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53–056 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–39] 

THE NEW STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN 

AND PAKISTAN AND DEVELOPMENTS 

IN U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

APRIL 2, 2009 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland 

ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

AILEEN ALEXANDER, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2009 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, April 2, 2009, The New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan 

and Developments in U.S. Central Command and Special Operations Command ..................................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, April 2, 2009 .......................................................................................... 51 

THURSDAY, APRIL 2, 2009 

THE NEW STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AND DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Flournoy, Hon. Miche`le, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 5 

Olson, Adm. Eric, USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command ........ 13 

Petraeus, Gen. David H., USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command ............... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Flournoy, Hon. Miche`le .................................................................................... 55 

Olson, Adm. Eric ............................................................................................... 106 

Petraeus, Gen. David H. .................................................................................. 59 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Counterinsurgency Guidance by Gen. David D. McKiernan, USA, Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan ... 113 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Giffords ....................................................................................................... 120 

Mr. Heinrich ..................................................................................................... 121 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 119 

Mrs. McMorris Rodgers .................................................................................... 119 

(1) 

THE NEW STRATEGY FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 

AND DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, April 2, 2009. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. 

Today, the House Armed Services Committee meets in open session to receive testimony on the new strategy for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan and developments in the United States Central Command 

and Special Operations Command. 

Our witnesses today are the honorable Miche`le Flournoy, under 

secretary of defense for policy; General David Petraeus, commander, United States Central Command; and, Admiral Eric 

Olson, commander of the United States Special Operations Command. 

And we certainly welcome each of you and thank you for being 

with us today. This is a very, very important hearing. 

As we begin to consider the new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, 

let me say, it is about time. 

Glenn Miller had a famous piece, a famous song entitled ‘‘At 

Last,’’ and I think we could probably hum that along now, because 

we have not had such a one since the early part of our efforts in 

Afghanistan. 

As any student of military history can tell you, you can lose even 

with a good strategy, but there is no way to win with no strategy. 

And for the last seven years, I feel we have had no strategy in Afghanistan and, for a period of time, it has been getting worse. 

So it pleases me greatly that the administration undertook a serious policy review and came up with a real strategy to address Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we have finally realized that this important region can no longer be called America’s forgotten war. 

I think that this strategy largely gets it right. The President, almost a week ago, got it right when he pointed out that the ultimate 

focus of our efforts is to eliminate Al Qaeda and remove the sanctuaries from which they are constantly planning attacks against 

us. 

That is the right goal and we should always remember that. 
2 

I strongly supported the President’s decision to add 17,000 troops 

in Afghanistan and I support his most recent decision to add another 4,000 as trainers and mentors for the Afghan security forces. 

As the President has noted, we can bring our troops home when 

the Afghans themselves can carry the burden of security. 

But we won’t win a counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan 

through military means alone, and I think our witnesses will speak 

of that. 

So I am glad our strategy calls for a real increase in civilian assistance to that country and, even more, ask our allies to increase 

their efforts. This is not just America’s war. 

I am also pleased that the strategy recognizes that success in Afghanistan will require more effective action on both sides of the 

border. Destroying Al Qaeda and their sanctuaries in Pakistan will 

require disrupting terrorist networks, advancing democratic government control, and promoting economic stability in Pakistan. 

We must also develop a mutually beneficial long-term U.S.-Pakistan partnership and work with international partners on these efforts. None of this will be done quickly or easily. But the administration’s new strategy is an important step, I believe, in the right 

direction. 

But the strategy on both sides of the border, Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, must have accountability. What we are missing at the 

moment is details on how the strategy will be achieved, how 

progress will be measured. How will we assure that the Pakistanis 

step up and become real partners? What is the proposed new Pakistan counterinsurgency capability fund and how will it propose 

changing existing authorities? 

How will we effect real civil-military coordination on the ground 

in Afghanistan? What are the metrics we will use to measure 

progress of our forces? 

These are details that we are looking for from the hearing today. 

Very shortly, this Congress, including this committee, will take 

action to authorize and appropriate funds to support our Afghan 

and Pakistani partners. 

Measures of accountability must and will be part of that effort. 

I hope our witnesses will take the opportunity here today to talk 

about what approaches may be the most productive, the most productive, in ensuring these partners make progress. 

We are committed to a long-term relationship, a consistent relationship both for Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

But the Congress and the American people are being asked to 

put up a significant amount of resources over a sustained period. 

So there must be accountability and there must be a measurable 

return on this investment. 

I now turn to my good friend, the ranking member, the gentleman from New York, John McHugh, for comments. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM NEW YORK, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON 

ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCHUGH. I thank the distinguished chairman. As always, I 

deeply appreciate his remarks and particularly today, as you noted, 

absolutely on point, as usual, this is a very important hearing. 
3 

Of course, the thing that makes it important, beyond the weighty 

topics that are before us, are our distinguished panelists, and I 

want to add my words of welcome to each of you. 

Madam Secretary, particularly to you, you are no stranger to this 

committee room, as we discussed, but I believe this is your first appearance in your new position, and I want to add our words of congratulations to you and that we look forward to your comments. 

Mr. Chairman, I noted to a friend yesterday that for all of the 

great challenges that we face as a nation and that come through 

this door that are under our charge, fortunately, one of them is not 

a crisis of leadership. 

We have two extraordinary examples of that fine leadership that 

has worked so hard to help bring us through some extraordinarily 

troubling times. 

And, General and Admiral, I want to personally thank you for 

the great job that you do. And a particular word of appreciation, 

I know both of you feel very strongly about this, as well, to the 

brave men and women in uniform that you lead in the important 

challenges that this nation has called upon you to face. 

Let me just add a couple of comments, and beginning with Afghanistan. Like the chairman, I welcome the President’s strategic 

direction for the fight. 

In my view, he laid out a framework of the strategy that is intended to win in that theater. But I do worry that the plan, 

through no fault perhaps of anyone, is starting to become all things 

to all people. 

And let me state, very simply, we cannot allow a minimalist approach to creep into this strategy, and Congress, those of us on this 

committee, has to ensure the plan is fully funded, fully resourced, 

and ably executed. 

And as I look at the strategy, it appears very clearly it is based 

on the advice of commanders on the ground, and that is the right 

way to proceed, and it includes many longstanding objectives that 

I know many in this Congress and in this room today support and 

have advocated, and I just want to outline, very briefly, a few of 

those. 

A commitment to fully resource a new counterinsurgency strategy that is designed to protect the Afghan population and dismantle, disrupt and destroy Al Qaeda and, equally important, its 

affiliated networks. 

An expansion of the Afghan National Security Force, again, I believe an important step. But for all of its merits, in my opinion, I 

think we are going to have to go even beyond the current numbers 

and perhaps as much as double the previously authorized levels for 

both the Afghan Army and the police. 

And on a cautionary note, I would just add that I would advise 

against viewing the expansion of the Afghan National Security 

Force (ANSF) as simply an element of and not an alternative to a 

population-based counterinsurgency strategy. 

And the acknowledgment that victory in Afghanistan will require 

a regional approach, the President got this right, in my judgment, 

and he places a heavy emphasis on working with Pakistan in the 

troubled areas, particularly the border of Afghanistan. 
4 

I believe that Islamabad must be a part of the solution in the region, but here, too, a word of caution. We cannot allow our efforts 

on the Pakistan front to distract from our push for progress in Afghanistan. 

And, finally, on Afghanistan, the 21,000 troops headed to southern Afghanistan is an important step in providing our commanders 

with the capacity needed to conduct clear, hold and build operations. In my view, this should but a first step. 

And we need to discuss the status of potential added force structure as we go forward in the days ahead. 

Let me now move to U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility (CENTCOM AOR) and briefly comment on Iraq. The President’s objective, again, to withdraw U.S. combat forces from Iraq, 

as I have said previously, is one that I believe we should all pray 

for, plan for, and work toward. 

One concern I have is it still remains a fragile situation and 

while we pray that nothing of this nature should happen, we have 

to work to mitigate any risk to our troops and their missions. 

Iraq faces significant challenges in 2009, including the national 

parliamentary election this December. I think it is critical we remain open to revisiting the plan if the situation on the ground deteriorates and violence increases, and our commanders, most importantly, must have the flexibility they need in order to ensure 

our hard fought gains are not put at risk. 

Finally, in the CENTCOM AOR, a word on Iran. We do have 

some challenges in the CENTCOM AOR. Tehran continues to pose 

a serious national security challenge. The shadow of Tehran looms 

over Iraq, Afghanistan, the Levant, the Gulf and beyond. 

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force is the terrorist organization that is increasingly capable and effective. Its 

support of Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas defy efforts to stabilize 

the region. 

And while estimates vary as to how close the Iranians are to developing and obtaining a nuclear weapon, there should be unanimity that we, this Congress and this administration, cannot 

allow Tehran to obtain nuclear weapons, period. 

A nuclear Iran will only expand on its record of regional mischief 

and threaten our partners and friends. And we hear a lot about 

diplomatic engagement and economic sanctions and it seems to me 

that Tehran poses a military threat that requires military planning, and I would like our witnesses to comment on how the military might be positioning itself to deal with the range of challenges 

posed by Iran. 

Let me conclude with just a few words about United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM). 

Admiral, oftentimes, the activities of your force remain below the 

radar screen and beyond the public eye. SOCOM has, as you know 

so very well, played a vital and central role in our military’s efforts 

since September 11, especially in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. 

Your forces have been deployed around the world, conducting 

missions that range from high end kinetic operations to softer engagements, but equally important, like building wells and providing medical care. 
5 

And thanks to SOCOM’s efforts and yours, Admiral, Al Qaeda 

and other violent extremist groups have been disrupted and kept 

off balance in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa and elsewhere. 

But as you know, too, these threats are persistent and require 

continued vigilance and dedication on our part. 

We all recognize that SOCOM will remain heavily engaged in 

Iraq and Afghanistan even after conventional forces are drawn 

down. I think it will be important for us to understand how you 

see SOCOM’s role in these theaters of operation and what concerns 

you may have in ensuring your forces have the appropriate support 

they need to continue to effectively conduct their missions. 

Again, to all of you, thank you so much for being here. 

And, Mr. Chairman, with that, I would yield back the balance of 

my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Madam Secretary, we thank you especially for your appearance 

before the whole House two days ago for the classified briefing. We 

appreciate your coming over. 

So we will recognize you at this time, Madam Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHE` LE FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Mr. Chairman and Mr. McHugh and other 

distinguished members, thank you very much for providing me and 

the General and the Admiral with the opportunity to testify before 

you today on the administration’s policy review on Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. 

I think the best articulation of this new strategy was the President’s speech last Friday, where he very clearly stated our strategic 

goal. 

It is a very clear one, and that is to disrupt, to dismantle and 

defeat Al Qaeda and its extremist allies in the region. 

And to do so, we must eliminate their safe haven in Pakistan 

and, also, work to prevent its reemergence in Afghanistan. 

Preventing future terrorist attacks on the American people and 

on our allies is absolutely vital, and I think there is no disagreement there. 

We have learned at too high a price the danger of allowing Al 

Qaeda and its extremist supporters to have safe havens and access 

to resources to plan their attacks. 

This is why we have troops in Afghanistan and it is why we 

must intensify our efforts to assist Pakistan. 

To achieve our goals, we need a smarter and more comprehensive 

strategy and, as both the Chairman and Mr. McHugh stated, we 

need to have the resources to fully implement it. 

A critical aspect of this new strategy is the recognition that Afghanistan and Pakistan are two countries, but that they comprise 

a single theater for our efforts and for our diplomacy. 

Al Qaeda and its extremist allies have moved across the border 

into Pakistan, where they plan terrorist attacks and support operations that undermine the stability of both countries and, indeed, 

the entire region. 
6 

The President has appointed Special Representative Holbrooke to 

lead both bilateral efforts with these countries, but, also, important 

trilateral discussions and regional diplomatic efforts. 

And from the defense side, we will be working to build the 

counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capabilities of both countries so that they can be more effective in this fight. 

Pakistan’s ability to dismantle the safe havens on its territory 

and defeat both terrorist and insurgent networks within its borders 

are absolutely critical to the security and stability of this nuclear 

arms state. 

And it is in America’s long-term interest to support Pakistan’s 

restored democracy by investing in its people and their economic 

wellbeing. 

We seek a strategic partnership with Pakistan that will encourage and enable it to shift its focus from deterring conventional war 

to actually conducting more effective counterinsurgency and 

counterterrorism operations. 

So we will be urging Congress to support forthcoming proposals, 

such as the Kerry-Lugar legislation on the Senate side, that would 

authorize civilian and economic assistance, as well as support for 

our proposals for a Pakistan counterinsurgency capability fund, to 

develop more effective military means to defeat terrorist and insurgent networks. 

This support, both military and economic, will require us to see 

improved Pakistani performance. 

We must also develop a long-term partnership with Afghanistan. 

Like Pakistan, Afghanistan suffers from severe socioeconomic crisis 

that exacerbates its political situation. 

These are the root causes of the insurgency that Al Qaeda and 

the Taliban have been exploiting. 

Building effective Afghan capacity to address these root causes, 

while simultaneously taking the fight to the enemy, are important 

components of our new strategy. 

The U.S., along with our Afghan partners and our international 

allies, is committed to fully resourcing an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency strategy. 

This strategy has to aim to do three key things. The first is to 

reverse Taliban gains and secure the populations in the most troubled areas of the south and east of Afghanistan. 

Second is to really accelerate our efforts to build the capacity of 

the Afghan National Security Forces, both the army and the police. 

These are critical elements of the strategy. 

Building up the Afghan security forces should enable us, over 

time, to transition from an International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) international-led effort to an Afghan-led counterinsurgency 

operation. 

To do so, we have got to meet the requirements on the ground 

of our commanders for additional training capacity. This is the rationale behind the President’s decision to deploy an additional 

4,000 U.S. troops to serve as trainers for the Afghan security 

forces. 

In addition, all of the American units who will be deploying in 

the coming months will be partnered with Afghan units to try to 

help build their capacity. 
7 

But beyond strengthening the military side of the mission, we 

must also intensify our civilian assistance and better integrate that 

assistance with our military effort to promote more effective governance in Afghanistan and better development from the bottom 

up. 

Working with the U.N. and our allies, we will seek to improve 

coordination and coherence to support Afghan development priorities. 

Ensuring free and fair and secure elections will also be a critical 

near-term goal. 

We will also complement efforts at the national level to build capacity in the ministries and so forth with more bottom-up initiatives aimed at building capacity at the district and local and provincial levels. 

This is really where the Afghan people have their direct experience of Afghan institutions and governance. 

Combating corruption will be a critical part of our effort to reinforce Afghan institutions at all levels of the government. These efforts also must address the root causes of the insurgency, build accountability, and give the Afghan people more reason to support 

and invest in their own government. 

Defeating the Taliban-led insurgency will require breaking its 

links to the narcotics industry and we have to work to build a more 

effective counternarcotics strategy. 

This means building Afghan law enforcement capacity, developing alternative livelihoods for farmers, and reforming the agricultural sector on which the vast majority of the population depends 

for sustenance. 

As we regain the initiative in Afghanistan, and we fully expect 

we will, it will not be easy, but we expect that we will regain the 

initiative, we must also support an Afghan-led reconciliation process that attempts to flip the foot soldiers to peel the insurgents 

away from the insurgency and reconcile them to Afghan society 

and integrate them into the state. 

If we are successful in these efforts, this should make it more 

easy to isolate and target the irreconcilable core elements of the 

Taliban and their extremist allies. 

Our men and women in uniform and our allies and our civilians 

on the ground have been toiling bravely in Afghanistan for a number of years. Nearly 700 of our soldiers and Marines have paid the 

ultimate price; 2,500 or more have been wounded. 

I think that one of the best ways we can honor their service and 

their sacrifice is to put in place an effective strategy going forward 

and to fully resource that effort so that we can be successful in 

bringing this war to a conclusion. 

And so I am here today to urge you to provide your full support. 

This strategy seeks to build a bridge to increased Afghan self-reliance and to increased Pakistani capability and capacity for effective counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. 

Ultimately, we will seek to transition responsibility in both of 

these fights to our partners, and our vital interests will demand no 

less than success. 

We will expect to come to back to you in the future once budget 

requests are sent to the Hill to ask for concrete assistance in sev-
8 

eral areas—support for the deployment of additional troops, support for accelerating the growth of the Afghan national security 

forces, support for counternarcotics funding, for additional Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), which is critical 

to the effectiveness of our commanders on the ground, for humanitarian assistance and the like. 

On the Pakistani side, we will be seeking your support for the 

security development plan, including the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund, counternarcotics funding there, coalition 

support funds, and so on. 

So we hope that this is the beginning of a conversation in which 

we can engage together in figuring out the best way forward. 

I would also encourage you to engage with your allies on committees that deal with the civilian side of the equation, because our 

investment in our own civilian capacity and the ability to deploy 

that capacity to partner with the military on the ground will be absolutely critical to the success of this strategy and our efforts going 

forward. 

Finally, I want to assure you that we do not think of this as 

America’s war. We think of this, of defeating Al Qaeda and dealing 

with its extremist allies, as an international challenge and an 

international responsibility. 

This is a burden that the international community must share. 

And so you will see the President in Europe this week, others in 

the administration, going to our partners in North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO), going to the European Union (EU), going to 

the region, to ask them to commit whatever they can commit in the 

way of capability, capacity and assistance to fully resource this effort together as an international community. 

This is something that we must do for the American people, for 

our allies, and for the international community. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Flournoy can be found in 

the Appendix on page 55.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

General Petraeus. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER, 

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, Congressman McHugh, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide an 

update on the situation in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility (AOR) and to discuss the way ahead in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan, together with Under Secretary Flournoy and the 

commander of the Special Operations Forces that are so critical to 

all that we do in the AOR, Admiral Eric Olson. 

As Under Secretary Flournoy noted in her statement and as 

President Obama explained this past Friday, the United States has 

vital national interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

These countries contain the most pressing transnational extremist threats in the world and, in view of that, they pose the most 

urgent problem set in the Central Command Area of Responsibility. 

Disrupting and ultimately defeating Al Qaeda and the other extremist elements in Pakistan and Afghanistan and reversing the 
9 

downward security spiral seen in key parts of these countries will 

require a sustained substantial commitment. The strategy described last Friday constitutes such a commitment. 

Although the additional resources will be applied in different 

ways on either side of the Durand Line, Afghanistan and Pakistan 

comprise a single theater that requires comprehensive, whole of 

governments approaches that are closely coordinated. 

To achieve that level of coordination, Ambassador Holbrooke and 

I will work closely with our ambassadors and our counterparts 

from other countries and the host nations. 

This morning, I will briefly discuss the military aspects of the 

new strategy, noting, however, that while additional military forces 

clearly are necessary in Afghanistan, they will not, by themselves, 

be sufficient to achieve our objectives. 

It is important that the civilian requirements for Afghanistan 

and Pakistan be fully met, as well. 

To that end, it is essential that the respective departments, State 

and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 

foremost among them, be provided the resources necessary to implement this strategy. 

Achieving our objectives in Afghanistan requires a comprehensive counterinsurgency approach, and that is what General David 

McKiernan and ISAF are endeavoring to execute with the additional resources being committed. 

The additional forces will provide an increased capability to secure and serve the people, to pursue the extremists, to support the 

development of host nation security forces, to reduce the illegal 

narcotics industry, and to help develop the Afghan capabilities 

needed to increase the legitimacy of national and local Afghan governance. 

These forces will also, together with the additional NATO elements committed for the election security force, work with Afghan 

elements to help secure the national elections in late August and 

to help ensure that those elections are seen as free, fair and legitimate in the eyes of the Afghan people. 

As was the case in Iraq, the additional forces will only be of 

value if they are employed properly. It is vital that they be seen 

as good guests and partners, not as would-be conquerors or superiors, and as formidable warriors who also do all possible to avoid 

civilian casualties in the course of combat operations. 

As additional elements deploy, it will also be essential that our 

commanders and elements strive for unity of effort at all levels and 

integrate our security efforts into the broader plans to promote Afghan political and economic development. 

We recognize the sacrifices of the Afghan people over the past 

three decades and we will continue working with our Afghan partners to earn the trust of the people and with security to provide 

them with new opportunities. 

These concepts and others are captured in the counterinsurgency 

guidance recently issued by General McKiernan. I commend this 

guidance to you and have provided a copy for you with my opening 

statement. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 113.] 
10 

The situation in Pakistan is, of course, closely linked to that in 

Afghanistan. Although there has been progress in some areas, as 

Pakistan’s newly reestablished democracy has evolved, significant 

security challenges have also emerged. 

The extremists that have established sanctuaries in the rugged 

border areas not only contribute to the deterioration of security in 

eastern and southern Afghanistan, they also pose an ever more serious threat to Pakistan’s very existence. 

It is these elements that have carried out terrorist attacks in 

India and Afghanistan and in various other countries outside the 

region, including the United Kingdom, and that have continued efforts to carry out attacks in our homeland. 

Suicide bombings and other attacks have, as you know, increased 

in Pakistan over the past three years, killing thousands of Pakistani civilians, security personnel and government officials, including, of course, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and damaging Pakistan’s infrastructure and economy. 

To be sure, the extremists have also sustained losses and in response to the increased concern over extremist activity, the Pakistani military has stepped up operations against militants in parts 

of the tribal areas. 

However, considerable further work is required. It is in Pakistan 

that Al Qaeda senior leadership and other transnational extremist 

elements are located. 

Thus, operations there are imperative and we need to provide the 

support and assistance to the Pakistani military that can enable 

them to confront the extremists who pose a truly existential threat 

to their own country. 

Given our relationship with Pakistan and its military over the 

years, it is important that the United States be seen as a reliable 

ally. 

The Pakistani military has been fighting a tough battle against 

extremists for more than seven years. They have sacrificed much 

in this campaign and they need our continued support. 

The U.S. military thus will focus on two main areas. First, we 

will expand our partnership with the Pakistani military and help 

it build its counterinsurgency capabilities by providing training, 

equipment and assistance. 

We will also expand our exchange programs to build stronger relationships with Pakistani leaders at all levels. 

Second, we will help promote closer cooperation across the Afghan-Pakistan border by providing training, equipment, facilities 

and intelligence capabilities and by bringing together Afghan and 

Pakistani military officers to enable coordination between the 

forces on either side of the border. 

These efforts will support timely sharing of intelligence information and help to coordinate the operations of the two forces. 

Within the counterinsurgency construct we have laid out for Afghanistan and Pakistan, we will, of course, continue to support the 

targeting, disruption and pursuit of the leadership, bases and support networks of Al Qaeda and other transnational extremist 

groups operating in the region. 

We will also work with our partners to challenge the legitimacy 

of the terrorist methods, practices and ideologies, helping our part-
11 

ners address legitimate grievances to win over reconcilable elements of the population and supporting promotion of the broadbased economic and governmental development that is a necessary 

part of such an effort. 

As we increase our focus on and efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, we must not lose sight of other important missions in the 

CENTCOM AOR. 

There has, for example, been substantial progress in Iraq, but 

numerous challenges still confront its leaders and its people. 

Although Al Qaeda and other extremist elements in Iraq have 

been reduced significantly, they pose a continued threat to security 

and stability. 

Beyond that, lingering ethnic and sectarian mistrust, tensions 

between political parties, the return of displaced persons, large detainee releases, new budget challenges, the integration of the Sons 

of Iraq, and other issues indicate that the progress there is still 

fragile and reversible, though less so than when I left Iraq last fall, 

especially given the successful conduct of provincial elections in 

late January. 

Despite the many challenges, the progress in Iraq, especially the 

steady development of the Iraqi security forces, has enabled the 

continued transition of security responsibilities to Iraqi elements, 

further reductions of coalition forces, and steady withdrawal of our 

units from urban areas. 

We are, thus, on track in implementing the security agreement 

with the government of Iraq and in executing the strategy laid out 

by the President at Camp Lejeune. 

A vital element in our effort in Iraq has been congressional support for a variety of equipment and resource needs, and I want to 

take this opportunity to thank you for that. 

In particular, your support for the rapid fielding of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and various types of unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as for important individual equipment and the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), 

has been of enormous importance to our troopers. 

With respect to CERP, we have taken a number of steps to ensure proper expenditure and oversight of the funds allocated 

through the program, including procedural guides, instruction of 

leaders, and an audit by the Army audit agency, at my request, 

when I was the Multi-National Force—Iraq (MNFI) commander in 

2008. 

Iran remains a major concern in the CENTCOM AOR. It continues to carry out destabilizing activities in the region, including 

the training, funding and arming of militant proxies active in Lebanon, Gaza and Iraq. 

It also continues its development of nuclear capabilities and missile systems that many assess are connected to the pursuit of nuclear weapons and delivery means. 

In response, we are working with partner states in the region to 

build their capabilities and to strengthen cooperative security arrangements, especially in the areas of shared early warning, air 

and missile defense, and the establishment of a common operational picture. 
12 

Iran’s actions and rhetoric have, in fact, prompted our partners 

in the Gulf to seek closer relationships with us than we have had 

with some of them in decades. 

We are also helping to bolster the capabilities of the security 

forces in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, the Gulf states, and the 

central Asian states, to help them deal with threats to their security, which range from Al Qaeda and other extremist groups to robust militia and organized criminal elements. 

In addition, we are working with partner nations to counter piracy, combat illegal narcotics production and trafficking, and interdict arms smuggling, activities that threaten stability and the rule 

of law and often provide funding for extremists. 

Much of this work is performed through an expanding network 

of bilateral and multilateral cooperative arrangements established 

to address common challenges and pursue shared objectives. 

As we strengthen this network, we strive to provide our partners 

responsive security assistance, technical expertise, and resources 

for training, educating and equipping their forces and improving 

security facilities and infrastructure. 

We believe significant gains result from these activities and we 

appreciate your support for them, too. 

Finally, in all these endeavors, we seek to foster comprehensive 

approaches by ensuring that military efforts are fully integrated 

with broader diplomatic, economic and developmental activities. 

We are working closely with former Senator Mitchell and Ambassador Ross as they undertake important responsibilities as special 

envoys, in the same way that we are working with Ambassador 

Holbrooke and the United States ambassadors in our region. 

In conclusion, there will be nothing easy about the way ahead in 

Afghanistan or Pakistan or in many of the other tasks in the Central Command area. Much hard work lies before us. 

But it is clear that achieving the objectives of these missions is 

vital and it is equally clear that these endeavors will require sustained, substantial commitment and unity of effort among all involved. 

There are currently over 215,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen serving in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. 

Together with our many civilian partners, they have been the 

central element in the progress we have made in Iraq and in several other areas, and they will be the key to achieving progress in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan and in other locations where serious 

work is being done. 

These wonderful Americans and their fellow troopers around the 

world constitute the most capable military in the history of our nation. They have soldiered magnificently against tough enemies during challenging operations in punishing terrain and extreme 

weather, and they and their families have made great sacrifices 

since 9/11, as you know. 

Nothing means more to these great Americans than the sense 

that those back home appreciate their service and sacrifice. 

And so this morning, I want to conclude by thanking the American people for their extraordinary support of our military men and 

women and their families, and by thanking the members of this 
13 

committee for your unflagging support and abiding concern for our 

troopers and their families, as well. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Petraeus can be found in the 

Appendix on page 59.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you, sir. 

Admiral Olson. 

Admiral, I might, before I introduce you, announce to the members that we will have a total of five successive votes, two of which, 

as I understand, are 15-minute votes. 

So we ask, ladies and gentlemen, for your patience and we shall 

return, to paraphrase General MacArthur. 

Admiral Olson. 

STATEMENT OF ADM. ERIC OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

Admiral OLSON. Good morning. Chairman Skelton, Congressman 

McHugh, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for 

the invitation to appear before this committee to represent the 

United States Special Operations Command. 

I will focus on the roles of our headquarters and joint special operations forces in addressing the current and potential threats 

posed by extremists and their allies and networks in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan. 

I am pleased to join Secretary Flournoy—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. Could you get the microphone just a 

hair closer? 

Admiral OLSON. I am pleased to join Secretary Flournoy and 

General Petraeus, who commands most of our deployed special operations forces, this morning. 

The situation in this region is increasingly dire. Al Qaeda’s surviving leaders have proven adept at hiding, communicating, and inspiring. And operating in and from remote sites in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, Al Qaeda remains a draw for local and foreign 

fighters who subscribe to its extremist ideology and criminality. 

The Taliban, although not militarily strong, is pervasive and brutal, operating in the guise of both nationalists and keepers of the 

faith, but behaving in the manner of street gangs, drug lords, and 

mafias. 

They have forced and intimidated a mostly benign populous to 

bend to their will. Their methods run the relatively narrow range 

from malicious to evil. 

The President’s strategy announced last week is one we fully 

support. We have contributed to the reviews of the past several 

months and are pleased to see that the strategy includes a clear 

focus on Al Qaeda as the enemy and that both a regional approach 

and a whole of government approach are directed. 

We know well that progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be 

neither quick nor easy. We, as a nation and an international community, must be prepared for an extended campaign and one that 

must go well beyond traditional military activities. 

Increasing the presence and capacity of civilian agencies and 

international organizations, to include sufficient funding and training, is essential. 
14 

Also essential is robust support to the military, law enforcement, 

border security, and intelligence organizations of Afghanistan and 

Pakistan themselves, as it is ultimately they who must succeed in 

their lands. 

The United States Special Operations Command has a major role 

as a force provider and the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine 

Corps forces it trains, equips, deploys and supports have key roles 

and missions within this campaign. 

With a long history of counterterror, counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare operations in many of earth’s crisis and tension spots, the capabilities, culture, and ethos of special operations 

forces are well suited to many of the more demanding aspects of 

our mission in Afghanistan and to our increasing interaction with 

Pakistan’s military and Frontier Corps forces. 

Right now, in Afghanistan, as for the last seven years, special operations activities range from high tech man hunting to providing 

veterinary services for tribal livestock. 

The direct action missions provide the time and space needed for 

the more indirect counterinsurgency operations to have their decisive effects. 

In Pakistan, we continue to work with the security forces at the 

scale and pace set by them, and we are prepared to do more. While 

we share much with them, our forces are, in turn, learning much 

about our common adversaries and the social complexities of the 

region from them. 

We stand ready to continue to work with Pakistani forces and to 

stand by them for the long term and, in this regard, it is important 

that we do not undervalue the contributions and sacrifices that 

they have already made. 

While certain units of the special operations force are leading 

high end efforts to find and capture or kill the top terrorist and extremist targets in Afghanistan, fundamental to most of the deployed special operations force is our enduring partnership with 

our Afghan counterparts. 

Under a program that began over three years ago, United States 

special forces, at the 12-man team level, have trained Afghan commandos in the classrooms and on the firing ranges and then moved 

with them to their assigned regions across the country, living remotely with them on small camps, continuing the training and 

mentoring, and integrating with them on day and night combat operations. 

This had great effect, and supporting their local development and 

assistance efforts has had perhaps even a more powerful impact. 

The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps component commands of the United States Special Operations Command use authorities and a budget granted by legislation to organize, equip, 

train, and provide their forces to support operational commanders 

globally. 

When outside the United States, all special operations forces are 

under the operational control of the appropriate geographic combatant commander. 

United States Special Operations Command’s budget is intended 

to fund materials, services, equipment, research, training and operations that are peculiar to special operations forces. 
15 

It primarily enables the modification of service common equipment and procurement of specialized items for the conduct of missions that are specifically and appropriately special operations 

forces’ missions to perform. 

The SOCOM budget has been robust enough to provide for rapid 

response to a broad set of crises, but we rely, importantly, on each 

of the services to provide for our long-term sustainment in wartime 

environments and to develop and sustain the enabling capabilities, 

and we rely on operational commanders to assign these capabilities 

to their special operations task forces. 

We can serve in both supporting and supported roles at the operational level, and special operations effect can be the core elements 

around which key parts of the strategy are based. 

More than 10,000 members of our special operations force are 

now under the command of General Petraeus in the Central Command Area of Responsibility, and around 100 more are working in 

Afghanistan under NATO’s ISAF command structure. 

About 2,000 others are in about 65 countries around the world 

on an average day. 

Their activities cover the broad spectrum of traditional military 

activities, well beyond the stereotypical one-dimensional 

gunslinger, to encompass the three-dimensional warrior, adept at 

defense, development and diplomacy. 

Special operations brings soft power with a hard edge. 

The employment of special operations forces will actually not 

change much as a result of a revised overall strategy. Our units 

have been conducting both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 

for several years. We will continue to provide our broad capabilities 

to our fullest capacity. 

Our strategy in Afghanistan must secure the primary urban 

areas and main routes so that life and legitimate business can 

begin and return to normalcy. 

But Afghanistan is not Iraq and most of the population is not 

urban. Security must be felt in the hinterland, provided by Afghan 

forces, supported by small teams of U.S. and NATO troops, and enhanced by civilian agencies in a manner that improves local life by 

local standards. 

I am encouraged by the prioritization of this approach in the new 

strategy. 

And inherent to our success and to the defeat of our enemies is 

the realization that this is a real fight, as long as Al Qaeda, the 

Taliban and associated extremists want it to be. 

Civilian casualties are mostly a result of their tactics, not ours. 

The operational commanders I hear from are doing all they can to 

minimize the number of noncombatant deaths, because they both 

abhor the reality of civilian casualties and they understand the 

negative strategic impacts of such deaths. 

They know that as long as our enemies force noncombatant 

women, children and others to support their operations or to remain on targeted facilities after warnings have been issued, some 

will die. 

They also know that the conditions, numbers and severity of the 

casualties will be highly exaggerated and quickly communicated. 
16 

We must acknowledge the seriousness of this challenge and find 

ways to mitigate its effects, especially as we increase our troop 

presence in the coming months. 

And I will conclude with a simple statement of pride in a special 

operations force that I am honored to command. Created by a 

proactive Congress and nurtured by your strong support over the 

last 22 years, United States Special Operations Command headquarters has brought together units from all four services to develop and sustain a truly magnificent joint capability. 

Special operations forces are contributing globally, well beyond 

what its percentage of the total force would indicate, and, in Afghanistan and Pakistan, they are well known for their effectiveness. 

Thank you. I stand ready for your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson can be found in the 

Appendix on page 106.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

In just a moment, we will adjourn for the votes. 

But, Admiral Olson, I have to make mention, you spoke of pride 

about the special operations and it was this committee, Congressman Dan Daniels from the state of Virginia, that was the father 

of the legislation that created what you do, and his memory is still 

a very strong one here. 

We will adjourn and return at the end of the votes. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. We will proceed. 

I thank the witnesses for their patience. These are unavoidable 

moments where we have to go vote, and we did, and people will be 

coming back in as soon as they leave the floor. But I will proceed 

with my questions. 

Our new strategy is reliant on success in Pakistan, no question 

about that. Our efforts with the Pakistanis thus far have involved 

a significant amount of taxpayers’ dollars. We also have inconsistent progress in fighting the insurgency. 

We need some more specifics on how we will change the dynamic 

and achieve accountability while we maintain a long-term partnership. And I understand and realize it may be walking a tightrope 

in the process of that, but the people of our country are entitled 

to accountability. 

As Congress begins to draft law regarding this, how would you 

recommend we think about ensuring the progress in Pakistan and 

accountability therefore? 

Ms. Flournoy. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Let me start by underscoring your point 

that we have to recognize the importance of Pakistan as a critical 

partner in achieving our core goal. 

We have to work closely with them to be able to disrupt and dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda and their extremist allies and the safe 

haven that is in Pakistan. 

I think the President’s strategy is very much designed to start 

with a commitment to Pakistan that is reassuring to them, that 

recognizes our common interests, and that gives them incentives to 

work closely with us. 
17 

But in addition to us stepping up and making that commitment 

to Pakistan, we also do need to follow up to ensure that their performance is meeting our common objectives, as well. 

I think for this committee, the most important point is to provide 

General Petraeus, Admiral Olson, our military commanders on the 

ground with the tools that they need to work effectively with the 

Pakistani military on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, to 

be able to set common objectives, to establish performance measures together, and then to work closely together to achieve those. 

So I think giving our commanders those authorities, those tools, 

the necessary resources is really critical to this effort. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Petraeus. 

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, to follow on that, those tools, 

if you will, come in several packages. And I don’t want to get ahead 

of the budget process, but since this is our opportunity with you, 

without talking numbers, what they will be comprised of are the 

familiar coalition support funds that you have—— 

The CHAIRMAN. No, we are not talking about numbers. We are 

just talking about accountability. 

General PETRAEUS. What we are after, of course, is to build a relationship with them that can, in a sense, reassure them, after 

years, as you know, of ups and downs with the Pakistanis. 

And as I mentioned in my statement, that is something that will 

take a sustained substantial commitment on our part, in return for 

which, obviously, we can expect a sustained substantial commitment on their part. 

The tools that are essential to us in showing this commitment 

are the Pakistani counterinsurgency capabilities fund, coalition 

support fund, and then the other types of funds wrapped up in the 

1206, 1207 and 1208, and I suspect that Admiral Olson may want 

to talk about a couple of those, as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral. 

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Without being overly restrictive, because the Pakistani commanders will need some flexibility, as well, I think it is important 

to tie in some way the programs to specific equipment, training, facilities, maintenance, operations with the accountability processes 

in place so that we can be assured that the support is being utilized in the way that we intended it and at the right levels. 

General Petraeus did mention the 1208 authority, which is a 

very important authority. It is not an appropriation. It is just an 

authority for Special Operations Command to use some of its funds 

in a direct support role to counterparts and surrogates. 

And because it is a very specific authority, with controls in place, 

I find it very effective. I think that, in some ways, that could be 

scaled up and serve as a model for a larger expenditure of funds 

in that regard, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Can one of you give us a better description of the 

Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund? Who can do that? 

General. 

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, that is a request that will be 

coming forward and it is specifically designed to provide resources 

that we can use, that Central Command can use, through the office 
18 

of the defense rep in Pakistan, to help the Pakistanis build the 

kind of capability and capacity they need to truly address the extremist threats in the federally administered tribal areas. 

That requires more than just counterterrorist operations. It requires a comprehensive counterinsurgency effort. And these funds 

are designed to specifically help them develop those capabilities. 

The CHAIRMAN. Is it replacing a fund? As I understand, this is 

in addition to the 1206, et cetera. Lots of dollars. Am I correct? 

General PETRAEUS. It is separate from those authorizations. It is 

a specific fund designed, again, to help the Pakistani forces develop 

specific capabilities, counterinsurgency capabilities. 

The CHAIRMAN. Was there anything comparable to this in Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. In truth, the Multi-National Security Transition Command (MNSTC–I) funding, that you remember well, the 

train and equip funding, arguably, was very comparable to that 

and in substantial amounts, as you will recall. 

But we don’t have a comparable organization. We do have the Office of the Defense Representative in Pakistan (ODRP), led by an 

admiral, with a Special Forces brigadier general as his deputy, and 

they oversee the activities, together with the ambassador, of the 

military personnel who are providing assistance and training to the 

Pakistani military forces. 

But we don’t have the kind of very robust train and equip program that we had in Iraq or in Afghanistan. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks so much. 

Mr. McHugh. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, yesterday, you and I had a chance to talk very briefly 

about your appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). I am particularly glad to see you all survived in 

such good form. 

You recommended I go to the transcript to get a gist of what you 

were talking about. In 17 years, I have learned that when a combatant commander suggests you do something, you should. 

And I did review that and I just want to refer to it. Senator 

Levin said, ‘‘First, on this 10,000 troop request, is there a pending 

request that is unfilled at this point for those 10,000 additional 

troops,’’ the request that General McKiernan had laid out. 

Your response was, ‘‘This is a request’’—excuse me—‘‘There is a 

request for forces for those elements, Senator, and it did move 

through me. My understanding is it has not been sent beyond the 

Pentagon at this time,’’ to which Senator Levin then said, ‘‘Has 

that been sent? I should look to you, then, Secretary Flournoy. Has 

that been sent by Secretary Gates? Has that request been made by 

Secretary Gates?’’ 

Ma’am, your response was, ‘‘The request was laid out along with 

all of the others on a timeline and the President was told that the 

request is out there, but that he doesn’t have to make it.’’ 

I am curious. Who told the President he doesn’t have to make the 

decision at that time and what was the rationale for that? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Senator—sorry. Sir—— 

Mr. MCHUGH. Let’s not get insulting now. [Laughter.] 

Secretary FLOURNOY. What we did is we looked at the full range 

of requests that General McKiernan had put on the table and the 
19 

two outstanding requests are for forces that would not arrive until 

2010, one in the first part and the other in like October of 2010. 

And what was clear is when the President asked, ‘‘Well, when do 

these decisions need to be made, to be able to alert units, give them 

the deployment orders, send them,’’ he was told, ‘‘Sir, you don’t 

have to make those decisions until the fall.’’ 

And so what he focused on was all of the decisions that the commander had put on the table to respond in the current timeframe 

and he said, ‘‘Given that we are changing strategy, we are substantially changing the resourcing of the mission, conditions on the 

ground will change between now and the fall, I am committing to 

a process of reevaluation, of establishing metrics and benchmarks, 

and of continuing to look at what is working, what is not, and adjusting.’’ 

And we fully anticipate that the General’s request may even 

change or evolve over time, in 6 months’ time. So the commitment 

was we will look at those decisions when we need to make them 

to actually affect the force flows. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Again, if I may, who made that request to the 

President? Was that Secretary Gates’ recommendation? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, this was in an interagency discussion, 

where several—the consensus recommendation to the President 

was to look at those decisions at that time. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Let me ask again. Was that Secretary Gates’ recommendation? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I believe that, yes, he said, basically—he 

and the chairman both explained that these requests are out there, 

but they do not need to be—that his decisions do not need to be 

made at this time, they can be made later and still meet the commanders’ needs on the ground. 

Mr. MCHUGH. So Secretary Gates recommended the President 

need not make that decision. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, you are putting words in his month 

and—— 

Mr. MCHUGH. No, I am not, ma’am. With all due respect—— 

Secretary FLOURNOY. That is not the way the discussion went. 

The discussion was he was at—the President asked to understand 

the timelines involved in these decisions. 

Those timelines were presented to him and they were fully explored and discussed and the decision was made that those decisions don’t need to be made at this time, and that would not adversely affect force flows meeting the commanders’ needs. 

Mr. MCHUGH. I want to be very clear. I have no desire to put 

words in your mouth, and that is why we are going through this, 

because I think it is very important to have clear on the record how 

this decision was reached. 

I think you have explained that. But I think it is equally important to understand where each person in the process stands. 

We have General McKiernan’s stated need. I assume General 

Petraeus passed that through, as he said he did. It is consistent 

with the counterinsurgency strategy numbers that certainly our 

very successful manual proved in Iraq. 
20 

Let me ask the question this way. Did Secretary Gates make a 

recommendation directly the President not make this or he just 

said, ‘‘It is up to you, Mr. President?’’ 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I am not privy to their private conversations, but I did not hear him make a recommendation either 

way. I heard him lay out the timeline and the options and the consequences. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you. 

Here is my concern. During my opening statement, I said that 

I worry about the President’s plan, that I fully support, that I feel 

he very articulately set forward, has committed us to a full counterinsurgency strategy. 

The concern I have is that by not supporting now the deployment 

and the assignment of troops that, admittedly, won’t be, in all likelihood, made until 2010, is sending a message we may not deploy 

those troops. They may not be committed, contrary to the commanders’ request on the ground. 

And therefore, this minimalist approach that takes us away from 

a counterinsurgency plan that the President has fully committed 

himself to and that I support becomes, in the mind of Congress, a 

very important player in this role, as we saw in 2007–2006 with 

respect to the Iraq surge, begins to take over and influence executive policy. 

That is my concern and I am hard pressed to get my mind 

around the benefit of not making this full commitment pursuant to 

the commanders’ request. That is my view. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. If I could just respond, sir. 

I don’t think there is any way that you can characterize the additional troops that are being sent, when you add in enablers and the 

additional brigade that the President just approved, nearly 25,000 

above what we have had, which has been a minimalist approach 

in the past, I do not think you can characterize that as minimalist 

or incremental in any way. 

I think what the President feels is important is that we set very 

clear metrics to measure our progress, that we hold ourselves accountable to those metrics, and that we consider commanders’ requests at the time when those decisions need to be made. 

And he will consider not only—he will consider whatever requests that are on the table at the appropriate time to ensure that 

our forces and our civilians on the ground have the resources they 

need to execute the strategy that has been outlined. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Now, with all due respect, because someone may 

read this transcript, as I have read the Senate, I want to make it 

clear, you are now putting words in my mouth. 

I never said the President had a minimalist approach. I said, in 

2006 and 2007, the Congress began to take a minimalist approach. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Okay, I appreciate that. Thank you. 

Mr. MCHUGH. And I am worried about the lack of clarity that 

this recommendation to the President, in whatever form it came, 

and I am still not certain we understand that, feeds into the congressional pocket that may still have that as an objective that I 

view as a very clear formula for the President’s plan, again, that 

I support and I want to see succeed, has dedicated itself to. 
21 

So I would make the argument I am actually trying to support 

the President here and I am trying to point out where I think there 

may be a problem that, frankly, I think we ought to overcome, pursuant to the commanders’ requests on the ground. 

Let’s move in a similar area to the Afghan National Security 

Forces. 

We have a current timeline by the end of 2011 to expand that 

force at an accelerated level, a decision that was made last December, to 134,000. 

General Wardak and others in Afghanistan, and most analysts 

that I have heard believe, and I tend to agree with them, that we 

have to have a substantial expansion beyond that to truly allow the 

Afghans to take the lead. That is the objective here and I think it 

is the right path. 

Why would we not at least announce—and I understand the limitations of the trainer availability, that can only evolve in time, but 

why don’t we say, particularly to our allies who are asking now to 

step forward and to help provide support troops and help provide 

trainers and such, that this is going to be a minimal target? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, we had extensive discussion about the 

growth of the ANSF and I think the sense around the table is that 

it will need to ultimately be larger than the current targets. 

In the near term, we thought the most important, realistic, concrete goal we could set would be to accelerate the targeted growth 

that we have already put out on the table, and that is to bring forward the completion date for when we reach the current goals. 

So we have done that, bringing that forward to 2011, and that 

is a very important target. 

That said, what we have also done is tasked Combined Security 

Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC–A) on the ground to do 

a detailed analysis of the needs for a larger force and what it would 

take to actually grow that force, because we did not have that in 

hand during the strategy review and we felt that if we picked a 

number, we would get it exactly wrong. 

We needed the time to follow up with the analysis of what is possible, what are the limitations that need to be overcome, what do 

we need to make this a sustainable force over time, and so forth. 

So that is ongoing work that we will continue to look at and we 

are open to revising those target goals upward. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Well, I support that and I think it is important, 

as you have now done, to make clear to those who are paying attention to this, and there are many, that the objective is likely to 

grow. 

Just as a point of clarification, I do believe you said ‘‘we have accelerated.’’ We are on the same accelerated timeline as CSTC–A 

and the secretary approved, in December of last year, 134,000 in 

the end of 2011. Is that not correct? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Yes. What is different is that we have 

resourced the trainer request to actually be able to meet that goal. 

Mr. MCHUGH. Which is a very critical component of that, and I 

would agree. 

Thank you. 

General PETRAEUS. Congressman, if I could just—— 

Mr. MCHUGH. Yes, General? 
22 

General PETRAEUS. As late as this morning, actually, there was 

an article in the ‘‘Early Bird,’’ an interview with Secretary Gates, 

in which he indicated every inclination, in fact, to support an increased number for the Afghan national army. 

He said he just needs the detail to sort that out, and, obviously, 

of course, there are some sustainment concerns that I think are 

very realistic, as well, and have to be dealt with. 

Mr. MCHUGH. I fully agree and the fact that you have clarified 

that is why, in part, I came here this morning, other than to hear 

all the other testimony, and I deeply appreciate that. 

And I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Madam Secretary, please restate, in 25 words or 

less, the prospect for additional forces. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. As part of this strategy, the President has 

committed to an ongoing process of reevaluation, to a process that 

will develop metrics and benchmarks for our progress, and he will 

consider requests for additional resources on both the civilian and 

military side in the future as those requests are needed or are 

made. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Let me remind the members that the witnesses have a drop-dead 

time at 2 o’clock and we are under the 5-minute rule, and let’s do 

our very, very best to stay within that. 

Mr. Ortiz. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Flournoy, good to see you again. 

In your testimony, you stated that the Department of Defense 

seeks a more strategic partnership with Pakistan that will encourage and enable it to shift its strategic focus from conventional war 

to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism so that they can better 

address the internal threat facing the country. 

My question would be how will the department oversee this strategic shift and what additional military resources are required? 

And I know that we talked about maybe sending an additional 

17,000 troops. And one of the problems that we have had there is 

that the insurgency has destroyed some of the equipment going to 

Afghanistan. 

Not too long ago, they destroyed heavy equipment going to the 

NATO troops. 

So are you very well prepared staff-wise to see that shift and the 

necessary personnel to carry it out? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, sir, I think helping to reassure Pakistan and enable a shift in the thinking of some of its key leaders, 

many of whom I believe are already there, have made that shift, 

I think it is going to take a regional approach that engages the full 

range of Pakistan’s security concerns with others in the region. 

I think it is going to take a whole of government approach that 

includes not only military assistance, but economic assistance and 

intensive political engagement. 

And I do think there is a military and security assistance component of this that involves, again, as I said, giving our commanders 

the tools in terms of authorities and resources to train, equip, advise, assist, work increasingly closely with the Pakistani military 

on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. 
23 

So I think it has to be part of a whole of government approach. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Do you know or do you have any estimate of how long 

this will take to really prepare to, to get things going? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think it is going to take some time, but 

if our experience already—and maybe General Petraeus and Admiral Olson could speak to this. 

When we have been able to get the access to work closely with 

them, things come along at a good pace. So I would defer to them 

and their direct experience. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Sure. 

General Petraeus. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, there has been progress, in fact, with 

great trainers, largely special forces from SOCOM, working really 

as trainers and nothing more than that, actually, but with the 

Frontier Corps, in particular, which has carried out operations in 

several of the areas of the FATA, Bajaur, Mohmand, among others. 

And, indeed, they have had some very tough fighting and they 

have achieved reasonably good results in those areas. 

That effort is gradually expanding. It is that effort that, in fact, 

the Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capability Fund would enable, in 

many respects, and that is the vehicle that we see for taking this 

forward. 

I will let you talk a bit about your—— 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, the effort that is underway now is a relatively small scale effort, but at the unit level, where the partnership has occurred, it has been with some enthusiasm on both sides 

and the Pakistani soldiers in both the military and the Frontier 

Corps have proven to be eager and capable students. 

So we will have to scale up at the pace that the Pakistanis permit it to, but I am encouraged by the progress that we have seen 

so far, sir. 

Mr. ORTIZ. I know that there are other members, so my time is 

about up. I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson, please. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today, 

Admiral Olson, General Petraeus, Secretary Flournoy. 

Admiral, General, I just greatly appreciate your leadership of our 

service members, who I believe are protecting American families by 

defeating the terrorists overseas in the global war on terrorism, 

and your leadership has just been extraordinary. 

And, in particular, General Petraeus, as a veteran myself of 31 

years with the Army National Guard and Reserves, I appreciate so 

much your leadership, your leadership of my former unit, my colleagues of the 218th Brigade that served for a year in Afghanistan. 

I know their respect for you, led by Brigadier General Bob Livingston. Our state of South Carolina, it was the largest deployment, 1,600 troops, since World War II, and the people of South 

Carolina appreciate their service. They are very grateful for their 

service, training Afghan police and army units. 

Additionally, as a parent, I want to thank you for your service. 

I have had two sons serve in Iraq. I have had a third son serve 

in Egypt. I know my wife and I were reassured knowing the level 
24 

of commitment of the military leaders that serve our country, and 

it made us feel good about their service. 

General, as we proceed forward, and this has been generally discussed, but it is about the manpower levels for the Afghan national 

army and the national police, 134,000 for the army, 84,000 for the 

police. 

A concern that I have had in the past is the low level of pay for 

these people serving, the lack of proper equipment. Is this being 

addressed? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, if I could just say, you should, indeed, be very proud of the 218th Brigade and the great job that 

they have done down range. 

Having trained years ago with them, when I was assigned at 

Fort Stewart, it was gratifying to see them get their chance to deploy and to do such a great job. 

With respect to the pay, there have been incremental pay increases. There have been efforts to, also, equalize pay so that one 

service doesn’t get more than the other. 

And, again, you have a dual-edged sword here, though, and that 

is the concern over the sustainability of these forces, because the 

bulk of their resources, obviously, come from donor countries, the 

United States and other members of the contributing nations. 

So that has, indeed, increased. One indicator is that there is certainly no shortage of volunteers for the Afghan national security 

forces. 

But what we have to do is ensure that, over time, the retention 

and other actions, the reduced absent without leave (AWOL) rates 

and so forth, some of this similar to what we went through in Iraq, 

frankly, with one big difference, and that is that they do not have 

the kind of oil revenues that Iraq had. 

So we have got to do this carefully. It has and is being addressed 

and so are the equipment and training challenges. 

If I could, I think it is important to know what the biggest challenge is in expanding the Afghan national security forces, and that 

is leaders. And this is, again, very similar to what we went through 

in Iraq. 

I remember telling this body, for example, we can train battalions, that is not a problem, we can train basic recruits, we can 

even—over time, we were producing lieutenants in substantial 

numbers. 

What you can’t produce overnight or with a 6-month or even a 

few-year course are those individuals who will command at the 

company, the battalion and the brigade level and serve on their 

staffs, and that just flat takes time and that is the long pole in this 

particular tent. 

Human capital is at a premium in Afghanistan. You have had 

over 30 years of war that has robbed the nation of a lot of that 

human talent over time and this is an area that we really have to 

help them to build, not just to rebuild. 

And I think it is very important, also, to observe that difference 

between Iraq and Afghanistan, that in Afghanistan, we are building, constructing, not typically reconstructing or rebuilding, as we 

were in Iraq. 

Thank you. 
25 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

And a final question. This has been identified, Afghanistan, as 

a test for NATO. We know that a country like Romania has been 

very courageous to provide more troops. 

Are there any other countries that we should identify as really 

stepping forward? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, there are a number of countries that 

actually are stepping forward and I think we need to see what happens at the NATO summit. 

There certainly is hope and some expectation that the full election security force will be filled, for example, and that there are 

others. 

There are some other nations that we are exploring and I just 

don’t want to get out ahead of the process, though, in announcing 

what those might be. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our guests for being with us. 

General Petraeus, the representatives from Maersk have one of 

the two contracts to resupply our troops in Afghanistan. It is my 

understanding that they have lost about 135 contract drivers that 

have been killed just transiting Pakistan. American President 

Lines has lost about another 15 or so. 

That is resupplying the present force. We have had entire convoys hijacked in Pakistan. We have had entire convoys destroyed 

transiting Pakistan. 

What is your degree of confidence that, given the additional 

25,000 people and their additional needs, we can continue to count 

on Pakistan as our major resupply route? 

I have seen the alternatives, the 8,000 miles through China, 50- 

something days if you use Turkey as your port of debarkation. It 

doesn’t look like we have many good alternatives other than Pakistan. 

So my question is what is your degree of confidence that 12 

months from now, that the routes will be opened to resupply the 

force we have now, plus the additional 25,000 Americans? 

General PETRAEUS. The degree of confidence is reasonable, Congressman. Let me give you an example—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. General, for a rookie like myself, reasonable would 

translate to what as a percentage? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I am not going to put numbers on this 

thing. But let me just explain, if I could, that between 15 February 

and 15 March, for example, there were about 3,600, roughly, equivalent containers that went through the Khyber pass. 

About 1 percent of all of that was damaged or destroyed in transit, and that included a couple of these sensational attacks. 

The Pakistani drivers, truckers unions, transport companies, 

shipping companies and government all realize that this is an enormously important boost to their economy. It is hugely significant 

to them. 

I have discussed this with the army chief, General Kiyani, on a 

number of occasions. They have, in fact, recently launched new operations, as well. 
26 

Now, beyond that, we do have decent alternatives for goods and 

services that are nonlethal and there are three Northern Distribution Network (NDN) routes that actually come ultimately through 

Uzbekistan and into Afghanistan from the north. 

In fact, we are now getting about 80 percent of our fuel, for example, through the north vice through the Khyber pass. 

Again, the Pakistanis are aware of this. There is competition for 

those routes. Some of these are not as easy as the route that goes 

through Khyber, although none of this is easy in terms of the distribution. 

But we do have those and we are even exploring more of those, 

because we do want to have as many alternatives as possible, and 

the U.S. Transportation Command has done a terrific job, together 

with our logisticians. 

We can also fly in and it is expensive, but we also do fly in very 

important items and we have, for example, flown in hundreds of 

MRAP vehicles. 

Mr. TAYLOR. What jumps out at me is that the route—the 

present route we are taking tends to be the more traditional route 

where there seems to be a city every 10 to 15 miles, the highly populated parts of Pakistan, which, in my mind’s eye, makes it more 

difficult because it only takes a few people out of the many to make 

that route very hard to transit. 

On the flipside, there appears to be a southern route through a 

much less populated part of Pakistan, using a port other than the 

port of Karachi. 

And I am just wondering to what extent we are talking to the 

Pakistanis, to what extent are they willing to listen. 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, we are all over this, let me assure you. 

This is about job one for the U.S. Transportation Command commander. 

If you brought Duncan McNabb in here, you would find out that 

he is on top of this. He has personally, actually, visited the countries. I personally went and saw them. 

Tomorrow, there is a signing agreement in one of those countries, 

as well, in the central Asian states, for example, on an agreement. 

We have looked at the routes actually that go through what is 

called the Chaman gate, which goes up past Quetta in southern 

Pakistan, and there is use of that and there is addition to the infrastructure that supports that going on. 

That is used pretty heavily by the British forces already and we 

will make some use of that over time. 

Quetta, as you know, though, has some potential for disruption, 

as well. 

Beyond that, there is another port, indeed. That port doesn’t yet 

have the infrastructure to support the kinds of transportation that 

we need, but we are looking at that one. And there is even a route 

that goes to the west that is an interesting route, as well, as you 

might know, through another country. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The new strategy for Afghanistan addresses very much the notion that this is—we need a regional approach and, often, when we 
27 

talk about Afghanistan and Pakistan, I have heard many people 

say you can’t really address improvements in Afghanistan, the security situation or anything else, without also addressing Pakistan, 

and some have used a hyphenated Afghanistan-Pakistan when 

talking about the strategy in Afghanistan. 

At the end of the day here, we are dealing with two sovereign 

nations, Pakistan and Afghanistan. And I was surprised and, 

frankly, a little bit shocked to see quoted in the newspapers this 

week a senior official talking about AFPAK, A-F-P-A-K. 

That does not seem, to me, to be a good idea for us to be putting 

forward the notion that they are somehow one newly created thing 

that suits our vision of how we might want to go forward in this 

conflict. 

And so I am offering the notion that we should not, senior officials should not, and the administration or in uniform, invent 

AFPAK as we go forward. 

If anybody disagrees with that, any of the three of you, this 

would be a time to speak up, if you disagree. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I don’t disagree. I think it is a classic 

case of unfortunate Washington shorthand. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. 

Now, I have another question—well, actually, that wasn’t a question so much as an opinion, but I think it is very important. I really do want to stress that. 

We cannot, because we think that we cannot address Afghanistan without considering Pakistan and we think of it in a regional 

sense, I would argue that the region might include more than Afghanistan and Pakistan, but we cannot denigrate those sovereign 

nations with a notion of AFPAK. 

Now, General Petraeus, we are shifting forces from Iraq to Afghanistan in your command and I have some concerns about that, 

because the two are not the same, and nobody knows that better 

than you, but I want to get this point. 

When you take soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines that are literally in country in Iraq, they have trained and prepared to serve 

in Iraq, with a somewhat different enemy, some would say an extremely different enemy, and certainly different terrain. 

And if you literally move those soldiers, let’s say, you are a 

Blackhawk pilot, and you move that unit literally from Iraq to Afghanistan, you are moving them into something that they really 

haven’t trained for or prepared for. 

They haven’t trained to fly in that terrain, to fight that enemy. 

And I don’t know to what extent, as we are looking at the shifting 

of forces, you and your subordinate commanders are looking at that 

problem. 

Can you address that for just a minute, please? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, in fact, we are looking at it very hard, 

Congressman. 

First of all, it is a relatively small number of forces that literally 

go directly from a mission in Iraq to a mission in Afghanistan, and 

it is probably on the order of several thousand. 

And these have been tough decisions, because these are forces 

that were in Iraq for a reason. They were performing important 

tasks. And we then have to do a risk assessment and determine, 
28 

particularly for what we call high demand-low density assets, 

where they are most needed, where is the risk highest if those 

forces are not there. 

And it tends to be elements like construction engineers, a lot of 

the elements that we are using to build up the infrastructure now 

in southern Afghanistan for the influx of new forces, those types, 

as well. 

So you have that number of those. The bulk of these, though, are 

what we call off-ramping. In other words, these are forces that 

were originally intended to go to Iraq, such as the Stryker Brigade 

that is going to Afghanistan instead. 

And the decision is made with sufficient time that they can shift 

their training and preparation focus from one of the area in Iraq 

to which they were headed to the area in Afghanistan, to which 

they will actually deploy. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

I just would suggest, and I know you know this, General, but I 

think it is important, that we really are bearing down on this issue. 

You need more than a week or two or three or four weeks, because you really are fighting, performing in a very, very different 

situation if you are working out of Bagram—— 

General PETRAEUS. No question about it. 

Mr. KLINE [continuing]. Than if you are working out of Al Anbar. 

So I appreciate it. 

General PETRAEUS. In fact, if I could, this is the kind of timeline 

and concern that drove these decisions. It is why actually some decisions were made even before the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy 

review was complete and those decisions were made as required. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. 

I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Dr. Snyder, please. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I was struck when Joe Wilson was talking about his four sons 

in uniform, how life takes you down different paths. I have four 

sons in diapers, although one of them is making great progress. 

Mr. WILSON. You are much younger. 

Dr. SNYDER. Secretary Flournoy, I wanted to ask you, you testified, in your other life, in January of last year, before our subcommittee, and your paper talked about, ‘‘achieving unity of effort 

and interagency operations.’’ 

And this is what you said at that time, ‘‘Unlike the U.S. military, 

which has doctrine and a standard approach to planning its operations, the U.S. government, as a whole, lacks established procedures for planning and conducting interagency operations. 

Each new administration tends to reinvent this wheel, either 

issuing new presidential guidance, which too often overlooks the 

lessons learned and best practices of its predecessors, or ignoring 

the issue entirely until it faces an actual crisis. This ad hoc approach has kept the United States from learning from its mistakes 

and improving its performance in complex contingencies over time. 

It is no wonder that U.S. personnel who have served in multiple 

operations over the last 10 to 15 years lament feeling a bit like 

Sisyphus. 
29 

In addition, the U.S. government lacks the mechanisms necessary to coordinate and integrate the actions of its various agencies at all levels in Washington, within regions, and in the field.’’ 

That is the end of your very thoughtful comment a little over a 

year ago. 

My question is: has this new administration reinvented the 

wheel? If it has, why has it and how has it? If not, what has it 

done differently with regard to the interagency issues or what General Petraeus refers to as a whole of government approach? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, it is a very important question and I 

did have a legislative adviser who says, ‘‘If they start quoting your 

words back to you, you know you are in trouble.’’ 

But I would actually stand by that. 

Dr. SNYDER. Your words were very important words. So you go 

back and hit that person for me. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. What I can say is I think one of the themes 

that came out in the strategy review is the importance of a whole 

of government approach and the need to get a much more tightly 

coordinated civil-military effort in Afghanistan, not only within the 

U.S. government piece, but with our international partners and 

particularly the U.N. presence there, as well. 

What we have done to try to operationalize that is we have asked 

that this kind of integrated planning to start at multiple levels. 

At General Petraeus’ level, he and—— 

Dr. SNYDER. Who has asked? You are the Department of Defense. 

Who asked? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. No, no, no. I am sorry. The principals, the 

interagency process, so the direction coming out of the principals 

meeting. And in this case, I think the President had specifically 

made some requests at the operational sort of campaign level for— 

I am sorry—the theater level for Ambassador Holbrooke and for 

General Petraeus to start working together at their level to try to 

coordinate this. 

I know the new ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, 

has been tasked to work very closely with General McKiernan to 

start working a joint civil-military campaign plan together in country, and they have also been tasked to marry their efforts up with 

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)’s effort, the U.N. effort, which is now being beefed up. 

And so we are trying to take this key insight from past experience and operationalize it at the theater level and at the country 

level, as well, and I expect that to be an ongoing work in progress, 

taking it down to various levels within Afghanistan, as well. 

Dr. SNYDER. Do you think the National Security Council’s 

(NSC)’s role is any different now than in the previous administration? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, I think this NSC has paid very 

close—I can’t speak to the last one, because I wasn’t there, but I 

can tell you that this NSC is playing very close attention to this 

issue. 

We believe that this strategy cannot succeed unless, A, you get 

the necessary military and civilian resources on the ground and, B, 

we do a much better job of synchronizing and coordinating those 

efforts. 
30 

Dr. SNYDER. General Petraeus, do you have any comment? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, as Secretary Flournoy said, it is very 

important that the ambassador and the ISAF/U.S. Forces Afghanistan commander partner, if I could offer, as close as Ambassador 

Crocker and I were able to partner over time to develop the kind 

of joint campaign plan that is necessary, noting that, of course, he 

is a NATO commander and that the U.N. presence is a good bit 

more significant in Kabul, at least now, than it was back when we 

were doing this in Iraq. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to thank the members of the panel for joining us 

today and thank you so much for your service to our nation. 

General Petraeus, we know, in looking at the situation there in 

Afghanistan, that the narcotics trade is clearly fueling the 

Taliban’s operations and their influence in the region. 

Are U.S. forces prepared to take on the drug interdiction mission 

as a primary mission? If so, would additional resources be necessary? And if not, what other options might be available to divert 

or disrupt the drug flow there as it relates to the monetary resources that come to the Taliban from that drug trade? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, first of all, the U.S. forces and, indeed, 

NATO forces, as well, depending on which country, but both NATO 

and U.S. forces have the authorities they need—they got these literally in the last several months—to conduct operations against the 

illegal narcotics industry elements that are linked to the Taliban, 

to the insurgency, and that is a pretty strong link, in most cases. 

It is not a hard one to establish at all. 

The money from this is, indeed, one of the primary sources of 

funding for the insurgents. There are others, but this is a significant one. We talk about it being the oxygen in the movement, in 

many cases. 

There are some resources that we do need to get in there and we 

actually are in the process of getting those. Some of these are interagency resources. 

In Iraq, we created what was called the Iraq threat finance cell. 

It focused specifically and like a laser, in fact, on one particular 

node in northern Iraq from which the extremists were able to siphon a great deal of money through a variety of illicit, as well as 

some licit activities, as well as extortion and a variety of other 

criminal actions. 

And we have taken steps to establish a similar cell in Afghanistan. It is still building. These do actually—these really take time, 

because you are looking for financial forensics analysts and that 

type of expertise. 

But that is an important component to this. Otherwise, I think 

that we have, in terms of the conventional forces, adequate forces 

to do the kind of mission in the course of our overall effort that is 

necessary to go after these individuals. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, General. 

I understand, too, a lot of the demand in this illicit drug trade 

exists in Russia and my question would be if that is, indeed, the 
31 

case, are there efforts to cooperate with Russia or to ask them to 

become a partner with us in interdicting that drug trade to Russia 

and trying to find ways to make sure we cut off the demand, as 

well as the supply. 

General PETRAEUS. There are, indeed. In fact, several individuals 

have suggested that, in fact, Russia has such significant interest in 

ensuring that extremists don’t take over again Afghanistan and 

that the illegal narcotics industry doesn’t keep pumping drugs into 

Russia and other neighboring countries. 

Iran has an enormous problem in this regard, as well. But given 

that common interest, that instead of continuing the new great 

game, as it is called in the central Asian states, there should be 

a broad partnership against extremism and against the illegal narcotics flow. 

Some certainly seem to embrace that idea in Russia. Others 

seem a bit more conflicted. 

We are working—we, coincidentally, just hosted here in Washington the central Asian and south Asian chiefs of defense staff. In 

fact, Secretary Flournoy spoke to them, as well. 

And so if we can, again, build these kinds of partnerships, we 

think it is in their interest to do this, as well, this would be a big 

advance. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the balance of 

my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Smith, please. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, I want to compliment all three of you for your efforts 

in putting together this plan and implementing it. I think it is critical to our national security and the work the administration did 

on this, very impressive; a lot of work ahead, but we are headed 

in the right direction. I appreciate that a great deal and the leadership of all three of you. 

Two areas I want to ask about. One is in the tribal areas and 

our counterinsurgency efforts there. This is a very important area, 

as you know, because of the Taliban and Al Qaeda influence and 

going back and forth across the border, destabilizing both Pakistan 

and Afghanistan. 

In the overall counterinsurgency effort that worked so well, and 

both, Admiral Olson and General Petraeus, you both had a great 

deal to do with making happen in Iraq and are now trying to implement in Afghanistan, sort of runs into a bit of a problem in the 

tribal areas, and that is we don’t have any people there. 

We have to find the community leaders that we want to work 

with, the tribal leaders who can begin to turn that around. 

And how do we do that if, A, we don’t have as much intelligence, 

knowing who is there, who can we work with, how do we build 

those relationships, and, B, we can’t actually physically be in there, 

I guess, to build those relationships? 

I am curious, when you look at that particular piece of the puzzle, and, obviously, we are trying to train the Pakistanis, but what 

is the plan for dealing with that challenge and trying to get a handle on the difficulties in the tribal areas? 
32 

General PETRAEUS. Simply put, the plan is to do that completely 

through the Pakistanis, through the Pakistani military partners 

that we have, through the Pakistani civilian authorities, northwest 

frontier province and then the actual local elements and the tribal 

agencies, but not doing that directly ourselves. 

The key is, again, giving the Pakistani military elements, the 

Frontier Corps, in particular, additional assistance so that they 

have the capability to carry out these operations and then supporting, on the civilian side, a whole of government approach that 

definitely needs increased resourcing and emphasis so that the 

military operations are followed up with the kind of civilian support that avoids alienation of the population because of displaced 

persons not being looked after, schools not being rebuilt, basic services not being restored in the wake of what are sometimes quite 

hard military operations. 

Mr. SMITH. And are you satisfied at this point that you know 

enough about the tribal areas, the interactions between the various 

tribes there, community leaders, that you have a picture of who 

you can work with, who the major challenges are, that the intel 

coming out gives you a clear enough picture? 

General PETRAEUS. I think, actually, with respect to all of the 

countries in this effort, actually, Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan, 

and especially, frankly, the tribal areas, that we have a great deal 

to learn. 

We, as you know very well from your visits and so forth in Iraq, 

over time, devoted enormous resources, particularly in the intelligence arena, with analysts and human terrain experts, if you will, 

and so forth, to where we really had the kind of nuanced understanding that we could carry out these local reconciliations or support local reconciliation. 

So when it comes to Afghanistan, this is hugely important, as 

well. But having not had the density of forces on the ground there, 

having had a relatively small number of individuals in Pakistan, 

again, we have some serious work to do in this area and I think 

that Admiral Blair, the DNI, commented on this the other day, as 

well. 

Mr. SMITH. I am really concerned about that piece of it, and 

serve on the Intelligence Committee, as well, and focused on that 

issue. I want to make sure that we ramp up our capabilities there. 

The only other question is for Secretary Flournoy. And as you 

mentioned, as the general mentioned in response to that question, 

the importance of the comprehensive strategy, the development 

piece. 

I am very concerned that development, the overall organization 

of that effort has been massively messed up to this point. A lot of 

people doing a lot of stuff. It is not well coordinated, not working 

as well as it should, at least, in part, because, as near as I can tell, 

nobody is really in charge of that piece of it. 

Now, the President has emphasized that. What do you think we 

need to do to get the right people in charge, to get the right level 

of coordination, so the dollars we spend are well spent, both in 

Pakistan and in Afghanistan? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, I should start by saying I am not a 

development expert. However, the thing I have observed, particu-
33 

larly, learning from past operations and especially Iraq, is what 

really, really helps is flexibility on the ground to be responsive to 

needs at the local level, to empower effective governance when it 

is starting to happen and so forth. 

And so I think the more we can look at flexible CERP-like authorities on the development side through organizations in USAID, 

like OTI, Office of Transition Initiatives and so forth, the better off 

we will be. 

The more flexibility in counterinsurgency kind of situations, the 

better. 

Now, obviously, you have to demand accountability for that, but 

the flexibility is key. 

Mr. SMITH. And I know that is not your area. Just the people 

whose area it is, I think that is an area we really need to ramp 

up. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, ma’am, good to see you today. 

And like Congressman Wilson, I have had the opportunity to 

serve. I have been blessed to be able to go to Iraq twice and Afghanistan once. In fact, I was there with his oldest son in 2004. 

We, kind of driving back on one of those main supply routes 

(MSRs), probably passed each other a few times. 

But, first, thank you, General Petraeus, for your leadership and 

for your successful implementation of the surge and this victory, 

though reversible, in Iraq that we have now, thank you for that. 

My first question is on this Afghan surge, if you want to call it 

that, the troop levels going up in Afghanistan. 

Have you or General McNeill or General McKiernan, at any 

point, ever asked for more troops than the 17,000, not counting the 

4,000 trainers? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, let me just be very clear that what is 

flowing to Afghanistan is more than doubling what was on the 

ground. If you look at, say, December or January of this year, I 

think we were at 31,000 or 33,000. 

By the end of this fall, we should be at 68,000. And the only 

forces that have been requested during that time that have not 

been approved are those ones that are out in the 2010 timeframe, 

which will be addressed when those decisions are required. 

That is not to say there aren’t requests for forces that are not 

filled at times, and this happened in Iraq, as well, even during the 

surge. There are some specific capabilities or capacities that are 

not resident in sufficient numbers. 

By the way, intelligence analysts were among those and we are 

gradually building the capabilities. And one of the big Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR) topics that has been raised by the combatant commanders in particular is what we call enablers. 

It is not just the combat forces, as you know. It is all of the other 

enablers that we have, in an ad hoc way, in some cases, developed 

initially, exploitation experts, the additional counter-IED (Improvised Explosive Device) elements, biometric teams, it goes on and 

on, and a lot of those in the intelligence arena. 
34 

And so we are always looking to build that particular capacity. 

But the specific answer, has there ever been something we have 

asked for that hasn’t been approved, the answer is, no, not for this 

year and, again, there are other decisions that lie ahead. 

Mr. HUNTER. Touching on those enablers, are you satisfied that 

the battlefield is prepped for our movement, for this many surge 

of troops, doubling them down going into August? Are you satisfied 

that the ground is ready to have them there? 

Because let’s look back to February, you were in Munich and this 

was—talking about enablers, ISAF also needs more so-called 

enablers to support the effort in Afghanistan, more intel, surveillance, reconnaissance platforms, and the connectivity to exploit the 

capabilities that they bring, more military, police, engineers with 

logistics, more lift-and-attack helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, additional air medical evacuations (MEDEVAC) assets, or increases in 

information, operations capabilities, and so on. 

Those are a lot of things to need a few months away from sending a whole lot of people into harm’s way. And I am just wondering, 

if we didn’t have elections in Afghanistan in August, would we be 

on the same timeline with the same number of troops that we are 

right now or are we rushing to react to what is going on in Afghanistan right now, and are we going to put our people unnecessarily 

in harm’s way because we are reactive right now? 

General PETRAEUS. No. There are a number of drivers here and 

the most important one is actually the fighting season, if you will, 

although that distinction has been less this past winter, both because it was a milder winter in many parts of the country, because 

we think the Taliban specifically did not want to let up, and, frankly, because we did not let up. 

We have continued to conduct offensive operations to expand the 

security envelope, particularly in certain areas in Regional Command South and Regional Command East. 

With respect to your question, are we set right now, no, of 

course, we are not. I mean, we are literally moving forces right 

now. We are moving assets to establish that infrastructure, to build 

the communications pipes, the bases, the logistical nodes and all of 

the rest of that, and there is an enormous amount of work that is 

ongoing. 

We think that we have it lined up. It is synchronized, if you will. 

No logistic plan survives in the contact, but I am convinced that 

the logisticians, that the Transportation Command, the services 

and everyone very much has—they all have their shoulders to the 

wheel and are pushing this as hard as is possible. 

Mr. HUNTER. In the interest of time, would you be on this same 

track if we didn’t have elections in August? 

General PETRAEUS. I would want to be on the same track if we 

didn’t. Again, the elections matter, as well. This is hugely important for the future of Afghanistan that these be seen to be free, fair 

and, in the eyes of the Afghan people, legitimate. 

Just as in Iraq, as you well know, when elections approached, 

you have to—you often will launch operations in advance of those 

to ensure security for them. 

It is why the NATO forces have asked—the NATO Command has 

asked for the election security force, as well. So certainly there is 
35 

a request for forces to specifically help with security for that election, as well. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis, the gentlelady from California. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, General Petraeus and Admiral Olson, for your 

strong and very capable leadership. 

And welcome, as well, Secretary Flournoy. It is good to have you 

in that role and I know you will have many continuing contributions. 

I know that you are aware of critics and just discussions, and a 

lot of it is very constructive, about whether we are engaged in an 

effort that speaks to our national security interests or is something 

good to do, but doesn’t necessarily make the grade in terms of our 

own national security interests. 

Do you make that distinction? In what way do you—I know that 

you see that relationship and the whole of government approach 

and you probably know from many of my questions before, though, 

I support that. 

But can you help us with that distinction and where in your 

thinking one begins to perhaps hurt the other? 

For example, the footprint, the military footprint, at what point 

does that become countervailing to the democracy-building attempts? How do you make those distinctions in the relationships? 

General PETRAEUS. If I could just start out by saying, first of all, 

that we very firmly believe that we have vital national interests in 

Afghanistan and, indeed, in Pakistan. 

This is where the 9/11 attacks came from, as you well know, and 

were the Taliban to take over, there is every reason to anticipate 

that there would be sanctuaries reestablished there by 

transnational extremists over time. 

Now, with respect to the additional forces, it is imperative that 

we ensure that the additional forces are employed properly, and 

that is really what comes to the heart of your question, I think. 

And this is the counterinsurgency guidance that General 

McKiernan has recently issued and which we provided a copy of to 

you with my opening statement. 

It captures the right approach for this very complex environment. It highlights the importance of avoiding civilian casualties in 

the conduct of combat operations, if at all possible, and so forth, 

about being a good neighbor, securing and serving the people and 

so forth. 

It is very, very important that our soldiers are seen by the Afghan people, indeed, to be partners and good guests, not as wouldbe conquerors. 

And so it is of equal measures important that you have more 

forces and that they be employed properly. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Are there instances where you would recommend 

that dollars that are used in a military fashion would be better 

used in democracy-building, whatever you want to call it? I know 

we are talking about building and not reconstruction here. 
36 

General PETRAEUS. Well, this is the value of the CERP program, 

frankly, because it provides the kind of flexibility and resources 

that enable us to do just that. 

You can use them for whatever particular emergency need is 

most important to reinforcing the efforts of the security forces. 

The fact is, though, that without security, nothing else is possible. We saw in Iraq, despite our best efforts at various times, you 

are working hard to build or rebuild something and if security is 

not present, over time, it comes to naught. 

But, again, the CERP program does provide that kind of flexibility to our battlefield commanders. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Congresswoman, if I could just jump in. I 

know this is a little beyond the focus of this committee, but I think 

as we think about deploying additional civilians to Afghanistan and 

as the security situation allows for their integration down at the 

provincial and local level in terms of what we are doing, it is really 

important that they also have flexible CERP-like authorities to do 

small-scale, bottom-up, micro development, help mentor local institutions, local leaders, et cetera. 

CERP is key for the military’s effectiveness on the ground. We 

don’t have anything quite like that on the civilian side and it really 

needs to be developed. 

Mrs. DAVIS. I think we all recognize that and I am, again, trying 

to get through those distinctions. 

Many of those programs are wonderful to see and to encourage 

and to motivate certainly the Afghan people to see that this is really their effort, not ours not even an international one, in some 

ways, but theirs and I am just interested in how we shift that, and 

I know you have tried to address that. 

My other questions just have to do with the undermining of all 

of these efforts by the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence 

(ISI) and whether you think that is a critical problem. 

The CHAIRMAN. Please answer the question. 

General PETRAEUS. There clearly are concerns about the ISI, recalling, of course, that they are the organization that, with our 

money and equipment, raised and trained and equipped the 

Taliban in the first place to help get roots in the fight against the 

Soviet forces in Afghanistan. 

They have been seen as an ally of the ISI over the years at various times. And so it is very important that we determine for ourselves, frankly, where there are cases of the ISI acting contrary to 

the interests of Pakistan and the coalition effort. 

There have been some cases of that in the past. Not all are as 

unambiguous as perhaps is sometimes reported, but there have 

been some that have been unambiguous, as well. 

We have had very direct conversations with Lieutenant General 

Pasha, the new head of the ISI, and, also, with the military leadership and the head of the country about it, and they understand the 

concerns. 

Our intelligence community comrades have had the same conversations and I think now we have to see what the future is going 

to hold in that regard. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kaufman, please. 

Mr. KAUFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
37 

And thank you all for your service. 

General Petraeus, in Iraq, the policy was—the surge was successful because it wasn’t simply an increase in the number of troops 

on the ground, but it was how those troops were deployed and the 

fact that they were deployed, previously deployed, where they 

would do patrols outside of our secure base camps located outside 

of the villages and neighborhoods, to being deployed in forward operating bases inside those neighborhoods, inside the communities, 

and that really created a level of security and stability that allowed 

the political process to move forward. 

You are having a much smaller footprint in terms of the number 

of troops on the ground in Afghanistan, as well as the planned expansion, even if we look at the aggregate numbers in terms of the 

expansion of Afghan security forces. 

What are the plans in Afghanistan in terms of pushing those 

forces into the rural areas, the villages? And this is much tougher, 

given where the population is in Afghanistan, where the Taliban 

have infiltrated those villages, those communities, and threatened 

the population, intimidated the population. 

What are the plans for doing that? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, again, the general principle of providing persistent security obtains and the challenge is to determine 

what is essentially a culturally acceptable way to perform that task 

in Afghanistan, an area with much less urban terrain, much less 

in the way of neighborhoods in which we could, as we did in Iraq, 

establish combat outposts or patrol bases together with our Iraqi 

partners. 

So here, what we need to do is literally talk to the locals, the 

mullahs, the tribal elders and so forth, typically locating on the 

edge of a village. 

Again, unlike Iraq, there is not extra infrastructure, there are 

not old Saddam era palaces and military bases and so forth that 

were unoccupied initially and could be used for these purposes. 

So we are typically constructing small outposts or patrol bases on 

the edge of villages and, ideally, where they are located, as well, 

to interdict the routes of infiltration in many of the areas that 

come in from the rugged areas of Pakistan. 

Mr. KAUFMAN. Thank you, General. 

To any member that wants to comment on this, we are giving, I believe, $1.5 billion a year to the government of Pakistan to try 

to entice them to engage in counterinsurgency operations in the 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), where they are a conventional military force who sees their primary difficulty as being 

India over Kashmir. 

And so it would seem to me that that is a very difficult turn for 

them to take when their natural enemies are not the Taliban. 

Could anybody comment on that, please? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, it is imperative, frankly, that all of the 

Pakistani leaders, including the elected civilian leaders, recognize 

that the existential threat to their country, the most important and 

threatening and serious existential threat is that posed by the internal extremists, even more so now at this point than India. 

And one of the many tragedies of Mumbai was that it ended up 

with an intellectual shift back to a focus on India for a period of 
38 

time after a period in which the Pakistani military had, indeed, 

with a considerable degree of seriousness, begun to look at this extremist threat internal to the country, realizing the magnitude of 

it. 

Mr. KAUFMAN. And if I could just—I don’t believe that there will 

be a shift that will occur from conventional to counterinsurgency 

operations in the FATA until the administration takes initiative, 

launches initiatives over Kashmir and try to somehow reconcile 

that issue so that the Pakistanis will, in fact, focus on the FATA. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I think that one of the reasons we 

talked about a regional approach in the strategy is that to affect 

Pakistan’s calculus, you really do have to take into account the full 

range of their security concerns. 

So we do need to see a reduction of tensions on the borders. We 

do need to—and this is something we can do. The U.S. needs to 

provide real reassurance and confidence that give them confidence 

that we are going to stick with them, that we are going to be an 

enduring partner, and they can afford to make the shift and not 

to use these groups that they have worked with in the past as a 

hedge against other threats. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Larsen, please. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A few years back, we had testimony from folks over at the Joint 

Chiefs about the Afghan National Army and, at the time, it was 

testified to us that we were going to build a 70,000-person army 

and I think, at the time, it was either going to be 10,000 per year 

for 7 years or 7,000 per year for 10 years, fairly firm number, fairly 

competent number. 

And, obviously, in Afghanistan, just as much as in Iraq, we have 

learned that it is tougher to put exact numbers on exactly how 

many you need, when they are going to be there, and how soon we 

can make that happen. 

But I did hear, Madam Secretary, that it is your sense—did I 

hear that it was your sense, when Mr. McHugh had asked the 

question, it is your sense that we will need to have a larger Afghan 

National Army than we currently envision at the 134,000 number, 

something larger than 134,000? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think that that is the general consensus, 

that we are going to need to grow beyond current levels. 

Mr. LARSEN. So right now, we are anticipating, by 2011 instead 

of the—when I was in Afghanistan in November, they said by 2012, 

but we have managed to accelerate that by at least a year. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think the original target date—it has 

been a moving target, but I think it was originally 2013, and now 

we are aiming to get there by 2011. 

Mr. LARSEN. And so that is about 46,000, 47,000 more than we 

have now, to get from about 87,500 to 134,000, it is about 46,000, 

if my number is right, and that is over 2 years. 

I don’t know if you can answer this or General Petraeus can answer this. 

Is the CSTC–A underneath you or is that under ISAF? 

General PETRAEUS. It is all under the U.S. Forces Afghanistan 

commander, CSTC–A is. 
39 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

General PETRAEUS. Which is under Central Command. So I 

would be happy to answer the question. 

Mr. LARSEN. Great, great. So either one can answer it. 

Do we anticipate learning better then how to train so that it is 

not every two years, we get an additional 46,500, or do we think 

that is going to be our—is that our capacity to train in Afghanistan 

for the military? 

General PETRAEUS. Candidly, we are learning all the time. And 

as I mentioned, the biggest challenge that we have is not actually 

infrastructure, it is not equipment, it is not really even trainers 

over time. It is leaders who can then take these units and lead 

them in what are very challenging combat operations and very 

complex counterinsurgency operations, and that is the challenge. 

They have actually now a full array of different schools and centers. There is a West Point of Afghanistan, there is an officer candidate school or Sandhurst of Afghanistan, there are staff colleges, 

there are war colleges. 

All of these are building, but this is something that, again, is just 

flat going to take time. I think we are pushing the envelope about 

as hard as we can, although we are certainly willing to push it 

harder wherever we see an opportunity to do so. 

We, obviously, want to expand this as rapidly as is possible so 

that they can shoulder the burdens rather than our troopers having to continue to do so. 

Mr. LARSEN. So what attrition rate are we anticipating within 

the ANA? I heard we have to train to 115 percent to get something 

in the high 80s. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, this is actually not the attrition rate. 

It is really the present for duty. 

Mr. LARSEN. Present for duty, yes. 

General PETRAEUS. Again, we experienced this in Iraq, as well. 

You may recall, when we began the surge, there was enormous concern about the very low levels of present for duty in Baghdad. 

Not the least of the problem was the sheer magnitude of the violence there. We, eventually, in Iraq, authorized as high as 130,000 

for units to make sure that they had approaching 100,000—or 130 

percent to make sure they came close to the full manning after you 

took out leave. 

You have the constant challenge in all of these different cultures 

of the leave, where you just can’t hop on the bus and drive home 

in Afghanistan and be back a week later. 

Mr. LARSEN. My yellow light is on. I have got to get to the police 

question so you can answer that. 

So right now, though, our goal is 82,000 by 2011, the police, or 

82,000 or so, and we are at 8,000. I am sorry. It is 82,000 and we 

are at 80,000 for police. 

General PETRAEUS. That is about right. 

Mr. LARSEN. Our problem is not going to be training 2,000 more 

over the next two years. Our problem for the police is about the 

quality. 

General PETRAEUS. That is exactly right. 

Mr. LARSEN. I will speak broadly about quality on the police 

force. 
40 

What specific steps can you tell us you are taking to enhance the 

quality of the police force? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, the most important is the so-called Focused District Development program, where the Afghan National 

Civil Order Police, which are units, go in, they take over a district. 

That allows to remove all of the local police from that district and 

they go retrain, re-equip, and then are reinserted. 

That has worked reasonably well. We have done that in some 

very important areas that are under threat and the police have, 

again, held up reasonably well. 

But I would want to point out that we need to have measured 

expectations of police in violent counterinsurgency operations, because, again, as we experienced in Iraq, where they melted away 

in areas because they are so vulnerable if other security forces are 

not there to back them up. 

They are the first line of defense, but that also means they are 

the first line to be attacked by the insurgents. Their families are 

vulnerable. They live in the neighborhood, and there are big challenges with that. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Rooney. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Distinguished members of the panel, I am a former Army captain, along with my wife. We were dual military for four years. I 

just want to say thank you for your leadership and your service to 

this country. 

And moving forward, I know that regardless of what you think 

of what is going on around the world, I honestly believe that we 

are in the best possible hands. So thank you for that. 

My question has to do with Afghanistan and as we move through 

this SOFA agreement in Iraq and move into Afghanistan. 

Over the years and certainly over the last couple of years, we 

have heard a lot of issues with regard to the laws of war and the 

rules of engagement. You touched on the laws of war in your opening statement. 

What challenges do you see moving into Afghanistan with regard 

to the rules of engagement? Specifically, also, when it comes to 

kind of cohabitating with the Afghan Army and what challenges do 

you see there? 

And specifically why I ask this question is there was a lot of kind 

of second guessing, especially over the beginning part of the war 

in Iraq, with regard to what was the clear focus. 

As somebody who taught laws of war at West Point, I would be 

especially interested personally to know what challenges you all 

think you are going to face in Afghanistan in the future. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I think the biggest challenge is not the 

rules of engagement. Of course, it is applying the rules of engagement, particularly when it comes to the minimization of civilian 

casualties in the course of combat operations, and that requires 

real thoughtful, considered leadership in the blink of an eye, in a 

violent situation, in many cases, where individuals are under fire. 

And those circumstances feature in our preparation and our situational training exercises before forces go down range. But at the 
41 

end of the day, it takes confident, capable leaders to implement 

those, as you well know. 

And I think I would say that that would be the biggest challenge 

that we face there. 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I think an important aspect of the strategy 

is the statement that there will be formalized assigned partnerships between Afghan units and U.S. units and the continuing 

coaching and mentoring that goes well beyond just existing on the 

same compound with the force, then leads to continuous dialogue 

about law of war, about what is right. 

And when you go beyond just putting an Afghan face on the operation, it becomes their operation. It is typically a very well run 

operation and the right kinds of things occur. 

So I think that highlighting the importance of the formalized 

partnerships is going to be very useful. 

Mr. ROONEY. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Marshall, the gentleman from Georgia. 

I might say, before you start, Mr. Marshall, hopefully, we can get 

everybody today before two o’clock, but in the event we can’t, in 

consultation with Mr. McHugh, we will begin the questions on the 

bottom rows and work backward at the next hearing. 

Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, thank you all for your service. 

Ms. Flournoy, in your statement, you make reference to what, in 

essence, is the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept as a 

way to address the ‘‘root causes of the insurgency and give people 

tangible reasons to support their government.’’ 

The first PRT I visited was in December 2003 with General 

Schoomaker, after, actually, visiting with General Petraeus when 

he was up in Mosul, and the PRT, that whole concept hasn’t 

changed much. They look kind of the same. 

General Petraeus just made reference to the fact that at least on 

the military side, we have now got a West Point type operation, we 

have got staff colleges, et cetera, trying to train up the Afghan security forces. 

On the civilian side, though, it seems to me had we had a little 

bit more foresight, maybe we could have done the same thing and 

had a provincial development—they should not be called redevelopment. It should just be provincial development teams, and we could 

have a university that is cranking out Afghans. 

My last trip there, I had dinner with some officers who mentioned that they had working for them as clerks Afghan doctors in 

Kabul and the reason these doctors were working for us as clerks— 

and they said they were great clerks, by the way—was because 

they could make more money working for us as a clerk than they 

would working as an Afghan doctor. 

Surely, we could double their pay and send them out to the 

PRTs, and there are lots of examples like that. It seems to me that 

it is more effective, safer, far more efficient to put an Afghan face 

on this as quickly as possible. 
42 

We have had five years to do that. We haven’t transitioned at all. 

So in executing your strategy, it seems to me, let’s try and head 

in that direction. That is just an observation. 

General Petraeus, I found, on page 16 of your testimony, a very 

nice summary of a wise shift of strategy from one that focused on 

balancing regional blocks of power and solely on combating terrorism to one which, as you describe it, ‘‘will be characterized by 

a focus on common interests, inclusivity and capacity-building. 

This network of cooperation is both effective and sustainable, because it creates synergies and, as it grows, strengthens relationships. Each cooperative endeavor is a link connecting countries in 

the region and each adds to the collective strength of the network. 

Progress made in generating cooperation in a set of circumstances can serve as an opening for engagement on other 

issues, thereby promoting greater interdependence. 

The foundation of this network consists of a focus on common interests, an atmosphere of inclusivity, and efforts to build security 

capacity and infrastructure.’’ 

I thought it was a great summary of an appropriate shift in 

strategy. 

To each of you, what do you think the challenges are going to be? 

What are the principal obstacles to actually executing a strategy 

like that and what can we expect? 

That is a very nice vision and if it can be pulled off, it should 

be successful, because there are clearly common interests. 

And one of the common interests here is getting rid of these nut 

cases that are trying to defeat organized society throughout the region, in essence, or create an organized society that is wholly different from the one that these people would prefer. 

So what are we going to run into in trying to actually execute 

what is a very appropriate strategy? What is going to be the challenge here? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I don’t want to sound simplistic about 

it, but it is actually divergent interests. It is the fact that, of 

course, with all of these countries, we have a number of common 

interests and, ironically, what Iran is doing in the region is actually—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. Bringing people together. 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Bringing people together more 

than they have been for decades. 

Certain aspects of air and missile defense are much more active 

now than they have been at any time probably since the Gulf War 

or, at the very least, 2003, and that has brought countries together. 

It has actually led to a strengthening of relationships between 

the Gulf states, in particular, and the United States, and then that 

allows us to help turn bilateral arrangements into somewhat more 

multilateral arrangements. 

And now if you look all the way down the Gulf states, you see 

a very, very substantial network, layers of networks, if you will, in 

the different areas of training, operations, air and missile space defense, shared early warning, air interdiction capacity, and on and 

on, and all of that supported by a growing network of training arrangements, as well. 
43 

Mr. MARSHALL. So you would just describe the chief threat as 

being diverging interests. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, there is still—certainly, understandably, folks don’t want to seem to be fighting our wars. There are 

occasionally different—certainly, more than occasionally, different 

perspectives on different problems. 

So I think the challenge has always, and more of a diplomatic 

one than perhaps a military one, but, of course, is to build on the 

common interests to the point that they can be seen as more important than the diverging interests. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, thank all of you for your service and for being here. 

I understand that while I was out of the room, you were asked 

about General McKiernan, and this is for you, General Petraeus, 

McKiernan’s request for 34,000 troops. 

And it may have been another person that gave this answer, but 

you didn’t have to deal with the additional troops, the 11,000 or 

12,000 that he still is not going to be getting after the 4,000 we 

are sending now, but that wasn’t a decision that had to be made 

until this fall. 

My question is why did he not already have the full complement 

of 34,000 troops that he said he needed in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, again, it literally takes time to build 

these up. There was a series of requests that were made, some all 

the way back to last year, in fact, and, as always, there has to be 

a process of sourcing forces, determining, in some cases, to take 

more risk in another area than in, say, in Afghanistan, and then, 

through the sourcing process, the approval of those requests for 

forces and then the sourcing and then, of course, preparation and 

deployment of those forces. 

But the fact is, I think, that it was Admiral Mullen who has said 

on a number of occasions that in Afghanistan, we do what we can; 

in Iraq, we do what we must. 

What was the phrase that he—in other words, implying that the 

focus until fairly recently of resources was on Iraq and, clearly, the 

focus is now shifting, enabled, in substantial part, by the progress 

that has been made in Iraq and has allowed us to draw down our 

forces there over time, with more of those to be expected in accordance with the plan that was announced by the President at Camp 

Lejeune. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thinking about now the greater shift of attention 

on Afghanistan, when do you expect that you will have for this 

committee the set of milestones, goals and objectives that you are 

measuring against for prospective success or failure in that theater? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, first of all, there already are a number 

of different metrics and measures. There are measures for the Afghan forces for security incidents, literally all the ones that we had 

in Iraq, although I think still being refined in the way that we did 

over time in Iraq, where eventually, as you know, we also had 

benchmarks and a variety of other measurement tools. 
44 

And with that, I will hand off to the undersecretary, who can 

talk about that effort. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I would just say in addition to the sort of 

field level metrics that are already in place, I would say we are in 

the process of developing sort of strategic level metrics and benchmarks on an interagency basis, looking not only at the military effort, but across the civilian effort, as well, and looking both at Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

That is something that we are working on. We hope to actually 

consult with many of you as we further develop those and to be 

able to bring those forward to you in the not too distant future. 

Mr. ROGERS. Not too distant future. As a lawyer myself, that is 

a good lawyerly way of putting it. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. No. We are actually having a meeting early 

next week to set the schedule and I just can’t tell you what it is 

going to be quite yet. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. A matter of clarification. The troops sent to Afghanistan, was that number decided by the last administration, before the present 17,000 and 4,000 announced? 

General PETRAEUS. There were some that were sent by the previous administration in response to the series of requests for forces 

that General McKiernan has sent in, and then, obviously, the subsequent ones are being sent by the current administration. 

The CHAIRMAN. When was that request made? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, there have been a series of these requests for forces. They date back certainly to last year, late last 

year. 

The CHAIRMAN. Did the previous administration honor all of the 

requests of the general for forces in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. Again, there has been a series of those. 

The CHAIRMAN. No, no, no. Answer my—— 

General PETRAEUS. Some of those that were submitted before the 

inauguration were dealt with by the previous administration. Others were not dealt with by the previous administration, I think 

with a view that they wanted to allow the next administration to 

make those decisions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. 

Ms. Tsongas. 

General PETRAEUS. The one beauty, if I could add, Mr. Chairman, is we have had the same Secretary of Defense during the 

whole time and there has been a degree of continuity there, frankly, that has been very helpful to combatant commanders, among 

others. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Well, thank you so much for your testimony and 

appreciate your hanging in there with us today. 

I have a question. As we have talked about a more holistic approach, one of the issues has been building up the civilian capacity. 

I am just curious what kind of numbers we are looking at. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, I think there is an initial request 

from the embassy on the order of 400 to 500, but I think there is 

a further needs analysis that is ongoing that we expect to yield a 

requirement of several thousand. 
45 

Obviously, not all of those can be met immediately with American governmental personnel, but we are going to be looking beyond government resources to private sector, as well, and we are 

also very much placing an emphasis on this as we go to talk to our 

allies, asking not only for military contributions, but contributions 

of civilian expertise. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And so we would be looking to the nongovernmental organization (NGO) community that is in place already or 

not? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Absolutely. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And I have a question related to that. At present, 

these agencies are not associated with our military and, as a result, 

they have some freedom of movement sort of outside the parameters of military operations, and this principle was outlined in the 

guidelines for the interaction and coordination of humanitarian actors and military actors in Afghanistan. 

Part of these organizations’ security is based on the general view 

that they are separate from military operations and, therefore, not 

a military target. However, this line is often blurred and, as you 

can imagine, some of those people in Afghanistan who seek to do 

harm really will not pay attention. 

But what concerns me is that as we implement a policy with 

strong emphasis on civilian activities, that we may further blur the 

civil-military lines and jeopardize the safety of the NGOs, as well 

as many others engaged in development activities. 

In fact, in conversations with some of those NGOs who have had 

longstanding operations in Afghanistan, there is growing concern 

about their physical safety, to the point where, in some instances, 

they are considering withdrawing from the country. 

How do we coordinate all of these entities towards a common 

purpose, while keeping separate our military strategy from efforts 

to reconstruct and develop Afghanistan? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I am sure General Petraeus will have a 

comment on this, too, given his experience. But I think part of 

what we are trying to do is create, with the influx of military 

troops, is to create a secure environment that will enable all kinds 

of actors to be more effective on the development side, NGOs, Afghans, our own government people. 

I think there are some NGOs who are quite comfortable working 

with the U.S. military and there are others who, as you say, safeguard their—hold dear their independence and try to remain separate. 

I think one of the things we need to do is work very closely with 

the U.N. Most of the NGOs who do not work directly with the U.S. 

military are working in consultation with either other civilian entities or with the U.N. 

And so I think strengthening our coordination mechanisms via 

the U.N. is one of the most effective things we can and should be 

doing in Afghanistan, and that is certainly part of the plan. 

But I think so often this comes down to very specific situations 

on the ground, that you really have to have the NGO personnel 

and the local U.S. government or international organization or 

military folks kind of negotiate rules of the road that work on the 

ground in a specific area. 
46 

Ms. TSONGAS. General Petraeus. 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, I think we really very much understand the importance of NGOs and the U.N. As you may recall, 

we lost literally the vast majority of the nongovernmental organizations and even the United Nations element in Iraq for a period because of the deterioration of the security situation. 

So the first order of business is, again, to, as the Secretary said, 

try to expand the security environment and the security bubble in 

which the operate. 

Beyond that, there are coordination mechanisms at all of the different levels, but nationally and then locally, as well, typically, 

with the different groups that are out there. Some of them may not 

want to even come into a compound of ours, but they still may be 

able to communicate if they need a quick reaction force, for example. 

And so depending on what the communications infrastructure in 

the area is, they can either use cell phones, if necessary, satellite 

phones or what have you if they get in trouble. 

But, again, as the Secretary said, in many cases, what you end 

up with is a general concept that then local commanders and unit 

leaders implement with the NGOs in that area. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. 

It just seems to me, given the—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. TSONGAS [continuing]. Whole picture, we need to really think 

about this. 

General PETRAEUS. I agree. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Loebsack. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to all of you who are here today for your service and for 

being here today for your service and for being here and participating. 

Actually, the comment that I was going to make actually flows, 

in some ways, from what Congresswoman Tsongas just said. 

First, a comment. Madam Secretary, the purview of the committee may, sort of strictly speaking, be military-oriented and making sure that we provide what our folks in uniform and those supporting them need. 

But at the same time, my own view of this is that for me to make 

an informed and intelligent decision with respect to that issue or 

others before this committee, especially when it comes to the commitment of significant numbers of forces abroad, I think I have to 

look at the big picture, and I think that is how I look at it, at any 

rate. 

So I am not myself as narrowly focused in on that sense. I am 

sure that is not what you are implying, that we should all necessarily just look at it from that perspective. But I think that is 

important to keep in mind. 

I have nothing but respect, obviously, for all of you here and I 

have gotten to know General Petraeus the last two years since I 

have been in office. This is my third year. And last time I saw him 

was on the tarmac in Abu Dhabi, in an airplane, and that was a 

really great meeting. 
47 

I was on my way to Thanksgiving dinner with some of our troops 

at a forward operating base (FOB) in Afghanistan. 

The second comment. I want to echo what Mr. Marshall said 

about PRT, and I think PRT should be called PDTs, because especially in Afghanistan, as you acknowledged early in your testimony, 

these are not comparable situations. 

Before I became a member of Congress, I was a college teacher 

and I took students overseas a number of times, traveled overseas, 

especially to so-called third world countries, and there are a lot of 

differences between Afghanistan and Iraq, which I think everybody 

on this committee is aware of, especially those who have traveled 

those countries. 

But we are really talking about provincial development teams 

more than we are reconstruction, and I think everyone would acknowledge that. 

But let me go back to the basics, because I am not sure that people really get right now, with all the other things that are going 

on that are occupying our attention with respect to the economy. 

What is the basic goal, first and foremost, of the United States 

in Afghanistan? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I think one of the things—we asked 

ourselves that question in the review and we went back to first 

principles and core interests, and the goal is to disrupt, dismantle 

and defeat Al Qaeda and its extremist allies in Afghanistan and in 

Pakistan, and everything else is derived from that core goal. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. We don’t then have a goal to construct a democracy in Afghanistan. Is that correct? I hope you will say yes, but 

that is my own view. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Again, I think that we are certainly supportive of all good governance efforts and so on, and I don’t want 

to deprive the Afghan people of that aspiration. 

But our core goal is about denying safe haven to Al Qaeda in this 

region at this time. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Is it fair to say then that we are—with respect 

to Afghanistan, at least at the moment and probably likely into the 

future, that we are not engaged in nation-building, per se, in Afghanistan at the moment? Is that correct? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think that the counterinsurgency strategy 

we are pursuing involves a lot of capacity-building to be successful. 

I don’t know what your definition of nation-building is, but there 

is certainly a big emphasis on building the capacity of the security 

forces and of basic Afghan institutions to be able to take the lead 

in protecting their own population and their territory. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. General. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, Congressman, to ensure, in the case of 

Afghanistan, for example, that there are not transnational extremist sanctuaries reestablished, you have to take certain actions beyond even just the strictly security arena to ensure that the governance is seen as legitimate by the people, that there is a degree 

of basic services and opportunity for them, education and expansion of health care and so forth, because at the end of the day, everything depends on the people supporting this new Afghan government and rejecting the alternative that is provided by the Taliban. 
48 

Mr. LOEBSACK. And just very quickly, you addressed the interagency question, the whole of government approach, whatever 

terms you prefer, but when we SIGAR and SIGIR here recently, of 

course, there is a lot of discussion about lack of interagency coordination in Iraq over the years. 

And I guess I will just leave it at this, if I might just finish my 

thought, Mr. Chair. 

I won’t ask you the question, but just leave you with this. I think 

it is really critical that we be thinking about sort of how we are 

going about this. 

I wasn’t entirely satisfied with your answer, Madam Secretary, 

especially the role of the NSC, because I am not recommending 

that the NSC play a major role in all this, but I would like to talk 

to you more in the future, and some of you, about how we are doing 

this in Washington, D.C., in particular. 

I understand how we are doing it in the theater and in the region, but, in particular, here in Washington, D.C., how the agencies 

are dealing with one another, because I think we have to do that 

to have success in Afghanistan, obviously. 

Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Since the witnesses turn to pumpkins at 2 o’clock 

and by a previous promise from the chair, we will ask Ms. SheaPorter to be the cleanup batter here, and, as I had previously announced, in consultation with Mr. McHugh, we will start the next 

hearing from the bottom row and work backward. 

But for the votes that we had on the floor, we would have been 

able to get through everyone quite easily. 

But Ms. Shea-Porter, and that is it. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. And I will speak Yankee fast. 

The first thing I wanted to just comment on, I am not expecting 

an answer on this, but I just wanted to put it out there, that we 

have had a lot of concerns about contractors in Iraq for a long time 

and, certainly, we saw KBR receive a contract recently, in spite of 

the electrocutions of our soldiers, and I hope that you are addressing those issues. I am trying to myself, as are others. 

But I have a deep concern. When we send our troops to a battlefield, they should not die in a swimming pool or in a shower. So 

I wanted to put that out there. 

General PETRAEUS. Task Force Safe, Congresswoman—I will try 

to speak Yankee, as a fellow New Hampshirite. Task Force Safe 

was created in Iraq in response to that. 

It has gone through tens of thousands, unfortunately, there are 

still tens of thousands of structures, but it is working very hard 

and we have shared those lessons with Afghanistan and other 

places in Central Command where we have similar types of infrastructure that have been built up by contractors. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And I am grateful for the work they are 

doing, but I am still concerned that KBR received another contract 

to do electrical work. 

If you don’t mind switching gears, I would like to talk about the 

Sons of Iraq. It seemed like it was doing pretty well and then recently I read that the Sunnis had not been integrated into the po-
49 

lice force as we originally hoped and that there was some trouble 

again. 

Could you please address that, General Petraeus. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, Sunnis have been integrated into the 

police force. Again, the local police are generally reflective of local 

populations. 

The national police are a generally national force that reflects 

the general national structure, as is the case with the overall Iraqi 

army and other security forces. 

The issue really is the Sons of Iraq not getting long-term jobs 

and there has been, literally, over the years now, a commitment 

that the Iraqi government would do everything humanly possible 

to find them either jobs in the security forces, and, again, over the 

years, have been probably 20,000 or more of them that have been 

able to do that. 

But there are still somewhere around 90,000 to 100,000 that 

don’t have longer-term employment options beyond the Sons of 

Iraq. 

Now, it is important to recognize the government of Iraq has 

been paying and they have literally, month-by-month, been taking 

over more and more each province over time. 

I think they are somewhere around the 90 percent range now in 

taking over the salaries of them as Sons of Iraq, and they will take 

over the remaining provinces in the month of April. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. I am going to interrupt, because 

we are on the clock, and say that I thought that was a very good 

program and I hope that we continue to pay attention. 

And the last question I wanted to ask you was I can remember 

several months ago reading an article about Iraqi widows who had 

to iron sheets for pennies a day and it made me think about what 

we are doing with the money when we bring it into Iraq. 

And are we targeting women and children enough? Are we putting enough money in their hands so they can do a micro business 

or change their future? Because if you want stability, you need stability in the family and the community. 

General PETRAEUS. There are programs for women that specifically do target women, both programs that we have and, also, the 

Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs in the government of Iraq. 

The tragedy is that there are vast numbers of these women that 

date all the way back to the terrible losses sustained by Iraqi men, 

primarily soldiers, in the Iran-Iraq war. And so this is a continued 

problem and then there are more in recent years, obviously, during 

the sectarian violence. 

So I don’t have any doubt that there needs to be more done in 

that area or, frankly, in a number of other areas, as the new Iraq 

redevelops its social and economic institutions. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I would be grateful if you could send information to me. 

And, again, thank you all for your service. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

The witching hour has arrived and we will end the hearing. But 

let me thank you each again for your service, for your testimony. 

You are the best we have. 
50 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. And we will see you soon. 

[Whereupon, at 2:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

APRIL 2, 2009 

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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

APRIL 2, 2009 

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QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I believe that looking at Pakistan and Afghanistan as one area of 

operation is a very wise decision that will help focus our strategic planning on the 

fact that what happens in one country has a direct effect on its neighbor. However, 

so much of Pakistan’s strategic planning is based on their relationship with India. 

Indeed much of Pakistan’s military is still focused on countering India, not on fighting the insurgency that currently rages within its borders. Even Ambassador 

Hoibrooke’s authority as Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan falls 

short of including India and the issue of Kashmir. What is being done to coordinate 

our Afghan/Pakistan strategy with India? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Both India and Pakistan are key international partners 

with which the United States continues to develop long-term strategic partnerships. 

National Security Advisor General James Jones said while recently visiting 

Islamabad that that India and Pakistan were at a ‘‘very, very important moment’’ 

in their relationship, which was progressing in the ‘‘right direction.’’ The Department of Defense in particular has expressed a deep commitment to building stronger 

ties with both countries. However, the Administration respects India’s position that 

it does not view Kashmir as within the scope of our strategy for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. The Administration will continue to consult with all our international 

partners as to how to best address the very real and very serious challenges facing 

the South and Central Asian region today. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCMORRIS RODGERS 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. President Obama has called his request for more 

troops in Afghanistan a troop surge. In the height of Iraq, we were up to 22 combat 

brigades, at the end of this year, we should have about 7 combat brigades in Afghanistan. How long do you see us maintaining this level of troops in Afghanistan? 

Do we need more? 

General PETRAEUS, Secretary FLOURNOY, and Admiral OLSON. Rather than a temporary surge in the numbers of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, the situation will require 

a sustained, substantial commitment of resources over a period of several years. It 

will take time and tough fighting to reverse the downward spiral in some parts of 

the country, to begin to make progress, and to build in a poor country torn by over 

thirty years of war and conflict. 

This fall, we anticipate that we will have some 68,000 U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan. This troop level, however, is not fixed and could change depending upon 

the requirements on the ground of our strategy. The President’s announcement on 

February 17, 2009, of troop increases was for forces that were required in 2009. 

That announcement was based on a request for forces by the Commander, U.S. 

Forces-Afghanistan, at the time GEN David McKiernan, which included forces required during 2009 and forces he anticipated would be needed in 2010. Because any 

decision for the deployment of these additional forces did not have to be made until 

late 2009, it made sense to defer the decision on the forces requested for 2010, assess the security environment in Afghanistan, and gauge the effect that our additional forces have had before sending more. 

GEN McChrystal is now conducting an assessment of the strategy for Afghanistan 

and a ‘‘resource-to-task’’ analysis to execute the strategy. His assessment will be 

provided to me, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense in August. 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. Although President Obama has called, for more combat 

troops, he is also deploying a surge of civilian advisors. Would you say that our 

country is getting into nation-building more so than really focusing on combating 

the terrorists? If you want to achieve the minimalist goal of preventing a safe-haven 

for terrorists, do we have to do the maximum by nation-building? 

General PETRAEUS, Secretary FLOURNOY, and Admiral OLSON. The goal of the administration in Afghanistan is to dismantle terrorist and extremist networks and 

prevent Afghanistan from ever again being a safe-haven from which terrorists can 

launch attacks on the United States and its allies. This goal requires an effective 
120 

Afghan government that can provide for the security of its own country and prevent 

terrorist safe-havens in its territory. The goal also requires a relatively prosperous 

economy that will give the Afghan people alternatives to extremism and criminality. 

The fulfillment of these conditions cannot be achieved by military means alone and 

requires a significant amount of civilian expertise. It is only through the integration 

of our military efforts, our training and mentoring of the Afghan National Army and 

Police, and the civilian work of building governance and economic infrastructure 

that we will be able to achieve success. 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. We have the best military in the world. Our country 

could not be more proud of the men and women serving in uniform. The troops in 

Afghanistan have been working hard to clear areas to make safe for the people of 

Afghanistan. However, shortly after our troops leave the area, the terrorist invade 

again. I have heard that the troops call this ‘‘mowing the lawn.’’ With the troop 

surge President Obama is calling for, what is your plan to help prevent our troops 

from having to ‘‘mow the lawn’’ and move forward to expanding more safe zones? 

General PETRAEUS, Secretary FLOURNOY, and Admiral OLSON. What the troops 

are referring to is the process, not uncommon in Afghanistan up until recently, of 

clearing an area of insurgents and then leaving, allowing those insurgents to return. 

The increase in U.S., Coalition, and Afghan forces will allow units to retain areas 

they clear, to hold on to their hard fought security gains, and then to build on them. 

Our new strategy is committed to protecting and serving the Afghan people. As part 

of the comprehensive counterinsurgency focus, we will take a residential approach 

and, in a culturally acceptable way, live among (or near) the people to provide a 

persistent security presence, understand their neighborhoods, and invest in relationships. The increase in U.S. forces will allow us to implement this strategy more effectively, because we will be able to expand the security presence further into the 

provinces and villages and not depart, ensuring the people in those areas are not 

susceptible to insurgent intimidation once again. The additional U.S. forces will also 

enable us to expand and improve our mentorship to develop the Afghan National 

Security Forces. In particular, the new forces will add significant capacity to underresourced Afghan police reform programs, expediting critical police development and 

allowing U.S. military advisors to mentor more Afghan National Army units. It is 

important to note that military forces are necessary but, by themselves, are not sufficient to achieve our objectives in Afghanistan. The U.S. must have robust and substantial civilian capacity to effectively complement and build upon progress in the 

security line of operation by helping develop Afghan governance and improve basic 

services provided to the people. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS 

Ms. GIFFORDS. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will be increased 

under these plans but in many places they will be working in areas that remain 

unsecured. Given the need for a low-key appearance which often includes no body 

armor and non-military vehicles, how will we protect more of these teams on the 

ground? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. All U.S. forces and civilian personnel, when deployed or stationed in a potentially hostile environment, will have the appropriate equipment 

and transportation to ensure the necessary level of security. General McChrystal 

has stated that all civilians sent to Afghanistan, including those deployed as members of PRTs, will be provided with appropriate security. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. I understand that the people of Pakistan have a very low opinion 

of the United States. I’ve heard polling data from the Pentagon that suggests it’s 

between 4 and 6 percent. Given our current approach to issues in the border region 

and in Pakistan and the continuance of ongoing operations, what is the breaking 

point for popular support in Pakistan and when will they decide that the current 

government’s support of the U.S. is too high to bear? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The U.S. approach to Pakistan is broad and long-term. A 

serious, long-term commitment by the U.S. will demonstrate to the Pakistani people 

that the U.S. is a committed partner countering the past history of ups and downs 

that characterized the relationship. This is particularly true in the military to military relationship where the U.S. continues to suffer from a ‘‘lost generation’’ of Pakistani military officers who were unable to forge ties with U.S. military counterparts 

during an 11-year period when military relations languished under our unilateral 

sanctions. The Department of Defense is moving forward with training, IMET, and 

other exchanges to rebuild a foundation for trust. However, Pakistani counterparts 

continue to cite a ‘‘trust deficit’’ as a key impediment to a successful relationship. 
121 

The Administration’s whole-of-government initiative is designed to support the 

democratic government of Pakistan as it addresses the needs of the population 

through a variety of means, including education, economic assistance, enhanced governance and political party development, law enforcement training, and as provided 

for in the President’s strategy, a fully-resourced counterinsurgency strategy. The 

Department of Defense is only one agency involved in this effort. The Departments 

of State and Treasury, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other 

U.S. agencies and departments are also fully engaged in this effort. The Department 

of Defense is working with the Department of State to develop a comprehensive 

strategic communications plan for Pakistan. While there is an urgent need to support Pakistan as it seeks to improve its capacity to conduct counterinsurgency operations to defeat Al Qaeda, the U.S. must also work to improve the capacity of the 

Government of Pakistan with a focus on education, agriculture, job creation, and 

training. The U.S. plans to foster long-term economic stability through direct budget 

support, infrastructure investment, development assistance, and technical advice on 

making sound economic policy. DoD is committed to building ties that will be the 

basis for a relationship that gains greater support from the Pakistani people. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. At Davis-Monthan AFB, our airmen train and deploy to provide 

precision Close Air Support to troops in contact. Unfortunately the demand for their 

services continues to rise. What increase in operational tempo can they anticipate 

as we surge in Afghanistan, and how are we planning to provide additional funding 

support for the aging A-10 aircraft they fly every day? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. The Office of the Secretary of Defense works closely with 

the Joint Staff and the Military Departments to determine our regional policy for 

Afghanistan. I recommend that you direct your question to the Secretary of the Air 

Force to ensure as accurate and informative an answer as possible. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. At Fort Huachuca we have increased our intelligence training by 

more than 500% since 9/11. We are prepared down there to continue to grow but 

there isn’t enough detail in this plan for us to judge one way or the other. How 

much additional need do you anticipate for intelligence assets on the ground? What 

increase in intelligence needs do you anticipate? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Our Combatant Commanders determine the requirements 

for operational intelligence in their respective theaters. The U.S. Army Intelligence 

Center (USAIC) is prepared to expand, as necessary, to meet Army and Combatant 

Commander emerging requirements by continuing to provide demanding, relevant, 

and realistic intelligence training to ensure a full-spectrum capability. Although the 

growth at Fort Huachuca since 9/11 has been a key enabler for our forces, there 

remain areas where future growth could prove to be beneficial. Below are areas 

where we see the greatest potential payoffs in terms of improving our tactical intelligence capabilities. 

a. An integrated Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 

training facility to train airborne ISR platform crews and their associated Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) to operate efficiently and effectively 

in any environment 

b. An increase in advanced Human Intelligence (HUMINT) training capacity to 

sustain the tremendous growth of the HUMINT Training Joint Center of Excellence 

(HT–JCOE) since its inception and accommodate even more unfunded growth that 

is currently in the requirements determination process 

c. Expanded capabilities in the Computer Network Operations (CNO) domain that 

would provide focused intelligence training in CNO operations to mitigate emerging 

threats 

d. Continued funding of the Army Cultural Center at Fort Huachuca, which has 

trained more than 70,000 personnel since its inception in 2006, is required to sustain this critical enabler for the Army in the hybrid warfare environment we face 

now and will face in the years to come 

e. Increased funding to develop high-fidelity models and simulations to enable the 

Intelligence Center to evolve intelligence support and force design into irregular/ 

asymmetric warfare, which will result in increased efficiencies as new capabilities 

are fielded 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH 

Mr. HEINRICH. Secretary Flournoy, you and General Petraeus mentioned in your 

testimonies the importance of the CERP Program (Commanders Emergency Response Program). I am a strong supporter of mechanisms that utilize smart power 

and complement our existing military missions abroad. What accountability measures have been implemented regarding CERP and how do you rate their success? 
122 

How prevalent is the CERP program in Afghanistan and do our allies and the International Security Assistance Force actively engage in a similar program? 

General PETRAEUS. USCENTCOM continues to work with the Army, the Department’s designated Executive Agent (EA) for the Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program (CERP), to strengthen accountability over CERP, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and to implement recommendations from General Accountability Office (GAO) 

CERP-related audits. Before relinquishing command of MNF–I, General Petraeus 

requested the Army Audit Agency (AAA) perform a management audit of CERP 

policies and procedures in Iraq. The resulting recommendations and lessons learned 

from that review are being applied to both theaters. The Commander, U.S. ForcesAfghanistan (USFOR–A) has recently requested a review by AAA of CERP policies 

in Afghanistan and the program’s effectiveness there. The USFOR–A Commander 

has specified accountability, training, and growth as the main priorities for CERP 

improvement in Afghanistan. 

USCENTCOM is drafting a fragmentary order (FRAGO) directing its components 

and other subordinate commands to take ‘‘cash off the battlefield’’ to the greatest 

extent feasible. Besides requiring fewer assets to protect and manage cash reserves, 

reducing the use of U.S. currency in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility will 

improve accountability for payments made under a variety of programs including 

CERP and minimize the potential for graft. To address the need for improved training, USCENTCOM is working with the Army (as CERP EA) to provide pre-deployment training at home station (through Mobile Training Teams) as well as CERP 

training at the National Training Centers. In both theaters, we intend to enhance 

training for Project Purchasing Officers, Paying Agents, and Project Officers supporting CERP. USFOR–A is also reviewing the feasibility of a central database to 

de-conflict CERP projects with functions and activities of other U.S. Government 

agencies, non-government organizations, and foreign governments. 

CERP is widely used in Afghanistan; the austere conditions magnify the need for, 

and the benefits of this vital COIN program. CERP enables DoD to address urgent 

humanitarian requirements, particularly in areas where the security environment 

prevents U.S. civilian agencies from routinely operating, and its use well supports 

the objectives of our counterinsurgency strategy. 

The NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Post-Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund (POHRF) provides quick humanitarian assistance following 

significant ISAF military operations. Established under the auspices of the ISAF 

Commander, POHRF receives donations from ISAF troop-contributing nations. 

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