(quoting LindeIli v. Town of San Anselmo, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453, 461 (Ct. 

App. 2003)). In other words, the writ must be denied if the petitioner will 

gain no direct benefit from its issuance and suffer no direct detriment if it 

is denied. Id. Counsel's concern in providing Bean with effective 

assistance of counsel at his trial is insufficient to establish the beneficial 

interest necessary to confer standing in this instance. In particular, 

Bean's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel 

belongs solely to him and counsel have no personal interest in that right. 

See Cole v. Gabriel, 822 S.W.2d 296, 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (dismissing a 

petition for a writ of mandamus filed by an attorney in his individual 

capacity because he did not have standing to assert his client's lawyerclient privilege because the attorney had no personal interest in the 

matter). Because counsel does not have standing to pursue this petition 

for a writ of mandamus, we must deny the petition.' 

"We nonetheless are concerned that the district court placed too 

much emphasis on Bean's invocation of his speedy trial rights in denying 

the continuance. There is inherent tension between a defendant's speedy 

trial rights and his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of 

counsel. See People v. Frye, 959 P.2d 183, 202 (Cal. 1998) (noting tension 

between right to speedy trial and right to effective assistance of counsel 

that arises "when the defendant's desire to invoke the right to speedy trial 

by refusing to waive time [comes] into conflict with defense counsel's 

request for a continuance"), overruled on other grounds by People v. 

Doolin, 198 P.3d 11 (Cal. 2009); Taylor v. State, 557 So. 2d 138, 141-42 

(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (noting the tension between the right to a speedy 

trial and the constitutional right to competent, prepared counsel), 

disapproved on other grounds by Heuss v. State, 687 So. 2d 823, 824 (Fla. 

1996). Bean's invocation of his speedy trial rights is only one factor in 

deciding whether a continuance would infringe on that right; the reason 

for the delay must also be considered. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 

530 (1972) (identifying four factors); see also Sheriff v. Berman, 99 Nev. 

102, 107, 659 P.2d 298, 301 (1983) ("The four Barker factors must be 

considered together, and no single factor is either necessary or 

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It is so ORDERED. 2 

Hardesty 

••°; 

Douglasii7 

CHERRY, J., dissenting: 

I am extremely concerned that Bean is "gaming" the 

administration of criminal justice by forcing his counsel to proceed to trial 

before counsel has properly prepared a mitigation defense to the capital 

murder charge. 

The majority denies the petition on the basis that Bean's 

counsel does not have standing (no personal interest in Bean's Sixth 

. . . continued 

sufficient."). Similarly, the statutory right to a speedy trial may give way 

to a showing of good cause for a delay. Huebner v. State, 103 Nev. 29, 31, 

731 P.2d 1330, 1332 (1987). The proffered reason or good cause for the 

delay is the need to protect Bean's constitutional right to effective 

assistance of counsel. That reason is significant and may warrant a 

reasonable continuance without violating Bean's right to a speedy trial. 

See Taylor, 557 So. 2d at 142 (finding no violation of the constitutional 

right to speedy trial where continuance, granted over defendant's 

objection, was reasonable and necessary to protect right to competent, 

adequately prepared counsel). It is unclear whether the district court gave 

sufficient consideration to the reason for the delay or based its decision 

solely on Bean's invocation of his speedy trial rights and objection to a 

continuance. 

2We deny petitioners' motions to stay the district court proceedings 

and to expedite this court's decision on the stay motion. 

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Amendment rights), and further, that Bean's right to a speedy trial 

trumps his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 

Thus, by denying the petition, the majority is allowing a speedy trial to 

outweigh effective assistance. 

My vast experience in the capital murder "trenches" as a 

public defender, court-appointed attorney, special public defender, and 

trial judge convinces me that Bean's counsel should prevail in this pretrial 

matter, and that a stay of proceedings and a continuance of the trial date 

are appropriate so that counsel can be adequately prepared to present 

mitigation evidence to the jury in case Bean is convicted of first-degree 

murder. 

I do not pretend to have a crystal ball, but I do envision 

extensive post-trial proceedings, including post-conviction relief years 

later if, in fact, Bean is sentenced to death. 

Why is it "strategy" or "tactics" when a defense attorney 

concedes the guilt of his or her client without the client's consent, 

Artnenta-Carpio v. State, 129 Nev. „ 306 P.3d 395, 398 (2013), 

which could be construed to violate the client's Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights to remain silent and not be forced to testify, and yet in 

this matter we ignore the strategy or tactics of defense counsel in their 

quest to provide effective assistance to a capital murder defendant? 

I have observed numerous situations where a defendant's 

speedy trial rights have been foiled due to the factors set forth in Barker v. 

Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 

In light of the above, I respectfully dissent. 

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cc: Hon. William Rogers, District Judge 

Kenneth V. Ward 

Richard P. Davies 

Jeremiah Diaz Bean 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Lyon County District Attorney 

Third District Court Clerk 

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