UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

ELAINE M. PUSH, 

 Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 15-11867 

 Honorable Victoria A. Roberts 

 Magistrate Judge David R. Grand 

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant. 

__________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [14, 15] 

Plaintiff Elaine M. Push (“Push”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g), 

challenging the final decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) 

denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under the Social Security Act 

(the “Act”). Both parties have filed summary judgment motions [14, 15], which have been 

referred to this Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B). 

I. RECOMMENDATION 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the Administrative Law Judge’s 

(“ALJ”) conclusion that Push is not disabled under the Act is supported by substantial evidence. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends that the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

[15] be GRANTED, Push’s Motion for Summary Judgment [14] be DENIED, and that, pursuant 

to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g), the ALJ’s decision be AFFIRMED. 

 

2:15-cv-11867-VAR-DRG Doc # 19 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 1 of 17 Pg ID 524
2

II. REPORT 

A. Procedural History 

On May 21, 2012, Push filed an application for DIB, alleging a disability onset date of 

December 19, 2011. (Tr. 151-57). This application was denied initially on September 24, 2012. 

(Tr. 71-75). Push filed a timely request for an administrative hearing, which was held on 

November 5, 2013, before ALJ Paul Jones. (Tr. 27-58). Push, who was represented by Brian 

Christie (a non-attorney representative), testified at the hearing, as did vocational expert Zachary 

Matthews. (Id.). On November 15, 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Push is 

not disabled under the Act. (Tr. 14-22). On March 19, 2015, the Appeals Council denied 

review. (Tr. 1-5). Push timely filed for judicial review of the final decision on May 22, 2015. 

(Doc. #1). 

B. Framework for Disability Determinations 

Under the Act, DIB are available only for those who have a “disability.” See Colvin v. 

Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). The Act defines “disability” as the: 

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 

expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last 

for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 

42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). The Commissioner’s regulations provide that a disability is to be 

determined through the application of a five-step sequential analysis: 

Step One: If the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful 

activity, benefits are denied without further analysis. 

Step Two: If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or 

combination of impairments that “significantly limits . . . physical or 

mental ability to do basic work activities,” benefits are denied without 

further analysis. 

Step Three: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, 

has a severe impairment that is expected to last for at least twelve months, 

2:15-cv-11867-VAR-DRG Doc # 19 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 2 of 17 Pg ID 525
3

and the severe impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed in 

the regulations, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled 

regardless of age, education, or work experience. 

Step Four: If the claimant is able to perform his or her past relevant work, 

benefits are denied without further analysis. 

Step Five: Even if the claimant is unable to perform his or her past 

relevant work, if other work exists in the national economy that the 

claimant can perform, in view of his or her age, education, and work 

experience, benefits are denied. 

Scheuneman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2011 WL 6937331, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2011) (citing 

20 C.F.R. §404.1520); see also Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 

2001). “The burden of proof is on the claimant throughout the first four steps .... If the analysis 

reaches the fifth step without a finding that claimant is not disabled, the burden transfers to the 

[defendant].” Preslar v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994). 

C. Background 

1. Push’s Reports and Testimony 

At the time of the administrative hearing, Push was 54 years old, and at 5’7” tall, 

weighed approximately 170 pounds. (Tr. 30, 32). She lived in a house with her husband and 18-

year-old daughter. (Tr. 30-31, 195). Push testified that she dropped out of school in ninth grade 

after her mother committed suicide; however, she later earned her GED. (Tr. 32-33). 

Previously, she worked for more than 25 years for 3M, the last 15 years as an administrative 

assistant. (Tr. 39, 57). She stopped working on January 20, 2009, when her employer “got rid” 

of her because she was unable to work, but alleges disability beginning on December 19, 2011 

(the date on which she tested positive for rheumatoid arthritis). (Tr. 35, 37-38). For the last four 

years she worked, Push took intermittent leave for her medical conditions. (Tr. 180). 

Push alleges disability as a result of rheumatoid arthritis, fibromyalgia, ulcerative colitis, 

and irritable bowel syndrome (“IBS”). (Tr. 180). She testified that she has “bad days” three or 

2:15-cv-11867-VAR-DRG Doc # 19 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 3 of 17 Pg ID 526
4

four days a week – these are days during which the only thing she does is get up to go to the rest 

room. (Tr. 53). Most days it takes her 30-45 minutes “just to get walking,” and she frequently 

tries to take naps during the day because she has difficulty sleeping at night due to “constant 

tingling and strange feelings going through [her] extremities ....” (Tr. 47, 51-52). The 

medications she takes – Vicodin, Klonopin, and Enbrel – make it difficult for her to “think 

straight.” (Tr. 47-48). She has difficulty picking up small objects. (Tr. 195). 

Push indicated that she can sit for 45 minutes at a time. (Tr. 52). She has difficulty 

lifting her right (dominant) arm and cannot wash or dry her own hair (her daughter helps her 

with this). (Tr. 52-53). She has trouble attending to her own personal care (i.e., she cannot snap 

her own pants, shave her legs, or hold onto eating utensils). (Tr. 52, 196). She no longer 

performs any housework, such as doing the dishes, laundry, or vacuuming.1

 (Tr. 53). She goes 

to the grocery store once a week with a companion and uses a motorized cart. (Tr. 53-54). She 

is able to prepare meals (heating up frozen dinners). (Tr. 197). She is able to drive but does so 

infrequently; because she has difficulty turning her head to the right, she feels unsafe. (Tr. 54). 

She spends time talking on the phone with friends and family. (Tr. 199). 

2. Medical Evidence 

The Court has thoroughly reviewed Push’s medical record. In lieu of summarizing her 

medical history here, the Court will make references and provide citations to the record as 

necessary in its discussion of the parties’ arguments. 

3. Vocational Expert’s Testimony 

Zachary Matthews testified as an independent vocational expert (“VE”) at the 

                                                            

1

 In a June 19, 2012 Function Report, Push indicated that she could do “light housework,” such 

as laundry. (Tr. 196). By the time of the administrative hearing in November 2013, however, 

Push testified that she could no longer perform these chores. (Tr. 53). 

2:15-cv-11867-VAR-DRG Doc # 19 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 4 of 17 Pg ID 527
5

administrative hearing. (Tr. 45-47, 48-49). The ALJ asked the VE to imagine a hypothetical 

individual of Push’s age, education, and work experience who can perform light work with the 

following additional limitations: only occasional climbing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and 

crawling; frequent reaching with the dominant right upper extremity, handling of objects 

bilaterally, and fingering bilaterally; and no concentrated exposure to vibration or the nonweather-related extremes of cold. (Tr. 45-46). The VE testified that the hypothetical individual 

would be capable of performing Push’s past relevant work as an administrative assistant. (Tr. 

46). The VE further testified that the hypothetical individual would also be capable of working 

in the light, unskilled jobs of counter clerk (55,700 jobs nationally), information clerk (55,800 

jobs), and board attendant (179,000 jobs). (Tr. 46-47). 

D. The ALJ’s Findings 

At Step One of the five-step sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Push has not engaged 

in substantial gainful activity since December 19, 2011 (the alleged onset date). (Tr. 16). At 

Step Two, the ALJ found that Push has the severe impairments of arthritis, fibromyalgia, 

IBS/colitis, right shoulder tenosynovitis, and spinal degenerative disc disease. (Id.). At Step 

Three, the ALJ found that Push’s impairments, whether considered alone or in combination, do 

not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. (Id.). 

The ALJ then found that Push retains the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform 

light work with the following additional limitations: only occasional climbing, stooping, 

kneeling, crouching, and crawling; frequent reaching with the dominant right upper extremity, 

handling of objects bilaterally, and fingering bilaterally; and no concentrated exposure to 

vibration or the non-weather-related extremes of cold. (Id.). 

At Step Four, the ALJ determined that Push is able to perform her past relevant work as 

2:15-cv-11867-VAR-DRG Doc # 19 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 5 of 17 Pg ID 528
6

an administrative assistant. (Tr. 20). In the alternative, at Step Five, the ALJ concluded, based 

in part on the VE’s testimony, that Push is capable of performing a significant number of jobs 

that exist in the national economy. (Tr. 21). As a result, the ALJ concluded that Push is not 

disabled under the Act. (Id.). 

E. Standard of Review 

The District Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final administrative 

decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Judicial review under this statute is limited in that the 

court “must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions absent a determination that the 

Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standard or has made findings of fact 

unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.” Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 

591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted); Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 

647, 654 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[I]f an agency has failed to adhere to its own procedures, we will not 

remand for further administrative proceedings unless the claimant has been prejudiced on the 

merits or deprived of substantial rights because of the agency’s procedural lapses.”) (internal 

quotations omitted). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a 

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) 

(internal quotations omitted). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

decision, the court does “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide 

questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); Rogers, 486 

F.3d at 247 (“It is of course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility 

of witnesses, including that of the claimant.”). 

When reviewing the Commissioner’s factual findings, the court is limited to an 

2:15-cv-11867-VAR-DRG Doc # 19 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 6 of 17 Pg ID 529
7

examination of the record and must consider the record as a whole. Bass, 499 F.3d at 512-13; 

Wyatt v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992). The court “may 

look to any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited by the Appeals 

Council,” or in this case, the ALJ. Heston, 245 F.3d at 535; Walker v. Sec’y of Health & Human 

Servs., 884 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir. 1989). There is no requirement, however, that either the ALJ 

or this court discuss every piece of evidence in the administrative record. See Kornecky v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App’x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n ALJ can consider all 

evidence without directly addressing in his written decision every piece of evidence submitted by 

a party.”) (internal quotations omitted). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence, “it must be affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter 

differently and even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.” Cutlip v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted);

Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (“if substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s decision, this Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is substantial 

evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion’”). 

F. Analysis 

 1. The ALJ Properly Analyzed the Medical Opinions before Him2

Although Push does not actually argue that remand is appropriate pursuant to sentence 

six of 42 U.S.C. §405(g), she relies heavily on the opinions of Dr. Dipak Patel and Dr. Dana 

Planer, both of which were submitted to the Appeals Council after the ALJ rendered his decision 

                                                            

2

 In her motion for summary judgment, Push argues that the ALJ improperly relied on the 

opinion of a single decision maker, Myung Ho Hahn, in formulating her RFC. (Doc. #14 at 19-

20). After the Commissioner responded with evidence that this individual is in fact a physician 

(Doc. #15 at 12), Push abandoned this argument (Doc. #16 at 1-2). 

2:15-cv-11867-VAR-DRG Doc # 19 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 7 of 17 Pg ID 530
8

in this case.3 (Tr. 4, 413-14). Specifically, on December 16, 2013 – one month after the ALJ’s 

decision – Dr. Patel, Push’s rheumatologist, wrote a letter in which he recounted Push’s 

medications, noted that she had one hour of morning stiffness and gelling during the day, 

observed that she needed her husband and daughter to help with tasks at home, and opined that 

she was “unable to work due to her symptoms.” (Tr. 413). Later that month, Dr. Planer, one of 

Push’s primary care physicians, wrote a letter in which she recounted Push’s diagnoses, signs, 

and symptoms; observed that the symptoms were “pervasive and affect all aspects of daily 

living”; and opined that Push “meets criteria for disability.” (Tr. 414). 

Remand to consider additional evidence is appropriate only when the evidence is new 

and material, and good cause is shown as to why it was not presented at the prior proceeding. 

See 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Willis v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 727 F.2d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 

1984). Evidence is “new” if it was “not in existence or available to the claimant at the time of 

the administrative proceeding.” Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2001). Here, the 

medical opinions at issue are dated December 16, 2013, and December 29, 2013. (Tr. 413-14). 

Thus, they can be considered “new” evidence, as they did not exist at the time of the ALJ’s 

November 15, 2013 decision. However, even if Push could establish “good cause” for her 

failure to submit these records sooner,4

 she has not demonstrated that they are “material.” 

                                                            

3

 Push criticizes the ALJ for failing to “even mention [] these opinions” (Doc. #14 at 22), but the 

ALJ could not possibly have mentioned these medical opinions as they did not exist at the time 

he issued his decision. 

4

 “Good cause” requires the claimant to demonstrate “a reasonable justification for the failure to 

acquire and present the evidence for inclusion in the hearing before the ALJ.” Foster, 279 F.3d 

at 357. As this Court has recognized, “‘Good cause’ is not established solely because the new 

evidence was not generated until after the ALJ’s decision; the Sixth Circuit has taken a ‘harder 

line’ on the good cause test.” Richardson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2012 WL 4210619, at *4 

(E.D. Mich. Aug. 27, 2012) (citing Oliver v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 804 F.2d 964, 966 

(6th Cir. 1986)) (emphasis in original). A plaintiff attempting to introduce new evidence “must 

explain why the evidence was not obtained earlier and submitted to the ALJ before the ALJ’s 

2:15-cv-11867-VAR-DRG Doc # 19 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 8 of 17 Pg ID 531
9

Courts have held that additional evidence is material only if there is “a reasonable 

probability that the [Commissioner] would have reached a different disposition of the disability 

claim if presented with the new evidence.” Sizemore v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 865 

F.2d 709, 712 (6th Cir. 1988). In this case, Push has not articulated how either Dr. Patel’s or Dr. 

Planer’s opinion is “material” under these standards. Indeed, both opinions ultimately concluded 

only that Push was “unable to work” and met the “criteria for disability” (Tr. 413-14), but such 

conclusions on the ultimate issue of disability are reserved to the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. 

§404.1527(d); see also Duehring v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2016 WL 865844, at *4 (E.D. Mich. 

Mar. 7, 2016) (“the ultimate disability determination is an issue reserved for the Commissioner; 

even if a doctor had opined that Plaintiff was disabled, such an opinion would be afforded no 

deference.”). Neither letter provided a medical opinion as to Push’s specific functional 

limitations; rather, each merely recounted her diagnoses, medication, reported symptoms, and 

allegations of needing her daughter and husband to help her with tasks at home, all of which the 

ALJ had already considered. (Tr. 17-20, 413-14). And, notably, the ALJ did consider a July 

2012 opinion from Dr. Patel, in which he indicated that Push had 30-45 minutes of stiffness 

every morning and gelling during the day, but improved with prednisone, an observation that is 

very similar to his December 2013 letter (indicating an hour of stiffness in the morning and 

gelling during the day, but improvement with prednisone). (Tr. 19, 297-98, 413). Thus, neither 

Dr. Patel’s nor Dr. Planer’s letter can be considered “material,” because Push has not shown a 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

decision.” Richardson, 2012 WL 4210619, at *4. Here, Push has not offered any explanation 

for why she did not obtain these opinions prior to the ALJ’s decision. Rather, in her reply brief, 

she acknowledges that “they should have [been] obtained before the hearing,” and indicates only 

that she does not know why her prior counsel failed to do so. (Doc. #16 at 5). However, courts 

have recognized that “[m]istakes by an attorney are not considered to be ‘good cause’ for 

purposes of a remand under Sentence Six.” Jackson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2009 WL 612343, 

at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 6. 2009) (citing Cline v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 96 F.3d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 

1996)). 

2:15-cv-11867-VAR-DRG Doc # 19 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 9 of 17 Pg ID 532
10

reasonable probability that the Commissioner would have found her disabled if presented with 

this additional evidence. Accordingly, Push is not entitled to a sentence six remand. 

 2. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Credibility Analysis

Push also challenges the ALJ’s determination that her complaints were not fully credible. 

(Doc. #14 at 23-25). As the Sixth Circuit has held, determinations of credibility related to 

subjective complaints of pain rest with the ALJ because “the ALJ’s opportunity to observe the 

demeanor of the claimant ‘is invaluable, and should not be discarded lightly.’” Kirk v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 538 (6th Cir. 1981) (quoting Beavers v. Sec’y of Health, 

Ed. & Welfare, 577 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1978)). Thus, an ALJ’s credibility determination 

will not be disturbed “absent compelling reason.” Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 

2001). The ALJ is not simply required to accept the testimony of a claimant if it conflicts with 

medical reports and other evidence in the record. See Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 

525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). Rather, when a complaint of pain is in issue, after the ALJ finds a 

medical condition that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s alleged 

symptoms, he must consider “the entire case record, including the objective medical evidence, 

the individual’s own statements about symptoms, statements and other information provided by 

treating or examining physicians . . . and any other relevant evidence in the case record” to 

determine if the claimant’s claims regarding the level of her pain are credible. Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-

7, 1996 WL 374186, *1 (July 2, 1996); see also 20 C.F.R. §404.1529. 

In this case, after finding at Step Two that Push suffers from the severe impairments of 

arthritis, fibromyalgia, IBS/colitis, right shoulder tenosynovitis, and spinal degenerative disc 

disease (Tr. 16), the ALJ concluded that she nevertheless retains the residual functional capacity 

to perform a reduced range of light work (Tr. 16-20). In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ 

2:15-cv-11867-VAR-DRG Doc # 19 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 10 of 17 Pg ID 533
11

specifically referenced Push’s testimony that she has difficulty sleeping, attending to her own 

personal care, using her hands, lifting her arms above her head, sitting for prolonged periods of 

time, walking, and climbing stairs. (Tr. 17). However, the ALJ found that while Push’s 

conditions could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, her statements about 

the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of those symptoms were not entirely credible to the 

extent they conflicted with the RFC assessment. (Tr. 17-20). In reaching this conclusion, the 

ALJ specifically considered the relevant medical evidence, Push’s response to medications, and 

her activities of daily living, and he gave good reasons for discrediting Push’s allegations of 

work-preclusive limitations. (Id.). 

As an initial matter, the ALJ properly considered the objective medical evidence when 

evaluating Push’s credibility. Specifically, the ALJ noted that, in February 2012, Push presented 

to Dr. Robert Ikeman for a rheumatology consultation, complaining of joint pain primarily in her 

hands and wrists. (Tr. 17, 260-62). Dr. Ikeman ordered x-rays of her hands and wrists (which 

were normal), and a subsequent MRI of the right hand did not show any significant 

abnormalities. (Tr. 266-67). At a follow-up visit in March 2012, Push reported no overall 

change in her “general aches and pains,” saying that she still suffered about thirty minutes of 

morning stiffness in her wrists and hands. (Tr. 258). Dr. Ikeman indicated a belief that she had 

inflammatory arthritis and suggested a trial of Humira. (Tr. 259). 

On April 26, 2012, Push saw Dr. Dana Planer, her primary care physician in Florida. (Tr. 

224-26). Dr. Planer noted that Push was being treated for rheumatoid arthritis, ulcerative colitis, 

and fibromyalgia, among other conditions. (Tr. 224). On examination, Dr. Planer found 

multiple tender points in a pattern consistent with fibromyalgia, and noted that both of Push’s 

2:15-cv-11867-VAR-DRG Doc # 19 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 11 of 17 Pg ID 534
12

hands had arthritic changes. (Id.). Dr. Planer further noted that Push had only recently started 

Humira and was hopeful that this medication would offer her some relief. (Tr. 225). 

After returning to Michigan for the summer, Push saw Dr. Carla Bregni-Page on June 25, 

2012. (Tr. 271). Dr. Bregni-Page noted that Push was tolerating Humira well and referred her to 

the rheumatology department at the University of Michigan Medical Center. (Id.). As the ALJ 

noted, on July 2, 2012, Push presented to Dr. Dipak Patel, a rheumatologist at the University of 

Michigan. (Tr. 19, 297-99). He noted that Push had developed pain, stiffness, and swelling in 

multiple joints three years earlier. (Tr. 297). Her hands, wrists, shoulders, knees, ankles, and 

feet were the most affected. (Id.). Dr. Patel then noted that x-rays did not show inflammatory 

features, but an MRI detected a cyst and supraspinus tendonopathy in her right shoulder. (Id.). 

Push reported 30-45 minutes of stiffness every morning, as well as gelling during the day, but 

indicated that her symptoms improved with prednisone. (Id.). Dr. Patel also reviewed prior 

notes and recounted that Push’s IBS symptoms were worsened by stress and relieved by Levsin, 

Klonopin, and fiber. (Id.). On examination, Push had moderate bogginess and tenderness in 

multiple bilateral proximal interphalangeal (PIP) and distal interphalangeal (DIP) joints without 

redness or limited range of motion. (Tr. 298). Her metacarpophalangeal (MCP) joints were 

unremarkable, as were her wrists, elbows, shoulders, hips, knees, ankles, and feet. (Id.). At a 

follow-up visit to Dr. Patel on August 30, 2012, Push continued to report one hour of morning 

stiffness, despite taking Humira and prednisone. (Tr. 302). The frequency of her Humira dose 

was increased and her diagnosis remained seropositive rheumatoid arthritis. (Id.). 

The ALJ also considered the September 2012 opinion of state agency physician Myung 

Ho Hahn, who reviewed the record and concluded that Push was capable of performing light 

work, with additional limitations (including a limitation to frequent fingering). (Tr. 20, 60-69). 

2:15-cv-11867-VAR-DRG Doc # 19 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 12 of 17 Pg ID 535
13

In addition, the ALJ evaluated a letter from Dr. Bregni-Page, dated July 22, 2013, in which she 

indicated that Push has “multiple medical conditions [] which cause her ongoing pain and 

disabilities.” (Tr. 20-21, 410). Importantly, she indicated that Push’s IBS and ulcerative colitis, 

which were first diagnosed in 1999, were “under control with proper diet and stress 

management.” (Id.). She also indicated that Push had fibromyalgia, which caused chronic pain; 

neck and lower back pain; rheumatological arthritis; and an anxiety disorder.5 (Id.). 

In attacking the ALJ’s credibility assessment, Push argues that the ALJ “said nothing” 

about her ulcerative colitis, IBS, and other gastrointestinal maladies. (Doc. #14 at 23). This is 

incorrect, however, as the ALJ specifically found these conditions to be severe impairments. (Tr. 

16). Push then argues that the ALJ erred in failing to include limitations in her RFC related to 

these conditions. (Doc. #14 at 23-24). But, the ALJ explicitly considered Push’s history of 

gastrointestinal bleeding, abdominal pain, diarrhea, nausea, vomiting, and development of 

anemia, along with her diagnoses of IBS and ulcerative colitis. (Tr. 18). He further observed 

that these impairments caused limitation of function and indicated that he considered “any added 

or accumulative effects [Push’s] disorders played on her ability to function, and to perform 

routine movement and necessary physical activity within the work environment.” (Id.). The 

ALJ further noted that Dr. Bregni-Page specifically indicated that Push’s IBS and ulcerative 

colitis symptoms were under control with proper diet and stress management. (Tr. 19, 410). 

Thus, where the ALJ explicitly indicated that he considered the limitations imposed by these 

conditions, and where the medical evidence indicates that these conditions were under control, 

the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s decision to decline to include specific restroom-related 

                                                            

5

 In her reply brief, Push asserts that the ALJ erred in giving “little weight” to Dr. Bregni-Page’s 

“opinion.” (Doc. #16 at 1-2). As the ALJ noted, however, Dr. Bregni-Page did not actually 

offer an opinion as to Push’s functional limitations; rather, she merely stated that Push was 

seeking permanent disability due to her ongoing degenerative conditions. (Tr. 20, 410). 

2:15-cv-11867-VAR-DRG Doc # 19 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 13 of 17 Pg ID 536
14

restrictions in Push’s RFC. See, e.g., Garcia v. Colvin, 2015 WL 5719652, at *4-5 (D. Colo. 

Sept. 30, 2015) (ALJ not required to provide for restroom access in RFC where evidence 

suggested ulcerative colitis was “more or less under control” and did not otherwise suggest 

restroom access needs would materially impact RFC). 

In addition, in assessing the credibility of Push’s allegations, the ALJ noted that, despite 

her allegations of disabling symptoms, she engaged in extensive daily activities. (Tr. 19). 

Specifically, the ALJ noted that Push was able to care for her pets, perform some household 

chores, prepare meals, use a computer, go shopping, read, watch television, handle money, take 

care of her personal needs, take her medication, go out alone, drive, and socialize. (Tr. 19, 196-

99). The ALJ further noted that she was able to follow instructions, pay attention, finish what 

she started, handle changes in routine, and travel between Michigan and Florida. (Tr. 19, 200-

01, 298). It was entirely appropriate for the ALJ to consider the fact that Push’s ability to 

perform daily activities was less limited than one would expect, given her allegations of 

disabling symptoms. See Walters, 127 F.3d at 532 (an ALJ may consider household and social 

activities in evaluating the credibility of the claimant’s allegations of disabling symptoms). 

Push argues that the ALJ “misrepresented her testimony” in evaluating her activities of 

daily living, claiming that he inaccurately described her as independent in her activities when in 

reality she required assistance. (Doc. #14 at 25). But, the ALJ reasonably relied on Push’s own 

reports and testimony; it is true that, while she did allege needing some help and having some 

difficulties, she also admitted being able to perform many activities independently. (Tr. 197-

200). It was both reasonable and appropriate for the ALJ to resolve any conflict that existed in 

Push’s accounts of her daily activities. See Workman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 105 F. App’x 794, 

801 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that “the Commissioner has the power and discretion to weigh all of 

2:15-cv-11867-VAR-DRG Doc # 19 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 14 of 17 Pg ID 537
15

the evidence and to resolve the significant conflicts in the administrative record”).

Consequently, the Court finds that the ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by substantial 

evidence. 

 3. Push’s Remaining Arguments are Without Merit

Push raises a few other arguments, albeit briefly, which are discussed below. First, she 

claims that the ALJ “made numerous odd remarks” at the administrative hearing, asking her 

strange questions about her alleged onset date and the date of her last medical appointment. 

(Doc. #14 at 24). As the Commissioner correctly points out, however, Push had the burden of 

establishing her onset date. (Doc. #15 at 16 (citing McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 

F.3d 830, 837 (6th Cir. 2006)). Moreover, as the factfinder, the ALJ was required to evaluate 

Push’s alleged onset date and determine whether the medical records are up to date, so the Court 

finds no error in the ALJ’s questioning regarding these matters. 

Push also argues that the ALJ erred in failing to account for the hand limitations assessed 

by Dr. Ikeman and Dr. Patel and in therefore concluding that she could frequently handle objects. 

(Doc. #14 at 26). Dr. Ikeman did discuss Push’s difficulty with her hands, including numbness, 

tenderness, and dropping objects, but he also noted that x-rays of her hands were normal. (Tr. 

260-62). Similarly, Dr. Patel indicated that Push would have difficulties with fine activities, 

such as fastening buttons on clothes, and observed bogginess and tenderness, but found no 

redness or limited range of motion in her PIP or DIP joints. (Tr. 297). Dr. Hahn reviewed all of 

this evidence and concluded that Push was capable of frequent handling and fingering (Tr. 63-

66). The ALJ then gave great weight to Dr. Hahn’s opinion and incorporated this limitation into 

2:15-cv-11867-VAR-DRG Doc # 19 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 15 of 17 Pg ID 538
16

Push’s RFC assessment (Tr. 16, 20). Push has simply failed to demonstrate error in the ALJ’s 

analysis of the relevant medical evidence and opinions.6

In sum, based on the above analysis and the Court’s detailed review of the record, it finds 

that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Commissioner’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment [15] be GRANTED, Push’s Motion for Summary Judgment [14] be 

DENIED, and the ALJ’s decision be AFFIRMED. 

Dated: March 30, 2016 s/David R. Grand 

Ann Arbor, Michigan DAVID R. GRAND 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS 

Within 14 days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation and 

Order, any party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and 

recommendations and the order set forth above. See 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 

72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(1). Failure to timely file objections constitutes a waiver of any 

further right of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, (1985); United States v. Sullivan, 431 

F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005). Only specific objections to this Report and Recommendation will 

                                                            

6

 Push also mentions that attorney William Christie did not actually appear at her hearing, and 

that instead his son (a non-attorney representative) appeared on her behalf, but she does not 

develop this observation into an argument in her motion for summary judgment. (Doc. #14 at 

18). Similarly, she suggests that the ALJ was not a “neutral fact-finder” (Doc. #16 at 6), but 

aside from referring to the purportedly “strange questioning” discussed above (regarding her 

onset date and medical records), she does not further develop this argument. The Court finds 

both of these arguments waived. See, e.g., McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995 (6th Cir. 

1997) (“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at 

developed argumentation, are deemed waived.”). 

2:15-cv-11867-VAR-DRG Doc # 19 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 16 of 17 Pg ID 539
17

be preserved for the Court’s appellate review; raising some objections but not others will not 

preserve all objections a party may have. See Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 

F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Frontier Ins. Co. v. Blaty, 454 F.3d 590, 596-97 (6th 

Cir. 2006). Copies of any objections must be served upon the Magistrate Judge. See E.D. Mich. 

LR 72.1(d)(2). 

A party may respond to another party’s objections within 14 days after being served with 

a copy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1). Any such response should be 

concise, and should address specifically, and in the same order raised, each issue presented in the 

objections. 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record 

and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System to their respective email or First Class 

U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on March 30, 2016. 

 s/Eddrey O. Butts 

 EDDREY O. BUTTS 

 Case Manager 

2:15-cv-11867-VAR-DRG Doc # 19 Filed 03/30/16 Pg 17 of 17 Pg ID 540