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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LASANDRA HILLSON, STEVEN 

BOHLER, and ASHLEY SCHMIDT,

individually and as representatives of 

the class,

 Plaintiffs,

vs.

KELLY SERVICES, INC.

 Defendant. 

Case No. 2:15-cv-10803-LJM-APP

Hon. Laurie J. Michelson

Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti

 

PLAINTIFFS’ UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF 

CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Plaintiffs LaSandra Hillson, Steven Bohler, 

and Ashley Schmidt (“Plaintiffs”) hereby respectfully move the Court for an 

Order: (1) granting final approval of the Parties’ Settlement; (2) certifying the 

proposed Settlement Class for settlement purposes only; (3) dismissing Plaintiffs’ 

and the Class Members’ claims against Defendant with prejudice; (4) approving 

the settlement payments for distribution to the Class Members who returned 

timely, valid Claim Forms; and (5) retaining jurisdiction over the implementation 

and enforcement of the Settlement. Defendant Kelly Services, Inc. does not 

oppose this Motion.

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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether the Parties’ Settlement should receive final approval from the 

Court.

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AUTHORITY FOR RELIEF SOUGHT

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e).

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INTRODUCTION

Named Plaintiffs LaSandra Hillson, Steven Bohler, and Ashley Schmidt

(“Plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf of the Settlement Class, 1 seek final 

approval of the Settlement of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Kelly Services, 

Inc. (“Defendant”) for alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act

(“FCRA”). On January 23, 2017, this Court preliminarily approved the Parties’ 

Settlement Agreement. (ECF No. 55.) The Court found on a preliminary basis 

that the terms of the Settlement are “fair and reasonable,” and approved the 

distribution of notice to the Class. (Id.) 

The response from the Class Members confirms that the Court’s preliminary 

analysis was correct. Out of 221,221 Class Members, approximately 50,147

individuals returned valid and timely Claim Forms, resulting in a claims rate of 

approximately 23%. This is an incredibly high claims rate for a consumer class 

action settlement, see infra at 22, and is substantially higher than rates that courts 

in this District have held are indicative of strong support for a settlement. There 

was only one objection to the Settlement and only ten individuals opted out. This 

too constitutes compelling evidence that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and 

adequate. Should the requested attorneys’ fees, costs, and Class Representative 

 1 Unless explicitly defined herein, all capitalized terms have the same meanings as 

those set forth in the Parties’ Settlement Agreement (ECF No. 37-2). 

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service awards be granted, and after the Administrator’s costs are paid, each 

Adjudicated Ineligible claimant will receive approximately $203.76 and each other 

claimant will receive approximately $67.92. Both the total settlement value and 

the per-claimant numbers exceed the value of many similar settlements that have 

been approved. The Court should grant final approval of the Settlement.

BACKGROUND

The history of this litigation and Settlement, and the claims involved, are set 

forth in detail in Plaintiffs’ preliminary approval papers and motion for attorneys’ 

fees, costs, and service award, which are incorporated herein by reference, and 

therefore will be only briefly summarized here. (See ECF Nos. 37, 60.)

I. Summary of Procedural History and Settled Claims

On July 18, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their class action complaint in the United 

States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that 

Defendant had violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2) by procuring background checks 

on them and putative class members without first providing a disclosure that a 

report would be obtained in a document consisting solely of the disclosure. (N.D. 

Cal. ECF No. 1.) Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant’s disclosure 

contained a liability release and other extraneous information beyond that allowed 

under the FCRA. (Id.) On August 19, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed a First Amended 

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Complaint clarifying their allegations (N.D. Cal. ECF No. 10), which Defendant 

answered on October 14, 2014 (N.D. Cal. ECF No. 35). 

The Parties attended an early mediation with third-party neutral Hon. Layn 

Phillips of Phillips ADR on February 23, 2015. Prior to attending the mediation, 

the Parties exchanged informal discovery and detailed mediation briefs. (ECF No. 

37-1, at ¶ 3.) The mediation was ultimately unsuccessful, and the Parties returned 

to litigation. (Id.) Following this mediation, the Parties stipulated to transfer the 

case to this Court (N.D. Cal. ECF Nos. 50, 52), and the Parties began to engage in 

formal discovery. (ECF No. 37-1, at ¶ 4.) 

Defendant moved to stay the litigation in May 2015, pending the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 13-1339. (ECF No. 18.) The Court 

granted the motion to stay on July 15, 2015. (ECF No. 29.) While the stay was in 

place, the Parties attended a second mediation with third-party neutral Hon. Wayne 

R. Andersen (Ret.) of JAMS on January 7, 2016. (ECF No. 37-1, at ¶ 5.) The 

Parties again exchanged detailed mediation briefs. (Id.) The Parties agreed to a 

settlement in principle at the mediation and subsequently engaged in arms’ length 

settlement discussions, facilitated by Judge Andersen, ultimately executing the 

Settlement Agreement in June 2016. (ECF No. 37-1, at ¶ 7, ECF No. 37-2.)

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II. Summary of Settlement Terms

In its preliminary approval order, the Court certified, for settlement 

purposes, the following Settlement Class:

All persons on whom Defendant procured a consumer report pursuant 

to the Fair Credit Reporting Act during the period from July 18, 2012 

through January 23, 2014, and whose initial hire date with Defendant 

was during the period of time when Defendant was providing new 

applicants with a disclosure form that contained a liability release.

(ECF No. 55.)

In consideration for the release of the Class Members’ claims, Defendant has 

agreed to provide monetary and non-monetary relief. First, Defendant will pay 

$6,749,000.00 into a common settlement fund. (ECF No. 37-2, at ¶ 45.) After any 

court-approved deductions for attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, administration costs, 

and Class Representative service awards, the fund will be distributed pro rata to all 

Class Members who returned properly completed, timely Claim Forms. (Id. ¶¶ 46-

49.) Those Class Members who were Adjudicated Ineligible (meaning that 

Defendant’s data management system shows them as having a background check 

result of anything other than “favorable”) will receive an allocation that is three (3) 

times that of those who were not. (Id. ¶ 46.) Should the requested attorneys’ fees, 

costs, and Class Representative service awards be granted, and after the 

Administrator’s costs are paid, each Adjudicated Ineligible claimant will receive 

approximately $203.76 and each other claimant will receive approximately $67.92.

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Should any funds remain after the close of the check negotiation period, the 

remaining funds (less additional administrative expenses) will be redistributed to 

those Class Members who cashed their original checks, as long as each check will 

be at least $10. (ECF No. 37-2, at ¶ 50.) Otherwise, the remaining funds will be 

donated to the Parties’ designated cy pres recipient, Flint STRIVE. (Id.) 

Second, the Settlement affords non-monetary relief. Defendant has agreed 

not to include a liability release in its FCRA disclosure form for a period of five 

years, unless or until there is a material change in the law. (Id. ¶ 42.) Further, 

since Notice was mailed, Class Members have been able to request free copies of 

the background checks Defendant procured on them, through the Settlement

Website and toll-free telephone line. (Id. ¶ 54.) There have been over 1,765 

requests received to date through the Website, or by mail to the Administrator. 

(Declaration of Settlement Administrator (“Admin. Decl.”) ¶ 13.) Defendant will 

maintain the toll-free call center to respond to these requests for an additional eight 

months following the Settlement’s Effective Date. (ECF No. 37-2 ¶ 55.) 

Defendant has also agreed to designate a dedicated “Consumer Reports 

Information Operator.” (Id. ¶ 43.) This person, or someone in a substantially 

similar role, will, for a period of three years, be responsible for timely responding 

to inquiries on a nationwide basis and providing information about how its 

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applicants or temporary employees can procure any consumer reports Defendant

obtained about them. (Id.) 

III. Class Notice and Reaction

On February 24, 2017, the Settlement Administrator, Epiq Class Action & 

Claims Solutions, Inc. (“the Administrator”), sent the court-approved Postcard 

Notice and Adjudicated Ineligible Postcard Notice to Class Members via first-class 

U.S. mail. (Admin. Decl. ¶ 5.) A total of 221,221 Postcard Notices were mailed. 

(Id.) When Notice was mailed, Class Counsel caused the Settlement Website to go 

live, which provided Class Members with general information about the 

Settlement, court documents, copies of the Notices (in English and Spanish) and 

important dates and deadlines. (Declaration of E. Michelle Drake (“Drake Decl.”)

¶ 3.) The Website also contained links where Class Members could file a Claim 

Form, update their address, and/or request a copy of their consumer report. (Id.) 

Also on February 24, 2017, the Administrator established a toll-free telephone line, 

which provided responses to frequently asked questions, and allowed Class 

Members to request their consumer reports from Defendant. (Admin. Decl. ¶ 6.) 

On June 20, 2016, the Administrator implemented notice to the appropriate 

officials as required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1715(a) and (b). (Id. ¶ 4.) 

On March 27, 2017, two weeks before the deadline for Class Members to 

file objections or opt out, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, 

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and Class Representative Service Awards (ECF No. 60), which was promptly 

posted on the Settlement Website. (Drake Decl. ¶ 4.) No Class Members objected 

to those requests. 

The deadline for Class Members to postmark any opt-outs passed on April 

10, 2017. There were ten (10) timely opt-outs received. (Admin. Decl. ¶ 11.) The 

deadline for objections to be postmarked was also on April 10, 2017. Notably, 

despite the size of the Settlement Class, there was only one pro se objection. (ECF 

No. 59.) The deadline for Claim Forms to be postmarked was on April 25, 2017. 

As of June 23, 2017, there were 41,193 timely, valid Claim Forms received from 

Class Members who were not designated Adjudicated Ineligible and 8,954 timely, 

valid Claim Forms received from Class Members who were Adjudicated Ineligible. 

(Admin. Decl. ¶ 12.) 

Class Members who were not initially determined to be Adjudicated 

Ineligible were also afforded the opportunity to challenge that designation and 

certify that they were in fact terminated or not hired/placed by Defendant and had 

an unfavorable background check. These challenges were to be submitted in 

writing by April 25, 2017. (ECF No. 37-2, at ¶ 60.) Class Members submitted 42

timely certifications. (Admin. Decl. ¶ 14.) Defendant challenged 22 of the 

certifications. Those 22 Class Members were mailed letters requesting further 

explanation and/or documentation by June 15, 2017 to support their claim. (Id. ¶ 

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14.) As of June 23, 2017, eight Class Members responded. (Id.) Their 

certifications will be resolved ten days prior to the final fairness hearing. (ECF 

No. 37-2, at ¶ 61.)

IV. Relief to be Provided After Final Approval

Defendant will establish the common fund within five business days of the 

Effective Date. (Id. ¶ 74.) Within twenty days of the Effective Date, the 

Administrator will mail checks to all Class Members who returned timely, valid 

Claim Forms. (Id. ¶ 75.) 

ARGUMENT

Courts favor the voluntary resolution of litigation through settlement, 

particularly in the class action context. See UAW v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 05-cv73991, 2006 WL 891151, *12 (E.D. Mich. March 31, 2006) (Gen. Motors I)

(citing cases). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) requires judicial approval for the compromise 

of claims brought on a class basis. The Sixth Circuit follows a three-step process 

for approving class action settlements, the first two of which have already been 

accomplished: (1) there must be preliminary approval of the proposed settlement; 

(2) the class members must be provided notice of the proposed settlement; and, (3)

after a hearing, there must be final approval of the settlement. Williams v. 

Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 921 (6th Cir. 1983). The standard for approval is 

“whether the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable . . . [and also] whether the 

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interests of the class as a whole are better served if the litigation is resolved by the 

settlement rather than pursued.” In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. 

508, 522 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). Before granting final 

approval to a settlement, the court should consider the following factors:

(1) the risk of fraud or collusion; (2) the complexity, expense, and 

likely duration of the litigation; (3) the amount of discovery engaged 

in by the parties; (4) the likelihood of success on the merits; (5) the 

opinions of class counsel and class representatives; (6) the reaction of 

absent class members; and (7) the public interest. 

UAW v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.3d 615, 631 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gen. Motors II); 

Williams, 720 F.2d at 922-923. For the reasons set forth below, each of these 

factors weighs in favor of the Settlement, and thus it should be finally approved.

I. The Procedure by Which the Settlement Was Reached Indicates that 

the Settlement Is Fair

“Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion in class action settlements 

unless there is evidence to the contrary.” Dick v. Sprint Commc’ns Co. L.P., 297 

F.R.D. 283, 295 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (quoting Leonhardt v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 581 F. 

Supp. 2d 818, 838 (E.D. Mich. 2008)); see also In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., 137 

F. Supp. 2d 985, 1016 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (citing Newberg on Class Actions

§ 11.51). In this case, there are affirmative indications that the Settlement is 

untouched by fraud or collusion. As noted above, the Parties’ Settlement 

Agreement was only formalized after there was an informal and formal exchange 

of documents and information, two mediations and subsequent negotiations 

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conducted with the assistance of a third-party neutral, the exchange of detailed 

mediation briefs, and the briefing of Defendant’s motion to stay. This timeline of 

events ensured that the Parties were well apprised of the facts and of each side’s 

position on litigation and settlement prospects. These circumstances are indicative 

of a non-collusive settlement. In re Cardizem, 218 F.R.D. at 530 (finding the fact 

that settlement was reached after multiple mediations and subsequent negotiations 

facilitated by mediator supported settlement); Connectivity Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l City 

Bank, No. 08-cv-1119, 2011 WL 292008, *5 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 26, 2011) (finding 

same). Additionally, attorneys’ fees and class representative payments were not 

discussed or negotiated until after all other material terms of the Settlement had 

been agreed upon, eliminating the possibility of a trade-off between compensation 

for the Class Members and compensation for Class Counsel and the Plaintiffs. 

(ECF No. 37-2, at ¶¶ 47-48; Drake Decl. ¶ 5.)

II. The Settlement Allows the Parties to Avoid Complex, Lengthy, and 

Expensive Litigation

“For class actions in particular, courts view settlement favorably because it 

‘avoids the costs, delays and multitudes of other problems associated with them.’” 

In re Delphi Corp. Secs., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 248 F.R.D. 483, 497 (E.D. 

Mich. 2008) (citing In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1013). In 

evaluating a settlement’s adequacy, “[t]he Court must also consider the risks, 

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expense, and delay the plaintiffs would confront if they pursued their claims and 

trial and through appeal.” Dick, 297 F.R.D. at 295. 

The prospect of delay in litigating the case to a final conclusion weighs 

heavily in favor of settlement approval. While this action has been pending for 

two years, litigation was stayed for much of that time. Much remains to be done 

before this case could reach a resolution in litigation. Formal discovery, expert 

discovery, dispositive motions, and a motion for class certification all have yet to 

occur. In addition, there would need to be a trial and, most likely, appeals. Each 

of these stages presents risks to Plaintiffs’ claims and imposes expense and delay.

Settling now is therefore advantageous for all Parties. See Connectivity Sys., 2011 

WL 292008, at *3 (“[T]he difficulty Named Plaintiffs would encounter in proving 

their claims, the substantial litigation expenses, and a possible delay in recovery 

due to the appellate process, provide justifications for this Court’s approval of the 

proposed Settlement Agreement.”); In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., 137 F. Supp. 2d 

at 1013 (finding the fact that motion practice, appeals, trial preparation, and trial 

remained, should litigation continue, weighed in favor of settlement approval).

III. The Parties Exchanged Sufficient Documents and Data Prior to 

Entering into the Settlement

To ensure the parties have had access to sufficient information to evaluate 

their case, the stage of proceedings and discovery undertaken must be considered. 

Prior to the Settlement being reached here, the Parties had engaged in substantial 

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exchanges of information and documents and had the opportunity to assess each 

side’s strengths and weaknesses, as well as the merits of the claims and defenses in 

the case. Among other things, prior to settling, the Parties had: (1) investigated the 

claims; (2) researched, drafted, and amended the complaint; (3) met and conferred 

regarding discovery; (4) researched and briefed a motion to stay the case; (5) 

exchanged and reviewed pre-mediation written and documentary discovery; (6) 

exchanged and reviewed formal written discovery responses and document 

productions; (7) researched and drafted multiple comprehensive mediation briefs, 

each of which canvassed the applicable law and risks of litigation both as to 

certification and the merits; (8) prepared for and participated in two separate 

mediation sessions; and (9) engaged in extended settlement negotiations. These 

circumstances support approval. Gen. Motors I, 2006 WL 891151, at *19 (noting 

that “informal discovery engaged in both before and after litigation commenced” 

resulted in “significant information available to the parties to negotiate their 

compromise” and weighed in favor of settlement); Dick, 297 F.R.D. at 296 (“Such 

negotiations allowed all parties to fully explore the factual and legal grounding of 

their positions in multiple mediation sessions. Such an exchange of information 

facilitated a candid perspective on the merits and risks of the parties’ respective 

cases and allowed them to agree upon an appropriate settlement value.”).

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IV. The Settlement Represents an Exceptional Recovery, As Success on the 

Merits Was Far from Assured

Courts “cannot judge the fairness of a proposed compromise without 

weighing the plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits against the amount and 

form of the relief offered in the settlement.” Gen. Motors II, 497 F.3d at 631

(quotations omitted). 

The Settlement here provides for a common fund of $6,749,000.00, which 

will result in net payments of approximately $67.92 for Class Members who were 

not Adjudicated Ineligible, and $203.76 for Class Members who were Adjudicated 

Ineligible if the Court grants the requested fees, costs, and service awards. 

Plaintiffs filed this case seeking statutory damages under the FCRA, which 

provides for damages of between $100 and $1,000 if the plaintiff can prove that the 

violation was willful. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1). If Plaintiffs were to prevail at trial, 

each class member’s recovery would likely be much closer to $100 than to $1,000. 

The FCRA itself does not provide any guidance to courts in choosing the 

appropriate recovery for a statutory violation, see 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1), but in 

determining the amount of statutory damages to impose pursuant to the FCRA, 

courts have looked to “the importance, and hence the value, of the rights and 

protections” at issue in the case. Ashby v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon, 592 F. 

Supp. 2d 1307, 1318 (D. Or. 2008); In re Farmers Ins. Co., Inc. FCRA Litig., 741 

F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1224 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 20, 2010). Given the breadth of 

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violations that fall within the $100 - $1,000 range, as well as the size of the Class 

here, it is unlikely that Plaintiffs would achieve an award of statutory damages 

which, on a per person basis, would substantially exceed $100 per person. 

The settlement allocation addresses the fact that individuals with 

unfavorable background checks had potentially harmful information disclosed and 

therefore suffered a greater privacy breach in relation to the violation. Overall, 

both the gross settlement amount and the per-class-member amounts compare 

extremely favorably to other settlements with similar claims. In terms of the relief 

that individual Class Members who made claims can expect to receive, the 

Settlement also compares extremely favorably to other settlements that have 

received approval. (See ECF No. 37, at 23-25, citing eight settlements in cases 

involving stand-alone disclosure claims where the gross per class member recovery 

(pre-attorneys’ fees and expenses) ranged from $10-$43.)

The Settlement’s provision of valuable non-monetary relief also weighs in 

favor of approval. Defendant has agreed to modify the form at issue in this case to 

ensure future individuals receive a disclosure without a liability release. 

Defendant’s designation of a dedicated “Consumer Reports Information Operator” 

will ensure that Class Members and future applicants and temporary employees 

have easy access to their background checks. Further, Class Members received the 

option of free assistance in connection with requesting copies of their consumer 

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reports. This is clearly valuable to the Class, as evidenced by the approximately 

1,765 Class Members who have requested their reports to date. These nonmonetary benefits would likely not have been available to Class Members if 

litigation were to continue, as the question of whether the FCRA permits a private 

right of action for injunctive relief is unresolved. Beaudry v. TeleCheck Sys.Inc.,

579 F.3d 702, 709 (6th Cir. 2009); Greear v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 14-

11988, 2014 WL 3809475, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 1, 2014) (citing cases).

When balanced against the remaining hurdles in adversarial litigation, the 

Settlement becomes even more impressive. Unlike other consumer statutes, in 

order to recover statutory damages under the FCRA, Plaintiffs must prove not only 

that Defendant violated the FCRA, but also that Defendant’s violations were 

willful. This is a very high standard, and one on which FCRA plaintiffs can lose, 

even after a successful verdict at trial. See Smith v. LexisNexis Screening Sols., 

Inc., 837 F.3d 604, 611 (6th Cir. 2016) (reversing jury verdict finding conduct to 

be willful under the FCRA); Domonoske v. Bank of America, N.A., 790 F. Supp. 2d 

466, 476 (W.D. Va. 2011) (“[G]iven the difficulties of proving willfulness or even 

negligence with actual damages [under the FCRA], there was a substantial risk of 

nonpayment.”). Plaintiffs expect that if the matter were litigated, Defendant would 

vigorously contest the question of willfulness. While Plaintiffs continue to believe 

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they would have ultimately prevailed on this issue, they recognize the inherent risk 

of litigation and potentially proceeding to trial on this issue. 

Further, at the time of the Settlement, Plaintiffs faced risks related to subject 

matter jurisdiction. The Settlement was negotiated in the shadow of the Supreme 

Court’s consideration of Spokeo, which addressed Article III’s injury-in-fact 

requirement, and the litigation was stayed pending the result. A defendant-friendly 

result in Spokeo could have significantly impacted this lawsuit, and, in the worst 

case scenario, potentially could have prevented the Class Member from receiving 

any recovery at all. The Settlement took into account and protected against these 

risks. (See ECF No. 37-2, at ¶ 77 (allowing enforcement of the Settlement in a 

mutually agreeable court of competent jurisdiction).) 

A recovery of a substantial percentage of the likely award if the case had 

proceeded all the way through final judgment is an excellent result for the Class

Members, especially when that recovery comes relatively early in the litigation 

process. By nature, a settlement “is a compromise which has been reached after 

the risks, expense, and delay of further litigation have been assessed.” In re 

Cardizem, 218 F.R.D. at 523 (quoting Williams, 720 F.2d at 922). Here, more than 

50,000 Class Members will receive immediate, guaranteed payments. “Given the 

time value of money, a future recovery, even one greater than the proposed 

Settlement Amount, may be less valuable to the Settlement Class than receiving 

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the benefits of the Settlement Agreement now.” Connectivity Sys., 2011 WL 

292008, at *4; see also N.Y. State Teachers’ Retirement Sys. v. Gen. Motors Co., 

315 F.R.D. 226, 236 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (“As the Settlement provides an 

immediate, significant, and certain recovery for Class Members, this [] favors the 

Court’s approval of the Settlement.”). In light of the risks of continued litigation 

and the substantial benefits provided for, this Settlement is clearly in the best 

interests of the Plaintiffs and the Class Members and should be approved. 

V. The Settlement Is Supported by Class Counsel and the Class 

Representatives

The Class Representatives, who have stayed abreast of developments in the 

case and have carefully reviewed the Settlement, fully support it. (See ECF Nos. 

64-66.) This weighs in favor of approval of the Settlement. Dick, 297 F.R.D. at 

297 (“[T]he Settlement is . . . endorsed by the Representative Plaintiffs, neither of 

whom have objected to this Settlement Agreement or moved to withdraw from the 

litigation. This factor points toward approval of the Settlement.”). 

Class Counsel also support the Settlement and strongly believe that it is in 

the best interests of the Class Members. Where, as here, the Parties are represented 

by counsel who have significant experience in class action litigation, settlements, 

and FCRA cases in particular,2 and no evidence of collusion or bad faith exists, the 

 2 See ECF Nos. 61, 61-3, 62, 62-3, and 63 for details on counsel’s experience. 

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judgment of the litigants and their counsel concerning the adequacy of the 

settlement is entitled to deference. Dick, 297 F.R.D. at 296 (“Class Counsel has 

considerable experience in this area of the law, as well as in settling class actions 

of this sort. Giving substantial weight to the recommendations of experienced 

attorneys, who have engaged in arms-length settlement negotiations is 

appropriate.” (internal quotations omitted)); N.Y. State Teachers, 315 F.R.D. at 238 

(“Lead Counsel has extensive experience handling . . . complex class action 

litigation. . . . As such, Lead Counsel’s endorsement of the Settlement is entitled to 

significant deference”); UAW v. Ford Motor Co., No. 07-cv-14845, 2008 WL 

4104329, *26 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2008) (same).

VI. The Reaction of the Class Members Is Positive

Of the approximately 221,221 Class Members, only 10 opted out, and only 

one objected. These are small numbers in comparison to the size of the Settlement 

Class (0.005% of the total), which decidedly weighs in favor of final approval. In 

re Cardizem, 218 F.R.D. at 527 (“If only a small number of objections to a class 

action settlement are received, that fact can be viewed as indicative of the 

adequacy of the settlement.”); Int’l Union v. Ford Motor Co., No. 05-74730, 2006 

WL 1984363, at *27 (E.D. Mich. July 13, 2006) (“[L]ess than one half of one 

percent-submitted an objection to the Settlement Agreement. This very small level 

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of opposition is another reason to conclude that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, 

and adequate.”). 

Further, approximately 50,147 Class Members returned valid, timely Claim 

Forms, resulting in an approximately 23% claims-filing rate. This rate compares

extremely favorably with other settlements that have required claim forms, 

demonstrating Class Members’ approval of the settlement. See, e.g., Gascho v. 

Glob. Fitness Holdings, LLC, 822 F.3d 269, 289-90 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting 

testimony of reputable settlement administrator that in its experience with over 

3,000 settlements, 99% of which were claims-made, the median response rate is 5 

to 8 percent); 2 McLaughlin on Class Actions § 6:24 (11th ed.) (citing cases and 

noting that “[c]laims-made settlements typically have a participation rate in the 10-

15 percent range”). A claim form was appropriate here due to the nature of the 

Settlement Class – temporary employees – and the fact that the Class Period began 

nearly four years ago. The use of a claim form helps ensure that Class Members 

who are sent checks will actually receive them. Claim forms are commonly used 

in class action settlements and are routinely approved. See, e.g., Shames v. Hertz 

Corp., No. 07-cv-2174, 2012 WL 5392159, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2012). 

The one pro se objection received, ECF No. 59, should be overruled. The 

objector, Ms. Mosier, does not identify any particular provision of the Settlement 

she objects to, stating only that she believes that Defendant ran background checks 

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as a “safety measure” and “should not be penalized for it.” (Id.) This statement 

reflects a misunderstanding of the nature of the Settlement. Defendant has agreed 

to this resolution of the lawsuit, and the Settlement is not a penalty or punishment. 

Moreover, Plaintiffs’ allegations are based not on Defendant’s decision to run 

background checks, but on the contents of Defendant’s disclosure form. 

Leonhardt, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 840 (overruling objection based on “flawed 

premises”). In any event, Ms. Mosier does not provide any statements as to any 

provisions of the Settlement Agreement she finds unfair, or any basis for 

withholding approval of the same. General statements of objection without 

specificity or support are insufficient to demonstrate inadequacy or unfairness. In 

re Rio Hair Naturalizer Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1055, 1996 WL 780512, at

*14 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 20, 1996) (“General objections without factual or legal 

substantiation carry little weight” (citing Newberg on Class Actions § 11.58 (3d 

ed.))); Connectivity Sys., 2011 WL 292008, at *6-7 (overruling objection that 

raised issues unrelated to the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the 

settlement, and noting that “[a] settlement is ‘presumptively reasonable’ once 

preliminary approval is entered and ‘[a]n individual who objects, consequently, has 

a heavy burden of demonstrating that the [settlement] is unreasonable’” (citing 

Bronson v. Bd. of Ed., 604 F. Supp. 68, 71-71 (S.D. Ohio 1984)).

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Every Class Member except one supports the Settlement. This factor 

supports final approval. In re Art Materials Antitrust Litig., 100 F.R.D. 367, 372 

(N.D. Ohio 1983) (overwhelming approval of settlement by class members “is 

entitled to nearly dispositive weight in [the] court’s evaluation of the proposed 

settlement.”); Olden v. Gardner, 294 Fed. App’x 210, 217 (6th Cir. 2008) 

(settlement found to be fair in light of 79 objections from 11,000 class members); 

Manners v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. 98-cv-0266, 1999 WL 33581944,*22

(M.D. Tenn. Aug. 11, 1999) (noting, in case in which 24 objections were filed and 

0.24% of the class opted out, that “[t]here has been very little opposition to this 

Settlement . . . This small amount of opposition strongly supports approving the 

Settlement.”).

VII. The Public Interest Weighs in Favor of Final Approval

Approval of this class action Settlement is in the public interest. “[T]here is 

a strong public interest in encouraging settlement of complex litigation and class 

action suits because they are notoriously difficult and unpredictable and settlement 

conserves judicial resources.” Dick, 297 F.R.D. at 297 (quotation omitted). The

Settlement here resolves a complex class action that would require lengthy, costly 

further litigation to otherwise adjudicate, and provides monetary relief to over 

50,000 people, and non-monetary relief to over 220,000. This resolution is 

certainly in the public interest, and this factor weighs in favor of approval. 

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Manners, 1999 WL 33581944, at *27 (“The proposed settlement would avoid 

complex and protracted litigation, provide valuable relief to the Class, and foster 

the goals of certainty, finality and economy, which lie at the heart of our general 

preference for settlement of class actions. ...” (internal citation and quotation 

omitted)); Franks v. Kroger Co. 649 F.2d 1216, 1224 (6th Cir. 1981) (noting the 

strong public interest in promoting settlement of class actions).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Settlement should be approved. 

Respectfully submitted, Date: June 26, 2017

BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C.

/s/ E. Michelle Drake

E. Michelle Drake,MN Bar #0387366* LYNGKLIP & ASSOCIATES

43 SE Main Street, Suite 505 CONSUMER LAW CENTER, PLC

Minneapolis, MN 55414 Ian B. Lyngklip, SBN P-47173

Telephone: 612-594-5995 24500 Northwestern Hwy, Ste 206

Facsimile: 612-584-4470 Southfield, MI 48075

emdrake@bm.net Tel.: 248-208-8864

*generally admitted ian@michiganconsumerlaw.com

NICHOLS KASTER, PLLP 

Paul J. Lukas, MN Bar #22084X* 

4600 IDS Center 

80 South Eighth Street 

Minneapolis, MN 55402 

Telephone: 612-256-3200 

Facsimile: 612-338-4878 

lukas@nka.com 

*generally admitted 

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 26, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing 

with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of 

such filing to all counsel of record.

Date: June 26, 2017 /s/E. Michelle Drake

E. Michelle Drake, MN 0387366

BERGER & MONTAGUE, P.C.

43 SE Main Street, Suite 505

Minneapolis, MN 55414

Tel: 612-594-5999

Fax: 612-584-4470

emdrake@bm.net

Attorney for Plaintiffs

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