1

Filed 8/22/16 In re B.M. CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re B.M. et al., Persons Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL 

SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

H.A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A146594

 (Alameda County

 Super. Ct. Nos. OJ13020846,

 OJ13021112)

Appellant H.A. (Father) argues the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the 

beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights in the 

dependency cases of his four and five-year-old daughters. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)1 We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in 

finding this is not an extraordinary case that justifies depriving dependent children of the 

permanency of adoption.

I. BACKGROUND

Father and A.M. (Mother; together, Parents)

2

left their two daughters (B.M., born 

2009, and M.M., born 2011; together, Children) in the care of their maternal grandmother 

 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 Mother is not a party to this appeal.
2

for an extended period of time, even though the grandmother had a history of 

methamphetamine abuse, untreated mental health problems, child welfare referrals, and a 

conviction for willful cruelty toward a child. In April 2013, the older child was molested 

by one of her grandmother’s roommates. Parents learned of the abuse and did not take 

any protective action. Other roommates of the grandmother reported the abuse, and the 

Sonoma County Human Services Department placed the girl in emergency foster care

and filed a juvenile dependency petition on her behalf. The Sonoma County Superior 

Court sustained the petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and 

(d) (sexual abuse), issued a restraining order against the grandmother and others, and 

transferred the case to Alameda County where Parents resided.

After the older child’s removal, it was believed that her younger sister was staying 

with Parents or paternal relatives in Oakland. In June 2013, the Alameda County Social

Services Agency (Agency) received a phone call from R.S., the mother of one of Father’s 

friends, who reported that she had been caring for the younger child “on and off for some 

time” and had not heard from Parents except for texts requesting pictures of their 

daughter. R.S. opined that Parents (who were 19 and 20 years old) were not ready to be 

parents. The Agency filed a petition on behalf of the younger child pursuant to 

section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), (g) (no provision for support), and (j)

(abuse of sibling). The child was detained, and both girls were placed in R.S.’s care.

By August 2013, the court had removed the Children from Parents’ care, and 

granted reunification services. Up to this time, Parents had made little effort to obtain 

services and reunify with their daughters: they were homeless and unemployed, had 

dropped out of high school, did not follow through on service referrals, often missed 

scheduled visitation, and failed to maintain regular contact with the Agency. Beginning 

in September, however, both Parents began to participate in Family Drug Court to treat 

abuse of marijuana and methamphetamine, as well as cocaine/crack in Father’s case. 

Mother also participated in weekly family therapy and regularly visited the Children and 

met with the Agency social worker, but failed to follow through with a mental health 

assessment or treatment. Father participated inconsistently in drug treatment, obtained 
3

some temporary employment, and visited the Children regularly, but failed to follow 

through with a mental health assessment.

In January 2014, Mother entered residential drug treatment and gave birth to 

Parents’ third child.

3

 In February, the court continued the Children’s removal and 

reunification services. Thereafter, Mother continued to participate in drug treatment, 

family therapy, and regular visitation. Father stopped participating in drug treatment by 

March, but continued to participate in family therapy and regular visitation. The court 

again continued removal and reunification services in the Children’s cases.

By the end of 2014, Mother had left her residential treatment program and had 

been arrested for possession of methamphetamine; Father had not followed through with 

outpatient substance abuse treatment or testing and consistently declined mental health 

assessment or treatment; the juvenile court had terminated services in the older child’s 

case and the Agency was recommending termination of services in the younger child’s 

case; and Parents’ relationship had deteriorated with conflict over custody of the baby. In 

March 2015, Father’s new girlfriend reported a violent incident that Father attributed to 

retaliation from a rival gang. Later that month, Father was arrested for driving under the 

influence: “[A] witness identified [Father] as the driver in a hit and run accident, and he 

smelled strongly of alcohol and performed poorly on field sobriety tests.”4 At an 

August 24, 2015 hearing, Father’s counsel informed the court that Father had been 

arrested for failure to appear at a hearing on his March 2015 driving under the influence

case and was in custody.

 

3

This child is not subject to this appeal and is referred to as “the baby.”

4 Also in March 2015, Mother obtained a family court order granting her full 

custody of the baby and required police assistance to retrieve her from Father’s home. 

However, the following May, the Agency detained the baby and filed a petition on her 

behalf pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j) after Mother failed to obtain 

medical care for her. Father was the first to seek medical attention for the baby, and the 

Agency ultimately released her to Father noting, “It was obvious [Father] and [the baby] 

have a strong and loving bond.”
4

The Section 366.26 Hearing

The section 366.26 hearing was conducted over several days between April and 

October 2015. In addition to witness testimony, evidence before the court included the 

Agency’s written reports and a court-ordered bonding study.

The Agency’s reports indicated that Parents attended weekly or twice-weekly 

visits with the older child in April and May 2013, and weekly visits with both girls in late 

June and early July. They did not visit between mid-July and late September. From late 

September 2013 to the end of 2014, Parents participated in weekly therapeutic visitation. 

“Overall [these] visits went well, but there were some concerns at times about how 

[Father] expressed anger and frustration during visits, both with the girls, and especially 

with [Mother]. Of additional concern were [Parents] arguing in front of the children 

during visits.” On December 9, 2014, the court ordered separate visits, with Mother and 

Father attending on alternate weeks, and he improved at handling his frustration during 

visits when Mother was not present. Father visited consistently in 2015.

As to the nature of parent-child relationships, the Agency’s reports described the 

Children as consistently glad to see Parents for visitation and, initially, as having been 

distressed to separate from them at the end of visits. Parents were described as 

affectionate, playful, and generally appropriate with discipline during those visits; 

however, arguments or disrespectful communications between Parents necessitated 

separate visits. Father sometimes teased the Children antagonistically or became 

physically forceful when he felt overwhelmed or frustrated, but he improved over time. 

From the onset of visits, the older girl did not consistently seek out help or comfort from

Parents, and after a few months the younger girl became increasingly inconsistent in 

seeking out help or comfort from them. As visitation progressed, the Children showed 

distress and regressive behavior at their preschool in anticipation of visits or when visits 

were cancelled. The social worker opined, “While . . . [the Children] clearly enjoy visits 

with their parents, they only see [them] during visits—which are designed to be pleasant. 

[¶] . . . [the girls] look to their caregiver for the day to day support, love, and structure 

that all young children need.”
5

The bonding study was prepared by a psychologist and was based on his review of 

the juvenile court record, interviews with Parents and R.S., and observations of visits 

between the Children and each of the three adults. With regard to Father, the 

psychologist observed that the Children called him “daddy” and were friendly and playful 

with him. They asked for his help and at times sought comfort from him. At times the 

girls were “animated, talked freely with [Father], and appeared very comfortable in their 

interactions with him”; at other times, they did not want to sit close to him or there was 

little interaction or physical affection. They sometimes separated easily from him, and 

sometimes showed separation distress. Father disciplined them appropriately, but missed 

some of the older child’s emotional cues.5

R.S.’s visit with the Children was “characterized by warmth, affection, and 

mutuality.” R.S. “reflected on the girls’ behavior, intentions and emotions in her 

comments. She was very emotionally attuned to them. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . She paced her 

actions with the children at a level consistent with their play tempo. She stimulated them 

intellectually, especially in terms of symbolic/fantasy development. She set appropriate 

structure and limits and was successful in gaining their compliance.” An especially high 

level of positive affect and mutual engagement occurred between the younger girl and 

R.S. The younger girl told the psychologist she was more likely to seek help and comfort 

from R.S. than from Parents, and she called R.S. “my other mommy.”

The psychologist concluded that the older girl “appears to have developed an 

attachment to both of her parents. She is comfortable interacting with them, and seeks 

their help, guidance and comforting when needed. Most often she accepts their efforts to 

help or comfort her. . . . [¶] [She] also appears to be attached to [R.S.] A high level of 

warmth, support seeking, and comfort seeking was noted. . . . [¶] Although displaying an 

 

5

The psychologist described Mother’s visits with the Children as warm and 

comfortable and they called her “mommy.” Mother at times was subdued and passive, 

but at other times showed more enthusiasm. She generally responded appropriately to the 

Children’s behavior, but made some inappropriate comments to the older child and 

missed some of her emotional cues. The Children showed no distress when Mother left 

the room.
6

attachment to each of these adults, there is some question as to the extent of security she 

experiences from these relationships. She presented as ambivalent in her attachment 

style with each of the adults. . . . It is likely that she is being affected by the legal and 

residential limbo in which she finds herself, as well as the adversity she experienced prior 

to placement. [She] believes she will return to the care of [Parents] but the uncertainty of 

her situation makes her anxious. Once a decision is made and permanency is achieved, it 

is likely that her anxiety will lessen and her sense of security will strengthen. [¶] . . . [¶] 

. . . If she remains with [R.S.] and if that placement is supported by her parents, she is 

likely to develop a greater degree of emotional security over time. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] 

[R]emoving [her] from the care of [R.S.] only places the child at additional risk of 

undermining her chances for developing a more secure internal sense of herself and the 

world.”

The psychologist concluded that the younger girl “also appears to have developed 

an attachment to both of her parents, as well as to [R.S.] She is comfortable with 

[Parents], enjoys being with them, seeks their help and comforting when needed, and 

generally responds well to their efforts. . . . Her primary attachment, however, appears to 

be with [R.S.], which is understandable given her age when placed in care and the 

amount of time she has lived with [R.S.] She identifies [R.S.] as the preferred person 

with whom to share activities, to help and take care of her, and to comfort her when she is 

hurt or upset. In short, her internal sense of security, safety, and nurturance is tied more 

to the care she has received in her current placement than with the care she received prior 

to placement or with the ongoing visits she has had with her mother and father. [¶] . . . [¶] 

. . . At this point, . . . [her] relationships with [Parents] are primarily play-based. [She]

has not had sufficiently consistent or high quality time with [them] to have developed a 

truly secure relationship with either of them.” Moreover, “[j]ust because a child is 

securely attached to one person . . . does not mean that she will develop a comparable 

level of security with a new caregiver. In short, if [she] is reunified with either or both of 

her parents, it should not be assumed that she will necessarily develop a secure 

attachment with them just because she currently experiences security with [R.S.]”
7

Assuming the Children remained with R.S., the psychologist opined that 

continuing contact with Parents “can have considerable benefits for children as they grow 

up, especially in terms of identity development and coping with adoption-related loss. 

However, such contact is only beneficial when birth parents and adoptive parents or 

guardians are able to respect one another and develop a cooperative relationship that 

fosters security and a sense of well-being on the part of the children.” R.S. had 

previously adopted seven children: three were adults living outside her home and two 

eight-year-olds and two five-year-olds were in the home with the Children. She had an 

open adoption arrangement with all of the adoptees, allowing contact with birth relatives 

who followed certain guidelines. She wanted a similar relationship with Parents and had 

no reservations about Mother, but reported conflict with Father. The psychologist

commented, “In this case, the relationship between [R.S. and Mother] is quite good. . . . 

On the other hand, the relationship between [R.S. and Father] is quite acrimonious. 

Neither trusts the other, and [R.S.] has even gone so far as to state that she doubts she 

could be the children’s guardian because of the threats made by the father to challenge a 

guardianship arrangement.”

6

The psychologist’s testimony was consistent with his report. He reiterated that 

continued contact with Parents would only be beneficial for the Children if Parents 

supported permanent placement with R.S., and if Parents were free of drug and mental 

health issues. He testified that the permanency of either adoption or an unchallenged

guardianship would lessen the older child’s anxiety, and noted that development of a 

 

6

Father testified that his relationship with R.S. was “okay,” and he believed he 

could work with her on arrangements for visitation. He denied sharing harsh words with 

her in person or by text, but said he once spoke harshly to her by phone. Mother testified 

that “[m]e and [R.S.] aren’t talking at the moment because of this whole situation with 

[Father] and her . . . . I just want to step back and let things happen. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I just 

don’t want to be in the middle of their dispute . . . .” Mother also testified she was now 

afraid R.S. would not let her see the children if they were adopted, and she preferred legal 

guardianship so she might be able to reunite with the Children eventually. Mother 

acknowledged to the psychologist, however, that the Children “have a stable and loving 

home with [R.S.] and are emotionally close to her.”
8

secure attachment “is absolutely critical at all ages.” Addressing R.S.’s “Anglo-Saxon” 

heritage and the Children’s Latino heritage, the psychologist testified, “Research shows 

that children placed trans-racially generally do well in terms of general adjustment. 

Potentially there is an implication in terms of racial or ethnic identity and pride. 

Although . . . if a white parent . . . goes out of their way to learn about that background, to 

support that background, to give the child the experience with people of that background 

including birth family, then children do well in terms of developing an appropriate racial 

pride and identity and an ethnic pride and identity as well. [¶] . . . [R.S. is] comfortable 

with that. She’s certainly indicated a desire and willingness to do this.” Some of her 

adopted children were biracial, and she had kept the birth parents involved in their lives.

At oral argument on the section 366.26 matters,7all parties stipulated that the 

Children were adoptable. Mother submitted on the evidence, and Father urged the court 

to apply the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights. 

The Agency argued the Children’s relationship with Father was not a parental 

relationship that outweighed the benefits of permanency: both girls were young (four and 

five); they had spent a minimal portion of their lives with Father, having lived with R.S. 

for more than two years and having been in the Parents’ care only intermittently before 

removal; Father’s relationship with them was play-based rather than parental or a primary 

psychological attachment; R.S.’s relationship with them was a primary psychological 

attachment; neither child longed to be in Parents’ care; and the Children needed 

 

7 On August 10, 2015, while the section 366.26 proceeding was still underway, 

Father filed section 388 modification petitions seeking each child’s return to his care with 

family maintenance services because he had “demonstrated substantial life style changes 

to the extent that a sibling, [the baby], has been placed with [him] . . . at the request of 

[the Agency] and with Court approval . . . and [he was] demonstrating sobriety by drug 

testing.” At a September 1 hearing, the court ruled that Father failed to state a prima 

facie case for modification because “there’s simply not enough information here. These 

are complex issues. I would have expected some more information . . . [regarding] 

Father’s performance under the Case Plan . . . , whether or how he’s mitigated the reasons 

that brought [the Children] out of home care, why the return of the [Children] at this 

juncture would serve [their] best interests.” Although Father appealed from the denial of 

this petition, he raises no argument regarding it in his appellate briefs.
9

permanency and maintenance of their relationship with R.S., which was the most 

important relationship they had at that point. The Agency also noted that Father had not 

completed services under his case plan that would address his underlying substance abuse 

problems, which was relevant to the impact of continuing contact with Parents. Minors’ 

counsel made similar arguments.

Father argued the best disposition for the Children was guardianship, “at least for 

the time being with [R.S.],” with continuing contact with Parents. Father had made 

substantial changes in his life and obtained custody of the baby. He had been “extremely

consistent with the exception of a brief period of time recently” with visitation. As the 

bonding study demonstrated, Father was a “man who presents as an involved and loving, 

caring parent who stimulates the girls intellectually and the children displayed an 

emotional attachment to [him].” He urged the court not to “sever this relationship 

between the father and his daughters permanently and forever versus keeping these 

children in what we’re told is a functional, comfortable and secure home where the 

guardian will continue—presumably she loves these children—will continue to meet their 

needs . . . [and] maintain a relationship with the man that they call daddy.”

The juvenile court ruled that the beneficial parental relationship exception to 

termination of parental rights did not apply. “I want the record to be clear that the 

willingness of [R.S.] to allow for continued contact with [Parents] is not a consideration 

that is properly before the Court. It has not been considered as a factor in these 

proceedings even though that information was constantly put before the Court. Also, I 

want the record to be clear that I do understand that a parent need not show that the 

children have a primary attachment to a particular parent. [¶] . . . Instead I look to the 

quality of the relationship in evaluating whether the attachment is substantial, positive 

and emotional.” The court found that Parents had maintained regular visitation. The 

older child had been out of her Parents’ care for half of her life and the younger child for 

more than half of her life. The Children had “largely positive interaction” with Parents, 

but the older child “needs permanence. She’s experienced early neglect and trauma and 

. . . [i]t is important that this matter be resolved.” The court ruled, “I cannot say that the 
10

strength and quality of the parent-child relationships in this case outweigh the security 

and sense of belonging that a new family would offer these children given their unique 

histories,” and it terminated Parents’ parental rights.

II. DISCUSSION

Father argues the juvenile court erred in declining to apply the beneficial parental 

relationship exception to termination of his parental rights. The Agency defends the 

court’s ruling. We affirm.

“By the time of a section 366.26 hearing, the parent’s interest in reunification is no 

longer an issue and the child’s interest in a stable and permanent placement is paramount. 

[Citations.] . . . The child has a compelling right ‘to [have] a placement that is stable, 

permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the 

child.’ ” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348.) “[I]t is only in an 

extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the 

Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.” (Id. at p. 1350.)

At a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court must first determine by clear and 

convincing evidence whether it is likely the dependent minor will be adopted. (§ 366.26, 

subd. (c)(1).) If the court finds a likelihood of adoption, the court must terminate parental 

rights and order the child placed for adoption unless, as applicable here, it finds a 

“compelling reason” that termination would be detrimental under one of the exceptions 

listed in section 366.26 subdivision (c)(1)(B). A party arguing that one of those 

exceptions applies has the burden of producing evidence that establishes the exception. 

(In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343 [discussing former § 366.26, 

subd. (c)(1)(A), predecessor of § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)].) Under the beneficial parental 

relationship exception, the court must find a “compelling reason” that termination would 

be detrimental because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with 

the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, 

subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) “We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual 

issue of the existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of discretion 

standard to the determination of whether there is a compelling reason for finding that 
11

termination would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Anthony B. (2015) 

239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395.)

“The existence of interaction between the natural parent and child will always 

confer some incidental benefit to the child.” (In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1342.) The beneficial parental relationship exception requires more, “that the parentchild relationship promote the well-being of the child to such a degree that it outweighs 

the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” 

(Ibid.) “[T]he court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child 

relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new 

family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the 

child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly 

harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not 

terminated.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) “The factors to be 

considered when looking for whether a relationship is important and beneficial are: 

(1) the age of the child, (2) the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, 

(3) the positive or negative effect of interaction between the parent and the child, and 

(4) the child’s particular needs.” (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.)

Courts have cautioned that it is not “reasonable to require the parent of a child 

removed from parental custody to prove the child has a ‘primary attachment’ to the 

parent, or to show the parent and the child have maintained day-to-day contact. If that 

were the standard, the rule would swallow the exception.” (In re S.B. (2008) 

164 Cal.App.4th 289, 299; In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 937 [“ ‘some 

measure of benefit’ ” in continued contact is not sufficient alone to invoke beneficial 

parent relationship exception].) When a child has been placed with a nonparent for a 

significant amount of time, “we expect the child has developed or will develop a secure 

parental relationship with his or her primary caregiver or prospective primary caregiver.” 

(S.B., at pp. 299–300.) The existence of that relationship does not necessarily negate the 

harm the child would experience from the loss of a significant parental relationship, 

which “may be continued or developed by consistent and regular visitation after the child 
12

has been removed from parental custody.” (Id. at p. 299, italics omitted.) Further, 

termination of parental rights is not justified by an expectation that the harm of losing the 

parental relationship will diminish over time or “on the basis of an unenforceable promise 

of future visitation by the child’s prospective adoptive parents.” (Id. at p. 300.)

Here, Father stipulated that the Children were adoptable, and the juvenile court 

reasonably found that he had maintained regular visitation. The main disputed issues 

were the quality of Father’s relationship with the Children and whether maintaining that 

relationship was a compelling reason to deny the Children the permanence of adoption. 

The court expressly stated that it was not relying on a finding that the Children lacked a 

primary attachment to either Mother or Father, and it was not considering R.S.’s apparent 

willingness to allow continuing contact between the girls and Parents. Although not 

expressly noted, the court also could not assume that R.S. would agree to serve as the 

Children’s guardian in the event adoption was rejected as the permanent plan, given that

R.S. had expressed reluctance to do so given her difficult relationship with Father.

Applying the four factors enumerated in In re Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at 

page 1315, the court noted the Children’s ages (four and almost six), the percentage of 

their lives lived outside parental care (at least half of their lives), the nature of the parentchild relationship (a “largely positive interaction”), and the needs of the Children. 

Focusing on the older child, the court found she “experienced early neglect and trauma 

and . . . [i]t is important that this matter be resolved,” giving her permanence. The court 

concluded that this need for permanence outweighed the benefits of continuing the 

parental relationship—explicitly for the older child and impliedly for her younger sister.

The juvenile court’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. The 

Children’s ages are undisputed of course, and the court if anything overestimated the 

amount of time they had spent in parental custody, given evidence that Parents had 

frequently left them in others’ care. The record supports the court’s description of the 

Children’s relationship with Father as “largely positive,” but the record also supports its 

implied finding that the relationship with Father was not such that the Children would be 

exposed to great harm if it were severed due to adoption. The older child had not 
13

developed a secure attachment with Father. From the onset of visitation shortly after her 

removal, she did not consistently seek out help or comfort from Father. She reacted 

negatively to Father’s teasing and physicality, and while Father modified this behavior 

over time she still showed ambivalence toward him at the time of the psychologist’s 

observation. The psychologist testified that development of a secure attachment is 

critical for all children’s well being and that the older child still lacked a secure 

attachment due to her traumatic experiences and lack of resolution in her living situation. 

He opined that the younger child had a secure attachment to R.S., thus supporting the 

inference that she might suffer significant harm if that attachment was severed because

adoption was rejected as a permanent plan.

The juvenile court’s ultimate ruling—that the Children’s possible loss of their 

relationship with Father was not a compelling reason to reject adoption as a permanent 

plan—was not an abuse of discretion. In addition to the foregoing evidence, the court’s 

ruling was supported by evidence that Father had not overcome the problems that had 

caused the dependencies in the first place: Father never completed substance abuse 

treatment or obtained a mental health assessment; and, in 2015 (the same year as the 

court’s ruling), he had been arrested twice—including for driving under the influence—

and his girlfriend was apparently a target of rival gang violence. This evidence supported

an inference that a continuing relationship with Father would involve some degree of 

instability and insecurity that would ill-serve the Children.

Father unquestionably made progress in overcoming problems that led to the 

dependencies, as evidenced by his continuing custody of the baby, his regular 

participation in visitation, and his loving and playful relationship with the Children. But 

the Legislature has recognized that, “in order to prevent children from spending their 

lives in the uncertainty of foster care, there must be a limitation on the length of time a 

child has to wait for a parent to become adequate.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 

295, 308.) Father was given a reasonable period of time to reunify. He was, 

unfortunately, unsuccessful and the Children’s interest in permanency and stability took

priority. (Id. at p. 309.)
14

The question before the juvenile court at the time of the section 366.26 hearing 

was whether the harm to the Children in severing Father’s rights was so great as to 

outweigh their interest in a stable and permanent placement that allowed their caretaker 

to make a full emotional commitment to them. The court reasonably exercised its 

discretion in deciding that adoption by R.S., who had cared for the Children for more 

than two years, best served their well-being.

III. DISPOSITION

The order terminating Father’s parental rights is affirmed.

_________________________

BRUINIERS, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

JONES, P. J.

_________________________

NEEDHAM, J.