UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

ZACHARY TAYLOR, #597646, 

 

 Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 15-12433 

 Honorable Robert H. Cleland 

 Magistrate Judge David R. Grand 

v. 

 

RANDALL HAAS, GEORGE 

STEPHENSON, DARRELL STEWARD, 

and REGINA JENKINS-GRANT, 

 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS [23] AND TO DENY AS MOOT 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [17] 

I. REPORT 

A. Background 

On June 30, 2015, Plaintiff Zachary Taylor (“Taylor”) filed his pro se civil rights 

complaint against Defendants Randall Haas, George Stephenson, Darrell Steward, and Regina 

Jenkins-Grant (collectively the “MDOC Defendants”). (Doc. #1). This case has been referred to 

the undersigned for all pretrial purposes. (Doc. #18). 

The MDOC Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on September 17, 2015. 

(Doc. #17). In their motion, the MDOC Defendants argue that Taylor’s complaint should be 

dismissed because he did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing suit, as 

required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). (Id.). Taylor 

failed to timely respond to the MDOC Defendants’ motion; therefore, on October 26, 2015, and 

December 2, 2015, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause and Final Order to Show Cause, 

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respectively. (Docs. #20, 21). In those Orders, Taylor was directed to show cause as to why this 

Court should not recommend that the MDOC Defendants’ motion be granted and/or that his 

action be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). (Id.). 

On December 21, 2015, Taylor filed a Motion to Dismiss, asking the Court to dismiss his 

case and indicating that he “does not oppose” the MDOC Defendants’ assertions that he failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by the PLRA. (Doc. #23). Taylor further 

indicates that the MDOC Defendants’ motion “is uncontested.” (Id.). On December 28, 2015, 

the MDOC Defendants filed a “Consent to Voluntary Dismissal,” indicating their agreement 

with Taylor’s request for voluntary dismissal of his lawsuit. (Doc. #24). 

B. Analysis

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) governs voluntary dismissals in federal court. Here, where a motion 

for summary judgment has been filed, and in the absence of a stipulation of dismissal signed by 

all parties, the plaintiff is required to seek an order of the court to voluntarily dismiss his suit. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). The court may grant a request for voluntary dismissal “on terms 

that the court considers proper.” Id. Whether to permit a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss his case 

is a matter committed to the court’s discretion. See Banque de Depots v. Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 

491 F.2d 753, 757 (6th Cir. 1974). An “abuse of discretion is found only where the defendant 

would suffer ‘plain legal prejudice’ as a result of a dismissal without prejudice....” Bridgeport 

Music, Inc. v. Universal-MCA Music Publ’g, Inc., 583 F.3d 948, 953 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal 

quotations omitted). Voluntary dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) is without 

prejudice, unless the court’s order states otherwise. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). 

In this case, the MDOC Defendants have specifically indicated that they agree with 

Taylor’s request for dismissal. (Doc. #24). Because the MDOC Defendants have not contended 

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that they will suffer any prejudice as a result of the voluntary dismissal of Taylor’s claims, the 

Court will not presume the existence of prejudice. See Hicks v. Welton, 2010 WL 2507775, at *1 

(W.D. Mich. June 17, 2010). For these reasons, Taylor’s request to voluntarily dismiss his 

claims against the MDOC Defendants should be granted.1

II. RECOMMENDATION 

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Taylor’s Motion to 

Dismiss (Doc. #23) be GRANTED and that Taylor’s Complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE as to all of the named Defendants. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that 

the MDOC Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #17) be DENIED AS MOOT. 

Dated: December 30, 2015 s/David R. Grand 

Ann Arbor, Michigan DAVID R. GRAND 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

REVIEW

Either party to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but must act within fourteen days of service of a copy hereof as provided for 

in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file specific objections constitutes 

a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. 

Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 

1981). Filing objections which raise some issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not 

preserve all objections that party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. 

Secretary of HHS, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers Local 

231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). A copy of any objection must be served upon this 

 

1

 Because the Court is recommending dismissing Taylor’s complaint without prejudice, the 

MDOC Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. #17) should be denied as moot. 

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Magistrate Judge. E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2). 

Note these additional requirements at the direction of Judge Cleland: 

Each objection must be labeled as “Objection #1,” “Objection #2,” etc., and must 

specify precisely the provision of this Report and Recommendation to which it pertains. Not 

later than fourteen days after service of objections, the non-objecting party must file a 

response to the objections, specifically addressing each issue raised in the objections in the same 

order and labeled as “Response to Objection #1,” “Response to Objection #2,” etc. The response 

must be concise and proportionate in length and complexity to the objections, but there is 

otherwise no page limitation. 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record 

and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class 

U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on December 30, 2015. 

 s/Eddrey O. Butts 

 EDDREY O. BUTTS 

 Case Manager 

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