J-S06025-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 v. 

SADEEN JONES 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 1936 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 29, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-09-CR-0000806-2018 

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED AUGUST 16, 2024

 Sadeen Jones appeals the order entered denying his Post Conviction 

Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Jones raises 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and challenges the court’s order 

that he register as a sex offender under the Sexual Offender Registration and 

Notification Act (“SORNA”). We vacate in part and remand for further 

proceedings on a single ineffectiveness claim. We affirm in all other respects. 

 In 2019, a jury convicted Jones of robbery, burglary, conspiracy, simple 

assault, recklessly endangering another person, false imprisonment of a 

minor, false imprisonment, unlawful restraint of a minor, unlawful restraint, 
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theft by unlawful taking, theft by extortion, and criminal coercion.1 We 

previously summarized the facts giving rise to Jones’ convictions: 

In the early morning hours of August 21, 2017, [Jones] and 

two co-conspirators, Brandon Eugene Davis and Raymond 

Anthony Daniels, executed an armed home invasion of the 

Bucks County residence of Emily and Jonatan Nadav. 

Present during the invasion were the Nadavs, their two 

daughters, ages twenty-five and twelve, and Mrs. Nadav’s 

seventy-three-year-old mother. N.T., 1/28/19, at 35-37, 

62-64, 77-78, 120-122. 

Masked, gloved, and dressed in dark clothing, the men 

terrorized the Nadavs with handguns throughout the 

extended encounter—at times holding a gun to the head of 

each Nadav daughter—and threatened to shoot until the 

family revealed where it kept its safe containing money and 

jewelry. Before the trio absconded with over $300,000 in 

cash and personal property, they used their cellular 

telephones multiple times in the home to update one 

another on their progress. N.T.[,] 1/28/19, at 48. 

On November 16, 2017, the Newtown Township Police 

Department arrested and charged [Jones] for his alleged 

role in the home invasion. 

Commonwealth v. Jones, No. 3284 EDA 2019, 2020 WL 6538814 at *1 

(Pa.Super. filed November 6, 2020) (unpublished memo.) (footnote omitted), 

appeal denied, 253 A.3d 210 (Table) (Pa. filed May 4, 2021). The court 

sentenced Jones to an aggregate term of 70 to 140 years’ incarceration. We 

affirmed the judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court denied allowance 

of appeal. See id. Jones sought United States Supreme Court review, which 

____________________________________________ 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), 3701(a)(1)(iii), 3502(a)(1)(i), 903, 

2701(a)(3), 2705, 2903(b), 2903(a), 2902(b)(1), 2902(a), 3921, 3923(a)(7), 

and 2906(a)(1), respectively. 
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that Court denied on May 2, 2022. See Jones v. Pennsylvania, 142 S.Ct. 

2684 (mem.) (2022). 

 Jones filed the instant, timely PCRA petition, raising ineffectiveness 

claims. He maintained that trial counsel should have objected to the trial 

court’s instruction on reasonable doubt, prosecutorial misconduct during 

closing argument, and his registration as a sex offender under SORNA. Jones 

further maintained that even if counsel had no obligation to raise the SORNA 

challenge, “the [c]ourt should find that [Commonwealth v.] Muhammad[, 

241 A.3d 1149 (Pa.Super. 2020)] and [Commonwealth v.] Torsilieri[, 232 

A.3d 567 (Pa. 2020)] present a retroactive change in law[.]” PCRA Petition, 

filed 9/22/22, at ¶ 81. Regarding direct appeal counsel, Jones maintained that 

counsel should have challenged the court’s allowing the Commonwealth to 

amend the bills of information immediately before the close of its case-inchief, as well as the court’s reasonable doubt jury instruction. 

 At a PCRA hearing, counsel argued that Muhammad should apply 

retroactively as a “substantive challenge to the legality of [Jones’] sentence 

in that it just violates his Constitutional rights, the due process, and reputation 

under the Pennsylvania Constitution given the facts of this case and the 

charges.” N.T., PCRA Hearing, 4/11/23, at 9.2 Regarding Torsilieri, counsel 

suggested that the court could “dismiss the facial challenge to SORNA pending 

Torsilieri -- the resolution of Torsilieri, specifically because 

____________________________________________ 

2

 No testimony was taken and no evidence was presented at this hearing. 
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[Commonwealth v.] Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602 (Pa.2020)], says that the 

petitioner can raise that claim at any time without the confines of the PCRA’s 

jurisdictional limits.” Id. at 12.3 

The PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice to dismiss the petition 

without an evidentiary hearing. It concluded that Jones’ ineffectiveness claims 

relating to the jury instruction and prosecutorial misconduct were waived 

and/or meritless. Regarding his SORNA claim, the court concluded that 

counsel was not ineffective “for failing to raise an as-applied constitutional 

challenge to [Jones’] SORNA registration at the time of sentencing or while his 

case was pending on a direct appeal” when Muhammad was decided. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice, filed 4/28/23, at 1. The court also dismissed Jones’ 

facial challenge to SORNA without prejudice “to allow [Jones] to raise the claim 

after Torsilieri is decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.” Id. at 2. The 

court ultimately denied Jones’ PCRA petition, and this timely appeal followed. 

 Jones raises the following issues: 

1. Whether trial and appellate counsel provided the 

ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to adequately 

challenge the trial court’s improper jury instructions 

where the court instructed the jury that if the jury were 

to find that the Commonwealth had proven the crimes 

charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury “must” 

convict, and trial and appellate counsel failed to properly 

____________________________________________ 

3

 Counsel was referencing the Commonwealth’s further appeal in Torsilieri, 

which at the time was pending before our Supreme Court regarding the 

constitutionality of SORNA. See Commonwealth’s Answer in Opposition to 

Post Conviction Relief Act Petition, filed 11/14/22, at 26-27. The Court decided 

Torsilieri on May 24, 2024. See Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 316 A.3d 77 

(Pa. 2024). 
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challenge the trial court’s reasonable doubt instruction in 

which the court instructed the jury that a pause and 

hesitation could not be reasonable doubt? 

2. Did trial counsel provide the ineffective assistance of 

counsel in failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct 

from the Commonwealth in the form of improper closing 

argument where the prosecution violated the “golden 

rule” by repeatedly asking the jurors to imagine 

themselves in the place of the victim? 

3. Whether appellate counsel failed to properly challenge 

the trial court’s decision to permit the Commonwealth to 

amend the bills at the close of its case to add additional 

counts of robbery, false imprisonment, and unlawful 

restraint? 

4. Whether Jones should be required to register as a sex 

offender pursuant to SORNA where Jones did not commit 

any crime that could even remotely be described as a sex 

offense? 

Jones’ Br. at 8-9 (suggested answers omitted). 

 We review the denial of PCRA relief to determine “whether the PCRA 

court’s order is supported by the record and free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 234 A.3d 735, 737 (Pa.Super. 2020) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 181 A.3d 1168, 1174 (Pa.Super. 2018)). 

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

 Each of Jones’ issues challenge the assistance of trial and/or appellate 

counsel. We address each separately. 

 Counsel is presumed effective, and the petitioner bears the burden of 

overcoming the presumption. See Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 

804 (Pa. 2014). This is accomplished by pleading and proving: “(1) the 

underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for 
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counsel’s actions or failure to act; and (3) [the appellant] suffered prejudice 

as a result of counsel’s error such that there is a reasonable probability that 

the result of the proceeding would have been different absent such error.” Id.

(citation omitted). A claim has arguable merit if “the factual statements are 

accurate and ‘could establish cause for relief.’” Commonwealth v. Stultz, 

114 A.3d 865, 880 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 

84 A.3d 701, 707 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc)). “A failure to satisfy any prong 

of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the claim of ineffectiveness.” 

Commonwealth v. Daniels, 963 A.2d 409, 419 (Pa. 2009). 

 Additionally, when a petitioner asserts a claim that raises an issue of 

material fact, the PCRA court should hold an evidentiary hearing. See 

Commonwealth v. Grayson, 212 A.3d 1047, 1054–55 (Pa.Super. 2019) (“‘if 

there are factual issues to be resolved,’ the PCRA court should hold an 

evidentiary hearing”) (citation omitted)). However, if it is clear from the 

pleadings that no there is no genuine issue of material fact, the court may 

dismiss the petition without a hearing. See Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 

335, 338 (Pa.Super. 2012). 

Jury Instructions 

 Jones argues that trial counsel failed to object to the reasonable doubt 

instruction, which he alleges was erroneous. He claims that the court’s 

instruction “that a hesitation or pause could not be a reasonable doubt” 

contradicted the definition for reasonable doubt explicitly established by our 

appellate courts and the standard jury instructions. Jones also contends that 
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the court misled the jury by stating it “must convict if the Commonwealth met 

its burden rather than using the correct language that it should convict.” 

Jones’ Br. at 24 (internal quotations omitted). He claims that these errors 

violated his due process rights and potentially influenced the jury to discount 

reasonable doubt, especially because the Commonwealth’s evidence was, in 

his view, circumstantial. He further claims that appellate counsel was 

ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the court’s instructions on direct 

appeal. Jones maintains he suffered prejudice because his due process rights 

were violated and the court’s instructions reduced the Commonwealth’s 

burden. 

 “The trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its instructions, and may 

choose its own wording so long as the law is clearly, adequately, and 

accurately presented to the jury for its consideration.” Commonwealth v. 

Hawkins, 787 A.2d 292, 301 (Pa. 2001); see Commonwealth v. Hughes, 

865 A.2d 761, 788 (Pa. 2004) (stating appellate court “will not evaluate the 

adequacy of the instructions based on isolated references; rather, the charge 

is reviewed as a whole, with deference accorded the trial court’s discretion in 

phrasing its instructions”). We review a court’s jury instruction “as a whole to 

determine if it was fair or prejudicial.” Commonwealth v. Drummond, 285 

A.3d 625, 634 (Pa. 2022) (citation omitted). 

 The contested jury instruction of reasonable doubt is as follows: 

There was reference during the closing arguments to what 

reasonable doubt means. It was slightly different from what 
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I am saying. You must go by my definition and not anything 

you heard during closing arguments. 

A reasonable doubt is a doubt that would cause a reasonably 

careful and sensible person to be restrained in acting in a 

matter of importance in his or her own affairs. It was argued 

to you that it was mere hesitation or pause. There is not a 

major decision anybody makes in their lifetime that you 

wouldn’t pause before you made it. That’s an important 

decision. Pause is, by definition, part of making that kind of 

major decision. 

So the question is whether or not a reasonable person, a 

careful person, a sensible person would hesitate and then 

be restrained from acting in a matter of importance in his or 

her own affairs. That is a reasonable doubt. A reasonable 

doubt must fairly arise out of the evidence, or it can arise 

from the lack of evidence presented, but it cannot be a 

doubt that’s created to avoid carrying out an unpleasant 

duty. Some people find sitting in judgment of another 

person very difficult, but that is what you are responsible 

for doing. That’s what you have taken an oath to do. And so 

you cannot find reasonable doubt in order just to avoid the 

decision. It must be based on the evidence or the lack of 

evidence that’s presented. 

So, to summarize, you may not find the defendant guilty 

based on mere suspicion. The Commonwealth has the 

burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. If it meets that burden, then the defendant is no 

longer presumed to be innocent and you must find him 

guilty. On the other hand, if the Commonwealth’s evidence 

does not meet its burden, then you must find him not guilty. 

N.T., 1/31/19, at 13-15. Defense counsel objected, “I got the impression that 

if you were restrained or constrained from making a decision of importance to 

yourself, that that is -- that is reasonable doubt.” Id. at 64. The court 

overruled the objection “because the language that I have used has been 

approved.” Id. at 65. 
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 Jones’ claim is meritless. The court’s instruction, when taken as a whole, 

properly conveyed the standard for reasonable doubt. The court explained 

that a reasonable doubt occurs when “a reasonable person, a careful person, 

a sensible person would hesitate and then be restrained from acting in a 

matter of importance in his or her own affairs.” Id. at 14. This instruction was 

in line with the suggested instructions for reasonable doubt and did not reduce 

the Commonwealth’s burden, as Jones suggests. See Commonwealth v. 

Uderra, 862 A.2d 74, 92 (Pa. 2004) (stating that a jury instruction is proper 

“where the charge, taken as a whole, fairly and accurately conveys the 

essential meaning”). Moreover, as the trial court explained, the Supreme 

Court has not found error in a nearly identical instruction. See

Commonwealth v. Cook, 952 A.2d 594, 632 (Pa. 2008). 

 Jones’ additional claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to the court’s instruction that the jury “must” find him guilty if the 

Commonwealth met its burden is also meritless. This Court has previously 

rejected such a claim. See Commonwealth v. Pope, 14 A.3d 139, 143 

(Pa.Super. 2011). Furthermore, the instruction here was similar to the 

Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instruction for “Presumption 

of Innocence – Burden of Proof– Reasonable Doubt.” See Pa. SSJI (Crim), 

§7.01 (“If the Commonwealth’s evidence fails to meet its burden, then your 

verdict must be not guilty. On the other hand, if the Commonwealth’s 

evidence does prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, 

then your verdict should be guilty”) (emphasis added). Here, as in Pope, the 
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trial court informed the jury that if the Commonwealth met its burden, it 

“must” find Jones guilty and conversely if it determined that the 

Commonwealth failed to meet its burden, it “must” find Jones not guilty. No 

relief is due on this claim. 

Closing Argument 

 Jones alleges that his trial counsel failed to object to prosecutorial 

misconduct during the Commonwealth’s opening statement and closing 

argument. He argues that the Commonwealth repeatedly urged “the jurors to 

imagine themselves as the victims,” and in so doing violated the “golden rule” 

against invoking sympathy from the jurors. Jones’ Br. at 40. He claims the 

Commonwealth focused on “generating sympathy for the victims rather than 

the evidence” and “emphasized the fear that the complainants likely felt 

during the incident rather than the actual evidence[.]” Id. at 40, 41. Jones 

maintains that the Commonwealth’s argument “served no purpose other than 

to inflame the passions of the jury and make it harder for them to objectively 

review the evidence and determine whether the Commonwealth met its 

burden.” Id. at 46. He states that our Courts have “repeatedly held that 

prosecutors may not urge the jurors to convict based on sympathy for the 

victim or to imagine being the victims and how horrible the crime must have 

been to experience.” Id. at 46-47. 

 “Our review of a prosecutor’s comment and an allegation of 

prosecutorial misconduct requires us to evaluate whether a defendant 

received a fair trial, not a perfect trial.” Commonwealth v. Jaynes, 135 A.3d 
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606, 615 (Pa.Super. 2016). “[T]he prosecution is accorded reasonable 

latitude, may employ oratorical flair in arguing its version of the case to the 

jury, and may advance arguments supported by the evidence or use 

inferences that can reasonably be derived therefrom.” Id. A prosecutor’s 

comments do not constitute reversible error “unless the unavoidable effect of 

such comments would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds a fixed 

bias and a hostility toward the defendant such that they could not weigh the 

evidence objectively and render a true verdict.” Commonwealth v. Stafford, 

749 A.2d 489, 498 (Pa.Super. 2000) (citation omitted). 

 The contested portion of the Commonwealth’s opening statement is as 

follows: 

I will argue for you again that these men took away the 

dreams of [C.N.] and Elle and Manya and Emily and 

Jonathan that night. I will argue to you again that they 

created their nightmare. I will argue that they took away so 

much more from the Nadav family than money and property 

or even dreams. 

I will argue that they began a nightmare for the Nadavs and 

I will ask you to end it by finding them guilty, but until then, 

I want to thank you for your attentiveness and patience as 

this nightmare unfolds. 

N.T., 1/28/19, at 21. 

 The contested portion of the Commonwealth’s closing argument is as 

follows: 

Jurors, imagine that moment for just a second of being on 

the ground and your hands and your legs being tied and 

there are two guns to you, pointed at you, and you are a 

25-year-old – 25-year-young woman and all you think 

about is your 12-year-old sister and your grandmother. 
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Over and over and over, for 30 minutes, she begged for 

their lives and she was told: We’ll do what we have to do. 

We’ll do what we have to do. 

*** 

We talked about Manya. We talked about the smell. We 

talked about – we didn’t talk yet about what she went 

through. And she, too, as she was marched – marched from 

her room, peeking into [C.N.’s] room to make sure her 12-

year-old granddaughter was there and safe. And by the way 

she wasn’t. 

And the confusion as she woke up and she is dazed and she 

is in her pajamas and all she hears is somebody yelling 

because she can’t really hear very well, but she hears yes 

or no, yes or no, and she doesn’t know how to answer. 

Imagine that confusion. Imagine not knowing what is 

happening. Imagine just thinking that your 12-year-old 

granddaughter is right next door and this man is screaming, 

“yes or no,” and you don’t know the right answer. What if 

you get it wrong? And then she tells you about being 

marched down to her daughter Emily’s room and she tells 

you that she walked into Emily’s room. There is [C.N.] on 

the ground, crying and shaking. And there is her daughter 

and her son-in-law in bed and now she realizes she’s not the 

only one and this guy isn’t the only one either. It’s an 

invasion. 

And remember that moment of when she said they put them 

in the closet and they’re in the closet and she said, “They 

said don’t move” and she thought, “This is it. This is it.” She 

thought her last moments were going to be in a closet with 

12-year-old [C.N.], with her daughter and with her son-inlaw, execution style. 

*** 

Just picture those moments, those moments thinking that 

your life or that of your 12-year-old [granddaughter] relies 

on you opening the safe and you not being able to do it. 

*** 

I told you at the beginning of this case that I would come 

back before you and I would summarize all of the evidence 
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for you and I told you that I would argue to you that the 

dreams of the Nadav family are gone. You heard about 

[C.N.] sleeping on a blowup mattress next to her parents 

because, at 14, she can’t sleep alone. You heard about Elle 

not wanting to come home to visit her family. You saw 

Manya and the effects this had on her to this day. You saw 

Emily and heard her voice as she talked about her children 

and what happened to them and you saw what this did to 

their father. 

Jurors, you have now heard this nightmare. You have heard 

the evidence of what happened in that house. You heard the 

evidence of the dreams being stolen. Let’s end this 

nightmare. Let’s put an end to it all. Finding the defendants 

guilty. Thank you. 

N.T., 1/30/19, at 197-98, 203-05, 206, 242-43 (emphasis added). 

The PCRA court found Jones’ underlying claim lacked merit. It stated 

that while the prosecutor “referred to the victims’ thoughts and emotions 

during the invasion, [the prosecutor] did so only to a minimum as the majority 

of her opening and closing statements were based on facts presented 

throughout the trial.” PCRA Court Opinion, filed 8/24/23, at 8. It further 

concluded that “victims’ thoughts and emotions are necessary for certain 

elements.” Id. We disagree. 

We liken this case to Commonwealth v. Cherry, 378 A.2d 800, 803 

(Pa. 1977), where the prosecutor asked the jury to imagine themselves as a 

victim of a crime. The prosecutor in that case said, “[J]ust put yourself in the 

place of any other victim, which could be you some day, we hope not[.]” Id.

On appeal, our Supreme Court determined that the prosecutor’s asking “the 

jurors to imagine themselves as victims improperly invoked the sympathy of 

the jurors for [the victim].” Id. at 804. The Court further concluded that the 
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prosecutor’s statements put the jury “in a position to disregard, out of 

sympathy, the inconsistencies in her testimony pointed out by [Cherry].” Id.

at 806. As such, the Court reversed the judgment of sentence and granted a 

new trial. 

Here, the prosecutor’s statements went beyond asking the jury to 

imagine themselves as a victim of a crime. The prosecutor asked the jury to 

imagine themselves as the actual victims of the crimes. She repeatedly asked 

the jury to imagine themselves as the 12-year-old victim, the 25-year-old 

victim, and the grandmother who was also victimized. See N.T., 1/30/19, at 

197 (“Jurors imagine that moment just for a second of being on the ground 

and your hands and your legs being tied and there are two guns to you, 

pointed at you, and you are a 25-year-old – 25-year-young woman”); 

204 (“Imagine just thinking that your 12-year-old granddaughter is right 

next door and this man is screaming, ‘yes or no,’ and you don’t know the right 

answer. What if you get it wrong?”); 206 (“Just picture those moments, those 

moments thinking that your life or that of your 12-year-old relies on you

opening the safe and you not being able to do it”) (emphasis added). 

The Commonwealth maintains that Cherry is distinguishable because 

the prosecutor there asked the jury to imagine itself in the position of a victim 

to argue that the jury should disregard inconsistencies and gaps in testimony, 

and the prosecutor here made the argument in a bid to have the jury find that 

the victims were in fear of serious bodily injury. That is a distinction without 

a difference. Though Cherry is not directly on all fours with the facts of the 
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instant case, here, as in Cherry, the prosecutor’s statements “suggested that 

the jury should render a verdict based on sympathy for the witness rather 

than the guilt or innocence of the accused.” Cherry, 378 A.2d at 804. Jones’ 

underlying claim has arguable merit. We therefore remand for the PCRA court 

to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Jones has satisfied the 

remaining prongs of the ineffectiveness test. See Fears, 86 A.3d at 804. 

Bills of Information 

Jones argues that appellate counsel should have challenged the 

Commonwealth’s amendment to the bills of information. The Commonwealth 

moved for the amendment at the close of its case-in-chief. The bills of 

information as originally drafted contained one count each of robbery, false 

imprisonment, and unlawful restraint, but each count alleged that Jones had 

committed the crime against “Jonathan Nadav, and/or Emily Nadav and/or 

Elle Nadav and/or C.N., a minor, and/or Manya Gurevich. . . .” Bills of 

Information, filed Mar. 6, 2018, at 1. The amendment separated each count 

into five separate counts, one for each victim. The trial court granted the 

amendment over a defense objection. It explained that the original 

information charged a crime against each of the five victims: 

[M]y ruling is that their robbery charge was charged 

“and/or,” which the law allows the Commonwealth to charge 

separate counts of robbery where there is force in one theft, 

where the – there’s force applied to separate individuals. 

Here, there is evidence that there was force applied to five 

separate individuals during the course of this home 

invasion, so therefore it would support five separate 

robberies. 
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In recognition that the Commonwealth charged “and/or,” 

“and/or” and therefore is able to charge them separately 

since they are, in fact, five separate robberies – the fact 

they included it in one count on the criminal information, 

which is controlled more by computer than anything else 

these days, doesn’t alter the fact that the charge itself 

charges five separate counts and so therefore I will submit 

a verdict slip as to five separate counts. 

N.T, Trial, 1/30/19, at 111. 

Jones maintains that “[t]here was no technical impediment to the 

Commonwealth filing multiple counts of robbery” and instead “[i]t simply 

chose not to do so until the trial was effectively over.” Jones’ Br. at 51. Had 

counsel raised this issue on appeal, Jones claims that the additional charges 

would have been vacated. Jones maintains that counsel’s failure to act 

prejudiced him because he received a consecutive sentence based on the 

additional charges. Additionally, he argues he was “deprived of the ability to 

decide whether to plead guilty rather than face the additional exposure.” Id.

at 58. 

 Rule 564 of the Criminal Rules of Procedure governs the amendment of 

an information: 

The court may allow an information to be amended, 

provided that the information as amended does not charge 

offenses arising from a different set of events and that the 

amended charges are not so materially different from the 

original charge that the defendant would be unfairly 

prejudiced. Upon amendment, the court may grant such 

postponement of trial or other relief as is necessary in the 

interests of justice. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 564 (emphasis added). 

When reviewing a challenge to an amendment, we consider: 
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whether the crimes specified in the original indictment or 

information involve the same basic elements and evolved 

out of the same factual situation as the crimes specified in 

the amended indictment or information. If so, then the 

defendant is deemed to have been placed on notice 

regarding his alleged criminal conduct. If, however, the 

amended provision alleges a different set of events, or the 

elements or defenses to the amended crime are materially 

different from the elements or defenses to the crime 

originally charged, such that the defendant would be 

prejudiced by the change, then the amend[ment] is not 

permitted. 

Commonwealth v. Quinones, 200 A.3d 1004, 1008–09 (Pa.Super. 2018) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 897 A.2d 1218, 1221 (Pa.Super. 

2006)). When presented with an amendment, a court should consider the 

following factors: 

(1) whether the amendment changes the factual scenario 

supporting the charges; (2) whether the amendment adds 

new facts previously unknown to the defendant; (3) whether 

the entire factual scenario was developed during a 

preliminary hearing; (4) whether the description of the 

charges changed with the amendment; (5) whether a 

change in defense strategy was necessitated by the 

amendment; and (6) whether the timing of the 

Commonwealth’s request for amendment allowed for ample 

notice and preparation. 

Commonwealth v. Witmayer, 144 A.3d 939, 947 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation 

omitted). 

 Jones’ underlying claim lacks arguable merit. The Commonwealth’s 

amendment involved crimes that involved the same basic elements and 

evolved out of the same factual situation. The amended charges were “not so 

materially different” from the original charges that Jones would have been 
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unfairly prejudiced since the original charges mentioned all the victims in one 

count rather than five separate counts. Pa.R.Crim.P. 564. 

SORNA 

 Jones argues that his trial counsel failed to object to the court’s order 

for him to register as a sex offender under SORNA despite not being convicted 

of a sex crime. He maintains that this registration requirement is 

unconstitutional, creating “an irrebuttable presumption to Jones violat[ing] his 

rights to due process and reputation.” Jones’ Br. at 59. Jones relies on 

Muhammad, where this Court vacated the order directing Muhammad to 

comply with SORNA registration because she had not been convicted of a sex 

offense, had no prior criminal history, and was not likely to reoffend. Jones 

maintains that he is like Muhammad because he had no prior record of sex 

offense, was not found to be a sexually violent predator, and had not 

committed a sex crime in the instant case. Jones also cites Torsilieri, stating 

that it presents a retroactive change in law regarding his SORNA registration. 

Finally, he argues that “appellate counsel should have a raised a challenge to 

SORNA as soon as Muhammad was decided[.]” Id. at 62. 

 Jones’ claim fails. His underlying claim relies on Muhammad. However, 

Muhammad had not been decided at the time of Jones’ sentencing or his 

filing of a direct appeal. The court sentenced Jones on May 23, 2019, and 

Jones filed his direct appeal on November 14, 2019. The Muhammad Court 

filed its opinion on October 23, 2020. Thus, neither trial nor appellate counsel 

could have raised a challenge to Jones’ SORNA registration under 
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Muhammad. Furthermore, Jones’ reliance on Torsilieri is misplaced. 

Torsilieri addressed a facial challenge to his registration, and Jones does not 

raise such a challenge before this Court. See Torsilieri, 232 A.3d at 573-74. 

Order vacated in part as to denial of PCRA petition for ineffectiveness 

claim for prosecutorial misconduct. Order affirmed for all remaining claims. 

Case remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Date: 8/16/2024