29004 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 99 / Wednesday, May 23, 2007 / Notices 

Specifically, the law requires that the 

Federal government create and maintain 

a single searchable Web site, accessible 

by the public at no cost to access, that 

includes specific data elements about 

most federal awards. Understanding this 

new legislation is extremely important 

to all GPC stakeholders because 

ultimately this law will apply to most 

awardees and sub-awardees, and federal 

agencies will require awardees to 

provide much of the needed data as a 

condition of receiving federal financial 

assistance. 

Secondarily, the purpose of the 

webcast meeting is to inform 

stakeholders about the GPC’s long-term 

planning and prioritization efforts and 

to receive input from stakeholders to 

inform a draft plan that will include 

both GPC’s mission and vision, as well 

as a listing of GPC priorities as they 

relate to ongoing activities connected to 

the FGSI. 

Meeting structure and agenda: The 

June 19 Webcast meeting will have the 

following structure and agenda: 

(1) Welcome by the host agency; 

(2) Overview of the FFATA by the 

Chair of the GPC; 

(3) Overview of the GPC’s long-term 

planning and proposed priorities by the 

Chair of the GPC; and 

(4) Participants’ discussion, questions 

and comments. 

Background: Background about the 

FGSI is set forth in the Federal Register 

published on September 13, 2006 (71 FR 

54098). 

Dated: May 17, 2007. 

Thomas Cooley, 

Chair, Grants Policy Committee of the U.S. 

Chief Financial Officer Council. 

[FR Doc. E7–9839 Filed 5–22–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7555–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Notice of Public Meeting for Fuel Cycle 

Facilities 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Public Meeting Notice. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

James Smith, Project Manager, 

Technical Support Section, Division of 

Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Office 

of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20005–

0001. Telephone: (301) 415–6459; fax 

number: (301) 415–5370; e-mail: 

jas4@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) is hosting a workshop to discuss 

issues of interest pertaining to the 

regulation of NRC-regulated fuel cycle 

facilities. The purpose of the workshop 

is to discuss various issues of the 

regulatory program related to the update 

of 10 CFR part 70. The specific issues 

to be discussed are 10 CFR part 70, 

Appendix A reportability of incidents, 

digital control systems, enforcement 

policy revisions, uranium solubility 

issues. 

The workshop will be held in 

Rockville, Maryland, at the NRC’s 

Executive Boulevard Building, located 

at 6003 Executive Boulevard and will be 

open to the public. We are expecting 

that NRC staff, licensees and certificate 

holders, and other interested parties and 

stakeholders will be making 

presentations on these issues of interest, 

with opportunity for followup 

discussion on each subject. 

II. Dates and Location 

Date: June 14, 2007. 9 a.m.–5:30 p.m. 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Executive Boulevard Building, 6003 

Executive Boulevard, Rockville, MD 

20852. 

III. Contact 

James Smith, Project Manager, Office 

of Nuclear Material Safety and 

Safeguards, Division of Fuel Cycle 

Safety and Safeguards, Special Projects 

Branch, Mail Stop: T8F42, 301–415–

6459, Fax: 301–415–5370, e-mail: 

jas4@nrc.gov. 

IV. Further Information 

The document related to this action is 

available electronically at the NRC’s 

Electronic Reading Room at http:// 

www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. 

From this site, you can access the NRC’s 

Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS), which 

provides text and image files of NRC’s 

public documents. The ADAMS 

accession number for the document 

related to this notice is provided in the 

following table. If you do not have 

access to ADAMS or if there are 

problems in accessing the document 

located in ADAMS, contact the NRC 

Public Document Room (PDR) Reference 

staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, 

or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day 

of May 2007. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Margie Kotzolas, 

Acting Chief, Technical Support Branch, 

Special Projects and Technical Support 

Directorate, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and 

Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Materials Safety 

and Safeguards. 

[FR Doc. E7–9923 Filed 5–22–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Notice of Availability of Model Safety 

Evaluation and Model License 

Amendment Request on Technical 

Specification Improvement Regarding 

Use of the Improved Banked Position 

Withdrawal Sequence for General 

Electric Boiling Water Reactors Using 

the Consolidated Line Item 

Improvement Process 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Request for comment. 

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that 

the staff of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) has prepared a 

model license amendment request 

(LAR), model safety evaluation (SE), and 

model proposed no significant hazards 

consideration (NSHC) determination 

related to changes to Standard 

Technical Specification (STS) 3.1.6, 

‘‘Rod Pattern Control,’’ and STS 3.3.2.1, 

‘‘Control Rod Block Instrumentation’’

for NUREG–1433 and NUREG–1434. 

The proposed changes would revise the 

Technical Specifications (TS) and Bases 

for STS 3.1.6, ‘‘Rod Pattern Control,’’

and STS 3.3.2.1, ‘‘Control Rod Block 

Instrumentation’’ to allow licensees to 

use an improved control rod banked 

position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) 

when performing a reactor shutdown. In 

addition, the proposed changes would 

add a footnote to Table 3.3.2.1–1, 

‘‘Control Rod Block Instrumentation’’

for NUREG–1433 and NUREG–1434. 

The requirements for implementing the 

improved BPWS are described in 

General Electric Licensing Topical 

Report (LTR) NEDO–33091–A, Revision 

2, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod 

Insertion Process,’’ dated July 2004. The 

General Electric Boiling Water Reactor 

Owner’s Group (BWROG) participants 

in the Technical Specifications Task 

Force (TSTF) initially proposed these 

changes to the STS in TSTF–476, 

Revision 0, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control 

Rod Insertion Process (NEDO–33091).’’

TSTF–476, Revision 1 was submitted on 

January 9, 2007 and was later accepted 

by NRC. Hereafter, all references to 

TSTF–476 refer to TSTF–476, Revision 

1, unless otherwise noted. Technical 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 99 / Wednesday, May 23, 2007 / Notices 29005 

Specifications and Bases changes 

provided in TSTF–476 completely 

supersede the proposed Technical 

Specification changes included in 

NEDO–3309 1–A. 

The purpose of these models is to 

permit the NRC to efficiently process 

amendments to incorporate these 

changes into plant-specific (TS) for 

General Electric Boiling Water Reactors 

(BWRs). Licensees of nuclear power 

reactors to which the models apply can 

request amendments conforming to the 

models. In such a request, a licensee 

should confirm the applicability of the 

model LAR, model SE and NSHC 

determination to its plant. 

DATES: The NRC staff issued a Federal 

Register Notice (71 FR 26118, May 3, 

2006) which provided for public 

comment a model SE, model LAR, and 

NSHC determination related to changes 

to STS 3.1.6, ‘‘Rod Pattern Control,’’ and 

STS 3.3.2.1, ‘‘Control Rod Block 

Instrumentation’’ for NUREG–1433 and 

NUREG–1434. Similarly, the NRC staff 

herein provides a revised model SE, 

revised model LAR, and NSHC 

determination. The NRC staff can most 

efficiently consider applications based 

upon the model LAR, which references 

the Model SE, if the application is 

submitted within one year of this 

Federal Register Notice. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Timothy Kobetz, Mail Stop: O–12H2, 

Division Inspection and Regional 

Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC 20555–

0001, telephone 301–415–1932. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

Regulatory Issue Summary 2000–06, 

‘‘Consolidated Line Item Improvement 

Process (CLIIP) for Adopting Standard 

Technical Specifications Changes for 

Power Reactors,’’ was issued on March 

20, 2000. The CLIIP is intended to 

improve the efficiency and transparency 

of NRC licensing processes. This is 

accomplished by processing proposed 

changes to the STS in a manner that 

supports subsequent license amendment 

applications. The CLIIP includes an 

opportunity for the public to comment 

on proposed changes to the STS 

following a preliminary assessment by 

the NRC staff and finding that the 

change will likely be offered for 

adoption by licensees. 

The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to 

evaluate any comments received for a 

proposed change to the STS and to 

either reconsider the change or proceed 

with announcing the availability of the 

change for proposed adoption by 

licensees. In several instances, the staff’s 

evaluation did result in changes to the 

model LAR. Those licensees opting to 

apply for the subject change to TS are 

responsible for reviewing the staff’s 

evaluation, referencing the applicable 

technical justifications, and providing 

any necessary plant-specific 

information. The model LAR shows 

licensees the expected level of detail 

that needs to be included in order to 

adopt TSTF–476, as well as guidelines 

for staff review. The NRC has 

established an internal review plan that 

designates the appropriate staff and 

approximate time lines to review plantspecific LARs that reference TSTF–476. 

Each amendment application made in 

response to the notice of availability 

will be processed and noticed in 

accordance with applicable NRC rules 

and procedures. 

This notice involves implementation 

of an improved BPWS, which allows 

licensees of General Electric BWRs to 

follow the improved BPWS when 

inserting control rods into the core 

during a reactor shutdown. By letter 

dated January 9, 2007, the BWROG 

proposed these changes for 

incorporation into the STS as TSTF–

476. These changes are based on the 

NRC staff-approved LTR NEDO–33091–

A, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod 

Insertion Process,’’ dated July 2004, as 

approved by NRC in a SE dated June 16, 

2004, accessible electronically from the 

Agency-wide Documents Access and 

Management System’s (ADAMS) Public 

Electronic Reading Room on the Internet 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML041700479) 

at the NRC Web site http://www.nrc.gov/ 

reading-rm/adams.html. Persons who 

do not have access to ADAMS or who 

encounter problems in accessing the 

documents located in ADAMS, should 

contact the NRC Public Document Room 

Reference staff by telephone at 1–800–

397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by e-mail 

to pdr@nrc.gov. 

Applicability 

These changes revise the Section 3.1.6 

and Section 3.3.2.1 TS and Bases for 

NUREG–1433 and NUREG–1434 

(General Electric BWR/4 and BWR/6 

plants, respectively), and TS Table 

3.3.2.1–1 for NUREG–1433 and 

NUREG–1434. 

To efficiently process the incoming 

license amendment applications, the 

NRC staff requests each licensee 

applying for the changes addressed by 

TSTF–476 use the CLIIP to submit a 

LAR that adheres to the following 

model. Any deviations from the model 

LAR should be explained in the 

licensee’s submittal. The CLIIP does not 

prevent licensees from requesting an 

alternative approach, proposing the 

changes without providing the 

information described in the eight 

model LAR conditions, or making the 

requested commitment. Variations from 

the approach recommended in this 

notice may, however, require additional 

review by the NRC staff and may 

increase the time and resources needed 

for the review. Significant variations 

from the approach, or inclusion of 

additional changes to the license, may 

result in staff rejection of the submittal. 

Instead, licensees desiring significant 

variations and/or additional changes 

should either submit a LAR that does 

not claim to adopt TSTF–476, or 

specifically state in their LAR that they 

are adopting TSTF–476 without using 

the CLIIP. 

Public Notices 

In a notice in the Federal Register 

dated May 3, 2006 (71 FR 26118), the 

staff requested comment on the use of 

the CLIIP to process requests to revise 

Section 3.1.6 and Section 3.3.2.1 TS and 

Bases and TS Table 3.3.2.1–1 for 

NUREG–1433 and NUREG–1434, as 

discussed in TSTF–476. In response to 

this notice, the staff received one set of 

comments (developed by the Technical 

Specifications Task Force and submitted 

in a letter dated May 31, 2006 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML061520129)). Specific 

comments on the model LAR were 

offered. These comments, along with the 

NRC staff’s responses, are summarized 

and discussed below: 

1. Comment: In the Applicability 

Section of the Notice and the model 

application, the terms ‘‘BWR/4’’ and 

‘‘BWR/6’’ are used incorrectly. These 

terms should be revised to NUREG–

1433 and NUREG–1434, respectively. 

The changes proposed are applicable to 

BWR/2–6 plants, if they have adopted 

the standard banked position 

withdrawal sequence (BPWS). TSTF–

476 proposes changes to the Improved 

Standard Technical Specifications 

(ISTS) included in NUREG–1433 and 

NUREG–1434, which may be applied to 

any BWR type. 

Response: The staff agrees with this 

comment. References to BWR/4 and 

BWR/6 have been replaced with 

NUREG–1433 and NUREG–1434, 

respectively. 

2. Comment: The notice, the model 

application, and the model Safety 

Evaluation imply that a license 

amendment is needed for plants with 

Technical Specifications based on 

NUREG–1433 to adopt TSTF–476. This 

is not correct. No license amendment 

request is required to adopt the 

proposed Bases changes included in 

TSTF–476 and no Technical 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with NOTICES
29006 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 99 / Wednesday, May 23, 2007 / Notices 

Specification change is needed to adopt 

TSTF–476 for plants with Technical 

Specifications based on NUREG–1433. 

Bases changes are made using the 

licensee Technical Specification Bases 

Control Program. 

Response: The changes proposed by 

TSTF–476, Revision 0, for NUREG–1433 

(BWR/4) were only changes to the Bases 

sections. However, a revised TSTF–476 

was submitted to the NRC on January 9, 

2007. The revised version of TSTF–476 

includes changes to the Technical 

Specifications and Bases sections for 

both NUREG–1433 (BWR/4) and 

NUREG–1434 (BWR/6). Therefore, 

licensees proposing to adopt TSTF–476 

are required to submit a license 

amendment request. 

3. Comment: In some BWR designs, 

the rod worth minimizers (RWMs) (e.g., 

NUMAC) cannot be reprogrammed to 

accept a new shutdown sequence. The 

notice should state that bypassing the 

RWM and entering the plant-specific 

action equivalent to NUREG–1433 

Specification 3.3.2.1, Required Action 

D. 1, for an inoperable RWM during 

shutdown (which requires the use of a 

second qualified person to verify rod 

movement in accordance with BPWS) is 

acceptable and would not be considered 

entering a Required Action for 

‘‘operational convenience’’ as discussed 

in the LCO 3.0.2 Bases. 

Response: During the comment 

disposition process it became apparent 

that revisions to TSTF–476 would be 

necessary. The changes proposed in 

TSTF–476, Revision 0, included bases 

changes to both NUREG–1433 (BWR/4) 

and NUREG–1434 (BWR/6). In addition, 

a note was proposed to be added to TS 

Table 3.3.2.1–1 of NUREG–1434 to 

allow the rod pattern controller to be 

bypassed in Modes 1 and 2 so that the 

BPWS can be used. A similar note was 

not included in NUREG–1433 since 

some BWR/4 plants rod worth 

minimizer (RWM) can be reprogrammed 

to accommodate the BPWS. However, 

the RWM of some BWR/4 plants cannot 

be reprogrammed to accommodate the 

BPWS, and need a similar note to that 

proposed for the BWR/6 NUREG–1434. 

Therefore, to be acceptable, a 

[bracketed] note similar to that proposed 

to be added to TS Table 3.3.2.1–1 of the 

BWR/6 NUREG–1434, was incorporated 

into TSTF–476, revision 1. A revised 

TSTF–476 was submitted to the NRC on 

January 9, 2007. The changes 

incorporated in the revised version of 

TSTF–476 include changes to the 

Technical Specifications and Bases 

sections that require the adopting 

licensee to submit a license amendment 

request. 

4. Comment: The notice should state 

that the Technical Specifications and 

Bases changes provided in TSTF–476 

completely supersede the proposed 

Technical Specification changes 

included in NEDO–3309 1–A. 

Response: An appropriate statement 

has been added in this notice. 

5. Comment: Throughout the notice, 

the acronym BPWS is defined 

incorrectly. The term BPWS stands for 

‘‘Banked Position Withdrawal 

Sequence,’’ not ‘‘Bank Position 

Withdrawal Sequence.’’

Response: Appropriate corrections 

have been made throughout the notice 

and its attachments. 

6. Comment: Cover letter, 1st 

paragraph—The license amendment 

request will revise Table 3.3.2.1–1 only. 

The associated Bases changes will be 

made by the licensee upon 

implementation using the Technical 

Specifications Bases Control Program. 

This also affects Sections I and 2 of 

Enclosure I. 

Response: The changes incorporated 

in TSTF–476 include changes to the 

Technical Specifications and Bases 

sections that are needed by the adopting 

licensee to submit a license amendment 

request. While the Bases remain subject 

to licensee control, a more timely 

review will be possible if the licensee 

requesting to adopt the changes 

includes Technical Specification Bases 

changes in its application. 

7. Comment: Cover letter, 3rd 

paragraph—Many licensees do not 

provide final Technical Specifications 

pages with the application. The final 

pages are provided only after NRC 

review has determined that no changes 

from the draft are required. Revised 

Bases pages are not required to be 

provided with an application. The 

Technical Specification Bases Control 

Program requires revised Bases pages to 

be provided to the NRC on a frequency 

consistent with 10 CFR 50.71(e). 

Response: While the Bases remain 

subject to licensee control, for this 

application the NRC staff plans to 

review marked-up Technical 

Specification and Technical 

Specification Bases pages, as well as 

pages that represent how the final 

Technical Specification and Technical 

Specification Bases pages will appear, 

in order to review a licensee’s license 

amendment application in the most 

timely manner. 

8. Comment: Enclosure 1, Section 2.0, 

Proposed Changes, the first bullet 

should reference the Bases for 

Specification 3.1.6, not 3.6.1, if the 

discussion of specific Bases changes is 

retained in this section. 

Response: Appropriate corrections of 

the errors have been made to the model. 

9. Comment: Enclosure 1, Section 2.0, 

Proposed Changes, the second bullet 

should discuss the rod pattern 

controller, not the rod worth minimizer, 

if the discussion of specific Bases 

changes is retained in this section. In 

addition, both bypassing and 

reprogramming should be discussed. 

Response: TSTF–476, revision 0 

called for changes to Technical 

Specification Section 3.3.2.1 Bases for 

NUREG–1434. TSTF–476, revision 1 

calls for changes to Technical 

Specification Section 3.3.2.1 Bases for 

both NUREG–1433 and NUREG–1434. 

The specific equipment nomenclature 

differs between the two standards. The 

model has been updated using the 

bracketing convention to allow the 

selection of the appropriate equipment 

nomenclature by the licensee prior to 

amendment application. 

10. Comment: Enclosure 1, Section 

5.1, the last sentence should be deleted. 

The NRC staff has already determined in 

the Safety Evaluation for NEDO–33091 

for all BWRs that no single failure of the 

boiling water reactor mechanical or 

hydraulic system can cause a control 

rod to drop completely out of the reactor 

core during the shutdown process. It is 

unnecessary and a burden with no 

safety benefit to require individual 

licensees to verify the statement when it 

has been generically approved by the 

NRC for all BWRs. 

Response: The staff’s approval and 

safety evaluation are predicated upon 

this determination, and the licensee’s 

verification is deemed essential. 

11. Comment: In Enclosure 1, Section 

5.1 and in the model Safety Evaluation, 

Section 3.0, commitment 1 should be 

deleted. For those plants with Technical 

Specifications based on NUREG–1434 

which will be submitting a license 

amendment request to adopt TSTF–476, 

the proposed change to Table 3.3.2. 1–

1 requires confirming control rod 

coupling integrity; therefore a separate 

commitment to do the same is not 

necessary. 

Response: This is a commitment to 

establish appropriate detailed 

operational procedures prior to 

implementation, and is deemed 

essential. 

12. Comment: Enclosure 1, Section 5. 

1, and in the model Safety Evaluation, 

Section 3.0 commitment 2 should be 

deleted. This ‘‘commitment’’ is a 

summary of the improved BPWS. The 

model amendment, the model Safety 

Evaluation, and the proposed Bases 

reference the NRC approved Topical 

Report as the basis for the improved 

BPWS sequence. It is unclear what is 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 99 / Wednesday, May 23, 2007 / Notices 29007 

required by this commitment that is not 

already required by adoption of the 

Technical Specifications and Bases. It is 

unnecessary to develop and track a 

separate regulatory commitment to do 

what is already required by the 

amendment and Topical Report. 

Response: This is a commitment to 

establish appropriate detailed 

operational procedures prior to 

implementation, and is deemed 

essential. 

13. Comment: Description—

Amendment requests will only be 

submitted by licensees with Technical 

Specifications based on NUREG–1434. 

Therefore, delete references to NUREG–

1433. 

Response: BWR/4 plants with a RWM 

that cannot be reprogrammed to 

accommodate the BPWS will need to 

amend their TS in order to adopt TSTF–

476. Therefore, references to NUREG–

1433 are not deleted. 

14. Comment: Description and 

Criterion I—The improved BPWS 

insertion process applies during reactor 

shutdowns. Delete the word ‘‘normal’’

before shutdown. The term ‘‘normal 

shutdown’’ is not used in the model 

Safety Evaluation or Topical Report. 

The improved BPWS insertion process 

applies to all shutdowns as long as the 

conditions for use are met. 

Response: The word ‘‘normal’’ has 

been removed as a modifier for the term 

‘‘shutdown’’ in applicable sections of 

the model. 

15. Comment: Criterion 2—Delete the 

phrase ‘‘in the absence of other 

unrelated failures’’ from the first 

sentence. Criterion 2 only evaluates the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident related to the proposed change, 

not other unrelated events. 

Response: The extraneous phrase has 

been removed from the model SE. 

For Inclusion on the Technical 

Specification Web Page the following 

example of an application was prepared 

by the NRC staff to facilitate the 

adoption of Technical Specifications 

Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF–476, 

Revision 1 ‘‘Improved BPWS Control 

Rod Insertion Process (NEDO–33091).’’

The model provides the expected level 

of detail and content for an application 

to adopt TSTF–476, Revision 1. 

Licensees remain responsible for 

ensuring that their actual application 

fulfills their administrative 

requirements as well as NRC 

regulations. 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 

20555. 

Subject: Plant Name, Docket No. 50–[xxx,] 

Re: Application for Technical Specification 

Improvement To Adopt TSTF–476, 

Revision 1, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod 

Insertion Process (NEDO–33091) 

Dear Sir or Madam: In accordance with the 

provisions of Section 50.90 of Title 10 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), 

[LICENSEE] is submitting a request for an 

amendment to the technical specifications 

(TS) for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.]. 

The proposed changes would revise 

Sections 3.1.6, ‘‘Rod Pattern Control,’’ and 

3.3.2.1, ‘‘Control Rod Block 

Instrumentation,’’ to allow [PLANT NAME] 

to reference a new Banked Position 

Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) shutdown 

sequence in the TS Bases. In addition, a 

footnote is added to Table 3.3.2.1–1, ‘‘Control 

Rod Block Instrumentation.’’

The changes are consistent with NRC 

approved Industry Technical Specification 

Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical 

Specification Change Traveler, TSTF–476, 

Revision 1, Improved BPWS Control Rod 

Insertion Process (NEDO–33091).’’ The 

availability of this TS improvement was 

announced in the Federal Register on 

[DATE] ([ FR ]) as part of the consolidated 

line item improvement process (CLIIP). 

Enclosure 1 provides a description and 

assessment of the proposed changes, as well 

as confirmation of applicability. Enclosure 2 

provides the existing TS pages and TS Bases 

marked-up to show the proposed changes. 

Enclosure 3 provides final TS pages and TS 

Bases pages. 

[LICENSEE] requests approval of the 

proposed license amendment by [DATE], 

with the amendment being implemented [BY 

DATE OR WITHIN X DAYS]. In accordance 

with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this application, 

with enclosures, is being provided to the 

designated [STATE] Official. 

I declare under penalty of perjury under 

the laws of the United States of America that 

I am authorized by [LICENSEE] to make this 

request and that the foregoing is true and 

correct. [Note that request may be notarized 

in lieu of using this oath or affirmation 

statement]. If you should have any questions 

regarding this submittal, please contact [ ]. 

Sincerely, 

Name, Title 

Enclosures: 

1. Description and Assessment of Proposed 

Changes 

2. Proposed Technical Specification Changes 

and Technical Specification Bases Changes 

3. Final Technical Specification and Bases 

pages. 

cc: NRR Project Manager, Regional Office, 

Resident Inspector, State Contact, ITSB 

Branch Chief. 

1.0 Description 

This letter is a request to amend 

Operating License(s) [LICENSE 

NUMBER(S)] for [PLANT/UNIT 

NAME(S)]. 

The proposed changes would revise 

the Bases sections of Technical 

Specification (TS) 3.1.6, ‘‘Rod Pattern 

Control’’, and 3.3.2.1, ‘‘Control Rod 

Block Instrumentation,’’ along with TS 

Table 3.3.2.1–1, ‘‘Control Rod Block 

Instrumentation,’’ to allow reference to 

an improved, optional Banked Position 

Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) for use 

during reactor shutdown. 

The new BPWS is described in 

Topical Report NEDO–33091–A, 

Revision 2, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control 

Rod Insertion Process,’’ dated July 2004, 

and approved by the NRC by Safety 

Evaluation (SE) dated June 16, 2004 

(ADAMS ML041700479). Technical 

Specification Task Force (TSTF) change 

traveler TSTF–476, Revision 1, 

‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion 

Process (NEDO–33091)’’ was announced 

for availability in the Federal Register 

on [DATE] as part of the consolidated 

line item improvement process (CLIIP). 

2.0 Proposed Changes 

Consistent with NRC-approved TSTF–

476, Revision 1, the proposed TS and 

Bases changes include: 

• Revised TS Section 3.1.6 Bases to 

allow use of an optional BPWS during 

plant shutdown. 

• Revised TS Section 3.3.2.1 Bases to 

allow reprogramming of the [rod worth 

minimizer/rod pattern controller] 

during the optional BPWS shutdown 

sequence. 

• Revised TS Table 3.3.2.1–1, 

‘‘Control Rod Block Instrumentation,’’

which adds a footnote that allows 

operators to bypass the [rod worth 

minimizer/rod pattern controller] if 

conditions for the optional BPWS 

shutdown process are satisfied. 

3.0 Background 

The background for this application is 

as stated in the model SE in NRC’s 

Notice of Availability published on 

[DATE ]([ ] FR [ ]), the NRC Notice for 

Comment published on [DATE] ([ ] FR 

[ ]), and TSTF–476, Revision 1. 

4.0 Technical Analysis 

[LICENSEE] has reviewed NEDO–

33091–A, Revision 2, and the staff’s SE 

dated June 16, 2004, as well as TSTF–

476, Revision 1, and the model SE 

published on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]) as part 

of the CLIIP Notice for Comment. 

[LICENSEE] has applied the 

methodology in NEDO–33091–A, 

Revision 2 to the develop the proposed 

TS changes. [LICENSEE] has also 

concluded that the justifications 

presented in TSTF–476, Revision 1 and 

the model SE prepared by the NRC staff 

are applicable to [PLANT, UNIT NOS.], 

and justify this amendment for the 

incorporation of the changes to the 

[PLANT] TS. 

5.0 Regulatory Analysis 

A description of this proposed change 

and its relationship to applicable 

regulatory requirements and guidance 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with NOTICES
29008 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 99 / Wednesday, May 23, 2007 / Notices 

was provided in the NRC Notice of 

Availability published on [DATE] ([ ] FR 

[ ]), the NRC Notice for Comment 

published on May 3, 2006 (71 FR 

26118), and TSTF–476, Revision 1. 

5.1 Regulatory Commitments 

As discussed in the model SE 

published in Federal Register on 

[DATE] for this technical specification 

improvement, the following plantspecific verifications/commitments 

were performed. The safety evaluation 

for NEDO–33091–A explained that the 

potential for the control rod drop 

accident (CRDA) will be eliminated by 

the following changes to the operational 

procedures, which [PLANT NAME] [has 

made/will commit to make prior to 

implementation]: 

1. Before reducing power to the low 

power setpoint (LPSP), operators shall 

confirm control rod coupling integrity 

for all rods that are fully withdrawn. 

Control rods that have not been 

confirmed coupled and are in 

intermediate positions must be fully 

inserted prior to power reduction to the 

LPSP. No action is required for fullyinserted control rods. 

If a shutdown is required and all rods, 

which are not confirmed coupled, 

cannot be fully inserted prior to the 

power dropping below the LPSP, then 

the original/standard BPWS must be 

adhered to. The original/standard BPWS 

can be found in Licensing Topical 

Report (LTR) NEDO–21231, ‘‘Banked 

Position Withdrawal Sequence,’’

January 1977, and is referred to in 

NUREG–1433 and NUREG–1434. 

2. After reactor power drops below 

the LPSP, rods may be inserted from 

notch position 48 to notch position 00 

without stopping at the intermediate 

positions. However, GE Nuclear Energy 

recommends that operators insert rods 

in the same order as specified for the 

original/standard BPWS as much as is 

reasonably possible. If a plant is in the 

process of shutting down following 

improved BPWS with the power below 

the LPSP, no control rod shall be 

withdrawn unless the control rod 

pattern is in compliance with standard 

BPWS requirements. 

In addition to the procedure changes 

specified above, the staff previously 

concluded, based on its review of 

NEDO–33091–A, that no single failure 

of the boiling water reactor control rod 

drive (CRD) mechanical or hydraulic 

system can cause a control rod to drop 

completely out of the reactor core 

during the shutdown process. Therefore, 

the proper use of the improved BPWS 

will prevent a CRDA from occurring 

while power is below the LPSP. 

[LICENSEE] has verified, in accordance 

with NEDO–33091–A, Revision 2, that 

no single failure of the boiling water 

reactor CRD mechanical or hydraulic 

system can cause a control rod to drop 

completely out of the reactor core 

during the shutdown process. 

6.0 No Significant Hazards 

Consideration 

[LICENSEE] has reviewed the 

proposed no significant hazards 

consideration determination published 

on [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]) as part of the 

CLIIP. [LICENSEE] has concluded that 

the proposed determination presented 

in the notice is applicable to [PLANT] 

and the determination is hereby 

incorporated by reference to satisfy the 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a). 

7.0 Environmental Evaluation 

[LICENSEE] has reviewed the 

environmental consideration included 

in the model SE published on [DATE] 

([ ] FR [ ]) as part of the CLIIP. 

[LICENSEE] has concluded that the 

staff’s findings presented therein are 

applicable to [PLANT] and the 

determination is hereby incorporated by 

reference for this application. 

8.0 References 

Federal Register Notices: 

Notice for Comment published on 

[DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]) 

Notice of Availability published on 

[DATE ] ([ ] FR [ ]) 

Model Safety Evaluation, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Office of 

Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Technical 

Specification Task Force TSTF–476, 

Revision 1, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control 

Rod Insertion Process (NEDO–33091)’’

1.0 Introduction 

By letter dated [llll, 20l], 

[LICENSEE] (the licensee) proposed 

changes to the technical specifications 

(TS) for [PLANT NAME]. The requested 

changes are the adoption of TSTF–476, 

Revision 1, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control 

Rod Insertion Process (NEDO–33091–

A),’’ to the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) 

Standard Technical Specifications 

(STS), which was proposed by the 

Technical Specifications Task Force 

(TSTF) by letter on January 9, 2007. 

This TSTF involves changes to NUREG–

1433 and NUREG–1434 Section 3.1.6 

‘‘Rod Pattern Control,’’ Section 3.3.2.1 

‘‘Control Rod Block Instrumentation,’’

and Table 3.3.2.1–1. The proposed 

TSTF would allow the use of the 

improved banked position withdrawal 

sequence (BPWS) during shutdowns if 

the conditions of NEDO–33091–A, 

Revision 2, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control 

Rod Insertion Process,’’ dated July 2004, 

have been satisfied. 

2.0 Regulatory Evaluation 

The control rod drop accident (CRDA) 

is the design basis accident for the 

subject TS changes. In order to 

minimize the impact of a CRDA, the 

BPWS process was developed to 

minimize control rod reactivity worth 

for BWR plants. The proposed improved 

BPWS further simplifies the control rod 

insertion process, and in order to 

evaluate it, the staff followed the 

guidelines of Standard Review Plan 

Section 15.4.9, and referred to General 

Design Criterion (GDC) 28 of Appendix 

A to 10 CFR Part 50 as its regulatory 

requirement. GDC 28 states that the 

reactivity control systems shall be 

designed with appropriate limits on the 

potential amount and rate of reactivity 

increase to assure that the effects of 

postulated reactivity accidents can 

neither (1) result in damage to the 

reactor coolant pressure boundary 

greater than limited local yielding nor 

(2) sufficiently disturb the core, its 

support structures or other reactor 

pressure vessel internals to impair 

significantly the capability to cool the 

core. 

3.0 Technical Evaluation 

In its safety evaluation for Licensing 

Topical Report NEDO–33091-A, 

‘‘Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion 

Process,’’ dated June 16, 2004, (ADAMS 

ML041700479) the staff determined that 

the methodology described in TSTF–

476, Revision 1, to incorporate the 

improved BPWS into the STS, is 

acceptable. 

TSTF–476, Revision 1 states that the 

improved BPWS provides the following 

benefits: (1) Allows the plant to reach 

the all-rods-in condition prior to 

significant reactor cool down, which 

reduces the potential for re-criticality as 

the reactor cools down; (2) reduces the 

potential for an operator reactivity 

control error by reducing the total 

number of control rod manipulations; 

(3) minimizes the need for manual 

scrams during plant shutdowns, 

resulting in less wear on control rod 

drive (CRD) system components and 

CRD mechanisms; and, (4) eliminates 

unnecessary control rod manipulations 

at low power, resulting in less wear on 

reactor manual control and CRD system 

components. 

[PLANT NAME] has been approved to 

use the improved BPWS, and the 

potential for a CRDA with power below 

the low power setpoint (LPSP) has been 

eliminated. The safety evaluation for 

NEDO–33091–A explained that the 

potential for the CRDA will be 

eliminated by the following changes to 

operational procedures, which [PLANT 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 99 / Wednesday, May 23, 2007 / Notices 29009 

NAME] [has made/will commit to make 

prior to implementation]: 

1. Before reducing power to the LPSP, 

operators shall confirm control rod 

coupling integrity for all rods that are 

fully withdrawn. Control rods that have 

not been confirmed coupled and are in 

intermediate positions must be fully 

inserted prior to power reduction to the 

LPSP. No action is required for fullyinserted control rods. 

If a shutdown is required and all rods, 

which are not confirmed coupled, 

cannot be fully inserted prior to power 

dropping below the LPSP, then the 

original/standard BPWS must be 

adhered to. 

2. After reactor power drops below 

the LPSP, rods may be inserted from 

notch position 48 to notch position 00 

without stopping at the intermediate 

positions. However, GE Nuclear Energy 

recommends that operators insert rods 

in the same order as specified for the 

original/standard BPWS as much as 

reasonably possible. If a plant is in the 

process of shutting down following 

improved BPWS with the power below 

the LPSP, no control rod shall be 

withdrawn unless the control rod 

pattern is in compliance with standard 

BPWS requirements. 

In addition to the procedure changes 

specified above, the staff previously 

verified during its review of NEDO–

33091–A, Revision 2 that no single 

failure of the boiling water reactor CRD 

mechanical or hydraulic system can 

cause a control rod to drop completely 

out of the reactor core during the 

shutdown process. Therefore, the proper 

use of the improved BPWS will prevent 

a CRDA from occurring while power is 

below the LPSP. 

The staff finds the proposed 

Technical Specification changes in 

[PLANT NAME’s] amendment request 

properly incorporate the improved 

BPWS procedure into the STS, and that 

[PLANT NAME] accurately adopted the 

TSTF–476 changes. Therefore, the staff 

approves the [PLANT NAME] license 

amendment request to adopt TSTF–476, 

Revision 1. 

4.0 State Consultation 

In accordance with the Commission’s 

regulations, the [llll] State official 

was notified of the proposed issuance of 

the amendment. The State official had 

[(1) no comments or (2) the following 

comments—with subsequent 

disposition by the staff]. 

5.0 Environmental Consideration 

The amendment[s] change[s] a 

requirement with respect to the 

installation or use of a facility 

component located within the restricted 

area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or 

surveillance requirements. The NRC 

staff has determined that the 

amendment involves no significant 

increase in the amounts, and no 

significant change in the types, of any 

effluents that may be released offsite, 

and that there is no significant increase 

in individual or cumulative 

occupational radiation exposure. The 

Commission has previously issued a 

proposed finding that the amendment 

involves no significant hazards 

consideration and there has been no 

public comment on such finding 

published [DATE] ([ ] FR [ ]). 

Accordingly, the amendment meets the 

eligibility criteria for categorical 

exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 

51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), 

no environmental impact statement or 

environmental assessment need be 

prepared in connection with the 

issuance of the amendment. 

6.0 Conclusion 

The Commission has concluded, 

based on the considerations discussed 

above, that (1) There is reasonable 

assurance that the health and safety of 

the public will not be endangered by 

operation in the proposed manner, (2) 

such activities will be conducted in 

compliance with the Commission’s 

regulations, and (3) the issuance of the 

amendment will not be inimical to the 

common defense and security or to the 

health and safety of the public. 

Principal Contributor: J. Hardy, SRXB/ 

DSSA, 301–415–4029. 

Proposed No Significant Hazards 

Consideration Determination 

Description of Amendment Request: 

[Plant name] requests adoption of an 

approved change to the standard 

technical specifications (STS) for 

Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Plants 

(NUREG–1433 & NUREG–1434) and 

plant specific technical specifications 

(TS), to allow the use of the improved 

banked position withdrawal sequence 

(BPWS) during shutdowns in 

accordance with NEDO–33091–A, 

Revision 2, ‘‘Improved BPWS Control 

Rod Insertion Process,’’ dated July 2004. 

The changes are consistent with NRC 

approved Industry/Technical 

Specification Task Force (TSTF) 

Standard Technical Specification 

Change Traveler, TSTF–476, Revision 1. 

Basis for proposed no-significanthazards-consideration determination: 

As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an 

analysis of the issue of no-significanthazards-consideration is presented 

below: 

Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does 

Not Involve a Significant Increase in the 

Probability or Consequences of an 

Accident Previously Evaluated 

The proposed changes modify the TS 

to allow the use of the improved banked 

position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) 

during shutdowns if the conditions of 

NEDO–33091–A, Revision 2, ‘‘Improved 

BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process,’’

July 2004, have been satisfied. The staff 

finds that the licensee’s justifications to 

support the specific TS changes are 

consistent with the approved topical 

report and TSTF–476, Revision 1. Since 

the change only involves changes in 

control rod sequencing, the probability 

of an accident previously evaluated is 

not significantly increased, if at all. The 

consequences of an accident after 

adopting TSTF–476 are no different 

than the consequences of an accident 

prior to adopting TSTF–476. Therefore, 

the consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated are not 

significantly affected by this change. 

Therefore, this change does not involve 

a significant increase in the probability 

or consequences of an accident 

previously evaluated. 

Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does 

Not Create the Possibility of a New or 

Different Kind of Accident from any 

Previously Evaluated 

The proposed change will not 

introduce new failure modes or effects 

and will not, in the absence of other 

unrelated failures, lead to an accident 

whose consequences exceed the 

consequences of accidents previously 

evaluated. The control rod drop 

accident (CRDA) is the design basis 

accident for the subject TS changes. 

This change does not create the 

possibility of a new or different kind of 

accident from an accident previously 

evaluated. 

Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does 

Not Involve a Significant Reduction in 

the Margin of Safety 

The proposed change, TSTF–476, 

Revision 1, incorporates the improved 

BPWS, previously approved in NEDO–

33091–A, into the improved TS. The 

control rod drop accident (CRDA) is the 

design basis accident for the subject TS 

changes. In order to minimize the 

impact of a CRDA, the BPWS process 

was developed to minimize control rod 

reactivity worth for BWR plants. The 

proposed improved BPWS further 

simplifies the control rod insertion 

process, and in order to evaluate it, the 

staff followed the guidelines of Standard 

Review Plan Section 15.4.9, and referred 

to General Design Criterion 28 of 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with NOTICES
29010 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 99 / Wednesday, May 23, 2007 / Notices 

1 Gas as used here includes, air, nitrogen, 

hydrogen, water vapor, or any other void that is not 

filled with liquid water. 

2 Decay heat removal (DHR), residual heat 

removal (RHR), and shutdown cooling (SDC) are 

common names for systems used to cool the reactor 

coolant system (RCS) during some phases of 

shutdown operation. The NRC staff generally uses 

DHR here. 

3 GL 88–17, ‘‘Loss of Decay Heat Removal,’’

October 17, 1988 (ML031200496); GL 97–04, 

‘‘Assurance of Sufficient Net Positive Suction Head 

for Emergency Core Cooling and Containment Heat 

Removal Pumps,’’ October 7, 1997 (ML031110062); 

and NUREG–0897, Revision 1, ‘‘Containment 

Emergency Sump Performance—Technical Findings 

Related to USI A–43,’’ October 1985. 

Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 as its 

regulatory requirement. The TSTF 

stated the improved BPWS provides the 

following benefits: (1) Allows the plant 

to reach the all-rods-in condition prior 

to significant reactor cool down, which 

reduces the potential for re-criticality as 

the reactor cools down; (2) reduces the 

potential for an operator reactivity 

control error by reducing the total 

number of control rod manipulations; 

(3) minimizes the need for manual 

scrams during plant shutdowns, 

resulting in less wear on control rod 

drive (CRD) system components and 

CRD mechanisms; and (4) eliminates 

unnecessary control rod manipulations 

at low power, resulting in less wear on 

reactor manual control and CRD system 

components. The addition of procedural 

requirements and verifications specified 

in NEDO–33091–A, along with the 

proper use of the BPWS will prevent a 

control rod drop accident (CRDA) from 

occurring while power is below the low 

power setpoint (LPSP). The net change 

to the margin of safety is insignificant. 

Therefore, this change does not involve 

a significant reduction in a margin of 

safety. 

Based upon the above discussion of 

the amendment request, the requested 

change does not involve a significant 

hazards consideration. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 10th day 

of May 2007. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Timothy J. Kobetz, 

Branch Chief, Technical Specifications 

Branch, Division of Inspection & Regional 

Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

[FR Doc. 07–2563 Filed 5–22–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Proposed Generic Communication; 

Managing Gas Intrusion in Emergency 

Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, 

and Containment Spray Systems 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Notice of opportunity for public 

comment. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is proposing to issue 

a generic letter (GL) to address the issue 

of gas intrusion into the emergency core 

cooling, decay heat removal, and 

containment spray systems (hereinafter 

referred to as the ‘‘subject systems’’). 

Specifically, the NRC is issuing this GL 

for the following two purposes: 

(1) to request addressees to submit 

information demonstrating that the 

subject systems are in compliance with 

the current licensing and design bases, 

and applicable regulatory requirements, 

and that suitable design, operational, 

and testing control measures are in 

place for maintaining this compliance, 

and 

(2) to collect the requested 

information to determine if additional 

regulatory action is required. 

This Federal Register notice is 

available through the NRC’s 

Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) under 

accession number ML0704001003. 

DATES: Comment period expires July 23, 

2007. Comments submitted after this 

date will be considered if it is practical 

to do so, but assurance of consideration 

cannot be given except for comments 

received on or before this date. 

ADDRESSES: Submit written comments 

to the Chief, Rulemaking, Directives, 

and Editing Branch, Division of 

Administrative Services, Office of 

Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Mail Stop T6–D59, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, and cite 

the publication date and page number of 

this Federal Register notice. Written 

comments may also be delivered to NRC 

Headquarters, 11545 Rockville Pike 

(Room T–6D59), Rockville, Maryland, 

between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on 

Federal workdays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT: 

Warren C. Lyon, NRR, at 301–415–2897 

or by e-mail: wcl@nrc.gov or David P. 

Beaulieu, NRR, at 301–415–3243 or by 

e-mail: dpb@nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

NRC Generic Letter 2007–XX, 

Managing Gas Intrusion in Emergency 

Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and 

Containment Spray Systems 

Addresses 

All holders of operating licenses for 

nuclear power reactors, except those 

who have permanently ceased 

operations and have certified that fuel 

has been permanently removed from the 

reactor vessel. 

Purpose 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is issuing this 

generic letter (GL) to address the issue 

of gas 1 intrusion into the emergency 

core cooling, decay heat removal 2, and 

containment spray systems (hereinafter 

referred to as the ‘‘subject systems’’). 

Specifically, the NRC is issuing this GL: 

(1) To request addressees to submit 

information to demonstrate that the 

subject systems are in compliance with 

the current licensing and design bases 

and applicable regulatory requirements, 

and that suitable design, operational, 

and testing control measures are in 

place for maintaining this compliance, 

and 

(2) to collect the requested 

information to determine if additional 

regulatory action is required. 

Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 

50.54(f), addressees are required to 

submit a written response to this GL. 

Background 

Instances of gas intrusion into the 

subject systems have occurred since the 

beginning of commercial nuclear power 

plant operation. The NRC has published 

20 information notices (INs), two GLs, 

and a NUREG 3 that are related to this 

issue and has interacted with the 

nuclear industry many times in relation 

to these publications and in response to 

gas intrusion events. The following 

paragraphs summarize a few events to 

illustrate some of the technical and 

regulatory requirements issues. 

In May 1997, at Oconee Nuclear 

Station Unit 3, hydrogen ingestion 

during plant cooldown damaged and 

rendered nonfunctional two highpressure injection (HPI) pumps. If the 

operators had started the remaining HPI 

pump, it too would have been damaged. 

The NRC responded with an augmented 

inspection team (IN 97–38, ‘‘LevelSensing System Initiates Common-Mode 

Failure of High-Pressure-Injection 

Pumps,’’ Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS) Accession No. ML031050514, 

June 24, 1997). The NRC team reported 

that there had been a total lack of HPI 

capability during power operation, a 

failure to meet technical specification 

(TS) HPI operability requirements, 

design deficiencies, inadequate 

maintenance practices, operators that 

were less than attentive to plant 

parameters, a failure to adequately 

assess operating experience, and a 

violation of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with NOTICES