[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 19-13296

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

BOBBIE LANE KENDLE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:04-cr-20486-KMM-1

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2 Opinion of the Court 19-13296

Before WILSON, JORDAN, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Bobbie Lane Kendle, a counseled federal prisoner, appeals 

the district court’s orders denying his motion to reduce his sentence under the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 

132 Stat. 5194 (Dec. 21, 2018) (First Step Act), and declining to 

grant reconsideration. Kendle filed his principal brief, and he and 

the Government now jointly move for summary reversal based 

on the framework outlined in United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 

1290 (11th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2635 (2021), and to 

substitute the same motion for Kendle’s initial brief. They argue 

Jones makes clear that Kendle was convicted of a “covered offense” within the meaning of the First Step Act and he is eligible 

for relief because he has not already received the lowest statutory 

penalty that would be available to him under the Fair Sentencing 

Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (Fair Sentencing 

Act). Finally, they assert Jones makes clear the district court erred 

in finding Kendle ineligible for a reduction based on the fact he 

was sentenced as a career offender under the guidelines and because his guideline range did not change. Noting the district 

court issued its denials before this court decided Jones, they move 

this Court to summarily reverse the district court’s order and remand for reconsideration in light of Jones.

We agree with the parties that Jones applies to this case as 

Kendle was convicted of a covered offense within the meaning of 

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19-13296 Opinion of the Court 3

the First Step Act. Jones, 962 F.3d at 1298 (holding a movant has a

“covered offense” if his offense triggered a statutory penalty that 

has since been modified by the Fair Sentencing Act). Because § 2 

of the Fair Sentencing Act “modified the statutory penalties for 

crack-cocaine offenses that have as an element the quantity of 

crack cocaine provided in subsections 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 

(B)(iii),” a movant has a covered offense if he was sentenced for 

an offense that triggered one of those statutory penalties. Jones, 

962 F.3d at 1298. In 2005, Kendle was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of crack cocaine, 

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The PSI set out Kendle’s 

statutory minimum and maximum as ten years to life pursuant to 

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (effective Nov. 2, 2002 to Mar. 8, 

2006) (detailing penalties for 5 grams or more of crack cocaine) 

and 851. The statutory penalties under § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) were 

modified by § 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act. Fair Sentencing Act 

§ 2(a)(1); see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (effective Dec. 21, 

2018). Because Kendle’s offense was a federal offense, the statutory penalties were modified by § 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act, and 

he committed his offense before the Fair Sentencing Act became 

effective on August 3, 2010, his offense is a covered one. Jones,

962 F.3d at 1298; see First Step Act § 404(a).

Further, the “as if” requirement in Jones did not limit the 

district court’s authority to reduce Kendle’s sentence. For the “as 

if” determination, the court is bound by a previous finding of drug 

quantity that could have been used to determine the movant’s 

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4 Opinion of the Court 19-13296

statutory penalty at the time of sentencing. Jones, 962 F.3d at 

1303. Here, the drug quantity finding that was used to determine 

Kendle’s statutory penalty at sentencing was the jury’s finding of 

5 grams or more of crack cocaine. While the district court found 

at sentencing that the offense involved 78.37 grams of crack cocaine for purposes of calculating Kendle’s offense level under the 

guidelines, that finding could not have been used to determine 

Kendle’s statutory penalty because he was sentenced after Apprendi and thus is not relevant to the “covered offense” determination here. Jones, 962 F.3d at 1301-02. The jury’s drug quantity 

finding of 5 grams or more that triggered Kendle’s statutory penalties at sentencing would now trigger the statutory penalties for 

crack cocaine offenses of less than 28 grams after the Fair Sentencing Act, which results in a statutory sentencing range of 0 to 30 

years after applying the § 851 enhancement for Kendle having a 

prior conviction for a felony drug offense. See Fair Sentencing 

Act § 2(a)(2). Because Kendle was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment, he was eligible for a sentence reduction because he did 

not receive the lowest statutory penalty that would be available 

to him under the Fair Sentencing Act, i.e., 0 years’ imprisonment. 

Jones, 962 F.3d at 1303.

The district court found Kendle ineligible for a sentence reduction, in part, because it found the covered offense determination should be made using its drug quantity finding of 78.37 grams 

of crack cocaine at sentencing, which was incorrect under Jones. 

The district court also found Kendle ineligible for a sentence reUSCA11 Case: 19-13296 Date Filed: 11/22/2021 Page: 4 of 5
19-13296 Opinion of the Court 5

duction because he was a career offender and his guideline range 

was unchanged after the Fair Sentencing Act, which Jones clarified were not relevant factors in determining whether a movant 

was eligible for a sentence reduction. Id. at 1305. Specifically, this 

Court in Jones vacated and remanded the denial of relief where 

the defendant’s “commuted sentence [was] at the bottom of the 

guideline range, which may have caused the district court to conclude that [he] was ineligible for a further reduction to his sentence.” 962 F.3d at 1305. Finally, the district court’s order denying

Kendle’s motion for reconsideration reiterated its previous findings and made clear the court did not believe the First Step Act 

gave it discretion to reduce his sentence, which was error. See id.

Thus, in light of Jones, Kendle was eligible to receive a sentence reduction under the First Step Act, and the parties’ position 

is “clearly right as a matter of law.” See Groendyke Transp., Inc. 

v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969) (stating summary 

disposition is appropriate where “the position of one of the parties 

is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case”). Accordingly, we 

GRANT the parties’ joint motions for summary reversal and to 

substitute the joint motion for Kendle’s initial brief and REMAND 

to the district court to consider whether to exercise its discretion 

to reduce Kendle’s sentence.1

REVERSED and REMANDED. 

1 We DENY as moot the parties’ motion to stay the briefing schedule. 

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