SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1568-18T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LUIS S. MANSO,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted January 21, 2020 – Decided April 9, 2020

Before Judges Fasciale and Rothstadt.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 98-11-4417.

Luis S. Manso, appellant pro se.

Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Matthew E. 

Hanley, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Luis Manso appeals from the November 7, 2018 denial of his 

second petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. 

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The details of defendant's conviction for murder and other charges, as well 

as the sentencing court's imposition of an aggregate term of sixty years, were 

detailed in our earlier unpublished opinion affirming the denial of defendant's 

first petition for PCR. See State v. Manso, No. A-2646-12 (App. Div. Aug. 26, 

2015) (slip op. at 3). As we noted in our prior opinion, we previously affirmed 

defendant's conviction and the Supreme Court denied certification. 

On July 23, 2018, defendant filed his second PCR petition. On November 

7, 2018, Judge Siobhan A. Teare entered an order denying "[p]etitioner's request 

for an attorney to be assigned and for [PCR] motion." The judge's order was 

supported by a ten-page written decision. 

In her decision, the judge reviewed the history of defendant's conviction, 

his appeal, and the denial of his first PCR petition. The judge noted that the 

present petition was before her as a result of the United States District Court's

decision to stay defendant's petition for habeas corpus in that court so he could 

"return to [S]tate court and address the allegations" of "prosecutorial 

misconduct" and other allegations "not raised in [S]tate court." The judge 
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described those other allegations as the prosecutor's "fail[ure] to disclose a 

potentially favorable witness, and that [defendant's] codefendant was prevented 

from testifying on his behalf due to an explicit condition of the codefendant[']s 

plea agreement."

The judge then turned to the issue of whether defendant had established 

good cause warranting the assignment of counsel for his second PCR petition. 

As the judge described, defendant contended that "the deliberate withholding of 

witnesses who were interviewed and whose statements would have allegedly 

been used to impeach the State's witness, [D.M.'s] version of events."

The judge then engaged in a detailed explanation of the law governing 

PCR petitions and specifically "second or subsequent petitions." Citing to Rule

3:22-12(a)(2), the judge described the circumstances under which a second 

petition could be pursued. In addition, the judge pointed out that under Rule

3:22-5 "'a prior adjudication upon the merits of any grounds for relief is 

conclusive whether made in the proceedings resulting in the conviction or in any 

post-conviction proceeding brought pursuant to this [Rule],' unless the 

constitutional problems are of substantial import."
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Applying those rules, Judge Teare addressed defendant's contentions and 

concluded that under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2), his second petition was time-barred. 

Despite the time-bar, the judge proceeded to address defendant's arguments.

First, the judge discussed defendant's contention about D.M.'s testimony,

finding that defendant's contention was considered on his first PCR petition and 

denied based upon testimony adduced at an evidentiary hearing held at that time. 

She identified defendant's contention as being that the State "deliberately 

withheld the interview and statements of a witness," specifically, [M.S.], the 

girlfriend of [D.M.], who was the State's "chief confidential informant." 

Defendant supported his contention by stating M.S. "was on the run with [D.M.] 

for approx[imately] one (1) year while he was hiding from authorities and would 

have been privy to conversations about the incident" that gave rise to defendant's 

conviction. The judge concluded that this argument was "replete with 

speculation" because the record did not confirm that M.S. "was in fact 

interviewed." 

The judge reviewed in detail portions of the record that established there 

was no confirmation of any interview and in fact no support from D.M. that M.S. 

"had any conversations with [D.M.] about the events or was ever interviewed by 

the [S]tate regarding this matter." The judge concluded that defendant's version 
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of the events was based upon pure speculation and he failed to establish a 

substantial denial of justice.

Turning to defendant's allegation that his codefendant was "told not to 

testify," the judge found that "this same issue was examined by the PCR court 

as to [another] codefendant." The judge considered the issue, even though it 

was not raised by defendant in his supporting brief, because it was raised by the 

federal court as an issue to be addressed. The judge found that defendant's 

contention about his codefendant being told not to testify was based upon his 

incorrect reading of the codefendant's plea agreement. The judge noted that the 

first PCR court already resolved the issue by finding that the statement in the 

codefendant's plea agreement was simply that "the [S]tate would not compel the 

codefendant to testify or use their statement against the codefendant at trial." 

That argument, which was addressed by the first PCR court, applied to the 

defendant's present contention as well.

Based on the judge's findings, she denied defendant's second petition for 

PCR. This appeal followed. 

On appeal defendant presents to us the following two arguments:
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POINT I

THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS 

BASED UPON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 

WHERE THE STATE FAILED TO DISCLOSE 

EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE.

POINT II

THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS ORIGINAL 

JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO R. 2:10-5 IN AN 

EFFORT TO BRING THIS MATTER TO A CLOSE 

DUE TO ITS PROTRACTED HISTORY. (NOT 

RAISED BELOW).

We are not persuaded by these arguments and affirm substantially for the 

reasons expressed by Judge Teare in her written decision. We only add that we 

conclude from our de novo review of the record, see State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 

391, 421 (2004), his contentions do not fall under any of the exceptions 

permitting the filing of a second PCR petition under Rule 3:22-4(b), and that 

defendant has failed to establish a viable claim that the prosecution in his case 

failed to disclose to defendants any exculpatory evidence or evidence that was 

material to his conviction. State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 518 (2019) (citing 

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).

Affirmed.