Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Economic Development,

Public Buildings, and Emergency Management,

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,

House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m.

Wednesday, May 9, 2001 COMBATING TERRORISM

Comments on H.R. 525 to

Create a President’s

Council on Domestic

Terrorism Preparedness

Statement of Raymond J. Decker, Director, Defense

Capabilities and Management

GAO-01-555T
Page 1 GAO-01-555T Combating Terrorism

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here to discuss a bill introduced by Representative

Gilchrest of the full committee—the Preparedness Against Domestic

Terrorism Act of 2001 (H.R. 525). The bill would create a new President’s

Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness to coordinate and increase

the effectiveness of federal efforts to assist state and local emergency

response personnel in preparation for domestic terrorist attacks.

We view this hearing as a positive step in the ongoing debate about the

overall leadership and management of programs to combat terrorism and

the nation’s effort to reach consensus on the best approach. As you know,

there are several other proposals to improve overall management of

programs to combat domestic terrorism. While H.R. 525 proposes several

changes to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency

Assistance Act,1

 our comments, as agreed with your staff, are limited to a

discussion of subtitle C that creates the new council. Many of the issues

we raise should be familiar to the subcommittee because of our recent

testimony before you on H.R. 525 and related bills and proposals.2

We agree with the basic purpose of H.R. 525 to improve federal assistance

to state and local personnel in preparing for and responding to domestic

terrorist attacks. We also agree in principle with major actions required by

the bill. Based upon the problems we have identified during five years of

GAO evaluations, these major actions include the need to (1) create a

single high-level federal focal point for policy and coordination,

(2) develop a comprehensive threat and risk assessment, (3) develop a

national strategy with a defined outcome to measure progress against,

(4) analyze and prioritize governmentwide budgets to identify gaps and

reduce duplication of effort, and (5) coordinate implementation among the

different federal agencies. There are other proposals similar to H.R. 525

that would create a single focal point for terrorism. Some of these

proposals place the focal point in the Executive Office of the President

(like H.R. 525) and others place it in a Lead Executive Agency. Both

locations have potential advantages and disadvantages.

 1

 42 USC section 5121 et. seq.

2 Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal Response

(GAO-01-660T, Apr. 24, 2001).

Summary
Page 2 GAO-01-555T Combating Terrorism

To improve federal efforts to assist state and local personnel in preparing

for domestic terrorist attacks, H.R. 525 would create a single focal point

for policy and coordination—the President’s Council on Domestic

Terrorism Preparedness—within the Executive Office of the President.

The new council would include the President, several cabinet secretaries,

and other selected high-level officials. An Executive Director with a staff

would collaborate with executive agencies to assess threats; develop a

national strategy; analyze and prioritize governmentwide budgets; and

provide oversight of implementation among the different federal agencies.

In principle, the creation of the new council and its specific duties appear

to implement key actions needed to combat terrorism that we have

identified in previous reviews.3

 Following is a discussion of those actions,

executive branch attempts to implement them, and how H.R. 525 would

address them.

In our May 2000 testimony, we reported that overall federal efforts to

combat terrorism were fragmented.4

 There are at least two top officials

responsible for combating terrorism and both of them have other

significant duties. To provide a focal point, the President appointed a

National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and

Counterterrorism at the National Security Council.5

 This position,

however, has significant duties indirectly related to terrorism, including

infrastructure protection and continuity of government operations.

Notwithstanding the creation of this National Coordinator, it was the

Attorney General who led interagency efforts to develop a national

strategy.

H.R. 525 would set up a single, high-level focal point in the President’s

Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness. In addition, H.R. 525 would

require that the new council’s executive chairman—who would represent

the President as chairman—be appointed with the advice and consent of

 3

 Our related reports and testimonies are listed in appendix I.

4 Combating Terrorism: Comments on Bill H.R. 4210 to Manage Selected

Counterterrorist Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-172, May 4, 2000).

5

 In May 1998, the President established the Office of the National Coordinator for Security,

Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism within the National Security Council,

which is tasked to oversee a broad variety of relevant policies and programs.

H.R. 525 Would

Address Key Actions

Needed to Combat

Terrorism

H.R. 525 Would Create

Single Focal Point in

New Council
Page 3 GAO-01-555T Combating Terrorism

the Senate. This last requirement would provide Congress with greater

influence and raise the visibility of the office.

We testified in July 2000 that one step in developing sound programs to

combat terrorism is to conduct a threat and risk assessment that can be

used to develop a strategy and guide resource investments.6

 Based upon

our recommendation, the executive branch has made progress in

implementing our recommendations that threat and risk assessments be

done to improve federal efforts to combat terrorism. However, we remain

concerned that such assessments are not being coordinated across the

federal government.

H.R. 525 would require a threat, risk, and capability assessment that

examines critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, evaluates federal and

applicable state laws used to combat terrorist attacks, and evaluates

available technology and practices for protecting critical infrastructure

against terrorist attacks. This assessment would form the basis for the

domestic terrorism preparedness plan and annual implementation

strategy.

In our July 2000 testimony, we also noted that there is no comprehensive

national strategy that could be used to measure progress. The Attorney

General’s Five-Year Plan represents a substantial interagency effort to

develop a federal strategy, but it lacks desired outcomes.7 The Department

of Justice believes that their current plan has measurable outcomes about

specific agency actions. However, in our view, the plan needs to go beyond

this to define an end state. As we have previously testified, the national

strategy should incorporate the chief tenets of the Government

Performance and Results Act of 1993 (P.L. 130-62). The Results Act holds

federal agencies accountable for achieving program results and requires

federal agencies to clarify their missions, set program goals, and measure

performance toward achieving these goals.

 6 Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources

(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218, July 26, 2000).

7

 In December 1998, the Attorney General published the classified Five-Year Interagency

Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan. An annual update is to be published

reporting on accomplishments.

H.R. 525 Would Require

Threat and Risk

Assessment

H.R. 525 Would Require

Council to Develop

National Plan
Page 4 GAO-01-555T Combating Terrorism

H.R. 525 would require the new council to publish a domestic terrorism

preparedness plan with objectives and priorities, an implementation plan,

a description of roles of federal, state and local activities, and a defined

end state with measurable standards for preparedness.

In our December 1997 report, we reported that there was no mechanism to

centrally manage funding requirements and to ensure an efficient, focused

governmentwide approach to combat terrorism.8

 Our work led to

legislation that required the Office of Management and Budget to provide

annual reports on governmentwide spending to combat terrorism.9

 These

reports represent a significant step toward improved management by

providing strategic oversight of the magnitude and direction of spending

for these programs. Yet we have not seen evidence that these reports have

established priorities or identified duplication of effort as the Congress

intended.

H.R. 525 would require the new council to develop and make budget

recommendations for federal agencies and the Office of Management and

Budget. The Office of Management and Budget would have to provide an

explanation in cases where the new council’s recommendations were not

followed. The new council would also identify and eliminate duplication,

fragmentation, and overlap in federal preparedness programs.

In our April 2000 testimony, we observed that federal programs addressing

terrorism appear in many cases to be overlapping and uncoordinated.10 To

improve coordination, the executive branch has created organizations like

the National Domestic Preparedness Office and various interagency

working groups. In addition, the annual updates to the Attorney General’s

Five-Year Plan track individual agencies’ accomplishments. Nevertheless,

we have still noted that the multitude of similar federal programs have led

to confusion among the state and local first responders they are meant to

serve.

 8 Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better

Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).

9

 National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1998, P.L. 105-85, section 1051.

10 Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs

(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145, Apr. 6, 2000).

New Council Would

Analyze and Review

Budgets

New Council Would

Coordinate

Implementation
Page 5 GAO-01-555T Combating Terrorism

H.R. 525 would require the new council to coordinate and oversee the

implementation of related programs by federal agencies in accordance

with the domestic terrorism preparedness plan. The new council would

also make recommendations to the heads of federal agencies regarding

their programs. Furthermore, the new council would provide written

notification to any department that it believes is not in compliance with its

responsibilities under the plan.

Federal efforts to combat terrorism are inherently difficult to lead and

manage because the policy, strategy, programs, and activities to combat

terrorism cut across more than 40 agencies. Congress has been concerned

with the management of these programs and, in addition to H.R. 525, two

other bills have been introduced to change the overall leadership and

management of programs to combat terrorism. On March 21, 2001,

Representative Thornberry introduced H.R. 1158, the National Homeland

Security Act, which advocates the creation of a cabinet-level head within

the proposed National Homeland Security Agency to lead homeland

security activities. On March 29, 2001 Representative Skelton introduced

H.R. 1292, the Homeland Security Strategy Act of 2001, which calls for the

development of a homeland security strategy developed by a single official

designated by the President.

In addition, several other proposals from congressional committee reports

and various commission reports advocate changes in the structure and

management of federal efforts to combat terrorism. These include Senate

Report 106-404 to Accompany H.R. 4690 on the Departments of

Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies

Appropriation Bill 2001, submitted by Senator Gregg on September 8,

2000; the report by the Gilmore Panel (the Advisory Panel to Assess

Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass

Destruction, chaired by Governor James S. Gilmore III) dated December

15, 2000; the report of the Hart-Rudman Commission (the U.S. Commission

on National Security/21st Century, chaired by Senators Gary Hart and

Warren B. Rudman) dated January 31, 2001;11 and a report from the Center

for Strategic and International Studies (Executive Summary of Four CSIS

Working Group Reports on Homeland Defense, chaired by Messrs. Frank

 11 H.R. 1158 is based upon the report of the Hart-Rudman Commission.

H.R. 525 Is One of

Several Proposals to

Provide a Single

Focal Point
Page 6 GAO-01-555T Combating Terrorism

Cilluffo, Joseph Collins, Arnaud de Borchgrave, Daniel Goure, and Michael

Horowitz) dated 2000.12

The bills and related proposals vary in the scope of their coverage. H.R.

525 focuses on federal programs to prepare state and local governments

for dealing with domestic terrorist attacks. Other bills and proposals

include the larger issue of homeland security that includes threats other

than terrorism, such as military attacks.

H.R. 525 would attempt to resolve cross-agency leadership problems by

creating a single focal point within the Executive Office of the President.

The other related bills and proposals would also create a single focal point

for programs to combat terrorism, and some would have the focal point

perform many of the same functions. For example, some of the proposals

would have the focal point lead efforts to develop a national strategy. The

proposals (with one exception) would have the focal point appointed with

the advice and consent of the Senate. However, the various bills and

proposals differ in where they would locate the focal point for overall

leadership and management. The two proposed locations for the focal

point are in the Executive Office of the President (like H.R. 525) or in a

Lead Executive Agency.

Table 1 shows various proposals regarding the focal point for overall

leadership, the scope of its activities, and it’s location.

 12 Another congressionally mandated commission, the National Commission on Terrorism

chaired by Ambassador Paul Bremer, is not included in our analysis because it was

primarily focused on international terrorism and did not address domestic terrorism.
Page 7 GAO-01-555T Combating Terrorism

Table 1. Proposals to Create a Focal Point for Overall Leadership and Management of Programs to Combat Terrorism

Source of proposal Focal point for overall leadership Scope of responsibilities Location of focal point

H.R. 525 President’s Council on Domestic

Terrorism Preparedness

Domestic terrorism preparedness Executive Office of the

President

H.R. 1158 Cabinet-level head of proposed

National Homeland Security

Agency

Homeland security (including

domestic terrorism, maritime and

border security, disaster relief and

critical infrastructure activities)

Lead Executive Agency

(National Homeland Security

Agency)

H.R. 1292 Single official to be designated by

the President

Homeland security (including

antiterrorism and protection of

territory and critical infrastructures

from unconventional and

conventional threats by military or

other means)

To be determined based upon

the President’s designation

Senate Report 106-404 Deputy Attorney General for

Combating Counterterrorism

Domestic terrorism preparedness

(crisis and consequence

management)

Lead Executive Agency

(Department of Justice)

Gilmore Panel National Office for Combating

Terrorism

Domestic and international terrorism

(crisis and consequence

management)

Executive Office of the

President

Hart-Rudman

Commission

Cabinet-level head of proposed

National Homeland Security

Agency

Homeland security (including

domestic terrorism, maritime and

border security, disaster relief, and

critical infrastructure activities)

Lead Executive Agency

(National Homeland Security

Agency)

Center for Strategic and

International Studies

Assistant to the President or Vice

President for Combating Terrorism

Homeland Defense (including

domestic terrorism and critical

infrastructure protection)

Executive Office of the

President

Source: GAO analysis of various proposals.

Based upon our analysis of legislative proposals, various commission

reports, and our ongoing discussions with agency officials, each of the two

locations for the focal point—the Executive Office of the President or a

Lead Executive Agency—has its potential advantages and disadvantages.

An important advantage of placing the position with the Executive Office

of the President is that the focal point would be positioned to rise above

the particular interests of any one federal agency. Another advantage is

that the focal point would be located close to the President to resolve

cross agency disagreements. A disadvantage of such a focal point would

be the potential to interfere with operations conducted by the respective

executive agencies. Another potential disadvantage is that the focal point

might hinder direct communications between the President and the

cabinet officers in charge of the respective executive agencies.

Alternately, a focal point with a Lead Executive Agency could have the

advantage of providing a clear and streamlined chain of command within

an agency in matters of policy and operations. Under this arrangement, we
Page 8 GAO-01-555T Combating Terrorism

believe that the Lead Executive Agency would have to be one with a

dominant role in both policy and operations related to combating

terrorism. Specific proposals have suggested that this agency could be

either the Department of Justice (per Senate Report 106-404) or an

enhanced Federal Emergency Management Agency (per H.R. 1158 and its

proposed National Homeland Security Agency). Another potential

advantage is that the cabinet officer of the Lead Executive Agency might

have better access to the President than a mid-level focal point with the

Executive Office of the President. A disadvantage of the Lead Executive

Agency approach is that the focal point—which would report to the

cabinet head of the Lead Executive Agency—would lack autonomy.

Further, a Lead Executive Agency would have other major missions and

duties that might distract the focal point from combating terrorism. Also,

other agencies may view the focal point’s decisions and actions as

parochial rather than in the collective best interest.

H.R. 525 would provide the new President’s Council on Domestic

Terrorism Preparedness with a variety of duties. In conducting these

duties, the new council would, to the extent practicable, rely on existing

documents, interagency bodies, and existing governmental entities.

Nevertheless, the passage of H.R. 525 would warrant a review of several

existing organizations to compare their duties with the new council’s

responsibilities. In some cases, those existing organizations may no longer

be required or would have to conduct their activities under the supervision

of the new council. For example, the National Domestic Preparedness

Office was created to be a focal point for state and local governments and

has a state and local advisory group. The new council has similar duties

that may eliminate the need for the National Domestic Preparedness

Office. As another example, we believe the overall coordinating role of the

new council may require adjustments to the coordinating roles played by

the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Department of Justice’s

Office of State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support, and the

National Security Council’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness

Group in the policy coordinating committee on Counterterrorism and

National Preparedness.

In our ongoing work, we have found that there is no consensus—either in

Congress, the Executive Branch, the various commissions, or the

organizations representing first responders—as to whether the focal point

should be in the Executive Office of the President or a Lead Executive

Agency. Developing such a consensus on the focal point for overall

Passage of H.R. 525

May Warrant Changes

in Existing

Organizations

Conclusion
Page 9 GAO-01-555T Combating Terrorism

leadership and management, determining its location, and providing it

with legitimacy and authority through legislation, is an important task that

lies ahead. We believe that this hearing and the debate that it engenders,

will help to reach that consensus.

This concludes our testimony. We would be pleased to answer any

questions you may have.

For future questions about this statement, please contact

Raymond J. Decker, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management at

(202) 512-6020. Individuals making key contributions to this statement

include Stephen L. Caldwell and Krislin Nalwalk.

GAO Contacts and

Staff Acknowledgment
Page 10 GAO-01-555T Combating Terrorism

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal

Response (GAO-01-660T, Apr. 24, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs

Further Improvement (GAO-01-463, Mar. 30, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied

Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination

(GAO-01-14, Nov. 30, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources

(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218, July 26, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Bill H.R. 4210 to Manage Selected

Counterterrorist Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-172, May 4, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to

Combat Terrorism (GAO/NSIAD-00-85, Apr. 7, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs

(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145, Apr. 6, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of

Mass Destruction Training (GAO/NSIAD-00-64, Mar. 21, 2000).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw

on Year 2000 Experiences (GAO/AIMD-00-1, Oct. 1, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk

Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attack (GAO/NSIAD-99-163,

Sept. 7, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs

(GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181, June 9, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist

Operations (GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat

Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107, Mar. 11, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness

Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).

Appendix I: Related GAO Products
Page 11 GAO-01-555T Combating Terrorism

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues

(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize

and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs

Requires Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39,

Dec. 1, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National

Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

(350061)