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******************************************************MICHELLE WATKINS v. JAMES WATKINS (AC 35995)
Keller, Mullins and Schaller, Js. Argued May 21—officially released August 5, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

Haven at Meriden, J. Fischer, J.)
Michael J. Fenton, with whom, on the brief, was George H. Romania, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Eric B. Caines, for the appellee (defendant).Opinion MULLINS, J. The plaintiff, Michelle Watkins, appeals from the summaryjudgment rendered bythe trial court in favor ofthe defendant, James Watkins, on her negligence action. The plaintiff claims that the court erred in concluding that the parties’ separation agreement
was clear and unambiguous and therefore precluded her negligence action because, in her view, the agreement was ambiguous. The plaintiff also claims that, notwithstanding the fact that the court concluded thatthe separation agreementwas clear andunambiguous, the court erred in declining to consider extrinsic evidence oftheparties’ intent, whichwouldhave shown that the plaintiff’s negligence action was not precluded by the separation agreement. We disagree with the plaintiff’s claims and affirm the judgment of the trial court. The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The plaintiffand the defendant
were married on June 12, 2004. During their marriage,
on or aboutJanuary 7, 2011, the plaintiffand defendant
were involved in an altercation that resulted in the plaintiffsustaining serious personal injuries. Following their altercation, the parties remained married for another fourteen months, until March 14, 2012.
On March 14, 2012, two things happened. First, the plaintiff, by service ofprocess, commenced the present negligence action against the defendant based on the January 7, 2011 incident. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that on January 7, 2011, her then husband, the defendant, ‘‘negligently and carelessly caused physical contact with [her] thereby causing [her] to fall to the ground inside [their] residence causing her to sustain injuries

. . . .’’ Second, after the plaintiff had served thedefendantwiththenegligencecomplaint,theparties executed a separation agreement, and the court, Conway, J., dissolved their marriage. Both parties were representedbycounselinthepreparationofthe separation agreement and in the ultimate dissolution of their marriage.
At issue in the present appeal are two paragraphs in the parties’ separation agreement. The first paragraph atissueisparagraphE undertheprefatorysectiontitled ‘‘Recital,’’ and it provides: ‘‘REASONS FOR SEPARATION AGREEMENT: The parties wish to be legally free to live separate and apart from one another for the remainder of their natural lives. Wife and Husband desire to settle all financial and property matters betweenthem createdbytheirmarriage by effectuating
anequitableassetandliabilitydistributionandbyterminating all present and future rights and obligations, except those reserved or created hereunder, which either of them now has or hereafter may have with respect to any property or estate of the other or inrespective estates upon the death of either.’’
The second paragraph at issue is § 10, titled ‘‘Mutual Releases,’’ anditprovides: ‘‘ThisAgreementisthe entire agreement of the parties. Except as to the obligations created hereunder and reservant to the parties hereto, therights setforthinthisAgreementisthe entireunderstanding of the parties and each party hereby releases and relinquishes to the other party any and all claims that either party has against the other for any and all property rights and causes ofaction from any behavior
or occurrence that happened during the marriage.’’
On the basis of the foregoing separation agreement, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s negligence action. The defendant claimed that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there was no genuine issue of material fact that the separation agreement precluded the plaintiff from bringing any claim against the defendant for any behavior that happened during their marriage. The defendantattachedtohismotion, as exhibits, the separation agreement, the plaintiff’s answers to the defendant’srequestsforadmissions, andhis ownaffidavit. These materials revealed that there was no dispute that the plaintiff’s alleged injuries occurred during her marriage to the defendant.
The plaintiff in turn filed an objection to the motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff attached to her objection, as exhibits, excerpts from the separation agreement and her own affidavit. In her affidavit, the plaintiff claimed that it was her understanding, based
on the parties’ conversations between themselves and their attorneys, that the negligence action would not be covered under the separation agreement. Afterreviewingtheparties’ submissionsandtheseparation agreement, the court, J

. Fischer, J., granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Specifically, the court ruled that the mutual releases provision of the parties’ separation agreement was clear and unambiguous and operated to foreclose the plaintiff from bringing the present negligence action against the defendant. The courtnotedthatbothpartieswererepresentedby counsel andthus weretobe heldaccountable for the unambiguous language used within the four
corners ofthe separationagreement. As such, andgiven the clarity ofthe agreement, the court declined to consider any extrinsic evidence regarding the parties’ intent. Ultimately, the courtconcludedthat‘‘there [was]
no genuine issue of material fact that the separation agreement preclude[d] the plaintiff from bringing the instant cause of action against the defendant.’’ This appeal followed.
We begin our analysis with the well settled standard ofreview appliedto acourt’s decisionto grant amotion for summaryjudgment. ‘‘Our review ofthe trial court’sdecision to grant [a] motion for summary judgment is plenary.

. . . In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact.

. . . To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.

. . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent.

. . . Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidencethatdemonstratestheexistenceofsomedisputed factual issue.

. . . It is not enough

. . . for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact

. . . are insufficient to establish the existence ofa material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45].’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rickel v. Komaromi, 144 Conn. App. 775, 779–80, 73 A.3d 851 (2013).
Theplaintiffassertsfive claims, allofwhicharevariationsonthesametheme. Theessence ofallofherclaims is that the court erred in granting summary judgment because the separation agreement, when read in its entirety, was ambiguous as to whether her negligence action was precluded by the mutual releases provision. In particular, she contends that ambiguity exists in the agreement because the agreement did not specifically preclude her negligence action. She also argues that ambiguity exists in the agreement with respect to her negligence action because, in her view, the entire agreement arises out of a divorce action and is limited to addressing only financial and property matters. Therefore, the plaintiff argues, because her negligence action did not specifically relate to a financial or property matter, her negligence action was not covered under the mutual releases provision. Relatedly, the plaintiff contends that the court erred by precluding her from introducing and relying on extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent with respect to the separation agreement. She contends that, even though the court had deemed the agreement clear and unambiguous, the court erroneously concluded that it could not consider extrinsic evidence that would have demonstrated that the parties did not intend for the separation agreement to encompass the negligence action. We are not persuaded by the plaintiff’s claims, and we reject her attempt to import ambiguity into the separation agreement where none exists. ‘‘Our Supreme Court has instructed that interpretation of a separation agreement incorporated into a dissolution decree is guided by the general principles governing the construction of contracts.

. . . A contract must be construed to effectuate the intent of theparties, which is determined from the language used interpreted in light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction.

. . . [T]he intent ofthe parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and

. . . the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensiblyappliedtothe subjectmatterofthe contract.

. . . Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms. A court will not torture words to import ambiguitywhere the ordinarymeaning leaves
no room for ambiguity

. . . . Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one party’s subjective perception of the terms.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nassra v. Nassra, 139 Conn. App. 661, 667, 56 A.3d 970 (2012). ‘‘[T]he mere fact that the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambiguous.

. . . [A] contract is ambiguous if the intent ofthe parties is not clear and certain from the language of the contract itself.

. . . The contract must be viewed in its entirety, with each provision read in light of the other provisions

. . . and every provision must be given effect ifit is possible to do so.

. . . Ifthe language ofthe contract is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the contract is ambiguous.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cruz

v. Visual Perceptions, LLC, 311 Conn. 93, 103, 84 A.3d 828 (2014). ‘‘If contract language is definitive of the parties’ intent, then the interpretation ofthe language becomes
a question of law for the court.

. . . Our review, in such a case, is plenary.

. . . If, however, the language is not clear, then the intention of the parties as represented in the contract becomes a question offact.

. . . Ifthefactinquestionisgenuinelymaterialtotheresolution of the issue, then it is not the proper subject of summaryjudgment.’’ (Citations omitted.) Best Friends Pet Care, Inc. v. Design Learned, Inc., 77 Conn. App. 167, 176, 823 A.2d 329 (2003). We conclude that the mutual releases provision is clear and unambiguous. As a result, our review is plenary, and in determining the intent of the parties to the agreement, it is the language of the agreement and the intent expressed therein that controls. Allstate Life Ins. Co. v

. BFA Ltd. Partnership, 287 Conn. 307, 314, 948 A.2d 318 (2008). Here, reading the language of the separation agreement, the mutual releases provision states that ‘‘each party hereby releases and relinquishes to the other party any and all claims that either party has against the other for any and all property rights and
causes ofactionfrom any behavior or occurrence thathappened during the marriage.’’ (Emphasis added.) This language is not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Its scope—‘‘any and all claims that either party has against the other’’—is broad, and its subject—claims for property rights and causes of action from any behavior or occurrence that happened during the marriage—is well defined. This language
means precisely what it says: that each party releases the other from any and all causes of action from any behavior or occurrence that happened during the marriage.
In construing the mutual releases provision of the separation agreement in this case, this court’s decision inDavisv.Davis, 112 Conn.App. 56, 63–65, 962A.2d 140 (2009), is instructive. In Davis, this court considered whether amutual release provision in the parties’ separation agreement precluded the plaintiff wife from bringing her negligence based claims against the defendant husband for conductthat occurred afterthe dissolution of the parties’ marriage. Id. The provision read: ‘‘Subject to the provisions of this [a]greement, and reserving the right to pursue any action for divorce or dissolution of the parties’ marriage or any breach of this [a]greement, each party has released and by this [a]greement does for himself or herself and his or her heirs, legal representatives, executors, administrators, and assigns, release and forever discharge the other of and from all cause or causes of action, claims, rights
ordemandswhatsoeverinlaw orinequity, whicheither of the parties ever had or now has against the other, including, without limitation, all claims or rights which
now exist or may hereafter arise by reason ofthe marriage of the parties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 63.
Thiscourtconcluded‘‘thatthelanguageoftheseparation agreement is clear and unambiguous.’’ Id., 64. The court noted that ‘‘the mutual release provision in the separation agreement provide[d] that each party release[d] the otherfrom ‘all claims orrightswhichnow existormayhereafterarise byreasonofthemarriageof the parties.’

. . . The language of the agreement clearly and unambiguously limit[ed] the mutual release to any and all claims existing at the time the separation agreement was entered and to any and all additional claims arising out of the marriage.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id. Because the conduct at issue in Davis occurred after the parties’ divorce, however, this courtultimatelyconcludedthatthemutualreleases provision did not bar the plaintiff’s claims against the defendant. Id., 64–65.
The language that the parties used in the release in Davis is strikingly similar to the language that the parties have used in the mutual releases provision in this
case. Infact, the agreementlanguageinthis case is even clearer and more straightforward than the agreementlanguage at issue in Davis

. In this case, the agreement
more plainly and simply states the parties’ intent to release each other from any and all causes of action arising from behavior or events occurring during their marriage. Consequently, the mutual releases provision at issue in this case clearly and unambiguously limits the release to any and all claims arising from behavior
or occurrences that happened during the marriage.
Unlike in Davis, however, the parties here do not disputethatthebasisoftheplaintiff’snegligenceaction, which is the January 7, 2011 altercation, occurred during their marriage. Accordingly, the mutual releases provision precludes the plaintifffrom bringing the present negligence action, as it is based on behavior that occurred during their marriage.
In reaching our conclusion, we observe, as did the court in Overberg v. Lusby, 921 F.2d 90, 91–92 (6th Cir. 1990), that ‘‘the separation agreement that [the parties] executed was [clearly] intended to tie up all loose ends andresolve all ofthe claims ordisputes thatmight arise fromthemarriagerelationship’’ andthat‘‘ifthe [plaintiff did] not intend a release of all known claims

. . . she could [have] expressly reserve[d] a tort claim from the settlement and then subsequently sue[d] in tort.’’ Similarly, here, as in Overberg, the reasonable interpretation of the separation agreement is that it was intended to tie up all loose ends and to resolve any and all claims or disputes with respect to property and
causes of action arising from any behavior or occurrencesthathappened duringtheparties’ marriage. Both parties were represented by counsel in the drafting and execution of the separation agreement. The plaintiff chose not to reserve expressly her negligence action fromthe separation agreement. She cannotnow escape the clear intent expressed in the mutual releases provision, namely, that she agreed to release the defendant from any and all causes of action for behavior that occurred during the marriage.1 Finally, we likewise reject the plaintiff’s argument that the court erred by disregarding her extrinsic evidence ofthe parties’ intent. The plaintiff contends that she was entitledto introduce and rely on such evidence underthe ‘‘intent rule,’’ regardless ofwhetherthe court deemed the agreement to be ambiguous. We disagree.
The ‘‘intent rule’’ was articulated by our Supreme Court in Sims v. HondaMotor Co., 225 Conn. 401, 419, 623 A.2d 995 (1993). In Sims, the question before the court was the proper construction of General Statutes § 52–572e (b), specifically, whether a tortfeasor must be named specifically in a release in order to be discharged of liability thereby. Id., 405–406. Ultimately,
our Supreme Court held that ‘‘[u]nder § 52–572e

. . . the contracting parties’ intent, not the operation of a legal rule [of contract interpretation], determines thescope ofarelease.’’ Id., 413. Accordingly, whenapplying § 52-572e, ‘‘[a] trial court may consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent regarding the scope of the release regardless ofwhetherthe court determines that the language ofthe release is ambiguous.’’ Id., 419. The court reasoned that it was necessaryto create a special ‘‘intent rule’’ of contract interpretation for § 52–572e in order to avoid frustrating the goal of that statutory provision.2The courtobserved: ‘‘Byabrogatingthe commonlawrulethatarelease ofonetortfeasordischarges, by operation oflaw, alljoint tortfeasors, § 52–572e preservesthe right ofthe injuredpartyto choose to release
one oralljointtortfeasors inaccordancewiththe intent of the negotiations between the injured party and the settling tortfeasor.’’ Id., 413.
Sims is factually distinct and legally inapposite to the present case. As this court noted in Embalmers’ Supply Co. v. Giannitti, 103 Conn. App. 20, 45, 929 A.2d 729, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 931, 934 A.2d 246 (2007), our Supreme Court did not intend for the rule in Sims to apply to all releases. In fact, ‘‘after Sims, our Supreme Court clarified that Sims should not be read as a rejection ofthe four corners doctrine of contract interpretation. See Levine v. Massey, 232 Conn. 272, 278 n.7, 654 A.2d 737 (1995). Instead, the court described it as a narrow exception to the general rule ofcontract construction that was needed to avoid frustrat[ing] the purpose of a remedial statute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Embalmers’ Supply Co. v. Giannitti, supra, 45.
In the present case, there is no remedial statute at issue. This case also does not involvejoint tortfeasors. Thus, the narrow exception to the general rules ofcontract construction created by Sims and the intent rule
are simply inapplicable to this case. Accordingly, normal principles of contract interpretation apply to the court’s interpretation of the separation agreement. As such, the courtproperly applied the oft statedprinciple that ‘‘[e]xtrinsic evidence may be considered in determining contractual intent only if a contract is ambiguous.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) OrangePalladium, LLCv. Readey, 144 Conn. App. 283, 297, 72 A.3d 1191 (2013). Because the court properly concludedthatthe separation agreement was clear and unambiguous, itproperlydeclinedto considertheplaintiff’s extrinsic evidence in determining the parties’ intent.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Indeed, it is worthy of note that § 11 ofthe separation agreement, titled ‘‘Mutual Drafting,’’ states that ‘‘this Agreement was drafted cooperatively by the parties’ counsel in consultation with the parties. Neither party shall be entitled to claim the benefit of any ambiguity from the drafting hereof.’’

2 General Statutes § 52–572e (b) provides that ‘‘[a] release by the injured person, orhis legal representative, ofonejointtortfeasordoes not discharge the othertortfeasors unless, and onlyto the extent, the release so provides.’’Our Supreme Court stated that ‘‘the purpose of § 52–572e

. . . is to permit the release ofonejoint tortfeasor to effect the release ofotherjoint tortfeasors only if the settling parties so intended.’’ Sims v. Honda Motor Co., supra, 225 Conn. 414.