BUDGET PROCESS

Biennial Budgeting for

the Federal Government

Statement of Susan J. Irving,

Associate Director, Federal Budget Issues

Accounting and Information Management Division

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

Before the Committee on Rules, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

9:30 a.m.

Friday,

March 10, 2000

GAO/T-AIMD-00-121
1

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to join you as you consider proposals to change the entire budget process from an

annual to a biennial cycle. This change has been advocated as a way to advance several

objectives: (1) to provide more focused time for congressional oversight of programs by

streamlining the congressional budget process and reducing the time Members of the Congress

must spend on seemingly repetitive votes; (2) to shift the allocation of agency officials’ time

from the preparation of budgets and justifications to improved financial management and

analysis of program effectiveness; and (3) to enhance agencies’ abilities to manage their

operations by providing more certainty in funding over 2 years.

Almost everyone involved in the current budget process finds it frustrating. The public finds the

budget deliberations confusing. Executive branch agencies say it is burdensome and time

consuming. How to make the best use of the new perspectives and information provided under

the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act and the Government Performance and Results Act

(GRPA) in the budget and resource allocation process is unclear. Many members of the

Congress say the annual budget process seems too lengthy, with its many votes on

authorizations, the budget resolution, reconciliation, and appropriations.

At the same time, budget debates are important—and important debates often take time.

Budgeting is the process by which we as a nation resolve the large number of often-conflicting

objectives that citizens seek to achieve through government action. The budget determines the

fiscal policy stance of the government—that is, the relationship between spending and revenues.

And it is through the budget process that the Congress and the President reach agreement about

the areas in which the federal government will be involved and in what way.

Despite the nearly universal agreement that the current process has problems, changes must be

carefully considered. The current budget process is, in part, the cumulative result of many

changes made to address previously-identified problems. For example, the Budget Enforcement

Act (BEA) was designed to enforce deficit-reduction agreements. With the shift from deficit to

surplus has come the question of whether and how to change the process to deal with new
2

challenges. Our recent work discussing how other countries are dealing with current surpluses

can be informative about the character of a new fiscal paradigm for our nation.1 Some countries

have recognized that using fiscal targets such as debt-to-GDP ratios can be useful to guide

decision-making in a world where achieving a current-year balance is no longer sufficient as a

fiscal compass.

Although the shift from deficit to surplus does not mark the end of the fiscal challenges you face,

it does free you from an exclusive focus on deficit reduction. It may permit taking a longer-term

perspective both on commitments and on the role of government. As the Comptroller General

has testified recently, there is a need for a serious debate about the role, the performance, and the

management of the federal government. However, the Congress has no single established formal

mechanism analogous to the budget resolution in which it may articulate performance goals for

the broad missions of government, to assess alternative strategies that offer the most promise for

achieving these goals, or to define an oversight agenda targeted on the most pressing crosscutting

performance and management issues. 2

All of these issues come into play as you consider whether to make any changes to the budget

process—whether that process remains on an annual cycle or is shifted to a biennial one. For

this hearing your staff asked me to discuss state experiences with biennial budgeting, the

question of periodicity and availability of funds, and to comment on some technical or

implementation issues to consider if you were to shift the federal cycle to a biennial one.

STATE EXPERIENCES

Seven states have a biennial legislative cycle and hence also a biennial budget cycle. Of the 43

states with annual legislative cycles, 27 describe their budget cycle as annual, 2—Kansas and

 

1

Budget Surpluses: Experiences of Other Nations and Implications for the United States (GAO/

AIMD-00-23, November 2, 1999).

2

Budget Issues: Effective Oversight and Budget Discipline Are Essential—Even in a Time of Surplus

(GAO/T-AIMD-00-73, February 1, 2000)
3

Missouri—describe their cycle as mixed, and 14 describe it as biennial. Table I below shows the

legislative and budget cycles of the states.

Table 1: State Legislative and Budget Cycles

States With Biennial

Legislative and

Budget Cycles

States With Annual

Legislative and

Budget Cycles

States With Annual

Legislative and

Mixed Budget Cycles

States With Annual

Legislative and

Biennial Budget

Cycles

1. Arkansas 1. Alabama 1. Kansas a 1. Arizona

2. Kentucky 2. Alaska 2. Missouri b 2. Connecticut

3. Montana 3. California 3. Hawaii

4. Nevada 4. Colorado 4. Indiana

5. North Dakota 5. Delaware 5. Maine

6. Oregon 6. Florida 6. Minnesota

7. Texas 7. Georgia 7. Nebraska

8. Idaho 8. New Hampshire

9. Illinois 9. North Carolina c

10. Iowa 10. Ohio

11. Louisiana 11. Virginia

12. Maryland 12. Washington

13. Massachusetts 13. Wisconsin

14. Michigan 14. Wyoming

15. Mississippi

16. New Jersey

17. New Mexico

18. New York

19. Oklahoma

20. Pennsylvania

21. Rhode Island

22. South Carolina

23. South Dakota

24. Tennessee

25. Utah

26. Vermont

27. West Virginia

a

In Kansas, 19 agencies are on a biennial budget cycle.

b

In Missouri, the operating budget is on an annual cycle while the capital budget is on a biennial cycle.

cAlthough statutorily North Carolina has a biennial legislature, in practice the legislature meets annually, with a

shorter session during the second year.
4

Connecticut has changed its budget cycle from biennial to annual and back to biennial. Since the

mid-1960s, 17 other states have changed their budget cycles: 11 from biennial to annual, 2 from

annual to mixed, and 4 from annual to biennial.

Translating state budget laws, practices, and experiences to the federal level is always difficult.

As we noted in our review of state balanced budget practices3 state budgets fill a different role,

may be sensitive to different outside pressures, and are otherwise not directly comparable. State

legislatures generally don’t separate the authorization and appropriation function. In about onethird of the states appropriations are contained in a single appropriations act. It also appears that

they make less use than does the Congress of tools like multiyear funding. The length of a

legislature’s session may be limited. In addition, governors often have more unilateral power

over spending than the President does.

In your deliberations this year the experience of three states—Ohio, Connecticut, and Arizona--

may be of particular interest. Of the five largest states in terms of general fund expenditures,

Ohio is the only one with both an annual legislative cycle and a biennial budget.4 Connecticut

shifted to a biennial budget cycle for 1993-94 with the avowed purpose of improving the quality

of oversight, and it now is in its fourth biennium. Beginning in 1993, Arizona took a phased

approach to shifting from annual to biennial budgeting, and this year is in the second year of the

first biennium in which the entire budget is on a biennial basis. Although we have not completed

our examination of just how biennial budgeting works in these states, I will discuss each briefly

based on preliminary work and interviews with some state officials.

Ohio

Ohio has had a biennial budget cycle since the early 1900s. In odd-numbered years the

legislature adopts two 1-year operating budgets. Appropriations for most state agencies are

 

3

Balanced Budget Requirements: State Experiences and Implications for the Federal Government

(GAO/AFMD-93-58BR, March 26, 1993).

4Of the 10 largest only Texas, Ohio and North Carolina have a biennial budget cycle. Texas has a biennial

legislative cycle. Although statutorily on a biennial legislative cycle, in practice the North Carolina

legislature meets annually.
5

contained in a single bill.5 In even-numbered years the legislature adopts two capital bills—a

capital reappropriations bill dealing with projects previously appropriated but not completed and

a separate capital budget for new projects. If there are legislative changes in the appropriations,

they may either be included in the capital reappropriations bill and/or in a corrective bill.

However, we are told that significant changes are rare.

In Ohio, there is no mandate for increased legislative oversight in the second year. The

legislature generally has a shortened session in this year and spends its time on the capital bills

and business other than the budget.

Adjustments during the biennium are generally handled by the Controlling Board. The Director

of the Governor’s Budget Office or his designee chairs this Board—we were told this is usually

the Deputy Director of the Office of Budget and Management. Its other six members are

members of the legislature.6 One official described the Controlling Board as legislative

oversight. This Board approves all contracts over $25,000 (or $75,000 for larger institutions). It

also has broad powers over spending. The Board may authorize increased spending from

dedicated revenues, fees, federal reimbursements, or private grants. We were told that agencies

may begin new projects if approved by the Controlling Board. Although under its general

authority the Board cannot increase or decrease General Revenue Fund appropriations, it can

move such funds across years and between purposes within an agency within a single biennium.

The Governor in Ohio has authority to unilaterally reduce spending in any area if necessary to

ensure the fiscal year ends in balance.

 

5

Separate bills are prepared for the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, the Industrial Commission, and the

non-general revenue fund portions of the budget for the Departments of Transportation and Public Safety.

In the fiscal year 2000-01 biennium, Ohio also enacted a separate bill for education-related agencies for the

first time.

6Other members are the Chair of the Finance and Appropriations Committee of the House of

Representatives, the Chair of the Finance Committee of the Senate, two members of the House appointed

by the Speaker of the House, and two members of the Senate appointed by the President of the Senate.
6

Connecticut

Beginning in 1993 Connecticut converted its budget cycle from annual to biennial.7 In oddnumbered years the Governor proposes and the legislature adopts two 1-year budgets. The

Governor’s budget proposal is reviewed by the legislature’s Appropriations and Finance

Committees. Appropriations for all state agencies are contained in a single bill. In evennumbered years the Governor transmits a report on the status of the enacted budget along with

any recommendations for revisions or adjustments.

Adjustments during the biennium can be handled in one of three ways. As mentioned above,

they may be contained in the Governor’s bill for the second year. Also, the Finance Advisory

Committee (a joint executive and legislative branch committee) must approve larger transfers

between appropriations accounts within an agency.8 Finally, the Governor, with Finance

Advisory Committee approval, has the authority to reduce overall appropriations up to 3 percent

of the total appropriation of any fund or up to 5 percent of any appropriation account in cases

where a deficit is projected or in cases where there is a change of circumstances.9

The main reasons given for a conversion to a biennial budget cycle were that an annual budget

process takes too long, is repetitive, and leaves little time for the legislature to carry out its

oversight responsibilities. Connecticut’s reform envisioned a process whereby budget activities

would take place during the first year with the second year devoted to oversight and any

necessary technical adjustments to the budget. However, phone conversations with a senior

budget official indicate that this has not been the experience. In practice, the Governor has

introduced new policy initiatives for the second year of the biennium. As a result, budget

activities in the “off-year” have not been limited to technical adjustments and the legislative

calendar, which is shorter in the second year, has been largely consumed by budget-related

deliberations.

 

7

Connecticut had a biennial legislative and budget cycle prior to fiscal year 1971-72 when it changed both

its legislative and its budget cycle to annual.

8

The Governor has the authority to transfer small amounts of money between accounts without the

approval of the Finance Advisory Committee.

9However, grants to towns and the Auditor of Public Accounts may not be reduced.
7

Arizona

Arizona is currently in the second year of its first full biennial budget. Arizona began its

transition to a biennial budget cycle in 1993 when it moved 26 smaller regulatory agencies to a

biennial basis. In 1996, all agencies except for the 15 largest were moved to a biennial cycle—

bringing the total to about 100. The 15 largest agencies, which represent more than 90 percent of

general fund expenditures, were converted to a biennial cycle in fiscal year 1999-2000. In

Arizona general funds constitute approximately 50 percent of revenues. The other half is split

approximately evenly between federal funds—which are not appropriated but flow directly to the

designated agency—and nonappropriated funds—which include user fees, regulatory fees, and

revenues enacted through voter initiative.

Arizona linked the shift to a biennial budget cycle with an attempt to increase program review.

Beginning in 1993 when Arizona first started its move toward biennial budgeting, the legislature

also established a Program Authorization Review (PAR) process whereby agencies were to

annually submit self-assessments to the legislative and executive budget offices. The directors of

each budget office are to jointly review the self-assessments and submit a report with their

findings to the legislature. In 1997 the PAR process was converted to a biennial process,

whereby the reviews were to occur in the non-budget years. Finally, in 1999, the legislature

modified the program evaluation process further, creating a Strategic Program Area Review

(SPAR) process to look more closely at broad program areas. For the first year it was specified

that the process would look at three program areas: (1) Arizona Ports of Entry; (2) Domestic

Violence programs; and (3) University Extended Education programs.

BIENNIAL BUDGETING AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL

The biennial bills before the Congress would shift the entire budget cycle from annual to

biennial. The President would submit a budget every other year. Authorizations would be for 2

years or longer. Budget resolutions would be adopted and appropriations enacted every 2 years.
8

The Congress would be required to enact two 1-year appropriations. All the biennial budget bills

introduced in this Congress provide for this kind of cycle. Most extend the time provided for

development of the budget resolution—moving it from April 15 to May 15—and hence shorten

the time provided for appropriations action in the first session of a Congress.

Experience with multiyear fiscal policy agreements and multiyear authorizations provides no

evidence to suggest that budget agreements, authorizations, budget resolutions, and

appropriations need to cover the same time period. Multiyear fiscal policy agreements and

multiyear authorizations make a great deal of sense, but they do not require changing the

appropriations decision cycle from annual to biennial. If multiyear agreements on spending

caps and enforcement regimes are continued, a biennial budget resolution may also be possible.

While biennial appropriations could save time for agencies and for the Congress, they would

result in a change in the nature of congressional control and oversight. Proposals to change the

process should be considered partly on the basis of their effect on the relative balance of power

in this debate. Similarly, any mechanisms developed to implement biennial budgeting could

have an impact on the balance of power.

Longer Term Perspective is Important

We have previously supported the use of multiyear authorizations for federal programs. These

can help both the Congress and the executive branch by providing a longer-term perspective

within which a program may operate and appropriations be determined. Multiyear

authorizations are the normal practice for most of the nondefense portion of the budget.

Increasingly, informed budget and policy decisions require an even longer-term perspective.

There has been a growing recognition that policymakers need information on the long-term cost

consequences of today’s commitments. The long-term costs implied by the government’s

current commitments can encumber major shares of future budget resources. Our long-term

budget model illustrates that the growth in Social Security and health commitments threatens to

crowd out discretionary spending in the long run, assuming a constant tax burden. While the

congressional budget process has made progress in considering the longer term in budgeting by

requiring a multiyear focus, it does not fully address sustainability issues. We have suggested
9

that this could be improved for some programs, like employee pension, retiree health, and federal

insurance programs, by adopting accrual measurements in the budget.10 Doing so would provide

a more complete picture of the cost of current decisions and thus may encourage timely changes

in these programs to control costs. For other long-term commitments, like social insurance,

which are not considered to be liabilities under current accounting standards but nevertheless

represent a commitment of the government, alternative approaches drawing upon accrual

concepts may be useful to explore and could very well lead to new ways of budgeting for such

commitments. However, while this perspective is important, the uncertainty of long-term

projections argues against incorporating them directly into the budget numbers.

Budgeting always involves forecasting, which itself is uncertain, and the longer the period of the

forecast, the greater the uncertainty. Increased difficulty in forecasting was one of the primary

reasons states gave for shifting from biennial to annual cycles. Among the issues that would

need to be worked out if the Congress moves to a biennial budget cycle are how to update the

Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecast and baseline against which legislative action is

“scored” and how to deal with unexpected events. The baseline is important because, as you

know, CBO scores legislation based on the economic assumptions in effect at the time of the

budget resolution. Even under the current system there are years when this practice presents

problems: in 1990 the economic slowdown was evident during the year, but consistent practice

meant that bills reported in compliance with reconciliation instructions were scored based on the

assumptions in the budget resolution rather than updated assumptions. However, the economic

slowdown caused spending to increase and federal revenues to decline by more than the savings

projected from the reconciliation act’s policy changes.11 If budget resolutions were biennial,

this problem of outdated assumptions would be greater—some sort of update in the “off-year”

would be necessary.

 

10Accrual Budgeting: Experiences of Other Nations and Implications for the United States, (GAO/

AIMD-00-57, February 18, 2000).

11See Budget Process: Issues Concerning the 1990 Reconciliation Act (GAO/AIMD-95-3, October 7, 1994).
10

Annual Appropriation Cycle Permits Flexible Periods of

Fund Availability and Changes in Levels Year toYear

In considering whether the federal government should shift to a biennial budget, it is important to

recognize the critical distinction between how often budget decisions are made and how long the

spending authority provided for agency use is available. That is the difference between the

frequency of decisions and the period of availability of funds. To date biennial budget proposals

have sought to change the frequency with which decisions are made—from annual to biennial—

without changing the periodicity of funds.

Sometimes a shift to biennial appropriations is discussed as though it were necessary to change

the frequency of decisions in order to change the length of time funds are available. As you

know, however, this is a misconception. First, nearly two-thirds of the budget goes for

mandatory programs and entitlements on which decisions are not made annually. Even the

remaining portion of the federal budget on an annual appropriations cycle is not composed

entirely of 1-year monies. Not all appropriated funds expire on September 30 of each year. The

Congress has routinely provided multiyear or no-year appropriations for accounts or for projects

within accounts when it seemed to make sense to do so. For example, just looking at the

accounts that in fiscal year 2000 were on an annual appropriations cycle shows that over 60

percent of these accounts contained some multiyear or no-year funds. For these accounts, some

previously enacted appropriations remain available for obligation beyond September 30, 2000

without further congressional action. The Congress has also responded to situations in which the

program year and the fiscal year do not match; for example, education programs routinely

receive forward funding. Thus, to the extent that biennial budgeting is proposed as a way to ease

a budget execution problem, the Congress has shown itself willing and able to meet that need

under the current cycle.

The federal government has had some experience with requirements for a biennial budget. The

1986 Defense Authorization Act directed the Department of Defense (DoD) to submit a biennial

budget for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 and every 2 years thereafter. DoD has submitted 2-year

budgets to the first session of a Congress for most biennia since then, including for the biennium
11

that would have begun with fiscal year 2000. However, it has never received both authorizations

and appropriations to cover a biennium. Thus, it then submits a 1-year budget to the second

session of a Congress to request appropriations for the second year of the biennium. According

to a DoD official, this attempt to implement biennial budgeting has created additional workload,

as DoD routinely must prepare budget justifications for the second year of the biennium twice.

Implementation Issues: Integration With BEA, GPRA

If BEA is extended, there are a number of technical issues to be considered in terms of the

integration of any biennial budget cycle with the BEA. For example, would biennial budgeting

change the timing of the BEA-required sequestration reports? How would sequestrations be

applied to the 2 years in the biennium and when would they occur? For example, if annual caps

are continued and are exceeded in the second year of the biennium, when would the Presidential

Order causing the sequestration be issued? Would the sequestration affect both years of the

biennium? We would be happy to work with your staff on these and other technical issues

should you wish.

The interaction between biennial budgeting and GPRA presents several challenges. These are

especially important given the expressed desire to use a shift to biennial budgeting as a way to

increase and improve oversight. At a minimum, as recognized in several of the bills that have

been introduced, there would need to be conforming calendar changes in GPRA. However, if a

shift to a biennial cycle is intended to facilitate oversight, integration will need to go beyond

such calendar adjustments to thinking about the purposes of GPRA and how it can best assist

congressional decision-making. Again, we would be happy to work with your staff on the

integration of these initiatives.

Potential Effects of Biennial Appropriations

For agency budget officials—both agency budget officers and program managers—the

arguments for biennial budgeting may seem quite strong. Currently, agency budget officers
12

spend several months every year preparing a “from-the-ground-up” budget with voluminous

written justifications. Much of this work is repetitious. In contrast, requests for supplemental

appropriations are handled on an exception basis. Only those agencies requesting supplemental

appropriations prepare and present justifications, and those justifications are less complex than

for the annual budget. If, under a biennial appropriations process, the “off-year” updates,

amendments, or adjustments were treated like supplemental appropriations, the savings in

agency time could be significant, even if the Congress required—as seems reasonable—that

agencies submit performance reports and audited financial and spending reports every year.

Would agency time and energy be shifted to improved financial management or better program

evaluation? That is likely to depend on the President’s and the agency’s leadership and on what

the Congress demanded of the agencies.

For agency program managers, the interest in biennial budgets is slightly different. Although

preparation and analysis for the annual budget preparation and submission process is timeconsuming and burdensome for program managers, they are likely to have a greater interest in

how long money is available for use. For managers with program cycles that are longer than or

different from a single fiscal year, multiyear appropriations tend to smooth program functioning.

However, as noted above, the Congress has already addressed this budget execution problem for

many of these programs by giving them some multiyear funding. While a shift of the entire

cycle would ease planning and increase predictability for all program managers, multiyear or

forward funding can be provided for those programs for which 1-year money seriously impairs

program effectiveness.

Regardless of the potential benefits to agencies, the decision on biennial budgeting will depend

on how the Congress chooses to exercise its constitutional authority over appropriations and its

oversight functions. Annual enacted appropriations have long been a basic means of exerting

and enforcing congressional policy. Oversight has often been conducted in the context of agency

requests for funds. A 2-year appropriation cycle would change—and could lessen—

congressional influence over program and spending matters, since the process would afford

fewer scheduled opportunities to affect agency programs and budgets. Even in an era of fixed-
13

dollar caps on discretionary spending, the Congress has retained the right to rearrange priorities

within the aggregate cap. Indeed, at the individual account level year-to-year volatility is much

greater than the volatility of appropriations in the aggregate. For example, while overall

discretionary appropriations were changing by only 2 to 4 percent per year between fiscal years

1995 and 1998, 37 percent or more of the individual accounts changed by more than +/-10

percent. In addition, appropriations subcommittees may feel a need to provide more flexible

budget execution tools to program managers—in the form of greater multiyear funding, lump

sum appropriations, and/or transfer authority—to address the greater uncertainty associated with

lengthened funding horizons.

Shifting the entire budget and appropriations cycle to a biennial one is likely to require the

reexamination of a number of congressional processes. How would the rules of each body need

to be changed to facilitate the desired operation of such a cycle? What new mechanisms might

be created and how would they work? For example, the question of how to respond to changing

conditions becomes increasingly important if appropriations are to be enacted every 2 years. A

biennial cycle is likely to increase the number of unexpected developments between

appropriations. Already the Congress adjusts its annual spending decisions as it responds to

emergencies or changes in the world that occur within the year. Over a 2-year period there are

likely to be more such outside events demanding “adjustments.” How would those be handled?

Integration of GPRA with a biennial cycle also raises a number of questions beyond adjusting

the dates. Among the questions are: How will annual performance reports be used in a biennial

cycle? Will the President’s governmentwide performance plan submitted with his biennial

budget reflect performance goals and measures on an annual or a biennial basis? Agencies will

be expected to prepare performance plans including annual goals and measures covering each

year of the biennium--how will these affect the governmentwide performance plan? Agencies

will still be expected to submit annual performance reports—how are these to be used in a

biennial cycle?

We have long advocated regular and rigorous congressional oversight of federal programs. Such

oversight should examine both the design and effectiveness of federal programs and the
14

efficiency and skill with which they are managed. In testimonies before both the House and

Senate Budget Committees last month12 the Comptroller General offered some organizing

themes or questions for use in structuring systematic oversight. As a result of recent reform

efforts, the Congress will soon begin receiving more consistent and complete information about

the costs, efficiency, and effectiveness of federal programs and activities. However, to be fully

useful, this information must become a routine component of congressional authorization,

oversight, and appropriations processes. While individual authorization and oversight

committees are well-suited to address performance or financial issues affecting individual

agencies or programs, many of the key performance questions are not confined to, and cannot be

addressed effectively on, an agency-by-agency or committee-by-committee basis. In his

testimony last month, the Comptroller General suggested that the Congress could consider the

need for mechanisms that would allow it to more systematically focus its oversight on problems

with the most serious and systemic weaknesses and risks. One possible approach would involve

modifying the current budget resolution to include a “performance resolution” to permit the

Congress to respond to, and present a coordinated congressional perspective on, the President’s

governmentwide performance plan.

In this context, we note that several of the bills make a substantive change to the budget act by

requiring that GPRA plans and reports be reviewed by each committee of jurisdiction. These

bills go on to say that each committee “may provide its views on such plans or reports to the

Budget Committee.” This represents an expansion of the scope of what is colloquially known as

“views and estimates reports.” It is unclear just how this information would be used by the

Budget Committee--the bills do not amend the content of the budget resolution or provide for a

companion “performance resolution,” as suggested in our earlier testimony. However, since one

of the consequences of a biennial process will be fewer opportunities to respond to executive

agency plans, some structured forum for responding to the President’s governmentwide plan may

be useful.

 

12Budget Issues: Effective Oversight and Budget Discipline Are Essential—Even in a Time of Surplus

(GAO/T-AIMD-00-73, February 1, 2000) and Congressional Oversight: Opportunities to Address Risks,

Reduce Costs, and Improve Performance (GAO/T-AIMD-00-96, February 17, 2000).
15

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, we have testified before that the decision to change the entire budget process to a

biennial one is fundamentally a decision about the nature of congressional oversight. Whether a

biennial cycle offers the benefits sought will depend heavily on the ability of the Congress and

the President to reach agreement on how to respond to uncertainties inherent in a longer

forecasting period. If biennial appropriations bills are changed rarely, the planning advantages

for those agencies that do not now have multiyear or advance appropriations may be significant.

Whether a biennial cycle would in fact reduce congressional workload and increase the time for

oversight is unclear. As I noted above, most current proposals actually shorten the time available

for appropriations action in the first session of the Congress—the session in which all

appropriations action is supposed to take place—by reducing the time between completion of

congressional action on the budget resolution and the beginning of the biennium at issue by 1

month.

Mr. Chairman, biennial budgeting would bring neither the end of congressional control

nor the guarantee of improved oversight. It would require a change in the nature of that

control. If the Congress decides to proceed with a change to a biennial budget cycle—

including a biennial appropriations cycle—careful thought will need to be given to

implementation issues. We stand willing to assist your staff either with those technical

and implementation questions or with other approaches to improved oversight under the

current annual cycle.