GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Testimony

Before the Committee on International Relations, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

10 a.m.

Thursday,

October 21, 1999

YEAR 2000 COMPUTING 

CHALLENGE

State and USAID Need to 

Strengthen Business 

Continuity Planning

Statement of Linda D. Koontz

Associate Director, Governmentwide and Defense 

Information Systems

Accounting and Information Management Division

GAO/T-AIMD-00-25

Page 1 GAO/T-AIMD-00-25

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for inviting me to participate in today’s hearing on the State 

Department’s and the United States Agency for International 

Development’s (USAID) efforts to address the Year 2000 (Y2K) technology 

problem. The Y2K problem has represented a unique challenge for State 

and USAID. First, like all organizations, these agencies need to remediate 

internal computer systems and plan for unexpected disruptions within the 

United States. Unlike others, however, they must also assess the Y2K status 

of virtually every country where the United States has a diplomatic 

presence and ensure the continuity of vital operations, such as protecting 

the welfare of millions of U.S. citizens traveling and living abroad, 

promoting economic development, providing humanitarian assistance, and 

achieving diplomatic agreements. 

Today, I will discuss State and USAID’s efforts to increase worldwide 

awareness of the Y2K problem, assess international preparedness, and 

inform American citizens of risks. In addition, I will discuss these agencies’ 

reported progress in remediating their internal computer systems and their 

efforts to prepare business continuity and contingency plans to ensure that 

they can continue to provide critical services. To perform our work for this 

Committee and prepare for this testimony, we reviewed key documents and 

interviewed senior State and USAID officials responsible for addressing 

international Y2K risks. A detailed discussion of our objectives, scope, and 

methodology for this review is included in the appendix to this statement.

In brief, our message today on State’s and USAID’s efforts is a mixed one. 

The two agencies have taken a number of positive steps to address 

international Y2K risks. Through its leadership of the President’s Year 2000 

Council International Relations Working Group, the State Department has 

worked to increase awareness of the problem throughout the world, 

collected and shared information on the problem with other federal 

agencies and foreign nations, and encouraged the remediation of faulty 

computer systems. State has also undertaken efforts to help ensure that 

Americans traveling and living abroad are informed about Y2K. In addition, 

State has successfully tested its ability to collect and analyze information 

from its worldwide posts during the rollover. Similarly, USAID has devoted 

resources to assessing what Y2K problems could occur at many of its 

worldwide missions and on USAID-funded projects currently underway 

within the countries where these missions are located. 
Page 2 GAO/T-AIMD-00-25

Both agencies also report that they have completed or have almost 

completed remediation and testing of their mission-critical computer 

systems. State reports that all 59 of its mission-critical systems are Y2K 

compliant and according to USAID, 6 of 7 are compliant. USAID’s New 

Management System is still being repaired and the agency expects it to be 

compliant by the end of this month.

However, State and USAID have been much less effective in the area of 

business continuity and contingency planning (BCCP). Because of the 

nature of the Y2K problem, organizations must first identify core missions 

and processes, decide which ones need to continue in the event of a 

Y2K-related emergency, and subsequently develop and test continuity and 

contingency plans that are clearly tied to the continuity of core processes. 

This is especially true for State and USAID since it is now clear that some 

countries will not be able to renovate all of their systems and, 

consequently, may experience disruptions in critical services such as 

power, water, and finance—disruptions which, in turn, are likely to affect 

the operations of many embassies, consulates, and missions. Our review 

showed that State’s BCCP did not identify and link its core business 

processes to its Y2K contingency plans and procedures and that the 

department has not yet tested its plans in Y2K-specific scenarios. USAID 

identified one core business process—financial management—in its 

Y2K BCCP, but did not identify or address other key agency functions. 

USAID also provided very little information on contingency planning 

activities for its missions and it is unclear when the agency expects to 

complete its BCCP process. Consequently, both agencies lack assurance 

that they can sustain their worldwide operations and facilities into the new 

millennium.

State and USAID Have 

Increased Awareness 

of Y2K Risks and 

Assessed International 

Preparedness

In recognition of the challenge Y2K presents, State and USAID launched 

comprehensive efforts to mitigate potential disruptions both here and 

abroad. The agencies have implemented the following initiatives to foster 

better awareness and gauge the likely severity of the problem.

• The State Department chairs the International Relations Working Group 

(IWG) of the President’s Council on Year 2000 Conversion. The group 

has worked with other federal agencies and international organizations 

including the United Nations, World Bank, and International Civil 

Aviation Organization to increase foreign nations’ awareness and 

encourage systems remediation by collecting and analyzing data on 
Page 3 GAO/T-AIMD-00-25

countries’ preparedness, sharing information, supporting and attending 

conferences, and conducting and encouraging Y2K exercises.

• As part of the IWG’s data collection efforts, State’s embassies and 

consulates conducted surveys in late 1998 of their host countries’ Y2K 

programs. They specifically focused on the countries’ status of Y2K 

remediation efforts, dependence on technology in critical infrastructure 

sectors, and vulnerability to short-term economic and social turmoil.

• State’s Inspector General’s (IG) Office has collected Y2K information 

during overseas visits and helped oversee the department’s Y2K efforts. 

Over the past year, IG staff visited 31 countries and met with host 

country representatives to increase opportunities for information 

sharing and cooperation. State’s IG Office collected and shared with 

other federal entities a great deal of information on the status of foreign 

countries’ preparedness for the Y2K rollover.

• USAID teams visited 49 of the agency’s 79 overseas missions to promote 

awareness of the Y2K issue, assess the missions’ Y2K preparedness, 

assess Y2K compliance of current USAID-funded information 

technology (IT) projects, and evaluate host country Y2K vulnerabilities. 

The teams issued Y2K compliance evaluation reports from July 1998 

through April 1999 that documented their findings and provided a 

baseline for remediation and contingency planning efforts. The reports 

vary in content but collectively indicate what USAID-funded projects 

are underway; whether they are computer dependent and vulnerable to 

Y2K problems; what their Y2K compliance status was at the time of the 

review; and whether the United States government, vendor, or host 

country is responsible for remediating the project. For example, 

USAID’s Year 2000 Compliance Evaluation for its Cairo mission 

discusses the agency’s portfolio of major development projects, 

including the installation of telephone lines and switches, disease 

prevention efforts, and power control centers within Egypt. Since 

conducting its evaluations, USAID has focused its limited resources on 

resolving problems in selected countries of strategic importance and/or 

with known Y2K vulnerabilities. According to USAID officials, the 

reports have also been provided to host countries’ governments so they 

can address the findings.

USAID developed a toolkit that foreign governments at all levels (local, 

provincial, and national) can use for Y2K contingency planning. USAID 

plans to distribute the toolkit beginning this week. According to USAID, the 

toolkit has been developed using a “fast-track” concept in recognition of 

the fact that many organizations have begun to address Y2K issues later 

than is optimal and that at this stage, they do not have the time to develop 
Page 4 GAO/T-AIMD-00-25

complete contingency plans. As such, the toolkit’s design speeds the effort 

and reduces the resources required so that at least some contingency plans 

can be in place. 

The collective efforts of State and USAID to analyze international Y2K 

readiness have shown that some countries will simply not make their Y2K 

deadlines and, in fact, are likely to suffer disruptions in critical 

infrastructure-related services such as power, water, and finance. As a 

result, it has become exceedingly important for State to ensure that 

Americans traveling and living abroad are informed about potential 

Y2K-related failures and that they have the best information available to 

help them prepare accordingly.

State Has Publicly 

Reported Information 

to Help Safeguard 

Americans

In implementing a broad public outreach strategy on Y2K, the Department 

of State issued and made available information about Y2K and foreign 

countries’ preparedness for the millennium rollover. Much of the 

information is intended to help ensure that Americans living and traveling 

abroad, or those contemplating foreign travel on January 1, 2000, are 

well-informed about potential Y2K-related failures. The department’s 

overseas posts are providing this information via numerous mechanisms, 

including brochures, warden1 notices, and bulletins on post Internet home 

pages.

The protection of American citizens traveling or living abroad is the 

department’s highest priority. In recognition of this, State’s long-standing 

“no double standard” policy requires that the department provide U.S. 

citizens in foreign countries with information available to official personnel 

regarding threats to safety and security that have not and cannot be 

countered. In addition, State officials have been very clear in advising U.S. 

citizens who may be overseas about their need to exercise personal due 

diligence in preparing for possible Y2K failures. As such, the department 

acknowledges that it does not have the resources or ability to provide food, 

water, shelter, fuel, or medicine to the 3 million plus Americans registered 

1

The State Department’s warden system consists of responsible individuals (usually U.S. 

citizens) in a foreign country who keep U.S. citizens in the area informed of developments 

during times of crisis, passing information provided to the warden by the U.S. embassy. The 

term “warden system” is derived from World War II when “air raid wardens” alerted citizens 

to emergencies. Because embassies now communicate with hundreds or thousands of 

citizens, the traditional warden system has evolved into a combination of telephone, fax, 

e-mail, high-frequency radio, media, and Internet home page mechanisms.
Page 5 GAO/T-AIMD-00-25

abroad or the millions more who travel for tourism or business each year. 

State’s strategy is to provide the best possible information to Americans so 

that they can make their own personal emergency preparedness 

arrangements and informed decisions. 

In January and July 1999, State issued worldwide public announcements to 

warn that all citizens planning to be abroad in late 1999 or early 2000 

should stay informed about Y2K readiness in their respective locations. In 

September 1999, the department issued updated Consular Information 

Sheets for 196 countries that included information on Y2K-related risks. 

The sheets are normally issued at least annually to provide advice to 

international travelers on issues such as a country’s road conditions, crime 

rate, and availability of medical facilities. The current information sheets 

identify countries’ reliance on computer systems and their level of 

preparedness for the Y2K problem, that is, whether they are well-prepared, 

prepared, generally prepared, somewhat prepared, not fully prepared, or 

unprepared. The sheets also assign an overall risk level (high, medium, or 

low) for potential Y2K disruptions in key infrastructure sectors such as 

energy, telecommunications, and finance, and reemphasize the need for 

American citizens to take precautions against Y2K-related disruptions. 

However, the Y2K-related language in the current information sheets is 

fairly general and is not as clear as the more specific information contained 

in other sections of the sheet. In addition, it may be difficult for readers to 

distinguish the risks in one country from those in another; specifically, they 

may be unable to discern the differences between a country that is 

generally prepared from one that is somewhat prepared. State officials 

stated that information in the sheets on topics other than Y2K is based on 

past events and is not as speculative as the Y2K language. Department 

officials further stated that the sheets include the best Y2K-related 

information they had available prior to publication, but that they have 

subsequently obtained additional information on some countries. They 

stated they plan to update their website to incorporate the new information 

and will also do so for those countries for which new information becomes 

available.

In addition, the department plans to issue travel warnings later this month 

for selected countries if State officials determine that specific credible 

concerns about potential Y2K disruptions exist. Travel warnings are issued 

when the department decides to recommend that Americans avoid travel to 

specific countries. State has indicated that under its no double standard 
Page 6 GAO/T-AIMD-00-25

policy, travel warnings will be issued for any countries in which official 

personnel will be authorized to depart.

State and USAID Have 

Been Working to 

Correct Their Internal 

Computer Systems

The State Department has reported to the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) that all 59 of its mission-critical systems2

 are Y2K compliant. 

In addition, State is now reporting that it has successfully completed 

end-to-end testing3

 of four groups of related business functions: consular, 

e-mail, command and control communications, and security. During this 

testing, State tested critical transactions throughout the department across 

major business areas, applications, and infrastructure that support the 

transactions. According to State, business management end-to-end testing 

is underway and expected to be completed by October 31, 1999. 

According to USAID, and as reported to OMB, of its seven mission-critical 

systems, one is not yet Y2K compliant. The New Management System 

(NMS)4

 is being repaired and USAID expects it to be compliant, validated, 

and implemented later this month. According to USAID, end-to-end testing 

is planned prior to the rollover, but no completion date has been 

established yet.

State and USAID 

Business Continuity 

and Contingency 

Planning Efforts Are 

Lacking

While there has been extensive remediation and testing of mission-critical 

systems by State and USAID, there is, nevertheless, a risk that problems 

may occur in the millions of lines of code that were fixed, in overlooked 

embedded chips, or in commercial products. There is also a risk that 

outside systems that exchange data with these agencies may fail as well as 

vital infrastructure services, such as electrical power and water. These 

risks, coupled with the risk of Y2K-related failures in foreign countries, 

mandate that agencies identify core business processes and functions, 

decide which ones must continue in the event of a Y2K-related emergency, 

2

Mission-critical systems support business processes whose failure would seriously affect 

an organization’s ability to meet its worldwide responsibilities.

3

The purpose of end-to-end testing is to verify that a set of interrelated systems, which 

collectively support an organizational core business area or function, interoperate as 

intended in an operational environment. 

4

NMS is a suite of administrative systems for USAID’s Washington office that includes 

accounting, acquisition and assistance, budget, and operations functions. According to 

OMB, NMS has underlying implementation problems unrelated to Y2K.
Page 7 GAO/T-AIMD-00-25

and subsequently develop comprehensive BCCPs to ensure that core 

business processes can be continued both domestically and internationally. 

We have developed guidance5

 on this topic, and OMB has adopted it as the 

standard that federal agencies are to use in developing these plans.

Our guidance recommends a mission-based approach to business 

continuity and contingency planning which involves, among other steps, 

(1) identifying an agency’s core business processes and supporting 

mission-critical systems, (2) determining the impact of internal and 

external information systems, and infrastructure failures on core business 

processes, (3) defining the minimal acceptable level of service for each 

core business process, and (4) identifying and documenting contingency 

plans and implementation modes for each process. The guide also 

advocates business continuity testing to evaluate whether individual 

contingency plans are capable of providing the desired level of support to 

core business processes and whether the plans can be implemented within 

a specified period of time. 

As required by OMB, State developed a June 15, 1999, enterprisewide Y2K 

business continuity and contingency plan. OMB described this plan in its 

September 1999 quarterly report as being “too high level to determine if 

risks have been fully addressed.” State’s BCCP is a summary document that 

cites other supporting plans, the department’s global responsibilities, and 

its centrally managed but decentrally implemented organizational 

structure. State’s supporting plans include bureaus’ business continuity 

plans, Y2K information technology systems contingency plans, Emergency 

Action Plans, Duty Officer Handbooks, cable guidance, and standard 

operating procedures. 

During our review, we found that State’s Y2K BCCP does not follow the 

mission-based approach that we recommend. The plan does not identify 

State’s core business processes or the minimum acceptable level of service 

for these processes during emergency situations. State’s plan also does not 

identify the department’s mission-critical systems or the impact of the 

failure of these systems on its core business processes. In addition, the 

BCCP does not link relevant contingency plans to State’s core business 

processes and does not identify the circumstances under which these plans 

would apply. Finally, the plan does not indicate when or how State will test 

5

Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Business Continuity and Contingency Planning

(GAO/AIMD-10.1.19, August 1998).
Page 8 GAO/T-AIMD-00-25

and evaluate its plans for sustaining operations in the event of Y2K 

disruptions. As such, the State Department does not have assurance that it 

is adequately prepared to continue critical business functions in the face of 

Y2K failures. State officials stated that they plan to test their contingency 

plans across a range of functional areas, regional bureaus, and scenarios 

and complete these exercises around mid-November 1999. State officials 

also advised us that they plan to issue and resubmit to OMB a new 

departmentwide plan today. According to State, this revised plan 

appropriately links core business processes, mission-critical systems, and 

contingency plans and meets all other OMB requirements. However, we 

have not had an opportunity to review this plan.

State also required that each embassy and consulate develop BCCPs and 

required the head of each facility to certify that such a plan had been 

completed. To assist in this endeavor, State developed and distributed a 

Contingency Planning Toolkit in early 1999. This toolkit provided an 

appropriate and detailed methodology for (1) identifying critical business 

processes, (2) assessing the risk of systems failure, (3) assessing the risk of 

infrastructure failures, (4) linking existing emergency procedures to Y2K 

failure scenarios, (5) assessing the adequacy of existing emergency 

procedures and augmenting them if necessary, and (6) identifying 

additional resources that would be needed to execute the revised plans.

We reviewed the toolkit responses prepared by 10 embassies located in 

countries of particular interest to the Committee6

 and found that all were 

incomplete. Although most of the plans identified critical business 

processes as well as additional resources needed to prepare for Y2K 

failures, only two linked existing contingency procedures to potential Y2K 

disruptions or identified any additional procedures needed. Further, there 

was no evidence that any of the plans had been tested. Without the kind of 

thorough analysis called for in State’s toolkit, there is no assurance that 

embassies and consulates are fully prepared for potential Y2K failures. 

State officials agreed with our assessment, but emphasized that the 

department routinely deals with overseas emergencies and crises. State 

officials stated that their embassies have standing procedures including 

their Emergency Actions Plans for a variety of crises and pointed out that, 

on average, the department executes an evacuation every 6 weeks. State 

officials also stated that some posts have tested existing emergency plans 

6

We reviewed responses from embassies in Brazil, Haiti, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, Panama, 

Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand.
Page 9 GAO/T-AIMD-00-25

in a Y2K scenario during crisis management exercises. To improve their 

BCCP and provide more assurance, however, State officials told us that 

they plan to further review and validate embassy contingency plans. As 

such, they stated that they have developed and implemented a web-based 

tool to validate posts’ plans and expect to complete validation by 

November 11, 1999.

In addition, State is now working to determine if any authorized 

departures7

 from embassies will occur, due to host country infrastructure 

vulnerabilities. At this time, the department has declared that no posts will 

be closed, but that for some posts, departures may be necessary. During 

our review, State officials advised us that final decisions on authorized 

departures would be made by late October 1999. At present, the departure 

date for personnel at those posts selected is December 10, 1999. 

Case-by-case departure decisions are also being made now for selected 

personnel with health conditions, such as illnesses and pregnancies, due to 

concerns about the possibility of Y2K disruptions at medical facilities.

To further support its business continuity efforts, the department is 

allocating and distributing resources requested by posts to help mitigate 

potential Y2K problems. State officials plan for all resources to be 

distributed no later than December 15, 1999.

USAID BCCP Is Also 

Inadequate

USAID has also developed an enterprisewide BCCP dated June 15, 1999. 

OMB’s September 1999 quarterly report states that “AID’s plan addresses its 

core business functions” and that plans are in place for USAID’s 

approximately 80 overseas posts. However, we found that USAID’s BCCP is 

incomplete and found little evidence within the plan that would indicate 

that the OMB-adopted GAO methodology was followed. 

USAID’s BCCP identifies one core business function—financial 

management—and four mission-critical systems supporting this function. 

The BCCP does not identify or address other key agency functions. Rather, 

the plan states that USAID is currently addressing other key processes, 

7

According to State, when warranted in the national interest or in response to imminent 

threat to life, a chief of mission may request authorized (voluntary) departure status for 

employees in nonemergency positions and/or family members who wish to leave the post 

under the authorized departure option. The Department of State must issue a travel warning 

when either authorized or ordered (mandatory) departure is approved for official personnel 

and/or their families.
Page 10 GAO/T-AIMD-00-25

such as administrative services and human resources, which we believe to 

be support processes rather than core business processes. We also found 

very little information on the agency’s contingency planning, including 

information on what alternative actions or workarounds would be taken to 

sustain critical operations or what events would trigger the need for these 

efforts. In addition, the BCCP is headquarters-focused with little 

information provided on mission-level contingency planning activities and 

provides no date for completing the plan. 

Furthermore, only one mission—Cairo—has prepared a Y2K contingency 

plan for its specific location. USAID officials stated that despite the 

absence of documented BCCPs, some business continuity and contingency 

planning activity has been underway at USAID missions. The officials 

stated, however, that they could not validate the quality of or extent to 

which the planning activity has occurred.

USAID officials stated that financial and technical constraints have 

severely limited their ability to conduct effective business continuity and 

contingency planning. USAID’s Inspector General’s (IG) Office has 

performed a comprehensive review of its agency’s Y2K business continuity 

and contingency planning process and efforts, and a representative from 

the IG’s office is here today to discuss the results of their work. Given the 

results of our and the IG’s work, we are extremely concerned about 

USAID’s ability to sustain its core business operations during the rollover 

and protect its overseas personnel from Y2K-related failures.

State Is Making Other 

Preparations for the 

Rollover

A significant aspect of business continuity and contingency planning is day 

one (also called day zero) planning. An effective day one strategy 

comprises a comprehensive set of actions to be executed by a federal 

agency during the last days of 1999 and the first days of 2000. Federal 

agencies and other organizations should have an effective day one strategy 

so they can position themselves to readily identify Y2K-induced problems, 

take needed corrective actions, and minimize adverse impact on their 

operations and key business processes. An effective day one Y2K plan will 

also help an agency provide information about its Y2K condition to 
Page 11 GAO/T-AIMD-00-25

executive management, business partners, and the public. We recently 

issued guidance8

 on this subject, which we have provided to OMB and 

executive agencies for their use. 

Day one planning is underway at State and USAID, although at the time of 

our review it was too early to evaluate their overall efforts. We did, 

however, review the discussion of day one planning contained in State’s 

current BCCP and believe the department’s approach seems reasonable. 

State indicates it will staff the Main State building and its headquarters 

annexes with up to 700 employees and augment its Operations Center with 

additional resources in a separate Y2K response center. 

In addition, we reviewed State’s efforts to test its ability to collect and 

disseminate information from its overseas posts. While not required by 

OMB, on September 9, 1999, State conducted an exercise to test its 

worldwide reporting mechanisms. State selected this date because there 

were concerns within the computing community that some systems may 

interpret the “9/9/99” date as an error or as the end of a file. The objective of 

the exercise was to assess the department’s ability to collect information 

on the Y2K status of all posts and host countries. No systems failed due to 

misreading 9/9/99. During the exercise, 165 overseas posts successfully 

reported status information on the impact of the 9/9/99 date rollover on 

operations at their facilities and host country infrastructures. State also 

tested its ability to assimilate and analyze this information at its 

headquarters location and is now assessing lessons learned for application 

to the actual Y2K event. 

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, the State Department has tremendous 

responsibilities in ensuring the safety of U.S. citizens overseas and 

operating its overseas posts. USAID has similar responsibilities in 

managing large IT-dependent projects and operating missions abroad. In 

addition, due to their reliance on foreign countries’ infrastructures, they 

face challenges unique to their international missions. State and USAID will 

need to marshal their resources in the remaining days ahead, strengthen 

their BCCPs to help mitigate any Y2K-related failures, and work toward 

maximizing assurance that they can continue to perform their core 

business functions and maintain their overseas operations during the 

8

Y2K Computing Challenge: Day One Planning and Operations Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.22, 

October 1999).
Page 12 GAO/T-AIMD-00-25

rollover. This concludes my remarks and I will be happy to answer any 

questions you or Members of the Committee may have.

Contact and 

Acknowledgements

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Linda 

Koontz at (202) 512-6240 or by e-mail at koontzl.aimd@gao.gov. Individuals 

making key contributions to this testimony include Cristina Chaplain, Kirk 

Daubenspeck, and Brian Spencer.
Page 13 GAO/T-AIMD-00-25
Page 14 GAO/T-AIMD-00-25

Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ApendxiI

To prepare for this testimony, we conducted an overview of State’s and 

USAID’s efforts to address international Y2K risks. We reviewed State’s 

overall strategy for addressing the Y2K problem and ensuring the safety of 

Americans overseas who may face risks from Y2K-related failures. Our 

work at USAID focused on the agency’s efforts to address Y2K-related risks 

to USAID-funded information technology projects and systems in foreign 

nations. 

We reviewed a number of key documents, including the State Department’s 

enterprisewide Y2K BCCP; analyses of foreign nations’ preparedness for 

the Y2K problem; bureau, embassy, and systems Y2K contingency plans; 

selected embassy Emergency Action Plans; Consular Information Sheets; 

and public Y2K announcements. We also reviewed USAID’s overall Y2K 

BCCP, a Y2K contingency plan for one mission, and about 50 assessments 

of selected overseas missions’ preparedness and their dependence on host 

country infrastructures. 

In addition, we interviewed senior officials responsible for addressing 

international Y2K risks, including the State Department’s Special 

Representative for the Year 2000 Problem, Deputy Chief Information 

Officer for the Year 2000, Deputy Chief Information Officer for Operations, 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Administration, Managing Director for International Financial 

Services, Executive Director for Consular Affairs, Director of Overseas 

Citizens Services, and the Director of the Year 2000 Working Group. At 

USAID, we interviewed senior officials including the agency’s Chief 

Information Officer and the Director of the Office of Information 

Resources Management. We performed our work in Washington, D.C., from 

August through October 1999, in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. We obtained comments on a draft of this 

testimony from State and USAID officials and incorporated these 

comments where appropriate.

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