. Sovereignty implied the right

to go to war in pursuit of national interests when a minimal set

of conditions was fulfilled. The horror of the world wars showed

that technology and industrialization made this notion too

expensive, at least for the world's most powerful states. World

War II and, in particular, the Holocaust, further eroded

sovereignty by giving birth to the idea that actions defined as

breaches of human rights by the world community, even if

acceptable under the laws of a sovereign state (e.g., apartheid

in white-ruled South Africa and Saddam Hussein's treatment of

Iraq's Kurdish and Shi'ite minorities), pose a threat to

international peace and stability and thus justify outside

intervention. As increased interstate trade and the rise of

multinational corporations led to the internationalization of the

global economy, the sovereign nation-state suffered another blow

as its ability to control its own economic well-being declined.

As a result, the utility of the economic element of national

power declined.

The devolution of power from sovereign nation-states will

probably continue in coming decades. In part, this is due to

cultural convergence, particularly among global elites linked by

information technology and the entertainment industry. Signs of

this include the globalization of Western and particularly

American popular culture, and the spread of liberal democracy. If

anything, information technology will accelerate this process as

the Internet becomes more economically, politically, and

culturally important. Through "chat rooms" and virtual

conferencing, the Internet facilitates the growth of

transnational electronic societies and the spread of the English

language. Admittedly, cultural convergence among the world's

technological, political, and economic elites will not

automatically lead to the demise of the sovereign nation-states.

Western Europe, the Arab world, and many other state systems have

seen periods where elites shared a transnational culture (often

based on religion) while independent states remained preeminent.

Cultural convergence among global elites will, however, affect

the security environment in yet unknown ways and might, in

combination with other factors, pave the way for the obsolescence

of the sovereign national state.

The changing nature of security or, more accurately, changes

in the nature of threats to personal security also encourage the

devolution of power from nation-states. As Martin van Creveld has

pointed out, the modern nation- state arose in large part because

it was the most effective unit for making war on other sovereign

nation-states.9

 Sovereign nation-states have not yet proven that

they are equally adept at dealing with new threats to personal

security, especially transnational, sub-state criminal cartels in
7

coalition with a range of indigenous social castoffs. If what

Jessica Mathews calls "a growing sense that the individuals'

security may not in fact reliably derive from their nation's

security" continues, the nation-states will have taken another

step toward obsolescence.10 Some states are already exploring the

privatization of intelligence, which is a key component of

security.11 If nation-states also begin to privatize the military

component of security, it will be their death-knell. Many state

governments, though, will not "go gentle into that good night" of

obsolescence and will resist the loss of power. The result will

be conflict and violence.

The demassification of security may spill over into other

areas as well. The information revolution already provides local

communities the opportunity to assume many of the infrastructure,

development, and welfare functions previously performed by

national governments. To date, there is no political incentive or

will to shift economic and military power from central

governments to local ones, but this could change. If national

governments continue to lose functions, they will soon lose

power. At the same time, sovereign nation-states are unable to

deal with many transnational problems, especially those

concerning the ecology and health. The shift in these areas is

toward empowerment of transnational entities. Again, as

transnational entities assume greater responsibility, they will

eventually develop their own financial base and further the

assault on the sovereign nation-state from both above and below.

The modern nation-state became the dominant political

organization because it was effective at providing order,

stability, and social identity. Unlike the world's principalities, city-states, sultanates, sheikdoms, chieftaincies, and

other small political units, the nation-state was large enough to

defend itself but not so large as to be culturally meaningless or

conflictive like multiethnic empires. To a large extent, the

original raison d'etre of the sovereign nation-state was to make

war. Initially most war was waged against internal forces--

usually landed nobility or minority groups--resisting the

centralization of power in the hands of the nation-state. As

nation-states consolidated and centralized internal authority,

interstate warmaking became the "core competency" of the

sovereign nation-state. What gave the sovereign nation-state its

amazing longevity was its combination of cultural coherence (at

least those states with a dominant culture) and its ability to

assume new tasks. The latter is particularly important.

Over the centuries, the state went from being solely a

provider of order and stability to the source of a vast range of

services such as infrastructure construction, health, education,

environmental protection, and support to the arts. Today, the

sovereign nation-state may have overstepped its capabilities and
8

assumed so many tasks that it is in danger of losing its

coherence and even its legitimacy. Individuals consider the state

responsible for jobs, health care, and old age pensions that

previously were the purview of the family. Today even effective

nation-states are hard pressed to meet the demands placed on

them. As people increasingly turn to other sources for resources

like security and health care, the power and legitimacy of the

nation-state will erode further. As Jessica T. Mathews writes:

Nation-states may simply no longer be the natural

problem-solving unit. Local government addresses

citizens' growing desire for a role in decision-making,

while transnational, regional, and even global entities

better fit the dimensions of trends in economics,

resources, and security.12

Skepticism concerning the effectiveness of the state and of

political leaders is being exacerbated by other factors as well.

One is the spread of the American variant of liberalism. The

American political culture has always combined a grudging and

utilitarian respect for political authority with a healthy

distrust of politicians and the political style of

decisionmaking. When American liberalism is transplanted to other

cultures, this distrust often spawns debilitating pessimism and

anomie. Extensive state involvement in the management of the

economy--a characteristic of the 20th century--opens opportunity

for corruption by political leaders. When this occurs, legitimacy

is further weakened. In addition, technology developed by the

entertainment industry may inadvertently erode political

legitimacy and authority by blurring the distinction between

illusion and reality. Generations growing up around the world are

so accustomed to special effects that they increasingly question

much of what they see or hear. The refinement of virtual reality,

morphing (the creation and manipulation of realistic electronic

images of someone), and holograms will add to this blurring of

illusion and reality. Since trust is the foundation of political

legitimacy, this pervasive skepticism, mistrust, and disbelief

are likely to add to the disintegration of political authority.

Social and Demographic Currents.

Of the ongoing social and demographic currents, population

growth and urbanization are likely to have the greatest impact on

the security environment. While population has leveled off in the

developed world, policies designed to stem population growth will

not take effect in the developing world for at least 30 years.13

According to most demographic predictions, world population will

eventually stabilize between 10 and 11 billion (about twice the

current population).14 Population growth alone does not

automatically hinder economic growth or cause poverty.15 There is,
9

however, a complex relationship among population growth,

environmental decay, particularly in developing areas unable or

unwilling to implement sound ecological practices, and migration,

whether to urban areas within developing countries or to

developed countries.16 Population pressure can accelerate

environmental decay and, under some circumstances, spark or

exacerbate conflict.17 The relationship between population growth

and conflict is thus indirect, but nonetheless important. As

Robert Kaplan puts it, "Demographic pressures never reveal

themselves as such: People don't demonstrate in the streets or

attack others because they believe their region is overcrowded.

The crush of humanity invites scarcity, whether in food, water,

housing, or jobs. Scarcity fuels discontent . . ."18

Urbanization is also changing the global security

environment. The United Nations believes that by 2005, half of

the world's population will live in cities.19 The trend toward

urbanization will be most intense in the developing world.

According to some estimates, Africa will have gone from 14.5

percent urban in 1950 to 53.9 percent in 2010, South America from

43.2 percent to 90 percent over the same period, and Asia from

16.4 percent to 50.1 percent.20 The population of megalopoli like

Mexico City and Sao Paulo will be well over 20 million by the end

of the 20th century and, according to U.N. projections, there

will be 24 urban agglomerations with more than 10 million

inhabitants.21 Places like contemporary Kinshasa, Zaire, where

there is a total collapse of government authority and

infrastructure in the slum regions, may portend the future of

many urban areas.22 As with population growth, there is no direct,

linear relationship between urbanization and violence, but when

urbanization is combined with other factors like the declining

legitimacy and effectiveness of the state and economic problems,

the result is incendiary. Given this, Ralph Peters is probably

correct when he writes, "The future of warfare lies in the

streets, sewers, high-rise buildings, industrial parks, and the

sprawl of houses, shacks, and shelters that form the broken

cities of our world."23

In most of the world, crime has replaced state-on-state war

or organized political insurgency as the preeminent security

threat. In large cities and Third World areas where states have

collapsed or failed, violence has become omnipresent, a normal

part of daily life rather than an aberration. Nothing suggests

that this will be reversed in the near future. Technology and the

overall drive for efficiency in business is increasing the number

of "economically surplus" people. Where a century ago it took the

labor of nearly the entire population of a state to produce the

various goods needed to sustain a society, the world is moving

toward a time when high rates of production will require the

labor of only a small group (whether physical or mental labor).

The social and ethical issues arising from this will pose great
10

challenges in the 21st century. The traditional notion that links

self-esteem and status to employment and productivity--what

sociologist Max Weber called the "Protestant ethic"--may become

obsolete. Such tectonic shifts in attitudes and social structures

are always dangerous.

Initially, the economic superfluity of large segments of the

population will lead to pervasive un- and under- employment along

with the boredom and low self-esteem which breed of crime and

violence. Global intercon- nectedness, whether electronic or

physical as migration becomes easier and more frequent, will

allow transnational criminal syndicates to coalesce, form

alliances, and, sometimes, go to war with each other to the

detriment of bystanders. In many cases, the response will be a

militarization or re-militarization of state and society as

citizens lose confidence in the ability of civilian regimes to

preserve law and order and turn to armed forces--whether state

militaries or private ones--to "save" society. Eventually, it may

require a new ethic that accords status on some basis other than

formal employment to regain social stability.

Ethical and Psychological Currents.

Changes in values and attitudes are particularly difficult

to predict yet will be important determinants of where, when, and

how armed force is used in the future security environment. Two

ethical and psychological currents of change appear particularly

significant. One is the worldwide quest for personal identity and

social meaning in the face of wide-ranging and rapid change. In

the Third World, traditional systems of identity and meaning are

in their death throes as urbanization increasingly leaves rural

villages--the historic structure for identity and meaning--

depopulated or inhabited only by the very young and the very old,

or marginalizes their role in shaping social life. The sprawling

cities seldom provide an effective alternative structure of

meaning and identity. The outcome is the immense attraction of

ideologies such as the various forms of what is often called

Islamic fundamentalism or, in other places, virulent and

nativistic ethnic or tribal nationalism. Today this is

particularly intense in the former Soviet bloc where no system of

personal meaning other than personal aggrandizement has filled

the psychic vacuum left by the implosion of Marxism-Leninism.

Even if ethnicity declines as a framework for identity in the

former Soviet bloc or regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the

Middle East, and South Asia, something similar will replace it

since the quest for a framework of identity and meaning is

intrinsic to humans.

The developed world has so far suffered less from lack of

effective structures for personal meaning and identity, but the
11

foundation exists. Japan, the United States, and many Western

European states have seen the rise of violent, millinerian

religious cults, racist organizations, right-wing militias, and,

in the United States in particular, conspiracy- theory groups

claiming everything from a program of government mind control to

collaboration between the U.S. Government and space aliens.24

There have always been frustrated, potentially violent fringe

groups in modern societies but now electronic communications

allows them to exchange ideas, reinforce each other, and,

sometimes accrete into loose coalitions unified by shared hate or

paranoia. "Today," writes Bruce Hoffman, "the means and methods

of terrorism are readily available at bookstores, from mail-order

publishers, on CD-ROM or even over the Internet and therefore

accessible to anyone with a grievance, purpose, agenda, or any

idiosyncratic combination of the above."25 From this basis, a

coalition of hate- or paranoia-based groups could give birth to a

new and very dangerous transnational ideology built, like Fascism

and Nazism, on fear, prejudice, and violence.

Resistance to the pace of change, interconnectedness, and

global culture may become the core of future security problems.

Islamic fundamentalism and most variants of nativistic ethnicism

whether in Russia, South Africa, Rwanda or elsewhere, are part of

this. So, too, is the neo-Luddism seen at the violent fringe of

the environmental movement. Already radical environmentalists

have turned to violence in the United States and Western Europe.26

One of the most extreme movements, Earth First!, has already

developed a coherent and violent ideology.27 Against this

backdrop, Edward Luttwak contends that an ideology he calls

"communitarianism" will emerge from localist and extremist

environmentalist groups and will pose the next great challenge to

democratic capitalism.28 And, reactionary political movements in

the United States such as the "Freemen" and the various racist,

skinhead, and militia movements must also be seen as a response

to change by those unable to cope with it or who see it as a

challenge to their status. In many ways, American skinhead and

militia movements have much in common with the mullahs who led

the 1979 Iranian Revolution. For the coming decades, the struggle

between those who either favor the deep changes underway or

accept them as inevitable, and those who fear and resist them

will play an absolutely vital role in shaping the global security

environment.

Military Currents.

The size, structure, doctrine, and equipment of future armed

forces will be context-specific, reflecting the threat that they

are designed to confront and the political, social, and economic

system that builds them. It is possible, though, to sketch some

currents of change that will affect nearly all the military
12

organizations that exist 25 years from now. One of these will be

increasing heterogeneity among global armed forces. During

periods of homogeneity, the militaries of at least the great

powers are relatively similar in structure, methods, and

equipment. Homogeneity arises from close contacts between armed

forces including war. Sustained war is the great arbitrator,

weeding out ineffective military structures, methods, and

equipment. This is the reason that the periods following the

world wars and the Napoleonic wars saw substantial similarities

among armed forces. Even small states attempted to emulate the

structure and methods of the larger, victorious powers. By

contrast, heterogeneity increases in the absence of sustained war

and when one state is so clearly preponderant that to emulate it

would be foolhardy, challengers seek structures and methods for

their armed forces different than those of the preponderant

power.

Eventually there will be another period of homogeneity among

the armed forces of the world, but the next few decades are

likely to see increasing heterogeneity. This is due, in part, to

the ongoing revolution in military affairs. Military revolutions

always lead to profound differences between the armed forces that

undertake them and those which cannot or do not.29 Today some

militaries are embracing new technology and developing doctrine,

organizations, and methods to utilize it. The U.S. military in

particular is integrating a wide range of digital technology and

exploring the use of robotics and new synthetic materials. At the

same time, many states realize they cannot afford or fully use

cutting edge technology and thus continue to rely on older

military structures and methods. The result is a growing gap

between the unit-for-unit capability of advanced and lessadvanced militaries.

Change in the definition of security is also encouraging the

heterogeneity of armed forces. National security is becoming more

than traditional functions such as protection against foreign

enemies and the preservation of internal order as it comes to

include things like economic development and ecological

reconstruction. For instance, a draft defense white paper in

South Africa states, "Security policy is no longer a

predominantly military problem but has been broadened to

incorporate political, economic, social and environmental

matters."30 Clearly a military configured solely for traditional

functions like warfighting will be very different from one

designed to support economic development and ecological

reconstruction. The devolution of power from the sovereign

nation-state will accelerate military heterogeneity. As sub-state

and supra-state entities gain political and economic power, they

are likely to form their own armed forces. Ethnic militias are a

current example, but others may emerge. Eventually, the

coexistence of supra-state, state, and sub-state armed forces
13

will make for a complex patchwork of military structures and

methods.

The revolution in military affairs is having other effects

as well. One is a reversal of the connection between the size of

an armed force and its prowess. Numbers mattered greatly in

industrial age warfare when sustained combat between sovereign

nation-states was the most important form of military activity.

But if advanced militaries make the organizational and conceptual

changes necessary to consolidate the revolution in military

affairs, small, advanced units may be more effective than the

large ones of the past. At the same time, the expense of advanced

armed forces, whether in terms of complicated equipment or in

terms of the time required to train operators of the equipment,

will make attrition warfare less viable.

A final important current of change is the blurring between

things military and things civilian. In part, this derives from

the increasing role that information and information technology

play in military activity. There is less distinction between

civilian information technology and military technology than in

other arenas. The skills needed by a future "information warrior"

will not be fundamentally different from those in charge of

corporate information security. The distinction between daily

life in the military and outside it may be insignificant. The

expanding concept of national security is also leading to a

melding of military and police activity. As criminals come to be

seen as the preeminent security threat in many countries, and as

they become better organized, better equipped, and interlinked,

armed forces and police will perform many of the same functions

and may eventually become indistinguishable. All of this means

that the distinction between military functions and civilian

functions, or between a military career and a nonmilitary career

may be less evident than in the past and may eventually fade away

all together.

PART II: ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

Alternative I: A State-Based Balance of Power System.

The term "post-Cold War" is still used to describe the

current global security system. This suggests that the world is

still in a transitional phase with the system which will replace

the Cold War one not yet fully formed. It is possible, though, to

use history and existing currents of change to delineate an array

of feasible future security systems. One of these is a linear

descendent of the current system. Its most prominent

characteristic would be the persistence of autonomous nationstates which retain a near-monopoly over organized violence and

use this and other forms of power to pursue national interests.
14

History suggests that a number of factors can lead to

conflict and violence in a system based on autonomous states

using power in pursuit of national interests.31 In fact, the right

to use violence under certain conditions is a widely-accepted

norm in a system based on sovereign nation-states. In particular,

conflict tends to accompany power vacuums or major shifts in the

power balance, particularly in the absence of skilled diplomacy.

For example, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the

decline of Turkish power in the Balkans generated conflict among

Russia, Austria, and, to some extent, Germany, thus paving the

way for World War I. Later, the decolonization of Africa and Asia

sparked a number of conflicts pitting the Soviet Union and its

allies against the United States and its allies. Power shifts can

also arise when a major state undergoes a real or perceived

decline in its relative power position and becomes aggressive in

an attempt to forestall this. At other times, authoritarian

regimes may use conflict to deflect internal discontent.

Governments may collapse or weaken to the point that civil war

ensues, drawing in external participants and sometimes leading to

interstate war.

Interstate armed conflict may also break out through

misperception or misunderstanding as states pursue their

interests. Skilled diplomacy is the palliative to misperception

and misunderstanding, and thus is vital for the maintenance of

order and the limitation of violence in a state-based, balance of

power system.32 Violence can be controlled through skillful

diplomacy, but never fully abolished. Alliances and coalitions

form and disband as the balance of power shifts. When any one

state appears willing and able to gain ascendancy in a balance of

power system, the others tend to band together to counter or

balance it.

Although nation-states may use armed force against violent

non-state enemies and internal wars are some of the most

intractable and bloodiest, state-on-state war usually poses the

greatest danger.33 This would certainly hold in a system where a

number of nations had weapons of mass destruction. In a future

state-based system, national militaries would remain the dominant

organizations for the use of force. The greater the global

involvement of a state, the wider the range of military

capabilities it would have to build. The armed forces of advanced

states will see substantial technological improvement, but those

with widespread commitments will often find that they cannot

bring their entire military to the cutting edge given the expense

of 21st century technology and talent and the diverse range of

operations armed forces must perform. There will thus be

substantial disparities between the units of even advanced

states. States will have to decide whether the most advanced

units should be the first to enter a war or saved for a decisive
15

moment as Napoleon used the Old Guard and other elite formations.

Setting the strategic-level order of battle will be a crucial

process for military strategists. (See Figure 1.)

_________________________________________________________________

 Strategic Military Characteristics Issues Implications

_________________________________________________________________

• Sovereign nation- • How can power shifts • Warfighting

states remain most be managed? remains the primary

important actors • How can U.S. pre- mission of armed

• Traditional state- eminence be maintained forces

on-state war remains without provoking oppo- • U.S. military will

the most important sition? need both unilateral

use of military • How can the United and coalition capapower States avoid overexten- bilities

• Shifting coali- sion? • The United States

tions are used to • To what extent should could face a peer

balance and contain U.S. power be used to competitor, probably

powerful states promote intangible a coalition rather

(including the interests? than a single state

United States) • How can U.S. national • Opponents would

 interests be reconciled use asymmetric

 with regional or global methods to contain

 interests? or defeat the U.S.

 military

_________________________________________________________________

Figure 1. State-Based Balance of Power System.

State-Based System: Strategic Issues.

A number of broad, enduring issues or questions will shape

American strategy in every feasible future security system. What

is the appropriate extent of American involvement in the world?

What types of issues or areas should be the foci of American

strategy? How can public support be sustained? What is the

appropriate role of military power? These broad questions,

though, will take slightly different form and slightly different

importance in each of the plausible future systems. In a statebased system, for instance, five macro-level strategic issues are

likely to be most important.

How should power shifts be managed? Power shifts in statebased, balance of power systems are very dangerous. These can
16

lead to power vacuums that tempt other states to jockey to

improve their position. U.S. strategy in a future state-based,

balance of power security system should seek to manage power

shifts, at least in key regions. This can be done by propping up

a declining power--a common technique in the classical European

balance of power between 1648 and 1914--or by engineering a new

balance to replace a defective one.34 War is usually the method of

last resort for consolidating power shifts in state-based

security systems. In a future system where a number of states

have weapons of mass destruction, this could be suicidal for the

human species. Thus developing effective procedures for the

management of power shifts would be integral to American strategy

in a state-based, balance of power security system. In

particular, American leaders would have to gauge the effect that

the information revolution has on the practice of diplomacy.

How could U.S. preeminence be maintained without provoking

the formation of opposing alliances or coalitions? Americans tend

to assume that others see U.S. power as benign or benevolent and

recognize that the United States has no desire for territorial

aggrandizement. This overlooks the fact that in a state-based

international system where every nation seeks its own interests,

preponderance or preeminence by one invariably causes suspicion,

perhaps even fear, in others. State-based, balance of power

systems have always seen formal or informal coalitions form to

counter the power of a dominant state, even when the dominant

power was a democracy.

Americans traditionally overlook the seriousness with which

the citizens of other countries take what they see as cultural

and economic imperialism. During the Cold War and the immediate

post-Cold War periods, many states saw U.S. power as the lesser

of evils when compared to that of aggressive authoritarian states

like the Soviet Union or Iraq. But if the United States succeeds

in helping spread democracy to Iraq and consolidating open

government in the former Soviet Union, the nations of the world

may come to see American power as intimidating or even

threatening. That current American strategy stresses "engagement

and enlargement" is worrisome to others even though U.S.

policymakers seem unaware or unconcerned that this can be

construed as imperialistic. 35

The belief that others will see a strong democracy as

benevolent is an old one. In 431 B.C., Pericles, the leader of

Athens, stated:

. . . there is a great contrast between us and most

other people. We make friends by doing good to others,

not be receiving good from them . . . We are unique in

this. When we do kindnesses to others, we do not do

them out of any calculations of profit or loss; we do
17

them without afterthought, relying on our free

liberality.36

Within a few years of this speech, most of the Greek citystates, concerned about the power and growing arrogance of

Athens, allied against it and defeated it. This precedent

suggests that if the United States continued to use force and

other forms of power as it did during the Cold War and post-Cold

War periods, many or most of the other nations of the world would

seek to contain the United States. Given this possibility,

American policymakers would have to be extraordinarily careful in

their exercise of power if the future security system relies on a

balance of power as the major means of preserving order. Finding

a nonintimidating way to use military power would be a key

objective and may become a factor in the formulation of U.S.

military strategy and even force structure decisions.

How can the United States avoid strategic overextension? To

be a "superpower" implies some sort of involvement in all regions

of the world and, taken to its extreme, in nearly all conflicts

around the world. After some hesitation, the United States

accepted this role during the early years of the Cold War. As the

Cold War waned, the United States rejected major retrenchment.

Like George Bush, Bill Clinton and his top advisers repeatedly

stress that the United States intends to remain globally engaged.

"The United States," President Clinton states, "recognizes that

we have a special responsibility that goes along with being a

great power. . ."37

In a future state-based, balance of power system, strategic

overextension would be a persistent temptation. The United States

could not rely on friends or allies to take actions which would

be in perfect accordance with U.S. national interests, and thus

would be tempted to become directly involved in a wide range of

global problems and conflicts. The issue of strategic "solvency"-

-assuring that objectives and power resources are in proportion--

would remain important.38 At a minimum, the United States would

have to re-think its geostrategic priorities. U.S. strategy

during the Cold War was clearly Eurocentric (even though American

military power was used extensively in Asia). That was logical

since Europe was both the region of greatest U.S. interest and

the one facing the most imminent security threat. This may not

hold in the future security environment. A case can be made that

U.S. strategy should be refocused on the Pacific Rim or on the

Americas.39 This is an issue that will require much open

discussion and debate before a consensus emerges.

To what extent should national power be used to promote

intangible interests? American foreign policy has long had a deep

streak of idealism. This has sometimes led the nation to expend

power resources to promote intangible interests like democracy,
18

human rights, and well-being in regions with few vital tangible

economic or geostrategic interests. Deciding whether the

distinction between tangible and intangible interests retains

relevance and, if so, how much national power should be expended

to promote intangible interests will be an important part of

crafting a coherent strategy if the future security system is a

state-based, balance of power one.

How can national interests be reconciled with regional or

global interests as the notion of sovereignty changes? A statebased security system is one in which national interests shape

and drive strategy. Today, communal interests--whether of a

region or of the globe as a whole--are becoming more important.

These issues range from prevention of genocide to a host of

ecological issues that spill over national boundaries. The

traditional notion of sovereignty that gave a state full license

within its boundaries is also changing. Thus a future state-based

security system would see the coexistence of national interests

and communal interests. Reconciling the two and deciding how much

sovereignty to surrender to supra-state organizations or

authorities could pose a major problem for American leaders.

State-Based System: Military Implications.

In a state-based, balance of power security system, the

revolution in military affairs would change the structure,

doctrine, concepts and equipment of the U.S. military but not the

ultimate strategic missions. Warfighting against the military

forces of other states would remain the primary task of the

American armed forces with nation support and humanitarian relief

secondary. Balance of power systems tend to be characterized by

fluid coalitions and alliances rather than formal, long-standing

ones, so the United States would need to retain a substantial

capability for unilateral action and for leading ad hoc, missionspecific coalitions. And, to avoid ostentatious displays of

military power that might provoke opposition, forward presence

would probably be reduced if not abandoned. In fact, the U.S.

military could lose all of its large, permanent overseas bases.

This would suggest a need for the ability to rapidly construct

temporary bases for power projection, or to project power from

the continental United States alone. In general, power projection

could become more the application of effects from long range

rather than the actual deployment of forces configured for close

engagement. As a result, American ground forces would probably be

fairly small.

In a state-based, balance of power system, the United States

could continue to face substate and regional threats, but could

also be confronted with a peer competitor. Given the historic

tendency of opposition to coalesce against a preeminent state,
19

this would probably be a coalition rather than a single state.

Existing U.S. military strategy, which assumes that American

forces will face a singe rogue state rather than a hostile

coalition, would have to be revised to reflect this. And, U.S.

military strategy and doctrine in a state-based balance of power

security system would have to deal with extensive asymmetry. This

would take two forms. One is asymmetric coalitions as American

armed forces sometimes operate in conjunction with other

militaries with very different organization and doctrine. The

second is asymmetric threats. Future opponents will likely avoid

confronting the U.S. military on its own terms and, instead, seek

methods of confrontation and warfare in which the United States

is weak. These asymmetric threats would usually target American

political vulnerabilities, particularly the difficulty accepting

substantial casualties in conflicts were vital interests are not

directly challenged. Enemies in a future state-based system will

often use weapons of mass destruction to counteract U.S.

conventional forces, eroding American morale and political will

through low-intensity operations, especially terrorism aimed at

U.S. nationals abroad and within the United States. Terrorism

would probably increasingly move into information attacks and

those attempting what Walter Laqueur calls "terrorist

superviolence." Laqueur notes, "An unnamed U.S. intelligence

official has boasted that with $1 billion and 20 capable hackers,

he could shut down America. What he could achieve, a terrorist

could too."40 Terrorism aimed at information infrastructure and

using weapons of mass destruction would become a major problem

for the U.S. military in a state-based security system.

Alternative II: A Trisected Security System.

In some security systems, there is a clear, central source

of conflict. But these are rare. The norm is a system shaped by

several more-or-less coequal sources of conflict. The future

system may fit this mold. Since interconnectedness and

demassification are advancing at different rates in different

parts of the world, the likely result is a global system composed

of three tiers. Trisection is actually a common pattern for

global or regional political systems. The ancient Greeks and

Chinese divided the world into "civilized," "semi-civilized," and

"barbarian" parts. Muslims distinguished those who followed

Islam, the "peoples of the book" (Jews and Christians who shared

some basic religious tenets with Muslims), and heathens. The

"world-system" analysis that became popular in Western

universities in the 1970s reflected a more economically-oriented

scheme based on "core," "periphery," and "semi-periphery."41 Even

more recently, scholars and strategists talked of the First,

Second, and Third worlds while Marxists divided the world into

capitalist, socialist, and proletarian segments. This frequent

recurrence of trisection suggests that it may be a natural form
20

for international systems.

If the future security system should once again be a

trisected one, the First Tier of the system will be characterized

by stability, prosperity, and multidimen-sional integration. Its

economies will depend on the management, manipulation, and

creation of information rather than traditional heavy industry.

Demassification and interconnectedness will be most strongly felt

here. Businesses (and, eventually, governments) will stress

flexibility and creativity, with a diminishing distinction among

management, development, and production in terms of both

functions and people. Economic interdependence and cultural

homogeneity will link the First Tier into a seamless web. As the

First Tier integrates, concepts such as national interests,

national boundaries, and sovereignty will decline in

significance. Governments will often see themselves as the agents

of business. Even though First Tier regions will experience some

serious political conflict growing from the difficulty in

adjusting to the various currents of change, governments will be

generally effective at least in providing basic resources like

security. Democracy will be increasingly participatory as

technology allows a regular and sustained citizen role in

political decisionmaking. Aversion to violence will be a major

component of the First Tier ethical system. Force will be seen as

an absolute last resort, with intense pressure to keep military

activity quick and cheap. Security strategies will stress

conflict prevention; military strategies will be defensive.

The Second Tier will be composed of what are today known as

"newly industrializing countries" and the more advanced states of

the former Soviet bloc. Traditional industrial production will

remain the economic bedrock. The distinction among management,

development, and production will persist, with social status and

political power closely linked to an individual's position in the

productive process. The state and business will sometimes be

coequals; at other times, one or the other will temporarily

dominate. The sovereign nation-state will remain the central

political and economic institution. The most intense political

debates in the Second Tier will pit those who seek greater

integration into the First Tier-dominated world culture and

economy against those who oppose it and, instead, favor economic

nationalism and cultural particularism. The Second Tier will see

cycles in which representative democracy emerges only to later be

replaced by some form of sham democracy or outright

authoritarianism. The shifts to and from democracy are likely to

be violent. Secessionism will pose a major challenge to the

governability, viability, and stability of many Second Tier

states. In fact, secessionism in the Second Tier will pose some

of the most dangerous challenges to the stability of the future

security system. Sovereignty will be jealously guarded by Second

Tier leaders. Their security and military strategies will remain
21

imbued with the notion of just war and the idea that national

interests sometimes require the use of state-controlled violence.

By contrast, economic stagnation, ungovernability, and

violence will be pervasive in the Third Tier. Informal economies

based on subsistence production, barter, and crime will be more

important than the formal economy for most citizens of the Third

Tier. Parts of the Third Tier will remain linked to the global

economy through the extraction and export of primary products and

the import of manufactured goods and foreign aid, but this will

only affect a small proportion of the population. Governments

will continue to dominate these shrinking formal sectors of the

economy, with the relationship largely a parasitic one. Most

areas of the Third Tier will abandon or be abandoned by the world

culture, thus leading to the emergence of distinct microcultures. Ironically, this will be something of a boon since it

will lead to the export of intellectual products like art and

music to First Tier consumers in quest of "something different."

The Third Tier will experience recurrent bouts of

ungovernability. The effectiveness of the state will drop

dramatically outside major cities, and will be minimal even in

large parts of the urban areas. Outright anarchy will be common,

and many current states will fragment. Democracy will be

attempted but almost always fail. Ungovernability will be

exacerbated by an accelerated "brain drain" as the educated and

ambitious immigrate. Ironically, though, there will also be

immigration into the Third Tier by groups of economic, political,

and cultural dissenters from the First Tier which reject

integration into the global economy and culture. If history

holds, these groups may energize otherwise stagnant economies.

Where the First Tier will be characterized by a widespread

aversion to violence and the Second Tier by the notion that

violence is justified under certain conditions (e.g., when used

by the state in pursuit of legitimate national interests),

violence in the Third Tier will be a routine part of daily life.

Ethical constructs like "just war" or casualty aversion will have

little meaning in a region where gunfire, explosions, coercion,

and personal brutality are depressingly normal. (See Figure 2.)

Trisected System: Strategic Issues.

For the United States, the most important characteristics of

a trisected security system would be the heterogeneity and

complexity of the strategic environment. First Tier states would

_________________________________________________________________

 Strategic Military Characteristics Issues Implications
22

_________________________________________________________________

• Global security • To what extent • The U.S. military

system divided into should U.S. strategy will develop along

three parts: (1) an focus on one tier of the lines suggested

advanced, integra- the system? by the current RMA

ted, stable First • If U.S. strategy is • Information warTier with informa- focused, what tier fare is very impor

tion-based econo- should it concentrate tant for the U.S.

mies; (2) a Second on? military

Tier of diverse and • How can U.S. inter- • The United States

autonomous states ests be promoted in will sometimes use

with uneven stabil- Second Tiers? traditional force

ity and manufac- • Will power projec- against Second and

turing-based econo- tion and conflict Third Tier opponents

mies; and, (3) an resolution remain core • The U.S. military

unstable, violence- elements of U.S. will seldom if ever

prone Third Tier strategy? pursue sustained

relying largely on • To what extent should campaigns, so the

extraction and the United States role of the Army

informal economies retain a unilateral will decline rela-

• The sources of military capability? tive to the Air

conflict vary among • To what extent should Force and Navy

the three tiers the United States inte- • Second Tier mili-

• First Tier states grate with the rest of taries will remain

will not make tradi- the First Tier? traditional, comtional war on each bined-arms forces

other; there will be • Third Tier milistate-on-state war taries will usually

within the Second be militias, private

Tier; Third Tier armies, and terrorstates will be in- ist organizations

capable of sustained,

large-scale warfare

_________________________________________________________________

Figure 2. Trisected Security System.

not make traditional war on each other, so terrorism would be the

only direct threat to the territory of the United States. Since

most applications of U.S. military power would continue to be

overseas, American strategy would focus on minimizing casualties

during military operations. Six key questions would shape U.S.

national security strategy.

To what extent should U.S. national security strategy focus

on one tier of the global security system? In a trisected global

system, the United States will have interests of one sort or the

other in all three tiers, but to expend substantial power
23

resources in all three simultaneously would risk dangerous overextension. This suggests that American strategy should focus on

one or two of them. The question is: Which one? To resolve this,

policymakers and the American public would have to reach

consensus on the level of risk the United States is willing to

accept.42 If the nation can tolerate a high level of risk in one

tier, resources can be concentrated in the other. Moreover,

American strategy must also reconcile the risk of overextension

with risks to specific interests in one of the tiers of the

system.

If the United States chooses to focus its strategy on one

tier, which one should it be? A rationale can be developed for an

American strategy focused on each of the tiers of a trisected

security system. Just as today the United States has the greatest

economic and political interests in the areas of the world that

will develop into the First Tier--North America, Western Europe,

and parts of the Pacific Rim--future U.S. ties to the First Tier

will be crucial. On the other hand, the security threats from the

First Tier are likely to be less overtly dangerous than from the

other two tiers, particularly as the First Tier undergoes

economic, political, and cultural integration. The fact that

Second Tier states will have the industrial and organizational

base to support large armed forces and sustained military

operations--and that many of them will have weapons of mass

destruction--suggests a strategy concentrated on this sector of

the global security system. This might be a matter of pure

strategic triage: the security situation in the First Tier will

probably not require the extensive application of U.S. power. The

problems of the Third Tier cannot be remedied by any feasible

level of American involvement; but the Second Tier may be both

dangerous and amenable to active U.S. engagement. At the same

time, though, the humanitarian needs of the Third Tier will be

most pressing. All this means that American policymakers and the

public must decide which will be the guiding criterion of

national strategy: the extent of American interests, the extent

of the danger inherent in a particular region, or the extent of

human need.

How should U.S. interests be protected and promoted in the

tiers of the global security system which are not the focus of

American strategy? Even if U.S. strategy focuses on one sector of

a three-tiered system, interests in the other tiers would have to

be promoted and protected. This might be done through nonmilitary

means. American policymakers would have to decide how and when

military force might be used in what are defined as "secondary"

tiers. In general, military strategy in secondary tiers could

follow three broad patterns. It could focus simply on containment

through maritime and aerospace power (including missile defense)

without using forward presence or pursuing conflict resolution.

It could seek to deter aggression in secondary tiers through
24

periodic direct applications of military force, most often by

stand-off precision strikes. Or, it could rely on coalitions.

Actual American military strategy for secondary tiers would

probably blend these three approaches in some way and would shift

as technology and political conditions change.

Will power projection and conflict resolution remain core

elements of the U.S. strategy? Power projection and conflict

resolution became important parts of American national security

strategy during the Cold War. Power projection kept conflict away

from American shores. Policymakers considered conflict

resolution, which entails the amelioration of the underlying

political, social, and economic causes of violence rather than

simply winning battlefield victory, important and concluded that

most conflicts left unresolved would not solve themselves, but

would eventually reemerge. In a future trisected security system,

Americans may reconsider this stress on power projection and

conflict resolution. Both are expensive and dangerous. They

invite asymmetric responses, especially terrorism aimed at

Americans or targets within the United States, and can require

long commitments of human and financial resources. Given this, it

is possible that future American strategy will be much more

defensive, stressing maritime and aerospace control with ground

forces used solely for spoiling attacks or to supplement allies

facing aggression. This issue must be debated and a consensus

reached if U.S. strategy in a trisected world is to be coherent

and effective.

To what extent should the United States retain a unilateral

military capability? Current American national security and

military strategy commit the nation to working with allies and

coalition partners whenever possible but also stress the need for

a full-spectrum unilateral capability. JCS Chairman General John

M. Shalikashvili, for instance, lists "decisive unilateral

strength" as one objective in his Joint Vision 2010.43 In a

trisected world of 2020 and beyond, though, the United States may

not be willing or may not see the need to maintain decisive

unilateral strength. The integration of the First Tier may mean

that all military operations except the very smallest are

coalition endeavors. The question of how long to retain decisive

unilateral capability is likely to be a persistent one in the

coming decades. That, plus the decision concerning which tier of

the system to focus on, will drive the size of the American

military.

To what extent should the United States pursue integration

with the rest of the First Tier? As the First Tier of a trisected

system undergoes economic, social, and then political

integration, there is likely to be mounting public pressure to

integrate national armed forces in order to limit defense

expenditures. First Tier militaries which often operate in
25

coalition may decide to specialize rather than seek a full

spectrum capability. And, beyond simply making militaries more

compatible, the First Tier is also likely to see increased formal

coordination during strategy and policy formulation. A key issue

for the United States will be how rapidly to accept this process

of integration. The United States will probably resist longer and

more strenuously than most other First Tier states but will

accept some integration in the end.

Trisected System: Military Implications.

In a trisected global security system, each tier would focus

on different forms of conflict and configure their military

forces accordingly. First Tier militaries will probably develop

along the lines suggested by current thinking about the

revolution in military affairs.44 Armed forces will be small in

terms of the number of people involved, but will make extensive

use of technology. Robotics, information technology, and

nanotechnology--the ability to mechanically manipulate molecules

and molecular structures during assembly and manufacture--will

become increasingly important.45 Military units will be extremely

flexible, able to rapidly reorganize and adapt to a wide variety

of tasks. Defensive information warfare--protecting information

systems against hostile action--will be an important military

mission. First Tier armed forces will also develop offensive

information warfare to disable or confuse opponents. In fact,

information warfare will be the only type of military action that

First Tier states would consider using against each other given

the restraints growing from interconnectedness. However,

information warfare will also have utility against Second Tier

and even some Third Tier enemies.

Even though First Tier states will not wage traditional war

against each other, they will occasionally use violence against

Second Tier and Third Tier enemies. As First Tier states prepare

for this, the need to minimize casualties will play a major role

in force development. For instance, weapons systems will be

deconstructed in that the sensor, operator, and strike platform

will be physically separated rather than coterminous as in many

of today's planes, warships, tanks, or infantry units. Soldiers

on the future battlefield, Brian Nichiporuk and Carl H. Builder

suggest, may be more important as sensors feeding information to

distant strike platforms than as a source of firepower.46 At the

same time, robotics and other brilliant weapons platforms will

become increasingly important. Long-range, stand off strikes and

reliance on nonlethal or less-lethal weapons (including weapons

aimed at psychological incapacitation rather than physical harm)

will be the norm.

Because of casualty aversion and the expense of weapons
26

systems based on advanced technology, what might be called

"burst" operations will replace sustained campaigns as the most

important form of military activity. Political decisionmakers

will be unwilling to use their powerful but small and casualtyaverse militaries in any activity that cannot be completed

quickly. Militaries will adapt to this by the revolutionary

transformation of doctrine and mastery of burst operations. Burst

operations will not require or allow mobilization, whether of

military forces or political support, so military reserves will

not be important. Military strategy will largely consist of

active defense and spoiling or punishing attacks. These attacks

are likely to become more psychologically sophisticated as First

Tier military planners learn how to structure and time strikes to

have the maximum psychological impact on target audiences. The

main tasks of senior military leaders will be to rapidly adapt

and reconfigure military organizations as tasks and conditions

change, and to plan burst operations. Given this, the essence of

strategic leadership will be creativity in complex and compressed

decision environments.

First Tier states will also undergo radical changes in

civil-military relations. The core dilemma for traditional civilmilitary relations was finding a way to cultivate and sustain a

body of people with the ability to do things considered abnormal

by civilians--to transcend physical discomfort, master fear, and

kill or coerce enemies-- without undercutting the day-to-day

comity that undergirds society. This required simultaneously

cultivating a warfighter's ethos and instilling the belief that

violence must only be used under very special circumstances and

against specific targets. Stable civil-military relations kept

warfighters separate from the rest of society (physically and

psychologically) without allowing them to become so isolated that

they might turn against society. In the future, this may not be

necessary. First Tier armed forces seldom will need to undergo

physical hardships or kill at close range. Killing itself will be

limited. When it does become necessary, it can be done from far

away or by robots. This means that First Tier states will no

longer have to erect a psychological and attitudinal wall between

the military and society. Soldiering will be much like any other

white-collar job. The notion of a distinct military ethos will

become quaintly archaic.

By contrast, the armed forces of Second Tier states will

still focus on war in the traditional, Clausewitzean sense with

its sequence of preparation, mobilization, combat operations, and

demobilization. They will also retain distinct militaries

organized around separate services defined by the medium in which

they operate. Because Second Tier states will have a higher

tolerance for casualties, their militaries will place relatively

less emphasis on expensive technology and more on the blood of

soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen. Unlike First Tier armed
27

forces, Second Tier militaries will be capable of sustained,

costly, intense operations or campaigns. Second Tier militaries

will rely heavily on commercial technology. They will also remain

vulnerable to information warfare since they will be end-users of

cutting edge technology rather than its masters.

Nuclear weapons may be used somewhere in the Second Tier

before 2020. If this happens, it will result in such a political

backlash that for nation-states, weapons of mass destruction will

be relegated to a purely deterrent role (although terrorists will

continue to find them useful). Second Tier militaries will have a

moderate power projection capability against each other, but will

have limited or no success against First Tier armed forces. The

essence of strategic leadership for Second Tier militaries will

remain synchronization during complex operations and the

balancing of short-term and long-term security considerations.

Civil-military relations will follow the 20th century model, with

the military psychologically and physically separated from

civilian society but usually controlled by civilians.

Third Tier armed forces will take the form of armed gangs,

militias, the personal armies of warlords, and terrorist groups.

The Third Tier will have no indigenous military production, so

its armed forces will have very limited ability to wage

sustained, combined-arms operations. The norm will be short,

intense periods of combat that exhaust military supplies followed

by long periods of low-level fighting or maneuver. In general,

there will be no clear distinction between war and peace since

much of the Third Tier will experience nearly constant, low-level

organized violence. As in Europe before the Treaty of Westphalia,

the acquisition of materiel or loot is likely to be the

preeminent objective of Third Tier military operations. Terrorism

will be the only form of long-range power projection available to

Third Tier political organizations. But, because the nature of

Third Tier life will cause an erosion of ethical restrictions or

inhibitions on the use of violence, states or warlords will have

no compunction about using terrorism. The most important

leadership skill will be the ability to motivate subordinates to

accept danger and remain loyal. Personal charisma, which will

matter less in First Tier and Second Tier armed forces, will

characterize successful Third Tier military leaders. There will

be little distinction between the military and society, and thus

no civil-military relations in the traditional sense.

In general, conflict across the three tiers will be like the

children's game "scissors, paper, and rock." High-tech First Tier

militaries will be able to defeat the large and somewhat lowertech forces of Second Tier states with relative ease, but will

find casualty aversion a serious constraint when fighting the

militias, terrorists, and private armies of the Third Tier.

Second Tier militaries, with their large size, ability to
28

undertake sustained, intense operations, and greater tolerance

for casualties, will have more success against Third Tier forces.

And, while Third Tier forces will be unable to stand and face

Second Tier militaries, they will find that their lack of

inhibition on the use of indiscriminate violence gives them some

influence in the First Tier, particularly when they can use

terrorism to extort aid or deter intervention. This all means

that First Tier militaries will be able to trump Second Tier,

Second Tier militaries will be able to trump Third Tier, and

Third Tier will be able to trump First Tier.

Alternative III: The Renaissance of Ideology.

With the collapse of Marxism-Leninism, the world is not

clearly divided by competing transnational ideologies. This may

be a temporary lull rather than a permanent "end of ideology" as

predicted by Daniel Bell in the 1960s or, more recently, by

Francis Fukayama.47 Humans seem to have an instinctive

psychological need for some sort of mass belief system--whether

it is called a political ideology or not--that explains social

conditions and offers apparently coherent solutions to political

and economic problems. As the 21st century approaches, it might

seem that nationalism and ethnicism have supplanted ideology as

the primary framework of social and political identity. This

overlooks the fact that nationalism is only on the rise in a

relatively small segment of the global security system--the

former Soviet bloc. The same is true of the argument that

ethnicity will be the dominant political force in the future

security environment. This only holds for regions a generation or

two removed from colonialism (whether European or Soviet) and

very well may subside in the early 21st century. As global

interconnectedness grows, it is possible that nationalism and

ethnicism will no longer define political divisions and thus not

serve as the primary sources of world conflict. Given the intense

pace of change that will characterize the 21st century and the

feelings of powerlessness that it will generate among much of the

world's population, conditions may be ripe for the reemergence of

transnational ideologies.

The ideologies of the future could take several forms.

Samuel P. Huntington has argued that the next pattern of conflict

may be a clash of civilizations.48 "Civilizations" in the sense

that Huntington uses the term are psychologically related to

ethnicity, but are based on beliefs, values, preferences, and

norms rather than the sort of physical or linguistic

characteristics that undergird ethnicity. In Huntington's schema,

the "fault line" running through Europe that divides Western

Christianity from Orthodox Christianity and Islam will be

particularly dangerous. This could lead to a bipolar security

system pitting nations based on Western culture (to include
29

Japan) against a coalition of non-Western cultures. There are

other conceivable configurations for an ideological bloc system:

democracies versus anti-democracies, capitalism versus anticapitalism of some sort, modernizers versus anti-modernizers,

globalists versus regionalists, and so on.

In any security system dominated by ideological blocs, most

armed conflict will occur along the fault lines or grey areas.

War will sometimes accompany the process of establishing or

adjusting the boundaries between blocs. Violence may break out

when a state attempts to move from one bloc to the other.

Violence would also be associated with attempts by members of one

bloc to support dissenters inside opposing blocs since whenever

ideology is intense, governments have little tolerance for

internal opposition. Witness the "red scares" in the United

States in the 1930s and 1950s, and Stalin's various purges.

Conflict and violence in an ideology-based system would range

from terrorism and insurgency through full-scale coalition war,

so militaries would need to retain a wide range of capabilities.

Within blocs, militaries would probably develop along similar

lines, in part to facilitate coalition operations. But, as during

other ideological struggles whether the Cold War or the Crusades,

there would be significant differences between the military

forces of the blocs. Because violence between conflicting belief

systems tends to be particularly vicious, there would be little

pressure to limit collateral damage or civilian casualties during

military operations. Decisive victory at any cost would be the

preeminent criterion for military strategy and force development.

(See Figure 3.)

Ideology-Based System: Strategic Issues.

Because ideology often breeds hatred and passion, a future

security system dominated by it would be partic- ularly

dangerous. Seven strategic issues would be the most important for

the United States.

What is the appropriate extent of U.S. involvement in global

security affairs? Even in a future with extensive political,

economic, and social interconnectedness, large-scale violence in

an ideology-based security system will likely occur far from the

United States. This, in conjunction with the inherent danger of

_________________________________________________________________

 Strategic Military Characteristics Issues Implications

_________________________________________________________________
30

• Competing or con- • What is the appro- • The U.S. military

flicting transna- priate extent of U.S. would be larger and

tional ideologies involvement in global more robust than in

structure the security affairs? other feasible 

global security • How can the system's security systems

system rules be consolidated? • Power projection

• Most conflict • How can conflicts be and support to

occurs on the fault localized or con- allies would remain

lines between ideo- tained? key components of

logical blocs • How can the use of U.S. military

• The use of force weapons of mass dis- strategy

is only partially truction be avoided? 

or weakly contained • How can the American

by normative public be mobilized 

restraints but not inflamed? 

 • If global schisms 

 are religious, how can

 the United States 

 avoid domestic ten- 

 sion? 

 • How can the United 

 States craft a holistic

 strategy? 

_________________________________________________________________

Figure 3. Ideology-Based System.

an ideology-based system, would encourage isolationism in the

United States. In fact, pressure for retrenchment or

disengagement of some type would probably be stronger in an

ideology-based system than in any other sort. This means that

deciding on the appropriate degree of American involvement would

be the cornerstone strategic issue in such a system. Options

range from military disengagement to full engagement as in the

Cold War. The extent of American involvement in world affairs

would be the prime factor determining the size of the U.S.

military in an ideology-based system.

How can the "rules of the game" be consolidated? Every

international system has rules. These are sometimes codified

through treaties and international law, but can also take the

form of informal strictures and parameters. Rules are sometimes

breached but, the more they are adhered to, the more stable the

system. In a state-based, balance of power system, the rules tend

to be fairly well understood but states face some uncertainty as

to who their friends and enemies are since coalitions shift

easily. An ideologically-based system is the opposite: states in

hostile ideological blocs know who their enemies are, but the

misperception and mistrust that accompanies ideological schisms
31

often lead to unclear or poorly understood rules of the game. In

a future ideologically-based system--especially one where many

states and even some sub-state actors have weapons of mass

destruction--the United States would need to find ways to clarify

the rules of the game as quickly as possible.

How can conflicts be localized or contained? The worst

possible situation in an ideologically-based system is total war

between opposing blocs. Historically, such conflicts were

devastating; in an era when weapons of mass destruction are

increasingly widespread, full-scale inter-bloc war could

literally lead to the obliteration of the human species. Because

of this, the major powers in an ideology-based system must

undertake great efforts to develop mechanisms for cauterizing and

containing regional conflicts. There are a number of mechanisms

for this: non-intervention agreements, bolstering the defense of

states surrounding an area of conflict, collaborative

intervention by the major powers, and so on. The most effective

mechanism will, of course, depend on the specifics of a conflict.

But the leaders of hostile ideological blocs must recognize and

agree on the dangers of allowing regional conflicts to escalate--

a lesson lost in 1914 on the leaders of a European system that

had transmutated from a balance of power one to an ideological

one.

How can use of weapons of mass destruction be avoided? If

the future security system does become an ideological one,

weapons of mass destruction will hang over every major conflict

like the sword of Damocles. By the time the future security

system coalesces, many states will have weapons of mass

destruction and the means to deliver them. Nonproliferation as it

existed in the last few decades of the 20th century will be

obsolete. It is possible, perhaps even likely, that weapons of

mass destruction will be used at some point in the next 30 years.

It will be incumbent on all the great powers, particularly the

United States, to mobilize pressure to prevent their use from

becoming routine. This will be difficult in an ideologicallybased system with its intense passions and hatreds.

How can the American public be mobilized but not inflamed?

If the United States opts for active engagement in a future

ideologically-based system, American leaders would have to find a

way to mobilize the public for the sacrifices and efforts such

engagement would entail but avoid inflaming the public to the

point that there is pressure for war. Building and sustaining

this fragile balance between too little public passion and too

much was actually one of the great (but overlooked) successes of

the Truman and Eisenhower administrations during the early years

of the Cold War. If the future security system is an ideological

one like the early Cold War system, such an endeavor would have

to be undertaken by future U.S. administrations. Their success or
32

failure would be an important determinant of the overall

stability of the global security system.

If global schisms are based on religion, how can the United

States avoid domestic tension? If analysts like Samuel Huntington

are correct, religion--particularly tension between Islam and

Christianity--will play a major part in determining the fault

lines and schisms of the future security system. This will pose

some serious domestic problems for the United States. The United

States is becoming increasingly multicultural. The number of

Islamic Americans in particular is growing rapidly. According to

Elisabeth Siddiqui:

At present, the number of Muslims in the United States

is estimated to be on the order of between 5 to 8

million. It is the fastest growing faith in this

country. Estimates indicate that by the year 2000, the

number of Muslims in the United States will be greater

than that of the Methodists, and that by the year 2010

the number will have doubled to 10 to 16 million. The

estimated conversion rate among Americans is 135,000

per year. The Defense Department reports that there are

now approximately 9000 Muslims on active duty in the

U.S. armed services (it is reported that more than 3000

Americans embraced Islam during the Gulf war alone). A

vast network of Muslim ministries also caters to some

300,000 converts in prisons, with an estimated

conversion rate of 35,000 per year.49

American Muslims have already faced harassment following

acts of terrorism linked (or thought to be linked) to the

politics of the Middle East.50 In an ideologically-based future

security system, this could be much worse. If the future global

security environment is dominated by Islam/Christian differences,

American leaders will have to be careful to prevent this from

exacerbating tensions within the United States.

How can the United States craft a total or holistic

strategy? More than any other type of security system,

ideologically-based ones require a "total" or holistic strategy

fully integrating the political, economic, psychological, and

military elements of national power.51 For a variety of reasons,

some dealing with the distribution of power within the government

and some dealing with an attitude toward the use of force that

sees it as an aberration rather than an integral part of

strategy, crafting and sustaining a coherent, holistic strategy

is somewhat difficult for Americans. To do so in a exceedingly

dangerous ideologically-based security system would probably

require fundamental reform of the strategy-making mechanisms used

in the United States. In particular, inter-agency cooperation

would need to be strengthened. This would require fundamental
33

reform of the policymaking system. Because major reorganization

always leads to the loss of power by some individuals or

institutions and its transfer to others, such change would be

difficult and require sustained, high-level involvement.

Ideology-Based System: Military Implications.

The inherent rigidity of an ideologically-based security

system diminishes the effectiveness of diplomacy. In a world

filled with weapons of mass destruction, states will attempt to

forestall conflict with diplomacy, but it is always difficult to

negotiate on core beliefs and, in an ideologically-based system,

that is what is at stake. Many diplomatic stratagems are ruled

out a priori because they are seen as "striking a deal with the

devil." As a result, the military element of national power rises

in importance. The U.S. military could probably expect higher

defense expenditures and a larger force in an ideologically-based

security system than in one built on a flexible balance of power.

An ideologically-based system has a much clearer and more

rigid strategic geography than a balance of power system since

conflict and violence tend to occur along the fault lines or grey

areas between the ideological blocs. If American policymakers opt

for extensive U.S. involvement in promoting the security of one

bloc or in serving as some sort of buffer between them, that is

where the military would be involved. In addition to deterring

aggression and defending along the bloc fault lines, the U.S.

military would also be used to reassure weaker or nonaligned

states by helping them with external defense and with internal

order. Because an ideologically-based system would involve longstanding, formal alliances rather than the fluid, ad hoc

coalitions that typify a balance of power system, the U.S.

military would have the time necessary to resolve

interoperability problems with its partners. The problem of

asymmetry--which is sure to arise as the United States pursues

the revolution in military affairs and other nations cannot or do

not--would persist. And, because the zone of conflict in an

ideologically-based system would be geographically defined, this

is the global security system that would require the greatest

amount of U.S. landpower (assuming American policymakers opt for

engagement). This does not necessarily imply that an extremely

large U.S. Army would be necessary since the revolution in

military affairs is likely to allow technology to compensate for

numbers, but effective U.S. landpower would be required to

support and bolster allies in the zone of conflict.

Alternative IV: Internal Collapse.

Strategic thinkers such as Ralph Peters and Martin van

Creveld contend that the most significant source of conflict in
34

the future security system will not be traditional state-on-state

war, but the power struggles involving sub-state actors such as

criminal cartels, militarized gangs, private armies, terrorists,

ethnic militias, and insurgents.52 Even developed states would

face serious threats from organized crime, urban gangs, regional

separatists, conspiracy-theory terrorism, radical cults, neoLuddites, and violent environmentalists. If this comes to pass,

the future security system may be one in which the primary threat

is internal disorder.

In such a system, democracy and civil rights would be

abrogated in the name of public safety. Authoritarianism would be

the norm; anarchy would be common in regions with less resilient

or resource-rich states. Governments would be so busy dealing

with internal problems that they would have little energy or

inclination for traditional interstate war. The major form of

military power projection might be the support or threatened

support of rebels, insurgents, terrorists, and militias

destabilizing hostile states. Militaries would take the form of

national police, gendarmes, or special forces. They might be

high-tech, but would have little capacity for large-scale, longrange power projection. Nations would build armed forces to

counter insurgency, terrorism and other forms of violence within

the state's borders and inside friendly states, and to support

insurgency and terrorism within the borders of enemies. The major

factors distinguishing the armed forces of different states would

be the level of technological advancement and the degree to which

the use of violence against internal enemies was constrained or

unconstrained. In general, more advanced militaries could afford

to be more restrained in the use of violence, substituting

technology, especially information and psychological technology,

for primitive violence. Less sophisticated armed forces would

have to rely on old-fashioned brutality.(See Figure 4.)

Internal Collapse: Strategic Issues.

The United States would face four major strategic issues in

a global security system characterized by internal conflict and

the collapse or near-collapse of national governments.

_________________________________________________________________

 Strategic Military

 Characteristics Issues Implications

_________________________________________________________________

• The primary • How and where should • Traditional,

threat to security the United States help state-on-state war

is internal vio- reestablish order? would be very rare,
35

lence rather than • Should the United so conventional warstate-on-state war States support friendly fighting would not

• Many weak states tyrants, warlords, or be the primary miswill fragment or separatists? sion of the U.S. 

collapse into • How should the United military

anarchy States deal with • Units similar to

• Even strong, militias, terrorists, current Special 

developed states and criminal gangs Forces would dominface internal chal- armed with weapons of ate the U.S. Army

lenges and will mass destruction? • The role of the 

sometimes respond • Should the U.S. Air Force and Navy

with draconian military be internally in U.S. military

methods or externally focused? strategy would

 diminish 

_________________________________________________________________

Figure 4. Internal Collapse.

Where and how should the United States help reestablish

order? A global security system permeated with internal collapse

and endemic violence between a chaotic array of militias, warlord

armies, and gangs of various kinds could stoke isolationism

within the United States. There would be a great need for

humanitarian involvement but engagement would often be

entangling, risking violence against Americans for limited

political gains. The tendency in the United States would be to

provide humanitarian assistance where possible and punish armed

groups for direct attacks on Americans, but, other than that, to

simply let warring factions kill each other until they tire of it

and request outside political involvement and, sometimes, peacekeepers. The notion that a conflict is only "ripe for resolution"

under specific conditions would gain wide credence among

strategic thinkers.

American involvement in a world dominated by the collapse of

political order could be measured on two scales which, to some

extent, overlay one another. The first is geographic. The United

States would have to decide whether to continue to pursue global

engagement or to limit itself to one or a few regions. Clearly,

it would be more difficult to disengage from a chaotic Central

America and Caribbean than an equally disorderly Africa. The

second scale of involvement would be one of intensity. The

greatest level of involvement would engage the United States

(including the U.S. military) in defending friends, punishing

aggressors, and actively working to engineer solutions to various

conflicts. The other end of the scale would be minimal

involvement, perhaps only the provision of relief supplies to

multinational or private humanitarian organizations. In between

would be a whole range of options involving the greater or lesser
36

use of American power. A consensus on where American strategy

should fall along these two scales would be fundamental.

Should the United States support friendly tyrants, warlords,

or separatists? As in contemporary Somalia and Bosnia, there

would seldom be a clear "good guy" in a security system permeated

by internal collapse. Most of the time, all the groups locked in

conflict would be guilty of some sort of transgression of human

rights and civil liberties. Yet many of them would seek U.S.

assistance and would be willing to offer political and economic

rewards in exchange. As during much of the Cold War, the United

States would have to decide whether to accept, perhaps even

embrace, friendly tyrants, warlords, or separatists. Good

arguments can be made both for and against this. On one hand, if

tyrants, warlords, or separatists are the only sources of local

power and authority, working with them would be the sole method

by which the United States could influence the situation, bring

humanitarian relief, and possibly prod a conflict toward

resolution of some sort. On the other hand, developing a

relationship with friendly tyrants, warlords, gang leaders, and

separatists always runs the danger of associating the United

States with unsavory, embarrassing, perhaps even evil friends,

with a concomitant erosion of prestige and public support for an

activist policy. This issue was important in shaping post-Vietnam

U.S. policy in the Third World.53 In a future system characterized

by the collapse of states, it would surface again.

How should the United States deal with militias, terrorists,

and criminal gangs who are able to acquire weapons of mass

destruction? Even though militias, terrorists, and criminal gangs

may not be able to muster the technological resources to develop

their own weapons of mass destruction, they will eventually

capture, steal, or purchase some. These may be "traditional"

weapons based on biological, chemical, or nuclear technology.

Even today, terrorists are actively pursuing these things.54 Or

the weapons of future terrorists may instead be computer programs

or devices able to do massive and rapid damage to national

electronic infrastructure. While it is impossible to predict how

and where this will happen or what the appropriate response will

be, it is fairly certain that the United States will have to deal

with new levels of terrorism in coming decades. Because of this,

an important part of U.S. strategy in a global security system

dominated by the collapse of states would be finding effective

ways to limit the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by

violent sub-state organizations, to deter or preempt the use of

the weapons if such groups do acquire them, and to respond to

blackmail if deterrence or preemption fails.

Should the U.S. military be internally or externally

focused? In a global security system dominated by internal

disorder, the United States is likely to experience similar
37

problems. While the total collapse of internal order in the

United States is unlikely, a range of challenges from urban

street gangs, high-tech extortionists, conspiracy-theory

terrorists, violent right-wing organizations to racial

separatists is at least conceivable. Under such conditions,

American leaders and the American public would have to decide

whether to return the military (particularly the Army) to its

historic mission of preserving internal order in regions where

police are incapable of doing so, or to keep the military focused

on defense against external enemies with only secondary

responsibility for internal order. If the internal challenge was

so great that the American people decided to use the military,

major changes would have to be made in law and attitudes, as well

as the organization and doctrine of the armed forces.

Internal Collapse: Military Implications.

In a security system dominated by internal disorder and the

collapse of state authority, there would be little sustained,

state-on-state war. States would use force to intervene in

neighbors and stem the spillover of disorder, but seldom against

each other. This would mean that the U.S. military would abandon

its conventional warfighting mission and focus instead on

internal order, counterterrorism, nation assistance, peace

support operations, and humanitarian relief. The Army could be

dominated by Special Forces with small, flexible units given

extensive training in languages and local politics and designed

to provide advice and training to allies. The revolution in

military affairs, which so far has focused on conventional stateon-state warfare, would be altered to produce more efficient and

effective means of operating in a low-intensity conflict

environment.55 A security system dominated by internal disorder

and the collapse of states would be one in which the U.S. Air

Force and the U.S. Navy would play a smaller role than in some of

the other future alternatives. Aerospace and naval power would be

used primarily for border patrols, anti-smuggling activities, and

prevention of illegal immigration, with some capacity for small

but long-range, precision strikes.

Alternative V: Economic Warfare.

A final plausible future security system is one

characterized by intense, sometimes violent competition between

nations and transnational entities for resources and markets.

This is similar to Edward Luttwak's concept of "geo-economics"

which mixes the traditional, adversarial, zero-sum, and

paradoxical logic of conflict with commerce's blend of

competition and cooperation.56 In such a system, there are two

possible military frameworks. In the first, states and

governments retain a near-monopoly on organized violence and the
38

legitimate use of force, and continue to serve as agents of

commercial organizations. Actions which benefit corporations such

as protection of their overseas assets and freedom of navigation

would continue to be defined as national interests. A second

framework would be one in which transnational corporations either

have their own well-armed and sometimes large security forces, or

will hire specialized security companies or even governments

looking for ways to subvent their armed forces. Glimmers of this

exist already: in Africa, a corporation called Executive

Outcomes, composed largely of former South African commandos, has

been hired by a number of governments, and many former South

African spies are forming private intelligence- gathering

agencies.57 This could be the beginning of a trend.

In a system dominated by economic warfare, military force

structure, doctrine, and equipment would be designed to minimize

collateral damage when used. If the objective of military

operations is to acquire or defend resources and markets, the

goal would obviously be to do as little damage as possible to

infrastructure, plant, and equipment. Since casualties diminish

potential customers, nonlethal weaponry will play a major role in

military operations. The most important military missions would

be information warfare against competitors and protection of

informa- tional, physical, and human assets against violence and

extortion. Armed forces would range from very sophisticated and

technology-reliant ones which serve rich nations or transitional

entities to old-fashioned thugs serving lower-level or poorer

masters. (See Figure 5.)

Economic Warfare: Strategic Issues.

In a future security system where most conflict involves the

struggle for resources and markets, three strategic issues are

likely to be the most important for the United States.

What is the appropriate relationship between the state and

transnational corporations? In a future system where conflict

arises from the struggle for resources and markets, most major

_________________________________________________________________

 Strategic Military

 Characteristics Issues Implications

_________________________________________________________________

• The major source • What is the appro- • The U.S. military

of instability is priate relationship would need only a 

intense, sometimes between the U.S. very limited capaviolent competition Government and trans- bility for tradifor resources and national commercial, tional warfighting
39

markets intelligence, and • The U.S. military

• Transnational security entities? would focus on

entities will • How can the United information warfare

develop security States help prevent and information 

interests and mili- economic competition security 

tary capabilities from causing political • Nonlethal weapons

separate from states conflict? and capabilities of

• Private security • What is the appro- all kinds would 

and intelligence priate strategy for increase in signicorporations will national information ficance 

play a major role security? 

in the system

• There would be

great pressure to

minimize collateral

damage and casualties when force is

used

_________________________________________________________________

Figure 5. Economic Warfare.

corporations will be transnational. It will be difficult to

decide which transnational corporations are American and thus

warrant the use of U.S. power resources to protect or promote. At

the extreme, the whole concept of "national" security may become

irrelevant if corporations become truly transnational and

security is defined in economic terms. Deciding under what

conditions it is appropriate to use state resources to protect a

national corporation or cartel will be a vital strategic issue.

Similarly, in a system where corporations or cartels have

their own power that transcends the strictly economic, the United

States will have to decide what sort of relationship to have with

transnational corporations or multinational cartels. Should, for

instance, the United States consider signing treaties, perhaps

even nonaggression pacts with powerful corporations? And, if

corporations do appear to pose an actual challenge to the power

of the state, should the U.S. Government pursue a strategy

designed specifically to prevent the accumulation of non-economic

power by corporations? And, what should U.S. policy be toward

transnational security corporations (a.k.a. mercenaries) such as

the highly successful Executive Outcomes composed of former South

African soldiers? Clearly, if power continues to accrue to

transnational corporations, the United States will have to rethink some of the basic tenets of its approach to security and

world politics.

How can the United States help prevent economic competition
40

from spilling over into political competition or conflict? In a

world where most conflict arises from the competition for

resources and markets, there will be the risk that struggles

between corporations could spark conflict between nations as

governments rush to support "their" commercial entities. There

are historic precedents for this. Conflict between European

trading and colonization companies in Asia, the Americas, and,

later, Africa sometimes caused European wars. In a future

security system with intense corporate competition and even

conflict, the United States would have to take deliberate steps

to build a firewall between commercial conflict and state

conflict. This would be very hard to do from a political

perspective since it might entail the government of the United

States rejecting an appeal for help from an American corporation.

What is the appropriate strategy for national information

security? If economic competition becomes the main source of

conflict in the future security system and if, as Toffler argues,

the United States develops a full-fledged "informa-tion economy,"

then protection of national information assets might become the

cornerstone of national security. Under these conditions,

crafting a strategy for national information security will be

extremely important. Such a strategy would have to develop broad

concepts for when, where, and how national power would be used to

protect information assets, and would have to be built on some

visions of the desired state of national and world information

assets. Already, some analysts are calling for such a strategy.58

The more that economics and national security meld in the future,

the greater the need for a coherent national information

strategy.

Economic Warfare: Military Implications.

There would be only limited need for a traditional

warfighting capability by the U.S. military in a security system

where conflict derives from economic competition. The U.S.

military would probably retain some capacity to deter states

still intent on waging traditional interstate war, but this would

not be the focus. Instead, the U.S. military would concentrate

more on information warfare and information security, with great

stress on nonlethal weapons. It is likely that the United States

would develop an information corps as suggested by Martin Libicki

and James A. Hazlett.59 This might go even further and see the

creation of an information security service that is either part

of or affiliated with the military. One of the great challenges

for the U.S. military would be to develop doctrine and techniques

for operating in coalition with non-state militaries such as

corporate armies or mercenary corporations. In general, though, a

future security system where economic competition is the main

source of conflict would probably see the smallest need for a
41

robust, traditional-style U.S. military.

Conclusions.

All of the future systems described here are models or

heuristic devices intended to aid analysis and long-term

planning. The actual future security system will undoubtedly

include all types of conflict, and thus be a blend of systems.

This does not mean that all forms of conflict will be of equal

importance. American political leaders and national security

strategists must thus reach a consensus on the priority or

importance of the plausible forms of future conflict. Only when

this is done can the military effectively build a program for

long-term force development.

One significant fact emerges from any assessment of

alternative future security systems: traditional, interstate

warfighting is not an eternal function, but is system specific.

It is conceivable that the global security system in place by

2030 will not be one where interstate war is a significant form

of conflict. This would require an absolutely funda- mental

reorientation of the U.S. military. Of course, it is impossible

to predict exactly what direction such a reorientation will take.

Given that, there are three things that the U.S. military can and

should do now to prepare for whatever future comes to pass.

First, it should continue to explore information warfare,

casualty-minimizing techniques, and the impact that proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction will have on military operations.

These things will be significant in any future security

environment. Second, the U.S. military should continue to

reexamine fundamental concepts and stress flexibility of

organizational structure and doctrine. Third, the U.S. military

must continue to pursue futurism. Currently, several studies of

the long-term future have been done, each using a different

methodology. These include the Air Force's Alternative Futures

for 2025, and the Project 2025 of the National Defense

University.60 In any form of innovative thinking, the first step

is to generate new methodologies, approaches and ideas, and then

to reconcile them. Military futurism is in the first stage but

should soon move toward consensus (while always allowing room for

creative dissent). In any case, by pursuing these three

intellectual endeavors, the military can generate the conceptual

raw material to make necessary changes once the future security

system finally crystallizes.

ENDNOTES

1. Charles W. Taylor, A World 2010: A New Order of Nations, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies

Institute, 1992, pp. 3-4.
42

2. This methodology based on trends and forms of conflict is

not the only one which can generate useful analysis for the

American military. A very important study by the U.S. Air Force,

for instance, identifies three "drivers" of the future: the

American world view, "∆ΤεΚ" which is the ability to employ

technology, and the "world power grid" which "describes the

general, transmission, distribution, and control of political,

military, economic, or informational power." See Joseph A.

Engelbrecht, et. al., Alternative Futures for 2025: Security

Planning to Avoid Surprise, a research paper presented to Air

Force 2025, April 1996, pp. 10-11.

3. This concept is developed in some detail in Alvin and

Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st

Century, Boston: Little, Brown, 1993.

4. Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave, New York: Bantam, 1980, p.

408.

5. This concept was introduced by Alvin Toffler in ibid., p.

158 and ff.

6. See Chris Morris, Janet Morris, and Thomas Baines,

"Weapons of Mass Protection: Nonlethality, Information Warfare

and Airpower in the Age of Chaos," Airpower Journal, Vol. 9, No.

1, Spring 1995, p. 27.

7. The most important analysis of the form of conflict known

as cyberwar is found in Alan D. Campen, Douglas H. Dearth, and R.

Thomas Goodden, eds., Cyberwar: Security, Strategy, and Conflict

in the Information Age, Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press,

1996. The Internet home page of the Institute for the Advanced

Study of Information Warfare defines information warfare as "the

offensive and defensive use of information and information

systems to exploit, corrupt, or destroy an adversary's

information and information systems, while protecting one's own.

Such actions are designed to achieve an advantage against an

adversary in a military or business situation" (http://www.

psycom.net/iwar.1.html, 13 February 1996). A good explanation is

also available in Martin C. Libicki, What is Information

Warfare?, Washington, DC: National Defense University Institute

for National Strategic Studies, 1995. So far, though, no

consensus on information warfare's strategic implications has

emerged. Many analysts within the U.S. military and Department of

Defense have viewed information warfare as an adjunct to

conventional strikes--a force multiplier--rather than a standalone method of warfare. The U.S. Air Force has shown a

particular interest in this. See, for instance, George J. Stein,

"Information Warfare," Airpower Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring
43

1995, pp. 30-55; Edward Mann, "Desert Storm: The First

Information War?" Airpower Journal, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 1994,

pp. 4-14; and, Owen Jensen, "Information Warfare: Principles of

Third-Wave War," Airpower Journal, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 1994,

pp. 35-44. There have been a few discussions of the strategic

implications of warfare as, for example, at the 1994 U.S. Air

Force Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs (Report on

the US Air Force Roundtable on the Revolution in Military

Affairs, McLean, VA: Science Applications International

Corporation, January 1994). One of the first attempts to develop

a comprehensive, strategic-level framework for information

warfare is found in John Arquilla and David Rondfelt, "Cyberwar

is Coming!" Comparative Strategy, Vol. 12, No. 2, April-June

1993, pp. 141-165; John Arquilla, "The Strategic Implications of

Information Dominance," Strategic Review, Vol. 22, No. 3, Summer

1994, pp. 24-30; and Richard Szafranski, "Theory of Information

Warfare," Airpower Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 56-

65.

8. Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift," Foreign Affairs, Vol.

76, No. 1, January/February 1997, p. 50.

9. Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, New York:

Free Press, 1991.

10. Mathews, "Power Shift," p. 51.

11. Robert David Steele, "Private Enterprise Intelligence:

Its Potential Contribution to National Security," Intelligence

and National Security, Vol. 10, No. 4, October 1995, p. 211.

12. Mathews, "Power Shift," pp. 65-66.

13. Mary H. Cooper, "Population Growth," CQ Researcher, Vol.

3, No. 26, July 16, 1993, p. 603.

14. Ronald D. Lee, "Long-Run Global Population Forecasts: A

Critical Appraisal," in Kingsley Davis and Mikail S. Bernstam,

eds., Resources, Environment, and Population: Present Knowledge,

Future Options, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 44.

15. Julian L. Simon, Population Matters: People, Resources,

Environment, and Immigration, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction,

1990, p. 190.

16. See Ibid., and George D. Moffet, Critical Masses: The

Global Population Challenge, New York: Penguin, 1994.

17. Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental

Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," International Security, Vol. 16, No. 2, Fall 1991, pp. 76-116.
44

18. Robert D. Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at

the Dawn of the 21st Century, New York: Random House, 1996, p.

117.

19. "Growing Urbanisation Increasing Poverty, U.N. Says,"

PanAfrican New Agency, electronic newswire, October 20, 1996.

20. Data is from the World Resources Institute, Washington,

DC, from 1994, reprinted in Peter Gizewski and Thomas HomerDixon, "Urban Growth and Violence: Will the Future Resemble the

Past?" Occasional Paper of the Project on Environment, Population

and Security, University of Toronto, June 1995, Appendix A.

21. Ira S. Lowry, "World Urbanization in Perspective," in

Davis and Bernstam eds., Resources, Environment, and Population,

p. 162.

22. See Howard W. French, "Booming City, Flush With Rats and

Dying Children," New York Times, September 30, 1996, p. A4.

23. Ralph Peters, "Our Soldiers, Their Cities," Parameters,

Vol. 26, No. 1, Spring 1996, p. 43.

24. For example, Internet site

http://www.wic.net/colonel/index5. htm, accessed September 23,

1996, tells of a meeting between President Eisenhower and space

aliens. Information supporting the "military movement" can be

found at Internet site http://www.apex.net/ users/patriot/,

accessed September 23, 1996; material opposed to it is at

http://www.sff.net/people/pitman/militia. htm, accessed September

23, 1996. While the militia movement and the array of conspiracytheory groups, including those dealing with UFOs, are not

necessarily interlinked, they are both manifestations of the same

psychological phenomena.

25. Bruce Hoffman, "Intelligence and Terrorism: Emerging

Threats and New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War Era,"

Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 11, No. 2, April 1996,

p. 215.

26. Sean P. Eagan, "From Spikes to Bombs: The Rise of EcoTerrorism," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 19, No. 1,

January-March 1996, p. 1.

27. Martha F. Lee, "Violence and the Environment: The Case

of 'Earth First!'," Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 7, No.

3, Autumn 1995, pp. 113-116.

28. Edward N. Luttwak, "The Shape of Things to Come,"

Commentary, June 1990, p. 25.
45

29. On this, see Steven Metz and James Kievit, Strategy and

the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies

Institute, 1995.

30. Defence in a Democracy, draft white paper on national

defence for the Republic of South Africa, June 21, 1995, chapter

2.

31. There is a large literature in political science on the

dynamics of state-based systems. Classic studies include Hans J.

Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and

Peace, 6th edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985; and Hedely

Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics,

New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.

32. For magisterial studies of the role of diplomacy in a

state-based system, see Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored:

Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822,

Boston: Houghton Mifflin, n.d., and, idem., Diplomacy, New York:

Touchstone, 1994.

33. For instance, in the period between Waterloo and the

beginning of World War I, the most costly wars in the world

included the American Civil War and the Taiping Rebellion in

China which took an estimated 20 to 30 millions lives.

34. See Edward Vose Gulick, Europe's Classical Balance of

Power, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1955.

35. During talks on U.S. national security strategy to

audiences in Latin America, I have found that simply translating

the phrase "engagement and enlargement" into Spanish causes much

concern on the part of the audience and, instead, I begin with a

fairly lengthy explanation of what policymakers mean by the terms

and then leave them untranslated on any briefing slides.

36. Pericles' Funeral Oration in Thucydides, The

Peloponnesian War, trans. Rex Warner, New York: Penguin, 1954, p.

147.

37. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy of

Engagement and Enlargement, Washington, DC: The White House,

February 1996, p. iii.

38. This is certainly not a new problem. From the beginning

of the Cold War, writers like Walter Lippmann warned of strategic

overextension in 1947. (The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign

Policy, New York: Harper, 1947.) As the United States reassessed

its world role after the collapse of the Soviet Union, analysts
46

like David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker raised the issue.

(The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America's

Purpose, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992).

39. Robert A. Pastor, "The Latin American Option," Foreign

Policy, No. 88, Fall 1992, pp. 107-125.

40. Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism," Foreign Affairs,

Vol. 75, No. 5, September/October 1996, p. 35.

41. For example, Immanuel M. Wallerstein, Geopolitics and

Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1991.

42. Developing a consensus on the level of acceptable risk

is a complex but vital part of any coherent strategy. See Steven

Metz, "Analyzing Strategic and Operational Risk," Military

Review, November 1991, pp. 78-80.

43. John M. Shalikashvili, Joint Vision 2010, Washington,

DC: The Joint Staff, 1996, p. 9.

44. See, for instance, Stuart E. Johnson and Martin C.

Libicki, Dominant Battlespace Knowledge: The Winning Edge,

Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995; Martin

C. Libicki, The Mesh and the Net: Speculations on Armed Conflict

in a Time of Free Silicon, Washington, DC: National Defense

University Press, 1994; and, Barry R. Schneider and Lawrence E.

Grinter, eds., Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Warfare

Issues, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1995. For a

theoretical and historical perspective on the revolution in

military affairs, see Steven Metz and James Kievit, Strategy and

the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies

Institute, 1995.

45. On nanotechnology, see Charles Ostman, "Nanotechnology:

The Next Revolution," 21st Century Online Magazine,

http://www.21net. com/online/nano.htm.

46. Brian Nichiporuk and Carl H. Builder, Information

Technologies and the Future of Land Warfare, Santa Monica, CA:

RAND Corporation, Arroyo Center, 1995, pp. 64-67.

47. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of

Political Ideas in the Fifties, New York: Free Press, 1962;

Francis Fukayama, Have We Reached the End of History?, Santa

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1989.

48. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?"

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49.
47

49. Elisabeth Siddiqui, "A Brief History of Islam in the

United States," http://www.colostate.edu/Orgs/MSA/docs/iia.html,

acces-sed September 20, 1996, p. 1.

50. For details, see Steven Metz, "To Insure Domestic

Tranquility: Terrorism and the Price of Global Engagement," in

Stephen C. Pelletiere, ed., Terrorism: National Security and the

Home Front, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College,

Strategic Studies Institute, 1995.

51. The concept of "total strategy" within the context of

ideological struggle was developed by the French general Andre

Beaufre. See An Introduction to Strategy, New York: Frederick A.

Praeger, 1965.

52. For instance, Ralph Peters, "The Culture of Future

Conflict," Parameters, Vol. 25, No. 4, Winter 1995-96, pp. 18-27;

and Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, New York: Free

Press, 1991.

53. See Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle, eds., Friendly

Tyrants: An American Dilemma, London: Macmillan, 1991.

54. John F. Sopko, "The Changing Proliferation Threat,"

Foreign Policy, No. 105, Winter 1996-97, pp. 5-6.

55. For details, see Steven Metz and James Kievit, The

Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War,

Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies

Institute, 1994.

56. Edward N. Luttwak, "From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics:

Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce," The National Interest,

No. 20, Summer 1990, pp. 17-24; and idem., The Endangered

American Dream, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993. Luttwak first

developed the notion of the "paradoxical logic of conflict" in

Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Cambridge, MA: Belknap,

1987.

57. "Private Intelligence-Gathering Companies Increase,"

Financial Mail (Johannesburg), January 17, 1997, reprinted in

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-AFR-97-011, January

17, 1997 (electronic edition).

58. For instance, Winn Schwartau, Information Warfare: Chaos

on the Electronic Superhighway, New York: Thunder's Mouth Press,

1994.

59. Martin Libicki and James A. Hazlett, "Do We Need an

Information Corps?" Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn 1993, pp. 88-
48

97.

60. Engelbrecht, et al., Alternative Futures for 2025; Alvin

H. Bernstein, et al., Project 2025, Washington, DC: National

Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies,

1991.
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