alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31.1

Certification of the

President and Chief Executive Officer

I, Henry R. Carabelli certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Pac-West Telecomm, Inc.
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
5. designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;
6. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
7. disclosed in this report any change in the reigstrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and
8. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):
9. all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
10. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls over financial reporting



Date: August 14, 2003

/s/ Henry R. Carabelli

________________________________

Henry R. Carabelli

President and Chief Executive Officer
§ 197.420 Operations manual. ( a ) The diving supervisor shall— ( 1 ) Provide an operations manual to the person-in-charge prior to commencement of any diving operation; and
( 2 ) Make an operations manual available at the dive location to all members of the dive team.
( b ) The operations manual must be modified in writing when adaptation is required because of— ( 1 ) The configuration or operation of the vessel or facility; or
( 2 ) The specific diving operation as planned.
( c ) The operations manual must provide for the safety and health of the divers.
( d ) The operations manual must contain the following: ( 1 ) Safety procedures and checklists for each diving mode used.
( 2 ) Assignments and responsibilities of each dive team member for each diving mode used.
( 3 ) Equipment procedures and checklists for each diving mode used.
( 4 ) Emergency procedures for— ( i ) Fire;
( ii ) Equipment failure;
( iii ) Adverse environmental conditions including, but not limited to, weather and sea state;
( iv ) Medical illness; and
( v ) Treatment of injury.
( 5 ) Procedures dealing with the use of— ( i ) Hand-held power tools;
( ii ) Welding and burning equipment; and
( iii ) Explosives.
§ 31.15-10 Towing vessels may carry persons in addition to crew—B/LBR. ( a ) Towing vessels engaged in towing tank barges on the Great Lakes, inland waters, or rivers, may be authorized by the Coast Guard District Commander of the district to carry on board such number of persons in addition to its crew as shall be deemed necessary to carry on the legitimate business of such towing vessel or barge, not exceeding, however, one person to every net ton of the towing vessel.
( b ) A Coast Guard District Commander granting a license to a vessel engaged in towing to carry persons in addition to its crew shall notify the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection, in whose jurisdiction the vessel receiving the permit is engaged, and the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection, shall keep a record of the same.
#### Peter Harper, *Respondent, v.*George D. Sherman, and La Fayette Sprague, *Appellants*.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. Mem. by

Learned, P. J., and Landon, J.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                          10,387
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   72,857
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,220
<INVENTORY>                                     60,397
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               153,030
<PP&E>                                         122,461
<DEPRECIATION>                                  59,159
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 279,917
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           91,003
<BONDS>                                        120,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     40,000
<COMMON>                                        10,000
<OTHER-SE>                                      13,827
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   279,917
<SALES>                                        258,595
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               258,595
<CGS>                                          196,155
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  196,155
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              12,417
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,054)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (1,471)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (583)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (583)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**




**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350**




In
      connection with the Annual Report of MCF Corporation on Form 10-K for the
      year ended December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
      Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), we, D. Jonathan Merriman and John
      D. Hiestand, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906
      of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:




(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13a) or
      15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




March
                23, 2007/s/D.
                Jonathan Merriman**D.
                Jonathan Merriman**
              ***Chairman
                and Chief Executive Officer***/s/John
                D. Hiestand**John
                D. Hiestand**
              ***Chief
                Financial Officer***
BEVERLY HILLS WEIGHT LOSS & WELLNESS, INC.

April 13, 2004

Mr. Tim Murray
3220 Deer Chase Run
Longwood, FL 32779

Dear Tim:

Please  let this  letter  serve as a  formal  offer  from  Weight  Loss  Forever
International,  Inc. to you. As we  discussed,  we would require you to join the
Board of Directors and fill an officer's position of Vice President of Corporate
Development.  These duties would include  managing the  day-to-day  bookkeeping,
accounts  payable,  oversight  of accounts  receivable,  communication  with the
transfer  agent  including  stock  issuances,  and being a conduit  between  the
Company and our investor relations outsourcing services.

In consideration of this, we would issue you the following:

      o     500,000 shares of restricted common stock immediately;

      o     500,000 shares of restricted common stock to be issued in 6 months;

      o     Additionally,  as of  May  1st,  existing  shareholders  would  make
            arrangements to issue you 100,000 shares of free trading stock every
            month for 5 months;

If this meets with your approval, please sign below.

Thank you.

Sincerely,


Mike D'Apolito
President, Beverly Hills Weight Loss & Wellness, Inc.

April 13, 2004


/s/ Tim Murray
-----------------------------------------
TIM MURRAY
§ 404.104 Ratemaking step 4: Determine target pilot compensation benchmark and apprentice pilot wage benchmark. ( a ) In a full ratemaking year, the Director determines base individual target pilot compensation using a compensation benchmark, set after considering the most relevant currently available non-proprietary information. For supportable circumstances, the Director may make necessary and reasonable adjustments to the benchmark.
( b ) In an interim year, the Director adjusts the previous year's individual target pilot compensation level by the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Employment Cost Index for the Transportation and Materials sector, or if that is unavailable, the Director adjusts the previous year's individual target pilot compensation level using a two-step process: ( 1 ) First, the Director adjusts the previous year's individual target pilot compensation by the difference between the previous year's Bureau of Labor Statistics' Employment Cost Index for the Transportation and Materials sector and the Federal Open Market Committee median economic projections for Personal Consumption Expenditures inflation value used to inflate the previous year's target pilot compensation.
( 2 ) Second, the Director then adjusts that value by the Federal Open Market Committee median economic projections for Personal Consumption Expenditures inflation for the upcoming year.
( c ) The Director determines each pilotage association's total target pilot compensation by multiplying individual target pilot compensation computed in paragraph (a) or (b) of this section by the number of pilots projected under § 404.103 or § 401.220(a) of this chapter, whichever is lower.
( d ) The Director determines the individual Apprentice Pilot wage benchmark at the rate of 36 percent of the individual target pilot compensation, as calculated according to paragraphs (a) or (b) of this section.
( e ) The Director determines each pilot association's total Apprentice Pilot wage benchmark by multiplying the Apprentice Pilot compensation computed in paragraph (d) of this section by the number of Apprentice Pilots and Apprentice Pilots with Limited Registrations projected under § 404.103(b).
[USCG-2017-0903, 83 FR 26193, June 5, 2018, as amended by USCG-2018-0665, 84 FR 20578, May 10, 2019; USCG-2020-0457, 86 FR 14220, Mar. 12, 2021; USCG-2021-0431, 87 FR 18525, Mar. 30, 2022]
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D18-2911

_____________________________

DONALD EDWARD BROOKS,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County.

Michael A. Flowers, Judge.

March 1, 2019

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

MAKAR, WINOKUR, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Donald Edward Brooks, pro se, Appellant.

Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, and Steven E. Woods, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 10, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-10694

Summary Calendar

 

DALE ANDERSON,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

DOUG DRETKE, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL 

JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,

Respondent-Appellee.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:02-CV-00157

USDC No. 4:02-CV-00158

USDC No. 4:02-CV-00159

--------------------

Before JOLLY, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Dale Anderson, Texas prisoner # 909781, appeals the denial

of his FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) motion challenging the dismissal and

denials of his three consolidated 28 U.S.C. § 2254 applications. 

The only issue before us is whether the district court abused its

discretion in denying Anderson’s Rule 60(b) motion. See Aucoin

v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 943 F.2d 6, 8 (5th Cir. 1991).
No. 03-10694

-2-

The sole purpose of Anderson’s Rule 60(b) motion was to

circumvent the jurisdictional problem caused by his failure to

file a timely notice of appeal from the judgment denying habeas

relief. A Rule 60(b) motion, however, is not a substitute for a

timely appeal. Dunn v. Cockrell, 302 F.3d 491, 493 (5th Cir.

2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1181 (2003). Moreover, the delay

in Anderson’s receipt of notice of the judgment denying habeas

relief does not qualify as an “extraordinary circumstance” under

Rule 60(b)(6). Although the time to file a notice of appeal had

expired when he received notice of the denial, Anderson failed to

take advantage of other remedies that were still available, such

as a motion for an extension of time or a motion to reopen the

time to file an appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5) (motion for

an extension of time); FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6) (motion to reopen

time to file notice of appeal).

AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>


                                     EXHIBIT
                                     ITEM 11

              Statement Reference Computation of Per Share Earnings

     Primary earnings (loss) per share amounts were computed on the basis of
the weighted average number of shares of common stock during the year. The
weighted average number of shares used for this computation was 1,055,350 for
1999, 1,042,286 for 1998 and 1,055,180 for 1997, and 1,064,045 1996, and 1995.

     Fully diluted earnings (loss) per share amounts were computed on the
basis of the weighted average number of shares of common stock and common
stock equivalents outstanding during the year. Common stock equivalents
include employee stock options. The weighted average number of shares used
for this computation was 1,269,623, 1,211,083, 1,253,593, 1,249,033 and
1,263,944, in 1999, 1998, 1997, 1996, and 1995, respectively.










PAGE 54
#### Henry N. Wright, *Appellant, v.*The Congregational Society of Northville, *Respondent*.

Order affirmed, with costs and disbursements. Opinion by

Barnard, P. J.;

Dykman, J., *not*sitting.
#### ROBERT N. WARD, PLAINTIFF, v. DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA AND WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, DEFENDANT.

Submitted October 12, 1928

Decided April 11, 1929.

Before Gummere, Chief Justice, and Justice Parker.

For the plaintiff, *Edward Stover.*

For the defendant, *Frederic B. Scott.*

Per Curiam.

This is a fire ease which took a rather unusual turn. Plaintiff’s bungalow and garage were burned by fire communicated from dry grass which, according to the evidence, spread over an area bounded southerly by defendant’s railroad tracks, which were about seventy-five feet distant from the garage, and extending to and around the garage and *380bungalow. The complaint charged that the fire was communicated from one of defendant’s engines, and- the answer admitted (or perhaps it is better to say alleged) that such fire was communicated from engine No. 2136, but that as to that engine, defendant had, in the language of the statute, taken - and used all practicable means to prevent the communication of fire. *Comp.*Stat., *p.*4245, 4256, 4257; *Pamph. L.*1921, *p.*786. The plaintiff replied (a) that fire came out of the grate of the engine as well as the smokestack; (b) putting defendant on proof of identity of the engine; (c) that fire was communicated from other engines. At the trial, defendant’s evidence about the condition of engine No. 2136 was so persuasive in character that plaintiff shifted his main ground to a claim that the fire had been communicated from some other engine or engines, and introduced some general testimony, over objection, that two days or so before the fire, sparks had been observed coming out of a passing engine.

The third reason quotes a passage in the charge, in which the court permitted the jury to consider, as an issue of fact, the question whether the fire was caused by some other engine than No. 2136, and the fourth reason points specifically to such-instruction as erroneous. We think that it was erroneous as we fail to find anything in the testimony that would justify a jury in fastening culpability on any engine but No. 2136. Either there was total failure to show that any engine passing within a reasonable period before the fire was emitting sparks, or a similar failure to show that any engine emitting sparks passed within such period. As the question of other engines was left to the jury, it may well be that they speculated on that issue and returned their verdict based upon it. This in our estimation is enough to vitiate the verdict, and it becomes unnecessary to deal with the other points argued.

The rule will be made absolute.
#### MARION D. FITCHETT, PROSECUTOR, v. BENJAMIN F. TURNER, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE CITY OF PASSAIC, THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF PASSAIC, AND THE CITY OF PASSAIC, DEFENDANTS.

Submitted May 18, 1929

Decided November 14, 1929.

Before Justices Trenchard, Lloyd and Case.

For the prosecutor, *Sigmond Unger (Arthur T. Vanderbilt,*of counsel).

For the defendants, *Joseph J. Weinberger.*

*1015Pee Cubiam.

This writ of *certiorari*brings np for review the action of the commissioner of public safety of the city of Passaic in summarily dismissing Marion D. Fitchett from her employment as a special investigator of the police department of Passaic. She was employed by a resolution of the board of commissioners adopted February 3d, 1920, reading as follows: “Resolved, that the following persons be employed in the various city departments,” and her name was amongst others, and therein she was described as “special police investigator,” and her salary “per annum” was therein fixed.

She was summarily dismissed without a hearing on August 29th, 1927. She claims this .was illegal and relies upon article 16, section 3, *Pamph. L.*1917, *p.*359. That act provides: “No person shall be removed from office or employment in any such police department or from the police force of any such municipality for political reasons, or for any other cause than incapacity, misconduct, non-residence, or disobedience of just rules and regulations;” and also relies upon article 16, section 5, which provides that “no person whether officer or employe in any such police department shall be removed from office or employment therein, except after just cause, as hereinabove provided, and then only after written charge or charges of the cause or causes of complaint shall have been preferred against such officer or employe, signed by the person or persons making such charge or charges and filed in the office of the municipal officer,” &c.

The record discloses, we think, that the prosecutor was not employed temporarily for a limited period, but was employed for an indefinite employment, and was actually employed uninterruptedly for nearly eight years as an investigator for the police department, and was recognized and paid as such. Her duties were many and varied. She acted as a police matron, investigated domestic and probation cases and the like for the police department, and the duties which she was required to and did perform were of a general, common and recurrent nature. She was discharged without written charges or hearing, with this bare statement: “Your services *1016will no longer be required in this department.” At the time there was no suggestion that she was discharged because the employment that she held was abolished, or for reasons or economy, nor does the latter reason, now urged, satisfactorily appear, it being, as we view it, a mere afterthought.

We think the order of dismissal must be set aside, with costs.
§ 401.620 Burden of proof. ( a ) In a suspension or revocation hearing, the Director shall have the burden of establishing, by substantial evidence, the grounds for a suspension or revocation of a Certificate of Registration held by a pilot, as stated in the letter addressed to such pilot notifying him of the U.S. Coast Guard intention to suspend or revoke the pilot's registration.
( b ) In a refusal-to-renew-registration hearing, the Director shall have the burden of establishing the grounds for the Director's determination under § 401.240(c) to deny renewal of the Certificate of Registration.
[32 FR 14222, Oct. 13, 1967, as amended at 61 FR 5721, Feb. 14, 1996. Redesignated and amended at 61 FR 32655, June 25, 1996, and further redesignated and amended by USCG-1998-3976, 63 FR 35139, 35140, June 29, 1998]