UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6638

MALCOLM MUHAMMAD,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

LESLIE S. GREEN; WILLIAM R. BLAINE; ELIZABETH BALLARD, DNA 

Forensic Scientist; ANN M. CONNELL, Deputy Clerk of Court; 

NATHAN LEE, Judge; Circuit Court Judge,

Defendants – Appellees,

and

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District 

Judge. (1:14-cv-00662-LO-MSN)

Submitted: September 15, 2015 Decided: February 10, 2016

Before KING, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Malcolm Muhammad, Appellant Pro Se.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Virginia prisoner Malcolm Muhammad appeals the district 

court’s order dismissing this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (2012) for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm in part 

and dismiss in part.

Muhammad contended that his due process rights were 

violated when a Virginia state court denied his postconviction 

motion, made pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-270.4:1 (2015), 

for preservation of certain items of evidence. Muhammad hoped 

to have DNA testing performed on the evidence and that the 

results of such testing would establish his innocence of 

first-degree murder. Muhammad’s chief contention was that, by 

allegedly requiring that he prove that the evidence in question 

constituted human biological evidence, the state court 

incorrectly interpreted and applied the statute and thereby 

violated his due process rights. 

The district court dismissed the case pursuant to Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck held that where

“establishing the basis for the . . . claim necessarily 

demonstrates the invalidity of the conviction,” a § 1983 action 

will not lie “unless . . . the conviction or sentence has 

already been invalidated.” Id. at 481-82, 487. Subsequent to 

Heck, the Supreme Court held that “a convicted state prisoner 
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seeking DNA testing of crime-scene evidence [may] assert that 

claim in a civil rights action under § 1983.” Skinner v. 

Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 524-25 (2011). The Court observed that 

gaining access to DNA testing alone does not necessarily imply 

the unlawfulness of the conviction or sentence. Id. at 525. 

Application of Skinner demonstrates that the dismissal of 

Muhammad’s § 1983 action on the basis of Heck was error.

However, despite this error, we find that this action is 

subject to dismissal on alternative grounds. First, there is no 

substantive due process right to the postconviction preservation 

and testing of DNA evidence. District Attorney’s Office for the 

Third Judicial Circuit v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 72 (2009); see 

also Skinner, 562 U.S. at 525. Second, with respect to the 

claimed violation of procedural due process, we note that 

Muhammad does not claim that § 19.2-270.4:1 is itself invalid. 

Rather, he contends that the state circuit court erroneously 

applied the statute in deciding his case. Lower federal courts

lack jurisdiction over this claim under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine.* Cf. Skinner, 562 U.S. at 531-32; see Exxon Mobil 

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).

 * Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); 

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 

(1983). 
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We therefore affirm the dismissal of Muhammad’s substantive 

due process claim and dismiss, for want of jurisdiction, his 

procedural due process claim. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal issues are adequately presented in 

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART; 

DISMISSED IN PART