J-S12008-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 v. 

PHILLIP STEWART 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 1625 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 2, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0506891-2002 

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., SULLIVAN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JULY 22, 2024

Appellant Phillip Stewart appeals from the June 2, 2023 order of the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his petition filed 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. 

Without addressing the merits of Appellant’s claims, we conclude that he is 

ineligible for relief under the PCRA because he is no longer serving a sentence 

at this docket. Accordingly, we affirm the order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA 

petition. 

On January 12, 2002, Philadelphia police officers arrested Appellant on 

drug-related crimes based upon the observations of, and investigation by, 

Philadelphia Officer Michael Spicer. On April 12, 2004, a trial court convicted 

Appellant, following a wavier trial, of the following crimes: Knowingly 

Possessing a Controlled Substance; Possession with Intent to Deliver a 
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Controlled Substance; and Fleeing or Attempting to Elude Police. On June 23, 

2004, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 15-30 months 

of incarceration. The docket indicates that Appellant did not file a direct 

appeal. Accordingly, his judgment of sentence became final on July 23, 2004, 

following the expiration of his time for filing a direct appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 

903(a); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). 

On May 1, 2018, the Defender Association of Philadelphia filed a PCRA 

Petition on behalf of numerous defendants, including Appellant, alleging “after 

discovered evidence” of police corruption based upon the March 5, 2018 

disclosure of the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office’s “Do Not Call List.” 

PCRA Petition, 5/1/18, at ¶ 3-4, 15. The Do Not Call List identified police 

officers, including Officer Spicer, whom “a prosecutor cannot call to testify in 

any matter without explicit permission from the First Assistant District 

Attorney.” Id. at ¶ 4. 

On April 28, 2023, the PCRA court issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, providing Appellant 20 days to respond. The 

court formally dismissed the petition on June 2, 2023, after Appellant did not 

respond. 

On June 20, 2023, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. Appellant and the 

PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Appellant raises the following issues before this Court: 

A. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing the PCRA petition as being 

without merit as Officer Michael Spicer was a necessary and 

critical officer, as he purportedly observed [A]ppellant engaged in 
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a narcotics transaction, which resulted in [A]ppellant’s arrest and 

conviction[?] Officer Spicer was later deemed not credible by the 

[D]istrict [A]ttorney’s office, and placed on the “do not call list[.”] 

B. Does not society ha[ve] an interest in exonerating the 

wrongfully convicted, therefore, even if no longer cognizable 

under the PCRA, this was a wrongfully dismissed habeas corpus 

petition, as Officer Michael Spicer was a necessary and critical 

officer, as he purportedly observed [A]ppellant engaged in a 

narcotics transaction, which resulted in [A]ppellant’s arrest and 

conviction[?] Officer Spicer was later deemed not credible by the 

[D]istrict [A]ttorney’s office, and placed on the “do not call list[.”] 

Appellant’s Br. at 7. 

Before addressing the merits, we must determine whether Appellant is 

eligible for relief under the PCRA. We conclude he is not. Indeed, Appellant 

acknowledges that “there is no jurisdiction under the PCRA” because “he is no 

longer serving a sentence on this matter.” Appellant’s Br. at 19. To be eligible 

for relief under the PCRA, a “petitioner must plead and prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence[,]” inter alia, that he is “currently serving a 

sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9543(a)(1)(i); see also Commonwealth v. Plunkett, 151 A.3d 1108, 

1109-10 (Pa. Super. 2016). As Appellant’s 2004 sentence of 15-30 months 

of incarceration has expired, he is not eligible for PCRA relief. Accordingly, we 

affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s PCRA petition.1

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1

 We acknowledge that the trial court did not dismiss the petition based on 

the expiration of Appellant’s sentence. Instead, the trial court dismissed 

Appellant’s PCRA based on its conclusion that Officer Spicer’s alleged 

misconduct “did not impact the outcome of [Appellant’s] case” because the 

misconduct occurred after 2006, three years after Appellant’s arrest and trial. 

PCRA Ct. Op, 9/1/23, at 3. Nevertheless, we may affirm a court’s decision on 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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Alternatively, Appellant seeks application of the doctrine of habeas 

corpus, asserting that “society has an interest in vindicating the wrongfully 

convicted[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 22. Appellant, nevertheless, acknowledges 

that the “PCRA statute subsumes the writ of habeas corpus[, such that issues] 

that are cognizable under the PCRA must be raised in a timely PCRA petition 

and cannot be raised in a habeas corpus petition.” Id. at 20 (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2013)); see 

also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542. Indeed, Appellant recognizes that his claims “are 

likely cognizable under the PCRA” but requests review under the doctrine of 

habeas corpus “in the interest of justice . . . as this is [A]ppellant’s only 

recourse.” Id. at 20. Appellant claims that “the law must have room to 

challenge a wrongful conviction at any time, whether an appellant is still 

serving a sentence or not, as it is a question of fundamental fairness, respect 

for due process and our society’s norms and customs.” Id. at 24. 

We conclude that the writ of habeas corpus provides no relief for 

Appellant. As noted by Appellant, the “PCRA statute subsumes the writ of 

habeas corpus[.]” Taylor, 65 A.3d at 466. Moreover, even if Appellant could 

assert a habeas claim outside the PCRA, that claim would fail for the same 

reason that his PCRA claim fails: he is not in custody at this docket. 

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any basis. See In re Jacobs, 15 A.3d 509 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“[This 

Court is] not bound by the rationale of the trial court[] and may affirm on any 

basis.”).
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It is well-established that “the essence of the common law writ of habeas 

corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, 

and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal 

custody.” Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 765 (Pa. 2013) 

(summarizing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)). As the 

Supreme Court explained, because Appellant’s “liberty is no longer burdened 

by a []sentence, [he] has no due process right to collateral review of that 

sentence.” Id. at 766. As Appellant acknowledges that he is no longer in 

custody, his habeas claim fails. 

Order affirmed. 

Date: 7/22/2024