Filed 11/23/15

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re DAKOTA J., et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

B264460

(Los Angeles County

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

STACEY J.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Super. Ct. No. CK74743)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Teresa Sullivan, Judge. Reversed.

Valerie N. Lankford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Office of the County Counsel, Mary C. Wickham, Interim County Counsel, 

Dawyn R. Harrison, Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

___________________________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

Appellant Stacey J. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s dispositional order 

removing her sons, Dakota and Joseph, from her physical custody and ordering suitable 

placement. Mother contends the court erred by removing the boys under Welfare & 

Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c), because the boys were not in her physical 

custody at the time the Department filed its petition, and had not been in her custody for 

several years prior.

1

 Mother also argues, in the alternative, that no substantial evidence 

supports the removal order, and that the court should have considered noncustodial 

placement under section 361.2, subdivision (a), rather than removal under section 361,

subdivision (c). We agree with mother’s first argument and reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mother has three children, Dakota (age 18)2, Joseph (age 15) and Faith (age 10). 

All three children were the subject of a prior juvenile dependency proceeding initiated 

in 2008. In connection with that proceeding, mother was awarded legal and physical 

custody of Dakota and Joseph in 2010.

3 However, for the past six or seven years, the 

boys lived with their father’s step-father, Michael Y, and saw mother only for a few 

hours each week.

4

 Faith continued to reside with mother.

In October 2014, the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) 

received an anonymous referral regarding Faith. In response to the referral, 

a Department social worker attempted to visit mother and Faith at the hotel where they 

were living. Mother refused to open the door to her hotel room or to speak with the 

 

1 All further statutory section references are to the Welfare & Institutions Code.

2 Dakota was 17 years old at the time the petition was filed.

3

The detention report states that mother was granted sole physical, but joint legal 

custody with the boys’ father. However, the jurisdiction/disposition report states that 

mother had sole legal custody.

4 Although the Department included allegations regarding the boys’ father in the 

current petition, he is not a party to this appeal. Accordingly, we do not discuss the 

allegations and facts pertinent only to him.
3

social worker. A few days later, another social worker attempted to visit mother at the 

hotel. Although mother initially opened the door to her room, when she learned the 

social worker was from the Department, she responded with profanity and threats of 

violence, then slammed the door. At the social worker’s request, officers from the 

Inglewood Police Department came to the hotel to assist with the Department’s

investigation. Mother refused to open her hotel room door, and would not comply with 

the officers’ verbal request to allow the social worker to see Faith and assess her 

condition. After the officers learned that there were outstanding warrants against 

mother, they obtained a key from the hotel attendant and opened the hotel room door. 

The officers entered the hotel room and observed Faith sitting on the bed. Mother said 

to the officers, “ ‘I have a right to kill you here because I don’t like cops. I have a right 

to murder you here now that you are inside my home.’ ” Mother attempted to strike the 

officers and, after a brief struggle, one of the officers used a Taser to subdue her. 

Mother was subsequently hospitalized with a broken arm.

With mother’s consent, the Department placed Faith temporarily with a family 

friend, Dorothy W., while mother was in the hospital. During an initial interview, 

Faith told the social worker she was nine years old but did not go to school. Faith said 

she left the hotel room only occasionally, when she would go with her mother to buy 

cigarettes. Faith also disclosed that mother smoked cigarettes and “other stuff.”

The Department conducted a comprehensive investigation of the family over the 

next several weeks. After mother was discharged from the hospital, a social worker 

visited mother and Faith at Dorothy’s home. Mother appeared frustrated by the 

investigation and denied neglecting Faith. Mother initially refused to answer the social 

worker’s questions, stating “ ‘you guys are in the process of me being in the Cold War. 

It’s international elite conspiracy. I don’t need to answer you.’ ” Mother later 

explained to the social worker that she had a microchip implanted in the left side of her 

neck behind her left ear to protect her. Mother stated she “did not abuse the power of 

the microchip even though she could have used it to find out classified 

information . . . . ”
4

Mother became increasingly agitated during the interview at Dorothy’s house 

and asked the social worker if Dorothy could join them. When the social worker stated 

the interview was intended to be confidential, mother responded, “ ‘[t]here is nothing 

confidential with me because I am sure the people at pentagon [sic.] are listening 

through the microchip.’ ” Mother also said the microchip implanted in her head sent her 

visual images, and the people watching her were “ ‘mixed people who were alien 

species that look like people,’ ” and were “ ‘everywhere.’ ” Mother stated she taught 

Faith how to identify the aliens because most people cannot recognize them and they 

can come through the television. She told the social worker she had been seeing white 

flies flying all over her recently, and also explained that the moon is a holographic 

satellite.

With regard to Faith, mother confirmed she was being homeschooled, but 

acknowledged the homeschooling was not being overseen by any educational entity. 

Although mother denied taking Faith to beg for money, she admitted that they “go out 

to do ‘freedom of speech stuff’ which is asking for money.” Mother claimed Faith had 

been receiving regular medical care, but refused to provide the name of any physician 

who had ever treated Faith. Mother also acknowledged that Faith did not receive 

immunizations because “they are poisonous,” and did not see a dentist because dentists 

are “ ‘scandalous and the fluoride in the toothpaste is poisonous.’ ” As to Dakota and 

Joseph, mother confirmed their father was in jail and the boys were living with 

Michael Y.

After meeting with mother, the social worker interviewed Faith, who confirmed 

many of the details mother provided. Faith disclosed she had seen her mother smoke 

cigarettes “and something that looked like little white stone and wood color looking 

wrapper,” and that mother had a pipe and would sometimes put flowers in the pipe and 

smoke.

A few weeks after the interview at Dorothy’s house, the social worker called 

mother to confirm that she would be taking Faith to get a medical examination. Mother 

said the hospital had contacted her to schedule an appointment. However, mother 
5

responded, “ ‘I don’t have to do anything that you guys said and I am not taking her to 

Harbor UCLA. Those government hospitals are where they implant microchip in 

people. I think you are working with the Zulus and you seem to be an agent.’ ” Mother 

abruptly ended the phone call and the Department’s further efforts to contact her were 

unsuccessful.

The Department also interviewed Dakota and Joseph.5 Dakota told the social 

worker he and Joseph lived with mother until he was 12 or 13 years old, at which time 

mother was evicted from her home. Dakota and Joseph had been living with 

Michael Y. since that time. Dakota stated he was attending continuation school, rather 

than high school. He explained that during 10th and 11th grades he didn’t do his 

homework and, as a result, fell behind in school. Although Dakota initially said mother 

was “mentally fine,” he later said “ ‘she believes that there are too many conspiracies 

about the Government and that the moon is a hologram. She just says things that 

I cannot understand, at times.’ ” Dakota remembered mother participated in a drug 

rehabilitation program when he was four years old in order to treat her crack cocaine 

addiction and denied mother was currently using drugs.

Joseph said he believed mother “ ‘is a good mom, but can be overprotective.’ ” 

He expressed concern for mother’s mental health, stating “ ‘I am worried about her 

paranoia, because she believes there are problems with the world and that someone 

could break into the house to kill us or hurt us.’ ” Joseph confirmed he was having 

difficulty in school but was trying to schedule time to do his homework. He described 

Michael Y. as “ ‘a nice guy,’ ” and said Michael provided food for the boys, transported 

them as needed, and washed their laundry for them. Joseph confirmed he felt safe with 

Michael Y. and at his home.

 

5

The Department interviewed Michael Y. as well, and included a number of 

statements attributed to him in its jurisdiction/disposition report. However, because the 

court sustained mother’s objection on hearsay grounds, Michael Y.’s statements have 

not been considered by this court.
6

On November 18, 2014, the Department filed a juvenile dependency petition 

under section 300, subdivision (b), seeking jurisdiction over all three children. The 

Department alleged mother was unable to provide regular care and supervision of the 

children due to her mental health condition; specifically, mother appeared to suffer 

from delusions, visual hallucinations and paranoid behaviors. Mother denied the 

allegations of the petition. The court detained all three children and ordered mother’s 

visitation to be supervised. The court also ordered mother to submit to random drug 

testing as well as a mental health and dual diagnosis assessment.

The Department attempted to contact mother in December 2014 regarding the 

petition. Mother stated she would not talk with the social worker without her attorney 

present. The Department repeatedly attempted to contact both mother and her attorney, 

without success. The Department also interviewed the children again. Dakota said that 

although mother believed in conspiracies, it did not affect her ability to parent the 

children. He said he had heard his mother talk about the microchip in her head and her 

belief that she was being watched through the television, but said, “ ‘I don’t pay 

attention to it. I feel safe with my mom. I’ve never felt threatened by my mom in any 

way.’ ” Joseph responded in a similar fashion. Faith told the social worker that 

“ ‘Mommy believes there are aliens in the TV. Mommy don’t like fluoride she says its 

poison. We use water to brush our teeth.’ ”

The Department filed an amended petition on January 29, 2015, adding an 

allegation that mother was unable to care for her children due to chronic use of 

marijuana and cocaine. According to the Department’s last minute information dated 

March 9, 2015, mother submitted to seven drug tests between November 18, 2014 and 

February 27, 2015. Mother tested positive for opiates (codeine, morphine, and/or

hydrocodone) on four occasions and failed to appear on one occasion. She tested 

negative for all drugs on one occasion, but also tested positive for cocaine on another 

occasion. In response to the positive drug tests, mother told the Department she was 

taking prescription pain medication, but she initially failed to provide the Department 

with copies or any other evidence of the prescriptions. However, mother later 
7

photographed the prescription bottles and provided the photos to the Department. 

Mother also stated on March 31, 2015, that she would not continue to submit to drug 

tests or follow the other court directives because “she feels that the drug testing site lied 

and that they are setting her up.” Her counsel later represented that mother “believes 

that the positive test [for cocaine] on January 31st was tampered with by Pacific 

Toxicology and/or somebody associated with Pacific Toxicology.”

The court held an adjudication hearing on April 13, 2015. The court found true 

both allegations regarding mother and found jurisdiction with respect to all three 

children under section 300, subdivision (b). With respect to the disposition, the court 

declared all three children to be dependents of the court and then found, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that there would be a substantial danger to the children’s physical 

health, safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being if they were returned to 

mother. Accordingly, the court issued an order removing all three children from mother 

and ordering suitable placement.

Mother timely appeals.

DISCUSSION

This case presents the following issue for our consideration: Where clear and 

convincing evidence supports removal of one child from a parent’s physical custody, 

may a juvenile court also order removal of the parent’s other children, when those 

children are not living with that parent at the relevant time? We conclude the court may 

not do so because, as mother argues, the Legislature has only authorized removal of 

a child from the physical custody of the parent(s) “with whom the child resides at the 

time the petition was initiated.” (§ 361, subd. (c), emphasis added.)

Although we usually review dispositional orders for substantial evidence, 

because the issue in this case involves the interpretation and application of a statute, our 

review is de novo. (In re D’Anthony D. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 292, 298.)

1. The Court Erred By Applying the Removal Statute to Dakota and Joseph

Section 361, subdivision (c)(1), provides in relevant part: “A dependent child 

shall not be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents or guardian or 
8

guardians with whom the child resides at the time the petition was initiated, unless the 

juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence . . . . [¶] [t]here is or would be 

a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional 

well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable 

means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the 

minor from the minor’s parent’s or guardian’s physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c).) 

Mother’s primary contention on appeal is that section 361, subdivision (c), does not 

apply to Dakota and Joseph because the boys were not in her physical custody: It was 

undisputed the boys had been living with their step-grandfather for at least five years 

before the Department filed its petition in this case. We agree.

In construing a statute, our role is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so that we 

may effectuate the purpose of the law. (In re J. W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200, 209.) We 

consider the words of the statute first, because they are normally the most reliable 

indicator of legislative intent. (Ibid.) Where, as here, the statutory language is 

unambiguous, the plain meaning controls. (See, e.g., In re D’Anthony D., supra, 

230 Cal.App.4th at p. 298.)

Section 361, subdivision (c), authorizes a child’s removal “from the physical 

custody of his or her parents or guardian or guardians with whom the child resides at the 

time the petition was initiated.” (§ 361, subd. (c), emphasis added.) Although we found 

no published case in the juvenile dependency context addressing the meaning of 

“resides” as it is used in this section, historically the term “resides” has been commonly

used and understood to mean “to dwell permanently or for a considerable amount of 

time.” (Leroux v. Industrial Acc. Commission of Cal. (1934) 140 Cal.App. 569, 573; 

see also Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 2001) p. 993, col. 1 

[reside: “to dwell permanently or continuously”].) Applying this definition, it is plain 
9

that the statute does not contemplate that a child could be removed from a parent who is 

not living with the child at the relevant time.6

Our interpretation of the statute is internally consistent. For instance, 

section 361, subdivision (c)(1), also provides that where a child under the age of five 

has been declared a dependent of the court due to severe physical abuse by the parent or 

other adult known to the parent, the court must “consider, as a reasonable means to 

protect the minor, each of the following: (A) The option of removing an offending 

parent or guardian from the home. (B) Allowing a nonoffending parent or guardian to 

retain physical custody as long as that parent or guardian presents a plan acceptable to 

the court demonstrating that he or she will be able to protect the child from future 

harm.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) These provisions reflect the statute’s focus on removal as 

a means of addressing abuse and neglect originating from the child’s home environment

in particular.

Our interpretation is also compatible with the considerable body of case law 

emphasizing that one of the major goals of the dependency system is to preserve the 

family unit. “The governing statute, section 361, subdivision (c), is clear and specific: 

Even though children may be dependents of the juvenile court, they shall not be 

removed from the home in which they are residing at the time of the petition unless 

there is clear and convincing evidence of a substantial danger to the child’s physical 

health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being and there are no 

 

6

The statute enumerates one, and only one, situation in which a court may order 

removal from a parent with whom the child does not reside. Section 361, 

subdivision (c)(5), authorizes the court to issue a removal order in the limited 

circumstance where “[t]he minor has been left without any provision for his or her 

support, or a parent who has been incarcerated or institutionalized cannot arrange for the 

care of the minor, or a relative or other adult custodian with whom the child has been 

left by the parent is unwilling or unable to provide care or support for the child and the 

whereabouts of the parent is unknown and reasonable efforts to locate him or her have 

been unsuccessful.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(5).) In this case, the court did not order removal 

under this subsection. We decline to extend this exception beyond its express terms to 

include the present situation, which does not involve incarceration, institutionalization, 

or the total abandonment described in subdivision (c)(5).
10

‘reasonable means’ by which the child can be protectedwithout removal. [Citation.] 

The statute embodies ‘an effort to shift the emphasis of the child dependency laws to 

maintaining children in their natural parent’s homes where it was safe to do so.’ 

[Citations.]” (In re Jasmine G. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 282, 288.) In that context, courts

have consistently held that removal “is a last resort, to be considered only when the 

child would be in danger if allowed to reside with the parent.” (In re Henry V. (2004) 

119 Cal.App.4th 522, 525.)

We are aware that mother was given legal custody of the boys in 2010, in 

connection with a prior dependency proceeding. However, given the plain meaning of 

the statute and a common sense interpretation of the phrase “parent [] . . . with whom 

the child resides,” we conclude the statute does not authorize an order of removal from 

every parent having legal custody rights, even those who do not currently reside with 

their children. Rather, as we have concluded, the Legislature chose to authorize 

removal only from a parent who is residing with his or her child. (Cf. In re Isayah C. 

(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 700 [“[A] parent may have custody of a child, in a legal 

sense, even while delegating the day-to-day care of that child to a third party for 

a limited period of time.”]) Courts considering temporary placement following removal 

are in agreement with our approach. For example, the court of appeal in In re Abram L.

(2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 452, concluded a juvenile court order removing two children 

from their mother was supported by substantial evidence. The court reversed the 

removal order as to father and observed the children “could not be removed from 

father’s physical custody under section 361, subdivision (c)(1) because they were not 

residing with him when the petition was initiated.” (Id. at p. 460.) The court held that 

following the removal of the children from their mother, the juvenile court should have 

considered whether to place the children with their noncustodial father under 

section 361.2, subdivision (a). (Id.; see also In re V.F. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 962, 969 

[noting § 361, subdivision (c), “does not, by its terms, encompass the situation of the 

noncustodial parent”].)
11

We conclude the court erred by ordering Dakota and Joseph removed from 

mother’s physical custody under section 361, subdivision (c), because they were not 

residing with mother when the Department initiated the petition and had not been 

residing with her for at least five years. Accordingly, we need not address mother’s 

contention that the removal order is not supported by substantial evidence. In addition, 

we do not address the parties’ arguments relating to the applicability of section 361.2, 

because that statute governs placement of a child after the court issues a valid removal 

order. (§ 361.2; see In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1820 

[“Section 361.2 establishes the procedures a court must follow for placing a dependent 

child following removal from the custodial parent pursuant to section 361.”].)

Finally, we reject the Department’s contention that mother forfeited her 

arguments on appeal by failing to object below. First, at the dispositional hearing, 

mother objected “to the court making any dispositional orders as it is her position that 

there was no basis for such orders.” We read this statement to include an objection to 

removal because the Department made clear in its jurisdictional/dispositional report that 

it was seeking to remove all three children under section 361, subdivision (c). Second, 

it was undisputed throughout the proceedings below that the boys were not residing 

with mother, as their counsel pointed out to the court at the hearing. On this record, the 

applicability of section 361, subdivision (c), is a question of law which we would 

exercise our discretion to address in any event. (See, e.g., In re Jonathan P. (2014) 

226 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1252 [finding father did not forfeit appellate review of whether 

the juvenile court failed to apply or comply with § 361.2 because the arguments raised 

by father were primarily issues of law]; In re Abram L., supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 462 [same].)

2. The Court’s Error Was Not Harmless

We cannot reverse the court’s judgment unless its error was prejudicial, i.e., it is 

reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been 

reached in the absence of the error. (See, e.g., In re Abram L., supra, 219 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 463.) In this case, the prejudice from the court’s removal order is manifest.
12

“A parent’s right to care, custody and management of a child is a fundamental 

liberty interest protected by the federal Constitution that will not be disturbed except in 

extreme cases where a parent acts in a manner incompatible with parenthood. 

[Citations.]” (In re Marquis D., supra, 38 Cal.App.4th p. 1828.) “[F]reedom of 

personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by 

the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citations.]” (Santosky v. Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 

753 (Santosky); Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 251.) Thus, the 

constitutional right of parents to make decisions regarding their children’s upbringing 

precludes the state from intervening, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of 

a need to protect the child from severe neglect or physical abuse. (Santosky, supra, at 

pp. 769–770; Marquis D., supra, at pp. 1828–1829.)

Our Legislature has acknowledged the gravity of a removal order. Before a court 

may order a child physically removed from his or her parents, it must find, by clear and 

convincing evidence, the child would be at substantial risk of harm if returned home and 

there are no reasonable means by which the child can be protected without removal. 

(§ 361, subd. (c)(1); Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 248.) This is a heightened 

standard of proof, as compared to the preponderance of the evidence standard necessary 

to find jurisdiction over a child. (Compare § 355, subd. (a) [jurisdiction must be 

established by preponderance of the evidence] with § 361, subd. (c) [removal authorized 

only upon clear and convincing evidence of risk of substantial harm]; see also 

In re Henry V., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 528 [noting that “the burden of proof is 

substantially greater at the dispositional phase than it is at the jurisdictional phase if the 

minor is to be removed from his or her home”].) “Removal on any ground not 

involving parental rejection, abandonment, or institutionalization requires a finding that 

there are no reasonable means of protecting the child without depriving the parent of 

custody. (§ 361, subd. (c); see Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 

253.)” (Id. at p. 525.)

The heightened standard of proof is crucial, and necessary to provide due 

process, because “[a] dispositional order removing a child from a parent’s custody is 
13

‘a critical firebreak in California’s juvenile dependency system’ [citation], after which 

a series of findings by a preponderance of the evidence may result in termination of 

parental rights.” (In re Henry V., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 530.) Further, the 

issuance of a removal order triggers the provision (or denial) of reunification services 

and starts the clock running on reunification efforts. (See §§ 361.5 [reunification 

services]; 366 [status review]; 366.21 [review hearings]; 366.22 [18 month permanency 

review].) Specifically, “[a]t the 12-month review, if the court does not return the child 

and finds that there is no substantial probability of return to the parent within 18 months 

of the original removal order, the court must terminate reunification efforts and set the 

matter for a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 for the selection and implementation of 

a permanent plan. (§ 366.21, subd. (g).) Even then, the court must determine by clear 

and convincing evidence that reasonable reunification services have been provided or 

offered to the parents. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) If the child is not returned to the 

parents at the 18-month review, the court must set the matter for a section 366.26 

hearing [to terminate parental rights].” (Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 249.)

Although there is ample evidence in the record concerning mother’s current 

inability to care for her children, we also acknowledge that mother recognized her 

situation and made arrangements for her boys to live with a relative who has cared for 

them and provided them with a stable home. Imposing a removal order in that instance 

is not only contrary to the plain language of the statute but is also punitive.

In addition, while it may often be the case that where removal of one child is 

necessary, removal of all children in the family also is necessary, that will not always be 

the case. (See, e.g., In re Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 147-148 [reversing 

removal order because fact of infant’s injury did not constitute clear and convincing 

evidence of a substantial risk of harm to older sibling].) That is, where more than one 

child is the subject of a dependency proceeding, the juvenile court must analyze each 

child’s circumstances independently at the dispositional stage. Although there is 

overwhelming evidence to support the removal order as to Faith, Dakota and Joseph 
14

have been well cared for and felt safe while with Michael Y. in his home for more than 

five years. The Department does not argue otherwise.

DISPOSITION

The portion of the court’s dispositional order removing Dakota and Joseph from 

mother’s physical custody under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), is reversed. 

Although we reverse the dispositional order because it is based on an improper 

application of section 361, subdivision (c), nothing in this opinion should be construed 

to restrict the court’s authority on remand to make a new dispositional order applying 

any applicable statute or rule. We note, for example, section 361, subdivision (a)(1), 

allows the court to “limit the control to be exercised over the dependent child by any 

parent or guardian . . . . ” (§ 361, subd. (a)(1).) Unlike section 361, subdivision (c), 

section 361, subdivision (a), applies to “any parent or guardian,” not solely custodial 

parents or guardians. Similarly, section 362, subdivision (a), further authorizes the 

court to “make any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, 

maintenance, and support of the child . . . . ” (§ 362, subd. (a).) We leave the specific 

provisions of the new dispositional order to the court’s sound discretion.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

LAVIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

ALDRICH, Acting P. J. JONES, J.

*

 

*

Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.