J. S31042/17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.N.S., AND 

T.S., JR., MINORS

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: T.S., SR., NATURAL 

FATHER

:

:

No. 218 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Order, December 28, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County

Orphans’ Court Division at Nos. 2016-205 IVT,

2016-206 IVT

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., DUBOW, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 26, 2017

Appellant, T.S., Sr. (“Father”), appeals from the order of 

December 28, 2016, terminating his parental rights to the children, A.N.S. 

and T.S., Jr. (“the Children”). After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court, following three evidentiary hearings, made the 

following findings:

1. On March 9, 2016, Cambria County 

Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) filed petitions to 

terminate the parental rights of [K.D., “Mother”], 

age 23, [], and [Father], age 32, [], to their 

respective children. [Mother] is the biological 

mother of [J.D.D.], [] age 3, []; [A.N.S.], [] age 2, 

[]; and [T.S., Jr.], [] now 11 months old []. [Father] 

is the biological father of [A.N.S.] and [T.S., Jr.]. 

The biological father of [J.D.D.] is unknown. The 

grounds alleged are 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] Section 2511(a) 

Subsections (1), (2), (5), and (8).

2. Counsel was appointed for the parents and 

children, and after continuance requests granted by 
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the Court evidentiary hearings were held on June 22, 

2016; September 20, 2016; and September 29, 

2016. After transcripts of the hearings were 

prepared and reviewed by counsel, all counsel 

submitted memoranda of their respective positions.

3. In July 2014, [Mother] and [Father] moved 

to Johnstown, Cambria County, Pennsylvania from 

Onondaga County, New York where [Mother] was 

involved with the New York Department of Social 

Services as a result of issues resulting in a neglect 

petition being filed involving [J.D.D.] and then newly 

born [A.N.S.].

4. Both [Mother] and [Father] were referred 

to Dennis M. Kashurba, a licensed psychologist. 

[Mother] was evaluated by Mr. Kashurba who issued 

a report dated August 20, 2014 (Petitioner Exhibit 

11). The purpose of the evaluation was to gather 

information pertinent to ascertaining what type of 

services would be appropriate to ensure the best 

interests of [Mother]’s two children. [Mother] had a 

history of anger management and impulse control 

problems. Mr. Kashurba in his report stated in part:

“Her judgment in the session 

appeared to be good once she would 

pause and think about the answer she 

had impulsively given to a question. Her 

level of insight appeared to be at an 

early adolescent level of development 

and rather consistent with the obtained 

estimate of intellectual functioning as 

noted below.”

In his diagnostic impression, Mr. Kashurba 

wrote:

“Axis I Impulse Control Disorder, 

NOS Relational Problem NOS 

Anxiety Disorder NOS ADHD, 

Combined Type Disruptive 

Behavior Disorder, NOS, by 

history Mathematics Disorder 
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Bipolar Disorder, NOS, by 

history 

Axis II Borderline Intellectual 

Functioning Histrionic 

Personality Disorder with 

Paranoid Traits and 

Obsessive Compulsive 

Features” 

In Mr. Kashurba’s summary of the various 

tests administered to [Mother], he stated:

“All of her performances fell within 

a relatively consistent band between the 

normal late 10-year level of development 

and the normal early 12-year level of 

development.”

5. In Mr. Kashurba’s conclusion he stated:

“The total information available at 

the present time suggests that [Mother] 

has below average overall intellectual 

ability and academic skills. She also 

appears to have long-standing mental 

health issues which may adversely affect 

her ability to harness her intellectual 

skills in terms of learning and 

independently implementing appropriate 

parenting techniques with her children. 

Thus, it does appear that there will be 

the ongoing need for comprehensive, 

multimodal mental health services as 

well as a variety of social services that 

can typically be facilitated through CYS. 

[Mother] claims that she plans to 

become enrolled in parenting classes at 

some time in the future whenever an 

opening exists for a six-week class. 

However, her mental health and 

cognitive issues clearly indicate that her 

need for services is well beyond the 

scope of typical parent training classes. 
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Additionally, the mental health issues of 

her paramour ([Father]) suggests that 

there will be an ongoing need for an 

external agent of control (CYS)...”

6. On September 24, 2014, Mr. Kashurba 

penned a report based upon his evaluation of 

[Father]. The purpose of that evaluation was to 

gather information pertinent to determining the 

probability of [Father] developing the ability to 

parent his children by himself or with the assistance 

of his paramour, [Mother]. In the clinical interview 

portion of his report, Mr. Kashurba states:

“[Father] presented on time for his 

scheduled appointment. Initially, his 

affect was calm and composed. 

However, later when he was informed of 

ongoing CYS concerns that were 

inconsistent with his perspective of the 

home and family situation, he became 

somewhat irate. He then proceeded to 

engage in denial and minimize the 

circumstances documented by the CYS 

caseworker, CYS social worker, and the 

IFS [(“Independent Family Services”)] 

home management person. [Father] 

actually appeared to possess grossly 

normal intellectual potential. He 

admitted that he has been hearing 

‘voices’ for the past eight years’ time. 

These voices were described as ‘Bob’ 

who supposedly is ‘a mean son of a bitch 

and what I would be like if I was bad.’ 

The other voice, Tom, was described as 

‘my good side.’ Supposedly Tom tells 

[Father] not to listen to Bob. In addition 

to hearing these voices, [Father] 

admitted that he sometimes sees them. 

Bob was described as being ‘tall and 

built’ and being blond with blue eyes. 

Tom, on the other hand, was described 

as having dark hair and hazel eyes and 

being slim.”
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Further, Mr. Kashurba notes:

“[Father] clearly had a 

preoccupation with the overvalued idea 

regarding the status of the dogs in his 

life...[.] It was reasonably obvious that 

[Father] viewed the dogs at least as 

equals to the children in terms of status 

within the family and perhaps higher in 

status.”

In Mr. Kashurba’s summary he notes:

“[Father]’s performance on 

academic testing today found him to 

meet with frustration in basic reading 

skills at a beginning 4th grade level of 

difficulty. This performance placed him 

within the mildly mentally deficient range 

and only at the 1st percentile for his 

chronological age group.”

Mr. Kashurba concludes:

“The total information available at 

the present time suggests that [Father] 

would have adequate intellectual 

potential to learn appropriate parenting 

strategies if his mental health issues 

could be ameliorated. In his current 

‘off meds’ condition, there is little 

likelihood that he will be able to 

ameliorate his mental health difficulties, 

which are chronic and severe, to a 

degree that he will be able to harness his 

low average intellectual potential to learn 

and independently implement 

appropriate parenting strategies for the 

children. His overvalued idea regarding 

the status of the dogs (supposed service 

animals) suggests that these animals will 

continue to be a higher priority to 

[Father] than the children in the 
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household. Unfortunately, it would be 

this examiner’s opinion that the 

supposed service animals have actually 

adversely affected [Father]’s ability to 

function in society.”

7. As a result of a permanency review hearing 

held on April 20, 2015, the Juvenile Court found that 

the parents had only been minimally compliant with 

the permanency plan and that there had been 

minimal progress toward alleviating the 

circumstances necessitating the original placement.

8. Among the Juvenile Judge’s orders, both 

parents were to enroll, participate, attend, and 

successfully complete parenting skill classes; comply 

with the agency social worker in addressing their 

mental health issues; no pets were permitted in the 

residence; and all pets were to be removed prior to 

any consideration of the children’s return home to 

either parent’s residence. [Father] was to have a 

psychiatric evaluation, which the Court notes he 

successfully completed on January 13, 2016 

(Respondent Exhibit 2).

9. Another permanency review hearing was 

held on September 21, 201[5]. Again the Juvenile 

Court found only minimal compliance with the 

permanency plan and only minimal progress toward 

eliminating the circumstances necessitating the 

original placement. Supervised visits were to 

continue, and both [Mother] and [Father] were 

ordered to submit to random drug screens.

10. [Father] was again evaluated by 

Mr. Kashurba resulting in reports of November 5 and 

November 12, 2015. Mr. Kashurba noted in his 

report:

“It would be this examiner’s 

impression that the prognosis for 

significant improvement in the parenting 

domain would not be substantially 

improved and in all likelihood would not 
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make positive contribution to the 

children. Thus, this examiner has no 

choice but to concur with the opinion of 

the CYS and home management staff 

that permanency through adoption would 

be in the children’s best interests.”

11. The results of the January 27, 2016 

permanency review hearing are significant in that 

the parties again had made only minimal compliance 

with the permanency plan, but the Court further 

found that the children had been in placement for 15 

of the last 22 months, neither parent was a 

placement option for the children, and that the 

parents had refused to allow the agency to inspect 

and photograph any residence since October of that 

year. In addition, even with attending mental health 

services both parents continued [to] display 

significant mental health instability. Both parents 

have cognitive limitations that are not likely to 

change in a reasonable period of time. The children 

need a permanent, consistent environment, and the 

goal was changed to adoption.

12. This Court further reviewed in detail 

Petitioner’s Exhibit 13, which were court summaries 

given to the Juvenile Court in October 2014, April 

2015, September 2015, and January 2016.

In the April 13, 2015 court summary it was 

noted that the home was found to be in a deplorable 

condition, including but not limited to garbage, food, 

clothes, dog feces and dog urine on the[] floor and 

furniture. Due to the ongoing nature of the house 

and the parents’ aggressive conversation with the 

social worker, all social worker visits were moved to 

the [CYS] Office.

In the September 21, 2015 report, it was 

noted that the parents now lived separately from 

each other. [Mother] still required constant 

redirection to focus on the skills that she was being 

taught. The social worker continued to observe 

positive progress in her ability to control her 
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impulses and aggressive outbursts however. The 

social [worker] noted that neither parent appeared 

to be able to multitask and supervise and interact 

with both children at the same time. When the 

social worker addressed making good decisions, 

[Father] and [Mother] became very angry and 

defensive and verbalized their belief they are fine 

because they do not have their children so they are 

doing nothing wrong. The parents were not open[] 

to changing their lifestyle to demonstrate stability for 

their children to return home.

In the final report to the Court dated 

January 22, 2016, the social worker noted:

“This social worker continues to 

have numerous concerns regarding 

[Mother]’s ability to provide for her 

children’s basic needs, safety, and 

well-being due to her parenting deficit, 

cognitive limitations, and mental health. 

[Mother] has demonstrated that she is 

unable to adequately parent her children 

during a two-hour visitation, as well as 

maintain a stable lifestyle. It is this 

social worker’s opinion [that] due to 

[Mother]’s cognitive limitations, her 

resistance to participate in parenting 

instruction, and her mental health it is 

not likely she can remedy these concerns 

in a timely manner.

Regarding [Father], he has shown 

consistency when parenting one child; 

however, he is resistant to social work 

services. This social worker has serious 

concerns regarding his mental health 

stability and his need for changing his 

daily functioning. It is this social 

worker’s opinion that [because of] 

[Father]’s mental health, cognitive 

limitations, and unwillingness to change 

his daily functioning [] it is also unlikely 
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he could alleviate the concerns in a 

timely manner.”

13. This Court is well aware that the 

termination of parental rights is one of the most 

serious and severe steps a court can take. As to 

[Father], this Court admits to struggling between 

separating the concept of “reasonable doubt” versus 

a civil case, clear and convincing evidence. This 

Court has examined the individual circumstances of 

this case and considered all explanations and 

accomplishments as to the [F]ather and the lack of 

explanations as to the [M]other on the issues before 

the Court.

14. Addressing the best interests of the 

children, the Court may rely on the testimony of the 

caseworkers and/or social workers. In the report 

(Petitioner Exhibit 10), the caseworker and 

caseworker supervisor note that:

“[Father] and [Mother] have the 

barrier of their mental health and 

cognitive limitations that prevent them 

from making the necessary significant 

changes to provide for their children’s 

safety and well-being in a reasonable 

period of time. In addition, they lie, 

attempt to manipulate, and refuse to 

take responsibility for their actions.

[Father] and [Mother] do love the 

children. There is no bond between both 

parents and [T.S., Jr.] as they have only 

seen him three times since his placement 

from the hospital on January 15, 2016. 

[Mother] has demonstrated minimal 

bonding with [A.N.S.] and [J.D.D.] and 

with that it was not a true parent-child 

bond with either due to her mental 

health and cognitive limitations. For the 

brief period of time [Father] visited with 

[A.N.S.] alone a parent-child bond was 

present. Once the visits resumed 
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together again both parents paid less 

attention and time with [A.N.S.]. The 

most significant bond was the bond 

between [J.D.D.] and [Father] though 

[Father] is not [J.D.D.]’s biological 

father.

[J.D.D.] and [A.N.S.] have a 

genuine bond with their foster family and 

[T.S., Jr.] is bonding with his foster 

family which demonstrates that they will 

be able to build a healthy bond with an 

adoptive family.”

. . . .

16. This Court has found that there does not 

presently exist a strong bond between [Mother] and 

her three children. In terminating the parental rights 

of [Mother], this Court has found that this will best 

meet the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the children.

17. In regard to [Father], the Court has found 

that any bond that exists is minimal. Further, that in 

terminating the rights of [Father] to his two children, 

this Court has found that this will best meet the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of those children.

Order, 12/28/16 at 1-11.

By order entered December 28, 2016, the trial court terminated the 

parental rights of both Mother and Father. The trial court determined that 

CYS established a basis for termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), 

(2), (5), & (8). (Id. at 11-12.) The trial court also found that termination 

best met the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of 

the Children under Section 2511(b). (Id. at 10-11.) This timely appeal 
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followed. In response to Father’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal, the trial court relied on its Opinion and 

Order of December 28, 2016. (Order, 2/14/17 at 1.)

Father has raised the following issues for this court’s review on appeal:

1. Whether the trial court properly considered the 

efforts made by Father to alleviate the 

conditions which led to the agency’s filing a 

Petition to terminate his parental rights[?]

2. Whether the Petitioner below had met its 

burden of terminating Father’s parental rights 

by clear and convincing evidence[?]

3. Whether the trial court erred in relying upon 

the testimony of an expert when said expert 

was relying upon inaccurate information[?]

Father’s brief at 1-2.

When considering appeals such as the one presently 

before us, we are guided by the following:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree 

terminating parental rights, we are 

limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by 

competent evidence. Absent an abuse of 

discretion, an error of law, or insufficient 

evidentiary support for the trial court’s 

decision, the decree must stand. Where 

a trial court has granted a petition to 

involuntarily terminate parental rights, 

this Court must accord the hearing 

judge’s decision the same deference that 

we would give to a jury verdict.

In re: Involuntary Termination of C.W.S.M. and 

K.A.L.M., 839 A.2d 410, 414 (Pa.Super. 2003). We 

are also aware that:
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In a proceeding to involuntarily 

terminate parental rights, the burden of 

proof is upon the party seeking 

termination to establish by “clear and 

convincing” evidence the existence of 

grounds for doing so. The standard of 

“clear and convincing” evidence is 

defined as testimony that is so clear, 

direct, weighty, and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the 

truth of the precise facts in issue.

In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 336 (Pa.Super. 2002) 

(quoting In re Adoption of Atencio, 539 Pa. 161, 

650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (1994)).

In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1003-1104 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc).

Moreover, an abuse of discretion occurs “when the 

course pursued represents not merely an error of 

judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly 

unreasonable or where the law is not applied or 

where the record shows that the action is a result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Id. Generally,

[o]ur case law has made clear that under 

Section 2511, the court must engage in a 

bifurcated process prior to terminating 

parental rights. In re D.W., 856 A.2d 

1231, 1234 (Pa.Super. 2004). Initially, 

the focus is on the conduct of the parent. 

The party seeking termination must 

prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511(a). In re 

B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007, 1013-14 

(Pa.Super. 2001). Only after 

determining that the parent’s conduct 

warrants termination of his or her 

parental rights must the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis: 

determination of the needs and welfare 
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of the child under the standard of best 

interests of the child. C.M.S., supra, 

[884 A.2d 1284, 1286-87 (Pa.Super. 

2005)]; A.C.H., supra, [803 A.2d 224, 

229 (Pa.Super. 2002)]; B.L.L., supra. 

Although a needs and welfare analysis is 

mandated by the statute, it is distinct 

from and not relevant to a determination 

of whether the parent’s conduct justifies 

termination of parental rights under the 

statute. One major aspect of the needs 

and welfare analysis concerns the nature 

and status of the emotional bond 

between parent and child.

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 508 

(Pa.Super. 2006).

Id. at 1004 (brackets in original).

We need only agree with the orphans’ court as to 

any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as 

Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 

843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc), 

appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141 

(2004). Here, we analyze the court’s decision to 

terminate under Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which 

provide as follows.

(a) General Rule.--The rights of a parent in 

regard to a child may be terminated after 

a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has 

caused the child to be 

without essential parental 

care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being and the 
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conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall 

give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child. The 

rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental 

factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical 

care if found to be beyond the control of 

the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) 

or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are 

first initiated subsequent to the giving of 

notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1215-1216 (Pa.Super. 2015).

In order to terminate parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), 

the following three elements must be 

met: (1) repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control 

or subsistence necessary for his physical 

or mental well-being; and (3) the causes 

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 

(Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). “The grounds 
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for termination due to parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative 

misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may 

include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to 

perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 

326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citations omitted).

Id. at 1216.

The record indicates that Father failed to comply with the court’s 

directives. For example, Father refused to get rid of the Pitbull dogs, which 

was a condition of having the Children returned. At one time, there were as 

many as 10 dogs in the residence, including 7 puppies. (Notes of testimony, 

6/22/16 at 37.) The residence was covered in dog feces and smelled of 

ammonia due to the presence of dog urine. (Id. at 169.) The Pitbull dogs 

were aggressive, overly protective, and malnourished, leading to a fear that 

they would attack the Children. (Notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at 131, 152-

153.) Mr. Lonnie Maldet, a CYS caseworker, testified that Mother and Father 

asked for money for dog food and baby formula. (Id. at 131.) He was 

concerned that a hungry Pitbull dog could turn on one of the Children. (Id.) 

Sabrina Uebel, another CYS caseworker, testified that there was one cup of 

dog food for three large Pitbulls, including one that was pregnant. (Id. at 

152.) The baby slept on the floor with the hungry Pitbulls. (Id.) Ms. Uebel 

testified that the dogs were large and aggressive and had to be put in the 

room upstairs during CYS visits. (Id. at 152-153.)

Father could not afford to feed the dogs and lacked the motivation to 

obtain free food from the pet food pantry. (Id. at 152.) The upstairs 
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nursery had been damaged by the dogs. (Id. at 31.) It was clear that 

Father put the needs of the dogs above those of the Children. (Id. at 15, 

124, 156; 6/22/16 at 136-137, 178.) Ashley Shaffer, a licensed social 

worker employed by CYS, testified regarding Father’s relationship with his 

dogs:

My concern with the dogs was it was court ordered 

from the beginning that the children would not be 

considered to go home without the removal of the 

dogs or any animals [from] that home. Your feelings 

of the dogs had been more than the feelings of your 

children. You had expressed to me that the dogs 

give you love. They make you want to be a better 

person and that you love them very much and you 

did that for your mental health. At one point you 

had stated to me that you could not get rid of your 

dogs because you were afraid they would feel 

abandon [sic] and you could not let your dogs feel 

that way. However, at no point did you ever say 

that about your children in foster care.

Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 197-198.

Mr. Kashurba concluded that Father “clearly had a preoccupation with 

the overvalued idea regarding the status of the dogs in his life.” 

(Psychological Evaluation, 9/24/14 at 4.) “It was reasonably obvious that 

[Father] viewed the dogs at least as equals to the children in terms of status 
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within the family and perhaps higher in status.” (Id. at 4-5.) Father never 

did remove the dogs despite the court’s explicit directions.1

Father had numerous financial issues that were never remedied. While 

he made efforts at budgeting, he continued to do things to cause his own 

financial instability such as losing subsidized housing by failing to notify the 

landlord that Mother was living with him. (Notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at 

14.) Ms. Shaffer testified that, “[W]e discussed it on a weekly basis that all 

they had to do was contact the Johnstown Housing Authority and put 

[Mother] on the Section 8 lease. Despite being told that weekly, they never 

followed through and he in fact lost his Section 8 housing.” (Notes of 

testimony, 6/22/16 at 187.) Father failed to pay his bills on time each 

month. (Notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at 14.) When the heating bill was not 

paid, the family would all sleep together on the living room floor. (Notes of 

testimony, 9/20/16 at 33, 94-95, 152.) Mother and Father relied on Father’s

social security disability income to pay the bills; however, the family was 

financially unstable. (Notes of testimony, 9/29/16 at 13.) Father received 

$775 per month and his monthly expenses were approximately $750. (Id.

at 13-15.) Father did claim he received approximately $200-250 cash per 

week doing work under the table. (Id. at 23, 28.) However, Mother and 

 

1 According to Father, the Pitbulls were “service animals.” Father presented 

a letter dated May 1, 2013, from Thomas Maltese, M.D., a psychiatrist, 

stating that the dogs were therapeutic. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 

142-143.) According to Dr. Maltese’s letter, the dogs helped ground Father 

in reality and relieve stress. (Id. at 143.)
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Father often could not afford diapers for the Children. (Notes of testimony, 

9/20/16 at 156.) Despite their financial pressures, there was testimony that 

Father would purchase crab legs for himself. (Id.) 

The condition of the family’s residence was described as deplorable 

and unsanitary. The house was littered with garbage and dog waste. (Notes 

of testimony, 6/22/16 at 169.) There was clutter and dried vomit 

throughout the house. (Id. at 21-22, 33.) Ms. Shaffer testified that the 

smell made her physically ill. (Id. at 169.) The kitchen was covered in 

trash, empty beer bottles, and dirty dishes. (Notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at 

33.) Ms. Gustkey-Patterson testified that the house smelled like dogs. (Id.

at 100.) There was trash and cockroaches in and around the home. (Id.) 

Sometimes she was afraid to enter the property. (Id. at 99-100.) In 

addition, the residence was not child-proofed and was unsafe, with knives 

lying around within reach of the Children. (Id. at 31, 101, 142.) Mr. Maldet 

testified that there were pocket knives, hunting knives, and kitchen knives 

strewn about, as well as cigarette butts and lighters. (Id. at 136, 142.) 

There was evidence of drug and alcohol abuse at the home. (Id. at 87-90; 

notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 194-195.) Father never complied with the 

court’s directive to maintain a consistently safe and clean home.

There was also testimony that Father was unable to appropriately care 

for the Children. Father was unable to multi-task and effectively parent the 

children together. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 39.) Father appeared to 
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be overwhelmed during the supervised visitations and could only focus on 

one child at a time. (Id. at 170.) Father was often unprepared for visits 

and would leave the brief visits to smoke cigarettes. (Id. at 39, 171.) He 

would ignore suggestions from the CYS caseworkers. (Id. at 40-41.) Father 

disregarded safety concerns. (Id.) Father was often defensive and 

combative when given suggestions or advice. (Id. at 173.) During one of 

the supervised visits, A.N.S. was gagging and choking on a large piece of hot 

dog. (Id. at 41.) When instructed that the pieces were too large for A.N.S., 

Father simply ignored the caseworker and continued to eat his own hot dog 

while the caseworker attended to A.N.S. (Id.) In addition, neither parent 

made any effort to change the Children’s diapers. (Psychological Evaluation, 

9/24/14 at 2.) When prompted by the caseworker to change one of the 

Children’s dirty diapers, Father and Mother argued over who was going to do 

it. (Id.) When they did change the Children’s diapers, they would not 

dispose of the dirty diapers properly. (Notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at 144.)

Furthermore, Father failed to cooperate fully with IFS and his mental 

health providers and follow through with recommendations from the 

psychological evaluations. Father denied access to his home to caseworkers 

on numerous occasions. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 34-36, 60.) 

Father was discharged from the Alternative Community Resource Program 

(“ACRP”). Father’s attendance was inconsistent, and he was ultimately 

discharged for failure to comply with the attendance policy. (Notes of 
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testimony, 9/20/16 at 80-82.) As a result, Father’s outpatient therapist at 

ACRP, Alyssa Gusmerotti, testified that she was barely able to “scratch the 

surface” of working with Father. (Id. at 82.)

Father argues that he successfully completed the Nulton Diagnostic 

and Treatment Center’s Adult Partial Hospitalization Program on January 13, 

2016. (Father’s brief at 6.) Father argues that he attended all of the 

sessions, and his psychiatrist testified that he was very cooperative. (Id., 

citing notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at 117-118.) CYS did not dispute that 

Father finished the program. (CYS’s brief at 15.) However, Father conceded 

that the program essentially taught him the same skills he had already 

acquired in prior treatment and that he did not get much out of it. (Notes of 

testimony, 9/20/16 at 184, 204; 9/29/16 at 10.) Father testified that it was 

basically the same as a program he attended in New York. (Notes of 

testimony, 9/29/16 at 10.) In addition, there was testimony that Father’s 

attitude during the program was that of resistance and that his progress was 

not significant. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 42, 164.) Ms. Shaffer 

testified,

Throughout the time [Father] was in partial, and I 

would ask him what he was learning, his response 

would always be, I haven’t learned anything. There 

were issues where during group [Father] was making 

inappropriate comments about drugs and alcohol. 

There was a man who had been sober for over 

20 years and is re-learning coping skills and [Father] 

told him to go have a beer.
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Id. at 176-177. Stephen Bower from Nulton testified that Father 

successfully completed the program but that he could not remember 

whether or not they had any problems with Father during group therapy 

sessions. (Notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at 64-66.)

Father was ordered to attend the program in October 2014 by the 

juvenile court judge. (Case record summary, CYS’s brief, Appendix 1 at 3-4; 

notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 38.) By his own admission, Father did not 

enroll in the program until August 2015, when he finally decided it was 

necessary to “kiss butt” to try to get the Children back. (Notes of testimony, 

9/20/16 at 199-201.) In the meantime, while Father delayed, A.N.S. and 

T.S., Jr., were growing up in foster care. 

Father also contends that the reports and recommendations of 

Mr. Kashurba, upon which the trial court relied, were based upon incorrect 

information. (Father’s brief at 9.) According to Father, Mr. Kashurba based 

his recommendations upon an erroneous report by Ms. Shaffer that Father 

was not compliant with the program and was close to being removed from 

the program. (Id. at 8-9.) In fact, Father argues that he successfully 

completed the program.

Any such conflicts in the evidence were for the trial court to resolve. 

The trial court heard the testimony that Father completed the program. 

Furthermore, as CYS points out, Mr. Kashurba did not rely solely on 

Ms. Shaffer’s report that Father was not meeting the requirements of the 
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program. (CYS’s brief at 16.) In fact, Mr. Kashurba’s September 24, 2014 

report was authored 10 months before Father even started the program. 

(Id.) In addition, Mr. Kashurba reviewed numerous documents and reports 

from multiple sources and also conducted his own interviews with Father, 

including observing him interact with the Children. (Id.; notes of testimony, 

6/22/16 at 110, 113-120.) Mr. Kashurba’s conclusion that Father was 

unlikely to make any significant improvements in parenting skills or make 

any positive contribution to the Children was based on a multitude of 

factors, including personal observations, not just Ms. Shaffer’s report.

Finally, Father argues that the main reason the Children were removed 

from the home was because of poor housekeeping and financial problems. 

According to Father, he made an effort to implement a workable monthly 

budget and also to improve the condition of the residence. (Father’s brief at 

10.)

There was testimony that Father attempted to establish a workable 

budget. (Notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at 16.) However, the record also 

reflects that Father had continuing financial issues. One of the juvenile 

court’s requirements was that Father pay rent, utilities, and other bills on 

time. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 28.) Ms. Kathy Scaife from IFS 

testified that while Father made an effort, the utility bills were not 

consistently paid on time. (Notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at 13-15.) There 

was testimony that Mother and Father shut off the heat in the winter to save 
J. S31042/17

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money. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 191-192.) Some of Father’s 

financial problems were the result of mismanagement, e.g., trying to feed 

10 dogs and purchasing $30 in crab legs for his own consumption while the 

Children went without diapers. (Notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at 156.) If 

Father had complied with the court’s order to get rid of the dogs, it would 

have freed up some money to take care of the Children’s needs. 

Regarding the deplorable conditions, while they would show some 

measurable improvement over short periods of time, they would always 

return to the status quo. (Notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at 16.) Ms. Scaife 

testified that some months the house looked okay and then other months it 

was terrible. (Id.) The conditions were not consistently acceptable. (Id. at 

17-18.) Ms. Scaife described clothing, papers, empty food containers, and 

food wrappers spread throughout the home. (Id. at 30-31.) She testified 

that the clutter was a tripping hazard for the Children. (Id.) According to 

Ms. Shaffer, in April 2015 she had to move visits off-site due to poor 

housekeeping. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 169.) She described dog 

feces and garbage strewn about the floor, as well as the odor of urine and 

marijuana smoke. (Id.) This testimony was corroborated by CYS 

caseworker Barbara Brzana who described a house full of fecal matter, dried 

vomit, clutter, and garbage. (Id. at 33.) On each of three occasions she 

visited the home from January 2015 to March 2015, the conditions were the 
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same. (Id.; notes of testimony, 9/29/16 at 36.) Any inconsistences in the 

accounts of the witnesses were for the trial court to reconcile.

In addition, as stated above, Father refused caseworkers entry into the 

residence on numerous occasions. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 60.) So, 

there is no way of knowing what the house looked like on those occasions 

when caseworkers were denied entry. Moreover, it is clear that the trial 

court’s order was not based solely on the parties’ finances or the condition of 

the home. As set forth at length supra, the Children were in physical and 

psychological danger. They were living in filth. Besides the Pitbulls and 

knives lying around, there was testimony of ongoing drug use and domestic 

violence. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 44, 194-195.) It was readily 

apparent to the trial court that despite 15 months of intensive services, 

Father was unable or unwilling to remedy the conditions which led to the 

Children’s placement, and they would continue to be at risk if returned to his 

care. Our review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that 

Father is incapable of parenting the Children, and that his parental 

incapacity has left the Children without essential parental care or control. 

Additionally, it was reasonable for the court to determine that Father will 

not, or cannot, remedy this incapacity.

Next, we consider whether termination was proper 

under Section 2511(b).[2] Section 2511(b) “focuses 

 

2

“Although [Father] does not challenge the trial court’s analysis of 

Section 2511(b), we proceed to address this issue nonetheless.” In re 

C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1010.
J. S31042/17

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on whether termination of parental rights would best 

serve the developmental, physical, and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of 

J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010). As this 

Court has explained, “Section 2511(b) does not 

explicitly require a bonding analysis and the term 

‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, 

however, provides that analysis of the emotional 

bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to 

be considered” as part of our analysis. In re 

K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa.Super. 2008). 

“While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her 

child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) 

best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of 

many factors to be considered by the court when 

determining what is in the best interest of the child.” 

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) 

(citing K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d at 533-36).

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the 

trial court can equally emphasize the 

safety needs of the child, and should also 

consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the 

child might have with the foster parent. 

Additionally, this Court stated that the 

trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships 

and whether any existing parent-child 

bond can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child.

Id. (quoting In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 

(Pa.Super. 2010)); see also In re T.D., 949 A.2d 

910, 920-23 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 601 

Pa. 684, 970 A.2d 1148 (2009) (affirming the 

termination of parental rights where “obvious 

emotional ties exist between T.D. and Parents, but 

Parents are either unwilling or unable to satisfy the 

irreducible minimum requirements of parenthood,” 

and where preserving the Parents’ rights would 

prevent T.D. from being adopted and attaining 

permanency).
J. S31042/17

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In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219.

Here, T.S., Jr., was placed directly from the hospital after birth and 

had spent his entire life in the foster care system. A.N.S. was only 21⁄2 

months old when she was removed from Father’s care. There was no 

meaningful bond between Father and the Children. (Notes of testimony, 

6/22/16 at 180-181.) Father rarely showed A.N.S. any attention. (Id. at 

44-45, 174-175.) In fact, Father focused mainly on J.D.D., who is not his 

biological child. (Id. at 44.) The trial court found that the Children are 

successfully bonding with their foster family, indicating that they will be able 

to build a healthy bond with an adoptive family. (Order, 12/28/16 at 10 

¶14.) 

The evidence supports the trial court’s determination that it would be 

in the Children’s best interest if Father’s parental rights were terminated. 

Clearly, it would not be in the Children’s best interest for their lives to 

remain on hold indefinitely in hopes that Father will one day fulfill his 

obligations and be able to act as their parent. See In re Adoption of 

C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1220, quoting M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1276 (“A child’s life 

simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the 

ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” (citations omitted)). 

Father is not entitled to relief.
J. S31042/17

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Accordingly, because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), we affirm the order of the trial court.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/26/2017