UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

KEVIN WILLIAMS, 

 Plaintiff, CIV. NO. 14-13787 

 

 v. HON. TERRENCE G. BERG 

 

MD HELICOPTERS, INC., an 

Arizona corporation, HELICOPTER 

TECHNOLOGY CO., a California 

corporation, and HENKEL CORP., 

a Delaware corporation, 

 Defendants. 

 / 

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MD HELICOPTERS, 

AND HELICOPTER TECHNOLOGY’S MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR 

LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION (DKTS. 7 & 11) AND DENYING 

DEFENDANT HENKEL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 24) 

 This product liability case arises from the crash of a helicopter in Somerset, 

England. Plaintiff Kevin Williams (“Plaintiff”), who piloted the helicopter and 

suffered serious injuries from the crash, is a citizen of the United Kingdom, though 

he currently lives in Ohio. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants MD Helicopters, Inc. 

and Helicopter Technology, Co (the “Helicopter Defendants”) are liable for design 

defects in the helicopter’s tail rotor which, according to Plaintiff, caused the crash. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Henkel, Corp. (“Defendant Henkel”) is liable for its 

production of a cleansing product, called Alumiprep 33, that was meant to reduce 

corrosion on the tail rotor, but failed to do so, thus contributing to the crash. 

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 The Helicopter Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of 

personal jurisdiction pursuant to under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) (Dkts. 7 & 11). 

Defendant Henkel has moved for summary judgment on the grounds that, because 

Plaintiff served the summons and complaint on Henkel’s resident agent in Ohio 

(rather than serving Henkel’s resident agent in Michigan), service of process was 

defective and, in the absence of effective service, the statute of limitations has run. 

 For the reasons set forth below, the Helicopter Defendants motions to dismiss 

for lack of personal jurisdiction are GRANTED, and the Complaint against them is 

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendant Henkel’s motion for summary 

judgment is DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 On June 18, 2014, Plaintiff, a citizen of the United Kingdom, filed a 

Complaint in the Circuit Court for Oakland County, Michigan (Dkt. 1, Ex. A, 

Compl.). Defendants then timely removed the action to this Court (Dkt. 1, Notice of 

Removal). The Complaint alleges that on June 19, 2011, Plaintiff was piloting an 

MD 369E helicopter, bearing UK registration G-KSWl, when the aircraft’s tail rotor 

suddenly failed, causing the helicopter to crash near Glastonbury, Somerset, United 

Kingdom (Compl., Count I ¶¶ 4,6). Plaintiff advances claims of strict liability and 

negligence against Defendants MD Helicopters, Inc., Patriarch Partners, LLC1, 

                                                            

1 On December 17, 2014, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the Complaint against Defendant 

Patriarch Partners, LLC without prejudice (Dkt. 23). 

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Helicopter Technology Co., Aerometals, Inc.2, and Henkel Corp. (Id. at Counts IVIII). 

 Defendant Helicopter Technology, Co. is a California corporation, with its 

principal place of business in California. Defendant MD Helicopters, Inc. is an 

Arizona corporation, with its principal place of business in Arizona. The record 

before the Court indicates that the Helicopter Defendants conducted the following 

business in Michigan. As to Defendant MD Helicopters, since at least 2009 it has 

sold almost $140,000 worth of goods and services to Michigan residents or entities 

(Dkt. 35, Ex. B, MD’s Answers to Interrogatories, Nos. 9, 24); purchased products 

and services from 21 different Michigan entities (Id. no. 24); provided helicopter 

maintenance training services to the Monroe County Sheriff (Id. No. 17); and 

solicited and marketed, but apparently never consummated, the sale of a helicopter 

to the Detroit Police Department (Id. No. 16). 

 As to Defendant Helicopter Technologies, from at least 2003 to 2014 it sold 

rotor blades to Michigan residents or entities, including three sales over a fourmonth period in 2014; its sales to Michigan residents total approximately $130,000 

(Dkt. 36, Ex. C). 

Defendant Henkel apparently operates a large manufacturing facility in 

Michigan and does not contest the fact that it is subject to this Court’s personal 

jurisdiction. For its part, however, Defendant Henkel moves for summary 

                                                            

2 On November 12, 2014, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Defendant Aerometals, Inc. without 

prejudice (Dkt. 17). 

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judgment, arguing that the Michigan summons was improperly served on its 

resident agent in Ohio, and that the state summons has consequently expired and 

the statute of limitations run on Plaintiff’s claims. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 

On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(2), the plaintiff has the burden of proving the court’s jurisdiction over the 

defendant. See Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir. 

2002); see also Children’s Legal Services, PLLC v. Shor Levin and Derita, PC, 850 F. 

Supp. 2d 673, 679 (E.D. Mich. 2012). In ruling upon a motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction, the district court has three procedural alternatives: “[it] may 

determine the motion on the basis of affidavits alone; or it may permit discovery in 

aid of the motion; or it may conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the 

motion.” Serras v. First Tennessee Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 

1989). In this case, the Court permitted Plaintiff to take discovery. 

“[I]n the face of a properly supported motion for dismissal, the plaintiff may 

not stand on his pleadings but must, by affidavit or otherwise, set forth specific 

facts showing that the court has jurisdiction.” Children’s Legal Servs., 850 F. Supp. 

2d at 679 (citing Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991)). 

When, as here, the district court allows discovery on the motion, the court should 

consider the facts offered by both parties and rule according to the preponderance of 

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the evidence. See SFS Check, LLC v. First Bank of Delaware, 774 F.3d 351, 356 

(6th Cir. 2014). 

B. The Helicopter Defendants are Not Subject to the Personal 

 Jurisdiction of this Court 

In a diversity case, as here, personal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper 

only if it comports with the requirements of the state long-arm statute and federal 

constitutional due process. See Children’s Legal Servs., 850 F. Supp. 2d at 679 

(E.D. Mich. 2012); see also Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 600.711, 600.715. The Sixth 

Circuit has held that “[w]here the state long-arm statute extends to the limits of the 

due process clause, the two inquiries are merged and the court need only determine 

whether exercising personal jurisdiction violates constitutional due process.” 

Children’s Legal Servs., 850 F. Supp. 2d at 679 (quoting Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 

Still N The Water Publ’g, 327 F.3d 472, 477 (6th Cir. 2003)). “The Michigan 

Supreme Court has construed Michigan’s Long-Arm Statute to bestow the broadest 

possible grant of personal jurisdiction consistent with due process.” Audi AG and 

Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. D’Amato, 341 F. Supp. 2d 734, 741 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 

In Michigan, personal jurisdiction over corporations may be general, see Mich. 

Comp. Laws § 600.711, or specific, see Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.715. In his 

responses to the Helicopter Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Plaintiff states that he 

is not arguing that the Court has specific jurisdiction over the Helicopter 

Defendants, and argues only that the Court has general jurisdiction over the 

Helicopter Defendants (Dkts. 35 & 36, at 1 ¶¶ 1, 2). 

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General personal jurisdiction is jurisdiction for all purposes. Michigan law 

provides for general personal jurisdiction over a corporation that is (1) incorporated 

in Michigan, (2) has consented to jurisdiction in Michigan, or (3) carries on a 

“continuous and systematic part of its general business within the state.” Mich. 

Comp. Laws § 600.711. It is undisputed that the Helicopter Defendants are not 

incorporated in Michigan, nor have they not consented to the jurisdiction of this 

Court, so this Court can only exercise general personal jurisdiction over them if the 

Helicopter Defendants have been carrying on a “continuous and systematic part of 

[their] general business within the state.” Hige v. Turbonetics Holdings, Inc., 662 F. 

Supp. 2d 821, 827 (E.D. Mich. 2009). 

The question, then, is whether the business conducted by the Helicopter 

Defendants in Michigan is “continuous and systematic.” The record before the 

Court, and the relevant case law, indicates that it is not. Indeed, Plaintiff’s counsel 

conceded during oral argument that this case could not be distinguished from 

several Supreme Court decisions declining to exercise general jurisdiction over a 

foreign defendant, including Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 

U.S. 408, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984) and Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. 

Ct. 746, 751, 187 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2014). In both of those cases, the party challenging 

general personal jurisdiction conducted considerably more business in the forum 

state than the Helicopter Defendants did in Michigan, and yet the Supreme Court 

found them not to have had continuous and systematic business operations 

sufficient to support general jurisdiction. Plaintiff is unable to distinguish the 

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authority of these cases, and is bound thereby. Therefore, the Helicopter 

Defendants motions to dismiss are granted, and the Complaint against them is 

dismissed without prejudice. 

C. Defendant Henkel Was Properly Served 

Defendant Henkel filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 24) arguing 

that Plaintiff’s service of the summons and complaint on Henkel’s resident agent in 

Ohio (rather than in Michigan) was defective, and that the three-year statute of 

limitations has since run. 

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a). A fact is material only if it might affect the 

outcome of the case under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 

477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view 

the evidence, and any reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, in the light 

most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citations omitted); Redding v. St. Edward, 

241 F.3d 530, 531 (6th Cir. 2001). 

The relevant procedural history in this case is as follows. On June 18, 2014, 

Plaintiff, then in pro per, filed this lawsuit in the Oakland County Circuit Court 

(Case No. 2014-141437-NP) (Dkt. 1, Ex. A). Plaintiff did not initially obtain 

summonses when he filed his Complaint on June 18, 2014. Plaintiff’s attorney had 

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summonses issued from the state court on August 25, 2014, which expired on 

September 17, 2014 (Dkt. 24, Ex. 3). 

On September 5, 2014, Plaintiff obtained an Order extending the summonses 

to November 17, 2014 (Dkt. 1, Ex. 8). On September 9, 2014, Plaintiff served the 

Complaint on Henkel through its resident agent in Columbus, Ohio3 rather than 

serving its resident agent in East Lansing, Michigan (Dkt. 24, Ex. 4, Ohio Proof of 

Service). It does not appear that Plaintiff made any attempt to serve Defendant 

Henkel through its resident agent in East Lansing, Michigan (Dkt. 24, Ex. 5) and on 

September 19, 2014, Plaintiff filed the Ohioan return of service in the Oakland 

County Circuit Court. Defendants removed the case to this Court on October 1, 

2014, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction (Dkt. 1). The extended (Michigan State 

Court) Summons expired on November 17, 2014. 

The relevant Michigan Court Rule reads as follows: “Service of process on a 

domestic or foreign corporation may be made by (1) serving a summons and a copy 

of the complaint on an officer or the resident agent...” Mich. Ct. R. 2.105 (D). There 

is no dispute that Plaintiff served Defendant Henkel’s resident agent, he just served 

the resident agent in Columbus, Ohio as opposed to the resident agent in East 

Lansing, Michigan. Defendant Henkel’s resident agent in Ohio and Michigan are, 

incidentally, the same company – CSC Lawyers Incorporating Service. Defendant 

                                                            

3 During oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that his administrative assistant called the 

Michigan Secretary of State to inquire about the location of Defendant Henkel’s resident agent, and 

was given an address in Columbus, Ohio. Based upon this information, Plaintiff served the 

summons and complaint in Ohio. There is, however, no question that Defendant Henkel received 

actual notice of this lawsuit, and filed timely responsive pleadings, and its counsel admitted this fact 

during oral argument. 

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Henkel has not pointed to any case indicating that service of process on a 

corporation’s resident agent in another state is somehow defective. Moreover, the 

plain language of the relevant court rule contemplates service on “the resident 

agent,” not on the resident agent in the state of the suit. 

Defendant Henkel argues that other sections of the Michigan Court Rule 

provide support for its position that “resident agent” should be interpreted to mean 

only the resident agent for the State of Michigan. Specifically, Defendant Henkel 

maintains that the language of MCR 2.105(D)(4) – which allows for service by 

registered mail to “the corporation or an appropriate corporation officer and to the 

Michigan Bureau of Commercial Services” under circumstances where a company 

has failed to appoint a resident agent and has failed to file its certificate “of that 

appointment” – suggests that the term “resident agent” should mean only a 

resident agent appointed according to a certificate on file with the State of 

Michigan. 

The Court rejects this reading of the Rule for three reasons. First, neither 

party can point to any Michigan case law, and the Court can find none, supporting 

such a narrow construction of the Rule. Second, subsection (4) of MCR 2.105(D), by 

referencing the “Michigan Bureau of Commercial Services” shows that the drafters 

of the Rule knew how to limit the rule’s application explicitly to Michigan entities 

when they intended to do so. Third, it is clear that the overarching purpose of the 

service requirements of MCR 2.105(D) is to provide notice to a company that is 

being sued, not to preserve and protect the industry of Michigan-registered resident 

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agents. Defendant Henkel’s resident agent in Ohio (the same agent registered to 

receive process in Michigan) received service and Defendant Henkel had notice of 

this suit and opportunity to respond. Under these circumstances, the Court will not 

grant summary judgment to Defendant Henkel founded on a cribbed reading of 

MCR 2.105(D). 

The Court finds that service of process was proper, and Defendant Henkel’s 

motion for summary judgment is denied. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the Helicopter Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction (Dkts. 7 & 11) are GRANTED, and the 

Complaint against them is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendant 

Henkel’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 24) is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

s/Terrence G. Berg 

 TERRENCE G. BERG 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: July 28, 2015 

Certificate of Service 

I hereby certify that this Order was electronically submitted on July 28, 

2015, using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification to each party. 

s/A. Chubb 

Case Manager 

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