Honorable Wilson E. Speir 

Director 

Opinion No. M- 411 

Texas Department of Public Safety 

5805 North Lamar 

Austin, Texas 78751 

Re: Definition of “specialized 

motor carrier” and “base 

incorporated municipality” 

under Article 911b, V. C. S. 

Dear Mr. Speir: 

In your recent request concerning the above-captioned matter, you referred 

to the amendments of the definition of “motor carrier” in Article 911b. Sec. 1 (g), 

Vernon’s Texas Statutes, by Acts, 1965, 59th Legislature, Chapter 290, page 572. 

Specifically, you request an answer to the following two questions: 

1. Does the term “specialized motor carriers” cover only those 

carriers certified by the Railroad Commission as “specialized 

motor carriers” or does it include any carrier satisfying the 

definition in Art. 911b, Sec. 1 (i)? 

2. Does the term “base incorporated municipality” mean (1) the 

municipality where the shipment either originates or terminates; 

(2) the municipality where the trucker or carrier has his base of 

operation; (3) any municipality which is contiguous to both the 

municipality where the shipment originates and the municipality 

where the shipments terminates; or (4) something not covered in 

W, (2), or (3)7 

Replying to your first question, we must look to Article 911b, Section 1, which 

states, in part: 

“When used in this Act unless expressly stated otherwise: 

*** 

(i) ‘Specialized motor carrier’ means any person owning, controlling, managing, operating, or causing to be operated any 

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Hon. Wilson E. Speir, page 2 (M-411) 

motor-propelled vehicle used in transporting, over any public 

highway in. this state, over irregular routes on irregular schedules, 

for compensation and for the general public with specialized equipment, property requiring specialized equipment in the transportation 

and handling thereof; provided, that the term “specialized motor 

carrier” as used in this Act shall not apply to motor vehicles operated exclusively within the incorporated limits of cities or towns; 

and, provided further, the term “specialized motor carrier” as 

used herein shall include those carriers who engage or desire to 

engage exclusively in the transportation of livestock, livestock 

feedstuff, agricultural products in their natural state, broom corn, 

grain, farm machinery, timber in its natural state, milk, wool, 

mohair, or property requiring specialized equipment as that term 

is hereinafter defined, or any one, or more, of the foregoing 

named commodities. ” [Emphasis added. ] 

Where the Legislature has itself defined the term, that definition ,Q controlling and one may not resort to a general meaning, practice, custom, or any 

other meaning. Central Power & Light Co. v. State, 165 S. W. 2d 920 (Tex, 

Civ. App. 1942, error ref. ); Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. State, 158 S. W.‘2d 

336 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942, error ref. ) Thus, “specialized motor carrier, ” wherever 

that term is used in Article 911b, must carry the statutory definition’contained 

in Section l(i), unless expressly stated to mean otherwise. The term “specialized 

motor carrier” is not expressly otherwise defined in the statute. Therefore, 

the answer to your first question is .that the term “specialized motor carrier” 

includes all carriers falling within the statutory definition whether certificated 

by the Railroad Commission of Texas or not. 

Replying to your second question, we refer you to a most thorough discussion 

of the legal meaning of the term “base municipality” as used in Article 911b and 

found in State v. Lomeda Corp., Civil Docket Number 67-4559-A, District 

Court of Dallas County, 14th Judicial Dist. of Texas, October 24, 1968, by 

Judge Clarence Guittard. Because of the importance of Judge Guittard’s opinion 

and the fact that the judgment has become final and it is unreported and the only 

legal authority on this question in Texas, we will quote at length ‘therefrom, with 

modifications necessary for continuity: 

. . . The State has brought the action for a declaratory judgment construing the 1965 amendment to Article 911b, Vernon’s Texas Civil 

Statutes.~ All parties agree that this amendment was enacted to avoid 

at least some of the effects of the decision of the Supreme Court in 

State v. Ace1 Delivery Service, Inc., 333 S. W. 2d 930 (Tex. S. Ct., 1965). 

“One of the principal problems is the meaning of the term ‘base 

municipality’ as used in Subparagraph (4) of Section 1 (g) of Article 911b. 

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em. Wilson E. Speir, page 3 (M-411) 

Under Section 1 (g) the term ‘motor carrier’ does not include vehicles 

operating between points: 

” l(4) Wholly within the limits of a base incorporated municipality 

and any number of incorporated cities, towns and villages which are 

immediately contiguous to said base municipality.’ 

“The term ‘base incorporated municipality’ is not defined in the 

statute. The following possible constructions have been suggested: 

(1) The city in which the carrier maintains its terminal; 

(2) The city in which the particular truck involved in the shipment 

is based; 

(3) The city where the shipment in question originates . . . 

(4) Any city through which a shipment passes . . . 

(5) Any principal city around which small municipalities are clustered. . . 

(6) Any city about which the Railroad Commission has consmued a 

“commercial zone” under authority of the second proviso of this section 

of the statute. 

“[Apparently] the term ‘base municipality is taken from the field 

of Federal motor carrier regulation under Part II of the Interstate 

Commerce Act. That act partially exempts from Federal regulation: 

*’ ‘The nansportation of passengers or property in 

interstate or foreign commerce wholly within a municipality or between contiguous municipalities or within a 

zone adjacent to and commercially a part of any such 

municipality or municipalities . . , ’ ” 49 U.S. C. A. 

Paragraph 303 (b) (8). 

“Pursuant to that act, the Interstate Commerce Commission has, 

with respect to various named major cities, defined zones ‘adjacent 

to and commercially a part of’ such cities, and has also adopted a 

general order, known as ‘MC-37’, the material provisions of ~which 

are as follows: 

” ‘Paragraph 1048.101. Commercial zones determined 

generally, with exceptions. ’ ” 

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Hon. Wilson E. Speir. page 4 (M-411) 

” ‘The commercial zone of each municipality in the 

United States . . . within which the transportation of 

passengers or property, in interstate or foreign commerce . . . is exempt from all provisions of Part II, 

Interstate Commerce Act, . . . shall be deemed to 

consist of: 

” ‘(a) The municipality itself, hereinafter called the 

base municipality; 

(b) All municipalities within the United States which are 

contiguous to the base municipality; 

(c) All other municipalities within the United States and 

all unincorporated area within the United States which 

are adjacent to the base municipality as follows: 

” ‘(1) When the base municipality has a population less than 

2,500 all unincorporated areas within two miles of its corporate limits and all of any other municipality any part of 

which is within two miles of the corporate limits of the base 

municipality, 

(2) When the base municipality has a population of 2,500 but 

less than 25,000. all unincornorated areas within 3 miles of 

its corporate limits and all 0; any other municipality any part 

of which is within 3 miles of the corporate limits of the base 

municipality. 

(3) When the base municipality has a population of 25,000 

but less than 100,000, all unincorporated areas within 4 

miles of its corporate limits and all of any other municipality any part of which is within 4 miles of the corporate 

limits of the base municipality, and 

(4) When the base municipality has a population of 100,000 

or more, all unincorporated areas within railes of its 

corporate limits and all of any other municipality any part 

of which is within 5 miles of the corporate limits of the base 

municipality, and . . . ’ ” 

“The term ‘base municipality’ seems to have originated with 

this order. In its opinion delivered in connection with promulgation of the order, Ex Parte No. MC-37, Commercial Zones and 

Terminal Areas, 46 M. C. C. 665 (1948), ‘at p. 684, the ICC explains in a footnote: 

” ‘The term base municipality will be used hereinafter to designate the municipality whose commercial zone is under consideration. ’ ” 

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Hon. Wilson E. Speir. page 5 (M-411) 

“The ICC further explains that the commercial zone of each 

municipality is separately determined, and may, therefore overlap other commercial zones: 

” ‘The result is that the commercial zone of any particular municipality will overlap to some extent the 

zone of each contiguous or closely adjacent municipality. This should, however, cause no confusion. 

The statute exempts only purely local operations within any one commercial zone. Where such zones overlap, the exemption of local operations within each may 

not be tacked or combined to cover operations not confined to a single zone. 

” ‘It will also happen in some instances that the commercial zone of a small municipality, as herein determined, will be completely contained within the commercial zone of some adjacent larger municipality. 

When this occurs, the smaller zone becomes unimportant and, as a practical matter, may be discharged, 

for transportation confined to it will also be performed wholly within the larger encompassing zone. ’ ” 

“It thus appears that under MC-37, every municipality has a 

‘commercial zone’ with respect to which motor carrier operations 

are partially exempt, even though interstate commerce may be 

involved, and every municipality is, with respect to such ‘commercial zone’ a ‘base municipality.” Thus under the facts 

stipulated here, for purposes of Federal regulation, Dallas is 

a ‘base municipality’, which has a ‘commercial zone’ consisting of the area within its corporate limits, all areas within 

the corporate limits of immediately contiguous municipalities, 

all unincorporated areas within five miles of the Dallas corporate limits, and all other municipalities any part of which are 

within five miles of the Dallas corporate limits. Such a zone 

would include Irving, Grand Prairie, and Garland. Likewise, 

each of these cities is a ‘base municipality’ under MC-37, 

with a commercial’zone similarly defined, except that the 

distance factor would be four miles or less instead of five because of the smaller population. The ‘commercial zone’ of 

Irving, under Federal regulation, would include Dallas, Grand 

Prairie, Arlington and Fort Worth, but not Garland or Benbrook. 

“The 1965 amendment to Article 911b, now under consideration, was evidently drafted with the Federal statute and 

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Hon. Wilson E. Speir, page 6 (M-411) 

ICC regulations in mind, since it employs the terms ‘base 

municipality’ and ‘commercial zone, ’ which had not previously 

been used in state legislation. However, we cannot say that 

these terms are used in precisely the same sense they are 

used in the Federal statutes and regulations. Under the Federal law each municipality has a ‘commerciai zone’, and the 

ICC order merely defines such zone; whereas under Article ollb, 

a ‘commercial zone’ exists only where the Railroad Commission, 

after notice and public hearing, finds a necessity for such a 

zone and prescribes its limits. 

“The question is, then, does ‘base municipality’ under 

Article 911b mean only a municipality as to which the Commission has by formal order prescribed a ‘commercial zone?’ 

I do not believe this is what the Legislature intended, for two 

reasons. In the first place, the provision concerning ’ commercial zones’ expressly excludes ‘operations of carriers of 

commodities in bulk in tank vehicles and all specialized motor 

carriers. ’ No such exclusion is prescribed with respect to the 

area within a ‘base municipality’ and its contiguous municipalities. 

In the second place, the provision concerning ‘base municipalities’ 

is set forth as the principal provision of Subdivision (4) of Subsection (g) of Section 1, whereas the provision concerning ‘commercial zones’ is contained in a proviso which follows that principal provision. It would be illogical for the meaning of the 

language in the principal provision to depend on the proviso, and 

I cannot assume that the Legislature so intended. 

“I conclude, therefore, that the provision concerning ‘base 

municipalities’ must be construed independently of the proviso. 

As so construed, with the background of MC-37 in mind, it 

seems that ‘base municipality’ probably means any incorporated 

municipality in the state, when considered in connection with 

the incorporated municipalities fmmediately contiguous to it. 

So considered, any such municipality, with its immediately contiguous municipalities, constitute a statutory zone, like the area 

defined in the three preceding enumerated subdivisions, within 

which property may be transported without regulation. In addition 

to these four statutory zones of non-regulation, the second proviso 

following Subparagraph (4) authorizes the Railroad Commission 

to prescribe zones of wider area, but not applicable to tank vehicles 

and specialized carriers. 

y 2045 - 
Hon. Wilson E. Speir, page 7 (M-411) 

“Under this construction of the statute, the ‘base municipality’ 

is not necessarily the municipality in which the carrier maintains 

its terminal, or where the trucks are based, or where the shipment originates, or which is surrounded by smaller municipalities:, 

or upon which a ‘commercial zone’ is constructed by the Railroad 

Commission. Rather it is any municipality to which other municipalities are immediately contiguous. A shipment between points 

within the area of such ‘base municipality’ and its immediately contiguous municipalities is exempt from regulation under the 1965 

amendment to Article 911b, regardless of whether the shipment 

originates in the ‘base municipality’ or one of its contiguous 

municipalities. Indeed, the shipment need never actually 

pass through the ‘base municipality’ if the point of origin 

and point of destination are both within municipalities which are 

contiguous to the ‘base municipality. ’ . . . 

“Application of this construction to the different fact 

situations stipulated in this case results in the following conclusion: .I 

“A. a, through Fort Worth, to Benbrook. This shipment is exempt because m Worth, ?iie ‘base municipality, ’ is 

contiguous to both Irving and Benbrook. 

“B. Fort Worth, through Arlington, Grand Prairie and 

Dallas, -Garland. This shipment is not exernpms 

it is with a ‘commercial zone’ prescribed by the Railroad 

Commission, because there is no ‘base municipality’to 

which both Fort Worth and Garland are contiguous. 

“C. Irving, through Grand Prairie and Arlington, to 

Fort Worth. This shipment is exempt because lrvingis 

contiguous to Fort Worth, and either may be considered 

the ‘base municipality’. The points of origin and destination 

are controlling, and the fact that other municipalities may be 

traversed is immaterial. (It may be noted thatwhere the 

point of origin or destination is in an unincorporatedarea, it 

is material under Subparagraph (3) to determine whether 

the shipment passes through more than one incorporated 

area.)’ 

“D. m. This shipment is exempt because 

the two cities are contiguous and either may be considered the 

‘base municipality’. 

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Hon. Wilson E. Speir, page 8 (M- 411) 

“The question remains as to whether defendant Lomeds may 

carry household goods from Benbrook to Garland without regulation. 

As noted in example B above, the question depends on whether 

such a shipment would be within the ‘commercial zone’ provision 

of Article 911b. It is stipulated that the Railroad Commission has 

by its General Order No. 45, established a ‘commercial zone’ 

which includes Irving, Fort Worth, Benbrook, Arlington, Grand 

Prairie, Dallas and Garland. Thus the ‘commercial zone’ would 

include both the point of origin and the point of destination, 

and the question is whether such transportation of household 

goods would be the operation of a ‘specialized motor carrier, 

which is excepted from the ‘commercial zone’ proviso. This 

term is defined in the Subsection (i) of Section 1 as follows: 

” ‘Specialized motor carrier’ means any person 

owning, controlling, managing, operatin or 

causing to be operated any motor-prope ---+ led 

vehicle used in transporting, over any public 

highway in this state, over irregular routes on 

irregular schedules, for compensation and for 

the general nublic with snecialized eouinment. 

property requiring specialized equipment in the 

transportation and handling thereof; provided, 

that the term ‘specialized motor carrier’ as 

used in this Act shall not apply to motor vehicles 

operated exclusively within the incorporated limits 

of cities or towns; and, provided further, the term 

‘specialized motor carrier* as used herein shall 

include those carriers who engage or desire to engage 

exclusively in the transportation of livestock, livestock 

feedstuff, agricultural products in their natural state, 

broom corn; grain, farm machinery, timber in its 

natural state, milk, wool, mohair, or property requiring specialized equipment as that term is hereinafter defined, or any one, or more of the foregoing named commodities. 

.’ 

” ‘For the purpose of this Act, the term ‘specialized 

equipment’ includes, but is not limited to block 

and tackle, hoists, cranes, windlasses, gin poles, 

winches, special motor vehicles, and such other 

devices as are necessary for the safe and proper 

loading or unloading of property requiring specialized 

equipment for the transportation and handling thereof. 

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Hon. Wilson E. Speir, page 9 (M-411) 

” ‘For the purpose of this Act, the term ‘property 

requiring specialized equipment’ is limited to (1) 

oil field equipment, (2) household goods and used 

office furniture and equipment,(3) pipe used in 

the construction and maintenance of water lines and 

pipelines, and (4) commodities which by reason of 

length, width, weight, height, size, or other physical 

characteristics require the use of special devices, 

facilities, or equipment for their loading, unloading, 

and transportation. ’ ” 

“Section 5a of the statute provides: 

” ‘The Commission is hereby given authority to issue 

upon application’and hearing as provided in this 

Act, to those persons who desire to engage in the 

business of a ‘specialized motor carrier, ’ certificates of convenience and necessity in the manner and 

under the. terms and conditions as provided in this 

Act. . . ,’ I’. 

” ‘Section 5b. No motor carrier shall transport 

oil field equipment, household goods, used office 

furniture and equipment, livestock, milk, livestock feedstuff, grain, farm machinery, timber 

in its natural state, wool or mohair, on any highway in this State unless there is in force with 

respect to such carrier and such carrier is the 

owner or lessee of a certificate of convenience 

and necessity issued pursuant to a finding and 

containing a declaration that a necessity requires 

such operation or a contract carrier permit 

issued by the Commission, authorizing the transportation of such commodity or commodities; . . . ’ ” 

“It is stipulated that defendant Lomeda is engaged in the 

business of transporting household goods and other commodities for compensation or hire. It contends, however, 

that it is not a ‘specialized carrier’ excepted from the ‘commercial zone’ exempted because it is not a ‘certificated’ 

specialized carrier. Under Section 5a (b), no ‘motor carrier’ 

is permitted to transport household goods on zany highway 

without a certificate. Lomeda his in violation of that provision if it is within the definition of ‘motor carrier’ in Subsection (g) of Sectionl, and it is within that definition unless 

- 2043 - 
Hon. Wilson E. Speir, page 10 (M-411) 

it is excluded by one of the subparagraphs or provisions 

of that subsection. When it transports household goods 

from Fort Worth to Garland, it is not excluded by the 

‘base municipality’ provision in Subparagraph (4), as I 

have already found. Neither is it excluded by the ‘commercial zone’ provision, because it is engaged in an 

activity, namely, transportation of household goods, for 

which a specialized carrier certificate is required by the 

other provisions of the statute above quoted. 

“Apparently it is Lomeda’s contention that the 

reference to ‘specialized motor carrier’ in the ‘commercial zones’ ~provision means ‘that specialized carriers 

with certificates to serve a certain territory cannot extend 

their operations within ‘commercial zones’ beyond the 

territory authorized in their certificates. The proviso would 

seem to have this effect, in so far as carriers with certificates are involved, but I see no basis for holding that the 

exclusion is limited to carriers with certificates. So far 

as I can tell, it is intended to apply to both regulated and 

unregulated carriers which carry property, such as household goods, requiring special equipment. The fact that the 

‘tacking’ proviso immediately preceding the ‘commercial 

zones’ proviso applies only to ‘motor carriers authorized to 

serve’ the areas exempted does not indicate an intention to 

limit the reference to ‘specialized motor carriers’ in the ‘commercial zones’ proviso to carriers which operate under 

certificates. The absence of any limiting language indicates 

that no special advantage for unregulated carriers was in; 

tended. I conclude that no carrier of property, including 

household goods requiring specialized equipment, can operate without a certificate unless its operations fall within one 

or more of the other exemptions in the statute. 

“To the extent that Lomeda transports goods other than 

property requiring specialized equipment, it may operate 

throughout the Dallas-Fort Worth ‘commercial zone. ’ Consequently, it may carry such other porperty from Fort 

Worth to Garland without a certificate. ” [Emphasis added. ] 

While the Lomeda case, supra, is limited to its particular facts, we believe ti 

the holding anming is sound. We conclude that “base municipality” is 

legally defined as any municipality to which other municipalities are immediately 

contiguous. 

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Hon. Wilson E. Speir, page 11 (M-411) 

SUMMARY 

“Specialized motor carrier” means any carrier coming within the 

statutory definition contained in Article 911b, Section 1 (i), V. C. S., regardless 

of whether certificated by the Railroad Commission. 

‘Base municipality” as used in Article 911b, V. C. S., means any municipality 

to which other municipalities are immediately contiguous. 

era1 of Texas 

Prepared by James H. Cowden 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Kerns Taylor, Chairman 

George Kelton, Vice-Chairman 

MONW Clayton 

Bill Allen 

Houghton Brownlee 

Sam McDaniel 

W. V. Geppert 

Staff Legal Assistant 

Hawthorne Phillips 

Executive Assistant 

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