United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee

on Military Research and Development

Committee on National Security, House

of Representatives

August 1998 DEFENSE

INFORMATION

SUPERIORITY

Progress Made, but

Significant Challenges

Remain

GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-278201 

August 31, 1998

The Honorable Curt Weldon

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Research

 and Development

Committee on National Security

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In 1996, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a conceptual

framework for the Department of Defense’s (DOD) war fighting called Joint

Vision 2010.1

 The document identifies information superiority over the

enemy as a key element for the success of this vision. DOD defines

information superiority as “the capability to collect, process, and

disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or

denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.” DOD believes that

information superiority can provide significant advantages over the enemy

during a conflict and increase the efficiency of peacetime and wartime

operations. However, greater reliance on information systems may also

make DOD vulnerable to intrusion and attack on those systems, damaging

its war-fighting capability.2

As requested, we evaluated DOD’s progress in implementing certain key

information superiority activities to provide an indication of how well DOD

is progressing toward its information superiority goals. Specifically, you

asked us to evaluate DOD’s progress in establishing a DOD-wide architecture

for the information systems known as Command, Control,

Communications, Computers (C4), Intelligence, Surveillance, and

Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; developing and implementing the Global

Command and Control System (GCCS); and establishing the Joint Tactical

Radio System (JTRS).

1

Joint Vision 2010 recognizes the need to modernize DOD’s war-fighting concepts and respond to

advancing technologies for the 21st century. It translates information superiority and the technological

advances that are changing traditional war-fighting concepts into new concepts through changes in

weapon systems, doctrine, culture, and organization. It also describes the improved intelligence and

improved command and control available in the information age as the basis of four operational

concepts—dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused

logistics.

2

Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks

(GAO/AIMD-96-84, May 22, 1996) and Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures,

Report of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (Washington, D.C.:

Oct. 1997).

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In addition, you asked us to evaluate DOD’s progress in implementing

recommendations of the Defense Science Board Task Force on

Information Warfare-Defense.3

 At your request, we reported on DOD’s

implementation of these recommendations and other activities to protect

its C4ISR systems in a separate letter to the Subcommittee for a June 11,

1998, joint hearing with the Military Procurement Subcommittee on the

fiscal year 1999 national defense authorization request on Critical

Infrastructure Protection-Information Assurance.4

Background Achieving information superiority will be expensive and complex. Based

on its analysis of the fiscal year 1999 through 2003 Future Years Defense

Plan, DOD estimates it will budget an average of $43 billion a year (nearly

17 percent of the $257 billion budget request for fiscal year 1999) for C4ISR

systems and activities during the plan period. Achieving information

superiority is complex because it involves thousands of decentralized C4ISR

systems and information networks. Furthermore, the systems, networks,

and information superiority activities are managed by many different

offices of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, services, unified

commands, and defense agencies throughout DOD.

One of DOD’s key activities to achieve information superiority is the

development of a Department-wide C4ISR information systems architecture.

An information systems architecture is a blueprint that guides and controls

the development and maintenance of many related systems. Another key

activity is the development and deployment of a Department-wide Defense

Information Infrastructure5

 that features GCCS as DOD’s principal worldwide

command and control system. GCCS has more capabilities and functions

(such as almost real-time knowledge of battlefield conditions, or

situational awareness)6

 than the system it replaced. DOD is also trying to

consolidate the services’ programmable, modular tactical radio

development and acquisition programs into a single JTRS program to

3

The recommendations were presented in Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on

Information Warfare-Defense (IW-D), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and

Technology (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1996). The task force determined that DOD’s information systems

were highly vulnerable to intrusions and attacks and made over 50 recommendations for improving

their protection.

4

DOD’s Information Assurance Efforts (GAO/NSIAD-98-132R, June 11, 1998).

5

DOD describes this infrastructure as all of the information systems and networks used to support the

war fighter.

6

DOD defines situational awareness as knowledge of one’s location, the location of friendly and hostile

forces, and external factors such as terrain and weather that may affect one’s capability to perform a

mission.

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reduce costs and increase the ability of the services to communicate with

each other. JTRS is intended to become one of the Department’s key

tactical-level C4ISR systems. Finally, DOD is developing and implementing a

Department-wide program to protect and defend its C4ISR systems from

intrusion and attack; this activity is known as information assurance.

Results in Brief DOD faces many challenges in achieving its information superiority goals

and objectives and may need many years of concerted effort to reach

them. One of the key challenges is to complete the development of a C4ISR

Architecture, maintain it, and ensure that the many systems that make up

the C4ISR infrastructure comply with the Architecture. Without an

established architecture and the ability to enforce its use, DOD will find it

difficult to make cost-effective development and acquisition decisions and

ensure that the systems work with each other, perform as expected, and

are adequately protected.

For over 30 years (since 1967) DOD has been trying unsuccessfully to

establish some form of Department-wide C4ISR Architecture. In the past 6

years DOD refocused its efforts and made progress by building

Department-wide consensus on what should be accomplished by the

Architecture and how it should be built. DOD also established the

architectural component that defines technical standards for C4ISR

systems.

However, the most important component, which defines the information

needs that are the basis for setting system standards and acquiring and

protecting systems, is not completed. Furthermore, plans for developing

and implementing the remainder of the Architecture, to define systems

and information flows, are still being formulated. Meanwhile, DOD has been

developing a number of critical C4ISR systems and information assurance

measures without the benefit of a completed and approved architecture.

Enforcing compliance with the C4ISR Architecture will be an important

factor in achieving information superiority. DOD said that compliance with

the Architecture will be achieved through a combination of new and

existing oversight organizations and processes. For example, DOD recently

reorganized the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I to

better focus on visibility, support, and responsibility for information

technology architectures. It also stated that it will rely on program reviews

conducted within traditional planning, budgeting, and acquisition

oversight processes to achieve compliance. However, DOD has had

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difficulty in achieving compliance with related C4ISR policies and decisions

in the past. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether the new organization

and traditional oversight processes will be effective in achieving

architectural compliance.

DOD’s experience with two key C4ISR systems is indicative of the types of

challenges ahead. In the absence of a C4ISR architecture, DOD has had

mixed success in developing and fielding GCCS, its premier strategic C4ISR

system. Although some of its features are well liked by users, GCCS has

encountered problems. These include problems with some key functions

that cause the system to perform less effectively than expected. It also has

potential year 2000 problems that could cause system failure.7

 Similarly,

requirements for JTRS have not been defined in the context of an

established C4ISR architecture. Also, DOD officials told us that the

Department has suspended development of the JTRS program until

Congress approves and funds the program. To meet interim needs, DOD has

allowed the services to acquire a limited number of service-unique radios

until the joint radios become available.

Progress Made With

the Architecture, but

Much Work Remains

A single C4ISR architecture is critical for achieving information superiority.

After more than 30 years, DOD has begun to make progress toward

establishing such an architecture but needs to complete its development,

establish adequate information assurance measures, and enforce

compliance by the services, unified commands, and agencies.

C4ISR Architecture Is

Critical to Achieving

Information Superiority

To construct a building it is necessary to have a plan that shows the

building’s features, its systems and their functions, the way different

components interrelate, and the way the components should be built. The

architects and engineers must also take into account building codes, rules,

and standards. The effective and efficient development and management

of an organization’s information systems require a similar architectural

blueprint. An information systems architecture can be viewed as having

both logical and technical components. At the logical level the architecture

includes a high-level description of the organizational mission being

accomplished, the different functions being performed, the relationships

between functions, the information needed to perform these functions,

and the flow of information among functions. At the technical level the

7

Year 2000 problems are difficulties that may be encountered by many information and computer

systems that were programmed to use two digits to identify years (98 for 1998), causing a year

identified as 00 to be misinterpreted as 1900 instead of 2000 and resulting in program malfunctions or

failure.

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architecture provides rules and standards to ensure that interrelated

systems are interoperable, portable, and maintainable.8

 These rules and

standards include specifications for hardware, software, communication,

data, security, and performance characteristics.

DOD is developing, managing, and maintaining an extremely complex

system of C4ISR information systems and networks. Establishing an overall

architecture under which these information systems and networks will

operate is critical for achieving information superiority. Without one, DOD

will have difficulty identifying, establishing, and prioritizing (1) the

information and information links needed among the services, war

fighters, intelligence sources, and national command authorities; (2) the

processes and technical standards to be used to communicate information

among them; (3) the systems and interoperability needed to achieve the

timely transfer of information from where it is maintained to where it is

needed; and (4) the measures needed to protect the systems, their

information, and the infrastructure supporting them.

Establishing information and information link requirements for conducting

operations is particularly important because they are needed to design and

develop systems. Information requirements include the amount, type,

source, frequency, and speed at which data and information must be

gathered, edited, correlated, fused, updated, displayed, printed, and

transmitted. Many system developers and program managers have

identified ill-defined or incomplete information requirements and

requirements growth as root causes of system failure.9

 Without adequately

defined, organizationally approved information requirements, a system

may need extensive and costly reengineering before it can become fully

operational. For example, we recently reported that the Federal Aviation

Administration had to spend over $38 million to overcome

incompatibilities between air traffic control systems, a problem that may

have been avoided if the Administration had a complete information

systems architecture.10 System requirements such as security, reliability,

availability, and maintainability must be accurately defined because they

drive subsequent choices (such as hardware and software) and have a

8

Interoperable means that systems or programs are capable of exchanging information and operating

together effectively. Portable means that a computer program can be transferred from one hardware

and/or software configuration to another. Maintainable means that errors in an operational program

can be located and fixed with reasonable effort.

9

Strategic Information Planning: Framework for Designing and Developing System Architectures

(GAO/IMTEC-92-51, June 1992).

10Air Traffic Control: Complete and Enforced Architecture Needed for FAA Systems Modernization

(GAO/AIMD-97-30, Feb. 3, 1997).

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significant impact on system development cost, schedule, and

performance.

As for the security provisions of a C4ISR architecture, a March 1997 report

of a DOD task force on information assurance stressed the importance of

having the architecture drive information assurance.11 The report

concluded that adequate information assurance is critical for achieving

information superiority and that U.S. forces are at increasing risk of failing

in their mission without it. It also concluded that DOD’s C4ISR Architecture

must support security and that security must be addressed in an integrated

way when the system is first designed and not later with add-on products

or services. The report further concluded that DOD must provide security

links throughout a C4ISR architecture to show what, when, where, and why

security should be applied; where, what, and how it will be applied; and

the codes and standards for what and how security will be applied.

Past Architecture Efforts

Not Successful

DOD has had an official requirement for C4ISR interoperability and for a

Department-wide architecture since 1967, when it encountered

communications interoperability problems during the Vietnam War.

However, it has never adequately met that requirement, even though it

experienced similar problems during military operations in Grenada,

Panama, and the Persian Gulf. In 198712 and again in 199313 we reported

that DOD had made little progress in meeting the requirement because it

lacked centralized or joint managerial and funding control over individual

service priorities, which often took precedence over interoperability

priorities. We also reported that all of DOD’s component commands,

services, and agencies had been unable to agree on what such an

architecture should accomplish or what it should consist of.

Recent Progress Made In 1992, after serious interoperability problems with command, control,

communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems in the Persian

Gulf War, the Joint Staff began an initiative called C4I for the Warrior to

stress joint interoperability, stimulate solutions, and guide the services

toward a global information system. This initiative gave stimulus to a

11Improving Information Assurance: A General Assessment and Comprehensive Approach to an

Integrated IA Program for the Department of Defense (ASD C3I, Mar. 28, 1997).

12Interoperability: DOD’s Efforts to Achieve Interoperability Among C3 Systems (GAO/NSIAD-87-124,

Apr. 27, 1987).

13Joint Military Operations: DOD’s Renewed Emphasis on Interoperability Is Important but Not

Adequate (GAO/NSIAD-94-47, Oct. 21, 1993).

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number of C4ISR development efforts, including the Defense Information

Infrastructure, the overall C4ISR Architecture, and the concept of

information superiority described in Joint Vision 2010.

Before an effective architecture could be developed, however, DOD had to

forge an agreement among the services, commands, and agencies on what

that architecture should accomplish and how it would be constructed.

Thus, a working group of service, command, and DOD agency

representatives in June 1996 established a C4ISR Architecture Framework,

which outlined a coordinated, Department-wide approach to C4ISR

Architecture development, presentation, and integration. The Framework

was updated in December 1997 and agreed on by the services, the Joint

Staff, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,

Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I). According to DOD, the

Framework is now required to be used by all DOD organizations.

The Framework describes an overall architecture comprised of three

interdependent, interlocking components: an operational, a systems, and a

technical subarchitecture. The operational component—known as the

Joint Operational Architecture—is supposed to identify and document

war-fighting information needs. The system component—known as the

Joint Systems Architecture—is supposed to describe which systems,

common information flow, and system interfaces will be used to meet

war-fighting needs. Finally, the technical component—known as the Joint

Technical Architecture—is supposed to specify the characteristics and

standards for hardware, software, communications, data, security, and

performance.14 Underlying the building of the information infrastructure

and technical subarchitecture was a common operating environment, in

which all DOD component organizations would be required to develop,

acquire, and deploy C4ISR systems that operate under a common set of

standards and protocols to permit interoperability.

The creation of this framework was an important step—it was the first

DOD-wide consensus on what a C4ISR architecture should do and how it

should be built. The three-part Architecture also conforms to the generally

accepted architectural definition described earlier: DOD’s operational

subarchitecture corresponds to the logical definition, while the technical

14In comments on a draft of this report, DOD described the C4ISR Architecture as being comprised of

three subarchitectural “views”—the Joint Operational, Joint Technical, and Joint Systems Views. It

also used the terms Joint Operational Architecture and Joint Technical Architecture. Because the

meaning of the term “view” may be confusing to some readers, we have used only the terms

“architecture” or “subarchitecture” when referring to the three architectural components.

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and system subarchitectures together correspond to the technical

definition.

Multiple DOD organizations are involved in the development of the

three-part Architecture. The Joint Staff’s C4 Systems Directorate (J6) is

responsible for developing the operational subarchitecture, the

component services and unified commands are responsible for developing

the systems subarchitecture, and the Defense Information Systems Agency

(DISA) is responsible for developing the technical subarchitecture. The

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I is responsible for

overall coordination and integration of the DOD-wide C4ISR Architecture.

Of the three subarchitectures, only the technical subarchitecture has been

officially established. In August 1996, DOD completed a first version of the

technical subarchitecture and mandated that all new C4ISR systems and

major upgrades comply with the standards and guidelines it prescribed.

DOD completed a second, expanded version of the technical

subarchitecture in February 1998.

Three-Part Architecture

and Information Assurance

Program Remain

Incomplete

Although DOD has established a technical subarchitecture, we believe the

operational subarchitecture is the most important of the three

subarchitectures and should have been completed first because it

determines the basis for information needs, thereby forming the

foundation for the other subarchitectures and for determining systems’

development and acquisition needs. The operational subarchitecture is

still being developed, and DOD officials estimate that its overall structure

will be completed in the second quarter of fiscal year 1999. DOD plans to

have each unified command develop its own operational architecture and

to have a working group under Joint Staff leadership oversee the

integration of all the different architectures into a single Joint Operational

Architecture. As for the systems subarchitecture, no plans have been set

for its development, according to a DOD official.

The need for establishing an overall C4ISR Architecture is highlighted by the

architecture’s close relationship with information assurance activities. In

our June 1998 letter to the Subcommittee on DOD’s C4ISR systems

protection activities, we noted that DOD’s organizations had undertaken a

variety of information assurance measures that were not meeting the

Department’s needs. For example, a DOD internal analysis and a

subsequent report in November 1997 concluded that the Department’s

decentralized information assurance management could not deal with

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information assurance adequately because of the proliferation of networks

across DOD and that some assurance efforts were only minimally effective.

In our letter we also noted that to improve information assurance

management, (1) in December 1997 the Assistant Secretary established an

Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process

that requires comprehensive information assurance evaluations of all

information technology systems in accordance with standard analytical

procedures, and (2) in January 1998 the Deputy Secretary directed the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I to develop and implement the

DOD-wide Defense Information Assurance Program proposed in the

November 1997 report. We concluded that the effectiveness of these new

activities remains to be determined but also noted that DOD’s information

assurance efforts are moving forward without a completed and approved

C4ISR Architecture in place.

Effective Management

Structure to Enforce

Compliance Is Essential

Creating the C4ISR Architecture in itself is not enough to build the Defense

Information Infrastructure and its attendant systems. An effective

management structure to enforce compliance with the Architecture is

essential. In December 1996 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

observing that no formal enforcement mechanism existed for the

implementation of the C4ISR Architecture Framework, cited the need for a

management structure to carry out this task. Specifically, no one had

responsibility for enforcing compliance with the Framework. At about the

same time, a DOD C4ISR Integration Task Force made a number of

recommendations to improve C4ISR management, including a

recommendation that DOD establish oversight mechanisms to ensure that

the Department’s organizations comply with the Architecture Framework.

An example of the sort of problem created by lack of an enforcement

mechanism was provided by a Joint Staff biennial assessment of DISA.

15

The assessment found that the services often experienced joint

interoperability, connectivity, and configuration management problems

with DISA’s core program systems after they were fielded. DISA relies on the

services at the base, post, station, and camp levels to integrate the systems

after they are fielded. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed

that such problems occurred because of so-called “Title 10 concerns”16 and

15This biennial assessment is required by 10 U.S.C. Section 193.

16This phrase refers to the independent funding authority granted the military departments under 10

U.S.C. and a tendency for them to fund their own service-unique requirements before funding joint

requirements.

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DISA’s lack of authority to require the services to adequately fund the

integrations needed. The tendency to give individual service requirements

higher priority was also noted in a November 1997 DOD Inspector General

report,17 which observed that the sense of urgency or importance of

implementing the Joint Technical Architecture is not apparent in the plans

and approaches of the Navy and the Air Force, while the Army has shown

greater commitment to implementation.

In comments on a draft of this report, DOD indicated that it will rely on a

combination of recently established and traditional oversight

organizations and processes to achieve compliance with the C4ISR

Architecture. These consist of the Architecture Coordination Council,

established in 1997 and cochaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition and Technology, the Joint Staff’s Director for C4 Systems, and

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I; the Joint Requirements

Oversight Council, supported by requirements analyses provided by a

Joint C4ISR Decision Support Center; the Joint Strategic Planning System;

the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System; and the acquisition

system. DOD also indicated that it will rely on program reviews conducted

within the planning, budgeting, and acquisition oversight processes to

achieve compliance with the C4ISR Architecture. Finally, DOD stated that it

recently reorganized the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

C3I to better focus on visibility, support, and responsibility for DOD

information technology architectures.

It is not yet clear whether these oversight organizations and processes will

be effective in achieving compliance with the C4ISR Architecture. As

indicated earlier, DOD has had a long history of being unable to override

service-unique priorities and establish C4ISR interoperability and a

DOD-wide architecture. In addition, other reports we have recently issued

on related subjects disclose a similar inability of DOD to attain compliance

with C4ISR policies and decisions.18 Finally, we believe it is too early to

gauge the potential impact the reorganization may have on DOD’s ability to

enforce compliance with the Architecture.

17Implementation of the DOD Joint Technical Architecture (DOD Inspector General Report No. 98-023,

Nov. 18, 1997).

18For example, Defense IRM: Poor Implementation of Management Controls Has Put Migration

Strategy at Risk (GAO/AIMD-98-5, Oct. 20, 1997) and Joint Military Operations: Weaknesses in DOD’s

Process for Certifying C4I Systems’ Interoperability (GAO/NSIAD-98-73, Mar. 13, 1998).

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GCCS and JTRS

Implementation

Efforts Illustrate

Challenges Facing

DOD

DOD is facing tough challenges in developing and implementing GCCS and

JTRS. Although GCCS has greater capabilities and functions—such as almost

real-time situational awareness of the battlefield—than its predecessor,

the development, fielding, and performance of GCCS have been hampered

by fragmented management. DOD is also trying to consolidate the services’

programmable, modular tactical radio development and acquisition

programs into a single joint radio program to increase interoperability

among services and efficiency in acquisition. While awaiting approval and

funding of the JTRS Program, the services are procuring interim radios.

GCCS Is an Evolving

System

GCCS began as a system of existing command and control components that

was to be implemented rapidly to replace DOD’s outdated World Wide

Military Command and Control System and fulfill the most urgent user

requirements. DOD plans to further develop GCCS as an “evolutionary

system,” which means that DOD will continue to develop its capabilities

incrementally as it reacts to user feedback or rapidly evolving new

technology. As new GCCS versions are fielded, DOD intends to have added

capabilities replace other existing C4ISR systems.

While initially developing GCCS, DOD did not clearly define the system’s

goals, requirements, and schedules. For example, a 1997 Institute for

Defense Analysis report on this evolutionary process said that the GCCS

architecture was designed, developed, and fielded not as a single system

but through periodic additions of functionality and capability over the past

3 years.19 It described GCCS as a “set of long-term goals established by DOD

senior leadership, the attainment of which does not have a well defined

trajectory.”

Mixed Success With GCCS DOD has experienced a mixture of successes and problems in

implementing GCCS. For example, users like some of the additional

features it provides compared to the old system and found them

productive. These features include mission-related communications by

e-mail, internet-like web pages, and on-line discussion groups. Users also

like the idea of being provided situational awareness of the battlefield.

However, some key capabilities, such as the system’s operational planning

function and the situational awareness function, have experienced

problems and are performing less effectively than expected. Also, operator

training is deficient, data exchange procedures with coalition partners

19Richard H. White et al., An Evolutionary Acquisition Strategy for the Global Command and Control

System (GCCS), Institute for Defense Analysis (Sept. 1997).

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have not been defined, and the system is at risk of failure because year

2000 problems have not been fully resolved. If GCCS encounters year 2000

problems, the United States and its many allies who use GCCS could have

difficulty conducting a Desert Storm-type engagement.20 We believe these

problems exist partly because DOD does not have a set of clearly defined

goals, requirements, and schedules for the system.

GCCS Management Is

Fragmented

A May 1995 report by DOD’s Office of Inspector General expressed concern

about GCCS management and oversight and said that GCCS management is

scattered among the Joint Staff, DISA, and the services.21 It noted that

although DISA is the project manager for GCCS, it does not have the

authority to provide overall direction and control of the program. A similar

issue was raised in a 1997 study commissioned by DISA on the technical

foundation of GCCS.

22 That study said that DOD had not established an

adequate foundation for enabling full interoperability among DOD

computer systems because DISA lacks resources and does not have the

formal mission of implementing a complete strategy to achieve

interoperability. The study concluded that there is little likelihood of the

pieces coming together as envisioned for full interoperability.

DOD recognizes that GCCS needs a more structured acquisition management

process and is considering ways to provide this structure, including a

strategy proposed in the September 1997 report by the Institute for

Defense Analysis. Under this strategy, future GCCS acquisitions would take

place in phases so that resources would be applied to meet mission

requirements in discrete time periods. Each phase would be controlled by

a contract that would describe cost, performance, scheduling, testing,

economic, and budgetary issues and identify deliverable command and

control capabilities. However, the strategy would still accept the current

roles and missions of organizations involved in GCCS.

Establishment of JTRS

Program

The Secretary’s Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 1999-2003

directed the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I, in coordination with

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the services, to define

20Defense Computers: Year 2000 Computer Problems Threaten DOD Operations (GAO/AIMD-98-72,

Apr. 30, 1998).

21Management of the Global Command and Control System (DOD Inspector General Report No.

95-201, May 24, 1995).

22Defense Information Infrastructure Common Operating Environment I&RTS Review and Assessment,

prepared by GARTNER Consulting for the Defense Information Systems Agency (Nov. 4, 1997).

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DOD-wide requirements for a high-capacity, next-generation, digital,

programmable tactical radio. It also directed the Assistant Secretary to

establish a joint program for a family of radios that would consolidate

similar programs under development by the services—the Army’s Future

Digital Radio, the Navy’s Digital Modular Radio, and the Air Force’s

Airborne Integrated Terminal.

In response to this directive, DOD officially established the JTRS Program in

September 1997.23 In December 1997, the Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition and Technology appointed the Army as the program’s

permanent component acquisition executive and lead service and directed

that a joint program office be established to manage the development of an

evolutionary architecture and perform JTRS management functions.

According to DOD officials, a joint program manager has been appointed,

and the services and the Office of the Secretary have agreed on an

organizational structure for the joint program office. However, according

to the officials, the activation of the program and joint program office are

on hold pending congressional approval of the program and

reprogramming action to fund it.

DOD plans to begin fielding JTRS radios between 2002 and 2004. In addition,

DOD has established the program’s joint operational requirements but, as

with the GCCS and other systems, these have been established without a

fully established and approved C4ISR Architecture. To meet interim needs,

the services plan to acquire limited numbers of their own radios. The Air

Force told us it plans to spend $133 million for 330 less expensive, reduced

capability Airborne Integrated Terminals needed for aircraft operating in

Europe to comply with European air traffic control requirements. The

Navy told us it plans to spend $211 million for 352 digital modular radios

to comply with a Joint Staff directive to meet Demand Assigned Multiple

Access24 standards for satellite communications terminals. The Army told

us it plans to begin buying 3,157 radios in fiscal year 2000 to support its

digitization program.

The JTRS Program’s objectives are to provide a family of digital, modular,

software-programmable radios that will allow military commanders to

communicate with their forces through voice, video, or data formats as

needed and that will range in configuration from a low-cost joint tactical

23The program was originally named the Programmable Modular Communications System. It was

renamed JTRS in December 1997.

24This is a technology for gaining efficiency in the use of ultra-high frequency satellite communication

channels through automated channel sharing by users.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257 Defense Information Superiority
B-278201 

radio to a higher capability, joint multiband, multimode radio. This

approach is being used to accommodate the services’ many individual

requirements, including space and size, and the many different

conditions—airborne, ground mobile, fixed station, maritime, and

personal communications—in which the radios will be used. The concept

is that the radios can be programmed or configured to function in a

number of modes and frequencies to fit a user’s specific needs. By

combining functions and using common components, DOD believes the

services will be able to reduce unit costs and the number of radios needed.

Conclusions DOD faces many challenges in achieving its information superiority goals.

These challenges are exemplified by the difficulty DOD has experienced in

its efforts to develop and implement the C4ISR Architecture, establish

system requirements and operational effectiveness for GCCS, and develop

the JTRS Program. DOD’s C4ISR architectural and other information

superiority activities are complex undertakings and involve considerable

investments in C4ISR systems. In addition, they will require overcoming

difficult and long-standing institutional problems and organizational

boundaries to be successful. Consequently, it may take many years of

concerted effort for DOD to reach its information superiority objectives.

DOD’s recent efforts to establish a C4ISR Architecture have begun to show

progress. However, much work remains to be done. In particular, DOD

needs to complete the C4ISR Architecture, follow through with information

assurance plans, ensure that efforts resulting from those plans are linked

to requirements established by the Architecture, and make certain that

established oversight processes are effective in achieving C4ISR systems’

compliance with the Architecture. Completion of these activities should

enable DOD to make cost-effective decisions for C4ISR systems development

and acquisition and make sure that the systems perform as expected.

In our opinion the complexity, magnitude, and cost of DOD’s information

superiority efforts warrant a comprehensive overview, to be completed

annually, of the state of the Department’s management and oversight of

C4ISR acquisitions. We believe that conveying such an overview, describing

to Congress DOD’s progress toward achieving a Department-wide C4ISR

strategy and compliance with the C4ISR Architecture, would enhance

Congress’ understanding of this important subject as well as the basis on

which decisionmakers consider future C4ISR investment needs.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257 Defense Information Superiority
B-278201 

Recommendations To enhance DOD’s ability to achieve its information superiority goals and

objectives, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense (1) establish

milestones for completing the C4ISR Architecture and information

assurance program and (2) ensure the C4ISR management structure has

sufficient authority to enforce compliance with the C4ISR Architecture and

is effective in achieving that compliance. A consideration the Secretary

should give to achieving that compliance is to ensure that Architecture

compliance is incorporated into DOD’s planning, programming, and

budgeting process and C4ISR systems funding decisions.

Matters for

Congressional

Consideration

Congress may wish to consider having DOD report, in conjunction with

annual budget requests, on the progress being made Department-wide in

implementing the information superiority concept and its attendant key

C4ISR systems development and acquisitions. In such reports, Congress

may wish to require DOD to describe its progress in (1) completing and

maintaining the C4ISR Architecture, including progress toward established

milestones; (2) establishing information assurance and its compliance with

the Architecture; and (3) developing and implementing key C4ISR systems,

such as GCCS and JTRS, and the ways and degree to which they are

complying with the Architecture and information assurance requirements.

Congress also may wish to take DOD’s progress into consideration when

deliberating the authorization and funding of C4ISR systems. In discussions

with us about these suggestions, DOD officials acknowledged that such

perspectives are not available and agreed that such information may be

useful to Congress and DOD in overseeing C4ISR investments. They stated

that DOD is working to establish such perspectives and could modify

existing reports to Congress to include them. Rather than establishing a

separate reporting requirement, Congress may wish to have DOD modify

the reports it already provides to include the information we suggest.

Agency Comments In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD generally concurred with our

recommendations. It also affirmed its commitment to achieving

information superiority and stated that it is making significant progress

toward that goal. For example, it noted that the Office of the Assistant

Secretary of Defense for C3I had recently been reorganized to enhance

visibility, support, and responsibility for information technology

architectures to achieve information superiority. It also cited the

Defense-wide Information Assurance Program as a recent step it has taken

to focus attention on the importance of information assurance and to

establish a means for achieving that assurance.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257 Defense Information Superiority
B-278201 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that milestones be established for

completing the C4ISR Architecture and information assurance program. It

also provided additional details on how it plans to complete the

development and implementation of the Architecture and Information

Assurance Program and pointed out that establishing and maintaining

them will be a continuous process involving all levels of the Department.

Based on this information, we updated the estimated completion date for

the operational subarchitecture. However, DOD did not provide details of

how or when the systems subarchitecture would be completed.

DOD also agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary take steps to

ensure that an effective management structure is in place with the

authority and responsibility to enforce compliance with the C4ISR

Architecture. DOD described the oversight organizations and processes it

will rely on to achieve compliance with the C4ISR Architecture Framework

and its architectures. We incorporated this information and our evaluation

of it into the report as appropriate.

DOD also commented on our matters for congressional consideration. DOD

stated that it already provides information to Congress on the

Department’s progress toward milestones through documents such as

congressional justification books for C4ISR programs, which are submitted

in conjunction with annual oversight hearings. In reviewing the documents

referred to by DOD, we found that they do not provide a comprehensive

overview of the progress DOD is making, Department-wide, on the C4ISR

Architecture and on C4ISR systems within the context of the Architecture

and information superiority goals. In further discussions with DOD officials

about these matters, the officials acknowledged that such a

Department-wide perspective is not available and agreed that such

information may be useful to Congress and DOD in overseeing C4ISR

investments. They stated that DOD is working to establish such

perspectives. However, these officials also stated that they were

concerned that our suggestion of the matters for congressional

consideration would require an additional reporting mechanism separate

from annual budget submissions and believed existing reports to Congress

could be modified to provide the information. We have clarified that the

congressional reporting we are suggesting could be done within the

context of existing reports.

Scope and

Methodology

To determine the progress of DOD’s efforts in establishing an overall C4ISR

Architecture, we obtained and reviewed the initial documents and latest

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257 Defense Information Superiority
B-278201 

drafts of DOD’s C4ISR Architecture Framework and Joint Technical

Architecture. To evaluate the issues DOD faces in implementing the

framework, we reviewed its C4ISR Integration Task Force Executive Report

(Dec. 23, 1996) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Combat Support Agency

Review of the Defense Information Systems Agency (Dec. 30, 1996). To

confirm our analysis of these documents and to determine the latest

progress in implementing a DOD-wide C4ISR Architecture, we interviewed

senior officials of the headquarters offices of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for C3I; the C4I Integration Support Activity, including the Director

and Deputy Director; and the Joint Staff, including the Director for C4

Systems. We also relied on our previous reports on DOD’s C4I

interoperability efforts for our analysis of DOD’s past architectural efforts.

In addition, we relied on information in our separate June 11, 1998, letter

to the Subcommittee concerning DOD’s information assurance efforts for

perspectives on these efforts. The scope and methodology of our efforts

for that work are contained in the letter.

To determine the progress of GCCS, we reviewed relevant reports, briefings,

and other documents from and interviewed appropriate officials within the

headquarters offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I; the Joint

Staff; DISA’s GCCS program office; and the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and

Air Force. We also interviewed and received briefings from appropriate

officials and reviewed relevant program documents during visits to the

U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Central Command with respect to the

commands’ experiences with GCCS and users’ points of view on its

development and progress. In addition, we observed the use of GCCS in

Unified Endeavor 98-1, a simulated joint task force war-game exercise at

the U.S. Atlantic Command’s Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation

Center in Suffolk, Virginia; in the U.S. Central Command war room; and in

the Army’s Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment in Fort

Hood, Texas. We also reviewed relevant studies and reports from the

Defense Science Board, the DOD Inspector General, and the Institute for

Defense Analysis. Finally, we interviewed a former Assistant Secretary of

Defense for C3I and a former DISA director who were involved in GCCS

conceptualization, development, and initial implementation. At the time of

our interviews, these two officials held executive positions with DOD

information technology contractors.

To determine DOD’s progress in developing and implementing JTRS, we

interviewed appropriate JTRS program officials within the headquarters

offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I; the Under Secretary of

Defense (Comptroller); and the Army, Navy, and Air Force. We reviewed

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257 Defense Information Superiority
B-278201 

relevant correspondence, cost and schedule data, and other documents

pertaining to the JTRS program.

In addition to the work described above, we sought perspectives on

information superiority implementation management in general through

interviews with a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I; a panelist

and several staff members responsible for C4ISR issues on the National

Defense Panel; a former Joint Staff C4 Systems and DISA director; and staff

members of a National Research Council of the National Academy of

Sciences review of Department of Defense C4I programs. We received

briefings and reviewed relevant documents from appropriate senior and

other officials within the headquarters offices of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for C3I, including the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3

and the Director and Deputy Director of the C4I Integration Support

Activity; DISA; and the Joint Staff, including the Director for C4 Systems. We

also obtained and reviewed relevant studies and reports from the

Congressional Research Service, Defense Science Board, DOD Inspector

General, Institute for Defense Analysis, and National Defense Panel.

We performed our review from July 1997 to June 1998 in accordance with

generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Ranking Minority Member of

the Subcommittee; the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the

House Committee on National Security; other interested congressional

committees; and the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the

Air Force. We will also make copies available to others upon request.

This report was prepared under the direction of Allen Li, Associate

Director, Defense Acquisitions Issues, National Security and International

Affairs Division, and Jack L. Brock, Jr., Director, Governmentwide and

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257 Defense Information Superiority
B-278201 

Defense Information Systems Issues, Accounting and Information

Management Division. Please contact Mr. Li on (202) 512-4841 if you or

your staff have any questions concerning this report. Other major

contributors to the report are listed in appendix II.

Henry L. Hinton, Jr.

Assistant Comptroller General

National Security and International

 Affairs Management

Gene L. Dodaro

Assistant Comptroller General

Accounting and Information

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257 Defense Information Superiority
Contents

Letter 1

Appendix I 

Comments Provided

by the Department of

Defense

22

GAO Comments 28

Appendix II 

Major Contributors to

This Report

30

Accounting and Information Management Division 30

Abbreviations

C3 Command, Control, and Communications

C3I Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence

C4 Command, Control, Communications, and Computers

C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and

Intelligence

C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers,

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency

DOD Department of Defense

GCCS Global Command and Control System

IA Information Assurance

JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257 Defense Information Superiority
Page 21 GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257 Defense Information Superiority
Appendix I 

Comments Provided by the Department of

Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comments 1

and 5.

See comment 2.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257 Defense Information Superiority
Appendix I 

Comments Provided by the Department of

Defense

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257 Defense Information Superiority
Appendix I 

Comments Provided by the Department of

Defense

See comment 3.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257 Defense Information Superiority
Appendix I 

Comments Provided by the Department of

Defense

See comment 4.

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257 Defense Information Superiority
Appendix I 

Comments Provided by the Department of

Defense

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257 Defense Information Superiority
Appendix I 

Comments Provided by the Department of

Defense

See comment 5.

See comment 5.

See comment 5.

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257 Defense Information Superiority
Appendix I 

Comments Provided by the Department of

Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

letter dated July 29, 1998.

GAO Comments 1. We have incorporated discussions of the reorganization into the report.

2. In discussions with DOD officials about these statements, the officials

said that DOD was referring specifically to the Congressional Justification

Book for Command, Control, and Communications; Information

Technology Exhibit for the budget submission (Exhibit 43); three volumes

of congressional justification books on joint military and tactical

intelligence programs and related activities; congressional budget

justification books submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence on

national intelligence programs; and Command C4ISR Architectures

produced by each unified command. However, we reviewed these

documents (with the exception of the national intelligence-related

document, which has restricted access) and did not find the

comprehensive overview of DOD’s C4ISR systems that we think would

enable Congress to fully understand and oversee the Department’s

information superiority-related authorization and funding requests.

For example, these submissions do not provide a Department-wide

overview of DOD’s progress in developing, implementing, and achieving

compliance with the C4ISR Architecture; compliance is a key to achieving

and managing information superiority effectively and efficiently. In

addition, the documents do not provide sufficient information about

(1) how the various C4ISR systems for which authorizations and funding

have been requested comply with the Architecture, (2) how the C4ISR

systems relate to one another in the overall scheme of the C4ISR

Architecture (providing a perspective on potential system redundancies

and relative need), or (3) how and to what extent the systems comply with

information assurance requirements dictated by the Architecture and

DOD’s Defense-wide Information Assurance Plan.

Currently, the information provided by DOD is scattered among multiple

and voluminous documents. Although we did not assess the usefulness of

these documents for other purposes, such as command-wide guidance to

system developers that may be provided by the command architectures,

we found that they do not provide a comprehensive overview of the

progress DOD is making, Department-wide, on the C4ISR Architecture and on

C4ISR systems within the context of the Architecture and information

superiority goals. For example, congressional justification books

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257 Defense Information Superiority
Appendix I 

Comments Provided by the Department of

Defense

summarize progress of individual systems. In subsequent discussions with

DOD officials on the content and purpose of the documents referred to by

DOD, the officials acknowledged that a Department-wide perspective is not

available and agreed that such information may be useful to Congress and

DOD in overseeing C4ISR investments. They stated that DOD is working to

establish such perspectives. However, these officials also stated that they

were concerned that our suggestion of the matters for congressional

consideration would require an additional reporting mechanism separate

from annual budget submissions and believed existing reports to Congress

could be modified to provide the information. We recognize that current

DOD reports to Congress could form a viable framework within which to

incorporate our suggestion for a Department-wide overview and progress

description. Consequently, we have clarified that the congressional

reporting we suggest could be accomplished within the context of existing

reports.

3. DOD continues to use the terms Joint Operational Architecture, Joint

Technical Architecture, and Joint Systems Architecture in conjunction

with the terms Joint Operational View, Joint Technical View, and Joint

Systems View. We believe the use of both sets of terms may be confusing

to some readers. Consequently, we have used only the terms “architecture”

or “subarchitecture” when referring to the three architectural components

in this report.

4. Based on the information provided, we updated the estimated

completion date for the operational subarchitecture. However, DOD did not

provide details of how and when the systems subarchitecture would be

developed and completed. Therefore, it remains to be seen how DOD will

develop and implement this portion of the Architecture.

5. We incorporated information DOD provided on Architecture compliance

mechanisms and recognized the reorganization initiatives. As stated in the

report, it is not yet clear whether these mechanisms and the reorganization

will be effective in achieving compliance. For example, DOD has a long

history of being unable to use its review processes effectively to overcome

service-unique priorities and attain compliance with policies and decisions

in joint C4ISR systems matters. While the organizational changes may

enhance DOD’s success in achieving architectural compliance, we believe it

is too early to gauge their potential effectiveness in this regard.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257 Defense Information Superiority
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division

Charles F. Rey, Assistant Director

Charles R. (Randy) Climpson, Evaluator-in-Charge

Robert R. Hadley, Senior Evaluator

Gregory K. Harmon, Senior Evaluator

Bruce H. Thomas, Senior Evaluator

Stefano Petrucci, Communications Analyst

Accounting and

Information

Management Division

Keith A. Rhodes, Technical Director

Joseph T. (Mickey) McDermott, Assistant Director

Joseph A. DeBrosse, Senior Evaluator

(707294) Page 30 GAO/NSIAD/AIMD-98-257 Defense Information Superiority
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