TACIT ACCEPTANCE AND WATCHFUL EYES:

BEIJING'S VIEWS ABOUT THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE

Fei-Ling Wang

January 24, 1997
ii

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The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of

the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the

U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release;

distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army

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All 1995 and later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)

monographs are available on the Strategic Studies Institute

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iii

FOREWORD

In October 1995, the Army War College's Strategic Studies

Institute and the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of Kyungnam

University, in partnership with the Defense Nuclear Agency and

The Korea Society, hosted in Seoul, Korea, an international

workshop on the U.S.-ROK Alliance. For nearly a half century, the

security alliance between the ROK and the United States has

deterred aggression, helped assure stability in Northeast Asia,

and supported the ROK's political and economic emergence as one

of the advanced democratic industrial countries of the world.

In this monograph, originally presented at the workshop,

Professor Wang Fei-ling examines the future of the alliance from

China's perspective. He suggests that China's current

preoccupation with its domestic agenda and relatively

conservative foreign policy seek to maintain the status quo in

Northeast Asia. And that status quo makes even continued U.S.

military presence desirable in the context of a divided Korea

because it buttresses stability and inhibits militarism in Japan.

But an American presence that grows, takes on the flavor of

containment, or emphasizes human rights and the enlargement of

democracy threatens Chinese security interests. Overall, concern

that Northeast Asia is on the verge of significant transformation

in economics, governments, and balance of power relationships

lends an inevitable duality to Chinese attitudes toward the

Washington-Seoul relationship.

Dr. Wang's comments provide insight into China's probable

reaction to various scenarios of change possible in the next

decade. The Sino-American relationship will become increasingly

important, and Dr. Wang's warning that a sharp shift in China's

Korea policy is possible has significant implications for U.S.

interests. Accordingly, this monograph warrants careful

consideration.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

FEI-LING WANG is an Assistant Professor at the School of

International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology. Born in

China, he graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1992

with a Ph.D. in political science and taught at the U.S. Military

Academy at West Point and the University of Pennsylvania. His

research interests are comparative and international political

economy, world politics and international relations, East Asia

and China studies. He has published, in English and Chinese, in

those areas.
v

SUMMARY

To understand China's foreign policy in the 1990s and the

true attitude of Beijing towards the military presence of the

United States in Northeast Asia, one must examine China's

perception of the alliance between the United States and the

Republic of Korea (ROK). Public statements aside, the People's

Republic of China (PRC) has shifted its traditional position and

has tacitly accepted, even welcomed, the continuation of the

U.S.-ROK alliance. Beijing views the institutionalized presence

of the Americans in Northeast Asia as a stabilizing force,

serving China's interest of maintaining the favorable status quo

in the region. However, continued acceptance is not guaranteed;

developments in the Sino-American relationship and the course of

reunification of the Korean Peninsula will affect attitudes in

the future.

In order to discuss China's perception of the U.S.-Korean

alliance, let us first examine China's general post-Cold War

security policy, especially regarding Northeast Asia. As the

century ends, Beijing, increasingly preoccupied with its own

domestic agenda, has adopted a more conservative attitude (nearterm) in Northeast Asia. In the post-Cold War era, international

competition has shifted from the political and military to the

economic arena. In this new mileau, Beijing displays a changed,

even ambivalent, attitude towards the United States' political

and military presence in Northeast Asia. American ground forces

in Japan and South Korea and U.S. naval presence in the Western

Pacific have now generally disappeared from China's list of

complaints. Indeed, the United States is frequently regarded as a

stabilizing force in the region, although Beijing watches

carefully Washington's "hegemonic" moves.

The future of the political division on the Korean Peninsula

is naturally of key importance to China's perception of the 

U.S.-ROK alliance. One can hardly observe much eagerness on

China's part for a rapid reunification of Korea, although Beijing

is somewhat sincere in supporting the idea of letting the Koreans

themselves control the reunification process. To Beijing, a

stable, peaceful and (hopefully) friendly, but perhaps divided,

Korean Peninsula is more desirable than rapid reunification or a

de-nuclearization of North Korea. Finally, as a result of China's

overall security considerations, Beijing now appears to have

quietly accepted the U.S.-ROK alliance as a part of the favorable

status quo in Northeast Asia. Continued tacit acceptance,

however, is not guaranteed. From the Chinese perspective, there

seems to be an inherent conflict between a united Korea and a

strong Korean- American alliance; if a united Korea maintains an

alliance with the United States, Beijing may have to make a sharp

policy shift. The key variables affecting China's perception of

the U.S.-ROK alliance in the future, therefore, seem to be the
vi

overall Sino-American relationship and the development of the

inter-Korean relationship.
1

TACIT ACCEPTANCE AND WATCHFUL EYES:

BEIJING'S VIEWS ABOUT THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE

The Chinese View of Post-Cold War Northeast Asia.

Amidst the jubilation at the end of the Cold War, many

Americans believed that the new, post-Cold War world would be

more uncertain, and even more dangerous, than the previous

decades.1 Similarly, the Chinese entered this new era with mixed

feelings. On the one hand, Beijing publicly stated that a

peaceful, golden era had arrived for China to modernize itself.

On the other hand, a new transitional, multipolar world seemed to

carry with it so many potential security threats and

uncertainties that China should be vigilantly wary of any new

hegemonic behavior on the part of other powers.2 Thus, while

relaxing in a secure post-Cold War world, "the most relaxed

security posture since World War II,"3 and seeking economic gains

over political influence abroad, Beijing continues to watch

carefully for potential security threats to its domestic

political stability and its reunification of the Motherland.

China appears to be playing a subtle, yet familiar, balance

of power game "with Chinese characters," aiming at preventing in

the region expanded U.S. dominance or Japanese military

resurgence, either of which would be viewed by Beijing as a major

security threat. China's actions during the recent North Korean

nuclear dispute demonstrate such an attitude. From that

perspective, the PRC has behaved like a typical status quo power

in Northeast Asia, and its foreign policy is expected to be

rather conservative in the near future.

Even before the demise of the former Soviet Union and the

sharp decline of Russian power, China started to reevaluate its

security environment with a heavy emphasis on "reconfiguration"

and competitions of "comprehensive national power" (zonghe guoli)

among the nations. The Chinese view of the world shifted from

emphasizing the "hegemonic struggle" between the superpowers to

focusing on "peace and development" in a multipolar world.

Motivated by domestic needs and forced by the negative

international responses to its handling of the 1989 Tiananmen

Incident, Beijing adopted Deng Xiaoping's famous "sixteencharacter" low profile approach in international relations.

Chinese analysts now believe that an emerging "multipolarity

helps stability and prosperity," at least in the Asia-Pacific

region.4

 They regard "the co-existence of China, Japan, Russia,

and the United States without confrontation between them (as)

something historically unprecedented."5 Northeast Asia is now

considered the most stable region in the post-Cold War world. A

leading foreign policy adviser wrote recently that China enjoys

"the best external environment since the establishment of the
2

Peoples' Republic"; Beijing can now rightfully expect a

"politically stable and economically fast-growing" Northeast Asia

that is largely free from the danger of military conflicts.6

Another Chinese researcher observed, "It is the first time that

China has faced no direct military threat since 1949, possibly

since the Opium War of 1840"; thus, "(g)enerally speaking, China

is satisfied with its current security environment."7 Most of the

past security threats have largely gone and many of the old

issues have been rather satisfactorily addressed.8 Whatever long

range security objectives or diplomatic ambitions they may have

in Northeast and Southeast Asia, China's leaders appear to

believe that time is on their side.

To Beijing, domestic political stability is the top security

priority, and a stable and relaxed international security

environment is indispensable to that goal.9 Domestic political

stability for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rests, albeit

indirectly, on rapid economic development. Therefore, economic

programs may take precedence over military and diplomatic goals.

At the 14th Congress of the CCP in 1992, Jiang Zemin called for

the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to "consciously subordinate

itself to the overall interests of national economic

development."10

A key component in that economic development is East Asia.

In 1992, China's trade with the region comprised nearly twothirds of its total foreign trade.11 Chinese trade with East Asia

grows at a higher than average rate (23 percent in 1991 compared

to 17.6 percent growth overall).12 Japan has been one of China's

largest trade partners (surpassing even Hong Kong in 1993)13 and a

major source of technology and capital. The PRC-ROK economic

relationship got a big boost in 1992 when the two established

full diplomatic relations; the bilateral trade volume in 1991-92

jumped 56 percent14 and has scored an average annual growth rate

of 37 percent for the past three years. In 1994, the PRC-ROK

trade reached an all-time high of US $11.66 billion (US $7.7

billion the first half of 1995).15 Seoul expects China, now its

third largest trading partner, to become its largest by the year

2000.16 China has already become the largest recipient of the

ROK's foreign investment; by the end of 1993, South Korea had

invested in 2,332 Chinese projects, worth US $2.13 billion. The

Chinese also established about 40 projects in the ROK worth US

$11 million.17 Since 1992, Beijing has also largely transformed

its former economic "assistance" to North Korea into a rather

profitable trade relationship.18

A second major Chinese security concern in East Asia is the

reunification of China. Ever since the CCP took power in 1949,

Taiwan has been a security problem to Beijing, both real and

imagined. Sometimes the PRC has appeared over-sensitive, fearing

that a foreign intervention would encourage Taiwan's drive for
3

independence, and thus directly endanger China's territorial

integrity and national security. On the one hand, to reunite the

Motherland is viewed as a mandate of history that must not be

compromised. Beijing's sole legitimate rule over China must not

be challenged. On the other hand, a foreign-backed, independent

Taiwan is likely to compel Beijing to use force to bring it under

control, thus leading to a costly military conflict which would

drain funds needed for modernization. Actually, to Beijing,

Taiwan would not have been such a problem had there not been

foreign forces involved, beginning with Japan's annexation of the

island nearly 100 years ago.19 Therefore, as Qian Qichan has

noted, Beijing "does not have any room for maneuver" on the

Taiwan issue because this is directly related to the fundamental

interest of the Chinese nation, and this issue has been the most

important obstacle to the smooth development of the Sino-American

relationship.20 The recent Sino-American conflict over the visit

of Taiwan's president, Lee Tung-Hui, to his American alma mater

(Cornell University) illustrates Beijing's sensitivity and

concern over the possibility of foreign involvement in its

dispute with Taipei. As long as Taipei restrains its ambition of

independence, however, Beijing appears not to be in a hurry to

reunify rapidly, perhaps violently.21

In short, Beijing now is cautious about any new developments

which may alter the status quo in East and Northeast Asia. From a

geopolitical perspective, the United States and Japan are the

only two world-class players who could cause new security

concerns for China in this region, by means of a dominant U.S.

power pursuing "hegemonic" policies there and an rearmed

aggressive Japan. Beijing might feel very insecure, for

historically justifiable reasons, if it had to accede to American

domination or Japanese leadership. The PRC also worries deeply

about potential support for Taiwan's drive for independence from

a still powerful United States or from a Japan restored to

political/military power. Either could jeopardize any diplomatic

goals China may have for the future. Therefore, veiled comments

by leading Chinese military strategists that "hegemonism of the

superpower(s) is still the long-term threat to the regional

security" and may pose new security challenges to the PRC in the

future hint that the "competing United States and Japan" are

those "superpowers" or "regional superpowers."22 Although Japan

now is a friendly neighbor and the United States is basically

viewed as a stabilizing power in Northeast Asia, Beijing

nonetheless plays a subtle, yet familiar, game of "using

barbarians against barbarians" (yiyi zhiyi) against a perceived,

developing threat. Aiming at "preventing the situation in which a

major power dominates the region,"23 China hopes to "take a

neutral stance towards the conflicts among the United States,

Japan and Russia" because it is desirable "for China to maintain

an equilibrium among America, Japan and Russia."24
4

The Chinese Policy Towards the U.S. Presence<R>in Northeast Asia.

From the end of the Korean War until the 1980s, Beijing was

always a very strong critic of the American military presence in

South Korea and Japan. Such rhetoric was especially harsh when

the possibility of renewed military confrontation on the Korean

Peninsula erupted or when incidents occurred that might escalate

into conflicts between the United States and North Korea. Beijing

labeled TEAM SPIRIT exercises "provocative," "aggressive," or

"imperialistic" actions. Starting in the 1970s, however, Beijing

began to tone down its criticisms of stationing in Japan American

forces whose strategic objective was to counter the former Soviet

Union. It did continue its criticism of the U.S.-ROK alliance,

mainly because of its own alliance with Pyongyang.

By the end of 1989, however, the world had changed. Beijing

witnessed the sudden collapse of the mighty Soviet Empire with

complicated feelings and deep emotions.25 The disappearance, at

least for the time being, of China's Number One Threat to the

north altered much of its security picture in Northeast Asia.

Potential security threats were now more likely from different

sources, such as the United States and Japan.

China's fear of a restoration of Japanese political

leadership and military power weighs much more heavily.

Prevention of a new Japanese militarism is now a high security

priority of Beijing.26 The Chinese press has always been very

watchful on any signs that might suggest a restoration of

militarism in Japan. Every August Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)

ridicules and criticizes Japanese officials who pay their

"homage" to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine.27 During the highly

publicized 50th anniversary celebration of V-J Day in August

1995, China's top leaders all condemned the Japanese refusal to

make sincere apologies and draw "the lessons of history." To most

of the ordinary Chinese, what the Japanese did to China half a

century ago is a horrendous crime that cannot be forgiven. A

strong anti-Japanese sentiment is still easily observed in China

today. China's leaders still call upon its people to "never

forget" Japanese war crimes.28 The Chinese openly regarded

Tokyo's "Official Resolution on World War II" (passed by the

Japanese Diet in June of 1995) as being far from a sincere

apology and, thus, yet another example of the influence of

powerful "right-wing" forces in Japan which seek to "cover up the

past."29 Like the Koreans, Beijing always responds quickly to any

comments by Japanese officials that may be interpreted as

"revising" history and glossing over Japan's past militarism and

aggression. Chinese military leaders have expressed strong doubts

about Tokyo's intentions in post-Cold War East Asia. They believe

that Japan's ability to project power must be monitored

carefully.30 As Jiang Zemin stated publicly in September 1995,
5

China must keep "severe criticisms and high vigilance" towards

the possible restoration of the Japanese militarism.31 Although

one may interpret Beijing's criticisms of Japan as a convenient

excuse for its own military growth, China's fear of a militarilypowerful Japan appears genuine and deep.32

Having lost a major balancing power in Northeast Asia with

the collapse of the Soviet Union and faced with addressing

Japan's need to possess secure sea lanes without allowing Tokyo

to have a mighty military machine, Beijing genuinely, but

quietly, prefers a continuation of the American military presence

in the region, mainly in Japan and South Korea. China now seems

to have accepted the notion that Washington can be a credible

balancing force to stop Japan's possible (and dangerous)

leadership aspirations in East Asia. Foreign Minister Qian

Qichen, for example, stated publicly in 1993 that traditionally,

in principle, China does not support any major power stationing

its troops abroad. But, the issue (of American military presence

in Japan and South Korea) is a legacy of the past and needs to be

solved gradually.33 Beijing's criticism of the American military

presence in Japan, South Korea and the Western Pacific have all

but disappeared. Despite domestic, anxiety-provoking calls for a

reduction of American military force in Asia, Beijing actually

expects the United States to retain forces in East Asia in the

"short and medium-term."34 The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which

they believe will remain in effect at least until early in the

next century, will continue to restrain any significant growth of

the Japanese military power. China thus regards the United States

as a "less harmful devil," which it can "use" to suppress Japan's

desires for military power and political leadership. To achieve

that goal, Beijing tacitly approves the American military

presence in the whole West Pacific.

The Two Koreas in the Eyes of Beijing.

The Chinese have had a deep and unique feeling about the

Koreans. The close relationship resulting from the tributary

system linked the two for more than one thousand years. Under its

Confucian, family-like "international" system, China historically

repressed Korean independence, but rarely intervened in Korean

domestic affairs. Despite the fact that Korea was China's

tributary nation for centuries, very few Chinese really believed

that Korea was ever a part of "China," as opposed to their

attitude toward Tibet, Xinjiang or even Mongolia. For more than

500 years, threatened by Japanese piracy and military aggression,

Korea's security was tied to that of China; that ended when China

failed to save the Yi dynasty from Korean peasants and the

Japanese military in 1895-1896. That loss directly led to the

downfall of the Chinese Empire itself. Never-theless, the close

bonds of history and culture remained.
6

That bond seemed especially close between the PRC and the

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), linked (it would

appear) by a common devotion to Leninist-Stalinist communism and

a shared experience fighting the Japanese in World War II. That

bond grew even stronger when the Korean War pitted the two

directly against the United States and its allies. For

historical, ideological, geopolitical, and strategic reasons,

therefore, Beijing called the North Koreans "comrades and

brothers," who shared a "unbreakable friendship cemented with

blood" and tested by time.35 Other than the occasional, but

generally discreet, conflict, such as North Korea's alleged

territorial demands and Pyongyang's annoying vacillation between

competitors Moscow and Beijing, Kim Il-Sun remained the sole,

lasting communist comrade of Beijing throughout the Cold War. In

the 1990s, after the collapse of the former USSR, China became

North Korea's main supplier of most goods, including food and

energy. Even by the mid-1990s, when the DPRK suffered huge

defaults in trade payments, Beijing continued to supply

Pyongyang.36 The PRC apparently hoped that the DPRK could be

economically more sustainable and, thus, "have a positive

influence in safeguarding peace and stability on the Peninsula"

by pursuing Chinese-style economic reforms and opening up

society. The establishment of the Najin-Sonbong Free Economic

Zone (NSFEZ) in North Korea was, therefore, highly regarded by

the Chinese press.37 A border thoroughfare was reopened in the

Fall of 1995 to allow the Chinese merchants in Jilin Province

easier access to the NSFEZ across the Tumen River.38 Beijing

generally traditionally refrains from commenting on the domestic

affairs of the DPRK other than praising the "eternal friendship"

between Beijing and Pyongyang and offering needed assistance.

Beijing's attitude toward South Korea has not been totally

hostile. Notwithstanding the fact that the ROK was an enemy of

the PRC during the Korean War and the entire Cold War era,

Beijing has always believed, or pretended to believe, that the

South Koreans were somehow victims themselves, pawns of American

aggression. Other than the "handful of Korean reactionaries

controlled" by the United States, China never actively disliked

the ROK--as it did some "walking dogs" of the former USSR and the

United States. Indeed, some small practices have even been used

to prove continued detente. The fact that South Korea,

paradoxically perhaps, kept more Chinese characters in its

language than the DPRK has often been used by many in China as

evidence to show the bonds and friendship between China and the

ROK. Seoul's "economic miracle" in the 1970s and 1980s greatly

altered China's view of the ROK. When China started its own

economic reform, South Korea became a major source of practical

"lessons-learned," as well as concrete "foreign assistance."39

Their rapidly-growing bilateral cooperation has now extended even

to sensitive, high-tech areas such as nuclear power projects.
7

Seoul is reported to have successfully signed contracts to build

nuclear reactors for China by mid-1995.40 South Korea is now

generally regarded by the Chinese government and people as an

admirable and friendly neighbor that is determined, prosperous,

reasonable, and cooperative. In the balance-of-power game aimed

at the Japanese and the Americans, both Koreas are generally

considered to be in the same camp as the Chinese. Beijing

believes that all three share victimization by America's annoying

"human rights" policies in Asia; Washington's notion of human

rights, its advocates argue, is undesirable and offensive

throughout the whole East Asian region.41

By most criteria, the DPRK is a major victim of the ending

of the Cold War, while the ROK emerged a major winner. Thus,

Pyongyang's fear for its own political survival and its self-help

efforts (including its nuclear ambitions) seem reasonable, even

justifiable, to the PRC leaders. China does not strive for the

success of one over the other; instead, it has worked to achieve

an overall balance and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Thus,

while it increases its political and, especially, economic ties

with the ROK, it maintains the stability of the DPRK. This

Chinese-style, balance-of-power strategy in Northeast Asia was

clearly illustrated by Beijing's policy towards the North Korean

nuclear issue. The stability of the status quo on the Peninsula,

not a decisive American victory over the DPRK, seems to be the

goal of the PRC. The subsequent development of the North Korean

nuclear issue appears, so far, to satisfy China since Pyongyang

agreed to stop its nuclear program, while the United States and

the ROK began to inject much needed resources to stabilize the

Kim Jong-Il regime.42

To deter the possible restoration of Japanese militarism and

cope with a resurgent United States forcefully advocating its

version of human rights and political democracy in Northeast

Asia, in the absence of credible Russian power, China is likely

to continue its balance-of-power strategy on the Korean

Peninsula, supporting a "separate but equal" policy in the near

term. Since the early 1990s, the Chinese press has spent equal

time reporting the activities and exchanges between the PRC and

each of the two Koreas. A closer look reveals that the greatest

activities between the PRC and the ROK, however, have been mainly

in the areas of economy, while the officially-reported, frequent

exchanges between Beijing and Pyongyang have largely been visits

of officials and former Chinese "Volunteers." China would have

the maximum strategic leverage on the Peninsula if the two Koreas

were peacefully co-existing, but separated. Li Ruihuan, a top CCP

leader, told the visiting ROK politician, Kim Tae-Chung, in the

Fall of 1995, that,

China hopes that the Korean Peninsula would maintain

peace and stability, . . . (thus to allow) both the
8

south and north sides of the Korean Peninsula to create

a favorable atmosphere for the final realization of

peaceful reunification.43

Like many Koreans themselves in the ROK, Beijing does not

wish for a rapid reunification of Korea at the expenses of the

stability and strategic maneuverability of the status quo. Rapid

reunification of the Peninsula is not a certainty for, as some

Chinese scholars believe, it would require a major political

change in North Korea.44 Nevertheless, for obvious reasons,

Beijing does not want to see its Northeastern provinces

overwhelmed by a refugee flood caused by a sudden collapse of the

Pyongyang regime.45 As one analyst noted,

reunification without incurring instability will serve

the interests of all parties concerned. Copying of the

"German model" is not realistic . . . (and) it is

difficult to confine the instability in the North

(Korea) to North only.46

Furthermore, as South Korean scholars observed, Korean

reunification will likely reduce the American presence in East

Asia and "greatly increase" the Japanese influence which is not

in the interest of the PRC.47 Other than strengthening itself in

the global "competition of comprehensive national power," China

will constantly search for buffer zones and counter-weights

against major powerful competitors like Japan and the United

States.48 The long-time "comrades" in Pyongyang and the rich,

vigorous, friendly and very "Asian" ROK would be of great help in

executing this strategy, for they, too, share this fear of Japan.

Indeed, the PLA noted in 1994 that Seoul has now put Japan ahead

of the PRC and DPRK as a potential security threat.49

Chinese Perception of the U.S.-ROK Alliance.

Traditionally, the PRC feels insecure and often reacts

forcefully to any neighbor's military alliance with a major

"external" power. The costly war China waged against Vietnam in

1979 was clearly motivated, to a great extent, by its fear of the

Vietnamese-USSR alliance formed a year earlier.50 The U.S.-ROK

alliance was for a long time viewed by Beijing as a hegemonic, if

not straightforward imperialist, tool of Washington to control

East Asia. U.S. nuclear forces and the TEAM SPIRIT exercises were

the main targets of Beijing's criticisms.

But, China's perception began to change as it started its

internal reforms, a process which accelerated as the Cold War

drew to an end. Beijing began to gradually and quietly accept

(and even like) the U.S.-ROK alliance for its utility in

stabilizing the Korean Peninsula and constraining the Japanese.
9

But, China's continued tacit acceptance of the alliance is not

guaranteed. China's perception appears to be conditioned by

overall Sino-American relations, Beijing's own regional security

interests, and the interactions between the two Koreas.

Current international relations in Northeast Asia are built

around the "quadrangular" relationship between the United States,

Japan, China and Russia.51 Their improved relationship may have

directly contributed to the political detente and increased

economic contacts between the two Koreas since late 1980s. The

likelihood of a new war between the two Koreas, thus, has

declined. China now is on the best terms in over a century with

the other three great powers and feels an immediate security

threat from none of them. Better still for the Chinese, "(a)mong

the four powers (United States, Russia, Japan and China), China

is the only country that currently has good relations with both

North and South Koreas."52

This historically unprecedented situation increases Chinese

confidence and gives it more room to maneuver in Northeast Asia.

The fast-growing economic tie between Seoul and Beijing form a

solid base for the PRC-ROK relationship. The 34-year-old "SinoKorean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance"

serves as a formal alliance between China and the DPRK. In such a

situation, the U.S.-ROK alliance (including its military

component) seems significantly less threatening to China's

national security. Since the military alliance between Seoul and

Washington is a major component of the favorable status quo

Beijing now enjoys in Northeast Asia, it is not a surprise to see

that China now rarely mentions, let alone objects to, the U.S.-

ROK alliance.

Tacit acceptance does not mean public endorsement, however.

The PRC's version of international ethics, including its

prohibition on stationing troops on foreign soil and its standing

commitments to Pyongyang, prevent Beijing from openly praising

such a military alliance. Tacit acceptance also does not keep

Beijing from censuring American actions. Washington is often

publicly criticized for still operating in the "Cold War mode,"

e.g., using rhetoric assailing "communists," including

(naturally) the CCP.53 Some in Beijing reproach Washington and the

American press for retaining a "Cold War Syndrome" or "hegemonic

psychology" that twists U.S. foreign policy and poisons the SinoAmerican relationship.54 Beijing may now empathize with

Pyongyang's feeling of being "cornered" by the United States

after the Cold War. "Aftereffects of the Cold War,"55 such as

using economic sanctions to destabilize ideological enemies, may

indeed look like an American attempt to "roll back" the Korean

Peninsula--something the Chinese would definitely be alarmed by.

The increasingly chilling atmosphere between Beijing and

Washington since 1989 only deepens China's suspicion of the
10

United States' real intention in East Asia. Some Chinese analysts

openly argue that the United States sees China as "the main

target of Westernization," implying that Washington could be

working to undermine the political stability of the PRC.56 The

recent disputes over Taiwan have led many Chinese to argue that

Washington may have become a right wing- dominated, aggressive

power that seeks to weaken--even destroy--the PRC.

 Beijing watches carefully the potential security threat

from a resurgent United States. Many Chinese analysts believe,

therefore, that the Korean Peninsula is potentially an arena for

renewed struggle between the United States and the PRC. As one

analyst noted,

The Korean Peninsula issue is no longer a simple

dispute between South and North Korea; the different

attitudes of China and United States on the North

Korean nuclear issue are, essentially speaking, a

strategic trial of strength between the two countries

on the Korean Peninsula.57

A resurgent United States threatens to limit the influence of

China in the post-Cold War World.

The United States . . . wants to contain China,

regarding China's unification, development, and growing

strength as 'potential threats' to the American

hegemony . . . because the United States does not have

a sufficient understanding of the accelerating trend

towards multipolarization in the post-Cold War world.58

China's attitude towards the U.S.-ROK alliance ebbs and

flows with the U.S.-PRC relationship. When relations with

Washington are cordial, Beijing can tacitly accept the alliance.

But, if Beijing suspects that Washington is using its military

ties with Seoul to pursue its "hegemonic" policies in East Asia,

e.g., to limit China's options in the South China Sea or in

Taiwan, Beijing could easily lean toward the DPRK's position and

make the U.S.-ROK alliance a major issue in Sino-American and

PRC-ROK relations. China could substantially strengthen its own

alliance with North Korea and more overtly encourage the

belligerence of Pyongyang.

Beijing fears that if the United States is allowed to have

its way every time in Northeast Asia, it could eventually

dominate the region, much like the situation in the Caribbean. In

such a case, Beijing would find itself in a very poor security

environment given its determination to sustain its political

system and reunify the country. American dominance in East Asia,

although unlikely at the moment, appears to be a major long-term

concern to Beijing, which will continually factor in Beijing's
11

attitudes toward the U.S.-ROK alliance.

By the mid-1990s, when the PRC seemed to have shifted its

immediate military attention to Southeast Asia, particularly to

the South China Sea islands and to the Taiwan Straits,59 the U.S.-

ROK alliance was still viewed as a stabilizing mechanism, thus

acceptable and even favorable to Beijing, that ensured that no

security problems would arise in Northeast Asia to disturb the

Chinese actions in the south. Whether Washington would (or could)

use those U.S. forces in South Korea to intervene against

possible Chinese military actions in the south, such as a naval

blockade against Taiwan, remains a major security concern to the

Chinese.

 A strong U.S.-ROK alliance may indeed contribute to a new

American containment strategy against China and, thus, affect

China's future pursuits and options. As one Chinese analyst

recently concluded,

It is impossible that China will lie there motionless

forever (as Napoleon allegedly suggested almost two

hundred years ago). The 1.2 billion Chinese people, who

are their own masters, want to develop and move on.

This is a historical trend that nobody can hold back. .

. . The "theory of containing China" will not get much

popular support and is doomed to failure.60

Another major variable affecting China's perception of the

U.S.-ROK alliance is the inter-Korean relationship. In order to

preserve the favorable status quo in Northeast Asia, Beijing is

reluctant to endure a "crash unification" of North and South

Korea (similar to that experienced by the two Germanies) or U.S.

military-backed international sanctions that could provoke a new

war on the Peninsula.61 An important factor in Beijing's

calculation about the U.S.-ROK alliance may be its desire to

"protect" its North Korean comrades. Ever since the end of the

Cold War, Beijing has expressed disappointment and unhappiness

over the U.S. and Japanese decisions not to establish full

diplomatic relations with Pyongyang--long after Moscow and

Beijing recognized Seoul. According to Chinese press and

academia, American behavior towards North Korea in the 1990s

actually matches quite well the Chinese description of "hegemonic

power," a buzzword for security threat and international enemy.

With a different agenda, perspective, and perhaps intelligence

collection, Beijing naturally does not share as deeply American

concerns over Pyongyang's drive for nuclear weapons and a

potential, explosive southward invasion from the DPRK. Beijing

easily deems active American actions in South Korea as

"unnecessary" and "hegemonic" moves that may actually harm

Chinese interests. Unless there is continued, further improvement

of the U.S.-DPRK relationship, Beijing will likely be cautiously
12

critical about the U.S.-ROK alliance on occasion; the alliancelike close relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang is likely

to continue to balance the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Finally, the Chinese perception of the U.S.-ROK alliance is

tightly linked to the issue of Korean reunification. The PRC's

tacit acceptance of the U.S.-ROK alliance apparently is only

valid under the current framework of international relations in

Northeast Asia. Beijing would clearly feel very uncomfortable and

insecure if a united Korea or a unifying Korea maintained an

effective military alliance with the United States.

When jointly considering the U.S.-ROK alliance and the

course of Korean reunification, the PRC appears to have a

hierarchy of preferences. The best scenario would be a nonthreatening U.S.-ROK alliance on the divided, but stable, Korean

Peninsula to maintain the favorable status quo. This is exactly

the current situation after the China-desired solution of the

North Korean nuclear issue. The second choice would be a gradual,

but peaceful, reunification of the two Koreas with an unambiguous

demise of the U.S-ROK alliance--especially its military

components. The PRC may obstruct such a peaceful reunification if

it meant a total disappearance of the DPRK regime. A less

desirable outcome would be a military withdrawal of the United

States from South Korea without a rapid Korean reunification. The

reduction of the American presence would encourage the rise of

Japan, but the divided (yet stable) Korean Peninsula could still

function as a buffer for the PRC. The least desirable situation

would be a rapid Korean reunification of the whole Peninsula with

a continued strong U.S.-ROK alliance, which China would regard as

a direct security threat.

Such a hierarchy of preferences makes the Chinese policy

towards the Korean reunification and the U.S.-ROK alliance a

complex and perplexing one. From the Chinese perspective, there

seems to be a fundamental conflict between accepting a U.S.-ROK

alliance and supporting Korean reunification. This deeply rooted

security concern is likely to make the gap between Beijing's

words and the deeds regarding Northeast Asia more apparent in two

ways. On the one hand, the PRC works to maintain the status quo, but needs to voice its "full support" to its ally, North Korea,

which at least publicly argues for an immediate American

withdrawal from South Korea. On the other hand, struggling with

its own reunification course, Beijing prefers the U.S.-ROK

alliance and a divided Korea, but is compelled publicly to

"encourage" the drive for Korean reunification (which may result

in a threatening Korean-American alliance covering the whole

Korean Peninsula). The PRC recently, however, has expressed

interest in the possibly changing nature of the U.S.-ROK alliance

from a dependent relationship to a partnership. In addition to

the growing American domestic cries for reducing the U.S.
13

security commitment in East Asia, increasingly many Koreans have

argued for a more "democratic" or "equal" partnership between

Seoul and Washington to serve the changed interests of the ROK in

the post-Cold War era.62 Such demands are likely to alter the

nature of the U.S.-ROK alliance in the years to come following

reunification. The military components of the alliance, for

example, could be significantly reduced, and Seoul might acquire

more control of the alliance. Some in the PLA, for example,

believe changes in such a direction would benefit the region and

the Peninsula,63 since a greater Korean say in the U.S.-ROK

alliance may result in a less-likely American threat.

Conclusion.

China is satisfied with current Northeast Asian

international relations. However, it watches for new threats--

mostly likely in the form of an external, dominating power in

East Asia or revived Japanese militarism. Limited by its own

capacity, the PRC is likely to play the old balance of power game

to maintain a favorable status quo. On the Korean Peninsula,

China does not want rapid change or stalemate. Despite China's

suspicions and doubts, the United States is currently viewed by

Beijing as an effective means to maintain the security

arrangement in Northeast Asia. For China's short-term security

objectives, the Americans are welcomed (and even encouraged) to

continue their military presence in South Korea to constrain the

Japanese. But, a United States that aggressively promotes human

rights and political democracy is deeply feared by Beijing as a

long-term challenge to the political stability of the CCP regime.

U.S. policies towards Taiwan, driven by domestic politics, touch

even more sensitive nerves in Beijing. The recent Chinese

taciturn consent to the presence of the Russian naval forces in

the Pacific may indicate that Beijing is preparing an alternative

to American help in balancing Japan. The double security

objective of using and resisting the United States in East Asia

appears to be China's dominant perception of the American

presence in this region in general and the U.S-ROK alliance in

particular.

Beijing accepts and even tacitly likes the U.S.-ROK

alliance, as long as it remains a bilateral alliance with the

simple aim of deterring external aggression against the ROK. The

Chinese Foreign Minister recently (and openly) termed the

formerly much-criticized U.S.-ROK military relationship as merely

something "the Americans are now discussing among themselves."64

That is, it is basically an American and South Korean issue under

the current international structure in Northeast Asia. China

would not mind this alliance at all. Given our understanding of

China's security concerns in East Asia, however, any alteration

of the purpose, content, or scope of the U.S.-ROK alliance would
14

necessarily cause Beijing to reassess its position. China accepts

a U.S.-ROK alliance in a divided Korea, but a united Korea with a

continued Korean-American military alliance would be very

undesirable to Beijing. The key variables affecting China's

perception of the U.S.-ROK alliance in the future, therefore,

seem to be the overall Sino-American relationship and the

development of the inter-Korean relationship.

ENDNOTES

1. John J. Mearsheimer, for example, is known for his views.

See also Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign

Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1990/91, pp. 23-33.

2. For a recent general assessment of the overall

international relations, see Yan Xuetong and Li Zhongcheng,

"Zhanwang 21 Shijicu de Guoji Zhengzhi" (Looking Ahead at the

International Politics at the Early 21st Century), Xiandai Guoji

Guanxi (Contemporary Inter-national Relations (henceforth CIR)),

Beijing, No. 6, 1995, pp. 2-8.

3. Shen Qurong, "Security Environment in Northeast Asia: Its

Characteristics and Sensitivities," CIR, Vol. 2, No. 12, December

1992, p. 13.

4. Li Zhongcheng and Guo Chuanling, "World Trends 1993,"

CIR, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 1993, p. 4.

5. Geng Huichang, "Multi-National Co-Ordination: Feasibility

in Asia-Pacific," CIR, Vol. 2, No. 11, November 1992, p. 11.

6. Yang Chenxu, "Jiangxi Dongya Anquan Wenti" (An Analysis

on East Asian Security Issues), Guoji Wenti Yanju (International

Studies), Beijing, No. 3, 1994, pp. 21, 19.

7. Yan Xuetong, "China's Regional Policy," conference paper

presented at the China at the Turn of the Century Conference,

East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, August 3-5, 1994, pp. 2, 4.

8. For a further discussion on this point, see Fei-Ling

Wang, "Lengzhan Yihou Zhongguo de Dongya Anquan Zhengca Jianxi"

(An Analysis on Chinese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War East

Asia), Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Jikan (Chinese Social Sciences

Quarterly), Hong Kong, No. 10, Spring 1995, passim.

9. Deng Xiaoping's remarks to President George Bush in 1989.

Deng Xiaoping, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng

Xiaoping), Vol. 3, Beijing: Renmin Press, 1993, p. 284; Jiang

Zemin, "To Accelerate the Reform and Opening," Beijing Review, October 26-November 1, 1992, p. 16.
15

10. Jiang Zemin, "To Accelerate the Reform and Opening," p.

25.

11. The Far East and Australasia 1994, 25th ed., London:

Europa Publications Limited, 1994, p. 208.

12. People's Republic of China (PRC) State Statistical

Bureau, 92' Zhongguo Fazhan Baogao (China Development Report

1992), Beijing: Tongji Press, 1993, p. 219.

13. Guoji Maoyi (International Trade Journal), Beijing,

March, 1994, p. 50.

14. PRC State Statistical Bureau, 92' Zhongguo Fazhan

Baogao, p. 219.

15. Renmin Ribao-Overseas, Beijing, September 12, 1995, p.

6.

16. "New Directions of China-Korea Economic Cooperation,"

East Asian Daily, Seoul, Korea, April 15, 1994, p. 1.

17. Renmin Ribao-Overseas, Beijing, September 12, 1995, p.

6.

18. For example, North Korea now imports 75 percent of its

oil supply, 72 percent of food imports, and 88 percent of cooking

coal from China. Time Magazine, June 13, 1994, p. 27; "Border

City's Trade with DPRK 'Severely Limited'," Hong Kong AFP News,

in English, July 14, 1994, in Daily Report, Foreign Broadcasting

Information Service China (henceforth FBIS-CHI)-94-135, July 14,

1994, p. 8.

19. "The Japanese Government Cannot Escape for the Blame,"

People's Daily, September 29, 1994, p. 8.

 20. Qian Qichan, unpublished speech at the luncheon of the

Foreign Affairs Council, New York, September 27, 1994.

21. See Fei-Ling Wang, "Taihai Niangan de Nengzhan yu

Rezhan" (The Cold War and Hot War Across the Taiwan Straites),

Yazhou Zhoukan (Asian Weekly), Hong Kong, August 6, 1995, p. 1.

22. Wu Guifu and Xia Liping, Yatai Diqu Anquan Huanjin

(Security Environment in Asia and the Pacific), Beijing: PLA

Press, 1995, passim.

23. Yang Chenxu, "An Analysis of East Asian Security

Issues," p. 20.

24. Yan Xuetong, "China's Regional Policy, p. 16.
16

25. For a description of China's open and covert reactions

to the demise of the former Soviet Union, see John W. Garver,

"The Chinese Communist Party and the Collapse of Soviet

Communism," China Quarterly, No. 133, March 1993, pp. 1-26.

26. Robert A. Manning, "Burdens of the Past, Dilemmas of the

Future: Sino-Japanese Relations in the Emerging International

System," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter 1994, pp.

45-58.

27. For example, see Gu Ping, "A 'Hot August' In Japan,"

Renmin Ribao, August 18, 1994, p. 8.

28. Xinhua Daily Telegraph, Beijing, August 17, 1995, p. 1.

29. Wei Li, "Yubao Pipa Banzhemian" (Covering-up Half the

Face with a Pipa), Shijie Zhishi (World Affairs), Beijing, No.

13, July 1, 1995, pp. 2-3.

30. Xiandai Jianchuan (Modern Maritime Vessels), Beijing,

1994.

31. Jaing Zeming, "Zhai Jinian Fang Faxisi Zhangzheng

Shengli Wushi Zhounian Dahui Shang de Jianghua" (Speech at the

Meeting to Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Victory of

Anti-Fascism War), Renmin Ribao-Overseas, September 4, 1995, pp.

1, 4.

32. The Japanese government has not really helped to reduce

that suspicion. On the contrary, some Japanese senior officials

seemed to like the idea of being the "leader" of East Asia again

at the expense of the Chinese and other East Asians. See, for

example, the speech by Yuji Miyamoto, the Japanese Consul General

to Atlanta, at the Southern Center for International Relations,

Atlanta, Georgia, April 21, 1995.

33. Renmin Ribao, March 24, 1993, p. 1.

34. Qurong, "Security Environment," p. 8.

35. See Jiang Zemin's remarks to his DPRK guests on August

27, 1995. Xinhua Daily Telegraph, Beijing, August, 28, 1995, p.

1.

36. South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, August 23, 1994, p.

8. A Japanese newspaper reported that China shipped food in late

July as "emergency aid" to the post-Kim Il Sung regime. "PRC Sent

Food to PDRK to 'Avert Economic Confusion'," Tokyo, Mainichi

Shimbun, July 29, 1994, in FBIS-CHI-94-147, August 1, 1994, p. 9.
17

37. Ya Tai, "Guanghui de Lichen, Yongheng de Youyi"

(Glorious Course, Eternal Friendship), Renmin Ribao, Beijing,

September 3, 1995, p. 1.

38. Jikin Ribao (Jilin Daily), Changchun, August 26, 1995,

p. 1.

39. There have been rather open discussions on the "useful"

lessons from the Korean case including the belief that "neoConfucianism" played a major role in Korea's development. See,

for example, Xin Guanjie, "Kongzi Rujia Xueshuo Xiang Shijie de

Chuanbuo" (The Promotion of Confucianism to the World), Renmin

Ribao-Overseas, April 27, 1995, p. 3.

40. Zhongguo Hegongye Bao (Chinese Nuclear Industry

Journal), Beijing, July 19, 1995, p. 2.

41. Hong Guoqi and Wang Xiaode, "Wenhua Yingshu Chubailiao

Clinton de Yatai Zhengce" (Clinton's Asian-Pacific Policy is

Thwarted by Cultural Factors), CIR, Vol. 5, No. 5, May 20, 1995,

in FBIS-CHI-95-156, August 14, 1995, pp. 10-13.

42. For a more in-depth examination of the China's policy on

the North Korean nuclear issue, see Fei-Ling Wang, "Chinese

Security Policy in Northeast Asia," in Tae-Hwan Kwak and Edward

A. Olsen, eds., Northeast Asia in a Changing World, Boulder, CO:

Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1996, passim. Some of the views

expressed in this paper are shared with those authors.

43. Jia Hao and Zhuang Qubing, "China's Policy towards the

Korean Peninsula," Asian Survey, Vol. 32, No. 12, December 1992,

p. 1152.

44. Yan Xuetong, "China's Regional Policy, p. 13.

45. Qurong, "China's Regional Policy," p. 13.

46. Young-Kyu Park, "Post-Unification Challenges" in Amos A.

Jordan, ed., Korean Unification--Implication for Northeast Asia, Washington, DC: CSIS, 1993, p. 42.

47. By the summer of 1994, Beijing made an interesting

change in its decade long position and stopped calling for a

reduction of Russian naval forces in the Pacific. Renmin Ribao, July 26, 1994, p. 4.

48. Peng Zhengxiang and Xia Liping, Shijie Junshi Da Qushi

(Grand Trends of the World Military), Beijing: National Defense

University Press, 1994, p. 310.

49. "Qiao Receives Japanese 'China Tour' Delegation,"
18

Beijing, Xinhua, in English, October 27, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-

208, October 27, 1995, pp. 9-10

50. See Fei-Ling Wang, "The Motivation for 'Punishing

Hanoi': a Reading of the People's Daily," unpublished conference

paper, Conference on China and International Relations, Harvard

University, Cambridge, MA, June 20-23, 1987, passim.

51. The term was first used by Herbert Ellison in Japan and

the Pacific Quadrille, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987, passim;

Harry Harding, China and Northeast Asia: The Political Dimension,

Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988, passim; among

others.

52. Chen Qimao, "The Role of the Greater Powers in the

Process of Korean Reunification," in Amos A. Jordan, ed., Korean

Unification-- Implication for Northeast Asia, Washington, DC:

CSIS, 1993, p. 78.

53. Shen Qurong, "U.S.'s Eight Misunderstandings and China's

Reality," unpublished conference paper presented to the

International Conference on Sino-American Relations, Bridgeport,

CT, April 1993, pp. 2-20.

54. Tang Tianri, "Meiguo de Nengzan Zhonghezhen" (The Cold

War Syndrome of the U.S.), Laiowang (Outlook), Beijing, July 24,

1995, p. 44. Renmin Ribao quickly carried an article that

directly and harshly criticized the "queer" article in the July

31, 1995, issue of Time Magazine ("Why We Must Contain China"),

Renmin Ribao, Beijing, August 4, 1995, p. 6.

55. Lu Zhongwei, "Security of Northeast Asia and Prospects

for Multilateral Consultation," CIR, Vol. 2, No. 11, November

1992, p. 20.

56. Yang Chenxu, "An Analysis of East Asian Security

Issues," p. 20. China would warn Washington to avoid such a

policy or risk the consequences. "We would like to advise those

Americans with an anti-China mentality to give up their

anarchronistic way of thinking and hegemonic psychology so that

Cold War II can be avoided." Li Zhongcheng, "China's Relations

with Major Powers," CIR, No. 7, July 20, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-

169, August 31, 1995, pp. 4-8.

57. Jen Hui-Wen, "The Chinese-U.S. Strategic Trial of

Strength on the Korean Peninsula," Hsin Pao, Hong Kong, April 8,

1994, p. 24.

58. Tang Tianri, "Meiguo de Nengzan Zhonghezhen" (The Cold

War Syndrome of the U.S.), Laiowang (Outlook), Beijing, July 24,

1995, p. 44.
19

59. Weixin Hu, "Beijing's Defense Strategy and the Korean

Peninsula," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, forthcoming

1995/96.

60. Lu Shi, "Zhuding Puomide Berimong" (A Daydream Doomed to

be Shattered--Refuting the 'Theory of Containing China'),

Guangmin Ribao, Beijing, August 25, 1995, p. 3.

61. A Hong Kong-based magazine made a similar speculation.

Lo Chieh-An, "China and DPRK strives for Political Stability and

Economic 'Break-away'," Tang Tai, Hong Kong, No. 41, August 15,

1994, pp. 57-58. A similar view is also found in another Hong

Kong-based newspaper. Jen Hui-Wen, "Inside Story about China

Briefing DPRK on How to Act," Hsin Pao (Star Daily), Hong Kong,

June 22, 1994, p. 2.

62. See, for example, Byung-joon Ahn, "The Future of KoreaU.S. Relations: Toward Regional Partnership," unpublished

conference paper, Annual Conference of the American Political

Science Association, Washington, DC, August 30-September 3, 1995.

At the International Workshop on the U.S.-ROK Alliance, Seoul,

Korea, October 5-7, 1995, many Korean participants expressed

similar, and even stronger, views.

63. Peng Zhengxiang and Xia Liping, Shijie Junshi Da Qushi

(Grand Trends of the World Military), Beijing: National Defense

University Press, 1994, pp. 311-316.

64. Renmin Ribao, March 24, 1993, p. 1. Similar statements

were later repeated by the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman in

1994 and 1995.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

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