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16-3267-cv 

Grievance Committee v. Grimm 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A 

SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED 

BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. 

WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY 

MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE 

NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held 

at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New 

York, on the 1st day of June, two thousand seventeen. 

PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 

 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,



 

Circuit Judges. 

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GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE OF THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 

NEW YORK, 

Petitioner-Appellee, 

v. No. 16-3267-cv 

MICHAEL G. GRIMM, 

 Respondent-Appellant. 

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 FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT: Annette G. Hasapidis, Law Offices of 

Annette G. Hasapidis, Ridgefield, CT. 

FOR PETITIONER-APPELLEE: Devin W. Ness, Counsel to the 

Grievance Committee, United States 

District Court for the Southern District 

of New York, New York, NY. 

 



 Judge Wesley, a member of the original panel, subsequently recused himself. Therefore, this case is 

decided by the two remaining members of the panel pursuant to Internal Operating Procedure E(b) of the 

Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
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Appeal from an August 22, 2016, order of the Committee on Grievances of the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (P. Kevin Castel, 

Chair, Committee on Grievances S.D.N.Y.). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that Appellant’s motion for judicial notice is GRANTED, the order of 

the Committee on Grievances of the United States District Court for the Southern District 

of New York is AFFIRMED, and Appellee’s motion for judicial notice is DENIED AS 

MOOT. 

Respondent-Appellant Michael G. Grimm, an attorney, appeals from an order of 

the Committee on Grievances of the United States District Court for the Southern District 

of New York (“the Committee”) striking his name from the roll of attorneys admitted to 

practice before that court. In support of the Committee’s order, Petitioner-Appellee 

moves the Court to take judicial notice of the stipulated facts in support of Grimm’s 

guilty plea in the district court and of certain previous disciplinary orders of the 

Committee. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, record of 

prior proceedings, and issues on appeal. 

 

On July 21, 2015, Grimm was convicted in the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of New York, following a guilty plea, of one count of aiding and 

assisting in the preparation of false and fraudulent tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 

§ 7206(2). On the basis of this conviction, the Committee issued an order pursuant to 

S.D.N.Y. Local Civil Rule 1.5(d)(1) directing that Grimm be stricken from the roll of 

practicing attorneys of that court unless he filed a written response showing why he 

should not be stricken. Grimm filed a response through counsel requesting that the 

Committee impose reciprocal discipline in the form of a suspension rather than striking 

his name from the roll, based on the New York Appellate Division’s suspension of 

Grimm pending further order of that court and the disposition of that disciplinary 

proceeding against Grimm.1

 Grimm’s response to the Committee also argued that 

suspension was a more appropriate sanction than disbarment in the circumstances. On 

August 22, 2016, the Committee ordered that Grimm be stricken from the roll of 

practicing attorneys, noting that the Committee had considered Grimm’s submission and 

declined his request to impose a suspension instead of disbarment. 

 

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 As reflected in Grimm’s motion for judicial notice filed after this appeal had been submitted for 

decision, the Appellate Division has since issued a decision in the disciplinary proceeding imposing a 

four-year nunc pro tunc suspension as a sanction for Grimm’s misconduct. We grant Grimm’s motion 

to take notice of the Appellate Division’s order, though for the reasons explained herein, the disposition 

of the state proceeding does not bear on the Committee’s authority to sanction Grimm on the basis of his 

federal conviction. 
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We review an original disciplinary order entered by a district court for abuse of 

discretion. In re Peters, 642 F.3d 381, 384 (2d Cir. 2011). “A district court has 

abused its discretion if its imposition of sanctions was based on an erroneous view of the 

law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or cannot be located within the 

range of permissible decisions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Although our 

review under this standard is “deferential,” we must “be careful to ensure that any 

decision to impose sanctions is made with restraint and discretion.” Id. (internal 

alterations and quotation marks omitted). 

On appeal, Grimm primarily argues that the Committee’s order striking his name 

from the roll should be vacated because: (1) he was entitled to a hearing prior to being 

disbarred, and (2) the Committee erred in disbarring him rather than imposing reciprocal 

discipline in the form of a temporary suspension. Both of these arguments fail. 

Grimm’s assertion that he was entitled to a hearing under S.D.N.Y. Local Civil 

Rule 1.5(d) misreads the text of that rule. According to subsection (1), “[i]f good cause 

is shown to hold an evidentiary hearing, the Committee on Grievances may direct such a 

hearing.” S.D.N.Y. Local Civil Rule 1.5(d)(1) (emphasis added). The rule further 

provides that, “[i]f good cause is not shown to hold an evidentiary hearing, the 

Committee on Grievances may proceed to impose discipline or to take such other action 

as justice and this rule may require.” Id. Thus, under the text of this rule, the 

Committee has the authority to hold a hearing if good cause is shown; otherwise, the 

Committee is permitted to impose discipline without such a hearing. 

Grimm’s argument that he showed good cause for the Committee to hold a hearing 

overlaps with his second challenge to the order, namely, that the Committee erred in 

declining to impose reciprocal discipline based on the Appellate Division’s order of 

suspension. This argument conflates the Committee’s authority to impose discipline on 

its own accord with its authority to impose reciprocal discipline on the basis of another 

court’s already-issued disciplinary decision. 

Local Rule 1.5(b)(1) explicitly states that “[d]iscipline or other relief . . . may be 

imposed” if it is “found by clear and convincing evidence” that “[a]ny member of the bar 

of this Court has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor in any federal court . . . .” 

S.D.N.Y. Local Civil Rule 1.5(b)(1); see also In re Kandekore, 460 F.3d 276, 279 (2d 

Cir. 2006) (noting that S.D.N.Y. rules “state that it is a ground for discipline if an 

attorney has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor”). Under this rule, the 

Committee may impose discipline on the basis of a federal conviction, without regard for 

the discipline other courts may decide to impose in connection with that conviction. See 

Matter of Jacobs, 44 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1994) (“A district court’s authority to discipline 

attorneys admitted to appear before it is a well-recognized inherent power of the court.”). 
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This disciplinary authority of the Committee is separate and apart from its authority to 

impose “reciprocal discipline,” which we have defined as “disbarment or suspension 

summarily imposed after some other court has taken such action based on a plenary 

inquiry.” In re Edelstein, 214 F.3d 127, 128 (2d Cir. 2000). Grimm’s reliance on the 

Committee’s practices with respect to reciprocal discipline is therefore misplaced. 

 

Grimm does not dispute that he has been convicted of a federal felony offense, nor 

does he dispute that he was provided notice and an opportunity to respond in writing as 

required by Local Rule 1.5(d). In light of these facts, we conclude that the Committee 

did not abuse its discretion in striking Grimm’s name from the roll of practicing attorneys 

on the basis of Grimm’s 2015 conviction. We also conclude that Grimm received all the 

process he was due because there is “no evidence suggesting any appreciable risk that 

without an evidentiary hearing [Grimm] might be erroneously deprived of his interest in 

practicing law.” Jacobs, 44 F.3d at 91. Because we reach these conclusions without 

consulting the documents that are the subject of the Committee’s motion for judicial 

notice, that motion is denied as moot. 

We have considered Grimm’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are 

without merit. Accordingly, we GRANT Grimm’s motion for judicial notice, AFFIRM

the order of the Committee, and DENY AS MOOT the Committee’s motion for judicial 

notice. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court