Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023 Page 1 of 14

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Keith W. Vonderahe

Dirck H. Stahl

Ziemer, Stayman, Weitzel & 

Shoulders, LLP

Evansville, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Terry Noffsinger

Kyle Noffsinger

KOOI Law Firm, LLC

Noblesville, Indiana

S. Anthony Long

Long Law Office, PC

Boonville, Indiana 

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Evansville Automotive, LLC, 

d/b/a Kenny Kent Toyota,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Samantha M. Labno-Fritchley, 

individually; as next friend of 

Penelope Rose Fritchley, a 

minor; and as personal 

representative of the estate of 

John Henry Fritchley II, 

deceased,

Appellees-Plaintiffs.

April 12, 2023

Court of Appeals Case No.

22A-CT-1601

Interlocutory Appeal from the 

Vanderburgh Circuit Court

The Hon. David D. Kiely, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

82C01-1901-CT-338

Opinion by Judge Bradford.

Judges May and Mathias concur. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023 Page 2 of 14

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary 

[1] In February of 2018, Boonville resident John Fritchley II attempted to remove 

the top of an empty fifty-five-gallon, metal drum (in particular, “the Drum,” 

generally, “drums”) with a cutting torch when it exploded, blowing the top off 

of the Drum and killing him instantly. The top of the Drum—down at which 

John had to have been looking as he cut—bore a warning label, which included

a red pictogram of a flame with the words “FLAMMABLE LIQUID” and also 

provided, inter alia, “Do not flame cut, braze or weld empty container.” 

Investigation of the incident revealed that the Drum had previously been in the 

possession of Superior Oil Company, Inc., d/b/a Superior Solvents and 

Chemicals, Inc. (“Superior”), who had filled it with a flammable brake-cleaning 

solution called S-1693. From Superior, the Drum had passed to distributor 

Busler Enterprises, Inc. (“Busler”), whose customers for S-1693 included 

Evansville Automotive, LLC, d/b/a Kenny Kent Toyota (“Kenny Kent”). As 

it happens, Kenny Kent had allowed Paul Rhoades—also a Boonville 

resident—to collect its empty drums for some time, apparently for resale. 

[2] In December of 2018, Samantha M. Labno-Fritchley, John’s widow, filed suit 

against Superior, Busler, and Kenny Kent on her behalf, as next friend of her

and John’s daughter, and as personal representative of John’s estate 

(collectively, “Samantha”). Samantha’s suit included allegations of negligence, 

violations of the Indiana Products Liability Act (“the Act”), negligent infliction 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023 Page 3 of 14

of emotional distress, and wrongful death. Kenny Kent moved for summary 

judgement, which motion the trial court denied in April of 2022. Kenny Kent 

contends that the trial court erred in denying its summary-judgment motion on 

the grounds that (1) the Act does not apply because it is not in the business of 

selling drums, (2) it had no duty of care to John, (3) there is no designated 

evidence that it ever had the Drum in its possession, and (4) the designated 

evidence establishes as a matter of law that John was more than fifty percent at 

fault. Because we agree with Kenny Kent’s contentions that the Act does not 

apply and that the designated evidence establishes that John was more than fifty 

percent at fault as a matter of law, we reverse and remand with instructions to 

enter summary judgment in favor of Kenny Kent. 

Facts and Procedural History 

[3] On February 11, 2018, sadly, John was in the process of removing the top from 

the Drum with a cutting torch at his Boonville residence when it exploded, 

propelling the lid upwards, which struck him in the head, killing him instantly. 

According to a report filed by Warrick County Sheriff’s Deputy Jarrett Busing, 

“the explosion caused the [top1] of the drum to pop off and this made contact 

with the deceased.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 23. Samantha later recalled 

that “John purchased the [Drum] and when he got home he set it up in front of 

the garage door, ran the hose to it, and attempted to cut the lid off with a 

1

 Deputy Busing later learned that what he had believed was the bottom of the Drum was actually the top. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023 Page 4 of 14

cutting torch.” Appellant’s App. Vol. VI p. 182. At the time of his death, John 

was employed by Alcoa USA Corporation (“Alcoa”) and had been for at least 

fifteen years. At Alcoa, John had received training for and had worked with: 

combustible dust; critical risk management; fire prevention, protection, and

extinguishers; hazard communication; performing hot works and hot-work 

permit refresher training module; tri-annual refresher training; workplace 

critical hazard refresher training; and workplace health hazards. John’s hotworks training had provided, inter alia, that sparking tools could be an ignition 

source and that one should “[n]ever cut or weld on a drum” because “[h]ot 

work performed on piping, tanks, vessels, containers, and confined spaces that 

contain or previously contained a hazardous, flammable or combustible liquids 

can explode” and “[p]iping, tanks and vessels can explode!!!!!!” Appellant’s App. 

Vol. VII p. 62 (first emphasis added; second emphasis in original). 

[4] After exploding, the Drum essentially remained intact but for the top. The 

warning label on the top had also remained intact and included a prominent 

pictogram in red of a flame with the words “FLAMMABLE LIQUID” 

underneath. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 11. The warning label also provided, 

in part, as follows:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023 Page 5 of 14

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 175. The entire label, in which the above warning is 

circled in red, appeared as follows: 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 11. Prior to the explosion, the warning label had 

looked approximately like this:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023 Page 6 of 14

Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 177. So, before the explosion, the label had also 

provided that the Drum had contained “S-1693 Solvent Blend,” or “Heptane 

Isopropanol,” a “Flammable Liquid,” and “Highly flammable liquid and 

vapor.” Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 177. 

[5] Regarding the source of the S-1693, the Drum’s label indicated that it had been 

manufactured by Superior Oil. Superior Oil sells S-1693 to Busler, an industrial 

commercial distribution customer. Before delivery to Busler, Superior Oil fills

drums with the S-1693 and affixes warning labels to the drums. Among 

Busler’s S-1693 customers is Kenny Kent, an automobile dealership in 

Evansville that also has a service center.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023 Page 7 of 14

[6] John’s death was investigated by the Indiana Department of Environmental 

Management (“IDEM”) and the Warrick County Sheriff’s Department. 

During the investigation, it was learned that Kenny Kent had, for some time, 

allowed Rhoades to collect its empty drums, at first only plastic drums that had 

contained windshield-cleaning fluid but eventually also some metal drums that 

had contained S-1693. 

[7] On December 6, 2018, Samantha brought suit against Kenny Kent, Superior, 

and Busler seeking money damages for alleged negligence and violation of the 

Act. In January of 2019, the Warrick Circuit Court transferred the case to the

Vanderburgh Circuit Court. On November 8, 2021, Kenny Kent moved for 

summary judgment. On December 8, 2021, Samantha filed her response and 

designation of evidence opposing Kenny Kent’s summary-judgment motion. 

On April 7, 2022, after an oral argument the week before, the trial court denied

Kenny Kent’s summary-judgment motion. 

Discussion and Decision 

[8] When reviewing the grant or denial of a summary-judgment motion, we apply 

the same standard as the trial court. Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Simrell’s Sports Bar & 

Grill, Inc., 741 N.E.2d 383, 386 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Summary judgment is 

appropriate only where the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of 

material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 

Id.; Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). To prevail on a summary-judgment motion, a party 

must demonstrate that the undisputed material facts negate at least one element 

of the other party’s claim. Merchs. Nat’l Bank, 741 N.E.2d at 386. Once the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023 Page 8 of 14

moving party has met this burden with a prima facie showing, the burden shifts 

to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue does in fact exist. Id. 

The party appealing the summary judgment bears the burden of persuading us 

that the trial court erred. Id. “In determining whether there is a genuine issue 

of material fact precluding summary judgment, all doubts must be resolved 

against the moving party and the facts set forth by the party opposing the 

motion must be accepted as true.” Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435, 

438–39 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied. 

[9] Kenny Kent contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on Samantha’s 

claim pursuant to the Act, arguing that there is no designated evidence that it 

has ever been engaged in the business of selling S-1693 drums, a requirement 

for the Act to apply. As for Samantha’s negligence claim, Kenny Kent 

contends that it had no duty of care to John as a matter of law, there is no 

designated evidence that it breached any duty it may have had to John, there is 

no designated evidence tending to show that it ever possessed the Drum, and 

the designated evidence of John’s conduct renders him more than fifty percent 

at fault as a matter of law. 

I. Products Liability

[10] Pursuant to the Act, 

a person who sells, leases, or otherwise puts into the stream of 

commerce any product in a defective condition unreasonably 

dangerous to any user or consumer or to the user’s or consumer’s 

property is subject to liability for physical harm caused by that 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023 Page 9 of 14

product to the user or consumer or to the user’s or consumer’s 

property if:

(1) that user or consumer is in the class of persons that the seller 

should reasonably foresee as being subject to the harm 

caused by the defective condition;

(2) the seller is engaged in the business of selling the product; 

and

(3) the product is expected to and does reach the user or 

consumer without substantial alteration in the condition in 

which the product is sold by the person sought to be held 

liable under this article.

Ind. Code § 34-20-2-1. Whether the Act applies is a question of law. Bayer 

Corp. v. Leach, 153 N.E.3d 1168, 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Stegemoller v. 

ACandS, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 974, 975 (Ind. 2002)). The Act imposes liability upon 

sellers and manufacturers of defective products. Ford Motor Co. v. Rushford, 868 

N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ind. 2007) (citing Morgen v. Ford Motor Co., 797 N.E.2d 1146, 

1148 (Ind. 2003)). The Act “governs all actions that are: (1) brought by a user 

or consumer; (2) against a manufacturer or seller; and (3) for physical harm 

caused by a product ... regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories 

upon which the action is brought.” Id. at 810 (citing Ind. Code § 34-20-1-1)

(ellipsis in Rushford). 

[11] Kenny Kent argues that Samantha’s claim pursuant to the Act fails because 

there is no designated evidence that it is or ever has been engaged in the 

business of manufacturing or selling drums, with the designated evidence 

indicating instead that it is in the business of selling and servicing automobiles. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023 Page 10 of 14

As Kenny Kent points out, Samantha does not address this argument directly.

2

 

“An appellee’s failure to respond to an issue raised by an appellant is akin to 

failure to file a brief, and subjects the appellee to reversal upon the appellant’s 

showing of prima facie error on that issue.” Hacker v. Holland, 575 N.E.2d 675, 

676 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Day, et al. v. Ryan, 560 N.E.2d 77, 84 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1990)), trans. denied. “Prima facie is defined in this context as at first sight, 

on first appearance, or on the face of it.” State Farm Ins. v. Freeman, 847 N.E.2d 

1047, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). 

[12] As we have noted, 

[the Act] applies to a seller of a defective product provided the 

seller is “engaged in the business of selling such a product.” See

IND. CODE § 33-1-1.5-3(a)(1) [repealed by P.L.1-1998, Sec. 221, 

recodified at Ind. Code § 34-20-2-1(2) with slightly modified 

language]. However, the occasional seller who is not engaged in 

that activity as part of his business is not liable in products liability. 

Perfection Paint v. Konduris (1971), 147 Ind. App. 106, 117, 258 

N.E.2d 681, 686. Thus, for example, the [Act] does not apply to a 

homemaker who sells a jar of jam or a person who sells his used 

car to his neighbor. Restatement Second of Torts § 402A, 

comment (f)[.]

Lucas v. Dorsey Corp., 609 N.E.2d 1191, 1202 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied. 

We conclude that Kenny Kent has established prima facie error in this regard. 

The designated evidence, i.e., evidence that Kenny Kent occasionally gave 

2

 Samantha argues instead that Kenny Kent did not have to actually sell drums in order to be subject to the 

Act and that Kenny Kent is a “distributor” pursuant to the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act. We 

agree with Kenny Kent that Samantha’s arguments, even if we were to accept them, do nothing to establish 

that Kenny Kent is in the business of selling drums. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023 Page 11 of 14

empty drums to Rhoades and that the drums were nothing more than “a waste 

product” to be discarded, Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 169, without more, falls 

short of establishing that it was “engaged in the business” of selling them. See 

Lucas, 609 N.E.2d at 1202. 

II. Negligence

[13] Kenny Kent also contends that the trial court erred in denying it summary 

judgment on Samantha’s negligence claim. Negligence is a tort that requires 

proof of “(1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that 

duty; and (3) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the defendant’s breach.” 

Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind. 2004). “Negligence will not be 

inferred; rather, all of the elements of a negligence action must be supported by 

specific facts designated to the trial court or reasonable inferences that might be 

drawn from those facts.” Kincade v. MAC Corp., 773 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2002). “An inference is not reasonable when it rests on no more than 

speculation or conjecture.” Id. “A negligence action is generally not 

appropriate for disposal by summary judgment.” Id. “However, a defendant 

may obtain summary judgment in a negligence action when the undisputed 

facts negate at least one element of the plaintiff’s claim.” Id.

[14] Kenny Kent argues that it did not owe a duty of care to John as a matter of law, 

the designated evidence establishes that it did not breach any duty it may have 

had, and the designated evidence establishes a lack of proximate cause. We 

need not address these arguments, however, as we accept Kenny Kent’s

argument that the designated evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that John
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023 Page 12 of 14

was more than fifty percent at fault for his fatal accident. Pursuant to the 

Comparative Fault Act, “[i]f the percentage of fault of the claimant is greater 

than fifty percent (50%) of the total fault involved in the incident which caused 

the claimant’s death, injury, or property damage, the jury shall return a verdict 

for the defendant[.]” Ind. Code § 34-51-2-7(b)(2). It is generally true that “the 

apportionment of fault is uniquely a question of fact to be decided by the factfinder.” Hampton v. Moistner, 654 N.E.2d 1191, 1195 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). It is 

also true, however, that “‘when there is no dispute in the evidence and the factfinder is able to come to only one logical conclusion[,]’” the “apportionment of 

fault becomes an issue of law solely for the [...] court[.]” St. Mary’s Med. Ctr. v. 

Loomis, 783 N.E.2d 274, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Moistner, 654 

N.E.2d at 1195). This is one of those cases. 

[15] The designated evidence shows that the top of the Drum had a conspicuous, red 

pictogram of a flame with the words “FLAMMABLE LIQUID[,]” the notation 

“DANGER Highly flammable liquid and vapor[,]” and a more specific 

warning label that stated that the Drum was “hazardous when empty” and that 

one should not “flame cut, braze, or weld [the] empty container.” Appellant’s 

App. Vol. II pp. 11, 175; Vol. III p. 177. Moreover, there is no question that 

any person bringing a cutting torch to the Drum to remove that top would have 

seen the prominently-displayed warning label. Given that the explosion 

propelled the top upward into John’s face, he was undoubtedly looking down at 

the label when the explosion occurred. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023 Page 13 of 14

[16] The designated evidence also indicates that, over the course of his fifteen-year 

career at Alcoa, John had received training for and had worked with: 

combustible dust; critical risk management; fire prevention, protection, and 

extinguishers; hazard communication; performing hot works and hot-work 

permit refresher training module; tri-annual refresher training; workplace 

critical hazard refresher training; and workplace health hazards. John was 

trained that sparking tools are an ignition source and that one should “[n]ever 

cut or weld on a drum” because “[h]ot work performed on piping, tanks, 

vessels, containers, and confined spaces that contain or have previously contained

a hazardous, flammable or combustible liquids can explode,” and “[p]iping, 

tanks and vessels can explode!!!!!!” Appellant’s App. Vol. VII p. 62 (first emphasis 

added; second emphasis in original).

[17] In light of the clear, unambiguous, and conspicuous warning label on the drum 

stating that it contained “FLAMMABLE LIQUID” and John’s specific 

knowledge through his work and training that cutting on a drum that 

contained, or had previously contained, a flammable liquid with a torch could 

cause an explosion, we cannot conclude that John’s fault must be left to a finder 

of fact. John knew or should have known the risks of cutting into the Drum 

with a torch. See, e.g., Coffman v. PSI Energy, Inc., 815 N.E.2d 522, 529 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2004) (concluding that plaintiff’s negligence was more than the total of 

any alleged negligence on the part of the appellees as a matter of law where 

plaintiff testified that he knew of specific risks associated with using a metal tarp 

frame on a truck near power lines), trans. denied. We conclude that the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CT-1601 | April 12, 2023 Page 14 of 14

designated evidence allows only one conclusion, namely, that John was more 

than fifty percent at fault for the explosion as a matter of law. Because 

Samantha cannot show that Kenny Kent is at least fifty percent at fault, she 

cannot recover, and Kenny Kent is therefore entitled to summary judgment on 

Samantha’s negligence claim.

[18] We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.