GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Attorney General

November 1999 SEIZED DRUGS AND 

WEAPONS

DEA Needs to 

Improve Certain 

Physical Safeguards 

and Strengthen 

Accountability

GAO/AIMD-00-17

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Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 28

Appendix II: Comments From the Drug Enforcement 

Administration 31

Tables Table 1: Seized Drug Activity for the Year Ended September 30, 1998 8

Abbreviations

AAPC Accounting and Auditing Policy Committee

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DOJ Department of Justice

FASAB Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

JFMIP Joint Financial Management Improvement Program

NEDS Non-Drug Evidence System

OIG Office of Inspector General

SFFAS Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standard

STRIDE System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence
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United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

Accounting and Information

Management Division

B-283521 Letr

November 30, 1999

The Honorable Janet Reno

The Attorney General

Dear Madam Attorney General:

Since 1990, we have periodically reported on government operations that 

we have identified as “high risk” because of their greater vulnerabilities to 

waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. One of these operations is the 

asset forfeiture program operated by the Department of Justice (DOJ). 

As we reported in January 1999, although some improvements have been 

made to the program since we first designated it as a high-risk program in 

1990, significant problems remain and continued oversight is necessary to 

ensure that policies and procedures are followed and that adequate 

safeguards are in place.1

Related to asset forfeiture, DOJ operations often involve the seizure, 

custody, and disposition of evidence that is used by federal prosecutors. 

A critical support function is controlling evidence to help ensure that 

federal cases are not compromised or weakened by challenges made by the 

defense about the existence, completeness, or handling of evidence, or its 

ties to defendants. Seized property, including items such as drugs and 

weapons, are subject to forfeiture and typically remain in the custody of 

the seizing agency until they are approved for final disposition. In fiscal 

year 1998, DOJ’s Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reported that its 

agents seized over 275,000 kilograms2

 of illegal drugs.

This report focuses on DEA’s controls over seized drugs and weapons. 

There is an inherent risk of theft, misuse, and loss of drugs and weapons 

due to the fact that such evidence typically has a market or “street” value. 

In addition, evidence can remain in DEA custody for significant amounts of 

time due to long-term investigations. Another factor increasing the risk is 

changes in the custody of the evidence as DEA often conducts its 

1

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice

(GAO/OCG-99-10, January 1999).

2

One kilogram equals 1,000 grams and is the equivalent of approximately 2.2 pounds. About 

453.6 grams is the equivalent of 1 pound.
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operations with other law enforcement agencies, which can result in 

evidence being transferred from one agency to another. 

Given this inherent risk, our audit objectives were to determine whether 

DEA (1) put in place physical safeguards to control access to and use of 

drug and weapon evidence and (2) maintained adequate accountability 

over such evidence. To accomplish these objectives, we interviewed 

officials from DEA headquarters and selected division offices and 

laboratories concerning various aspects of the seizure, storage, and 

disposal of seized drugs and weapons. We reviewed DEA’s Laboratory 

Operations Manual and Agents Manual for policies and procedures 

pertaining to the processes used to seize, account for, safeguard, and 

dispose of drugs and weapons. Based on documentation provided by DEA 

headquarters, we selected four division offices and corresponding 

laboratories with large volumes of drug seizure activity–Dallas, Texas 

(South Central Laboratory); Miami, Florida (Southeast Laboratory); 

New York, New York (Northeast Laboratory); and San Diego, California 

(Southwest Laboratory)–to perform testing of these policies and 

procedures. 

To determine if issues we identified at the four selected division offices and 

laboratories are indicative of more systemic concerns, we (1) reviewed 

reports issued by DOJ’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) related to 

laboratory operations3

 and (2) requested and reviewed a copy of the 

sections of the most recent DEA internal inspection reports for 20 of DEA’s 

21 division offices4

 and for the 8 laboratories that cover procedures and 

internal controls related to seized drugs and weapons. These inspections 

were performed from March 1996 through August 1998. Because we 

received the sections of the internal inspection reports near the end of our 

fieldwork, we did not follow-up with the division offices or laboratories to 

determine the extent to which noted deficiencies had been corrected. 

According to DEA officials, the reported deficiencies have been addressed; 

however, as noted throughout this report, we identified instances where 

weaknesses similar to those included in the internal inspection reports 

existed at the locations we visited. 

3

Drug Enforcement Administration’s Laboratory Operations (DOJ OIG, 95-18, May 1995) and 

Retention of Drug Evidence in Drug Enforcement Administration Laboratories (DOJ OIG, 

I-96-02, February 1996). 

4

The El Paso Division Office was established after the completion of our fieldwork.
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We performed our work in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards from August 1998 through August 1999. See appendix I 

for a more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology. We requested 

written comments on a draft of this report from the Attorney General or her 

designee. The Acting DEA Administrator provided written comments 

which are discussed in the “Agency Comments and Our Evaluation” section 

of this report and reprinted in appendix II. DEA also provided technical 

suggestions or supplemental information that we took into consideration 

while finalizing our report.

Results in Brief Physical safeguards over drug and weapon evidence, which include 

adequate storage facilities and control procedures, are essential for 

guarding against theft, misuse, and loss of such evidence and securing it for 

federal prosecutors. Each of the four laboratories and division offices we 

visited had physical safeguards in place, that, if operated effectively, would 

help control access to and use of drug and weapon evidence. However, we 

found instances of inadequate packaging of drug and weapon evidence and 

overcrowded drug vaults that could increase the potential for theft, misuse, 

and loss. Further, we found that certain requirements, such as chemists 

returning drug evidence to the vault within 5 working days after analysis 

and laboratories destroying drugs within 90 days of receiving authorization 

to destroy, were not always met. Similar issues were reported in the 

internal inspection reports provided to us by DEA that covered DEA 

inspections performed from March 1996 through August 1998.

Drug and weapon evidence must also be accounted for completely, 

accurately, and promptly to help ensure that such evidence is not 

compromised for federal prosecution purposes and is protected against the 

risk of theft, misuse, or loss. Based on our visits to four selected DEA 

laboratories and division offices, we found weaknesses related to DEA’s 

accountability over drug and weapon evidence. The weaknesses included 

(1) incomplete and missing drug evidence documentation, including chain 

of custody documentation, (2) inaccurate recordkeeping of drug and 

weapon evidence, and (3) improper accounting for drug weights, including 

unverified and unexplained weight differences in drug exhibits. For 

example, DEA policy requires that chemists verify the weight of drug 

evidence against the weight reported by the submitting agent upon receipt 

of the evidence and obtain a witness’ verification if a difference above a 

certain threshold exists. For 28 of the 86 drug exhibits we reviewed that 

had weight discrepancies above the threshold set forth in DEA’s policy, 
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chemists did not obtain the appropriate verification before opening and 

analyzing the evidence. 

DEA’s internal inspection teams also reported instances of missing 

documentation and improper recordkeeping in their reports covering 

inspections performed from March 1996 through August 1998. 

Notwithstanding these problems, DEA officials at the four laboratories and 

division offices we visited were able to locate each item selected for our 

testing that was in storage in evidence vaults or warehouses, and for those 

items not in storage, they provided documentation supporting the current 

location or the status of the item. We are making recommendations to 

address the above issues. 

In commenting on this report, DEA concurred that the accountability and 

safeguarding of evidence is of critical importance and said it will take the 

appropriate steps to reinforce its adherence to existing policies or to 

implement new policies relating to 11 of our 12 recommendations. 

However, DEA stated that issues identified in the report do not appear to 

be systemic weaknesses and were found in areas where redundant controls 

are in place to ensure the integrity of evidence is maintained at all time. We 

disagree with DEA and, as discussed in this report, identified several issues 

which we consider to be of a more severe nature at all, or almost all, of the 

locations that we visited and for which redundant controls did not exist to 

compensate for the deficiencies. In addition, DEA officials indicated that 

the reported deficiencies identified by their internal inspections performed 

prior to our review had been addressed. However, as noted throughout this 

report, we identified weaknesses that were the same or similar to ones 

identified during DEA’s internal inspections.

Further, in several comments related to the significance of certain 

discrepancies, DEA stated that all exhibits of drug evidence examined by 

GAO were found to be in a sealed condition. However, certain conditions 

identified by us during our testing and included in this report diminish the 

effectiveness of DEA’s sealing of evidence procedures.

Background DEA plays a leading role in combating the production and distribution of 

illegal drugs. Under DOJ, DEA’s mission is to enforce controlled substance 

laws and bring individuals and organizations that violate these laws into the 

justice system. To carry out its mission, DEA operates 21 domestic division 

offices and 77 foreign offices in 56 different countries. DEA also has eight 

laboratories located throughout the country, that conduct drug analyses for 
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DEA and other law enforcement agencies and maintain thousands of 

exhibits from investigations. 

In fiscal year 1998, DEA reported that its agents seized over 275,000 

kilograms of drugs, including marijuana, cocaine, and heroin (see table 1) 

and approximately 280,000 kilograms were maintained at DEA facilities as 

of September 30, 1998.5

 When drug evidence is seized, the agent maintains 

custody of the drugs until sending them either via mail or hand delivery to 

the laboratory for testing. Agents seal, label, and weigh the drug evidence, 

as well as assign consecutive exhibit numbers to such evidence acquired 

under a given case number. All drug evidence seized in DEA-controlled 

investigations must be submitted to a DEA laboratory for safekeeping and 

analysis. If the seizure involves over 10 kilograms of marijuana, only a 

sample amount is sent to the laboratory, with the remainder being stored in 

a secured area by the division offices. For large “bulk” narcotics seizures, 

DEA informs the appropriate U.S. Attorney’s Office in writing within 5 days 

that amounts above a certain threshold will be destroyed after 60 days from 

the date notice is provided of the seizure, unless a written request not to 

destroy the excess is received.6

5

DEA employees are drug tested before they are hired and are subject to additional random 

drug testing during employment at DEA. 

6

Drug seizures over certain threshold amounts are considered “bulk” seizures. Bulk seizure 

thresholds vary depending on the type of drug. For example, the threshold amount for 

heroin is 2 kilograms, while the threshold for cocaine is 10 kilograms. The U.S. Attorney’s 

Office may request keeping amounts in excess of the threshold if it believes possession of 

the drugs may affect the legal proceedings.
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Table 1: Seized Drug Activity for the Year Ended September 30, 1998

Source: Aggregate figures for bulk and nonbulk drugs from DEA’s Annual Financial Statement Fiscal 

Year 1998.

Drug evidence may change hands several times from seizure to disposition, 

particularly if another agency is involved or if the evidence is presented in 

court. Upon receipt at the laboratory, an evidence technician takes custody 

of the drugs, verifies that the seals are intact, assigns each exhibit a 

laboratory identification number, and stores it in a vault for safekeeping. 

The evidence technician also enters the receipt of the drug evidence into 

DEA’s Laboratory Evidence Management System, which produces a bar 

code to be used for inventory purposes. Within 3 days of receipt, 

information about the evidence is also required to be entered into DEA’s 

drug database, the System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence 

(STRIDE). STRIDE is used to track evidence submitted to the laboratories 

from receipt to destruction and for statistical purposes. Supervisors assign 

the exhibits to specific chemists for analysis. Chemists then check out the 

drugs from the vault, verify that the seals are intact, weigh and analyze the 

drug evidence, and then return it to the vault. The results of the analysis are 

required to be documented on a forensic chemist worksheet (DEA 86). 

DEA policy states that evidence should normally be returned to the vault 

within 5 working days after the analysis report is prepared. After analysis, 

STRIDE is updated to reflect the test results. 

Evidence received from other agencies, such as the U.S. Customs Service 

(Customs) or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), is returned to that 

agency after DEA has completed its analysis. DEA drug evidence remains 

stored in the laboratory’s vault until the laboratory director receives 

approval from the division office for destruction. Upon receiving approval 

(in kilograms)

Drug type

Beginning

balance Additions Deletions

Ending

balance

Marijuana 29,536 239,515 195,288 73,763

Cocaine 196,722 31,649 38,704 189,667

Heroin 1,989 364 687 1,666

Methamphetamine 3,857 1,217 771 4,303

Other 10,991 3,377 4,630 9,738

Total 243,095 276,122 240,080 279,137
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for destruction, DEA policy requires that the drugs be disposed of within 90 

days. Drugs are disposed of periodically at a commercial incinerator. 

Agents also seize weapons, including rifles, handguns, knives, and 

ammunition and maintain them in vaults within division and field offices. 

An evidence technician takes custody of the weapons from the seizing 

agent and enters the receipt into DEA’s Non-Drug Evidence System 

(NEDS), which produces a bar code for inventory purposes. Weapons are 

maintained in a vault until destroyed, forfeited, transferred to another 

agency, or returned to the owner.7

To help ensure that policies and procedures are followed and that evidence 

is properly safeguarded and accounted for, the DEA Office of Inspections 

and the Office of Forensic Sciences performs internal inspections at each 

laboratory and division office approximately every 24 months. These 

inspections include a review of field operations including those pertaining 

to safeguarding and accounting for drug and weapon evidence. After the 

completion of the inspection, a report detailing the findings and 

recommendations is issued to division or laboratory management, which 

must then submit a memorandum to the Chief Inspector within 90 days of 

issuance, noting any corrective actions completed or planned. The reports 

remain open until all corrective actions are completed.

DEA Needs to Improve 

Safeguarding of Drug 

and Weapon Evidence

Physical safeguards, which include adequate storage facilities and 

procedures, are needed to reduce the risk of theft, misuse, or loss of drug 

and weapon evidence and help ensure that evidence is not compromised 

for prosecution purposes. In addition, physical safeguards can promote a 

safe working environment for DEA personnel. The four laboratories and 

division offices included in our review have physical safeguards in place 

that if operating properly help control access to and use of drug and 

weapon evidence. However, we identified some weaknesses, including 

storage problems, which could affect DEA’s ability to properly safeguard 

drug and weapon evidence. In addition, we found that certain required 

procedures involving drug evidence were not met. DEA’s internal 

inspection reports noted similar weaknesses in the safeguarding of drug 

evidence. 

7

Return of a firearm to the owner can take place only if the party receiving the firearm may 

legally own a firearm and ownership of such type of firearm is not prohibited by law. 
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Physical Safeguards DEA’s evidence vaults and other designated secure areas used to store drug 

and nondrug evidence must meet certain requirements as established by 

DEA, DOJ, and the General Services Administration. The requirements 

include construction specifications and standards for locks, locking 

devices, and access control systems. At each of the four laboratories and 

division offices, we observed the location and condition of evidence vaults 

and other designated secure areas and noted that drug and nondrug 

evidence was segregated in separate areas as required by DEA policy. We 

also observed physical safeguards, including cameras, motion detectors, 

and combination locks that are in place to control and monitor access to 

and use of drug and weapon evidence. However, due to the sensitive nature 

of the evidence, we did not perform any comprehensive tests to verify the 

operation of the specific physical safeguards because we did not want to 

risk compromising any of the evidence that may be needed for prosecution 

purposes. For example, while we observed employees entering keypad 

access codes to obtain entry, we did not attempt to obtain unauthorized 

entry into controlled areas.

Based on our visits to the four selected locations and our review of DEA’s 

internal inspection reports, we noted some weaknesses with DEA’s 

physical safeguards. Specifically, at the South Central Laboratory in Dallas, 

we were informed that two cameras inside the drug evidence vault, which 

monitor vault activity, were not operational. In addition, DEA’s policy 

allows for short-term storage of bulk seizures in detention cells; however, 

we noted that the Dallas Division Office was using a detention cell for longterm storage for bulk marijuana. In one example, three boxes of marijuana 

were stored in the detention cell from May 1996 until January 1998. Also, 

the internal inspection report for the Northeast Laboratory in New York 

indicated that a vault alarm system had not functioned properly for several 

years. An official at DEA headquarters indicated that the inspection report 

did not clearly state the problem and that the alarm was working properly 

but was not connected to the division office alarm system as required. The 

official indicated that the alarm was subsequently fixed. To confirm this, 

we asked for the more recent inspection report for this laboratory, but as of 

the completion of our fieldwork, it had not been provided to us. 

Storage of Drugs and 

Weapons 

During our visits to drug and weapon evidence vaults at the laboratories 

and division offices, we noted instances of improperly stored evidence. For 

example, at the laboratories, we noted evidence packaging that was 

deteriorating and overcrowded evidence vaults. At the division offices, we 
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also noted improperly sealed weapons. Weaknesses such as these have 

previously been reported by the DOJ OIG and by DEA’s inspection teams. 

Unsealed and damaged evidence packaging and overcrowded evidence 

vaults increase the potential for theft, misuse, and loss of evidence and that 

such evidence could be compromised for federal prosecution purposes. 

Due to space constraints in the drug evidence vaults at two of the four 

laboratories we visited, we observed boxes that had been stacked on the 

floor such that the lower boxes were being crushed. As the DOJ OIG 

reported in 1996, the storage of exhibits on vault floor space is not 

recommended because “cluttered vault aisles can be hazardous and make 

retrieving and accounting for exhibits more cumbersome and timeconsuming.” In 1995, the DOJ OIG also reported that the vault storage 

space was insufficient at the same two laboratories where we noted 

overcrowding. 

We also observed exhibits where the packaging or the tape used to seal 

boxes was deteriorating or had already deteriorated to the point that the 

box was open, increasing the potential for access to the contents. For 

example, at one location, we observed a punctured evidence bag 

containing approximately 2 kilograms of heroin. At another location, we 

observed a cocaine exhibit for which the gross weight after analysis was 

unknown (i.e., not recorded on the box, in the file, or in STRIDE), being 

stored in a box that was in poor condition. Officials agreed that such items 

should be repackaged. At the bulk marijuana warehouse maintained by the 

New York Division Office, we observed that several bags of a 9,000-pound 

seizure were worn, increasing the potential for access to the contents. 

An internal inspection report for one laboratory, not included in our review, 

also identified improperly stored drugs. Specifically, the internal inspection 

found that the laboratory had stored drug and nondrug evidence within the 

same vault, which is not in compliance with DEA policy. Also, the 

inspection teams identified one resident office, a smaller office within a 

division office, that did not have an overnight drop safe to store seized 

drugs, as required by DEA policy. 

For safety purposes, DEA policy requires that firearms be carefully 

unloaded by the agent most familiar with the weapon and sealed in an 

evidence bag. While conducting our inventory testing of 78 weapons, we 

observed two handguns that had not been sealed in evidence bags as 

required. We also observed one seizure of knives that had not been sealed 

properly. Specifically, the knives were stored within a zipper bag that could 
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be easily opened. Weapons that are not sealed properly can create unsafe 

conditions for DEA personnel, as well as for others who may require access 

to the evidence.

We noted that, while not required by DEA policy, but similar to a Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) policy, many of the handguns we 

observed had a plastic strip inserted through the chamber, further 

rendering the firearm safe.8

 In addition, unlike FBI policy, DEA’s policy 

does not require written certification from a firearm instructor ensuring 

that the firearm has been rendered safe.9

 Although DEA agents are not 

required to take these additional steps, formalizing such requirements 

would provide further safeguards that firearms are rendered safe. 

Timeliness of the 

Performance of Certain 

Required Actions 

The DOJ OIG reported in 1995 that chemists took an average of 15 days to 

return exhibits to the vault after analysis and indicated that even taking 7 

days appeared to be excessive. Based on an OIG recommendation, DEA 

policy was revised to require that drug evidence normally be returned to 

the vault within 5 working days after analysis. During our visits to four 

selected laboratories, we found that for 20 of the 216 laboratory items we 

selected, where the chemists had completed their analysis and prepared 

the related report, the chemists had retained evidence for an average of 10 

working days. Seventeen of the 20 cases occurred at the South Central 

Laboratory in Dallas, and in one instance, the chemist maintained an 

exhibit for 34 working days. A laboratory official could not explain why this 

exhibit was not returned promptly. Promptly returning evidence to the 

vault ensures that the chemists do not maintain evidence for excessive 

amounts of time in an area more accessible than the vault.

DEA policy also requires that drug evidence be destroyed within 90 days of 

receiving approval to do so from the division office. We found that 1 of 16 

exhibits we tested, which were being maintained by the laboratory and had 

been approved for destruction, had not been destroyed within the 90 days 

required by DEA policy. This exhibit had been authorized for destruction 

but was not destroyed until over 5 months after approval was obtained. 

Timely destruction of drugs authorized to be destroyed conserves limited 

8

ATF requires plastic tie wraps to be inserted through the chamber prior to storage of all 

firearms, including handguns and rifles. 

9

FBI policy requires that a firearm instructor certify in writing that seized firearms are 

rendered safe prior to transferring custody to an evidence custodian. 
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vault space, allows agents to close the related case files promptly, and 

eliminates the additional inherent risk of theft of these drugs that are no 

longer needed as evidence. 

According to DEA policy, DEA has 5 days in which to notify the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office that amounts above certain thresholds for bulk seizures 

will be destroyed after 60 days from the notification date unless a letter 

requesting DEA to maintain the drugs is received from the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office. The letters notifying the U.S. Attorney’s Office of DEA’s intent to 

destroy the amounts above certain thresholds and the response letters 

from the U.S. Attorney’s Office with justification for not destroying these 

amounts were not provided for two of the five exhibits we tested in which 

letters should have been included in the file. In another instance, the U.S. 

Attorney’s Office had been notified; however, the 60-day deadline passed in 

February 1998 and the evidence had not yet been destroyed as of our visit 

in October 1998. Ensuring that U.S. Attorney’s Offices are promptly notified 

and that responses are received from them for not destroying evidence 

needed for prosecution purposes allows DEA to quickly destroy unneeded 

evidence and conserve limited vault space. 

Internal inspection reports identified similar deficiencies at 3 of the 

8 laboratories, which include the Southeast and Northeast Laboratories, 

and at 4 of the 20 division offices, which include the Dallas and New York 

Division Offices. For example, one laboratory, not included in our review, 

was not always destroying evidence within the required 90 days after 

notification that the seized item was approved for destruction. Other 

examples included chemists not returning exhibits to the vault within the 

5 working day time frame, and seized drugs being stored in a temporary 

overnight storage location for over 1 year.

Accountability Over 

Drug and Weapon 

Evidence Needs 

Strengthening

We identified weaknesses over the accountability of drug and weapon 

evidence that could increase the potential for theft, misuse, or loss of such 

evidence, and that such evidence could be compromised for federal 

prosecution purposes. Although the division offices and laboratories had 

policies and procedures designed to ensure accountability over drug 

evidence, they did not always follow them. During our visits, we noted 

(1) incomplete and missing documentation over drug evidence, including 

chain of custody documentation, (2) weaknesses in recordkeeping of drug 

and weapon evidence, and (3) weaknesses in accounting for drug weights, 

including unverified and unexplained weight differences in drug exhibits. 

Notwithstanding these problems, evidence control personnel at the four 
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laboratories and division offices we visited were able to locate each item 

selected for our testing that was in storage in evidence vaults or other 

secure areas, and for those items not in storage, they provided 

documentation supporting the current location or status of the item. For 

example, if the exhibit had previously been destroyed, we were provided a 

copy of the DEA form authorizing the destruction and showing signatures 

of the DEA personnel who witnessed the destruction. 

Maintaining Documentation During our testing, we identified laboratory and evidence custodian files 

that were missing documentation, including chain of custody 

documentation, or contained incomplete documentation. We also identified 

evidence labels that were missing witness signatures. DEA policy requires 

that complete and accurate documentation, such as the Report of Drug 

Property Collected, Purchased, or Seized (DEA 7), forensic chemist 

worksheets (DEA 86), and forms (DEA 12) used to transfer evidence to 

other parties (e.g., court, another federal agency), be maintained in the 

seizure files. These forms, along with evidence accountability records 

(DEA 307) maintained in a separate area within the vault, are used to 

document transfers of evidence and provide a chain of custody for the 

evidence. For bulk seizures, the laboratory files must also contain 

photographs of bulk seizures submitted to the laboratory. Photographs 

provide visible proof of the evidence in the event that drugs over certain 

threshold amounts are destroyed. In addition, DEA policy requires that two 

agents be involved in the seizure and sealing of evidence and that they both 

sign an evidence label. Having a witness to the seizure and the sealing of 

critical evidence is important to prevent any one individual from having 

uncontrolled access to evidence. 

Upon receipt of evidence at the laboratory, the evidence custodian is 

required to sign the DEA 7, which is prepared by the submitting agent, 

accepting receipt of the evidence. The evidence custodian is not required to 

reweigh the evidence, but must examine the seals and check a box on the 

form indicating whether the evidence seals are intact. We found substantial 

compliance with the policy, but noted a few exceptions. For example, 3 of 

the 236 DEA 7s we reviewed were missing the checkmark indicating 

whether the seals were intact and one was missing the evidence custodian’s 

signature. The internal inspection report for one division office, which was
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not included in our review, stated that numerous deficiencies were noted in 

documenting the chain of custody on the DEA 7 form.10

DEA 86s are used by chemists to record all raw data, observations, and 

calculations regarding their analysis of drug evidence. They are also used 

to document which chemist received the evidence, whom the evidence is 

physically received from, and gross weights before and after analysis, 

among other items. After the form is prepared, a supervisory chemist is 

required to review the form. Our review of the DEA 86s noted a few 

exceptions. Specifically, the worksheets were missing from 2 of 216 

analyzed exhibits in our sample and 3 of the worksheets were missing the 

reviewer’s initials. Four of the eight DEA laboratory internal inspection 

reports, including the Southwest Laboratory, also identified instances in 

which there were errors in the completion of this form. Not being able to 

locate these forms or incorrectly completed forms could require a chemist 

to break the original chemist’s seal and reanalyze evidence—perhaps years 

after the initial analysis. In addition, certain information reported only on 

the form, such as the gross weights before and after analysis, would be 

unknown. 

DEA 12s are required to be maintained in the laboratory case files if drug 

evidence is transferred to individuals outside of the laboratory. The 

individual receiving custody of the evidence is required to sign the form 

and return it to DEA for inclusion in the laboratory file. According to DEA 

policy, the signature of a witness must be obtained when the evidence is 

transferred to a non-DEA official, such as a Customs or FBI agent. We 

found that the files for 10 of the 77 exhibits in our laboratory sample that 

had been transferred to an individual outside the laboratory were missing a 

transfer form. In addition, the laboratories were inconsistent in obtaining 

witness signatures on these forms. At the Southwest Laboratory, officials 

told us that they did not require Customs agents to provide a witness 

signature due to the large volume of exhibits they analyze for Customs 

(i.e., over 300 exhibits could be picked up on a given day). Additionally, an 

internal inspection report for one of the laboratories, not included in our 

review, also found examples of missing DEA 12s. Having the recipient’s 

acknowledgement of receipt is critical for documenting the transfer of 

custody and the recipient’s acceptance of responsibility for the evidence. 

10No additional explanation of these chain of custody issues was given in the document we 

were provided.
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DEA policy also requires that photographs of bulk seizures be maintained 

in laboratory files. Photographs provide visible evidence of drugs that may 

be destroyed prior to the trial of a case and may be used in lieu of 

transporting drugs to court. Two of the four bulk seizure laboratory files we 

reviewed were missing the required photographs. The drugs for one of 

these seizure cases had already been destroyed. In another example, 

photographs were missing for a 50-kilogram seizure because it had been 

split into five exhibits, so that no one exhibit was considered bulk. In 

addition, DEA internal inspection reports for three laboratories, including 

the Southeast and Southwest Laboratories and the San Diego Division 

Office, indicated that 11 of 43 bulk seizure cases reviewed were missing the 

required photographs. Ensuring that photographs are taken and maintained 

in the file can reduce unnecessary transporting of drug evidence to court 

and could allow for earlier destruction of bulk evidence. 

DEA policy requires that two agents be involved in the seizure and sealing 

of evidence and that they both sign an evidence label. During our testing, 

we noted instances where the required witness signature was missing from 

the evidence label. Specifically, 4 of the 142 drug exhibits we weighed, as 

well as 8 out of 72 weapons we selected for testing and observed, were 

missing the required witness signatures on the evidence labels. Officials 

were unable to explain why the required signatures were missing. Having a 

witness to the seizure and the sealing of critical evidence is important to 

prevent any one individual from having uncontrolled access to evidence. 

Recordkeeping DEA uses various information systems and logbooks to account for drug 

and weapon evidence. During our testing, we noted errors and inaccuracies 

in certain data in the systems used to account for both drug and weapon 

evidence and the logbook used to account for bulk marijuana. DEA’s 

internal inspection teams reported similar weaknesses with the 

recordkeeping of drug evidence. Maintaining complete and accurate 

records is essential for ensuring that evidence is properly accounted for 

and reported on. 

Federal financial accounting standards and related supplemental guidance 

have highlighted the importance of accurately accounting for nonvalued 

seized and forfeited property, including seized drugs. Specifically, the 

Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standard (SFFAS) No. 3, 

Accounting for Inventory and Related Property, issued in October 1993, 

requires the disclosure of all material forfeited property, including those 

items with no financial value. One such disclosure is an analysis of changes 
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in seized property that would include the amount of seized property, 

including drugs (1) on hand at the beginning of the year, (2) acquired during 

the year, (3) disposed of during the year, and (4) on hand at the end of the 

year.11

Recently issued supplemental guidance for SFFAS No. 3 states that 

amounts for certain drugs, including cocaine and heroin, should be based 

on weight.12 For example, the standard unit of measurement for such illegal 

drugs should be kilograms. In addition, according to the guidance, material 

amounts of other seized drugs should be separately reported by liquid 

weight, dry weight, number of tablets, or other appropriate measures. 

The evidence system used to track nondrug evidence, including weapons, 

contained inaccurate data even though annual inventories were being 

performed with no outstanding exceptions being documented. DEA policy 

requires annual inventories of all nondrug evidence; however, we identified 

6 of 78 sampled items at three of the four division offices we visited where 

weapons were included on the inventory listing but DEA officials were 

unable to locate them in the evidence vault. Only after DEA personnel 

conducted research were they eventually able to explain all of the 

discrepancies and provide us with supporting documentation. In some 

cases the weapon had already been destroyed; in others, the weapon had 

been transferred. For example, at the Miami Division Office, two of the 

weapons were destroyed in July 1995, while another was transferred to the 

U.S. Marshals Service in 1993. These weapons still appeared on the office’s 

inventory listing as of October 1998 even after the division office officials 

indicated that annual inventories had been conducted. 

In another instance at the Miami Division Office, we were unable to 

physically observe a firearm because the evidence custodian was unable to 

11The Joint Financial Management Improvement Program (JFMIP) has recently issued an 

exposure draft, Seized Property and Forfeited Assets Systems Requirements (JFMIP-SR99-7, June 1999), that covers systems requirements for seized property and forfeited assets. 

According to the exposure draft, a system component that covers the custody of seized and 

forfeited property must have the capability to provide information to allow the independent 

verification that each item of seized property is in the physical or constructive custody of 

the government and that the recorded quantity is accurate.

12Reporting on Non-Valued Seized and Forfeited Property, Federal Financial Accounting and 

Auditing Technical Release Number 4, July 31, 1999, issued by the Accounting and Auditing 

Policy Committee (AAPC), which is a permanent committee sponsored by the Federal 

Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB).
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locate the firearm at the time of our visit. The custodian subsequently 

informed us that the firearm had been packaged for transfer to another 

DEA office and provided us with photographs that DEA represented was of 

the firearm. Additional documentation was provided supporting the 

transfer and receipt of the firearm; however, we noted that the contents of 

the package, listed as “3 guns, money, and jewelry” was recorded on a copy 

of the Federal Express packaging slip, which was attached to the outside of 

the package. According to DEA policy, the nature of the contents should 

not have been specified on the packaging slip. 

We also noted errors in the logbooks used to account for evidence 

maintained in the bulk marijuana storage facilities at two division offices. 

For 3 of the 15 bulk storage items selected for testing at the San Diego 

Division Office, inaccurate case numbers were recorded in the logbook 

when the drugs were initially brought into the storage area and then the 

proper case number was recorded when the drugs were removed. This 

inconsistent recording makes it more difficult to track the amount of drugs 

that should be in the facility at any given time and to link the drugs to the 

case number they are associated with. The responsible division office 

official could not explain why the agents were using incorrect case 

numbers and stated that she would take action to address this issue. At the 

Dallas Division Office, a logbook entry was taped over and not marked 

through and initialed as required by DEA policy. Properly marking through 

and initialing the entry allows others to determine who made the change 

and whether the original entry was no longer appropriate. 

Other discrepancies were found with the data in the laboratories’ STRIDE 

system. This system is used to provide statistical and other program 

information related to drug seizures. Data from the DEA 7, as prepared by 

agents, is required to be entered into STRIDE within 3 working days of 

receipt of the evidence. In most cases, the information was not entered 

within 3 working days. DEA officials attributed this to staffing shortages 

and other priorities. Once the analysis is completed by a chemist, STRIDE 

is required to be updated to record the results of the analysis and again 

when the evidence is transferred or destroyed. Out of the 236 laboratory 

files we reviewed, we found 15 instances where the data in STRIDE did not 

agree with the supporting documentation. In 6 of the 15 instances, STRIDE 

was not updated to reflect correct weight information. Ensuring that data 

are promptly and correctly entered into STRIDE provides program 

managers with more accurate and useful information. 
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DEA’s internal inspection reports also highlighted recordkeeping problems 

at 2 of the 8 laboratories, the Northeast and Southeast Laboratories, and 3 

of the 20 division offices, all of which were not included in our review. For 

example, the Northeast Laboratory, after conducting an inventory of its 

vault, experienced “a large number of discrepancies” when reconciling its 

STRIDE inventory report to the DEA 307s. The inspection report relating to 

this laboratory also stated that, “[a]s a result of the noted deficiencies, 

which involved numerous items of evidence not accounted for, a PR [Office 

of Professional Responsibility] investigation was initiated.” Because we 

received the sections from the internal inspection reports near the end of 

our fieldwork, we did not follow-up with the laboratory to determine the 

results of this investigation. 

DEA’s internal inspection reports also noted problems at two division 

offices not included in our review involving the logbook used to account 

for items in the bulk storage facility. At one location, it was reported that 

the individual responsible for the drug evidence was “not maintaining his 

record keeping and tracking system in compliance with DEA policies as 

delineated in the DEA Agents Manual, Section 6662. Although several log 

books were present, IN [Office of Inspections] determined that all drug 

evidence was tracked in one bound ledger, which contained gaps in time 

exceeding seven years.” At another division office, the report stated that 

“there were inaccurate entries in the drug logbooks. Both drug logbooks 

contained inconsistent descriptions of the drug exhibits seized and 

submitted, which coupled with a lack of case numbers and submitted 

weights, created the appearance that drug exhibits may have been lost.” 

According to a DEA official, corrective actions have been taken to address 

these issues. 

Accounting for Weights of 

Drug Exhibits

According to DEA policy, for control purposes and because of mandatory 

minimum sentencing laws, all weights for drug exhibits should be 

determined as precisely as possible. Properly documenting the weights at 

different stages (i.e., upon receipt or after analysis) and resolving 

discrepancies is critical if the exhibit is used as evidence in court and for 

decreasing the potential for theft. We found weaknesses with the recorded 

weights of drug exhibits, from the initial seizure by the agent through 

destruction by the laboratory. Specifically, we found instances where 

(1) agents improperly recorded weights on the DEA 7, (2) chemists did not 

obtain a witness’ verification for weight differences, (3) DEA did not 

always require that weights be recorded on the forms used to transfer 
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drugs for safekeeping, (4) chemists improperly recorded weights on the 

DEA 86 after analysis, and (5) unexplained weight differences occurred. 

DEA policy requires agents to be properly trained in the use of scales and 

to weigh drug evidence after sealing and prior to submission to the 

laboratory. The gross weight of the exhibit is recorded on the DEA 7 to the 

nearest tenth of a gram if under 1 kilogram and to the nearest gram if over 

1 kilogram. We found instances where agents inappropriately rounded or 

recorded the number of packages seized instead of the weight. In one 

example, an agent recorded that 6 “kilos” or bricks of cocaine had been 

seized and submitted to the laboratory, not the actual weight (7.75 

kilograms as recorded by the chemist). In another example, the agent 

recorded that 25 kilograms of hashish oil was seized and submitted to the 

laboratory, instead of recording the weight to the nearest gram as required 

by DEA policy. Since the agent did not record the weight to the nearest 

gram, a significant difference could exist and not be detected. For example, 

the weight recorded to the nearest gram for this exhibit could range from 

24,500 grams to 25,499 grams. Inaccurate recording of drug weights 

decreases DEA’s accountability over such evidence.

During our testing we noted that drug evidence is not required to be 

weighed by the laboratory upon receipt, but just prior to analysis by a 

chemist. The evidence may remain in the vault for several months before it 

is analyzed. Prior to breaking the seals, chemists are required by DEA 

policy to verify that the weight of drug evidence agrees with the agent’s 

submitted weight for the drug evidence. If there is a difference of more 

than 2 grams or 0.2 percent from the agent’s submitted weight, whichever is 

greater, the chemist is required to obtain verification of the weight 

difference from a supervisor or another chemist who must then initial next 

to the chemist’s recorded weight designating that the verification was 

performed. 

In 1995, DEA’s Administrator disagreed with an OIG recommendation that 

exhibits be weighed immediately upon receipt at the laboratory. The 

Administrator stated that the laboratory should ensure that the evidence is 

properly sealed and that “policy and procedure permit any discrepancy in 

gross weight to be addressed administratively at any time prior to breaking 

the seal.” However, of the 216 analyzed exhibits in our sample, the chemist 

did not obtain the required written verification for 28 of the 86 drug 

exhibits that met the criteria for verification. The differences ranged from 

just over 2 grams to 1.75 kilograms (about one-fifth of the exhibit’s total 

weight). Obtaining independent verification when differences exist ensures 
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that possible arguments over such differences by the defense or the 

submitting agent are mitigated. It also decreases the potential that the 

difference could be subjected to theft and not be detected. For the 28 

exhibits we reviewed with differences and no witness verification, the time 

frames for receipt of evidence by the laboratory to when the chemist 

weighed the exhibit ranged from 1 week to over 5 months.

During our testing, we also noted instances where the weights of drug 

exhibits were not recorded on the forms used to document the transfer of 

drugs to a division office or to a laboratory. DEA policy requires the gross 

weight of bulk marijuana to be thoroughly documented, but does not 

specifically require that this information be provided to the evidence 

custodian upon transfer to bulk storage facilities at the division offices. In a 

bulk marijuana exhibit we selected for testing, we were only able to verify 

that the quantity (12 boxes and 1 container) agreed to the quantity recorded 

on the form used to transfer the evidence. There was no weight recorded in 

the file maintained by the evidence custodian or in the logbook. Also, at the 

laboratories we visited, we noted that weights were not always recorded on 

the forms used by several non-DEA agencies when submitting exhibits to a 

DEA laboratory for analysis. The agencies included local police 

departments, ATF, and Customs. DEA policy does not require non-DEA 

agencies to record weights on the forms used to transfer exhibits, therefore 

chemists are unable to determine if there is a difference between the 

submitted weight and the new weight that would require a witness 

verification. Further, the policy does not require that chemists obtain a 

witness’ verification if the weight is not recorded on the transfer form. Not 

documenting weights on the forms used to transfer drugs for safekeeping 

and/or requiring that chemists obtain a witness’ verification for exhibits 

that do not contain a recorded weight on the transfer form decreases DEA’s 

accountability over such evidence. 

Once the chemist performs the analysis on the exhibit, DEA policy requires 

the chemist to record the gross weight of the exhibit after it is resealed to 

the nearest tenth of a gram if the weight is between 10 and 1,000 grams, and 

to four significant figures if greater than 1,000 grams (e.g., 2,013 grams, 

327.0 kilograms). However, the weights for 8 of the 142 exhibits we 

physically observed were inappropriately rounded by the chemist (7 of the
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8 occurred at the Southeast Laboratory).13 In one example, the chemist 

recorded the gross weight after analysis as 7.1 kilograms, instead of 

recording the weight to 4 significant figures. Not recording the weight more 

precisely could result in undetected theft of the difference due to rounding. 

There was one instance in which we could not compare our observed 

weight for a particular exhibit to the recorded gross weight after analysis 

because the chemist recorded the combined weight of four exhibits 

together and not for each exhibit. DEA officials agreed that the weights 

should have been recorded for each exhibit, particularly since one exhibit 

could be destroyed before the others. As noted above, inaccurate recording 

of drug weights decreases DEA’s accountability over such evidence. 

We also noted instances where DEA officials were unable to account for or 

explain differences between recorded weights and our observed weights. 

These differences ranged from a few grams to over 11.35 kilograms (about 

25 pounds). Of the 142 items we reweighed at the laboratories, our 

observed weight for 40 of the items was more than 5 grams over or under 

the chemist’s recorded gross weight after analysis. 

DEA officials told us that scientific research has been performed and 

documented as to why certain drugs are susceptible to weight changes. 

For instance, weight gains are typically due to moisture absorption by 

certain drugs, such as cocaine and heroin. They stated that losses for 

certain other drugs, such as marijuana and cocaine base, are usually the 

result of the drugs losing moisture as they dry. However, 7 of the 40 items 

with weight differences did not follow the above trends and 2 of these 

items occurred on exhibits that had been authorized for destruction. 

Specifically, at the Northeast Laboratory, we weighed one cocaine exhibit 

that was no longer needed as evidence and was about to be destroyed, and 

determined that it was about 50 grams14 less than the gross weight recorded 

by the chemist a few weeks before our visit. At the Southeast Laboratory, 

one cocaine exhibit had been analyzed 3 years prior to our testing and the 

weight for this exhibit had decreased by 6 percent, approximately 300 

grams. In another example at the same laboratory, the gross weight after 

13According to DEA officials, having chemists record the gross weight after analysis on the 

DEA 86 has always been a recommended procedure that became a requirement in January 

1998. We were unable to compare our observed weight for 16 exhibits that were analyzed 

prior to when the requirement to record the gross weights after analysis became effective.

14Fifty grams of cocaine have an approximate “street” value of up to $5,000 based on DEA 

estimates as of February 1998.
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analysis of a cocaine exhibit decreased by over 200 grams, even though 

additional materials, three plastic bottles and bubble wrap, were added to 

the exhibit prior to resealing. Laboratory officials at both sites were unable 

to specifically explain the lower weights for these three exhibits, but 

indicated that other factors, such as humidity or temperature changes 

within the vault, could result in weight differences that did not follow the 

above trends.

The largest difference was noted at the bulk storage facility maintained by 

the Miami Division Office, where a marijuana exhibit weighed about 

25 pounds less than (or about half) the weight recorded when the drug was 

received at the site. Although both the agent and the evidence custodian 

had verified and initialed the receiving weight in this case, DEA officials 

agreed that the decrease in weight seemed excessive, but were unable to 

provide a specific explanation for the difference. 

Conclusion DEA has established numerous policies and procedures to control and 

safeguard drug and weapon evidence in its custody. However, based on our 

work at four division offices and laboratories and the results of DEA’s 

internal inspections performed from March 1996 through August 1998, 

specific actions are needed to strengthen accountability over and 

safeguarding of drug and weapon evidence. Such actions will help reduce 

the potential for theft, misuse, or loss of drug and weapon evidence and the 

risk of evidence being compromised for federal prosecution purposes 

while in DEA custody. 

Recommendations We recommend that the Attorney General require that the DEA 

Administrator take the appropriate steps to reinforce DEA’s adherence to 

existing DEA policies regarding 

• properly storing bulk marijuana evidence in designated approved areas 

and sealing weapons in evidence bags;

• destroying drugs promptly to alleviate overcrowded drug evidence 

vaults and reduce the additional risk of theft since these drugs are no 

longer needed as evidence; 

• chemists returning drug evidence to the evidence vault promptly after 

analysis so that the evidence is not maintained for excessive amounts of 

time in a more accessible area than that of the vault;
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• requiring that two signatures be recorded on evidence labels prior to 

acceptance by laboratory and division office evidence custodians;

• maintaining complete and properly reviewed documentation in the 

laboratory seizure files and promptly entering accurate information into 

STRIDE; 

• identifying any discrepancies–between evidence maintained in the vault 

and the location of evidence per the Non-Drug Evidence System–during 

annual inventories and promptly researching the discrepancies and 

updating the appropriate records;

• not specifying the contents on packaging slips when using commercial 

carriers;

• maintaining complete and accurate information in bulk marijuana 

logbooks; and

• chemists and agents recording weights in accordance with DEA policy 

and chemists obtaining an independent written verification if weight 

differences, over the DEA established threshold, exist between the 

weight of drug evidence reported by the agent and that weighed by the 

chemist.

Further, we recommend that the Attorney General require that the DEA 

Administrator modify existing DEA policy to include guidance for 

• agents to obtain a written certification from an independent party 

experienced in handling firearms that firearms and other weapons being 

submitted for storage in the vault are rendered safe prior to being 

stored; 

• requiring that if a DEA 12 is used to transfer bulk marijuana (1) the 

weight be recorded on the DEA 12 or (2) a copy of the DEA 7 be 

provided to the evidence custodian; and 

• requiring that weights be recorded on the forms used to transfer nonDEA exhibits to a laboratory prior to acceptance by the evidence 

custodian and/or requiring that chemists obtain a witness verification if 

no weight is recorded on the transfer form.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DEA concurred that the 

accountability and safeguarding of evidence is of critical importance and 

that we are right to point out the inherent risk involved in monitoring the 

integrity and accountability of evidence. DEA indicated that it will take the 

appropriate steps to reinforce its adherence to existing policies or to 

implement new policies relating to 11 of our 12 recommendations. DEA 

disagreed with our recommendation to modify existing DEA policy to 
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require that weights be recorded on the forms used to transfer bulk 

marijuana exhibits prior to acceptance by the evidence custodian because 

they believe that this policy already exists. While we recognize that a DEA 

policy exists that requires that weights be documented on the DEA 7, 

several of our sample items involved transfers of bulk marijuana to an 

evidence custodian using a DEA 12 and the weights were not recorded on 

the DEA 12. Although a description of the evidence is required to be 

recorded on the DEA 12, recording the weight on the form is not 

specifically required. We therefore clarified our recommendation to state 

that DEA modify their existing policy to require that if a DEA 12 is used to 

transfer evidence (1) the weight be recorded on the DEA 12 or (2) a copy of 

the DEA 7 be provided to the evidence custodian. 

In addition to responding to our recommendations, DEA provided us with 

additional comments on our draft report and requested that we consider 

them before finalizing the report for publication. DEA stated that issues 

identified in the report do not appear to be systemic weaknesses and, for 

the most part, were found in areas where redundant controls are in place to 

ensure that the integrity of the evidence is maintained at all times. We 

disagree. Several of the issues discussed in this report, which we consider 

to be of a more severe nature, involved discrepancies at all, or almost all, of 

the locations that we visited and redundant controls did not exist to 

compensate for the deficiencies. In addition, while DEA officials indicated 

that the reported deficiencies in their inspection reports had been 

addressed, as noted throughout this report, we identified weaknesses that 

were the same or similar to ones identified during internal inspections 

performed prior to our review including some at the locations we visited. 

For example, DEA policy requires that if drug evidence is transferred to an 

individual outside of the laboratory, the individual receiving custody must 

sign the DEA 12 (transfer form) and return it to DEA. We found 10 of 77 

drug exhibits that had been transferred to an individual outside the 

laboratory that were missing the DEA 12. Having the recipient’s 

acknowledgment of receipt is critical for documenting the transfer of 

custody and the recipient’s acceptance of responsibility for the evidence. 

The controls mentioned by DEA (i.e., recording the transfer on a DEA 307, 

DEA 12, and in a database) may be redundant in documenting the transfer 

of custody, but these do not in any way annotate or document the 

recipient’s actual acceptance of responsibility for the transferred evidence. 

We identified this problem at each of the four laboratories we visited. 
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In another example, for 28 of the 86 drug exhibits we reviewed that had 

weight discrepancies above the threshold set forth in DEA’s policy, 

chemists did not obtain the appropriate verification required by DEA policy 

before opening and analyzing the evidence. Obtaining independent 

verification when differences exist ensures that possible arguments over 

such differences by the defense or the submitting agent are mitigated and 

decreases the potential that the difference could be subjected to theft and 

not detected. Three of the 4 laboratories that we visited contributed to the 

28 discrepancies in this area, and we did not identify a compensating 

control that would specifically reduce the risk of this type of deficiency. 

According to a DEA official, the inspection teams did not test for this 

verification, but will do so in future inspections. 

In several comments related to the significance of certain discrepancies, 

DEA stated that all exhibits of drug evidence examined by GAO were found 

to be in a sealed condition. We agree that adequately established and 

implemented sealing of evidence procedures can reduce the risk of theft, 

misuse, or loss of drug evidence. However, certain conditions identified by 

us during our testing and included in this report diminish the effectiveness 

of DEA’s sealing of evidence procedures. For example, a witness signature 

was not present on the evidence label used to seal evidence by the seizing 

agent for 4 of 142 drug exhibits we reweighed. Having a witness signature 

at the time of sealing the evidence is important to prevent any one 

individual from having uncontrolled access to evidence. In addition, we 

observed exhibits for which the packaging or the tape used to seal boxes 

was deteriorating, or had already deteriorated to the point that the box was 

open, increasing the potential for access to the contents. At one location, 

we observed a punctured evidence bag containing approximately 

2 kilograms of heroin. Further, at a bulk marijuana warehouse, we 

observed that several bags of a 9,000 pound seizure were worn, increasing 

the potential for access to the contents. 

This report contains recommendations to you. The head of a federal agency 

is required by 31 U.S.C. 720 to submit a written statement on actions taken 

on these recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental 

Affairs and the House Committee on Government Reform within 60 days of 

the date of this report. You must also send a written statement to the House 

and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency’s first request 

for appropriations made over 60 days after the date of this report.
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We are sending copies of this report to Senator Fred Thompson, Senator 

Joseph Lieberman, Representative Dan Burton, Representative Henry A. 

Waxman, Representative Stephen Horn, and Representative Jim Turner in 

their capacities as Chair or Ranking Minority Member of Senate or House 

Committees and Subcommittees. We are also sending copies of this report 

to Donnie R. Marshall, the Administrator of DEA; Robert L. Ashbaugh, 

Acting Inspector General, Department of Justice; and the Honorable 

Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will be 

made available to others upon request.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-3406. Key contributors to this assignment were Larry Malenich, 

Casey Keplinger, and Jeffrey Knott. 

Sincerely yours,

Gary T. Engel

Associate Director

Governmentwide Accounting and

Financial Management Issues
Page 28 GAO/AIMD-00-17 Seized Drugs and Weapons

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed officials from DEA 

headquarters and selected division offices and laboratories concerning 

various aspects of the seizure, storage, and disposal of seized drugs and 

weapons. We reviewed DEA’s Laboratory Operations Manual and Agents 

Manual for policies and procedures pertaining to the processes used to 

seize, account for, safeguard, and dispose of drugs and weapons. Based on 

documentation provided by DEA headquarters, we selected four division 

offices and corresponding laboratories with a large volume of drug seizure 

activity–Dallas, Texas (South Central Laboratory); Miami, Florida 

(Southeast Laboratory); New York, New York (Northeast Laboratory); and 

San Diego, California (Southwest Laboratory)–to perform our testing. 

From DEA headquarters, we obtained a STRIDE listing for drug exhibits 

submitted to the laboratories from October 1997 through August 1998. 

A random sample of 59 drug exhibits from the listing was statistically 

selected for each of the four laboratories. These exhibits included DEA 

cases, as well as cases from other agencies, such as FBI and Customs. For 

each item selected, we requested the laboratory seizure file and other 

related documentation to test certain controls, mostly related to ensuring 

that proper chain of custody documentation existed. We judgmentally 

selected and weighed 10 of the 59 items at each selected site to verify the 

recorded weight in the file against our observed weight.1 At each of the 

selected laboratories, we also obtained current inventory listings of 

cocaine seizures over 3 kilograms and heroin seizures over 500 grams, and 

selected 10 seizures from the listings, observed their existence, and 

weighed the item.2

 From the evidence maintained in the vault at each of the 

four selected laboratories, we judgmentally selected 15 items, weighed 

each item, and traced each one to a current inventory listing provided by 

the laboratory. Items were selected based on length of time the exhibit had 

been in storage, condition of packaging, type of drug, and/or whether the 

exhibit had been authorized for destruction. In total, we weighed 142 items. 

1

At two of the laboratories, we were unable to select 10 items to reweigh because many of 

the exhibits in our sample of 59 had been transferred to another agency, destroyed, or were 

of insignificant amounts. In these instances, replacement items were selected.

2

At two of the laboratories, we selected seven items from the listings and 3 items from 

alternative sources. At one laboratory, 3 of the 10 items had been authorized for destruction. 

At another laboratory, 3 of the 10 items selected were exhibits received by the laboratory, 

but not yet analyzed.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 29 GAO/AIMD-00-17 Seized Drugs and Weapons

At each selected division office, we reviewed the logbooks maintained by 

the facility to track bulk marijuana and physically inspected the bulk 

storage facilities. We judgmentally selected a total of 20 exhibits from the 

logbooks and 18 exhibits from those maintained in the storage facilities. We 

reviewed the related files maintained by the evidence custodian and 

weighed 14 of the exhibits. The specific number of cases selected for 

review and weighed varied at each location due to a limited number of bulk 

drug exhibits being maintained or because we were unable to reasonably 

reweigh the exhibit. For those cases not reweighed, we verified the 

quantity. At each selected division office, we also obtained current 

inventory listings from NEDS to randomly select 10 weapons to verify their 

existence in the vault. In addition, from weapons maintained in the vault, 

we judgmentally selected 10 items based on length of time each weapon 

had been in storage, type of weapon, or condition of packaging. Each 

selected item was traced to the current inventory listing.3

 We observed 

72 of the total 78 items selected. Six of the items selected from the listing 

were no longer being stored in the division office’s evidence vaults. For 

these six cases, we reviewed the related disposition documents. 

At each of the four laboratories and division offices, we observed the 

location and condition of storage facilities and other physical safeguards 

including cameras, motion detectors, and combination locks that are in 

place to control access to and use of drug and weapon evidence. We also 

made inquiries of DEA’s personnel about the operation of the physical 

safeguards. However, due to the sensitive nature of the evidence, we did 

not perform any comprehensive tests to verify the operation of the specific 

physical safeguards because we did not want to risk compromising any of 

the evidence that may be needed for prosecution purposes. 

To determine if issues we identified at the four selected division offices and 

laboratories are indicative of more systemic concerns, we (1) reviewed 

reports4

 issued by DOJ’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) related to 

3

At one division office, we used a manually prepared listing provided by the evidence 

custodian. At another division office, we were only able to identify and select six weapons 

from the vault since this division office seizes a limited number of weapons and does not 

maintain a separate area just for weapons. We selected and observed an additional two 

items from the listing. Therefore, the total number of weapons selected at the 4 offices 

was 78. 

4

Drug Enforcement Administration’s Laboratory Operations (DOJ OIG, 95-18, May 1995) and 

Retention of Drug Evidence in Drug Enforcement Administration Laboratories (DOJ OIG, 

I-96-02, February 1996). 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 30 GAO/AIMD-00-17 Seized Drugs and Weapons

laboratory operations and (2) requested and reviewed a copy of the 

sections of the most recent DEA internal inspection reports for 20 of DEA’s 

21 division offices5

 and for the 8 laboratories that cover procedures and 

internal controls related to seized drugs and weapons. These inspections 

were performed between March 1996 and August 1998. Because we 

received the sections of the internal inspection reports near the end of our 

fieldwork, we did not follow-up with the division offices or laboratories to 

determine the extent to which noted deficiencies had been corrected. We 

performed our work in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards from August 1998 through August 1999.

We requested written comments on a draft of this report from the Attorney 

General or her designee. The Acting DEA Administrator provided written 

comments, which are discussed in the “Agency Comments and Our 

Evaluation” section and are reprinted in appendix II. DEA also provided 

five enclosures with technical suggestions or supplemental information 

that we took into consideration while finalizing our report.

5

The El Paso Division Office was established after the completion of our fieldwork.
Page 31 GAO/AIMD-00-17 Seized Drugs and Weapons

Appendix II

Comments From the Drug Enforcement 

Administration ApendxiI

See comment 1.

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in the 

report text appear at the end 

of this appendix.
Appendix II

Comments From the Drug Enforcement 

Administration

Page 32 GAO/AIMD-00-17 Seized Drugs and Weapons

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 2.

See comment 4.

See comment 2.

See comment 5.

Now on pp. 14 & 15.

Now on p. 16.
Appendix II

Comments From the Drug Enforcement 

Administration

Page 33 GAO/AIMD-00-17 Seized Drugs and Weapons

See comment 6.

Now on p. 10.

See comment 7.

See comment 8.

See comment 9.

Now on pp. 10-11.

See comment 2.

See comment 10.
Appendix II

Comments From the Drug Enforcement 

Administration

Page 34 GAO/AIMD-00-17 Seized Drugs and Weapons

See comment 2.

Now on p. 11.

See comment 11.

Now on p. 12.

See comment 12.
Appendix II

Comments From the Drug Enforcement 

Administration

Page 35 GAO/AIMD-00-17 Seized Drugs and Weapons

See comment 10.

Now on p. 13.

See comment 4.

Now on p. 14.

See comment 4.

See comment 13.

Now on p. 15.

See comment 14.
Appendix II

Comments From the Drug Enforcement 

Administration

Page 36 GAO/AIMD-00-17 Seized Drugs and Weapons

See comment 15.

Now on p. 16.

See comment 16.

Now on p. 18.

See comment 17.

Now on pp. 19-20.

See comment 18.

Now on pp. 22-23.
Appendix II

Comments From the Drug Enforcement 

Administration

Page 37 GAO/AIMD-00-17 Seized Drugs and Weapons

See comments 9 and 10.

See comment 19.
Appendix II

Comments From the Drug Enforcement 

Administration

Page 38 GAO/AIMD-00-17 Seized Drugs and Weapons

See comment 20.

See comment 21.

See comment 2.
Appendix II

Comments From the Drug Enforcement 

Administration

Page 39 GAO/AIMD-00-17 Seized Drugs and Weapons

See comment 22.
Appendix II

Comments From the Drug Enforcement 

Administration

Page 40 GAO/AIMD-00-17 Seized Drugs and Weapons

The following are GAO’s comments on the Drug Enforcement 

Administration’s letter dated October 21, 1999.

GAO Comments 1. This review occurred in June 1999 with accreditation being granted in 

September 1999, subsequent to our review. The review covered DEA’s 8 

laboratories, but none of the division offices. 

2. See “Agency Comments and Our Evaluation” section.

3. We did note in our report that we requested and reviewed a copy of the 

sections of the most recent DEA internal inspection reports for the division 

offices and laboratories in existence at the time of our fieldwork that cover 

procedures and internal controls related to seized drugs and weapons. In 

addition, in several places in this report, we noted the period of time 

covered by these inspections. As we reported, because we received the 

sections of the internal inspection reports near the end of our fieldwork, 

we did not follow-up with the division offices or laboratories to determine 

the extent to which noted deficiencies had been corrected. 

4. In order to provide balance to the report, we also reported instances 

where we only found a few discrepancies. For the cases cited here by DEA 

where we noted three or fewer discrepancies, we used language such as, 

we “found substantial compliance with the policy, but noted a few 

exceptions.” As noted throughout the report, we identified numerous 

discrepancies in other key areas.

5. The report was clarified to include that chemists also document that 

they have verified that the seals are intact by checking the appropriate box 

on the DEA 86. 

6. As noted in our report, at the South Central Laboratory, we were 

informed that there were cameras that monitor vault activity that were not 

operational. In addition, at our exit conference with DEA, agency officials 

provided documentation indicating that after our visit the two cameras in 

question had subsequently been fixed. 

7. We reported that an official indicated that the vault alarm system at the 

Northeast Laboratory in New York had been fixed. We also noted that to 

confirm this, we had asked for the more recent inspection report for this 

laboratory, but as of the completion of our fieldwork, it had not been 

provided to us. After our exit conference with DEA, we were provided 
Appendix II

Comments From the Drug Enforcement 

Administration

Page 41 GAO/AIMD-00-17 Seized Drugs and Weapons

further documentation relating to this issue. However, the documentation 

did not clearly demonstrate that the alarm had been fixed. In addition, 

along with the comments on our draft report, DEA provided a SelfInspection Status Report (instead of the requested internal inspection 

report). However, this report did not specifically indicate that the work was 

performed and whether the problem was resolved. 

8. We reported that we observed physical safeguards that are in place to 

control and monitor access to and use of drug and weapon evidence. 

However, due to the sensitive nature of the evidence, we did not perform 

any comprehensive tests to verify the operation of the specific physical 

safeguards because we did not want to risk compromising any of the 

evidence that may be needed for prosecution purposes. The specific 

physical safeguard issues listed in this report are weaknesses we identified 

through observation or inquiry of officials, or were reported in DEA’s 

internal inspection reports. Since we were not previously informed of the 

physical security surveys or formal courtesy visits referred to in DEA’s 

comments and have not been provided any documentation showing the 

scope of such reviews, we cannot determine whether the reviews 

addressed the control areas we reported on. 

9. We reported that due to space constraints in the drug evidence vaults at 

two of the four laboratories we visited, we observed boxes that had been 

stacked on the floor such that the lower boxes were being crushed, 

increasing the potential for access to the contents and therefore increasing 

the potential for theft, misuse, or loss. DEA stated that it recognizes that 

the evidence vaults at some locations are overcrowded and need to be 

enlarged and has plans to construct several new laboratory facilities with 

larger evidence vaults to address this issue. 

10. Our report does describe the process by which DEA handles bulk 

evidence, including the recognition that other parties influence how bulk 

evidence is handled and when it is destroyed. We did not take issue to there 

being circumstances for which bulk evidence may need to be held for 

extended periods of time, but requested that documentation supporting the 

extension be provided. Specifically, for bulk exhibits tested, we requested 

that DEA provide either a (1) DEA 48, authorizing the destruction or 

(2) Letter of Intent to Destroy, which is sent to the U.S. Attorney’s Office, 

along with the U.S. Attorney’s response authorizing DEA to retain bulk 

amounts. For two of the five bulk exhibits tested, the letters authorizing 

DEA to maintain amounts above certain thresholds or the forms 

authorizing the destruction were not provided. In addition, 1 of 16 exhibits 
Appendix II

Comments From the Drug Enforcement 

Administration

Page 42 GAO/AIMD-00-17 Seized Drugs and Weapons

that had been authorized for destruction had not been destroyed within the 

90 days as required by DEA policy. This exhibit had been authorized for 

destruction but was not destroyed until over 5 months after approval was 

obtained. 

11. We recognize that situations beyond management’s control can 

occasionally preclude chemists from adhering to the requirement that drug 

evidence normally be returned to the vault within 5 working days after the 

chemist’s analysis. However, returning evidence to the vault promptly 

ensures that chemists do not maintain evidence for excessive amounts of 

time in a more accessible area than that of the vault. In addition, 17 of the 

20 reported instances occurred at the South Central Laboratory, indicating 

a more significant problem at this particular laboratory. DEA 

acknowledged that it would continue to reinforce the 5 working day policy 

and that specific procedures have been instituted to correct the problem at 

the South Central Laboratory.

12. The timeliness issues addressed in this report primarily affect the 

controls over the safeguarding of evidence. Destroying evidence within 90 

days of receiving approval as required by DEA policy conserves limited 

vault space and eliminates the additional inherent risk of theft of drugs that 

are no longer needed as evidence. DEA indicated that it will continue to 

devote resources to ensure the timely destruction of evidence. 

13. During our testing at each DEA location visited, we met with agency 

officials and discussed our findings and provided them opportunities to 

respond to our findings and to provide documentation that could resolve 

the discrepancies. We requested, but were not provided, DEA 12s for 10 of 

the 77 exhibits selected for our review that had been transferred to an 

individual outside the laboratory. In addition, we were not provided with 

any other documentation acknowledging receipt of the transferred items 

by the recipient. 

14. At our exit conference with DEA, agency officials indicated that the 

issue in the internal inspection reports had been corrected, but did not 

indicate that the DEA 12s in question related to special program exhibits 

and were being filed in one central file, not in the individual corresponding 

case files. DEA states that this issue has since been corrected and copies of 

the DEA 12s for special program exhibits are being placed in their 

respective case files. 
Appendix II

Comments From the Drug Enforcement 

Administration

Page 43 GAO/AIMD-00-17 Seized Drugs and Weapons

15. As noted in comment 13, during our testing at each DEA location 

visited, we met with agency officials and discussed our findings and 

provided them opportunities to respond to such findings and to provide 

documentation that could resolve the discrepancies. We requested, but 

were not provided the required photographs for two of the four bulk 

seizure files we reviewed, both of which exceeded the 10 kilogram 

threshold. 

16. Ensuring that data are promptly and correctly entered into STRIDE 

provides program managers with more accurate and useful information. 

However, as we reported, we found 15 instances where the data in STRIDE 

did not agree with supporting documentation and therefore diminished 

DEA’s accountability over the related evidence. 

17. The two reported examples relate to exhibits that were submitted to 

the laboratory in person and not mailed. Regardless of the method of 

delivery, it is important that the chemist, as required by DEA policy, obtain 

a witness’ verification when differences above the established threshold 

exist to ensure that possible arguments over such differences by the 

defense or submitting agent are mitigated.

18. We recognize that certain uncontrollable environmental factors may 

cause weight differences that do not follow trends. However, DEA could 

not specifically explain the weight decreases for several differences we 

identified, including differences relating to two exhibits that had been 

authorized for destruction and were therefore no longer needed as 

evidence. For example, the weight for one cocaine exhibit that had been 

analyzed 3 years prior to our testing had decreased by 6 percent or 

approximately 300 grams. According to DEA officials, cocaine typically 

absorbs moisture and gains weight. In another example, a marijuana 

exhibit weighed about 25 pounds less than (or about half) the weight 

recorded when the drug was received at the division office. DEA officials 

agreed that the decrease in weight seemed excessive, but were unable to 

provide a specific explanation for the difference. Further, as noted in our 

agency comments and evaluation section of this report, we identified 

certain conditions that diminish the effectiveness of DEA’s sealing of 

evidence procedures. 

19. DEA concurred with our recommendation to reinforce its policy that 

requires two signatures be recorded on evidence labels prior to acceptance 

by laboratory or division office evidence custodians. DEA stated that it will 

reinforce the policy, but it is reluctant to return evidence that is mailed to 
Appendix II

Comments From the Drug Enforcement 

Administration

Page 44 GAO/AIMD-00-17 Seized Drugs and Weapons

the laboratory with only one signature due to the added risk and delay of 

mailing evidence back. We agree that mailing evidence back to obtain a 

second signature may not be appropriate, however, the occurrence of this 

situation should decrease if stronger adherence to the policy is achieved. 

20. A Miami Division Office official provided us with a copy of a packaging 

slip showing that one of the firearms in our sample had been transferred 

from Miami to another DEA office. We reported that the contents of the 

package, listed as “3 guns, money, and jewelry,” was recorded on the 

packaging slip which was attached to the outside of the package. We 

recommended that DEA adhere to a previously existing policy in its Agents 

Manual, Section 6663.43, which states that the procedures set forth for the 

domestic delivery of drug evidence shall also apply to nondrug property. 

The procedures for mailing drug evidence specifically state that the outer 

wrapping should bear no indication as to the nature of the contents. 

21. Our primary objective in testing the controls over the safeguarding of 

weapons was to determine whether control procedures existed and were 

being followed. As we reported, we found two handguns that had not been 

sealed in evidence bags as required by DEA policy and knives that were 

stored in a zipper bag that could be easily opened. The scope of our testing 

did not include determining if the weapons themselves were rendered safe.

22. The scope of our review was designed to determine whether 

weaknesses in controls existed that increase the risk that evidence could 

be compromised for federal prosecution purposes. It was not our intent to 

specifically determine whether the evidence had in fact been 

compromised. 

(901799) Letr
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