NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 22-1958

_______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v.

TELWIN VINCENT

Appellant

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. No. 2-21-cr-00567-001)

District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler

_______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

on January 24, 2023.

Before: HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and MATEY, Circuit Judges

(Filed: January 31, 2023)

_______________

OPINION*

_______________

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 

Telwin Vincent challenges the reasonableness of the 41-month sentence he received 

after pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud and conspiracy to use 

unauthorized access devices. We discern no error and will affirm.

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding 

precedent.
2

I. DISCUSSION1

Vincent contests both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. 

A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court applies the appropriate 

enhancements and deductions under the Sentencing Guidelines, considers any motions for 

departure, and weighs the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States 

v. Seibert, 971 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 2020). A procedurally reasonable sentence is also 

substantively reasonable unless “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the 

same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” 

United States v. Shah, 43 F.4th 356, 367 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Tomko, 

562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)).

According to Vincent, his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the 

Government misinformed the District Court that he was ineligible for a sentence of 

noncustodial probation. But Vincent was indeed ineligible for probation. He pleaded

guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, a crime punishable by up to 30 years’ 

imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1349. An offense punishable by a maximum term of 

imprisonment of 25 years or more is a Class B felony. Id. § 3559(a)(2). By statute, a court 

1

 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). In reviewing a sentence, we 

defer to the district court’s factual findings “and reverse only for clear error” but consider 

legal rulings de novo. United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation 

omitted). Because Vincent did not raise procedural objections to his sentence below, we 

assess the procedural reasonableness of his sentence for plain error. United States v. 

Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). We review the substantive 

reasonableness of his sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Pawlowski, 27 

F.4th 897, 911 (3d Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
3

cannot sentence a defendant to probation for a Class B felony. Id. § 3561(a)(1).

Next, Vincent contends the Government misinformed the District Court that the 

Guidelines range was mandatory, thereby rendering Vincent’s sentence procedurally 

unreasonable. That assertion is inaccurate. The Government explicitly apprised the Court 

of its duty to exercise discretion in sentencing Vincent. 

In a final procedural challenge, Vincent argues that the District Court failed to 

adequately consider his personal history and caregiving role for his mother. But the Court 

specifically acknowledged Vincent’s past hardships and the toll incarceration would have 

on his family. It nevertheless determined that the gravity of his offense and the need for 

deterrence warranted a sentence within the Guidelines range. Thus, the District Court

properly “considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] 

own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)

(citation omitted).

Although Vincent states in passing that his sentence was substantively unreasonable 

because “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same 41-month prison 

term,” Opening Br. 12, he offers no argumentation in support of that conclusion. As this 

contention is merely “adverted to in a cursory fashion, unaccompanied by developed 

argument,” it is waived. United States v. Penn, 870 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 

Rodriguez v. Mun. of San Juan, 659 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2011)). And, in any event, 

Vincent’s cursory allegations do not rebut the presumption that a sentence that falls within 

the Guidelines range is reasonable. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 347.
4

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.