GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

Armed Services, House of 

Representatives

March 2001 KOSOVO AIR 

OPERATIONS

Army Resolving 

Lessons Learned 

Regarding the Apache 

Helicopter

GAO-01-401

Page 1 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Doctrine Change or Implementation Lessons Learned 18

Appendix II: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and 

Intelligence Lessons Learned 19

Appendix III: Training Lessons Learned 20

Appendix IV: Additional Capability Lessons Learned 22

Appendix V: Force Structure Lessons Learned 24

Figures Figure 1: Map of the Balkans 5

Figure 2: Apache Helicopter 6

Figure 3: Status of Task Force Hawk Lessons Learned 11

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

HQDA Headquarters Department of Army

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command
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Page 3 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548 Letr

March 2, 2001

The Honorable Bob Stump

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Following the failure of peace talks and escalating violence against ethnic 

Albanians in Kosovo, on March 24, 1999, the United States provided 

military forces in support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization combat 

operations against Yugoslavia. Combat operations officially ended on 

June 20, 1999, with the Yugoslav acceptance of a peace plan and the U.N. 

endorsement of the plan. Your Committee requested that we examine a 

number of issues associated with the conduct of these combat operations, 

called Operation Allied Force. This report, one in a series responding to 

your requests, addresses the Army’s participation in the operation—the 

deployment of Apache attack helicopters and supporting equipment and 

personnel, called Task Force Hawk. Our objectives were to (1) examine 

how Task Force Hawk’s concept of operation compared to Army and joint 

doctrine, (2) review the lessons learned identified from the operation and 

determine the status of actions to address those lessons, and (3) examine 

the extent to which the Army and the Air Force were able to operate 

together as a joint force. We will report separately on other matters 

involving Operation Allied Force.

Results in Brief During Operation Allied Force, Task Force Hawk’s mission was to use its 

Apache helicopters to conduct deep attacks against Serbian forces in 

Kosovo. Military officials consider the task force and its mission consistent 

with doctrine, but not typical in that the task force was supporting an air 

campaign rather than its more traditional role of being used in conjunction 

with Army ground forces to engage massed formations of enemy armor. 

According to Army officials, the Task Force Hawk mission was not 

something the Army routinely trains for. 

The Army undertook an extensive effort to identify the lessons learned 

from Task Force Hawk. In total, it collected 107 unique action items. We 

categorized the lessons into five broad themes that in our judgment 

characterize the type of remedial action required: (1) doctrinal revisions; 

(2) command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence 

improvements; (3) training changes; (4) additional capabilities needed; and 
Page 4 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

(5) force structure changes. The Army is taking remedial actions to address 

these lessons. As of January 2001, 47 of the 107 lessons have been 

recommended for closure either because action has been taken or the 

lessons were no longer germane. However, it will take some time to 

complete remedial actions on some of the lessons learned that have been 

recommended for closure. Action is in process for the remaining 60 

lessons. Similarly, it may take years to complete action on items in process. 

The commanding generals of the U.S. Army and Air Force in Europe have 

placed a high priority on taking remedial action. However, we have 

reported in the past that the Army has not always been successful in 

implementing lessons.

The Army and the Air Force experienced significant problems in their 

ability to work together jointly and in the interoperability of the command, 

control, communications, computers, and intelligence equipment used 

during the operation. Both these areas emerged clearly in the lessons 

learned and are the subject of many remedial actions. The Army has 

deemed both issues as high-priority items and is working both issues 

aggressively. However, it will take time for the results to be seen. 

To help the Army move forward with its planned remedial actions, we are 

suggesting that the Congress may wish to have the Army report on progress 

toward implementing Task Force Hawk lessons learned. 

Background Task Force Hawk deployed to Albania in April 1999 as part of Operation 

Allied Force. Originally, the task force was to deploy to the Former 

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. However, the government of Macedonia 

would not allow combat operations to be conducted from its territory. The 

United States subsequently obtained approval from the government of 

Albania to use its territory to base Task Force Hawk and conduct combat 

operations. (See fig. 1.) Albania did not have any previously established 

U.S. military base camps as Macedonia did and was not viewed as having a 

stable security environment. According to Army officials, the size of the 

Task Force had to be increased to provide more engineering capability to 

build operating facilities and provide force protection. 
Page 5 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

Figure 1: Map of the Balkans

Source: U.S. Army.

The task force was a unique Army organization. It was comprised of 1 

attack helicopter battalion with 24 Apache attack helicopters; 1 Corps 

aviation brigade with 31 support helicopters; 1 Multiple Launch Rocket 

System battalion1

 with 27 launchers; a ground maneuver element for force 

protection; and other headquarters and support forces. (See fig. 2 for a 

1

The Multiple Launch Rocket System is an artillery system used to provide suppression of 

enemy ground forces during an operation. 

Hungary

Vojvodina

Montenegro

Belgrade

Sarajevo

Solia

Skopje

Pristina

Kosovo

Serbia

Croatia

Romania

Bosnia and

Herzegovina

Albania

Macedonia

Bulgaria

Area

Enlarged

Adriatic

Sea
Page 6 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

picture of an Apache helicopter.) It ultimately totaled about 5,100 

personnel. Its planned mission was to conduct deep attacks against Serbian 

military and militia forces operating in Kosovo using Apache helicopters 

and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems. The task force deployed to Albania 

and trained for the mission but was not ordered into combat. Ultimately, its 

focus changed to using its radar systems to locate enemy forces for 

targeting by other aircraft. Additionally, the task force assumed 

responsibility for the protection of all U.S. forces operating out of Tirana 

Airfield, its staging base, which included Air Force personnel providing 

humanitarian assistance to Kosovo refugees. 

Figure 2: Apache Helicopter

Source: U.S. Army.

Concerned about the combat readiness of Apache helicopters and their 

experience in Task Force Hawk, the House Armed Services Committee’s 

Subcommittee on Readiness held a hearing on July 1, 1999. That hearing 

focused on pilot shortages, the lack of pilot proficiency, and unit combat 

training. In addition, it discussed equipment that was not fully fielded at the 

time of the operation, such as aircraft survivability equipment and 

communication equipment. Our work was designed to address other 

matters associated with Task Force Hawk and how the services plan to 

address them for future operations. 
Page 7 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

Task Force Hawk Not a 

Typical Army 

Operation 

Doctrine is the fundamental principle by which the military services guide 

their actions in support of national objectives. It provides guidance for 

planning and conducting military operations. In the Army, doctrine is 

communicated in a variety of ways, including manuals, handbooks, and 

training. Joint doctrine, which applies to the coordinated use of two or 

more of the military services, is similarly communicated. Doctrine provides 

commanders with a framework for conducting operations while allowing 

flexibility to adapt operations to specific circumstances. 

According to Army and Joint Staff doctrine officials, the concept of 

operation that was planned to be used by Task Force Hawk, the use of 

Apache helicopters for a deep attack mission as part of an air campaign, 

fell within established Army and joint doctrine. Typically, attack helicopters 

are used in conjunction with Army ground forces to engage massed 

formations of enemy armor. They were used in this manner in the Gulf 

War.2

 In the Kosovo air campaign, Task Force Hawk’s planned deep attacks 

differed in that they were intended to be part of an air campaign, not an 

Army led combined arms3

 land campaign. Additionally, the aircraft’s 

planned attacks principally would have engaged widely dispersed and 

camouflaged enemy ground forces instead of massed formations. 

According to Army doctrine officials, doctrine is broad and flexible enough 

to allow a combatant commander to employ his assets in the manner that 

was planned for the task force. However, Army officials agree that this 

planned usage differed from the employment typically envisaged in Army 

doctrine. Furthermore, Army officials said that the Task Force Hawk 

experience was not something the Army routinely trained for and was 

considered to be an atypical operation.

Although Task Force Hawk’s mission and operations were consistent with 

both Army and joint doctrine in the broadest sense, changes to doctrine at 

both the Army and joint levels are being made that will address some of the 

operation’s lessons learned. A total of 19 Army doctrine publications will be 

developed or modified to better address the experience gained from Task 

Force Hawk. Examples of new or revised doctrine include a new handbook 

on deep operations; an update to the Army’s keystone warfighting doctrinal 

2

During the Gulf War, attack helicopters were also used as part of the air campaign to attack 

Iraqi air defenses. 

3

Combined arms is the integration of the Army’s combat capabilities, such as tanks, artillery, 

and engineer and transportation units. 
Page 8 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

publication on conducting campaigns, major operations, battles, 

engagements, and operations other than war; and an update to the Army 

aviation brigade field manual that expands the role of aviation brigades and 

task forces with a heavier emphasis on tactics, techniques, and procedures4

for task force, combined arms, and joint operations. Modifications to Army 

doctrine are being made as part of the on-going established process for 

reviewing and revising doctrinal publications. 

A total of five joint doctrine publications will be developed or modified 

based at least in part on the Task Force Hawk experience. A new joint 

publication is being developed to cover the role of the Joint Force Land 

Component Commander, detailing his role and responsibilities in a 

“supported” and “supporting” role. (See our discussion of this role in the 

Joint Operations section of this report.) Updates to four remaining joint 

publications, including close air support and fire support, will be made 

during the normal 21-month joint doctrine publication and review cycle.

Army Working to 

Implement Lessons 

Learned

The Army has a large effort underway to collect and resolve lessons 

learned pertaining to Task Force Hawk. A total of 146 Task Force Hawk 

lessons learned were collected at three different sources.5

 The U.S. Army 

Europe developed 64 lessons and forwarded them to the Army’s Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans for remedial action.6

 The Army’s 

Training and Doctrine Command developed a listing of 76 lessons and has 

assigned them to their different proponent schools for remedial action. 

Hundreds of joint action items were collected at the European Command 

on Operation Allied Force and forwarded to the Joint Warfighting Center. 

Of these items, six were specifically associated with Task Force Hawk and 

were sent to the Joint Staff for remedial action. 

We analyzed the 146 Task Force Hawk lessons and determined that a 

number of them submitted by different organizations were the same. Of the 

76 lessons raised by the Training and Doctrine Command, 38 were similar 

4

Tactics, techniques, and procedures implement the fundamental principles of military 

doctrine. 

5

These are the lessons learned collected to date that we are aware of; however, there could 

be other initiatives. 

6

The U.S. Army Europe developed 66 lessons, but 2 of them did not have anything to do with 

Task Force Hawk; therefore, we dropped them from the listing.
Page 9 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

to those submitted by U.S. Army Europe. Of the six European Command 

lessons, we determined that one was similar to an issue submitted by U.S. 

Army Europe. Deleting the 39 duplicates resulted in a total of 107 unique 

lessons submitted for remedial action. 

We categorized the 107 lessons into five broad themes that in our judgment 

characterize the type of needed remedial action. The five themes are as 

follows.

• The need for revisions to Army and joint doctrine, as discussed earlier. 

We identified 19 such lessons. See appendix I. 

• Improvements in command, control, communications, computers, and 

intelligence (C4I) equipment or procedures. We identified 20 such 

lessons. See appendix II. 

• Areas needing additional training. We identified 30 such lessons. See 

appendix III. 

• The need for additional capability in areas other than C4I. We identified 

24 such lessons. See appendix IV. 

• Potential force structure changes. We identified 14 such lessons. See 

appendix V.

We determined the status of each of the 107 lessons learned as of January 

2001. We did not evaluate the merit of the actions proposed or completed. 

We placed them into one of two status categories:

• Recommended for closure: We placed 47 items in this category. 

However, there are varying degrees of closure within this category. First, 

there are items that specifically have had actions completed, such as 

procuring night vision goggles for Apache pilots. According to Army 

officials, the goggles have been procured and fielded. Twenty-three of 

the 47 lessons fell into this subgroup. Second, there are lessons that 

have had actions taken, but will require a long lead-time for 

implementation, such as the procurement of survival radios and a 

deployable flight mission rehearsal system for aviation units. For 

example, while approval for the survival radios has been obtained, they 

will not begin fielding until fiscal year 2003. In addition, the Army has 

recommended an interim fix for a mission rehearsal system, but it is 

costly. The far-term solution is the joint mission planning system, which 
Page 10 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

will not be fielded until 2007. Fifteen of the 47 lessons fell into this 

subgroup. Finally, there are items that Army officials are recommending 

for closure because, upon further review, they determined the lessons 

should not have been submitted or events have overtaken the initial 

lesson and they are no longer applicable. The remaining nine lessons fell 

into this subgroup. Lessons learned that were recommended for closure 

are indicated as such in appendixes I-V. 

• In progress: We placed 60 lessons in this category. These items are still 

considered open issues by the Army officials tracking Task Force Hawk 

lessons learned and they have been assigned to responsible bodies for 

resolution. Seventeen of the 60 in progress lessons reside with the 

Department of the Army—Headquarters, 10 with the Joint Staff or Joint 

Forces Command, 27 with the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, 

and 6 with U.S. Army Europe. Many issues remain open because they 

require efforts that are being incorporated into much larger overall 

Army projects, such as transformation7

 or Flight School XXI,8 that will 

require a much longer time frame to implement. Other lessons learned 

remain open because efforts to address them are just beginning. Lessons 

learned where solutions are in progress are indicated as such in 

appendixes I-V. 

Figure 3 shows the 107 lessons learned issues by category and by status 

grouping. 

7

The Army Vision, announced in October 1999, encompasses people, readiness, and 

transformation. The goal of the Army vision is to transition the entire Army into a force that 

is strategically responsive and dominant at every point of the spectrum of operations.

8

Flight School XXI is the Army’s project to realign flight training to meet warfighting 

requirements by producing aviators who arrive at their initial duty station basic mission 

qualified and ready to begin unit training. 
Page 11 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

Figure 3: Status of Task Force Hawk Lessons Learned

Note: C4I = Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence.

Source: GAO analysis of Army and joint lessons learned data.

The Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe has emphasized the need to 

capitalize on the lessons learned from Kosovo and to focus on partnership 

with the Air Force. He is personally involved with the lessons learned 

process and considers the process and follow-up a personal commitment to 

U.S. Army Europe soldiers. During our visit to U.S. Air Forces in Europe, 

we were told that their commanding general has also placed a high priority 

on working together with the Army to address the lessons learned in 

conducting joint operations. While both commands have taken steps to 

resolve the issues, some of the remedial actions will require years to 

complete. In addition, over time the services assign new commanders and 

reassign the current commanders. We reported in 1999 that while the Army 

had established a program to validate that remedial action on past lessons 















	

  
 	

c	





s	
	



Closed In progress

Number of lessons
Page 12 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

learned were implemented, the program has not been very successful.9

Lessons Learned 

Highlight Problems 

With Joint Operations 

and Equipment 

Interoperability 

Two key themes emerged from the lessons learned collected. One was the 

need for the Army and the Air Force to work together better jointly. The 

other theme was the interoperability of the two services’ command, 

control, communications, computers, and intelligence equipment. 

Improvements Are Being 

Made in the Ability to 

Conduct Joint Operations

The Task Force Hawk experience highlighted difficulties in several areas 

pertaining to how the Army operates in a joint environment. One area was 

determining the most appropriate structure for integrating Army elements 

into a joint task force. Doctrine typically calls for a Joint Force Land 

Component Commander or an Army Force Commander to be a part of a 

joint task force with responsibility for overseeing ground elements during 

an operation. The command structure for the U.S. component of Operation 

Allied Force did not have a Joint Force Land Component Commander. Both 

Army officials and the Joint Task Force Commander in retrospect believe 

that this may have initially made it more difficult to integrate the Army into 

the existing joint task force structure. The lack of an Army Force 

Commander and his associated staff created difficulties in campaign 

planning because the traditional links with other joint task force elements 

were initially missing. These links would normally function as a liaison 

between service elements and coordinate planning efforts. Over time, an ad 

hoc structure had to be developed and links established. The Army has 

conducted a study to develop a higher headquarters design that would 

enable it to provide for a senior Army commander in a future Joint Task 

Force involving a relatively small Army force. This senior commander 

would be responsible for providing command, control, communications, 

computers, and intelligence capability to the joint task force. The study 

itself is complete, but testing of the design in an exercise is not scheduled 

until February 2002.

9

Military Readiness: Full Training Benefits From Army’s Combat Training Centers Are Not 

Being Realized (GAO/NSIAD-99-210, Sept. 17, 1999).
Page 13 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

A second area that the Army had difficulty with during its mission training 

was including its aircraft in the overall planning document that controls air 

attack assets. The plan, called an air tasking order, assigns daily targets or 

missions to subordinate units or forces. Air Force officials in Europe told 

us that they had difficulty integrating the Army’s attack helicopters into the 

air tasking order. According to U.S. Army Europe officials, there were no 

formalized procedures for how to include Army aviation into this planning 

document and they had little or no training on how to perform this 

function. The Army and the Air Force in Europe are developing joint 

tactics, techniques, and procedures for integrating Army assets into the air 

tasking order and are beginning to include this process in their joint 

exercises. 

A third area that the Army and the Air Force had difficulty with was 

targeting. As previously discussed, once the decision was made that Task 

Force Hawk would not conduct deep attacks, its resources were used to 

locate targets for the Air Force. According to U.S. Army Europe 

documentation, Army analysts in Europe had little or no training in joint 

targeting and analyzing targets in a limited air campaign. As a result, in the 

early days of the Army targeting role, mobile targets nominated by the 

Army did not meet Operation Allied Force criteria being used by the Air 

Force for verifying that targets were legitimate and, therefore, were not 

attacked. As the operation progressed, the two services learned each 

other’s procedures and criteria and worked together better. The Army and 

the Air Force in Europe are now formalizing the process used and are 

developing tactics, techniques, and procedures for attacking such targets 

and sharing intelligence. They are including these new processes in their 

joint exercises.

Improvements Are Needed 

in Interoperability

The second major theme that emerged from the lessons learned was the 

interoperability of the command, control, communications, computers, and 

intelligence equipment. The Army is transitioning from a variety of 

battlefield command systems that it has used for years to a digitized suite 

of systems called the Army Battlefield Command system. During Operation 

Allied Force, Army elements used a variety of older and newer battlefield 

command systems that were not always interoperable with each other. The 

mission planning and targeting system used by the Apache unit in Albania 

during Task Force Hawk was one of the older systems and was not 

compatible with the system being used by the Army team that provided 

liaison with the Air Force at the air operations center. The Army liaison 

team used the new suite of Army digitized systems that will ultimately be 
Page 14 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

provided to all Army combat forces. However, at the time of Task Force 

Hawk, the suite of systems was not fully fielded and not all the deployed 

personnel were trained on the new systems. Consequently, the Apache unit 

in Albania used the older systems, making it difficult to communicate with 

the liaison team and requiring the manual as opposed to electronic transfer 

of data. 

The older mission planning and targeting system used by the Apache unit in 

Albania was also not compatible with the Air Force system. The Air Force 

has a single digital battlefield command system. The Apache unit in 

Albania, using its older equipment, could not readily share data directly 

with the Air Force. In addition, the intelligence system being used by the 

Army at the unit level and at the liaison level could not directly exchange 

information with the Air Force. As was the case within the Army, personnel 

had to manually transfer data. This was time consuming and introduced the 

potential for transcription errors. 

The Army is continuing to field the new suite of systems. We have 

previously reported that the schedules for fielding these systems have 

slipped and the Army in Europe is not scheduled to receive the complete 

suite of new systems before 2005.10 When it is eventually fielded, this new 

suite of systems is expected to reduce if not eliminate the inability of the 

Army’s and the Air Force’s systems to work together.

Conclusions The commanding generals of the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Forces in Europe 

have made resolving the lessons learned identified from Task Force Hawk a 

high priority. They have already made progress in taking remedial action on 

a number of the lessons. However, many of the lessons will require a 

significant amount of time, sometimes years, for implementation. In 

addition, over time senior military leadership changes and we have found 

in the past that the Army has not been very successful in ensuring that 

remedial actions are brought to closure. 

10Battlefield Automation: Performance Uncertainties Are Likely When Army Fields Its First 

Digitized Division (GAO/NSIAD-99-150, July 27, 1999) and Battlefield Automation: Army 

Needs to Update Fielding Plan for First Digitized Corps (GAO/NSIAD-00-167, July 25, 2000).
Page 15 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration

To ensure that the Army maintains the momentum to take actions to 

resolve Task Force Hawk lessons learned, the Congress may want to 

consider requiring the Army to report on remedial actions taken to 

implement Task Force Hawk lessons. This could be in the form of periodic 

progress reports or another appropriate reporting approach that would 

meet congressional oversight needs. 

Scope and 

Methodology

To determine how Task Force Hawk’s concept of operation compared to 

existing Army and joint doctrine, we reviewed Army and Joint Staff 

doctrine publications and were briefed on existing deep attack doctrine at 

the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command and the Army’s Aviation 

School. We then compared this information to Task Force Hawk’s concept 

of operation. We discussed which doctrine publications would be revised 

based on the Task Force Hawk experience with officials at the Army’s 

Training and Doctrine Command and the Joint Warfighting Center. 

To determine the number of Task Force Hawk lessons learned, we 

collected and reviewed Army lessons learned from the Army’s Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Operations and Plans, the Army’s Training and Doctrine 

Command, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned. We collected and 

reviewed joint lessons learned at the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

the Joint Warfighting Center. To obtain an understanding of the lessons and 

their status, we discussed them with individuals directly involved with the 

Task Force Hawk operation or those directly involved in addressing the 

individual lessons. We discussed the lessons with individuals at the Army’s 

Aviation School, the Army’s Artillery School, U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Air 

Forces in Europe, and the U.S. European Command. 

To determine how well the Army and the Air Force worked together in 

Operation Allied Force, we collected documentation on joint operations 

and interoperability of equipment and interviewed personnel at the U.S. 

European Command, U.S. Army Europe, and U.S. Air Forces in Europe.

We conducted our review from June 2000 through January 2001 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We 

reviewed the information in this report with the Department of Defense 

(DOD) officials and made changes where appropriate. DOD officials agreed 

with the facts in this report.
Page 16 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, 

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Greg Dahlberg, Acting Secretary of the 

Army; and the Honorable Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Director, Office of 

Management and Budget. 

If you have any questions, please call me on (757) 552-8100. Key 

contributors to this report were Steve Sternlieb, Laura Durland, and

Frank Smith.

Sincerely yours,

Neal P. Curtin

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Page 17 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations
Page 18 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

Appendix I

Doctrine Change or Implementation Lessons Apendxies

Learned ApendxiI

Lessons learned Source

In progress 

proponent 

Recommended closed

The Army and the Air Force use different terms to define strategic airlift’s mission 

status. 

U.S. Army Europe

Joint logistics doctrine needs to be examined with respect to ordnance input. Training and Doctrine 

Command (TRADOC)

Review Field Manual (FM)100-17—Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment and 

Demobilization—to ensure that it meets the requirements of a strategic responsive 

Army.

TRADOC

Review FM 100-17 for joint doctrine disconnects and implement the required changes 

to the pertinent field manuals.

TRADOC

Review FM 100-17 and FM 100-17-4 to make sure the responsibilities of the major 

commands are adequately discussed. 

TRADOC

Conduct a mission analysis to determine if doctrine supports the goal of sustaining 

overmatch capabilities across the spectrum of conflict.

TRADOC

Determine the operational impact of the Roberts Amendment, which prohibits use of 

funds for the deployment of U.S. armed forces to Yugoslavia, Albania, and Macedonia 

without congressional consultation, on alliance and coalition warfare. 

U.S. European 

Command

Recommended closed but requiring a long implementation period

Revise publication FM 100-6 entitled Information Operations. TRADOC

Accelerate the implementation of doctrine and associated tactics, techniques, and 

procedures related to FM 3-13 action plan.

TRADOC

In progress

Peace support operations doctrine needs to be updated and more fully developed. U.S. Army Europe TRADOC

General support aviation doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures need to be 

developed and/or updated.

U.S. Army Europe and 

TRADOC

TRADOC

There is no available mission-training plan for the Tactical Terminal Control System. U.S. Army Europe TRADOC

Aviation war-fighting doctrine for the unmanned aerial vehicle employment with Army 

aviation is needed.

U.S. Army Europe TRADOC

Review the need to develop multi-service tactics, techniques, and procedures for Army 

aviation to support other services or functional components.

TRADOC TRADOC

Refine doctrine to enable better integration of Army units into joint command and 

control architecture.

TRADOC TRADOC

Develop joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for the employment of aircraft 

survivability equipment. 

TRADOC TRADOC

Revise publication FM 100-5 entitled Operations. TRADOC Headquarters 

Department of Army 

(HQDA)

Revise publication FM 100-1 entitled The Army. TRADOC HQDA

Revise doctrine to include the use of echelons above division elements in the deep 

attack mission. 

TRADOC TRADOC
Page 19 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

Appendix II

Command, Control, Communications, 

Computers, and Intelligence Lessons Learned ApendxiI

Lessons learned Source

In progress 

proponent

Recommended closed

Joint Force protection command and control procedures in Albania were not clear. U.S. Army Europe

Procedures for video teleconference integration as a command, control, and intelligence structure 

need to be developed.

U.S. Army Europe

Albania/Kosovo regional maps were unavailable at the outset of the operation. U.S. Army Europe 

Tactical human intelligence reconnaissance is lacking in current organizations. U.S. Army Europe

Counter and human intelligence needs to be expanded to a joint operating system. U.S. Army Europe

The public affairs strategy in Kosovo was not coordinated. U.S. Army Europe

Recommended closed but requiring a long implementation period

All Source Analysis System, which gathers and fuses battlefield information to produce a correlated 

threat picture, is incompatible with other systems.

U.S. Army Europe

Accelerate the timetable for fielding the next generation digital series of communications equipment. 

A 10-year fielding cycle is too slow.

U.S. Army Europe 

TRADOC

Improved survival radios are needed for aviation units. U.S. Army Europe

In progress

Upgrade Army aircraft communications capabilities to include satellite communication capabilities. U.S. Army Europe 

TRADOC 

HQDA

The Army requires an airborne battlefield command and control center to conduct deep attack 

missions over extended distances. 

U.S. Army Europe 

TRADOC

HQDA

Joint intelligence tactics, techniques, and procedures are lacking. U.S. Army Europe Joint Forces 

Command

Joint analysis is lacking. The primary problem in joint intelligence operations is a lack of service/joint 

interoperability of intelligence systems.

U.S. Army Europe Joint Forces 

Command

Additional facilities and capabilities to increase bandwidth within the intelligence and signal 

communities are needed.

U.S. Army Europe Joint Forces 

Command

Joint intelligence, doctrine, and training need to be better coordinated and integrated. U.S. Army Europe Joint Forces 

Command

Second generation forward-looking infrared sensors are needed. TRADOC TRADOC

The Dual Datalink, which supports intelligence operations, must be replaced. European 

Command

Joint Forces 

Command

The Army space support team needs improved technologies, including a direct satellite downlink 

capability, to provide satellite imagery to the warfighter. 

European 

Command

Joint Forces 

Command

Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence operations, organizations, and 

materiel for the Army in a supporting role needs to be analyzed. (TRADOC has expanded this single 

issue to 32 separate issues.)

TRADOC TRADOC

Determine the appropriate design and augmentation required to enable a division or corps to act as 

an Army Force Commander, which would provide command, control, communications, computers, 

and intelligence to the forces. 

TRADOC TRADOC
Page 20 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

Appendix III

Training Lessons Learned ApendxiI

Lessons learned Source

In progress 

proponent

Recommended closed

Obtain required airspace allocations for conducting Guardrail training in Europe. U.S. Army Europe

Develop over-water and alpine training areas in Europe. U.S. Army Europe

Require annual under-wire flight training and have local commanders establish areas to 

perform training. 

U.S. Army Europe

Aviation training manuals should be modified to include asymmetrical threats, special 

instructions on how to use air tasking orders, unit integration into North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization operations, annual joint air attack team training, and a minimum planning time 

mission rehearsal exercise. 

U.S. Army Europe 

TRADOC

Find an integrated, complex air defense range for conducting electronic warfare training or 

obtain the necessary waivers for use of the range at Polygon, France. 

U.S. Army Europe

Conduct mission analysis to determine if deployment requirements are covered in unit 

training programs. 

TRADOC

Provide a product that describes the roles, missions, and functions of the U.S. Transportation 

Command to all Army schools for inclusion in their training opportunities.

TRADOC

Continue emphasizing military decision-making process training. TRADOC

Incorporate task force operations instruction in professional military education. TRADOC

Recommended closed but requiring a long implementation period

The current Battle Command Training Program fails to adequately address the joint/combined 

operational environment of current and future contingencies.

U.S. Army Europe 

TRADOC

Increased individual, crew, and junior leader development training is needed. U.S. Army Europe 

TRADOC

Platoon Leader/Company Commander certification and training is inadequate as currently 

executed.

U.S. Army Europe 

TRADOC

Increase the level of survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training. U.S. Army Europe 

TRADOC

A joint/combined multinational training event is required. U.S. Army Europe 

TRADOC

In progress

Increased officer, noncommissioned officer, and advanced individual training is needed. U.S. Army Europe 

TRADOC

TRADOC

Revise training to ensure new Apache helicopter pilots are basic mission qualified. U.S. Army Europe 

TRADOC

TRADOC

There is a need for signal intelligence survey teams in the Army. U.S. Army Europe HQDA

Fully fund ammunition requirements for appropriate aviator training to include advanced 

gunnery.

U.S. Army Europe HQDA

Provide a realistic radar threat generator for flight training. The current system only replicates 

a minimal amount of threat systems. 

U.S. Army Europe HQDA

Fund travel costs associated with U.S. Army Europe units attending required training schools. U.S. Army Europe U.S. Army Europe
Appendix III

Training Lessons Learned

Page 21 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

a

In February 2001, U.S. Army Europe advised us that it had moved this lesson learned to the 

recommended closed category.

U.S. Army Europe needs to continue efforts to remove, extend, or modify the current night 

flight, frequency management, and radar utilization restrictions in Germany to support 

training. 

U.S. Army Europe U.S. Army Europe

Simplify procedures for obtaining identification of friend or foe interrogation training.a U.S. Army Europe U.S. Army Europe

Require and resource for each attack squadron a complete Combat Maneuver Training 

Center force-on-force rotation. 

U.S. Army Europe U.S. Army Europe

Emphasize how the major commands fit into the Joint Deployment Process. TRADOC Joint Forces 

Command

The services need to continually reinforce and train on joint deep operations in order to 

maximize warfighting capabilities. 

U.S. European 

Command

Joint Forces 

Command

Integrate high gross weight operations and complex terrain training in simulation mission 

scenarios.

TRADOC TRADOC

Utilize simulation to drive training scenarios. TRADOC TRADOC

Aviation mission planning systems rehearsal tool for individual and crew utilization does not 

meet training requirements. 

TRADOC TRADOC

Review and ensure applicability of digitized systems. TRADOC TRADOC

Develop a deployment training exercise with the objectives of understanding the deployment 

process and developing synchronized movement plans.

TRADOC HQDA

Lessons learned Source

In progress 

proponent
Page 22 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

Appendix IV

Additional Capability Lessons Learned ApendxiIV

Lessons learned Source

In progress 

proponent

Recommended closed

Field night vision goggles. U.S. Army Europe 

TRADOC

Institutionalize the concept of tiered force provider packages to support Army units, including 

force protection materials.

U.S. Army Europe

The aerial weapon scoring system needs further development and refinement. U.S. Army Europe

The Army needs to conduct additional deployment training and buy additional C-17 mock-up 

trainers for Europe. 

U.S. Army Europe 

TRADOC

Procure and field the transportation coordinator’s automated information movement system II. TRADOC

The Army needs to continue to support and deploy systems, such as the Deployable Weather 

Satellite Workstation, that autonomously process weather satellite imagery and data.

U.S. European 

Command

Recommended closed but requiring a long implementation period

Field a deployable flight mission rehearsal system. U.S. Army Europe 

TRADOC

Field a night vision system compatible with nuclear biological chemical masks. U.S. Army Europe

Develop and field a new time-phased force and deployment data system. U.S. Army Europe 

TRADOC

Upgrade Army aviation mission simulators. U.S. Army Europe 

TRADOC

Procure and field the aviation combined-arms training suite into brigade and below training. TRADOC

In progress

Develop, resource, train, and sustain a combat search and rescue capability. U.S. Army Europe Joint Forces 

Command

The Apache helicopter requires extended range/self-deployment fuel tanks that are 

crashworthy.

U.S. Army Europe 

TRADOC

HQDA

Upgrade Army aviation aircraft survivability equipment. U.S. Army Europe 

TRADOC

HQDA

Modify Apache Longbow to meet specific theater requirements to include better night vision 

systems, more powerful engines, increased communications, and better aircraft survivability 

equipment. 

U.S. Army Europe HQDA

The Army requires a self-contained lethal and non-lethal joint suppression of enemy air 

defenses capability.

U.S. Army Europe Joint Forces 

Command

Field additional tactical engagement simulation systems to the Combat Maneuver Training 

Center as well as what is currently funded for the Apache Longbow.

U.S. Army Europe HQDA

Fund the Apache helicopter self-deployment capability to include instrument flight rules and 

an approved global positioning system.

U.S. Army Europe HQDA

Fund the procurement of aviation life support equipment for over-water operations. U.S. Army Europe TRADOC

The closed loop facility at Ramstein, Germany, requires additional equipment for major 

strategic air deployments. 

U.S. Army Europe U.S. Army Europe
Appendix IV

Additional Capability Lessons Learned

Page 23 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

U.S. Army Europe requires an alternate strategic deployment airfield. U.S. Army Europe U.S. Army Europe

Fund Robertson fuel tanks and rotor blade anti/de-ice capability. U.S. Army Europe HQDA

Procure system to track flight experience. TRADOC TRADOC

Continue research and development of imagery transmission systems. TRADOC TRADOC

Lessons learned Source

In progress 

proponent
Page 24 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

Appendix V

Force Structure Lessons Learned ApendxiV

Lessons learned Source

In progress 

proponent

Recommended closed

Public affairs staff support is inadequate. Additional units are required. U.S. Army Europe

Guardrail units need to be filled at 100 percent. U.S. Army Europe

Need to review Army guidance to determine if multifunctional logistics officer qualifications need 

to be modified. 

TRADOC

Authorize tactical operation officers for electronic warfare officer positions. TRADOC

In progress

Revise the Apache helicopter squadron’s force structure to include a fire support officer and an air 

defense artillery officer. 

U.S. Army Europe HQDA

Field unmanned aerial vehicle units at corps level. U.S. Army Europe HQDA

Add sufficient personnel to the force structure of the corps and division headquarters to allow for 

commanders to conduct split-based operations.

U.S. Army Europe 

TRADOC

TRADOC

Add an Apache helicopter qualified field grade officer in the executive officer or operations officer 

position of the battlefield coordination detachment. 

U.S. Army Europe HQDA

The Army requires the ability to rapidly deploy forces to anywhere in the world and sustain 

overmatch capabilities across the full spectrum of operations. The Infantry School is developing 

an interim brigade combat team that has greater tactical and strategic agility. 

TRADOC TRADOC

The Army needs to look into a redesign of what is needed at echelons above division in terms of 

ordnance combat service support to enhance joint and combined operations. 

TRADOC TRADOC

New materiel requirements for the Ordnance Corps can be anticipated as a result of the Army’s 

development of the initial brigade combat team.

TRADOC TRADOC

To support rapidly developing contingencies and promote efficiency, the Army needs to evaluate 

consolidating combat service support. 

TRADOC TRADOC

Continue to build support for fielding a cargo transfer company. TRADOC TRADOC

Formalize a tactical operations career field for electronic warfare officer. TRADOC TRADOC

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Page 27 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations

Contents

Figure 1: Map of the Balkans 5

Figure 2: Apache Helicopter 6

Figure 3: Status of Task Force Hawk Lessons Learned 11
Contents

Page 28 GAO-01-401 Kosovo Air Operations