United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-3864

Christina Peeper, *
* Appellant, *

*
v. * Appeal from the Unite d States
* District Court for the Callaway County Ambulance District, a * Western District o f Missouri. political subdivision of the State of * Missouri, *
* Appellee. *

Submitted: May 21, 1997 Filed: August 19, 1997

Before MURPHY, HEANEY, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

Appellant, Christina Peeper, sought injunctive relie f from a resolution of a county ambulance district boar d of d irectors limiting her participation as a member o f that board because of her marriage to an employee of the ambu lance district. The district court denied Peeper’ s motion, holding that the resolution was narro wly drawn to meet significant state interests. We reverse.23 I.

In April 1996, Peeper became a member of th e Calla way County Ambulance District Board of Director s (“Bo ard”) after winning an election for the sea t rep resenting her subdistrict. Peeper’s husband ha d worked as an emergency medical technician and supervisor for the Callaway County Ambulance District (“District” ) for t wo years at the time of Peeper’s election to th e Board. The District is a corporate body and politica l subdivision of the State of Missouri governed by the sixmemb er Board. At the time of Peeper’s election, th e Dist rict and its employees were engaged in discussion s
ov er three major issues affecting their employmen t relationship: threatened litigation regarding overtim e wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act; org anization of the employ ees of the District for purposes of collective bargaining; and the schedule and hours worked by District employees.

Peeper attended her first meeting as a member of the Board on April 23, 1996. After conducting its routin e busi ness and election of officers, the Board adopted , over Peeper’s objection, a resolution limiting Peeper’ s participation as a member of the Board. On M ay 28, 1996, th e Board passed an amended resolution with the sam e goal. The resolution provided:

[I]n order to comply with applicable law an d effectively prevent Christin[a] Peeper fro m usi ng confidential information concerning th e Distr ict for financial gain, . . . th e unde rsigned board members desire and do hereb y allo w Christin[a] Peeper to participate in an y4

Dist rict matter except she may not participat e in di scussions involving, or vote upon, any o f the following:

A. Legal actions, causes of action o r litigation between the District and it s employees and any confidential or privilege d communication between the District or it s representatives and its attorneys or legal work product;5 B. Hiring, firing, disciplining o r promoting of particular employees by th e District when personal information about th e employee, including information relating to th e performance or merit of indivi dual employees, is discussed or recorded; C. Testing and examination materials , before the test or examination is given or, i f it is to be given again, before so given again; D. Preparation, including any discussion s or work product, on behalf of the District o r its representatives for negotiations wit h employee groups; E. Individually identifiable personne l records, performance ratings or record s pertaining to employees or applicants fo r emp loyment, including information relating t o medical, psychiatric, psychological, o r alcoholismor drug dependency diagnosis o r treatment; and, F. Any other matter implicating th e co nflict-of-interest concerns of Chapter 10 5 RSMo which the board may, by majority vote , decide to prevent Christin[a] Peeper fro m hearing, participating in, or voting upon. . . . [I]n order effort [sic] to comply with applicable law and effectively preven t Chri stin[a] Peeper from acting in matters tha t would result in a specific monetary benefit t o her o r her spouse, that Christin[a] Peeper i s directed to recuse herself and if she does no t recu se herself she is prohibited from hearing , participating in, or voting upon the following: A. Budgetary items involving th e compensation, benefits, and pensions paid t o employees; B. The hiring, promotion, discipline , compensation, benefits, and pensions o f employees of the District; and C. Any other matter implicating th e co nflict-of-interest concerns of Chapter 10 56

RSMo which the board may, by majority vote , decide to prevent Christin[a] Peeper fro m hearing, participating in, or voting upon.
(Jt. App. at 62-64). The Missouri conflict-of-interes t law, to which the resolution refers provides, in part , that:

No elected or appointed official or empl oyee

. . . of any political subdivision [of th e state] shall:

. . . .Confidential information is defined as “all information . . . which is of such a nature 1 that it is not, at that time, a matter of public record or public knowledge.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 105.450(5) (1997). The Missouri conflict-of-interest law imposes criminal sanctions on a ny person who 2 violate its strictures. The first knowing violation of the conflict-of-interest la w c o nstitutes a class B misdemeanor under Missouri law. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 105.478(1) (1997). A party committing a second offense under the law is guilty of a class D felony. Id . § 105.478(2).

7

(2) Use confidential information obtained i n 1 the c ourse of or by reason of . . . [her ] offic ial capacity in any manner with intent t o result in financial gain for [her]self [or her] spouse . . . ; (3) Disclose confidential informatio n obtained in the course of or by reason of [her]

. . . official capacity in any manner wit h intent to result in financial gain for [her]self or any other person; (4) Fa vorably act on any matter that is s o specifically designed so as to provide a special monetary benefit to such official or [her ] spouse . . . . In all such matters suc h officials must recuse themselv es from acting . .

. .
Mo. Rev. S tat. § 105.454 (1997) (footnote added). Board

mem bers expressed concern about their own potentia l

cr iminal liability in the event Peeper misuse d 2 information she received as a member of the Board. Peeper protested the May resolution and filed a clai m in federal court seeking injunctive relief based on he r claim that the resolutions violated her rights under the Firs t and Fourteenth Amendments to the United State s Co nstitution and under the free speech clause of th e Missouri Constitution. The district court denie d8

Peeper’s request for relief. The court held that the May resolution is “content-neutral,” narrowly tailored t o meet the significant government interests of preventin g the appearance of government corruption and p romoting the effe ctive functioning of the District, and leaves ope n alternative channels of communication for Pee per. Id. at 6. The court further held that the May resolutio n conforms to the provisions of the Missouri conflict-9

of-interest law, specifically citing section 105.47 6 whic h provides, in part, that “nothing in [s]ection s 105.4 50 to 105.498 shall prohibit any politica l subdivision from establishing additional or mor e stringent requirements than those specified i n [s]ections 105.45 0 to 105.498.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 105.476 (1997)

. The restri ctions in the May resolution place limitations on Peeper that are not rationally related to the goals of Misso uri conflict-of-interest law and that impinge o n Peepe r’s First Amendment associational rights and he r Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. Therefore,

we reverse.

II.

We review the distri ct court’s conclusions of law de

novo. United States v. Kistner , 68 F.3d 218, 220-21 (8th Cir. 1995). Our first task is to determine whether th e challenged resolution deserves scrutiny that goes beyond that traditionally required for restrictions placed o n cand idates or officeholders. See Clements v. Fashing , 457 U.S. 9 57, 963 (1981). Where a regulation implicates

a fundamental right, such as the First Amendment’s fre e speech guarantee, we review the regulation unde r heigh tened scrutiny. Id . If no fundamental right i s implicated, traditional equal protection principle s appl y. Id . Traditional equal protection principle s dic tate that state-imposed burdens that affect som e citizens d ifferently than others offend equal protection under t he Fourteenth Amendment only if such a burden i s “who lly irrelevant to the achievement of the [s]tate’ s [constitutional] objectives.” McGowan v. Maryland , 36 6 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).Str ict scrutiny under the First Amendment dictates that a state may not restric t 3 speech on a content basis unless it can show the restriction is n arrowly tailored to serve a compellingstate interest. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC , 518 U.S. ___, ___ (1996).

10 The district court e xamined the May resolution under the F irst Amendment strict scrutiny standard. W e 3 disagree t hat strict scrutiny applies to the limitations at issue.11

An individual’s right to be a candidate for p ublic office unde r the First and Fourteenth Amendments is nearl y identical to one’s right to hold that office. Because of the analogous rights involved, we employ the sam e constitutional test for restrictions on an officeholde r
as we do for restrictions on candidacy. In reviewin g cand idacy restrictions, the existence of barriers to a
ca ndidate’s access to the ballot “does not of itsel f compel close scrutiny.” Bullock v. Carter , 4 05 U.S. 134, 143 (1972). The Supreme Court has upheld res trictions on cand idacy that are unrelated to First Amendment value s and that “protect the integrity and reliability of th e elec toral process itself.” See Anderson v. Celebrezze , 460 U.S . 780, 788 n.9 (1983) (citing Clements , 457 U.S

. at 973 (upholding state provision prohibiting a n incumbent Justice of the Peace from seeking election t o the state legislature)). To determine whether to uphold restrictions on candidacy, we first “consider th e charact er and magnitude of the asserted injury to th e rights pro tected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments” caused by the challenged restriction. Anders on , 460 U.S. at 789. Following that evaluation, we must:

identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the [s]tate as just ifications for the burde n imposed by the rule. In passin g judgment, the Court must not only determine the legit imacy and the strength of each of thos e inter ests; it also must consider the extent t o which those interests make it necessary t o burden the plaintiff’s rights.

Id

.12

Following this process, we initially consider th e injury caused by restrictions on the officeholder. A s is the cas e with restrictions on candidacy, restrictions

on a n elected official’s ability to perform her dutie s implica te the interests of two distinct parties: th e individual’s First Amendment associational rights an d Fourt eenth Amendment equal protection rights; and th e voters’ rights to be meaningfullyLimitations on an elected official’s participation in the proceedings of a public body 4 such as the District also conce ivably affect the official’s First Amendment free speech rights, whi ch would require us to apply strict scrutiny as Peeper suggests. Here , however, t he May resolution only limits Peeper’s participation as a member of th e Boardand does not limit her ability to vote for Board members, to speak before th e Board during p ublic comment periods, or to otherwise express her opinions about the District’s operation as any other citizen may under the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee.
Candidacy restrictions affect the voters’ First Amendment right to be represented 5 by reducing the pool of candidates, although voters have the opportunity to recruit other candidates to represent their viewpoints. See Plante v. Gonzalez , 575 F.2d 1119, 1126 (2dCir. 1978) (requirements for candidacy are not unconstitutional unless they deny
a cog nizable group of citizens the right to meaningful representation through othe r candidates). Limitations on an officeholder, by co ntrast, provide voters no opportunity to be hea rd through an alternative representative. If the restrictions prevent th e officeholder

from meaningfully representing the voters who elected the official, such restrictio ns are subject to strict scrutiny. See Bullock , 405 U.S. at 143. Becaus e Peeper does no t raise the issue of the voters’ rights, and because we hold the Ma y resolution unconstitutional under the rational-basis test, we need not determine whether

13 represented by their elected officials. Cf. Bullock , 405 U.S

. at 143 (1972) (“[T]he rights of voters and th e rights of candidates do not always lend themselves t o neat separation” when considering the effect o f limi tations on candidacy). Restrictions on a publi c of ficial’s participation necessarily affect tha t individual’s First Amendment associational rights an d Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. Legitimat e 4 stat e interests may warrant restrictions that are d e minimis limitations of the official’s partici pation. See Cle ments , 457 U.S. at 972-73. Restrictions on a n officeholder after election also infringe upon voters ’ rights to be represented even more severely than when a state similarly restricts candidacy. 5strict scrutiny applies.

14

Althoughthe district court upheld the May resolutio n applying the more rigid strict-scrutiny stand ard, we hold the resolution unconstitutional under rational-basisBoard members also expressed an interest in avoiding their own criminal liability 6 for violations of the Mis souri conflict-of-interest law that Peeper might commit. Yet, the statute requires a person to “knowingly” violate the conflict-of-interest law before that person is subject to criminal liability. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 105.478(1). The mer e presence of Peeper in discussions that are not spec ific to her husband cannot constitute knowledge of, much less the “aiding or abetting”of a vio lation of the statute on the part of other Board members.

15 revi ew. The resolution’s provisions injure Peeper’ s First Amendment associational rights and her Fourteent h Amen dment equal protection rights. The resolutio n creates a standard specific to Peeper that treats he r differently than other Board members, strongl y implicating her Fourteenth Amendment equal protectio n rights. The restrictions also restrain Peeper’ s inte raction with other Board members, implicating he r First Amendment associational rights.

Having determined that the resolution injure s Pe eper’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, w e evaluate t he state’s purported interests and whether the

res trictions rationally serve those interests. Th e Boar d’s stated interests are threefold: to prevent th e misap propriation of information for personal gain; t o prevent the appearance of impropriety; and to promote the free flow of ideas among members of the Board. Each of 6 these interests, if served, can at a minimum constitut e a reasonab le state interest. See , e.g. , FEC v. National Cons ervative Political Action Comm. , 470 U.S. 480, 50 0 (1985) (government’s interest in avoiding corruption i s
co mpelling); Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976 ) (preventio n of the appearance of corruption is a concern almo st equal to the prevention of actual corruption) ; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , 376 U.S. 270 (1964 )16

(uni nhibited, wide-open debate should be a “profoun d national c ommitment” and a “fundamental principle of the Amer ican government”). In this case, however, th e port ions of the resolution that restrict Peeper fro m participating in or even hearing discussions not directly related to her husband do not rationally relate to those interests.17

The Ma y resolution limits Peeper in a wide range o f matters, most of which do not involve the concern s expressed by the Board or addressed by the conflict-of

interest l aw. For instance, the May resolution prevents Peeper fro m participating in discussions of or voting on “[l]egal a ctions, causes of action or litigation between the District and its employees” without a requiremen t that the topic be related to Peeper’s husband’ s emplo yment. Likewise, the resolution prevents Peepe r from participating in discussions of hiring or firin g employees or addressing testing and examinati on materials without re gard to whether Peeper’s husband is associated with the matters. The resolution goes well beyond th e Missouri conflict-of-interest law’s general prohibitio n of t he misuse of confidential information for financia l gain and recusal requirement for measures “designed .

. . to provi de a special monetary benefit” to the official or her spouse. The Board’s concern about keeping its discussion s free-flowing, particularly during the Board’s close d sessions, is based on its belief that Peeper’s presenc e woul d chill discussions between other Board members

. This chilling, the Board contends, stems from the othe r Bo ard members’ opinion that if Peeper is present sh e might pass on confidential information to her husband who would, in turn, pass it on to his co-workers. It i s incongruous, however, for a state to allow the electio n of p eople with such relationships to public office an d then consider them less-trustworthy stewards o f confidential information merely because of thes e relationships. The Missouri conflict-of-interest la w prohibits any public official from misusing confidential info rmation or acting for self-benefit, and those wit h18

spouses em

ployed by the public bodies they serve perhaps face greater temptations to run afoul of tha t prohibitio n. One does not, however, face any additional temp tation where the matters are unrelated to th e offi cial’s spouse. Yet the May resolution prohibit s Peeper fro m participating in any matter dealing with any empl oyee’s records, any testing material, or the hirin g
or firing of any employee. The Board’s interest i n prev enting corruption or at least the appearance o f corruption is not served by the vast portions of the May resolution that go beyond matters that could not lead or appear to lead to corrupt behavior by Peeper.19

As su ch, those portions of the May resolution are no t rati onally related to the state interests cited by th e Board.

Because provisions of the May resolution infring e upon Peeper’s constitutional rights under the First an d Fourteenth Amendments without being rationall y related to

a le gitimate state interest, the May resolution canno t stand as written.

III.

We re verse the decision of the district court. I n light of our holding that the May resolution cannot stand as written, no injunctive relief is necessary.

A true copy.

Attest.

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT

.