### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Assigned on Briefs J

anuary 23, 2001
BILLY J. GROOMS v. STATE OF TENNE SSEE Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Cocke County No. 26,243 III Rex Henry Ogle, Judge

No. E2000- 00958-CCA- R3-PC March 14, 2001
The petitioner, Billy J. Grooms, appeals the trial court's denial of a pro se petition to correct an illegal judgment/sentence. The trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; D

ismissal Affirme

d.
G ARY R. W ADE , P.J., delivered the o pin ion of t he court, in which J OSEPH M. T IPTON , J., joined. J AMES C URWOOD W ITT , J R ., J., joined in the result. Billy J. Grooms, Pro Se.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; R. Stephen Jobe, Assistant Attorney General; Al Schmutzer, Jr., District Attorney General; and James B. Dunn, Assistant District Attorney

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION
On August 20, 1983, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of first degree murder during the perpetration of an armed robbery. The trial court imposed conc urrent life sentences. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-202 (1982). The convictions were affirmed on direct appea l. State v. R ichard Grooms and Billy Gr

ooms , No. 107 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Mar. 26, 1986). Application for permission to appeal to the supreme court was denied on June 30, 198 6. Since that time, the petitioner has challenged the propriety of his convictions on several occasions. In Billy Groom s v. State , No. 142 (Tenn. Crim . App., at Knoxville,

Mar. 21, 1989), thi

s court affirmed th e trial cour t's denial of post-conviction relief. Appl ication for permission to appeal to the supreme court was deniedJune 5, 1989. In Billy Grooms v. State , No. 03C01-9103-CR-00092 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Nov. 6, 1991), this court affirmed the denial of a second petition for post-conviction relief. In Billy Groom

s v. State , No. 03C01-9603-CC-00136 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Apr. 21, 1997), this court affirmed the denial of a third petition for post-conviction relief. On February-2-

15, 2000, the petitioner filed this "Petition to Correct Illegal Judgment/Sentence." As grounds for relief, he conte

nded as follows: (1) The trial court improperly included two separate convictions and sentences on one judgment f

orm; (2) the judgment for

m was not entered

in the minutes of the

clerk of the cour

t; (3) the trial court treated the minutes lightly; and (4) the judgment identified the petitioner as Billy

L. Gr ooms ra ther th an Bill y J. Grooms. The state filed a response and the trial court dismissed by genera l order.
In this appeal, the petitioner addresses only issues (1) and (2). He alleges that the convicting court failed to comply

withTenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-209(e)–(f), requiring a separate judgment for eachconviction, and Te

nn. R. Crim. P. 32(e), requiring a judgment of conviction to be "entered by the clerk." The petitioner also complains that the minutes had not been signed at the end o f each workday in accordance

with Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-106(a). He contends that h

e is entitled to relief because any sentence imposed at variance with express statutory provisions is a nullity and subject to correction at any time.
The gener a l rule is that an illegal sentence may, in fact, be corre cted at anytime. State v. Burkhart , 566 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978) (noting that thetrial court had the power and duty

to correct an ill ega l sentence at any time). Typica lly, a challenge to an illegal sentence by an incarce rateddefendant is by petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Stephenson v. Car lton , 2 8 S.W.3d 910 (Tenn. 2000); Freddie Cupples v . State , No. 02C01-9511-CC-00333, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 22, 1996), app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 10, 1997). This cour t has als o considered

an attack on an illegal sentence by way of post-conviction petition, holding that the action is not barred

by the applicable statute of limitations. Kevin Lavell Abston v. State , No. 02C01-9807- CR-00212, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. , at Jackso n, Dec. 30, 1 998) (citi ng State v. Mahler , 735 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tenn. 1987)); see also Jame s Gord on Coo ns, III v. State , No. 01C01-9801-CR

00014, sli p op . at 6 (T enn . Cr im. App ., a t Na shv ill e, M ay 6, 1999). Rule 3(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate

Procedure does not

recognize a direct appeal of a dismissal of a motion to correct an illegal sentence. In the interests of justice, however, an order de nyi ng a petition to correct an illegal sentence may be treated by this court as a petition for writ of certiorari. State v. Donald Ree Jon es , No. M2000-00381-CCA-R3-CD, slip op. at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct. 13, 20 00) ; see also State v. Leath , 977 S. W.2d 132, 135 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). In Jones , a panel of this court also ruled that when a petitioner seeks relief from an illegal sentence by way of habeas corpu

s, he may do so in the

convicting cour

t rather than the

court nearest hi

s place of incarceration (Morgan County i n this case) because the former can correct an illegal sentenc e at any time and

is i n possession of the records pertaining to the sentence. Id. , slip op. a t 2-3. This cour t ruled that the-3-

convenienceof having the re cords present pr

ovides a sufficie

nt reason for the

convicting cour

t to exercise jurisdiction despit

e th e terms of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-105 ( "The [habeas co rpus] application should be made to the court or judge most conv eni ent in point of distance to the applicant,unless a sufficient reason be given in the petition for not applying to such court or judge."). In State v. Bruce C. Reliford , this court treate d an improper app

eal of a motion to

correct alleg

edly illegal sentences as a common law petition for writ of certiorari because the claim was that the trial court had "'exceeded the jurisdiction conferred, or [was] acting illegally , when, in the judgment of the court,there [was] no other p lain, speedy, or adequate remedy.'" No. W1999-00826-CCA-R3- CD, slip o p. at 2 (Tenn . Crim. App ., at Jacks on, Oct. 2, 2000) (quo ting Leath , 977 S.W.2d at 135 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101)).
A sentence is illegal if it directly contravened a statute in existence a t the time it was imposed. Taylor v. Sta

te , 995 S.W.2d 78, 85 (Te nn. 1999). A sente

nce is not ill egal when the defendant claims only p

rosecutorial misc

onduct or judicial

vindictiveness. See Luttrell v. State , 644 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (noting that alleged constit

utional violations a

re properly addressed in post-conviction, not habeas corpus, proceedings). "Technical violations related to the judgment forms and committa

l documents

. . . would not render [a] petitioner's confinement illegal as long as a valid conviction and resultant legal senten ce were imposed." Marvin Anthony Matthews v. Charles C. Noles , No. 02C01-9206-CC -00140, slip

op. at 4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Feb. 24, 1993), app. denied

(Tenn. June 1, 1993).
In our view, the "technical" concerns expressed by the petitioner

relative to the judgment and the minute entries do not serve as a basis for relief. In State v. Gregory A. Hedges and Thomas D. Carter , Nos. E1999-01350- CCA-R3-CD and E1999 -01323-CCA-R3-CD

(Tenn. Crim

. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 6, 2000), this court held that combining separate convictions in a single judgment form, while violative of

Rule 17 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court, does not provide a basis for relief on a claim of illegal sentence. It has also been held that even the lack of a trial judge 's signaturedoes not neces sarily render a judgment void. Jack P. Carr v. Davi d Mills , No. E2000- 00156-CCA-R3-PC

(Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 13, 2000). Furthermore, a judge's failure to sign minutes does not

result in an illeg

al sentence or a

void judgment. The

duty to sign minutes is deemed directory rather than mandatory

. Jerry L. Johns v. State, No. E1999-00260- CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Mar. 9, 2000), app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 11, 20

00); Kenneth Lee Weston v. State , No. E1999-02095- CCA-R3-CO (Tenn. Cr

im. App., at Knoxville, Nov. 27, 2000). Here, the original indi

ctm ent include d separate counts for each of the two murders. The minutes for

August 20, 1983, reflect two separate verdicts of guilt, as returned by the jury, and the entry of judgment by the trial court. The trial judge approved and signed the minutes on September 2, 1983. The order dated October 4, 1983, providing for concurrent sentences, is also signe d by the trial judge. In our vi ew, the sentence is not illegal. Because the petitioner has not presented any basis for relief, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court is affirme d.-4- ___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRESIDING JUDGE