1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

VICKIE LUDELL 

WALLACE, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant. 

 

Case No. 2:15-cv-11839 

Judge Robert H. Cleland 

Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti 

___________________________________/ 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 13) AND GRANT DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DE 14) 

I. RECOMMENDATION: For the reasons that follow, it is 

RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment (DE 13), GRANT Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (DE 14), 

and AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision. 

II. REPORT 

 Plaintiff, Vickie Ludell Wallace, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 

for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying her application for disability insurance (DI) benefits. 

This matter is before the United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and 

Recommendation on Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (DE 13), the 

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Commissioner’s cross motion for summary judgment (DE 14) and the 

administrative record (DE 8). 

A. Background

 Plaintiff filed her application for DI benefits on October 29, 2012, alleging 

that she has been disabled since February 17, 2010, at age 40. (R. at 172-180, 191-

193.)1

 Plaintiff alleges disability as a result of a back injury and herniated disc, 

degenerative bone disease and depression. (R. at 194-205.) Plaintiff’s application 

was denied on February 21, 2013. (R. at 112-139.) 

On March 27, 2013, Plaintiff sought a de novo hearing before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (R. at 140-141.) ALJ John Pope held a 

hearing on November 14, 2013, at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel 

(Andrea Hamm) and Vocational Expert (VE) Edward F. Pagella testified. (R. at 

42-101; see also R. at 149, 150, 171, 253.) On November 27, 2013, ALJ Pope 

determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act. (R. at 17-41.) 

Plaintiff requested review of the hearing decision on December 13, 2013. 

(R. at 14-16.)2

 On April 9, 2015, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for 

 

1

 A prior application resulted in a February 16, 2010 disposition awarding benefits 

for a closed period (March 3, 2007 to August 1, 2009). (See R. at 35, DE 13 at 8.) 

2

 On January 6, 2014, the SSA granted Plaintiff’s request for more time before 

acting on her case. (R. at 7-13.)

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review. (R. at 1-6.) Thus, ALJ Pope’s decision became the Commissioner’s final 

decision. 

Plaintiff then timely commenced the instant action on May 21, 2015. (DE 

1.) 

B. Plaintiff’s Medical History 

 Plaintiff alleges in the field office disability report that she has been disabled 

since February 17, 2010. (See R. at 191.) Plaintiff’s medical records span the 

period from March 18, 2011 to November 8, 2013. (R. at 268-395 [Exhibits 1F10F].) 

1. Physical health records from 2011 through 2013 

It seems that Plaintiff treated with Luis Chapman, M.D., of Advantage 

Health Centers during February and March 2011. (See R. at 341-344.) Lab tests 

performed in early March 2011 appear to show an abnormal electrocardiogram 

(ECG) and high cholesterol levels. (R. at 347-351.) On April 7, 2011, Plaintiff 

underwent an x-ray of the thoracic spine, which revealed “mild spondylosis at the 

T6-T7 level anteriorly.” (R. at 318, 352, 353.) She also underwent an x-ray of the 

cervical spine, which revealed “mild arthritic change of the C5-C6 level 

anteriorly.” (R. at 354.) Plaintiff was again treated at Advantage Health Centers – 

apparently by Dr. Chapman - during April, May, June, July 2011 and October 

2011. (R. at 333-340, 346; see also R. at 345.) 

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On August 3, 2012, Plaintiff underwent an MRI of the lumbar spine, which 

revealed mild enhancing scar tissue along the posterior margin of the disc at the 

L5-S1 level, as well as evidence of anterior spinal fusion surgery at L5-S1. (R. at 

270-271, 279-280.) Whole-body bone imaging performed on August 24, 2012 

revealed, inter alia, focal areas of increased uptake, including the: bilateral 

shoulders, lower lumbar spine, sacroiliac joints, bilateral hips, left knee, 

sternoclavicular joints, and bilateral feet, greater on the right. (R. at 269, 282-283.) 

What appear to be Dr. Chapman’s progress notes from the same date recommend 

follow up with a neurosurgeon. (R. at 286-287, 331-332.) 

Plaintiff saw Daniel Elskens, M.D., of Eastside Neurosurgery, P.C., on 

September 14, 2012. Dr. Elskens diagnosed degeneration of the lumbar or 

lumbosacral intervertebral disc and lumbar pain. (R. at 275-278.) A September 

17, 2012 x-ray of the lumbosacral spine revealed anterior fusion surgical changes 

at L5-S1, but no acute fracture dislocation or spondylolisthesis. (R. at 268, 281.) 

On October 30, 2012, Plaintiff was again seen by Dr. Elskens, who again 

diagnosed degeneration of lumbar or lumbosacral intervertebral disc and lumbar 

pain. (R. at 272-274.) 

Plaintiff was seen at Advantage Health Centers – seemingly by Dr. 

Chapman – during November 2012 for a follow up visit. (R. at 284-285, 329-330.) 

She was seen at Advantage Health Centers by Dr. Chapman, from November 27, 

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2012 to May 10, 2013; by Angela Allen, A.P.R.N., B.C., during October 2013; and 

by Crystal Lee-Billing, M.D. on October 18, 2013. (R. at 323-328, 388-395.) 

On August 7, 2013, Plaintiff was seen at the University Pain Clinic Detroit. 

Dr. Tolbert and/or Dr. Perov assessed postlaminectomy syndrome of the lumbar 

region and lumbosacral radiculopathy. (R. at 306-310; see also R. at 311-315.) A 

same-day urine test was positive for Alpha-Hydroxyalprazolam. (R. at 303-305.) 

Thereafter, August 14, 2013, August 28, 2013 and September 11, 2013, Plaintiff 

received lumbar epidural steroid injection with fluoroscopy. (R. at 297-298, 299-

300, 301-302.) 

On November 8, 2013, Dr. Lee-Billing completed a social security 

disability/ability form. The listed diagnoses include lumbosacral radiculopathy 

and postlaminectomy syndrome of the lumbar region. (R. at 382-383.) 

2. Mental health records from 2013 

On or about January 29, 2013, Plaintiff underwent a consultative psychiatric 

evaluation by R. Hasan, M.D., who diagnosed, among other things, mood disorder, 

not otherwise specified (NOS), and a global assessment of functioning (GAF) 

score of 50, with a fair to guarded prognosis. (R. at 288-290.) During May, June 

and August of that year, Plaintiff treated at Eastwood Clinics with Sharon Masek, 

L.M.S.W. (R. at 370-373, 378-381, 361, 366-367.) 

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Meanwhile, Plaintiff underwent psychiatric evaluation or treatment with V. 

Yeragani, M.D. of Eastwood Clinics, on several occasions: June 7, 2013, July 8, 

2013 and September 3, 2013. (R. at 362-365, 374-377; R. at 359-360; and R. at 

357-358). Although these notes will be discussed in detail as necessary below, I 

note here that Dr. Yeragani’s diagnoses included bipolar II disorder with 

depression (severe) and panic disorder with agoraphobia (moderate). (R. at 365, 

377.) 

 C. Hearing Testimony 

 1. Plaintiff’s Testimony 

 At the November 14, 2013 hearing, Plaintiff testified that she was 44 years 

of age and married. She lives in a multi-level house with her husband, her 23 years 

old son and her 2 year old granddaughter. (R. at 48-49.) Plaintiff is 5 feet 6 

inches tall and weighs about 235 pounds. She has an unrestricted driver’s license. 

(R. at 49.) She graduated from high school. (R. at 50.) 

Plaintiff apparently last worked in 2007 or 2008, at which time she was 

working at Vitec “making tanks and different parts for Chrysler and Ford and 

GM.” (R. at 50-51; see also R. at 93.)3

 She stopped that work, and filed a 

worker’s compensation claim, because she was injured on the job. She did not 

 

3

 According to the administrative record, Plaintiff earned $3,222.47 in 2008. (See 

R. at 186-190.) 

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return to work after her injury, explaining that she had been terminated. According 

to Plaintiff, unemployment benefits were denied. (R. at 51.) She has since looked 

for work in the health care field, but was unable to undertake such work because of 

her limitations with lifting, pulling and turning. (R. at 52-53.) Plaintiff also 

testified that she has problems with standing, walking, sitting, lifting and carrying. 

(R. at 54; see also R. at 81-83, 85-86, 91.) There is no position she can be in for a 

long time. (R. at 87.) 

a. Testimony about physical conditions 

 With respect to physical conditions, Plaintiff testified she has a problem 

with her back and is constantly in pain. (R. at 53; see also R. at 78.) Her lower 

back pain sometimes radiates. (R. at 78-79; see also R. at 80.) She had an L5-S1 

lumbar discectomy in February 2009 and was told it would take two years to heal. 

(R. at 55, 57; see also R. at 273, 276.) She had an MRI in 2012 and was offered 

surgery by Dr. Elskens, but refused. (R. at 58-59.) She has also received treatment 

for her back from Dr. Chapman, including physical therapy and medication. (R. at 

59-61.) Plaintiff testified that Dr. Chapman told her to not lift more than a gallon 

of milk, i.e., a 5 pound restriction, and not do a lot of bending. (R. at 62, 81.) She 

has also received steroid injections, seemingly from Dr. Perov at University Pain 

Clinic. (R. at 61-62; see also R. at 79-80, 297-302.) These help for a week or so, 

after which her pain returns to 10 on a scale of 1 to 10. (R. at 87-88.) 

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Plaintiff testified that, in a typical day, she gets up at 8 a.m. and takes pain 

medication, apparently Ibuprofen 800 mg. (R. at 65-66, 80; see also R. at 87.) 

The pain in her back makes it difficult to walk downstairs. She eats breakfast 

around 9 a.m. (R. at 66.) She takes care of her granddaughter from 11 a.m. to 2 

p.m. while her son is at school. Everyday chores might take her a whole day, 

because she cannot do a lot of standing or walking. (R. at 67-68; see also R. at 85-

86.) She lies down at least 3-4 times per day for 20 or 30 minutes, as it relieves 

pressure. (R. at 86.) When she is active, her pain increases. (R. at 81.) 

Sometimes, she does not eat lunch, although she makes lunch for her 

granddaughter around 12:00 p.m. or 12:30 p.m. (R. at 68.) She begins the evening 

meal around 5:00 p.m. and eats around 6:00 p.m. or 6:30 p.m. In the evenings, she 

will go upstairs and attempt to rest or sit down. (R. at 69.) If the dinner dishes are 

not washed, she will get back up at 8 p.m. After doing the dishes, she goes back to 

bed and watches television. She takes pain medication between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 

p.m. and falls asleep around 10 p.m. (R. at 70.) 

Plaintiff testified that she can dress herself, shower and wash her hair or take 

a bath. She shops and does laundry. Her only hobbies are going to church and 

trying to visit her other grandchildren. (R. at 71; see also R. at 75-77, 90-91.) She 

likes listening to music and also coloring, which sometimes takes her mind off of 

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her pain. (R. at 89.) She learned physical therapy exercises, but she does not do 

them. She also does not exercise. (R. at 71-72.) 

b. Testimony about psychological conditions 

Plaintiff testified that she is receiving treatment at Eastwood Clinic from 

psychiatrist Dr. Yeragani and therapist Masek. (R. at 72-73.) She recently began 

taking Elavil (amitriptyline), Flexeril, Prolypterall4

 and Trazodone, as well as 

Xanax, all prescribed by Dr. Yeragani. (R. at 62-63; see also R. at 80.) The side 

effects include distraction. (R. at 64.) She is still having “ups and downs” with her 

mood, but does not want to increase her medication. (R. at 89-90.) Plaintiff gets 

panic attacks when she is upset or depressed (approximately once per month). 

These episodes are scary for her, as she cannot breathe and thinks she is dying. (R. 

at 73-74.) 

Plaintiff testified that she is forgetful, distracted, and her concentration is 

off, but she believes treatment with Dr. Yeragani is “a start.” (R. at 75; see also R. 

at 78, 91.) She is sometimes able to follow a 30 minute program on television. (R. 

at 88.) She sometimes has problems getting along with “casual contacts.” (R. at 

77-78.) Although she does not have physical problems driving, she has problems 

remembering where she is going. (R. at 84.) She attributes her depression, at least 

 

4

 The Court suspects this may be a reference to Trileptal. (See R. at 365, 377, 388 

& 393.) Also, I note that, instead of Flexeril, Dr. Yeragani’s notes list Celexa. 

(See R. at 365, 377.) 

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in part, to the loss of her job and the loss of her income. (R. at 84-85; see also R. 

at 90.) She began staying to herself after she lost her job. (R. at 90.) 

 2. Vocational Expert Testimony

 VE Pagella testified that a hypothetical individual with a high school 

graduation level and 40-44 years of age but who is limited to only unskilled light 

exertion involving only occasionally balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, 

crawling and climbing would be able to perform claimant’s past work as an 

assembler. (R. at 93-94.) 

The VE also testified that such an individual who is further limited to 

sedentary work (lifting no more than five pounds frequently, 10 pounds 

occasionally) and jobs that require only minimal focus and concentration (defined 

as simple one and two-step tasks) would be able to perform work as a hand sorter, 

assembler and packer. Such an individual who is further limited to occasional 

contact with the public and the ability to alternate sitting and standing would be 

able to perform the same jobs. (R. at 94.) Upon cross-examination by Plaintiff’s 

counsel, the VE further testified that if the individual was limited to lifting no more 

than 5 pounds, it would result in a less than sedentary work capability. (R. at 98-

99.) Finally, the VE testified that the limitations of no contact with coworkers and 

work not depending on someone else doing his or her job would preclude the jobs 

outlined in response to the second hypothetical. (R. at 99-100.) 

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 D. The Administrative Decision5

 ALJ Pope rendered his decision on November 27, 2013. (R. at 17-41.) At 

Step 1, he found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 

February 17, 2010, the alleged onset date. (R. at 22.) 

At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: 

osteoarthritis; degenerative disc disease, status post lumbar spinal fusion and 

discectomy; postlaminectomy syndrome of the lumbar region; lumbosacral 

radiculopathy; mood disorder; depression; severe bipolar disorder with depression; 

and moderate panic disorder with agoraphobia. (R. at 22.) 

 

5 Social Security Regulations require ALJs to resolve a disability claim through a 

five-step sequential evaluation of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4); 

see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Although a dispositive finding at any step terminates 

the ALJ’s review, see Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007), if 

fully considered, the sequential review considers and answers five questions: 

 1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? 

 2. Does the claimant suffer from one or more severe impairments? 

 3. Do the claimant’s severe impairments, alone or in combination, meet 

or equal the criteria of an impairment set forth in the Commissioner’s Listing of 

Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 1? 

 4. Considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity, can the 

claimant perform his or her past relevant work? 

 5. Considering the claimant’s age, education, past work experience, and 

residual functional capacity, can the claimant perform other work available in the 

national economy? 

See 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4); see also Henley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 264 (6th 

Cir. 2009); Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001). 

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At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed 

impairments. (R. at 22-24.) 

 At Step 4, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work 

with certain postural limitations (only occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, 

crouching, crawling and climbing) and a limitation to unskilled work. (R. at 24-

36.) Moreover, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is capable of performing her past 

relevant work as an assembler, as this work does not require the performance of 

work-related activities precluded by her RFC. (R. at 36.) 

 Alternatively, at Step 5, having considered Plaintiff’s age, education, work 

experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that there are other jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff also can perform. (R. at 

36-38.) 

 E. Standard of Review

 The District Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final 

administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). When reviewing a case 

under the Social Security Act, the Court “must affirm the Commissioner’s decision 

if it ‘is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal 

standards.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. at 2009) 

(quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. at 2007)); see 

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also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as 

to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Under 

this standard, “substantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence 

but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 

(quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 

1994)). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, the 

court does “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide 

questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); 

Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247 (“It is of course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, 

to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including that of the claimant.”). 

 Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. 

The Court must “‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from 

[the] weight’” of the Commissioner’s decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 

395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 

(1951)). Nevertheless, “if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, this 

Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is substantial evidence in the record that 

would have supported an opposite conclusion.’” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

581 F.3d 399, 406 (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). 

Finally, even if the ALJ’s decision meets the substantial evidence standard, “‘a 

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decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its 

own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or 

deprives the claimant of a substantial right.’” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting 

Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)). 

F. Analysis

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform 

light work with postural limitations and a skill-level limitation was not supported 

by substantial evidence, because the ALJ did not (a) properly weigh the opinion of 

Dr. Crystal Lee-Billing, Plaintiff’s treating physician; (b) comply with 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1527, 416.927 when rejecting the treating physicians’ opinions; (c) have 

support for his physical RFC assessment; and (d) properly assess Plaintiff’s mental 

RFC. (DE 13 at 7, 22-31.) 

The Commissioner contends that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC, because the ALJ properly assessed (a) Dr. LeeBilling’s opinion; (b) Dr. Elskens’s treatment notes; (c) Plaintiff’s physical RFC; 

and (d) Plaintiff’s mental RFC. (DE 14 at 3, 11-19.) 

1. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s physical RFC 

determination (light work exertional and postural 

limitations).6

 

6 As listed in the Disability Determination Explanation form, exertional limitations 

include lifting, carrying, standing, walking, sitting, pushing and pulling. Postural 

limitations include climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and 

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a. The ALJ properly weighed the opinion evidence. 

i. Evaluating opinion evidence under 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527, 416.927 

The ALJ must consider all medical opinions that he or she receives in 

evaluating a claimant’s case. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(b), 416.927(b). The 

regulations define medical opinions as “statements from physicians . . . that reflect 

judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your 

symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), 

and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 

416.927(a)(2). “Administrative law judges are not bound by any findings made by 

State agency medical or psychological consultants, or other program physicians or 

psychologists.” 20 CFR §§ 404.1527(e)(2)(i), 416.927(e)(2)(i). The ALJ must, 

however, “consider findings and other opinions” of State Agency medical or 

psychological consultants. 

The ALJ generally gives deference to the opinions of a treating source 

“since these are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a 

detailed, longitudinal picture of [a patient’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring 

a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the 

 

crawling, while exertional limitations include lifting, carrying, standing, walking, 

sitting, pushing and pulling. (R. at 119, 131.) 

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objective medical findings alone . . . .” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 

416.927(c)(2); Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 408 (6th Cir. 2009). 

To qualify as a treating source, the physician must have an “ongoing treatment 

relationship” with the claimant. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502, 416.902. 

If the ALJ does not afford controlling weight to a treating physician’s 

opinion, the ALJ must meet certain procedural requirements.7

 Wilson v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). Specifically, if an ALJ does not 

give a treating source’s opinion controlling weight: 

[A]n ALJ must apply certain factors—namely, the length of the 

treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature 

and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, 

consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and the 

specialization of the treating source—in determining what weight to 

give the opinion. 

Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). 

 

7 An exception exists for treating source opinions on issues that are reserved to the 

Commissioner, which “are never entitled to controlling weight or special 

significance.” S.S.R. 96-5p, 61 FR 34471-0, at *34473. Examples of issues 

reserved to the Commissioner include: 

1. Whether an individual’s impairment(s) meets or is equivalent in 

severity to the requirements of any impairment(s) in the listings; 

2. What an individual’s RFC is; 

3. Whether an individual’s RFC prevents him or her from doing past 

relevant work; 

4. How the vocational factors of age, education, and work experience 

apply; and 

5. Whether an individual is “disabled” under the Act. 

Id. 

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However, while an ALJ must “always give good reasons in [the ALJ’s] 

notice of determination or decision for the weight [the ALJ] give[s] your treating 

source’s opinion,” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2), and “must be 

sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the 

adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that 

weight,” Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 09-3889, 375 F. App’x 543, 550 (6th 

Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (internal quotation omitted), there is no per se rule that 

requires a written articulation of each of the six regulatory or “Wilson factors” 

listed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6). Norris v. Comm'r of 

Soc. Sec., No. 11–CV–11974, 2012 WL 3584664, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 

2012) (citing Tilley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 394 F. App'x 216, 222 (6th Cir.2010)). 

In other words, the regulations do not require “an exhaustive factor-by-factor 

analysis.” Francis v. Commissioner Social Sec. Admin., 414 F.App’x 802, 804-

805 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing § 404.1527(d)(2)). 

Moreover, the failure to discuss the requisite factors may constitute harmless 

error: (1) if “a treating source's opinion is so patently deficient that the 

Commissioner could not possibly credit it;” (2) “if the Commissioner adopts the 

opinion of the treating source or makes findings consistent with the opinion;” or 

(3) “where the Commissioner has met the goal of [§ 1527(c) ]–the provision of the 

procedural safeguard of reasons–even though she has not complied with the terms 

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of the regulation.” Nelson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 195 F. App'x 462, 470 (6th 

Cir.2006) (quoting Wilson , 378 F.3d at 547). See also, Betty v. Comm'r of Soc. 

Sec., No. 15-CV-10734, 2016 WL 1105008, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 17, 2016), 

report and recommendation adopted, No. 15-CV-10734-DT, 2016 WL 1090554 

(E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2016). 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has stressed the 

importance of the good-reason requirement: 

“The requirement of reason-giving exists, in part, to let claimants 

understand the disposition of their cases,” particularly in situations 

where a claimant knows that his physician has deemed him disabled 

and therefore “might be especially bewildered when told by an 

administrative bureaucracy that she is not, unless some reason for the 

agency’s decision is supplied.” Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d 

Cir.1999). The requirement also ensures that the ALJ applies the 

treating physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ’s 

application of the rule. See Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32–33 

(2d Cir. 2004). 

Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544–45. Thus, the reason-giving requirement is “particularly 

important when the treating physician has diagnosed the claimant as disabled.” 

Germany-Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 312 F. A’ppx 771, 777 (6th Cir. 2008) 

(citing Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242). 

For the reasons stated below, I find that the ALJ’s opinion gives good 

reasons for discounting the medical opinions at issue and that the Commissioner 

has met the goal of 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). Francis, 414 F.App’x at 

805 (quoting Wilson, 378 F.3d at 547). I also find that the opinion “‘permits the 

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19

claimant and [this] reviewing court a clear understanding of the reasons for the 

weight given [the] treating physician’s opinion[.]’” Francis, 414 F.App’x at 805 

(quoting Friend, 375 F.App’x at 550). 

ii. Crystal Lee-Billing, M.D. (treating physician) 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to comply with 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1427(c), 416.927(c) in assigning weight to the opinion of Dr. Lee-Billing, 

Plaintiff’s treating physician. (DE 13 at 22-25.) 8 In a November 8, 2013 social 

security disability/ability form, Dr. Lee-Billing opined that Plaintiff’s exertional 

limitations include lifting less than 5 pounds, and pushing, pulling and carrying no 

more than 5 pounds. She also opined that Plaintiff is unable to bend and has 

limitations on fine finger manipulation. (R. at 382-383.) 

The ALJ assigned “little weight” to this opinion. Here, the Court should 

conclude that the ALJ properly discounted, or declined to give controlling weight 

to, this assessment by Dr. Lee-Billing. While acknowledging that Dr. Lee-Billing 

is a treating source, the ALJ noted: 

Dr. Lee-Billing's extremely limiting opinion is inconsistent with the 

record as a whole, which contains some evidence of degenerative disc 

disease related pain and occasionally reduced spinal range of motion 

and straight leg raising, but otherwise normal upper and lower 

 

8

 These regulatory factors include examining relationship, treatment relationship, 

supportability, consistency, specialization and other factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(c)(1)-(6), 416.927(c)(1)-(6). 

 

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20

extremity strength, full extremity range of motion, and generally 

normal gait and station . . . . 

(R. at 34.) As cited in support of the ALJ’s opinion, Dr. Elskens’s September 14, 

2012 and October 30, 2012 musculoskeletal notes do, in fact, indicate normal gait 

and station, and notes from the September 14, 2012 visit also describe normal 

range of motion, muscle strength and tone, and stability in the right and left upper 

and lower extremities. (R. at 273, 277 [Ex. 2F].) Likewise, although Drs. Tolbert / 

Perov’s August 7, 2013 musculoskeletal notes indicate some limitations in spinal 

range of motion and a straight leg raise test which was positive on the left, these 

notes also indicate normal range of motion in the right and left lower extremities. 

(R. at 308-309 [Ex. 5F].) Having acknowledged Dr. Lee-Billing’s status as a 

treating physician, but also having explained how her opinion was inconsistent 

with the record as a whole, the ALJ sufficiently complied with 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(c), 416.927(c). See Francis, 414 F. App'x at 804-805 (“Here, the ALJ 

acknowledged Dr. Wakham's role as Francis's ‘treating family osteopath.’ In 

assigning no weight to his opinion, the ALJ cited the opinion's inconsistency with 

the objective medical evidence, Francis's conservative treatment and daily 

activities, and the assessments of Francis's other physicians. Procedurally, the 

regulations require no more.”). 

In addition to the ALJ’s consideration of consistency (20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4)), it is worth noting that the record appears to contain 

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21

only October 18, 2013 progress notes (R. at 388-389), a same-day medication list 

(R. at 392) and the November 8, 2013 social security disability form (R. at 382-

383) by Dr. Lee-Billing. The remaining notes from Advantage Health Centers 

appear to have been documented by Dr. Chapman and Angela Allen, A.P.R.N., 

B.C. (R. at 284-287 [Ex. 3F], 323-344, 346, 351 [Ex. 7F], 388-395 [Ex. 10F].) As 

appropriately noted by the Commissioner, Plaintiff’s brief does not indicate the 

length of her treatment relationship with Dr. Lee-Billing, and, aside from the 

November 8, 2013 form (R. at 382-383), the record reveals only one visit with this 

physician. (DE 13 at 22-25, DE 14 at 13, R. at 388-389, 392.) Consistent with 

this, Plaintiff referred to her as a “new doctor” in her hearing testimony. (R. at 59.) 

Thus, consideration of the “length of the treatment relationship and the frequency 

of examination,” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)(i), 416.927(c)(2)(i) would not 

operate in Plaintiff’s favor, as Dr. Lee-Billing fails to provide the “longitudinal 

picture” or the “unique perspective” which lends weight to the opinions of 

“treating sources.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2), 416.927(c)(2). 

iii. Daniel Elskens, M.D. (treating neurosurgeon) 

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ did not give proper weight to the 

opinions and assessments of treating physician Dr. Elskens as required by 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927 and SSR 96-2p. (DE 13 at 25-27.) As noted above, 

Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Elskens of Eastside Neurosurgery on September 14, 2012 

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22

and October 30, 2012. Each time, the diagnoses were degeneration of lumbar or 

lumbosacral intervertebral disc and lumbar pain. (R. at 272-278.) However, while 

the medical advice at the first visit included home exercise and initiation of 

physical therapy, the medical advice at the latter visit included review of posterior 

fusion versus spinal cord stimulation as treatment options. (R. at 274, 278.) 

Although the ALJ did not make an express assignment of weight to these 

opinions, it is not clear that he was required to do so. “Controlling weight may be 

given only in appropriate circumstances to medical opinions, i.e., opinions on the 

issue(s) of the nature and severity of an individual's impairment(s), from treating 

sources.” SSR 96-2P (S.S.A. July 2, 1996) (emphasis added). “Medical opinions

are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical 

sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), 

including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite 

impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2) (emphasis added). While the “assessments” in Dr. 

Elskens’s treatment notes arguably constitute medical opinions, the “plans” do not 

offer an opinion on Plaintiff’s ability to function, such as from an exertional, 

postural, manipulative, visual, communicative or environmental standpoint. See 

Winter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-11962, 2013 WL 4604782, at *9 (E.D. 

Mich. Aug. 29, 2013) (“But Dr. Scaddan [Plaintiff’s treating physician] never 

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23

opined on what he believed [Plaintiff] could still do in view of her symptoms; in 

other words, he offered no opinion on his patient's ability to function.”). In other 

words, it does not appear that the ALJ was required to expressly assign weight to 

either Dr. Elskens’s September 2012 discussion of home exercise or direction to 

initiate physical therapy or his October 2012 review of Plaintiff’s treatment 

options. (R. at 273-274, 278.) 

Moreover, the ALJ expressly discussed these visits, including Dr. Elskens’s 

review of posterior fusion versus spinal cord stimulation as treatment options. (R. 

at 28, 29.) Then, the ALJ relied upon Dr. Elskens’s notes from these visits in 

support of his finding that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform the exertional 

requirements of light work. Specifically, citing notes from both the University 

Pain Clinic (Ex. 5F) and Eastside Neurosurgery (Ex. 2F), the ALJ explained that 

Plaintiff’s upper and lower extremity strength, intact sensation, full range of 

motion and/or generally normal gait and station support Plaintiff’s ability (a) to 

perform the lifting and carrying requirements of light work and (b) to perform the 

significantly reduced standing, walking, and sitting requirements of light work, 

totaling six hours per day. (R. at 31.) In fact, both the September 14, 2012 and the 

October 30, 2012 musculoskeletal examinations revealed normal gait and station. 

(R. at 273, 277.) Also, the October 30, 2012 neurologic examination indicated, 

“[n]ormal mental status, cranial nerves, motor system, sensory system and 

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reflexes.” (R. at 273.) Therefore, Plaintiff is simply incorrect that the ALJ ignored 

Dr. Elskens’s consideration of another fusion or a spinal cord stimulator. 

(Compare DE 13 at 26, R. at 29). 

iv. Muhammad Khalid, M.D. (non-examining state 

agency medical consultant) 

Plaintiff also alleges that there is no support for the ALJ’s physical RFC 

assessment and that “the record is devoid of any RFC assessments from any 

physicians.” (DE 13 at 27-29.) Within this argument, Plaintiff contends the ALJ 

“did not perform the function-by-function assessment required by SSR 96-8p . . . .” 

(DE 13 at 27-28.) 

In fact, the administrative record contains the January 14, 2013 opinion of 

non-examining state agency medical consultant Muhammad Khalid, M.D. (R. at 

118-120, 130-132.) Among other things, Dr. Khalid opined that Plaintiff has the 

exertional limitations of being able to lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 

10 pounds frequently, stand and/or walk for a total of approximately 6 hours in an 

8-hour workday, and sit for a total of approximately 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. 

Dr. Khalid further opined that Plaintiff has the postural limitations of occasional 

climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling. (R. at 119, 131.) 

In addition, he explained that, having reviewed the medical evidence of record and 

the activities of daily living, Plaintiff was assessed for a light RFC finding. (R. at 

120, 132.) 

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In assigning this opinion “great weight,” the ALJ acknowledged that Dr. 

Khalid did not physically examine Plaintiff. (R. at 34.) Nonetheless, “[s]tate 

agency medical and psychological consultants and other program physicians, 

psychologists, and other medical specialists are highly qualified physicians, 

psychologists, and other medical specialists who are also experts in Social Security 

disability evaluation.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2)(i), 416.927(e)(2)(i). “[A]n ALJ 

can properly rely on the conclusions of a non-examining, record reviewing 

physician to support an RFC assessment.” Gazella v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 13-

11099, 2014 WL 555192, at *11 n.2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 12, 2014) (Zatkoff, J., 

adopting report and recommendation of Hluchaniuk, M.J.);9 see also McGrew v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 343 F.App’x 26, 32 (6th Cir. 2009) (where the ALJ properly 

considered the opinions of two state agency physicians). Were this not the case, 

and if ALJs were utterly bound to rubber-stamp the opinions of treating sources 

regardless of the 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c) considerations, one would 

have to ask rhetorically what the point of obtaining a consulting opinion could 

possibly be. 

Moreover, the ALJ noted that Dr. Khalid’s opinion was: 

 

9 See also Hirschback v. Colvin, No. 1:12-CV-713, 2013 WL 6147883, at *3 (S.D. 

Ohio Nov. 22, 2013) (“After assessing the weight afforded to medical source 

evidence, ultimately, an ALJ can properly rely on the conclusions of a 

nonexamining, record reviewing physician to support an RFC assessment.”), 

report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Hirschback v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 

No. 1:12CV713, 2014 WL 1271027 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2014). 

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26

. . . consistent with the record as a whole, which contains evidence of 

degenerative disc disease related pain and occasionally reduced spinal 

range of motion and straight leg raising, but otherwise normal upper 

and lower extremity strength, full extremity range of motion, and 

generally normal gait and station (Exhibit 2F, 3F, 4F, 5F, 7F). 

(R. at 34.) As mentioned earlier, these observations are consistent with the 

musculoskeletal examinations of Dr. Elskens and Drs. Tolbert / Perov. (R. at 272-

274 [Ex. 2F], 275-278 [Ex. 2F], 306-310 [Ex. 5F].) Where, as here, the nonexamining source’s opinion is consistent with the overall record and the treating 

source’s opinion is not, the ALJ is permitted to give greater weight to the former 

than to the latter. SSR 96-6P (S.S.A. July 2, 1996) (“In appropriate circumstances, 

opinions from State agency medical and psychological consultants and other 

program physicians and psychologists may be entitled to greater weight than the 

opinions of treating or examining sources.”); see also Thomas v. Comm'r of Soc. 

Sec., No. 12-11545, 2013 WL 4550198, at *13 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 28, 2013) (“the 

examining and reviewing state agency physicians described essentially consistent 

findings regarding plaintiff's functional limitations, and the ALJ reasonably gave 

some weight to the opinions of those physicians.”). Having explained how Dr. 

Khalid’s opinion was consistent with the record as a whole, the ALJ sufficiently 

complied with 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). See Francis, 414 F. App'x at 

804-805. APP: I would adjust this section to make it align with any changes to the 

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parallel discussion under Dr. Lee-Billing. [Not sure what you are proposing. 

Please quickly show me your proposed revision.] 

e. Conclusion 

The ALJ properly discounted, or declined to give controlling weight to, the 

opinions of the consultative examiner and treating physician and appropriately 

gave significant weight to the opinion of the state agency medical consultant. 

Therefore, the Court should conclude that the ALJ properly evaluated the opinion 

evidence in this case in accordance with 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). 

2. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s mental RFC 

determination (limited to unskilled work). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not assess Plaintiff’s mental RFC in 

accordance with SSR 96-8p and/or SSR 85-15, namely that the ALJ did not 

consider the impact of Plaintiff’s Step 2 severe mental impairments (mood 

disorder, depression, severe bipolar disorder with depression, and moderate panic 

disorder with agoraphobia) on her functional ability. (DE 13 at 29-31.) 

SSR 96-8p, which concerns assessing RFC in initial claims, provides, in 

part: “The RFC assessment must first identify the individual's functional 

limitations or restrictions and assess his or her work-related abilities on a functionby-function basis, including the functions in paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) of 20 CFR 

404.1545 and 416.945.” SSR 96-8p (S.S.A. July 2, 1996). “Only after that may 

RFC be expressed in terms of the exertional levels of work, sedentary, light, 

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medium, heavy, and very heavy.” Id. (emphasis added). As to non-exertional 

capacity, the rule further provides: “Work-related mental activities generally 

required by competitive, remunerative work include the abilities to: understand, 

carry out, and remember instructions; use judgment in making work-related 

decisions; respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers and work situations; 

and deal with changes in a routine work setting.” Id. (emphasis added); see also 

Calloway v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-10020, 2016 WL 1165948, at *7 (E.D. 

Mich. Mar. 1, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 15-10020, 2016 

WL 1161529 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 23, 2016) (citing SSR 96–8p, 1996 WL 374184, at 

*6 (July 1, 1996)). In other words, “SSR 96–8p requires an ALJ to individually 

assess the exertional (lifting, carrying, standing, walking, sitting, pushing, and 

pulling), and non-exertional (manipulative, postural, visual, communicative, and 

mental functions) capacities of the claimant in determining a claimant's RFC.” 

Delgado v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 30 F. App'x 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2002) (emphasis 

added). 

However, “[a]lthough SSR 96–8p requires a ‘function-by-function 

evaluation’ to determine a claimant's RFC, case law does not require the ALJ to 

discuss those capacities for which no limitation is alleged.” Delgado, 30 F. App'x 

at 547. Instead, the ALJ “‘need only articulate how the evidence in the record 

supports the RFC determination, discuss the claimant's ability to perform sustained 

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work-related activities, and explain the resolution of any inconsistencies in the 

record.’” Id. (quoting Bencivengo v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 00–1995, 251 F.3d 

153, slip op. at 5 (3d Cir. Dec. 19, 2000)). 

a. The ALJ adequately discussed Plaintiff’s mental 

limitation to unskilled work. 

At Step 2, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s severe impairments, which 

included mood disorder, depression, sever bipolar disorder with depression and 

moderate panic disorder with agoraphobia – “interfere more than minimally with 

[Plaintiff’s] ability to perform basic work tasks . . . .” (R. at 22.) ALJ Pope then 

considered Plaintiff’s mental health records - the January 29, 2013 consultative 

psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Hasan (R. at 288-290), the 2013 records from 

psychiatrist Dr. Yeragani (R. at 357-367) and the 2013 records from Eastwood 

Clinic (R. at 370-383) – in multiple places. 

To begin, at Step 3, in concluding that Plaintiff has mild restrictions in 

activities of daily living, the ALJ stated: “The fact that the claimant is able to care 

for her young granddaughter each day without supervision, shows that she retains 

mental capabilities exceeding her testimonial reports[,]” and “it would seem that 

any limitations in this domain are secondary to her physical rather than mental 

impairments.” (R. at 23 (emphases added).) Then, the ALJ cited Plaintiff’s mental 

health records in his conclusions that Plaintiff had mild difficulties in social 

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functioning and moderate difficulties with regard to concentration, persistence or 

pace (CPP). (R. at 23-24.) 

Next, at Step 4, the ALJ expressly considered Plaintiff’s mental health 

records in great detail. (See, i.e., R. at 29-30.) Perhaps most importantly, the 

ALJ’s Step 4 discussion of Plaintiff’s mental health records explains the 

determination that Plaintiff’s mental RFC is limited to unskilled work. For 

example, the ALJ observed: 

Turning to the claimant's mental impairments, the foregoing record 

contains evidence of mood disorder, depression, bipolar disorder, and 

panic disorder with agoraphobia, which would reasonably interfere 

with her ability to perform skilled tasks. Mental status examinations 

have revealed occasional cognitive distortion and short-term memory 

problems and occasionally impaired judgment and impulse control, 

and although the claimant has been compl[ia]nt with medication and 

recent formal mental health treatment, she continues to demonstrate 

some mood abnormalities (Exhibit 4F, 8F, 9F). As a result, the 

claimant is limited to unskilled work. However, additional limitations 

are not warranted, as examinations have revealed normal orientation, 

generally normal thought processes and thought content, generally fair 

memory skills, and intact attention and concentration (Id.). In 

addition, despite some indications of agoraphobia and reports of panic 

attacks, the claimant has been cooperative[10] and demonstrated fair 

eye contact on examination (hearing testimony, Exhibit 4F, 8F, 9F). 

Thus, it is clear that she retains the residual mental capacity to 

perform unskilled work. 

 

10 In addition, Plaintiff’s October 29, 2012 SSA field office disability report notes 

that Plaintiff was cooperative. (See R. at 192.) 

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(R. at 32.)11 The ALJ also considered the Eastwood Clinics records in observing 

that “[t]he behavioral health record is significantly limited and sporadic.” Among 

other things, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff “has not required emergency 

hospitalization or inpatient psychiatric treatment.” (R. at 33.) Moreover, the ALJ 

considered Plaintiff’s mental health records in arriving at the conclusion that, since 

ALJ Freeman’s February 16, 2010 partially favorable disposition, “the updated 

record does contain evidence of mental impairment . . .[,]” warranting the inclusion 

of mood disorder, depression, bipolar disorder and panic disorder with agoraphobia 

as severe impairments and indicating that Plaintiff is limited to unskilled tasks. (R. 

at 35.) 

 The absence of a “detailed” function-by-function analysis is not required by 

SSR 96-8p. Delgado v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 30 F. App'x 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2002) 

(“‘Although a function-by-function analysis is desirable, SSR 96–8p does not 

 

11 These observations seem to be supported by Dr. Elsken’s September 14, 2012 

psychiatric observations (R. at 275-278 [Ex. 2F]), psychiatrist Dr. Hasan’s January 

29, 2013 notes (R. at 288-290 [Ex. 4F]), therapist Masek’s May 3, 2013 intake 

assessment form (R. at 378-381 [Ex. 9F]), Masek’s May 3, 2013 outpatient 

progress notes (R. at 370 [Ex. 9F]), Masek’s May 21, 2013 progress notes (R. at 

371 [Ex. 9F]), Masek’s June 3, 2013 outpatient progress notes (R. at 367, 372 [Ex. 

8F]), Dr. Yeragani’s June 7, 2013 psychiatric evaluation (R. at 362-365 [Ex. 8F], 

374-377 [Ex. 9F]), Masek’s June 14, 2013 outpatient progress notes (R. at 373 [Ex. 

9F]), the July 8, 2013 assessment by Dr. Yeragani / Masek (R. at 359-360 [Ex. 

8F]), Drs. Tolbert’s / Perov’s August 7, 2013 notes from the University Pain Clinic 

Detroit (R. at 306-310 [Ex. 5F]), and Masek’s August 20, 2013 progress notes (R. 

at 366 [Ex. 8F]). Additionally, I note that the ALJ’s statement that there is 

evidence of depression, bipolar disorder and panic disorder with agoraphobia is 

consistent with Dr. Lee-Billing’s October 2013 progress notes. (R. at 388.) 

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32

require ALJs to produce such a detailed statement in writing.’”) (quoting 

Bencivengo, slip op. at 4). Moreover, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s behavioral 

health records throughout his decision and explained the determination that 

Plaintiff is limited to unskilled work. In other words, he articulated “how the 

evidence in the record supports the RFC determination . . . .” Delgado, 30 F.App’x 

547. The ALJ performed an extensive, if not exhaustive, discussion of Plaintiff’s 

mental health records (R. at 29-30, see also R. at 26, 31) and then explained the 

effect of her mental health impairments on her ability to work. (See 32-33, see 

also R. at 35). Plaintiff’s characterization of this effort as a failure “to properly 

assess” is misplaced. (DE 13 at 29.) The ALJ’s assessment was proper and 

thorough. 

In reality, Plaintiff appears to take issue with the ALJ’s weighing of the 

evidence, and seeks to reverse the conclusion, but this is not permitted by the 

applicable standard of review. The Court cannot re-weigh this evidence in favor of 

Plaintiff simply because there is evidence in the record supporting an opposite 

conclusion. See VanSingel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 26 F. App’x 488, 489 (6th Cir. 

2002) (“If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be 

affirmed, even if [the reviewing court] would have arrived at a different result.”) 

(citing Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059 (6th Cir.1983)); Mullen v. 

Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (concluding that “[a]n administrative 

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33

decision is not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence would have 

supported an opposite decision.”). The ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s mental 

RFC is limited to unskilled work is supported by substantial evidence, is consistent 

with SSR 96-8p, and should be upheld. 

b. The ALJ made appropriate assignments of weight 

with respect to the behavioral health evidence of 

record. 

 

i. The ALJ was permitted to discredit the GAF 

scores. 

 The ALJ’s decision makes several references to Plaintiff’s global assessment 

of functioning (GAF). For example, Dr. Hasan’s January 29, 2013 GAF 

assessment was 50 (R. at 290), therapist Masek’s May 3, 2013 GAF assessment 

was 60 (R. at 380), and Dr. Yeragani’s June 7, 2013 GAF assessment was 50 (R. at 

365, 377). By way of background, “[a] 41–50 reflects the assessor's opinion that 

the subject has serious symptoms or serious impairment of social or occupational 

functioning[,]” and “a 51–60 reflects the opinion that the subject has moderate 

symptoms or moderate impairment of social or occupational functioning.” 

Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App'x 496, 511 (6th Cir. 2006). 

The ALJ accorded these scores “little weight,” in part because such scores 

are “highly subjective” and do not represent “a longitudinal view of the claimant’s 

functioning.” Furthermore, the ALJ reasoned that “in this case, the generally mild 

mental health findings contained in the record and minimal mental health treatment 

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34

do[] not support greater functional limitation than what is set forth in the above 

[RFC], despite the low GAF scores.” (R. at 32; see also R. at 29, 30.) 

The ALJ was permitted to discredit these scores. As the Sixth Circuit has 

observed, “according to the DSM's explanation of the GAF scale, a score may have 

little or no bearing on the subject's social and occupational functioning.” 

Kornecky, 167 F. App'x at 511. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit has noted that it is 

“not aware of any statutory, regulatory, or other authority requiring the ALJ to put 

stock in a GAF score in the first place.” Id. at 511. 

ii. The ALJ properly credited the opinion of R. 

Hasan, M.D. (state agency psychiatric 

consultative examiner). 

 Plaintiff claims that Dr. Hasan’s opinion does not discuss Plaintiff’s RFC in 

terms of “work-related functions,” as contemplated by SSR 96-8p, which concerns 

assessing RFC in initial claims, and SSR 85-15, which concerns evaluating solely 

non-exertional impairments. (See DE 13 at 30-31.) 

 In his Step 4 RFC determination, the ALJ considered the January 29, 2013 

psychiatric evaluation by R. Hasan, M.D., which concluded that Plaintiff is able to 

“understand, follow and retain simple instructions[,]” and “manage [her] own 

benefit funds.” (R. at 34, 290; see also R. at 29.) In assigning Dr. Hasan’s opinion 

“great weight,” the ALJ made two specific observations: (1) Dr. Hasan’s opinion 

is consistent with his own “mild examination findings” of “occasional short term 

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memory problems;” “mild mood and self-esteem abnormalities” (in other words 

mood swings, depressed mood, mood disorder and low self-esteem); but otherwise 

“normal speech,” described as spontaneous and logical; “fair eye contact;” and 

“some motivation and insight[,]” (R. at 34, 289; see also R. at 29), and (2) Dr. 

Hasan’s opinion is consistent with the remaining record evidence, such as “some 

continued mood abnormalities,” “occasionally impaired judgment, impulse control, 

and cognitive distortion,” but otherwise “normal orientation,” generally “normal 

thought processes and thought content,” generally “fair memory skills,” and “intact 

attention and concentration[.]” (R. at 34.) 

 Thus, the ALJ considered the factor of consistency (see 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4)) when determining the weight assigned to Dr. 

Hasan’s opinion and then provided “good reasons” for assigning it “great weight.” 

Moreover, in twice commenting on Dr. Hasan’s statement that Plaintiff “is able to 

understand, follow and retain simple instructions[,]” (see R. at 29, 34, 114, 126, 

290), the ALJ expressly considered Plaintiff’s ability to “understand, carry out, and 

remember instructions[.]” SSR 96-8p. If ALJ Pope did not also expressly 

comment on Plaintiff’s ability to “use judgment in making work-related decisions; 

respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers and work situations; and deal 

with changes in a routine work setting[,]” per SSR 96-8p, Plaintiff has not shown 

how such an omission entitled her to a different mental RFC than that assessed by 

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36

ALJ Pope. (See DE 13 at 29-31, Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 

529 (6th Cir. 1997) (“during the first four steps, the claimant has the burden of 

proof[.]”).) 

iii. The ALJ properly discounted the opinion of 

Edward Czarnecki, Ph.D. (non-examining state 

agency psychological consultant). 

In his Step 4 RFC determination, the ALJ considered the February 20, 2013 

assessment by Dr. Czarnecki, who explained that Plaintiff’s mental impairment “is 

not severe.” (R. at 34, 117-118, 129-130.) Plaintiff claims that Dr. Czarnecki’s 

opinion does not discuss Plaintiff’s RFC in terms of “work-related functions,” as 

contemplated by SSR 96-8p and SSR 85-15. (See DE 13 at 30-31.) 

To be sure, Plaintiff’s argument as to Dr. Czarnecki assessment appears to 

be that it is not an adequate substitute for the allegedly similar omissions in Dr. 

Hasan’s opinion. (DE 13 at 30.) However, the ALJ did properly discount this 

opinion, setting forth three reasons why he assigned this opinion “little weight.” 

First, it is a non-examining determination. Second, Dr. Czarnecki’s opinion is 

inconsistent with the record as a whole, “which contains evidence of some, albeit 

mild, mental status examination findings of mood abnormalities, occasionally 

impaired judgment and impulse control, and occasional cognitive distortion and 

impaired short-term memory[.]” Third, the ALJ noted that Dr. Czarnecki’s 

February 20, 2013 assessment pre-dates Plaintiff’s formal mental health treatment, 

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37

which appears to have been initiated on May 3, 2013 (R. at 378-380). (See R. at 

32.) Thus, the ALJ considered 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c) factors when 

determining the weight assigned to Dr. Czarnecki’s opinion and then provided 

“good reasons” for assigning it “little weight.” 

G. Conclusion

 In sum, I conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision 

denying benefits and, further, that the clarity of his opinion allows for meaningful 

appellate review. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (DE 13), GRANT Defendant’s motion 

for summary judgment (DE 14), and AFFIRM the Commissioner of Social 

Security’s decision. 

III. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

 The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and 

Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service, 

as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 

72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right 

of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections that raise some 

issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a 

party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health & 

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38

Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of 

Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1273 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 

72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge. 

 Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” and “Objection No. 

2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and 

Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an 

objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the 

objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 

72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, 

in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to 

Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without 

merit, it may rule without awaiting the response. 

Dated: June 29, 2016 s/Anthony P. Patti 

 Anthony P. Patti 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was sent to parties of record 

on June 29, 2016, electronically and/or by U.S. Mail. 

 

 s/Michael Williams 

 Case Manager for the 

Honorable Anthony P. Patti 

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