2017 UT App 40

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SHARON SMITH,

Appellee and Cross-appellant,

v.

KEITH SMITH,

Appellant and Cross-appellee.

Opinion

No. 20150354-CA

Filed March 2, 2017

Third District Court, Tooele Department

The Honorable Robert W. Adkins

No. 134300466

Michael D. Black, Attorney for Appellant

and Cross-appellee

Troy L. Booher and Julie J. Nelson, Attorneys for

Appellee and Cross-appellant

JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES

GREGORY K. ORME and JILL M. POHLMAN concurred.

ROTH, Judge:

¶1 Keith Smith appeals from a divorce decree, claiming that 

the trial court misinterpreted the terms of a family trust and, as a 

consequence, improperly allocated certain property between the

spouses. We affirm.
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BACKGROUND

¶2 Sharon Smith and Keith Smith married in 1979. Sharon1

came from a farming family with sufficient assets to enable 

Sharon’s mother to help the couple financially from time to time. 

To protect and pass her assets on to her children, Sharon’s 

mother created the Luveda Fincher Family Limited Partnership 

(the Family Partnership), which included Sharon and her 

siblings as limited partners. In 2002, Sharon’s mother modified 

the structure of the Family Partnership to begin distributing a 

portion of its assets to her children on a monthly basis. Sharon 

received distributions from the partnership for some years 

during the marriage and used the money for family expenses.

¶3 In 2006, the Smiths drafted a family trust document to

shelter their real and personal property. The Smith Family Trust 

was comprised of two constituent trusts—the Keith L. Smith 

Trust and the Sharon L. Smith Trust. All assets transferred into 

the Family Trust were to be part of one spouse’s individual trust 

as specified in the trust documents, or, if neither individual trust 

were specifically designated, the property would be “allocated 

equally between [the individual trusts].” In connection with the 

creation of the trust, the Smiths executed Schedule A, which was 

attached to and incorporated by reference in the main trust 

document.

¶4 Schedule A is the focal point of this appeal and appears to 

be the primary mechanism through which the Smiths funded the 

Family Trust. Schedule A contains four subsections, each 

covering a different category of property. Each subsection 

includes an ownership designation. Specifically, Schedule A 

 

1. As is our practice in cases where both parties share a last 

name, we refer to the parties by their first name with no 

disrespect intended by the apparent informality. Earhart v. 

Earhart, 2015 UT App 308, ¶ 2 n.1, 365 P.3d 719.
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provided that “property listed under the ownership category 

KLS is the exclusive property of The Keith L. Smith Trust, 

property listed as SLS is the exclusive property of The Sharon L. 

Smith Trust, and property designated KLS & SLS is owned 

equally by the two Trusts.” The two subsections of Schedule A 

relevant to this appeal read as follows:

2. The following accounts in the following 

institutions, together with all future additions, 

interest or accumulations therein and also 

including all new accounts and the accumulations 

and the future additions, interest or accumulation 

in any and all other financial institutions in which 

new accounts are opened in the future:

Ownership

KLS & SLS A. Tooele Federal Credit Union

[individual account information 

redacted]

. . . .

4. All right, title and interest in and to the 

following:

SLS A. All interest of Sharon L. Smith 

in and to Luveda Fincher 

Family Limited Partnership, an 

Arizona Limited Partnership.

¶5 After her mother died in 2012, Sharon received a large 

inheritance distribution from the Family Partnership by check. 

Sharon deposited the check into two money market accounts in 

her own name that she had opened for that purpose.

¶6 In 2013, the Smiths separated their joint accounts, and not 

long after, Sharon filed for divorce. The divorce proceeded to 
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20150354-CA 4 2017 UT App 40

trial to resolve a number of disputed questions, most of which 

are not at issue on appeal. Relevant here, Keith argued that he 

was entitled to half of Sharon’s inheritance distribution or, in the 

alternative, that he was entitled to alimony. The trial court 

rejected Keith’s primary argument and determined that the 

inheritance money from the Family Partnership was Sharon’s 

separate property and that Keith was not entitled to a share. The 

court’s reasoning was based on two independent decisions. First, 

the court determined that the inheritance distribution was a 

traditional inheritance, which is ordinarily considered separate 

property under Utah law. Second, the court determined that 

Sharon’s inheritance did not thereafter become joint property 

under subsection 2 of Schedule A when she deposited the money 

in new accounts because subsection 4 of Schedule A applied to 

the inheritance check. This “mean[t] all the distributions [from 

the Family Partnership] belong to [Sharon]” even if she 

deposited the money into a financial account held in her name.

¶7 Although the court awarded Sharon’s inheritance to her 

alone, it also determined that Keith had unmet financial needs of 

$502 per month. The court therefore ordered Sharon to pay him 

that amount in alimony for a term up to the length of the 

marriage. Keith appeals the court’s decision that the inheritance 

belonged exclusively to Sharon.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8 The single issue presented in this appeal is whether the 

trial court properly awarded Sharon the entire inheritance 

distribution from her family partnership.2 Typically, “[t]rial 

 

2. Sharon filed a conditional cross-appeal asking us to vacate the 

trial court’s alimony award if we reversed the court’s award of 

the inheritance money to Sharon alone. Because we affirm the 

(continued...)
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20150354-CA 5 2017 UT App 40

courts have considerable discretion in determining property 

distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on appeal 

unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is 

demonstrated.” Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 8, 

176 P.3d 476 (ellipsis, citation, and internal quotation marks 

omitted). However, Keith’s argument turns on the trial court’s

interpretation of Schedule A of the Family Trust document. “A 

trial court’s interpretation of a trust instrument is a question of 

law, which we review for correctness.” Hull v. Wilcock, 2012 UT 

App 223, ¶ 21, 285 P.3d 815 (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

¶9 Keith does not appeal the trial court’s determination that 

the inheritance distribution itself was Sharon’s separate 

property. Rather, he challenges the trial court’s decision that the 

money did not become joint property under the terms of the 

Family Trust when Sharon deposited it in the money market 

accounts. Thus, according to Keith, “[t]he sole issue in this 

appeal is the proper division of two financial accounts . . . , both 

held in [Sharon’s] name.” His arguments are based on 

subsection 2 of Schedule A (the Financial Accounts Provision). 

He asserts that the Financial Accounts Provision established that 

Sharon and Keith were to share equally both the assets in the 

bank accounts specifically listed in Schedule A, as well as any 

assets in “‘all new accounts . . . in any and all other financial 

institutions in which new accounts are opened in the future.’” 

(Quoting the Financial Accounts Provision.) Keith argues that, 

under the plain language of the Financial Accounts Provision, he 

 

(...continued)

court, the condition of the cross-appeal is not satisfied and we do 

not address it.
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20150354-CA 6 2017 UT App 40

became entitled to half of the substantial inheritance distribution 

once Sharon deposited it in the new accounts.

¶10 Sharon counters that the “trial court correctly concluded 

that when [she] deposited her separate property into her 

separate account, it did not morph into marital property” 

because, among other reasons, the court’s decision was 

“consistent with the plain language of the Family Trust and the 

intent of the settlors.” In support of her argument, Sharon points 

to subsection 4 of Schedule A (the Partnership Provision), which 

assigns “[a]ll right, title and interest in and to” the Family 

Partnership to Sharon alone. Thus, Sharon contends that the 

Partnership Provision “assigns sole ownership of the inheritance 

distribution” to her irrespective of the broad language in the 

Financial Accounts Provision.

¶11 Significantly, Keith does not argue that the distribution 

itself was marital property in which he is entitled to a share. 

Indeed, he concedes that “Sharon could take the distribution in 

cash, reinvest it, spend it, or anything else.” But he asserts that, 

“once Sharon placed [the distribution] in a financial account, the 

account was joint property and half of the account belonged to 

Keith.” Thus, our review focuses narrowly on the question of 

whether the inheritance changed in character from separate 

property to joint property simply because Sharon deposited it into 

a financial account. We agree with the trial court that it did not.

¶12 “We employ familiar principles of contract interpretation 

when construing trust instruments.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 

¶ 29. “When interpreting a [trust], a court first looks to the 

[trust’s] four corners to determine the parties’ intentions, which 

are controlling.” Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 

62, ¶ 16, 52 P.3d 1179. When a trust is unambiguous—as both 

Keith and Sharon agree is the case here—“a court determines the 

parties’ intentions from the plain meaning of the [trust’s]

language.” Id.
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¶13 Keith’s argument turns on the Financial Accounts 

Provision, which provides that “all new accounts . . . in any and 

all other financial institutions in which new accounts are opened 

in the future” will be owned equally by Keith’s and Sharon’s 

individual trusts. He relies on that language for the proposition 

that, “once Sharon placed [her inheritance] in a financial 

account,” the inheritance converted into joint property, and 

Keith was entitled to half of it.

¶14 Keith’s argument would be stronger if the Financial 

Accounts Provision stood alone. However, “we consider each 

[trust] provision in relation to all of the others, with a view 

toward giving effect to all and ignoring none.” JENCO LC v. 

Perkins Coie LLP, 2016 UT App 140, ¶ 11, 378 P.3d 131 (ellipsis, 

citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). We must 

therefore also consider how the other provisions in Schedule A 

apply to Sharon’s inheritance distribution—in particular the 

Partnership Provision, which assigns “[a]ll right, title and 

interest in and to” the Family Partnership to Sharon alone.

¶15 It is uncontested that Sharon deposited her inheritance 

from the Family Partnership into two newly created financial 

accounts, where the money remained at the time of the divorce. 

Although we do not decide the issue, if the terms of the Financial 

Accounts Provision alone control, Keith might be entitled to half 

of the assets in Sharon’s accounts. If the Partnership Provision 

controls, however, Sharon is entitled to the total amount of her 

inheritance. Thus, there is an apparent conflict between the two 

provisions that we must resolve, and our review hinges on 

whether a reasonable reading of Schedule A can give effect to 

both provisions. Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., 266 P.2d 494, 495–96 

(Utah 1954) (“[I]f effect can be given to both of two apparently 

conflicting provisions in a reasonable reconciliation[,] that 

interpretation will control.”); Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. 

Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1360 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 

(“[W]here two seemingly conflicting contract provisions 
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20150354-CA 8 2017 UT App 40

reasonably can be reconciled, a court is required to do so and to 

give both effect.”).

¶16 Here, another canon of construction helps us to reconcile 

the apparent conflict, namely the concept that “[g]eneral terms 

and provisions are restricted by specific terms and provisions 

following them.” 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 208 (2016); see also CoBon 

Energy, LLC v. AGTC, Inc., 2011 UT App 330, ¶ 22, 264 P.3d 219 

(“When interpreting contract language, specific provisions 

ordinarily will be regarded as qualifying the meaning of broad 

general terms in relation to a particular subject.”). “Under this 

canon, the specific provision is treated as an exception to the 

general rule.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: 

The Interpretation of Legal Texts 183 (2012) (discussing the 

“general/specific canon” of construction).

¶17 There can be no question that the Financial Accounts 

Provision is general in nature. Indeed, its language is written in 

the broadest possible terms, purporting to cover all monies in all 

accounts created in any financial institution at any point in time 

after execution of the trust. Conversely, the Partnership 

Provision applies particularly and exclusively to Sharon’s 

interest in the Family Partnership. And in keeping with general 

drafting principles and the canons of construction mentioned 

above, the broad general provision comes before—and is 

therefore constrained in its breadth by—the specific provision 

that follows. We therefore read the Partnership Provision as a 

specific exception to the otherwise broad reach of the Financial 

Accounts Provision, a reading that harmonizes and gives effect 

to both provisions of Schedule A. Cf. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch 

Co., 740 P.2d at 1360 n.3. For this reason, we agree with the trial 

court’s interpretation of Schedule A—the inheritance distribution 

that Sharon received from the Family Partnership was exclusively 

hers under the plain language of the trust document.

¶18 Our conclusion is supported by other interpretive rules. 

For instance, Keith’s argument—that “Sharon could take the 
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20150354-CA 9 2017 UT App 40

distribution in cash, reinvest it, spend it, or anything else” so 

long as she did not deposit it into a financial account—ignores 

the pragmatic ramifications of reading Schedule A as broadly as 

he suggests. Given the financial realities of the modern world, 

we question how an individual could reasonably make use of or 

even secure a substantial sum of money without utilizing a 

financial account of some kind. It is simply unrealistic to expect 

Sharon to store a distribution in cash under the proverbial 

mattress. Likewise, it is difficult to imagine how Sharon might 

have undertaken the obvious next step of reinvesting her 

inheritance without using a financial account at least as an 

intermediary.3 Thus, reading Schedule A as Keith proposes 

works an absurd result to Sharon’s substantial detriment by 

preventing her from using the most commonly available—and 

almost indispensable—financial tools in conventional ways. See

Selvig v. Blockbuster Enters., LC, 2011 UT 39, ¶ 28, 266 P.3d 691 

(rejecting a proposed reading of a contract because it “would 

countenance [an] absurd result”).

¶19 Keith argues that the provisions of Schedule A can be 

harmonized under his reading. Specifically, he asserts that the 

“Partnership Provision is not rendered meaningless” by his 

reading of the Financial Accounts Provision because “an interest 

in a limited partnership includes a right to receive distributions, 

but the actual funds once distributed are not the ‘interest’ in the 

partnership.” This argument likewise fails to persuade. The 

claim—that Sharon’s entitlement under the Partnership 

Provision to “[a]ll interest of Sharon L. Smith in and to Luveda 

Fincher Family Limited Partnership” does not also include all 

 

3. We note that the size of the distribution check does not drive 

our analysis. Rather, it is the general principle of Keith’s 

interpretation and its consequences that are determinative, and 

those principles apply regardless of whether the check was for 

$100 or $1 million.
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20150354-CA 10 2017 UT App 40

interest in the assets actually distributed—has little to 

recommend it.4 An interest is a “legal share in something; all or 

part of a . . . claim to or right in property.” Interest, Black’s Law 

Dictionary 934 (10th ed. 2014). And a distribution is the tangible

result of “[t]he act or process of apportioning or giving out.”

Distribution, Black’s Law Dictionary 576 (10th ed. 2014). Thus, if 

Sharon’s interest in the Family Partnership is her separate 

property under Schedule A as Keith concedes, an “apportionment 

or giving out” of some portion of the partnership’s assets—here,

a distribution of money—must also be exclusively hers. Cf.

distributive share, Black’s Law Dictionary 577 (10th ed. 2014)

(“The share of assets . . . that a partner . . . acquires after the 

partnership has been dissolved.”).

¶20 Thus, Keith’s argument draws an arbitrary line between 

Sharon’s interest in the Family Partnership and her interest in 

the benefits derived from it. However, this argument fails for 

similar reasons that his proposed reading of Schedule A leads to 

absurd results. If the Financial Accounts Provision instantly 

converted distributions into joint property as soon as Sharon 

tried to use the money by placing it into a financial account, then 

the most obvious benefit of Sharon’s sole interest in the Family 

Partnership—money distributions from its assets—becomes 

essentially meaningless. Because “we look for a reading [of a 

written instrument] that harmonizes the provisions and avoids 

rendering any provision meaningless,” Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor 

Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, ¶ 28, 210 P.3d 263, we reject 

Keith’s proposed interpretation of Schedule A.

¶21 For these reasons, Sharon’s reading of Schedule A 

prevails over Keith’s. Her reading achieves the major goals of 

trust interpretation applicable to these circumstances—it

 

4. The apparent implication of Keith’s argument is that, having 

been given the whole cow, Sharon can use only half the milk.
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20150354-CA 11 2017 UT App 40

harmonizes all the provisions of the instrument, renders none of 

them meaningless, works no absurd results, and thereby best 

conforms to the intent of the parties as expressed by the plain 

language of the document.

CONCLUSION

¶22 We conclude that the Partnership Provision set out in 

Schedule A of the Smith Family Trust established that Sharon’s 

interest in the Family Partnership, including any distribution 

from the partnership, was her separate and exclusive property 

and that the Financial Accounts Provision did not transform the 

inheritance distribution into joint property when she deposited it 

into financial accounts held in her name alone.

¶23 Affirmed.