United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

December 1996 COURTHOUSE

CONSTRUCTION

Improved 5-Year Plan

Could Promote More

Informed

Decisionmaking

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/GGD-97-27

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

General Government Division

B-271103 

December 31, 1996

The Honorable William S. Cohen

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government

 Management and the District of Columbia

Committee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Wayne T. Gilchrest

Chairman, Subcommittee on Public Buildings and

 Economic Development

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

House of Representatives

The General Services Administration (GSA), together with the federal

judiciary, has embarked on a $10 billion courthouse construction initiative.

Its purpose is to address the urgent housing needs of the federal judiciary,

which have arisen due to reported space shortages, security concerns, and

operational inefficiencies at courthouses around the country. One of the

major criticisms of this construction initiative by us and others has been

the lack of a long-term strategic plan that (1) identifies and prioritizes all

the judiciary’s most urgently needed courthouse construction projects,

(2) helps congressional decisionmakers compare and evaluate the merits

of project proposals and priorities, and (3) provides a rationale for

allocating resources to the most urgently needed projects.

In March 1996, the judiciary—with assistance from its administrative arm,

the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOC)—issued a courthouse

construction plan that identifies projects it proposes be funded between

fiscal years 1997 and 2001. This report responds to your request that we

assess whether the 5-year plan (1) reflects the judiciary’s most urgent

courthouse construction needs and (2) provides information needed by

decisionmakers to evaluate the relative merit of project proposals.

Results in Brief While the judiciary has developed a methodology for assessing project

urgency and a 5-year construction plan to communicate its urgent

courthouse construction needs, our analysis suggests that the 5-year plan

does not reflect all of the judiciary’s most urgent courthouse construction

needs. In preparing the 5-year plan, the judiciary developed urgency scores

Page 1 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
B-271103 

for 45 projects. However, it did not develop urgency scores for other

locations that according to AOC also need new courthouses. Our analysis of

available data on conditions at the 80 other locations showed that 30 of

them likely would have an urgency score higher than some projects in the

plan. According to AOC, 1 of these locations would have an urgency score

higher than 40 of the plan’s 45 projects.

In addition, for projects that are in the plan, high urgency scores did not

always correlate to high funding priority. For example, seven projects

identified for site and/or design funding in 1998 had lower scores than

eight projects identified for site and/or design funding in 1999. One of

these 1999 projects scores as the fifth most urgent project among the 45 in

the plan, yet 23 other projects with lower urgency scores have higher

funding priority.

AOC officials said that this was a transitional plan in that it placed heavy

emphasis when assigning funding priorities on the projects already in the

GSA “pipeline” rather than solely on project urgency. They also said that,

due to resource and time constraints, they did not develop scores for all

competing projects.

Our work also showed that the judiciary’s plan and related material do not

present competing projects in a long-term strategic context or articulate a

rationale or justification for proposed projects and their relative priority.

Moreover, they do not contain project-specific information on the

conditions that exist at each location that would help decisionmakers

compare the merits of individual projects, better understand the rationale

for funding priorities, and justify funding decisions. Finally, the plan and

related material do not explain that urgency scores were not developed for

all projects or that funding priorities were not based exclusively on

urgency.

The judiciary’s efforts to assess urgency and willingness to prepare the

plan represent positive steps forward. We recognize that the plan is

transitional and that it will evolve. Furthermore, we believe that it is

reasonable for pipeline projects to receive some priority consideration for

funding, but the plan and related material should make a convincing

argument as to why they should be funded before others that have higher

urgency scores. We also recognize that the overall process for identifying

and funding courthouse projects is dynamic and that various factors

influence funding decisions. Within this context for decisionmaking, the

judiciary’s plan and related urgency score methodology have the potential

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B-271103 

to provide important baseline information for use in weighing priorities

and making more informed decisions. Considering the magnitude of the

courthouse construction initiative and the scarcity of resources, we

believe that decisionmakers would benefit from a plan that provides more

information about project proposals and a more complete explanation of

priorities among all competing projects.

Background In the late 1980s, the judiciary recognized that it was facing space

shortages, security shortfalls, and operational inefficiencies at courthouse

facilities around the country. To address this problem, the Judicial

Conference of the United States directed each of the 94 judicial districts,

with assistance from AOC, to develop long-range space plans to determine

where new and additional space was needed. To date, AOC has provided

each judicial district with planning guidance in developing 5-, 10-, and

30-year space shortage projections. As a result of this process, the

judiciary identified approximately 200 locations that would be out of space

within the next 10 years and has estimated that funding for new

courthouses at these locations would cost approximately $10 billion. In

addition to identifying space shortages, these planning efforts also

identified security concerns and operational inefficiencies at many of

these facilities nationwide.

The judiciary makes requests for new courthouse projects to GSA, the

federal government’s central agency for real property operations. GSA

requests funding for courthouses as part of the president’s annual budget

request to Congress. Under the Public Buildings Act of 1959, as amended,

GSA is required to submit to the Senate Committee on Environment and

Public Works and the House Committee on Transportation and

Infrastructure detailed project descriptions, called prospectuses, that

contain project cost estimates and justifications for projects that exceed a

prospectus threshold. Under the act, GSA can adjust the prospectus

threshold upward or downward based on changes in construction costs

during the preceding calendar year—the threshold is $1.74 million for

fiscal year 1997. Once projects are funded by Congress, GSA is to contract

with private sector firms for design and construction work.

In the early 1990s, Congress, we, and the private sector began calling on

the judiciary and GSA to prioritize projects for this major initiative. In 1990,

we began reporting that Congress needed better information for

decisionmaking, including a prioritization of capital investment needs.1

 In

1

GAO reports and testimonies on GSA real property issues are listed at the end of this report.

Page 3 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
B-271103 

1994, the Conference Committee on GSA’s 1995 appropriations act directed

that the courthouse construction requirements established by GSA and the

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) include a prioritization of projects

by AOC.

2

 A year earlier, the Independent Courts Building Program

Panel—which was formed in 1993 by GSA and AOC and comprised leading

architects, engineers, and construction professionals—recommended that

courthouse projects be prioritized into yearly 5-year plans. More recently,

in November 1995, we testified that the process for funding new

courthouse projects lacked—and could benefit from—a comprehensive

capital investment plan that articulates a rationale or justification for

projects and presents projects in a long-term strategic context.3

Furthermore, during the last 6 years, we have reported that Congress lacks

quality information to assess the merits of individual projects, understand

the rationale for project priorities, and justify funding decisions.

In March 1996, the judiciary—through the Judicial Conference of the

United States—issued a 5-year plan for courthouse construction for fiscal

years 1997 through 2001. The plan, which is intended to communicate the

judiciary’s urgent housing needs to Congress and GSA, identifies 45 projects

for funding based on information from Congress and GSA that $500 million

could be used as a planning target in estimating funds that will be available

for courthouse construction each year. Appendix I shows the projects in

the plan by fiscal year.

To determine project urgency, the judiciary developed a methodology for

assigning urgency scores to projects. The criteria and related weights

applied in assessing urgency include the length of time space shortages

have existed as defined by the year a location was or will be out-of-space

(30 percent); security concern ratings of 1 through 4 (30 percent), where a

1 indicates the lowest level of security concern; operational inefficiency

ratings of 1 through 5 (25 percent), where a 1 indicates minimal

operational inefficiencies; and the number of judges affected as defined by

the number of judges without courtrooms (15 percent). Under the

methodology, each project receives an urgency score on a scale of 100,

with a score of 100 indicating the highest level or degree of urgency.

Appendix II contains a more detailed description of the judiciary’s urgency

score methodology. In addition to the plan, AOC provided us with related

material, including a description of the methodology for assessing

urgency, an overview of the process used to develop the plan, and urgency

2

GSA fiscal year 1995 appropriations act conference report (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-741, at 47 (1994)).

3

FEDERAL COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION: More Disciplined Approach Would Reduce Costs and

Provide for Better Decisionmaking (GAO/T-GGD-96-19, Nov. 8, 1995).

Page 4 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
B-271103 

scores for the projects in the plan. AOC indicated that it provided the same

material to key congressional committees.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

Our objectives were to determine whether the judiciary’s 5-year plan

(1) reflects the judiciary’s most urgent courthouse construction needs and

(2) provides information needed by decisionmakers to evaluate the

relative merits of project proposals.

To meet the first objective, we focused on determining whether the plan

contains all the most urgently needed projects and if priorities in the plan

correlate with the judiciary’s own project urgency scores. In making this

assessment, we relied primarily on the urgency scores the judiciary

developed for projects in the plan, its methodology for assessing project

urgency, and AOC data related to urgency for projects that were not

included in the plan. The judiciary’s methodology for assessing urgency

appears to include factors that would be important in gauging the relative

urgency of competing projects, and the process used to assign scores for

each of the four criteria, though subjective, seems straightforward.

However, we did not assess the validity of the methodology or the

reliability of the urgency scores developed for each location.

To determine whether the plan contains the most urgently needed

projects, we developed minimum urgency scores for 80 locations that

were not in the plan but, according to AOC, also need new courthouse

projects. AOC provided us with security concern and out-of-space year data

for these projects. As previously mentioned, security concern and

out-of-space year data each have weights of 30 percent that are applied in

developing the urgency score. Operational inefficiencies and the number

of judges affected—the two other components of the urgency score—have

weights of 25 percent and 15 percent of the score, respectively. Therefore,

security concern and out-of-space year data equate to 60 percent of the

total urgency scores these projects would receive.

To calculate minimum scores for these locations, we used the security

concern and out-of-space year data and applied the judiciary’s urgency

score methodology to these 80 other locations. Because data for

operational inefficiencies were not available for these locations, we

assigned minimum ratings of “1” to each of the 80 locations. AOC officials

told us that, according to the scoring methodology, 1 was the lowest score

locations could receive for this criterion. For the fourth factor, number of

judges affected, AOC did not have data, and thus we used “0” for this factor

Page 5 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
B-271103 

in our calculation. Therefore, our minimum scores do not include an

assessment of operational conditions at these locations or a calculation for

the number of judges affected. If actual scores for these two factors were

included, urgency scores for these projects could either increase or remain

the same—the scores could not decrease. We then compared these

minimum scores to the complete scores assigned to the 45 projects in the

5-year plan and discussed the results with AOC officials. Appendix II

contains a more detailed description of the urgency score methodology

and our calculation of minimum scores for projects not included in the

plan.

To determine whether priorities in the plan correlate with the project

urgency scores the judiciary developed, we compared the urgency scores

for the 45 projects in the plan with the yearly sequence of funding

priorities specified in the plan for fiscal years 1997 through 2001. We

specifically focused on comparing projects that were at similar stages,

such as site and design, that are scheduled for funding in different years

according to the plan. We also discussed project priorities with AOC and

GSA officials to identify other factors that may have been considered in

prioritizing projects.

To meet the second objective, we compared the information in the plan

and related material to the types of information decisionmakers need to

effectively assess project proposals and funding requests. Our past work

specifically identified the types of information decisionmakers need when

making decisions on courthouse construction funding. It includes a capital

investment plan that prioritizes individual projects and puts them in some

long-term strategic context and provides a rationale or justification for

priorities set among competing projects.

In making our comparison, we also considered the results of our work on

the first objective because knowing whether the plan reflects the

judiciary’s most urgently needed projects has ramifications for the amount

of information decisionmakers would need to understand the basis for the

plan’s priorities. Also, as mentioned before, the judiciary’s intent in

developing the plan was to communicate its urgent courthouse

construction needs. In addition, we reviewed congressional reports and

testimonies pertaining to capital investment planning. We also considered

a 1993 report by a GSA/judiciary-sponsored panel of private sector experts

that outlined ways to improve the courthouse construction initiative. We

did our work between March and November 1996 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards. We received written

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B-271103 

comments on a draft of this report from AOC, which we have included in

appendix III. GSA provided oral comments on a draft of this report. We

summarize and evaluate AOC’s and GSA’s comments on pages 14 and 15.

5-Year Plan Does Not

Reflect All the Most

Urgently Needed

Projects

Our analysis showed that the 5-year plan does contain projects with high

urgency scores, including 13 projects with scores above 65. However, it

also contains others that have scores lower than projects that were not

included in the plan. Using the judiciary’s methodology and available data

on security and space concerns and assuming the lowest possible scores

for operational conditions and number of judges affected, we calculated

minimum urgency scores for 80 projects that were not in the plan. Of

these, we identified 30 projects that had minimum urgency scores higher

than the complete scores for some of the projects in the plan. In fact,

according to AOC, 1 of the 30 projects not in the plan would have a

complete urgency score that is higher than those for 40 of the 45 projects

in the plan.

In developing the plan, the judiciary did not develop urgency scores for all

competing projects. Instead, the judiciary focused on those projects that

were in the GSA pipeline or were previously identified during earlier

internal efforts to develop project priorities. Using this approach and the

assumption that $500 million would be available for projects in each of the

5 years, the judiciary developed scores for 45 projects. AOC officials told us

that they were unable to develop scores for other projects not included in

the plan in time for the plan’s March 1996 issuance. They added that, based

on their general knowledge of conditions at the other locations, they

believed these other projects would not have urgency scores as high as the

projects in the plan, except for a few cases. However, AOC did not provide

any analysis to support these assertions. It said that it intends to develop

scores for all the projects for possible inclusion in future versions of the

plan.

Urgency scores and related data were not available for projects not

included in the plan when we began our review. However, AOC

subsequently provided us with out-of-space year and security concern data

it had developed for 80 projects identified for funding consideration in the

fiscal years 2002 through 2006 timeframe. These two factors have a total

weight of 60 percent that is applied in developing the urgency score. We

used these data to apply the judiciary’s methodology for assigning project

urgency scores to identify minimum scores for these 80 projects. Data for

operational inefficiencies at these locations were not available; therefore,

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we assigned a minimum rating of 1 to each of the 80 locations. According

to the scoring methodology, 1 is the score locations receive when

operational inefficiencies are minimal. For the fourth factor, number of

judges affected, AOC did not have data, and we used 0 in our calculation,

which is the minimum score a location can receive for this factor. As

shown in table 1, using these data and the judiciary’s methodology, we

calculated that 30 locations have a minimum urgency score of 41.3 or

higher, which is higher than the complete scores for 3 projects in the

plan—San Diego, CA; San Jose, CA; and Cheyenne, WY.

Table 1: Minimum Urgency Scores for

30 Projects Not Included in the 5-Year

Plan Location

Minimum urgency

score Location

Minimum urgency

score

Los Angeles, CA 54.5 Macon, GA 42.8

Jackson, MS 48.8 Rock Island, IL 42.8

Guam 47.0 Aberdeen, MS 42.8

Austin, TX 47.0 Abingdon, VA 42.8

Anchorage, AK 46.4 Yakima, WA 42.8

Lexington, KY 46.4 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 41.3

Jefferson City, MO 46.4 Marquette, MI 41.3

Anniston, AL 44.6 Oxford, MS 41.3

Huntsville, AL 44.6 Columbus, OH 41.3

Boise, ID 44.6 Chattanooga, TN 41.3

South Bend, IN 44.6 Harrisonburg, VA 41.3

Alexandria, LA 44.6 Christiansted,

USVIa

41.3

Billings, MT 44.6 Madison, WI 41.3

Honolulu, HI 43.4 Elkins, WV 41.3

San Antonio, TX 43.4 Casper, WY 41.3

aU.S. Virgin Islands.

Source: AOC data and GAO analysis.

In addition to having a minimum score higher than the San Diego, San

Jose, and Cheyenne projects, Los Angeles has a minimum score higher

than another 16 locations that were included in the plan. Jackson has a

minimum score higher than a total of eight projects in the plan. We also

noted that the projects in San Diego and San Jose are scheduled to begin

receiving the $197 million they are estimated to require in fiscal year 1998,

which is 4 years before funding is to be considered for any of the projects

Page 8 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
B-271103 

in table 1. Appendix II shows our calculations of minimum urgency scores

for each of the 80 projects that were not included in the plan.

It is important to recognize that the minimum score calculations for these

30 locations include a minimum assessment of operational conditions and

number of judges affected for these locations, 2 factors that have weights

totaling 40 percent that are applied in developing the urgency scores.

Although we were unable to determine the extent to which additional data

on these other two criteria would increase the urgency scores, our

minimum score calculations clearly showed that the 45 projects in the plan

do not reflect the 45 most urgent projects according to the judiciary’s

methodology.

The AOC official responsible for developing the plan told us that the actual

urgency score for Los Angeles when taking into account all 4 criteria

would be somewhere in the 80s. Only 5 of the plan’s 45 projects have

scores of 80 or above. The official said that the judiciary is aware of the

conditions in Los Angeles and that the project was left out of the 5-year

plan until some key planning decisions are made by GSA and the judiciary.

The official added that one major obstacle to moving this project up in the

plan is its cost, which is estimated at over $200 million. Another obstacle is

the unwillingness of certain judicial districts to have their projects pushed

back to make room for this project given that the plan assumes only

$500 million will be available each year. We recognize that these factors

will need to be considered in the funding process. However, not explaining

the situation in Los Angeles in the plan seems questionable given the

urgency score it would receive and that the objective of the plan was to

communicate the judiciary’s urgent needs. Further, the obstacles to

including it in the plan provided by AOC seem to be ones in which Congress

has a stakeholder interest since it funds the projects and may not be fully

aware of the situation in Los Angeles. We did note that the plan recognizes

in a footnote that further study is needed to determine how to resolve the

need for a project in Los Angeles. However, the plan provides no

indication of the forthcoming challenge of funding this large project with

limited resources or the severe conditions that exist in Los Angeles.

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For example, Los Angeles has a “severe” security concern rating of 4,4

which is quite different from the two California locations that are

scheduled for funding beginning in 1998. These two locations, San Jose

and San Diego, had security concern scores of only 1—the lowest score

possible. No other locations, including those in the plan, had security

concerns lower than 2. In fact, six other locations not included in the

plan—including Jackson, MS—had “major” security concerns warranting

scores of 3.5

Funding Priorities in

the Plan Not Always

Based on Urgency

In addition to not reflecting the most urgent projects, project funding

priorities in the plan itself were not always exclusively based on the

urgency scores. Our analysis of project priorities and urgency scores

showed that several of the projects in the plan identified for funding in

fiscal year 1998 had lower urgency scores than several projects scheduled

for fiscal years 1999 and 2000. The first year of the plan, 1997, does contain

several projects with high urgency scores, including projects in Brooklyn,

NY; Corpus Christi, TX; Cleveland, OH; and Seattle, WA that have scores

ranging from 77.5 to 100. However, eight projects identified for site and/or

design funding in 1999 had higher urgency scores than seven projects

identified for site and/or design funding in 1998. Table 2 shows these

projects and their urgency scores.

4

According to AOC, a severe security concern means that most or all of the following conditions exist:

the facility lacks separate circulation patterns for prisoners and judges; is in an area designated by the

Marshals Service as a high crime area; has specific structural problems that would make the building

susceptible to a bomb or threat; has no platform through which to transport prisoners; has a split

district court situation causing prisoner transport problems; and has been described by the Marshals

Service as among the worst in the nation and/or the Marshals Service has been forced to move from

the building.

5

According to AOC, a major concern includes most or all of the conditions for a severe concern except

that the U.S. Marshals have not designated the location as among the worst in the nation and the

Marshals have not moved from the building.

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Table 2: Comparison of Selected 1998

and 1999 Projects 1998 projecta Urgency score 1999 project Urgency score

Little Rock, AR 54.8 Richmond, VA 85.0

Cape Girardeau, MO 52.3 Biloxi, MS 76.6

Fresno, CA 51.7 Buffalo, NY 68.3

Orlando, FL 50.3 El Paso, TX 61.9

Erie, PA 47.3 Mobile, AL 61.3

San Diego, CA 40.4 Norfolk, VA 58.9

San Jose, CA 39.5 Las Cruces, NM 56.3

Charlotte Amalie,

USVIb

55.0

aAbout $19.4 million was appropriated for three of these projects—Fresno, Orlando, and Erie—in

the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No 104-208, 110 Stat 309, Title IV §

404 (1996).

bU.S. Virgin Islands.

Source: Judiciary 5-Year Plan for Courthouse Construction.

In fact, one 1999 project—Richmond, VA—has the fifth highest urgency

score among projects in the plan, yet 23 other projects in the plan with

lower urgency scores have higher funding priority. Furthermore, five

projects scheduled for site and/or design funding in 2000 all have urgency

scores higher than three of the projects scheduled for site and/or design

funding in 1998. These five 2000 projects have scores ranging from 47.9 to

50.8 and are located in Harrisburg, PA; Sioux Falls, SD; Muskogee, OK;

Birmingham, AL; and Toledo, OH. Appendix I shows the scores for all

these projects as well as for the other projects in the plan.

AOC officials said that projects in the plan were not prioritized exclusively

on the basis of their urgency scores. As previously mentioned, the plan

places heavy emphasis on projects that were already in the GSA pipeline.

These pipeline projects include projects in the latter stages of the GSA

planning process that GSA had already planned to request funding for in

1997 and 1998. The GSA planning process includes assessing needs,

estimating costs, and developing prospectuses for congressional review.

GSA officials confirmed that projects in the plan for 1997 and 1998 were in

the GSA pipeline. They added that for projects identified for 1999 and

beyond, GSA was not prepared to request funding any sooner than is

specified in the 5-year plan. For example, they had only recently become

aware of the urgent need in Richmond and were not prepared to request

funds for a project there any earlier than 1999.

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According to AOC officials, the plan is transitional in that it addresses

projects already identified for funding by GSA in 1997 and 1998, and then

begins addressing urgent projects identified through the judiciary’s new

process in 1999 and beyond. According to these officials, these pipeline

projects should be funded first because their planning efforts are already

under way. We recognize that the process for identifying and funding

projects is complex and dynamic and that various factors, including

planning decisions already made, total funding available, and the political

nature of the process, will influence final decisions. Nonetheless, the

judiciary’s plan and its related urgency score methodology have the

potential to provide important baseline information to help

decisionmakers weigh priorities and make more informed decisions. While

we believe that pipeline projects should compete for funding, we also

believe that the plan should make a convincing argument as to why these

projects should be funded first. As discussed in more detail in the next

section, the plan and related material do not (1) provide a rationale or

justification for why Congress should fund these pipeline projects first or

(2) discuss the consequences of or trade-offs involved in funding projects

with low urgency scores that GSA had already planned to request instead of

others that have higher scores.

Plan Lacks Key

Information

Decisionmakers Need

The judiciary’s 5-year plan and related materials do not provide all the

information needed by decisionmakers to fully assess the relative merits of

project proposals. Over the last several years, we have stressed the

importance of placing construction proposals in a priority-based plan.

And, our November 8, 1995, testimony on courthouse construction noted

that Congress lacked information that (1) puts individual projects in some

long-term strategic context and (2) provides a rationale or justification for

project priorities.

During our current review, we examined the judiciary’s plan and its

related material to see whether they contained the type of information we

said Congress lacked when making critical capital investment decisions.

Our analysis showed that the plan and its related material do not articulate

priorities in a long-term strategic context, primarily because they do not

reflect an assessment of the urgency of all competing projects. As

mentioned earlier, the judiciary focused on projects in the GSA pipeline and

others identified during earlier internal efforts to plan for future projects.

However, it did not assess other projects that, our work showed, have

higher urgency scores than several of the projects in the plan. Although

this approach produced a list of the judiciary’s priorities, it did not provide

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B-271103 

decisionmakers a long-term perspective on the urgency of projects in the

plan compared to others that were not included. In addition, the plan did

not explain that all needed projects had yet to be assessed. Without this

explanation, decisionmakers could get the impression that projects not

included in the plan all have lower urgency scores.

Furthermore, the plan does not contain a rationale or justification for its

project priorities. As discussed earlier, the judiciary fashioned the plan to

give higher priority to projects in the GSA pipeline. However, the plan and

related material do not explain that pipeline projects did not always have

the highest urgency scores or articulate why Congress should fund these

projects first. As a result, the plan does not convey to Congress the

consequences of or trade-offs involved in not funding higher urgency

projects sooner in favor of projects with lower urgency scores that are in

the GSA pipeline.

Related to not justifying its priorities, the plan and its related material lack

specificity about conditions that exist at each location—information that

would help decisionmakers better understand priorities. The plan and its

related material do not discuss conditions such as security concerns or

severe space shortages at different locations. Although the urgency scores

and related data were provided, summarizing the specific conditions that

are driving the need for individual projects could strengthen the plan and

give decisionmakers a better perspective or understanding about why one

project is more urgent than another.

Conclusions The judiciary has made an effort to improve capital investment planning

for courthouse construction as evidenced by its methodology for assessing

project urgency and its efforts to prepare a construction plan. However,

the current 5-year plan does not reflect all the judiciary’s most urgently

needed projects, and project funding priorities are not always based

exclusively on urgency. Furthermore, the plan does not provide key

project-specific information needed by decisionmakers to compare and

evaluate the merits of individual projects and understand the rationale that

supports priorities.

We recognize that the plan is transitional and that it will evolve. We also

recognize that the process for funding courthouse projects is dynamic and

that various factors influence funding decisions. Within this context, the

judiciary’s plan and the related urgency score methodology have the

potential to provide important baseline information to help

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decisionmakers weigh priorities and make more informed decisions. This

plan and its related material do not alert Congress, an important

stakeholder, that the projects do not reflect all the judiciary’s most urgent

needs nor do they explain that pipeline projects with high funding priority

do not always have the highest urgency scores. Absent this information,

decisionmakers may not be aware of the severity of needs in other

locations not included in the plan—such as Los Angeles—or that projects

in the plan with high scores—such as Richmond—have a lower funding

priority than other projects with lower scores.

Recommendations We recommend that the Director of AOC work with the Judicial Conference

Committee on Security, Space, and Facilities to make improvements to the

5-year plan. These improvements should be aimed at making the plan

more informative and a more useful tool for helping Congress to better

understand project priorities and individual project needs. At a minimum,

the plan should (1) fully disclose the relative urgency of all competing

projects and (2) articulate the rationale or justification for project

priorities, including information on the conditions that are driving

urgency—such as specific security concerns or operational inefficiencies.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

AOC, on December 13, 1996, provided written comments on a draft of this

report that generally concurred with the draft and our recommendations.

AOC said that many of the improvements we recommended were already

under consideration (see app. III). AOC recognized that the judiciary is

responsible for providing its requirements to GSA as one of GSA’s many

tenants and has done its part to project space requirements in a

methodical way. However, AOC pointed out that, since the executive

branch has not released strategic real property plans for the federal

government as a whole, our comment about the lack of a strategic real

estate plan would be more appropriately addressed to the executive

branch.

We agree that a governmentwide strategic plan for real property is needed

and have recommended that GSA take the lead in developing such a plan in

several of our prior products (see Related GAO Products at the end of this

report). However, the development of a governmentwide plan was not the

subject of this review. Instead, we reviewed the judiciary’s 5-year plan,

which serves as input to GSA’s overall planning efforts. To date, through

the 5-year plan and related urgency score methodology, the judiciary has

begun playing an important role in improving strategic planning for the

Page 14 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
B-271103 

courthouse construction initiative. Their approach has the potential to

provide important baseline data that are key ingredients to strategic

planning. However, the judiciary’s efforts to date have been incomplete

and could benefit from the improvements outlined in our

recommendations.

We believe that any GSA customer with major capital investment needs like

the judiciary should think and plan strategically and have significant input

into the development of a governmentwide plan. The proportion of

courthouse projects in GSA’s new construction budget submissions has

been significant, far surpassing that of all GSA’s other tenants

combined—about $633 million of the $715 million GSA requested for new

construction in fiscal year 1997 were for courthouse projects. According to

the judiciary’s plan, courthouses could continue to take up a large

proportion of GSA’s construction resources given that the plan identifies

about $500 million in needs per year between fiscal years 1997 and 2001

and that, as our work showed, 80 additional locations have needs to be

addressed beyond 2001.

We received oral comments on a draft of this report from key GSA Public

Buildings Service officials involved in the courthouse construction

initiative—the Assistant Commissioner for Portfolio Management, the

Courthouse Management Group (CMG) Program Executive, and the CMG

Program Director. These officials agreed with the thrust of the report and

said that it was a fair representation of issues related to the 5-year plan. In

addition, the Assistant Commissioner pointed out that judiciary needs do

not always have to be met through new construction. GSA will consider

other options, including leasing and lease-construction, in developing

proposals for consideration by Congress. She said that, because the

judiciary conveyed its needs in what was called a construction plan, its

audience may assume that new construction is the only option for meeting

these space needs.

The CMG Program Director, speaking for himself and the CMG Program

Executive, wanted to reemphasize that the pipeline projects identified for

1997 and 1998, including those with low urgency scores, were the only

projects GSA was prepared to request in these years. He said that GSA would

need time to plan and develop proposals for locations with high urgency

scores identified for 1999 and beyond. Finally, these officials also

suggested a few minor clarifying changes to the draft, which we made

where appropriate.

Page 15 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
B-271103 

We are sending copies of this report to the Director of AOC; Chairman of

the Judicial Conference Committee on Security, Space, and Facilities;

Administrator of GSA; Director, Office of Management and Budget; and

other interested congressional committees and subcommittees. The major

contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. If you have any

questions or would like additional information, please contact me on

(202) 512-8387.

J. William Gadsby

Director, Government Business Operations

 Issues

Page 16 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Page 17 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Judiciary 5-Year Plan

and Related Urgency

Scores by Fiscal Year

20

Appendix II 

Explanation of the

Judiciary’s Urgency

Score Methodology

and Our Calculation

of Minimum Scores

for 80 Projects Not in

the Plan

24

Appendix III 

Comments From the

Administrative Office

of the United States

Courts

32

Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to

This Report

34

Related GAO Reports

and Testimonies

36

Tables Table 1: Minimum Urgency Scores for 30 Projects Not Included in

the 5-Year Plan

8

Table 2: Comparison of Selected 1998 and 1999 Projects 11

Table I.1: Fiscal Year 1997 Projects 20

Page 18 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Contents

Table I.2: Fiscal Year 1998 Projects 20

Table I.3: Fiscal Year 1999 Projects 21

Table I.4: Fiscal Year 2000 Projects 22

Table I.5: Fiscal Year 2001 Projects 23

Table II.1: Minimum Urgency Scores 26

Abbreviations

AOC Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts

CMG Commissioner for Portfolio Management, the Courthouse

Management Group

GSA General Services Administration

OMB Office of Management and Budget

Page 19 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Appendix I 

Judiciary 5-Year Plan and Related Urgency

Scores by Fiscal Year

Table I.1: Fiscal Year 1997 Projects

$ in millions

Priority rank City Project phase

Urgency

score Cost

1 Brooklyn, NY (Cellar

Annex)

Construction 100 $187.2

2 Corpus Christi, TX Construction 87.2 26.2

3 Cleveland, OH Construction 85.4 142.3

4 Seattle, WA Site 77.5 17.7

5 Las Vegas, NV Construction 61.9 96.0

Total $469.8

Table I.2: Fiscal Year 1998 Projects

$ in millions

Priority rank City Project phase

Urgency

score Cost

1 Brooklyn, NYa Construction 91.0 $122.6

2 Denver, CO Site & design 76.4 9.8

3 Washington, DC Design 75.4 5.7

4 London, KY Construction 69.4 15.1

5 Springfield, MA Site & design 68.8 3.5

6 Columbia, SC Construction 67.1 48.4

7 Jacksonville, FL Construction 63.8 76.1

8 Eugene, OR Site & design 63.7 6.3

9 Miami, FL Site & design 62.0 26.0

10 Laredo, TX Construction 58.9 24.3

11 Salt Lake City, UT Site & design 55.9 11.8

12 Wheeling, WV Construction 55.1 36.0

13 Little Rock, AR Site & design 54.8 3.2

14 Covington, KY Construction 54.3 18.9

15 Cape Girardeau, MO Design 52.3 2.2

16 Fresno, CA Design 51.7 7.8

17 Greeneville, TN Construction 50.8 23.6

18 Orlando, FL Site & design 50.3 10.7

19 Erie, PA Site & design 47.3 3.3

20 Savannah, GA Construction 45.8 30.5

21 San Diego, CA Site 40.4 18.2

22 San Jose, CA Site 39.5 2.7

Total $506.7

aOld U.S. Post Office building renovation.

Page 20 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Appendix I 

Judiciary 5-Year Plan and Related Urgency

Scores by Fiscal Year

Table I.3: Fiscal Year 1999 Projects

$ in millions

Priority rank City Project phase

Urgency

score Cost

1 Seattle, WA Construction 77.5 $153.6

2 Denver, CO Construction 76.4 62.5

3 Washington, DC Construction 75.4 98.2

4 Springfield, MA Construction 68.8 20.0

5 Eugene, OR Construction 63.7 56.5

6 Salt Lake City, UT Construction 55.9 35.5

7 Richmond, VA Site & design 85.0 8.9

8 Biloxi, MS Site & design 76.6 6.7

9 Buffalo, NY Site & design 68.3 12.6

10 El Paso, TX Site & design 61.9 8.2

11 Mobile, AL Site & design 61.3 11.3

12 Norfolk, VA Site & design 58.9 5.3

13 Las Cruces, NM Site & design 56.3 3.5

14 Charlotte Amalie, USVIa Site & design 55.0 10.9

15 Rockford, IL Site & design 54.3 3.6

16 Cedar Rapids, IA Site & design 52.9 12.7

17 Nashville, TN Site & design 51.8 13.4

Total $523.3

aU.S. Virgin Islands.

Page 21 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Appendix I 

Judiciary 5-Year Plan and Related Urgency

Scores by Fiscal Year

Table I.4: Fiscal Year 2000 Projects

$ in millions

Priority rank City Project phase

Urgency

score Cost

1 Miami, FL Construction 62.0 $91.4

2 Little Rock, AR Construction 54.8 26.2

3 Cape Girardeau, MO Construction 52.3 29.0

4 Fresno, CA Construction 51.7 83.7

5 Orlando, FL Construction 50.3 38.0

6 Erie, PA Construction 47.3 17.2

7 San Diego, CA Design 40.4 5.2

8 San Jose, CA Design 39.5 9.8

9 Richmond, VA Construction 85.0 50.6

10 Biloxi, MS Construction 76.6 38.1

11 Buffalo, NY Construction 68.3 71.1

12 Harrisburg, PA Site & design 50.8 8.1

13 Sioux Falls, SD Site & design 50.0 4.7

14 Muskogee, OK Site & design 49.0 5.0

15 Birmingham, AL Site & design 48.2 4.3

16 Toledo, OH Site & design 47.9 6.6

17 Greenville, SC Site & design 47.6 5.7

18 Cheyenne, WY Site & design 33.2 2.7

Total $497.4

Page 22 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Appendix I 

Judiciary 5-Year Plan and Related Urgency

Scores by Fiscal Year

Table I.5: Fiscal Year 2001 Projects

$ in millions

Priority rank City Project phase

Urgency

score Cost

1 San Diego, CA Construction 40.4 $91.2

2 San Jose, CA Construction 39.5 69.9

3 El Paso, TX Construction 61.9 46.2

4 Mobile, AL Construction 61.3 64.0

5 Norfolk, VA Construction 58.9 29.8

6 Las Cruces, NM Construction 56.3 20.0

7 Charlotte Amalie, USVIa Construction 55.0 33.4

8 Rockford, IL Construction 54.3 20.4

9 Cedar Rapids, IA Construction 52.9 44.5

10 Nashville, TN Construction 51.8 75.8

Total $495.1

aU.S. Virgin Islands.

Sources: The sources for tables I.1 through I.5 are the judiciary’s 5-year plan for courthouse

construction and an AOC listing of project urgency scores. (Note: When it provided the plan and

related materials, the judiciary listed the urgency scores for projects in the plan separately from,

and not in the same order as, its yearly funding priorities.)

Page 23 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Appendix II 

Explanation of the Judiciary’s Urgency

Score Methodology and Our Calculation of

Minimum Scores for 80 Projects Not in the

Plan

The criteria and related weights applied in assessing urgency under the

judiciary’s methodology include the length of time space shortages have

existed as defined by the year a location was or will be out of space

(30 percent); security concern ratings of 1 through 4 (30 percent), where a

1 indicates the lowest level of security concern; operational inefficiency

ratings of 1 through 5 (25 percent), where a 1 indicates the lowest level of

operational inefficiency; and the number of judges affected as defined by

the number of judges without courtrooms (15 percent). Under the

methodology, the range of possible conditions for each of the four criteria

has a corresponding multiplication factor between 0 and 1. These factors

are multiplied by the weight for each of the criteria to determine the

urgency score. As a result, each project receives an urgency score on a

scale of 100, with a score of 100 indicating the highest level or degree of

urgency.

To calculate minimum scores for the 80 locations not included in the

5-year plan, we used security concern and out-of-space year data AOC

provided and applied the judiciary’s urgency score methodology. The data

AOC provided are shown in table II.1 under the columns entitled “security

concern” and “out-of-space year.” According to the methodology, each

level of security concern and out-of-space year have corresponding

multiples used in calculating the score. These multiples are shown in table

II.1 under the columns entitled “security score multiple” and “out-of-space

year multiple.” The security concern and out-of-space year portions of the

urgency score result from applying the multiple to 30, the weight given to

each of these factors. These scores are shown in table II.1 under the

columns “security score” and “out-of-space year score.”

Although data for operational inefficiencies at these locations were not

available, we assigned a minimum rating of 1 to each of the 80 locations.

AOC officials told us that, according to the scoring methodology, 1 was the

lowest score locations could receive for this criterion. According to the

judiciary’s methodology, a score of 1 equates to 5 points in the calculation

of the urgency score. For the fourth factor, number of judges affected, AOC

did not have data, and thus we used 0 for this factor in our calculation,

which is the lowest score a location can receive for this factor. The

minimum urgency score total shown in the last column of table II.1,

therefore, represents an addition of the security score, out-of-space year

score, and minimum scores applied for operational conditions and number

of judges affected.

Page 24 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Appendix II 

Explanation of the Judiciary’s Urgency

Score Methodology and Our Calculation of

Minimum Scores for 80 Projects Not in the

Plan

Page 25 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Appendix II 

Explanation of the Judiciary’s Urgency

Score Methodology and Our Calculation of

Minimum Scores for 80 Projects Not in the

Plan

Table II.1: Minimum Urgency Scores

Location

Security

concern

Security score

multiple

Security score

(multiple x 30)

Los Angeles, CA 4 1 30

Jackson, MS 3 0.75 22.5

Guam 3 0.75 22.5

Austin, TX 3 0.75 22.5

Anchorage, AK 2 0.75 15

Lexington, KY 2 0.5 15

Jefferson City, MO 2 0.5 15

Anniston, AL 2 0.5 15

Huntsville, AL 2 0.5 15

Boise, ID 2 0.5 15

South Bend, IN 2 0.5 15

Alexandria, LA 2 0.5 15

Billings, MT 2 0.5 15

Honolulu, HI 3 0.75 22.5

San Antonio, TX 3 0.75 22.5

Macon, GA 2 0.5 15

Rock Island, IL 2 0.5 15

Aberdeen, MS 2 0.5 15

Abingdon, VA 2 0.5 15

Yakima, WA 2 0.5 15

Ft. Lauderdale, FL 2 0.5 15

Marquette, MI 2 0.5 15

Oxford, MS 2 0.5 15

Columbus, OH 2 0.5 15

Chattanooga, TN 2 0.5 15

Harrisonburg, VA 2 0.5 15

Christiansted, USVIa 2 0.5 15

Madison, WI 2 0.5 15

Elkins, WV 2 0.5 15

Casper, WY 2 0.5 15

Pocatello, ID 2 0.5 15

Fort Wayne, IN 2 0.5 15

Pikeville, KY 2 0.5 15

Springfield, MO 2 0.5 15

Charlotte, NC 2 0.5 15

Greenville, NC 2 0.5 15

Johnstown, PA 2 0.5 15

Page 26 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Appendix II 

Explanation of the Judiciary’s Urgency

Score Methodology and Our Calculation of

Minimum Scores for 80 Projects Not in the

Plan

e

) Out-of-space year

Out-of-space year

multiple

Out-of-space year

score (multiple x 30)

Operational

conditions score

Number of judges

affected score

Minimum urgency

score total

0 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 54.5

5 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 48.8

5 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 47

5 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 47

5 1991 0.88 26.4 5 0 46.4

5 1991 0.88 26.4 5 0 46.4

5 1991 0.88 26.4 5 0 46.4

5 1992 0.82 24.6 5 0 44.6

5 1992 0.82 24.6 5 0 44.6

5 1992 0.82 24.6 5 0 44.6

5 1992 0.82 24.6 5 0 44.6

5 1992 0.82 24.6 5 0 44.6

5 1992 0.82 24.6 5 0 44.6

5 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 43.4

5 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 43.4

5 1993 0.76 22.8 5 0 42.8

5 1993 0.76 22.8 5 0 42.8

5 1993 0.76 22.8 5 0 42.8

5 1993 0.76 22.8 5 0 42.8

5 1993 0.76 22.8 5 0 42.8

5 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3

5 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3

5 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3

5 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3

5 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3

5 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3

5 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3

5 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3

5 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3

5 1994 0.71 21.3 5 0 41.3

5 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5

5 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5

5 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5

5 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5

5 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5

5 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5

5 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5

(continued)

Page 27 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Appendix II 

Explanation of the Judiciary’s Urgency

Score Methodology and Our Calculation of

Minimum Scores for 80 Projects Not in the

Plan

Location

Security

concern

Security score

multiple

Security score

(multiple x 30)

Beaumont, TX 2 0.5 15

Houston, TX 2 0.5 15

Plano, TX 2 0.5 15

Big Stone Gap, VA 2 0.5 15

Clarksburg, WV 2 0.5 15

San Francisco, CA 3 0.75 22.5

Benton, IL 2 0.5 15

Great Falls, MT 2 0.5 15

Greensboro, NC 2 0.5 15

Statesville, NC 2 0.5 15

Santa Fe, NM 2 0.5 15

Riverside, CA 2 0.5 15

Wilmington, NC 2 0.5 15

Panama City, FL 2 0.5 15

Columbus, GA 2 0.5 15

Newnan, GA 2 0.5 15

E. St. Louis, IL 2 0.5 15

Springfield, IL 2 0.5 15

New Orleans, LA 2 0.5 15

Detroit, MI 2 0.5 15

Dallas, TX 2 0.5 15

Ft. Worth, TX 2 0.5 15

McAllen, TX 2 0.5 15

Rome, GA 2 0.5 15

Monroe, LA 2 0.5 15

Ft. Smith, AR 2 0.5 15

Wilmington, DE 2 0.5 15

Hinesville, GA 2 0.5 15

Peoria, IL 2 0.5 15

Baltimore, MD 2 0.5 15

Greenbelt, MD 2 0.5 15

Flint, MI 2 0.5 15

Durham, NC 2 0.5 15

Winston-Salem, NC 2 0.5 15

Aberdeen, SD 2 0.5 15

Danville, VA 2 0.5 15

Philadelphia, PA 2 0.5 15

Tyler, TX 2 0.5 15

Page 28 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Appendix II 

Explanation of the Judiciary’s Urgency

Score Methodology and Our Calculation of

Minimum Scores for 80 Projects Not in the

Plan

e

) Out-of-space year

Out-of-space year

multiple

Out-of-space year

score (multiple x 30)

Operational

conditions score

Number of judges

affected score

Minimum urgency

score total

5 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5

5 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5

5 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5

5 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5

5 1995 0.65 19.5 5 0 39.5

5 2000 0.35 10.5 5 0 38

5 1996 0.59 17.7 5 0 37.7

5 1996 0.59 17.7 5 0 37.7

5 1996 0.59 17.7 5 0 37.7

5 1996 0.59 17.7 5 0 37.7

5 1996 0.59 17.7 5 0 37.7

5 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9

5 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9

5 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9

5 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9

5 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9

5 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9

5 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9

5 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9

5 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9

5 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9

5 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9

5 1997 0.53 15.9 5 0 35.9

5 1998 0.47 14.1 5 0 34.1

5 1998 0.47 14.1 5 0 34.1

5 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3

5 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3

5 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3

5 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3

5 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3

5 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3

5 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3

5 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3

5 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3

5 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3

5 1999 0.41 12.3 5 0 32.3

5 2000 0.35 10.5 5 0 30.5

5 2000 0.35 10.5 5 0 30.5

(continued)

Page 29 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Appendix II 

Explanation of the Judiciary’s Urgency

Score Methodology and Our Calculation of

Minimum Scores for 80 Projects Not in the

Plan

Location

Security

concern

Security score

multiple

Security score

(multiple x 30)

San Diego, CAb 2 0.5 15

Medford, OR 2 0.5 15

Bridgeport, CT 2 0.5 15

Memphis, TN 2 0.5 15

Portland, ME 2 0.5 15

Page 30 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Appendix II 

Explanation of the Judiciary’s Urgency

Score Methodology and Our Calculation of

Minimum Scores for 80 Projects Not in the

Plan

e

) Out-of-space year

Out-of-space year

multiple

Out-of-space year

score (multiple x 30)

Operational

conditions score

Number of judges

affected score

Minimum urgency

score total

5 2001 0.29 8.7 5 0 28.7

5 2001 0.29 8.7 5 0 28.7

5 2002 0.24 7.2 5 0 27.2

5 2002 0.24 7.2 5 0 27.2

5 2005 0.06 1.8 5 0 21.8

aU.S. Virgin Islands.

bBankruptcy Court project.

Source: AOC data and GAO analysis.

Page 31 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Appendix III 

Comments From the Administrative Office

of the United States Courts

Page 32 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Appendix III 

Comments From the Administrative Office

of the United States Courts

Page 33 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

General Government

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Gerald Stankosky, Assistant Director, Government Business Operations

 Issues

John F. Mortin, Assignment Manager

David E. Sausville, Evaluator-in-Charge

Page 34 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Page 35 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
Related GAO Reports and Testimonies

Federal Courthouse Construction: More Disciplined Approach Would

Reduce Costs and Provide for Better Decisionmaking (GAO/T-GGD-96-19,

Nov. 8, 1995).

General Services Administration: Opportunitites For Cost Savings in the

Public Buildings Area (GAO/T-GGD-95-149, July 13, 1995).

Federal Real Property: Key Acquisition and Management Obstacles

(GAO/T-GGD-93-42, July 27, 1993).

Federal Office Space: Obstacles to Purchasing Commercial Properties

From RTC, FDIC, and Others (GAO/GGD-92-60, Mar. 31, 1992).

General Services Issues (GAO/OCG-93-28TR, Dec. 1992).

Real Property Management Issues Facing GSA and Congress (GAO/T-GGD-92-4,

Oct. 30, 1991).

Long-Term Neglect of Federal Building Needs (GAO/T-GGD-91-64, Aug. 1,

1991).

Federal Buildings: Actions Needed to Prevent Further Deterioration and

Obsolescence (GAO/GGD-91-57, May 13, 1991).

The Disinvestment in Federal Office Space (GAO/T-GGD-90-24, Mar. 20, 1990).

(240193) Page 36 GAO/GGD-97-27 Judiciary 5-Year Plan
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