UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

In Re: AUTOMOTIVE PARTS ANTITRUST 

LITIGATION 

Master File No. 12-md-02311 

Honorable Marianne O. 

Battani 

In Re: Occupant Safety Restraint Systems 

THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: 

Rush Truck Centers of Arizona, Inc., et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

TRW Automotive Holdings Corp., et al., 

Defendants. 

No: 2:15-cv-00607 

No: 2:15-cv-12050 

ORAL ARGUMENT 

REQUESTED 

MOTION TO DISMISS TRUCK AND EQUIPMENT DEALERS’ CLASS ACTION 

COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL 

PROCEDURE 12(b)(1) AND 12(b)(6) 

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, by their counsel listed below, Takata Corporation and TK 

Holdings Inc. (“Defendants”) respectfully move this Court for an Order pursuant to Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) dismissing all claims in the Truck and Equipment 

Dealers Class Action Complaint (ECF No. 1) (“Complaint” or “Compl.”). This motion is based 

on the supporting memorandum of law, which incorporates by reference and fully adopts 

arguments previously made to the Court in the Memorandum of Law in Support of the T.Rad 

Defendants and Calsonic Kansei North America, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss the Truck and 

Equipment Dealers’ First Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (“Radiators Motion to Dismiss”), Rush Truck Centers of Alabama, Inc., et. 

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2 

al. v. Calsonic Kansei Corp., et. al., No. 2:15-cv-14097, Dkt. 30 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2016), and 

argued before the Court on November 16, 2016, in addition to oral argument of counsel, and 

such other and further material as the Court may consider. Arguments identical to those made in 

the Radiators Motion to Dismiss are briefly repeated. 

As required by Local Rule 7.1(a), counsel for Defendants sought concurrence from

counsel for the Truck and Equipment Dealership Plaintiffs on February 3, 2017 by telephone. 

Counsel for Defendants generally explained the nature of this motion and its legal basis and 

requested, but did not obtain, concurrence in the relief sought (i.e., dismissal of the Complaint). 

 

Dated: February 3, 2017 Respectfully submitted, 

David M. Zinn 

John E. Schmidtlein 

Samuel Bryant Davidoff 

Williams & Connolly LLP 

725 Twelfth Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20005 

202-434-5000 

Fax: 202-434-5029 

dzinn@wc.com 

jschmidtlein@wc.com 

sdavidoff@wc.com 

By: /s/ Robert J. Wierenga 

Robert J. Wierenga 

Suzanne L. Wahl 

Schiff Hardin LLP

350 S. Main Street, Suite 210 

Ann Arbor, MI 48104 

734-222-1500 

Fax: 734-222-1501 

rwierenga@schiffhardin.com 

swahl@schiffhardin.com 

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS TAKATA CORPORATION AND TK HOLDINGS INC. 

Case 2:15-cv-12050-MOB-MKM ECF No. 28 filed 02/03/17 PageID.747 Page 2 of 20
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION

In Re: AUTOMOTIVE PARTS ANTITRUST 

LITIGATION 

Master File No. 12-md-02311 

Honorable Marianne O. 

Battani 

In Re: Occupant Safety Restraint Systems 

THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: 

Rush Truck Centers of Arizona, Inc., et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

TRW Automotive Holdings Corp., et al., 

Defendants. 

No: 2:15-cv-00607 

No: 2:15-cv-12050 

ORAL ARGUMENT 

REQUESTED 

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF 

TAKATA CORPORATION AND TK HOLDINGS INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE 

TRUCK AND EQUIPMENT DEALERS’ CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT PURSUANT 

TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(1) AND 12(b)(6)

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i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ........................................................................... iv

STATEMENT OF CONTROLLING OR MOST APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES ....................v

INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1

ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................2

I. PLAINTIFFS LACK ARTICLE III STANDING TO BRING CLAIMS ON 

BEHALF OF EQUIPMENT OR BUS DEALERS. ............................................................2

II. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO PLEAD FACTS PLAUSIBLY SUGGESTING A 

CONSPIRACY AFFECTING OSS FOR TRUCKS & EQUIPMENT. ..............................4

A. Standard of Review ..................................................................................................4

B. Plaintiffs Allege Nothing To Connect OSS Used in Passenger Vehicles to 

OSS Used in Trucks and Equipment .......................................................................5

III. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT RELY SOLELY ON A PASSENGER VEHICLE 

CONSPIRACY TO SATISFY TWOMBLY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY CLAIM 

THE RELEVANT STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS WERE TOLLED. ............................8

IV. THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ STATE LAW CLAIMS ON 

STATUTORY OR OTHER GROUNDS...........................................................................10

CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................11

Exhibit A ..................................................................................................................................... A-1 

Exhibit B ......................................................................................................................................B-1 

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ii 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

FEDERAL CASES 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ............................................................................................4 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ........................................................................4, 6 

Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2012) .....................................................5 

Dapeer v. Neutrogena Corp., 95 F. Supp. 3d 1366, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2015) ....................................3 

Germain v. Teva Pharm., U.S.A., Inc. (In re Darvocet, Darvon & Propoxyphene 

Prods. Liab. Litig.), 756 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2014) .....................................................................6 

In re Auto. Parts Antitrust Litig., No. 14-14451, 2015 WL 10372437 (E.D. Mich. 

Dec. 30, 2015) ............................................................................................................................6 

Loren v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 505 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2007) ....................................2 

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) ......................................................................3 

NAACP v. Snyder, 879 F. Supp. 2d 662 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (per curiam) .......................................9 

Stuart & Sons, L.P. v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 336 (D. Conn. 2006) .........................10 

Sundance Apartments I, Inc. v. G.E. Capital Corp., 581 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (S.D. 

Fla. 2008) .................................................................................................................................10 

STATE CASES 

McCue v. Franklin, 131 P.2d 704 (Kan. 1942) ..............................................................................10 

State ex rel. Leech v. Levi Strauss & Co., No. 79-722-III, 1980 WL 4696 (Tenn. 

Ch. Sept. 25, 1980) ..................................................................................................................10 

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iii 

OTHER AUTHORITIES 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1410(B) ........................................................................................................10 

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16750.1 .................................................................................................10 

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208 ....................................................................................................10 

D.C. Code § 28-4511(b).................................................................................................................10 

Dave Phillips, FBI raids Auburn Hills automotive supplier, Oakland Press News, 

Feb. 9, 2011................................................................................................................................9 

Dustin Walsh, Antitrust investigation leads FBI to raid TK Holdings in Auburn 

Hills, Crain’s Detroit Business, Feb. 9, 2011 ............................................................................9 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)....................................................................................................................1 

Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) .........................................................................................................................9 

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(3)(f) ...........................................................................................................10 

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-24(a) ...........................................................................................................10 

Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/7 .......................................................................................................................10 

Iowa Code Ann. § 553.16(2) ..........................................................................................................10 

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-306 ..............................................................................................................10 

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-512 ...............................................................................................................10 

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 93, § 13 ..............................................................................................10 

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 325D.64(1) ......................................................................................................10 

N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 75-16.2 ......................................................................................................10 

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 356:12(II) ..................................................................................................10 

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-12 .............................................................................................................10 

Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-212 .......................................................................................................10 

S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530 ............................................................................................................10 

S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-150 ............................................................................................................10 

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-3117(2) ..................................................................................................10 

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iv 

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 

1. Whether the Truck and Equipment Dealership named Plaintiffs have Article III standing 

to assert claims arising from the sale of Equipment or buses as defined in the Complaint, 

where the named Plaintiffs have not purchased, marketed, or sold any such Equipment 

and Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants sold any occupant safety restraint systems to 

the bus OEMs whose bus occupant safety restraint systems Plaintiffs carry. 

2. Whether the Truck and Equipment Dealership Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation that 

Defendants participated in a conspiracy with respect to occupant safety restraint systems 

sold to Truck and Equipment manufacturers is sufficient to state a claim under Twombly 

where the Complaint contains no plausible factual allegations that the Defendants

individually ever marketed or sold those products to Truck and Equipment

manufacturers—much less that they conspired as to those sales, and where the 

Complaint’s only non-conclusory allegations relating to Defendants describe guilty pleas 

as to a conspiracy affecting different products sold in a different market to different

customers that the Complaint expressly excludes from this case. 

3. Whether the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims that are subject to three- and 

four- year statutes of limitations because Plaintiffs did not file the Complaint until

June 6, 2015, where publicity of antitrust investigations into a price-fixing

conspiracy among occupant safety restraint systems suppliers in the auto parts 

industry, upon which Plaintiffs’ allegations depend, was widespread by February 

2011, at the latest, and Plaintiffs have not alleged any basis for tolling the running of 

the relevant limitations period beyond that time. 

4. Whether Plaintiffs’ state antitrust and unjust enrichment claims are deficient for 

certain state-specific reasons. 

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v 

STATEMENT OF CONTROLLING OR MOST APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES 

Cases 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) 

Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2012) 

Germain v. Teva Pharm., U.S.A., Inc. (In re Darvocet, Darvon & Propoxyphene 

Prods. Liab. Litig.), 756 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2014) 

In re Auto. Parts Antitrust Litig., No. 14-14451, 2015 WL 10372437 (E.D. Mich. 

Dec. 30, 2015) 

Loren v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 505 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2007) 

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) 

NAACP v. Snyder, 879 F. Supp. 2d 662 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (per curiam) 

Rule 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 

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INTRODUCTION 

This is an indirect purchaser action in which certain truck dealers allege an antitrust 

conspiracy affecting what they broadly define as Occupant Safety Restraint Systems (“OSS”),1

and conclude that since antitrust violations occurred with respect to OSS for certain passenger 

vehicles, it necessarily follows that antitrust violations must have also occurred with respect to 

Truck and Equipment parts. As explained in this Motion, nothing alleged in the Complaint 

supports this far-reaching inference. 

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs lack standing to assert claims related to OSS for buses and 

equipment. No named plaintiff sells construction equipment, mining equipment, agricultural 

equipment, or railway vehicles (“Equipment”); however, Plaintiffs assert claims for these 

products. Similarly, Plaintiffs sell buses produced by four original equipment manufacturers 

(“OEMs”) according to their website; however, the Complaint does not allege that Defendants 

sold OSS to any of those four bus OEMs. Since Plaintiffs do not have standing to sue about 

items they do not sell, or where they have no actual injury, Plaintiffs lack standing to sue with 

respect to bus and equipment OSS. Therefore, the Court should dismiss all bus and equipment 

claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). 

Plaintiffs do not plead facts that establish a conspiracy affecting truck parts. They allege 

no specifics as to who did what with respect to OSS used in Trucks and Equipment. Instead their 

Complaint provides only unsubstantiated conclusions that there must have been antitrust 

violations affecting truck and equipment OSS, failing to meet the requirements in Twombly. In 

 

1

 The Complaint defines OSS as “generally comprised of the parts in a vehicle that 

protect drivers and passengers from bodily harm,” and that include “seat belts, airbags, 

steering wheels, and steering systems.” Compl. ¶ 2. 

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place of factual allegations, the Complaint relies on a prohibited propensity argument that asserts 

that if Defendants can plausibly be alleged to have engaged in bad acts with respect to parts for 

passenger vehicles, then surely they must have done the same for truck parts. The Court has 

previously rejected such arguments in other contexts, specifically in the Wire Harness Truck and 

Equipment case with respect to the Fujikura and Mitsubishi Electric Defendants. The Court was 

clear that anticompetitive conduct with respect to passenger vehicles is insufficient to support an 

inference of anticompetitive conduct in the separate market for Trucks and Equipment. That 

conclusion is applicable here. The lack of factual support to establish any conspiracy affecting 

Truck and Equipment parts is fatal to the Complaint and requires this action be dismissed. 

Moreover, even if the Court concludes Plaintiffs’ prohibited propensity argument is 

sufficient to state a claim under Twombly, Plaintiffs’ claims subject to three and four-year 

statutes of limitations must be dismissed. Plaintiffs cannot simultaneously rely only on 

allegations regarding antitrust violations with respect to passenger vehicles as sufficient to state 

their claims for Trucks and Equipment, and then deny that those very same public allegations 

regarding antitrust violations for passenger vehicles put them on notice of their claims. Under 

either scenario, Plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed. 

Finally, Plaintiffs’ claims under the laws of various states that do not permit such claims 

must be dismissed. 

ARGUMENT 

I. PLAINTIFFS LACK ARTICLE III STANDING TO BRING CLAIMS ON 

BEHALF OF EQUIPMENT OR BUS DEALERS. 

Standing is a threshold issue that must be decided at the start of a case, and not at class 

certification. Loren v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 505 F.3d 598, 607 (6th Cir. 2007) 

Case 2:15-cv-12050-MOB-MKM ECF No. 28 filed 02/03/17 PageID.755 Page 10 of 20
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(“Congress ‘cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to 

sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.’”(citation omitted)). 

Not one of the named Plaintiffs deal in Equipment, or in buses for which Defendants are 

alleged to sell OSS. Plaintiffs’ catch-all definition of “Trucks and Equipment” obscures this 

point by defining that term collectively as: 

medium-duty (Class 4, 5, 6, & 7) trucks and heavy-duty (Class 8) trucks, 

buses, commercial vehicles (excluding automobiles, light trucks, vans, sports 

utility vehicles, and/or similar motor vehicles sold by automobile dealers), 

construction equipment, mining equipment, agricultural equipment, railway 

vehicles, and other similar vehicles. 

Compl. at Intro. But the named Plaintiffs deal in trucks, and did not engage in commerce with 

respect to construction, mining, agricultural, or railway equipment. They therefore cannot claim 

injury traceable to alleged price fixing related to the purchase and sale of the latter products. Nor 

do Plaintiffs have injury with respect to OSS for buses, since they do not claim to sell buses 

made by the manufacturers to which the Defendants are alleged to sell their OSS. Absent such 

injury, Plaintiffs do not have Article III standing to assert a claim for Equipment or buses. Lujan 

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Dapeer v. Neutrogena Corp., 95 F. Supp. 

3d 1366, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (dismissing claims for lack of Article III standing where plaintiff 

did not purchase certain products, because he could not allege injuries from products that he 

never purchased). 

 This argument was previously made by defendants in Rush Truck Centers of Alabama, 

Inc., et. al. v. Calsonic Kansei Corp., et. al., i.e., the Radiators Parts Litigation, and that motion 

is pending before the Court. Defendants do not repeat those arguments in detail, but for 

efficiency incorporate by reference the arguments contained in that previous motion to dismiss 

regarding Plaintiffs’ lack of standing to bring claims on behalf of Equipment or bus dealers. See 

Rush Truck Centers of Alabama, Inc., et. al. v. Calsonic Kansei Corp., et. al., No. 2:15-cvCase 2:15-cv-12050-MOB-MKM ECF No. 28 filed 02/03/17 PageID.756 Page 11 of 20
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14097, Dkt. 30 at 9–14 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2016) (T.Rad Defs. & Calsonic Kansei N. Am., Inc.’s 

Mot. To Dismiss the Truck & Equip. Dealers’ First Am. Compl. (“Radiators Motion to 

Dismiss”)). As explained therein, since Plaintiffs did not purchase Equipment nor claim to sell 

buses made by the manufacturers to which the Defendants are alleged to have sold parts, they 

have no standing to sue over those products, and the Court should dismiss their claims for those 

products.

II. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO PLEAD FACTS PLAUSIBLY SUGGESTING A 

CONSPIRACY AFFECTING OSS FOR TRUCKS & EQUIPMENT. 

The Complaint does not allege a single fact that evidences a conspiracy related to OSS 

for Trucks and Equipment. Instead the Complaint relies on allegations regarding passenger 

vehicle parts cases, and guilty pleas and investigations regarding passenger vehicles that have no 

bearing on OSS sold for use in Trucks and Equipment. Because the Complaint fails to plead a 

factual basis to connect the supposed dots between OSS used in passenger vehicles and OSS 

used in Trucks and Equipment, it should be dismissed. 

A. Standard of Review 

To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

The Twombly standard requires courts to distinguish between concrete factual allegations and 

mere conclusory ones. “[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by 

identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the 

assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The Sixth Circuit advises 

that “a court should first identify factual allegations that are entitled to a presumption of [the] 

truth—that is, those allegations that are more than just legal conclusions.” Carrier Corp. v. 

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Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 444 (6th Cir. 2012). Here, the Complaint contains only 

conclusory allegations as to all material elements necessary for recovery. 

B. Plaintiffs Allege Nothing To Connect OSS Used in Passenger Vehicles to OSS 

Used in Trucks and Equipment 

The Complaint lacks allegations regarding Defendants’ supposed conspiratorial activity 

with respect to Truck and Equipment OSS; instead, Plaintiffs rely solely upon guilty pleas and 

investigations in the passenger vehicle context and foreign investigations of unrelated 

industries to incorrectly conclude that a U.S. Truck and Equipment conspiracy for OSS parts 

exists. Even assuming the allegations against defendants in the passenger vehicle industry are 

true with respect to OSS, that would not support a conspiracy as to Truck and Equipment OSS 

and represents nothing more than a prohibited propensity argument. The Complaint should 

therefore be rejected for failure to state a claim. 

 Plaintiffs do not allege any specific contact or communication between or among 

Defendants during which any agreement was reached about fixing prices as to Truck or 

Equipment OSS, in stark contrast to the allegations in other cases. See Radiators Motion to 

Dismiss at 18. This is a particularly notable omission given that Plaintiffs reached settlements 

with two other OSS Defendants in this action last year and would, therefore, have access to facts 

to substantiate the Complaint’s conclusory allegations, if there were any. See In re Occupant 

Safety Restraint Sys., No. 2:14-cv-00107, Doc. No. 58 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2016). Instead, 

Plaintiffs only point to allegations related to the passenger vehicle cases. Similarly, the 

Complaint also does not identify any particular RFQ that Defendants supposedly conspired to 

fix, despite their settlements with OSS Defendants. Instead, Plaintiffs allege how the RFQ 

process generally works. See Compl. ¶ 72. 

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Notably, Plaintiffs’ 101-page Complaint contains a total of two allegations that attempt 

to link this case to the passenger vehicle parts case, and does so with conclusory allegations 

made on information and belief with no facts. Those paragraphs state: 

 Upon information and belief, Defendants’ employees responsible for negotiating the 

prices and terms for parts, including Occupant Safety Restraint Systems, were 

involved in sales to Truck and Equipment manufacturers as well as to automobile 

manufacturers. Compl. ¶ 75. 

 Upon information and belief, many of the Defendants’ employees who were 

involved in negotiating the prices of Occupant Safety Restraint Systems and other 

parts sold to automobile OEMs were the very same individuals involved in 

negotiations over the pricing on sales of the same parts for Trucks and Equipment. 

Compl. ¶ 172. 

Plaintiffs have articulated no basis for this “information and belief,” and the Sixth 

Circuit is clear that “[t]he mere fact that someone believes something to be true does not create 

a plausible inference that it is true.” Germain v. Teva Pharm., U.S.A., Inc. (In re Darvocet, 

Darvon & Propoxyphene Prods. Liab. Litig.), 756 F.3d 917, 931 (6th Cir. 2014); see also 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551 (finding a complaint insufficient even though it said, “Plaintiffs 

allege upon information and belief that [defendants] have entered into a contract, combination 

or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The 

Court has already rejected the argument that such allegations are enough to link a conspiracy 

for passenger vehicles to one for Trucks and Equipment. See In re Auto. Parts Antitrust Litig.,

No. 14-14451, 2015 WL 10372437, at *2, *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2015). The successful 

complaints have provided much more detail to establish a plausible basis to infer supposed 

anticompetitive conduct with regard to the RFQ process. See Radiators Motion to Dismiss, at 

19–20. 

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Even if the Court accepts Plaintiffs’ allegations based on “information and belief,” the 

guilty pleas by certain defendants regarding antitrust violations affecting other parts sold to 

passenger vehicle manufacturers and foreign investigations do not plausibly support allegations 

of a comparable conspiracy as to Trucks and Equipment. See Radiators Motion to Dismiss, at 

21–22. 

Importantly, Plaintiffs’ complaint contains only one allegation about a government 

investigation specific to trucks, but it involves bearings, an unrelated part. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 164, 

203. This investigation is unrelated to OSS for Trucks and Equipment, and the Complaint 

lacks any allegations that Defendants even make bearings for Truck or Equipment. The 

Complaint also references other U.S. and Japanese investigations, but similarly these too do not 

involve OSS or Truck and Equipment manufacturers. Instead, they involve “industrial 

machinery bearings and automotive bearings,” Compl. ¶¶ 13, 163 (emphasis added), and 

“automobile and internal combustion engine manufacturers,” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 165 

(emphasis added), and have nothing to do with the claims in this case.2

Given the Court’s ruling that there is not “one conspiracy across component parts,” an 

investigation into truck bearings, and passenger vehicle investigations and pleas do not create 

an inference of a Truck and Equipment conspiracy. See Radiators Motion to Dismiss, at 22– 

23. 

 

2

 The JFTC and DOJ investigations referenced in the Complaint make no mention of

any sort of vehicle or vehicle part that would be considered related to Trucks and Equipment 

as defined in the Complaint. See Compl. ¶¶ 163, 165. Plaintiffs omit any allegation that these 

investigations relate to OSS or Truck or Equipment manufacturers as defined in the 

Complaint. The allegations actually made do not satisfy their burden. 

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Moreover, other courts in the antitrust context at the motion to dismiss stage have 

similarly refused to assume conduct crossed parts or markets without specific allegations to 

link them factually. See Radiators Motion to Dismiss, at 23–24. Without specific allegations 

tying the alleged conspiracy in the passenger vehicle cases to Trucks and Equipment, 

Plaintiffs cannot meet the pleading requirements of Twombly. 

The arguments above were previously made by defendants in the Radiators Motion to 

Dismiss. Defendants incorporate by reference the arguments contained in that previous motion 

to dismiss regarding Plaintiffs’ propensity argument and failure to plead facts that establish that 

there was any conspiracy affecting Truck or Equipment parts. See Radiators Motion to 

Dismiss, at 16–24. As explained therein, because the complaint is based solely on allegations 

of price-fixing in connection with passenger vehicles or non-OSS truck components and 

contains no specific factual allegations that Defendants conspired to fix prices for OSS for 

Trucks and Equipment, Plaintiffs’ complaint must be dismissed. 

III. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT RELY SOLELY ON A PASSENGER VEHICLE 

CONSPIRACY TO SATISFY TWOMBLY AND SIMULTANEOUSLY CLAIM 

THE RELEVANT STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS WERE TOLLED. 

As discussed above, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts related to OSS that suggest

any conspiracy related to Truck and Equipment parts. If the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’ 

propensity allegations are sufficient under Twombly, however, then it must find them timebarred as publicity into price-fixing allegations of OSS suppliers was widespread by February 

2011, more than four years before Plaintiffs filed their complaint. Under either approach, 

Plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed. 

Publicity into price-fixing investigations specific to OSS was widespread by February 

2011, when Defendant TK Holdings Inc. was raided by the FBI. See, e.g., Dustin Walsh, 

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9 

Antitrust investigation leads FBI to raid TK Holdings in Auburn Hills, Crain’s Detroit 

Business, Feb. 9, 2011 (Ex. A); Dave Phillips, FBI raids Auburn Hills automotive supplier, 

Oakland Press News, Feb. 9, 2011 (Ex. B).3

 If Plaintiffs posit that car-related facts make 

their claim plausible, they then cannot reasonably argue that those same facts did not create 

notice of their claim. Simply put, there could be no fraudulent concealment past February 

2011, when publicity of the investigation into an OSS conspiracy was substantial. 

Moreover, if the Court accepts plaintiffs’ argument that inferences of an OSS conspiracy 

from other conspiracies in unrelated parts is reasonable, then the date is even earlier. It is 

undisputed that publicity of the investigation into a wire harness conspiracy began in 

February 2010, and thereafter the publicity surrounding a broader antitrust investigation into 

automotive parts suppliers was substantial and widespread. But Plaintiffs did not file their 

complaint until June 6, 2015—more than four years after the February 2011 raid of Takata 

and more than five years after the wire harness conspiracy publicity. Accordingly, 

Plaintiffs’ state law claims subject to four- and three-year statutes of limitations are timebarred,4 and must be dismissed.

 

3

 On the basis of this and other articles, the Court may judicially notice that the

investigations into price-fixing by auto parts suppliers, including those who manufactured and 

sold OSS, were widely publicized by February 2011. Courts may judicially notice any fact 

that is “not subject to reasonable dispute” because it “can be accurately and readily 

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 

201(b). Here, the Court need not consider the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., whether the 

contents of the various articles discussing the investigations are accurate. Instead, the fact 

that “cannot reasonably be questioned” is that these articles gave Plaintiffs notice of the pricefixing investigations as of the date of the articles’ publication. See id.; see also NAACP v. 

Snyder, 879 F. Supp. 2d 662, 666 n.5 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (per curiam). 

4

 Plaintiffs’ claims under the following states’ laws are subject to a limitations period 

of four years from accrual of the claim: Arizona (see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1410(B)) (antitrust

claim); California (see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16750.1 (antitrust claim), 17208 (consumer 

protection claim)); District of Columbia (see D.C. Code § 28-4511(b) (antitrust claim)); 

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IV. THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ STATE LAW CLAIMS ON 

STATUTORY OR OTHER GROUNDS. 

Plaintiffs’ state antitrust and unjust enrichment claims are deficient for certain statespecific reasons and should be dismissed accordingly. Defendants incorporate by reference 

herein, but will not repeat, the arguments made in the Radiators Motion to Dismiss regarding 

deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ claims under the laws Hawaii, Illinois, and Massachusetts. See 

Radiators Motion to Dismiss, at 32–33, 37. For the reasons explained therein, the claims 

under the laws of Hawaii, Illinois, and Massachusetts should be dismissed. 

 

Florida (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(3)(f); Sundance Apartments I, Inc. v. G.E. Capital Corp., 581 

F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (holding Florida consumer protection claims are

governed by section 95.11(3)(f)); Hawaii (Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-24(a)) (antitrust claim); 

Illinois (740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/7); Iowa (Iowa Code Ann. § 553.16(2) (antitrust claim); 

Massachusetts (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 93, § 13); Minnesota (Minn. Stat. Ann. § 

325D.64(1) (antitrust claim); Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-212) (antitrust claim); 

New Hampshire (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 356:12(II) (antitrust claim); New Mexico (N.M. 

Stat. Ann. § 57-1-12) (antitrust and consumer protection claims); North Carolina (N.C. Gen. 

Stat. Ann. § 75-16.2) (antitrust and consumer protection claims); North Dakota (N.D. Cent. 

Code Ann. § 51-08.1–10(1)) (antitrust claim); Utah (Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-3117(2) 

(antitrust claim)). The same four-year statute of limitations applies to the unjust enrichment 

claims in Arizona, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 

Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Utah. Stuart & 

Sons, L.P. v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 336, 343 (D. Conn. 2006). 

Plaintiffs’ claims under the following states’ laws are subject to a limitations period of 

three years from accrual of the claim: Kansas (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-512 (providing the

limitations period for liability created by antitrust statute); McCue v. Franklin, 131 P.2d 704, 

708 (Kan. 1942) (holding antitrust claim time-barred after applying the limitations period in 

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-306 (1963) (current version at Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-512 (2016))); South

Carolina (S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-3-530, 39-5-150 (regarding antitrust claim)); Tennessee (see

State ex rel. Leech v. Levi Strauss & Co., No. 79-722-III, 1980 WL 4696, at *1 (Tenn. Ch. 

Sept. 25, 1980) (regarding private antitrust claim)); New York (N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) 

(consumer protection claim only)). The same three-year statute of limitation applies to the 

unjust enrichment claims in Kansas, South Carolina, and Tennessee. Stuart & Sons, 456 F. 

Supp. 2d at 343. For additional discussion of the application of the relevant statutes of 

limitations to Plaintiffs’ claims, see No. 2:14-cv-14451-MOB-MKM, ECF No. 28, at 12–56. 

Case 2:15-cv-12050-MOB-MKM ECF No. 28 filed 02/03/17 PageID.763 Page 18 of 20
11 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Truck and Equipment dealers’ Complaint should be 

dismissed with prejudice. 

Dated: February 3, 2017 Respectfully submitted, 

David M. Zinn 

John E. Schmidtlein 

Samuel Bryant Davidoff 

Williams & Connolly LLP 

725 Twelfth Street, N.W. 

Washington, DC 20005 

202-434-5000 

Fax: 202-434-5029 

dzinn@wc.com 

jschmidtlein@wc.com 

sdavidoff@wc.com 

By: /s/ Robert J. Wierenga 

Robert J. Wierenga 

Suzanne L. Wahl 

Schiff Hardin LLP

350 S. Main Street, Suite 210 

Ann Arbor, MI 48104 

734-222-1500 

Fax: 734-222-1501 

rwierenga@schiffhardin.com 

swahl@schiffhardin.com 

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS TAKATA CORPORATION AND TK HOLDINGS INC. 

Case 2:15-cv-12050-MOB-MKM ECF No. 28 filed 02/03/17 PageID.764 Page 19 of 20
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 I, Robert J. Wierenga, hereby certify that on February 3, 2017, I caused the foregoing 

Takata Corporation and TK Holdings Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss the Truck and Equipment Dealers 

Class Action Complaint to be electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF 

system, which will send notification of such filing to all counsel of record. 

/s/ Robert J. Wierenga 

 Robert J. Wierenga 

Case 2:15-cv-12050-MOB-MKM ECF No. 28 filed 02/03/17 PageID.765 Page 20 of 20