In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

Nos. 22-1743, 22-1744, 22-1745, 22-1746, 22-1747, 22-1748, 22-

1749, 22-1750, 22-1751, 22-1752, 22-1753, 22-1754, 22-1755, 22-

1756, 22-1757, & 22-1758 

RICHARD MAZUREK, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v.

METALCRAFT OF MAYVILLE, INC., 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

Nos. 17-cv-1439, 20-cv-0435, 20-cv-0436, 20-cv-0438, 20-cv-0439,

20-cv-0440, 20-cv-0441, 20-cv-0443, 20-cv-0447, 20-cv-0448, 20-cv-0449,

20-cv-0451, 20-cv-0452, 20-cv-0454, 20-cv-0455, 20-cv-0490 — 

Brett H. Ludwig, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED OCTOBER 28, 2022 — DECIDED AUGUST 2, 2024 

____________________ 

Before SCUDDER, KIRSCH, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit 

Judges. 

JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge. A group of employees 

sued their employer, Metalcraft of Mayville, for failing to pay 

them for time spent working just before or after their shifts. 
2 Nos. 22-1743, et al. 

The workers suffered a major blow at summary judgment; the 

district court ruled their lawsuits were based on vague recollections and fragmentary evidence. Metalcraft, perhaps emboldened by the district court’s strong language in granting it

summary judgment, then pushed for sanctions against plaintiffs’ counsel, characterizing the lawsuits as frivolous from the 

start. The district court disagreed, ruling that sanctions would 

be “overkill.” Metalcraft brought this appeal in response, but 

in doing so has made unwarranted claims about the frivolity 

of the suits and cast unfair aspersions on the honesty of opposing counsel. Because there was just enough factual and legal support for the plaintiffs’ claims and because the behavior 

of plaintiffs’ counsel does not fit Metalcraft’s expansive allegations, we uphold the denial of sanctions. 

I 

Richard Mazurek, a machinist at Metalcraft’s West Bend, 

Wisconsin, plant, filed a Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) collective action in October 2017. The suit, pressed on behalf of 

himself and a class of hourly employees at his plant and the 

company’s Mayville, Wisconsin, plant, alleged the workers 

were denied overtime pay. Metalcraft’s timekeeping system 

allowed employees to punch in up to 15 minutes before their 

scheduled start times and punch out up to 15 minutes after 

their scheduled end times. When employees clocked in early 

but did not perform compensable work, the clock-in time was 

adjusted to the regular start time for the employee, as opposed to when they punched the clock. The employees alleged that these adjustments to the on-paper start time happened despite working during these 15-minute periods. 

The collective action was decertified in April 2020. Afterwards, the workers filed 24 additional cases which the district 
Nos. 22-1743, et al. 3

court consolidated. Nine cases were subsequently dismissed 

for various reasons, the most common being communication 

issues between client and counsel. Of the remaining cases, the 

district court asked the parties to select two cases each for 

summary judgment briefing. 

The district court granted summary judgment to 

Metalcraft in all four of the selected cases. Mazurek v. 

Metalcraft of Mayville Inc., No. 17-CV-1439-BHL, 2021 WL 

5964541, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 16, 2021) (Metalcraft I). In doing 

so, it held that although FLSA plaintiffs have a lower burden 

of proof when an employer’s record keeping practices do not 

provide accurate time, employees still must provide some 

level of proof as to the hours they worked and were not compensated for, through methods like reconstructed memory or 

inference. Id. at *4–5. The district court noted that this standard was designed to be lenient, but it was not an invitation to 

“guess or invent working hours post hoc.” Id. at *5. All four 

plaintiffs, the district court explained, acknowledged their reconstructed worktime was guesswork and ruled out the existence of events or distinctive elements of the workday that 

would jog their memories about how much work they did 

during the disputed period. Id. at *7. 

In a separate order issued the same day, the district court 

explained, “[g]iven that Plaintiff’s counsel had the ability to 

pick two of the cases presented at summary judgment, and 

those cases shared the same fatal defect as those selected by 

Defendant’s counsel, it appears that all pending cases may 

share the same fate.” “[T]o avoid unnecessary and wasteful 

motion practice in the remaining cases,” the district court ordered plaintiffs’ counsel to file a statement in each of the remaining 12 cases, “identifying any particular facts or legal 
4 Nos. 22-1743, et al. 

arguments that might warrant a different outcome.” If differences existed for a particular case, the district court would 

schedule further proceedings for that case. If not, the court 

would enter summary judgment for Metalcraft.

In response, the 12 remaining plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their cases with prejudice, stating that the district 

court’s summary judgment order as to the four other plaintiffs was “likely determinative” of their claims.

Metalcraft then moved for sanctions in all 16 cases. In each

brief supporting the motion in the 12 remaining cases, 

Metalcraft stated: “Our Motion for Sanctions for these twelve 

cases are similar. Only the transcripts of the twelve are different and those [two] cases having a statute of limitations issue.” The word “transcripts” refers to the 12 remaining plaintiffs’ deposition transcripts, excerpts of which Metalcraft had

dropped into the part of its motion discussing each plaintiff’s 

guesswork and speculation. As for the four cases resolved on 

summary judgment, Metalcraft filed an identical sanctions 

motion in each.

In moving for sanctions, Metalcraft argued that the 16 

cases shared not only similar facts and law, but also the same 

root cause of a Rule 11 violation: “no evidence, just speculation.” According to Metalcraft, Mazurek’s deposition served 

as the “cornerstone” illustrating the frivolity of the 16 cases

because he admitted he had no proof of a FLSA violation. 

Metalcraft urged the district court to sanction the plaintiffs 

because “a rudimentary inquiry of all sixteen plaintiffs based 

on Mazurek’s deposition during a pre-filing investigation 

would have made clear all sixteen cases did not have any 

facts.”
Nos. 22-1743, et al. 5

The district court disagreed, pointing to precedent allowing unreported work time to be reconstructed using methods 

of proof below the standard in most commercial litigation. 

Mazurek v. Metalcraft of Mayville Inc., No. 17-CV-1439-BHL, 

2022 WL 1028928, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 6, 2022) (Metalcraft II).

The problem that undermined the suits, the court continued, 

was a matter of “degree, not kind.” Id. The fact that the evidence was not enough to win on summary judgment, the 

court noted, did not retroactively make the cases frivolous 

enough to merit sanctions, which would be “overkill.” Id. at 

*3. In its sanctions decision, the district court made clear that 

it was evaluating the evidence of the suits as a unit, and—like 

Metalcraft—it did not make meaningful distinctions between 

the quality of proof provided in each suit. Metalcraft now appeals the denial of sanctions.

II

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) requires attorneys 

presenting a pleading or other paper to the court to certify, 

among other requirements: (1) the pleading or other paper is 

not being provided to unnecessarily delay or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims are supported by 

existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for modifying the 

law; and (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support. 

FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). Rule 11 sanctions—monetary or other 

penalties assessed against attorneys who violate these requirements—are designed to deter baseless filings, like those 

presented for an improper purpose. Pac. Dunlop Holdings, Inc.

v. Barosh, 22 F.3d 113, 118 (7th Cir. 1994). But because sanctions can harm the reputation of attorneys and chill the creativity of counsel, care must be taken in their issuance. Id. 
6 Nos. 22-1743, et al. 

(citing Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 936 

(7th Cir. 1989) (en banc)). 

We review a district court’s decision to impose Rule 11 

sanctions for abuse of discretion. Cooney v. Casady, 735 F.3d 

514, 518 (7th Cir. 2013). When evaluating the appropriateness 

of sanctions, we consider the objective reasonableness of the 

filing under the circumstances of the case. Pac. Dunlop Holdings, 22 F.3d at 118. The focus of the rule is conduct and not 

result; losing a legal challenge or motion, by itself, is not a reason for sanctions. Id. at 119. 

Metalcraft makes two primary arguments for the necessity 

of sanctions: (1) there was no factual support for the employees’ claims, and (2) established FLSA doctrines, namely the 

Portal-to-Portal Act and the de minimis doctrine, foreclosed 

the employees’ claims as a matter of law. Neither of these arguments finds support in the record.

A 

Metalcraft argues there was no factual substance to the 

FLSA claims brought against it by Mazurek, his coworkers, 

and their attorneys. Metalcraft points to a deposition three 

months before the initial collective action was filed, during 

which Mazurek stated that he had memories, but not written 

records, of the times he worked before the start of his shift. 

Based on this statement, Metalcraft claims Mazurek 

“doomed” his initial lawsuit and the 15 other lawsuits that 

followed. Metalcraft made similar attacks on the proof provided by the other plaintiffs, and even accused plaintiffs’ 

counsel of suborning perjury by submitting evidence 

Metalcraft considered contradictory. 
Nos. 22-1743, et al. 7

But in asserting that Mazurek “doomed” his lawsuit from 

the beginning and in alleging other instances of opposing 

counsel chicanery, Metalcraft forgets that FLSA claims can be 

made through reconstructed memories of the claimants. 

When an employer does not keep accurate records of time 

worked, employees have a lower burden for proving FLSA 

damages. Brown v. Fam. Dollar Stores of Ind., LP, 534 F.3d 593, 

595 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 

328 U.S. 680, 687–88 (1946)). In those cases, “an employee has 

carried out his burden if he proves that he has in fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated and 

if he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” 

Id. To show hours worked by “just and reasonable inference,” 

an employee’s time can be reconstructed from memory, inferred from the particulars of the claimant’s jobs, or estimated 

through other methods. Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 

F.3d 770, 775 (7th Cir. 2013). If that standard is met, the employer then has the burden of showing either (1) evidence of 

the exact amount of work performed, or (2) evidence negating 

the inference drawn from the employee’s evidence. Brown, 

534 F.3d at 595. 

The district court held that Metalcraft’s timekeeping system, through its use of the 15 minute “grace period” and the 

practice of rounding time up or down, “do[es] not provide an 

accurate representation of the time employees spent performing compensable work.” Metalcraft I, 2021 WL 5964541, at *4. 

Consequently, as the district court found, the lowered burden 

for FLSA claimants came into play, and the invocation of 

memory did not render the suit unfit for filing. Indeed, given 

this lower standard of proof, Metalcraft’s allegations of perjury are unreasonable. 
8 Nos. 22-1743, et al. 

The district court’s finding that the suits were not unfit for 

filing applied not only to Mazurek but also to the other plaintiffs. In its order denying sanctions, the district court stated 

that the plaintiffs marshalled a “handful of facts that might 

support a FLSA action.” The dissenting opinion reads this 

statement as pertaining to Mazurek’s case only, or to the four 

summary judgment cases only, not also to the 12 other cases 

for which Metalcraft sought sanctions. True enough, the district court specifically quoted the summary judgment order’s 

discussion of Mazurek’s claim. But in so quoting, the district 

court stated, “Plaintiffs presented the Court with ‘a handful of 

facts that might support a FLSA action[.]’” This indicates the 

district court was speaking not only about Mazurek when 

making the “handful of facts” comment, but also about the 

collective of suits. We do not have reason to question the district court’s decision on how to quote its prior decision.

More importantly though, that is not all the district court 

said about the factual support underpinning each of the 16 

cases:

The decisive issue in these cases was whether 

Plaintiffs could prove their allegedly uncompensated worktime as a matter of “just and reasonable inference.” ... As the Court noted in its 

summary judgment order, Plaintiffs presented 

the Court with “a handful of facts that might 

support a FLSA action[.]” Mazurek, 2021 WL 

5964541, at *7. The problem was one of degree, 

not kind—the methods Plaintiffs used to estimate worktime were simply too unreliable to 

permit a factfinder to draw a “just and reasonable inference.” Id. But a case is not frivolous, nor 
Nos. 22-1743, et al. 9

is a factual presentation baseless just because it 

crumbles at summary judgment. See Harrison v. 

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 886–87 

(7th Cir. 1992). Plaintiffs came forward with the 

kind of evidence that courts hearing FLSA actions have come to expect; they just failed to 

come forward with enough of this type of evidence. This failure was not sanctionable.

Metalcraft II, 2022 WL 1028928, at *2. No portion of this reasoning suggests that it applies to Mazurek only, as opposed 

to all the plaintiffs.1

The dissenting opinion insists that, in addition to determining whether sanctions were warranted in some, all, or 

none of the cases, the district court should have addressed 

each of the 16 motions separately. Nothing prohibits this approach, but we know of nothing compelling the approach 

1 The dissenting opinion contends that Mazurek’s testimony tells us 

nothing about the factual basis for the 15 other cases, and it is not clear 

whether there is support for equating Mazurek’s FLSA claim with the 

other plaintiffs’ claims. The district court, however, did not hinge its decision as to the 15 other cases on Mazurek’s testimony. Plus, Metalcraft took 

the opposite position, stating throughout its motions that the “pattern” of 

“unreliable speculation and guesswork” that was “known [after] and exemplified [by] Mazurek’s testimony ... continued for all sixteen of the individual 

plaintiffs” and “a rudimentary inquiry of all sixteen plaintiffs based on Mazurek’s deposition during a pre-filing investigation would have made clear 

all sixteen cases did not have any facts.” Metalcraft theorized that Mazurek’s testimony clued the other plaintiffs in on the guesswork and speculation in their individual cases. Ultimately, Metalcraft concluded—and 

the district court agreed—that Mazurek and the 15 other cases “shared a 

fundamental flaw”: no admissible evidence. Where Metalcraft and the district court diverged was on the question whether that shared flaw made 

the filing of the 16 cases frivolous and, therefore, sanctionable. 
10 Nos. 22-1743, et al. 

either. Nor does the dissenting opinion identify any such authority. And Metalcraft did not ask the district court or our 

court to parcel out the suits. Rather, Metalcraft alleged the 

workers as a collective did not have sufficient evidence for 

their claims, and Metalcraft supported this position by emphasizing the similarity of the 16 cases. This presentation by 

Metalcraft—focusing on the near identical nature of the cases 

rather than the component cases, and at times concentrating 

on the primary named plaintiff (Mazurek)—persisted despite 

the decertification of the actual collective action and the filing 

of individual suits. With this, the district court decided the 16 

motions in a single order, concluding that none of the cases 

warranted sanctions. Under these circumstances, we are 

mindful of the discretion afforded district courts in making 

sanctions decisions given their firsthand knowledge of the 

proceedings. We are also mindful the district court’s explanation must suffice to allow us to meaningfully review the denial of sanctions. Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634, 655 (7th Cir. 

2018). We are convinced that the district court’s order clears 

this hurdle.2

We uphold any exercise of a district court’s discretion that 

could be considered reasonable, even if we might have resolved the question differently. So, we uphold the decision 

below; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying sanctions based on the plaintiffs’ alleged speculation and 

guesswork.

2 The district court did not address whether the statute of limitations 

defense asserted in two cases rendered those plaintiffs’ claims frivolous. 

But Metalcraft did not raise this issue on appeal, so it has been waived. 

Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 722 n.4 (7th Cir. 2019).
Nos. 22-1743, et al. 11

B 

We turn to Metalcraft’s second argument about why sanctions are necessary: Metalcraft believes two authorities, the 

Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 and the de minimis doctrine, foreclosed the plaintiffs’ FLSA claims as a matter of law. But 

Metalcraft’s argument ignores nuances in the doctrines that 

made the employees’ claims legally viable and sufficient to 

avoid Rule 11 sanctions.

The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 designates the following 

activities as not compensable under the FLSA: “(1) walking, 

riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform,” and (2) “activities which are 

preliminary to or postliminary” to the employee’s principal 

activities. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a). Metalcraft contends the pre-shift 

activities the plaintiffs described were “merely preliminary 

and two steps removed from their principal activities,” and 

therefore barred under the statutory language. 

However, the workers argued from the outset that the Portal-to-Portal Act had no bearing on the calculation of hours 

within the workday based on a Department of Labor regulation stating that the provision does not apply to time between 

the “first principal activity on a particular workday and before [the employee] ceases the performance of the last principal activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 790.6(a). The plaintiffs also pointed 

to IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, which held that the time meatpacking 

plant employees spent walking from their locker rooms to the 

production area after putting on safety gear was not barred 

from compensation under the Portal-to-Portal Act. 546 U.S. 

21, 30–31, 37 (2005). 
12 Nos. 22-1743, et al. 

Metalcraft counters by citing our decision in Chagoya v. 

City of Chicago as evidence the Portal-to-Portal Act decisively 

foreclosed the workers’ claims. 992 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2021). 

There, we held members of a Chicago Police SWAT team 

could not seek compensation under the FLSA for time spent 

transporting, loading, and unloading their weapons and 

other gear from department-provided vehicles and securing 

it in their homes. Id. at 622. We ruled the FLSA did not cover 

this time because those requirements were weapons security 

directives removed from “the operators’ principal activity of 

handling critical incidents.” Id. at 623. Metalcraft did not mention this case until its reply brief for summary judgment, depriving the plaintiffs of the chance to respond, but that matters little anyway: Mazurek had already addressed in his 

summary judgment motion the argument that pre-shift activities were “integral and indispensable” to his workday as a 

machine operator. He rebutted, in advance, the very point for 

which Metalcraft belatedly cited Chagova. 

Metalcraft likewise insists the de minimis doctrine barred 

the workers’ claims. The de minimis exception renders activities that take “insubstantial and insignificant periods of time” 

not compensable under the FLSA. Frank v. Wilson & Co., 172 

F.2d 712, 716 (7th Cir. 1949) (quoting Anderson, 328 U.S. at 693 

(1946)). To evaluate these claims, courts “typically consider 

the amount of time spent on the extra work, the practical administrative difficulties of recording additional time, the regularity with which the additional work is performed, and the 

aggregate amount of compensable time.” Kellar v. Summit 

Seating Inc., 664 F.3d 169, 176 (7th Cir. 2011). The employer 

bears the burden of showing the doctrine is applicable to a 

particular FLSA claim. Id. Even though Metalcraft argues the 

doctrine foreclosed the employees’ claims, it is far from the
Nos. 22-1743, et al. 13

absolute bar Metalcraft suggests. Mazurek and the other 

plaintiffs carefully outlined reasons why their claim was not 

de minimis under the Kellar factors. 

In sum, the plaintiffs extensively briefed both the de minimis issue and the Portal-to-Portal Act at the summary judgment stage. A party making a legal argument that turns out 

to be barred by Supreme Court or Seventh Circuit precedent 

is not per se sanctionable; an attempt to distinguish one’s case 

from the precedent that purportedly forecloses the claim is 

enough. Brunt v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, 284 F.3d 715, 721 (7th 

Cir. 2002). The plaintiffs’ legal arguments on both issues fall 

well short of the “baseless” threshold that merits Rule 11 sanctions. See, e.g., Royce v. Michael R. Needle P.C., 950 F.3d 939, 957 

(7th Cir. 2020) (upholding sanctions against a party that took 

a position “disregarding what anyone having taken a firstyear contracts class could identify as the pivotal legal issues”). 

In its attempt to persuade us that the employees’ claims 

were never legally viable given the Portal-to-Portal Act and 

the de minimis doctrine, Metalcraft points to the district 

court’s brief statement at summary judgment that the plaintiffs “have not established” the work they performed was 

compensable under either doctrine. Metalcraft I, 2021 WL 

5964541, at *7 n.4. However, this statement, wedged into a 

footnote, was eclipsed by the court’s overwhelming focus on 

the deficiencies of the employees’ proof of time worked. Id. It 

is not difficult to imagine, had there been better factual substantiation of the workers’ claims, the district court would 

have looked more closely at the briefing on these FLSA exceptions and come to a different conclusion. 

In continuing to press its view about the legal viability of 

the employees’ claims, Metalcraft relies on arguments that 
14 Nos. 22-1743, et al. 

ignore the difference between the standard for summary 

judgment and the standard for sanctions. It claims the court’s 

conclusions at summary judgment necessarily mean sanctions are in order. However, we have urged caution in 

“adopting findings and conclusions” from one stage of a litigation to a different stage of the litigation with different legal 

standards. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 

292 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Commc’ns Maint., Inc. v. Motorola,

Inc., 761 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir. 1985)). This instruction particularly applies in this case, as the standard for a grant of 

summary judgment—when there is no genuine issue of material fact, Sweatt v. Union Pac. R. Co., 796 F.3d 701, 707 (7th 

Cir. 2015) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c))—is distinctly different 

from that for Rule 11 sanctions. Such sanctions are warranted 

when an attorney’s pleadings are not well grounded by appropriate factual contentions, “existing law[,] or by a nonfrivolous argument” for changing legal precedent. FED. R. CIV. P.

11(b). Here, Mazurek and the other plaintiffs presented plausible legal arguments for the compensability of their working 

time, not to mention evidence appropriate in FLSA suits challenging employers with deficient internal recordkeeping 

practices. See Brunt, 284 F.3d at 721; Brown, 534 F.3d at 595. 

III

Notwithstanding our decision affirming the district court, 

we note the court’s handling of the case perhaps invited 

Metalcraft to mount this challenge. The court used strong language throughout its summary judgment decision, slamming 

the plaintiffs’ suits as “speculative,” “internally inconsistent,” 

and an attempt to “extract and weaponize” a “morass of contradictory allegations.” Metalcraft I, 2021 WL 5964541, at *5–7. 

The court’s choice language risked suggesting to a summary 
Nos. 22-1743, et al. 15

judgment victor that sanctions were a natural next step when, 

for the reasons we have explained above, they were not. 

Then the court wrote that it was declining to award sanctions in part because doing so “would be overkill.” Metalcraft 

II, 2022 WL 1028928, at *3. At the outset of its opinion, the district court cited and discussed Rule 11 at length, before later

explaining why the suits were “not frivolous”; why the suits’ 

“factual presentations [were not] baseless”; and why it concluded that the “plaintiffs came forward with the kind of evidence that courts hearing FLSA actions have come to expect

... [but] failed to come forward with enough of this type of 

evidence.” Id., at *1–2. This shows the district court did not 

apply an erroneous legal standard, notwithstanding its word 

choice later in the opinion. 

Metalcraft’s arguments in favor of sanctions fail to meet 

the high standard required to override the discretion of the 

district court. The plaintiffs’ suits were based on legitimate legal arguments, using legitimate methods of proof. That the 

plaintiffs turned out to have insufficient evidence to support 

their allegations might have been a sign of poor case strategy, 

but it is not the kind of bad faith that justifies sanctions. As a 

result, we AFFIRM the district court.
16 Nos. 22-1743, et al. 

KIRSCH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying sanctions in Richard Mazurek’s lawsuit. But 

in my view, the district court failed to analyze the factual underpinnings of the other fifteen plaintiffs’ suits when denying 

Metalcraft’s motions for sanctions. 

Sanctions are appropriate when plaintiffs or their attorneys bring baseless suits not reasonably grounded in law or 

fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 

U.S. 384, 393 (1990). The factual contentions underlying 

claims must “have evidentiary support” or a likelihood 

thereof “after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3). When reviewing a 

denial of sanctions, we give deference to a district court’s familiarity with the proceedings. But that deference is not blind. 

“Deferential review will not prevent this court from ensuring 

that district judges reflect seriously, and consider fully, before 

imposing (or denying) sanctions. Until discretion has been 

taken seriously in the district court and exercised conscientiously, the basis for deference is missing.” Mars Steel Corp. v. 

Cont’l Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 936 (7th Cir. 1989). 

When deciding whether to impose sanctions under 

Rule 11, a district court must give careful thought as to 

whether they are warranted in each individual case. When a 

sanctions motion contends that a suit lacks any reasonable basis, “the court must undertake an objective inquiry into 

whether the party or his counsel should have known that his 

position is groundless.” Cuna Mut. Ins. Soc’y v. Off. & Pro. 

Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 39, 443 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2006) 

(cleaned up). If a party moves for sanctions in multiple lawsuits that were consolidated for litigation, a district court 
Nos. 22-1743, et al. 17

cannot take shortcuts. Determining whether an attorney’s behavior was sanctionable in one case neither blesses nor condemns his actions in another. After all, at its core, a Rule 11 

inquiry is a case-by-case determination. See Beverly Gravel, Inc. 

v. DiDomenico, 908 F.2d 223, 225 (7th Cir. 1990) (“What constitutes a reasonable pre-filing investigation [under Rule 11] depends on the circumstances of each case.”); Orlett v. Cincinnati 

Microwave, Inc., 954 F.2d 414, 419 n.5 (6th Cir. 1992) (“The district court itself recognized correctly that ‘a Rule 11 sanction 

must be based on a case by case inquiry.’”); Matter of Yagman, 

796 F.2d 1165, 1182 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Each case must be taken 

individually and evaluated in light of its own peculiar circumstances.”). For this reason, a district court must analyze 

each case separately and determine whether sanctions are 

warranted in some, all, or none. 

After Metalcraft won at summary judgment, it moved for 

sanctions in each of the sixteen cases. The district court consolidated the motions and denied them all in a single order

without separately addressing Metalcraft’s evidentiary arguments as to each motion. The court reasoned that sanctions 

were not warranted based on its conclusion at summary judgment that the plaintiffs presented “a handful of facts that 

might support a FLSA action.” And it concluded that because 

the plaintiffs had already lost at summary judgment, “sanctions would be overkill.” 

The district court committed two errors here that warrant 

reversal and remand. First, the factual support that the district 

court identified pertained to only one of the sixteen cases for 

which Metalcraft sought sanctions. The “handful of facts that 

might support a FLSA action” referred solely to the summary 

judgment order’s discussion of Mazurek’s claim and his 
18 Nos. 22-1743, et al. 

contradictory deposition testimony. But Mazurek’s testimony—and any evidence supporting his claim—tells us nothing about the factual basis for the other fifteen cases. The majority contends that, since the district court quoted its summary judgment order by referencing “Plaintiffs” rather than 

just a single plaintiff, it implicitly considered the evidence 

available in all sixteen individual cases. But that conclusion 

contravenes the context of the district court’s discussion, 

which wholly hinged on the evidence it reviewed at summary 

judgment. Recall that only four representative cases—likely 

the strongest ones—were tested at summary judgment. At 

most, then, “Plaintiffs” refers to those four cases, not the 

twelve others that were voluntarily dismissed (and potentially were even weaker and more sanctionable than the representative cases rejected at summary judgment). 

To be sure, there is no evidentiary basis for equating the 

FLSA claims reviewed at summary judgment with the other 

plaintiffs’ claims. For instance, Mazurek stated that he had 

memories, but not written records, of the times he worked before the start of his shift. But at least one other plaintiff, Casey 

Lamberg, testified that he had no memories of working before 

or after his shifts. The district court denied sanctions without 

even assessing whether each of the other suits had any factual 

support. The district court’s conclusion that Mazurek’s suit 

(or the three other summary judgment suits) was not sanctionable does not mean that the other plaintiffs’ suits can get 

away with sanctionable conduct, if there was any. 

The majority then asserts that Metalcraft did not parcel out 

the suits before the district court, and that therefore, the district court did not need to address each case individually. 

That contention mischaracterizes the record. As mentioned, 
Nos. 22-1743, et al. 19

Metalcraft filed a separate motion for sanctions for each individual case. For a case-by-case inquiry, that should have been 

enough. Further, while substantial portions of those motions 

were identical across all cases (which is to be expected in a 

situation like this), each motion also contained unique evidence and argument as to the named plaintiff. For example, 

in Jeffrey Anders’s case, Metalcraft’s motion emphasized the 

absurdity of the lawsuit within Anders’s specific employment

context, focusing on his substantial involvement in non-workrelated activities and noting that he received overtime pay 

even when he was not working. The district court should 

have addressed this motion (and the others) separately. 

Second, reading the district court’s order, it is unclear 

whether it applied the correct standard in assessing whether 

sanctions were warranted. The district court declined to 

award sanctions in part because doing so “would be overkill.” 

The majority rightly identifies that overkill is not the standard, yet even so, defers to the district court’s decision in the 

other fifteen suits that it failed to analyze. I would not. 

“A serious Rule 11 motion is not a gnat to be brushed off 

with the back of the hand. This motion was serious; it should 

have received serious attention[.]” Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. 

Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1084 (7th Cir. 1987). I would vacate and remand to the district court with instructions to reconsider Metalcraft’s motion for each individual suit under 

the appropriate standard. 

I respectfully dissent.