Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1403-CT-188 |April 14, 2015 Page 1 of 26

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

George M. Plews 

Brianna J. Schroeder 

Jonathan Penn 

Plews Shadley Racher & Braun 

LLP 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE ERIC J.

SPICKLEMIRE

Thomas F. O’Gara 

Bradley R. Sugarman 

Jeffrey D. Stemerick 

Taft Stettinius & Hollister, LLP 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA 

5200 Keystone Limited Realty, 

LLC, 

Appellant-Defendant, 

v. 

Filmcraft Laboratories, Inc., Eric 

J. Spicklemire, Portrait America, 

Inc., A.C. Demaree, Inc., Clean 

Car, Inc., and The Wax Museum 

& Auto Sales, Inc., 

Appellee-Plaintiff 

April 14, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No. 

49A02-1403-CT-188 

Appeal from the Marion 

Superior Court

Cause No. 49D07-0310-

CT-003394 

The Honorable Michael D. 

Keele, Judge 

Friedlander, Judge. 

[1] This litigation involves a dispute over responsibility for the costs of 

environmental cleanup of commercial real estate (the Site) located near the 
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corner of 52nd St. and Keystone Avenue in Indianapolis. 5200 Keystone 

Limited Realty, LLC (KLR) acquired the subject property from Apex Mortgage 

Corporation (Apex) after Apex had acquired the property through foreclosure 

proceedings against Eric Spicklemire, who purchased the property in 1981. 

Apex filed its complaint against Filmcraft Laboratories, Inc. (Filmcraft), a 

company owned by Spicklemire. The complaint alleged causes of action under 

these three statutes: 1) Ind. Code Ann. § 13-11-2-70.3 (West, Westlaw current 

with legislation of the 2015 First Regular Session of the 119th General 

Assembly effective through March 24 2015) (creating an “environmental legal 

action” (ELA), which is a legal action “brought to recover reasonable costs 

associated with removal or remedial action involving a hazardous substance or 

petroleum released into the surface or subsurface soil or groundwater that poses 

a risk to human health and the environment”); 2) Ind. Code Ann. § 13-30-3-

13(d) (West, Westlaw current with legislation of the 2015 First Regular Session 

of the 119th General Assembly effective through March 24, 2015) (creating an 

action to recover reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred by a 

landowner on whose land solid waste has been illegally dumped); and 3) Ind. 

Code Ann. § 6-1.1-22-13 (West, Westlaw current with legislation of the 2015 

First Regular Session of the 119th General Assembly effective through March 

24 2015) (liability for back property taxes). KLR was substituted as plaintiff 

after it purchased the Site from Apex. Shortly thereafter, KLR amended its 

complaint, adding as defendants Spicklemire, Portrait America, Inc., A.C. 

Demaree, Inc., Russ Dellen, Inc. (RDI), Clean Car, Inc., and The Wax 

Museum & Auto Sales. KLR appeals the grant of Spicklemire’s motion to 
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dismiss with respect to KLR’s statutory causes of action, and a grant of 

summary judgment with respect to certain common-law claims presented by 

KLR at trial. KLR presents the following consolidated, restated issues for 

review: 

1. Did the trial court err in excluding expert testimony 

regarding whether the Wax Museum & Auto Sales and 

Clean Car caused or contributed to the contamination at 

the Site? 

2. Did the trial court err in entering summary judgment 

against KLR on its common-law claims? 

3. Did the trial court err in dismissing KLR’s complaint 

pursuant to Trial Rule 41(B) on grounds that KLR failed 

to present sufficient evidence to show Spicklemire caused 

or contributed to chlorinated solvent and petroleum 

hydrocarbon contamination of the Site? 

[2] We affirm. 

[3] In order to understand the issues involved in this case, we must first set out in 

detail the history of the ownership and activity on the Site. A.C. Demaree Inc. 

(Demaree) owned and operated a commercial dry cleaning business on the Site 

from at least 1948 to 1973. It is undisputed that during this time, dry cleaners 

used two solvents to clean textiles: perchloroethylene, a chlorinated solvent, 

and Stoddard solvent, a petroleum hydrocarbon. Demaree stored these solvents 

in tanks at the Site. 

[4] In 1973, Demaree sold the Site to Robert Dellen, who in turn conveyed the Site 

in 1979 to Dellen Realty, Inc. (Dellen Realty), a predecessor of RDI. From 

1974 to 1981, Filmcraft leased the Site from Dellen and Dellen Realty. In 
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January 1981, Spicklemire and his father purchased the Site from Dellen 

Realty, and from 1981 to 2000, Spicklemire leased the site to Filmcraft. 

Spicklemire was a shareholder, officer, and employee of Filmcraft, and became 

the company’s president in 1994, when he became sole owner of Filmcraft and 

the Site. He remained in this position until the company ceased operation. 

Portrait America, also a Spicklemire-owned entity, leased the Site from 2000 to 

2001. During its years of operation, Filmcraft sublet the back of the Site to 

several auto-detailing operations. These included Clean Car, Inc. and The Wax 

Museum & Auto Sales (collectively, the Detailers). 

[5] During the time its business was located on the Site, i.e., 1974 to 2000 or 2001, 

Filmcraft operated a commercial photo-processing operation. This process was 

accomplished by the use of machines, which ran approximately eight to twelve 

hours per day. These machines processed film and printed images on paper. 

The processing generally involved the feeding of paper through a machine that 

sent the film or paper through a series of chemical baths and water-wash tanks. 

The chemicals used in this process included bleaches, fixers, and stabilizers 

manufactured by Kodak and other suppliers. Such chemicals were highly 

diluted by water. None of these chemicals contained chlorinated solvents. 

Filmcraft documents indicate that the only petroleum hydrocarbon used in 

Filmcraft’s operation were white grease and photographic lacquer. White 

grease was used to lubricate a single piece of equipment, and a single, three- to 

four-inch tube lasted the entire time that Filmcraft was in operation on the Site. 
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[6] During his ownership of the Site, Demaree had installed trench drains 

throughout the Site that connected to the sewer. Later, photo-processing 

chemicals spent in Filmcraft’s operations were discharged from its machines 

through a silver recovery device in the form of an effluent and, per 

manufacturer recommendations and standard industry practice, discharged into 

the trenches Demaree had installed. This effluent contained minute amounts of 

silver but did not contain chlorinated solvents or petroleum hydrocarbons. 

Subsequent testing indicated the presence of silver in a sediment sample 

collected from inside the trench where photo-processing effluent was 

discharged. No silver above regulatory action levels, however, was found in the 

soil and groundwater samples taken at the Site in 2013. On occasion, paper 

from the paper processor would clog the drain and form a sludge. This sludge 

did not contain chlorinated solvents or petroleum hydrocarbons. In 2013, the 

sewer lines were scoped by Gurney Bush, Inc. (GBI) with a video camera, 

which revealed certain offset joints in the sewer line, but no leaks were found.1

 

Also, GBI’s investigation confirmed that the sewer on the Site was usable and 

that water sent down the pipes went into the city’s main sewer line. 

[7] Filmcraft used small cans of aerosol lacquer that were approximately the size of 

a can of spray paint. Each can would last approximately one month, and the 

aerosol lacquer was applied directly to photographs in a ventilated area on the 

Site. Any overspray ended up on a peg board that was used to hold the 

 

1

 Indeed, GBI indicated that its procedure was not intended to look for leaks. 
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photographs or was vented out of the building through an exhaust fan. The 

testing indicated that no lacquer was released to the soil or groundwater at the 

Site. 

[8] As indicated, the rear part of the Site was sublet to various auto-detail 

companies during Filmcraft’s operation. The rear of the Site was separated 

from Filmcraft’s operation by a wall and a windowless door. The Detailers had 

their own main entrance to the Site on the outside of the building. Spicklemire 

was not in any way involved with the Detailers’ operations and had no 

knowledge of whether they used chemicals in their operations, much less what 

those chemicals would have been if indeed any were used. His interaction with 

those tenants was confined primarily to going to the rear of the Site to collect 

rent when it was overdue. Also, on occasion, Spicklemire would go to the 

Detailers and asked them to stop running cars inside the building when that 

occurred. On four or five occasions, Spicklemire brought photo-processing 

machinery through the garage door located in the Detailers’ space. Spicklemire 

claimed to have no knowledge of any chemical releases by the Detailers. 

[9] In 2001, Spicklemire defaulted on the mortgage and abandoned the Site. Apex 

foreclosed and acquired title via a sheriff’s deed, purchasing the Site via a credit 

bid of $240,000. After it acquired the property, Apex hired Keramida 

Environmental, Inc. (Keramida) in 2002 to conduct soil and groundwater 

samples at the Site. Keramida issued a report detailing the contamination it 

had discovered and suggesting further evaluation. Keramida’s report estimated 

that the cost of remediation for the problems it discovered would exceed 
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$150,000. On October 9, 2003, Apex filed this action against Filmcraft. After 

the lawsuit was filed, Portrait America paid Patriot Environmental & 

Engineering, Inc. (Patriot) to inventory and remove all chemicals from the Site. 

The chemicals removed included a gas can, motor oil, and various paints. 

None of these chemicals were used in Filmcraft’s operations. 

[10] “After full and complete disclosure of all potential environmental issues known 

to Apex as a result of the Keramida [inspection]”, Apex sold the Site to KLR 

for $20,000 in 2014. Exhibit 8B, paragraph 6, Admitted Exhibits Binder2

(Exhibits Binder). “Apex accepted the $20,000 sale price for the Site from 

[KLR] as a discount from the earlier appraised value of $400,000 because of the 

potential environmental contamination at the Site discussed in Keramida’s 

Phase II report [.]” Id. At this point, KLR was substituted for Apex as plaintiff 

in the present lawsuit. In 2013, KLR hired Terra Environmental Corporation 

(Terra) to perform additional tests on the Site. Terra’s test results essentially 

duplicated those of the tests performed earlier by Keramida in that they 

revealed the presence of chlorinated solvents and petroleum hydrocarbons in 

soil and groundwater samples. 

[11] As indicated above, the original and amended complaints alleged three 

statutory causes of action, including an ELA complaint under I.C. § 13-11-2-

70.3 to recover costs associated with remediation of hazardous substances 

 

2

 The pages in the Admitted Exhibits Binder (two volumes) are not numbered. The exhibits are, however, 

arranged in numerical order and tabbed, which expedited our review. 
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released into the soil or groundwater on the Site, an action under I.C. § 13-30-3-

13(d) to recover expenses and attorney fees incurred because solid waste was 

illegally dumped on the Site, and an action under I.C. § 6-1.1-22-13 against 

Spicklemire for back taxes owed on the Site. Ultimately, default judgments 

were entered in favor of KLR against Demaree, the Wax Museum & Auto 

Sales, and Clean Car. Claims against Portrait America were settled before trial. 

Russ Dellen, Inc. prevailed on summary judgment. Therefore, all that 

remained were the claims presented in a second amended complaint filed by 

KLR against Filmcraft and Spicklemire. 

[12] On March 28, 2013, KLR filed its Plaintiff’s Preliminary Contentions, 

Itemization of Damages, and Witness/Exhibit Lists (Plaintiff’s Preliminary 

Contentions), setting out for the first time among its “preliminary itemization of 

damages” common-law claims for lost rent and lost use. In response, 

Spicklemire sought summary judgment on KLR’s common-law claims on 

grounds that they were never pleaded and that in any event they are not 

available to a property owner against a prior owner of the same property. KLR 

challenges the trial court’s grant of this motion, which the trial court entered 

upon its finding that KLR was not entitled to recover economic damages under 

the ELA and that KLR had not pleaded any common-law claims. 

[13] Trial commenced against the remaining parties on the remaining counts on 

February 19-21, 2014. At the conclusion of KLR’s case-in-chief, Spicklemire 

and Filmcraft moved for involuntary dismissal under Trial Rule 41(B), arguing 

that upon the weight of the evidence presented by KLR, there had been no 
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showing of a right to relief. The trial court granted this motion and dismissed 

the complaint. KLR appeals the grant of the T.R. 41(B) motion and the grant of 

summary judgment on KLR’s common-law claims, as well as the exclusion of 

certain expert testimony. 

1. 

[14] We begin with KLR’s evidentiary claim that the trial court erred in disallowing 

KLR’s expert, Douglas Zabonick, Keramida’s president, to testify about his 

opinion regarding whether the auto-detailing operations conducted on the Site 

during Spicklemire’s ownership more likely than not used petroleum 

hydrocarbons and chlorinated solvents. During Zabonick’s direct testimony, he 

was asked whether he had an opinion regarding whether the Detailers’ 

operations more likely than not caused or contributed to the contamination at 

the Site. Spicklemire’s counsel objected and asked the following preliminary 

question: “You don’t have any knowledge whatsoever as to what chemicals 

these particular auto detailers were using at any time, do you?” Transcript at 

909. Zabonick responded, “That would be correct.” Id. Counsel objected to 

this line of questioning on the basis that Zabonick’s testimony would be “just 

speculation.” Id. KLR’s counsel then proceeded to question Zabonick about 

whether his (Zabonick’s) car had ever been to an auto detailing shop, and he 

responded that it had. When Zabonick was asked to describe that process, 

Spicklemire’s counsel objected on grounds that “whatever nice experience Mr. 

Zabonick may have had with the detailing of his car is utterly irrelevant to what 

was going on with these auto detailers.” Id. at 912. Spicklemire’s counsel again 
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objected on grounds that Zabonick’s testimony as it applied to the facts of the 

present case was “inherently speculative.” Id. KLR contends the trial court 

erred in sustaining the objection. 

[15] Indiana Evidence Rule 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony, and 

provides as follows: 

(a) A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 

experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an 

opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other 

specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 

evidence or to determine a fact in issue. 

(b) Expert scientific testimony is admissible only if the court is 

satisfied that the scientific principles upon which the expert 

testimony rests are reliable. 

[16] The admissibility of expert testimony under Evid. R. 702 is a matter within the 

trial court’s broad discretion and we will reverse such determinations only for 

an abuse of that discretion. Estate of Borwald v. Old Nat’l Bank, 12 N.E.3d 252 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Expert testimony admitted under Rule 702 requires more 

than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. Armstrong v. Cerestar USA, 

Inc., 775 N.E.2d 360 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. In conducting our 

review, we presume the trial court’s decision is correct, and the party 

challenging that decision bears the burden of persuading us that the trial court 

abused its discretion. Id. 

[17] Citing Vaughn v. Daniels Co., 841 N.E.2d 1133 (Ind. 2006), KLR argues that the 

trial court’s ruling improperly requires that in order to be admissible, an expert’s 

testimony must be based on first-hand experience. In Vaughn, the trial court 
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struck a paragraph in an affidavit completed by an expert and submitted by the 

opponent of a motion for summary judgment. Among other things, the 

proponents of the affidavit contended that the trial court erred in excluding that 

paragraph on grounds that the opinion lacked the requisite foundation. The 

trial court’s ruling was premised upon the fact that the expert did not view the 

equipment in question, but rather reviewed only documents setting forth the 

defendant’s proposal with respect to the equipment. Our Supreme Court 

reversed, holding that the expert’s prior experience and review of documents 

relating to the proposal provided a sufficient foundation for the expert opinion 

and that it was not necessary for the expert to have actually seen the equipment 

in question for him to render an expert opinion. 

[18] Although it is true that the Vaughn expert was permitted to offer opinion 

testimony even though he had not seen the equipment in question, it cannot 

fairly be said that the resulting opinion was based on “pure speculation.” The 

expert’s opinion as to the safety of the equipment at issue was based upon his 

review of a design drawing of that equipment rendered by its creator, who also 

happened to be a defendant. We reiterate, however, that in the present case, 

Zabonick admitted that he did not have “any knowledge whatsoever as to what 

chemicals these particular auto detailers were using at any time [.]” Transcript 

at 909. Thus, it appears that the only evidence that the Detailers could have 

caused or contributed to the particular contamination found at the Site involved 

pure speculation on Zabonick’s part as to what chemicals they used. This is not 

legally sufficient. See Estate of Dyer v. Doyle, 870 N.E.2d 573, 581 (Ind. Ct. App. 
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2007) (the appellant challenged the admission of expert testimony regarding the 

faked left syndrome,3

 arguing that there was no evidence that the factual 

scenario occurred in which the syndrome would be applicable; the court 

reversed upon observing that the plaintiff “admitted during cross-examination 

that there was no evidence that [the decedent] was ever in [the defendant’s] 

lane” and that “there must be some evidence other than the opinion itself that 

there was a ‘faked left’ occurrence for the opinion to pass muster”), trans. denied. 

The trial court did not err in excluding this evidence. 

2. 

[19] KLR contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of 

Spicklemire on KLR’s common-law claims of lost rent and loss of use. The 

trial court held, in pertinent part: 

The Second Amended Complaint makes no mention of any 

common law claims. Nor are the operative facts asserted against 

Spicklemire sufficient for a reasonable person to be on notice that 

[KLR] is making claims under any common law theories. The 

facts pled in [KLR’s] Second Amended Complaint are simply not 

 

3

 This was explained in Smith v. Yang, 829 N.E.2d 624, 627 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) as follows: 

This syndrome is seen near curves and/or hill crests where an initial vehicle 

enters the area left of center and the other driver steers to the left, now being 

left of center in avoidance, when the initial vehicle steers back to the right 

and a head-on collision occurs in the initial vehicle’s traveling lane. 
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sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that [KLR] is 

asserting common law claims against Spicklemire. 

Appellant’s Appendix at 40. 

[20] Summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party shows there are no 

genuine issues of material fact with respect to a particular issue or claim. Ind. 

Trial Rule 56(C); Bleeke v. Lemmon, 6 N.E.3d 907 (Ind. 2014). We review a 

summary judgment order de novo. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000 (Ind. 2014). 

Considering only the facts supported by evidence designated to the trial court 

by the parties, we must determine whether there is a “genuine issue as to any 

material fact” and whether “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 

matter of law.” T.R. 56(C); see also TP Orthodontics, Inc. v. Kesling, 15 N.E.3d 

985 (Ind. 2014). Where the moving party designates material demonstrating 

there are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to a particular issue or 

claim, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to come forward with 

designated evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

Bleeke v. Lemmon, 6 N.E.3d 907. Upon review, we will accept as true those facts 

alleged by the nonmoving party. Sees v. Bank One, Ind., N.A., 839 N.E.2d 154 

(Ind. 2005). “All designated evidence and reasonable inferences must be 

construed in favor of the non-moving party, and doubts resolved against the 

moving party.” Bleeke v. Lemmon, 6 N.E.3d at 917. The appellant bears the 

burden of demonstrating that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. 

Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000. Finally, we will affirm a grant of summary 

judgment on any theory supported by the record. Holiday Hospitality 

Franchising, Inc. v. AMCO Ins. Co., 983 N.E.2d 574 (Ind. 2013). 
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[21] KLR argues that the grant of the summary judgment was improper on the 

stated grounds because Indiana is a notice-pleading state, and as such requires 

only a short, plain statement of the claim showing an entitlement to relief, and a 

demand for relief to which the pleader is entitled. See Ind. Trial Rule 8(A). 

KLR claims that its complaint met these criteria because its second amended 

complaint “pled the operative facts to support claims for lost rent and reduced 

property value [.]” Appellant’s Brief at 41. In other words, the common-law 

claims were tried by consent. 

[22] In resolving this issue, it is important to note that at the time KLR filed its 

Plaintiff’s Preliminary Contentions, the only claims that remained unresolved 

were those presented in the second amended complaint against Filmcraft and 

Spicklemire. In an introductory paragraph of the Plaintiff’s Preliminary 

Contentions, KLR described its lawsuit against Spicklemire as an ELA action 

(i.e., “[KLR] brought this Environmental Legal Action (“ELA”) against the 

defendants for the payment of costs to delineate and remediate this Site”). 

Appellant’s Appendix at 103. It was in this document that KLR referenced for the 

first time its claim for lost rent and lost use. In response, Spicklemire filed a 

motion for summary judgment on grounds that the ELA permits recovery only 

of reasonable costs of removal or remedial action, and does not authorize 

claims for lost rent or loss of use. See I.C. § 13-30-9-2 (West, Westlaw current 

with legislation of the 2015 First Regular Session of the 119th General 

Assembly effective through March 24, 2015). In its brief opposing 

Spicklemire’s motion for summary judgment, KLR asserted that those costs 
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were recoverable under various common-law theories. This was the first time 

that KLR mentioned common-law remedies, or indeed described this lawsuit in 

terms other than an ELA action. This was approximately ten years after the 

onset of this litigation. Nevertheless, KLR contends these issues were tried by 

consent because the second amended complaint pleaded operative facts 

sufficient to support claims for lost rent and reduced property value, i.e., “these 

substances were deposited in the soil and groundwater during the Defendant’s 

ownership and/or operations at the Site and remained there after the 

Defendants ceased ownership and/or operation at the Site and continue to 

cause property damage.” Appellant’s Appendix at 59. 

[23] We first observe that the foregoing language cannot be deemed to have 

expressly presented the common-law claims in question. Not only are the 

concepts of “lost rent” and “loss of use” not pleaded with specificity, but the 

reference to continuing property damage is made in a complaint identified 

explicitly as an ELA action. This leaves only the possibility that the commonlaw claims were tried by implied consent of the parties, which is the main thrust 

of KLR’s argument on this point. 

[24] Trial Rule 15 (B) provides: “[w]hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried 

by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects 

as if they had been raised in the pleadings.” Generally, we consider two factors 

when determining whether a party has impliedly consented to a non-pleaded 

issue at trial. First, did the opposing party have notice of the issue? Second, did 

the opposing party object to the issue being litigated at trial? Mercantile Nat’l 
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Bank of Ind. v. First Builders of Ind., Inc., 774 N.E.2d 488 (Ind. 2002). Our 

Supreme Court has stated, “[i]f the opposing party both had notice and failed to 

object at trial, then that party will have impliedly consented to the non-pleaded 

issue at trial.” Id. at 492-93. Both elements must be met in order for a party to 

be deemed to have impliedly consented to a non-pleaded issue. See id. at 493 

(“[w]e find that Owner validly objected to the personal liability issue being 

litigated, and although Owner had notice of this issue, Owner did not impliedly 

consent to it being litigated within the meaning of Trial Rule 15(B)”). 

[25] Even assuming Spicklemire had notice of the common-law claims, his objection 

to the presentation of those claims when denominated as such for the first time 

in Plaintiff’s Preliminary Contentions constituted a valid objection to those 

issues being litigated. Therefore, Spicklemire did not impliedly consent to 

litigating those issues at trial within the meaning of T.R. 15(B). The trial court 

did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Spicklemire on KLR’s 

common-law claims. 

3. 

[26] KLR contends the trial court erred in dismissing its complaint pursuant to Trial 

Rule 41(B) on grounds that KLR failed to present sufficient evidence to show 

Spicklemire caused or contributed to chlorinated solvent and petroleum 

hydrocarbon contamination of the Site. 

[27] When reviewing a ruling on a T.R. 41(B) motion to dismiss, we apply the 

following standard of review: 
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The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss made under Trial Rule 

41(B) is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. In 

reviewing a motion for involuntary dismissal, this court will not 

reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. 

We will reverse the trial court only if the evidence is not 

conflicting and points unerringly to a conclusion different from 

the one reached by the lower court. 

Todd v. State, 900 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Thornton–

Tomasetti Eng’rs v. Indianapolis–Marion Cnty. Pub. Library, 851 N.E.2d 1269, 

1277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). 

[28] In this particular case, in granting Spicklemire’s T.R. 41(B) motion, the trial 

court ruled that KLR failed to establish a viable ELA claim. In order to 

establish such a case, KLR was required to prove that Spicklemire “caused or 

contributed to the release of a hazardous substance or petroleum into the 

surface or subsurface soil or groundwater that poses a risk to human health and 

the environment.” I.C. § 13-30-9-2. The parties stipulated before trial that 

“chlorinated solvents and petroleum hydrocarbons [had] been detected in the 

soil and groundwater at the Site.” Appellant’s Appendix at 45. Thus, in order to 

prevail, or, as the case may be, survive a T.R. 41(B) motion to dismiss, KLR 

was required to offer evidence that Spicklemire caused or contributed to the 

release of chlorinated solvents and petroleum hydrocarbons in the soil and 

groundwater at the Site. 

[29] KLR contends that it did present such evidence, and further that the trial court’s 

conclusion to the contrary is a result of the court applying the wrong legal 

standard. According to KLR, “[t]he ELA does not require a person who cleans 
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up a contaminated property to prove specific contaminating incidents with 

direct evidence.” Appellant’s Brief at 12. Rather, according to KLR, it is enough 

“to show with direct or circumstantial evidence that the defendant more likely 

than not ‘had some involvement with the contaminants at issue’ or ‘helped 

bring about’ contamination of the property.” Id. (citing Reed v. Reid, 980 

N.E.2d 277, 289 (Ind. 2012), Gary v. Schafer 683 F. Supp.2d 836, 855 (N.D. Ind. 

2010), and Neal v. Cure, 937 N.E. 1227, 1234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. 

denied)). KLR urges that “[e]ven if [Spicklemire] only helped spread 

contamination others put at the Site or contributed to one-half of 1 % of the 

contamination at the Site, he is liable under the ELA.” Id. at 12-13. KLR 

claims that it presented evidence that Spicklemire contributed to a release of the 

contaminants by having some involvement with the contaminants. In essence 

KLR contends that Spicklemire helped spread the contaminants that were 

brought to and released onto the Site by others. As KLR phrases it, “it is 

against the logic and effect of the evidence presented at trial to hold that 

Spicklemire’s 26 years of unlawful, chemical-laden operations and heavy daily 

discharges at the Site had absolutely no effect on the Site.” Id. at 13. 

[30] The standard to be applied in ELA cases alleging that a party “caused or 

contributed” to environmental contamination of the sort covered by the ELA 

was addressed by this court as follows: 

The phrase “caused or contributed” is not defined by statute, and 

we must give those words their plain and ordinary meaning. 

“Each term of the phrase ‘caused or contributed’ requires some 

involvement by the actor which produces a result.” Standard 
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English dictionaries may also be consulted in determining the 

meaning of this phrase. A standard dictionary definition of 

“cause” is “‘a person, thing, fact, or condition that brings about 

an effect or that produces or calls forth a resultant action or 

state.’” “Among other things, ‘contribute’ means ‘to act as a 

determining factor; share responsibility for something.’” Our goal 

when construing the phrase “cause or contribute” should be to 

hold accountable all parties “responsible for creating 

environmental contaminations.” 

JDN Props., LLC v. VanMeter Enters., Inc., 17 N.E.3d 357, 360-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2014) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, KLR is correct in that “caused or 

contributed” in this context requires proof that the defendant was in some way 

involved in the contamination of the property in question. 

[31] In Neal v. Cure, 937 N.E.2d at 1234, the definition of “caused or contributed” 

was further refined for our particular purposes, i.e., in determining the liability 

of a landlord under the ELA. In Neal, the plaintiff sued a landlord under the 

ELA for contamination caused by its tenant. The landlord submitted a motion 

for summary judgment, arguing that it was not responsible for the 

contamination, nor was it aware that the contamination was occurring or had 

occurred. On appeal, the plaintiff argued only that the evidence demonstrated 

that the landlord “contributed” to (versus “caused”) the contamination. The 

trial court granted the motion upon its conclusion that the plaintiffs had 

presented no evidence demonstrating an affirmative act on the part of the 

landlord that caused or contributed to the contamination. The court further 

concluded, “any alleged inaction on the part of [the landlord] ... cannot form 

the basis for determining that the [landlord] caused or contributed to the 
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contamination.” Id. at 1233. The court on appeal thus undertook to determine 

the meaning of “contributed” in this context and concluded that “the plain 

language of the statute does not permit an ELA action against landlords who 

‘by all accounts were not involved in the alleged release of hazardous 

substances and had no knowledge of the release.’” Id. at 1235 (quoting City of 

Martinsville v. Masterwear Corp., 2006 WL 2710628, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Ind. 

2006)). 

[32] In the present case, the parties stipulated that Demaree was responsible for the 

chlorinated solvent and petroleum hydrocarbon contamination at the Site. The 

court found that subsequent purchaser Spicklemire had no involvement in the 

day-to-day operations of Filmcraft’s subtenants, i.e., the Detailers, nor did he 

have knowledge regarding whether those subtenants used chemicals in their 

operations. Moreover, there was no evidence that the Detailers used any 

chlorinated solvents or petroleum hydrocarbons in their operations. Therefore, 

the evidence supported the determination that Spicklemire was not liable by 

virtue of his status as landlord vis-à-vis the Detailers and their operations on the 

Site. 

[33] As for liability by virtue of Filmcraft’s own activities, the direct evidence 

indicated that, with but one very minor exception, its operations did not involve 

the use of chlorinated solvents or petroleum hydrocarbons. The exception 

involved the use of a single tube of white grease – about three to four inches in 

size – which contained petroleum hydrocarbon. That single tube was used so 

sparingly that it lasted the entire time Filmcraft was in operation. This supports 
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the trial court’s finding that Filmcraft’s operations did not contribute to the 

petroleum hydrocarbon or chlorinated solvent contamination on the Site. 

[34] We note also that sometime around 1980, Filmcraft purchased a fifty-fivegallon drum of photographic lacquer. Filmcraft also purchased four one-gallon 

cans of lacquer. None of these containers were ever used, or apparently even 

opened, because Filmcraft did not have enough lacquer orders to justify it. The 

full fifty-five-gallon drum was found during Patriot’s chemical 

decommissioning, and was described by Patriot as sealed and not leaking. 

Patriot properly disposed of it. The evidence also showed that Filmcraft used 

small cans of aerosol lacquer, which was applied to photographs in a ventilated 

booth. Overspray ended up on the pegboard used to hold the photographs at 

the time, or was vented out of the building through an exhaust fan. Filmcraft 

used approximately one can (about the size of a can of spray paint) per month. 

This evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Filmcraft’s operations did 

not contribute to the petroleum hydrocarbon or chlorinated solvent 

contamination on the Site. 

[35] Those chemicals that Filmcraft did use were heavily diluted with water, and 

effluent from the photo-processing operations was discharged into a trench 

drain that led to city sewers. Zabonick testified that the photo-processing 

effluent did not contain chlorinated solvents or petroleum hydrocarbons, and 

that discharge of photo-processing effluent to the trench did not cause 

contamination at the Site. The effluent did contain silver, but not in amounts 

above regulatory action levels in the soil or groundwater. A test of the soil 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1403-CT-188 |April 14, 2015 Page 22 of 26

around the drain did not reveal the presence of silver in the soil. Moreover, we 

must bear in mind that this testing of the drain and sewer lines occurred in 

2013, which was fully twelve or thirteen years after Filmcraft ceased operations 

on the Site. Again, this evidence supports the trial court’s finding that 

Filmcraft’s operations did not actively contribute to the petroleum hydrocarbon 

or chlorinated solvent contamination on the Site. 

[36] We understand that the gist of KLR’s argument is that the trial court applied an 

impossibly high standard in determining whether KLR had proven its case 

under the ELA. According to KLR, “the ‘contributed’ element of the ELA 

should not be interpreted to require an ELA plaintiff to produce direct evidence 

that the defendants released specific contaminants on specific dates, which 

caused the contamination driving the remediation decades later.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 8. It seems that KLR reads into the court’s findings and conclusions the 

view that, in order to prevail under the ELA, KLR was required to present 

evidence that on a specific date Spicklemire contributed to the release of a 

particular contaminant into the soil or groundwater. We do not interpret the 

trial court’s findings and conclusions to convey such an exacting standard. 

[37] For purposes of this litigation, the important dates were those dates for which 

KLR could establish that Spicklemire was present on the Site, or had 

knowledge of or bore some responsibility for what was occurring on the Site. 

KLR adduced such evidence, establishing the date range of Spicklemire’s 

ownership of the Site, the date range of Filmcraft’s operations, and the date 

range of the operations of the subtenants, i.e., the Detailers. It was then up to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1403-CT-188 |April 14, 2015 Page 23 of 26

KLR to present evidence linking Spicklemire to the particular contaminants 

discovered to be present at the Site via the inspections performed by Keramida 

in 2002 and Terra in 2013, i.e., chlorinated solvents or petroleum hydrocarbons. 

As explained above, KLR’s evidence did not establish that Filmcraft used 

products containing those contaminants in its operations, nor did Filmcraft’s 

subtenants, the Detailers. 

[38] KLR points to the testimony of its expert, Zabonick, to the effect that “the 

historical operations of the Site have contributed to the contamination present 

at the Site.” Transcript at 854. He went on to include Filmcraft as a contributor 

to that contamination on grounds that some of the chemicals used in the film 

processing operation “more likely than not would have contributed to the 

contamination or cause some additional contamination.” Id. at 855. Yet, 

Zabonick also testified on this subject as follows: 

Q Now, let’s talk about your opinion that Filmcraft’s photo 

and film processing operations contributed to the 

contamination at the site. You understand that Filmcraft 

used chemicals to develop film and photographs, correct? 

A Correct. 

Q You understand that these chemicals included developers, 

fixes, bleaches, as well as some other -- as well as water, 

correct? 

A Correct. 

Q You also understand that Filmcraft used a variety of 

machines when they developed film and photographs, 

correct? 

A Correct. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1403-CT-188 |April 14, 2015 Page 24 of 26

Q But it’s not your opinion that day-to-day effluent or 

discharge from these machines contained any chlorinated 

solvents or petroleum hydrocarbons, is it? 

A That would be correct. 

Q In fact, you agreed with me that introducing chlorinated 

solvents would be detrimental to that photographic or film 

processing, didn’t you? 

A I believe so. 

Q So rather you believe that Filmcraft may have conducted 

other activities at the site that contributed to that -- to the 

petroleum hydrocarbon and chlorinated solvent 

contamination, correct? 

A By “contributed to”, are you meaning adding additional 

chlorinated and petroleum hydrocarbons or contributing to 

the migration of the existing contamination? 

Q Let’s stick with your old opinion. Just contributing to the 

chlorinated solvent and petroleum hydrocarbon 

contamination at the site and then we’ll talk about this 

migration. 

A Okay. Can you ask the question again, please. 

Q So you believe that Filmcraft conducted some other 

activities at the site other than discharging effluent that 

added something to the petroleum hydrocarbon and 

chlorinated solvent contamination at the site, correct? 

A Yes. 

Q And you believe these activities could have included 

cleaning the film and the developing equipment, is that 

right? 

A That’s correct. 

Q Even though you have no knowledge of whether or not 

they used chlorinated solvents or petroleum hydrocarbons 

in that process? 
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A That’s correct. 

Q You also believe that these activities could have included 

cleaning film, correct? 

A Correct. 

Q What film cleaners did the photo processing, the photo 

and film processing operations use? 

A This specific operation? 

Q Yes. 

A I have no knowledge of any specific cleaners that they 

would have used. 

Q So you don’t know the company that manufactured it, 

correct? 

A That would be correct. 

Q You don’t know the chemical that they supplied, correct? 

A That would be correct. 

Q You don’t know how Filmcraft may have used that 

chemical, is that correct? 

A That would be correct. 

Q How do you know that these operations could have 

contributed? 

A I guess I’m not sure – [.] 

Transcript at 940-43. In light of this testimony, among other things, Zabonick’s 

opinion as to Spicklemire’s responsibility for the contamination was not so 

irrefutably supported by the direct and circumstantial evidence presented during 

KLR’s case-in-chief that, in rejecting it, the trial court committed clear error. 

See Todd v. State, 900 N.E.2d 776. In the end, the evidence cited by KLR as 
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crossing the minimum threshold4

 is just too speculative to mandate a different 

result. We cannot say that the evidence pertaining to whether Spicklemire 

caused or contributed to contamination at the Site is non-conflicting and points 

unerringly to a conclusion different from the one reached by the trial court. See

id. 

[39] Judgment affirmed. 

Kirsch, J., and Crone, J., concur. 

 

4 E.g. “The contaminants found at the Site are consistent with some of the petroleum hydrocarbons and 

chlorinated solvents typically used by photo processors during Filmcraft’s operations.” Appellant’s Brief at 5 

(emphasis supplied).