Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on National Security,

Veterans Affairs, and International Relations,

Committee on Government Reform,

House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m.,

Tuesday,

May 22, 2001

MILITARY AIRCRAFT

Cannibalizations Adversely

Affect Personnel and

Maintenance

Statement of Neal P. Curtin, Director, Defense Capabilities

and Management

GAO-01-693T
Page 1 GAO-01-693T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

We are pleased to be here today to share the preliminary results of our

ongoing work regarding the military services’ practice of cannibalization,

which is the removal of a working component from one aircraft to install it

on another. In January 2001, we reported on the major performance and

accountability challenges facing the Department of Defense and identified

inventory management as a high-risk area because the Department

continues to maintain levels of inventory that are too high, and its

management systems and procedures are ineffective.1

 This means that in

some instances, excessive quantities of some parts may be procured and

held in stock, while in other instances, quantities are insufficient. We

warned that if this condition persists, the Department risks having key

items, including spare aircraft parts, not available when needed, impairing

aircraft and other equipment readiness. To compensate for logistics

shortfalls, all the military services—Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine

Corps—have resorted to the inefficient maintenance practice of

cannibalization.

Our testimony today is based on the work we performed in response to

your request that we analyze cannibalizations by the services over the last

5 years. We determined the extent to which the services rely on

cannibalizations, the effects of cannibalizations, the reasons for

cannibalizations, and the actions that the Department of Defense and the

services are taking to reduce cannibalizations.

All the military services use cannibalization extensively as a routine

aircraft maintenance strategy. In fiscal years 1996 through 2000, the Navy2

and the Air Force reported about 850,000 cannibalizations, requiring over 5

million maintenance hours. These numbers, however, do not include the

Army’s cannibalizations,3

 and the Navy reportedly understates its data by

as much as 50 percent. As a result, neither the Department of Defense nor

the services know the overall magnitude of the practice.

 1

 See Performance and Accountability Series: Major Management Challenges and Program

Risks: Department of Defense (GAO-01-244, Jan. 2001).

2

 Navy data includes the Marine Corps because it is consolidated at the headquarters level.

3

 While information is available for the Army at the installation level, the Army does not

collect servicewide data; therefore, we could not include Army totals in our statistics.

Summary
Page 2 GAO-01-693T

Cannibalizations have several adverse impacts. They increase maintenance

costs by increasing workloads, may affect morale and the retention of

personnel, and sometimes result in the unavailability of expensive aircraft

for long periods of time. Cannibalizations can also create unnecessary

mechanical problems for maintenance personnel. As shown by a recent

survey, over half of all aircraft maintenance personnel work more than 50

hours a week (some work 70 hours or more) compared with the average of

40 hours. A Navy study notes that the additional work generated by

cannibalizations adversely affects morale and lowers reenlistment rates.

However, because the services do not keep track of all the maintenance

hours they spend on cannibalizations, they cannot assess all of the

consequences.

The services have many reasons for cannibalizing aircraft and strong

incentives for continuing to do so. With the exception of the Navy, the

services do not consistently track the specific reasons for cannibalizations;

as a result, much of the information on causes is anecdotal. In the

broadest sense, cannibalizations are done because of pressures to meet

readiness and operational needs and the shortcomings of the supply

system. When parts are not available and an aircraft needs to fly a mission,

cannibalization becomes the answer. In addition, a Navy study found that

cannibalizations are sometimes done because mechanics are not trained

well enough to diagnose problems or because testing equipment is either

not available or not working.

Although the services have undertaken some initiatives to reduce

cannibalizations, none of them have developed a specific strategy to

reduce the maintenance hours associated with cannibalizations. Because

they view cannibalization as a symptom of spare parts shortages, they

have not closely analyzed other possible causes or made concerted efforts

to measure the full extent of the practice. A number of working groups

have been asked to address cannibalization, but they have had very limited

success in determining how to reduce it. Neither the Department of

Defense nor the services can accurately determine (1) which

cannibalizations are necessary and what alternatives, if any, are available

to reduce the number of those that are not; (2) what specific

improvements or changes need to be implemented to effectively limit the

adverse effects of cannibalizations; and (3) to what extent reducing the

workload associated with cannibalizations would increase morale and

retention rates. Furthermore, they cannot make sound economic decisions

concerning the relative costs of alternatives, such as changes to stockage

levels or storage locations.
Page 3 GAO-01-693T

In fiscal years 1996-2000, Air Force and Navy units reported a total of

about 850,000 cannibalizations and annual figures ranging between 154,000

and 176,000 (see fig. 1). The actual numbers, however, may be

considerably higher because of underreporting by the Navy and the Air

Force and the lack of servicewide data for the Army.

Figure 1: Total Navy and Air Force Cannibalizations Reported in Fiscal Years 1996-

2000

Source: Navy and Air Force.

Cannibalizations Are

Extensive, but Full

Magnitude Is

Unknown

0

50,000

100,000

150,000

200,000

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

170,958 174,448 175,717 168,836

154,440

Cannibalization actions

Fiscal year

Navy

Air Force
Page 4 GAO-01-693T

In 1998, a Navy group studying aviation readiness noted that as many as

half of all cannibalizations may go unreported, and the Navy’s Inspector

General has reported that cannibalizations are consistently unreported.4

 In

addition, a 1998 review conducted by the Air Force Audit Agency on the

Air Force’s maintenance analysis program noted that maintenance

technicians did not always report cannibalizations.5

According to Army officials, only a small portion of Army cannibalizations

are reported—for serial-numbered parts. The Army does not track

cannibalizations servicewide and does not require subordinate commands

to do so. Several Army headquarters officials we talked to agreed that

cannibalizations should be tracked so as to provide an overall picture of

the degree to which units are performing cannibalizations.

We found that selected aircraft—which the services depend on the most to

accomplish their mission—had relatively high reported cannibalization

rates. In addition, some of these aircraft experienced a significant increase

in the number of cannibalizations from fiscal year 1996 to 2000.

The Navy measures cannibalization rates as the number of

cannibalizations per 100 flying hours. In the 5-year period under study

(fiscal years 1996-2000), the Navy’s average cannibalization rate ranged

from a high of 9.6 in fiscal year 1997 to a low of 8.8 in fiscal year 2000.

However, in fiscal year 2000, 4 of the 63 aircraft types reporting

cannibalizations had more than twice the service’s average rate of 8.8,

while 2 aircraft types had rates that were almost twice the average. (See

fig. 2.)

 4

 See Final Report of Naval Aviation Spares and Readiness, Naval Inspector General (Apr.

28, 2000).

5

 See Report of Audit on Maintenance Analysis Program, Air Force Audit Agency (July 31,

1998).
Page 5 GAO-01-693T

Figure 2: Reported Cannibalization Rates of Six Navy Aircraft, Fiscal Year 2000

Source: Navy.

Of the 31 Air Force aircraft types reporting cannibalizations in fiscal year

2000, 4 accounted for over half the service’s total. They included three

fighter aircraft (F-16C, F-15C, and F-15E) and the B-1B bomber. From

fiscal year 1996 to 2000, the Air Force reported a 100-percent or more

increase in the number of cannibalizations of several aircraft, including the

A-10A, OA-10A, F-15B, E-3C, and F-117A. Unlike the Navy, the Air Force

measures cannibalization rates in terms of cannibalizations per 100 sorties

(flights). The Air Force’s average cannibalization rate during the 5-year

period ranged from a low of 10.6 in fiscal year 1996 to a high of 12.7 in

fiscal year 1997. However, in fiscal year 2000, the rates of the B-52H, C-5B,

C-5A, and B-1B were all well over twice the average rate of 11.6.

Cannibalization rates for these aircraft ranged between 30 and 85 per 100

sorties. The rates of the F-15C and F-15E were almost twice the average at

22 and 23, respectively. (See fig. 3.)

32.8

27.7

21.5

18.2

16.2 16.7

0

10

20

30

40

E-2C EA-6B S-3B FA-18E FA-18B F-14D

Cannibalizations per 100 flying hours

Navy aircraft

Navy average rate = 8.8
Page 6 GAO-01-693T

Figure 3: Reported Cannibalization Rates of Six Air Force Aircraft, Fiscal Year 2000

Source: Air Force.

Cannibalizations are done to meet operational and readiness needs, but

they come at a high cost. Cannibalizations have increased the workload of

maintenance personnel by millions of hours since fiscal year 1996—costly

time that could have been spent more productively. Evidence shows that

increasing the workload of maintenance personnel has a negative effect on

morale. Cannibalizations also take expensive aircraft out of service,

sometimes for long periods of time, and can create unnecessary

mechanical problems. Nevertheless, it is difficult to gauge the precise

effects of cannibalizations because the services do not know how many

they are performing, what the specific reasons are for performing them, or

how much time and money they are spending on them.

Cannibalizations require at least twice the maintenance time of normal

repairs because they involve removing and installing components from

two aircraft instead of one (see fig. 4).

Cannibalizations Have

Many Negative

Effects

Effects on Workload

22 22.8

30.2

42.2

54.6

85.4

0

20

40

60

80

100

F-15C F-15E B-52H C-5B C-5A B-1B

Cannibalizations per 100 sorties

Air Force aircraft

Air Force average rate = 11.6
Page 7 GAO-01-693T

Figure 4: Repairs Require Two Steps, Cannibalizations Four

Through the 5-year period, the Navy and the Air Force reported spending

about 5.3 million additional maintenance hours on cannibalizations—the

equivalent of more than 500 aviation maintenance personnel working fulltime for 5 years. The annual reported cannibalization hours ranged from a

low of 951,000 to more than 1.1 million (see fig. 5). The Navy accounted for

2.8 million of the total hours, while the Air Force reported 2.4 million

hours. A relatively small group of aircraft accounted for most of these

maintenance hours. For example, in fiscal year 2000, six Navy aircraft (FA18C, P-3C, S-3B, FA-18A, E-2C, and EA-6B) were responsible for about 45

percent of the Navy’s 441,000 cannibalization hours, while five aircraft (F15C, F-15E, F-16C, B-1B, and KC-135R) accounted for 65 percent of the Air

Force’s 510,000 hours.

Repair

4

3

1

2

Supply

system

Cannibalization

1 2

Supply

system

Remove broken part

Install new part

1

2

1

2

3

4

Remove broken part

Remove working part from cannibalized aircraft

Install working part on aircraft under repair

Install new part on cannibalized aircraft

Recipient

aircraft

New

part

Old

part

Cannibalized

aircraft

New

part

Cannibalized

part

Old

part
Page 8 GAO-01-693T

Figure 5: Total Cannibalization Personnel Hours, Fiscal Years 1996-2000

Source: Navy and Air Force.

Evidence suggests that cannibalizations have a negative effect on morale

because they are sometimes seen as routinely making unrealistic demands

on maintenance personnel. Cannibalizations may have to be performed at

any time, day or night, and very quickly in order to meet operational

commitments. In such cases, personnel must continue working until the

job is done, regardless of how much time it takes.

To the extent that cannibalizations contribute to extensive overtime,

morale and retention may be adversely affected, and additional costs may

be incurred in recruiting and training new personnel. In April 2000, the

Naval Inspector General reported that cannibalization is

counterproductive and has a “huge” impact on morale. Our analysis of a

Effects on Morale

0

500

1,000

1,500

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Fiscal Year

1,080 1,035

1,142

1,065

951

Personnel hours (thousands)

Navy

Air Force
Page 9 GAO-01-693T

1999 survey of active duty personnel showed that a significant portion of

aviation maintenance personnel worked more than 50 hours a week, and

that some worked 70 hours a week. In August 1999, we reported that the

majority of factors cited by military personnel as sources of dissatisfaction

and reasons for leaving the military were work-related circumstances such

as the lack of parts and materials to successfully complete daily job

requirements.6

One example of how cannibalizations may become the source of waste or

frustration is the case in which a major component needed by an EA-6B

aircraft to perform its mission was removed from or reinstalled on four

different aircraft, for a total of 16 times in 6 days. In another case, an Air

Force C-5 was missing 136 parts, 47 of which had been used to make

another cannibalized aircraft operational.

Aircraft that are missing parts due to cannibalizations may remain

grounded for long periods of time. These aircraft are not available for

operations, denying the military the use of valuable assets. Air Force and

Navy guidance states that, to the maximum extent possible, cannibalized

aircraft should not remain grounded for more than 30 consecutive days.

Yet we observed numerous cases in which aircraft were grounded for

much longer periods. One wing we visited provided us a daily aircraft

status report showing that 6 out of 28 aircraft downed for parts had not

flown for 37 days or more. One of these aircraft had not flown for more

than 300 days and, according to the Maintenance and Material Control

Officer, was missing 111 parts. As a result, the Navy had been unable to

use this multimillion-dollar asset for almost a year. He estimated it would

take more than 1,000 maintenance hours to return the aircraft to flying

status. In another example, four cannibalized FA-18 aircraft were missing

so many parts that they were referred to as “wind chimes” (see fig. 6).

According to Navy officials, the number of days these aircraft had not

flown ranged between 903 and 1,756 when they were transported to a

Navy depot in July 2000. As of May 2001, one of the aircraft, which had

been missing over 400 parts, had been funded for assembly, while the

remaining three were in storage waiting funding approval. The depot

estimated reassembly costs for the funded aircraft at about $568,000, if the

squadron that owns the aircraft supplies all needed parts.

 6

 See Military Personnel: Perspectives of Surveyed Service Members in Retention Critical

Specialties (GAO/NSIAD-99-197BR, August 16, 1999).

Expensive Assets

Unusable
Page 10 GAO-01-693T

Figure 6: Cannibalized Navy FA-18 Aircraft

Source: Navy.

A Navy squadron within 30 days of a major exercise reported that 6 of its

13 assigned aircraft had not flown for 30 or more days—2 of them because

the squadron’s wing directed that parts be given to other squadrons. A

Navy training squadron we visited had 20 of its 29 aircraft down for parts

or maintenance—6 of them were cannibalized aircraft. In 2000, the same

squadron reported an average of 113 cannibalizations a month.

In order to remove a component, mechanics often have to remove other

parts or components as well. This increases the risk of collateral damage

to the aircraft and components involved. Substantial anecdotal evidence

indicates that cannibalizations do indeed cause these types of problems

because they involve two aircraft rather than one and are often performed

under very rushed conditions. Furthermore, cannibalizations do not

replace a broken part with a new part, but with a used one. According to a

December 2000 study,7

 cannibalizations do not restore a component to its

full projected life expectancy but rather increase the chance that the same

component will break down again prematurely.

 7 Analysis of Aircraft Maintenance Cannibalization With Respect to Aging Aircraft Within

the EA-6B Community, Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Daniel C.

Worra (Dec. 2000).

Potential for Mechanical

Side Effects
Page 11 GAO-01-693T

The services have many reasons for cannibalizing aircraft and strong

incentives for continuing to do so. They are operating with aging aircraft, a

high operational tempo, and continued spare parts shortages. As aircraft

age, they tend to break more often, take longer to inspect and maintain,

and are less available for training and operations.8

 The combination of

these factors, along with intense readiness requirements, creates an

environment that encourages cannibalization. But it is impossible to know

why a particular aircraft or system is cannibalized because, with the

exception of the Navy, the services do not record the reasons for

cannibalizations. This lack of information makes it difficult to develop

strategies to reduce cannibalizations.

Service officials believe that the shortage of parts is the major reason for

cannibalizations and claim that they must cannibalize if parts are not

available in the right place at the right time. Given the current logistics

shortfalls, officials also believe that cannibalizations must continue in the

foreseeable future. In a recent report to the Congress, the Department of

Defense identified aviation readiness as one of its major problems and

expressed concern about parts shortages and maintenance issues.9

The Comptroller General recently testified that for years, the Department

of Defense has had equipment readiness problems because of a lack of key

spare parts. He also said that the insufficiency of spare parts has been

recognized as a major contributor to aircraft performing at lower mission

capable rates than expected.10 Our ongoing work shows that the failure of

service logistics systems to deliver parts in a timely manner is caused by a

number of different reasons, including parts production problems, lower

reliability of parts than predicted, inadequate initial procurement of

spares, and unanticipated demand for an item. The services will

sometimes cannibalize aircraft for “convenience”—when it is faster to

cannibalize than wait for a part to be delivered from across the base or

town. A Navy study group estimated that these actions may account for as

many as half of all Navy cannibalizations.

 8

 See Tactical Aircraft: Modernization Plans Will Not Reduce Average Age of Aircraft (GAO01-163, Feb. 2001).

9

 See Department of Defense Quarterly Readiness Report to the Congress, January—

February 2001.

10 See Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Departments of Defense, State,

and Veterans Affairs (GAO-01-492T, Mar. 7, 2001).

Services Cannibalize

for Many Reasons

Supply System Problems
Page 12 GAO-01-693T

Readiness and operational demands put heavy pressure on the supply

system to provide parts immediately and wherever they may be needed.

Local commanders are willing to do whatever is necessary to keep

readiness ratings high, even if this requires cannibalizing aircraft

constantly and having personnel routinely work overtime.

The services believe that cannibalizations allow them to better perform

their operational missions. Information is not available to determine to

what extent cannibalizations contribute positively to readiness. But two

Army studies concluded that readiness would be significantly degraded if

cannibalizations were not performed. A 2000 study cited cannibalization

among the reasons for maintaining readiness rates at acceptable levels and

concluded that readiness would suffer if units were not allowed to

cannibalize. A 1987 study of similar helicopter units found that readiness

rates dropped more than 25 percent when units were forced to stop

cannibalizations as part of a controlled experiment, and readiness rates

rose back to previous levels when cannibalizations resumed. The Army

has not repeated the experiment elsewhere.

According to feedback provided through a Navy internet tracking system,

the reasons for cannibalizations also include parts-related issues such as

vendor production problems, depots without the necessary parts to fix a

repairable component, and delays from vendors. For its part, the Navy

Inspector General has cited three other reasons for cannibalizations

related to maintenance deficiencies: (1) lack of experience and insufficient

training on the part of maintenance personnel, (2) outdated maintenance

manuals and (3) lack of testing equipment.11 In other words,

cannibalizations are sometimes done to diagnose a problem or to identify

which component is not working properly. By removing a suspect part and

replacing it with one that is known to be working, a mechanic can identify

where a problem lies.

The services have not developed servicewide strategies to reduce

cannibalizations. Services consider cannibalization a symptom of logistics

shortfalls and are trying to improve logistics support, especially through

the application of best inventory management practices. Although the

services have not established or identified specific strategies for reducing

cannibalizations, each has taken some initiative to deal with the issue. But

 11 See Final Report of Naval Aviation Spares and Readiness, Naval Inspector General, (Apr.

28, 2000).

Readiness and Operational

Demands

Other Reasons

Services Have Not

Developed Specific

Strategies to Reduce

Cannibalizations
Page 13 GAO-01-693T

until they develop an overall reduction plan, the services will not be in a

position to significantly reduce cannibalizations or to alleviate their

negative effects.

The Air Force is undertaking an initiative to minimize cannibalizations at

bases in Langley, Virginia, and Elmendorf, Alaska. The bases have

instituted a “consolidated” cannibalization program, referred to as the

Cannibalization Dock Program. The program centralizes cannibalization

management, whereby each of the squadrons in the wing provides a

“donor” aircraft and a cadre of maintenance personnel on a rotating basis.

The program is designed to ensure that as few aircraft as possible are

cannibalized and that the cannibalized parts are better controlled. While

these efforts are localized, they have reduced the number of cannibalized

aircraft and the amount of time that aircraft remain cannibalized,

minimized the number of personnel performing cannibalizations, and

improved quality control over the process. Although Air Force policies

allow cannibalizations to meet urgent operational requirements, the

policies also state that such actions should be minimized because they

tend to adversely affect morale and aggravate the very same supply

problems that they are meant to overcome.

According to Navy policy, cannibalization is a manifestation of a logistics

or maintenance support system failure and its reduction or elimination

should be of prime concern to management. In March 1998, the Navy

established an Aviation Maintenance-Supply Readiness Study Group to

recommend specific actions to reduce overall Navy aviation maintenance

and supply costs and increase readiness. Noting the fleet’s increasing

concern over cannibalization, the Study Group included the practice

among the primary issues. As a result of the Group’s findings and

recommendations, the Navy initiated actions to better identify the specific

causes of cannibalizations and increase the visibility of items that are

being cannibalized extensively. Beginning in June 2001, the Navy will also

implement the requirement that more specific reasons be reported for

each cannibalization. Although a requirement that reasons be reported is

currently in place, the new requirement increases the number of reasons

that can be considered, so that causes can be better captured. In addition,

a website has been established to better highlight the items frequently

cannibalized and to provide an avenue for maintainers, program managers,

and inventory control personnel to comment on problems and track

progress in resolving issues. Logistic program managers within the Naval

Air Systems Command also maintain lists of top cannibalization items in

the weapon systems for which they are responsible. In addition, a new

Air Force

Navy
Page 14 GAO-01-693T

reporting system is being implemented which, according to Navy officials,

should improve reporting accuracy.

The Army has taken the least formal approach to addressing

cannibalization. Its actions so far have been limited to the two studies

mentioned above, which concluded that cannibalizations are a good tool

for commanders to use and that command involvement is adequate for

preventing abuse. Although Army policy limits cannibalizations to

whenever a needed item is not available through the supply system, it

allows commanders at installation levels and below to use their discretion

as to whether and how much to cannibalize.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes our

statement. We appreciate the opportunity to have it placed in the record.

Our report on this work will be out this summer with a series of

recommendations for the services to address this issue.

Contacts and Acknowledgments

For future contacts regarding this statement, please contact Neal Curtin at

(757) 552-8111 or William Meredith at (202) 512-4275. Individuals making

key contributions to this statement included Harry Taylor, Hugh Brady,

Douglas Mills, Janine Cantin, and Stefano Petrucci.

Army

(702067)