UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SOPHIA PAPPAS,

Petitioner,

v.

ANTHONY STEWART,

Respondent. 

 /

Case Number: 15-CV-11701

HONORABLE GERALD E. ROSEN

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS AND DECLINING TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Sophia Pappas’ petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is incarcerated at the Huron

Valley Women’s Complex in Ypsilanti, Michigan pursuant to her convictions for arson of

a dwelling house, conspiracy to commit arson of a dwelling house, sending explosives

with intent to injure, and assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. She

seeks habeas relief on two grounds: insufficient evidence supported one of the elements

of arson of a dwelling house, and sentence was based on inaccurate information. The

Court denies the petition. 

I. Background and Procedural History

Petitioner’s convictions arise from the firebombing of a house in Livonia on April

24, 2012. The Michigan Court of Appeals summarized the evidence leading to

Petitioner’s convictions are follows: 

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The prosecution presented evidence to establish that defendant, upset about

the failure of her romantic relationship with Angela Passini as well as the

impact it might have on her efforts to adopt two children, sought to exact

harm upon Alana Faulk, a person whom Passini had begun dating. In

seeking to exact this harm, defendant retained the assistance of Evelyen

Lewek and Alvin Echols. According to Lewek, who describes herself as

being known for hurting people, defendant asked her and Echols to “cut

[Faulk’s] throat” or “beat her until she stops breathing.”1 Lewek claimed

that Echols and defendant agreed to a price of $2,000 for the killing. For

approximately two days leading up to April 24, 2012, the group followed

Faulk to and from her place of work at a bar in Inkster, Michigan, and

familiarized themselves with Stanmoor Street in Livonia, where Faulk

lived. Lewek testified that the group would “sit for hours out at night

circling the house and just watching the neighborhood.” Scott Gatscher,

Faulk’s neighbor who lived directly across Stanmoor Street, testified that on

April 23, 2012, he saw a dark minivan or SUV driving slowly down the

street without its lights on, parking intermittently.

Lewek testified that Echols came up with an idea to firebomb Faulk’s

house. On the night of April 24, 2012, defendant was driving the group in

her Trailblazer, pulled into a gas station, and filled a small gas can with

gasoline. The group also purchased a bottle of motor oil and three glass

bottles of juice. Security camera footage from the gas station shows

defendant and Lewek walking into the store and purchasing the items. 

Defendant drove the Trailblazer to Faulk’s home, and the group saw that

lights were illuminated in Faulk’s bedroom, indicating that Faulk was in the

house. Defendant drove several blocks away to a dark area, and Echols

constructed three Molotov cocktails with the items purchased at the gas

station. While Echols made the explosive devices, defendant and Lewek

went to a local K-Mart and purchased handkerchiefs, which Echols used as

fuses for the Molotov cocktails. When the explosives were completed,

defendant drove the group back to Faulk’s home and made sure the lights

were still on in Faulk’s bedroom. Defendant dropped off Echols in front of

Faulk’s house and drove the Trailblazer down the street a short distance to

wait for Echols to return.

Faulk testified that on the night of April 24, 2012, she was lying in bed

reading a book when she heard two loud bangs outside her window, with

approximately ten seconds between the bangs. Faulk jumped out of bed,

looked out the window, and saw a “wall of fire” burning the outside the

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house. Faulk ran out of the room. Gatscher observed the flames from his

front window and stated that he could see a bush in front of the house and

the area behind the bush burning. Gatscher picked up his cellular telephone

to call 911 and walked outside to assist Faulk. As Gatscher was walking

out of his house, he noticed a figure walking toward a dark minivan or SUV

parked down the street from Faulk’s house. The figure got into the vehicle

and the vehicle sped down the street. By the time Gatscher got to Faulk's

front door, Faulk was outside the house and the fire had largely dissipated.

Within five to ten minutes of the fire starting, police officers arrived on the

scene.

Officer Eric Eisenbeis, a police officer with the city of Livonia, was the first

officer to arrive on the scene. Eisenbeis observed a charred, broken glass

bottle, an intact glass bottle filled with liquid, and a red rag hanging from a

tree outside the bedroom window. Eisenbeis also observed that the outside

of the bedroom window was charred and a pillar attached to the house

appeared to be charred. Eisenbeis spoke with Gatscher, who relayed the

information about the dark minivan or SUV that fled the scene of the fire. 

Officer James Green, a police officer with the city of Livonia, was alerted

to look out for a dark minivan or SUV, and he located a burgundy

Trailblazer traveling south on Inkster Road. Green conducted a traffic stop,

and when he approached the vehicle, he could immediately smell gasoline.

Defendant was the driver of the vehicle, Lewek was seated in the front

passenger seat, and Echols was sitting in the back seat. Green observed a

gas can sitting on the floor of the back seat and white latex gloves on the

seat next to Echols. Defendant told Green that she had picked up the two

passengers at a friend’s house and was taking them back to her house to

babysit in the morning. Green detained the occupants of the vehicle and

radioed the stop to Eisenbeis. When it was determined that Faulk was

familiar with defendant, defendant was arrested.

After the arrest, police were able to obtain text and Facebook message

records for defendant and found that defendant engaged in various

conversations in March and April 2012 in which she attempted to determine

the identity of Faulk as well as other persons who may have been involved

in relationships with Passini. During questioning by police after her arrest,

defendant made conflicting statements concerning the gas can and how she

knew Lewek and Echols.

* * *

Lewek testified that initially, defendant wanted her and Echols to kill a man

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with whom Passini may have been involved, and the three of them staked

out a hotel by the airport for a few days in an effort to locate the man. 

Defendant then changed her plans, and Lewek understood that defendant

wished to harm a woman named April, who had been communicating with

Passini. The three of them attempted to locate April a couple of times at an

apartment complex in Westland. Unsuccessful yet again, defendant turned

her attention to Faulk.

People v. Pappas, No. 313751, 2014 WL 1234151, *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. March 25,

2014). 

Petitioner was charged in Wayne County Circuit with conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, arson, conspiracy to commit arson,

and sending explosives with the intent to injure. Following a bench trial, she was

acquitted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, but convicted of arson of a

dwelling house, conspiracy to commit arson of a dwelling house, sending explosives with

intent to injure, and assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. On

November 26, 2012, she was sentenced to 9 to 20 years’ imprisonment for the arson,

conspiracy to commit arson, and sending explosives with intent to injure convictions, and

5 to 10 years’ imprisonment for the assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than

murder conviction. 

Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals raising these

claims:

I. There was insufficient evidence to support conviction of arson of a

dwelling house because there was no real structural damage to the house,

just charring.

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II. Pappas was sentenced based on inaccurate information as she did not

interfere with the administration of justice under OV 19, she merely made a

failed attempt to do so. 

The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. 

People v. Pappas, No. 313751, 2014 WL 1234151 (Mich. Ct. App. March 25, 2014). She

filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme court, raising the same

claims raised in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied

leave to appeal. People v. Pappas, 497 Mich. 856 (Mich. Sept. 5, 2014). 

Petitioner then filed the pending habeas petition. She raises the same claims raised

on direct review in state court. 

II. Standard

Review of this case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner is entitled to a writ of

habeas corpus only if he can show that the state court’s adjudication of his claims – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceedings. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it ‘applies a

rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it

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‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the

Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [this] precedent.’” 

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). “[T]he ‘unreasonable application’ prong of the statute

permits a federal habeas court to ‘grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts’ of petitioner’s case.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003)

(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). However, “[i]n order for a federal court find a state

court’s application of [Supreme Court] precedent ‘unreasonable,’ the state court’s

decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court’s application

must have been ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (citations

omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. “A state court’s determination that a claim

lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’

on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101

(2011), quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). “Section 2254(d)

reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state

criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal. . . .

As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must

show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in

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existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786-87 (internal

quotation omitted). 

Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court’s review to a determination of

whether the state court’s decision comports with clearly established federal law as

determined by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Section 2254(d) “does not require citation of [Supreme

Court] cases – indeed, it does not even require awareness of [Supreme Court] cases, so

long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” 

Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[W]hile the principles of “clearly established

law” are to be determined solely by resort to Supreme Court rulings, the decisions of

lower federal courts may be instructive in assessing the reasonableness of a state court’s

resolution of an issue.” Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2007), citing

Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2003); Dickens v. Jones, 203 F. Supp.

2d 354, 359 (E.D. Mich. 2002).

Lastly, a federal habeas court must presume the correctness of state court factual

determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this presumption

only with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th

Cir. 1998). 

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III. Discussion

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner argues that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support her

conviction for arson of a dwelling house. Under Michigan law, the elements of arson of a

dwelling house are: (1) the defendant willfully and maliciously burned a dwelling house

and (2) the defendant intended to burn the dwelling house, or intentionally committed an

act that created a very high risk of burning the house, and the defendant knew of that risk

and disregarded it. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.72; People v. Barber, 255 Mich. App. 288,

294-95 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). Petitioner was convicted as an aider and abettor. “To

establish that a defendant aided and abetted a crime, a prosecutor must show that (1) the

crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person, (2) the defendant

performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime, and (3)

the defendant intended the commission of the crime or knew that the principal intended to

commit the crime at the time he gave aid and encouragement.” Riley v. Berghuis, 481

F.3d 315, 322 (6th Cir. 2007), citing People v. Carines, 597 N.W.2d 130, 135 (1999). 

Petitioner focuses her sufficiency of the evidence argument on a single element. She

argues that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Faulk’s house

was burned. 

The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s sufficiency of the evidence

claim, finding “there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable finder of fact to conclude

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that Faulk’s home was burned to the extent necessary to support defendant’s conviction.” 

Pappas, 2014 WL 1234151 at *3. The Michigan Court of Appeals acknowledged there

was no major damage to the structure of the home, but held that structural damage was

not an element of the charged offense. Id. The state court noted that a police officer

observed that the outside wall of the house near Faulk’s bedroom and a pillar attached to

the house were both charred. A fire investigator similarly testified that he observed a

charred scorch mark above the shutters next to Faulk’s bedroom window and that a pillar

attached to the front of the house was charred. Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals held

that the arson statute required only “minimal damage” to a home and that the damage

described by the officer and investigator was sufficient to satisfy this threshold. Id. 

“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon

proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with

which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). On direct review, review

of a sufficiency of the evidence challenge must focus on whether “after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443

U.S. at 319 (emphasis in original). In the habeas context, “[t]he Jackson standard must be

applied ‘with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as

defined by state law.’” Brown v. Palmer, 441 F.3d 347, 351 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16). 

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“Two layers of deference apply to habeas claims challenging evidentiary

sufficiency.” McGuire v. Ohio, 619 F.3d 623, 631 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Brown v.

Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 204-05 (6th Cir. 2009)). First, the Court “must determine whether,

viewing the trial testimony and exhibits in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Brown, 567 F.3d at 205 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319)). Second, if

the Court were “to conclude that a rational trier of fact could not have found a petitioner

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, on habeas review, [the Court] must still defer to the

state appellate court’s sufficiency determination as long as it is not unreasonable.” Id.

On habeas review, a federal court “does not reweigh the evidence or redetermine

the credibility of the witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the trial court.”

Matthews v. Abramajtys, 319 F.3d 780, 788 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Marshall v.

Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983)). “A reviewing court ‘faced with a record of

historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume – even if it does not

affirmatively appear in the record – that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in

favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.’” McDaniel v. Brown, 558

U.S. 120, 133 (2010) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326). According the state court’s

findings of fact a presumption of correctness, the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision

easily passes scrutiny under the deferential AEDPA standard. The state court applied the

correct constitutional test, relied on facts amply supported in the record, and did not

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unreasonably apply clearly established constitutional law. Petitioner is not entitled to

federal habeas corpus relief with respect to this claim. 

B. Scoring of Offense Variable 19

Next, Petitioner challenges the scoring of offense variable (OV) 19. OV 19

provides that 10 points will be assessed when an offender interferes or attempts to

interfere with the administration of justice. Mich. Comp. Laws § 777.49(c). 

It is well-established that “<federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state

law.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S.

764, 780 (1990)). Petitioner’s argument that the state court erred in scoring her

sentencing guidelines is based solely on the state court’s interpretation of state law. It

does not implicate any federal rights. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (“[A]

state court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the

challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting on habeas review.”); Mullaney v.

Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) (“[S]tate courts are the ultimate expositors of state

law.”). “[A] claim that the trial court mis-scored offense variables in determining the

state sentencing guidelines is not cognizable on habeas corpus review.” See Adams v.

Burt, 471 F. Supp. 2d 835, 844 (E.D. Mich. 2007).

Moreover, the Michigan Court of Appeals expressly found that sufficient evidence

supported the scoring of OV 19 and detailed the facts supporting that determination. 

Pappas, 2014 WL 1234151 at *4. The Sixth Circuit repeatedly has recognized “‘that a

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state court’s interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the

challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.’” Stumpf v.

Robinson, 722 F.3d 739, 746 n.6 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76). 

The state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim therefore was not based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts and was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of established Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

IV. Certificate of Appealability

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal may not proceed

unless a certificate of appealability (COA) is issued under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Rule 11 of

the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings now requires that the Court “must issue or

deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” 

A COA may be issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). A petitioner must show “that

reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should

have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to

deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)

(citation omitted). In this case, the Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not

debate the conclusion that the petition fails to state a claim upon which habeas corpus

relief should be granted. No certificate of appealability is warranted. Nor should

Petitioner be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal as an appeal cannot be

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taken in good faith. See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a).

 Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus is DENIED. 

It is FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED and

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is DENIED. 

s/Gerald E. Rosen 

United States District Judge

Dated: April 12, 2016

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or

counsel of record on April 12, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Julie Owens 

Case Manager, (313) 234-5135

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