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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

DERRICK L. HILLS, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. Case No. 2:15-cv-12148 

 Honorable Arthur J. Tarnow 

RICHARD A. ROBLE, 

AARON GARCIA, and 

JOHN DOE 1-6, 

 Defendants. 

______________________________/ 

ORDER 

(1) RESCINDING THE ORDER OF REFERENCE (ECF No. 8), 

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR SERVICE OF THE COMPLAINT (ECF No. 3),

(3) DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 6),

(4) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR ADMINISTRATIVE CLOSURE (ECF No. 11),

AND 

(5) CLOSING THIS CASE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES 

I. Introduction and Background 

 On June 11, 2015, plaintiff Derrick L. Hills, a prisoner at the Federal 

Correctional Institution in Loretto, Pennsylvania, filed a pro se civil rights complaint 

for money damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 

Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). At the same time, 

Plaintiff moved to have the United States Marshal serve his complaint on the 

defendants. 

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 The complaint alleges that, on June 20, 2012, attorney Richard A. Roble of the 

United States Trustee’s Office filed a notice of appearance in a criminal contempt 

prosecution against Plaintiff, and in September of 2013, Roble represented the 

Government at Plaintiff’s trial on the contempt charge. Plaintiff stated that, on 

September 19, 2013, a jury found him guilty of five counts of criminal contempt, and 

because he failed to appear for sentencing, a warrant was issued for his arrest. 

 Plaintiff further alleges in his complaint that, during the execution of the arrest 

warrant on February 21, 2014, defendant Aaron Garcia, a deputy United States 

Marshal, and the unnamed defendants snatched him out of his house, flung him facefirst into fourteen inches of snow, and twisted his arm with extreme force even though 

he was completely cooperative. He also alleges that one of the arresting officers shot 

and killed his dog. 

 Plaintiff states in his complaint that he is serving a sentence of forty-six months 

in prison as a result of his federal conviction for criminal contempt. He claims that: 

(1) defendant Roble deprived him of life and liberty without due process of law by 

prosecuting him without a proper grant of authority; and (2) defendant Garcia and the 

unnamed defendants violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force on him 

during his arrest. 

 On September 11, 2015, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the 

ground that Plaintiff’s due process claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 

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477 (1994), because his conviction has not been set aside.1 Defendant Roble also 

claimed that he was entitled to absolute immunity from suit for his role in judicial 

proceedings. Defendant Garcia sought a dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for wrongful 

arrest or wrongful entry and improper seizure of Plaintiff’s dog. He claimed that he 

was entitled to qualified immunity and that Plaintiff had failed to show he had any 

personal involvement in the shooting of Plaintiff’s dog. 

 On September 16, 2015, the Court referred Plaintiff’s case to the Magistrate 

Judge for all pretrial proceedings and for a report and recommendation on all 

dispositive matters. On September 22, 2015, Plaintiff filed an objection to the 

defendants’ motion to dismiss and a motion of his own for administrative closing. He 

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 The Supreme Court held in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnotes omitted), 

that, 

to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness 

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove 

that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, 

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized 

to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s 

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for 

damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not 

been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state 

prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider 

whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the 

invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be 

dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or 

sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines 

that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the 

invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the 

action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the 

suit. 

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urges the Court to stay his case or to dismiss the case without prejudice because an 

appeal from his criminal contempt conviction is pending in the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 

 In a reply to Plaintiff’s answer to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, defendants 

Roble and Garcia continue to urge the Court to dismiss the claims against Roble in 

their entirety and the claims against Garcia in part. Both defendants assert that 

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey. In addition, Roble reasserts the 

right to absolute immunity from suit for acts taken during judicial proceedings. 

Defendant Garcia seeks partial dismissal on grounds that (1) a valid arrest warrant 

forecloses Plaintiff’s claim of wrongful entry or arrest and (2) Plaintiff has failed to 

show that Garcia was personally involved in the seizure of Plaintiff’s dog. 

II. Discussion

 A federal court may dismiss an action at the Plaintiff’s request “on terms that 

the court considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). The dismissal is without 

prejudice unless the order states otherwise. Id. Rule 41(a)(2) is “a discretionary 

procedural rule,” which requires the district court to “provide some indication as to 

why it exercised its discretion as it did.” Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Universal-MCA 

Music Pub., Inc., 481 F.3d 926, 931 (6th Cir. 2007). 

 Here, Plaintiff desires to voluntarily dismiss his case because he recognizes that 

Heck v. Humphrey is a bar to some of his claims and because he is confident that his 

conviction will be reversed. A dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey, moreover, is 

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without prejudice. Callihan v. Schneider, 178 F.3d 800, 804 (6th Cir. 1999). The 

Court therefore believes that a dismissal of this action is appropriate and fair to all 

concerned. Accordingly, 

 • the order referring this case to the Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 8) is rescinded; 

 • Plaintiff’s motion for service of the complaint (ECF No. 3) is denied as moot, 

because the complaint has already been served on the defendants or on counsel for the 

defendants; 

• the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint (ECF No. 6) is denied 

without prejudice; and 

 • Plaintiff’s motion for administrative closure (ECF No. 11) is granted. The 

complaint is dismissed without prejudice, and this case is hereby closed. 

 SO ORDERED. 

 s/Arthur J. Tarnow 

 ARTHUR J. TARNOW 

Dated: October 15, 2015 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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