### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Februar y 12, 2 003 Session
IN RE: PETITION OF JAMES F. WAT SON, GENERAL SESSION S COURT JUDGE
Appeal from the Chancery Court for McMinn County No. 20672 Jerri S. Bryant, Chancellor FILED JULY 31, 2003

No. E2002-02480-COA-R3-CV

This is a decl arator

y ju dgment a

ction. Judg e James F. Watson was , at all relevant times, the general sessions court judge for McMin n County . Prior to 2 000, McMin n County was clas sified asa county of the second class and Judge Watson was paid in accordanc e with the statut o ry compensa

tion scheme for such counties. As a resu lt of the 20 00 censu s, McMinn County became a county of the first class. Judge Watson filed a petition seeking a determination as to the proper c alculati on of his salary as a cla ss one general sessions court judge . The trial court determined that Judge Watson was entitled to continue receiving the jurisdictional supplements to his salary that he hadbeen receiving as a class two judge. We reverse.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Reversed; Case Remanded

C HARLES D. S USANO , J R ., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which H OUSTON M. G ODDARD , P.J., and H ERSCHEL P. F RANKS , J., joined.
Michael E. Evans, Nashville, Tennessee, for the a ppellant, McMinn County, Tennessee

. James F. Watson, Pro Se.
OPINION

I.
Prior to September 1, 1990, Te nn. Co de Ann. § 16-15-204 (repealed 1993) g overned the classification of Tenne ssee cou nties for th e purpose o f determining the compensation of gene ral sessions court jud

ges. That statute delineated eight classes of counties. I n pertinent part, it provided as follow s:1 Cer tain classif ications of judges were not eligible to receive these sup plemen ts. Howeve r, as these clas sif icat ions are n ot re leva nt t o thi s appea l, the y wi ll not be dis cuss ed.
-2- ( a)(1) Counties having a population of one hundred thou san d (100,000 ) or more , shall co nstitute c ounties of the first class; (2) Counties having a population of fifty thousand (50,000) or more, butless than

one hundr

ed thousa

nd (100,0 00), shall constitut e countiesof the se cond cla ss;
* * * (b) The pop ulation of the several c ounties f or the pur poses of t his chapter shall be de te rmined by the fe deral census of 1950, and by each suc ceeding

federa l census.

The salary sca

le for judges in each

of the ei ght diff

erent c lassific ations wa s set fort h in Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-205 (repealed 1993). Effective Septembe r 1, 1982, the annua

l base salary for general sessions court judges of the first class was $51,000, and for judges of the second class, $38,941. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-2 05(d)(1 )(A) & (B). Th is statute also provided for

salary suppleme

nts to general sessions court judges who exercised additional jurisdiction. For examp le , a judg e with juvenile court jurisdiction received an annual supplement equal to 10% of his or her an nu al sa la ry, and a judge who exercised probate jurisdiction received a supplement of 5%. 1 See Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-205(d)(2) & (3). Be ginning July 1, 1983, the salar ies of all general sessions court judge s were adjusted annually

to refle ct the an

nual incr ease in t he cost of living. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-205(d)(4).

On September 1, 1990, Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5001 (Supp. 2002) became ef fec tiv e, replac ing Ten n. Co de Ann . § 16- 15-20 4, and provi ding, in per tinen t part , the f ollo wing:

(a) For the purpose of determining the compensa tion of a general sessions judge, the cou nties of this state are divided into eight (8) classesas follow s: (1) Counties having a population of more than forty -nine thousand (49,000) constitute

countiesof the fir st class; (2) Coun ties h aving a population of more than thirty-eig

ht thousand (38,000) but not m ore tha n forty -nine thousand (49 ,000) co nstitute countiesof the se cond cla ss;
* * *-3- (b) The clas s into which a county falls sha ll be determined by the 1990 federal census and any subseque nt federal census or any

special
census conducted by

the depa rtment of economic

and commu

nity developm ent.
* * * (d)(2) If a county

is in one class as pr ovide d in this section on September

1, of the y

ear in wh ich a judg e is elected

to office and after such date, suc

h county moves in

to anot her class on the basis of a subsequent

census, the salary

of such judge shall be determined by the higher classification for

the remai nder o f the t erm fo r whic h the j udge was elected. September

1, 1990, was also the effective date of Tenn. Code A nn. § 16-15-5003 (Supp. 2002), the new statute addressingthe calculation of salaries of general sessions cour t judges. The statute sets a ba se salary of

$70,000 for all general sessions court judge s in class one counties, and
a base salary

of $50,000 for judges in class two counties. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5003(a)(1) & (2). The statute also provided that judges in class two and three c ounties exercising juvenile court jurisdiction would be entitled to an annual supplement of $20,000, and a $10,000 supplement for exercising probate jurisdiction. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5003(b)(1)(A) & (B ). However, the annual supplements were capped at a maximum of $20,000, “[r]egardless of the kind or amount of additional jurisdiction a Class 2 judge may ha ve,. . . .” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5003(b)(2). Ad di ti on al ly, the statute provided that, beginning July 1, 1991, the judges’ salaries would be adjus ted annually to ref

lect the increase in the cost of living. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5003(f).

When Tenn. Cod

e Ann. § 16 -15-5003 went into e ffect, judges in class one counti es wh o exercisedaddition al juri sdiction were excluded from the list of those entitled to receive annual supplements; their salaries were capped at $70,000, plus annua l adju stmen ts for the co st of l ivin g. However, at the time Tenn. Code Ann. § 16- 15-5003 was enacted, Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-205 had not yet

been repealed. Accordingly , class one judges were still receiving their annual suppleme nts pursuant to § 16-15-205. Effectiv e July 1, 1993, § 16- 15-205 wa s repealed

. See Chapter 241, Public

Acts of 19 93. Nine m

onths late r, the Te nnessee Attorney Genera l iss ued an opinion addressing the issue of juvenile court supplements for general sessions court

judges in class
one coun ties:

It is the opinion of

this Office that, beginningJuly 1, 1993, the salary of general sessions court judges has been governed solely by [Tenn. Code Ann. ] § 16-15-5 003 as a r esult of the express repeal of [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 16-15-205 by 1993 Tenn. Pub. Acts Ch. 241.

It is also the opinion of

this Office

, howeve r, that bec

ause of Art

icle VI, § 7 of the Te nnessee

Constitution

, 1993 Tenn . Pub. Act

s Ch. 241 may not be construed as having the eff ect, during any jud

ge’s ter m-4- that commenced

prior to July 1, 1993, of denying to such judge any supplemental

salary, if the supplement was paid pursuant to a statutory provision that was in effect when the judge’s term began.
Therefore, this Office also renders its opinion that, prior to the effectivedate

of the expre ss re

peal of [T enn . Code Ann.] § 16-15- 205, any salary suppleme

nt for juv enile court jurisd icti on th at was paid to a general

sessions c ourt judg e in a cla ss 1 county was leg ally paid pursuant to [Tenn. Co de Ann.] § 1 6-15-205 (d)(2) , which wa s in effect during s u ch time, and that such supplement may not be increased or diminished during the continuation of a judge’s term that began prior to July 1, 1993. Op. Tenn. Att’y Ge

n. 94-044 (April 4, 1994) (empha sis added). Over a y ear and a half later, the A ttor ney General issued another opinion, stating, based upon the same r ationale, that class one judges a lso could c ontinue to

receive supplements for exercising probate and divorce jurisdiction. Op. Tenn. Att’y Ge

n. U95-093 (December 22, 1995).

One ye ar prior

to the 1998 election s, the General Assembly amended Tenn. Code Ann. § 16- 15-5003 b y a

dding su bsection (i), whic h provide s as follow s:
Effective September 1, 1998, the annual salary for a general sessions court judge shall be increased over the a nnual compensation and suppleme nts and annu al adjustm

ents which each ju dg e actua lly received as of August 31, 1998, by the lesser of: (A) Ten thousand dollars ($10,000); or
(B) Tw en ty percent (20%) of such annual compensa tion and supplements and annual adjustments as of August 31, 1998.
Thus, judges in class o ne counti es who we re reelected to

office in Augus t, 1998, re

ceived t heir annual salary , plus any

annual ju risdictio nal supple

ments they

were “ actually

” rece iving on A

ugust 31, 1998. In addition, those judg es rece ived a $10 ,000 incr

ease ove r the amount they

were a ctually being paid on August 31, 1998.

II

. In August, 1986, Judge Watson was elected to fill the unexpired term of the previous General Sessions Court judge for McMinn County. I n addi tion, Judge Watson served as the judge of the McMinn County juvenile and probate c ourts. At the time of his election, M cMinn County was classifiedas a county of

the second class, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-204. As a general sessions court judge in a class two county who was exercising both juvenile and probate jurisdiction,2 Tenn. Cons t. art . I, § 8.

3 U.S . C ons t. ame nd. XIV.
-5- Judge Watson received both the 10% and the 5% annual supplements, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-205(d)(2) & (3). Judge Watson was reelected in August, 1990. When Tenn. Code Ann. § 16- 15-5001 b ecame effectiveon September 1, 1990, McMinn County was still classified as a class two c ounty, as it had
a populatio n of betw een 38,0 00 and 49, 000 acc ording t o the 1990

federa l census. Pursuant

to Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5003, Judge Watson began receiving a base salary

of $50,000, plus an additional $20,000 in supplem

ents, bas ed upon hi s exercise of juvenile and probate jurisdiction, for a total of $70,000, not including the annual cost of living adjustments to which he was entitled.

In August, 1998, Judge Watson was reel ected on ce ag ain, and h e continu ed to rec eive his salary and suppl eme nts as a class two judge. When the 2000 federal ce nsus results were made public, McMinn Cou

nty was found to have a

populatio n of over

49,000, which move d the coun ty into a class one designation. As such, Judge Watson found himself as a general sessions court judge in a class one county f

or the remainder of the 1998-2006 term. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16- 15-5001 and 16-15-5003, Judge Watson was then entitled to rec eive a base salary of $70,000; however, there was n ot, at that time, a statute in effect expressly providing for the pay

ment of jurisdict ional supp lements to

class one judges.

On June 29 , 200 1, th e Atto rney Genera l iss ued an opin ion s pecifi cally add ressi ng Jud ge Watson’s situation, finding that h e was not entitled to continue receiving the jurisdictional suppleme nts that he had received as a judge of a class tw o county

because “[n]o statut

e curren tly in effect authorize s the pay

ment of jur

isdictiona l su pp lements to

a judge in a count

y th at is newl

y classifi ed as a first class county .” Op. Tenn. Att’y Gen. 01-107 (June 29, 2001). In addition, the Attorney General opined that there is no evidence of any legislative intent to allow suchjudges t o continue recei ving sup plements, and that the differences in treatment of cla ss one judges “are rationally rela

ted to the legitimate state interest of retaining incumbent judg es.” Id.

Two and a half months later, Judge Watson filed this petition for declarat ory judgment , seeking a determination of the proper calculation of his sal ary as a new cla ss one judg e. I

n his petition, Judge Wats on aversthat his sa lary for the

r emainder of the 1998-2006 term should be calculated

by “consi der[i ng] all laws that were in effect from September 1, 1990 forward which have actually affected and still affect the salarie s of general sessions court judges pre viously in class [two] counties prior to the 2000 census.” Judge Watson argues that “it is the clear legislative intent that all general sessions court judges similarly situated by county

class and jurisdiction be paid the same salarie s” and that, more specifically , Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5001(d)(2) “reflects a clear intent by the legisla

ture” to pay judges w ho move int

o a higher count

y c lassific ation the

same sala

ry as their colleag ues. In a

ddition, Judg e Watson a llegest hatthe Equal Protection clauses of both the Tennessee 2 and UnitedStates 3 constitutions “require[] that all persons similarly situated be trea ted the same.”-6-

McMinn County answered Judge Watson’s petition, denying the core of his claim for relief. Followin g a hea

ring, th e trial c ourt ente

red its or der on Au gust 21, 2002, find ing as f ollows:

The GeneralAssembly provided under [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 16-15- 5001(d), that when a county is in one class on the date o n which a judge is elected to offic e and af ter that d ate that c ounty

moves to another class on the basis of a subsequent census, the salary of such judge shall be determined by the higher classification for the remainder

of the term for which the judge is elected. T he Attorney Ge neral of the State of Tennessee has provided the opinion tha t [Tenn. Code Ann. ] § 16-15-5 003(i) allows som e Class 1 judges, who
were st ill receiving jurisdictional supplements under [Tenn. Code Ann.] § 16-15-205 and Attorney General Opinion94-44, to receive
a $10,000 increase over their actual Aug ust 31, 1998 salary. Thi s meant that the salary f

or the judges in the 1998 term would continue to reflect those jur

isdictiona l suppleme

nts. [Tenn . Code

Ann. ] § 16- 15-5003(i) allows supplements to continue.

There is no ratio nal basisto differ entiate betwee n Class 1 judges who
were receiving supplements prior to Augus t 31, 1998, and continue those in the 1998 term and those who are moved to Class 1 by virtue of the 2000 census. Those moved to Class 1 by the census should be equal lyenti tled to continue their supplements as those that were likewise reelected to another ter m in 1998 and were receiving supplements prior to August 31, 1998. (Emphasi s in orig inal). F rom this or

der, McMinn County

appeals

. III.

In this non-ju

ry case, ou r review is de novo upon the record of the proceeding s below; but the record comes to us with a presumption of correctness as to the trial court’s factua l determinations that we must honor

unless the

evidenc e preponderate s otherwi se. Tenn . R. App. P. 1 3(d); Wright
v. City of Knox ville , 898 S.W.2d 1 77, 181 (Tenn. 1995 ); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston , 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). Our review of qu estions of law is de novo with no such presumption of correctness attaching to the trial cour t’s conclusions of law. Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp. , 919 S.W.2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1 996); Presley v. Bennett , 860 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Tenn. 1993).

IV.
McMinn County arg

ues that the trial court er

red in determining that Judge Watson is entitled to continue

receiving his ju

risdictio nal supple

ments , as suc h supplements are not authorized by statute. We agree.-7-

As previous ly d

iscussed , the Attor

ney Genera l addres sed this very issue whe n he repli ed to
an inquiry specific ally

pertaining to Judge Watson in Op. Tenn. Att’y Gen. 01-107 (June 29, 2001). Becau se we agree with the Attorney General’s determination on this issue and decide this case on the same bases, we quote liberally from that opinion:

U nder Tenn. Code A nn. § 1 6-15- 205, ge neral s essio ns ju dge s wer e entitled to salary

suppleme

nts for exercising

juvenile and prob ate court jurisdiction. The General Assembly expressly rep ealed that statute in 1993. But our Office concluded that Class 1 judges w ho took office before the repea

l were entitled to continu e rece iving the se suppleme nts until the end of the

ir curre nt term – in

most case s, until August 31, 199 8. In 1 997, the General Assembly amended Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5003 to add subsection (i) regarding the salaries of general sessions judges for the te rm beginning September

1, 1998. That subsection pro vides:

Effective S eptember 1, 1998, the annual salary for a general sessions c ourt judg e shall be in c reased over the annual compensation and suppleme

nts and annual adjustmen

ts which each ju dge actually received as of August 31, 1998 , by the lesser of : (A) Ten th ous and dollars ($10,000); or (B) Twenty per

cent (2 0%) of such
annu al compensation and supp lement s and an nua l adjustme

nts as of A

ugust 31, 1998. (Emphasi s added) . T hus by its terms, Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15- 5003(i) provides that each jud ge reel ected to office was entit led to receivean increase over

the salary a

nd supplement he or she actually received on August 31, 1998. Presumabl y, a t le ast some ju dges in class one coun

ties wer e sti ll receiving additional jurisdictional suppleme nts under Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-205 and Opinion 94-44
as of Augus t 31, 1998. Those judges therefore rec eived a $10,000 increa se over their actual August 31, 1998, salary . If a class one judge was actually r

e ceiving jurisdictiona l supplements on August 31, 1998, th en th at ju dg e’ s s al ar y f or the 1 998 term will continu e to reflect those jur

isdictiona l suppleme

nts.
The request

asks whe ther, be cause so me judge s in counti es of the first cl ass continue to receive a salary that reflects jurisdictiona l suppleme nts, the sala

ries of ju dges whose coun ties move into class
one as a r esult

of the 200 0 census s hould also reflec t those suppleme nts.-8- We have reviewed the legislative history for the various ac ts now codifiedat Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15 -5003. We do not think the General As se mb ly i ntend ed the sta tute to be interpre ted to ent itle indi viduals who were not actually receiving salary

supplements under the repealed statute to receive them when their salary

is recalculated. The effect of this interpretation would be to incorporate jurisdictional suppleme nts no longer directly

authorized by stat

ute perma nently into the base s alary of

the class one judge. The statutory language does notsupport this interpretation. Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 16- 15-5003(i) nowhere purports to increase theb ase salary payable to a

judge in a cla ss one county. F

urther, the statute refers to an increa se ov er th e salary the judg e was actually receiving as of August 31, 1998. It does notrefer to an increase over the hypothetical

maximu m salary

to which a general sessions judge in a c lass one county would have been entitled as of that date. In any case, as of

that date no statute

then in effect expressly

authorized these supplements. Finally, Te nn. Code Ann. § 16- 15-5003(i)(4)(A), enac ted in 1997 , expressl y pr ovides: (4)(A) The compensation, supplement and annual adjustmentprovisi ons of this section are to be
c onstrued as minimum levels. The compensation schedule es ta bl is he d b y this part

is a compr e hensive pla n, and no salary supplement in excess of th e supplements provided

b y this part shall be av

ailable to a genera l sessions j udge unle ss expre sslyprovided and funde d by a priv

ate act. (Emphasis added). Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-205 did not app ear in Part 50 of the statute, but in Part 2. Further, that statute was repealed in 1993. Tenn. Code Ann. §16-15-5003(i)(4)(A) therefore supports the argumen t that the Ge neral A ssemb ly did no t int end an y judge besides tho se in office who were actually receiving supplements on August 31, 1998, to receive a salary reflecting supplements under that statute. For thes e reaso ns, we thin k that supp lements former ly author ized u nder Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-205 should only be reflected in the sala

ry of ge neral sessions judges in counties of the first class who were actually r eceiv ing those supplements as of August 31, 1998. (Citation omitted) ( emphasisin original). We believe the Attorney General’s interpretation

of Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5003 is the corr ect on e. Judge Watson is essentially asking to be treated retroa ctively as a class one judge, which is neither prope r nor contemplated under the present statutory scheme. As Judge Wa

tson was n ot actually receiving the salary and supple

ments of a class4 Ob viously, we are spea king hyp othetic ally. We do not know whether s uch j udges hips were in f act created. The point is t

hat if such jud geship s were create d and filled du ring the in dicate d time frame s, the new judg es, unlike their
more senior

collea gues si tti ng as cl ass one j udges, woul d not have been enti tled t o the benef it of the ju risdi ctiona l supplem ents. -9- one judge on August 31, 1998, he was not entitled to begin re ceiving tho se supple ments when he became a class one judge in 2000. Judge Watson asserts that the legislature clearly intended that general sessions court judges in each county

classification who exercise equaljurisdict ion are t o be paid equally, and that to pay
somejudg es in c lass o ne countie s more than othe rs wo uld vi olate

that l egi slati ve in

tent. We disagree.

In a ddressin g this issu e of legislative intent, the Attorney Genera l found asfollows:
[B] y referring to the salary

each judge actually received on A ugus t 31, 1998, as th

e base for the salary

during that judge’s next term, the General Assembly

in effect preserved any discrepancies of pay existing among counties of the same class as of that date. Thus, if a cl ass one judg e was actually receiving supp lements a s of that date , and he or she

is elected to a subs equen t term , that judge will continue to receiv e a sala ry that ref lects the su pplem ents. If a class one ju dge
was not receiving such supplements as of that date, and he or she is elected to a subsequent term, that judge will receive a salary that does notreflect the supplements. For this reason, excluding jurisdictional supplements from the salary for judges in counties that have moved into countiesof the fir st

class as a result of the 2000 census does not contrad ict the Ge neral As sembly ’s legi slative in tent. Op. Tenn. Att’y Ge

n. 01-107 (June 29, 2001). Judge Watson contends that Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5003(i)(2) contemplates that judges in the same cou nt y exercising the sa me jurisdi ction will b e compen sated eq ually , and that

it is “obviousl y intended to confer on newly elected or appointed judges the full benef its of all past salary calculations enjoyed by

the more senior judges in each county .” However, as demonstrated by the Attorney General’s opinion, such an interpretation is erroneous. General sessions court judges who took office in class one counties for the first time on September 1, 1998, and who began exercising juvenile, probate or other jurisdiction, would not be entitled to receive the jurisd ictional s upplemen

ts because they were no t actuall

y receiving those supplements on August 31, 1998. By the same token, judges in class one counties who were elected to fill new positions created by the le gislature 4 after Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-205 was repealed but prior to August 31, 1998, and who were exercising additional ju ris diction, w ould not be entitled t o recei ve jurisd

ictional s upplemen

ts for the same reason. Clearly , it is possib le, under the statut ory scheme, that some

class one judges are receiving
more compensa

tion than a

re some o f their f

ellow judg es in coun

ties of the first cla ss. We agree with-10-

the Attorney Ge

neral that thelegisla

ture did n ot intend to

equally compensa

te all class one judges exercising the same

jurisdiction. Rather, the legislature carved out a slim exception for those judg es who had been receiving

the jurisdictional supplements prior to July 1, 1993. Judge s, su ch as J udge Watson, who become class one judges after that date are not entitled to receive the benefit of the jurisdict ional supp lements.

J udge Watson also argues that there is no rational basis for trea ting some class one judges differe ntly from others of the same rank, and that constitutional principles, namely Article I , Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the Four teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, should be considered. The Attorney G eneral add res sed this argument as follow s:
The right of equal protection under the law guarantees that a ll persons similarly s itu ated will be treated the same. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection [& Ins. Co.] v. Harrison , 301 U.S. 45 9, 57 S. Ct. [838] (1937). But equal protection of the law does not require equality of treatment where there

is a reasonable and material differe nce between the classesof perso ns inquestion. Rinaldi v. Yeagar , 384 U.S. 305, 86 S. Ct. 1497 [( 1966)]; Graham v. We st Virgi nia , 224 U.S. 616, 32 S. Ct. 58[3] (19[1 2]). A stat utory scheme t hat i nv olves no suspect classification and does not i nfrin ge on a fundamental right is subject to review under the rational basis test. Under that test, where a group possesses di stinguishing characteristics releva nt to the interests the Statehas the authority to implement, a state’ s decision to act on the basis of those differences does not give r ise t o a constitutional violation. [Bd.] of

[T rs.] of [Univ.] of

Alabama v. Ga

rrett , [531] U.S. [356], 121 S. Ct . 955 (200 1). Such a classifi cation c annot r

u n afoul of the Equal Protectio n Clause if there is a rationa l relationship betweenthe disparity of trea tment and somelegitimate governmental purpose. Id. The State need not articulate its re asoning at the momenta particular decision is made; rather, the burden is upon the challengingparty to neg ate any r easonably c onceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. Id.

In the present case, the statutory scheme ensures that an incumbent judge who has been rece iving sa lary suppleme

nts unde r the old statute will not experience a

pay cut w hen his or her 1990 term expires and he or she begins a new te rm. We think

this resul

t is rationa lly related to the leg

isl ativ e interest of encouraging experienced

judges to remain in office. By contrast, the m aximu m salary – excluding private act supplements – a judge can r eceive in a county of the second class is $70,000, plus cost of living increas e s and th e $ 10 ,0 00 ma xi mu m i nc re as e. Th e m ax im um sa la ry – excluding private act supplements – a judge of the first class c an now-11- receiveunder Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5003, as interpre ted in this op inio n, is the $70,000 base, plus cost of living increases and the $10,000 maximum incr

ease. I t theref ore appe ars th at a j udge in a county of the se cond cla ss – reg ardless of the jurisdiction he or she
was exercising – will not e xperience a pay cut as a result of the change in county

classification if the new salary does not reflect the jurisdictional suppleme

nts under Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-205. For this reason, we think th

ere is a rationa l basis for the different

methods of calculation. See, e.g., Gulbrandson v. Carey , 272 Mont. 494, 901 P.2d 573 (1995), rehearing den ied (1995) (a statute providing increased retirement benefits to judges whoretired after its effective date was rati onally

related to the legislative purpose of providing an incentive for judges then serving to remain on the bench). For this reason, we think a court would conclude that the statutes for determining the salary of

judges in counties of

the first class co mply with the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Op. Tenn. Att’y Ge

n. 01-107 (June 29, 2001).

We agree with th e Atto rney Ge

neral and conclude that the statutes in question do not run afoul of the Equ al Protection Clause or Article I, Section 8 of the Te nnessee Constitution. There is
a rationa l basis for treating those cla ss one judges w

ho were receiving the j urisdicti onal suppl ements prior to July 1, 1993, diffe rentl y: the legi slatu re want ed to e ncour age those experienced, incumbent judges to run for reelection, and by a llowing t hosejudges t

o retain the bene fit of the ir supple ments, the legisl ature provided

them with a

n incenti ve to remain in off ice. We be

lieve thisreasoning is sufficient to justify placing those judges in a special classification.

Ac co rd in gl y, we find that the trial court erred in determining that Judge Watson was entitled to continue receiving his jurisdictional supplements. He is entitled to the base salary of $70,000, the $10,000 maximum increase provided for in Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-15-5003(i)(1)(A), and the be nefit of cost of living increases provided for in Tenn. Code A nn. § 16-15-5003(f).

V.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed. This case is remanded to the trial court for such further proceedings, if any , as may be r equired, and for collecti on of cost s assesse d below, a ll pursuant to applicable law. Costs on appeal are taxed to the appellee, Judge James F. Watson.

_______________________________ CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE