# ORDER U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

SUBJ: RUNWAY SAFETY AREA PROGRAM 5200.8 EXHIBIT 

# i .:r;:TFJ1 21

## A1. PURPOSE. This order establishes a. The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Runway Safety Area (RSA) Program and b. The procedures that FAA employees will follow in implementing that program. 2. DISTRIBUTION. This order is distributed to the division level in the Office ofAirport Safety and Standards and the Office ofAirport Planning and Programming; to the division level in the regional Flight Standards, Airway Facilities, and Air Traffic Divisions; to the branch level in the regional Airports Divisions; and a standard distribution to all Airport District Offices. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE. October 1, 1999 4. BACKGROUND. The RSA is an integral part ofthe runway environment. RSA dimensions are established in AC 150/5300-13, Airport Design and are based on the Airport Reference Code (ARC). The RSA is intended to provide a measure of safety in the event of an aircraft's excursion from the runway by significantly reducing the extent of personal injury and aircraft damage during overruns, undershoots and veer-offs. 5. OBJECTIVE The objective of the Runway Safety Area Program isthat all RSAs atfederally obligated airports and all RSAs at airports certificated under 14 Code of Federal regulations (CFR) part 139 shall conform to the standards contained inAC 150/5300-13 Airport Design, to the extent practicable. 6. RESPONSIBILITY AND DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY. a. The Regional Airports Division Manager ensures that the program is implemented in accordance with the procedures provided in this directive. b. The Regional Airports Division Manager approves all RSA determinations required by Paragraph 8.0 of this order. This authority may be delegated to the ADO Manager, only when it is determined practicable to obtain the RSA.

Dist: A-W(AS/AP)-2; A-X (FS/AF/AT)-2); A-X(AS)-3; A-FAS-O (STD) Initiated byAAS-31 0

### 5200.8 10/01/99

7. RSA INVENTORY. Each regional airports division shall collect and maintain data on the RSA for each runway atfederally obligated airports and airports certificated under part 139 within their geographic purview. The data will include the current width of each RSA and the length that the RSA extends beyond each runway end. The data will also contain the standards that apply to each RSA at the airport. In addition, all objects within the area that comprises a standard RSA shall be documented. Appendix 1, Runway Safety Area Database, provides aformat for this data collection. 8. RSA DETERMINATIONS. a. Supporting Documentation. The region/ADO shall prepare documentation for each RSA. Appendix 2, Supporting Documentation for RSA Determinations, provides guidance that must be adhered to in preparing this documentation. The Regional Airports Division will decide the level of detail required for all planning, environmental, and engineering factors that are to be incorporated in analyzing the practicable alternatives. The objective isto assure that accurate and complete information supports the decision making process on RSA determinations. (1) For an RSA that does not meet current standards, the Regional Airports Division Manager will make a determination as required in paragraph 8b, based on this documentation. (2) Determinations are based on the best, current, available information. However, information that becomes available at a later date can effect changes or revisions to a determination and, as a result, updates the determination. For example, the final determination may depend on the outcome of an Environmental Assessment process. Until that outcome is known, a determination is made on the best, current, available information. (3) Although for data collection purposes it is convenient to describe the RSA in terms of runway ends, the determination shall be made for the entire RSA, i.e., both runway ends as well as the full width. b. Determination. The Regional Airports Division Manager shall review the data collected for each RSA in Paragraph 7, along with supporting documentation prepared by the region/ADO for that RSA, and make one of the following determinations: (1) The existing RSA meets the current standards contained inAC 150/5300-13. (2) The existing RSA does not meet standards but it is practicable to improve the RSA so that itwill meet current standards. (3) The existing RSA can be improved to enhance safety, but the RSA will still not meet current standards. (4) The existing RSA does not meet current standards, and it is not practicable to improve the RSA.
c. Form of Determination. The RSA determination will be signed and dated by the Regional Airports Division Manager and kept on file along with the supporting documentation in the regional office orADO. The determination and its date will also be included in the RSA database. See Appendix 1. Page 2

### 10/01/99 5200.8

d. Revision to Determination. If new information becomes available, the Regional Airports Division Manager may issue a revised determination. The revised determination shall be in aform required by Paragraph 8(c) and supported by documentation required by Paragraph 8(a). The date ofthe revised determination shall be recorded in the RSA database. 9. TIMING OF DATA COLLECTION AND DETERMINATION. The RSA inventory and RSA determinations specified in paragraph 7 and 8 will be completed in accordance with the following schedule: a. For runways used by air carriers at airports certificated under 14 CFR Part 139, the RSA inventory and determination will be completed by June 30, 2000. b. For all other runways atfederally obligated airports, the RSA inventory and determination can be done at any time, but will normally be done during the master planning process. However, the inventory and determination must be completed prior to any project for runway construction, reconstruction, or significant expansion that involves Federal funds. 1

### O. IMPLEMENTATION OF RSA IMPROVEMENTS. a. A project to improve an RSA in accordance with the determination made in Paragraph 8 may be initiated at any time. b. Whenever a project for a runway involves construction, reconstruction (includes overlays), or significant expansion, the project shall also provide for improving the RSA in accordance with the determination made in Paragraph 8. Reconstruction and significant expansion are construed as any project that results in changing the capability ofthe airport orthe load-bearing strength ofthe pavement, restores the original design life ofthe pavement, or changes the actual or potential design aircraft use. (1) The requirement to upgrade RSA under Paragraph 10b is applicable at part 139 airports regardless ofthe funding source for the runway project. (2) The requirement to upgrade RSA under Paragraph 10b is applicable at federally obligated airport, if Federal or Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) funds are used for the project. 11. OVERSIGHT. The Airport Office of Safety and Standards (AAS) isthe office of primary interest. This office may selectively review RSA analyses or the entire program on a periodic basis to assure consistency. The office also provides consulting and guidance injudging the merits of a specific alternative.

David L. Bennett Director ofAirport Safety and Standards Page 3

### 10/01/99 5200.8 Appendix 1 Appendix 1. RUNWAY SAFETY AREA DATA BASE

A national data base that is accessible on the Intranet is being developed as part ofthis program. The following pages provide sample copies ofthe formats to be used for entering RSA information into this data base. The electronic version ofthis Appendix, along with accompanying instructions, is available on the FAA intranet and isto be used for transmitting the above information. As AAS-1 00 and AAS-300 gain experience in using the data that are collected through these forms, modifications and/or clarifications may be necessary. The latest version of this Appendix will always be found on the Intranet.

Page 1

### 5200.8

Appendix 1 Runway Form

Locid:

### 11...-

_ 10/01/99

Airport:

# 1,--

_ City/State:

# I ADO:I Region:!•••.

_

Runway: 1 -, Length:

# w Width: Part 139: 

### 0

CRITICAL AIRCRAFT: Approach Category: C==:J Design Group:C==:J Visibility Minimums:

## II...- ....J

PUBLISHED RUNWAY SAFETY AREA STANDARDS:

Length:C==:J Width:C==:J

Uniformity Comments: Runway Ends:! ...L...

_ Actual RSA Length Actual RSAWidth RSA Grade (+/- 5%) Dimensional Uniformity 

### 0 0

0 0

- RSA D~terminiiltion Currently Meets Standards 0 0

Practicable to Meet Standards 0 0 Can be Improved ButWill Not Meet Standards 0 0

Not Practicable to Improve 0 0 Date of Determination (month/year):

# I I

- Plann~d Impro\!~m~nts

RSA to Design Standards Obtainable: 

### 0 

### 0 Runway Realignment or Relocation: 

### 0 0 Shift Runway From Present Alignment: 

### 0 0

Use Declared Distances: 

### 0 0

Use EMAS: 

### 0 0 Other: 

### 0 0

Scheduled Completion (year):C==:J

Remaining Costs: C==:J

Improvement Comments:



### Page 2

### 10/01/99

Object Form

Lo cid:11...-

__ ---' R IJl"lway Safety Area Data Sheet

C ity/State:

## I Airport:I ---J R egion:L...1

__ ..J
ADO:I 

### 5200.8



### Appendix 1

L th RUNWAY 

# - el"lg ~ ~ ~

:E



### " 

# --

# ----

# ---

# --

# ------ ~
R IJl"lway S fety Area
Object Idel"l1iticatiol"l Object Location Object Status

No. Type Name f@y 8ld Dist UR UR Dist Rwy 8ld 

### " '" '" <Dt;j

" 0 •• 0 u"ii 0: o 

## •.. '" '" '" :a..c:

.- 0 0" 

### " .- C!M


### .... Owner



### Page 3

### 10/01/99 5200.8 Appendix 2 Appendix 2. Supporting Documentation for RSA Determinations 1. GENERAL. RSA determinations must be supported by documentation that provides the rationale upon which the determination was based. The extent ofthe documentation will vary, depending upon the circumstances. For example, in cases where the RSA already meets the current standards through atraditional graded area surrounding the runway a simple statement to this effect will suffice. Where declared distances have been implemented to obtain the RSA, the documentation would contain a statement to this effect and also identify the graded area that exists beyond each runway end. In contrast, in cases where it is not practicable to improve a safety area to meet current standards, the documentation must address the alternatives that were considered and explain the reasons why one was selected over the others. 2. CONSIDERATIONS IN EVALUATING ALTERNATIVES. In evaluating alternatives for obtaining or improving RSAs, there are many factors that could affect the viability ofthe alternative. What may be viable at one airport may not be viable at another. Factors to be considered include: a. Historical records of airport accidents/incidents. b. The airport plans as reflected in current and forecast volume of passengers, number of operations, design aircraft and percent runway use, both for all weather and IFR operations, c. The extent to which the existing RSA complies with the standard. High performance aircraft, operating at higher loads and speeds have greater requirements than small, low performance aircraft. d. Site constraints. These include, for example, precipitous terrain drop-off, the existence of bodies ofwater, wetlands, a major highway, a railroad at a runway end, etc. e. Weather and climatic conditions. These include conditions such as low visibility, rain, snow, and ice and the frequency ofthese conditions. Overruns on contaminated runways constitute a significant percentage of runway excursions. f. Availability ofvisual and electronic aids for landing. 3. ALTERNATIVES TO BE CONSIDERED. The first alternative to be considered in every case is constructing the traditional graded area surrounding the runway. Where it is not practicable to obtain the entire safety area in this manner, as much as possible should be obtained. Then, the following alternatives shall be addressed in the supporting documentation. The applicability ofthese alternatives will vary, depending on the location. a. Relocation, shifting, or realignment ofthe runway. b. Reduction in runway length where the existing runway length exceeds that which is required for the existing or projected design aircraft,

Page 1

### 5200.8

Appendix 2 10/01/99

c. A combination of runway relocation, shifting, grading, realignment, or reduction d. Declared distances. e. Engineered Materials Arresting Systems (EMAS). 4. CONSIDERATIONS IN ASSESSING ALTERNATIVES. When making determinations about the practicability of obtaining the RSA, the first attempt shall consist of investigating fully the possibility of obtaining RSA that meets the current standards through atraditional graded area surrounding the runway. Land acquisition, grading requirements as well as environmental conditions must be examined. Any portion of land that will increase the RSA, even if it is but an incremental increase (see Paragraph 4a below) and will not result in meeting the standard fully, is preferable and will serve as a starting point for the consideration of additional alternatives (see paragraphs 4b through 4f below). a. Incremental gains must be obtained whenever possible. The gain may be relatively very little, but any gain isvaluable. The following example illustrates this. The design standard for an RSA beyond the runway end, 1,000' by 500', is not met. The dimensions are 300' by 500' on each ofthe ends. Byfilling and grading, another 200' could be gained on one end. This should be accomplished as an incremental gain, even though itwill not provide the design standard. Other alternatives (see Paragraphs 4b through 4f below) would then be considered for obtaining the remainder of the safety area.

300'

additional 200' by filling and grading

500' b. When obtaining a standard RSA is not practicable through traditional means (e.g. land acquisition, grading, fill, etc.), alternatives must be explored. During some types of projects, it may be feasible to relocate, realign, shift, or change a runway in such away that the RSA may be obtained. It is recognized that the costs ofthis kind of adjustment may bejustified only in an extensive project, but the concept should be evaluated to determine if it is a practicable alternative.

Page 2

### 10/01/99 5200.8 Appendix 2
c. Another alternative to be addressed is a reduction in runway length. This is aviable option ifthe current critical aircraft requires less than what is presently available, or the use of other runways, ifavailable, will accommodate the larger aircraft. d. When considering the configuration of RSA, ifthe total RSA area available is less that the total required to meet the design standard, an appropriate balance may be achieved by allocating a greater portion of RSA to one runway end. The factors to consider in this allocation are: navaids (ILS, PAPI, PLASI, VASls), which provide vertical guidance and lessen the likelihood of an undershoot; predominant direction of runway use by air carrier aircraft, and historical data on overruns on the runway. For example, the total available RSA below is 1400'. Because there is an ILS for air carrier use, a determination is made to allocate 900' to the departure end ofthis runway and 500' to the approach end ofthe runway

6,~ ~OOO'

500' 500' 900' ILS is located on this end ofthe runway e. Declared distances present another alternative that may provide an acceptable means of providing RSA. This requires athorough understanding of user needs and views, since their cooperation is an integral factor in selecting this alternative. However, the airport, in conjunction with FAA, will determine the final disposition of this type of situation. f. At any time, when it is not practicable to obtain a safety area that meets current standards, consideration should be given to enhancing the safety ofthe area beyond the runway end with the installation of EMAS. The AC 150/5220-22, Engineered Materials Arresting Systems (EMAS) forAircraft Overruns, pertaining to the installation and use of EMAS, provides details on design to be considered in determining feasibility ofthis alternative.

Page 3

### 5200.8

Appendix 2 10/01/99

g. When it is not practicable to obtain an RSA that meets current standards through the measures identified in Paragraphs 4a through 4e, the feasibility of increasing the size of the RSA by including additional land parcels should be considered, even iftheir inclusion will result in an RSA with an irregular shape. This alternative should be explored, irrespective of a decision to install EMAS in the RSA. For example, the design standard for an RSA beyond the runway end is not met. However, a parcel of land is available and would lengthen the RSA on one side only. This should be accomplished and noted in the comment section provided in the database. The following example illustrates this. 300' 250' additionalirregularlyshaped piece that will extend the RSA on one side 500' at this point.

Page 4

# , 

# • .EXHIBIT· 

## ~2J..B



# - u.s. Department ofTransportation FederalAviation Administration 

# Advisory

Circular

Subject: Engineered Materials Arresting Systems (EMAS) for Aircraft Overruns

1. PURPOSE. This advisory circular (AC) contains standards for the planning, design, and installation of Engineered Materials Arresting Systems (EMAS) in runway safety areas. Engineered Materials meanshigh energy absorbing materials ofselected strength, which willreliably and predictably crushunderthe weight of anaircraft. 

# • 2. BACKGROUND. Aircraft can and do overrun

theendsofrunways, sometimes withdisastrousresults. An overrun occurs when an aircraftpasses beyond the end of a runway during an aborted takeoff or while landing. The majority of such overruns by air carrier aircraft come to rest within 1000 feet of the runway end and between the extended edges of the runway. Data on aircraft overruns over a 12-yearperiod from 1975 to 1987 indicate that a large majority of all overruns (approximately 90%) occur at exit speeds of 70knotsorless (Reference 7,Appendix2). Inorderto minimizethehazards ofoverruns, theFederalAviation Administration (FAA) incorporated into airport design standards the concept of a safety area beyond the runway end. To meet the standards, the safety area must be capable, under normal (dry) conditions, of supporting aircraft that overrun the runway without causing structural damagetotheaircraft orinjuryto its occupants. Besides enhancing airport safety,the safety area provides greater accessibility for emergency equipment after an overrun incident. There are many runways, particularly those constructed prior to the adoption of the safety area standards, where natural obstacles (bodies of water or sharp drop-offs), local development (roads and railroads), or environmental constraints (wetland encroachment), make the construction of a standard safety area impracticable. There have been accidents at some of these airports wherethe abilityto stop anoverrunning aircraftwithin the runway safety area would have prevented major damageto aircraftand injuriestopassengers. 

# • Date: 8/21/98 Initiated by: AAS-l 00 AC No: 150/5220-22 Change:
Recognizing the difficulties associated with achieving a standard safety area at all airports, the FAA undertook research programs on the use of various materials for arresting systems and, in conjunction withindustry, conducted a series offieldtests utilizing aninstrumented Boeing 727 aircraft. As aresultofthe data obtained from these test programs, the Port AuthorityofNew York andNew Jersey (PANYINJ), in 1997,installed anEMAS comprised ofcellular cement on the Runway 4R safety area at John F. Kennedy International Airport. This prototype system is being monitoredtoprovide information onsystemlongevity. 3. APPLICATION. At some airports, reconstruction of a runway requires its safety areas to be brought up to current standards to the extent practicable. Of course, conformance with current standards is desirable at all airports, even when not requiredby regulation. Occasionally, however, itmay notbe practicable to achieve a standard safety area as specified in Tables 3-1, 3-2, and 3-3 of AC 150/5300-13, Airport Design. In these situations, Appendix 14,Declared Distances, ofthat AC provides an alternative means of enhancing safety. The declared distance alternative allows anairport ownerto declare what portions of an operational runway are available to satisfy the aircraft's accelerate-stop and landing distance requirements, with runway beyond these "declared distances" available as runway safety area. However, the use ofdeclared distances at some airports may result in the inability to accommodate aircraftthat arecurrently inuseatthat airport. Insuch asituation, installing anEMAS maybe anotherway of enhancing safety. An EMAS isNOT a substitute for, norequivalent to, any lengthorwidthofrunway safety area and does not affect declared distance calculations. AnEMAS isalsonot intendedtomeetthe definition of astopway asprovided inAC 150/5300-13.AC 150/5220-22 The guidelines and standards contained herein are recommended by the FAA for the design of EMAS. This AC is not mandatory and does not constitute a regulation. It is issued for guidance purposes and to outline a method of compliance. One may elect to follow analternatemethod, provided itisalsofoundby the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to be an acceptable means ofcomplying with Title 14,Codeof Federal Regulations (CFR), Chapter I, FAA. Therefore, mandatory terms such as "shall" or "must" used herein apply only to those who seek to demonstrate compliance by use ofthe specificmethod describedbythis AC, orfor those forwhomtheuseof these guidelines is mandatory, such asthose installing an EMAS funded under Federal grant assistance programs. 4. RELATED READING MATERIAL. Appendix 2 contains a listing of documents with supplemental material relating to EMAS. These documents contain certain information on materials evaluated, as well as design, construction, andtesting procedures utilized to date. Testing and data previously generated under FAA studies referenced in Appendix 2 may be used as input to anEMAS design withoutfurtherjustification. 

### 5. PLANNING CHARTS. The purpose of FiguresAI-I through AI-4 is to allow a preliminary analysis, providing sufficient information to determine whether to proceed with adetailed engineering design ofan optimum EMAS installation. They are intended to be used as apreliminary screening tool only. They are not sufficient for final design, which must be customized for each installation. The charts illustrate estimated EMAS stopping distance capabilities for various aircrafttypes. Thedesignusedineachchartis optimized specifically for the aircraft noted on the chart and assumes the availability of brakes and reverse thrust. It should be noted that the absence of eitherwouldresultinlongerstopping distances.
a. Example 1. Assume acandidate runway has arunway safety areathat extends 500 feetbeyond the endoftherunway andthe designaircraft isaDC-9 (or similar). FigureAI-I showsthatanEMAS 500feetin length (including a 100'jet blastbuffer) is capable of stopping a DC-9 within the confines ofthe system at runwayexitspeedsofupto94knots. b. Example 2. Assume the same runway safety area but assume the design aircraft is a DC-IO (or similar). Figure AI-3 shows an EMAS of the same length, but designed for larger aircraft, can stop the

2 8/21/98 DC-IOwithintheconfinesofthesystematrunwayexit speedsofupto72knots. 6. SYSTEM DESIGN REQUIREMENTS. For purposes ofdesign,theEMAS canbe consideredfixed by itsfunction and frangible since itis designedto fail ataspecified impact load. Therefore, anEMAS isnot considered an obstruction under 14 CFR Part 77, Objects Affecting Navigable Airspace. The following systemdesignrequirements shallprevail forallEMAS installations.

a. Concept. An EMAS is designed to stop an overrunning aircraft by exerting predictable deceleration forces on its landing gear as the EMAS material crushes. Itmust be designedto minimize the potential for structural damage to aircraft, since such damage could result in injuries to passengers and/or affectthepredictability ofdecelerationforces. b. Location. An EMAS is located beyond the end of the runway, centered on the extended runway centerline. Itwill usually begin at some distance from the end oftherunway to avoid damage duetojet blast and short landings (Figure I). Thisdistance willvary depending on the available area and the EMAS materials.

c. Design Method. An EMAS design shall be supported by a validated design method, which can predict the performance of the system. The design aircraft is defined as that aircraft using the associated runway that imposes the greatest demand upon the EMAS. Tothe extentpracticable, however, theEMAS design should considertherangeofaircraftexpectedto operate ontherunway. In someinstances, this may be preferable to optimizing the EMAS for the design aircraft. Thedesignmethod shallbederived fromfield orlaboratorytests. Testingmaybebasedonpassage of eitheranactual aircraft orequivalent single wheel load through atest bed. The designmust consider multiple aircraft parameters, including but not necessarily limited to allowable aircraft gear loads, gear configuration, tire contact pressure, aircraft center of gravity, and aircraft speed. The model must calculate imposed aircraft gear loads, g-forces on aircraft occupants, deceleration rates, and stopping distances within the arresting system. Any rebound of the crushed material that may serve to lessen its effectivenessmustbeconsidered. d. Operation. The EMAS shall be a passive system. 

# ,

# •

•

•

# •



# •

• \ 8/21/98 AC 150/5220-22


# ELEVATION VIEW

# EMAS

PLAN VIEW Figure 1.Typical EMAS (Not to Scale)

e. Width. The minimum width of the EMAS shall be the width of the runway (plus any sloped area as necessary - see paragraph 6.h below). f. Base. The EMAS shall be constructed on a surface capable of supporting the occasional passage of the critical design aircraft using the runway and fully loaded Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) vehicles without deformation of the base surface or structural damage to the aircraft or vehicles. It shall be designed to perform satisfactorily under all local weather, temperature, and soil conditions. It shall provide sufficient support to facilitate removal of the aircraft from the EMAS. Full strength runway pavement is not required. g. Entrance Speed. To the maximum extent possible within the available safety area, the EMAS shall be designed to decelerate all air carrier aircraft expected to use the runway at exit speeds of 70 knots or less without imposing loads that exceed the aircraft's design limits, causing major structural damage to the aircraft, or imposing excessive forces on its occupants. For design purposes, it shall be assumed that the aircraft has all of its landing gear in full contact with the runway and is traveling within the confines of the runway and parallel to the runway centerline. h. Aircraft Evacuation. The EMAS shall be designed to enable safe ingress and egress as well as movement ofARFF equipment (not necessarily without damage to the EMAS) operating during an emergency. Ifthe EMAS is to be built above existing grade, sloped areas sufficient to allow the entrance of ARFF vehicles from the front and sides must be provided. Provision for access from the back of the EMAS may be provided ifdesirable, but will result in a shorter effective length. Maximum slopes should be based on the EMAS material and performance characteristics of the airport's ARFF equipment. i. Maintenance Access. The EMAS shall be capable of supporting regular pedestrian traffic for the purposes of maintenance of the arresting material and co-located navigation aids without surface damage. An EMAS is not intended to support vehicular traffic for maintenance purposes. j. Undershoots. The EMAS shall be designed so as not to cause control problems for aircraft undershoots touching down in the arresting system. Fulfillment of this requirement may be based solely on flight simulator tests. Materials of density and strength greater than those shown by flight simulator tests not to cause control problems for aircraft undershoots will be deemed acceptable. k, Navigation Aids. The EMAS shall be constructed to accommodate approach lighting structures and other approved facilities within its boundaries. It shall not cause visual or electronic interference with any air navigation aids. All navigation aids within the EMAS must be frangible as required by 14 CFR Part 139, Certification and

3AC 150/5220-22 Operations: Land Airports Serving Certain Air Carriers. To meet the intent of this regulation, approach light standards must be designed to fail at two points. The firstpoint of frangibility shallbe zero to three inches above the top of the EMAS. The second point of frangibility shall be zero to three inches abovethe expectedresidual depthoftheEMAS afterpassage ofthedesign aircraft. I. Drainage. TheEMAS shallbedesignedsuch that water will not accumulate on its surface or any portionoftherunwayorrunway safetyarea.
m. Jet Blast. The EMAS shallbe designed and constructed sothat itwillnot be damagedby expected jetblast. n, Repair. The EMAS must be designed to be repairedto ausable condition within45 days ofuseby the design aircraft at the design entrance speed. It shouldbenotedthatthis isadesignrequirement only

- notanoperationalrequirement. 7. MATERIAL QUALIFICATION. The material comprising the EMAS shall have the following requirements andcharacteristics:
a. Material Strength and Deformation Requirements. Materials must meet a force vs. deformationprofilewithin limits havingbeen shownto assure uniform crushing characteristics, andtherefore, predictable response to an aircraft entering the arresting system. b. Material Characteristics. The materials comprisingtheEMASmust: (1) Be water-resistant to the extent that the presenceofwaterdoesnotaffectsystemperformance. (2) Not attract vermin, birds, or other creatures. (3) Benon-sparking. (4) Benon-flammable. (5) Notpromotecombustion. (6) Not emit toxic fumes or malodorous fumes inafireenvironment afterinstallation. (7) Not supportunintendedplantgrowth with propertreatment.

4 8/21/98 (8) Have constant strength and density characteristics during all climatic conditions within a temperature range appropriate for the locale as specifiedbytheairportowner. 

# •

(9) Beresistantto deterioration dueto: (a) Salt. (b) Typical aircraft and runway deicing fluids. (c) Aircraft fuels, hydraulic fluids, and lubricatingoils.

(d) Sunlight. (e) Water. (1) Freeze/thaw, if installed where freezingispossible.

(g) Blowing sand. 8. DESIGN PROPOSAL SUBMITTAL. The EMAS design shallbe submittedtotheFAA, Office of Airport Safety and Standards, through the responsible FAA Airports Regional or District Office, for review and approval and shall be certified as meeting all the requirements ofthis AC. The submittal shall include all design assumptions and data utilized in its development as well as proposed construction procedures andtechniques. 

# •

9. INSTALLATION.
a. Material Conformance Requirements. A material sampling and testing program shall be established to verify that all materials are in conformance with the previously qualified force vs. deformation profile/limits. The sampling and testing program must be submitted to and approved by the FAA, Office of Airport Safety and Standards. Materials failing to meet requirements based on the testingprogram shall notbeused. b. Construction. A quality assurance program, submitted to and approved by the FAA, Office of Airport Safety and Standards, shall be implemented to ensure that construction is in accordance with the approveddesign. 10. MARKING. An EMAS is marked as an area unusable for landing, takeoff, and taxiing with yellow chevrons in accordance with AC 150/5340-1, StandardsforAirport Markings. 

# •8/21/98 

# • 11. MAINTENANCE. An inspection and

maintenance program, submitted to and approved by the FAA, Office ofAirport Safetyand Standards, shall be established and carriedoutbythe airportsponsorto ensure original specified density and strength are maintained throughout the operating lifeoftheEMAS. The program shall include any necessary procedures for preventive maintenance and unscheduled repairs, particularly to weatherproofing layers. Airport personnel must be notified thatthe EMAS isdesigned to fail under load andthatprecautions shouldbe taken when activities require personnel to be on, or vehicles andpersonnel tobenear,theEMAS. 

### 12. AIRCRAFT RESCUE AND FIRE FIGHTING (ARFF).
a. Access. As required by paragraph 6.h, an EMAS is capable of supporting typical ARFF

DAVIDL.BENNETT 

# • DirectorofAirport SafetyandStandards



# • AC 150/5220-22 equipment. However, as the sides of the system are typicallysteeplysloped, andthe systemwillbe severely rutted after an aircraft arrestment, ARFF vehicles so equippedshouldbe shifted into all-wheel-drive priorto entering andmaneuvering upon anEMAS. b. Tactics. Any firepresent afterthe arrestment of an aircraft will be three-dimensional due to the rutting and breakup of the EMAS mat~rial. A dualagent attack and/or other tactics appropriate to this typeoffireshouldbeemployed. 

### 13. NOTIFICATION. Upon installation of an EMAS, its length, width, and location shall be included as aremark inthe Airport/Facility Directory. Thefollowingisanexample ofatypical entry: "Engineered 400'L x 150'W, runway 16." Materials

located Arresting

at departure System,

end of

5(and 6)NOTES: 1. ARRESTOR INCLUDES A 100'-0· PAVED LEAD-IN RIGID RAMP. 2. PERFORMANCE BASED ON WET LEAD-IN RAMP CONDITIONS. PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY NOT TO BE USED FOR DESIGN. SEE PARAGRAPH 5 

## DC-9 GW

# = 114,000 Ibs. MAXIMUM THRUST REVERSE 

## & BRAKING

- 120 ,.,.--r-r--r-r..,...,..."T""T"---r"'T"'"'T""'T"'"'T".,-,-.,-,--,-r-r-r-r-..--r-;r-r--r-r--,-,-r-T-r-T,.--r-r"'T"'"'T"..,-y-..,.-.--.--..,..-,-.......-r-T"'"'"T""'".........-~ 

# J!! o e ~ 110 : : : . 

# - c w w 

# a. 

# en I-



# - >< W 

# >

~ 

## Z 

# ::l 

# 0:: :E 

# ::l 

# :E

~ 

# :E


# •100
90 · . . •.•••••••••••• : ••••••••••••• 0° ••••••••••.••• 0° •••••••



### · 

## . . . . ..•.....•••.. ". •.•..••..... "0" ••...•..••. -0- .....•.••.•. -0"··· •..•.•.•• -0"·· ..•....••• 

## 80 70 •••••••• °0 ••••••••••••• 0 •••••••••• , ••• 0 ••••••••••• ' •• 0 ••••••••••••• 

## . . . . 60 

# · . . 

## . .



# .. , 

### . 

## · . . . . 50 • • • I • •••••••••••• , ••••••.••.••.•.•.••. 0" •.•.•.•.•••.•.•.•.•.•.•••. 0° •.••.•.•.•.•.•••.••. "0" •••.••••••.•.•.•.•.•.• ," •.••.••.•.•.••.•.••. 

### 40 --t-L-..1......L.-.L....L-JL..-l-L........,....L...J-.J.....L.-L-L.-J,-1-L""T'"""-.J.....L.-L-L.-J,-1-L...J.......r-.J.....L.-L-L.-J,-1-L...J-,.L.r-L-L.-J,-1-L~..L.-r-J.......J......-1-L~-L-J..-.j 

## 200 300 400 

## 500 600 700 

## 800 RUNWAY SAFETYAREA AVAILABLE (FEET)



## FIGURE A1-1 

# • • ".NOTES: 1. ARRESTOR INCLUDES A 100'-0" PAVED LEAD-IN RIGID RAMP. 2. PERFORMANCE BASED ON WET LEAD-IN RAMP CONDITIONS.



# • PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY NOTTO BE USED FOR DESIGN· SEE PARAGRAPH 5 

## DC-10 GW

# = 455,000 Ibs. 

## MAXIMUM THRUST REVERSE & BRAKING



# - t/) 

# '0 r:: 110

~ 

# - c w 100 

# w Q. 

# en I-



# - >< W 

# >-

~ 

### Z 

## :J 

# 0::: 

# ::E :J 

# :E



# - >< 

# « :E 90 •.••.•••••••.•.••••.•••.•. ~ •••••••••••••••• "0 •••••••••••••• " •••••••••••••• 0° •••••••••••••• 0° •••••••••••••• 

## · . . . .

· . . . . ••••••••••••••••••••.••••...• -0-· ••••......•..•.. _0_ ....................•... ·0· ......• · ....•..•.. · .. ·0_ · •......•..

•••••••••••••••••••••••• "" •••••••••••••••••••• 0••••••••••••••••••••••• °0 ••••••••••••••••••••• 0.



# · . . . . ••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••.••••.•••.••••••• ,," •.••••••••••••••••••. "." •.•.••••.•.•.•.•.••••• "." ••••••••••••••••••••• "0" •••••.•.•••• 

## 80 

## 70 . 

# . •. '0 ••.•.••••.•.•.•.••• • •••.•.•.••.••.•.••.•.••.•.•••••••.•••••.•••.•.••.



## . . 

## 60 

# . . •. 

# .

•••• eo"· •••••••• •• •••• •• •••• "0" •.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•. •• •. eo" •• ••• •••••••••• •• •• • ., ••••••••••••••••••••


### 50 

## ..

## : :- 

## : : -: 

## . 

## 40 ~~L....L-.J,.-L.....L..~L-L-L-L.....L....L.....L-JL...1..;--'--L-..L.....L-JL...J......L-'--L--r-"'-'L-L-L...J.......l-.J.....I......J'--f-I....J.......l-..L.....L-JL...J......L~~L-L-L...J.......l--'---'-I 

## 200 300 

## 400 500 

## 600 

## 700 800 RUNWAY SAFETY AREA AVAILABLE (FEET)



## FIGURE A1-3 

# • • 00 N



# - '<, '00 00NOTES: 1. ARRESTOR INCLUDES A 100'-0" PAVED LEAD-IN RIGID RAMP. 2. PERFORMANCE BASED ONWET LEAD-IN RAMP CONDITIONS. 

# •

PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY NOTTO BE USED FOR DESIGN· SEE PARAGRAPH 5 

## B727-200 GW

# =209,000 Ibs. MAXIMUM THRUST REVERSE & BRAKING



# - l! o c 110

~ 

# - c 

# w 100 

# w D. 

# en t- 

# >< W 

# >

~ 

## Z 

## :J 

# [t:: 

# :E :J 

# :E >< 

# « :E 90 

# . . . .

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0••••••••••••••• 0 ••••••••••••••• 0 ••••••••••••••• 0 •••••••••••••••



### · 

## . . . ,



# · . . . ...•...•....... "' .......•.....• -0-.··· .••....••• 0-

.. · .••.. · ...• _00 •..•.....•••..



## · . . .....................................................



## · . . 

## 80 .•..••••.•.... 0 .............•... 0........ • ... ,0.••...•..•.•.•• 0•.•.••••••••... 0.•••.•••.••...


### · 

## . . . . 

## 70 . 

# . . 

# .

••••••••••••••••••• , ••••••••••••••• 0 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 

## . 

# . 60 

# · . . 

# . . •• , •••••••••• , •••••••••••••• "0' ••••••••••••• "0"············ •• "," ••••••••• - - 0

- -0-

_ •• 0

- 0

- 0

- 0

- 0_ 

## 50 • 0 0 0

- _. _ •• - - - _-_ - _. - 0 0 ••

__ •

__ 00• 0 0 0

_ •••

_ 0.0 •• 0:

__ 0 

### o.

_- 0

_ •• _:. 0.0 ••••• - -

_ ••• .: -

_ ••• _.0.0.

-- 

## 40 -+-->--'--'-1-..l....I-J-,.L...L-,.....L.-I-.&.....L..I~-'--'-...,..-J--1-..l....I....J-L.-L.....L....L.....r-J.......I....1--L.-J,..-L.....L....L-L-r--J-L--L.-J,..-L.....L..-'--'-J-.r--'-J-,.L-'--'-....L-I-~ 

## 200 300 

## 400 

## 500 600 700 

## 800 RUNWAY SAFETYAREA AVAILABLE (FEET)



## FIGURE A1-2 » '0 () '0 , (l)

- ::3 VI 0.. 0 

# _.

# -- x VI 

# -~ o I tv tv

co N


# - ;:0 coNOTES: 1. ARRESTOR INCLUDES A 100'-0· PAVED LEAD-IN RIGID RAMP. 2. PERFORMANCE BASED ON WET LEAD-IN RAMP CONDITIONS. PLANNING PURPOSES ONLY NOT TO BE USED FOR DESIGN
- SEE PARAGRAPH 5 

## B747 GW

# =820,000 Ibs. MAXIMUM THRUST REVERSE & BRAKING



# - U) 

## ••• 

# g 110

~ 

# - o w 100 

## w 

# n. en I-



# - >< w 

# >

~ 

# z ::> 

# 0:: :E ::> 

# :E 

# >< 

# « :E 90 

## . . . 

# .

•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0••••••••••••••• 0 ••••••••••••••• 1 ••••••••••••••• " ••••••••••••••

• • • I •



## · . . . 

## .

•••••••••••••• ~ ••••••••••••••• 0 •••••••••••••• "0 •••••••••••••• 0 •••••••••••••••• 0 ••••••••••••••



## · . 

# . .

· . 

## . . . ............................. "0"············· "." "." "0"···.·

. 

## 80

••••••••••••••• "0 ••••••••••••••• °0 •••••••••••••• °0 •••••••••••••• °0 ••••••••••••• 00 ••••••••



### · 

## . 

## 70 

# · . . 

# .

••••••••••••••• - ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1 •••••••••••••••



# · . 60 . 

# . . 

# . .

••••••••• "0' ••••••••••

_ •• e._ ..... 0 ••••

_ ••• 0 •• 00 •••• 0 ••••• 

## 50

•••••

_ ••• - - _.:- 0 

### o.

_......•

__ .:•..•.......

__ .. :......••....... :.

0 0 0 ••••• 00. _. 

## 40 ~:"""""""...L...L.....L-..I..-.I...-..I--.r--'--'~-L-I.-L-L.~..L-..I..-'-'--''-'--L-'--L-r-...L...L.....L-..I..-'-'--'L.....L-..r-'--L-'--'-...L...L.....L-..I..-''---j-JL.-.L...I.-L-L-'--L~ 

## 200 300 400 600 

## 700 800 500 RUNWAY SAFETY AREA AVAILABLE (FEET)



## FIGURE A1-4 

# •

00 i0



# -

--- '0 008/21/98 AC 150/5220-22 Appendix 2

# • APPENDIX 2. RELATED READING MATERIAL.

This appendix contains a listing ofdocuments with supplemental material relating to the subject ofEMAS. These documents contain certain information onmaterials evaluated as well as design, construction, and testing procedures utilized to date. These publications may be obtained from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, VA22I51.

1. DOT/FAA/PM-87/27, Soft Ground Arresting Systems, Final Report-Sept. 1986

-Aug. 1987,published Aug. 1987 byR.F. Cook,UniversalEnergySystems,Inc.,Dayton,OH. 2. 2. DOT/FAA/CT-93/4, Soft Ground Arresting Systems for Commercial Aircraft

- Interim Report-Feb. 1993 by RobertCook. 3. DOT/FAA/CT-93/80, Soft Ground Arresting Systems for Airports

- FinalReport

-Dec. 1993byJimWhite, Satish K.Agrawal, andRobertCook. 4. DraftReport

-DOT/FAA/CT-95,Preliminary Soft Ground Arrestor Design for JFK International Airport

- March 1995. 5. DraftTestReport

-Soft Ground Arresting System Using Cellular Concrete

-Nov. 1994. 6. DOT/FAA/AOV 90-1

-Location ofCommercial Aircraft Accidents/Incidents Relative to Runways, July1990. 7. UDR-TR-88-07, Cook,R.F., Evaluation ofa Foam Arrestor Bedfor Aircraft Safety Overrun Areas, University of DaytonResearch Institute,Dayton,Ohio. 1988. 

# •

•

1(and2)