J-S92010-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MARKEL JOVAN HALL,

Appellant No. 326 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 1, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0000864-2015

BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, and STRASSBURGER,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED MARCH 13, 2017

Markel Jovan Hall (“Appellant”) appeals pro se from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County.1 We affirm.

Appellant and two co-defendants were arrested in connection with a 

home invasion that occurred on October 17, 2014. Although an attorney 

was appointed for Appellant, defense counsel was permitted to withdraw and 

____________________________________________

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 In his notice of appeal and amended notice of appeal, Appellant purports 

to appeal from the orders denying his post-sentence motion and his motion 

for modification of sentence. However, an “order denying post-sentence 

motions acts to finalize the judgment of sentence for purposes of appeal. 

Thus, the appeal is taken from the judgment of sentence, not the order 

denying post-sentence motions.” Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 658 

A.2d 395, 397 (Pa. Super. 1995). We have amended the caption 

accordingly.
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Appellant was permitted to represent himself after a waiver colloquy at 

which the trial court determined that Appellant’s waiver of trial counsel was 

voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. N.T., 9/4/15, at 6–7. At a second 

waiver colloquy, Appellant orally requested stand-by counsel, and the trial 

court directed Appellant to file a written request for stand-by counsel. N.T., 

10/29/15, at 3. Appellant complied, and, following a hearing, the trial court 

denied Appellant’s request. N.T., 11/10/15, at 6. After a two-day trial, a 

jury convicted Appellant of one count each of criminal conspiracy, robbery, 

burglary, theft by unlawful taking or disposition, receiving stolen property, 

simple assault, and criminal trespass.2 N.T., 11/13/15, at 76.

The trial court sentenced Appellant on February 1, 2016, to 

incarceration for an aggregate term of forty-two to eighty-four months. 

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on February 2, 2016, which the trial 

court denied on February 3, 2016. On February 10, 2016, Appellant filed a 

request for modification of his sentence, which the trial court denied on 

February 16, 2016. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on March 1, 

2016, and an amended notice of appeal on March 14, 2016.

Following a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 

A.2d 81, 82 (Pa. 1998), on March 23, 2016, the trial court determined that 

Appellant’s waiver of appellate counsel was also knowing, intelligent, and 

____________________________________________

2

 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903, 3701(a)(1)(iv), 3502(a)(1), 3921(a), 3925(a), 

2701(a)(3), and 3503(a)(1)(i), respectively.
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voluntary. N.T., 3/23/16, at 1–5. Accordingly, the trial court entered an 

order on March 24, 2016, permitting Appellant to proceed pro se on direct 

appeal.

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for review:

[I.] Whether the trial court erred by failing to conduct a 

complete and thorough, on-the-record colloquy of 

Appellant before allowing him to proceed to his trial pro se 

in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 121, resulting in an 

unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent waiver of his 

right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United 

[States] Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution?

Appellant’s Brief at 7 (full capitalization omitted).3

Initially, we address a procedural matter. The trial court originally 

concluded that Appellant’s issue was waived because he did not file a courtordered statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b). Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/16, at 1. In response, Appellant alleged 

that he did not receive notice of the Rule 1925 order. Appellant’s Brief at 9 

n.1. We remanded this matter to the trial court for re-entry and proper 

notice of a Rule 1925(b) order. Docket Entry 87. The trial court complied. 

Docket Entry 88. Thereafter, Appellant filed a timely Rule 1925(b) 

____________________________________________

3

 We note that Appellant filed two appellate briefs: Brief for Appellant, 

8/4/16; Amended Brief for Appellant, 9/9/16. The briefs are substantively 

the same, only the type face and formatting between the two versions are 

different. The Commonwealth did not file a brief in this matter.
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statement, and the trial court filed a new Rule 1925(a) opinion. Docket 

Entries 89, 91. Therefore, Appellant’s issue is ripe for review.

As the trial court observed, “[t]his appeal concerns Appellant’s waiver 

of court-appointed trial counsel, and request for standby counsel.” Trial

Court Opinion, 2/3/17, at 1. We have explained:

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right, necessarily 

implied under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, to 

self-representation at trial. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 

806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). However, before a 

defendant will be permitted to proceed pro se, he or she must 

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive the right to 

counsel. Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 596 Pa. 510, 946 A.2d 

645, 655 (2008). To ensure that a waiver is knowing, voluntary, 

and intelligent, the trial court must conduct a “probing colloquy,” 

which is a searching and formal inquiry as to whether the 

defendant is aware both of the right to counsel and of the 

significance and consequences of waiving that right. 

Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 664 A.2d 1326, 1335–

[13]36 (1995). More specifically, the court must determine the 

following: (a) that the defendant understands that he or she has 

the right to be represented by counsel, and the right to have 

free counsel appointed if the defendant is indigent; (b) that the 

defendant understands the nature of the charges against the 

defendant and the elements of each of those charges; (c) that 

the defendant is aware of the permissible range of sentences 

and/or fines for the offenses charged; (d) that the defendant 

understands that if he or she waives the right to counsel, the 

defendant will still be bound by all the normal rules of procedure 

and that counsel would be familiar with these rules; (e) that the 

defendant understands that there are possible defenses to these 

charges that counsel might be aware of, and if these defenses 

are not raised at trial, they may be lost permanently; and (f) 

that the defendant understands that, in addition to defenses, the

defendant has many rights that, if not timely asserted, may be 

lost permanently; and that if errors occur and are not timely 

objected to, or otherwise timely raised by the defendant, these 

errors may be lost permanently. Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(2); 

Blakeney, supra at 655; Starr, supra at 1335.
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Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 263 (Pa. 2011). If the trial court 

finds that the defendant’s waiver is not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 

after a probing colloquy, the court may deny the defendant’s request to 

proceed pro se. Starr, 664 A.2d at 1335.

After reviewing Appellant’s brief, the certified record, and relevant 

authority, we conclude that the trial court’s opinion thoroughly addresses the 

issue raised on appeal and correctly concludes that the issue lacks merit. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence, and we do so on the basis 

of the trial court’s February 3, 2017 opinion. The parties are directed to 

attach a copy of the trial court opinion in the event of further proceedings in 

this matter.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/13/2017