ML081850581 

UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION 

OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS 

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 

October 22, 2008 

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2008-17: CONSTRUCTION EXPERIENCE WITH 

CONCRETE PLACEMENT 

ADDRESSEES 

All current and potential applicants for an early site permit, combined license, or standard 

design certification for a nuclear power plant under the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear 

Power Plants,” all current holders of and potential applicants for construction permits under 

10 CFR Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, and all licensees 

and potential applicants for new fuel cycle facilities under 10 CFR Part 70, “Domestic Licensing 

of Special Nuclear Material.” 

PURPOSE 

The United States (U.S.) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information 

notice (IN) to alert addressees to the importance of considering lessons learned from 

construction experience when planning for and constructing new nuclear power plants or fuel 

cycle facilities. Recipients are expected to review the information for applicability to their 

planned activities and consider actions to avoid similar problems. The suggestions contained in 

this IN are not NRC requirements, and no specific action or written response is required. 

BACKGROUND 

The nuclear industry in the U.S. faced many construction quality and design issues in the 1970s 

and 1980s. In 1984, the NRC issued NUREG-1055, “Improving Quality and the Assurance of 

Quality in the Design and Construction of Nuclear Power Plants,” to document the lessons 

learned from plant construction in the U.S. (Agencywide Documents Access and Management 

System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML063000293). The NRC also issued IN 2007-04, 

“Construction Experience Related to the Assurance of Quality in the Construction of Nuclear 

Facilities” (ADAMS Accession No. ML063040426), to alert addressees to the importance of 

considering lessons learned from construction experience when planning for and constructing 

new nuclear power plants or fuel cycle facilities. 

Recently identified problems in some domestic and international construction projects could 

provide new insights to the nuclear industry to understand the causal factors and to avoid 

similar mistakes in the future. The experiences referenced in this IN mainly focus on problems 

with concrete placement processes in the construction of new nuclear power plants and a fuel 

fabrication facility. The NRC believes this information is appropriate for consideration in the 

construction of any nuclear facilities. 
IN 2008-17 

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DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES 

Concrete Placement Issues at Olkiluoto 3 in Finland

An investigation report, issued July 10, 2006, on the construction problems and resulting delays 

of Olkiluoto 3 by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), identified several 

contributing factors. Among them was the concrete placement of the reactor building basemat. 

During this phase of construction, Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO), the licensee, detected 

inconsistencies in the concrete between different truckloads. TVO confirmed that the plasticizer 

caused the variation. Other problems involved water-cement ratios outside of design 

requirements and changes in the composition of the concrete made by the contractor outside of 

the procedural process without the licensee’s knowledge. As a result, the licensee and 

regulator required various tests on the concrete and also investigated the construction site 

operations. Test results indicated that the concrete met minimum standards. Investigation of 

site operations indicated that this event was, in part, caused by the lack of communication, the 

lack of defined responsibilities, and poor quality control. Although the concrete was ultimately 

found acceptable, this event caused lengthy construction delays and had a negative impact on 

public confidence. The full STUK investigation report is available online at 

http://www.stuk.fi/stuk/tiedotteet/2006/en_GB/news_419/_files/76545710906084186/default/inve

stigation_report.pdf

Concrete Mixing Issues at Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility

In September 2007, an NRC inspector at the Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility 

(MFFF) construction site observed various problems with concrete placement. Based on the 

applicant’s rejection of five concrete truckloads due to concrete slumps being outside of the 

design value, the inspector performed an inspection of the concrete batch plant. During 

inspection at the batch plant, which was operated by a contractor, the inspector noted that 

chemical plasticizer and water that exceeded the manufacturer’s recommendation and the 

design specification were added to the design mix. The addition was made without procedural 

guidance and was not documented. In response to the NRC inspection, the applicant, Shaw 

AREVA MOX Services, assumed responsibility for concrete testing at the batch plant, provided 

immediate quality assurance coverage of all batching operations, ensured that batch plant 

procedures were written or revised as necessary, and consulted independent experts for 

recommendations for improvement. NRC Team Inspection Report 70-3098/2007-004 is 

available as a public document in ADAMS under Accession No. ML073030407. 

In January 2008, at the construction site of the MFFF, a concrete reinforcement steel bar failed. 

The reinforcement steel bar fractured near a bend location due to work hardening during the 

bending process. In response, the NRC conducted a reactive inspection in February 2008, 

which revealed problems with bent rebar, primarily in the foundation of the facility. This led to 

NRC inspections of the reinforcing steel vendor and the MFFF site. The inspection of the steel 

vendor revealed the following five nonconformances: inadequate surveillance of the fabrication 

of rebar, inadequate audits of sub-suppliers, failure to verify adequacy of design in the 

dedication of commercial grade items, failure to write a corrective action process condition 

report for a significant condition adverse to quality, and the failure to properly disposition a code 

deficiency. The MFFF inspection yielded no findings. The applicant had already issued more 

than 80 condition reports addressing problems with vendor parts and further increased oversight 
IN 2008-17 

Page 3 of 4 

of vendor activities. NRC Team Inspection Reports 70-3098/2008-005 and 99900866/2008-001 

are available as public documents under ADAMS Accession Nos. ML081340672 and 

ML081410040. Additionally, NRC Inspection Report 07003098/2007-003 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML072080093), provides information on nonconformance reports issued by the licensee to 

the steel vendor. 

Concrete Placement Issues at Flamanville 3 in France

An inspection of the Electricite de France (EDF) Flamanville 3 European Pressurized Reactor 

construction site by the Autorite de Surete Nucleaire (ASN) in March 2008 revealed several 

problems with the reinforcement steel bars and concrete placement for the basemat of the fuel 

storage buildings. The inspection revealed improperly spliced and tied rebar, and reinforcing 

steel placement that did not conform to approved procedures and design requirements. Despite 

these deficiencies, the concrete contractor had initiated the concrete placement procedure. 

ASN was able to check that corrective action had been taken accordingly before concrete had 

actually been placed in the area. In another case, the concrete reinforcement and placement 

did not follow the construction specifications and drawings. A review of site conformance 

records indicated that some aspects of the work were flagged with specific notations as 

potential nonconformances, but the follow-up actions were not tracked. Accordingly, ASN 

requested that the licensee provide additional information. For the issue of improperly spliced 

and tied rebar and nonconforming reinforcing steel placement, assurances that prior concrete 

placements were free of inconsistencies with the design requirements were requested. In the 

case where implementation did not match the construction specifications and drawings, ASN 

requested that the licensee document and validate the alternate methods, and explain the 

reasons for the failure to follow approved construction procedures. ASN requested information 

about the causes leading to the failure to track and close deficiencies identified in field records. 

The letter from ASN to the licensee (in French) detailing the inspection findings and required 

actions can be found online at http://www.asn.fr/sections/rubriquesprincipales/actualites/lettresuite-d/genie-civil_10/downloadFile/file/INS_2008_EDFFA3_0012.pdf

On May 21, 2008, EDF informed ASN about another nonconformity concerning the 

reinforcement steel of the basemat of the safeguard auxiliary buildings, specifically, a lack of 

stirrups. Beyond the technical nonconformance, ASN considers the main issue to be the 

licensee’s quality management system. A preliminary analysis of the root causes indicated that 

the nonconformance had not been corrected before concrete placement although the lack of 

stirrups had been identified on time by both the subcontractors and the licensee. Consequently, 

ASN stopped the concrete placement activities of all buildings relevant to safety, mainly the 

pumping station and nuclear island basemat. ASN asked the licensee to provide detailed plans 

to identify managerial and organizational enhancements to support improved oversight of field 

activities, and to facilitate field task tracking. The licensee submitted its revised action plan, and 

ASN determined that it would allow the proposed improvement to the quality management 

system of Flamanville 3. On June 17, 2008, ASN authorized the licensee to resume concrete 

placement activities on all buildings except the basemat of the safeguard auxiliary buildings. 

For the safeguard auxiliary buildings, the licensee submitted a technical analysis of the 

nonconformance and a proposed correction that have been assessed by ASN. ASN then 

authorized the licensee to resume concrete placement activities on the safeguard auxiliary 

buildings in July 2008. 
IN 2008-17 

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DISCUSSION 

Both abroad and in the U.S., interest in new reactor and fuel cycle facility construction is 

resuming after many years. However, problems in nuclear construction, similar to those 

identified in the U.S. more than 20 years ago, have resurfaced. Although the technical issues 

vary, inspections repeatedly identify a lack of contractor oversight and poor quality control in 

concrete placement. A commitment to quality, applied early in a construction project, ensures 

that a facility is constructed and operated in conformance with its license and NRC regulations. 

Particular attention should be given to quality assurance program effectiveness and the 

implementation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B requirements, especially when the construction work 

is directly related to nuclear safety and is performed by contractors. Also, concrete placement 

problems can be avoided by ensuring the correct installation of the rebar in accordance with the 

approved drawing details and complying with the applicable American Concrete Institute codes. 

Specifically, prevention of problems similar to those identified necessitates appropriate controls 

in activities such as: (1) concrete batch plant inspections and truck mixer quality checks (e.g., 

slump tests), (2) rebar bending, (3) concrete placement and consolidation using vibrators, (4) 

quality control checks of the rebar installation (prior to concrete placement), and the visual 

inspection of the concrete placement activities, and (5) concrete testing (e.g., cylinder samples 

and compressive strength breaks). 

CONTACT

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any 

questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below. 

/RA/ /RA/ 

Michael Case, Director Glenn Tracy, Director 

Division of Policy and Rulemaking Division of Construction Inspection and 

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Operational Programs 

 Office of New Reactors 

/RA/ 

Daniel Dorman, Director 

Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards 

Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards 

Technical Contacts: Richard Laura Omid Tabatabai 

 NRO/DCIP/CCIB NRO/DCIP/CCIB 

 (301) 415-1837 (301) 415-6616 

 richard.laura@nrc.gov omid.tabatabai@nrc.gov

Principal Contributor: Genevieve Russo 

 NRO College Intern 

 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, 

http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections 
IN 2008-17 

Page 4 of 4 

DISCUSSION 

Both abroad and in the U.S., interest in new reactor and fuel cycle facility construction is resuming after 

many years. However, problems in nuclear construction, similar to those identified in the U.S. more than 

20 years ago, have resurfaced. Although the technical issues vary, inspections repeatedly identify a lack 

of contractor oversight and poor quality control in concrete placement. A commitment to quality, applied 

early in a construction project, ensures that a facility is constructed and operated in conformance with its 

license and NRC regulations. Particular attention should be given to quality assurance program 

effectiveness and the implementation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B requirements, especially when the 

construction work is directly related to nuclear safety and is performed by contractors. Also, concrete 

placement problems can be avoided by ensuring the correct installation of the rebar in accordance with 

the approved drawing details and complying with the applicable American Concrete Institute codes. 

Specifically, prevention of problems similar to those identified necessitates appropriate controls in 

activities such as: (1) concrete batch plant inspections and truck mixer quality checks (e.g., slump tests), 

(2) rebar bending, (3) concrete placement and consolidation using vibrators, (4) quality control checks of 

the rebar installation (prior to concrete placement), and the visual inspection of the concrete placement 

activities, and (5) concrete testing (e.g., cylinder samples and compressive strength breaks). 

CONTACT

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about 

this matter to the technical contact listed below. 

/RA/ /RA/ 

Michael Case, Director Glenn Tracy, Director 

Division of Policy and Rulemaking Division of Construction Inspection and 

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Operational Programs 

 Office of New Reactors 

/RA/ 

Daniel Dorman, Director 

Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards 

Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards 

Technical Contacts: Richard Laura Omid Tabatabai 

 NRO/DCIP/CCIB NRO/DCIP/CCIB 

 (301) 415-1837 (301) 415-6616 

 richard.laura@nrc.gov omid.tabatabai@nrc.gov

Principal Contributor: Genevieve Russo 

 NRO College Intern 

 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, 

under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections 

DISTRIBUTION: 

IN File 

ADAMS ACCESSION: ML081850581 

OFFICE CCIB:DCIP:NRO Tech Ed. TL:CCIB:DCIP:NRO BC:CCIB:DCIP:NRO BC:IAC:OIP BC:MB:FCSS:NMSS OGC (NLO) 

NAME GRusso HChang RLaura RRasmussen CAbrams MKotzalaz MSpencer 

DATE 07/15 /08 07/18 /08 08/18 /08 08/18 /08 10/15/2008 10/10/2008 08/22/08 

OFFICE LA:PGCB:NRR PM:PGCB:NRR BC:PGCB:NRR D:DCIP:NRO D:FCSS:NMSS D:DPR:NRR 

NAME CHawes DBeaulieu MMurphy GTracy DDorman MCase 

DATE 09/17/08 10/03/08 10/22/08 09/12/08 10/21/2008 10/22/08 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY