alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2012200EN.01000702.xml

| 7.7.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 200/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

7.7.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 200/7

---

Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) lodged on 3 May 2012 — Walter Endress v Allianz Lebensversicherungs-AG

(Case C-209/12)

2012/C 200/13

Language of the case: German

Referring court

Referring court

Bundesgerichtshof

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Walter Endress

Applicant:

Defendant: Allianz Lebensversicherungs-AG

Defendant:

Question referred

Question referred

Must the first indent of Article 15(1) of Council Directive 90/619/EEC of 8 November 1990 (1) on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance, laying down provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide services and amending Directive 79/267/EEC (Second Life Assurance Directive), having regard to Article 31(1) of Council Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 (2) on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance and amending Directives 79/267/EEC and 90/619/EEC (Third Life Assurance Directive), be interpreted as precluding a provision — such as the fourth sentence of Paragraph 5a(2) of the Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (Law on insurance contracts) in the version of the Drittes Gesetz zur Durchführung versicherungsrechtlicher Richtlinien des Rates der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Third Law implementing directives of the Council of the European Communities on insurance law) of 21 July 1994 — under which a right of cancellation lapses one year at the latest after payment of the first premium even if the policy-holder has not been informed about the right of cancellation?

1

2

---

(1)  Council Directive 90/619/EEC of 8 November 1990 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance, laying down provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom to provide services and amending Directive 79/267/EEC, OJ 1990 L 330, p. 50.

1

(2)  Council Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to direct life assurance and amending Directives 79/267/EEC and 90/619/EEC (third life assurance Directive), OJ 1992 L 360, p. 1.

2

---
Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)  Board Actions | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports received:Boston | New York | Philadelphia   | Cleveland | Richmond   | AtlantaChicago | St. Louis | Minneapolis   | Kansas City | Dallas   | San Francisco

#   Board Actions 

## Actions taken during the week ending July 1, 2006

----

Discount RatesDiscount and Advance Rates  -- increase in the primary credit rate from 6 percent to 6-1/4 percent by the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Richmond, Atlanta, Chicago, St. Louis, Minneapolis, Dallas, and San Francisco.					-Approved, June 29, 2006 					

EnforcementCitigroup Inc., New York, New York, and CitiFinancial Credit Company, Baltimore, Maryland  -- cease and desist order dated May 27, 2004, terminated June 22, 2006.					-Announced, June 26, 2006 					

FormsForms  -- final Board review to extend with revision the interagency Suspicious Activity Report (FR 2230).					-Approved, June 27, 2006 					

Release dates | Full version (300 KB PDF)  Board Actions | Actions   under delegated authority  Applications and reports received:Boston | New York | Philadelphia   | Cleveland | Richmond   | AtlantaChicago | St. Louis | Minneapolis   | Kansas City | Dallas   | San Francisco
Home | Banking information and regulationAccessibility | Contact   usLast update: July 6, 2006
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL SALAMI,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No.: 15-12248

Honorable Terrence G. Berg

v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford

 

DEPUTY CLEMENTS, et al., 

Defendants. 

__________________________________/

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT [R. 16]

Plaintiff Michael Salami, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the 

instant complaint alleging claims against certain Macomb County Jail 

officials, Correct Care Solutions (“CCS”), the Macomb County Jail and 

Sheriff Anthony Wickersham. To date no defendant has been served. 

Salami now moves to amend his complaint to dismiss his claims against 

Wickersham and the Jail, and add defendant Macomb County. 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(A), Salami has 

the right to amend his complaint once as a matter of course within 21 days 

after serving it. Since the complaint has not yet been served, Salami does 

not require leave of this Court to amend his complaint. For this reason, 

Salami’s motion to amend his complaint [R. 16] is GRANTED. 

Since Salami’s motion did not include a proposed amended complaint 

4:15-cv-12248-TGB-EAS Doc # 19 Filed 07/21/15 Pg 1 of 2 Pg ID 63
as required by Local Rule 15.1, he shall have until August 7, 2015, to file 

his amended complaint naming the correct parties. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 21, 2015 s/Elizabeth A. Stafford

Detroit, Michigan ELIZABETH A. STAFFORD

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS

The parties’ attention is drawn to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), which 

provides a period of fourteen (14) days from the date of receipt of a copy of 

this order within which to file objections for consideration by the district 

judge under 28 U.S. C. §636(b)(1). 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served 

upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF 

System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses 

disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on July 21, 2015.

s/Marlena Williams

MARLENA WILLIAMS

Case Manager

4:15-cv-12248-TGB-EAS Doc # 19 Filed 07/21/15 Pg 2 of 2 Pg ID 64
§ 295.31 Criteria for payment ( a ) *Submission of voucher.* For contractors operating under more than one MSP Operating Agreement, the contractor may submit a single monthly voucher applicable to all its agreements. Each voucher submission shall include a certification that the vessel(s) for which payment is requested were operated in accordance with § 295.21(d) and applicable MSP Operating Agreements with MARAD, and consideration shall be given to reductions in amounts payable as set forth in § 295.30. All submissions shall be forwarded to the Director, Office of Accounting, MAR-330 Room 7325, Maritime Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590. Payments shall be paid and processed under the terms and conditions of the Prompt Payment Act, 31 U.S.C. 3901. ( 1 ) Payments shall be made per vessel, in equal monthly installments, of $175,000.
( 2 ) To the extent that reductions under § 295.30(b) are known, such reductions shall be applied at the time of the current billing. The daily reduction amounts shall be based on the annual amounts in 295.30(a) of this part divided by 365 days (366 days in leap years) and rounded to the nearest cent. Daily reduction amounts shall be applied as follows: FY 1997—$5,753.42 FY 1998—$5,753.42 FY 1999—$5,753.42 FY 2000—$5,737.70 FY 2001—$5,753.42 FY 2002—$5,753.42 FY 2003—$5,753.42 FY 2004—$5,737.70 FY 2005—$5,753.42
( 3 ) In the event a monthly payment is for a period less than a complete month, that month's payment shall be calculated by multiplying the appropriate daily rate in § 295.31(a)(2) by the actual number of days the Eligible Vessel operated in accordance with § 295.21.
( 4 ) MARAD may require, for good cause, that a portion of the funds payable under this section be withheld if the provisions of § 295.21(d) have not been met.
( 5 ) Amounts owed to MARAD for reductions applicable to a prior billing period shall be electronically transferred using MARAD's prescribed format, or a check may be forwarded to the Maritime Administration, P.O. Box 845133, Dallas, Texas 75284-5133, or the amount owed can be credited to MARAD by offsetting amounts payable in future billing periods.
( b ) [Reserved]
EXHIBIT 32

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Annual Report of V-ONE  Corporation  ("Company") on
Form  10-K/A  for the  fiscal  year ended  December  31,  2002 as filed with the
Securities  and  Exchange   Commission  on  the  date  hereof  ("Report"),   the
undersigned,  in the capacity and on the date indicated below,  hereby certifies
pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350,  as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to her knowledge:

      1.    The Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      2.    The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of  operation of the
Company.


Date:  January 9, 2004              By:      /s/ Margaret E. Grayson
                                          ------------------------------------
                                    Name:    Margaret E. Grayson
                                    Title:   Chief Executive Officer and
                                             Principal Financial Officer
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

CHRIS PLUNKETT,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 558 EAL 2016

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 15th day of May, 2017

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2416 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2416

To require the Department of Veterans Affairs to use purchases of goods 
  or services through the Federal supply schedules for the purpose of 
 meeting certain contracting goals for participation by small business 
  concerns owned and controlled by veterans, including veterans with 
                    service-connected disabilities.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 14, 2009

  Mr. Adler of New Jersey (for himself and Mr. Lance) introduced the 
   following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Veterans' 
 Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Oversight and Government 
 Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in 
   each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the 
                jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To require the Department of Veterans Affairs to use purchases of goods 
  or services through the Federal supply schedules for the purpose of 
 meeting certain contracting goals for participation by small business 
  concerns owned and controlled by veterans, including veterans with 
                    service-connected disabilities.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. USE OF FEDERAL SUPPLY SCHEDULES BY DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS 
              AFFAIRS TO MEET CONTRACTING GOALS FOR PARTICIPATION BY 
              SMALL BUSINESS CONCERNS OWNED AND CONTROLLED BY VETERANS.

    Section 8127 of title 38, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsections (k) and (l) as subsections 
        (l) and (m), respectively; and
            (2) by inserting after subsection (j) the following new 
        subsection:
    ``(k) Federal Supply Schedules.--Notwithstanding any law or 
regulation relating to the Federal supply schedules of the General 
Services Administration, a contracting officer of the Department shall 
use purchases of goods or services through the Federal supply schedules 
for the purpose of meeting the goals under subsection (a).''.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADDED BY

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Florida Business BancGroup, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
Report), I, Marti J. Warren, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 1350, as added by § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | To my knowledge, the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for
the period covered by the report.
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       |  |     |  |                                             
|---------------------- |  | --- |  | --------------------------------------------
|Date: November 8, 2004 |  | By: |  | /s/ Marti J. Warren                         
|                       |  |     |  | Marti J. Warren, Principal Financial Officer
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 40003/40004

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LEVI WOOD MILLS,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 403

Filed: March 15, 2013

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Kootenai County. Hon. John P. Luster, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and current, unified sentence of ten years, with two and 

one-half years determinate, for attempted strangulation, affirmed; judgment of 

conviction and concurrent, unified sentence of three years, with one year 

determinate, for intimidating a witness, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Jordan E. Taylor, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Daphne J. Huang, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge;

and GRATTON, Judge

PER CURIAM

In docket number 40003, Levi Wood Mills pled guilty to attempted strangulation. Idaho 

Code § 18-923. In docket number 40004, Mills entered an Alford1 plea to intimidating a witness. 

I.C. § 18-2604. The district court sentenced Mills to concurrent terms: a unified term of ten 

years, with two and one-half years determinate, for the attempted strangulation conviction and a 

unified term of three years, with one year determinate, for the intimidating a witness conviction. 

 

1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
2

Mills appeals both cases, contending his sentences are excessive. The two cases have been 

consolidated on appeal.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the 

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and 

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 

1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 

1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record 

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Mill’s judgments of conviction and sentences are affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                            5
<CIK>                                0001071157
<NAME>                               SPORTSMAN'S WHOLESALE COMPANY

<S>                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                        6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                    JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                         JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                               6,238
<SECURITIES>                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                        9,611
<ALLOWANCES>                         0
<INVENTORY>                          5,726
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                     21,575
<PP&E>                               25,696
<DEPRECIATION>                       8
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                       47,271
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                4,625
<BONDS>                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                0
<PREFERRED>                          0
<COMMON>                             165
<OTHER-SE>                           42,481
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>         47,271
<SALES>                              4,242
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                     4,242
<CGS>                                3,638
<TOTAL-COSTS>                        3,638
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                     21,193
<LOSS-PROVISION>                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                      (20,589)
<INCOME-TAX>                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                  (20,589)
<DISCONTINUED>                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                      0
<CHANGES>                            0
<NET-INCOME>                         (20,589)
<EPS-BASIC>                        (.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                        (.01)


</TABLE>
#### § 4.09-10 Witnesses, payment of.

Any witness subpoenaed under § 4.09-5 shall be paid such fees for his travel and attendance as shall be certified by the chairman of a Marine Board of Investigation or an investigating officer, in accordance with § 4.11-10.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

RISHI RAMDIAL

, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

, Appellee

.

No. 4D22

- 1673

[ September 15, 2022 ]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for

the Fifteenth Judicial C ircuit ; Palm Beach County

, S c ott Suskauer

Judge; L.T. Case No s

. 502018CF005901 and 502018CF007692

.

Rishi Ramdial, Madison , pro se

.

No appearance filed for appellee

.

P ER C URIAM

Affirmed.

M AY

, C IKLIN and G ERBER

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### Sally Barker *v.*William Barker,

Where goods are attached and sold on mesne process, and the purchaser pays the price to the creditor, who recovers a judgment for an amount sufficient to absorb the whole, and the sheriff has no other claim upon the purchaser than as trustee for such creditor, a bill in equity will lie to compel an application of the amount so paid to the claim of the sheriff.

This is a bill in equity, alleging that the defendant sued one Eleazer D. Barker and attached his goods, which were sold upon mesne process; that the plaintiff purchased some of them at auction, and for the price *342gave her note with surety to the *sheriff;*that the plaintiff, through her agent, from time to time, advanced money and goods to the defendant upon an agreement that the amount should be allowed in payment of the plaintiff’s aforesaid note; that the sheriff who had also attached the same goods upon, other writs subject to the defendant’s attachment, had sued the plaintiff, and obtained judgment upon her said note, and was threatening to enforce the same; that the defendant had obtained judgment against the said Eleazer D. Barker for an amount greater than the value of all the goods so attached, and that the avails of the judgment against her in favor of the sheriff if enforced would all be for the benefit of the defendant; and she therefore prayed that the defendant be enjoined from collecting said judgment, and for general relief.

*JBatchelder,*for plaintiff.

*E. A.*Hibbard, for defendant.

Bellows, J.

The cause was heard upon bill, answer and proofs, and the court arefof the opinion that the material allegations of the bill are sustained; and the question is, whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief in this form.

The substance of the case is that the sheriff holds the proceeds of the goods attached by him in trust for the creditors he represents, and defendant being the first attaching creditor and having obtained a judgment for an amount sufficient to absorb the whole, must be regarded as having the equitable interest in the price to be paid by the plaintiff; and payment to him ought in equity to be a discharge of the plaintiff, unless the officer has other claims upon the aAmils of the plaintiff’s note paramount to hers, and of this there is no proof or suggestion in the answer or otherwise.

It is necessary, however, that the sheriff and the plaintiff’s surety, and also Hiram Barker, to whom the debt against Eleazer D. Barker in favor of the defendant has been assigned since the above mentioned payments, be made parties; and upon that being done, the plaintiff will be entitled to a decree for the application of the sums of money and goods so advanced to the payment of the plaintiff’s said note, unless upon the coming in of the new parties a different case is made.
§ 391.11 Definitions. ( a ) As used in the regulations in this part and as defined in section 607(k) of the Act— ( 1 ) The term *eligible vessel* means any vessel— ( i ) Constructed in the United States, and if reconstructed, reconstructed in the United States,
( ii ) Documented under the laws of the United States, and
( iii ) Operated in the foreign or domestic commerce of the United States or in the fisheries of the United States. Any vessel which was constructed outside of the United States but documented under the laws of the United States on April 15, 1970, or constructed outside the United States for use in the U.S. foreign trade pursuant to a contract entered into before April 15, 1970, shall be treated as satisfying the requirements of paragraph (a)(1) of this section and the requirements of paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section.
( 2 ) The term *qualified vessel* means any vessel— ( i ) Constructed in the United States and, if reconstructed, reconstructed in the United States,
( ii ) Documented under the laws of the United States, and
( iii ) Which the person maintaining the fund agrees with the Secretary of Transportation will be operated in the U.S. foreign, Great Lakes, or noncontiguous domestic trade or in the fisheries of the United States.
( 3 ) The term *agreement vessel* means any eligible vessel or qualified vessel which is subject to an agreement entered into under section 607 of the Act.
( 4 ) The term *vessel* includes cargo handling equipment which the Secretary of Transportation determines is intended for use primarily on the vessel. The term *vessel* also includes an ocean-going towing vessel or an ocean-going barge or comparable towing vessel or barge operated in the Great Lakes.
( b ) Insofar as the computation and collection of taxes are concerned, other terms used in the regulation in this part, except as otherwise provided in the Act or this part, have the same meaning as in the Code and the regulations thereunder.
[29 FR 10464, July 28, 1964]