[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-12949

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-20768-WPD-4

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

CLINTON COLEMAN, JR., 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(October 12, 2017)

Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Clinton Coleman, Jr. appeals his convictions and sentences for conspiring to 

import cocaine into the United States, 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(b)(1)(B), 963, and 

conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(A)(ii), 846, as well as the denial of his motion for new trial based on the 

weight of the evidence. On appeal, Coleman first argues that the trial evidence 

was insufficient to support his convictions. Second, he contends that the court 

abused its discretion by denying his motion for new trial. Finally, he argues that 

his total 135-month sentence is unreasonable. After review,1 we affirm.

I. DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Coleman first contends that the evidence was insufficient because it was 

based only on circumstantial and speculative evidence and the testimony of a 

confidential informant (CI), who Coleman submits was not credible. He further 

argues that, because he was acquitted of substantive charges but convicted of the 

related conspiracy charges, the verdicts were inconsistent.

 1 When the defendant has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence by an appropriate 

motion for judgment of acquittal, we review de novo whether there is sufficient evidence to 

support a conviction. United States v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280, 1284 (11th Cir. 2009). We 

review the district court’s disposition of a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1312 (11th Cir. 1985). On a motion for a new trial based on 

the weight of the evidence, the court need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the verdict, but instead may weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of the witnesses. Id. 

Finally, we review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion 

standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).

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To sustain a conviction for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance

under 21 U.S.C. § 846, “the government must prove that 1) an agreement existed 

between two or more people to distribute the drugs; 2) that the defendant at issue 

knew of the conspiratorial goal; and 3) that he knowingly joined or participated in 

the illegal venture.” United States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082, 1089 (11th Cir. 2009)

(quotation omitted). To sustain a conviction for conspiracy to import a controlled 

substance under 21 U.S.C. § 960, “the government must prove that there existed an 

agreement between two or more persons to import narcotics into the United States 

and that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily participated in that agreement.” 

United States v. Arbane, 446 F.3d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 2006).

There is a reasonable basis in the record for both convictions. The evidence 

supports the conclusion that Coleman knew about the goal of the conspiracies to 

import and distribute drugs and knowingly participated in the ventures. At trial, 

the Government produced an audiotape of Coleman discussing the conspiracy on 

the night the cocaine was seized at the port, in which Coleman provided to the CI 

the size and location in the cargo ship of the container in which the cocaine was 

stowed. Law enforcement agents testified that the container Coleman described 

was the one they later seized and which was ultimately found to contain a cocaine 

shipment. Further, Coleman and the CI discussed compensation and back pay 

from prior deals and whether payment would be made in cash or in kind, requiring 

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the conspirators to engage in further drug deals. The CI testified to explain the 

import of the conversations, and although Coleman attacks the informant’s 

credibility on appeal, “the jury gets to make any credibility choices, and [this 

Court] will assume that they made them all in the way that supports the verdict.”

United States v. Garcia-Bercovich, 582 F.3d 1234, 1238 (11th Cir. 2009)

(quotation omitted). In addition, the Government produced evidence that Coleman 

made only four phone calls to other members of the conspiracy in the weeks 

leading up to the seizure, but made dozens of calls on the day before the cocaine 

shipment arrived, the day of, and the day after. See United States v. Lyons, 53 F.3d 

1198, 1201 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that the inference of participation from 

presence and association with conspirators is “a material and probative factor that 

the jury may consider in reaching its verdict” (quotation omitted)). Taken in the 

light most favorable to the Government, the evidence is sufficient to show 

Coleman knowingly participated in the conspiracy to import and distribute the 

cocaine. See United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1333 (11th Cir. 2010)

(reiterating that in reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence, we view the record in 

the light most favorable to the government and resolve all reasonable inferences in 

favor of the verdict; accordingly, a defendant’s conviction will be sustained as long 

as there is a reasonable basis in the record for it).

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Contrary to Coleman’s assertions, acquittal on the substantive counts does 

not foreclose convictions for the related conspiracies. United States v. Corley, 824 

F.2d 931, 935 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[C]onspiracy and the related substantive offense 

which is the object of the conspiracy are considered separate and distinct crimes. 

An acquittal on the substantive count does not foreclose prosecution and 

conviction for a related conspiracy.” (citations and footnote omitted)). Similarly, 

Coleman’s assertion that the evidence was circumstantial and thus insufficient to 

convict him also fails. See United States v. Williams, 390 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th 

Cir. 2004) (stating that whether the evidence is direct or only circumstantial, this 

Court will accept all reasonable inferences that tend to support the Government’s 

case). 

B. Motion for New Trial

Coleman argues that the court abused its discretion by denying his motion 

for new trial, as the court did not properly weigh the circumstantial evidence 

presented at trial, consider the witnesses’ credibility, or recognize the 

inconsistencies in the CI’s testimony. However, as discussed above, there was 

evidence that Coleman knowingly joined in the conspiracies to import and 

distribute cocaine. Coleman’s challenges to the Government’s evidence, such as 

the alleged inconsistencies in the CI’s testimony (which were in any event 

reconciled), are insubstantial. See United States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1313 

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(11th Cir. 1985) (“[C]ourts have granted new trial motions based on weight of the 

evidence only where the credibility of the government's witnesses had been 

impeached and the government's case had been marked by uncertainties and 

discrepancies.”). The weight of the evidence presented at trial does not 

preponderate heavily against the verdict such that it would be a miscarriage of 

justice to let the verdict stand. See id. at (stating that in order for a new trial to be 

proper, “the evidence must preponderate heavily against the verdict, such that it 

would be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand”).

C. Unreasonableness of Sentence

Finally, Coleman challenges the reasonableness of his sentence. See United 

States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008) (describing two-part 

reasonableness inquiry). He contends the district court erred when it imposed a 

fifteen-month upward variance over the ten-year statutory minimum. Coleman has 

not demonstrated that his sentence is either procedurally or substantively

unreasonable. See United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(“The party challenging the sentence has the burden of demonstrating that it is 

unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors.”). The record shows 

that the court weighed the § 3553(a) factors before imposing Coleman’s sentence, 

such as his history, his characteristics, and the need to impose a sentence that acts 

as a deterrent to others. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); 18 

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U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). It explained in detail that Coleman’s statements at sentencing 

convinced it that the court needed to impose a sentence that promotes respect for 

the law. See id.; United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The 

weight to be accorded to any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the 

sound discretion of the district court . . . .”).

In addition, Coleman’s 135-month sentence was well below the statutory 

maximum penalty of life imprisonment for each count, an indicator of a reasonable 

sentence. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). 

Coleman has not established that the court improperly weighed the sentencing 

factors, committed a clear error of judgment, or unjustly relied on one factor to the 

detriment of all the others. See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th 

Cir. 2010) (en banc).

Finally, Coleman’s contention that the court improperly calculated the 

guideline range by erroneously applying an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 

is without merit. The court imposed an upward variance based on its conclusion 

that a within-Guidelines sentence was insufficient, not an enhancement under 

§ 3C1.1. 

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II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm Coleman’s convictions and his 

sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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