CRREL REPORT 96-3

The Northern Sea Route

Its Development and Evolving

State of Operations in the 1990s

Nathan D. Mulherin April 1996
Abstract

The summer of 1991 marked the first time in recent history that Russia

offered to escort ships of other countries across the Northern Sea Route

(NSR). For moving cargo between the North Pacific region and Northern

European ports, the NSR, along Russia’s northern coastline, is between 35

and 60% shorter than the traditionally used routes through the Suez and

Panama Canals. In addition to its shorter distance, there already exists an

extensive ports and shipping infrastructure, a current cargo base, and the

potential for developing new markets in Russia and other northern areas.

These incentives are attracting considerable attention from the international

shipping community, including that portion servicing Alaskan and northwestern U.S. ports. This report is a general compilation of the historical

usage, recent trade developments, the current regulatory climate, the physical

environment, the ports and navigational infrastructure, cost factors, and

practical considerations that may shape future U.S. interests in the route.

For conversion of SI units to non-SI units of measurement consult ASTM

Standard E380-93, Standard Practice for Use of the International System

of Units, published by the American Society for Testing and Materials,

1916 Race St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19103.

Cover: Russian nuclear icebreaker Yamal prepares to clear a passage for

merchant vessels on the Northern Sea Route. (Photo courtesy of

Neste Shipping.)
CRREL Report 96-3

The Northern Sea Route

Its Development and Evolving

State of Operations in the 1990s

Nathan D. Mulherin April 1996

Prepared for

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DISTRICT, ALASKA

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

US Army Corps


of Engineers

Cold Regions Research &


Engineering Laboratory
ii

PREFACE

This report was written by Nathan D. Mulherin, Research Physical Scientist, Snow and

Ice Division, Research and Engineering Directorate of the U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory. It represents one of several investigations supporting

a reconnaissance study of the Northern Sea Route. These reconnaissance study projects

were funded by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Alaska District, Dr. Orson Smith,

Project Manager.

The author is indebted to Mark Maliavko, Director of HydroCon Ltd., St. Petersburg,

Russia, for obtaining and translating much of the Russian material that was crucial for this

work, and to his associate, Finn Fjellheim at HydroCon in Norway for facilitating

communications; to Capt. Lawson Brigham, former Commanding Officer of the

USCGC Polar Sea, for advice, photographs, and valuable background material and for

technical review of the manuscript; to Walter Tucker, Chief of the Snow and Ice Division at

CRREL for manuscript review; and to Juhani Laapio of Neste Shipping for photographs

and relating details of his three voyages across the NSR aboard a Finnish tanker. Sincere

thanks are also owed each of the other Reconnaissance Study team members for valuable

guidance, suggestions, translations, or materials used.

The following individuals are recognized for significant contributions of information:

Cheryl Bertoia of the U.S. Navy/NOAA National Ice Center; Gordon Cox of Amoco

Eurasia Petroleum Company in Houston, Texas; James Ojala of AviaBusiness/America,

Inc. in Seattle, Washington; Nikolay Doronin of EcoShelf in St. Petersburg, Russia; Tor

Wergeland of the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration; Torgny

Vinje of the Norwegian Polar Research Institute; Roger Colony of the University of

Washington’s Polar Science Center; and Capt. Edmond Pope of the Office of Naval Research.

The dedicated work of the following individuals at CRREL is gratefully acknowledged in

producing this report: Nancy Liston and Elisabeth Smallidge for procurement of publications and translation services; Maria Bergstad for editorial review; Sandy Smith for final

production; William Bates and Edward Perkins for figure preparation; and Vicki Keating for

typing assistance.

The contents of this report are not to be used for advertising or promotional purposes.

Citation of brand names does not constitute an official endorsement or approval of the use

of such commercial products.
iii

CONTENTS

Page

Preface ................................................................................................................................ i

Abbreviations and acronyms ........................................................................................... vi

Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1

The Northern Sea Route ............................................................................................ 1

International interest .................................................................................................. 1

Further development needed ................................................................................... 3

The Northern Sea Route advantage ................................................................................ 3

Distance advantage .................................................................................................... 4

Underutilized existing infrastructure ...................................................................... 8

International investment opportunities .................................................................. 8

Historical review................................................................................................................ 9

Early history ................................................................................................................ 9

Recent history.............................................................................................................. 9

Recent landmark developments ............................................................................... 11

Increasing international interest............................................................................... 12

Administration and regulations ...................................................................................... 14

Administration............................................................................................................ 14

Management of field operations .............................................................................. 16

Regulations for passage ............................................................................................. 16

The trade setting ................................................................................................................ 17

The physical setting ........................................................................................................... 21

The Barents Sea ........................................................................................................... 26

The Kara Sea ................................................................................................................ 26

The Laptev Sea ............................................................................................................ 27

The East Siberian Sea ................................................................................................. 27

The Chukchi Sea (Russian) ....................................................................................... 27

Alaskan waters............................................................................................................ 28

The navigational setting ................................................................................................... 30

Sources consulted ....................................................................................................... 30

Routes, distances, and depths................................................................................... 30

The major straits used for passage ........................................................................... 32

Navigation aids ........................................................................................................... 36

Russian Arctic seaports ..................................................................................................... 41

The role of ports under Soviet rule .......................................................................... 41

Recent administrative changes ................................................................................. 42

River shipping............................................................................................................. 43

Northern seaports....................................................................................................... 44

Vessels and cargoes ........................................................................................................... 48

Types of vessels using the NSR ................................................................................ 48

Principal Arctic shipping companies ...................................................................... 49

Cargoes ....................................................................................................................... 51

Shipping costs .................................................................................................................... 52

Proposed Russian fee structure ................................................................................ 54

Marine insurance ........................................................................................................ 55

Practical considerations .................................................................................................... 55

Social, economic, and political.................................................................................. 55

Infrastructural ............................................................................................................. 56
iv

Page

Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 57

Literature cited ................................................................................................................... 59

Appendix A: Cargo ship and icebreaker classification equivalencies ....................... 63

Appendix B: Translated table of contents for the NSR sailing guide, entitled

Guide to Navigation Through the Northern Sea Route, scheduled for

release in 1995 ...................................................................................................... 64

Appendix C: Selected sea-ice data and severity index for the north coast of

Alaska, 1953–1993 ............................................................................................... 65

Appendix D: Declassified, general-distribution Russian hydrographic charts for

the NSR, as of November 1993 .......................................................................... 66

Appendix E: Contents of a computerized Russian seaports database ...................... 68

Appendix F: Russian Arctic seaports data from Lloyd’s of London’s

Ports of the World .................................................................................................. 70

Appendix G: Seaports data from Defense Mapping Agency’s World Port Index ..... 73

Abstract ............................................................................................................................... 77

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

1. The Russian Arctic................................................................................................ 2

2. The various Northern Sea Route options .......................................................... 2

3. Sea routes between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans ....................................... 4

4. Noril’sk-class SA-15 multipurpose, arctic icebreaking cargo ship ................. 6

5. Russian nuclear-powered icebreaking LASH Sevmorput ............................... 8

6. Track of the first surface ship to reach the geographic North Pole in 1977 . 11

7. Icebreaker Sibir’ and icebreaking multipurpose cargo ship Kapitan

Myshevskiy on first high-latitude crossing of the NSR in 1978 ............. 12

8. Russian transportation systems.......................................................................... 18

9. Actual and projected tonnages of Russian freight, in million of tons, by

various transportation modes ................................................................... 19

10. The Soviet Union’s 1988 international trade, in millions of tons, by

various transport modes ............................................................................ 20

11. Actual and projected annual tonnage of Russian sea trade, in

millions of tons, by region ......................................................................... 20

12. Russia’s trade composition percentages for 1992 ............................................ 21

13. The bathymetry of the Russian Arctic ............................................................... 22

14. Location of offshore and recurrent open water areas, or “polynyas,”

during the time of maximum ice development ...................................... 22

15. General distribution of various ice types at the time of maximum

development ................................................................................................ 23

16. Location of recurring ice massifs ....................................................................... 23

17. Seasonal extent of the sea-ice edge ....................................................................

18. Mean sea-ice extent for concentrations of 7/10ths and greater for

 July through September ............................................................................ 25

19. Zones of environmental severity affecting marine trafficability in

Alaskan waters ............................................................................................ 28
Page

20. Approximate distances, in nautical miles, of the various route segments

between Murmansk and Dutch Harbor .................................................. 31

21. General scheme of constant surface currents during the normal period of

navigation .................................................................................................... 32

22. General scheme and maximum velocities of summary currents near the

ocean surface ............................................................................................... 34

23. Location and ranges of wind directions that tend to create compacted

ice conditions that are generally unfavorable for navigating along

the NSR ......................................................................................................... 35

24. Declassified Russian hydrographic charts for the NSR, as of

November 1993 ........................................................................................... 37

25. Russian ice chart and ship routing analysis for the coastal area between

Dikson and Cape Chelyuskin ...................................................................

26. A portion of an Alaskan Regional Ice Analysis from the Joint Ice Center ... 38

27. A specialized ship routing analysis from the Joint Ice Center ....................... 39

28. Russian Arctic seaports listed in DMA ............................................................. 44

29. Trade volume from Europe to the North Pacific region by cargo type ........ 52

30. Trade volume from the North Pacific region to Europe by cargo type ........ 52

TABLES

Table

1. Comparison of the distance, in nautical miles, for the NSR and canal

alternatives ................................................................................................... 5

2. Comparison of average speed, in knots, of ships using the NSR and

canal alternatives ........................................................................................ 5

3. Average speed, in knots, for vessels on sections of the NSR ......................... 5

4. Soviet shipping activity along the Northern Sea Route.................................. 10

5. Icebreakers and voyages that have reached the North Pole .......................... 13

6. Probability of occurrence of conditions that require icebreaker assistance

through various NSR massifs ................................................................... 24

7. Summary of environmental conditions of the Eurasian seas along the

Northern Sea Route .................................................................................... 25

8. Joint Ice Center’s sea ice severity data for Alaska’s north coastal waters .... 30

9. Approximate length, minimum width, and depth of key straits .................. 32

10. Distances, in nautical miles, between ports and waypoints along the

NSR and other ports of interest ................................................................ 33

11. Cargo turnover, in millions of tons, and vessel traffic in Russia’s largest

ports for 1990 ............................................................................................... 42

12. Russian ports open to foreign shipping, as of July 1994 ................................. 45

13. Russian Federation shipping fleet, as of 1 July 1992 ....................................... 49

14. Russia’s principal shipping companies, their fleet composition, and

trade patterns as of 1991 ............................................................................ 49

15. Recent voyages with foreign involvement ....................................................... 53

16. Icebreaker basis fees for escorting vessels through the NSR ......................... 54

v
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

m meters

km kilometers

nm nautical miles

mt million tons

m/s meters per second

shp shaft horsepower

dwt deadweight tons

loa length overall

kn knots

°C degrees Celsius

AARI Arctic and Antarctic Scientific Research Institute

ANSR Administration of the Northern Sea Route

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

CNIIMF Central Marine Research and Design Institute

CRREL U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory

DMA Defense Mapping Agency

FESCO Far Eastern Shipping Company

FSU Former Soviet Union

GEC Gulf Engineers and Consultants, Inc.

INSROP International Northern Sea Route Programme

JIC U.S. Navy/NOAA National Ice Center

MSC Murmansk Shipping Company

NSR Northern Sea Route

RSMOT Russian State Ministry of Transport

UAF University of Alaska Fairbanks

USAED U.S. Army Engineer District, Alaska

vi
INTRODUCTION

The Northern Sea Route

The Northern Sea Route, or NSR, is the modern-day designation for the Arctic marine route

that extends from the Russian islands of Novaya

Zemlya to the Bering Strait, which separates the

state of Alaska from Russia. It extends a distance

of between 2000 and 3100 nautical miles (nm)

along Russia’s northern coastline, where encounters with bitter cold temperatures, ice-choked seas,

shallow straits, blinding fog, and isolation are routine. The route extends across or into four seas of

the Arctic Basin: the Kara, the Laptev, the East

Siberian, and the Chukchi. It is the most challenging segment of the historic Northeast Passage from

Europe to the Far East, offering a shorter distance

between seaports in the North Atlantic and the

North Pacific relative to the traditional Suez and

Panama Canal routes. Transit distances using the

NSR between North Pacific and European ports

are as much as 60% shorter than the more southern canal routes.

For approximately 50 years before 1991, the Soviet Union devoted significant energy and resources to developing a vast marine transportation system to help bring the abundant natural

resources of Russia’s isolated northern frontier to

its more populated manufacturing centers (Fig. 1).

Despite the considerable physical challenges of the

Arctic regions, an intricate system of seaports, navigation aids, communications systems, icebreaking

ships, ice forecasting, and piloting expertise was

developed, to the point where open-ocean cargo

transportation now routinely occurs four months

of the year along the entire Eurasian Arctic coastline. Shipping traffic, both local and full transit,

plies the entire route from the beginning of July to

the end of October. On the western end of the

route, regular service from Murmansk across the

Barents and Kara Seas and up the Yenisey River to

Dudinka has been operating virtually year-round

since about 1980.

Several variations of the NSR are possible (Fig.

2), depending mainly on the transient ice conditions at the time. The first is the most southerly

and conventional coastal route. The second follows a midroute from Cape Zhelaniya (the northern tip of Novaya Zemlya) to Dikson and from

Novaya Sibir’ Island to the port of Pevek. A third

route, which is shorter for through traffic, stays to

the north of Cape Zhelaniya, Cape Arkticheski

(the northern tip of Severnaya Zemlya), and the

Novosibirskiy Islands. A fourth route, 700 nm

shorter than the coastal route, is the great circle

route by way of the geographic North Pole. This

fourth course is not economically feasible at the

present time, but in the future it may become viable as transportation technology improves.

International interest

Using their highly advanced fleet of icebreaking

ships, the Russians have the experience and technological capability to move ships virtually anywhere in the Arctic during the summer months, a

fact that has been demonstrated by several trips to

the North Pole by Russian nuclear-powered icebreakers since 1977. Year-round maintenance of

the entire route is currently being promoted by the

Russians as a way of bringing hard currency into

the country. The shorter shipping route might serve

to open the entire northern region more to economic development, foreign trade, and tourism.

The shift from socialism to a privatized, market-driven economy in the Soviet Union that began around 1985 resulted in economic and social

disruption. The problems were compounded in

1991 with the transformation of the Soviet Union

The Northern Sea Route

Its Development and

Evolving State of Operations in the 1990s

NATHAN D. MULHERIN
A R C T I C C I R C L E

Kolym a

River

I ndigirka

R i ver

I ndigirka

R i ver

Yana Riv e r

Len a

River

Kotuy R vi e r

Yenis e y R.

Taz R vi e

O

r

b R iver

A n a d y r R .

N O R T H

P O L E

Arkhangel'sk

Murmansk

Salekhard

Yamburg Igarka

Noril'sk

Dikson Khatanga

Nordvik

Dudinka

Tiksi

Magadan

Pevek

ARCTIC OCEAN

Barents


Sea

Kara Sea

Laptev


Sea

Bering


Sea

Chukchi


Sea

East


Siberian


Sea

Provideniya

S

Alaska

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

Mys


Shmidta

70°

60°

 180°

 0°

 90°

0 500

Nautical Miles

0 1000

Kilometers

 150°

 60°

 30°

 30°

 150°

Sea of


Okhotsk

F

GREENLAND

St. Petersburg

Olenek River

D

E

A

B

C

H

G

Cape


Chelyuskin

Kolguyev


Is.

Novaya


Zemlya

Novosibirskiy


Islands

Wrangel


Is.

Severnaya


Zemlya

Kolym a

River

Yana Riv e r

Len a

River

Kotuy R vi e r

Yenis e y R.

Taz R vi e

O

r

b R iver

A n a d y r R .

N O R T H

P O L E

Arkhangel'sk

Murmansk

Salekhard

Yamburg Igarka

Noril'sk

Dikson Khatanga

Nordvik

Dudinka

Tiksi

Yakutsk

Magadan

Pevek

ARCTIC OCEAN

Barents


Sea

Kara Sea

Laptev


Sea

Bering


Sea

Chukchi


Sea

East


Siberian


Sea

Provideniya

RUSSIA

Alaska

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

Mys


Shmidta

70°

60°

 180°

 0°

 90°

0 500

Nautical Miles

0 1000

Kilometers

 150°

 60°

 30°

 30°

 150°

Sea of


Okhotsk

F

GREENLAND

St. Petersburg

Olenek River

D

E

A

B

C

H

G

Cape


Chelyuskin

Kolguyev


Is.

Novaya


Zemlya

Novosibirskiy


Islands

Wrangel


Is.

Severnaya


Zemlya

Key Straits in Russian Arctic Seas


–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

A


B


C


D


E


F


G


H


Matochkin Shar


Kara Gate (Karskiye Vorota)


Yugorskiy Shar


Shokal'skogo


Borisa Vil'kitskogo


Sannikova


Dmitriya Lapteva


Long (Longa)

into the Commonwealth of Independent States

(CIS). One way to address these problems may lie

in the Commonwealth’s ability to stimulate domestic growth and attract foreign trade. Although

it is fortunate that authority over the entire NSR

transferred intact to the new Russian Federation,

inexperience with free enterprise and reductions

in state subsidies have resulted in unemployment

and excess capacity in all sectors of the economy,

including the Arctic marine transportation system.

Historically, the USSR claimed that crucial sections of the Northern Sea Route passed through

Figure 2. The various Northern Sea Route options.

Figure 1. The Russian Arctic.



















































A R C T I C C I R C L E

Coastal Route


Mid Route


Transit Route


Over-the Pole Route

Sea of


Okhotsk

Siberian


Sea

Sea

Sea

Kolym a

River

Indigirka

R i ver

Indigirka

R i ver

Yana Riv e r

Len a

River

Kotuy R vi e r

Yenis e y R.

Taz R vi e

O

r

b R iver

A n a d y r R .

St. Petersburg

Arkhangel'sk

Murmansk

Salekhard

Yamburg

Khatanga

Nordvik

Igarka

Noril'sk

Dikson

Dudinka

Tiksi

Yakutsk

Magadan

ARCTIC OCEAN Pevek

Barents

Kara Sea

Laptev

Bering


Sea

Chukchi


Sea

East

Provideniya

S

Alaska

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

Mys


Shmidta

70°

60°

 180°

 0°

 90°

0 1000

Kilometers

 150°

 120°

 60°

 30°

 30°

 150°

GREENLAND

NOR T H POLE

Olenek River

0 500

Nautical Miles

Sea of


Okhotsk

Siberian


Sea

Sea

Sea

Kolym a

River

Yana Riv e r

Len a

River

Kotuy R vi e r

Yenis e y R.

Taz R vi e

O

r

b R iver

A n a d y r R .

St. Petersburg

Arkhangel'sk

Murmansk

Salekhard

Yamburg

Khatanga

Nordvik

Igarka

Noril'sk

Dikson

Dudinka

Tiksi

Yakutsk

Magadan

ARCTIC OCEAN Pevek

Barents

Kara Sea

Laptev

Bering


Sea

Chukchi


Sea

East

Provideniya

RUSSIA

Alaska

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

Mys


Shmidta

70°

60°

 180°

 0°

 90°

0 1000

Kilometers

 150°

 120°

 60°

 30°

 30°

 150°

GREENLAND

NOR T H POLE

Olenek River

0 500

Nautical Miles

2
its sovereign waters, and they guarded these carefully from incursion by foreign vessels, effectively

eliminating all foreign traffic. Before 1991, the last

transit of the NSR by a foreign ship was in 1940.

However, in October of 1987, then-General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev announced a new spirit

of cooperation in the Arctic regions. As one item

on the agenda, he proposed opening the Northern

Sea Route, with certain restrictions, to all foreign

vessels for peaceful and commercial purposes. This

landmark change of policy was the first step in the

privatization of Russia’s Arctic fleet. Important assets, the NSR and the northern fleet continue to be

promoted for bringing foreign currency into the

country by “selling” premiere Russian ice navigation capabilities to the world. The Russians have

proposed the following ways of employing its Arctic fleet to raise foreign capital:

• Escort foreign ships along the route with

Russian icebreakers;

• Transport foreign goods aboard Russian icestrengthened cargo ships;

• Encourage the export and coastal movement

of Russian goods in foreign ships;

• Employ idle Russian icebreakers and cargo

vessels in the U.S. and Canadian Arctic;

• Promote Arctic tourism.

The world’s northern-tier nations and territories have become increasingly attracted to the idea

of a trade route that will open new markets to

their exports. In addition, income for their own

economies will be generated by providing ports of

call along the route.

Further development needed

The challenge of the physical environment of

the Northern Sea Route will require the development and exploitation of technologies pertaining

to ship design as well as ship operations. Public

policy alternatives will have to be investigated,

some of which pose difficult trade-offs between

economic development and other considerations

such as social well-being and environmental protection.

Establishing a viable year-round cargo transportation system will require advances in several

areas, including:

• Further development of markets for cargoes;

• Development of larger, more powerful, and

more economical icebreaking ships;

• Improvement in the navigation infrastructure;

• Consideration of the rights and well-being

of the region’s indigenous peoples;

• Reduced risk to vessels, cargoes, and the

environment, leading to more affordable

insurance rates.

All these improvements should serve to make the

NSR alternative more competitive with other

routes and hence more attractive to international

shipping.

THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE

ADVANTAGE

The Northern Sea Route is from 2000 to 3100

nm in length (Ivanov and Ushakov 1992). Estimates vary because the route is not a unique passageway; it is widely regarded as any and all possible routes from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific

through the myriad straits, passages, open seas,

and island groups north of the Eurasian land mass.

It is, however, legally defined by the Administration of the Northern Sea Route (ANSR) in

Moscow as beginning at the “western entrance of

the Novaya Semlya (sic) Straits and the meridian

north through Mys Zhelaniya” and ending “by

the parallel 66°N and the meridian 168°58'37"W”

(ANSR 1991). This essentially constitutes the area

extending from the islands of Novaya Zemlya in

the west to the Bering Strait in the east.

Navigational difficulties are considerable in the

far north due to bitter weather conditions, ice-infested waters, the short daylight season, and isolation. So why is the NSR considered a possible international marine trade route? Some of the many

reasons include:

• Shorter distances between northern ports

in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans;

• The presence of an existing cargo base;

• The availability of a currently underutilized

transportation infrastructure;

• Potential stimulation of the Russian

economy;

• The prospect for investment opportunities

in Russia.

While it is beyond the scope of this report to fully

expand on these points, each is addressed in somewhat more detail below.

3
Distance advantage

The primary advantage offered for braving the

Northern Sea Route’s greater physical challenge is

to save time and therefore money. Figure 3 shows

the current trade circuit for the Northern Hemisphere encircling the continents through the Suez

and Panama Canals. It also shows the NSR nearly

bisecting that circuit. The cities of New York,

Montreal, London, and Odessa are shown on the

Atlantic side and their corresponding “areas of

equidistance” are shown on the Pacific side of the

circuit. These zones represent destinations that are

the same distance from the city of origin by traveling either the NSR or the traditional canal routes.

For example, the mileage is the same from London to Hong Kong by either the Suez Canal or the

NSR. Therefore, when the NSR is used, any destination north of Hong Kong is a shorter distance

from London. The same is true for the London-toSan Francisco–Victoria run. The North American

coast north of San Francisco is closer to London

via the NSR. Ports in Alaska are especially closer

to European ports north of London.

Mileage comparisons of the northern trading

routes are shown in Table 1; it can be seen that the

savings made possible by the NSR are considerable. A savings of 24% is possible for a Hamburg

(Germany)-to-Vancouver (Canada) voyage. The

Hamburg-to-Dutch Harbor (Alaska) trip is more

than 6000 nm, or 60%, shorter than the Suez Canal

route.

Estimates of travel time, based on past performance during the summer season, are also competitive with the Suez and Panama Canal alternatives. Table 2 shows that the average ship speed

during seven complete transits from Europe to the

Far East was 11.3 kn via the NSR, and for three

voyages by way of the Suez Canal it was 12.9 kn.

This information, supplied by the Murmansk Shipping Company (MSC) and reported by Wergeland

(1991), was summarized from transit data for the

1990 and 1991 shipping season.

Figure 3. Sea routes between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (from Svendsen

1963).

New York

Montreal

Panama

San 

Francisco

Yokohama

Odessa

Murmansk

St. Petersburg

Hong Kong

Suez

London

Vladivostok

Nagasaki

Equidistant area from

London via Panama and

the Northern Sea Route

Equidistant area from

New York and Montreal

Equidistant area from Odessa

Equidistant area from

London via Suez and

the Northern Sea Route

Victoria

4
Table 1. Comparison of the distance, in nautical miles, for

the NSR and canal alternatives (after Wergeland 1991 and

Mikhailichenko 1992).

Shortest Difference

Route NSR distance canal distance (%)

Hamburg to Dutch Harbor 4,200 10,400 60

Hamburg to Vancouver 6,635 8,741 24

Hamburg to Yokohama 6,920 11,430 39

Oslo to Yokohama 7,146 12,013 41

London to Yokohama 7,323 11,655 37

Table 2. Comparison of the average speed,

in knots, of ships using the NSR and canal alternatives (after Wergeland 1992).

Number of Average

Route trips speed

NSR eastbound 4 12.2

NSR westbound 3 10.3

Suez Canal westbound 3 12.9

Table 3. Average speed, in knots, for vessels on sections of the NSR (after Wergeland 1991).

Route section Distance Month

(west–east) (miles) Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Noril’sk-type vessels

Kolguyev Island to 580 8.6 8.3 8.0 7.8 7.5 7.8 11.0 13.8 14.0 12.8 9.2 8.9

Dikson

Dikson to 440 4.9 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.3 4.5 6.0 6.7 7.0 7.3 5.3 5.1

Cape Chelyuskin

Cape Chelyuskin to 540 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.6 5.0 7.0 9.0 9.0 4.2 4.1

Tiksi

Tiksi to 1,640 7.4 7.1 6.9 6.6 6.4 6.7 14.0 14.5 15.0 14.5 7.9 7.6

Provideniya

Weighted means 6.7 6.5 6.2 6.0 5.8 6.1 10.8 12.0 12.6 12.5 7.2 6.6

Nuclear-powered lighter aboard ship (LASH)

Weighted means 7.6 9.0 9.0 8.3 7.9 8.3 12.8 14.1 15.4 15.7 10.2 9.8

Total distance 3,200

Computer simulations, the operational experience of Russian Noril’sk-type vessels [ice-strengthened, multipurpose cargo ships (Fig. 4) of the highest ice classification* (ULA-class)], and actual

transit times for other MSC vessels were used to

estimate the mean transit time through various

sections of the NSR for the entire year. The latter

two sources were used by Wergeland in developing the data presented in Table 3. Although the

July-through-October Noril’sk speeds are competitive with those attained on the Suez and Panama

Canal routes, the slower speeds for the rest of the

year offset the savings in distance. The estimated

speeds that can be attained with the Russian

nuclear-powered LASH (lighter aboard ship) vessel show a freight transportation efficiency that

appears more promising. The LASH Sevmorput

(Fig. 5) is a shallow-draft, icebreaking freighter

that is designed to transport up to 74 barges (lighters) or 1300 standard cargo containers. It has an

open-water capability of 20 kn but, more importantly, in ice up to 1.5 m thick it does not require

icebreaker escort. The LASH has, however, proven

to be somewhat of an economic failure. Its nuclear

powerplant is very expensive to operate, and fears

concerning its safety persist despite Russian

reassurances to the contrary (Armstrong 1991).

* The ice classification serves as a measure of a ship’s

ability to navigate safely in ice-covered waters. Unfortunately, there is no single world standard, and the

categories of the many national standards are somewhat difficult to compare. A table of classification

equivalencies is included as Appendix A.

5
Figure 4. Noril’sk-class SA-15 multipurpose, icebreaking cargo ship. (Courtesy of Murmansk

Shipping Company.)

Ship stores Deck cranes

Daily consumption, t/day Type Outreach, Number and

In port m capacity Description Mass, t

Underway cargo no cargo

 operation operation

diesel oil 783 2.0 2.0 1.0 electro-hydraulic 22 3 × 20

 Fuel

high viscosity 3,743 76 7.0 3.0 electro-hydraulic 20 2 × 40

fuel

Lubricating oil 185 0.6 0.1 0.1

Boiler water 44.4 — — —

Fresh water 457 13.2 13.2 10.0

Fuel heating provided

Water ballast heating provided

Ventilation Main machinery

Cargo spaces naturally and mechanically Two geared diesel engine of 14ZV 40/48

Wärtsilä-Sulzer type

Service spaces naturally and mechanically Built in Finland, 1982

output × kW 2 × 7,700

(b.h.p) 2 × 10,500

Accommodation provided with air conditioner cSt50°C 180

spaces Recommended fuel

secR1100 °F 1,500

Type, number and VPP

unit × m

diameter of propellers 1 × 5.6

Supplementary data

1. The ship is provided with a corner ramp 18 m long and 5.0 m wide.

6
Figure 4 (cont’d).

Built at the Shipbuilding Ship’s type The single-screw, double-deck motorship with long forecastle,

Yard Wörtsilö, Turku, long poop, intermediate engine room and house, corner ramp,

Finland, 1982 icebreaker bow and transom stern

General Main particulars

Classification KM ★ Y Λ Α 2 A2 Length o.a. m 173.5

gross g.r.t. 17,910 Length b.p. m 159.6

Register tonnage

net n.r.t. 9,484 Breadth moulded m 24.0

full-loaded knots 17.0 Depth moulded m 15.2

Service speed

in ballast knots 17.6 Summer load-line draft m 10.5

Navigating range miles 16,000 Loaded displacement t 30,758

Crew pers. 39 Deadweight t 19,942

Height of mast above the baseline m 51.0 Loading capacity t 15,648

bale m3 25,300 forward m 1.10

Light draft

grain m3 31,185 aft m 7.45

Capacity

containers TEU 576 Loading capacity per 1 cm draft tpcm

packed timber m3 — Type of hatch Upper deck Tweendecks

covers end-rolling hinged to ends

Description, dimensions and capacities of cargo spaces

Deep- Cargo

Holds Tweendecks tanks hatches

Dimensions, m Capacity, m 3 Dimensions, m Capacity, m 3 Capacity, m3 Dimensions, m

3,100

1 12.25 20.5 4.50 978 800 4 19.0 5.0 40 900 12.8 13.0

2,799

2,900

2 27.0 18.0 8.50 3,657 2,900 96 27.0 5.0 48 2 19.2 2 × 8.0

3,793

3,800

3 33.25 18.0 8.50 4,257 3,900 144 33.25 5.0 64 2 25.6 8.0

4,760

2,200

4 23.75 18.0 8.50 3,255 2,300 108 23.75 5.0 44 2 19.2

3,431

2,000

5 11.0 23.0 3.25 902 500 4 21.25 5.25 24 — 12.8 11.0

2,746

—

6— — — — — — — — — —

607

14,000

Total 13,049 10,400 356 Total 220 900

18,136

Space no.

LengthBreadthHeight

grain bale

containers,

TEU

LengthHeight

bale

containers,

TEU

grain

LengthBreadth

grain

7
foreign use of the NSR can more fully utilize the

Russian fleet and provide revenue toward its operation and maintenance. In Granberg’s (1993a)

own words:

It may appear paradoxical that at this juncture,

in the midst of acute crisis at home, Russia should

be actively promoting ... the Northern Sea Route

... Far from it—this is an integral part of the

general strategy of stabilization and development of the NSR. The most pressing objective

for the NSR today is to utilize more fully the

Arctic fleet and to provide it financial support.

The Russians hope that international tourism

to the Arctic Basin and Siberia can be increased to

bring in foreign revenue and to employ underutilized resources. During the summer of 1990,

the Russian icebreaker Rossiya made a voyage to

the North Pole with 88 paying tourists from 12

countries aboard. In 1991, the Sovietskiy Soyuz repeated the North Pole voyage with 80 more tourists from 15 countries. Two more North Pole cruises

took place in 1992 (Mikhailichenko and Ushakov

1993), three in 1993 (Sodhi 1995), and four in 1994

(Anonymous 1994a). It is evident that a voyage to

one of the world’s few remaining remote and pristine regions can be successfully promoted as adventure to a large number of people. The popularity of these cruises seems to ensure that increasingly

more will be available in the future.

International

investment opportunities

From the western perspective, Russia’s continued pursuit of democratic reform is desirable. More

importantly, the health of the Russian economy

and the stability of its sociopolitical system is an

international asset for obvious reasons. Russia’s

new policy of openness to world trade can be of

Brigham* reported difficulties with maneuvering

in ice because of its extreme waterline length, its

single screw arrangement, and its waterline

breadth, which is more than 3 m wider than that

of the largest icebreakers.

The Noril’sk and future vessels designed for

heavy ice service together in convoys led by powerful icebreaking ships will play a major role in

expanding commercial traffic on the NSR, increasing the geographic range of regular service and

lengthening the shipping season. Indeed, for nearly

20 years it has been a goal of the Soviet Union, and

now Russia, to keep the entire Northern Sea Route

open for year-round use.

Underutilized

existing infrastructure

The marine transportation infrastructure along

the northern Russian coastline is well developed.

It includes a fleet of the world’s most powerful

icebreakers and ice-strengthened cargo ships, as

well as port facilities and aids for navigation, communication, and environmental forecasting. The

reason for this development has been to extract

the natural resources of the Siberian region and to

supply the northern settlements with finished

goods and necessities. Hence, there is an existing

transportation network and a flow of goods that

can serve as a springboard for establishing new

international trading partners and cargoes.

The current economic difficulties in Russia have

sidelined a portion of the available transport and

icebreaking capacity on the northern route. NSR

cargo turnover peaked at 6,578,000 tons in 1987

and has progressively declined since then to

4,903,000 tons in 1991 (Granberg 1992). Increasing

* L.W. Brigham, 1994, U.S. Coast Guard, personal communication.

Figure 5. Russian nuclear-powered icebreaking LASH Sevmorput (from Brigham 1985).

8
significant benefit to business partners. The potential exists for foreign investment in the development of Russian shipping and resource extraction. For example, western oil companies are

negotiating with the Russians to supply foreign

development expertise and investment dollars in

the Yamal and Taymyr regions for a share of the

raw oil and gas products shipped via the NSR. It is

conceivable that other business arrangements can

be formed to boost working capital for regional

development of the necessary port facilities and

service infrastructure along the route.

HISTORICAL REVIEW

Early history

Maritime nations throughout history have

sought shipping advantages in distance and time

over their rivals. This rivalry spurred early exploration of new trade routes. The terms “Northwest

Passage” and “Northeast Passage” came into popular usage more than 400 years ago to refer to desired corridors of travel from Europe to the East

Indies via northern waters. The Northwest Passage was a proposed route from Europe westerly

across the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, by way of

the Canadian archipelago. Alternatively, the Northeast Passage accessed the Pacific Ocean from Europe by traveling northerly along Scandinavia to

the Arctic Basin and then eastward along Asia’s

northern coastline.

In time, the idea of a northern sea passage to

the Orient fell out of favor as the environmental

challenges of the Arctic became more apparent

from successive exploratory voyages. However, the

prospect of trade along the northern Asian coastline itself continued to inspire exploration in the

region. The land and sea journeys of early

expeditioners such as Vitus Bering, Willem Barents,

Baron F.P. Wrangel, and many others were significant, and their legacy is noted by prominent geographical place names that honor their achievements.

Although attempts to pioneer the route began

in the 16th century, it wasn’t until 1879 that a westto-east transit was finally completed, by a Swede,

Baron Nils Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld, after a twoyear voyage. He was forced to winter-over in the

ice at Kolyuchino, just 135 nm short of the Bering

Strait, but Armstrong (1992a) states that he most

certainly could have completed the route in a single

season had he not undertaken an ambitious program of scientific observations along the way.

Early in the twentieth century, the Russian government commissioned two small icebreakers,

Taymyr and Vaygach, to perform an extensive

hydrographic survey along the entire northern

coast. They worked each summer season from 1910

to 1915 and succeeded in the first, although protracted, east-to-west transit of the passage. Soon,

however, international shipping interest shifted

away from the Russian Arctic to more accessible

routes, not only because of the physical environment, but due to legal accessibility as well.

Claims of sovereignty over the route extend at

least as far back as 1704 when an edict of Peter the

Great established a Russian monopoly over commercial fishing and hunting in the western Arctic

seas. Similar imperial declarations were issued in

1753, 1799, and 1821. Russian legal claims were

confirmed by conventions with the United States

(1824) and Great Britain (1825). These and repeated

Soviet claims following the October Revolution of

1917 have resulted in nearly universal observance

of Soviet dominion over the Northern Sea Route

(Kolodkin and Volosov 1990; see also Franckx 1988,

Butler 1991).

Isolated by a protectionist policy, the Soviets

invested heavily in a marine infrastructure that

allowed them to settle and develop their northern

coastline and reap the abundant natural resources

of their frontier. The USSR sought to become independent of other nations for raw materials. The

huge nickel deposits at Noril’sk in the Yenisey

River basin and the tin deposits at Deputatskiy

and Iul’tin were discovered during this period,

and gold was discovered in the far northeast, diamonds in the Lena River basin, and apatite near

Murmansk.

Recent history

Granberg (1992) breaks down the modern era

of Soviet development of the Northern Sea Route

into four periods:

• Exploration and settlement (1917–1932);

• Organization of regular navigation and

development of fleet and ports (1932 to

early 1950s);

• Development completed and regular seasonal traffic established (early 1950s to late

1970s);

• Efforts to establish year-round shipping

(late 1970s to present).

Highlights of these four periods of the modern era

are presented below.

9
Before the October Revolution and the Soviet

takeover in 1917, there were sporadic attempts at

regional exploitation by a few venturesome individuals. Resources such as furs, wool, fish, salt,

and coal were marketable products of the northern frontier that encouraged early enterprise. Whaling and sealing also encouraged Arctic marine activity.

The devastation of World War I crippled Russia’s

economy and created the social discontent that

lead to the Soviets’ rise to power. The disruption

of the railroad system played an important role in

initiating regular marine traffic along the northern

coast to distribute food goods. In 1920, a Soviet

agency, the Committee of the Northern Sea Route

(in Russian, Komitet Severnogo Morskogo Puti, abbreviated to Komseveroput) was established to

“equip, improve, and study” the entire route from

Arkhangel’sk to the Bering Strait. The activities of

this committee were given high priority for establishing a resource transportation system that was

regarded as vital to the nation’s economy.

In 1932 a German, Otto Shmidt, completed the

entire route in the small Soviet icebreaker Sibiryakov

in just two months. The ship, however, lost its

propeller in the ice just short of the Bering Strait

and had to be towed by freighter after emerging

from the ice under improvised sails (Barr 1978).

Still, the voyage was a remarkable achievement

and underscored the advanced navigational skills

and technological capability of the Russians in this

severe environment. Shmidt’s second attempt one

year later in a Soviet cargo ship, the Chelyuskin,

ended when the ship was trapped in the ice and

crushed.

The first damage-free transit in a single season

was accomplished by the Soviet icebreaker Fedor

Litke in 1934. The next year she successfully convoyed the first two freighters through from west

to east. NSR shipping activity increased dramatically by 1936 when 14 freighters were escorted

through.

Soviet resolve and experience in ice navigation

were unrivaled, and traffic in the Arctic continued

to grow. For example, from 1917 to 1934, there

were only two sinkings out of 178 round-trip voyages across the Kara Sea to import finished goods

to and export timber from Igarka.

In 1932, a new and more powerful government

department, the Glavnoye Upravleniye Severnogo

Morskogo Puti (Glavsevmorput), or Chief Administration of the Northern Sea Route,* assumed the

role to “develop the NSR from the White Sea to

the Bering Strait, to equip it, to keep it in good

order, and to secure the safety of shipping along

it” (Arikaynen 1991). Otto Shmidt was installed as

its first head, and for the remainder of the decade

he dramatically increased freighting along the

route. Under his administration, major additions

were made to the Arctic fleet, which moved between 100,000 and 300,000 tons of cargo annually

and employed from 40 to 150 ships per year. Timber exports from Igarka accounted for as much as

two-thirds of the total cargo weight; the rest was

mainly supply cargo into the growing industrial

areas of northern Siberia. Soviet shipments in the

region grew steadily in support of Siberian development, and improving icebreaking technology

produced a steady increase in the length of the

navigation season (Arikaynen 1991, Armstrong

1992b). These two facts are supported by the figures in Table 4.

In 1940, before the USSR became involved in

World War II, a German warship was escorted

across most of the NSR for a fee of about £80,000.

Hitler’s strategy was to quickly move a patrol ship

into the Pacific arena undetected. The Komet, an

armed raider disguised as a merchant ship, was

the first foreign ship in over 20 years to be granted

passage, and it was the last foreign transit for more

than 50 years thereafter. News of her passage was

not made public until 1945 with the capture of

secret German documents at the end of the war.

Armstrong (1958) surmised that the Soviets may

Table 4. Soviet shipping activity along the Northern Sea Route (after Ushakov et

al. 1991).

Year 1935 1940 1950 1960 1963 1965 1970

Freight tonnage (000) 246 289 503 1,013 1,390 1,600 2,400

Length of season (days) 93 93 122 128 130 135 145

* Various translated names for Glavsevmorput have appeared in the literature. Arikaynen (1991) gives “Chief

Northern Sea Route Agency,” Armstrong (1992b) gives

“Chief Administration of the Northern Sea Route,” Barr

(1991) gives “Directorate of the Northern Sea Route,”

and Ushakov et al. (1991) give “Main Department of

the Northern Sea Route.”

10
have had second thoughts about aiding and abetting Hitler, and within about 700 nm of the Bering

Strait, they advised the Germans to turn about

and return west to avoid U.S. ships patrolling the

Strait. The German captain refused, absolved the

Soviets from further responsibility for the safety

of his ship, and successfully completed the passage unescorted. A new transit record of just 21

days was set (only 14 days were actually spent

under way) but, more importantly, the strategic

value of the route was demonstrated: the Soviet

Union was capable of moving manpower and

equipment between the Atlantic and the Pacific

Oceans without leaving its own territorial waters.

When the USSR entered the war in 1941, the

route became important for bringing Allied supplies into the country. Supply convoys from the

west into Murmansk suffered heavy casualties

from German U-boats in the Barents Sea as well as

the Atlantic. Although the “Murmansk Run” did

not make use of the actual NSR, the NSR did become an alternate supply route from American

West Coast ports to Russia’s northern ports by

way of the Bering Strait. In the four seasons of

1942–1945, 120 ships transported approximately

450,000 tons of relief supplies, which amounted to

approximately half the freight turnover for the NSR

during this period. Most of these voyages offloaded

at Tiksi on the Lena River, but 13 were able to

reach the Yenisey delta, and one even traveled as

far west as Arkhangel’sk (Barr 1991).

Post-war information on shipping figures is difficult to obtain, because comprehensive annual summaries of shipping

data were not published. What information there is was gleaned from a variety of

sources and news coverage of the most

noteworthy events, but it presents a general pattern of relatively constant growth

in the marine infrastructure and activities

over the next 40 years.

Recent landmark developments

A table of voyages is included in Sodhi

(1995) that lists numerous important

events in the development of icebreaking

technology. From this list, we have selected

and discuss below certain events that were

most significant toward the opening of

the NSR.

In 1959, the Soviets launched the

world’s first nuclear-powered surface ship,

the icebreaker Lenin. This was an extremely significant development in Arctic shipping because it expanded the range of travel in

isolated regions. In the past, travel into Arctic regions was seriously limited by the ship’s fuel storage capacity or the availability of fuel en route.

The advent of nuclear-powered ships virtually

eliminated this historically significant barrier overnight.

The Soviet offer to open the Northern Sea Route

to foreign shipping and provide icebreaking support for a fee was first extended to the world in

1967. A demonstration voyage took place that summer in which a Soviet ship transported cargo from

western Europe to Yokohama. Although the transit was successfully accomplished in only 27 days,

foreign shippers never seized upon this initiative.

Armstrong (1972) presents the possibility that the

offer was tacitly withdrawn so that the Soviets

would not offend their Arab allies by proposing

an alternative to the Suez Canal.

In 1977, the Soviets powered the first surface

vessel to the geographic North Pole (Fig. 6). The

nuclear-fueled Arktika, the world’s most powerful

icebreaker with 75,000 shaft horsepower, departed

Murmansk on 9 August and reached the Pole on

the 17th. The return to Murmansk, by way of Franz

Josef Land, was completed on 23 August. The 14-

day experimental voyage, more than half of which

was spent breaking through ice, covered 3852 nm

at an average speed of 11.5 kn (Armstrong 1978,

Ivanin 1978).

Figure 6. Track of the first surface ship to reach the geographic

North Pole in 1977 (after Armstrong 1978). 





































































































A R C T I C C I R C L E

NORTH POLENORTH POLE

Kotuy R vi e r

Yenis e y R.

Taz R vi e

O

r

b R iver

Arkhangel'sk

Murmansk

Salekhard

Yamburg Igarka

Noril'sk

Dikson Khatanga

Nordvik

Dudinka

Tiksi

S

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

 180°

 0°

 90°

0 1000

Kilometers

 150°

 120°

 60°

 30°

 30°

 150°

GREENLAND

St. Petersburg

Olenek River

0 500

Nautical Miles

L ena R.

Kotuy R vi e r

Yenis e y R.

Taz R vi e

O

r

b R iver

Arkhangel'sk

Murmansk

Salekhard

Yamburg Igarka

Noril'sk

Dikson Khatanga

Nordvik

Dudinka

Tiksi

RUSSIA

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

 180°

 0°

 90°

0 1000

Kilometers

 150°

 120°

 60°

 30°

 30°

 150°

GREENLAND

St. Petersburg

Olenek River

0 500

Nautical Miles









 Less than 50 m depth


More than 50 m depth


11
In 1978 another landmark voyage occurred: the

first complete, high-latitude passage of a surface

ship. The Arktika-class icebreaker Sibir’ led the

Amguema-class transport ship Kapitan Myshevskiy

(Fig. 7), which was loaded with oil-field equipment bound for the Kolyma region (Mikhailichenko 1986). This voyage followed the track identified as the “transit route” in Figure 2. They

travelled from Murmansk east through the Bering

Strait to Magadan and passed to the north of all

the major island groups (except Wrangel Island),

shaving many miles off the standard coastal route.

Altogether, the convoy covered 3200 nm, of which

nearly 3000 was in ice. In addition, the ships left

Murmansk in May (a record early departure up to

that time) to obtain data on navigating under more

challenging ice conditions.

The advent in 1990 of Russian tourist cruises to

the North Pole could be considered landmark. The

fact that the Soviets have the capability to make

routine and profitable excursions there is unique

in the world today. As of August 1994, they had

succeeded in reaching the Pole on 13 occasions

with six different vessels (Table 5). Only four other

nations can boast of the considerable achievement

of having piloted a surface vessel to 90° North,

and they have accomplished this only once and

each with a single ship. The Swedish icebreaker

Oden and the German icebreaker Polarstern shared

in a scientific expedition and arrived at the Pole

on 7 September, 1991. On 22 August, 1994, the U.S.

icebreaker Polar Sea and the Canadian icebreaker

Louis St.-Laurent celebrated their attainment of that

geographic prize (Brigham 1995). By remarkable

coincidence, this joint scientific expedition met the

Russian ship Yamal, still in the vicinity, which had

arrived two days earlier on its sixth polar tourist

excursion. This marked the first time in history

that surface ships from three separate nations

would rendezvous virtually at the top of the globe.

The Louis St.-Laurent and Polar Sea went on to complete an historic first crossing of the Arctic Basin:

over the Pole from the Bering Strait to Spitsbergen

and Iceland. It is significant that only nuclear-fueled ships have been successful in reaching the

North Pole alone. The ability to navigate such long

distances in heavy ice has so far required either

two diesel-fueled vessels to take turns in the lead

(and thus save fuel), or the nearly limitless range

of a nuclear-powered vessel.

Increasing international interest

Since Gorbachev’s 1987 Murmansk speech (see

Armstrong 1988 for a translation of the relevant

Figure 7. Icebreaker Sibir’ and icebreaking multipurpose cargo ship Kapitan Myshevskiy on

first high-latitude crossing of the NSR in 1978. (Courtesy of Sovphoto, Moscow.)

12
Table 5. Icebreakers and voyages that have reached the North Pole.*

Ship Date Country Powerplant

1 Arktika 17 August 1977 Soviet Union Nuclear

2 Sibir’ 25 May 1987 Soviet Union Nuclear

3 Rossiya 8 August 1990 Soviet Union Nuclear

4 Sovietskiy Soyuz 4 August 1991 Soviet Union Nuclear

5 Oden 7 September 1991 Sweden Diesel

6 Polarstern 7 September 1991 Germany Diesel

7 Sovietskiy Soyuz 13 July 1992 Russia Nuclear

8 Sovietskiy Soyuz 23 August 1992 Russia Nuclear

9 Yamal 21 July 1993 Russia Nuclear

10 Yamal 8 August 1993 Russia Nuclear

11 Yamal 30 August 1993 Russia Nuclear

12 Yamal 21 July 1994 Russia Nuclear

13 Kapitan Dranitsyn 21 July 1994 Russia Diesel

14 Yamal 5 August 1994 Russia Nuclear

15 Yamal 20 August 1994 Russia Nuclear

16 Louis St.-Laurent 22 August 1994 Canada Diesel

17 Polar Sea 22 August 1994 United States Diesel

* L.W. Brigham, 1994, U.S. Coast Guard, personal communication.

portion), several developments have occurred to

increase foreign interest in using the NSR. A multinational organization, the International Northern Sea Route Programme (INSROP), was formed

to undertake any and all activities that would enhance international interest in the route. The lead

agencies coordinating INSROP are the Fridtjof

Nansen Institute (Norway), the Central Marine

Research and Design Institute (Russia), and the

Ship and Ocean Foundation (Japan). This project

is the first credible attempt to bring together an

international working group to comprehensively

define problem areas and provide a forum for solutions. INSROP participants recognized the following four areas of concern and assigned member groups to address each one in the form of pilot

studies (Østreng and Jørgensen-Dahl 1991):

• Physical conditions and navigation issues,

• Ecological aspects,

• Commerce and trade studies,

• Legal, political, and military–strategic issues.

The INSROP effort received additional impetus

in November 1991 from a resolution of The Northern Forum, another organization committed to addressing a variety of northern territorial

concerns. Signed by 13 representatives of northern-tier regions in the U.S., Canada,

Norway, Russia, Finland, China,

Mongolia, Japan, and Korea, the resolution gives approval to the INSROP

initiative and encourages a priority

emphasis for supporting activities that

promote the NSR.

Another international group,

known as the Barents Council, has also

given its endorsement to the promotion efforts and has formed a subcommittee called the Working Group for

the Northern Sea Route. At their meeting in Oslo in September 1992, which

was attended by representatives from

eleven European, Asian, and North

American countries, it was decided

to formulate a plan for addressing issues relevant to promotion of the NSR.

The activities of these three organizations is evidence of an international

commitment toward the route’s development and a widely held belief

that such development might substantially benefit not only Russia, but

many other countries as well.

Foreign response to Gorbachev’s invitation and

the international activities to promote utilization

of the Northern Sea Route began with the leasing

of cargo space aboard Soviet SA-15 icebreaking

cargo carriers (Brigham 1993). In 1989, there were

several of these transits from Hamburg to Osaka.

In 1990, six more voyages took place, each requiring about 25 days, which was approximately 10

days faster than a Suez Canal passage.

That same year, the nuclear icebreaker Rossiya

made the third visit to the North Pole by a surface

ship (the second, by the Sibir’, took place in 1987

[Frolov 1991]). The unique feature of this nine-day

voyage was the fact that the ship was adapted to

accommodate 40 foreign tourists who paid $20,000

each for the trip. The cruise was considered such a

success that the Sovietskiy Soyuz made three similar tourist trips in 1991 and 1992. An interesting

description of these polar excursions from the tourist–adventurer point of view appeared in a nationally distributed recreation magazine (Cahill 1993).

The popularity of these excursions seems assured,

and tourism in the Arctic is a business opportunity that the Russians hope to capitalize on.

In August of 1991, a Russian freighter sailed

from Norway to Hong Kong carrying 10,000 tons

of steel. This marked the first time that Norwegian

cargo had been shipped to Asia via the Northern

13
Sea Route. The summer of 1993 saw the commencement of sea trials for a Finnish–Russian joint venture using a foreign vessel to supply Russian fuel

products to a Siberian destination.* A 16,000-deadweight-ton (dwt) IA Super-class (the highest Finnish ice classification) tanker with a Russian ice pilot on board made three consecutive round-trip

voyages. The cargo was taken on at Arkhangel’sk

and transported to the mouth of the Yana River in

the Laptev Sea, a distance of approximately 2150

nm. It was then offloaded to shallow-draft vessels

for delivery to upriver destinations. Each round

trip required 19–23 days to complete, which included 2–3 days turnaround time. The 1993 season was estimated to be of 1-in-10-year severity in

terms of ice conditions. It was necessary at times

to break 3- to 5-m-thick pack ice in a 300-mile

section of the Laptev Sea beginning at Vil’kitskogo

Strait. Four nuclear-powered icebreakers, stationed

in the area to maintain a passage, assisted the

tanker through this section, but the tanker was

under constant escort by Russian icebreakers only

from Dikson to the Khatanga River. The trial voyages were deemed successful, and the run became

regularly established in the summer of 1994. It

was recently reported that the Neste and Murmansk Shipping collaboration, known as Arctic

Shipping Services, now handles all deliveries of

petroleum products along the Russian Arctic coast

(Anonymous 1994b). Although the Russians are

seeking foreign cargo and investment to employ

their own idle container ships, Finnish tankers were

required for this joint venture. There are, ironically, no ice-strengthened tankers in the Russian

fleet, as they were all distributed to other members of the CIS upon the breakup of the USSR.

In the United States, interest in the Northern

Sea Route is high in Alaska and the state of Washington (Weathersby 1990). The Department of

Commerce and Economic Development for the

state of Alaska tried for two years to set up a demonstration shipment using Russian cargo ships to

transport Alaskan goods such as fish, ore, timber,

or coal to European markets. Unfortunately, negotiations between Alaskan officials and the

Murmansk Shipping Company broke down, and

the trial voyage planned for the summer of 1993

failed to materialize. Davies (1993a) cited the shipping company’s inability to provide the ship type

and size needed for the Alaskan cargo. Discussions continued throughout the ensuing winter,

but the two sides still could not reach agreement

for the voyage to occur during the summer of 1994.

An enterprising voyage carrying foreign goods

aboard a Russian ship did, however, take place in

the summer of 1993 (Davies 1993b). An SA-15

owned by the Far Eastern Shipping Company successfully transported prefabricated housing materials for oil-field workers from New Westminster,

British Columbia, to Novvy Port on the Yamal Peninsula.

Davies (1994) also reported on a transit in September 1993 that was arranged by a freight chartering company based in St. Michaels, Maryland.

The company chartered a Russian SA-15 to ship

timber from Hamina, Finland, to several ports in

Japan. The voyage took 28 days and saved nearly

$250,000, according to a company executive. “We

avoided the $90,000 cost of using the Suez Canal

and reduced our transit time by 14 days with ship

costs that run about $10,000 per day.” He added,

“Based on our experience, I couldn’t imagine it

[the NSR] not becoming a major international shipping route.” Only one short section of ice in the

Vil’kitskogo Strait between the Kara and Laptev

Seas required icebreaker assistance. Our source

stated that the Russians did not charge them for

icebreaking services (we presume because a Russian ship was being escorted), but they are contemplating charging up to $100,000 for assisting

foreign ships.

Even with the most up-to-date technology, the

Northern Sea Route sometimes presents unexpected challenges. As late as 1983, an early October cold spell trapped approximately 50 ships in

several locations around the East Siberian and

Chukchi Seas. Thirteen icebreakers were dispatched to the scene to effect a massive rescue

operation. By late November, the ships were freed

(except for one that was crushed by ice), but 30

suffered damage of varying degree (Armstrong

1984, Barr and Wilson 1985). Each voyage into this

region still presents a level of risk that will never

be eliminated but will likely continue to diminish

with technological advances and increased operational experience.

ADMINISTRATION

AND REGULATIONS

Administration

From 1932 to 1953, the administration of the

Russian marine Arctic rested with the Chief Administration of the Northern Sea Route (CANSR),

* J. Laapio, 1993, Neste Shipping, personal communication.

14
which was a direct arm of the Council of People’s

Commissars of the USSR. This special affiliation

afforded it great status and power for carrying out

its mission to “develop the Northern Sea Route.”

During this period, great strides were made in

organizing regular navigation and developing the

fleet and port infrastructure. In 1953, CANSR became a department under the Ministry of Merchant Marine in Moscow, and for 17 years the infrastructure was improved to provide the capability for both summer and autumn shipping. Since

1970, when CANSR became the Administration of

the Northern Sea Route (ANSR), the emphasis has

been on achieving year-round trafficability. When

it was established, the agency was staffed with 35

people. By 1981, that number had been reduced to

16 and, later still, dwindled further to nine.

With the formation of the Commonwealth of

Independent States in 1991, total jurisdiction over

the NSR passed to the Russian Federation

(Arikaynen 1991). In 1991, the Ministry of the Merchant Marine (ANSR’s parent organization) and

the Ministry of River Transport were reorganized

as departments under the new Ministry of Transport. This consolidation was accompanied by reduced state subsidies, which were followed by

additional manpower and funding cuts.

These two ministries once centrally managed

the three water transport sectors of international

ocean shipping, internal river/canal shipping, and

domestic coastal shipping. They were responsible

for determining all investment decisions, service

arrangements, productivity targets, and fees for

services. Centralization made possible regional

specialization of marine assets. Most ports and

cargo carriers were thus developed and managed

for specific purposes to support the centrally formulated plan of the Soviet Union. This system

may have worked well under the nearly all-Union

trading pattern, but the breakup of the USSR in

1991 left each of the new republics without certain

key facilities. Even though all ports of the Arctic

and Pacific Rim regions remained under control

of Russia, several key, high-volume ports and cargo

carriers in the Baltic and Black Sea regions were

lost to other nations of the CIS. For example,

Russia’s port capacity was reduced by 53%, as 11

of 18 ports were lost. This represented over 6 million tons (mt) of cargo-handling capacity per year.

Novotalinn Port, which became operational only

in 1986 and was the former Soviet Union’s (FSU’s)

premier grain storage and shipping site, became

part of Estonia. The port of Riga, one of only two

modern container-handling facilities, went to

Latvia. In 1990, only 63% of FSU sea trade was

routed through what are now Russian ports. Most

of the rest passed through the Baltic republics and

Ukraine (Holt 1993).

The maritime fleet was also divided up. This

reapportionment changed the national statistics

dramatically: in 1992 a large portion of Russian

sea trade was channeled through newly foreign

ports (37%) and moved by foreign vessels (46%),

resulting in a hard currency drain of nearly US $3

billion (Peters 1993).

Although this is recognized by the Russian shipping industry as a problem, it is difficult to address because of the lack of central control, aging

of the Russian fleet, and the technologically inferior state of its cargo-handling infrastructure. The

trend will be difficult to reverse in the current trading climate. The major national carriers have become self-sustaining enterprises, free to follow their

own corporate strategies with the exception only

of setting rates and ship acquisition and disposal.

With the emphasis on generating hard currency

income, shipowners favor servicing foreign clients

as much as possible. About a third of the entire

Russian fleet was involved in this type of crosstrading in 1992. Another popular strategy is for

shipowners to register their vessels under a thirdcountry flag so that more lucrative rates can be

charged for services. A third strategy is to form

independent joint ventures with foreign partners

and to place fleet assets into pools of ownership

that fall outside the control of the Transport Ministry. Hard currency is required to move cargo on

these ships, hard currency that ends up primarily

in foreign banks. Both the ruble’s low value relative to international currencies and the unavailability of Russian ships to meet national needs

increase the drain on the country’s reserves.

The director of the ANSR, since May 1990, is

Vladimir Mikhailichenko. He is the ex-captain of

the ice-strengthened vessel Pavel Ponomarev and

understands well the field operations end of the

system. The ANSR is currently responsible for the

overall planning, coordination, and execution of

organizational and regulatory activities for marine operations. It is responsible for meeting the

annual Arctic freight transportation goals, while

at the same time ensuring that personal and environmental safety is maintained (Mikhailichenko

and Ushakov 1993). These are very large tasks for

such a small department to address adequately.

One of Mikhailichenko’s primary goals is to bring

in more foreign revenue to reduce the Arctic fleet’s

dependence on state subsidy.

15
After Gorbachev’s 1987 speech, regulations for

foreign use of the NSR and a framework for administering them needed to be developed, protocols for escorting foreign ships had to be established, navigation guides and maps had to be

declassified and made available, and so forth. The

Russians officially opened the route to foreign use

in July of 1991.

Management of

field operations

Actual operations, including scheduling, route

assignment, navigational support, pilotage, and

so forth, are controlled by two marine operations

headquarters (MOHQs). Their areas of authority

are divided at longitude 125°E. Ships and shipments originating at the western end of the route

are directed by the MOHQ located at Dikson on

the Kara Sea coast. The formerly state-owned

Murmansk Shipping Company (MSC) runs the

Dikson MOHQ. Contractual arrangements for plying the route in this direction must be made in

advance with MSC’s administrative offices in

Murmansk. For traffic originating at the eastern

end, the corresponding authority is the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESCO). FESCO’s administrative offices and MOHQ are located in Vladivostok and the East Siberian Sea port of Pevek,

respectively. The staffs at the MOHQs are composed of personnel skilled in all aspects of in-ice

navigation, including ship captains, reconnaissance

aircraft and ice pilots, and weather and ice forecasters. In addition, these are centers for search

and rescue, emergency ship repairs, and the enforcement of safety and pollution-prevention

measures.

Regulations for passage

The Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of

the Northern Sea Route (Mulherin et al. 1994) were

formulated by the Head Department of Navigation and Oceanography under the USSR Ministry

of Defense. Adopted in July 1991, they comprise a

21-page pamphlet in both Russian and English

that is quite widely available, as it has been reprinted in several conference proceedings and

trade publications. In short, the regulations require:

• ANSR approval for passage,

• Ship certification for ice worthiness and an

experienced Master. If the MOHQ determines that his level of experience is inadequate, it may assign an ice pilot to the vessel for all or part of the voyage,

• Proof of indemnity for possible damage liability (mainly pollution),

• That vessels follow the directives of the

MOHQ or face removal from the route.

The regulations, in effect, grant full authority to

the MOHQ to conduct all NSR shipping as field

conditions warrant.

Three additional ANSR publications reportedly

elaborate further on the rules and procedures. According to Mikhailichenko and Ushakov (1993),

these are:

• Requirements for the Design, Equipment, and

Supply of Vessels Navigating the Northern Sea

Route,

• Rates Charged for Escorting Foreign-Flag Vessels Through the NSR,

• Guide to Navigation Through the Northern Sea

Route.

The first publication, in Russian (an unofficial

translation can be found in Mulherin et al. 1994),

details such requirements as double hulls, steel

plating thickness, powerplant size, and propeller

design. Other requirements for foreign vessels include a 30-day supply of fuel, a 60-day supply of

food, and a water-distilling plant aboard for drinking water. In 1993, Mikhailichenko* stated that the

second document (“Rates Charged ...”) was not

yet published.

Mikhailichenko and Ushakov (1993) stated that

the third publication, “Guide to Navigation ...”,

was slated for release by July 1992. However, its

publication has been seriously delayed as a result

of the country’s socioeconomic difficulties. In December 1993, Maliavko† reported that the guide

was only in draft form and would be released by

the Russian Head Department of Hydrography

sometime in 1995, in Russian. He translated its

main sections as follows:

Section 1: General overview

Section 2: Hydrological/meteorological

description

Sections 3–6: Navigation directions for the

various seas

* V. Mikhailichenko, 1993, Administration of the Northern Sea Route, personal communication.

† M. Maliavko, 1993, HydroCon, Ltd., St. Petersburg,

Russia, personal communication.

16
Section 7: Navigational beacons and radio

frequencies

Section 8: General ice navigation techniques

It was apparent that this publication might be

useful for characterizing the navigational setting

of the NSR, so CRREL contracted with HydroCon,

Ltd., a Russian geographic publications supply

company in St. Petersburg to obtain a copy of the

draft and translate it for our use. HydroCon completed all necessary arrangements and, during the

period May–July 1994, sections of the translated

document were received at CRREL. Its table of

contents is reproduced as Appendix B. It is an

exhaustive, 600-page compilation of regulations,

environmental information, sailing directions, and

miscellaneous navigational instructions. Maliavko

later indicated that he may publish and market his

English translation of the Guide to coincide with

the official release of the Russian original.

THE TRADE SETTING

Peters (1993) presents a detailed and frank

evaluation of the water transport industry in Russia today, and most of the near-term news is not

encouraging. This is a particularly dynamic period in the transformation of the FSU. Great and

rapid change will undoubtedly occur in the next

few years in Russia. Aside from the commodities

of coal, petroleum, wood exports, and grain imports, international trade is of lesser importance

and languishing. Total cargo turnover decreased

with the onset of political and economic turmoil

in the late 1980s and the subsequent breakup of

the Soviet Union in 1991. For this section, we have

relied heavily on Peters’ report, which was the

waterborne transit portion of an economic analysis of and prognosis for the entire Russian transportation system by the World Bank (Holt 1993).

Water transport can be subdivided into 1) international ocean transport, 2) cabotage (domestic

port-to-port trade), and 3) internal river transport

(not considered “sea trade”). Cabotage is a tiny

contributor to Russia’s freight transport total,

amounting to a minuscule 0.15%, but it is a very

important mode of supply for the northern frontier. River transport accounted for only 17 mt or

10% of international trade in 1992. All three of

these categories are probably more important for

trade along Russia’s Arctic coastline than elsewhere

in the country. It can be seen in Figure 8 that the

rivers there, which generally flow from south to

north, form an extensive navigable network. Eastto-west movement of Siberian cargo is accomplished by first moving it along the rivers to railheads in the south or to seaports in the north.

Russia’s water-borne transport network is a relatively small component of the entire national cargo

transportation system, which includes highways,

railroads, pipelines, and air service. Figure 9 shows

the volumes of freight moved by various methods

in 1991 and those projected through 1995. Road

and rail transport were by far the prime movers of

all freight (95%). River and sea cargo (564 and 103

mt, respectively) amounted to less than 3% of all

Federation tonnage moved in 1991.

In 1992, only 7.5% of Russia’s total trade was

transported by ship: 165 mt by sea, 542 mt by river

and canal, and 35 mt in cabotage. Only 17 mt of

Federation sea trade was international in nature.

River trade in 1993 was 470 mt; it is expected to

drop to around 450 mt or less by 1995. Cabotage is

off three-fold, and river ports work at only 40% of

capacity (Berenyl et al. 1994).

For international cargo transport, the importance of Russia’s waterborne sector becomes more

evident. Excluding transport by pipeline, more

than 70% of all its international trade moved by

water in 1988 (50% of all export tonnage and 76%

of all import tonnage), as shown in Figure 10.

Russia’s international trade in the final few years

of the Soviet Union ranged between 508–609 mt

annually, with roughly four times more imports

than exports. Even though the international tonnage handled annually in all of the nation’s ports

combined was approximately equal to the annual

throughput of Shanghai, China, alone, cargo transport by water is crucial for Russia’s relatively small

international trade. The above figures reflect the

basic Soviet philosophy of self-reliance and allUnion trade. Before the breakup, only 5% of all

cargo was international. After the breakup of the

Union, fundamental changes in the composition

and direction of trade flows were inevitable, and

they are still occurring. Commerce between the

newly formed nations of the CIS was no longer

considered domestic; this was reflected in immediately higher international trade statistics. However, the waterborne sector’s share of international

freight decreased by approximately 40%, from 281

mt in 1988 to 167 mt in 1992, due to the heavy

reliance on rail transport within the CIS whose

members suddenly became international trading

partners.

Although highways and railroads move by far

17
Figure 8. Russian transportation systems (reprinted courtesy of Holt 1993).
25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Air

Sea

River

Pipelines

Railways

Road

All Traffic

Actual and Projected Tonnage (million tons)

Est. Proj. Proj. Proj.

Mode 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

All Traffic 23,601 19,088 17,700 18,201 19,101

including General Purpose 5,855 4,374 4,560 4,725 4,900

Railway 7,745 6,678 6,170 6,300 6,550

including General Purpose 1,956 1,825 1,910 1,975 2,050

Road 14,688 11,504 10,703 11,073 11,724

including General Purpose* 2,731 2,550 2,650 2,750 2,850

including Rosavtotrans† 2,396 2,350 2,250 2,325 2,450

including Own Account 11,957 10,700 10,900 11,100 11,900

River 564 374 339 363 382

including General Purpose 50 47 46 51 55

Sea 103 101 87 90 94

Pipelines 499 430 400 373 348

Air 2 1 1 2 2

* Includes international, intracity, intercity.

† Excludes Mosavtotrans and St. Petersburgavtotrans. As of 1993, “Rosavtotrans” will be a

Russian joint stock trucking company.

North America, and Australia, Japan, and South

Korea. Exports went mainly to Italy, The Netherlands, Great Britain, and Spain, while imports arrived mainly from Canada, France, and Japan. The

next largest group of trading partners (11%) was

composed of developing countries, with India

alone accounting for more than 54% of trade with

this group. A further 9% is traded with nations of

the FSU, and less than 5% is traded with other

socialist countries such as North Korea, China, and

former Yugoslavia. These statistics reveal that Russia generally exports raw materials and imports

finished goods.

the majority of all freight, waterways are the primary mode in certain regions where other means

are not practical. In some relatively isolated regions, it is the only mode available. The waterborne sector is vitally important throughout northern Siberia, since the highway and railroad systems

have not extensively penetrated into this area.

Siberia’s navigable waterways are approximately

four times the length of its railroads and eleven

times longer than its road system.

Russia’s international sea-trading partners are

primarily (76%) developed Western and Far Eastern nations, such as those of Western Europe and

Figure 9. Actual and projected tonnages of Russian freight, in million of tons (mt) by various

transportation modes (from Holt 1993). Actual and Projected Tonnage (million tons)

19
AA

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40

30

20

10

0

Regional Share of Total Sea Trade (%)

Asov and

Black Seas

Baltic Pacific

Rim

Arctic

Rim

Caspian

Sea

AA

AA

AA

1990

1992

1995

1990 1992 1995

Foreign Regional Foreign Regional Foreign Regional

Geographic Cabotage trade % of total Cabotage trade % of total Cabotage trade % of total

(mt) (mt) sea trade (mt) (mt) sea trade (mt) (mt) sea trade

Arctic Rim 5.99 8.68 6.8 5.90 7.39 6.7 5.78 6.31 41.9

Baltic Sea 0.43 54.91 25.5 0.35 41.85 21.2 0.32 37.81 19.6

Azov and

 Black Seas 0.78 88.27 41.1 0.66 85.87 43.5 0.56 80.73 27.9

Caspian Sea 2.64 5.67 3.8 2.67 5.76 4.2 2.71 5.83 6.2

Pacific Rim 25.28 24.09 22.8 25.88 22.51 24.3 26.76 27.37 4.4

Total 35.12 181.62 35.46 163.38 36.13 158.05

Figure 10. The Soviet Union’s 1988 international trade, in millions of tons, by

various transport modes. Values shown above each bar represent percentages of

total exports and imports (from Peters 1993).

Figure 11. Actual and projected annual tonnage of Russian sea trade, in millions

of tons, by region (from Peters 1993).

Russia’s sea trade by region is illustrated in Figure 11. In 1992, seaports of the Black and Azov

Seas accounted for 44% of the Federation’s total

tonnage, mainly in the form of grain imports and

oil exports. The Pacific Rim ports generated 24%,

accounting for 73% of all Federation cabotage. Although Arctic ports handled only 7% of all sea

trade, when considered along with those of the

Pacific Rim, the role of the NSR for the nation’s

throughput is substantial.

The composition of international trade in 1992

is shown in Figure 12. Crude oil and petroleum

derivatives were 57% of all exports. Dry bulk cargo

was 62% of all imports. Cabotage consisted of

nearly 40% each of dry bulk and general cargo.

Dry bulk comprised mainly grain (44%), iron ore

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1995

1992

1990

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Exports

Imports

250

200

150

100

50

0

Ocean Pipeline Rail River Highway

Transport Mode

Volume (millions of tons)

47.2

74.1

31.0

1.1

19.2

23.0

2.4

1.4 0.2 0.4

Volume (mt)

Mode Imports % of imports Exports % of exports Total

Ocean 83.8 74.1 196.8 47.2 280.6

River 1.6 1.4 10.0 2.4 11.6

Rail 26.0 23.0 79.9 19.2 105.9

Highway 0.5 0.4 1.0 0.2 1.5

Pipeline 1.2 1.1 129.5 31.0 130.7

Total 113.1 417.2 530.3

Imports

Exports

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20
(21%), and coal (15.3%). More than 50% of cabotage dry bulk was coal. In the past three years,

liquid exports and imports have fallen off by 10%

and 15%, respectively, while dry bulk cargoes have

increased by similar proportions. Cabotage cargoes were relatively unchanged in composition.

Although the near-term outlook for Russia’s sea

trade shows reasonable stability now after a 30%

drop between 1988 and 1992, it is expected to grow

as privatization in the industry matures. Peters

(1993) predicts that an improving economy, political stabilization, industrial recovery, and expected

full convertibility of the ruble should help international water trade grow by 4.5% annually by 1996.

He also projects an annual growth rate in cabotage

of 3.5%.

THE PHYSICAL SETTING

In this section we summarize general information on the physical environment in the Russian

and Alaskan Arctic regions, according to the various seas progressing from west to east. The information was derived from Brigham and Voelker

(1985), Barnett (1991), Vefsnmo et al. (1991),

Batskikh and Mikhailichenko (1993), and RSMOT

(in prep.). For more detailed information, the

reader is referred to the research of climatological

conditions conducted for the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers NSR Reconnaissance Study (Proshutinsky et al. 1995)

The continental shelf is extremely wide off

Russia’s north coast (Fig. 13), and the seas overlying it are shallow. In general, the winter distribution of sea ice across the Russian Arctic is characterized by the growth of shorefast ice in vast areas

where the water is less than 30 m deep. Calculations based on climatic conditions show that the

maximum ice thickness averages 120 to 130 cm in

the Kara Gate, 160 to 170 cm near Dikson and in

the Longa Strait, and 190 to 200 cm in the straits of

Vil’kitskogo and Dmitriya Lapteva. These mean

values can vary by 30 to 50 cm depending on yearto-year conditions. The presence of snow has a

large effect on the fast-ice thickness, because it

acts as an insulating blanket over the growing ice

and reduces its thickness.

Seaward of the fast-ice boundary, the ice cover

is in constant motion due to ocean currents and

winds. This region of moving ice, known as “pack

ice,” continually experiences openings, called

leads, where the ice cover pulls apart, and convergence areas, where the ice crushes together to form

pressure ridges and fields of broken rubble. Recurrent open water in specific locations due to prevailing winds and currents are known as “polynyas” (Fig. 14). During the freezing period (roughly

August to May), new ice is continually being produced in the leads, and these areas of thinner ice

and the polynyas are obvious lines of weakness

that are exploited to maximum extent by ice pilots

and sea captains. Figure 15 shows the general distribution of various ice types across the Arctic BaLiquid cargo Dry bulk cargo General cargo

Category (%) (%) (%)

Export 57.0 30.5 12.5

Import 12.5 62.9 24.6

Cabotage 24.1 38.4 37.5

Total 40.3 39.9 19.8

Figure 12. Russia’s trade composition percentages for 1992 (from Peters 1993).

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Cargo Composition (%)

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Dry Bulk

General

Import Export Cabotage Total

Trade Category

21
vives the summer season. These ice fields, or massifs, sometimes cover hundreds of square kilometers and are found in the same regions every summer. Figure 16 shows the location of nine such

massifs along the Northern Sea Route. They all

experience some degree of seasonal fluctuation in

May–June

6 Polynya Number

Shore-fast ice

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Figure 14. Location of offshore and recurrent open water areas, or “polynyas,” during the time of

maximum ice development (May to June). (Translated from RSMOT, in prep.)

sin at the time of maximum ice development (May

to June). In the areas of convergence, rubble ice

refreezes into much thicker and stronger masses.

In some places, due to the presence of land barriers, prevailing winds, currents, and so forth, ice

accumulates in large enough masses that it surFigure 13. The bathymetry of the Russian Arctic. 































































































A R C T I C C I R C L E

Kolym a

River

I ndigirka Ri v er

Yana Riv e r

Len a

River

Kotuy R vi e r

Yenis e y R.

Taz R vi e

O

r

b R iver

A n a d y r R .

N O R T H

P O L E

Arkhangel'sk

Murmansk

Salekhard

Yamburg Igarka

Noril'sk

Dikson Khatanga

Nordvik

Dudinka

Tiksi

Magadan

Pevek

ARCTIC OCEAN

Bering


Sea

Chukchi


Sea

Provideniya

S

Alaska

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

Mys


Shmidta

70°

60°

 180°

 0°

 90°

0 1000

Kilometers

 150°

 120°

 60°

 30°

 30°

 150°

Sea of


Okhotsk

GREENLAND

St. Petersburg

Olenek River

0 500

Nautical Miles

Kolym a

River

I ndigirka Ri v er

Yana Riv e r

Len a

River

Kotuy R vi e r

Yenis e y R.

Taz R vi e

O

r

b R iver

A n a d y r R .

N O R T H

P O L E

Arkhangel'sk

Murmansk

Salekhard

Yamburg Igarka

Noril'sk

Dikson Khatanga

Nordvik

Dudinka

Tiksi

Yakutsk

Magadan

Pevek

ARCTIC OCEAN

Bering


Sea

Chukchi


Sea

Provideniya

RUSSIA

Alaska

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

Mys


Shmidta

70°

60°

 180°

 0°

 90°

0 1000

Kilometers

 150°

 120°

 60°

 30°

 30°

 150°

Sea of


Okhotsk

GREENLAND

St. Petersburg

Olenek River

0 500

Nautical Miles









 Less than 50 m depth


More than 50 m depth


22
Figure 16. Location of recurring ice massifs (from Gudkovich et al. 1972). 



























































































A R C T I C C I R C L EA R C T I C C I R C L E

Laptev

Sea

East


SiberianSea

Chukchi Sea

 150°

Olenek River

Sea of


Okhotsk

St. Petersburg

0 500

Nautical Miles

E

A

B

C

D

F

G

H

I

Kara

Sea

GREENLAND

Kolym a

River

I ndigirka

R i ver

I ndigirka

R i ver

Yana Riv e r

Len a

River

Kotuy R vi e r

Yenis e y R.

Taz R vi e

O

r

b R iver

A n a d y r R .

N O R T H

P O L E

Arkhangel'sk

Murmansk

Salekhard

Yamburg

Khatanga

Nordvik

Igarka

Noril'sk

Dikson

Dudinka

Tiksi

Yakutsk

Magadan

Pevek

ARCTIC OCEAN

Barents


Sea

Bering


Sea

Provideniya

S

Alaska

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

Mys


Shmidta

70°

60°

 180°

 90°

0 1000

Kilometers

 150°

 120°

 60°

 30°

 30°

A
 150°

B


C


D


E


F


G


H


I

Ice Massifs
 ——————–––———————————

Laptev

Sea

East


SiberianSea

Chukchi Sea

 150°

Olenek River

Sea of


Okhotsk

St. Petersburg

0 500

Nautical Miles

E

A

B

C

D

F

G

H

I

Kara

Sea

GREENLAND

Kolym a

River

Yana Riv e r

Len a

River

Kotuy R vi e r

Yenis e y R.

Taz R vi e

O

r

b R iver

A n a d y r R .

N O R T H

P O L E

Arkhangel'sk

Murmansk

Salekhard

Yamburg

Khatanga

Nordvik

Igarka

Noril'sk

Dikson

Dudinka

Tiksi

Yakutsk

Magadan

Pevek

ARCTIC OCEAN

Barents


Sea

Bering


Sea

Provideniya

RUSSIA

Alaska

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

Mys


Shmidta

70°

60°

 180°

 90°

0 1000

Kilometers

 150°

 120°

 60°

 30°

 30°

A
 150°

B


C


D


E


F


G


H


I

Novaya Zemlya (Novozemelskiy)


North Kara (Severniy Karskiy)


Severnaya Zemlya (Severozemelskiy)


Taymyr (Taymyrskiy)


Yana (Janskiy)


Novosibirskiy


Ayon (Ayonskiy)


Wrangel (Vrangelevskiy)


North Chukchi (Chukotskiy Severniy)

Ice Massifs
 ——————–––———————————

Figure 15. General distribution of various ice types at the time of maximum development. According

to WMO (1970), multiyear ice is that which has survived at least one melt season and is not less than

2.5 m thick; first-year thick ice is between 1.2 and 2 m thick; first-year medium ice, first-year thin ice,

and young ice covers the range from 0.1 to 1.2 m thick. (Translated from RSMOT, in prep.)

May–First

Half of June

Coast Ice

Clear Water

One-year

Thick Ice

Old Ice

One-year Medium Thickness Ice

and Light Ice; Young Ice

23
size. For example, the Novaya Zemlya massif

nearly melts out completely, while the Taymyr,

Ayon, and Wrangel massifs are more resistant and

experience less ablation.

Table 6 shows the probability for ice conditions

that necessitate icebreaker assistance through NSR

massifs for ULA-class ships (the highest ice classification for cargo ships under the Russian registry). The data include observations from 1970

through 1991. Although the individual probabilities are quite low for October, there is a high probability that all cargo vessels will need icebreaker

assistance somewhere along the way, even in October. In fact, Section 7.4 of the ANSR regulations

(1991) stipulates that escort is mandatory for all

foreign ships seeking passage at any time through

certain island straits (Vil’kitskogo, Shokal’skogo,

Dmitriya Lapteva, and Sannikova).

The summer season occurs roughly from June

to September when the ice cover melts significantly,

diminishing in both extent and strength. Figure 17

shows the seasonal changes in the normal ice cover.

It can be seen that the greatest seasonal fluctuation occurs at the east and west ends of the route.

This is due to the influence of ocean currents moving northward from the warmer Atlantic Ocean in

the west and the Bering Sea in the east, which

accelerate ice decay in the spring and retard

freezeup in the fall. Of greater interest to shipping

is the mean July-to-September location of the ice

edge with 7/10ths or greater concentration.* These

isolines are shown in Figure 18. This map does not

take into account the location of the ice massifs, as

the September and, to a large extent, the August

isolines are well north of the massifs shown in

Figure 16.

Between the freezing and melting seasons is a

brief interphase of ice pack movement from wind

and ocean currents. This interphase is characterTable 6. Probability (%) of occurrence of conditions

that require icebreaker assistance through various

NSR massifs (from Buzuev 1991).

Amguema-class Noril’sk-class

Ice massif Jun Aug Oct Jun Aug Oct

Novaya Zemlya 95 0 0 95 0 0

Severnaya Zemlya 100 75 25 100 60 5

Taymyr 95 65 40 95 55 15

Novosibirskiy 95 60 20 90 45 10

Ayon 95 35 15 95 30 5

Wrangel 95 10 25 95 5 5

Figure 17. Seasonal extent of the sea-ice edge (from Barnett 1991; USNODC 1986a,b).

* Ice concentration is usually expressed in tenths or

octas describing the amount of sea surface covered by

ice as a fraction of the total area being considered.



























A R C T I C C I R C L EA R C T I C C I R C L E

Mys


Shmidta

70°

N O R T H

P O L E

JAPAN

Pevek

East Siberian Sea

Olenek River

Khatanga

Nordvik

Kotuy R vi e r

50°

Sea of


Okhotsk

A n a d y r R .

Magadan

Bering


Sea

Chukchi


Sea

Provideniya

Alaska

60°

I ndigirka

R i ver

I ndigirka

R i ver

Kolym a

River

Minimum Ice Limit (mild summer)


Average Summer Ice Extent


Average Winter Ice Extent


Maximum Ice Limit (severe winter)

Sea Ice Extent
 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

Yana Rv e r

Len a

River

Yenis e y R.

Ob R iver

Arkhangel'sk

Murmansk

Salekhard

Yamburg Igarka

Noril'sk

Dikson

Dudinka

Tiksi

Yakutsk

ARCTIC OCEAN

Kara Sea

S

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

 180°

 90°

0 1000

Kilometers

 150°

 120°

 60°

 30°

 150°

GREENLAND

Barents


Sea

Laptev


Sea

Taz R vi er

St. Petersburg

0 500

Nautical Miles

Mys


Shmidta

70°

N O R T H

P O L E

JAPAN

Pevek

East Siberian Sea

Olenek River

Khatanga

Nordvik

Kotuy R vi e r

50°

Sea of


Okhotsk

A n a d y r R .

Magadan

Bering


Sea

Chukchi


Sea

Provideniya

Alaska

60°

Kolym a

River

Minimum Ice Limit (mild summer)


Average Summer Ice Extent


Average Winter Ice Extent


Maximum Ice Limit (severe winter)

Sea Ice Extent
 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

Yana Rv e r

Len a

River

Yenis e y R.

Ob R iver

Arkhangel'sk

Murmansk

Salekhard

Yamburg Igarka

Noril'sk

Dikson

Dudinka

Tiksi

Yakutsk

ARCTIC OCEAN

Kara Sea

RUSSIA

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

 180°

 90°

0 1000

Kilometers

 150°

 120°

 60°

 30°

 150°

GREENLAND

Barents


Sea

Laptev


Sea

Taz R vi er

St. Petersburg

0 500

Nautical Miles

24
Table 7. Summary of environmental conditions of the Eurasian seas along the Northern Sea Route

(from Barnett 1991).

Barents West Kara East Kara Laptev E. Siberian Chukchi

Mean air temp. (°C)

Winter –10 to –15 –15 to –20 –25 to –30 –30 –30 –20 to –30

Summer — 5 2 — 2 to 5 2 to 5

Mean fast ice

thickness (cm) 50 to 150 120 to 200 200 200 to 250 170 to 200 130 to 180

Average date of

minimum ice

cover 15 Sept 24 Sept 14 Sept 17 Sept 13 Sept 12 Sept

Summer ice cover

relative to winter max.

extent (% of area) 10 25 48 47 57 20

Average date of

complete freeze-up Never Mid – late Nov Mid Nov — Mid Oct Mid – late Nov

Average date of

min. ice extent 15 Sept 24 Sept 14 Sept 17 Sept 13 Sept 12 Sept

Figure 18. Mean sea-ice extent for concentrations of 7/10ths and greater for July through September.

(Translated from RSMOT, in prep.)

July–

September

Average Ice Edge (month)

ized by near-freezing air temperatures that produce little ice growth or decay. Shipping activity

routinely occurs throughout the melt and the autumn interphase. The Russians would like to extend the shipping season into the freeze period

and the spring interphase. Table 7 provides a summary of the environmental conditions encountered

in the Eurasian seas of the Northern Sea Route.

As previously mentioned, the bathymetry of the

Russian Arctic is characterized by the continental

shelf lying at relatively shallow depth over vast

areas. For example, the average depth of the entire

East Siberian and Chukchi Seas is only 58 m and

88 m, respectively (Østreng 1991). Tidal changes

range from 5 to 7 m in the Laptev Sea, from 3 to 4

m in the East Siberian Sea, and are no more than 2

to 2.5 m in the Kara Sea (Buzuev 1991). The limiting depths for navigation are those found in the

various straits. Most exceed 20 m, except the

Sannikova and Dmitriya Lapteva straits located

25
south of the Novosibirskiy Islands, which are only

13 m and 8 m deep, respectively. These extreme

shallows limit the size of ships that can pass safely

to those under 20,000 dwt unless they are specially designed for shallow-water operations

(Wergeland 1991). The more northerly routes are

deeper, but ice conditions are also more severe.

The Barents Sea

The Barents is the warmest of the Eurasian seas,

and the only one not totally ice-covered in winter.

During the most severe winters, only about 90%

of the surface is covered with ice (70% and 50% in

normal and mild winters, respectively). It experiences the greatest seasonal variation of sea-ice extent. Its ice cover is dramatically affected by the

influx of warm water from the Atlantic, which

moderates the ice conditions in the southern and

southwestern Barents. General ocean circulation

and prevailing winds in winter advect ice southwestward from the northern Barents ice pack. The

southern Barents in winter, however, experiences

generally southwesterly winds that introduce

warm maritime air and inhibit ice growth. Winter

mean air temperatures are relatively mild (–10 to

–15°C). First-year ice thickness averages 50 to 100

cm in the south and 120 to 150 cm in the north.

Severe winter conditions are the result of occasional shifts in the normal positioning of the Icelandic low and Siberian high pressure systems,

which cause southeasterly winds to dominate. Such

a shift brings in cold continental air off the Siberian plateau, which gives rise to greater ice production in the southern Barents.

The protection offered by the perimeter location of the major island groups of Svalbard, Franz

Josef Land, and Novaya Zemlya prevents the influx of ice from neighboring seas where ice production is greater. In addition, weaknesses in the

ice cover are prevalent on the leeward side of most

island groups in the Barents. Prevailing easterly

winds continually drive the ice offshore so that ice

that is present at any time is newly formed and

relatively thin. These lee-side polynyas are generally evident throughout the winter off Nordaust

Land, Kong Karls Land, Kvitøya, Novaya Zemlya,

and especially Franz Josef Land. The spring–summer melt pattern usually initiates and expands

from these areas. During summer, the polynyas

typically expand southward to meet the northerly

retreating main ice edge, forming vast tongues of

open water. In a normal summer the ice edge retreats to about 78°N. While all the major islands

have actively calving glaciers, icebergs are not a

serious concern to navigators in the Barents at any

time.

The Kara Sea

The other seas along the Russian coast are influenced by cold continental air masses and hence

experience much colder air temperatures than the

Barents. Mean winter temperatures range from

–15 to –20°C in the southwest Kara and from –25

to –30°C in the north and east Kara. Mean summer

air temperatures range from 0 to 5°C. The sea ice

cover is greatly influenced by its relatively landlocked perimeter, winds, river runoff, and shallow

bathymetry. Due to Novaya Zemlya, there is little

exchange of warm water from the Barents. Likewise, Severnaya Zemlya inhibits exchange with

the Laptev Sea. Water and ice mass exchange is

almost entirely with the Arctic Ocean to the north.

Fast ice forms along the entire Kara coastline,

and it is generally narrow, except in the eastern

Kara where it extends outward for 80 to 110 nm.

Throughout fall and winter, the only substantial

openings in the ice cover usually occur at the

boundary between this fast ice and the outer pack

ice. Offshore winds tend to push the pack away

from the stationary ice, creating occasional lanes

of newly forming ice. This transport mechanism

produces thicker ice to the north. The coastline at

the eastern end of the Kara is about 400 nm farther

north than at the western end, resulting in cooler

air and sea conditions in the eastern sector. The ice

thickness in a normal winter ranges from 120 cm

in the southwest to 200 cm in the northeast.

Summer melting in the Kara typically begins at

the outer edge of the fast ice when ice production

ceases. A few weeks later the fast ice breaks free

and drifts seaward. Rivers flowing into the Kara

constitute more than half of all the runoff entering

the Eurasian seas. Warm spring runoff produces

early open-water areas at the major estuaries, and

by midsummer, the western Kara is normally icefree as far north as 75°N. There may be open water

as far north as 82°N during a mild summer. There

is, however, a cold ocean current running southward along Novaya Zemlya that piles ice into the

Kara Gate. This ice often survives through an unusually cool summer.

In the eastern Kara, summer melting is less extensive; nearly half of its area remains ice-covered

throughout a normal summer. The year-to-year

variability, however, ranges from 0 to 80% coverage. In addition to a more northerly latitude, warm

river inflow is dramatically less here than in the

western Kara. There is no prevailing summer wind

26
pattern, but in some years, westerly winds concentrate ice at its eastern barrier of Severnaya

Zemlya and the Taymyr Peninsula, creating a difficult barrier to navigation.

Freezeup begins in September in the colder

northeast Kara and in October in the less saline

central region where the Ob’ and Yenisey Rivers enter. After that, the intervening region rapidly grows an ice cover that connects the two.

The extreme southwest sector, extending 95 to

150 nm eastward from the Kara Gate, normally

remains open into November, but with large

year-to-year variation (late October to late December).

The Laptev Sea

Sea-ice distribution in the Laptev is influenced

by cold winter temperatures, southerly winter

winds, ocean currents, heavy river inflow, and a

vast continental shelf of very shallow depth. With

the extraordinarily broad continental shelf in this

region, half of the entire Laptev is less than 50 m

deep, and south of 76°N its depth does not exceed

25 m. Because of these shallow waters, the Laptev

and the East Siberian Seas have the largest expanse of fast ice in the world from January to

June. The fast-ice thickness typically reaches 200

cm due to mean midwinter air temperatures of

–30°C and can grow up to 250 cm thick during

severe winters.

Similar to the process previously discussed for

the Kara, prevailing southerly winter winds continually push the pack ice northward away from

the fast ice, resulting in a nearly permanent lane of

weakness. The amount of old, thick ice found in

the Laptev is limited not only by these winds but

also by northward ocean currents. The total area

of summer melt is particularly extensive due to

this reduced presence of old ice. In the western

Laptev, however, the ice drift is southward, and

large masses of ice are deposited along the coast of

Severnaya Zemlya and the Taymyr Peninsula.

Along with the eastward ice deposition from the

Kara Sea, the Vil’kitskogo Strait and the Taymyr

coast present a serious challenge to navigation at

all times of the year.

Many rivers empty into the Laptev, but the Lena

accounts for more than 70% of the total inflow.

The summer melt pattern is greatly influenced by

this warm water influx. Large areas of open water

expand outward from the deltas so that, by the

end of summer, the Laptev is typically ice-free as

far north as 77°N (only 74°N for the western portion). Winds are light and variable in summer, but

prolonged easterlies transport additional ice into

the Taymyr ice massif.

The East Siberian Sea

Of all the Eurasian seas, the East Siberian experiences the least amount of summer melting. On

average, more than 50% remains ice-covered

throughout the summer season. The persistence

of the ice cover is attributed to cold winter and

cool summer air temperatures, prevailing winds,

ocean currents, a wide continental shelf, and meager river inflow.

The East Siberian Sea is the shallowest of the

Eurasian seas. The broad continental shelf allows

fast ice, averaging 170 to 200 cm thick, to extend as

far as 270 nm outward from the coast. In winter,

prevailing southerly winds bring in cold continental air, producing a winter mean air temperature of –30°C. These winds also cause weak ice

conditions and potential navigation lanes at the

outer edge of the fast ice as they do in the Kara

and Laptev Seas.

In summer, the winds shift to northerly, bringing in polar air. In addition to cool air temperatures, warming from river inflow is limited. Total

river discharge into the East Siberian Sea amounts

to only 20% of the Kara’s total and only 35% of the

Laptev’s. Ocean currents favor the influx of ice

from (rather than its removal to) the Arctic Ocean,

resulting in the permanence of the Ayon massif

that protrudes into its eastern sector. Winter

freezeup begins in the north in September and is

usually complete by mid-October.

The Chukchi Sea (Russian)

The Russian portion of the Chukchi Sea is almost totally ice covered from early December to

mid-May. It experiences a large seasonal variation

in ice cover, losing about 80% of its maximum

winter extent during the summer season. The extent of its summer ice melt is exceeded only by

that in the Barents. Important factors that influence sea-ice distribution in the Chukchi are the

sea’s bathymetry, winds, ocean currents, air temperatures, and the presence of Wrangel Island.

Winter mean air temperatures range from –30°C

in the west to –20°C in the east due to the inflow of

relatively warm water from the Bering Sea. Consequently, winter mean ice thickness ranges from

180 cm in the west to 130 cm in the east. Because

the continental shelf is less extensive, only a 10- to

15-km-wide band of fast ice forms along the mainland and the Wrangel Island coast. Ocean currents

tend to concentrate old ice from the Arctic into

27
Longa Strait under great pressure, which can sometimes present the greatest navigational obstacle of

the entire route. It was at this location that the 50-

ship convoy became ice-bound in the autumn of

1983. The only midwinter area of weakness is a

lee-side polynya that forms off Wrangel Island that

can occasionally be more than 50 nm wide. The

prevailing onshore winds of winter normally shift

around to a more offshore flow in the spring, resulting in a narrow lane of open water along the

coast for the duration of the shipping season.

The summer melt pattern is primarily influenced by the influx of warmer water from the

Bering Sea. Breakup initiates in the eastern end

and progresses westward. At the height of summer (mid-September), the Chukchi is normally 80%

free of ice. Summer air temperatures average from

2 to 5°C. Winter freezeup is usually delayed into

September or October by this warmer inflow, and

open water north of the Bering Strait is found into

late November.

Alaskan waters

The information presented in this section was extracted primarily from the Arctic Marine Transportation Program summary report by Voelker (1990). The

program, which took place from 1979 to

1986, collected field and operational data

during 12 deployments of a U.S. Polarclass icebreaker to the ice-infested waters

surrounding Alaska. The program’s purpose was threefold:

• To assess the feasibility of commercial marine operations in ice,

• To obtain data for improving ship

design for ice operations,

• To define the environmental conditions along potential shipping

routes.

Therefore, this environmental summary

contains information on the Chukchi,

Beaufort, and Bering Seas that is more applicable to ship trafficability than that presented for the Russian seas.

Based on an analysis of meteorological

and satellite imagery data and experience

gained from the ship deployments, 13

specific geographic areas were identified

as having differing levels of environmental severity in terms of trafficability (Fig.

19). These zones are based on representative conditions that would result during an average ice year with winds trending from the north to

northeast and prevailing throughout the winter

season. The winter season for the Bering Sea is

considered to be six months long (December

through May). Winter in the Chukchi is nine

months long (November through July), and in the

Beaufort Sea it lasts 10 months, beginning in October and ending in July.

The Bering Sea

In the Bering Sea, open water can be expected

from about the Pribilof Islands southward. The

southern limit of zone 1 marks the ice edge where

pack ice in low concentrations is found. According to the Alaska Marine Ice Atlas (LaBelle et al.

1983), zones 2 and 3 are areas of landfast ice with a

level-ice thickness range of 100 to 130 cm based on

freezing degree-day calculations (LaBelle et al.

1983). Areas marked as zone 4 lie in the shadow of

Figure 19. Zones of environmental severity affecting marine

trafficability in Alaskan waters. The numbers from 1 through 13

represent increasing degrees of navigation difficulty in the areas

indicated (after Voelker 1990).

28
land masses and are thus somewhat sheltered from

the degree of ice movement and consolidation that

occurs in more exposed locations. Ice here is usually less than 30 cm thick during periods of prevailing northerly wind. Zones 5 and 6 are regions

of dynamic ice displacement, resulting in pressure

ridges, rubbled floes, and open leads caused by

ice drift averaging 0.3 to 0.5 kn. Ice, which is transported primarily by wind, consolidates to a thickness of between 30 and 120 cm. The most severe

ice conditions in the Alaskan Arctic are found just

south of the Bering Strait (zone 13). Ice becomes

extremely rubbled and compacted to the windward side of St. Lawrence Island.

Year-round marine traffic using current icebreaking capabilities is technically feasible

throughout most of the Bering Sea, but it is usually suspended from late December to mid-May,

according to the U.S. Coast Pilot manual (USDC/

NOAA 1981). Fast ice begins to form along the

coast and in sheltered areas sometime in October.

Pack ice formation in the more open areas begins

its southward progression in November with the

seasonal cooling of the water. According to Brower

et al. (1988), 97% of the ice found in the Bering Sea

actually forms there with very little southward

influx of ice through the Bering Strait. Winter ice

coverage in the Bering is highly variable from year

to year, and even month to month, due to shifts in

prevailing winds that produce leads and polynyas

of short duration. Thick, multiyear ice is generally

not found in the Bering Sea, since the ice cover

melts out completely during the summer.

The Chukchi Sea (Alaskan)

The U.S. portion of the Chukchi Sea is divided

into three different zones of severity. Zone 7, adjacent to the Alaskan coastline, is a region of relatively stable and level shorefast ice ranging in thickness from 155 to 190 cm. Zones 9 and 10 roughly

divide the Chukchi at 69°N latitude. The ice conditions in zone 9 are generally more serious than

those found anywhere in the Bering (except zone

13) and include pressure ridges, thick rubble ice,

and ice pressure. Zone 10 conditions are made

more serious still by the greater concentration of

drift ice that enters from the Beaufort Sea. The

drifting ice ranges from 150-cm-thick first-year ice

to 9-m-thick multiyear floes.

Freezeup in the northeast Chukchi begins in

mid-September to early October and progresses

southwestward. The U.S. Coast Pilot manual recommends that southbound ships be south of the

Bering Strait by early November. Two winter deployments to the north Chukchi during the Arctic

Marine Transportation Program, however, concluded that year-round transits are technically—

but probably not economically—feasible using

current U.S. icebreaking capabilities. The study

pointed out that the full 60,000-shaft horsepower

(shp) operational capacity of the Polar-class icebreakers was often required and that ice piloting

and operating skills were extremely important.

Average air temperatures for coastal stations in

February, the coldest month, range between –18

and –30°C, while extremes of –45°C and below

have been recorded. Winds can be severe and prolonged, leading to extreme ice pressures and dangerous wind-chill conditions for personnel. The

five-year return period for maximum sustained

winds for both the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas is

68 kn.

The disintegration of the seasonal ice cover begins, usually around mid-May, at the seaward edge

of the fast ice along Alaska’s northwest coast in

response to strong offshore (easterly) winds that

develop in March and April. However, the pack

ice generally remains close in to Pt. Barrow until

late July or early August.

The Beaufort Sea

The Beaufort Sea presents the most challenging

navigation conditions in Alaskan waters. The narrow region along the northern coastline (zone 8)

grows fairly stable landfast ice averaging 200 cm

thick. The area contains not only level first-year

sea ice, but also has an abundance of pressure

ridges and multiyear ice. At the seaward edge of

the fast ice, at approximately the 20-m isobath, is a

shearing zone marking the transition to highly

dynamic pack ice that constitutes zones 11 and 12.

Shear ridges in this transition zone are larger and

more extensive than anywhere else on the Alaskan coastline. Both zones have an abundance of

very large (several km in diameter) multiyear floes

and first-year rubble that produces massive pressure ridges. Zone 12 experiences a greater frequency and intensity of pressured ice conditions

because of its relative position with Alaska’s north

coast and prevailing northeasterly winter winds.

February air temperatures along the coast average

–28 to –30°C. Summertime air temperatures average 2 to 6°C. Because ice transit operations there

are so demanding, refueling stops for nonnuclearfueled icebreakers along the way would be required where none currently exist. The median

date for opening the cargo transport season around

Barrow to Prudhoe Bay is August 2, but it has

29
INSROP Working Paper I.1.1

A paper by Kjerstad (1994) published by the

International Northern Sea Route Programme provides perhaps the latest information publicly available on navigation guides, regulations, operational

aids, and communication systems. Though we did

not receive it in time to thoroughly review and

incorporate its contents into this report, the interested reader is advised of its existence and from

where it can be obtained (see Literature Cited).

Routes, distances, and depths

The overall distance from one end of the NSR

to the other is variable because of the choice of

routes available. Due to variable ice and hydrographic conditions, longer routes may be more favorable in terms of the time required for passage.

Figure 20 shows the distances between various

waypoints along the route. In general, the shorter

(in distance) transit routes between Novaya

Zemlya and the Bering Strait are the northern variants. These routes need to be weighed against the

likelihood of more severe ice conditions to be found

farther off the coast.

The Russian Arctic is characterized by expansive seas (the Kara, the Laptev, the East Siberian,

and the Chukchi) separated by island archipelagoes (Novaya Zemlya, Severnaya Zemlya, Novosiberskiy, and Wrangel), with several routing

choices around or through each. The choice of route

is determined by several factors, including the voyage origin and destination, the current ice conditions or those to be expected based on meteorological and hydrodynamic forecasting, and the

location of icebreaking resources at the time.

Table 8. Joint Ice Center’s sea ice severity data for Alaska’s north coastal

waters (from USN/NOAA NIC 1994).

Median Extremes

Parameter 1953–1993 1953–1993

Initial opening date of coastal route to Prudhoe Bay* 3 Aug 18 Jul–never

Length of navigation season (days) 61 0–112

Final closing date 6 Oct NA† –7 Nov

Number of days route entirely ice free 25 0–92

Distance (nm) from Pt. Barrow northward to:

Ice edge on 10 August 0 0–50

Heavy pack edge** on 10 August 5 0–70

Ice edge on 15 September 25 0–165

Heavy pack edge on 15 September 70 0–210

 * Opening date based on the initial date that the entire route from the Bering Sea to Prudhoe

Bay may be navigated through ice cover of less than 5/10 concentration.

 † No closing date in 1975 because the route never opened.

** Boundary between greater than 5/10 ice cover to the north and less than/equal to

5/10 to the south.

varied between 19 July and 3 September. The

length of the navigation season also varies considerably, as shown in Appendix C. In 1975, the route

never opened, whereas in 1993 it was considered

navigable (5/10 ice concentration or less) for 112

days. Table 8 presents the means and extremes of

sea-ice conditions affecting navigation in northern Alaskan waters from 1953 through 1993.

THE NAVIGATIONAL SETTING

Sources consulted

DMA sailing directions

The Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic/

Topographic Center in Bethesda, Maryland, publishes and sells a series of detailed sailing directions for the entire globe. Navigational details for

the NSR are described in the Agency’s Publication

183, Sailing Directions: Northern Coast of Russia

(DMA 1993). In addition to sailing directions, this

publication provides important information about

the region’s river and seaports.

Russian State Hydrographic Department

The State Hydrographic Department under

Russia’s Ministry of Transport has, since the formal opening of the route, been compiling an official NSR navigation guide for foreign consumption. It is to be published as the Guide to Navigation

Through the Northern Sea Route, and was described

earlier (see Administration and Regulations). Our

draft translation of this document served as a major source of the information presented below.

30
The NSR is approached from the west through

the Barents Sea. The islands of Novaya Zemlya

separating the Barents and Kara Seas mark the

westernmost end of the NSR. In addition to the

high-latitude route around Cape Zheleniya, the

northernmost tip of the archipelago, there are three

navigable passages through this island group that

can be used by deep-draft vessels. The southernmost two are most commonly used: the straits of

Yugorskiy Shar, which lies south of Vaygach Island, and Karskiye Varota (the Kara Gate) to the

island’s north. The third, Matochkin Shar, the strait

that divides Novaya Zemlya proper into two large

islands, was often used over the last 40–50 years

as a nuclear test site and is currently closed to

shipping (Kjerstad 1994). The shortest distance

from Murmansk to the Kara Sea and the western

terminus of the NSR is 465 nm, through the Matochkin Shar Strait. The greatest distance is 745

nm, around Cape Zheleniya. The average depth

of the Kara Sea is 90 m (Hume 1984).

The NSR enters the Laptev Sea after passing

through or around the Severnaya Zemlya archipelago. The most often-used passage is also the

southernmost, Vil’kitskogo Strait. It separates the

island group from Cape Chelyuskin on the Taymyr

Peninsula. At nearly 78°N, Cape Chelyuskin is the

Russian mainland’s most northerly point and consequently the weather and ice conditions in this

region are often the most challenging of any part

of the route. Much less frequently used are Proliv

Shokal’skogo, the strait separating the islands of

Bolshevik and Oktyabra’skoy Revolyutsh, and the

high-latitude route around Cape Arkticheski, the

archipelago’s northern tip located at 81°N. The

shortest distance from Murmansk to the Vil’kitskogo

Strait is approximately 1260 nm, around Cape

Zheleniya. Following the coastal route, the distance from Murmansk to the Vil’kitskogo Strait

(through the Kara Gate) is 1510 nm.

The East Siberian Sea is usually entered from

the west in one of three ways: 1) the southernmost

passage is the Dmitriya Lapteva Strait, lying between Lyakhovskiy Island and the mainland; 2)

the Sannikova Strait, the next further north; and 3)

the high-latitude route to the north of the entire

archipelago. The straight-line distance between the

Vil’kitskogo Strait and either of these two straits is

600 nm, and the distance from Murmansk is 1660–

2360 nm.

The Longa Strait, the 75-nm-wide water passage between Wrangel Island and the Chukotka

mainland, marks the transition from the East Siberian to the Chukchi Sea. The Ayon and the Wrangel

ice massifs in this area usually create some of the

most challenging ice conditions for navigation on

the entire route. However, the ice within the strait

is nearly always more navigable than it is to the

























A R C T I C C I R C L EA R C T I C C I R C L E

Kolym a

River

Indigirka

R i ver

Indigirka

R i ver

Yana Riv e r

Len a

River

Olenek R vi er

Kotuy R vi e r

Yenis e y R.

Taz R vi e

O

r

b R iver

A n a d y r R .

N O R T H

P O L E

Murmansk

Dikson

Tiksi

Pevek

S

Alaska

GREENLAND

ICELAND

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

80°

70°

60°

 180°

 0°

0 1000

Kilometers

 150°

 120°

 60°

 30°

 30°

 150°

50°

JAPAN

0 500

Nautical Miles

1065

745

465

525

890

490

495

860

520

600

600

635

210

600

690

695

740

610

185

370

690

To Dutch Habor, Alaska

Kolym a

River

Yana Riv e r

Len a

River

Olenek R vi er

Kotuy R vi e r

Yenis e y R.

Taz R vi e

O

r

b R iver

A n a d y r R .

N O R T H

P O L E

Murmansk

Dikson

Tiksi

Pevek

RUSSIA

Alaska

GREENLAND

ICELAND

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

80°

70°

60°

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 0°

0 1000

Kilometers

 150°

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JAPAN

0 500

Nautical Miles

1065

745

465

525

890

490

495

860

520

600

600

635

210

600

690

695

740

610

185

370

690

To Dutch Habor, Alaska

Figure 20. Approximate distances, in nautical miles, of the various route segments between Murmansk and

Dutch Harbor.

31
north of Wrangel Island. The average straight-line

distance from the straits of the Novosibirskiy Islands to the Bering Strait is 1090 nm, and the total

distance from Murmansk is 2720–3520 nm.

Table 9 summarizes the approximate lengths,

widths, and depths for the straits described above.

Other distances of interest may be obtained from

Table 10.

The major straits used for passage

The sources for the following information are

DMA (1993), Kjerstad (1994), and RSMOT (in

prep.) unless otherwise indicated. The major navigable straits are shown on Figure 1.

Yugorskiy Shar Strait, between the Barents and

Kara Seas, is approximately 21 nm in length, about

5.5 nm wide at its narrowest point, and trends in

a southwest-to-northeasterly direction. Depths in

this strait are very irregular, with several off-lying

shoals and shallow banks that extend far offshore.

The marked fairway has a minimum depth of 12

m, but the water level is increased somewhat by

east winds and lowered by west winds. Tidal

variations in depth are normally 0.9 m. Surface

currents usually flow from the Barents to the Kara

at a rate of 0.25–0.5 kn. Figure 21 shows the general scheme of surface currents during the period

of navigation for the entire Russian Arctic. MaxiTable 9. Approximate length, minimum width, and depth of key straits (from DMA 1993;

RSMOT, in prep.).

Length Width Depth

Strait Location, passage from–to (nm) (nm) (m)

Yugorskiy Shar Novaya Zemlya, Barents–Kara Seas 21 6 12

Karskiye Vorota Novaya Zemlya, Barents–Kara Seas 18 14 21

Matochkin Shar Novaya Zemlya, Barents–Kara Seas 55 1 12

Vil’kitskogo Severnaya Zemlya, Kara–Laptev Seas 60 30 25

Shokal’skogo Severnaya Zemlya, Kara–Laptev Seas 80 10 37

Dmitriya Lapteva Novosibirskiy, Laptev–East Siberian Seas 63 30 6.7

Sannikova Novosibirskiy, Laptev–East Siberian Seas 120 16 13

Longa Wrangel Island, East Siberian–Chukchi Seas — 75 20

Figure 21. General scheme of constant surface currents (0–10 m deep) during the normal period of

navigation (July through October). Constant currents are sometimes called “permanent currents” and

are distinct from those due to wind and tides. They result primarily from the presence of water density

gradients and can change with the seasons. (Translated from RSMOT, in prep.)

Navigation Period

(July – October)

Direction of Current

Assumed Direction of Current

Velocity (knots)

32
Table 10. Distances, in nautical miles, between waypoints along the NSR and other ports of interest (from Kjerstad 1994).

Tromsø TromsøMurmansk 407 MurmanskArkhangel’sk 772 435 Archangel’skYugorskiy Strait 848 578 659 Yugorskiy StraitKara Gate 799 523 607 65 Kara GateMatochkin Strait 678 466 617 320 260 Matochkin StraitCape Zhelaniya 905 745 920 650 590 330 Cape ZhelaniyaDikson 1289 1013 1097 477 490 461 310 DiksonDudinka 1619 1343 1429 807 820 791 640 330 DudinkaIgarka 1715 1439 1523 903 916 887 736 426 136 IgarkaVil’kitskogo Strait 1686 1410 1491 874 887 858 521 496 826 922 Vil’kitskogo StraitKhatanga 2234 1958 2039 1422 1435 1406 1069 1044 1374 1470 548 KhatangaTiksi 2321 2045 2126 1509 1522 1493 1156 1131 1461 1557 635 786 TiksiSannikova Strait 2285 2009 2090 1473 1486 1457 1120 1095 1425 1521 599 770 325 Sannikova StraitLaptev Strait 2288 2012 2093 1476 1489 1460 1123 1098 1428 1524 602 773 210 93 Laptev StraitPevek 2864 2588 2669 2052 2065 2036 1699 1674 2004 2100 1178 1349 819 579 609 PevekBering Strait 3350 3074 3155 2538 2551 2522 2185 2160 2490 2586 1664 1838 1390 1065 1110 558 Bering StraitProvideniya 3460 3184 3265 2648 2661 2632 2295 2270 2600 2696 1774 1948 1500 1175 1220 668 110 ProvideniyaDutch Harbor 4150 3874 3955 3338 3351 3322 2985 2960 3290 3386 2464 2638 2190 1865 1910 1258 690 615 Dutch HarborValdez 4955 4679 4760 4143 4156 4127 3790 3765 4095 4191 3269 3443 2995 2670 2715 2063 1495 1420 805 ValdezVancouver 5682 5406 5487 4870 4883 4854 4517 4492 4822 4918 3996 4170 4080 3755 3800 3248 2332 2241 1626 1210 VancouverVladivostok 5885 5609 5690 5073 5086 5057 4720 4695 5026 5121 4199 4373 3925 3600 3645 3093 2535 2425 1880 2680 4378 VladivostokYokohama 6043 5767 5848 5231 5244 5215 4878 4853 5183 5279 4357 4531 4441 4116 4161 3609 2693 2583 2580 3380 4258 931 Yokohama

33
mum currents in the narrowest section of the strait

due to semidiurnal tides are about 2.5 kn, while

currents due to northeast winds can reach 4.5 kn,

which can interrupt the tidal current. Figure 22

shows the general scheme of summary current

velocities along the northern Russian coastline.

Though highly variable, the mean date for ice

breakup in the strait is June 28, and for the end of

the navigation season it is November 23.

Karskiye Varota, commonly referred to as the

Kara Gate, is the most often-used passage from

the Barents to the Kara Sea. It is approximately 18

nm long and also trends in a southwest-to-northeasterly direction. Due to many islands, islets, and

submerged obstacles, its fairway is reduced to less

than 14 nm wide at its narrowest point. Surface

currents trend from the Barents toward the Kara

at a rate of 0.5 to 1 kn, but with a southwest wind

they can reach 2 kn. Tidal currents are greatest in

the western end of the strait, where they can reach

2.5 kn; they decrease in the middle section to as

little as 0.5 to 0.75 kn. Ice conditions are highly

dependent on those in the adjacent waters of the

Kara Sea; northwest winds can quickly move the

Novaya Zemlya ice massif in to block the east

entrance. Heavy fogs and poor visibility are frequent throughout the archipelago region during

any season of the year, but their occurrence reaches

a maximum during July and August.

The Matochkin Shar Strait, currently closed to

foreign vessels, is approximately 55 nm long, and

trends west to east from the Barents to the Kara

Sea. The strait cuts between the high mountains

of the northern and southern main islands of

Novaya Zemlya and is only a mile wide on average. Depths are very irregular throughout, but

the minimum fairway depth of 12 m is found near

the western end. Due to high intervening mountains, the weather conditions at the west end of

the strait can be very different from those at its

eastern end. Ice conditions, though usually mild

at the western end, can be severe during east winds

at the Kara Sea entrance due to the presence of

the Novaya Zemlya massif. Tidal currents are

quite regular, averaging about 2 kn, and reversing direction every 6 hours. In the narrowest

sections of the strait these currents can reach 3.5

to 5 kn. Winds can affect the period and direction

of the currents so that a change in regularity of

the currents is an indication of the winds to be

expected.

The Vil’kitskogo Strait, a west-to-east trending

strait from the Kara to the Laptev Sea, is approximately 60 nm long and 30 nm wide at its narrow-

— 2.0 — Isoline and Maximum Velocity

(knots)

Navigation

Period

Figure 22. General scheme and maximum velocities of summary currents near the ocean surface (0–10 m

deep). Summary currents are the resultant combination of all local currents (i.e., tidal current, winddriven current, permanent current, etc.). (Translated from RSMOT, in prep.)

34
est point. The minimum depth of the fairway is

reported to be greater than 25 m. RSMOT (in prep.)

states that the depths are generally 100 to 200 m,

except in the western approach where they are

“somewhat less.” It appears that depth throughout this strait is not a limiting factor for vessels of

any size. A northeast current of 1.5 kn normally

prevails in the strait but it can increase to 3 kn on

a southwest wind. Ice conditions are highly variable in terms of location and can change rapidly,

depending on the wind. The wind primarily determines the direction and velocity of the ice drift.

West winds create difficult ice conditions in the

western approach. Winds from other directions are

generally more favorable. Figure 23 shows the general range of wind directions that create more difficult navigational conditions along the entire NSR.

The Shokal’skogo Strait, a passage between the

Kara and Laptev seas that trends southwest to

northeasterly, is 80 nm long and 10 nm wide at its

narrowest point. Depths within this strait are not

a limiting factor for shipping, as the minimum

depth, which lies at the southwest entrance, is 37

m. Due to ever-present challenging ice conditions,

Russian pilotage is mandatory for all ships using

this strait. Severe magnetic variations of up to

54°E have been observed here.

The Dmitriya Lapteva Strait, a west-to-east trending passage from the Laptev to the East Siberian

Sea, is the strait most often used by ocean-going

traffic between these two seas. It is 63 nm long and

30 nm wide and separates the Novosibirskiy archipelago from the Russian mainland. Although

the western part of the fairway is deep and clear

of submerged obstacles, the eastern portion has

several areas that restrict traffic to vessels with

less than 6.7 m draft. This strait reportedly is not

penetrated by heavy Arctic ice and that which is

found there is only of the first-year variety. Navigating this strait during August and September is

usually not difficult except during exceptionally

cold years. RSMOT (in prep.), however, states that

ice conditions in the vicinity are complicated and

a principal hindrance to navigation. Passage is often only possible under icebreaker escort. Winds

during July to September are relatively calm, averaging 3–8 m/s. East winds are the most settled

and last from 1 to 10 days. The number of stormy

days, with winds as high as 30 m/s, average 3 to 4

days per month in the western part of the strait

and 1 to 2 days per month in the eastern part.

Visibility is obscured by fog 15 to 19 days per

month in July and August, decreasing to 8 to 12

days in September. The semidiurnal tidal fluctuaFigure 23. Location and ranges of wind directions that tend to create compacted ice conditions that are

generally unfavorable for navigating along the NSR. (Translated from RSMOT, in prep.)

Navigation Routes

Direction of Air Currents

Sector Limits

35
tion is only 0.1 to 0.3 m, but storm surge caused by

northwest winds can be as much as 2.4 m in the

strait. Constant currents under calm conditions are

from the west at 0.1 to 0.3 kn. Under the influence

of typical winds, currents are 0.2 to 1.3 kn and can

change direction very quickly following a change

of wind direction.

The Sannikova Strait, another west-to-east trending passage from the Laptev to the East Siberian

Sea, is approximately 160 nm long with a fairway at

least 16 nm wide. Minimum depths in the fairway

are greater than 13 m. Severe ice conditions are often encountered, forcing a deviation from the recommended track through the strait. Deviations to

the north are riskier in terms of submerged obstacles. Freezeup commences in early October and

is complete by the end of the month. The ice,

mainly landfast, remains in the strait until midJuly (the mean date of breakup is July 21) when

strong or prolonged east winds favor its clearance.

West winds tend to bring in heavy ice from the

Laptev Sea. Depending on the ice conditions in the

East Siberian Sea, final clearing in the strait can

occur anytime from early August to late September.

The Longa Strait, an expansive passage separating Wrangel Island from mainland Russia, is

the transition between the East Siberian and the

Chukchi Seas. It is so wide that it is not treated

as a strait by either DMA or RSMOT. That is,

the sailing directions issued by both agencies

are not explicit as to its west-to-east geographic

limits or for specific hydrometeorological conditions to be found therein. Kjerstad (1994) lists

southern and northern route variations through

this strait as being 120 nm and 160 nm long,

respectively. The directions given are for approaching either the mainland or the island, as

opposed to navigating between them. Depths

are apparently not of concern when keeping to

offshore courses. In general, heavy accumulations of rubbled ice that make navigation difficult can be expected. Fog is also a challenge

during the warm season. In both July and August the mean number of foggy days is 16, decreasing to about eight in September.

Navigation aids

Icebreaker escort

Operations while en route are monitored and

strictly controlled by the regional MOHQ. The

regulations issued by the ANSR describe the various modes of assistance that the MOHQ can require, depending on the severity of ice conditions:

• Shore-based pilotage, recommending

routes for specific locations,

• Aircraft-assisted pilotage (fixed-wing

and/or helicopter),

• Russian ice pilot on board,

• Icebreaker leading escort,

• Icebreaker escort with a Russian ice pilot

on board.

Shore-based guidance is likely to be rendered

at the beginning and end of a transit voyage, that

is, in ice-free areas of the Barents and Chukchi

Seas. The level of control and guidance increases

with the severity of ice conditions, both existing

and expected. “Icebreaker escort with ice pilot on

board” is mandatory for the perennially difficult

straits of Vil’kitskogo, Shokal’skogo, Dmitriya

Lapteva, and Sannikova.

The shore route has been sectioned into six zones

of varying environmental severity by Batskikh and

Mikhailichenko (1993). Each has its own environmental character requiring different navigational

tactics:

1. From Murmansk to Kolguyev Island (33° to

50°E longitude)—Generally ice-free or has

only primary ice present. Ice-class vessels can

ply on their own without icebreaker assistance.

2. From Kolguyev Island to the port of Makarova (50° to 85°E)—Navigation requires assistance by Arktika-class (75,000 shp) icebreaker through drifting first-year ice.

3. From Makarova to the northernmost mainland peninsula of Chelyuskin (85° to 105°E)—

Navigation through fast ice under convoy of

Arktika- or Vaygach-class (50,000 shp) icebreaker.

4. From Chelyuskin Peninsula to the Novosibirskiy Islands (105° to 140°E)—Ice conditions

and tactics are similar to those for section 2.

5. From the Novosibirskiy Islands to Wrangel

Island (140° to 178°E)—Navigation is through

drifting first- and multiyear sea ice with

Arktika-class icebreaker assistance. It is currently preferred to convoy a single cargo vessel using two icebreakers.

6. From Wrangel Island to the Bering Strait

(178°E to 170°W)—Navigation is in drifting

first- and multiyear sea ice under Arktikaclass icebreaker convoy.

The above prescription shows that the critical section is from the Novosibirskiy Islands to

Wrangel Island and the Longa Strait. Successful

36
NSR transit depends most critically on the ice conditions through this section; i.e., less consolidation

and ice pressure, and the existence of leads, fractures, and polynyas.

Navigation charts

For this study, we investigated only U.S. and

Russian sources for maps of the Northern Sea

Route and, more specifically, hydrographic maps.

Some maps of the Russian Arctic and Alaskan

coastlines are produced by the Defense Mapping

Agency (DMA). The Alaskan coastline is fully covered, and there is fairly good coverage of the Russian coastlines in the Chukchi, East Siberian, and

western portion of the Barents Sea. Except for three

large-scale maps, one each for the Kara Gate and

the mouths of the Ob’ and Yenisey Rivers, DMA

currently has no coverage between 45° and 135°E

(the White Sea to the Novosibirskiy Islands). We

are not aware of any other publicly available maps

for this area from U.S. sources.

According to Mikhailichenko,* Russian hydrographic charts covering the entire route are being

declassified and made available for purchase from

the Russian State Hydrographic Department under the Ministry of Transport. At the October 1992

Northern Sea Route Expert Meeting, held in

Tromsø, Norway, Mikhailichenko provided a diagram showing 23 charts that were available at that

time. We had extreme difficulty in obtaining them

from Russian government sources. In November

1993, we contacted HydroCon, Ltd., a small, privately owned distributor of geographic products

based in St. Petersburg, Russia. They informed us

that the NSR nautical charts are actually issued by

the Russian State Navigation and Oceanography

Department under the Ministry of Defense, which

had no policy for responding to one-time, small

orders for their products. HydroCon acted as a

facilitator in working through the official and unofficial bureaucracy to obtain the charts and arrange for their delivery. This exercise revealed the

value of having an individual on-site in Russia to

facilitate requests and negotiations. Face-to-face

contact by one who speaks the language and knows

the social system seems to be much more effective

for producing the desired result than long-distance

inquiries. Most of the maps were in Russian, with

the exception of a few of the latest editions, which

were bilingual. Their dates of issue ranged from

1984 to 1993, with most showing revision dates

from 1990 to 1993. Their scales ranged between

1:10,000 and 1:2,000,000, with the majority scaled

between 1:100,000 and 1:700,000. Figure 24 is an

* V. Mikhailichenko, 1993, Administration of the Northern Sea Route, personal communication.





















































A R C T I C C I R C L

0 E

Nautical Miles

50°

JAPAN

Kolym a

River

Indigirka

R i ver

Indigirka

R i ver

Yana Riv e r

Len a

River

Olenek R vi er

Kotuy R vi e r

Yenis e y R.

Taz R vi e

O

r

b R iver

A n a d y r R .

N O R T H

P O L E

S

Alaska

GREENLAND

ICELAND

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

80°

70°

60°

 180°

 0°

 90°

0 1000

Kilometers

 150°

 120°

 60°

 30°

 30°

 150°

500

947

603

600

13005

697

696

650

617

13028

13317

698

945

948

12330

950 949

12332

951

952

953

954

955

1096

1088

1085

695 A R C T I C C I R C L

0 E

Nautical Miles

50°

JAPAN

Kolym a

River

Yana Riv e r

Len a

River

Olenek R vi er

Kotuy R vi e r

Yenis e y R.

Taz R vi e

O

r

b R iver

A n a d y r R .

N O R T H

P O L E

RUSSIA

Alaska

GREENLAND

ICELAND

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

80°

70°

60°

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 0°

 90°

0 1000

Kilometers

 150°

 120°

 60°

 30°

 30°

 150°

500

947

603

600

13005

697

696

650

617

13028

13317

698

945

948

12330

950 949

12332

951

952

953

954

955

1096

1088

1085

695

Figure 24. Declassified Russian hydrographic charts for the NSR, as of November 1993. Refer to chart number

in Appendix D for a description of each map.

37
Figure 25. Russian ice chart and ship routing analysis for the coastal area between Dikson (lower left) and Cape

Chelyuskin (upper right). It represents the ice conditions on 1 and 2 September 1990, and was integrated from

satellite, aircraft, and icebreaker observations (from Buzuev 1991).

index map showing the coverage provided by the

1:100,000-scale and larger charts. Maps of the

Yenisey River were 1:100,000, and several included

inset maps of shoal and port areas with scales ranging from 1:10,000 to 1:25,000. The complete list of

available hydrographic charts that were available

as of November 1993 is included in this report as

Appendix D.

Forecasting and routing

Russian efforts to maintain up-to-date weather,

ice, and sea-state information along the Northern

Sea Route include the use of satellites, shipboard

helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, shore-based and

drifting ice stations, drifting buoys, and shipboard

observations. The information is used in AARI models to produce both short- and long-range forecasts

and ship-routing aids such as the ice map shown

in Figure 25. Ice maps and routing recommendations from the Dikson and Pevek MOHQs are sent

twice a week to the icebreakers and then relayed

to the ships under their escort. Radio communications along the route are handled from seven communications centers located at Amderma, Dikson,

Cape Chelyuskin, Tiksi, Pevek, Cape Shmidta, and

Provideniya. The Provideniya center is operated

by the Ministry of Merchant Marine, and the others are maintained by the State Committee for

Hydrometeorology (Ushakov et al. 1991).

Ice mapping has been improved with the availability of high-resolution imagery from the European Space Agency’s Earth Resources Satellite

(ERS-1) platform. The Synthetic Aperture Radar

(SAR) provides coverage with a resolution of 30 m

that is independent of darkness and cloud cover.

Nearly round-the-clock ice concentration mapping

with a resolution of 30 km is possible using data

from the U.S. Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) Special Sensor Microwave/Imager

(SSM/I). Although these technologies are not yet

in widespread use by the Russians, who rely primarily on data in the visual and infrared spectrum, SAR and SSM/I services are commercially

available. Russian ice pilots can make expert use

of the information if it is available aboard a foreign ship under their escort. In 1991, routing for

L’Astrolabe’s transit voyage was the joint work of

the Nansen Environmental and Remote Sensing

Center (NERSC), the ESA, the Norwegian Space

Center, and the Alaska SAR Facility. Ice maps made

from the satellite products were telefaxed to the

ship using the Inmarsat satellite telecommunications system. The time delay from satellite observation to shipboard reception of the maps ranged

from 6 hours to 2 days. The quality and utility of

the information was judged by the Russian ice

pilots to be extremely good relative to their own

products. The routing work that was done for

38
Figure 26. A portion of an Alaskan Regional Ice Analysis from the National Ice Center.

L’Astrolabe is described in a report by Johannessen

et al. (1992).

The U.S. agency in charge of sea-ice analyses

and forecasting is the U.S. Navy/NOAA’s National

Ice Center (NIC). It is the world’s only organization that routinely provides global coverage, and

its standard ice guidance products are available to

the general public. Their data are derived from a

variety of satellite-borne sensors, and their products include:

• A weekly, global-scale (1:10,000,000) analysis showing sea-ice extent, concentration,

stage of development, and the location of

leads and polynyas for the entire Arctic

Basin;

• A biweekly, regional-scale (1:7,500,000) 30-

day forecast of the above parameters;

• A long-range seasonal outlook for the west

Arctic, issued each year on 15 May.

The agency maintains a convenient 24-hour,

auto-polling system that subscribers can use to

obtain analyses and forecasts in telefaxed form.

Figure 26 shows a portion of their Alaskan Regional Ice Analysis that was produced for 15 October 1993. The NIC can also provide to any U.S.

government agency more specialized guidance

products, including ship routing recommendations, operational briefings, and aerial reconnaissance support. For example, Figure 27 shows a

ship routing recommendation that was transmitted via satellite to the U.S. Coast Guard ship Polar

Star en route from the Canadian archipelago to

Point Barrow, Alaska, in September 1992. NIC provided latitude and longitude for each waypoint

along the track and the distance and heading between each point. The figure shows several large

ice floes that were avoided along the coastal route,

resulting in a significant savings in time and fuel.

A complete description of NIC products and

39
rology and Oceanography Command Centers in

Norfolk, Virginia, and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, respectively. The NIC products from previous years

are archived on 9-track tape and are available upon

request from either the National Climate Data Center in Asheville, North Carolina, or the National

Snow and Ice Data Center in Boulder, Colorado.

Figure 27. A specialized ship routing analysis from the Joint Ice Center. The image was produced in

September 1992 using ERS-1 SAR imagery for the USCGC Polar Star, which was en route from the

Canadian archipelago to Pt. Barrow, Alaska. It was sent directly to the ship via satellite and recommends

(dashed line) a route to avoid several large floes and ice consolidation areas. (Courtesy of the National Ice

Center.)

support activities can be found in USN/NOAA

NIC (1993). This publication is currently undergoing revision to reflect recent transfer of weather

forecasting responsibilities to other Navy centers.

Weather forecasts and ship routing support to government agencies for the east and west Arctic regions have been transferred to the Naval Meteo40
Communications and positioning

Rosenberg (1993) reports that satellites make

voice and fax communications available to ships

in all areas of the Arctic below 80°N latitude. The

Inmarsat system, for example, can be used to send

and receive a variety of communications, including positioning and navigational information, ice

and weather forecasts, and emergency and distress transmissions. This system enables the NIC’s

auto-polled products to be transmitted directly to

ships. Various commercial firms also offer routing

products that can be telefaxed regularly to client

ships. For example, weather forecasts and route

recommendations provided by OceanRoutes, Inc.,

were transmitted to a Finnish tanker for its three

voyages from Arkhangel’sk to the Yana River in

1993. Laapio* of Neste Shipping reported that the

OceanRoutes products were used and well regarded by the Russian pilot on board.

Extensive information about radio navigation

and positioning systems in use on the Northern

Sea Route is found in the NSR sailing guides by

Kjerstad (1994) and RSMOT (in prep.). Ushakov et

al. (1991) and Kjerstad (1992) state that, in the last

50 years, the Russians have installed more than

2,500 navigation markers, light buoys, light beacons, radio beacons, radar reflectors, and radar

beacon responders throughout the Arctic. Radio

navigation is by way of their hyperbolic MARS-75

system, which is similar in operation to the U.S.

Loran-C system, though the two are not compatible. It has an operating range exceeding 1000 km

from each of its three coastal links, providing essentially complete coverage of the route, and it

has better than 250-m accuracy. This system is being phased out in favor of newer technology. The

Chaika radio navigation system, which is compatible with Loran-S, operates for the Barents and

Kara Seas.

Satellite navigation systems, such as the Navigator (U.S.) and the Glonass (Russian), which will

provide continuous and global coverage, are currently in development. Their deployment is expected in 1995. Reporting on his experiments using a Global Positioning System satellite receiver

aboard the SA-15 Kapitan Danilkin, Kjerstad (1992)

concluded that coverage en route from Murmansk to the Bering Strait was continuous. He

also stated that the ship had both Russian and

Western navigation equipment installed. Improvements in both positioning and communications

systems are ongoing.

RUSSIAN ARCTIC SEAPORTS

The role of ports under Soviet rule

The NSR is considered navigable year-round

from Murmansk to Dudinka, except for the period

May through June when the river ice is going out

(DMA 1993). According to Østreng and JørgensenDahl (1991), there were nine significant seaports

along the NSR. These were Amderma, Dikson,

Khatanga, Tiksi, Pevek, and Mys Shmidta near the

coastline, and the ports of Dudinka and Igarka on

the Yenisey River and Zelenyy Mys on the Kolyma

River. They stated that there were also approximately 100 other locations where no permanent

facilities exist but cargo is exchanged. One practice that is common along Russia’s shallow Arctic

coastline is on- and offloading of cargo directly

from and to the ice using the ships’ own lifting

equipment. Where a ship’s draft may be too great

to enter shallow coastal waters, the fast-ice edge

can serve for wharfing purposes. The ship is secured alongside or in the ice, and cargo is transferred to and from vehicles driven out to the ship.

Under the FSU, overall coordination and control of the marine and river ports systems rested

with the ministries of the Merchant Marine and

River Transport, respectively. These two ministries once centrally managed all water transport

by determining investment decisions, service arrangements, productivity targets, and fees for services. Centralization made possible regional specialization. Most ports and cargo carriers were

thus developed and managed for specific purposes

in support of the overall Union plan. The day-today management of each port, however, was delegated to a single, regional shipping company.

The Murmansk Shipping Company, for example,

was responsible for the ports of Murmansk and

Kandalaksha, and the Northern Shipping Company (based in Arkhangel’sk) controlled the ports

of Arkhangel’sk, Amderma, Mezen, Nar’yan Mar,

and Onega.

 Aside from issues related to overall Union prosperity, most aspects of individual port management were the responsibility of the shipping companies. They managed and maintained everything

related to water transportation in their respective

regions. That is, they were responsible for port

facilities, navigation aids, channel dredging, marine support, and so forth. In addition, they also

* J. Laapio, 1993, Neste Shipping, personal communication.

41
provided for most of the social needs of their employees and families, such as operating schools

and hospitals, providing housing, and managing

farms and factories that produced goods totally

unrelated to water transport. In some cases, these

support services consumed a large percentage of

the port’s operating income. A European Bank report estimated that social benefits add approximately 40% to basic port labor costs; 35 to 40% of

port operating costs went directly toward wages,

and another 15% was consumed by social benefits

(EBRD 1993). For example, only 15% of Arkhangel’sk’s 1992 net profit of 160 million rubles

remained for maintenance and investments after

social expenditures had been deducted (Peters

1993).

Recent administrative changes

In January of 1991, Russia’s ports were delinked

from the cargo carriers in the advancement of decentralization and privatization. The new Department of Maritime Transport under the Ministry of

Transport retained only a few of the port administration duties previously held by the government.

The overriding assignment of each port’s specialty

role, the control of broad investment decisions toward that end, and the establishment of service

charges officially continue to be controlled by the

department. In actual practice, these reduced mandates are probably not being strictly adhered to

since the department’s manpower and funding

shortages make enforcement relatively impossible.

Port managers are frustrated that the fees for service established by the department are not keeping up with the rapid rise in the actual cost for

delivering that service. It is more likely that more

lucrative, albeit unofficial, business arrangements

are being sought in the effort to generate desperately needed working capital.

The Department of Maritime Transport has recently established three categories of national seaports. The ten largest and most diversified ports,

handling significant international trade, comprise

Category I and are considered to be of the highest

national importance. Forced privatization, or the

turnover of port assets and operations to current

port personnel, is being considered only for Category I ports. Nine of these ten ports are most

likely those presented in a table of principal ports

by Peters (1993), a portion of which is reproduced

as Table 11. Category II is composed of 21 ports

that are considered to be of regional importance,

and their management will be transferred to regional jurisdiction. Most of these are located in the

Pacific Rim region. Category III is composed of

ten smaller ports that are considered to be of limited, local importance. Their organization and management will be placed in local hands. Most of

these are found in the White, Azov, and Caspian

Seas. We can only assume that the Arctic ports

(with the exceptions of Murmansk and Arkhangel’sk) fall mainly into Category III due to their

relatively low cargo turnover.

During the Soviet period, ports and transportation companies were supposed to cover operating

costs out of revenues, and government subsidies

were to be allocated to fund capital improvements

and investment. Even this arrangement was unrealistic, for additional subsidies were required every year to fund basic operations. This was especially true in the Soviet Arctic where transportation

is much more equipment- and labor-intensive.

Now, not only have these subsidies been reduced

and in some cases discontinued, but the government has also levied new taxes on port operators

that are creating very difficult business conditions.

None of the ports has sufficient reserves to maintain its current infrastructure, let alone invest in

Table 11. Cargo turnover, in millions of tons, and vessel traffic in Russia’s largest

ports for 1990 (from Peters 1993).

Total Liquid Dry Bulk Container Number of

Port cargo cargo cargo cargo cargo vessel calls

Novorossiysk 43.6 34.5 9.1 6.9 — 1,176

Tuapse 14.6 12.0 2.6 2.2 — 851

Nakhodka 12.0 4.5 7.5 3.6 — 1,901

Vostochny 11.6 — 11.6 8.8 2.0 1,218

St. Petersburg 10.9 — 10.9 7.1 0.9 1,776

Murmansk 7.9 — 7.9 6.9 0.3 578

Kholmsk 6.7 — 6.7 0.6 —

42
necessary improvements and modernization. Insufficient capital has allowed 40% of ship and

cargo-handling equipment in all ports to become

useless, and approximately one third of all quay

walls are verging on collapse. Peters (1993) reports

that about 85% of all profits would be necessary to

just maintain current equipment in operating condition.

Even though all ports of the Arctic and Pacific

Rim regions came under the control of Russia, several key, high-volume ports and cargo carriers in

the Baltic and Black Sea regions were lost to other

nations of the CIS. This reapportionment changed

the national statistics dramatically, so that in 1992

a large segment of Russian sea trade was channeled through foreign ports (37%) and moved by

foreign vessels (46%). Foreign handlers now require payment for services in hard currency, resulting in a serious drain of nearly US $3 billion

equivalent. To stem this outflow, the Russian government responded quickly by redirecting freight

shipment as much as possible through Federation

ports and onto Russian ships. Approximately 50%

of foreign trade is still moved on foreign vessels,

which generally provide more efficient service at

lower cost than domestic ships.

Privatization and profit-motivated management

are not familiar concepts in Russia, and the drastic

changeover is sure to cause many immediate problems. Industry analysts expect a period of upheaval

and adjustment resulting in near-term lower port

productivity and, in some cases, the closing of certain facilities. Viktor Miskov, president of FESCO,

was recently quoted as saying “This type of

privatization is totally wrong ... they broke up the

chain ... Before taking this step, they should have

taken into account the psychology of the people,

traditions, even geography—the whole system we

used to live in. Maybe it could be done in a few

years time, but not now, not straight away.”

(Berenyl et al. 1994)

The government’s policy to dissolve central control of port operations, eliminating state subsidies

and allowing market forces to prevail, does not

bode well for the industry, considering the current

upheaval. Peters (1993) is especially concerned

about the plan’s viability for northern ports that

have never been positioned to be commercially

profitable. He points to high cost factors such as

ice navigation, the short sailing season, sparse

population, small cargo volume, and heavy nontransport-related social responsibilities as reasons

for unprofitable shipping. Yet the importance of

shipping in these areas is unquestioned. It is currently the only means for servicing these outlying

regions, which are crucial for resource development and the hard currency it can generate in the

form of exports. Though Peters’ analysis of current conditions is certainly unsettling, it admits to

disregard of international shipping, which could

conceivably improve the regional outlook. Still, he

presents a series of recommendations that appear

promising for the future.

River shipping

In the Siberian North, river shipping is inextricably dependent on ocean transport. North (1991)

provided the following general information on

Russia’s northern rivers. As important as it is for

the regional economy, river navigation is limited

each year by ice and low water. For example, many

ports are inaccessible for most of the year due to

the presence of ice, and spring ice breakup causes

a two- to four-week idle period for most river ports.

In general, rivers west of the Taymyr Peninsula

are ice-free for an average of 120 days, and east of

the peninsula the average is around 80 days. Variations of 20 days about these means are typical.

Low water becomes problematic following spring

runoff. Precipitation is sparse during the summer

months so that watersheds are not replenished at

a rate comparable to drainage. Rivers, particularly

east of the Yenisey, are affected by a shallower line

of permafrost that prevents the infiltration of snowmelt and rainfall. Consequently runoff is more

rapid and water level fluctuations are more extreme. Small rivers are even more greatly affected.

For the shallower and more upstream reaches,

which comprise a large percentage of Siberia’s total river mileage, the navigation season can be 30

days or less, assuming that the minimum depth

needed is 0.6 m. Sporadic years of unusual dryness can limit navigation here to even a 10-day

season. This inherently short season for river vessel movement coupled with its unpredictability

must be considered when projecting when, how

much, and what types of cargoes can be moved by

water transport.

The Yenisey and Ob’ are navigable by oceangoing vessels for approximately the same distance

(to Igarka on the Yenisey), but the majority of the

Ob’s distance is a gulf. The gulf of Ob’ is shallow,

and transshipment to river craft takes place at roadsteads using floating cranes. Besides the inconvenience, the work is often interrupted by weather

when conditions become too rough for smaller

river craft. The Lena River delta is shallow, so that

cargo has to be transshipped at nearby Tiksi, and

43
then the small river craft are at risk in crossing

open coastal water with uncertain weather.

Northern seaports

Sources consulted

This section summarizes information for

Russia’s northern ports that are currently open for

foreign stopover or are scheduled to be opened at

some future unspecified date. Several providers

of port information were consulted, primarily

Lloyd’s of London in England (LLP), the U.S. Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), and the Russian

State Ministry of Transport (RSMOT).

In addition, a computerized database entitled

Commercial Sea Ports of the CIS and Baltic States, and

River Ports of Russia, available from Russia’s Central Marine Research and Design Institute

(CNIIMF), is described in Appendix E. The

CNIIMF database is currently available only in

Russian and was not consulted for this study.

Ports of the World 1994 (LLP 1994) is a comprehensive directory that provides a wide range of

navigational information on approximately 2,700

ports worldwide. It is updated annually, and its

information includes each port’s authority, physical description, navigation season, the type of cargo

handled, facilities and accommodations, approach

description, communication frequencies, and resident shipping agents. The directory lists altogether

only 28 Russian ports, and only one, Igarka, is

located on the NSR. Four of the ports are found on

the White Sea (Archangel’sk, Kandalaksha, Mezen,

and Onega) and two on the Barents Sea (Murmansk

and Nar’yan Mar). As of July 1994, Igarka was the

only port on the route that was officially open for

foreign stopover. Information on northern Russian

seaports from Ports of the World is included as Appendix F.

Another directory of ports worldwide that is

published periodically is the World Port Index

(DMA 1992a). It lists a total of 45 north coast and

far eastern Russian ports (App. G). Twenty-four of

these are located between the Norwegian–Russian

border and the Kara Strait, and eleven more lie

along the NSR (Fig. 28). Its wide array of information is presented in a table nearly 75 columns wide.

The Defense Mapping Agency also publishes a

series of sailing directions that provide detailed

navigational information for harbors, coastlines,

and passages of the entire world. These are periodically updated in regional volumes every 5 to

10 years with subsequent amendments between

editions appearing in the DMA Weekly Notice to

Mariners. Sailing Directions (Enroute): Northern Coast

of Russia (DMA 1993) covers the region from the

Norwegian–Russian border to the Bering Strait and

was consulted for some of the information pre-





























A R C T I C C I R C L E

Kolym a

River

I ndigirka

Ri ver

Yana Riv e r

Len a

River

Olenek R vi er

Kotuy R vi e r

Yenis e y R.

Taz R vi e

O

r

b R iver

A n a d y r R .

N O R T H

P O L E

ARCTIC OCEAN

Barents


Sea

Kara Sea

Laptev


Sea

Bering


Sea

Chukchi


Sea

East


Siberian


Sea

Provideniya

S

Alaska

GREENLAND

ICELAND

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

80°

70°

60°

 180°

 0°

 90°

0 1000

Kilometers

 150°

 120°

 60°

 30°

 30°

 150°

50°

Sea of


Okhotsk

JAPAN

0 500

Nautical Miles

Nar'yan-Mar

Arkhangel'sk

Onega Mezen

Kandalaksh

Murmansk

Khabarovo

Novvy Port Ust-Port

Kapitana


Varzugina

Dikson

Golchikha

Dudinka

Igarka

Pevek

Ambarchik

Tiksi

Kolym a

River

I ndigirka

Ri ver

Yana Riv e r

Len a

River

Olenek R vi er

Kotuy R vi e r

Yenis e y R.

Taz R vi e

O

r

b R iver

A n a d y r R .

N O R T H

P O L E

ARCTIC OCEAN

Barents


Sea

Kara Sea

Laptev


Sea

Bering


Sea

Chukchi


Sea

East


Siberian


Sea

Provideniya

RUSSIA

Alaska

GREENLAND

ICELAND

NORWAY

SWEDEN

FINLAND

80°

70°

60°

 180°

 0°

 90°

0 1000

Kilometers

 150°

 120°

 60°

 30°

 30°

 150°

50°

Sea of


Okhotsk

JAPAN

0 500

Nautical Miles

Nar'yan-Mar

Arkhangel'sk

Onega Mezen

Kandalaksh

Murmansk

Igarka

Kapitana


Varzugina

Khabarovo

Novvy Port Ust-Port

Dikson

Golchikha

Dudinka

Pevek

Ambarchik

Tiksi

Figure 28. Russian Arctic seaports listed in DMA (1992a). Those in bold type and marked with triangular

symbols are open for foreign stopover, as of July 1994.

a

44
sented in this chapter. The reader is also advised

of the agency’s Sailing Directions (Enroute): East

Coast of Russia (DMA 1992b) for similar coverage

from the Bering Strait to North Korea.

The scope of information provided by these LLP

and DMA directories is similar although very different in format. LLP’s port descriptions tend to

be more literal and quantitative, and DMA’s are

coded and qualitative, employing indices for

ranges of values. A comparison of the two descriptions for Igarka reveal differing lapses of data

in each and sometimes disagreement (e.g., the location coordinates and minimum channel depth).

The Igarka example indicates that both directories

can provide important information that is not entirely available in either one. The LLP source book

presently has little information about NSR ports.

However, in time more will be learned, and this

source should be much more useful in the future.

Another useful source of ports information,

RSMOT’s Guide to Navigation on the Northern Sea

Route, was described in the Administration and

Regulation section of this report.

Northern ports open

 for foreign stopover

For more than 50 years prior to 1991, the seas

along Russia’s northern coastline and its ports were

closed to foreign shipping. In July of 1991, the first

foreign ship since 1940, L’Astrolabe, was escorted

across the entire Northeast Passage. At that time,

the only Russian port that was officially open to

foreign call anywhere along the official NSR was

Igarka. The ANSR has been systematically easing

restrictions and implementing procedures to allow greater freedom of movement of foreign ships

through its territorial waters, which includes making more ports of call available along the route.

The list of Russian ports that have been officially opened to foreign stopover is published annually in issue No. 1 of the Russian Notices to

Mariners (RSMOT 1994). The list appearing as

Table 12 was reported to be valid as of July 1994.*

What follows is information summarized from the

above-named sources on those ports that are located along Russia’s northern coastline.

Murmansk. Some sources consider the port of

Murmansk to be the western terminus of the

Northern Sea Route. It does play an important

role as the home port of the Murmansk Shipping

Company, the marine operator of the western half

of the NSR. Situated on the eastern shore of the

Kolskiy Gulf, approximately 24 nm from the

Barents Sea, it is connected to the Baltic Sea via

the White Sea–Baltic Canal. Murmansk is open

year-round except for short episodes of heavy

Table 12. Russian ports open to foreign shipping, as of July 1994. Ports in boldface are

those that have been opened since the latest edition of Notices to Mariners (RSMOT

1994).

Arctic seas:

Arkhangelsk, Igarka, Kandalaksha, Mezen, Murmansk, Nar’yan-Mar, Onega.

Baltic Sea:

Vyborg, Vysotsk, Kaliningrad, Kaliningrad-Rechnoy, Brusnichnoye, St. Petersburg.

Black Sea:

Anapa, Novorossiysk, Sochi, Tuapse, Gelendzhik, Ozero Solenoye.

Sea of Azov:

Taganrog, Kerch, Yeysk.

Caspian Sea:

Makhachkala.

Pacific Ocean:

Aleksandrovsk-na-Sakhaline, Beringovskiy, Vanino, Vladivostok, Vostochnyy, Korsakov,

Korf, Magadan, Nakhodka, Nevel’sk, Nikolayevsk-na-Amure, Oktiabr’skiy, Okhotsk, Poronaysk,

Provideniya, Reid Makarova, Bukhta Svetlaya, Uglegorsk, Khasanskiy, Kholmsk, Shakhtersk,

Sovetskaya Gavan’, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, Anadyr’, Bukhta Troitsy, De-Kastri,

Komsomol’sk-na-Amure, Krabozavodsk, Kuril’sk, Lavrentiya, Mago, Pos’yet, Severo-Kuril’sk,

Uelen, Yuzhno-Kuril’sk.

* M. Maliavko, 1994, HydroCon, Ltd., St. Petersburg,

Russia, personal communication.

45
weather and fog. November to February is generally the period with the most difficult weather

conditions, but moderate gales can be expected

two to four days every month of the year. Episodes of fog are heaviest from January to April.

Ice normally begins forming at the beginning of

January, attains its maximum thickness by the end

of February, and is gone by mid-April. Icebreakers are available throughout the period to maintain ocean-going traffic. Springtime ice breakup

on the Tuloma and Kola Rivers presents a brief

challenge to navigation in May. The channel approach varies from 10 to 30 m, and depths alongside the 28 available berths range from 6 to 13 m.

The tidal fluctuation is 3.7 m. The port can accommodate general cargo, container, and bulk cargo

ships, ro-ro (“roll-on, roll-off” ship capable of

transporting wheeled cargo such as trucks, trailers, or automobiles) and passenger ships, and

tankers. Ships can be as large as 44,750 dwt, up to

202 m in length, and with 12 m draft. Murmansk,

a city of about 500,000, offers provisions, bunkers,

fresh water, and medical services; nearby highway, air, and rail transportation; and repairs for

ships up 30,000 dwt. Berenyl et al. (1994) report

that cargo throughput at Murmansk has decreased

from 8.5 million tons per year to 6.5 million. His

source states that large volumes of liquids are not

handled there; only dry cargoes, including fertilizers (up to 4 million tons of apatite per annum in

the early 1990s), ores, coal, grain, alumina, and

containerized general cargo.

Kandalaksha. This port is located just inside the

mouth of the Niva River, which empties into

Kandalaksha Inlet and the White Sea. Kandalaksha

Inlet forms the southern edge of the Kola Peninsula. The port is normally frozen over from early

November to late May. Tides cause a depth fluctuation of 2.1 m, and tidal currents run between

0.5 and 1.5 kn. The depth of the approach channel

and its berthing area is reportedly 4.9 to 6.1 m.

LLP lists the maximum alongside-berthing depth

as 8.5 m. Five berths with a total length of 288 m

are available, the longest being 90 m. The maximum vessel size is not mentioned. Principal facilities are for dry bulk and general cargoes. Medical

services, fresh water, and provisions are available,

but bunkers are not. Only minor ship repairs can

be performed. Rail service is available nearby, but

there is no air service.

Onega. Located on the north bank of the Onega

River, between 4.8 and 6.4 km upstream of its

mouth on Onezhskiy Bay of the White Sea, Onega

is a center for timber and sawmilling activities. Its

principal export is timber, and facilities for handling general cargoes are available. The port is

closed for 5 to 6 months of the year, and ships

cannot winter afloat in the river as ice conditions

prevail in the estuary and port area from early

November to mid-May. In high water conditions,

the channel will allow passage of vessels up to 124

m in length with drafts of 5.1 to 6.4 m. The tidal

fluctuation is 2.7 m. The two largest berths are 470

m and 110 m in length with alongside depths of

6.1 m and 4 m, respectively. Cargo loading and

handling is accomplished using the ships’ own

gear. There is rail but not air service nearby, and

only limited ship repairs are available. Other services include medical, fresh water, and ship’s provisions, but bunkers cannot be guaranteed.

Arkhangel’sk. Arkhangel’sk is situated on the east

bank of the Severnaya Dvina River, about 28 nm

upstream from its mouth on the White Sea. The

port area extends nearly 30 nm along the river,

comprising the entire navigable waterways and

facilities of the river. Arkhangel’sk is one of Russia’s

largest and most important ports. The port is normally open from the end of April through November but can be used year-round by ice-classed vessels under icebreaker escort. Ice can occur from

late October to mid-May and, depending upon

the severity, the port may be closed periodically

during the winter period. The river delta approach

to Arkhangel’sk has three main branches among

numerous islands and shoals. The channel depth

is reportedly 6.4 to 7.6 m, but this is variable due

to erosion and siltation. The tidal fluctuation is 0.6

m. There are a total of 35 berths with alongside

depths of 7.8 to 9.6 m and facilities for tanker,

container, general, and bulk cargo vessels. Ships

up to 19,200 dwt, an overall length of 162 m, and a

beam of 30 m can be accommodated. A wide array

of stores are available by order. Bunkers and supplies of fresh water are available from offshore

barges and lighters. Air and rail service is available nearby. Ship repairs are handled at floating

docks for vessels up to 7000 dwt. Berenyl (1994)

states that the three port areas of Arkhangel’sk can

accomodate vessels with drafts of 8.0 to 9.2 m.

Plans call for the construction of a methanol plant

that will begin exporting up to 700,000 tons per

year to the U.S. in 1995. He also reports that the

construction of a new terminal is being considered

to receive metals for export from the Cheropovets

metallurgical plant and from Magnitogorsk.

Mezen. This port is located 35 km upstream on

the Mezen River, which empties into Mezen Bay

in the northeast region of the White Sea. It is only

46
open from late May until October, and vessels

may enter the port only on high water during

daylight hours. The tidal fluctuation is reportedly

4.9 m. Mezen can only accommodate general cargo

vessels up to 2930 dwt, 120 m in length, with 4.5

m of draft. Berthing length is limited to 200 m on

pontoons near a timber mill. Vessels with 4 m of

draft are usually grounded when loading timber.

Loading is accomplished using the ship’s own

gear. Rail and air service is not available, and only

minor ship repairs can be expected. A hospital is

located in the town, and fresh water and provisions can be obtained. Bunkers are not guaranteed available.

Nar’yan-Mar. This commercial port is located

on the south bank of the Pechora River about 70

nm upstream from its mouth on Pechorskaya Bay

on the Barents Sea. It is normally open to navigation between late June and late October (120–130

days per year). Ice begins forming in the estuary

in October, attains a thickness of 1 to 2 m by springtime, begins clearing in June, and is normally out

by July. The permitted draft for port entry is about

4.5 m due to the bar that forms at the river’s mouth,

but this figure is set by the Port Authority at the

beginning of each season. The tidal variation is

0.6 m. The port is primarily a timber exporting

center, but other dry and bulk cargoes are handled,

including grain, salt, metals, fish, coal, and cement. Four berths are available with a maximum

alongside depth of 6.5 m. The maximum vessel

length is 125 m. Provisions and fresh water are

usually available, however, only minor ship repairs can obtained and fuel oil bunkers cannot be

guaranteed available. There is medical and air service available, but no rail service.

Igarka. Igarka is situated on the east bank of the

Yenisey River, 321 nm upstream from its mouth

on the Yenisey Gulf. Its normal navigation season

is from July to mid-November. Ice begins forming

about mid-October. Igarka is the only NSR port

now open for foreigner stopover; it is navigable

for about 135 days per year. Interestingly, it lies

136 nm upstream from the port of Dudinka, which

is navigable year-round but is not yet open to

foreigners. Only those vessels with drafts less than

7.3 m can safely negotiate the river bars and enter

the port. The largest vessel that can be accommodated is 14,203 dwt and 151.8 m length overall

(loa). Tidal fluctuations are not a factor this far

upriver, but depth fluctuations associated with

runoff events can be as much as 15 to 20 m. The

main wharf for the principal export, timber, is 300

m long with an alongside depth of 7.5 m where

loading is accomplished using the ships’ own gear.

Twelve berths are available in the inner roads

where vessels secure stern-on to the island. Provisions, bunkers, air, and medical services are available. Fresh water is obtained from the river outside the port area.

Northern ports slated for opening

The following section summarizes the information available on the ports of Dudinka, Dikson,

Tiksi, and Pevek, which were identified by

Mikhailichenko (1992) as slated for opening sometime in the future. He did not project when this

would occur and, according to Maliavko,* they

have yet to be opened.

Dudinka. Situated on the east bank of the

Yenisey River approximately 185 nm upstream of

its mouth on the Kara Sea, Dudinka is the largest

Arctic port east of Arkhangel’sk. Near the port,

the river is 1.25 to 1.75 nm wide, has low banks,

and is subject to large fluctuations in depth. Permafrost prevents the percolation of rainfall, so runoff events are particularly flashy. Dudinka is

evacuated and closed for two weeks or more during the ice breakup period in late June to early

July to avoid ice and flood damage. The depth

limitation for entering port is reportedly 7.6 m.

The main wharf is 300 m long and is said to accommodate vessels of 10,000 gross tonnage. The

main cargo facilities are primarily for minerals

export. Medical and air services are available, and

there is a railroad to Noril’sk. Although fuel oil is

said to be available, ships’ provisions, repairs, and

water are not guaranteed.

Dikson. The port of Dikson, where the western

Marine Operations Headquarters is based, is composed of a harbor indentation on the east side of

Ostrov (Island) Dikson. The maximum permitted

draft is 11 m. The general cargo wharf has two

berths of 100 and 107 m with an alongside depth

of 5.2 m. Including nearby Ostrov Konus, there

are three coal piers of 38, 56, and 61 m in length

with alongside depths of 3, 7, and 7 m, respectively. There are two petroleum berths, one 24 m

long and the other 23 m. The alongside depth for

both is 5.2 m. Medical facilities and air service are

available, but rail service is not. Water, fuel oil,

ships’ provisions, and minor ship repairs can be

obtained, as well as rescue service and communication equipment repair.

* M. Maliavko, 1994, HydroCon, Ltd., St. Petersburg,

Russia, personal communication.

47
Tiksi. The port of Tiksi is located on the west

side of Tiksi Bay, an inlet just southeast of the

Lena River delta. It is the largest coastal port actually situated on the NSR, and it is the transfer

point for cargo going into and out of the Lena

River. The port is generally closed by ice from

mid-October to mid-July. Winds also have a large

effect on the water depth in the bay. Strong north

and east winds tend to raise the water level, and

south and west winds tend to lower it; this windinduced fluctuation can be as much as 1.2 m.

Tiksi’s main pier is 122 m long with 6.7 m depth

alongside. Air service, water, fuel oil, and minor

repairs are available, but rail service and ships’

provisions are not.

Pevek. Pevek has approximately 10,000 inhabitants and is located on the northwestern side of

Poluostrova (Peninsula) Pevek. It is the main outlet for extensive mining operations in that region.

Its normal navigation season extends from June

to September. Two wharves, one 260 m long and

the other 215 m long with alongside depths of 7 m

and 5.5 m, respectively, are used mainly for dry

and bulk cargoes. An offshore pipeline berth services ocean-going vessels. Ships as large as 20,000

dwt have been accommodated. Air and medical

services, water, fuel oil, and minor repairs are

available, but ship provisioning and rail service

are not.

VESSELS AND CARGOES

Types of vessels using the NSR

This section does not attempt to inventory the

world’s fleet of icebreakers and ice-strengthened

ships that are using or might use the NSR. That

task was the focus of a separate CRREL investigation (Sodhi 1995). We instead present recent and

general information concerning vessels on the

route.

The speed at which nonstrengthened ships

would have to operate for an acceptable margin of

safety practically eliminates anything but icestrengthened vessels using the NSR competitively.

In principle, only ice-strengthened vessels will be

allowed to operate along the route. The ANSR

regulations stipulate that vessels having at least

an L1 ice classification under the Russian Register

(or its equivalent rating under other registers) will

be allowed to ply the route under the control of

icebreakers. Special exceptions for less ice-resistant ships may be granted for transits through areas that are expected to be virtually ice-free. Regulations stipulate that vessels having an L2 classification may be permitted in areas west of 125°E

longitude under favorable conditions, but they

may go east of that line only into totally ice-free

areas. Finally, vessels classified as L3 that were

already in service and assigned to Arctic ports at

the time the regulations were published (around

1991) may be permitted to operate during the summer period exclusively and only in ice-free coastal

zones.

Shallow depths in several key locations effectively limit ships on the route at the current time

to 20,000 dwt tons and less (Granberg 1992). Transit shippers must consider shallow waters overlying the far-reaching continental shelf, which extends seaward for hundreds of kilometers, and

shallow passages between land barriers separating the various seas. The straits through the

Novosibirskiy Islands, Sannikova and Dmitrya

Lapteva, are 13 and 7 m deep, respectively. The

high-latitude route variation to the north of the

islands has no such depth limitation, but at the

present time it is not reliably navigable to ensure

regular passage. Cabotage and river shipping must

also contend with shallow waters due to heavy

silt deposition at coastal deltas and in riverine channels. Many coastal and river ports can only be

approached by ships with shallow draft. Dredging is necessary at the deltas and within upriver

shipping channels to maintain passage. Efficient

cargo transportation in this region therefore currently favors the use of ships with high carrying

capacity, reduced draft, and technological features

(structural, mechanical, navigational, etc.) that allow some ability to operate independent of icebreaker escort.

The former Soviet merchant fleet was divided

among the CIS such that 57% of both ships and the

deadweight tonnage remained with Russia.

Russia’s entire fleet as of July 1992 consisted of

13.6 million dwt and 1433 ships (Table 13). Fiftyfive percent of those ships and nearly 30% of the

tonnage is made up of general cargo ships.

Currently the newest and most capable cargo

ship in use there is the Noril’sk-class SA-15 (Fig. 4).

It is a multipurpose icebreaking vessel of 20,000

dwt designed to carry up to 15,000 t of a variety of

cargoes including containers, trailers, refrigerated

cargo, and bulk material (e.g., ore, grain, coal). It is

fitted with a stern ramp and 40-ton-capacity cranes

(operable in –40°C ambient temperatures) that allow cargo exchange where pier facilities do not

exist. The ships are 174 m long, have a maximum

draft of 10.5 m, an operating range of 16,000 nm,

48
and travel at 17 kn in open water when fully

loaded. They are ice-classed as ULA, the highest

freighter rating in the Russian Registry, and are

able to operate independently and continuously

at 2 kn in 1-m-thick ice. Special ice navigation

features include air-bubbling and water jetting systems and a low-friction hull coating to enable

easier passage. The two Finnish yards of Wartsila

and Valmet produced the first 14 of these ships,

the first of which, the Noril’sk, was completed in

1982. Five more were built between 1985 and 1987.

As of July 1994, these 19 were owned by the

Murmansk, Far Eastern, North Bulk, and Sahkalin

shipping companies and were operating along

the NSR.

Principal Arctic shipping companies

The Russian Federation’s nine principal shipping companies, their respective fleets, and their

trade patterns are listed in Table 14. Peters (1993)

has compiled a paragraph of specifics on each of

those listed. His descriptions, with additional information extracted from Berenyl et al. (1992, 1994),

for those companies that operate in the Arctic and

Far East follow.

Arctic Shipping Company

The Yakutsk Production Organization was reorganized in March 1991 and became known as

the Arctic Shipping Company. The company’s

headquarters are in Tiksi, which is located near

the Lena River estuary on the Laptev Sea. Its gross

revenues in 1990 were 40 million rubles. Payroll

staff involved in transport operations and cargo

management comprises 1660 employees. The fleet

consists mainly of general cargo ships, many of

which are “ice-class.” The average vessel cargocarrying capacity is under 4000 dwt.

Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESCO)

The Far Eastern Shipping Company is involved

in domestic sea transportation service along the

Pacific coast from Posyet in the south to Pevek on

the East Siberian Sea (28% of all activities), in bilateral trade (65%), and in regular liner cross trade

(10%). The company is a well-established and wellregarded carrier with a diversified organization

and service network. Its headquarters are in

Vladivostok, and it employs a staff of close to

19,000. FESCO is the largest of Russia’s Far East

ship owners, having a fleet of over 225 vessels

totalling 1.8 million dwt. Universal cargo vessels

make up 40% of its fleet, and timber carriers another 20%. The fleet includes 21 container vessels

(less than 15,000 dwt average capacity), 88 general

cargo ships (3000–12,000 dwt), 39 timber carriers

(4000–6000 dwt), 15 reefer vessels (5500 dwt average), and seven dry bulk carriers (12,000–15,000

dwt). Until 1991, the company was functionally

responsible for the ports of Nakhodka, VladivoTable 13. Russian Federation shipping fleet

as of 1 July 1992 (ships of 300 gross tons and

greater) (from Holt 1993).

Dwt Number

Ship type (000) of ships

Oil tankers 3,908.9 239

Chemical tankers 32.8 9

Liquid gas tanker 0 0

Bulk carriers 15,05.0 74

OBO carriers 16,11.6 18

Container vessels 4,84.6 40

General cargo vessels 39,23.9 793

Reefer vessels 1,055.1 190

Ro-ro ships 1,072.5 70

Total 13,594.4 1,433

Table 14. Russia’s principal shipping companies, their fleet composition, and trade patterns as of 1991 (from Peters 1993).

Fleet composition Trade distribution

Tonnage Number International Cabotage

Company (000 dwt) of ships (000 tons) (000 tons)

Arctic 94.4 25 223 452

Baltic 1,920.6 178 11,509 Negligible

Far Eastern 1,846.2 228 10,243 6,584

Kamchatka 220.4 53 330 2,939

Murmansk 929.3 78 5,675 2,895

Northern 673.0 135 5,299 660

Novorossiysk 5,321.8 112 46,093 790

Primorsk 597.8 53 2,171 4,887

Sakhalin 419.4 88 2,574 10,231

49
stok, and Vostochny, and it continues to maintain

managerial links with the Nakhodka, Slavyanka,

and Vladivostok ship repair yards.

Kamchatka Shipping Company

The Kamchatka Shipping Company’s fleet has

declined to 45 to 50 ships totalling 220 million

dwt. It provides regular liner service from the

Kamchatka Peninsula to Japan (timber) and the

Koreas (cement). However, its main activities involve services to and from ports in the Federation’s

northeastern region. The company is headquartered in Petropavlovsk–Kamchatsky and employs

about 4500. The fleet consists mainly of general

cargo ships with ice-strengthened hulls and an

average carrying capacity of under 4000 dwt. Although officially freed from port responsibilities,

the carrier continues to be managerially involved

in the ports of Petropavlovsk–Kamchatsky and

Ust-Kamchatsk, as well as in the Petropavlovsk

ship repair yard. The company faced closure sometime in late 1994 or early 1995, but that has been

forestalled by a recent agreement with a South

Korean company to lease some of Kamchatka’s

idle ships. It is also trying to branch out from its

previous nearly exclusive role as a cabotageur

and develop cross-trading with Japan and South

Korea.

Murmansk Shipping Company (MSC)

The Murmansk Shipping Company has a sizable fleet of ice-class vessels that provide supply

services to the Arctic region. It also assists in keeping sea routes open. The company has a diversified service network that extends all over Western

Europe and the Mediterranean. It is headquartered

in the city of Murmansk, and has about 9000 on its

payroll. The fleet does not include cellular container tonnage, but nine rather large ro-ro carriers

(about 20,000 dwt average) provide container carrying facility. The fleet distinguishes itself also by

having 31 dry bulkers of 18,000–22,000 dwt, which

are large by Russian standards. Furthermore, there

are 24 general-cargo ships in the 4000 dwt range.

Before 1991, Murmansk Shipping was functionally responsible for the ports of Kandalaksha and

Murmansk, and the ties with both ports remain

strong. MSC’s trade has recently fallen off threeand-a-half-fold due to the high cost of Arctic shipping and the closing of Russia’s Arctic research

and meteorological stations, which it kept supplied. The company entered into a joint arrangement, known as Arctic Shipping Services, with

Neste Shipping of Finland in 1993 to ship petroleum products and move equipment for oil and

gas exploration activities to northern settlements.

Northern Shipping Company

The Northern Shipping Company, one of

Russia’s oldest shipowners, is mainly involved in

the transport of sawn timber, cardboard, and pulpwood from northern latitudes to Western Europe,

the Mediterranean, Africa, and the U.S.A. It has a

fleet of 106 timber carriers ranging from 1 to 17

years old. Limited quantities of dry bulk and general cargo are also carried. Its cabotage trade was

once at 6 million tons per year but that is down

threefold and now its primary trade is international. More recently, the company has begun engaging regular container services to Western

Europe. Northern Shipping’s homeport is Arkhangel’sk, where it employs about 9800 in transport

operations and cargo management. Its fleet is relatively large, including nine dry bulkers of around

14,000 dwt and more than 100 general cargo ships

in the 2500–6000 dwt range, which is typical of the

Russian multipurpose fleet. Before 1991, the company was responsible for the ports of Amderma,

Arkhangel’sk, Mezen, Nar’yan Mar, and Onega.

With the exception of Arkhangel’sk, it remains

closely involved in the management of the ports,

as well as in the operations of the Krasnayaknuznitsa and Layskiydok ship repair yards.

Primorsk Shipping Company (PSC)

The Primorsk Shipping Company, established

in 1969 as the tanker division of FESCO, became

independent three years later. Though its main

activities were once related to cabotage services

along Russia’s Pacific Rim, it has been freed to

pursue international, or cross, trade, particularly

with the Far East. PSC’s fleet consists exclusively

of oil and liquid product tankers. It is a carrier of

oil and petroleum products, vegetable oils, molasses, and similar cargoes to Japan and South Asia,

East Africa, and Europe. PSC’s headquarters are

in Nakhodka, with about 4500 staff involved in

transport operations and cargo management. Of

these vessels, 20 have a capacity between 14,000

and 20,000 dwt, and the balance is in the 4000 to

6000 dwt range. The average age of its 40 tankers

is only 12 years.

Sakhalin Shipping Company (SASCO)

The Sakhalin Shipping Company, founded in

1945, is the Federation’s key cabotage operator,

with much emphasis on sea–rail ferry services. Its

service network includes all of Russia’s Far East50
ern provinces and the Arctic region. The company

is also competing with FESCO for international

cargo, providing regular services to ports in China,

Japan, and Southeast Asia. Its administrative seat

and home base are in Kholmsk, on Sakhalin Island. Payroll staff comprises almost 6250 employees, of whom only 1455 are assigned to transport

and cargo management functions. The fleet includes several gas carriers of 1500 dwt, a variety

of vessels with mixed cargo–passenger configurations (usually less than 3000 dwt), two 20,000 dwt

ro-ro vessels, and a pool of general cargo ships in

the usual 3000 to 5000 dwt range. Although nominally freed from port responsibilities in 1991,

Sakhalin Shipping continues to provide much management cohesion in the ports of Alexandrovsk,

Kholmsk, Korsakov, Krasnogorsk, Nikolayevsk,

Poronaysk, Uglegorsk, and Vanino.

Cargoes

Alexander Granberg, an economic advisor to

the Office of the President of the Russian Federation, provided the following encapsulated observation on both the importance of the NSR for the

Russian economy and the type of products that

are being shipped from the region:

The Northern Sea Route is instrumental in

the flow of goods into and out of Russia’s

northern regions, which are estimated to bring

in 60% of the entire country’s hard currency

revenue. In 1988 the northern deposits accounted for the Soviet Union’s entire production of diamonds and apatite and more than

half of its production of gold, nickel and tin.

The oil and gas fields of northwestern Siberia

supplied 65% and 62%, respectively, of the

Soviet Union’s entire oil and gas production.

Today, the shipping of raw timber and nickel

ore from the Yenisey River ports of Igarka and

Dudinka, respectively, makes up the bulk of

tonnage in transit along the western NSR.

(Granberg 1992)

A recent study for the Finnish shipping industry (Arpiainen 1994) estimated the potential cargo

volumes that might be shipped via the NSR based

on current trade flows. That study’s region of interest was limited to routes having at least a 20%

distance advantage over the canal routes. This criterion allowed consideration of the European locations of Great Britain, Germany, The Netherlands, and Scandinavia; Far Eastern locations of

Japan, the Koreas, and northern China; and West

Coast North American ports lying north of the

U.S.–Canadian border. The study estimated that

the total cargo potential between northern Europe,

the Far East, and North America is approximately

20 mt. Arpiainen further estimates that this tonnage would employ a fleet of 100 dedicated ships,

assuming an average vessel size of 20,000 dwt and

five round-trips annually per ship. These figures

reflect the total cargo currently moving between

these regions and perhaps unrealistically assumes

all of it would be diverted to the NSR. It does,

however, provide a planning estimate. Not reflected in the estimate is the additional cargo traffic that might be generated by increased NSR shipping, increased competition, and decreased costs

due to economies of scale. Another speculation by

Arpiainen is the extent to which established trading patterns will be altered by the availability of

the new route. It is likely that increased traffic

along the NSR would generate new trade agreements for Russian products that have not been

widely available to world markets in the past. For

example, shipments of coal and timber to Europe

from Canada would be replaced to some degree

by Siberian shipments due to their greater proximity.

There are four broad categories of trade that

will ply the route, and each has its own set of

cargoes. These are exports, imports, cabotage, and

transit cargoes.

Exports

Exports are domestic Russian products shipped

from NSR ports to other countries for consumption. These consist mainly of raw and intermediate materials that will be processed into finished

goods in other countries. Exports most significant

to the Northern Sea Route are from Siberia’s storehouse of raw wealth. These include raw fuels (coal,

oil, natural gas, oil shale, peat), bulk ores (iron,

copper, nickel, bauxite, titanium, cobalt), bulk minerals (apatite, sulphur, sodium chloride, mica), raw

materials (timber, building stone, alumina, calcite,

other materials used for making glass, cement, and

brick), and precious metals (gold, diamonds, rare

earths). Cruise tourism, which has great potential

for the region, can also be considered an export

because it brings foreign currency into the country.

Imports

Imports coming into the Russian Arctic and Pacific Rim ports via the NSR will be a relatively

minor segment of total cargo flow. The low population density and lack of hard currency will be an

51
impediment to foreign imports to this region. Modest shipments of construction equipment, oil and

gas exploration equipment, general, and containerized cargo are necessary for the raw material

extraction activities of the region. The majority of

these supply shipments will be cabotage; any imported cargoes will have been broken down into

smaller loads at domestic ports for distribution to

the settlements.

Cabotage

Cabotage cargoes are products that are transported from one Russian coastal port to another.

Cabotage consists of both materials bound for export that are shipped to larger domestic ports for

consolidation, and imports that are distributed

from domestic break-bulk points to smaller ports.

These products are typically raw or bulk materials

bound for industrial processing centers, fuels (both

raw and finished), construction equipment and

housing materials, finished goods, foodstuffs, and

general cargo to supply outer settlements. Sand

and gravel, grain, coal, and fertilizer are major

cabotage goods. Fish and reindeer meat are northern food exports that are important to the indigenous economies. The transfer of railway freight

to large, Pacific Rim island population centers

(Sahkalin and the Kurils) via ferry transport accounted for 73% of all Federation cabotage in 1992.

Transit cargo

Transit shipments are those that traverse

the NSR but originate and end outside its

bounds. They utilize the route only as a convenient path of progress between the North

Atlantic and North Pacific regions. Ideally,

they would bypass all intermediate ports in

the interest of saving time, but they would

still require icebreaker escort and rely on Russian facilities or services along the way in an

emergency.

Arpiainen estimates that potentially 10 mt

of cargo would transit the route annually,

including 4 to 5 mt of dry bulk cargo, 2 mt of

container cargo, and 1 to 2 mt of other cargo.

This is a small figure compared with the cargo

that moves through the Suez Canal (280 mt)

and the Panama Canal (160 mt), so it is unlikely that canal authorities would adjust their

passage fees to appreciably alter traffic flows

to the NSR.

Figures 29 and 30 show the composition

of trade between Europe and the North Pacific as reported by Arpiainen (1994). Potential cargoes from the North Pacific to the

North Atlantic include coal, ores, grain, timber (logs and sawn), automobiles, pulp and

paper waste, and container goods. Potential

cargoes in the reverse direction include container and general cargoes, foodstuffs (raw

and processed), and refrigerated food products (seafood, meat, dairy products, fruit, and

vegetables).

SHIPPING COSTS

It should be emphasized that few foreign

ships have undertaken an NSR voyage, so

8

4

2

0

1983 1984 1985 1986

Volume (millions of tons)

Dry Bulk Other Dry

Liquid Bulk

Refrigerated

General

6

Figure 29. Trade volume from Europe to the North Pacific

region by cargo type (from Arpiainen 1994).

Figure 30. Trade volume from the North Pacific region to

Europe by cargo type (from Arpiainen 1994).

6

4

2

0

1983 1984 1985 1986

Volume (millions of tons)

Dry Bulk Other Dry

Liquid Bulk

Refrigerated

General

52
Table 15. Recent voyages with foreign involvement (from Armstrong 1991, Kjerstad 1992, Brigham 1991a,

Matyushenko 1992).

Year Ship/flag Begin – end Comments

1967 Novovoronezh No. Europe – Yokohama Soviet ship with foreign cargo

USSR

1967 Dubno No. Europe – Japan Soviet ship with foreign cargo

USSR

1967 Ustyuzhna No. Europe – Japan Soviet ship with foreign cargo

USSR

1989 Several transits Hamburg – Osaka Soviet ships with foreign cargo

USSR

1990 6 transits No. Europe – Far East Soviet ships with foreign cargo

USSR

1990 Rossiya North Pole trip Foreign tourists on Soviet icebreaker

USSR

1991 L’Astrolabe Murmansk – Provideniya 1st foreign ship transit allowed since 1940

France

1991 Dagmar Aen Nar’yan-Mar – Igarka Foreign ship with no ice classification

FRG

1991 Kapitan Danilkin Norway – Hong Kong Soviet SA-15 with Norwegian cargo

USSR

1991 Kapitan Danilkin Malaysia – Murmansk Soviet SA-15 with foreign cargo

USSR

1991 Tiksi Hamburg – Chiba, Japan Soviet ship with foreign cargo

USSR

1991 Sovietskiy Soyuz North Pole trip Foreign tourists on Soviet icebreaker

USSR

1991 8 other voyages Various Russian ships with foreign cargo

USSR

1992 Sovietskiy Soyuz North Pole trip Foreign tourists on Russian icebreaker

Russia

1992 Freighter Vancouver – Tiksi Russian ship with foreign cargo

Russia

1992 Sovietskiy Soyuz 2 North Pole trips Foreign tourists on Russian icebreaker

Russia

1993 3 round-trip voyages Arkhangel’sk – Yana River Foreign tankers with Russian cargo

Finland

1993 SA-15 New Westminster, BC – Novvy Port Russian ship with foreign cargo

Russia

1993 SA-15 Hamina, Finland – Japan Russian ship with foreign cargo

Russia

1993 Yamal 3 North Pole trips Foreign tourists on Russian icebreaker

Russia

1994 Yamal and North Pole trip Foreign tourists on Russian icebreaker

Kapitan Dranitsyn

Russia

1994 Yamal 2 North Pole trips Foreign tourists on Russian icebreaker

Russia

there is little international experience to draw upon.

Further, the economic, social, and political instability in Russia makes the future uncertain: past

experience does not necessarily reflect the future.

There are reports that the fees are highly negotiable and depend more on the type of cargo than

on actual cost of services (Armstrong 1989).

Armstrong (1990) reported complaints of flat

rate charges for icebreaking services without regard to the amount of work done. He has reported

more recently on wage and labor disputes (1990,

1991, 1992b) and difficulties in arranging resupply

voyages due to lack of operating funds and “enormous” insurance rates (1993).

There does not appear to be an established protocol at this time. Arrangements between foreign

parties and the Russian shipping companies (MSC

and FESCO) are negotiated on a case-by-case basis. ANSR officials, when questioned at the 1992

Northern Sea Route Expert Meeting, replied that

53
the transit tariffs were open to negotiation, depending on the specific shipping task, and would

compare favorably with alternative canal routes

and transport by rail. Although there are problems to be overcome, and the costs appear to be in

a state of flux, Administration officials were clearly

open to and inviting of cooperative discussion.

That being the case, it might be useful for potential NSR users to obtain information from other

foreign parties that have already used the route

(refer to Table 15). The annual summaries of NSR

activities that are published in Polar Record by

Terence Armstrong following each shipping season are another source of information. These usually include reports of foreign involvement.

Proposed Russian fee structure

Some economic information can be found in

Wergeland (1991), who was relied on for the following. Prices are in U.S. dollars as of July 1991.

The guiding principles used by MSC and FESCO

in determining fees for their services are that:

• Rates should not be lower than the actual

cost of services rendered;

• Rates should be low enough that an economic advantage is maintained over the alternative canal routes.

That said, “icebreaker fees,” more specifically,

depend on the vessel’s displacement (size), its ice

classification, the route chosen, and the level of

escort or support required. In addition to

icebreaking, this fee includes guiding by reconnaissance aircraft, hydrographic and meteorological services, and the use of communication systems. To arrive at a specific rate, a three-step process

is used. First, the basis fee is determined for the

size of the ship. This fee is derived from the rate

set for guiding a cargo ship having the highest ice

classification (ULA) through the NSR. Table 16

shows the sliding scale that is used to determine

the basis fee: the larger the ship, the lower the perton tariff.

Second, the NSR has been divided into three

different tariff regions based on their historically

known difficulty of transit:

• Region A, from Novaya Zemlya to Severnaya Zemlya (60°E to 90°E);

• Region B, from Severnaya Zemlya to the

Bering Strait (90°E to 169°W);

• Region C, which includes all areas north of

the 78°N parallel.

The tariff for Region A is set at 70% of Region C,

and for B it is 80% of Region C. The tariff for

Region C (from Table 16) is assessed for any fulltransit voyage or one that traverses two or more of

these regions.

Third, ships of lesser ice classification are required to pay the following relatively higher surcharges: UL = 20% more, L = 44%, and B/kl = 73%.

Wergeland calculated the icebreaker fee for an Lclass vessel of 15,000 displacement tons sailing in

Region B at $66,000 (that is, 15,000 tons × $3.82/

ton × 0.8 × 1.44). The transit tariff for a foreign

icebreaker, on the other hand, is 33% less than that

for the ULA-class vessel.

Fees for compulsory piloting are assessed separately. The pilot fee is for having a Russian ice

pilot onboard during operations in ice. It is $1.01

per nautical mile, based on the ship’s “tariff distance” or shortest recommended route. The cost to

transport the pilot out to the ship is also assessed.

Wergeland listed the following additional cost elements that might be encountered during the voyage, citing a regulatory manual entitled Port Dues

and Charges for Commercial Soviet Seaports (the prices

are as of the manual’s 1988 effective date):

• Route recommendation based on meteorological and ice forecasts where, for example,

a one-day forecast is $90 and a three-day

forecast is $231;

• Communication services billed at the rate

of $2.20 per minute for telex and $4.50 per

minute for telephone;

• Salary for a Russian helmsman at $33.33

per day if the vessel doesn’t have one qualified for ice navigation;

Table 16. Icebreaker basis fees

for escorting vessels through the

NSR (from Wergeland 1991).

Total displacement

 (tons) Basis fee

From To (US$/ton)

100 1,000 15.20

1,001 2,000 9.16

2,001 5,000 5.51

5,001 8,000 4.73

8,001 11,000 4.21

11,001 14,000 3.98

14,001 17,000 3.82

17,001 20,000 3.72

20,001 23,000 3.64

23,001 27,000 3.56

27,001 30,000 3.26

54
• Maps, guidebooks, tide tables, signals book,

and such can total $700 to $900 for the route;

• Special vessel steerage can be required by

local authorities in various ports of call for

safety considerations; unstated local rates

probably apply;

• Bunker-filling fee is $6.30 per ton, and the

bunker itself is priced at “world market

rates”;

• Supply of fresh water en route ranges between $0.99 and $11.69 per ton, depending

on location and its quality.

The fees used for analysis in Wergeland (1993b)

are the same as those listed above, indicating that

no new figures have been supplied to INSROP by

FESCO and MSC since 1991.

Marine insurance

Marine insurance is a significant issue for shipping along the NSR. The insurance premium protecting the shipowner is another cost factor to be

considered to determine whether a shipment can

be accomplished profitably. There are three different components of a marine insurance policy: 1)

hull, machinery, and equipment coverage on the

vessel itself, 2) protection and indemnity insurance to cover damages caused to others by the

vessel or its operator, and 3) damage coverage for

the cargo. Because there have been few voyages in

that area, there is presently no statistically based

assessment of the risk involved. Until there is, insurers will no doubt be conservative and charge

rates that reflect a higher than actual degree of

risk. Regardless of the risk, the premiums will be

custom tailored to the particular situation based

on the following factors:

• The gross tonnage of the vessel

• The insured value

• The level of deductible damages

• Time of season and expected environmental conditions

• The client’s past relationship with the insurer

• The competition between rival insurers.

This is a complex issue that is outside our sphere

of expertise, so we will not attempt to be more

specific on these costs. Instead we refer the interested reader to Torrens (1994) and Arpiainen (1994),

two publications that contain very recent insurance information specific to the Northern Sea

Route.

PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Social, economic, and political

Social, economic, and political instability are the

fundamental obstacles to developing the NSR

(Franzen 1993, Granberg 1993a,b). When Boris

Yeltsin assumed the Russian presidency in 1991,

he inherited an economy on the verge of widespread collapse. The shortage of basic goods led to

social and political unrest that in turn produced

further chaos in the supply system. Drastic emergency reforms were instituted in 1992 to stem the

tide, but during the three previous years, virtually

every economic indicator was showing the strain.

In 1991 alone, the Russian gross national product

dropped 17% and retail prices increased by 189%.

Although salaries increased by 80% in response to

inflation, purchasing power fell an estimated twoto threefold. The government’s response to the

crisis has been to print more rubles, fueling inflation. Granberg cites many examples of economic

distress that may adversely affect NSR operations.

The Russians declare that the Northern Sea

Route is now open and the obstacles of the past

are disappearing. Actual experience appears to indicate otherwise. Total cargo figures, which

showed a steady annual increase to about 6,600,000

tons in 1987, dropped to 4,900,000 tons in 1991

(Granberg 1992). The fact that both traffic and tonnage along the route have dramatically decreased

since 1990 in the face of shortages testifies to the

current problems with moving freight in that area

of the world. Reports of protests and labor strikes,

stemming from poor wages and living conditions,

are common. With producer privatization measures, the government is attempting to introduce

profit incentives for its citizens. However, eliminating the old way of doing business has severely

disrupted the producers’ industry-to-industry

connections and their ability to bring goods to

market. It will take time to re-establish these networks (Arikaynen 1991).

In addition to the overall national problems,

Arikaynen discusses numerous problems between

the administrative and operations entities in carrying out the Arctic maritime transportation plan.

While MSC and FESCO perform all icebreaking

tasks and move most of the cargo, they do not

appear to be working together to achieve an overall cargo transport plan. Together, they effectively

make up the complete operations arm for the plan,

and yet they have been forced to pursue their own

respective economic interests due to reduced subsidies from Moscow.

55
The most pressing and difficult problem to address may be the lack of incentive to deliver freight

in the most efficient and economical manner. Inefficiencies plague virtually all aspects of the system. Labor discontent is reported aboard icebreakers and cargo ships (Armstrong 1990, 1991, 1992b).

Several experts contacted for this study speculated

that the shipping companies have an endemic preference for dealing with large bureaucratic entities,

giving low priority to small business transactions

where the profit potential for each is less. This

may be a cultural artifact stemming from decades

of state-mandated controls over the distribution

of goods and services.

Negative social and ecological effects from uncontrolled Arctic development have been identified as a potential risk. The Arctic regions form a

delicate ecosystem that recovers very slowly after

change is introduced. Arikaynen (1991), Young and

Osherenko (1991), Roginko (1991, 1993), Stokke

(1992), Hansson (1992, 1993), and Osherenko

(1993), for example, advocate international vigilance and strong cooperative agreement for environmental protection. Indeed, one of the four main

focuses of INSROP is to inventory the indigenous

human, animal, and plant populations of the Arctic to create a baseline for assessing the impacts of

development (Brekke and Fjeld 1991). Though several authors point out that environmental protection has not been emphasized in the Soviet past

(for example, Hansson 1993, Osherenko 1993,

Hume 1984), there appears today to be a shared

international awareness and concern, which these

authors and others hope will translate into adequate safeguards.

Another related problem is the difficulty of finding return cargo, which can lead to slow turnaround for ships or costly return voyages without

cargo (Wergeland 1992, Armstrong 1993). This

problem should diminish with increased import–

export activity along the route. Greater international effort to promote awareness of the route,

more demonstration voyages, and gradual elimination of the unknowns will help to expand the

NSR cargo base.

Infrastructural

The language barrier may be of some concern

to potential users of the NSR, but our experience

in contacting various Russian agencies and businesses for this project did not reveal any serious

communication problems, once we were able to

establish contact. The ANSR, the shipping companies, and almost all other agencies we contacted

had a staff member nearby who understood and

spoke English.

On the other hand, Russia’s telecommunications

equipment is outdated and often unreliable

(Franzen 1993). Telephone lines into Russia are

overloaded and very often busy. The quality of the

connection is sometimes poor, which can be detrimental for facsimile transmission. There were no

apparent difficulties in our receiving telefaxes, but

we experienced much difficulty in trying to send

fax messages to Russia.

Franzen (1993) presents a recent evaluation of

the communications systems servicing Russia and

several alternatives to avoid the unreliable telephone and telefax systems. Due to these problems,

many Russian businesses are setting up subsidiaries in neighboring European and Scandinavian

countries to take advantage of modern and/or

more reliable communications technology to the

outside world. We learned from more than one

knowledgeable U.S. source that fax machines in

Russia are often shut off after business hours, which

is a problem (though easily remedied) for potential clients half a world away. Many Russian businesses limit incoming faxes to a single page to

conserve paper. The unwary sender, in the habit of

preceding his message with a cover page, would

thus not be in communication.

Electronic mail is in the early stages of development in Russia. Although AARI is connected to

the Internet, no other agencies or companies we

contacted were. Franzen (1993) reports that although e-mail allows electronic communication via

modem from a desktop computer to any telex terminal worldwide, error correction software is required to help ensure clear messages.

Although the infrastructure is already in place

to fully support NSR traffic during the summer

season, it has been suggested (Wergeland 1991,

Østreng 1991) that it will be difficult to attract

greater foreign interest unless the navigation season can be extended. The additional investment

for building ice-class ships is considerable. These

ships are not ideal for use in other parts of the

world when the Arctic passage is closed for the

winter, and they are less efficient and more costly

to run in open water than conventional vessels.

An ice-strengthened vessel costs 15 to 20% more

to build, according to Wergeland (1993b). To offset

the greater construction, operating, and maintenance costs, shipowners rely on the ships providing year-round service. Since depth limitations in

some straits prevent passage of ships greater than

20,000 dwt, the shallow-draft fleet of the Northern

56
Sea Route may not be desirable for use where larger

ships can move cargo more efficiently. More northerly route options would enable larger and perhaps more efficient ship passage but would also

require greater icebreaking capabilities than are

currently available. As recently as 1988, there was

discussion that the Soviets were considering the

construction of a new 150,000-shp icebreaker,

which was seen as a necessary step for expanding

NSR shipping through the winter (Østreng 1992).

Although those plans have been deemed premature in light of current cargo volume, costs, and

revenue possibilities, we are left to wonder which

must first occur—improvements in icebreaking

capacity that will allow more economical cargo

transportation, or the development of markets for

trade goods that will spur technological advance.

It is likely that advances on both fronts must

occur simultaneously to effect real progress. Import and export industries depend heavily on reliable, year-round transportation of goods. Few businesses can afford the limitation of a seasonal supply

of raw materials or seasonal distribution of their

finished products. Attracting year-round trade will

encourage the establishment of alternative transportation modes for the off-season, such as overland rail or air freight service. These will introduce another source of competitive pressure on

marine shipping that is perceived as negative.

According to Makinen (1993), average ship

speeds along the Northern Sea Route need to be

increased from 6–13 to 10–15 knots to make the

route more competitive with the alternative canal

routes. Wergeland’s economic analysis shows that

the NSR advantage in transit time diminishes to

only two days by assuming an average transit

speed of 12 knots vs. the 21-knot speed possible

on the canal routes. When other costs associated

with the NSR are then considered (greater insurance and political risk, higher maintenance and

operating costs, smaller vessel capacity), the NSR

advantage disappears. It isn’t likely that ship

speeds will be substantially increased in the near

future. The NSR’s economic advantage in the near

term may perhaps only be realized by Russia offering attractive rates for chartering and services

to bring the overall cost down.

Use of the Northern Sea Route will also depend

on wider availability of emergency services. Personal safety demands greater access to rescue and

medical services, whereas equipment emergencies

might include ship repairs, refueling sites, and

pollution abatement response. At the present time,

the MOHQs and icebreaker escorts must be relied

upon for these emergency services. Only the port

of Igarka is now open as a stopover for foreign

ships. Other ports slated to be opened are Dudinka,

Dikson, Tiksi, and Pevek. Another advantage to

opening more ports would be the stimulation of

spinoff support services that could bring additional

foreign revenue into the northern economy, from

tourism and lodging facilities, for example

(Brigham 1993).

The ability to respond to an environmental disaster at sea in this harsh and remote region is of

concern to the northern populations of Russia as

well as to the international community. The need

for a coordination center and establishment of standard emergency procedures is widely acknowledged (for example, Roginko 1993, Sandkvist 1993).

A funding source to achieve these goals is needed

but is not immediately apparent. Until more experience is gained and more facilities become established, NSR shipping will continue to be perceived

as riskier than the traditional canal routes.

Other needed improvements to navigation are

• Better communication between ships and

MOHQs (Mikhailichenko and Ushakov

1993);

• Better ice-imaging tools (Østreng 1991);

• Modern hardware for positioning and communication;

• Dredging of ports (Brigham 1993).

The hardware that allows for global communications from virtually any Arctic location is already in place, although better coordination in the

use of that hardware may be needed. The technology to receive ice data from satellite-based sensors

that do not require clear sky or daylight would

enable the Russian experts to substantially improve

their forecasting and ship-routing capabilities.

CONCLUSIONS

Our study of the history and current conditions

related to international use of the Northern Sea

Route brings us to the following general conclusions:

• The Northern Sea Route is a substantially

shorter passage for shipping between northern European ports and those of the Far

East and Alaska than routes through the

Suez and Panama Canals. Comparisons

show a 35 to 60% savings in distance.

57
• The Russians have a highly developed maritime infrastructure along the Northern Sea

Route and specialized ice navigation experience that spans many decades. Their Arctic marine system has been used primarily

to develop Russia’s northern regions, extract raw materials, and resupply their

coastal settlements. They have a fleet of the

world’s most powerful icebreaking ships

and specialized, ice-strengthened ships for

moving most types of cargo. Their cargo

ships are small, however, relative to ships

plying the canal routes.

• Overall responsibility for shipping activities on the route currently resides with the

Administration of the Northern Sea Route

(ANSR) in Moscow. Actual sea operations

are directly controlled by two marine operations headquarters: the Murmansk Shipping Company (MSC) operates the icebreakers and controls shipping through the

western half of the route, and the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESCO) controls

the eastern half.

• A western segment of the route, from

Murmansk to Dudinka, has been open yearround since 1980. The remainder is normally

kept open for both transit and local freighting from the beginning of July through October. For the Northern Sea Route to be more

attractive as an international trade route,

the length of the shipping season will have

to be extended, if the route is not actually

kept open year-round. Average transit

speeds need to be increased as well. While

the former requirement can be immediately

addressed, at least partially, by enlisting the

underutilized icebreaking and transport capacity of the Russian fleet, the latter will

likely require better ice forecasting tools and

advances in ship technology.

• There is currently much international interest and momentum toward expanded shipping development. Since 1987, when the Soviet Union’s new spirit of openness and

international cooperation was announced,

much has been made of the possible use of

the Northern Sea Route as a major marine

trade corridor. Several international organizations and regional government bodies

have endorsed the idea, formulated agenda, and begun promotional activities.

• The USSR’s dissolution into the Commonwealth of Independent States was accompanied by social and economic hardship.

Shortages, inflation, and unemployment

have extended even to the Arctic fleet and

the maritime trade setting. Now, more than

at any other time in history, Russia is open

to discussion of the many ways to employ

their marine infrastructure to raise muchneeded foreign capital, such as providing

icebreaker support for foreign ships, leasing Russian cargo ships to transport foreign goods over the NSR and elsewhere,

joint venturing with foreign companies in

Russian marine trade, leasing out idle Russian icebreakers in the U.S. and Canadian

Arctic, and Arctic tourism.

• Social instability may be the greatest impediment to the development of the Northern Sea Route. Labor discontent, currency

devaluation, cutbacks in personnel and services, and the inability to maintain the fleet

and navigation equipment are all problems

that directly affect future development.

Communication between foreign parties,

the NSR Administration, and the shipping

companies is made difficult by outdated

equipment. The result is a climate of uncertainty for potential users of the route, which,

accordingly, diminishes foreign interest. The

Murmansk Shipping Company and the Far

Eastern Shipping Company must be willing to offer rate guarantees so that the

Northern Sea Route maintains an economic

advantage over other route and transit options. Finally, the NSR Administration and

the shipping companies need to be more

reliable and responsive to inquiries from

potential foreign clients.

The technological advances necessary to enable

year-round traffic along the Northern Sea Route

will occur more rapidly if the international community perceives a need for them. This would help

to promote the growth of the Russian economy

and encourage a cooperative and constructive posture for that nation, both domestically and internationally.

There is a large degree of skepticism as to

whether the Russians can sufficiently reorganize

their operations and develop a credible continuity

to the extent that foreign shippers will have faith

in the system. At this time, there is considerable

perceived risk. To increase credibility, more success stories will be required. As more successes

are reported, greater interest is sure to follow, and

58
the need for technological advance will be recognized.

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Peters, H.J. (1993) Russia’s waterborne trade and

transport: Issues in market transformation. Maritime Policy Management, 20(4), 265–292.

Proshutinsky, A., T. Proshutinsky, and T.

Weingartner (1995) Northern Sea Route reconnaissance report: Climatology of environmental conditions affecting commercial navigation along the

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Roginko, A.Y. (1991) Environmental protection in

the Soviet Arctic seas. In The Soviet Maritime Arctic

(L.W. Brigham, Ed.). Woods Hole Oceanographic

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Roginko, A.Y. (1993) The Northern Sea Route: Protection of marine environment in the context of

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Moscow, Russian State Ministry of Transport, Head

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the Northern Sea Route (in Russian). Moscow:

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258–283.

62
APPENDIX A: CARGO SHIP AND ICEBREAKER

CLASSIFICATION EQUIVALENCIES

(FROM TORRENS 1994)

Cargo ship classes:

Ice class

Organization Class symbol High Medium Low

Det norske Veritas (post-1971) 1A1 1A* 1A 1B 1C

Finnish/Swedish rules (toll

classes as per 1985) IA Super IA IB IC II

American Bureau of Shipping

(post-1971) A1 (E) IAA IA IB IC

Bureau Veritas (pre-1971) I 3/3 E I-Super I II III

Bureau Veritas (post-1971) I 3/3 E IA-Super IA IB IC

Bulgarian Register of Shipping KM ULA, UA L1 L2 L3 L4

DDR Schiffs-Rev. und Klassif. DSRK KM Eis Arktis, Eis 1 Eis 2 Eis 3 Eis 4

Eis Super

Germanischer Lloyd 100 A4 E4 E3 E2 E1

Lloyd’s Register of Shipping

(post-1971) 100 A1 1AS 1A 1B 1C 1D

Polski Register Statkow KM L1A, UL L1 L2 L3 L4

Nippon Kaiji Kyokai NS IA Super IA IB IC

Register of Shipping

People’s Republic of China ZCA B1* B1 B2 B3

Register of Shipping of the USSR* KM ULA, UL L1 L2 L3 L4

Registro Italiano Navale 100A-1.1 RG 1* RG 1 RG 2 RG 3

Registrul Naval Roman RNR+M CM G 60, G40 G 30 G 20 G10

O G 50

Canadian ASPPR rules/zones A B C D E

Icebreaker classes:

Ice class

Organization High Low

Register of Shipping of the USSR LL1 LL2 LL3 LL4

Det norske Veritas

(includes “Sealer” class) Polar-30 Polar-20 Polar-10 Ice-10 Ice-05

Ice-15

Lloyd’s Register of Shipping AC3 AC2 AAC1.5 AC1

Canadian ASPPR rules/zones Classes not available.

*For Russian classes: L = ice; U = reinforced, A = Arctic.

63
APPENDIX B: TRANSLATED TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR THE NSR SAILING GUIDE

ENTITLED GUIDE TO NAVIGATION THROUGH THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE,

SCHEDULED FOR RELEASE IN 1995

GENERAL INFORMATION

Notes and abbreviations 1–13

Navigation–geographical review 14

Hydrometeorological review 24

Rules of navigation 109

Rules of navigation on the seaways of the Northern Sea Route 109

Rules of icebreaker-assisted pilotage of vessels through the Northern Sea Route 113

NAVIGATIONAL INFORMATION

Chapter 1. Kara Sea 123

The Strait of Yugorskyy Shar, eastern coast of the island of 126

Vaygach, and Karskiye Vorota strait

Novaya Zemlya islands 140

From Yugorskyy Shar Strait to Dikson Island 143

From Dikson Island to the Nordensheld archipelago 156

Nordensheld archipelago 175

Islands of the open part of the Kara Sea 197

The strait of Vilkitsky and approaches from the west 208

Recommendations for sailing along the main recommended routes 223

Chapter 2. Laptev Sea 238

From the strait of Vilkitsky to Anabarsky Bay 243

From Anabarsky Bay to the mouth of the river Lena 256

From the mouth of the river Lena to the Novosibirskiye (New Siberian) Islands 263

Western coasts of the Novosibirskiye Islands 268

Recommendations for sailing along the main recommended routes 275

Chapter 3. East Siberian Sea 278

Novosibirskiye islands and straits dividing them 281

From the Novosibirskiye islands to the river Kolyma 298

From the river Kolyma to Cape Yakan 305

Recommendations for sailing along the main recommended routes 314

Chapter 4. Chukchi Sea and approaches to the Bering Strait 325

Wrangel and Gerald Islands 327

From Cape Yakan to Cape Dezhnev 336

Recommendations for sailing along the main recommended routes 357

Chapter 5. Aids to navigation/Radio aids to navigation 367

Lights 367

Shore-based radio-navigational systems 432

Marine radio beacons 438

Racons 456

Pictures showing aids to navigation 464

REFERENCE SECTION

Icebreaker-assisted sailing 465

Autonomous sailing of a ship through the ice 546

Support in case of emergency 581

Requirements for ships and their equipment 584

Correlation table—classification of ice strengthening 598

Register of Shipping of Russian Federation versus other registers

Lights’ characteristics 599

Table of the horizon distance 600

Objects’ visibility range nomogram 601

Nomogram of luminous (meteorological) range of lights 602

Morse code 603

Alphabetic index 603

Comments on the correction 604

64
65

APPENDIX C: SELECTED SEA-ICE DATA AND SEVERITY INDEX FOR

THE NORTH COAST OF ALASKA, 1953–1993 (FROM USN/NOAA NIC 1994)

Rank Year nm nm nm nm Date Date Days Days Meters Outlook

1 1958 50 150 50 210 07/19 10/25 92 99+ 285 fav

2 1968 25 165 30 200 07/19 10/18 86 91 275 fav

3 1993 0 130 5 185 07/18 11/07 64 112 358 unfav

4 1962 25 150 30 150 07/19 09/30 49+ 68+ 265 fav

5 1973 5 80 5 190 07/31 10/20 73 82 280 fav

6 1954 20 115 20 210 08/01 09/30 38+ 61+ 285 fav

7 1963 5 130 5 130 08/13 10/18 67 67 300 unfav

8 1960 0 90 40 90 07/23 10/12 75 105 289 fav

9 1961 15 105 15 135 07/25 09/24 49+ 62+ 255 fav

10 1979 0 125 0 125 08/04 10/08 31 56 309 unfav

11 1989 10 70 55 110 07/19 10/22 34 95 296 unfav

12 1974 10 100 10 100 08/06 10/05 35 61 255 fav

13 1978 5 70 30 95 07/25 10/09 35 76 231 fav

14 1986 10 80 10 110 07/29 10/21 30 58 298 unfav

15 1977 5 55 25 85 08/02 10/15 63 74 251 fav

16 1959 20 65 20 65 07/19 10/06 42 86 250 fav

17 1982 0 85 0 95 08/03 10/10 21 69 268 fav

18 1972 0 60 30 90 07/31 10/01 45 63 270 fav

19 1957 5 45 70 60 08/01 10/06 18 67 255 fav

20 1987 0 10 0 85 08/05 10/30 35 59 287 fav

21 1981 0 0 35 100 07/26 10/01 0 66+ 221 fav

22 1985 0 35 0 55 08/01 10/15 22 52 301 unfav

23 1967 15 0 30 50 07/25 10/12 Unk 68 275 fav

24 1984 0 25 0 50 08/11 10/15 21 42 309 unfav

25 1966 5 0 5 45 08/01 10/22 24 65 375 unfav

26 1992 15 0 15 75 08/09 09/19 24 37 297 unfav

27 1965 0 10 0 70+ 08/25 09/25 25 32 300 unfav

28 1980 15 25 15 25 08/05 09/30 11 42 359 unfav

29 1953 0 0 5 35 07/27 09/16 5 52+ 330 unfav

30 1976 0 15 0 15 08/15 10/07 21 53 307 unfav

31 1971 0 0 0 30 08/23 11/01 8 71 295 unfav

32 1991 0 0 0 20 08/16 10/02 0 46 304 unfav

33 1960 0 0 20+ 20 08/05 09/07 0 34 290 unfav

34 1988 0 0 0 25 08/09 09/20 0 32 236 fav

35 1983 0 10 0 10 08/08 09/16 0 21 277 fav

36 1964 0005 08/13 09/20 0 39 310 unfav

37 1970 0050 08/06 09/14 0 32 295 unfav

38 1956 0 0 0 40 09/07 09/30 0 24 300 unfav

39 1969 0 0 0 30 09/07 09/18 5 12 240 fav

40 1955 0 0 5 15 09/13 09/24 0 12 310 unfav

41 1975 5050 Never Never 0 0 290 unfav

NOTES:

Column 3—Distance from Point Barrow northward to ice edge (10 Aug)

Column 4—Distance from Point Barrow northward to ice edge (15 Sep)

Column 5—Distance from Point Barrow northward to boundary of five tenths ice concentration (10 Aug)

Column 6—Distance from Point Barrow northward to boundary of five tenths ice concentration (15 Sep)

Column 7—Initial date entire sea route to Prudhoe Bay less than/equal to five tenths ice concentration

Column 8—Date that combined ice concentration and thickness dictate end of prudent navigation

Column 9—Number of days entire sea route to Prudhoe Bay ice free

Column 10—Number of days entire sea route to Prudhoe Bay less than/equal to five tenths ice concentration

Column 11—Primary indicator of ice season severity...sum of values for 1000 mb heights at point A (52°N/100°E) and point B (70°N/140°E).

Column 12—Value in column 11 indicating favorable/unfavorable summer ice conditions (<290 m = favorable; >290 m = unfavorable).
APPENDIX D: DECLASSIFIED, GENERAL-DISTRIBUTION

RUSSIAN HYDROGRAPHIC CHARTS FOR THE NSR, AS OF NOVEMBER 1993

Areal coverage

Map Map name Revision Scale

no. (translated) date (1:_____) Latitude Longitude*

600 Arctic Ocean; Barents Sea–Cape Nordkap to Cape Kanin 1990 750,000 72°20′ 25°50′

Nos 68°00′ 43°30′

603 Barents Sea–Murmansk Shore, Pechenega Bay to 1990 200,000 70°16′ 31°20′

Gavrilovskie Islands 69°05′ 36°00′

617 Barents Sea; Southeastern Part–Kolokolkovaya Bay 1984 200,000 69°21′ 52°08′

to Cape Cheornaya Lopatka with Pecheorekaya Bay 68°07′ 56°45′

620 Barents Sea; Murmansk Shore; Kola Peninsula 1984 50,000 69°24′24′′ 32°57′00′′

68°55′06′′ 33°47′30′′

624 Barents Sea; Kola Peninsula; Murmansk Harbor 1990 25,000 69°04′12′′ 32°54′00′′

68°55′06′′ 33°10′00′′

650 Arctic Ocean; Barents Sea–Cape Orlov-Terskiy Tolstyi 1986 750,000 71°22′ 41°18′

to Karskiye Vorota Strait 66°48′ 59°06′

695 Arctic Ocean, Barents and Kara Seas–Approaches to 1990 250,000 71°13′ 54°20′

Karskiye Vorota and Yugorskiye Shar Straits 69°20′ 62°30′

696 Barents and Kara Seas–Novaya Zemlya 1986 1,000,000 77°56′ 48°00′

69°00′ 72°00′

697† Arctic Ocean; Kara Sea–Novaya Zemlya to Dikson Island 1991 700,000 77°30′ 56°00′

72°50′ 81°00′

698 Kara Sea; Yenisey Bay–Golchina River to Dikson Harbor 1989 200,000 73°35′ 78°31′

71°41′ 83°40′

with expanded region: Moscow and Kristovskiy Straits 50,000 72°28′00′′ 80°40′00′′

72°17′00′′ 81°10′30′′

940 Yenisey River–Igarka Harbor 1980 25,000 not shown not shown

945i Kara Sea; Yenisey River–Cape Sopochnaya Karga to 1991 100,000 72°07′ 82°03′

Cape Dorofeyevskiye 71°22′ 83°50′

945ii Yenisey River–Cape Dorofeyevskiye to 1984 100,000 71°27′ 82°00′

Baykalovo Village 70°40′ 83°45′

945iii Yenisey River–Baykalovo Village to Bolshoy Island 1986 100,000 70°46′ 82°15′

69°57′ 84°00′

with expanded region: Turushinskiy Shoal 25,000 70°40′12′′ 83°24′00′′

70°33′42′′ 83°32′18′′

945iv Yenisey River–Bolshoy Island to Tochino Village 1985 100,000 70°02′ 82°50′

69°25′ 85°15′

with expanded region: Navigating channel to the 25,000 69°57′00′′ 83°25′00′′

69°53′00′′ 83°35′00′′

945v Yenisey River–Tochino Village to Nikolskoye Village 1984 100,000 69°51′ 84°40′

69°00′ 86°25′

945vi Yenisey River–Nikolskoye Village to Port Igarka 1990 100,000 69°05′ 85°49′

(North-ern part) 68°12′ 87°02′

(Southern part) 100,000 68°12′ 86°12′

67°21′ 86°42′

with expanded region: Lipatnikovsky Shoal 25,000 68°33′48′′ 86°17′00′′

68°25′54′′ 87°02′00′′

947 Arctic Ocean–Southern part of Barents Sea 1990 2,000,000 77°00′ 10°00′

66°15′ 59°00′

948 Kara Sea–Dikson Harbor to Russkiy Island 1991 700,000 78°52′ 80°00′

73°30′ 96°20′

949 Kara and Laptev Seas–Russkiy Island to Petra Island 1991 700,000 79°26′ 95°40′

75°52′ 118°20′

950 Kara Sea–Vil’kitskogo Strait 1991 200,000 78°18′ 98°10′

77°17′ 104°32′

951 Laptev Sea–Ahabaskogo Strait to Buor-Haya Bay 1991 700,000 76°50′ 113°44′

70°40′ 130°50′

952 Laptev and East Siberian Seas–Buor-Haya Bay to 1991 700,000 75°30′ 129°50′

Indigirka River delta 70°40′ 152°30′

66
Areal coverage

Map Map name Revision Scale

no. (translated) date (1:_____) Latitude Longitude*

953 East Siberian Sea–Novosibirskiye Islands, Sannikova and 1991 500,000 75°00′ 138°50′

Dmitriya Lapteva Straits 72°16′ 152°05′

954 East Siberian Sea–Indigirka River delta to Shalaupova 1991 700,000 74°29′ 150°50′

Island 69°20′ 173°30′

955 East Siberian and Chukchi Seas–Schapovalov Island to 1991 700,000 72°30′ 172°00′

Cape Golovin 66°50′ W165°20′

1085 Pacific Ocean–Northern part of Bering Strait 1978 2,000,000 67°38′ 170°15′

58°45′ W163°00′

1088 Bering Sea; Chukotskiy Peninsula–Cape Yakun to 1978 250,000 64°36′ W174°15′

Cape Mertensa with St. Lawrence Island 63°18′ W170°15′

1089 Bering Sea; Chukotskiy Peninsula–Provideniya Harbor 1979 50,000 64°35′00′′ W173°39′21′′

64°14′10′′ W173°03′51′′

1096 Bering Sea, northern part; Bering Strait 1979 250,000 66°10′ W171°30′

64°56′ W167°30′

12330† Kara Sea–Ringnes Island to Gavrilova Island 1993 200,000 76°42′ 86°42′

75°35′ 93°06′

12332† Kara Sea; Taymyr Peninsula–Knipovicha Bay to 1993 200,000 77°30′ 97°34′

Cape Poluostrovnoy 76°02′ 108°18′

13005 Barents Sea–Murmansk Shore, Kildin Island to Voroni 1993 100,000 69°56′ 34°08′

Luki Islands 69°07′ 35°51′

13028 Barents Sea, Southeastern part–Cape Medynski Zavorot to 1993 100,000 69°32′ 58°42′

Cape Chayka with Dolgiy Island 68°56′ 61°01′

13317 Kara Sea; Yugor Peninsula–Mestnyi Island to Svyaschenyi 1993 100,000 70°13′ 61°04′

Znak Schpindlera 69°38′ 63°25′

15352 River Yenisey; Channel Golovin–Approaches to Nosok 1993 25,000 70°15′12′′ 82°20′00′′

Village 70°06′00′′ 83°50′00′′

18389 River Yenisey–Fairway to the south from Bolshoy Island 1993 10,000 69°57′40′′ 83°24′45′′

69°52′40′′ 83°35′24′′

* All latitudes are east of the prime meridian through Greenwich, England, unless otherwise listed.

† Map has both Russian and English labeling.

67
APPENDIX E: A CONTENTS OF A

COMPUTERIZED RUSSIAN SEAPORTS DATABASE

A computerized database, entitled Commercial Sea Ports of the CIS and Baltic States, and River

Ports of Russia is commercially available from the Central Marine Research and Design Institute

(CNIIMF) in St Petersburg, Russia. It is compatible with an IBM PC/AT and requires 2.1 MB of hard

disk. The database is currently available only in Russian; however, it could be translated for the foreign

market if there is sufficient interest. Developed and periodically updated by CNIIMF, it currently

contains detailed information on 67 commercial seaports and 125 river ports. The user can select ports

of one, several, or all states of the CIS as well as Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia by type of cargo;

maximum item weight of cargo; limiting ships’ draft; or various wharf specifications (for example,

depth at the wharf, wharf length, and type of cargo handled). It is said to contain the following

information:

1. General information on each port:

– full mailing address, telephone, fax, and telex numbers of port administration;

– telephone numbers for port master, deputy port master, and principal subdivisions for

services;

– port location and general description;

– period of navigation;

– draft limitations;

– maximum ship length;

– maximum ship breadth;

– loading/unloading/transshipment facilities;

– number and specialization of transshipment complexes;

– cargoes handled;

– maximum weight of heavy cargo item;

– yearly cargo turnover;

– number and purpose of harbour craft;

– services available;

– ship agents;

– transportation organizations;

– port railway address (for cargo);

– plan of each port (wharfs with their numbers, main administrative buildings, etc.);

2. Port transshipment capacities:

– total number of loading wharfs (berths);

– number of loading berths for local shipping lines;

– number of passenger wharfs;

– total number of auxiliary wharfs;

– number of (auxiliary) bunkering wharfs;

– total length of berthage;

– cargo handling capacity;

3. Port storage space:

(i) total area of roofed depots, and, in particular:

– for containers;

– for bulk cargo;

– for dangerous cargo;

– for perishable cargo;

(ii) total area of open air depots, and, in particular:

– for containers and ro–ro;

– for timber;

68
– for bulk cargo;

– for perishable cargo;

4. Wharfs’ characteristics:

– name of the port;

– number of the transshipment complex (a “complex” may include a certain number of wharfs

grouped by territory, or by purpose);

– wharf number;

– wharf length;

– depth at wharf;

– purpose of wharf;

– number of the overhead travelling cranes at the waterfront/at the rear/total;

– number of the 5/6 tons overhead travelling cranes at the water front/at the rear/total;

– number of the 10/20 tons overhead travelling cranes at the water front/at the rear/total;

– number of the 16/20/32 tons overhead travelling cranes at the water front/at the rear/total;

– number of the 16/32/40 tons overhead travelling cranes at the water front/at the rear/total;

– loading units for particular types of cargo;

– area (m2) of roofed depots on the wharf;

– area (m2) of open air depots on the wharf;

– cargo handling capacity.

5. Characteristics of specialized container handling complexes:

– name of the port with container terminal;

– container terminal wharf numbers;

– year the terminal was put into service;

– typical ship for which the terminal was designed;

– frontage;

– depths at wharf;

– total area;

– size of container sorting and filling areas;

– number of 20-ft. containers stored;

– number of reloaders on a wharf;

– number of gantry rail cranes;

– number of depot reloaders;

– number of overhead truck loaders;

– number of specialized tractors;

– annual handling capacity (in thousands of containers).

69
APPENDIX F. RUSSIAN ARCTIC SEAPORTS DATA FROM

LLOYD’S OF LONDON’S PORTS OF THE WORLD (LLP 1994)

70
71
72
APPENDIX G: SEAPORTS DATA FROM

DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY’S WORLD PORT INDEX (DMA 1992a)

EXPLANATION OF DATA COLUMNS

In the data listing for each port, the letter “Y” indicates Yes and “N” No; where there is a blank, no information is available,

By tabulation and codification, specific information for each port is confined to a single line. The data is listed under the

column headings described below:

INDEX NUMBER—Each port and place listed in the text of this publication is numbered consecutively. Ports and places

can be located by referring to the alphabetical index to find the index number. The page number will not be listed. In cases where

there is an alternate and/or more familiar name, that name will have the same index number. However, only the approved

name will appear in the text.

PORTS—Ports are grouped according to country and locality, and are listed in geographic sequence as shown on the

chartlets in the fore part of the volume, following, in general, the coastal trend. The listing of ports in off-lying islands normally

interrupts the coastal listing at some convenient place abreast of the island. River ports are listed toward the head of navigation,

alternating from bank to bank, except where local considerations make other arrangements more practicable.

In general, ports are listed under the names approved by the U.S. Board on Geographic Names. Alternate or more familiar

names, however, are also included in the index, under the same index number.

LATITUDE AND LONGITUDE—The position of each port, expressed in degrees and minutes, is generally obtained from

the best-scale chart available.

SAILING DIRECTIONS—The publication number of the Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic/Topographic Center

Sailing Directions, describing the port or area in which the port is located, is normally given. For ports in other areas, however,

other publications are shown under the following abbreviations:

USCP—United States Coast Pilot, published by the National Ocean Service, NOAA, Department of Commerce, for

United States continental and territorial ports, including the Canadian Ports on the Great Lakes.

SCOR—Small Craft Guide, Ottawa River, published by the Canadian Hydrographic Service.

GLVI—Great Lakes Sailing Directions, Volume 1, published by the Canadian Hydrographic Service, covers the St.

Lawrence River from Montreal to Lake Ontario, the waters of Lake Ontario, Lake Erie, Lake St. Clair and the connecting

waterways including the Welland Canal, Detroit River and the St. Clair River.

PAC—Pilot of Arctic Canada, Volumes 1, 11 and 111, published by the Canadian Hydrographic Service, covers coasts

and adjacent sea areas of the Canadian eastern and western arctic, northward of Hudson Bay.

BA—Black Sea Pilot, published by the Hydrographic Department of the British Admiralty for ports in the Black Sea.

CHARTS—The number of the best-scale chart issued by the Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic/Topographic Center

is listed with no prefix. In some cases, foreign charts are listed when this Center does not provide coverage. These charts can

be obtained from the Hydrographic departments or services of the countries concerned or their authorized agents.

SIZE—The classification of port size is based on several applicable factors, including area, facilities, and wharf space. It is

not based on area alone or on any other single factor.

TYPE HARBOR—The term “harbor” is used for the principal water area of the port. Harbors are classified as being coastal

natural, coastal breakwater, open roadstead, etc. Typical harbor types are illustrated in the forepart of this volume.

SHELTER AFFORDED—The shelter afforded from wind, sea, and swell refers to the area where normal port operations

are conducted, usually the wharf area. Shelter afforded the anchorage area is given for ports where cargo is handled by lighters,

ENTRANCE RESTRICTIONS—Natural factors restricting the entrance of vessels, such as ice, heavy swell, etc., are listed.

OVERHEAD LIMITATIONS—This entry is shown only to indicate that bridge and overhead power cables exist. It is

advisable to refer to the chart for particulars.

DEPTHS—Depth information generalized into 5 foot units, equivalents in meters, is given for the main channel, the main

anchorage, and the principal cargo pier and/or oil terminal. Depths refer to chart datum.

Depths are given in increments of 5 feet in order to lessen the number of changes when a small change in depth occurs.

A depth of 31 feet would use letter “K”, a depth of 36 feet would use “J”, etc. The letter “K” means a least depth of 31 feet

or greater but not as great as 36 feet.

Channel (controlling)—The controlling depth of the principal or deepest channel at chart datum is given. The channel

selected should lead up to the anchorage if within the harbor or to the wharf/pier. If the channel depth decreases from the

anchorage to the wharf/pier and cargo can be worked at the anchorage, then the depth leading to the anchorage is taken.

Anchorage—The depth in the anchorage is the least depth in the best or principal anchorage. The depth listed reflects

a general depth in the anchorage rather than an isolated shoal spot. A shoal which does not necessarily obstruct the anchorage

is not considered for the least depth if the rest of the anchorage is safe and practicable.

73
Wharf/Pier—The greatest depth at chart datum alongside the respective wharf/pier is given. If there is more than one

wharf/pier, then the one which has greatest usable depth is shown.

TIDE—The mean range in feet is normally given, but the mean rise is substituted if range data is not available. It is felt that

the distinction between range and rise can be disregarded without affecting the general utility of this publication.

MAXIMUM SIZE VESSEL—”L” indicates that a ship of over 500 feet may be accommodated and “M” indicates ships less

than 500 feet.

GOOD HOLDING GROUND—This is indicated only where actual anchorage conditions have been reported.

TURNING AREA—An indication that a turning basin or other water area for vessels is available in the port.

FIRST PORT OF ENTRY—A port where a vessel may enter and clear foreign goods and personnel through Customs and

Immigration. For vessels arriving from overseas a quarantine clearance is required by the First Port of Entry.

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE—Indicates whether the United States maintains civilian/military representation in that port.

ETA (Estimated Time of Arrival) MESSAGE—Indicates whether ETA message is required for that port.

PILOTAGE—The necessity or advisability of taking a pilot is given. In some cases, pilot may be compulsory, although pilots

are not actually stationed at the port in question and must be obtained elsewhere.

TUGS—Indicates whether tugs are available for docking or anchorage assistance.

QUARANTINE—Indicates if regular quarantine procedures are required or if further details must be found in other

publications.

COMMUNICATIONS—Indicates what types of communications are available in the port and/or near-by area.

LOAD–OFF-LOAD—Refers to the area where normal port operations are conducted.

MEDICAL FACILITIES—An indication that there is some form of medical facilities in the port that will accommodate

seamen.

GARBAGE DISPOSAL—Indicates whether garbage can be disposed of at the pier or by lighters at the anchorage or mooring.

DEGAUSSING—Indicates whether degaussing facilities are available.

DIRTY BALLAST—Pertains to a port that has sufficient facilities for receiving oily and/or chemically contaminated dirty

ballast.

CRANES–LIFTS—Indicates whether there are cranes available and what type, and indicates its lifting power in tons.

SERVICES—Indicates whether normal port services are available.

SUPPLIES—The availability of provisions, water, and fuel oil is listed. Fuel oil and diesel oil are listed separately, but in cases

of original source information falling to distinguish between the two, both kinds are presumed to be available and are so listed.

REPAIRS—Repairs that can be made to oceangoing vessels are classified as follows:

A–Major—Extensive overhauling and rebuilding in well equipped shipyards.

B–Moderate—Extensive overhauling and rebuilding that does not require drydocking. Suitable drydocking facilities are

usually lacking or inadequate.

C–Limited—Small repair work in independent machine shops or foundries.

D–Emergency only.

N–None.

DRYDOCK–MARINE RAILWAY—The general size and type of the largest underwater repair facility in the port is listed.

Drydock Marine Railways

Up to 656 feet—S—Up to 200 meters Up to 200 tons—S

657 feet to 984 feet—M—201 to 300 meters 201 to 1000 tons—M

985 feet and over—L—301 meters and over Over 1000 tons—L

74
75

Arrows show the geographic sequence, and numbers abreast

selected ports indicate the numerical sequence of ports listed.

GEOGRAPHIC SEQUENCE OF PORTS WORLD PORT INDEX
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 AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

 OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT

NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)

Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

298-102

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved

OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and

maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,

including suggestion for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington,

VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

April 1996

The Northern Sea Route: Its Development and Evolving State of

Operations in the 1990s

Nathan D. Mulherin

U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory

72 Lyme Road CRREL Report 96-3

Hanover, New Hampshire 03755-1290

U.S. Army Engineer District–Alaska

P.O. Box 898

Anchorage, Alaska 99506-0898

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Available from NTIS, Springfield, Virginia 22161

Icebreakers Northern Sea Route Shipping routes 87

Arctic seas Icebreaking Russia USSR

Geography Navigation Sea commerce

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UL

The summer of 1991 marked the first time in recent history that Russia offered to escort ships of other countries

across the Northern Sea Route (NSR). For moving cargo between the North Pacific region and Northern European

ports, the NSR, along Russia’s northern coastline, is between 35 and 60% shorter than the traditionally used routes

through the Suez and Panama Canals. In addition to its shorter distance, there already exists an extensive ports

and shipping infrastructure, a current cargo base, and the potential for developing new markets in Russia and

other northern areas. These incentives are attracting considerable attention from the international shipping

community, including that portion servicing Alaskan and northwestern U.S. ports. This report is a general

compilation of the historical usage, recent trade developments, the current regulatory climate, the physical

environment, the ports and navigational infrastructure, cost factors, and practical considerations that may shape

future U.S. interests in the route.