NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1



# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued April 16, 2009 Decided April 23, 2009



### Before

F RANK H. E ASTERBROOK
, Chief Judge

W ILLIAM J. B AUER
, Circuit Judge

D ANIEL A. M ANION
, Circuit Judge

No. 08

- 2753

V ALERY V INAROV
, Plaintiff

- Appellant

,

v

.
M OTOROLA
, I NC

. , Defendant

- Appellee

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 05 C 2063 Susan E. Cox, Magistrate Judge

.

Order

After Mo torola fired Valery Vinarov, he filed an employment

- discrimination suit. All claims based on federal law (Vinarov asserted that Motorola had discriminated based on his age and national origin) were resolved in M o torola’s favor by the district court, and Vi narov does not pursue them on appeal. He maintains, however, that he is entitled to relief under a state

- law theory that depends on the supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §1367. Vinarov contends that he developed a plan, using his contacts in Ru s sia, tha t increased Motorola’s business in that nation, and he insists that he is entitled to e xtra compensation for those efforts. Vinarov was a project manager in Motorola’s ne tworking division, however, and not a salesman paid on commission. Motorola co ntends t hat his salary covered all of his services on its behalf, including his efforts to e xpand bus i ness with Russia. A magistrate judge, presiding by consent, see 28 U.S.C. §636(c), agreed with M o torola and granted judgment in its favor.

Vinarov’s principal arg ument is that a clause in his employment contract assigning to Motorola all copyrights, patents, and other intellectual property developed during his time with the firm does not apply to his business plan for providing communic ations services to Russian cu stomers. Let us suppose that Vinarov is co r rect about that clause’s scope. Still, it is not enough to knock out a clause that would defeat the cu r rent demand for compensation. Vinarov worked under a written employment contract; heNo. 08

- 2753 Page 2

received a sa l ary for ser vices in the firm’s employ. That some of these services turned out to be related to sales rather than engineering or project management is u n impo rtant. The salary is what it is; Motorola never agreed to pay him extra for work b e yond his role as a project m anager, or for business plans that he says were co n ceived at home.

Vinarov was entitled to refrain from any work beyond his assigned tasks unless M o torola promised higher pay. Apparently he negotiated with M o torola for a while about compensation for using his Russian contacts. Nothing came of these neg o tiations. V i narov does not identify any rule of Illinois law (which governs this di s pute) requiring an employer to pay extra when an employee does tasks not in the job description. Rules about quantum meruit and unjust enrichment do not apply to someone who is in

a co n tractual relation with the other party and seeks to be paid, b e yond the agreed amount, for volunteered services. See, e.g., Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Co. v. Reinsu r ance Results, Inc ., 5 13 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2008); Murray v. ABT A s sociates, Inc ., 18 F.3d 1376 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ill i nois law); La Throp v. Bell Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n , 68 Ill. 2d 375, 370 N.E.2d 188 (1977).

Concord Industries, Inc. v. Harvel Industries Corp ., 122 Ill. Ap p. 3d 845, 462 N.E.2d 1252 (1984), on which Vinarov principally relies, dealt with a situation in which a written co ntract arguably had been supplemented by an oral contract covering additional su b jects. Vinarov might be in a similar situation were he arg u ing that he had an agreement with Motorola on supplemental compensation for sales to Russia; he does not say that any such agreement was reached, however, or that a misunderstanding about the exi s tence of such an agreement allows quasi

- contractual recovery

.

A FFIRMED