UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, CASE NO. 15-20412

HON. DENISE PAGE HOOD

v.

EUGENE DESHAWN JACKSON,

Defendant.

 /

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO REMOVE COUNSEL,

AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR NEW COURTAPPOINTED COUNSEL [#63] 

I. BACKGROUND

On July 7, 2005, Defendant Eugene Jackson (“Jackson”) was charged by

Indictment with giving a False Statement During the Acquisition of a Firearm,

Aiding and Abetting (Count I), Distribution of Controlled Substance (Heroin)

(Count II), Felon in Possession of a Firearm Following Three Serious Drug

Offense Convictions (Count III) and Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a

Drug Trafficking Crime (Count IV). (Doc # 4) A jury trial was set for August 25,

2015. (Doc # 17) Michael Rataj (“Rataj”) appeared as counsel for Defendant

Jackson. Pursuant to a Stipulated Order, jury trial was eventually reset for

September 13, 2016. (Doc # 33) Jackson entered a plea of guilty to Count III,

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pursuant to a Rule 11 Plea Agreement with the Government. A plea hearing was

held on August 22, 2016, and the Court accepted the Rule 11 Plea Agreement and

Jackson’s plea of guilty, finding that the plea was knowingly, freely, and

voluntarily made. (Doc # 42) 

On November 2016, Jackson filed a letter to the Court alleging neglect, lack

of communication, and disrespect on Rataj’s part toward Jackson and his family. 

(Doc # 43) The letter further alleges that Jackson entered a plea of guilty under

duress because he was “overwhelmed and mentally exhausted by [his] several

cases and [his] attorney double talking” him, and because his attorney coerced him

to believe he was guilty. (Id.) Rataj filed his first Motion to Withdraw as Counsel

on December 5, 2016. (Doc # 45) The Court held a motion hearing on January 24,

2017. Rataj withdrew his Motion on the record. Jackson agreed on the record to

move forward with Rataj, and stated that their relationship had been restored. The

Court then entered an Order Allowing Rataj to withdraw his Motion to Withdraw

as Counsel. (Doc # 48)

Rataj filed a second Motion to Withdraw as Counsel on May 11, 2017. (Doc

# 50) The Court granted Rataj’s Motion on June 23, 2017. (Doc # 55) S. Allen

Early, III (“Early”) appeared as new defense counsel on July 6, 2017. (Doc # 56) 

On August 16, 2017, Jackson filed a Motion for Permission to Withdraw his Plea

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of Guilty (Doc # 57), which was denied by the Court on October 12, 2017. (Doc #

61) Sentencing is set for November 9, 2017. (Id.) 

This matter is now before the Court on Jackson’s request to remove counsel,

and be granted a new court-appointed attorney. Jackson alleges that there has been

a total and irreconcilable breakdown in the attorney-client relationship to such an

extent that it is in his best interest that new counsel be appointed to represent him. 

Jackson alleges Early: (1) has not provided him with all Discovery material in his

possession; (2) has not submitted a motion to compel discovery by the

Government; (3) has not sought the investigative information Jackson has

requested; (4) has kept very poor communication with Jackson; and (5) is not

responding to any of his letters or phone calls from his “support system.” 

Jackson further accuses Early of “deficient performance, poor investigative

inquir[y], lack of significant communication, disassociated attitude, failure to

create adversary challenges, and gross with-holding of Discovery material.” (Doc

# 63, Pg ID 3) Jackson provides this information in support of his assertion that

Early has provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The Government filed a

response and takes no position concerning the Motion before the court. (Doc # 64) 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Jackson’s Motion. 

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II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Remove Counsel

The Local Rules provide that an attorney making an appearance on behalf of

a defendant continues to represent the defendant through an appeal unless the

district court grants a motion to withdraw prior to the notice of appeal being filed. 

E.D. Mich. L. Cr. R. 57.1(a). It is well established that a criminal defendant

accused of a felony has a constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to be

represented by counsel and to have counsel appointed for him if he cannot afford

one, or, alternatively, to represent himself in such proceedings. Faretta v.

California, 442 U.S. 806 (1975). The “essential aim of the Amendment is to

guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure

that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.” 

Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). The Sixth Amendment does not

guarantee a “meaningful relationship” between a defendant and his attorney. 

Morriss v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). A motion for new court appointed

counsel based upon a defendant’s dissatisfaction with his counsel is addressed to

the sound discretion of the trial court. United States v. White, 451 F.2d 1225 (6th

Cir. 1971). The defendant’s right “to court appointed counsel does not carry with

it the right to select a particular attorney.” Id.

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This is the third motion to either remove or withdraw counsel in the present

case. Jackson has presented arguments critical of Early’s representation that are

nearly identical to the criticisms he made against Rataj. The differences being

attributable to the timing of the present Motion. This is also the second time

Jackson has accused his attorney of ineffective assistance of counsel. Jackson

alleges that Early has provided ineffective assistance, mostly because of an alleged

failure to provide Discovery documents that Jackson believes are in Early’s

possession. However, Jackson has not adequately supported his ineffective

assistance of counsel theory. 

The Supreme Court in Strickland v. United States, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)

announced the two prong test to determine whether counsel’s assistance was

ineffective. One seeking relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel

bears the burden of showing that his attorney was so deficient as not to be

functioning as counsel under the Sixth Amendment and that prejudice resulted to a

degree that the petitioner was deprived of a fair trial. Id. at 686–87. In the context

of a guilty plea, the resulting prejudice must amount to a showing that, but for

counsel’s errors, the petitioner would not have pled guilty but would have insisted

on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985). The defendant must

show: first, that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as

counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment; and second, that the deficient

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performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. “The defendant must show that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. 

Jackson does not direct the Court to any errors Early has committed that rise

to ineffective assistance of counsel. Jackson has also not shown prejudice–that but

for prior counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have

been different. Id. Similar to arguments Jackson previously made against Rataj,

he has failed to show that Early’s representation has been ineffective. Jackson is

not entitled to the representation of his choice. See White, 451 F.2d at 1226 (“The

right of an accused to court-appointed counsel does not carry with it the right to

select a particular attorney.”). 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Jackson’s Motion to Remove Counsel

(Doc # 63) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jackson’s request for new Court

appointed counsel is DENIED.

S/Denise Page Hood 

Chief Judge, United States District Court

Dated: January 9, 2018

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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of

record on January 9, 2018, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry 

Case Manager

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