Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

MICHAEL C. BORSCHEL GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Fishers, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

ANGELA N. SANCHEZ

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

D.S., )

)

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A04-1210-JV-522

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT 

The Honorable Marilyn A. Moores, Judge

The Honorable Geoffrey A. Gaither, Magistrate

Cause No. 49D09-1207-JD-1842

April 23, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

KIRSCH, Judge 
2

D.S. appeals the adjudication finding him a delinquent child for committing what 

would be the crime of receiving stolen property1as a Class D felony if committed by an 

adult. On appeal, D.S. raises the following restated issues:

I. Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by permitting the 

State to reopen its case in chief; and 

II. Whether the juvenile court committed reversible error by denying 

his motion for involuntary dismissal under Indiana Trial Rule 41(B).

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

During May 2012, Ty Steigmeyer (“Steigmeyer”) and Leslie Uland (“Uland”) 

lived in the 4500 block of Carrollton Avenue in Indianapolis. Around 7:00 p.m. on May 

17, 2012, the couple left their two Trek bicycles on their home’s screened-in porch. 

When Uland awoke at 7:00 the next morning, she discovered that the porch screen had 

been cut and the bicycles were gone. The couple called the Indianapolis Metropolitan 

Police Department (“IMPD”), but because the police station was involved in roll call, 

officers did not immediately respond.

Uland and Steigmeyer decided to drive around the neighborhood to look for their 

bicycles. In the alley of the 4300 block of Carrollton Avenue, less than two blocks from 

their home, they saw Steigmeyer’s bicycle and lock in a backyard. Steigmeyer 

approached the bicycle and confirmed that it was his. The couple left the bicycle and 

lock at the scene and drove to a nearby police station to inform the police that they had 

found the bicycle.

 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2. 
3

Officer Martin Koeller (“Officer Koeller”) of the IMPD was standing outside the 

police station near his patrol car; the couple told him their story. Officer Koeller

responded to their request to investigate, located the residence in question, but did not 

find the bicycle. However, Officer Michael Burgess (“Officer Burgess”) of the IMPD, 

responding contemporaneously to the original theft call, drove independently to the 

location and found a bicycle matching Steigmeyer’s bicycle inside a locked front porch at 

the house at 4301 Carrollton Avenue. Officer Burgess also noticed a bicycle lock at the 

rear of the residence. Steigmeyer identified the bicycle as his. The bicycle serial number 

matched that from Steigmeyer’s original purchase and Steigmeyer’s key opened the 

bicycle lock found in the backyard. The police returned the bicycle to Steigmeyer, and 

the next day, D.S.’s father came to Steigmeyer’s home to report that the second bicycle 

could also be found at his home at 4301 Carrollton Avenue. Uland’s bicycle was also 

recovered from that location. 

While at the scene, Officer Koeller spoke to several persons including D.S., his 

aunt, and his father. Officer Koeller was also present when D.S. was interviewed by a 

detective. During that meeting, D.S. stated that he bought what was later identified as 

Steigmeyer’s bicycle from someone on the street in his neighborhood for ten or twenty 

dollars. Eventually, D.S. was arrested and the State filed a petition charging him with 

committing what would be the crime of receiving stolen property as a Class D felony if 

committed by an adult. 

On August 29, 2012, the juvenile court held a denial hearing. Following the 

State’s case in chief, D.S. moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 
4

41(B) on the basis that the State had produced no evidence that D.S. possessed the 

bicycles or “that he knew that [the bicycles] were stolen.” Tr. at 23. The juvenile court 

granted the State’s motion to reopen its case to ask some additional questions of Officer 

Koeller. Thereafter, D.S. renewed his motion for involuntary dismissal, which the 

juvenile court denied. The juvenile court found the allegation of D.S.’s delinquency to be 

true. D.S. now appeals. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Motion to Reopen State’s Case in Chief

D.S. first contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it granted the 

State’s motion to reopen its case in chief during the fact-finding hearing. A party should 

generally be afforded the opportunity to reopen its case to submit evidence that could 

have been part of its case in chief. Saunders v. State, 807 N.E.2d 122, 126 (Ind. Ct. App.

2004). Whether to grant a party’s motion to reopen its case after having rested is a matter 

committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Id. The factors that weigh in the 

exercise of discretion include whether there is prejudice to the opposing party, whether 

the party seeking to reopen appears to have rested inadvertently or purposely, the stage of 

the proceedings at which the request is made, and whether any real confusion or 

inconvenience would result from granting the request. Id. Additionally, “[t]he 

opportunity for a party to reopen its case includes the chance to cure a claimed 

insufficiency of evidence.” Lewis v. State, 406 N.E.2d 1226, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)

(citing Eskridge v. State, 258 Ind. 363, 369, 281 N.E.2d 490, 493 (1972)). The rationale 

being that “‘a trial is not a game of technicalities, but one in which the facts and truth are 
5

sought.’” Ford v. State, 523 N.E.2d 742, 746 (Ind. 1988) (quoting Eskridge, 258 Ind. at

369, 281 N.E.2d at 493).

Following the State’s case in chief, D.S. moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant 

to Indiana Trial Rule 41(B) on the basis that the State had produced no evidence that D.S. 

possessed the bicycles or “that he knew that [the bicycles] were stolen.” Tr. at 23. The 

State immediately made a motion to reopen its case in chief in order to ask Officer 

Koeller, who had recently testified, a few more questions. Id. at 24. The juvenile court 

granted the State’s request. The State questioned Officer Koeller about information he 

learned during an interview of D.S. Id. at 26. Officer Koeller testified that D.S. stated he 

had purchased one bicycle from a black male who approached him on the street, that he

did not know the man’s name; and that he had paid the man ten or twenty dollars for the 

bicycle. Id. at 31. Officer Koeller “took that to mean that [D.S.] had possession of [the 

bicycle].” Id. D.S. maintains that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it granted 

the State’s motion to reopen the case.

Our decision in Saunders serves as guidance to our analysis. At the close of the 

State’s case, Saunders moved for judgment on the evidence based on the State’s failure to 

identify Saunders as the person accused. Saunders, 807 N.E.2d at 126. The trial court 

denied Saunders’s motion, and then allowed the State to reopen its case so the victim

could identify Saunders. Id. Saunders alleged this was error, as he was prejudiced by the 

identification. Id. Our court reasoned as follows:

In Jones v. State, 269 Ind. 543, 548, 381 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 (1978), no 

abuse of discretion was found when the State was allowed to reopen its 

case to present evidence of the defendant’s age. The State both rested and 
6

moved out of the presence of the jury to reopen its case. Our supreme court 

held “no real confusion or inconvenience [was] occasioned by the 

reopening of the [S]tate’s case.” Similarly, in Lewis v. State, 406 N.E.2d 

1226, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), there was no abuse of discretion in 

allowing the State to reopen its case to present identification testimony 

where the State sought to reopen immediately after the close of its case-inchief and where the witness to be presented in reopening was the last 

witness in its case-in-chief. The court reasoned there was therefore no 

undue emphasis on the witness’s reopening testimony. Id. at 1230.

The identification evidence [the victim] offered after the case was reopened 

was evidence that could have been part of the State’s case-in-chief. Even 

though [the victim] was not the State’s last witness, she had been recalled 

to the stand at least once after her initial direct and cross examination in 

order to answer a juror’s question. As a result, it is not apparent that undue 

emphasis could have been placed on her return to the stand to identify 

Saunders. The trial court’s grant of the State’s motion to reopen its case 

was not an abuse of discretion.

Id.

The State made a request to reopen the case just minutes after the State rested, and 

the evidence presented when the case was reopened could have been admitted during the 

State’s case in chief. Here, D.S. was not prejudiced by the additional evidence because 

D.S. had the right to both cross-examine Officer Koeller and offer evidence in his own 

defense. See Gorman v. State, 463 N.E.2d 254, 257 (Ind. 1984) (no prejudice in 

reopening case where witness was known to defense and defense given opportunity to 

cross-examine witness and call additional witnesses in his behalf). Furthermore, because 

the fact-finding hearing was before the bench, there was no real confusion or 

inconvenience. A fact-finding hearing, like a trial, is not a game of technicalities, but one 

in which the facts and truth are sought. Ford, 523 N.E.2d at 746. The juvenile court did 

not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to reopen its case in chief.
7

II. Voluntary Dismissal Pursuant to Trial Rule 41(B)

D.S. next contends that the juvenile court committed reversible error by failing to 

grant his motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Trial Rule 41(B) where the 

evidence was insufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that D.S. knew that the 

bicycles were stolen. 

Involuntary dismissal: Effect thereof. After the plaintiff or party with the 

burden of proof upon an issue, in an action tried by the court without a jury, 

has completed the presentation of his evidence thereon, the opposing party, 

without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not 

granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the weight of 

the evidence and the law there has been shown no right to relief. The court 

as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against 

the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the 

evidence. . . . 

Ind. Trial Rule 41(B).

Our review of the juvenile court’s Trial Rule 41(B) decision is well-established:

The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss made under Trial 

Rule 41(B) is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.

Taflinger Farm v. Uhl, 815 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App.

2004). In reviewing a motion for involuntary dismissal, this 

court will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of 

the witnesses. Id. We will reverse the trial court only if the 

evidence is not conflicting and points unerringly to a 

conclusion different from the one reached by the lower court.

Chemical Waste Mgmt. of Ind., L.L.C. v. City of New Haven, 

755 N.E.2d 624, 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

Thornton–Tomasetti Eng’rs v. Indianapolis–Marion County Pub. Library, 

851 N.E.2d 1269, 1277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). In a criminal action, “[t]he 

defendant’s [Trial Rule 41(B)] motion is essentially a test of the sufficiency 

of the State’s evidence.” Workman v. State, 716 N.E.2d 445, 448 (Ind.

1999). Notably, our review of the denial of the motion for involuntary 

dismissal is limited to the State’s evidence presented during its case-inchief. See Harco, Inc. v. Plainfield Interstate Family Dining Assocs., 758 

N.E.2d 931, 938 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); see also Stephenson v. Frazier, 425 
8

N.E.2d 73, 74 (Ind. 1981) (“Our review of the denial of the motion for 

involuntary dismissal . . . is limited to an examination of the evidence most 

favorable to [the State] which was presented prior to the filing of the 

motion.”) (quoting F.D. Borkholder Co. v. Sandock, 274 Ind. 612, 413 

N.E.2d 567, 570 n.2 (1980)), superseded on other grounds, Ind. Trial Rule 

41(B) (as amended Nov. 4, 1981).

Todd v. State, 900 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Williams v. State, 892 

N.E.2d 666, 670-671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (alterations in original), trans. denied).

The statute defining the crime of receiving stolen property provides: “A person 

who knowingly or intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another 

person that has been the subject of theft commits receiving stolen property, a Class D 

felony.” Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(b). “In addition to proving the explicit elements of the 

crime, the State must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person knew that the 

property was stolen.” S.G. v. State, 956 N.E.2d 668, 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing 

Fortson v. State, 919 N.E.2d 1136, 1139 (Ind. 2010)), trans. denied; see Ind. Code § 35-

41-2-2(d) (“Unless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise, if a kind of 

culpability is required for commission of an offense, it is required with respect to every 

material element of the prohibited conduct.”). “The test of knowledge is not whether a 

reasonable person would have known that the property had been the subject of theft, but 

whether, from the circumstances surrounding the possession, the defendant himself knew 

that it had been the subject of theft.” Id. “‘[K]nowledge that property is stolen may be 

inferred from the circumstances surrounding the possession.’” Id. (quoting Fortson, 919 

N.E.2d at 1139).
9

D.S. is correct that “the mere unexplained possession of recently stolen property 

standing alone does not automatically support a conviction for theft.” Fortson, 919 

N.E.2d at 1143. “Rather, such possession is to be considered along with the other 

evidence in a case, such as how recent or distant in time was the possession from the 

moment the item was stolen, and what are the circumstances of the possession (say, 

possessing right next door as opposed to many miles away).” Id. “In essence, the fact of 

possession and all the surrounding evidence about the possession must be assessed to 

determine whether any rational juror could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id. 

During the fact-finding hearing, the State presented evidence that Steigmeyer and 

Uland’s bicycles were stolen between 7:00 p.m. on May 17, 2012 and 7:00 a.m. on May 

18, 2012. Tr. at 20. The bicycles were stolen from the 4500 block of Carrollton Avenue. 

Id. at 2-3. Less than twelve hours after the bicycles were stolen, Steigmeyer saw a 

bicycle, later confirmed to be his, in the backyard of a house in the 4300 block of 

Carrollton Avenue (“the home”). Id. at 12, 20. The bike was found less than two blocks 

from Steigmeyer’s house. Steigmeyer left the bicycle in the yard and informed the 

police. Id. at 17. When Officer Koeller went to the home, the bicycle was gone. Id. 

Upon further investigation, Officer Burgess found that the bicycle had been moved and 

was now inside an enclosed and locked front porch of the home. Id. at 13. Police spoke 

with a woman at the home who turned out to be the aunt of D.S. Id. at 18. The next day, 

a man, identified in court as D.S.’s father, knocked on the victims’ door to report that the 

other bicycle was also at the home. Id. at 21-22. Uland testified that D.S.’s father had no 
10

reason to know Steigmeyer’s address. Id. at 22. Steigmeyer and Uland recovered 

Uland’s bicycle from the home—the same place where Steigmeyer’s bicycle had been 

found. Id. at 21. When the case was reopened, and prior to D.S.’s renewed motion for 

involuntary dismissal, the State introduced evidence that D.S. admitted he purchased 

Steigmeyer’s bicycle for ten or twenty dollars, from a man he did not know, and who 

randomly approached D.S. on the street and asked him if he wanted to buy the bicycle. 

Id. at 31, 32. 

D.S. was not charged with having stolen the property; instead, he was charged 

with receiving stolen property. The State presented the following evidence: 

Steigmeyer’s and Uland’s bicycles were stolen from Steigmeyer’s house; D.S. bought 

Steigmeyer’s bicycle the same night it was stolen at a location close to Steigmeyer’s 

house; D.S. bought the bicycle from a man on the street that he did not know and for a 

relatively low price; and the bicycle, while initially outside, was placed in the locked 

porch of D.S.’s home soon after Steigmeyer discovered it. This evidence was sufficient 

to support the juvenile court’s conclusion that D.S. received property that he knew had 

been stolen. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not commit reversible error when it 

failed to grant his motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Trial Rule 41(B).

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, J., and PYLE, J., concur.