### The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge 1 

### for the District of Minnesota. ___________ No. 95-3985

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Minnesota. Cheryl Stone, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: March 12, 1996 Filed: March 22, 1996

___________ Before FAGG, BOWMAN, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Cheryl Stone challenges the sentence imposed by the district court 1 after she pleaded guilty to knowingly making, uttering, and possessin g forged securities, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513(a). W e affirm.

St one's presentence report noted no factors warranting a departur e from t he applicable 6-to-12 month Guidelines range. Stone objected , conten ding that a downward departure "to straight probation" wa s appropriate because ( 1) the criminal history calculation over-represented the seriousness of her criminal history or the likelihood that she would commit further crimes; (2) she had displayed an extraordinary level o f acceptance of responsibility; and (3) she was un der the influence of drugs and

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alcohol when she committed the offense, but was presently alcohol- an d drug-free. At senten cing, Stone added that a co-defendant had received a downward departure to a 4-month term of incarceration.
The district court denied Stone's departure request and sentenc ed her to thre e years probation, a condition of which was that she reside in a community corrections center for six months. Fo r reversal, Stone contends the district court er red in not departing downward, based on the totality of the circumstances, including the factors she presented below and he r lack of dangerousness.

We first conclude that we cannot review the district court' s dis cretionary refusal to depart--on overstated criminal-history an d
su bstantial acceptance-of-responsibility grounds--because the sentencin g transcript demonstrates the district court was aware of its authority to do so. See United States v. Elkins , 16 F.3d 952 , 954 (8th Cir. 1994). In anyevent, we note that the district court could not "depart[] below the lower limit of the gu ideline range for Criminal History Category I on the basis of the adequacy of criminal history." U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, p.s.; see United States v. Franklin , 926 F.2d 734, 737 (8t h Cir.), cert. denied , 502 U.S. 881 (1991).
We further conclude no error occurred in the district court's f ailure to grant Stone a departure based on the fact that her co-defendant ha d received a departure. "Disparity between sentences imposed on codefendant s is not a proper basis for departure." United States v. Polanco , 53 F.3d 893, 897 (8th Cir. 1995), pet. for cert. filed , No. 95-5022 (U.S. Jun. 29, 1995). We do not address Stone's contention that her lack of dangerousnes s merited a departure, because she did not present this argument below. See Fritz v. United States , 995 F.2d 136, 137 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 114 S. Ct. 887 (1994). Finally, we conclude that the

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factors relied upon by Stone--viewed as a whole--did not warrant a downwar d departure. Cf. United States v. Whitehorse , 909 F.2d 316, 318-19 (8th Cir
. 1990) (noting that discrete circumstances may co nverge to create situation warranting departure).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.