COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bumgardner, Humphreys and Clements 

Argued by teleconference 

JOHN H. POUND 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1767-02-3 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS 

 MARCH 11, 2003 

DEPARTMENT OF GAME AND 

 INLAND FISHERIES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BATH COUNTY 

Duncan M. Byrd, Jr., Judge 

 Charles M. Allen (Michael D. Hancock; 

Goodman, Allen & Filetti, PLLC, on briefs), 

for appellant. 

 Guy W. Horsley, Jr., Senior Assistant 

Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney 

General; Judith Williams Jagdmann, Deputy 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

John H. Pound appeals a judgment of the trial court, finding 

him ineligible to receive benefits pursuant to the Virginia Law 

Officer's Retirement System ("VaLORS"), Code § 51.1-211 et seq. 

Pound contends that his status as a "special game warden" was 

sufficient to place him within the relevant provisions of Title 

51.1, which create and govern VaLORS. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
I. Background

Pound began work for the Department of Game and Inland 

Fisheries in November of 1971, as a wildlife biologist. In that 

role, Pound was responsible for various tasks, including 

maintaining certain fish and wildlife populations and analyzing 

biological data. 

On February 11, 1972, Pound was appointed as a "special game 

warden" by the former Director of the DGIF. As evidence of his 

appointment, Pound was given a certificate stating that he was 

thereby commissioned as a special game warden, with statewide 

authority, "so long as [he was] employed" by DGIF. Pound was also 

given another certificate, stating that he had taken the oath 

required of such officers, and a "wallet-sized" identification 

card stating that he was "a qualified Special Game Warden" and 

that his "authority" as such would expire "with termination of 

employment." Accordingly, Pound's employment duties increased 

with his new "appointment," permitting him to carry a firearm and 

to enforce the hunting and fishing laws of the State of Virginia. 

During the years that followed, Pound and other special game 

wardens were directed by their supervisors to cease their law 

enforcement activities for various periods of time, while DGIF 

reviewed various training and certification requirements. After 

each occasion, the special game wardens were told to resume their 

law enforcement activities. 

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In May of 1991, however, Pound received a memorandum from 

Gary Spiers, his regional manager, which stated as follows, in 

relevant part: 

[E]ffective immediately you are no longer 

authorized to perform the duties of a 

Special Game Warden. Your Job Description 

and performance Planning and Evaluation form 

will both be revised to reflect this change 

in work tasks and duties and performance 

expectations. 

(Emphasis added). Pound acknowledged that Spiers gave him the 

memorandum during a face-to-face meeting and explained to him 

that DGIF was "looking at doing away with some of the law 

enforcement activities on national forest property, and that's 

why they had chose [sic] to do away with [his] appointment at 

that time." Pound further acknowledged that Spiers collected 

all of the DGIF "law enforcement equipment" that had been issued 

to him, in addition to his special game warden identification 

card. Subsequently, in 1994, DGIF "discontinued the special 

game warden appointments for [all other DGIF] employees due to 

the costs in time and money that would be required for these 

part-time officers." 

Nevertheless, after that time, Pound and other employees who 

had acted as former special game wardens, were asked, on occasion, 

by DGIF to aid the regular game wardens in enforcement activities. 

The individuals were also directed to report any violations they 

observed to the regular game wardens for further investigation. 

In addition, DGIF reissued pistols to those individuals who had 

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formerly acted as special game wardens, including Pound, and set 

up a program that would allow those individuals the option of 

purchasing their pistol upon retirement. However, in issuing the 

pistols to the "filed personnel" DGIF emphasized that the pistols 

were issued for "non-law enforcement activities." 

In 1999, the General Assembly passed VaLORS (which became 

effective on October 1, 1999), which provides enhanced retirement 

benefits for certain "law officers." See Code § 51.1-211 et seq. 

After its enactment, Pound, who was still employed with DGIF as a 

Wildlife Biologist Assistant, requested to be included in the 

VaLORS retirement plan arguing that because he was a special game 

warden, he was an "employee," as defined by the legislation 

governing VaLORS. DGIF denied Pound's request, contending that 

his status as a special game warden did not bring him within the 

meaning of "employee" pursuant to the VaLORS enactment. 

Pound ultimately appealed DGIF's denial and received a 

hearing, pursuant to the State Grievance Procedure, before the 

Department of Employment Dispute Resolution. See Code § 2.2-3001 

et seq. After a hearing on the merits, the hearing officer found 

that Pound was not entitled to benefits under VaLORS as a special 

game warden. Specifically, the hearing officer found that Pound 

was a "Special Game Warden" "in title only and not in substance." 

Further, the hearing officer held that based upon the title of the 

statutory enactment, as well as its language, the legislative 

intent of the Act was that it apply only to individuals whose job 

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duties require them to enforce criminal or quasi-criminal laws. 

Thus, because the hearing officer found that Pound's position at 

the time of VaLORS' enactment required no such duties, nor gave 

him any such authority, he did not fall within the definition of 

"employee" as stated by VaLORS and envisioned by the legislature. 

Pound appealed the hearing officer's decision to the Circuit 

Court of Bath County, pursuant to Code § 2.2-3006(B). After 

hearing arguments on the issue and reviewing legal memoranda filed 

by each party, the trial court affirmed the decision of the 

hearing officer, finding that "because [Pound] was not authorized 

to engage in law enforcement activities on October 1, 1999, the 

effective date of VaLORS[,] . . . [Pound] is not covered." 

II. Analysis

On appeal, Pound contends the trial court erred in affirming 

the decision of the hearing officer, finding that he was not 

entitled to benefits pursuant to VaLORS. Specifically, Pound 

argues that he retained his status as a special game warden even 

after he was directed by his supervisor to discontinue his law 

enforcement duties and that accordingly he is an "employee" within 

the meaning of VaLORS because he is a "game warden" as defined by 

the VaLORS plan. 

We first note that in conjunction with the Virginia Personnel 

Act, Code § 2.2-2900 et seq, the General Assembly established a 

system for handling state employee complaints arising in the 

workplace by enacting the State Grievance Procedure. Code 

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§ 2.2-3000 et seq.; Virginia Dept. of Envtl. Quality v. Wright, 

256 Va. 236, 238, 504 S.E.2d 862, 862-63 (1998). Pursuant to Code 

§ 2.2-3006 of that statutory scheme, a party may appeal a final 

decision to the appropriate circuit court "on the grounds that the 

determination is contradictory to law." After a hearing of the 

appeal "on the record," the court may "affirm the decision or may 

reverse or modify the decision." Code § 2.2-3006. Such 

determinations of the circuit court may be appealed to this Court, 

pursuant to Code § 17.1-405(1), granting any aggrieved party the 

ability to appeal "[a]ny final decision of a circuit court on 

appeal from . . . a grievance hearing decision issued pursuant to 

§ 2.2-3005." Code § 17.1-405(1). Thus, because the General 

Assembly granted to the circuit courts only the authority to 

consider whether the final determination of the hearing officer is 

"contrary to law," we are likewise limited to such review in 

considering whether the trial court erred in its determination. 

See Virginia Department of State Police v. Barton, 39 Va. App. 

439, 573 S.E.2d 319 (2002); see also Shuler v. Virginia Employment 

Commission, 14 Va. App. 1013, 1016-17, 420 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1992) 

(holding that where statutory language plainly provides the 

process governing judicial review of determinations, VAPA does not 

govern such review). "We review . . . statutory interpretations 

and legal conclusions de novo." Rollins v. Commonwealth, 37 

Va. App. 73, 79, 554 S.E.2d 99, 102 (2001). 

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The General Assembly created VaLORS in 1999 and ordered that 

it become effective as of October 1, 1999. See 1999 Va. Acts, 

ch. 585. Code § 51.1-217(B), as enacted by the legislature, 

provided for a retirement allowance of $8,952 per annum (until the 

"member's" 65th birthday), payable in addition to the "member's" 

normal retirement benefits. Id.1 However, to qualify as a 

"member" of VaLORs, the statute requires "membership in the 

Retirement System." Code § 51.1-212. Pursuant to Code 

§ 51.1-213, "Membership in the Retirement System [is] compulsory 

for all employees." As used in Chapter 2.1 of Title 51.1, 

"[e]mployee" 

means any (i) member of the Capitol Police 

Force as described in § 30-34.2:1, (ii) 

campus police officer appointed under the 

provisions of Chapter 17 (§ 23-232 et seq.) 

of Title 23, (iii) game warden in the 

Department of Game and Inland Fisheries 

appointed under the provisions of Chapter 2 

(§ 29.1-200 et seq.) of Title 29.1, (iv) 

special agent of the Department of Alcoholic 

Beverage Control appointed under the 

provisions of Chapter 1 (§ 4.1-100 et seq.), 

(v) law-enforcement officer employed by the 

Virginia Marine Resources Commission as 

described in § 9.1-101, (vi) correctional 

officer as the term is defined in § 53.1-1, 

and including correctional officers employed 

at a juvenile correction facility as the 

term is defined in § 66-25.3, (vii) any 

parole officer appointed pursuant to 

§ 53.1-143, and (viii) any commercial 

 

1

 The additional allowance amount has been adjusted by the 

Board of Trustees of the Virginia Retirement System, pursuant to 

the direction of the legislature, and is currently $9,264. 

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vehicle enforcement officer employed by the 

Department of State Police. 

Code § 51.1-212 (emphasis added). 

Code § 29.1-200(A) provides the Director of the DGIF with the 

authority to "appoint regular and special game wardens as he may 

deem necessary to enforce the game and inland fish laws." 

(Emphasis added). Code § 29.1-205 provides as follows, in 

relevant part: 

All game wardens are vested with the 

authority, upon displaying a badge or other 

credential of office, to issue a summons or 

to arrest any person found in the act of 

violating any of the provisions of the 

hunting, trapping, inland fish and boating 

laws. 

Regular game wardens are vested with the 

same authority as sheriffs and other 

law-enforcement officers to enforce all of 

the criminal laws of the Commonwealth. 

Any special game warden shall have general 

police power while performing his duty on 

properties owned or controlled by the Board. 

(Emphasis added). 

Pound argues that because Code § 51.1-212 uses the term "game 

warden," versus "regular game warden" or "special game warden" as 

distinguished in Code § 29.1-205, the General Assembly clearly 

intended the term to apply to any "game warden" appointed pursuant 

to Chapter 2 of Title 29.1. Accordingly, as Pound contends he was 

still a special game warden at the time of the enactment of the 

statute, he argues he falls within the definition of an "employee" 

under VaLORS. 

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We agree with Pound's contention that the language of Code 

§ 51.1-212, and its related counterparts, is unambiguous and thus, 

there is no need to resort to statutory construction. See City of 

Richmond v. Confrere Club, 239 Va. 77, 80, 387 S.E.2d 471, 473 

(1990) ("[W]hen a statute is clear and unambiguous, its plain 

meaning must be accepted without resort to extrinsic evidence or 

to the rules of construction. Legislative intent is determined 

from the plain meaning of the words used."). Indeed, the phrase 

"any" "game warden," as used in the statute is neither "difficult 

to comprehend, of doubtful import, [n]or lacking in clearness and 

definiteness." County of Augusta Jail v. Cook, 16 Va. App. 247, 

252, 430 S.E.2d 546, 549 (1993). 

However, we disagree with Pound's contention that his 

particular status as a "special game warden" brought him within 

the parameters of the statute. Pursuant to the requisite standard 

of review here, we are bound by the hearing officer's factual 

determination that Pound was a "special game warden" in "title 

only" at the time VaLORS was enacted. Nevertheless, Pound 

conceded during the hearing on his grievance that in May of 1991, 

DGIF effectively revoked (or "[did] away with") his authority to 

"enforce the game and inland fish laws," of Virginia. Code 

§ 29.1-200. Indeed, Pound's regional manager, acting on behalf of 

his employer, the Director of DGIF, provided Pound with a written 

memorandum stating that he was "no longer authorized to perform" 

such duties and told him that DGIF had chosen to "do away" with 

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his "appointment" to perform such duties at that time. 

Furthermore, the regional manager collected items Pound possessed 

as indicia of any such authority, including his gun, his badge and 

his special game warden identification card. Thus, as the hearing 

officer recognized, after May of 1991, Pound had no power to act 

as either a "game warden" and/or a "special game warden," pursuant 

to the authority and duties set forth in Code § 29.1-205.2 

Moreover, Pound's job duties, performance plans and performance 

evaluations were specifically amended by DGIF to reflect this 

change. 

As stated above, Code § 29.1-200, governing the appointment 

of special game wardens, gives the Director of the DGIF the 

authority to appoint "special game wardens . . . to enforce the 

game and inland fish laws," of Virginia. It does not permit the 

Director to appoint special game wardens for other purposes, nor 

does it permit the Director to maintain appointments for other 

purposes. Accordingly, the reference in Code § 51.1-212 of VaLORS 

to "any" "game warden in the Department of Game and Inland 

Fisheries appointed under the provisions of Chapter 2 (§ 29.1-200 

 

2

 Indeed, even though DGIF subsequently directed Pound, and 

others who had acted as special game wardens prior to 1994, to 

assist regular game wardens in law enforcement on an occasional 

basis and/or to report any violations observed, Pound and the 

others were given the directive to do so only in conjunction 

with the regular game wardens, who possessed the requisite power 

and authority to enforce the game and inland fish laws of 

Virginia. 

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et seq.) of Title 29.1," clearly dictates that only "special game 

wardens" with law enforcement duties and authority, fall within 

the definition of "employees" within the context of VaLORS. 

This is markedly contrary to the situation reflected in 

County of Augusta Jail v. Cook, as relied upon by Pound. Cook, 16 

Va. App. at 252-53, 430 S.E.2d at 549. In Cook, we found that no 

language in Code § 65.2-402, the statute pertaining to 

presumptions of compensability for specified conditions incurred 

by those engaged in certain occupations, "expressly or impliedly 

limit[ed] its application to deputy sheriffs who [were] primarily 

law-enforcement officers." Id. Thus, regardless of whether Pound 

retained the title of "special game warden" at the time VaLORS was 

enacted, his title as such did not operate to bring him within the 

definition of an "employee" under VaLORS. 

The Supreme Court of Virginia has consistently held that 

statutes "must be given a rational interpretation consistent with 

[their] purposes, and not one which will substantially defeat 

[their] objectives." City of Chesapeake v. Gardner Enterprises, 

253 Va. 243, 247, 482 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1997) (citing Mayor v. 

Industrial Dev. Auth., 221 Va. 865, 869, 275 S.E.2d 888, 890 

(1981); Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Lassiter, 193 Va. 360, 364, 68 

S.E.2d 641, 643 (1952)); see also Tabb v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 47, 

56-57, 34 S.E. 946, 949 (1900) ("A provision of a section of a 

statute ought not to receive a mere literal interpretation, when 

it would contravene the intention of the Legislature apparent from 

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the other sections and provisions thereof, but the words are to be 

expanded or qualified to effectuate the intention."). Consistent 

with this policy, we find that the Act governing VaLORS, by its 

plain language, clearly evinces the legislature's intent that it 

apply only to those "game wardens" described as "employees" 

pursuant to Code § 51.1-212, who are cloaked with both the 

authority, and the duty, to enforce the game and inland fish laws 

of the Commonwealth. 

As found by the hearing officer, the record here demonstrates 

that since May of 1991, Pound has had no authority to enforce any 

such laws, nor has the enforcement of such laws been a part of his 

regular duties in his capacity as a wildlife biologist with DGIF. 

Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment, determining that 

the hearing officer's decision, denying Pound's request for 

benefits pursuant to VaLORS was not "contradictory to law." 

Affirmed.

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