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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

PAUL M. BROWN, 

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-CV-11061 

vs. DISTRICT JUDGE MARIANNE O. BATTANI 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE MONA K. MAJZOUB 

COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant. 

___________________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff Paul Brown seeks judicial review of Defendant the Commissioner of Society 

Security’s determination that he is not entitled to Social Security benefits for his physical 

impairments under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Docket no. 1.) Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment (docket no. 13) and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket 

no. 15). The motions have been referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Docket no. 4.) The Court has reviewed the pleadings, 

dispenses with a hearing pursuant to E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2), and issues this Report and 

Recommendation. 

I. Recommendation 

The undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 

13) be DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 15) be 

GRANTED. This matter should be dismissed in its entirety. 

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II. Procedural History 

Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits on May 7, 2011, alleging that 

he had been disabled since September 1, 2008, due to Hepatitis C, hemophilia A, and bilateral 

ankle arthritis. (See TR 20, 22; docket no. 13 at 3.) The Social Security Administration denied 

benefits. (See TR 65-68.) Plaintiff requested a de novo hearing, which was held on August 27, 

2013, before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Oksana Xenos, who subsequently found that 

Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits because he was capable of performing a significant number of 

jobs in the national economy. (TR 20-30.) The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ’s 

decision, and Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review. The parties then filed their 

instant Motions. 

III. Plaintiff’s Testimony, Medical Evidence, and Vocational Expert Testimony

Plaintiff (docket no. 13 at 3-6), Defendant (docket no. 15 at 4-7), and the ALJ (TR 23-28) 

each set out a detailed factual recitation with regard to Plaintiff’s medical record, Plaintiff’s 

hearing testimony, and the VE’s testimony. Having conducted an independent review of 

Plaintiff’s medical record and the hearing transcript, the undersigned finds that there are no 

material inconsistencies between these recitations of the record. Therefore, the undersigned will 

incorporate the ALJ’s factual recitation by reference. Additionally, the undersigned will include 

comments and citations as necessary throughout this Report and Recommendation. 

IV. Administrative Law Judge’s Determination

 The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the act through 

December 31, 2013; that he had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 1, 

2008, his alleged onset date; and that he suffered from severe hemophilia, hepatitis C, and 

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degenerative joint disease. (TR 22.) The ALJ then found that his impairments did not meet or 

equal those listed in the Listing of Impairments. (TR 23.) 

Next, The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the extent of his symptoms were 

not wholly credible and that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work with the following additional 

limitations: 

[Plaintiff] can occasionally push and pull with the lower extremities; cannot climb 

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can occasionally climb stairs and ramps, stoop, kneel, 

crouch, and crawl; can frequently balance; can occasionally reach overhead; and 

should avoid hazards, such as moving machinery and unprotected heights. 

(TR 23-28.) The ALJ then determined, in reliance on the VE’s testimony, that Plaintiff was 

capable of performing work as an inspector, sorter, or assembler. (TR 28-29.) Therefore, the 

ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act from September 1, 2008, 

through the date of her decision. (TR 22.) 

V. Law and Analysis 

A. Standard of Review

 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s 

final decisions. Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decisions is limited to determining 

whether his findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether he employed the proper 

legal standards. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Walters v. Comm’r, 127 

F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a 

preponderance; it is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.’” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Walters, 127 F.3d at 528. It is not the function of this Court to try 

cases de novo, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility. See Brainard 

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v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989); Garner v. Heckler, 745 

F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). 

 In determining the existence of substantial evidence, the court must examine the 

administrative record as a whole. See Kirk v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 

536 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). If the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, even if the reviewing court would decide 

the matter differently, Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir. 1983), and even if 

substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. See Her v. Comm’r, 203 F.3d 388, 

389-90 (6th Cir. 1999); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (noting that 

the substantial evidence standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which the 

decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts”). 

B. Framework for Social Security Determinations

 Plaintiff’s Social Security disability determination was made in accordance with a 

five-step sequential analysis. In the first four steps, Plaintiff was required to show that: 

(1) Plaintiff was not presently engaged in substantial gainful employment; and 

(2) Plaintiff suffered from a severe impairment; and 

(3) the impairment met or was medically equal to a “listed impairment;” or 

(4) Plaintiff did not have the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform 

relevant past work. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). If Plaintiff’s impairments prevented Plaintiff from doing past 

work, the Commissioner, at step five, would consider Plaintiff’s RFC, age, education, and past 

work experience to determine if Plaintiff could perform other work. If not, Plaintiff would be 

deemed disabled. See id. at § 404.1520(g). The Commissioner has the burden of proof only on 

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“the fifth step, proving that there is work available in the economy that the claimant can perform.” 

Her, 203 F.3d at 391. To meet this burden, the Commissioner must make a finding “supported by 

substantial evidence that [the claimant] has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs.” 

Varley v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 1987). This 

“substantial evidence” may be in the form of vocational expert testimony in response to a 

hypothetical question, “but only ‘if the question accurately portrays [the claimant’s] individual 

physical and mental impairments.’” Id. (citations omitted). 

C. Analysis

 The Social Security Act authorizes “two types of remand: (1) a post judgment remand in 

conjunction with a decision affirming, modifying, or reversing a decision of the [Commissioner] (a 

sentence-four remand); and (2) a pre-judgment remand for consideration of new and material 

evidence that for good cause was not previously presented to the [Commissioner] (a sentence-six 

remand).” Faucher v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Under a sentence-four remand, the Court has the authority to “enter upon the 

pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, denying, or reversing the decision of 

the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the cause for a hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Where there is insufficient support for the ALJ’s findings, “the appropriate remedy is reversal and 

a sentence-four remand for further consideration.” Morgan v. Astrue, 10-207, 2011 WL 

2292305, at *8 (E.D.Ky. June 8, 2011) (citing Faucher, 17 F.3d at 174). Plaintiff argues that this 

matter should be reversed or remanded because “the ALJ’s decision lacks support based upon 

substantial evidence” and because “the ALJ erred in making credibility determinations which were 

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not substantially supported by the record as a whole.”1 (Docket no. 13.) 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “relied on partial snippets of the record to impugn [his] 

credibility.” (Docket no. 13 at 7.) Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly discounted opinions 

given by a consultative examiner and Plaintiff’s nurse practitioner2 when finding that the record 

did not support Plaintiff’s allegation that he required a cane and that the record further supports 

Plaintiff’s allegations of spontaneous ankle bleeds, which severely limited his mobility. (Id. at 

7-8.) And as noted above, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly weighed his ability to perform 

some daily activities. (Id. at 4-7.) 

“An ALJ’s findings based on the credibility of the applicant are to be accorded great weight 

and deference, particularly since an ALJ is charged with the duty of observing a witness’s 

demeanor and credibility.” Walters v. Commissioner, 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). But 

credibility assessments are not insulated from judicial review. Despite the deference that is due, 

such a determination must nevertheless be supported by substantial evidence. Id. An ALJ’s 

credibility determination must contain “specific reasons . . . supported by the evidence in the case 

 

1 Plaintiff’s brief separates these two arguments into disparate sections, but both arguments 

substantively focus on the ALJ’s credibility determination. For example, when arguing that the 

ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly 

considered Plaintiff’s “work history prior to his incarceration and his ability to perform some 

simple activities to impugn his credibility and as ‘substantial evidence’ supporting the decision.” 

(Docket no. 13 at 4-5.) Plaintiff then contends that the ALJ did not properly weight his testimony 

or his daily activities in light of the record as a whole. (Id. at 5-6.) Because the ALJ considered 

this evidence while assessing Plaintiff’s credibility, the Court will consider Plaintiff’s arguments 

together as an attack on the ALJ’s credibility determination.

2 To the extent Plaintiff challenges the weight the ALJ afforded to each of the medical 

opinions in this matter, this argument is undeveloped as Plaintiff merely makes this reference in 

passing. Regardless, though, the ALJ properly noted that Plaintiff’s nurse practitioner is not an 

acceptable medical source and thoroughly explained her rationale for discounting the consultative 

examiner’s opinion. (TR 26, 27.) Thus, even if Plaintiff had developed an argument related to 

the medical opinions of record, the ALJ’s decision regarding the same is supported by substantial 

evidence.

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record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent 

reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the reasons for that 

weight.” SSR 96–7p. “It is not enough to make a conclusory statement that ‘the individual’s 

allegations have been considered’ or that ‘the allegations are (or are not) credible.’” Id. “The 

adjudicator may find all, only some, or none of an individual’s allegations to be credible” and may 

also find the statements credible to a certain degree. See id.

Further, to the extent that the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements are not substantiated by 

the objective medical evidence in the record, the Regulations explicitly provide that “we will not 

reject your statements about the intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms or about 

the effect your symptoms have on your ability to work . . . solely because the available objective 

medical evidence does not substantiate your statements.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(2). The ALJ 

must consider: (1) the claimant’s daily activities, (2) the location, duration, frequency, and 

intensity of claimant’s pain, (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type, dosage, 

effectiveness, and side effects of any medication taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms, (5) 

treatment, other than medication, for pain relief, (6) any measures used to relieve the pain, and (7) 

functional limitations and restrictions due to the pain. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3); see also 

Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1039-40 (6th Cir. 1994) (applying these factors). 

After noting Plaintiff’s allegations, the ALJ set forth a detailed account of Plaintiff’s 

medical history and the opinions of his doctors. The ALJ discussed progress notes from the 

Michigan Department of Corrections clinic related to Plaintiff’s care while incarcerated, finding 

that although Plaintiff suffered from hemophilia and hepatitis C, his physical examinations were 

“within normal limits . . . throughout the nearly two year incarceration.” (TR 25.) Additionally, 

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the ALJ found that while his doctor recommended a left ankle cheilectomy and eventually an ankle 

replacement, Plaintiff was still able to perform light jobs while incarcerated and several daily 

activities. (TR 26.) The ALJ also noted that while the consultative examiner acknowledged 

Plaintiff’s use of a cane during his examination, Plaintiff did not use a cane when he visited the 

SSA Field Office or when he attended his hearing. Ultimately, the ALJ summarized her findings 

regarding Plaintiff’s credibility: 

Overall, the undersigned does not find the record supports the claimant’s 

allegations of totally disabling symptoms, or of limitations beyond the reduced 

range of sedentary work outlined in this decision. The undersigned stresses that 

the claimant’s hemophilia is a congenital disease, and despite that condition, as 

well as his osteoarthrosis, the claimant was capable of performing work at the light 

and medium exertional levels prior to his incarceration. In fact, the claimant 

stopped working prior to his incarceration due to reasons wholly unrelated to his 

impairments. He testified and reported that the work was seasonal and all 

employees were laid off. Moreover, the record contains no evidence of any drastic 

change to his treatment regimen, traumatic injury, or overall worsening ot his 

conditions to account of the alleged changes in his functional abilities. Instead, the 

record and testimony indicate the claimant had difficult securing employment 

following his incarceration due to his status as a felon. The claimant testified he 

attended several interviews but was rejected due to his felon status, and reported 

similar statements to treating sources. The fact that his impairments did not 

prevent the claimant from working for the 10 years prior to his incarceration 

strongly suggests that if he had not been classified as a felon, he would have 

continued to work. In fact, there are numerous statements throughout the record of 

the claimant’s desire and attempts to seek employment, which are contrary to the 

claimant’s allegations of disability. For instance, he reported he had a job lined up 

following his incarceration, felt he could do a job with less physical activity, and 

testified he would consider returning to school fi money were available. All of 

these statements suggest the claimant is not as limited as alleged in connection with 

this application. 

Finally, the claimant’s statements regarding the severity and limiting effects of his 

symptoms are not fully credibility because they are not supported by the medical 

evidence of record, nor by the claimant’s intact daily living activities. While the 

claimant has joint pain and bleeds, the prophylactic treatment infusions have been 

effective in reducing his symptoms. Moreover, he has not required any 

specialized treatment for his hepatitis C. . . . Despite his testimony and the report 

of Dr. Said, the record as a whole does not support the need for a cane. There was 

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not mention of any ambulatory assistance throughout his two-year incarceration, 

and the claimant was able to work several jobs at the light and medium exertional 

levels, which required him to be on his feet and ambulatory. . . . 

Contrary to his reports of disabling limitations, the record shows he is able to care 

for his personal needs, shops, cleans, drives, and spends time with family and 

friends, engaging in activities such as video games, movies, and coffee shops. 

These statements suggest the claimant is not as functionally limited from a physical 

health standpoint, but rather, support the residual functional capacity assessed 

herein. 

(TR 28-29 (citations omitted).) 

Here, while Plaintiff may disagree with the ALJ’s interpretation, her decision is supported 

by substantial evidence. The ALJ thoroughly analyzed Plaintiff’s credibility and gave specific 

reasons, supported by the evidence, to make clear to Plaintiff and the Court the weight given to 

Plaintiff’s allegations and the reason for that weight. Therefore, the ALJ’s credibility 

determination should not be disturbed, and Plaintiff’s Motion should be denied. 

VI. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 13) 

should be DENIED, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 15) should be 

GRANTED. This matter should be dismissed in its entirety. 

REVIEW OF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Either party to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but must act within fourteen (14) days of service of a copy hereof as provided 

for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2). Failure to file specific objections 

constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard 

v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 

F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections which raise some issues but fail to raise others with 

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specificity will not preserve all objections that a party might have to this Report and 

Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 

1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). 

Pursuant to Rule 72.1(d)(2) of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Michigan, a copy of any objection must be served upon this Magistrate Judge. 

Within fourteen (14) days of service of any objecting party’s timely filed objections, the 

opposing party may file a response. The response shall be not more than five (5) pages in length 

unless by motion and order such page limit is extended by the Court. The response shall address 

specifically, and in the same order raised, each issue contained within the objections. 

Dated: April 12, 2016 s/ Mona K. Majzoub 

 MONA K. MAJZOUB 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

PROOF OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a copy of this Report and Recommendation was served on counsel of 

record on this date. 

Dated: April, 12, 2016 s/ Lisa C. Bartlett 

Case Manager 

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