In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 17-3325 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

ABDELLA AHMAD TOUNISI, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division 

No. 13 CR 328-1 — Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED AUGUST 7, 2018 — DECIDED AUGUST 21, 2018 

____________________ 

Before KANNE, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. Federal agents thwarted Abdella Tounisi’s 

plans to travel to Syria to join Jabhat al-Nusrah, a militant terrorist group associated with al-Qaida, when they arrested 

him at an airport gate while awaiting a flight to Turkey. He 

pleaded guilty to knowingly attempting to provide material 

support to a foreign terrorist organization, and the district 

court sentenced him to the statutory maximum of 15 years in 

prison and a lifetime of supervised release. Tounisi argues on 
2 No. 17-3325 

appeal that the district judge procedurally erred at sentencing 

in four ways: (1) he did not sufficiently address Tounisi’s mitigating arguments; (2) he did not adequately explain the 

length of imprisonment; (3) he failed to properly consider the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors; and (4) he did not adequately explain the length of supervised release. Because the judge did 

not make any of these errors, we affirm the judgment. 

I. Background 

By early 2013, Tounisi had decided to join 

Jabhat al-Nusrah in Syria. He had watched videos of and read 

articles about its violent operations and its links to al-Qaida. 

His parents learned of his plans and attempted to stop him by 

taking away his passport in January. Undeterred, Tounisi applied for an expedited passport, reporting that his previous 

one had been lost and that he intended to travel to Jordan. He 

also opened a post-office mailbox just to receive the new passport. Later that month he visited a purported recruitment 

website for Jabhat al-Nusrah and emailed the listed contact 

person, who was actually an FBI agent, about his strategy to 

travel to Syria by flying to Istanbul, Turkey, then bussing to 

Gaziantep, a Turkish city bordering Syria. He explained that 

he would seize the opportunity to attain martyrdom if it presented itself. 

Tounisi, then 18 years old, solidified his plans in April 

2013. He bought a ticket for a flight on April 19 to Istanbul. 

The day before his flight, the “recruiter” sent him a bus ticket 

for Istanbul to Gaziantep and promised that “brothers” 

would be waiting to take him to a training camp in Syria. 

Tounisi responded by describing what he would be wearing 

when he arrived. As scheduled, he went to O’Hare International Airport to catch his flight to Turkey. He made it as far 
No. 17-3325 3

as the airport gate before federal agents approached, questioned, and ultimately arrested him. Tounisi was charged 

with knowingly attempting to provide material support to a 

foreign terrorist organization, see 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1), and 

making false statements in connection with an offense involving international terrorism, see id. § 1001(a)(2). He pleaded 

guilty to the first charge in exchange for dismissal of the second. 

A probation officer determined that Tounisi had a total offense level of 37 and a criminal history category of VI, each 

heavily influenced by the offense qualifying as a federal terrorism crime: the offense level was increased by 12 and the 

criminal history category automatically raised from I to VI. 

See U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4. The guideline imprisonment range 

would have been 360 months to life with those extended parameters. But that range exceeded the then-statutory maximum of 180 months, which thus became the applicable advisory guideline imprisonment term. Because Tounisi’s terrorism crime also posed a foreseeable risk of injury to another 

person, the policy statements for supervised release recommended a term of 1 year to life. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b)(1). 

In his sentencing memorandum, Tounisi advocated for an 

84-month prison sentence followed by a 10-year term of supervised release. He relied on a report by Dr. Marc Sageman, 

an expert in “forensic psychiatry and terrorism,” who had interviewed him. Dr. Sageman concluded that Tounisi was “at 

no greater risk than the normal population of being a danger 

to the public,” and that he was “not so brainwashed ideologically” that he remained a risk to run off to fight. Tounisi 

agreed that the guidelines were correctly calculated but argued that the increases for a terrorism offense resulted in an 
4 No. 17-3325 

overstated sentencing range because (1) he was placed in the 

highest criminal history category despite having no prior 

criminal history; and (2) he did not target the United States 

but instead, in a misguided effort, meant to help combat the 

dictatorial Syrian government. 

Tounisi also highlighted several of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

factors. First, as to his history and characteristics, 

id. § 3553(a)(1), he had struggled with depression and isolation resulting from his family’s financial struggles and the religious and racial discrimination they experienced, so he had 

turned to religion to cope. Now that his plans had been 

thwarted, he was remorseful and thankful he had not succeeded. When looking at the nature and circumstances of the 

offense, id., Tounisi reiterated that his choice to join Jabhat 

al-Nusrah was influenced by his isolation and motivated by 

his desire to help fight the Syrian government rather than a 

wish to join a terrorist group. He explained that he was 

friends with Adel Daoud, an 18-year-old from his mosque 

who tried to detonate a bomb in downtown Chicago. Tounisi 

had briefly considered helping Daoud but later tried, to no 

avail, to dissuade him from attempting to carry out the attack. 

Additionally, Tounisi argued against a significant need for 

deterrence, id. § 3553(a)(2)(B), and for further punishment, id.

§ 3553(a)(2)(A). He asserted that specific deterrence was unnecessary, citing empirical studies showing that (1) being a 

first-time offender, (2) having strong family ties, and (3) enduring swift and sure punishment all greatly decreased his 

chances of reoffending. Moreover, his youth and immaturity 

partially explained his conduct, and he would have matured 

by his release from prison after his requested 84-month sentence. As for general deterrence, Tounisi pointed to studies 
No. 17-3325 5

showing that other consequences related to prosecution (social stigma, etc.) were more effective deterrents than incarceration. Further, Tounisi already had been incarcerated for almost 20 percent of his life and had to carry the stigma of being 

a “terrorist” and felon forever, so punishment beyond his suggested sentence would not be “just.” 

Separately, Tounisi suggested changes to a few proposed 

conditions of supervised release but otherwise did not object 

to them. He requested a 10-year term, or alternatively, the 

possibility of early termination of a longer term. 

The government argued for a 15-year term of imprisonment. It submitted that the offense was particularly serious 

despite Tounisi’s stated goal of fighting the oppressive Syrian 

government. After all, by joining a terrorist group associated 

with al-Qaida, he was joining an enemy of the United States, 

and his plans easily could have backfired: he could have 

killed innocent Syrian people or been forced to return to the 

United States to commit an attack here. The government also 

pointed to Tounisi’s perseverance in committing his offense. 

He had not been deterred by FBI questioning after Daoud’s 

arrest, his family trying to stop him by taking away his passport, or his pursuit of educational opportunities. 

At the sentencing hearing, Tounisi repeated the mitigating 

arguments: his difficult background, his remorse, his ill-advised friendship with Daoud, and his youth. Tounisi again 

emphasized that his offense was less severe than a typical terrorism offense, and that the goals of general deterrence and 

just punishment could be satisfied without a 15-year sentence. 

Counsel did not mention the proposed 10-year term of supervised release. The government described Tounisi as someone 

who “was not going to be deterred,” reiterating the lengths he 
6 No. 17-3325 

undertook in attempting to get to Syria. The government also 

argued that general deterrence was paramount in order to 

dissuade others who might be young and naïve from following in Tounisi’s footsteps. 

After the parties’ arguments, the district judge solicited 

their views on the proposed conditions of supervised release 

(not the term’s length). He then repeated the parties’ written 

and oral sentencing arguments before discussing his view of 

the § 3553(a) factors. The judge noted that Tounisi had been 

struggling in life but concluded that those difficulties “cannot 

excuse the seriousness of his crime,” which weighed “heavily.” He remarked that many immigrants face discrimination, 

but most do not resolve to join an international terrorist organization. The judge opined that, despite Tounisi’s supposed noble intentions, he still was aligning himself with a 

group that advocates for the destruction of the United States 

and had placed himself at risk of becoming “a pawn” in a future attack against the country. The judge thus thought his 

crime, though never consummated, ranked “at the top.” 

The judge also concluded that Tounisi’s actions showed 

that he needed to learn respect for the law. He had not warned 

anyone about Daoud’s plans, had not been deterred even after speaking with the FBI about his friend’s arrest, and had 

lied to agents when they caught him at the airport. Next, the 

judge said that “there is a definite need to deter the defendant 

and others” from committing terrorism offenses. He emphasized that he had considered Tounisi’s argument that specific 

deterrence was unnecessary but said that “a great need for 

general deterrence” existed because people must know that 

they will be punished for “assisting terrorist organizations.” 
No. 17-3325 7

The judge, moreover, thought that the public needed protection from Tounisi because—irrespective of his motivations 

and newfound remorse—he had been willing to hurt innocents. The judge also briefly reviewed Dr. Sageman’s conclusions about Tounisi being at a decreased risk of recidivism. 

Addressing Tounisi directly, the judge noted that he had 

deliberately thrown away his opportunity to attend college 

and help people in a positive way in order to “join a bunch of 

thugs that take pride in cowardly killings,” even defying his 

family to do so. The judge sentenced him to 180 months in 

prison—the statutory maximum—adding that the factors 

“would warrant a significantly higher sentence” if there had 

not been a cap. Having “considered the factors in Section 

3553(a) in determining the conditions of supervised release,” 

the judge imposed a lifetime term and repeated those conditions. 

II. Discussion 

On appeal, Tounisi asserts that the district judge erred 

only procedurally in determining his sentence, but he challenges nearly every aspect of the judge’s reasoning. Tounisi, 

in short, wants de novo review of all the issues he raises, even 

if they touch on the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. See United States v. Thompson, 864 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 

2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 704 (2018) (explaining procedural 

challenges to sentence are reviewed de novo and substantive 

challenges are reviewed for abuse of discretion). 

First, Tounisi takes issue with how the judge handled his 

mitigating arguments, contending that he repeated them but 

did not explain how he evaluated them. A district judge must 
8 No. 17-3325 

address the defendant’s principal arguments made in mitigation, but the explanation can be implicit or imprecise and does 

not need to be extensive. See United States v. Reed, 859 F.3d 

468, 472–73 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Davis, 764 F.3d 690, 

694 (7th Cir. 2014). It must be detailed enough that we can 

recognize that the judge “considered the argument and ha[d] 

a reasoned basis” for how he weighed it. Davis, 764 F.3d 

at 694. The judge did that here. 

He acknowledged several mitigating factors—Tounisi’s 

lack of criminal history, mistreatment by others, youth, and 

depression and isolation—but Tounisi says he then “baldly 

assert[ed]” that they could not “excuse” the severity of the 

crime. The judge understandably considered these points together, however, because the first sentencing factor encompasses both “the nature and circumstances of the offense” and

“the history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(1). And as he explained more than once, the judge 

thought that the offense was still gravely serious in spite of 

Tounisi’s argument that his was not a typical “terrorism” offense and other mitigating arguments. In context, “excuse” 

meant “outweigh”: the nature and severity of the offense 

overshadowed the mitigating factors. 

Tounisi also contends that the judge mishandled his mitigating argument about specific deterrence. He says that the 

judge’s remarks lacked logic and ignored the parties’ positions. But the judge largely accepted that, as the parties 

agreed, specific deterrence was unnecessary. Though he remarked on the “definite need” to deter Tounisi (and “others”), he then repeated Tounisi’s primary arguments about 

why specific deterrence was unimportant. Relatedly, Tounisi 
No. 17-3325 9

contends that the judge should have explicitly accepted or rejected Dr. Sageman’s conclusions about his risk of recidivism 

or explained their effect. Not so. Tounisi used Dr. Sageman’s 

conclusions throughout his presentation to support his views 

on the § 3553(a) factors, and the district judge addressed each 

of those arguments. Thus, even though the judge did not 

orally state his view of Dr. Sageman’s conclusions, he considered the primary subject of the report, and a need for specific 

deterrence did not figure heavily, if at all, in his selection of a 

maximum sentence. It is clear, though, that general deterrence 

did play a role in the judge’s decision—he concluded that “a 

great need for general deterrence” existed and explained 

why. 

Second, Tounisi maintains that the judge erred by failing 

to explain why a shorter sentence would not suffice, relying 

on United States v. Ferguson, 831 F.3d 850 (7th Cir. 2016). But 

in Ferguson the district court had ignored both parties’ sentencing recommendations and imposed a sentence more than 

two-and-a-half times longer than the high end of that guideline range without justifying the choice. Id. at 854–55. In concluding that more explanation was needed, we relied on the 

Supreme Court’s admonishment that a “major departure” requires “a more significant justification than a minor one.” 

Id. at 854 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)). 

Here the judge chose the guideline sentence of 180 months, so 

it follows that an extended explanation of why he did not pick 

a lower sentence was unnecessary. See United States v. Kappes, 

782 F.3d 828, 864 (7th Cir. 2015). Still the judge more than fulfilled his obligation to explain the chosen sentence: he carefully covered every § 3553(a) factor and addressed each of 

Tounisi’s mitigating arguments. 
10 No. 17-3325 

Third, Tounisi argues that the judge improperly weighed 

several § 3553(a) factors. The government asserts that these 

are actually disputes with the sentence’s substantive reasonableness, not procedural arguments, but Tounisi persists in 

calling them “procedural” in his reply brief. We agree with 

the government that Tounisi is challenging the substance of 

the district judge’s decision, see United States v. Warner, 

792 F.3d 847, 856 (7th Cir. 2015), but his arguments are meritless either way. He confusingly contends that the judge erred 

in finding a need to promote respect for the law by focusing 

solely on the offense conduct. Tounisi points to his remorse, 

honesty with the government, and desire to help others avoid 

the same path to show that he respects the law. He never 

made that argument at sentencing, though, and even if he 

had, it does not defeat the judge’s concerns about Tounisi’s 

persistence in joining a terrorist group and his lies to the FBI. 

Tounisi also asserts that the judge placed the seriousness 

of the offense above all other factors, thereby disregarding 

him as an individual and implying that all defendants convicted of a “terrorism” offense would warrant the maximum 

sentence. But the judge consistently referred to the circumstances of Tounisi’s case, including that he had carefully 

planned the offense, ignored his parents’ wishes, knowingly 

sought to join a terrorist group, and risked being turned 

against the United States. The judge made it clear that he considered the offense serious not just because it was a terrorism 

offense but because of how Tounisi committed it and the 

damage he could have foreseeably caused. 

Last, Tounisi argues that the district judge did not sufficiently justify the lifetime term of supervised release. (At oral 
No. 17-3325 11

argument, Tounisi’s counsel clarified that he does not challenge any of the supervised-release conditions on appeal.) 

Tounisi points out that he contested the length of the recommended term of supervised release in his sentencing filings, 

yet the district judge did not specifically address the parties’ 

divergent proposals, except to say that he had considered the 

§ 3553(a) factors. Tounisi cites a case in which we remanded 

the defendant’s sentence so that the district court could consider the defendant’s “serious arguments” about supervised 

release and “the interaction between the length and terms of 

supervised release.” United States v. Quinn, 698 F.3d 651, 652 

(7th Cir. 2012). 

Although Tounisi undoubtedly preserved his argument 

about the length of supervised release, we cannot say that he 

prioritized it at sentencing. He requested a 10-year term twice 

in filings, but counsel never mentioned that request during 

the sentencing hearing. These two written comments about 

supervised-release length are unlike the “serious arguments” 

made in Quinn and instead are more like those we characterized as not even “principal” arguments in Kappes. See 782 F.3d 

at 846–47. There, a defendant’s counsel requested 10 years of 

supervised release just once at the end of oral remarks during 

sentencing. See id. 

As we did in Kappes, we conclude that, without any particular emphasis on the supervised-release term, the judge 

was not obligated to explain it at length. Id. at 847. His decision to discuss his “reasons for imposing the sentence as a 

whole” was “a reasonable choice.” Id. Supervised release and 

prison are part of “a single sentence,” and therefore just “one 

overarching explanation and justification—tethered, of 

course, to the § 3553(a) factors”—is required. United States v. 
12 No. 17-3325 

Oliver, 873 F.3d 601, 610–11 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal citation 

omitted); see also United States v. Moose, 893 F.3d 951, 960 

(7th Cir. 2018). A district judge is not required to rehash the 

relevant factors after he has just discussed them as they relate 

to an appropriate imprisonment term. See Oliver, 873 F.3d at 

611. The judge in this case carefully reviewed the § 3553(a) 

factors when he explained the prison sentence, so repeating 

his explanation in the supervised-release context was in no 

way required, especially since he chose a term within the 

range suggested by the policy statements. 

Tounisi emphasizes, however, that the factors that may be 

considered for purposes of determining the term of supervised release are slightly different than the § 3553(a) factors. 

The relevant statute for supervised release, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(c), instructs a district judge to consider the factors 

listed in § 3553(a), except for “the need for the sentence imposed” “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote 

respect for the law, and to provide just punishment,” 

§ 3553(a)(2)(A), and “the kinds of sentences available,” 

§ 3553(a)(3). Thus, Tounisi maintains that the judge placed the 

offense’s seriousness above all else, so the justification given 

for the imprisonment term cannot support the chosen supervised-release term. But Tounisi misunderstands the judge’s 

reasoning. The judge permissibly considered “the nature and 

circumstances of the offense,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), in determining both the appropriate terms of imprisonment and supervised release. The discussion of that sentencing factor, just 

like the discussion of the offense’s seriousness, was just one 

part of an extensive explanation for the sentence imposed. 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment.