UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TRAYVEON JACKSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

LORI GIDLEY,

Defendant.

 /

Case No. 2:15-cv-10669

HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS (document no. 1), DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY, AND DENYING PERMISSION TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Petitioner Trayveon Jackson (“Jackson”) was convicted in the Saginaw Circuit Court

after he pled no contest to assault with intent to commit murder, Mich. Comp. Laws §

750.83, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Mich. Comp. Laws

§ 750.227b. He was sentenced under the terms of a plea agreement to 7 years and 6

months-to-40 years for the assault conviction and a consecutive 2 years for the firearm

conviction. Jackson now brings a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, raising two claims: (1)

Jackson's defense counsel coerced his plea by representing that Jackson would be

convicted if he stood trial, and (2) Jackson was denied the effective assistance of counsel

for failing to challenge the validity of Jackson’s statement to police. The Court finds that

Jackson’s claims are without merit, and will deny his petition. The Court will also deny

Jackson a certificate of appealability and permission to proceed on appeal in forma

pauperis.

BACKGROUND

The case began with a shooting in Saginaw, Michigan. At the preliminary examination,

Jackson’s acquaintance, Julian Allen ("Allen"), testified that he saw Jackson with a

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handgun at his house on the afternoon of March 10, 2012. Allen saw three people walking

down the street at the time. Allen testified that he heard Jackson say that the three people

were from Chicago, and he had a problem with them a while ago. Allen heard Jackson

"rack" the gun and saw him go outside. Allen then heard three gunshots.

Twelve-year-old Rodney Norals ("Norals") testified that he was one of the three

people walking down the street near Allen’s house with his two cousins. Norals stopped

to talk to a girl. Norals testified that he heard three gunshots and tried to run, but he had

been hit by a bullet and fell to the ground. 

The physician who treated him testified that if the bullet was just slightly higher, it

would have severed a main artery and Norals would have died. The police recovered a .40

caliber casing near the back door of Allen’s house — directly across the street from where

Norals was shot.

The police located Jackson at a house in another part of the city the next day.

Jackson was taken to the police station for questioning. During the interview, Jackson

asked to use the restroom. He yelled out from the restroom to an officer, “how much time

am I going to get?” Hrg. Tr. 9–10 (Sep. 25, 2012), ECF No. 8-5. The officer responded that

he did not know, and then Jackson indicated that he would show the officer where he hid

the gun. Jackson then led the police to the gun, which was located in a kitchen cupboard

at another house. The gun matched the description given by Allen.

Jackson was subsequently charged with three counts of assault with intent to commit

murder, carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, carrying a concealed weapon,

and three counts of felony firearm. The assault charge carried a possible maximum

sentence of life imprisonment. 

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Jackson initially elected to be tried by a jury. Prior to trial, the court held an evidentiary

hearing on the voluntariness of Jackson’s statements to police. After the questioning officer

testified, the court took a recess and spoke with counsel in chambers. When court

resumed, the parties indicated that a plea agreement had been reached. 

The prosecutor indicated that it was willing to enter into the agreement only because

Jackson had cooperated and led them to the loaded gun. He indicated that the ballistics

report had come back on the gun, but he was still waiting for the fingerprint and DNA

analysis. 

The plea agreement between the parties called for Jackson to plead no contest to one

count of assault with intent to commit murder and one count of possession of a firearm

during the commission of a felony. The prosecutor agreed to dismiss the remaining counts.

The plea agreement also included a sentencing agreement for a minimum sentence of 7

years and 6 months on the assault charge, which was below the preliminary calculation of

the sentencing guideline range. 

After entry of Jackson’s plea, the trial court sentenced him in accordance with the

agreement to a term of 7 years and 6 months-to-40 years for the assault conviction, and

a consecutive 2 years for the firearm conviction. 

Jackson was appointed appellate counsel who filed a motion to withdraw the plea, for

an evidentiary hearing, for resentencing, for amendment of the presentence investigation

report (PSIR), and for production of the interview DVD. A hearing was held on the motion,

and the trial court granted the request to amend the PSIR and to produce the interview

DVD. The trial court determined that trial counsel provided effective assistance and denied

the remaining motions. 

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Jackson then filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of

Appeals, raising the following claims:

I. Defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights were violated when he

was coerced into taking a plea because his attorney was not acting in his

best interest, failed to file motions and told him that he had no issues and that

no one would believe him if he testified that he was not the shooter. And his

attorney was ineffective.

II. Defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights were violated when he

was coerced into taking a plea because his attorney was not acting in his

best interest and failed to put forth his valid defense and this constitutes

ineffective assistance.

The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Jackson’s conviction “for lack of merit in the

grounds presented.” People v. Jackson, No. 316994 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2013).

Jackson subsequently filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme

Court, raising the same claims. The Michigan Supreme Court denied the application

because it was not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by the

Court. People v. Jackson, 495 Mich. 918 (2013). 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when a state court decision “resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state court’s decision is “contrary to”

clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that

reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000). An “unreasonable application” occurs

when “a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the

facts of a prisoner’s case.” Id. at 409.

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The standard is difficult to satisfy. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).

Under § 2254(d), a federal court may grant habeas relief only “in cases where there is no

possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with the

[Supreme Court’s] precedents.” Id. The habeas statute is a “guard against extreme

malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error

correction through appeal.” Id. at 102–03. 

DISCUSSION

Both of Jackson’s claims challenge the constitutionality of his plea. He first argues

that his attorney coerced him into accepting the plea by advising him that he would lose if

he stood trial. Jackson alleges that his decision to enter his plea based on this advice was

involuntarily because he was only seventeen years old and had little education. Jackson

next asserts that his trial counsel’s advice that he would lose at trial was ineffective.

Jackson claims his counsel should have continued to pursue the suppression issue, and

had he done so, his statements and the gun would have been suppressed, and he would

have then prevailed at trial. 

Respondent asserts that his claims are unexhausted because he failed to present his

affidavit containing the factual support to the Michigan Supreme Court. Respondent argues

in the alternative that the claims are without merit. 

With respect to the Respondent’s exhaustion argument, the Court will elect to proceed

to the merits of the claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), because it provides for a more

straight-forward grounds for decision. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 524–25

(1997) (habeas court need not address complicated procedural defense when claims are

more easily resolved on the merits).

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Under clearly established Supreme Court law, a plea is voluntary and therefore

complies with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment so long as it is not induced

by threats or misrepresentations and the defendant is made aware of the direct

consequences of the plea. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). The

voluntariness of a plea “can be determined only by considering all of the relevant

circumstances surrounding it.” Id. at 749. The plea is intelligent and knowing where there

is nothing to indicate that the defendant is incompetent or otherwise not in control of his or

her mental faculties, is aware of the nature of the charges, and is advised by competent

counsel. Id. at 756. The plea must be made “with sufficient awareness of the relevant

circumstances and likely consequences.” Id. at 748.

With respect to Jackson’s claim that he was denied the effective assistance of

counsel under the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has set forth a two-part test. First,

the Jackson must establish that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 62 (1985) (quoting Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984)). To demonstrate that counsel’s performance

fell below this standard, Jackson must overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 669.

Second, the petitioner must also show that counsel’s performance resulted in

prejudice, i.e., “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.

Here, the trial court rendered the last reasoned decision rejecting Jackson’s claims

when it denied his post-judgment motion:

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The Court is going to deny the request to withdraw the guilty plea. . . . The

Court would note that Mr. Gust is one of the finest attorneys in this county.

And if he told his client that — gave him advice as to whether or not a jury

would believe him, I would hope he would rely on that advice. As Mr. Gust

has won as many cases as a defense attorney as anyone in this county, and

does know juries and how they rule in this county.

The Court did advise the defendant of all of his rights. And, certainly, he

waived any rights. Waived the claim to — he gave up any claim that this plea

was the result of promises or threats that he wasn’t told about. His attorney

not only gave him good advice, but he got a sentence that was way below

the guidelines after consulting with the prosecutor. And the guidelines, I

believe, were 135 to 225. And his sentence was, minimum sentence was 90

months; clearly, way below the guidelines. I don’t know how he could claim

ineffective assistance of counsel under those — under that agreement.

But he was read all his rights. I feel he was given effective assistance in light

of the plea that was taken and in light of the guideline departure that his

attorney worked out. So I am denying his request.

 

Hrg. Tr. 4–5 (June 10, 2013), ECF No. 8-7. The decision did not result in an unreasonable

application of clearly established Supreme Court law.

When a state prisoner brings a federal habeas petition challenging the voluntariness

of his plea, the state generally satisfies its burden of showing a voluntary and intelligent

plea by producing a transcript of the state-court proceeding. Garcia v. Johnson, 991 F.2d

324, 326 (6th Cir. 1993). When the transcript is adequate to show that the plea was

voluntary and intelligent, a presumption of correctness attaches to the state court findings

of fact and to the judgment itself. Id. A satisfactory state-court transcript, containing findings

after a proper plea colloquy, places upon petitioner a “heavy burden” to overturn the state

findings. Id. at 328; see Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992).

While it is true that Jackson was young and had a poor education, a review of the

thorough plea colloquy reasonably supports the conclusion that Jackson’s plea was

voluntary. The trial court informed Jackson of all the trial rights he would be waiving by

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entering his plea, and Jackson agreed. Jackson was informed that he faced up to a life

sentence if convicted after a trial, and he indicated his understanding. The trial court

correctly recited the terms of the plea agreement, and Jackson indicated his desire to

accept the agreement and enter his plea. Jackson indicated that he had a complete

opportunity to discuss the matter with his counsel. Jackson denied that anyone had

threatened him in anyway to obtain the plea and that it was his own free choice to enter into

the agreement. Accordingly, the record of the plea hearing allowed the state court to reject

Jackson’s first claim without unreasonably applying clearly established Supreme Court law.

 It was also reasonable for the trial court to reject the ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. The trial court had the benefit of a DVD of Jackson’s interview, and it heard the

testimony of the officer at the suppression hearing. The trial court determined that Jackson

was properly informed of his rights before making his incriminating statement. Counsel was

not ineffective for abandoning the long-shot suppression motion and instead accepting a

very favorable plea offer. Extraordinary deference is afforded trial counsel in the context

of plea bargaining. Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 125 (2011). And here the case against

Jackson was quite strong and the plea offer was generous. The state trial court did not act

unreasonably when it refused to second-guess defense counsel’s decision to advise his

client to accept the plea bargain and forego a trial that in his judgment was likely to end with

a guilty verdict. In other words, the state court adjudication of the claim was not

unreasonable, and habeas relief is therefore barred under § 2254(d). 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

In order to appeal the Court’s decision, Jackson must obtain a certificate of

appealability, which requires a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28

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U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To demonstrate this denial, the applicant is required to show that

reasonable jurists could debate whether, or agree that, the petition should have been

resolved in a different manner, or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483–84 (2000). A

federal district court may grant or deny a certificate of appealability when the court issues

a ruling on the habeas petition. Castro v. United States, 310 F.3d 900, 901 (6th Cir. 2002).

Here, jurists of reason would not debate the Court’s conclusion that Jackson has not meet

the standard for a certificate of appealability with respect to his claims. The Court will

therefore deny a certificate of appealability with respect to all of Jackson’s claims.

The Court will also deny permission to appeal in forma pauperis because any appeal

of this decision would not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). 

ORDER

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that permission to appeal in forma pauperis is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

s/Stephen J. Murphy, III 

STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

United States District Judge

Dated: October 26, 2015

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or

counsel of record on October 26, 2015, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

s/Carol Cohron 

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Case Manager

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