[Cite as State v. Dixon, 2018-Ohio-192.]

 

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

WILLIAM DIXON 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 27652 

Trial Court Case No. 05-CR-4213/4 

(Criminal Appeal from 

 Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 19th day of January, 2018. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by SARAH E. HUTNIK, Atty. Reg. No. 0095900, Montgomery 

County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division, Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 

West Third Street, 5th Floor, Dayton, Ohio 45402 

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

WILLIAM DIXON, #529-169, Toledo Correctional Institute, P.O. Box 80033, 2001 E. 

Central Avenue, Toledo, OH 43608 

 Defendant-Appellant, Pro Se 

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HALL, J. 

{¶ 1} William Dixon appeals pro se from the trial court’s denial of his April 17, 2017 

motion for relief from judgment on the basis of a void sentence. 

{¶ 2} Although Dixon’s appellate brief lacks an assignment of error, the essence 

of his argument, both in his motion below and on appeal, is that the trial court erred in 

failing to merge allied offenses when it sentenced him in 2006 to an aggregate twentyone-year prison term for complicity to commit aggravated robbery, complicity to commit 

aggravated burglary, and complicity to commit felonious assault, all with firearm 

specifications. 

{¶ 3} Following his conviction, Dixon filed an unsuccessful direct appeal. He also 

unsuccessfully pursued post-conviction relief on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Dixon, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 21823, 2008-Ohio-755; State v. Dixon, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23592, 

2010-Ohio-2635; State v. Dixon, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26873, 2016-Ohio-5538. 

{¶ 4} In his recent motion for relief from judgment, Dixon argued that the trial court 

had a mandatory duty to merge allied offenses of similar import in his case and that res 

judicata did not preclude him from raising the issue now because the non-merger of allied 

offenses rendered his 2006 sentence void. (Doc. #11). The trial court rejected Dixon’s 

argument. While not conceding that he was entitled to merger, the trial court reasoned 

that a failure to merge allied offenses of similar import renders a sentence voidable, not 

void. That being so, the trial court concluded that res judicata applied because Dixon 

could have raised the issue on direct appeal. (Doc. #15). 

{¶ 5} Upon review, we see no error in the trial court’s ruling. Any allied-offense 

sentencing error would have rendered Dixon’s sentence voidable, not void. Thus, res 
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judicata precludes him from raising an allied-offense issue in post-conviction proceedings 

when the issue could have been raised on direct appeal. 1 State v. Byrd, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 26700, 2015-Ohio-5293, ¶ 10 (“The failure to merge allied offenses does 

not render a judgment void, but voidable. * * * Consequently, challenges to the trial court’s 

failure to merge allied offenses are barred by the doctrine of res judicata if they could 

have been, but were not, raised on direct appeal.”); see also State v. Haynes, 2d Dist. 

Clark No. 2013 CA 90, 2014-Ohio-2675, ¶ 14 (“[T]he issues raised in Haynes’s 

assignments of error could have been raised on direct appeal, and are barred by res 

judicata, regardless of whether they might be characterized as plain error.”); State v. 

Dominguez, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26853, 2016-Ohio-5051, ¶ 11 (“Because 

Dominguez could have raised the allied-offense issue in a direct appeal, the trial court 

correctly concluded that res judicata applied to his post-conviction motions.”). Here we 

see no reason why Dixon could not have raised an allied-offense argument on direct 

appeal, and he has not identified any such reason. 

{¶ 6} In his reply brief, Dixon suggests that his attorney actually did raise an alliedoffense issue on direct appeal. This court’s February 22, 2008 opinion affirming Dixon’s 

conviction on direct appeal contains no reference to an allied-offense issue. See State v. 

Dixon, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21823, 2008-Ohio-755. But even if we assume his 

assertion is true, res judicata still applies. See, e.g., State v. Kidd, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2016-

CA-87, 2017-Ohio-6996, ¶ 12 (recognizing that res judicata applies to issues that were or 

could have been raised on direct appeal). 

 

1 Dixon appears to believe that some “new law” renders a sentence void if it results from 

an error in failing to merge allied offenses of similar import. But none of the cases he cites 

stand for that proposition, which is contrary to Ohio law. 
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{¶ 7} In short, the trial court correctly found that Dixon’s sentence would have been 

voidable, not void, if an allied-offense error had occurred and that res judicata applied. 

The judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court is affirmed. 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

WELBAUM, J. and TUCKER, J., concur. 

Copies mailed to: 

Mathias H. Heck 

Sarah E. Hutnik 

William Dixon 

Hon. Steven K. Dankof