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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

HASKELL G. GREER, et al., 

 

 Plaintiffs, Case No. 15-12444 

 Honorable Judith E. Levy 

v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford 

 

CITY OF HIGHLAND PARK, 

et al., 

 

 Defendants. 

__________________________________/ 

ORDER SANCTIONING DEFENSE COUNSEL FOR UNREASONABLY 

AND VEXATIOUSLY MULTIPLYING PROCEEDINGS BY HIS CONDUCT 

RELATING TO THE PARTIES’ SETTLEMENT EFFORTS 

I. Introduction 

Plaintiffs Haskell Greer, Kim Greer, Ashley Greer, Catera Greer, 

Kailaa Greer and Alexander Lawrence filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 against Defendants City of Highland Park, Chief Kevin Coney, 

Sergeant Ronald Dupuis II, William Melendez, Brian Shafer, Eric Taylor, 

Charles Gardner, Jeremiah Hall, James McMahon, Hollis Smith, Allison 

Askia, Christopher Zeullig, Tyrell White, and Heather Holcomb. [ECF No. 

26]. Kailaa is Haskell and Kim’s minor child. [Id., PageID.305]. 

In August 2018, the Court held a settlement conference and the 

parties agreed to a settlement. Two months later, plaintiffs moved to 

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enforce the settlement, and the Honorable Judith E. Levy referred the 

motion to this Court. [ECF Nos. 71, 75]. On January 7, 2019, the Court 

held a hearing on the motion and on an order for defense counsel to show 

cause why he should not be sanctioned for unreasonably and vexatiously 

multiplying proceedings by his conduct related to the parties’ settlement 

efforts. [ECF No. 90]. At the hearing, the Court found that McGinnis 

should be sanctioned under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the parties agreed that 

a sanction of $900 is reasonable.1 The reasons for sanctioning McGinnis 

are described below. 

II. Background 

The Court’s settlement conference notice instructed that 

“[i]ndividuals with full settlement authority shall be personally 

present at settlement conferences. . . . For the defendant(s), ‘full 

settlement authority’ is defined as the full relief requested in the lawsuit 

and/or the relief requested by the last settlement demand.” [ECF No. 58, 

PageID.600 (emphasis in original)]. The parties appeared for the 

settlement conference on August 29, 2018 and negotiated from about 

10:00 a.m. to about 1:00 p.m. [See ECF No. 77, PageID.1071-72]. 

 

1 A separate report and recommendation will be filed on the motion to 

enforce the settlement. 

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McGinnis appeared “on behalf of Defendants,” and City Administrator 

Kathy Square was represented as having “authority to enter into a 

Settlement Agreement.” [Id., PageID.1071]. 

The parties agreed to a settlement of $110,000 for all plaintiffs to be 

paid in three installments on the 15th day of October 2018 and February 

and May of 2019. [Id., PageID.1073]. McGinnis noted that “only the City 

Council can bind the municipality to a contract, so [ ] this Settlement is 

subject to Council approval.” [Id.]. But he also said that Square had 

authorized him to enter into the agreement and that he understood “that the 

Council will meet some time in September and we would then get word of 

whether or not they have approved the settlement.” [Id.]. McGinnis 

continued, “We will enter into a Release and Settlement Agreement with 

the Plaintiff which will incorporate the terms of the settlement as put on the 

record.” [Id.]. 

There was significant discussion about what would happen if the City 

did not fulfill its obligations under the settlement. Plaintiffs’ counsel, Jeffrey 

Stewart, described the “overall objective” of the parties “to provide 

protection to the individual Defendants by having them included in the 

settlement and the release, but also preserve the Plaintiffs' rights against 

all Defendants in the event the City was unable or unwilling to live up to its 

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obligations.” [ECF No. 77, PageID.1074]. McGinnis agreed that, if the 

case had to reopened, it would be reopened against all the defendants, 

“but reopened to enforce the settlement, not carte blanche to pursue all 

claims against all individuals.” [Id., PageID.1079]. Stewart then 

summarized the discussion: 

Ultimately what we’re agreeing to is the equivalent of a joint and 

several settlement in Judgment. We won’t enter it as a 

Judgment because we’ll enter it as a settlement, right? But if 

we have to reinstate the case, then my understanding is we 

would then be entitled to enter a Judgment for the balance 

remaining, giving full credit for payments that have already 

been received, but we can enforce that Judgment against any 

and all Defendants jointly and severally. . . . [I]f there were a 

default we could reopen for purposes of collecting the 

difference between what was promised to be paid and what has 

been paid and we could enforce against any and all Defendants 

jointly and severally. 

 

 [Id., PageID.1080-81]. McGinnis responded, “That’s my understanding.” 

[Id., PageID.1081]. 

 The Court asked counsel if there were any other terms to be placed 

on the record. [Id.]. Stewart responded that, if the approval from the city 

council was delayed, he agreed “that such a delay would not itself be a 

breach of our Agreement provided that once it was approved we’re on the 

original schedule of October, February and May.” [Id.]. After the terms of 

the settlement were fully described, Square confirmed her agreement to it. 

[Id., PageID.1086]. 

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The parties also addressed the fact that one of the plaintiffs who 

would receive payment from the settlement proceeds is a minor child. 

Stewart stated that he was unsure of whether he would need to obtain 

approval of the amount of the settlement allocated to the minor child 

through this Court or through Oakland County Circuit Court; if the latter, a 

conservatorship would need to be established. [Id., PageID.1072, 1074]. 

McGinnis raised no concern at that point about moving forward with the 

settlement agreement pending approval of the settlement and the 

establishment of conservatorship.2

After all parties agreed to the terms of the settlement, McGinnis 

agreed to forward a draft of a written settlement agreement, and he did so 

two days later. [Id., PageID. 1086-87; ECF No. 73-2; ECF No. 73-3]. But 

on September 6, 2018, McGinnis sent Stewart a letter stating that there 

were two issues with the settlement. First, he asserted that a next friend 

 

2 Research conducted after this hearing reveals that it is this Court, and not 

a state court, that must approve the settlement of the minor child under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(ii). See Green v. Nevers, 111 

F.3d 1295, 1302 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding district court’s decision to 

reduce contingency fee in settlement involving minor child); Kiel by Kiel v. 

Barton, No. 09-CV-15053, 2011 WL 13206189, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 31, 

2011) (declining to rely on Michigan Court Rule 2.420 because federal 

rules applied to approval of a settlement of a minor in federal court); Hertz 

v. Miller, No. 07-14369, 2011 WL 4433763, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 21, 

2011) (requiring parties to file motions to approve settlement because 

settlement involved a minor child). 

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had to be appointed because the minor child did not have capacity to sue, 

but he said that he had “authority to stipulate to a Next Friend.”3 [ECF No. 

75-2]. McGinnis also noted that a court would need to approve the portion 

of the settlement apportioned to the minor child; he presumed that would 

be Oakland County Probate Court. [Id.]. 

McGinnis secondly asserted, “[W]e had a provision of settlement that 

allows you (your clients) to collect against the individual officers if Highland 

Park defaults on payments. The individual officers have not consented to 

collections against them. The City of Highland Park has.” [Id.]. Plaintiffs’ 

counsel responded to McGinnis’s letter by agreeing that a conservatorship 

was needed. But he correctly noted that the ability to enforce the 

 

3 Defendants are mistaken in this regard, as Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 17(c) allows a parent to sue on a child’s behalf. See In re 

Brooks, 583 B.R. 443, 444–45 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2018) (“Because Mr. 

Bucceri may sue on behalf of his minor daughter as her parent without 

resort to any appointment as next friend or guardian ad litem under Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 17(c)(2), the court will deny the Next Friend Petition as 

unnecessary.”); Communities for Equity v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic 

Ass’n, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1006 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (“This contention is 

defeated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c), however, which 

provides that a general guardian may sue on behalf of a minor. A parent is 

a guardian who may so sue.”); Bender v. Metro. Nashville Bd. of Educ., No. 

3:13-CV-0470, 2013 WL 3777197, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. July 18, 2013) (“Under 

Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a parent or guardian 

may bring suit on behalf of his or her minor child.”); Cavanaugh ex rel. 

Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist., 409 F.3d 753, 755 (6th Cir. 2005) 

(under Rule 17(c), parents “may sue or defend on their minor child’s 

behalf,” but not pro se). 

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settlement against all of the defendants was a condition of the settlement. 

[ECF No. 75-3, PageID.1067]. 

Subsequently, through Stewart, the minor child’s father, Haskell 

Greer, filed a petition to be appointed as her conservator and for approval 

of an allocation of $20,000 to the minor child from the settlement proceeds. 

[ECF No. 88, PageID.1802]. Stewart states that he sent McGinnis a 

courtesy copy of the petition because McGinnis had raised a concern about 

securing approval of the settlement. But at the January 7 hearing, both 

Stewart and McGinnis stated that McGinnis objected to the probate court 

approving the settlement on behalf of the minor child. McGinnis told the 

court that the City had not agreed to a settlement. The probate court 

appointed Haskell as his minor daughter’s conservator but did not approve 

of the settlement on behalf of the child because of McGinnis’s objection. 4

And despite the parties’ settlement, defendants moved to dismiss for 

insufficient process and statute of limitations. [ECF No. 83]. 

Plaintiffs have moved for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 11 and Section 1927 based on defendants’ belated filing of their 

 

4 As noted in footnote 2, it is this Court that must approve the settlement on 

the minor child’s behalf. 

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motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 88]. Defendants have yet to address that 

motion, and the Court will hear it separately from the January 7 hearing. 

What the Court did consider at the January 7 hearing was whether to 

order McGinnis to reimburse plaintiffs for their reasonable expenses 

incurred during the settlement conference and in subsequent attempts to 

finalize the settlement agreement. 

III. Analysis 

“Any attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case 

unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy 

personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably 

incurred because of such conduct.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. This rule is 

designed “to deter dilatory litigation practices and to punish aggressive 

tactics that far exceed zealous advocacy.” Red Carpet Studios, Div. of 

Source Advantage, Ltd. v. Sater, 465 F.3d 642, 646 (6th Cir. 2006). 

Section 1927 sanctions do not require a showing of bad faith. Knopf v. 

Elite Moving Sys., 677 F. App’x 252, 257 (6th Cir. 2017). Instead, they “are 

warranted when an attorney objectively falls short of the obligations owed 

by a member of the bar to the court and which, as a result, causes 

additional expense to the opposing party.” Id. (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). Section 1927 sanctions “require a showing of 

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something less than subjective bad faith, but something more than 

negligence or incompetence.” Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel Indus., Inc., 556 

F.3d 389, 396 (6th Cir. 2009). 

McGinnis’s was required to treat the settlement conference and 

agreement as “solemn obligations” and “to make every reasonable effort to 

see that the agreed terms are fully and timely carried out.” Aro Corp. v. 

Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1976); Zwerin v. 533 Short 

N. LLC, 568 F. App'x 374, 375 (6th Cir. 2014). He has fallen well short of 

these obligations. 

First, McGinnis appeared at the settlement conference representing 

all of the defendants, but then sent a letter on September 6 indicating that 

the individual defendants would not agree to the settlement. The Court 

instructed that parties with settlement authority must attend settlement 

conference. If McGinnis lacked authority to settle on behalf of the 

individual defendants, it was his duty to ensure that they appeared for the 

settlement conference. If the individual defendants gave McGinnis 

settlement authority but later balked at the agreement, that would have put 

McGinnis is a difficult position. Still McGinnis’s apparent authority to 

negotiate on behalf of the individual defendants means that the settlement 

agreement is binding. “In Michigan, attorneys are considered to have the 

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apparent authority to settle lawsuits on behalf of their clients, and opposing 

parties have the right to rely upon the existence of such settlements when 

agreed to by attorneys.” Auramet Int'l, LLC v. C.R. Metals, No. 16-CV11177, 2017 WL 2959418, at *2 (E.D. Mich. June 12, 2017) (citing Capital 

Dredge & Dock Corp. v. City of Detroit, 800 F.2d 525, 530–31 (6th Cir. 

1986)). 

McGinnis referred to the settlement agreement as being only 

“tentative”; he argued that the intent of the parties was that they would be 

bound only when a signed agreement was finalized. This argument is 

factually inaccurate in that the reduction of the agreement to writing was 

not a part of the terms of the agreement described on the record. Instead, 

the discussion about McGinnis providing the initial draft of the written 

settlement was a housekeeping matter addressed at the end of the 

settlement conference, well after the terms of the agreement were placed 

on the record. [ECF No. 77, PageID.1081, 1086-87]. 

And McGinnis’s argument is legally unsustainable because it is well 

settled that “[t]here is no requirement that a settlement agreement be 

reduced to writing to be enforceable.” Glen Elec. Holdings GmbH v. 

Coolant Chillers, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1109, 2013 WL 2407613, at *8 (W.D. 

Mich. May 31, 2013). See also Auramet Int’l, LLC, 2017 WL 2959418 at *2 

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(“The validity of this agreement is not undermined by the fact that the 

written settlement agreement remains unsigned.”). 

The Court is also concerned about McGinnis’s efforts to frustrate 

plaintiffs’ attempts to finalize the settlement. In his September 6 letter to 

Stewart, McGinnis expressed concern that court approval was required 

needed to finalize the settlement on behalf of the minor child. McGinnis 

(mistakenly) assumed that the Oakland County Probate Court would need 

to provide the approval. But he then appeared at the probate hearing to 

object to the approval of the settlement, and also moved to dismiss 

plaintiffs’ complaint in this Court. McGinnis actively took steps to frustrate 

the completion of the settlement agreement and, if they were successful, 

he would have wasted the time and effort of this Court and plaintiffs in 

negotiating the agreement. 

Based on this conduct, the Court finds that McGinnis fell well short of 

his solemn obligation “to make every reasonable effort to see that the 

agreed terms are fully and timely carried out.” Aro Corp., 531 F.2d at 1372; 

Zwerin, 568 F. App’x at 375. Making matters worse, McGinnis was 

intransigent during the January 7 hearing. He repeatedly argued that the 

agreement was not binding until it was reduced to writing despite the Court 

citing opinion and after opinion to the contrary. McGinnis emphasized that 

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he sent Stewart a draft of the written settlement agreement and that the 

plaintiffs did not return an executed copy. But a few days after sending 

Stewart the draft agreement, McGinnis sent a letter to Stewart that would 

remove an essential term of the agreement placed on the record. 

McGinnis refused to acknowledge that, because of this sequence of 

events, he was responsible for the parties’ inability to finalize the 

settlement. This is but one example of the unfounded accusations that 

McGinnis made about Stewart. 

McGinnis also cast aspersions on the Court, defensively accusing the 

undersigned of being unfair and biased. He is entitled to his opinion. But 

McGinnis’s effort to defend himself by blaming Stewart and the Court does 

not give confidence that he will treat future settlement conferences and 

agreements with the necessary solemnity. A Section 1927 sanction is 

warranted to deter the tactics he has used before this Court. 

IV. Conclusion 

McGinnis raised a due process argument near the end of the hearing, 

and the Court invited him to file a request for furthering proceedings, but he 

ultimately stipulated that he would pay $900.00 in sanctions to plaintiffs’ 

counsel without an objection or further proceedings. Plaintiffs’ counsel 

asserted that the attorney’s fees and costs to them as a result of their 

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efforts to enforce the settlement exceeded $900.00, but they too agreed to 

settle the issue for that amount. 

The Court therefore ORDERS McGinnis to pay plaintiffs $900.00 for 

his actions in unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying the proceedings as 

it relates to the settlement agreement by January 25, 2019. This Order 

does not settle plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions resulted from the filing of 

defendants’ motion to dismiss, [ECF No. 88]; any sanctions ordered 

because of that motion will be in addition to the sanctions ordered here. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 s/Elizabeth A. Stafford 

 ELIZABETH A. STAFFORD 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

Dated: January 9, 2019 

NOTICE TO PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS 

The parties’ attention is drawn to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), which 

provides a period of 14 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order 

within which to file objections for consideration by the district judge under 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF 

System to their respective email or First-Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on January 9, 2019. 

 s/Marlena Williams 

 MARLENA WILLIAMS 

 Case Manager 

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