T he P et i t i oner as s er t s i n h i s pet i t i on t hat “ [ c] ouns el advi s ed appeal was f i l ed. ” H owever , i n t he at t ach ed 1 (continued...)

1 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT JAC KSON

OLIVE R J. HIGGINS v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forHardin Cou nty No. 7608 Charles C. M cGinley, Jud ge

No. W2008-02671-C CA-R 3-PC - Filed Augu st 17, 2009

The P etitioner, Oliver J. H iggins, appeals the tria l court’s de nial of his petition for post-conviction relief . The State ha s filed a motion reque sting that thi s Court affirm the trial court’s denial of re lief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appea ls. The petition for post-conviction re lief fails as it is barre d by the s tatute of limit ations. Acc ordingly, we gr ant the State’s motion and af firm the jud gme nt o f the low e r c ou rt

.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt of th e Tr ial Co ur t A ff

ir me d Pur sua nt to Rul e 20 , R ule s o f the Co ur t o f C r im ina l A ppe als

C AM I LLE R. M C M ULLEN , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in w hich J OHN E VERET T W I L L I AMS and A LA N E. G LE NN , JJ., joined.

Oliver J. Higgins, pro se.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr ., Attorney Ge nera l & Reporter; Michae l Moore, S o l i citor Ge nera l; Cl are nce E. Lutz, Assistant Attorney Ge nera l , for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

M EM ORAN DU M OP IN ION

As all eg ed in hi s petition, on January 15, 1998, the Petitioner, Oliver J. Higgins, entere d guilty pleas to four counts of t he sale of a controlled substance
, i.e., c oc a ine
, in the Ha rd in C ou nty Circuit Court. For these convictions, the Petitioner rec eived a n eff ective se ntence of twelve year s
c on fi ne me nt. No app e a l w a s ta ke n s e e kin g r e vie w o f the se nte nc e

. Th e Pe tit ion e r i s c ur re ntl y 1(...continued) 1

m em o randum t o hi s p et i t i o n, he m ai nt ai ns “H i ggi ns d i d not ap p eal t he C ri m i nal judgm ent i n t hi s m at t er, nor has he f i l ed any previ o us M o t i o ns, P et i t i o ns, or o t her pl ead i ngs t o chal l enge t he val i d i t y of co nvi ct i o ns o r s ent ences. ” T he

rec o rd s o f

t his C o urt f

ail t o refl ec t a d i rec t ap p ea l f ro m t he se c o nv i cti o ns.

2 incar cer ated at a fe dera l prison in Kentucky, serving an ef fec tive sentenc e life plus five year s based

on various drug-related convictions out of t he United States District Court for the W estern D istrict of Tenne ssee. See United States v. Higgins, 557 F.3d 381, 384 (6 Cir. 2009). th

On Se pte mbe r 2 4, 20 08
, the Pe tit ion e r fi le d a pe tit ion fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f i n th e Ha rd in County Ci rcuit Court. As grounds for relief , the Petitioner all eg ed t hat his guilty pl eas w ere involuntary, the prosec ution f ailed to disc lose favor able evidenc e, he was denied th e effec tive assistance of counse l, he is actua lly innocent of the c harge s fo r whi ch he sta nds convicted. The Petitioner further asserts that newly discove red e vidence justifies the tolli ng the statute of limitations in his case. Spec ifically, the Petitioner asse rts t h at “[n] ewly discove red e vidence shows that law enfor ceme nt personnel working with the 24 Judicial Circuit and Har din County S heriff ’s Nar cotics th Task Force we re co rrupt at the time Higgins wa s being ‘investigated’ . . . .” The Petitioner, in a subsequent plea ding responding to the State’s answ er, a rgued that Johnson v. St ate, 544 U.S. 295, 125 S. Ct . 1571 (2003), “established an acc rual point for challenging s tate prior convictions at the date suc h was used in fe d er al co urt to enhanc e the de fendant’s sentenc e.” U sing Johnson, the Petitioner argue d that, since he was sente nced in f eder al court on Dece mber 27, 2007, his petition for post-c onviction relief w as t i mely filed. By order enter ed July 18, 2007, the lower court d is mi s s e d th e p e ti ti o n a s b arr e d b y th e s tatu te o f li mi tati o n s

. T h e Pe ti ti o n e r , proce eding pr o s e , timely filed a notice of

appea l document on Novembe r 26, 2008.

On Februa

ry 19, 2009, the Petitioner, proc eeding pr o s e , fi le d a n ini tia l brie f w ith thi s Co urt. Inhis brie f, the Pe tit ion e r a lle ge d th a t th e statut e of lim itatio ns ba

rring his request f

or po stconviction re lief should be tolled base d, not only upon the ruli ng in Johnson v. State, but also upon his assertion that “the le gal questions prese nted by [his] post- co n v i ct i o n petition are not strictly a temp[o]r al ca l cu l at i o n

. ” In lieu of a responsive brief, the State, on June 24, 2009, filed a motion

re qu e sti ng that thi s Cou rt a ff ir m the low e r co ur

t’ s den ia l of pos t- c on vic tio n re lie f p ur su ant t o Ru le 20, Rules of the Tennessee Court of C riminal Appea ls. As basis for its motion, the St ate a sserted that the petit ion is time-barr ed. The State further argued that the Petitioner’s c laims do not satisfy the statutory

exceptions to the tim ely filing r equire ment. On J uly 1
, 2 0 0 9, the Petitioner filed a response to the State’s motion for af firmanc e.

Pursuant to Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tion 40-30-102(a ), a pe rs o n in custody under a

se nte nc e of

a c ourt of thi s st a te mus t pe tit ion

fo r po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f w ith in o ne y e ar of the date of the fi na l ac tio n of the highe st state a pp e llate c ourt to wh ic h an a pp e a l is take n o r, if

no a pp e a l is taken, within one year

of the date on which the judgme nt become s final. The statute emphasizes that “[t] ime is of t he esse nce of the rig ht to file a petition for post- conviction re lief or motion to reope n established by

this chapter, a

nd the one- y ear

limit ations period is an element of the rig ht to file such

an ac tion and is a condition upon its ex erc ise.” T.C.A.§ 40-30-102( a). Whil e due pr ocess dictates that the statute of limitations not be so strictly applied as to de ny a person the opportunity to have3

his clai m h ea rd and dete rmined at a meaning ful time and in a mea ningf ul manner, se e State v. McKnig ht, 51 S.W .3d 559 (Tenn. 200 1 ); S ea ls v. St ate, 23 S.W.3d 272 (Tenn. 2000); B urfor d v. State, 845 S.W .2d 204 (Tenn. 1992) , the exceptions to the statute of limitations ar e explicitly limit ed, i.e. , (1 ) c la ims ba se d up on a ne w ru le of c on sti tut ion a l la

w a pp lic a ble to p e tit ion e r’ s c a se , ( 2) c la ims based up o n new sc ientific evide nce show ing innoc ence , and (3) claims based upon e nhance d
sentenc es that we re e nhance d beca use of c onvictions subsequently found to be illeg al. T.C.A. § 40- 30-102(b) (1-3)

. The post-conviction court must a lso c onsider an otherwise untimely petition if the application of the statute of li mitations would be a denial of due process. See Seals, 23 S.W.3d at 27 8- 79 . T he pr inc ipl e s o f d ue pr oc e ss a

re fl e xible , r e qu ir inga

ba lanc ingof

the Pe tit ion e r’ s li be rt

y interest ag ainst the State’s finality interests. Sample v. State, 82 S.W.3d 267, 274 (Tenn. 2002).

When consider i n g wh et her due proce ss should tol l the statute of limitations, we utili ze a thr e e -s te p p ro c e ss: (1) de termine whe n the limitations period would have norma lly have be g un to run, (2 ) d e te rm ine wh e the r t

he g ro un ds fo r r e lie f a c tua lly aro se a ft e r t

he lim itatio ns pe ri od

wo uld normally have c ommenced; a

nd (3) if the g rounds are “later -ar ising,” deter mine if, under the fac ts of the ca se, a stric t application of the limit ations period would ef fec tively deny t he petitioner a

re a so na ble op po rt

un ity to p re se nt t

he c la im. Sands v. State, 903 S.W .2d 297, 301 (Tenn. 1995) . The re viewingcourt must car efully weig h the Petitioner’s liberty

interest in “c ollatera lly attackingconstitutional viol ations occur ring duringthe conviction proc ess,” B urfor d, 845 S.W .2d at 207, ag ainst the State’s i n t er est in preve nting the litigation of “ stale and f

raudule nt claims.” Sands, 903 S.W.2d at 301. The Petiti oner c laims that the statute of limitations i s tolled by (1) the United States Supreme Court’s d ec i sion in J ohnson v. United States, 544 U.S. at 295, 125 S. Ct. at 1571, (2) newly discovere d evidenc e of la w enf orce ment

corr uption that aff

ecte d the Petitioner’s ca se; and (3) the Petitioner’s ac tual innocenc e of the char g es in this case.

In J ohnson, the United States Supreme Court, interpr eting a one- y ear fede ral s t atut e of limit ations, held that the vac atur of a prior state c onvictio n u s ed to enhanc e a f eder al sentenc e constituted a new“fa ct,” whic h commence d the s tatute of limit ations for collatera lly attackingthe fede ral sente nce. Johnson did not create a new constitutional rule of law a p p l i ca b l e t o the Petitioner’s case . See T.C.A. § 40-30- 102(b)( 1). The Petitioner’ s relianc e upon Johnson is mis pla c e d. Th e ho ldi ng in Johns on wa s limit e d to cha lle ng ing fe de ra l sen te nc e s and did no t c re a te

a tol lin g pr ov isi on

fo r c ha lle ng ingstate c on vic tio ns

.

Th e Pe tit ion e r f

ur the r a ll ege s th a t he is a c tua lly inn oc e nt o f t

he of fe ns e and that ne wl y discovere d evidenc e of law enfor ceme nt corr uption entitles him to relief. I n support of his argument that ne wl y

dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e e xists , th e Pe tit ion e r m a int a ins that “law e nforc em ent per sonnel working with the 24 Judicial Circuit and Har din County Sheriff’ s Narc otics Taskfor ce w ere corr upt th

a t th e tim e Hi gg ins wa s bei ng ‘i nv e sti gate d.

.. .’ ” Th is inf orma tio n f

a ils to q ua lif

y a s n e w s c ie nti fi c evidenc e. See T .C.A. § 40-30-102(b) (2). More over, the Petitioner’s allegation in thi s rega rd

rema ins just t hat an a llegation. The P etitioner has f ailed to provide any specific documented evidenc e to substantiate his claims. Finally, the Petiti oner a lleges that he is ac tually innocent of the4

crimes f or which he has been convicted. He fails to specific ally allege any argume nt in support of this claim. Based upon the re cord be fore this Court and the vague a rgument pre sented by the Pe tit ion e r, thi s Co urt r e ma ins un c on vin c e d th a t th e Pe tit ion e r i s a c tua lly inn oc e nt o f the of fe ns e s.
Due pr ocess r equire s that a petitioner be provided the oppor tunity to pursue a c laim; it does

no t r e qu ir e th a t th e c o urt s o f th i s s t a t e p e r m i t p e t i t i o n e r s t o w av e th e b an n e r o f “ d u e p r o c e ss” to excuse purposef

ul delay in the prese ntation of claims nor doe s i t p er mit petiti oners to wr ap themselves in a cloak of “due proce ss” comprised of frivolous g uises to evade the ex pired statute of limit ations. The Petitioner’s pe tition for post-conv i ct i o n relief filed nea rly ten y ear s after

the limit ations expi red is time-ba rre d.

When an opinion would have no pr ece dential value, the C o u rt of Criminal Appea ls may

a ff ir m th e judgm e nt o r a c tio n o f t he tr ia l c ourt

by me mor and

um o pin ion

wh e n th e jud g me nt i s

re nd e re d o r t

he a c tio n ta

ke n in a pr oc e e din g wi tho ut a

jur y and su c h ju dg me nt or a c tio n is no t a deter mination of g uilt, and the evidenc e does not pre ponderate ag ainst the finding of the trial judg e. See Te nn. R. Ct. C rim. App. 20. We conclude that this case s at i s fi es the c riteria of Rule 20. Ac c or din g ly , it is or de re d th a t th e State ' s mo tio n is g ra nte d. Th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

is aff irmed in ac corda

nce w ith Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appea ls.

___________________________________ 

### CAMILLE R. MC MULLEN, JUDGE