In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth ___________________________

No. 02-20-00013-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 231st District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 231-527816-13

Before Birdwell, Kerr, and Bassel, JJ.

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

IN THE INTEREST OF M.H. AND C.H., CHILDREN
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A.H., the father of two children, appeals from a trial court’s order terminating 

his parental rights and awarding permanent managing conservatorship of both 

children to the Department of Family and Protective Services.

1 See Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (b)(2). We affirm.

Father’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief in which he asserts that 

Father’s appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 

1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 

2003, no pet.) (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination 

cases). The brief meets Anders’s requirements by presenting a professional evaluation 

of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced 

on appeal. Although provided with the opportunity to obtain a copy of the appellate 

record and file a pro se response, Father has not done so. The Department of Family 

and Protective Services has declined to file a response.

In assessing the correctness of a compliant Anders brief’s conclusion that an 

appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights is frivolous, we must 

independently examine the appellate record to determine if any arguable grounds for 

1

The trial court originally terminated Father’s rights along with the children’s 

mother’s in a September 2018 judgment, which only Father appealed. See In re M.H., 

No. 02-18-00329-CV, 2019 WL 1284912, at *1 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth Mar. 21, 

2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). We reversed that judgment as to Father and remanded the 

case to the trial court for a new trial at which Father was to be afforded appointed 

counsel. See id. at *2–3. This appeal is from the judgment after that new trial.
3

appeal exist. In re C.J., No. 02-18-00219-CV, 2018 WL 4496240, at *1 (Tex. App.––

Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 

503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.––

Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). We also consider the Anders brief itself and any pro se 

response. In re K.M., No. 02-18-00073-CV, 2018 WL 3288591, at *10 (Tex. App.––

Fort Worth July 5, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 

408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding).

We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief and the appellate record. Finding no 

reversible error, we agree with counsel that this appeal is without merit. See Bledsoe v. 

State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 

(Tex. App.––Dallas 2009, pet. denied). Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order

terminating Father’s parental rights to M.H. and C.H.

Counsel did not file a motion to withdraw, and the record does not show good 

cause for withdrawal independent from counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (order); In re C.J., 501 

S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2016, pets. denied). Accordingly, counsel 

remains appointed in this appeal through proceedings in the supreme court unless 

otherwise relieved from his duties for good cause in accordance with Family Code 

Section 107.016(3)(C). P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27.

Per Curiam

Delivered: April 30, 2020