United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on Military Research and Development,

Committee on National Security, House

of Representatives

October 1997 BRILLIANT ANTIARMOR

SUBMUNITION

Opportunity Exists to

Conduct Critical Test

Prior to Production

Decision

GAO/NSIAD-98-16

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-276833 

October 30, 1997

The Honorable Curt Weldon

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military

 Research and Development

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Army has been developing the brilliant antiarmor submunition (also

referred to as BAT) since 1984 and plans to request authority to start

low-rate initial production in December 1997. At your request, we are

providing our assessment of the status of its acquisition plans and whether

it is technically ready to enter production.

Background The Army is developing the brilliant antiarmor submunition, with acoustic

and infrared seekers working in tandem, to autonomously search for,

track, and destroy moving armored targets. This submunition is to be

carried deep into enemy territory by the Army Tactical Missile System

(ATACMS) Block II missile, which is still in development and is a

modification of the in-production ATACMS Block IA missile, which carries a

different submunition. The brilliant antiarmor submunition and the ATACMS

Block II missile are a $4-billion system designed to support the Army’s

“deep fires” mission, which calls for the destruction and/or disruption of

enemy forces at ranges exceeding 100 kilometers. Each Block II missile is

to carry 13 submunitions that will be dispensed over large clusters of high

payoff targets to attack and destroy individual targets. The advantage of

the submunition is that it can cover a large area when dispersed, which

allows it to compensate for target location errors. Figure 1 shows the

submunition acquiring a moving column of tanks.

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-98-16 Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
B-276833 

Figure 1: The Brilliant Antiarmor

Submunition Acquiring a Moving

Target

Dispense

Target Search

and Acquisition

Target

Selection

The brilliant antiarmor submunition program was established in 1984 as a

special access program and progressed to a successful engineering and

manufacturing development phase decision in May 1991. The Tri-Service

Standoff Attack Missile was designated as the first delivery vehicle for the

submunition, but when the Army terminated its participation in the

program in December 1993, the ATACMS Block II missile was designated as

the submunition’s carrier. This change of carrier and continued technical

difficulties have led to significant cost growth. The current program office

estimate shows that development costs have increased from $700 million

to $1.2 billion (in constant 1991 dollars) from the initial February 1992

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-98-16 Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
B-276833 

estimate.1 Projected production costs have also risen by almost $7,000 per

submunition (in constant 1991 dollars). The Army currently plans to

produce 2,352 submunitions during low-rate initial production and a

program total of 19,871 during fiscal years 1998-2006. According to current

Army documentation, the average procurement cost of a single Block II

missile loaded with 13 brilliant antiarmor submunitions is about

$2.3 million (in constant 1991 dollars).

Results in Brief A decision on low-rate initial production of the brilliant antiarmor

submunition, scheduled for December 1997, appears to be premature

because a crucial technical demonstration will not be accomplished by

that time. In 1995, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the

Army agreed to relax the performance criteria that the brilliant antiarmor

submunition was to meet before proceeding into low-rate initial

production. Under the new criteria, the Army is not required to

demonstrate that the submunition can be successfully dispensed from the

ATACMS Block II missile. In September 1994, the Department of Defense

(DOD) noted, in its comments to our draft classified report, that the

successful completion of multiple tests of the submunition with the ATACMS

as the carrier would be required. Without such a test, the Army would have

little or no assurance that the submunition to be acquired under low-rate

initial production could successfully meet performance and technical

requirements.

The submunition’s current test schedule also appears to be extremely

ambitious. Its development program is almost 3 years behind its original

schedule, and a significant portion of the test schedule remains

uncompleted. The project office added five development flight tests to the

schedule because of technical problems. In addition, the Army plans to use

a test aircraft for all submunition flight testing with subsonic deployment

rather than the supersonic deployment from the ATACMS Block II missile.

The testing completed to date has uncovered numerous problems that

required design changes, additional testing, and schedule delays. Army

program officials admit that the testing schedule is extremely ambitious,

but they assume it will be successful.

Although the submunition test plans do not include an evaluation of

whether or not the ATACMS Block II can dispense the submunition, the

1

According to program office data, $270 million of the $500 million in development cost increase is

associated with developing an improved submunition. The new brilliant antiarmor submunition is

scheduled to be introduced into the production line in fiscal year 2001. It is designed to increase

lethality and add the capability to attack cold, stationary, armored targets.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-98-16 Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
B-276833 

Block II missile test plans do include a test to dispense tactical

submunitions in December 1997, the same month that the decision is to be

made on low-rate production of the submunition. However, according to

Army representatives, data from this test will not be used in making the

submunition production decision, since the test is not required. In

addition, any delays in qualifying the submunition’s subcomponents and

developmental flight testing will likely postpone the date of the Block II

dispense test. The Army’s ability to complete the remaining portion of the

submunition’s test schedule on time is highly suspect, considering the

repeated number of testing failures already experienced. Therefore, it is

probable that the ATACMS Block II dispense test will be delayed.

The submunition’s schedule is unnecessarily ambitious. According to

program officials, the driving factor for making the production decision in

December 1997 is for the submunition’s delivery schedule to coincide with

the Block II missile’s delivery schedule. However, a review of the program

office’s production lead time and delivery requirements shows that the

submunition’s low-rate initial production contract can be awarded 

8 months later than currently scheduled and the submunition can still be

delivered in time to be integrated into the missile. This would allow the

Army additional time to complete the submunition’s development testing

and the ATACMS dispense test before awarding the contract.

The ATACMS Block IA’s planned full-rate production decision was recently

delayed by 1 year, to March 1998, because of target acquisition problems.

According to representatives from the Office of the Director, Operational

Test and Evaluation, the Block IA missile’s problems will also affect the

Block II missile. Therefore, the Block II missile’s currently scheduled

production date is uncertain. If its production date is delayed, the Army

would have even more time to sufficiently complete key submunition

developmental testing.

Key Performance

Criteria Relaxed

One of the brilliant antiarmor submunition’s original criteria for starting

low-rate initial production was to demonstrate that it could be

successfully dispensed from its carrier. This criterion was established in

an acquisition decision memorandum dated May 1991 for the submunition

and its original missile carrier, the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile.

With the termination of the Army’s participation in this missile program

and the selection of the ATACMS as the new carrier in 1993, new criteria

were subsequently developed.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-98-16 Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
B-276833 

In a 1994 classified report on the brilliant antiarmor submunition, we

raised the issue of the lack of sufficient testing requirements in the

criteria. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the

Secretary of the Army to conduct substantial system-level testing before

low-rate initial production was approved. DOD’s written response to that

report stated that the decision to start low-rate initial production would

not be made without significant system-level testing, including both the

carrier and the submunition. In addition, DOD stated that the criteria

proposed by the Army for entering low-rate initial production would

require the successful completion of multiple system tests with the ATACMS

as the carrier. The response also stated that the planned testing for the

submunition to support the low-rate initial production decision was

consistent with and exceeded the original criteria established in the 1991

acquisition decision memorandum and that the criteria would have to be

approved by DOD.

Nevertheless, the submunition’s revised criteria, approved on October 4,

1995, do not require the Army to demonstrate that the ATACMS Block II can

successfully dispense the submunition. We could not determine why such

a demonstration is no longer required. The revised criteria call for the

submunition to meet or exceed its performance specifications in its

requirements document. Under these specifications, the Army will

consider (1) how many kills are achieved per load of submunitions fired,

(2) how well the system will operate in countermeasures, (3) how well the

system will perform in degraded weather conditions, (4) how lethal the

system is, and (5) how reliable the system operates. According to project

office representatives, many of these requirements will initially have to be

met using simulations but will eventually be verified through actual flight

testing. However, the flight testing will not occur until after the low-rate

initial production decision has been made. While the current criteria do

not require that the submunition be dispensed from its carrier, officials

from OSD, Army, and project office acknowledge that this is a key issue for

the system’s performance. Army and OSD representatives agree that they

would like to see a demonstration of the carrier successfully dispensing

the submunition before the submunition’s production decision. However,

this is not a requirement.

Submunition

Development Is

Behind Schedule

The brilliant antiarmor submunition’s development is significantly behind

its original and revised schedules. The submunition received approval to

enter its engineering and manufacturing development phase on May 15,

1991. The plan at that time was for the Defense Acquisition Board to hold

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-98-16 Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
B-276833 

its low-rate production decision review in November 1994. However,

because of a change in the submunition’s carrier and the technical

difficulties being experienced with individual subcomponents, the Army

approved a new program plan on September 22, 1995. This plan stretched

out the development program by 3 years and rescheduled the low-rate

initial production review for December 1997.

Despite the change in the program’s plan, the submunition is still behind

schedule. The submunition is currently behind its revised design

verification test completion estimate by 6 months and behind its revised

contractor development testing completion date by 8 months. Army

officials maintain that the past slippage will have no impact on the

scheduled December 1997 low-rate initial production decision, but admit

that the schedule is extremely ambitious. Table 1 shows the

September 1995 scheduled dates and the estimated slippage since the

revised estimates.

Table 1: Revised Submunition

Program Schedule

Milestone events

September 1995

estimate

Current

estimate

Slippage from

September 1995

(months)

Critical design

review

5/92 5/92 Not applicable

Prototype

production complete

Not applicable 9/95 Not applicable

Design verification

test

10/95 4/96 6

Contractor

development test

3/97 11/97 8

Low-rate initial

production decision

12/97 12/97

Source: Army program office data.

A significant portion of the submunition’s test plan remains uncompleted.

The project office has added five development flights to the test program

because of technical problems, without extending the time to complete all

the tests. Three of these flights were added by the contractor to verify

hardware design changes that were made due to prior flight test failures.

The other two flights were added as preproduction verification tests as a

result of previously failed flight tests. The plan is to complete development

flight testing and qualification testing in November 1997. According to the

project manager, the entire test schedule is tight, and there is no time

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-98-16 Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
B-276833 

available prior to the scheduled production decision to conduct additional

tests should any new problems develop. For example, after a July 1997

developmental test failure, the project office continued with other planned

tests without allowing time to analyze the failure or do a retest.

All of the submunition’s flight testing will be done using a test aircraft with

subsonic deployment rather than the supersonic deployment from its

intended carrier, the ATACMS Block II missile. The Army has not included a

flight test in its submunition’s test plans to evaluate whether or not the

carrier can dispense the final tactical submunition configuration.

However, the Army plans to conduct three ATACMS Block II flight tests to

dispense the submunition within the next several months. During the first

two tests, a nontactical version of the submunition will be used, but during

the final test in December 1997, tactical submunitions will be used.

According to Army representatives, data from this test will not be used in

making the submunition’s low-rate initial production decision, since a test

to dispense the submunition is not required. In addition, the ATACMS Block

II missile tactical dispense tests are dependent upon the submunition’s

subcomponent qualification and development tests being completed by

then. According to the former ATACMS Block II product manager, if any

problems result from the submunition flight tests, the ATACMS Block II

dispense tests would not be done until after the December 1997 low-rate

initial production decision. The final Block II test might not occur until

after January 1998.

The Army’s ability to complete the remaining portion of the test schedule

on time will be a significant challenge. The testing completed to date has

uncovered numerous problems that have resulted in design changes,

additional testing, and schedule delays. Some component failures have

required repeated efforts to resolve. For example, the bands that secure

the wings and tail fins to the submunition’s body prior to it being

dispensed from the missile have caused problems during two flight tests.

When the submunition is dispensed, the bands are designed to fall away,

allowing the wings and tail fins to deploy. During the first flight, however,

the bands did not fall away from the submunition and prevented the wings

from successfully deploying. Although the project office believed the

problem had been solved, during a subsequent flight, the bands again

failed to fall away, causing the submunition to crash. The second

redesigned band system performed successfully in a May 1997 flight test.

The entire process to redesign the bands required approximately 

10 months to complete.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-98-16 Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
B-276833 

The three other components that have taken the longest time to qualify

and have contributed to the bulk of the schedule delay are the inertial

measurement unit, the deceleration and stabilization system, and the

infrared seeker. Qualification testing was scheduled to be completed in

November 1995. However, under the current schedule, qualification testing

is not expected to be complete until November 1997.

The design and production of the inertial measurement unit, which

provides in-flight data to adjust the submunition’s flight path, continue to

be significantly delayed. According to the product manager, the problems

with the unit are the result of the change in carriers. As a result of this

change, the unit had to be redesigned, and that effort has taken more than

2 years. As of the June 1997 performance report, the contractor had

delivered 34 of 95 units and is at least 6 months behind schedule. The

contractor problems with the design and production efforts have resulted

in expensive plans to work around the problems and delays in integrating

missile hardware. Although project office personnel told us that the

technical problems had been resolved, the June 1997 production

performance report stated that the inertial measurement unit program was

falling further behind schedule. Because of the delays, the new unit is not

expected to pass qualification testing until November 1997, after the

completion of all submunition development flight tests. None of the

currently planned development test flights will have a qualified inertial

measurement unit. Thus, the primary objective of the developmental flight

tests—to verify design and performance—will not be met.

The change in carriers also required the development of a deceleration and

stabilization system. The brilliant antiarmor submunition was originally

designed to be dispensed at the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile’s

subsonic speeds, but will now be dispensed at supersonic speeds by the

ATACMS Block II missile. The deceleration and stabilization system is

required to slow the submunition to subsonic speeds. The contractor has

experienced technical problems with the design of the system that have

caused additional schedule delays. In March 1997, the final design for the

system was completed. As of the June 1997 report, the contractor had

delivered only 25 of 96 units and is at least 2 months behind schedule. The

May 1997 system qualification tests had to be suspended because two

units failed during the tests. Project officials expect testing to resume in

August 1997, a 3-month delay. Because of this delay, none of the

submunition development tests will be conducted with a qualified

deceleration and stabilization system.

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-98-16 Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
B-276833 

The infrared seeker, which detects and guides the submunition to its

target, is at least 8 months behind schedule. The contractor had delivered

49 of 99 units, according to the June 1997 performance report. During

three test flights, the seeker experienced hardware failures that caused the

submunition to crash. Two of the failures required the redesign and

addition of new seeker components and caused testing delays. Because of

the tight testing schedule, testing of the submunition will continue before

a failure analysis is completed on the third failed flight. In addition,

qualification testing revealed more problems that must be resolved before

the seeker can be qualified. Qualification is not scheduled to be complete

until November 1997. According to testing officials, the seeker will not be

qualified until after the completion of all development tests.

Submunition’s

Ambitious Schedule Is

Unnecessary

The Army built in 8 months of excess time into the submunition’s

production delivery schedule, therefore it is unnecessary to make the

low-rate initial production decision in December 1997. According to

program officials, making the low-rate initial production decision in

December 1997 is driven by the desire to have the submunition’s delivery

schedule coincide with the ATACMS Block II missile production schedule.

However, a review of the program office production lead time and delivery

requirements shows that the submunition’s initial production contract can

be awarded in August 1998 and still allow sufficient time for the

submunition to be integrated into the missile. Delaying the decision would

allow the Army additional time to complete its development test program.

The program office currently plans to award a limited production contract

for 395 brilliant antiarmor submunitions in January 1998. However, 90 of

these submunitions are funded with research and development funds and

are considered developmental units. These units are required for the

December 1999 ATACMS Block II operational test. The remaining 305 units

are low-rate initial production submunitions, which are required to be

delivered to the contractor, starting in April 2000, to be integrated into the

first low-rate initial production Block II missiles. According to program

officials, the lead time to produce the submunition is 18 to 19 months.

However, under the current schedule, the 305 low-rate initial production

submunitions do not need to begin delivery until 27 months after contract

award. Our analysis of delivery requirements reveals that the contract

award for the low-rate initial production quantities can be delayed 

8 months, or until August 1998.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-98-16 Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
B-276833 

The Army’s current brilliant antiarmor submunition schedule is linked to

the ATACMS Block II December 1999 operational test date and July 2000

first missile delivery date. To meet these dates, the contract for low-rate

initial production of the ATACMS Block II missiles must be awarded in

January 1999. However, the ATACMS Block IA missile’s planned full-rate

production decision was recently delayed by 1 year, to March 1998,

because of a “sensor to shooter” problem that surfaced during initial

operational testing. The Block IA’s problems may not be resolved before

the Block II is ready to enter production. According to representatives

from the Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, and the

Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command, the “sensor to shooter”

problem will also affect the Block II missile. If the Block II missile’s

schedule is delayed at all, the submunition’s initial production contract

could be delayed even further, allowing more time to complete

submunition testing.

Neither the ATACMS nor the brilliant antiarmor submunition has a sensor

that can provide necessary targeting information and must rely on

targeting data supplied from external sources. The submunition must have

initial targeting information prior to launch and missile positioning

information while in flight. For example, a moving column of armored

vehicles’ initial location must be identified prior to launching the missile.

According to project office officials, this target information must be as

precise as possible.

The Army recognizes that the lack of a targeting sensor is a serious

problem. A general officer steering committee has been established to

further investigate the problem and to recommend a solution. According

to testing officials, the ATACMS Block II’s and brilliant antiarmor

submunition’s operational performance must be evaluated using targeting

information. They indicated that without a solution to the “sensor to

shooter” problem, the effectiveness of the system would be affected, and

missile production delays would be warranted.

Recommendation Given the criticality of the dispense to the brilliant antiarmor submunition

program, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army require the

program office to demonstrate that qualified tactical submunitions can be

successfully dispensed from the ATACMS Block II missile before seeking a

low-rate initial production decision on the submunition program.

According to production requirements, the submunition can still meet its

existing delivery schedule with the ATACMS Block II missile, even with an

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-98-16 Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
B-276833 

8-month delay in awarding the low-rate initial production contract. Such a

delay would allow more time for the Army to resolve the submunition’s

technical difficulties and demonstrate that it can be successfully dispensed

from the ATACMS Block II missile.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD indicated that it did not

believe that it was necessary to perform a “full-up” dispense test of tactical

submunitions from the ATACMS Block II missile prior to the low-rate

production decision. DOD stated that even though successful dispensing of

tactical submunitions was not a formal criterion to be met before the

decision to go into production, two Block II missile tests are scheduled to

dispense a tactical submunition before the production decision and that

information from these tests would be used in its assessment of the

submunition. DOD also stated that delaying the submunition’s low-rate

initial production by 8 months would delay the Block II missile’s initial

operational and live fire testing by 8 months and subsequently delay the

Block II’s full-rate production decision, as well as significantly increase

costs.

We are not pursuaded by DOD’s argument for the following reasons and

have retained our recommendation. First, OSD and Army officials told us

that the dispense event was a key performance objective for the project

because of its criticality to the system’s effectiveness. Second, a successful

dispense event was a requirement for the low-rate production decision

before the change in carriers. Third, problems are currently being

experienced in the submunition’s development testing and delays are

already occurring. Finally, if the Army is not confident that the

submunition can meet this standard, it should not seek approval for

low-rate production.

The Army does not need to start low-rate production to obtain additional

submunitions to complete development activities and for testing. If

additional submunitions are procured using separate contracts—a

January 1998 research and development contract to procure assets for the

operational and live fire testing and a subsequent procurement contract

for low-rate production when the submunition demonstrates its

performance—the Block II’s schedule would not necessarily be delayed.

Even if the schedule would be delayed, we believe DOD should be more

concerned about the risks associated with starting the production of an

unqualified and largely unproven system.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-98-16 Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
B-276833 

DOD’s comments are presented in their entirety in appendix I, along with

our evaluation of them.

Scope and

Methodology

To determine whether the brilliant antiarmor submunition acquisition plan

was on schedule, we reviewed current Army submunition and ATACMS

Block II missile program testing and production schedule documentation

with officials in the ATACMS-BAT project office, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

We also reviewed similar documentation with officials in the Offices of the

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and

Acquisition and the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army for Operations and

Plans, Washington, D.C.

To determine whether the brilliant antiarmor submunition has

successfully demonstrated its technical readiness to enter production, we

reviewed current and prior criteria to evaluate the requirements to be

demonstrated before entering production. We then evaluated test plans,

test results, and contractor performance reports with ATACMS-BAT project

office officials, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, to determine whether the

submunition had demonstrated all the required events. We also discussed

testing and criteria issues with representatives from the Office of the

Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Washington, D.C.; the Army’s

Operational Evaluation Command, Alexandria, Virginia; and the Assistant

Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and Acquisition,

Washington, D.C.

We conducted our review from April to August 1997 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its

issue date. At that time, we will send copies to other interested

congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense and the Army; the

Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties.

We will also make copies available to others upon request.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-98-16 Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
B-276833 

If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please contact

me at (202) 512-4841. The major contributors to this report were 

Bill Graveline, Laura Durland, and John Randall.

Sincerely yours,

Louis J. Rodrigues

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-98-16 Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-98-16 Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-98-16 Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-98-16 Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 4.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-98-16 Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

letter dated September 12, 1997.

GAO Comments 1. Although DOD states that the Army has adamantly maintained a

test/fix/test approach to all test flights and always ensured that the

necessary analysis was completed before conducting the next test flight in

the series, DOD acknowledges that the Army had not completed the root

cause analysis on the third seeker flight failure before executing the next

flight test.

2. After the draft of this report was sent to DOD for comment, the Army

revised its testing schedule to postpone the final flight tests from October

to November 1997. If the seeker testing had progressed as planned, the

Army should have been able to use a qualified seeker in this final test.

However, program officials have subsequently confirmed that the seeker

test schedule has since slipped even further behind because of technical

difficulties. The program office has had to add additional modifications

and testing to the seeker. Program officials state they will not be able to

qualify the seeker prior to the completion of the development flight tests,

even with the date slip reflected in DOD’s comments.

3. If the Army needs more submunitions to complete development

activities and for testing, it is not necessary to start low-rate initial

production to do that. For operational testing purposes, the standard is

that the submunitions be production representative, not production

missiles. Because of the difficulty in stopping production once it starts, we

are concerned about the Army starting production of an unqualified and

largely unproven submunition. We are also concerned about the use of

acquisition strategies that tend to force the start of low-rate production on

a definite schedule, regardless of the status of the development effort.

Moreover, in our opinion, the potential costs associated with buying a

submunition that has significant unresolved technical problems more than

offsets concerns about potential costs that may be incurred if production

was delayed until the technical problems are resolved.

4. According to DOD testing officials, the Army has not demonstrated that it

has a dedicated sensor that can provide accurate targeting information to

the Block 1A missiles. These officials maintain that this is an issue for the

Block II missile. To indicate how serious this issue is, DOD has established

a general officer steering committee to resolve the problem. The Block II’s

schedule may still be delayed because of this problem.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-98-16 Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

5. We have modified the report to address this comment.

6. While the Army wants only to consider the results from tests that may

occur prior to the production decision, we believe the Army must

demonstrate that it can successfully dispense qualified tactical brilliant

antiarmor submunitions before seeking approval for low-rate initial

production.

(707243) Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-98-16 Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition
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