NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE

.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS

D IVISION O NE

STATE OF ARIZONA

, Appellee

,

v.

DANIEL RAE WILSON

, Appellant

.

Nos. 1 CA

- CR 22

- 0077
1 CA

- CR 22

- 0078 (Consolidated)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2018

- 121688

- 001, CR2018

- 118176

- 001 The Honorable Jacki Ireland

, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office , Phoenix By Gracynthia Claw Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office , Phoenix By Damon A. Rossi C ounsel for Appellant FILED 3-30-2023STATE v. WILSON
Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

P A T O N
, Judge:

¶1 D aniel Rae Wilson appeals his convictions and sentences on one count of aggravated identity theft , ten counts of forgery, and thre e counts of criminal possession of a forgery device

. He argues the superior court violated Arizona Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 404( b ) by admi tting

a lleg ed propensity evidence

. He further a ssert s t he State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by introducing that evidence and referencing it in closing argument

. He also c hallenges the admission of alleged profile evidence

. Finally, he contends the superior court improperly commented

on a detective’s testimony

. For reasons that follow, we affirm his convictions and sentences.

FACT S AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts, resolving all inferences against Wilson. See State v. R eaves , 252 Ariz. 553, 558, ¶ 2 (App. 2022). A police officer arrived at a parking lot early one April morning to investigate a report of a suspicious vehicle

. T here

, he found Wilson asleep and alone in the driver’s seat of a parked ca r , which was registered to a female

. Afte r the officer asked for his name and identification

, Wilson abruptly sped away

. He soon crashed the car in front of a house, then ran through the neighborhood

. O fficers located him hiding inside a she d where they also found numerous credit , debit, and gift cards ( collectively, “credit cards”) stacked o n a shelf

. The shed’s owner , M

. A

. , had never met Wilson

, and she had not stor ed any credit cards in the shed

.
¶3 When officers searched t he crashed car

, they found Wilson’s wallet, a backpack, two laptops

, two keyboards , methamphetamine, and marijuana

. The backpack contained a credit

- card embosser, a credit

- card encoder , and a chip scanner ( collectively, “forgery devices”)

.
¶4 D etective Kim, who specializ es in fraud and identity

- theft investigations

, analyzed the evidence seized from the shed and the car

. W ilson was not the legal accountholder for any of the credit cards, but hi sSTATE v. WILSON
Decision of the Court

3 name had been emboss ed on several of them

. According to Detective Kim,

a per son could use the forgery devices to read and remov e account number s from a card’s magnetic strip

. The per son could then encode th e number s and other name s onto the magnetic strip s of different car d s

. At that point, the per son could make purchases with the card or sell it

.
¶5 The State obtained two indictments against Wilson. The first indic t ment charged him with one count of aggravated identity theft, a class three felony; ten counts of forgery, class four felonies; and five counts of possessing a forgery device, class six felonies

. T he second indictment charged him with one count each of possessing methamphetamine, a class four felony; possessing marijuana, a class six felony; and criminal trespass in the first degree, a class one misdemeanor. T he superior court later granted the Sta te’s motion s to consolidate the criminal

- trespass charge with the first indictment and dismiss the drug

- possession counts , which the

court refused to consolidate with the other charges

.
¶6 At t rial , Wilson ’s counsel conceded in opening statement that Wilson had been trespassing in the shed, that the prosecution could prove the credit cards had been “ altered

, ” and that the associated credit card accounts had been “ compromised. ” Although his counsel acknowledged that Wilson had made “mistakes” and “laps es in judgment” that day

, he argued the police had likewise made errors and “cut corners ” in their investigation , le a d ing to “mental leaps” and “quick conclusions

. ” B ased on th ose asserted defici en c i es , he argu ed t hat th e State w ould not be able to

prove Wilso n “knowingly possessed forged cards” and had “ the intent to defraud [.]”

¶7 T he State presented the testimony of s everal victims whose account numbers had been encoded on the seized credit cards

. The victims verified t hat they did not recognize the cards or the named financial
institutions. Four victims further explained that they had unauthorized transactions on thei r accounts.

¶8 The State called Detective Kim , who described his investigation

. He ob tained the information encoded on the credit cards’ magnetic strip s using a card reader

. T he financial institutions named on the card s differed from the encoded informatio n

. Detective Kim also noticed suspicio u s features on s everal o f the cards, including “really tight ” embossing

, “conspicuous” numbers that were “slightly raised

, ” and account numbers embossed on the front that did not match the encod ed information

.STATE v. WILSON
Decision of the Court

4 ¶9 On cross

- examination, Detective Kim acknowledged that he had not done a ny “quality control” on the forgery devices and thus did not know whether they worked properly. H e had not “brushed them for fingerp rints,” nor had the police conducted any forensic analysis of the laptops. Further, he never determine d who had manufactured the cards, he did not “follow up with the stores or locations where any alleged fraudulent use occurred,” and he did not know whether the “ cards themselves [were] responsible for those [unauthorized] charges.”

¶10 On redirect examination , Detectiv e Kim explained he did not examine the forgery devices for fingerprints because b ased on his experience, devices that have been touched by multiple subjects

, as was the case here

, are not typically fingerprinted . And he did not believe fingerprinting was necessary based on the circumstances of the case. He also addressed why he did not conduct any forensic analysis:

We have a three

- year wait for DNA analysis because this is considered a property offense. Again, based on my assessment of what the officers told me and the evidence recovered, I was highly confident in this case and the recovered evidence absent DNA evidence or fingerprints. . . . Our present wait for a forensic search [of the laptops ] . . . [ i s] upwards to 12 months

. . . because it’s a prop erty offense. I used the judgment based on the evidence at hand. Why would I delay my case [?] Why would I delay justice for the known victims [?] I fully acknowledge that there is a possibility of 100 [victims]

. . . as [defense counsel] said. That’s true. We don’t know because I did not get the forensic tests done. But based on what we had, potentially eight to ten
victims

— the statute asked for three. Based on my normal practice, we shoot for a goal of five. Under no circumstances would we ever present a case with 100 victims, 50 victims, even two dozen victims. It’s cost prohibitive. It’s time prohibitive. Again, it was my responsibility and judgment, my assessment. That’s what I chose to do.

¶11 The State concluded its redirect examination following that exchange

. Once Detective Kim left the stand

, the trial judge sua sponte instructed the jury :
There w[ere] questions and answers regarding the value judgment and decisions of Detective Kim. None of that should be consi dered

. . . to determine beyond a reasonableSTATE v. WILSON
Decision of the Court

5 doubt whether the State has proven [the] elements of the offenses

. . . . [T] he opinions of police officers or even the opinion of the lawyers or my opinion doesn’t mean anything. It’s your job.

¶12 After the State r ested , the superior court granted Wilson’s motion for judgments of acquittal on two forgery

- device c harge s but denied it on the remaining counts

. Wilson did not testify or call any witnesses in his defense.

¶13 In closing argument, Wilson ’s counsel again acknowledged that Wilson trespassed in the shed, the credit cards were altered

, Wilson’s

name was on the cards , “[t]here was fraudulent activity on the victims’
accounts, ” and “[t] he items in the backpack, if operable, could theoretically alter cards

. ” He also argued that Wilson fled and hid from the officers because he had a n outstanding arrest warrant

. Despite those facts, h is counsel maintained that t he State failed to prove Wilson “ knew that these cards were altered or forged, that [he] had intent to use them unlawfully [or] defraud others, [and that he] was ever in possession of the items found in the backpack. ” And he assailed Detective Kim ’s performance in advancing the defense’s de ficient

- investigation the ory , arguing that not only could Detective Kim not prove the seized cards were ever used, but he did not reach out to the businesses for potential eyewitness testimony, leaving the “real possibility that the person responsible f or the charges” was someone other than Wilson. For the forgery

- device charges, Wilson’s counsel argued that doubt existed as to Wilson’s ownership of the backpack because it was found in a car with a different registered owner.

¶14 In rebuttal, the prosecutor noted that the backpack was in Wilson’s “ immediate reach ,” and even though Wilson was not the car’s registered owner, he “ had some authority to drive the car ” and thus had

“ authority to possess the things that were in the car. ” He al so urged tha t D etective Kim ’s decision not to identify the credit cards ’ user was “immaterial” because none of the charge s contained an “element which require[d] [the jury] to determine

. . . whether [Wilson had] used those cards sometime in the past.”

¶15 The jury found Wil son guilty as described above

. The superior court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 15 years ’ imprisonment. We have jurisdiction to hear hi s timely appeal under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (“ A.R.S. ”) Sections 12

- 120.21(A)(1), 13

- 4031, and 13

- 4033(A)(1)

.STATE v. WILSON
Decision of the Court

6 DISCUSSION

I. Asserted Rule 404(b) Violation and Prosecutorial Error

¶16 Wilson a rgue s the admission of the victims’ testimony recounting the unauthorized tr ansactions on their accounts violated Rule 404(b) ’s prohibition on propensity evidence

. He further alleges the State committed prosecutorial error by introduc ing that testimony and using it in closing argument

. Wilson characterizes the prosecutor’s actions as “misconduct” based on his allegation that the prosecutor intentionally misused the challenged evidence . Because we conclude Wilson has not shown error, we use the term “prosecutorial error,” consistent with our supreme court’s directive in Matter of Martinez , 248 Ariz. 458, 47 0, ¶ 47 (2020). Wilson’s failure to raise his challenges in the superior court limits our review to fundamental, prejudicial error. See State v. Hulsey , 243 Ariz. 367, 381, ¶ 38 (2018).

¶17 Under fundamental

- error review, Wilson carries the burden

to show trial error exists, the error i s fundamental, and t he error caused him prejudice. See State v. Riley

, 2 48 Ariz. 154

, 170 , ¶ 2 4 (20 20 ). Trial e rror s are fundamental when the y (1) go to the “ foundation of the case, ” (2) deprive the defendant of “ a right essential to his defense

, ” or (3) are “ so egregious that [ the defendant ] could not possibly have received a fair trial. ” State v. Escalante , 245 Ariz. 135, 14 2, ¶ 21 (2018).

¶18 Defendants must make a separate showing of prejudice under the first two f undamental

- error categorie s ; errors in the third category are inherently prejudicial

. Id

. To make such a showing, defendants must establish that “a reasonable jury could have plausibly and intelligently returned a different verdict” absent the error. Id. at 144, ¶ 31. “A reasonable jury is composed of persons of average intelligen ce and judgment who use

common sense ” in evaluatin g the evidence and applying the given
instructions

. Id. ( citation omitted). The “ could have ” inquiry is objective and demands an examination of the entire record, “including the parties’ theories and arguments as well as the trial evidence.” Id

.
¶19 Rule 404(b) (1)

– (2) bars the admission of evidence of “ other crimes, wrongs, or acts

. . . to prove the character of a [defendant] in order to show action in conformity therewith” but authorizes its admission for

non

- propensity purposes, “ such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Before admitting other

- act evidence

, court s “must first find that there is clear and convincing proof both as to the commission of the other bad actSTATE v. WILSON
Decision of the Court

7 and that the defendant committed the act.” State v. Allen

, 253 Ariz. 306, 3 3 3

, ¶ 57 ( 2022 ) ( citation omitted )

.
¶20 Here, it is undisputed that the record contains no evidence indicating Wilson made the unauthorized transactions ; indeed, Wilson’s claim is predicated on th is point

. N one of the victims accused Wilson of the fraudulent purchases , and Detective Kim repeatedly acknowledged that he neither knew nor attempt ed to discover the perpetrator’s identity. As a result, this testimony did not implicate other act evidence

. See Rule 404(b)

.
¶21 Nonetheless, Wilson asserts the prosecut or improperly insinuated in closing argument that Wilson had, in fact, committed the uncharged act s, citing the following italicized comment in support : “Was [Wilson] knowledg e able about the devices’ characters, and did he intend to commit fraud? He clearly knew of the devices’ characters. There’s evidence of past fraudulent use by [him]

, meaning his creation of the cards themselves

. ” We disagree , given that t he prosecutor immed iately clarified that he was

a lleging Wilson had manufactu red the cards . Further, the comment occurred with in the context of discussing the forgery devices , not the unauthorized

trans a ctions

. S ee S tate v. Rutledge , 205 Ariz. 7, 1 3 , ¶ 33 (2003) ( explaining that the propriety of a prosecutor’s comment depends on the comment’s

context ). Nowhere in t he cited comment

— or any where else

— did the prosecutor blame Wilson for using the cards to make the frau du lent purchases found on the victims ’ accounts

. Thus, we find no merit to Wilson’s complaint.

¶22 Wilso n also cites State v. Holsinger , 124 Ariz. 18 (1979), to support his argument that the prosecutor’s conduct entitles him to a new trial

. But that case is inapposite here

. There, the prosecutor asked a witness whether he knew that the defendant had a “long criminal record” even though the defendant had no such record

. Id. at 20. Our supreme court found that the question was improper under evidentiary and ethical rules,
constitut ing reversible error. Id. at 2 0

– 22

. Here, no evidence connected Wilson to the fraudulent acts

, and the prosecutor never accused him of committing the m, let alone hint ed a t false facts about his criminal history.

¶23 Wilson’s reliance on State v. McGann

, 132 Ari z. 296 ( 1982 ), is also misplaced

. In that case, our supreme court found the admission of other act evidence , namely evidence of other uncharged forgeries involving different victims

, was prejudicial, fundamental error because the evidence was critical to the prosecutor’s case and founded in hearsay testimony. Id.
at 298

– 99. Here, the evidence of the credit card transactions was not criticalSTATE v. WILSON
Decision of the Court

8 to the State’s case because none of the charges required proving fraudulent

us e nor was it introduced as evidence of Wilson’s other acts.

¶24 Moreover, Wilson has not show n prejudice. H e contend s the admission of the victims’ testimony “ relieved the State of its burden to prove that [he] knew the nature of the items in the car and int ended to use them to defraud

. ” B ut he does not explain how the challenged evidence did so, nor does he cit e any record evidence to support his claim

. Wilson ’s sole defense to the forgery

- device charges was that he had no knowledge or ownership of them, not that he possessed them for lawful purposes

. And as noted above, the jury was well aware the State could not tie Wilson to the unauthorized transactions. Accordingly, he has not demonstrated that

“ a reasonable jury could have plausibly and intel ligently” acquitted him had the court excluded the victims’ testimony

. Escalante , 245 Ariz. at 14 4 , ¶ 31 ; see S tate v. Fierro , 254 Ariz. 35, 41 , ¶ 21 (2022) (“The ‘could have’ standard requires a showing far greater than a metaphysical possibilit y and necessarily excludes imaginative guesswork. ” (citation omitted) ).

¶25 Finally, b ecause the challenged testimony did not trigger a Rule 404(b) analysis

, Rules 401 through 403 governed its admissi bility

. See
State v. Togar

, 248 A riz. 567, 573

- 74, ¶¶ 19, 22 (App. 2020) ( noting admissibility is generally assessed under Rules 401 through 403 ). Wilson

, however, d oes not argue in his opening brief that the evidence’s admission violated the applicable Rules

. T hus

, he has waiv ed any such c laim of error

. S ee Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.10(a)(7)(A) ( O pening briefs must contain “c ontentions with supporting reasons for each contention, and with citations of legal authorities and appropriate references to the portions of the record on which the appellant relies

. ” ); S tate v. Bolton

, 182 Ariz. 290

, 298 ( 1995 ) (“ Failure to argue a claim on appeal constitutes waiver of that claim .” )

.
¶26 I n Wilson’s reply brief, he disputes the State’s argument on appeal that the evidence was relevant and admissible under Rules 401 through 403

. We need not consider issues an appellant raises for the first time in a reply brief

. See S tate v. Watson , 198 Ariz. 48, 51, ¶ 4 (App. 2000)

. That said

, Wilson makes no attempt to explain how any asserted error was fundamental and prejudicial

. His failure to do so is fatal to his protest

. See Escalante

, 245 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 21; see also S tate v. Vargas

, 249 Ariz. 186, 190

, ¶ 13 ( 2020 ) (“[I] f a defendant simpl y asserts a general claim of error on appeal and fails to develop it, a court is not obligated to consider it. ” ). In any event , his counter argument is effectively identical to his argument that the victims’ testimony breached Rule 404(b), which we have a ddressed and rejected

. Wilson is therefore not entitled to relief.STATE v. WILSON
Decision of the Court

9 II. Alleged Profile Evidence

¶27 Citing Escalante

, Wilson asserts the superior court improperly allow ed the State to elicit testimony from Detective Ki m that “create[d] a profile of [him] as a person who ran a ‘forgery mill.’” We revi ew his unpreserved claim for fundamental , prejudicial error. See Escalante

, 245
Ariz. at 14 0 , ¶ 12

.
¶28 “Describing evidence as ‘p rofile ’ evidence is a shorthand way of saying that the evidence is offer ed to implicitly or explicitly suggest that because the defendant” possesses “one or more of an informal compilation of characteristics or an abstract of characteristics typically displayed by persons engaged in a particular kind of activity,” the jury “sh ould conclude that the defendant must have committed the crime charged.” State v. Haskie

, 242 Ariz. 582, 585

- 86, ¶ 14 (2017) ( citation omitted)

. The prosecution is prohibited from offering profile evidence as substantive proof of guilt because it creates a “ risk that a defendant will be convict ed not for what he did but for what others are doing.” Id. at 5 86 , ¶ 1 5 ( citation omitted ).
None theless, “[e] xpert testimony about general behaviors is permitted if helpful to a jury’s understanding of the evidence.” Escalante , 245 Ariz. at 143 , ¶ 25

.
¶29 Detective Kim’s testimony explaining the nature and potential uses of the forgery devices did not invite the jur y to draw the impermissible inference that Wilso n was guilty of the charged crimes because he shared traits with forgery

- mill operators

. I nstead, the testimony provided context for the jur ors and established facts about physical evidence relevant to the f orgery

- device charges

. See A.R.S. § 13

- 2003(A)(1) (criminal possession of a forgery device requires inter alia proof that a

person made or possess ed a device “ specifically designed or adapted for use in forging written instruments ” ) ; c f. Escalante

, 245 Ariz. at 143 , ¶ 25 (noting qualified officers could permissib ly testify that “ dryer sheets and coffee beans, like the ones found in [the defendant’s] truck, can be used to mask the smell of illegal drugs from police dogs ” ). At no point did the detective list traits common to forgery

- mill operators or link his testimony

to Wilson’s conduct

. Therefore, Detective Kim’s testimony did not
constitute improper profile evidence.

¶30 Although Wilson contends otherwise, Escalante does not support a contrary conclusion

. That case largely turned on whether the defendant possessed a baggie of methamphetamine the police found “in the middle of the road” hours after the defendant’s arrest , which “ cast [ed] doubt on whether he had discarded the drug. ” Escalante

, 245 Ariz. at 143,STATE v. WILSON
Decision of the Court

10 ¶ 2 6

. No f ingerprint analysis was conducted , and DNA testing “revealed nothing” indicating Escalante had possessed the baggie

. Id. T o prove the

case , t he State introduced drug

- courier profile evidence as substantive

ev idence of guilt that “permeated the trial” : “ [e] ight officers over three days ” explained the “ typical behaviors of drug

- t raffickers,” Id. at 143, ¶ 27,

a nd the ir “ testimony was only relevant to demonstrat e that Escalante’s behaviors were consistent with drug trafficking.” Id. at 142, ¶ 24

. Further,
i n opening statement and closing argument , the prosecutor invited the jury to compare Escalante’s behavior to the general behaviors of drug traffickers in reaching i ts verdicts

. See i d. at 142

– 43, ¶¶ 24, 27.

¶31 Our supreme court c onclud ed that a dmi tting the drug

courier profile evidence constituted fundamental error under prong one because it impacted a “ pivotal ” factual dispute

. Id. at 143, ¶ 26

. The court further found that Escalante ha d established prejudice , reasoning “ the admissible evidence supporting the prosecution’s case on these counts was circumstantial and prompted several questions from the jury about the baggie’s ownership. ” Id. at 14 5

– 46 , ¶ 40.

¶32 Unlike in Escalante , the alleged profile evidence here did not serve as the “linchpin” of the State’s case

. I d. at 143, ¶ 27

. I nstead, the prosecutor argued that the credit cards embossed with Wilson’s name provided the most incriminati ng evidence against him. And u nlike the baggie ’s remote location in Escalante

, the police found the forgery devices in the car where Wilson had been sleeping alone and from which he fle d. Further, Wilson’s jury did not ask any questions about h i s possession of the forgery devices , and the superior court instructed the jur ors that in reaching their verdicts, they could consider evidence that he fled and hid. Th erefore

, Wilson has not shown any hypothetical error would have go ne to the foundation of the case.

¶33 E ven assuming arguendo the existence of fundamental error, Wilson has not demonstrate d resul ting prejudice

. Without identifying any record evidence in support , he asserts in conclusory fashion that “[a]bsent th [e] impermiss ible profile evidence, the jury could have acquitted [him] of at least the Forgery Device counts ” because “ no testimony at trial revealed that the police found anything inside the backpack

. . . that linked [him] directly to its [ ] contents. ” Not only doe s Wilson fail to address the other charges

, but he does not explain how testimony that the forgery devices could generally be used to alter credit cards

— a point he conceded

— affected the jury’s analysis of whether he possesse d those items. Nor does he make any effort to show the challenged testimony impeded hi s de fense to th e forgery

- device charges , which was disclaim ing knowledge andSTATE v. WILSON
Decision of the Court

11 ownership of the items

. Because “[s] peculative prejudice is insufficient under fundamental error review [,] ” State v. Martin , 225 Ariz. 162, 166, ¶ 15 (App. 2010)

, his claim fails.

III. Instruction Following Detective Kim’s Testimony

¶34 Wilson contends the superior court ’s instruction recounted

supra ¶ 1 1 violated the Arizona Constitution’s prohibition against judicial commentary on trial evidence

. The State counters that in context, the instruction “ referred to the detective’s opinion about the case’s strength and its impact on his investigative decision

- making, which were, respectively, improper an d irrelevant

, ” and the court properly told the jury to disregard th at testimony. As Wilson acknowledges, w e apply fundamental

- error review to hi s claim. See Escalante

, 245 Ariz. at 1 40 , ¶ 12

.
¶35 We agree with the State. “A judge violates Arizona ’ s constitutional prohibition against commenting on evidence by expressing an opinion as to what the evidence proves, in a way that interferes with the jury ’ s independent evaluation of that evidence.” Rile y , 248 Ariz. at 179, ¶ 85 ( citation omitted); see also Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 27

. Here , t he instruction neither referred to specific evidence nor conveye d the judge’s opinion of what the evidence proved

. T hat the superior court gave the instruction follo wing redirect examination indicates the court’s purpose was to alleviate any potential prejudice from Kim’s arguably objectionable opinion s about the quality of his investigation

. See State v. Trostle

, 191 Ariz. 4, 22 (1997) ( “ Trial judges are presumed to know the law and to app ly it in making their decisions.” (quoting Walton v. Arizona , 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) ). Conversely, h ad the trial judge intended

— as Wilson suggests

— to

co mmunicate to the ju ry that the judge “assigned no value to [his] li ne of

cross

- examination,” it is reasonabl e to infer the judge would have given the
instruction immediately after Wilson had finished his questioning

.
¶36 Wilson also has not shown he was prejudiced by the claim ed

error. Without elaboration or record support, he asserts “[a] reasonable probability existed that, had the court restrained itself, the jury may have found [him] not guilty on some, if not all charges. ” His conjecture is insufficient to obtain relief under fundamental

- error review

. See State v. Dickinson

, 233 Ariz. 527, 5 3 1 , ¶ 13 ( App. 2013 ) ( explaining defendants must “affirmative ly prove prejudice” on fundamental

- error review ).STATE v. WILSON
Decision of the Court

12 CONCLUSION

¶37 W e affirm W ilson’s convictions and sentences.